LONERGAN WORKSHOP

Volume 26
EDITOR’S INTRODUCTION

Before the late Joseph Flanagan, SJ, then chair of Boston College’s Philosophy Department, who also initiated two of Boston College’s foremost educational experiments—the PULSE Program, which combines ten to twelve hours of field work at select placements in greater Boston with classes designed to reflect on participating students’ experiences in the field, and the Perspectives Program, which is a four-year integrated alternative to the CORE—appointed Brian Braman to be the director of Perspectives, Brian underwent more almost two decades’ apprenticeship with him, especially in relation to Perspectives II, Modernism in the Arts, which includes literature, music, architecture, painting, and sculpture. Brian’s paper combines apercus from Perspectives II—especially architecture—and Perspectives I, which directly engages the question of the best way to live in relation to Athens and Jerusalem in the pre-modern era and philosophers and religious authors in the modern era.

From his undergraduate years, Patrick Byrne, a religiously oriented student who was both devoted to the natural sciences and so the originating leader of the science and mathematics component of BC’s Perspectives Program (as well as the socially conscious co-founder with Joseph Flanagan of Boston College’s PULSE program), was taken with the work of the Jesuit scientist-philosopher-mystic, Teilhard de Chardin—a thinker whose work (scil., The Divine Milieu) Lonergan also admired. The sweep of Teilhard’s thought, which is so expressive of the unrestricted desire to know as well as the love of God, begs adequate comparison with the sweep of Lonergan’s thought. This is something that perhaps no one is more equipped to do justice to than Pat Byrne.

The final chapters of Insight are concerned with general and special transcendence; both treatments play crucial roles in Method in Theology’s assembly of the “general” and “special” categories in Lonergan’s foundational methodology. Ivo Coelho, SDB, as a student of the scholar of Hinduism, Richard de Smet (whose work on Sankara Ivo has retrieved and commented upon), is now also an overseer of the worldwide mission of the Salesians. His paper is intent upon correctly
understanding Lonergan's transposition of the medieval theorem of the supernatural (regarding in part the concrete relationship between general and special transcendence) as it is brought to bear on God's universal salvific will.

By imaginatively linking issues in pastoral theology and practice as thematized by Charles Taylor and other authors (including Brian McClaren, the Protestant author of books on the need for church reform), Victor Clore, is the pastor extraordinaire of a combination of two highly diverse parishes in the Detroit Archdiocese while teaching theology at Mercy College in Detroit. He brings his long pastoral experience to bear as he asks hard questions that are altogether relevant to recent findings of the Pew Research Center about decreasing church attendance. Readers will appreciate the concreteness of problems he has faced in his parish by way of true-life narratives and incisive commentaries.

Present circumstances in academic and church life have scarcely given rise to serious consideration of Lonergan's notion of functionally specialized theology in service to the church's mission, with the exception, perhaps, of Jesuit Robert Doran's What Is Systematic Theology? Still less has there been much imaginative application of such an approach to a theology of religions and transformative interreligious dialogue. Among the earlier generation of Lonergan's students, Bob has taken what are among the first bold steps in this direction. Even further elaboration occurs in his volumes of The Trinity in History, the first volume of which already has a wide readership, not only because he reconceives the contingent participations in Trinitarian relations in a way that genially incorporates the thought of René Girard, especially as regard grace-transformed mimesis, but as well uses his understanding of the normative scale of values to illuminate further the implications of this for practical and political dialectics earlier explored in Theology and the Dialectics of History. (These topics may also be examined on the websites of Philip McShane.)

Evaristus Ekueme, SJ, studied with Joseph Flanagan and relatively recently completed his doctorate in philosophy under Patrick Byrne. Evaristus is surely the single person who combines expertise in the
burgeoning field of information technology with deep thought about its implications for worldwide Christianity from the perspective of one grounded in Lonergan's work. His oral presentation of the summary of his paper engaged the listeners with an account of the communication of news about a major airplane crash by Nigerians on the scene, who first reported with photos and messages from their cellphones. His paper makes clear just how important devoting more than journalistic and commercial thought to the multitudinous advances in information technology will be in the future of all of us.

Long-time colleague in Boston College's theology department (now recently retired), Robert Imbelli, is a priest of the New York Archdiocese who, before getting his doctorate at Yale Divinity School, studied theology during the four years before ordination at the Gregorian University while residing at Rome's prestigious Collegio Capranica. Incidentally, in 2001 the Capranica's rector kindly hosted both Sebastian Moore, OSB, and Peter Corbishley, during our First International Lonergan Workshop. Whenever Bob writes or speaks on public occasions he invariably stresses in manifold ways the centrality of Jesus Christ for ecclesial and Christian life in order to counter a too common tendency toward a certain "forgetfulness of Christ." Bob's paper on the occasion of his presentation at our first Workshop celebration of the Second Vatican Council underlines the often-overemphasized "Christic Center" of the council.

Christine Jamieson teaches in the theology department of Concordia University in Montreal – a university that came about through the union of the George Williams University founded by Methodists and Loyola University, a key locale in Lonergan's younger days. As the title of her first paper for the Lonergan Workshop indicates, her dissertation and professional engagements have explored the virtualities of Lonergan's thought in relation to that of Julia Kristeva, the extraordinary French-language (though native Bulgarian) phenomenologist, psychologist,

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and advocate for the mentally and bodily disabled. So, along with her engagement in ecumenism and moral theology generally, like David J. Roy, another Montreal scholar who has developed implications of Lonergan’s work for medical ethics, Christine has devoted a great deal of her attention to medical ethics, as shown by her multiple collaborations with the Centre for Clinical Ethics (Toronto). So it is altogether fitting that in the light of her Kristeva-Lonergan background that her paper, “The Ethical Challenges of Medicine Today: Drawing on the Wisdom of Vatican II,” highlights her concerns in this increasingly significant area.

The topic of the hypostatic union of Jesus’s divine nature with his fully human nature was a major theological issue leading up to and following the Council of Chalcedon (451 CE) – and remained so in streams of Anglican, Orthodox, and Catholic theology up to Vatican II. Since then the issue has been dropped for the most part due to the current dominance of anti-metaphysical and historicist approaches. However, the question of that unity still remains for inquiring believers in the divinity and humanity of Christ. To be sure, meeting the complexities thrust upon theologians by the entry into “theology’s new context” requires an adequate foundational methodology. Only then can one hope faithfully and honestly to confront both the issues raised by the integration of critical history into theology and to articulate a metaphysics that has not fallen prey to the scandal of “onto-theology.” Few contemporary theologians are as equipped with such a foundational methodology as my now retired Boston College colleague, Charles Hefling. And of those few, none (to my mind) have as deep an understanding of what the issues are, or are as capable of articulating Lonergan’s approach to them in as lucid, precise, and original a manner as Charles in “On Understanding the Hypostatic Union.”

One of the most positive things to have emerged after Vatican II is integrally connected with the “turn to the subject” in philosophy and theology, namely, the emergence of need for competence in psychology as

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a human science and practice. Psychology has now become inseparable from the task of mediating religion within its contemporary cultural matrix. Having done his dissertation on Boethius, Paul LaChance, has for some time dedicated himself to the study and teaching of patristics and medieval philosophy and theology (see his Lonergan Workshop papers on Augustine). More recently he has turned to the form of psychological inquiry intimately related to generalized empirical method, epitomized by Eugene Gendlin’s method of Focusing. The fact that both religious and secular institutions have long since adopted the use of psychological testing of their applicants is just one clue to the significance of Paul’s paper, “Recourse to Psychology within Vocational Journey: Vatican II and Post-Concilar Documents.”

The person in Lonergan studies who antecedes Paul LaChance’s recent explorations into the broader field of psychology is William Mathews, an Irish Jesuit philosopher from the Milltown Institute, Dublin. Bill has long been a regular contributor to the Lonergan Workshops. Along with forays into Lonergan’s economics, several of Bill’s papers were done in connection with research he was doing for his massive work, Lonergan’s Quest: A Study of Desire in the Authoring of Insight. Perhaps the bulk of his presentations were to do with his decades-long examination of the links between desire and expression – not unlike aspects of Gendlin’s Focusing – as provoked by another psychologist in whom Lonergan was vitally interested, Ira Progoff, who was a proponent of journaling as a method of discovering one’s intimate emotional biography. Bill’s paper, “Self-Appropriation in the World of Meaning,” explores the link between this style of psychology and Lonergan’s crucial post-Insight breakthrough into “meaning” as the central category both of the human sciences (or Geisteswissenschaften) and for contemporary philosophy and theology.

Another perennial presenter at summer Workshops has been Michael McCarthy (emeritus of Vassar College’s philosophy department). Michael has also made several presentations at mini-Workshops occurring during the academic year – first on his then recently published book on The Crisis of Philosophy and later on in anticipation of his now recently published book on The Political Humanism of Hannah
Arendt, among a host of other presentations. Because of the depth of his knowledge of the history of philosophy in relation to politics, Fr. Flanagan, founding director of Boston College's Perspectives Program, invited Michael to hold sessions for all the teachers in that program attending the week-long annual May seminars. As a Catholic layman educated at Notre Dame before serving in the Army and doing his doctorate at Yale, Michael has also kept abreast of affairs in the Roman Catholic Church, and, like so many of his contemporaries, is greatly appreciative of the achievements and promise of Vatican II. Thus, his paper for this volume, "Reforming the Church: Redeeming the World."

The prodigiously productive theologian and research professor from the Australian Catholic University system, Neil Ormerod, has at times combined his participation at the meetings of the Catholic Theological Society of America with presentations at the summer Lonergan Workshops. After Vatican II, Catholic theologians, while giving up on neo-Scholastic metaphysics tout court, tended in general to relinquish philosophy, except as a resource to be "drawn upon" eclectically. In spite of the stream of splendid works, replete with outstanding ideas and historical erudition since the council, it remains that the possibility of institutionalizing the doing of theology along the lines proposed by Lonergan's Method in Theology has never even been so much as tried. This is understandable given the post-Vatican II division of theology departments into competing fiefdoms of biblical, patristic, medieval divisions of historical (aka "positive") theology, ethics, systematics, comparative theology, and theology for religious educators and ministers. In this situation, what was formerly called dogmatic theology and now is labeled systematic or philosophical theology has arguably fallen mostly into disarray. Hence, the timeliness of Neil's "The Needed Renewal of Systematic Theology."

John Ranieri is a priest in the Newark Diocese who began the intensive studying of Russian literature in the original language at Columbia University and afterwards as a young parish priest. John did his doctorate in philosophy at Boston College on Eric Voegelin (published as Eric Voegelin and the Good Society), and now teaches at Seton Hall University. While delving into political philosophy during his doctoral studies, he began to read the works of Leo Strauss as well as those of Voegelin. In those days, John already questioned the way those thinkers, each in his own way, showed an astonishing disregard for both Jewish and Christian revelation. Unsurprisingly, John soon became interested in the work of René Girard, whose study of mimetic rivalry and the attendant roles of sacrifice and scapegoating, led him (Girard) to turn from strictly literary scholarship to what he called “biblical anthropology.” As a respected Girard scholar, John began to spell out in detail the serious shortcomings of both Strauss and Voegelin in his book, Disturbing Revelation: Leo Strauss, Eric Voegelin, and the Bible. Thereafter he returned to his earlier interest in the great Russian authors, many of whom were deeply imbued by Christian revelation, and to Leo Tolstoy in particular. John’s “Tolstoy’s Conversions” offers a provisional account of why he finds Tolstoy so relevant, especially in that Tolstoy’s conversions do meet the minimal conditions for a radical change in orientation.

The leading Lonergan scholar (and most recent winner of the CTSA’s John Courtney Murray Award for life-time achievements in theology), Joseph Komonchak, pioneered the use of Lonergan’s general and special categories in ecclesiology. And so in “The Church Becoming Herself: Synonym for Communications,” the Dominican Friar, Maury Schepers, has taken up Komonchak’s suggestions about applying the “ontology of meaning” set forth in the chapter on the functional specialty of Communications in Method in Theology to a theology of the church. Maury’s perspective on communications has been experientially shaped in exceptional ways. After his doctorate on Calvin while studying at Le Saulchoir in France (where he had the good fortune of discussing his thesis with Yves Congar), Maury went on to teach theology at LaSalle University in Philadelphia, and then for many years in Zambia (along with his fellow Lonergan Fellow, Brian Cronin) before moving on to Nairobi. While in Africa he learned to communicate in Swahili. Since
presenting his paper, Maury has also been appointed a Dominican superior in Africa.

From 1956 until 1992 – that is, including the years of Vatican Council II (1963-65), for which he contributed to Lumen Gentium’s second paragraph – Francis Sullivan, SJ (also a John Courtney Murray Award recipient), taught ecclesiology at Rome’s Gregorian University and was also the dean there from 1964-70. From 1992 to 2009 he taught in Boston College’s theology department. Some of Frank’s books – Magisterium: Teaching Authority in the Catholic Church, Creative Fidelity: Weighing and Interpreting Documents of the Magisterium, and Apostles to Bishops: The Development of the Episcopacy in the Early Church – make it clear that whatever statements he makes in his paper, “The Challenge of Vatican II – After Fifty Years,” are profoundly grounded in an understanding of the theology and history of the church. Indeed, the challenge or Aufgabe, about which Frank makes no bones in his paper, regards the specifically unfulfilled recommendation for national churches to make full use of Plenary Councils. Frank points out how helpful such a council would have been in relation to the clergy sexual abuse crisis in the United States, especially as regards establishing the procedures for bishops to follow in handling these sensitive issues. Frank underscores how, with respect to both the role of lay participants and the authoritative character of the decisions reached, Plenary Councils provide structures that would have had the kind of salutary effect that was certainly called for but not fully attained at the meeting of the nation’s bishops held in Dallas to meet the crisis.

Michael Vertin spoke at the very first Lonergan Workshop in 1974, when he was at the beginning of a distinguished teaching career in philosophy at St Michael’s University, Ottawa. His dissertation was on the fons et origo of what has come to be called “transcendental Thomism,” Joseph Marèchal, SJ, whose Louvain philosophy department Lonergan once characterized as the place where “Marèchal taught . . . and everyone else taught Marèchal.” Since then, Mike has presented several papers that exemplify what Lonergan in Method in Theology called the functional specialty of Dialectic and has also taken on the leading of the afternoon workshop on Insight for several years. In his classes as well as
in many of his Workshop papers, he begins with a reading of the author or authors entering into the discussion of the given topic of his paper that "makes the best of" their arguments, and then traces whatever disagreements that might arise back to their roots in cognitional theory, and thus contextualize their differences of opinion in light of the presence or absence of intellectual conversion. Thus, his renditions of his interlocutors are as fair as possible. Throughout his active career that continues well into his retirement, he has been the devoted editor of Frederick E. Crowe’s published and unpublished essays. Most recently he has turned to editing a volume containing the papers in the area of ecumenical theology by his late wife Margaret O’Gara. (The volume – No Turning Back: The Future of Ecumenism – has received a rave review from Marquette’s Susan Wood.) That one of Fred Crowe’s opuscula was entitled The Lonergan Enterprise suggests not only the provenance of the title of Mike’s paper for this Workshop – “The Lonergan Enterprise: What Is Its Future?” – but also its quality of calm judiciousness.

The English priest and philosopher, Gerard Walmsley, came to Boston College all the way from South Africa, where he had been teaching philosophy at a diocesan seminary (whose library he personally stocked with books in philosophy and theology from the United States and England) to do his doctorate at Boston College – an important work that later saw the light of day as Lonergan on Philosophic Pluralism: The Polymorphism of Consciousness as the Key to Philosophy. After returning to Johannesburg he became one of the chief founders, leading fund-raiser, professor, and sometime president of South Africa’s first and only Catholic University, St Augustine’s. Drawing upon his insights into polymorphism-based pluralism in philosophy in his teaching, research, and innumerable speaking engagements throughout Africa, Europe, and the States, he has also undertaken a long-term research program on the topic of human dignity. In his paper, “Lonergan and the ‘Year of Faith’: Responding to Current Vatican Concerns about Postmodern Relativism,” Gerry confronts the perennially bothersome issue of relativism by treating it in the context of a positional cognitional theory that is capable of accounting seriously for the polymorphism of human consciousness.
We have again to express our gratitude to Regina Gilmartin Knox for shepherding these papers into this volume, and prodding with great patience the editor to write his introductory remarks.

Fred Lawrence
August, 2015
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“WE ALL HAVE FEET”
AUTHENTIC DWELLING AND ARCHITECTURE

Brian Braman
Boston College
Chestnut Hill, Massachusetts

Private faces in public places
Are wiser and nicer
Than public faces in private places.
W. H. Auden

I

Sitting in a seedy bar in Amsterdam, the “Mexico City,” Jean Baptiste Clamence, the protagonist in Albert Camus’s The Fall, encounters a stranger and offers to help him secure a drink. A friendship of sorts begins to develop, and at a certain point, Jean Baptiste tells the stranger that he, Jean Baptiste Clamence, sits every night in this bar acting as a judge-penitent: “What is a judge-penitent? Ah, I intrigued you with that business.” However, before he tells the stranger what it means to be a judge-penitent he indicates that he has to reveal certain details of his story. We come to discover that Jean Baptiste was once a very successful and respected Parisian lawyer. “I had a specialty: noble causes. Widows and orphans. . . .” He was beyond reproach. “I never accepted a bribe . . . I never stooped to shady proceedings.” In public he was always a man who went out of his way to offer assistance to those in need. He was generous, but his generosity was always tied to how his public image was perceived. Everything about him was shaped

1 Thanks to Fred Lawrence for his help in making this a much better paper.
3 Camus, The Fall, 17.
4 Camus, The Fall, 19.
by a public persona. "When I would leave a blind man on the sidewalk to which I had conveyed him, I used to tip my hat to him. Obviously that hat tipping wasn't intended for him since he couldn't see it. To whom was it addressed, to the public."5

One night, while walking by the way of the Pont Royale, his life was radically altered. Jean Baptiste passed a figure on the bridge "leaning over the railing and seeming to stare at the river. On closer view I made out a slim young woman dressed in black."6 He continued to walk but he suddenly heard the sound of a body hitting the water. He heard repeated cries that eventually ceased (70). He stopped to listen, "then slowly under the rain, I went away. I informed no one."7

In this episode Camus presents a man for whom public places are regarded as the only arena where any kind of moral concern might be appropriate. Absent public places there are no obligations to act justly, courageously, moderately, or wisely. Thus, Jean Baptiste is the quintessential "modern man." Any obligations or duties he happens to have are merely artificial, socially reinforced, and only binding in the public realm. In the privacy of one's own heart, and in one's own personal place, there is no obligation to act well. The fact that Jean Baptiste left that woman, presumably to drown, underscores how Camus has described a character for whom living well means no more than the external observance of publicly defined values. When Jean Baptiste had to make a courageous decision that was not linked to public approval or accolades, he walked away.

This story highlights one of the defining characteristics of modernity: the belief that I have no obligation to act well unless commanded publicly, and what I do in the privacy of my own heart or place is free from any moral commitments or obligations. The position that moral action is obligatory only in terms of the commands that hold in public places appears to start with Machiavelli, continues through Hobbes, Locke, and John Stuart Mill, and becomes canonized as the "right to privacy." One is free to do as one pleases in private places. What has been lost in this artificial bifurcation between public and private places is a commonly shared and habitual sense of reference

5 Camus, The Fall, 47.
6 Camus, The Fall, 70
7 Camus, The Fall, 70.
frames. It is these reference frames that guide people consistently in both public and private places, so that one’s moral identity and orientation amounts to more than merely a congeries of culturally constructed roles to play.

The purpose of this paper, then, is twofold. First, I will give a narrative of how this understanding of ourselves, in terms of a split between public and private morality, arose. Second, drawing upon the insights of the philosopher of architecture, Christian Norberg-Schulz, and the thought of Bernard Lonergan, I will offer a way to avoid thinking of public and private places as two separate moral realms by understanding space as “an ordered totality of concrete extensions.”

One may ask what is the point of thinking about architecture and its relevance to moral living? Why not just focus on the question of moral choices regardless of the context?

In response to these questions, first, I draw your attention to the fact that we have forgotten that, as the very word suggests, architecture is an *architectonic* art, because it is the primordial material condition for human living as both an artistic and a moral undertaking. Starting from the most basic level, we can say that just as Heidegger helped us face the fact that we are “mooded” beings, whose primordial relationship to the world is affective, so too he reminded us that we dwell on the earth and under the sky. Joseph Flanagan emphasized this by saying that Heidegger reminded us that “we all have feet.” Human dwelling is embodied. “At the very beginning of our individual lives we measure and order the world out from our bodies: the world opens up in front of us and closes behind.” In relationship to ourselves as embodied beings, things are up or down, near or far. As spatial, body-centered beings our lives unfold in particular types of places, each with its own set of meanings and values. Our lives, including our moral lives take place in environments created by an architectural concretization of “existential space.”

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Second, in a lecture at Hobart and William Smith Colleges, entitled “Self-transcendence: Intellectual, Moral, Religious,” Bernard Lonergan, drawing upon Roger Poole’s *Toward Deep Subjectivity*, said of a picture of a Czech couple, in a park in Prague, sitting at right angles to three invading Russian soldiers who avoid looking the Czechs in the eye, that “it illustrates ethical space” as presenting a correlation between “the objective world” and “the subjective reality of two moral judgments.” In fact, Poole’s analysis of this scene, makes clear that the “body is the locus of all ethical experience, and all experience is, because spatial, ethical. There can be no act which does not take place in ethical space.” The premise of this paper is that “ethical space” is a crucial dimension of “existential space.”

II

Before we explore what is meant by the concretization of existential space, in relation to moral or ethical space, we first begin with an account of how and why we currently tend to have morally split personalities.

In Book II of Plato’s *Republic*, Glaukon and Adeimantus have made it clear that they both desire to know why one ought to be just rather than unjust. They want to be persuaded – in the best sense of understanding – why one should pursue justice for its own sake. And why being just is intrinsically better than being unjust. As part of this persuasion (*peitho*), Glaukon tells Socrates that he is going to show what justice is and what its origins are.

First, Glaukon recapitulates the position of Thrasymachus, who claims that doing injustice is good and suffering injustice is bad (ok as stated?). Thrasymachus claims there is a disparity between those who have power and those who do not, so an agreement is reached between members of the community to institute laws and covenants: “What the

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12 Poole, *Towards Deep Subjectivity*, 27.
law commands they call lawful and just." This is interpreted in terms of a cost-benefit analysis. If I do not have to pay the penalty, then I will do what benefits me in terms of my advantage in every way. If, however, the punishment is more disadvantageous than what is to be gained, I will obey the laws.

This only reiterates Thrasymachus's overall position that the unjust are happier than the just. Glaukon, adding an account of the origin of justice, says that laws, and the justice they purport to protect, are merely acts of convention, so that, because they are no more than products of human agreement, law and justice have no relevance outside the publicly agreed-upon communal contract.

Glaukon tells The Myth of Gyges, which is too familiar to be repeated in detail here. Suffice it to say the myth concretizes an understanding that human nature (physis) is intrinsically unjust. Only the agreements of the conventional law keep the actions of men and women within the bounds of legality, if not exactly of justice. If the threat of penalty or punishment is removed, everyone will revert to their "natural" wickedness and pursue their self-regarding desires no matter what the impact doing so may have upon others.

Eric Voegelin calls Plato's use of this myth an example of "dream anthropology," because the myth suggests that it is not really difficult to order the soul and society rightly. Even though human nature (physis) is intrinsically self-centered, all that is required is conventional laws backed up with an army and police force to govern wicked human nature. Furthermore, the myth expresses what has been lost within the Athenian soul – namely, the "experience of participation in a universal order." Human existence is reduced to the pursuit of individual passion and pleasure.

Lastly, according to Voegelin, Plato's use of this myth is a form of doxa, by which he means a disorienting account of the true nature of law and justice, which seeks to explain the order of soul and society.

15 Voegelin, Plato and Aristotle, 76.
16 Voegelin, Plato and Aristotle, 76.
as reducible to a set of contractual relations. Human nature offers no
guidance about the nature of justice or the ordering of the polis.¹⁷

Let me add here that besides denying that a relationship exists
between justice, human nature, and the proper ordering of the polis,
the "Myth of Gyges" implies that nothing like a moral place exists.
Once the ring makes Gyges invisible, not only does any obligation to be
just disappear, but also the role of morally authentic dwelling vanishes
as well. According to the myth, there are no public or private places
where one is obligated to choose justice. In fact, there are only publicly
controlled places or places under surveillance. Any place ungoverned
by laws and police is unrelated to the morally good. It supposes that
beyond the range of coercive power, the human persons will always
choose what is most beneficial to their material well-being.

It is not by accident that in the Republic this myth follows
Socrates's account of the nature of a craft, because the point of the craft
analogy is Socrates's argument that there are always sets of practices
internal to the craft by which one can discern the craft's perfection or
excellence:

By a "practice" I ... mean any coherent and complex form of
socially established cooperative human activity through which
goods internal to that form of activity are realized in the course
of trying to achieve those standards of excellence which are
appropriate to, and partially definite of, that form of activity,
with the result that human powers to achieve excellence,
and human conceptions of the ends and goods involved, are
systematically extended.¹⁸

Moreover, when, in the Republic Socrates defines justice, as "doing
what one ought to do by nature," he intends a set of practices internal
to the craft that one is obligated to practice. To practice one's craft as
it ought to be practiced is to be just and excellent. There is more to this
definition, though, than meets the eye. Besides a stratified society of
workers, guardians, and the philosopher king, this definition of justice
implies the existence of private places and public places constituted

¹⁷ Voegelin, Plato and Aristotle, 76.
¹⁸ Alisdair MacIntyre, After Virtue (Notre Dame, IN: University of Notre Dame Press,
only within an overarching moral or ethical space. In contrast to the Myth of Gyges, the true meaning of justice indicates that there is no place in which persons dwell where they are not obligated to do what they ought to do by nature: that is, to choose the good. The notion of justice in the *Republic* unifies all places in a moral or ethical space. Plato's dramatization of the meaning of justice is a compact and global account of what later reflection explains is the first principle of the natural law: choose and do the good and avoid evil.19

Turning briefly to Aristotle, the idea that nature "teleologically directs organic processes to their destined perfection,"20 suggests that there is a normativity to human development that directs the various operations to their natural end.21 For Aristotle, this teleologically directed process occurs within a cosmos understood as

the ordered totality of being that coordinates those processes as well as the laws that rule them. *Kosmos* includes next to the *physis* of organic being, the ethos of personal conduct and social structures, the nomos of normative custom and law, and the logos, the rational foundation that normatively rules all aspects of the cosmic development.22

Aristotle articulates an architectonic vision of the "the whole" that Heraclitus said is governed by the one *logos*: "the law or order of the Cosmos."23 Thus, the ancient philosophers understood the cosmos as an "ordered totality"24 that "included moral and aesthetic values."25 The harmony (architectonic vision), that for the ancients was to be sought within this totality, possessed an "aesthetic quality" that "was expressed

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19 Ironically, Plato's comic device of having the guardians live communal lives and eschew the private and intimate good of marriage and the raising of children reinforces the position that private and public places have their own set of constitutive goods that are chosen for their own sake.


philosophically, artistically, sculpturally, and architecturally.\textsuperscript{26}

The point I want to stress is that Plato and Aristotle envisioned an ordered totality of places constituting a politically relevant existential space. These places involve a network of intelligible relations including what Plato and Aristotle meant by justice. Such places are constituted by the meanings and values of the various craftsmen and women, of the guardians, and of the philosopher king(s). Ideally all the citizens and rulers are ordered one to the other by justice. The Republic presents an ordered totality of places as space for dwelling. This well-ordered totality of places provides the “existential foothold” that enables one to dwell on the earth and under the sky in justice. This sense of dwelling is later taken up into the Latin word \textit{conversari}, which is the rationale underlying Thomas Aquinas’s definition of politics as a \textit{civilis conversatio}. People work out their identity and orientation by sharing in such a conversation understood as dramatic interaction in both word and deed.

In spite of the divisions among the classes, the Republic’s ideal city based on justice provides an ordered totality of places within an overarching space that sets the conditions for both a coherent sense of communal and individual identity and a way for people to orient themselves in their technical, economic, and political practices.

In Aquinas’s theory of natural law, the first practical principle (pursue and choose the good, and avoid evil!) implies two things. First there are no places where people are free from the obligation to pursue and choose the good and avoid evil. Second, pursuing and choosing the good depends upon the development of excellent internal habits that will help one attain happiness. Accordingly, public and private places are differentiated components of an overarching moral frame of reference grounded in the first principle of the natural law because the good in which human beings attain perfection is capable of being instantiated both privately and communally.\textsuperscript{27}

Caroline Walker Bynum showed in her article “Did the Twelfth Century Discover Individualism?” that the discovery of the self with both its inner and outer dimensions had nothing to do with the “individual”

\textsuperscript{26} Dupre, \textit{Passage to Modernity}, 18.

in the modern sense of what Charles Taylor calls the "punctual self": "These two (inner and outer) aspects of the Twelfth Century go hand in hand – inner with outer, motive with model, self with community." It follows from the harmony and integrity between inner and outer self that a consistency of behavior consonant with Christ as one's model was expected whether in public or in private. Similarly, Shannon McSheffrey's, "Place, Space, and Situation: Public and Private in the Making of Marriage in Late-Medieval London," reminds us that the distinction between private and public place first arose with "liberal Enlightenment thought," so that this distinction we take for granted is neither natural nor universal. For example, "living in a world in which the sacred was immanent, medieval people saw nothing unusual about undertaking a sacrament, a vow before 'God' in a space we might regard as obviously profane, such as a tavern." Here the overarching principle of the sacred transforms disparate places to form a unity of sacred space.

Machiavelli broke away from ancient answers to the two fundamental questions that gave rise to philosophy – What is the truly flourishing way of life? And, what is the best regime? – and ushered in the "first wave of modernity." For thinkers in this wave, the idea that the truly excellent life and the best regime are integrally dependent on the attainment of virtue is unrealistic. As a result, man's fulfillment is no longer related to the ordered whole of the polis and the cosmos. For the ancients, "man has his place in an order which he did not originate." Machiavelli, because of the empirical evidence of human nature's wickedness, lowers the standard for the right way to live for both individuals at large and for the prince. What matters is whether one's actions are based on effectual truth. Effectual truth heightens

30 McSheffrey, "Place, Space and Situation," 961.
31 McSheffrey, "Place, Space and Situation," 973.
33 Strauss, What Is Political Philosophy?, 85.
34 Strauss, What Is Political Philosophy?, 85.
the probabilities of the human achievement of less lofty goals. What is lost is a transcendent end to human striving.35

Machiavelli is the first to suggest that human behavior, particularly for the prince, is usually a matter of “seeming to be” what one is not in order to be successful. Machiavelli demands “the judicious and vigorous use of both virtue and vice according to the requirements of the circumstances.”36 Clearly, the princes must only appear to be virtuous when it is to their advantage; this “seeming” becomes the standard for public acts in public places. For example, in Shakespeare’s Richard III there is a scene in Act III where Gloucester is lodged in the privacy of his bedroom. He has now put in place the conditions to be anointed king. The lord mayor of London comes to Baynard’s Castle to entreat Gloucester to accept the crown. Gloucester’s servant Catesby tells the Lord Mayor that Gloucester is within, praying/meditating with two priests and cannot be persuaded to come out. If you are familiar with the play you know that Gloucester emerges from the privacy of his room with a prayer book in hand speaking about Christian virtue. Obviously, Gloucester’s virtue and piety is merely for public consumption. It is more important to appear to be virtuous or pious in public places even if one is not so in private. Whereas the ancients conceived the cosmos as an architectonically ordered totality of differentiated places in terms of a substantive idea of dwelling space, Machiavelli sees no normatively ordered moral dwelling space whether public or private. Moral dwelling is beside the point. One has to appear to be what one is not in public places, in accord with the requirements of getting, keeping, and protecting power or comfort or fame.

Arguably, Thomas Hobbes promotes the modern project with full force by reviving the Myth of Gyges in the guise of the state of nature. In the Myth of Gyges, absent any command structure, human beings will be violent and seek to dominate through power; that same is true of Hobbes’s account of the state of nature, which is pre-political. It describes what human existence would be like without what Hegel called the “system of command” and its power to enforce the laws. Life

35 Strauss, What Is Political Philosophy?, 86
in the state of nature as the (clarify wording) state of war of all against all is, as Hobbes so memorably put it, “solitary, poor, nasty, brutish, and short.” To phrase this in Norberg-Schulz’s terms, the “genius loci” (or the guiding spirit of the place) becomes a constant state of war, either actually or potentially. With neither private nor public places, the state of nature is just the space for pursuing the vital value of self-preservation as an absolute right. In a kind of Newtonian abstract space whose crucial characteristic is scarcity, the right to self-preservation recognizes no distinction between public or private. Dwelling on the earth and under the sky for Hobbes is a just matter of satisfying appetites. Whatever is needed for my self-preservation is mine. All choices aim at the satisfaction of one’s appetites by the acquisition of “power after power that ceaseth only in death.” Because Hobbes virtually identifies the state of nature with a state of war of all against all, life becomes intolerable, so people will seek peace as a release from the fear of violent death by entering into a social contract in which they surrender all their rights to exercise power to a sovereign for the sake of self-preservation. The fear of death sets a limit to possessive individualism by means of the social contract under the Leviathan, who has a monopoly of power. Public dwelling places are then governed by the commands of positive law, while private places are those where one can operate free from coercive power to satisfy material desires in peace. With Hobbes, we see that law is concerned solely with external action in the public forum, and the private sphere is where publicly exercised power does not prevail since law leaves “untouched the whole realm of evil desire and intentions.”

The current remake of Gyges’s ring is the way that the “right to privacy” tends to be understood now. I wish to distinguish between the political value or the good of privacy that limits the government’s power to interfere in the lives of its citizens, and the more general cultural claims about morality made in the name of this right as expressed, for example, in such phrases as “I am free to do whatever I want in the privacy of my home,” or “as long as it does not harm anyone else,” As John Stuart Mill put it: “individuality is good in itself even when an individual’s ‘plan of life’ or experiments of living are not

37 Fortin, Classical Christianity and the Political Order, 205.
notably good or may even be bad."\textsuperscript{38} Such beliefs about privacy entail the individualist premise both that we are “unencumbered selves” (in Michael Sandel’s words), and that there is no such thing as normative moral space that binds our lives together that is not of our own making. There are just public or private places that are morally neutral at best, while the private ones are also legally neutral. In other words, the current cultural account of this value of privacy implies that there is no obligation to pursue and choose the good and to avoid evil, either publicly or privately.

Against this background, comparative legal scholar, Mary Ann Glendon, points out that the “origin of all rights in the Lockean fable was the ‘property’ a man possessed in his own person in the state of nature.”\textsuperscript{39} This argument is restated in Blackstone’s claim that a second-order task of the law was to regulate relationships between public persons,\textsuperscript{40} along with their rights and duties. According to Blackstone, a man must be left alone: “Let a man . . . be ever so abandoned in his principles, or vicious in his practice, provided he keeps his wickedness to himself, and does not offend against the rules of public decency, he is out of the reach of human laws.”\textsuperscript{41} Here the premises of Gyges are thus writ large when, unlike Blackstone, we can no longer take for granted a normative set of behaviors grounding the behavior of Englishmen, and hence the forgetfulness that his \textit{Commentaries on the Laws of England} hinged on the English tradition of limited government, and not on the value of personal privacy.\textsuperscript{42}

Glendon traces the shift toward securing privacy as a legal right back to the nineteenth century with the rise of instantaneous photography and the increase in mass communications\textsuperscript{43} when the right to privacy was grounded in property rights in Locke’s sense that we have our very first property in our bodies.\textsuperscript{44} To violate a person’s


\textsuperscript{40} Glendon, \textit{Rights Talk}, 49.

\textsuperscript{41} Glendon, \textit{Rights Talk}, 49.

\textsuperscript{42} Glendon, \textit{Rights Talk}, 49.

\textsuperscript{43} Glendon, \textit{Rights Talk}, 49.

\textsuperscript{44} Glendon, \textit{Rights Talk}, 50-55.
privacy is to violate property rights. However, in an 1890 article in the
Harvard Review, due to the aggressiveness of the press and its lack of respect for those in the public eye, Samuel D. Warren and Louis D. Brandeis said that what was really being “protected was the inviolate personality of the artist and author, a personal right rather than a property right,”45 which they called “the right to privacy.” Brandeis and Warren coupled this right to privacy with the claim that “in what merely concerns himself, the independence of the individual, is, of right, absolute.”46 It was but a short step for them to meld Mill’s position with Locke’s to arrive at the conclusion that “Over himself, over his own body and mind the individual is sovereign.”47 In the end, “two intellectual paradigms”48 combined in the development of this right: first, property understood as creating or “marking off a sphere around the individual which no one could enter without permission;”49 and second, the belief that “this barrier must protect man in the house and interior life.”50 So it was that the 1972 decision in Eisenstadt v. Baird “marked a shift from privacy as “freedom from surveillance or disclosure of intimate affairs to privacy as ‘freedom to engage in certain activities...’”51 This decision lent a legal basis for the cultural belief shared by many in terms of which the right to privacy implied freedom from all obligation to choose or pursue what is truly worthwhile and to avoid evil.

III

Because this popular belief regarding privacy is so embedded in our culture, I would like to offer some reflections on how one might reorient thinking about private and public places in relation to moral dwelling with the aid of Norberg-Schulz’s work on architecture and the thought of Bernard Lonergan.

45 Glendon, Rights Talk, 51.
46 Glendon, Rights Talk, 52.
47 Glendon, Rights Talk, 53.
48 Glendon, Rights Talk, 52.
49 Glendon, Rights Talk, 52.
50 Glendon, Rights Talk, 52.
51 Glendon, Rights Talk, 57.
Modernity’s emphasis on the unencumbered self has lost what Christian Norberg-Schulz (applying ideas from Heidegger) has called the human capacity to dwell. As commonly understood, the “right to privacy” presupposes and supports the idea that the “self is defined in abstraction from any constitutive concerns.”52 Or as Habermas puts it, the “bourgeois public sphere may be conceived above all as the sphere of private people come together as a public.”53 For Norberg-Schulz’s notion of dwelling, on the other hand, the “spaces where life occurs are places with distinct characteristics,” invested with their own felt sense of identification and orientation. Authentic dwelling demands the ability of people to orientate themselves within their environment in a deeply meaningful way. Authentic dwelling “reveals the holistic way we express understanding of ourselves, our relation with others and the world.”54 Authentic dwelling means dwelling in an ordered totality of meaningful places that makes up one’s life-world. In addition, each place has its own spirit that contributes in a unique way to the ordered relationship among dwelling places. So while there will be intimate, private and public places, these places fit into an ordered whole unified by the spirit of the place as expressed architecturally.

In Genius Loci: A Phenomenology of Architecture, Norberg-Schulz argues that if human beings are to dwell authentically under the sky and on the earth, architecture’s role is to provide an “existential foothold,” which grounds people’s relationship to their environment. “Man dwells when he can orientate himself with his environment and experiences it as meaningful.”55 In other words, to dwell means achieving individual and collective identity and orientation in given places. But what does it mean to have an identity? By identity I mean “[T]he self that we think we are is in large measure de-centered, which means that our identity is to a large degree the product of a multifaceted process of socialization.”56 Our identity is grounded in a

56 Brian J. Braman, Meaning and Authenticity: Bernard Lonergan and Charles
framework that is constituted by sets of meanings and values. These meanings and values are both cultural and personal. Who and what we are defined by the horizon out of which we live our lives. “Horizons are the background that give meaning and structure to our life, as well as articulate for us what we consider of worth, and how we understand ourselves…”57

People have to feel they belong to or are at home in a given place.58 The existential foothold it is architecture’s role to provide concretizes existential space by articulating or embodying the “genius loci” or “spirit of the place.”59 According to Norberg-Schulz, the “Basic act of architecture is, therefore, to understand the ‘vocation of the place,’”60 or to answer the questions, What does the place want to be? What is its guiding spirit or daimon? In terms of architecture, a site becomes a dwelling place when the meanings that are potentially present become uncovered or revealed by the act of building. Place is something permanent, and so “place unites a group of human beings; it is something that gives them a common identity and hence a basis for fellowship or society.”61 In other words, places are types of narrative “texts with layered meanings”62 that need interpretation in order to for us to understand what it means to dwell authentically in these places.

The principal aspects of dwelling are the primordial aspects of man’s being-in-the-world:63 identification and orientation, where “identification” means to experience a total environment as meaningful. Who and what I am resonate with the meaning and values of the environment. “Orientation” means to feel and be at home. “Orientation means one must know where he is, and he has to know how he is.”64


57 Braman, Meaning and Authenticity, 31.
58 Norberg-Schulz, Genius Loci, 23.
59 Norberg-Schulz, Genius Loci, 23.
60 Norberg-Schulz, Genius Loci, 23.
63 Norberg-Schulz, Genius Loci, 22.
64 Norberg-Schulz, Genius Loci, 19.
Finally, our capacity to dwell, our being-in-the-world, “demands a meaningful relationship between man and his environment.” According to Norberg-Schulz, the four modes of dwelling include: settlements, urban spaces, public space, and private dwelling space. Passing over settlement in this paper, we focus briefly on the other three. Urban spaces unify places of discovery, affording a milieu of possibilities. Urban space is a dramatic stage where human encounters take place, as exemplified by the Roman Forum and the Greek agora. Fanger argues in Dostoevsky and Romantic Realism that before the rise of the modern city, it “was presumed that the strange could be sought only in exotic places; everyday life and its subsistence rituals could generate no worthy stories.” With the advent of Paris, London, and St. Petersburg, however, “urban chroniclers came to see multiple mysterious worlds in every tenement . . . [so that] without ceasing their romantic quests, they and their heroes could stay at home” in the city.

Public spaces are the institutions built for public dwelling in relation to the recurrence schemes of the good of order, such as religion, education, technology, economy, and polity. Public buildings, courthouses, capital buildings like Boston's Government Center, embody meanings and values that organize common ways of living and constitute some values of the good of order and exclude or downplay others. In addition to public buildings, public spaces also include things such as parks, zoos, sports arenas, botanical gardens, green belts, convention centers, and open air concert sites.

Private dwelling places, especially homes, are intimate places that go beyond social meanings and values in relation to the good of order, to embody cultural and personal values such as hospitality, generosity, friendship, family intimacy, and genuine fellow feeling.

Consequently, urban, public, and private dwellings function as boundaries that set in relief certain meanings and values that inform

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70 Fanger, Dostoevsky and Romantic Realism, xi.
a common way of life. Or as Lonergan would put the issue, architecture is an act of meaning that is both constituting and constituted and communicative.\textsuperscript{71} For example, when we enter a home, we bring "in" from "outside" public meanings and values to mingle with the intimate relationships proper to our private dwelling places, which also have their own set of meanings and values. This is why one of the most important functions of architecture for Norberg-Schulz is mediating the outside world with the world inside. Hence, the significance of windows, doors, covered porches, et cetera. In short, places are not only "functional but ethical and spiritual."\textsuperscript{72}

According to Joseph Flanagan, Lonergan enables us to differentiate among public, private, and universal kinds of personal reference frames; and Patrick Byrne adds that private reference frames are constituted by individual sets of meanings and values, whereas public reference frames are "intersubjective orderings that are culturally constituted." In regard to reference frames, we may wonder with Flanagan how one shifts coherently from a personal or private frame to a public one (not to go into how one ultimately shifts to a universal context, which I will not treat here). In order to respond to this question, I need to know how to de-center myself so as to be able to relate and re-order my personal or private places and my public places for the sake of taking the distinction between the two seriously without collapsing them into each other, or falling into the morally false dichotomy between public and private. Here again, we encounter the relevance of Norberg-Schulz's investigations into what orients people, or what is people's guiding spirit or daimon. For instance, the distorted understanding of privacy discussed above is now a cultural value; and as such a value, it is also part of one's personal reference frame inasmuch as it mediates and orders all of one's experiences of places whether public or private, as well as ordering all actual and potential places. Ideally, then, what for Lonergan is the frame of reference that would allow me to move from place to place by means of a coherent identity and orientation while preserving the integrity of my identity and orientation is conversion. Whether intellectual, moral, or religious, conversion transforms the


\textsuperscript{72} Sheldrake, \textit{A Spiritual City}?, 51.
reference frame by which one orders all public and private places in light of what one regards as truly lovable and worthwhile. "Conversion is understood as a transformation of the subject and his world."

An authentic subject is orientated by the transcendental precepts of being attentive, intelligent, reasonable, responsible, and loving, which move human subjects out of the frames of reference that see places only in terms of personal satisfaction, to see private and public places as the arena in which the drama of their existence is lived out authentically. In the measure that people transcend themselves by their attentiveness, intelligence, reasonableness, responsibility, and love, subjects relinquish the frames of reference that regard all places only in terms of personal satisfaction. Then private or public places become the stage on which the drama of human existence unfolds genuinely in the quest for meaning and value. In other words, conversion transforms both the person's identity and orientation and the public or private places where persons dwell. In personal and collective transformation places become locales filled with transcendental value.

For example, Martin Luther King Jr.'s personal conversion to non-violent discipleship transformed the Birmingham Jail cell from a mere public place of punishment for criminal behavior into a public symbol of injustice and recurrent violations of human dignity. Think, too, of the civil rights workers who staged sit-ins at lunch counters. They caused a symbolic explosion when public places for nourishment and intersubjective relationships were transformed from places that excluded human beings because of their skin color into public places that made the dignity and worth of all men and women unmistakably manifest.

Counter-examples can also show how values and meanings become debased in private places. Ang Lee's movie, "The Ice Storm" (set in the early 1970s in New Canaan, Connecticut), centers on two families, the Carvers and the Hoods, living next-door to each other. The movie shows the impact of the 1960s sexual revolution on marriage and the raising of children. In one of the movie's scenes, Ben Hood (Kevin Kline) is having an adulterous affair with his neighbor, Janey Carver (Sigourney Weaver). The scene takes place in Janey Carver's bedroom. Her husband is out of town. Ben and Janey are lying together in the Carver bed after having sex, so there is a complete transvaluation of
the values and meanings associated with the intimacy of the married couple’s bedroom place. Ordinarily when we think of the bedroom place of a husband and wife we think of the meanings and values of that place: intimacy, fidelity, partnership, trust, safety, comfort, solace, shared concerns, and shared suffering. Ben’s and Janey’s adultery transforms the symbolism of this private, intimate place into the disvalues of infidelity, discomfort, and dishonesty.

These examples demonstrate that architectural places express meaning, and human beings incarnate it in their choices and the way they live in these places: “it is the meaning of a person, of his way of life of his world or his deeds.” In this way, one’s daemon helps determine the character of any place. Just as Norberg-Schulz discovers the character of a place in terms of its constitutive elements, such as texture, color, material substance, so too we may say that public and private places embody the formal element in architectural embodiments, namely, the individual and collective meanings and values of incarnate persons and communities. And so, if people are authentic, public places can be intersubjective locales that resonate with moral authority. Conversely, if people are inauthentic dwelling places can be debased into something akin to T. S. Eliot’s “Wasteland.”

In conclusion, when properly understood, privacy is not so much a right as a description of intimate places inhabited by converted or authentic people who order all of their places, public or private, by observing the transcendental precepts: be attentive, be intelligent, be reasonable, be responsible, and be loving.
THE UNITY OF SCIENCE, 
THE UNIVERSE, AND HUMANITY FOR 
TEILHARD AND LONERGAN

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In recent essays, various authors have suggested that the work of Pierre Teilhard de Chardin, S.J. had a powerful influence and indeed received an important vindication at the Second Vatican Council (1962-65). In particular, the Pastoral Constitution on the Church in the Modern World (Gaudium et Spes) is cited as bearing the imprint of Teilhard’s influence. Quoting Gaudium et Spes, John Haught for example writes:

“The human race has passed from a rather static concept of reality to a more dynamic, evolutionary one. In consequence there has arisen a new series of problems … calling for efforts of analysis and synthesis.” … It is nearly impossible to read these words and not find in them some of the key ideas of Pierre Teilhard de Chardin.¹

No doubt Haught has in mind passages from Teilhard’s writings such as the following:

The problem today is not to define the relations between the Christic and the Trinitary – but between Christ and a Universe that has suddenly become fantastically big, formidably organic.²


² Henri de Lubac, Teilhard de Chardin: The Man and His Meaning (New York: The
There is also a striking resonance between the opening of *Gaudium et Spes* and Teilhard’s “The Mass on the World.” Compare for example the opening sentence of *Gaudium et Spes*:

> The joys and the hopes, the griefs and the anxieties of the men of this age, especially those who are poor or in any way afflicted, these are the joys and hopes, the griefs and anxieties of the followers of Christ.

with Teilhard’s offering: “I, your priest, will make the whole earth my altar and on it will offer you all the labours and sufferings of the world.” The joys and the hopes, the griefs and the anxieties of all people were for Teilhard the “elements” that he offered in prayer on the “steppes of Asia,” when he had neither bread nor wine.³

This need to think anew the relationship between Christ and the modern world (natural and human) as made known through the researches of modern science was the overriding concern of Teilhard’s lifework. Because of modern scientific researches, we must now contemplate a universe that has been evolving for over 13 billion years. This includes over a billion species of plants and animals that were produced by over 3.8 billion years of biological evolution on earth. It is a universe that continues to evolve toward an unknown future. Haught and others have said that just as Teilhard endeavored to think out the relationship between Christ and this world as revealed by modern natural and human sciences, so also *Gaudium et Spes* called upon the Roman Catholic Church and its members to engage and to think anew about how to spread the healing and elevating work of God’s grace throughout such an evolving world.

It seems fitting, therefore, to offer some reflections on the vision of Fr. Teilhard in relation to the theme for this year’s Lonergan Workshop, “The Promise of Vatican II – 50 Years Later.” In particular, my reflections compare the vision of Teilhard with that of Bernard Lonergan. Teilhard and Lonergan were two of the twentieth century’s most remarkable Jesuit thinkers. The two shared a love of God

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incarnate in Christ Jesus, as well as a love of modern science and the world it has revealed. Born into a time in history where both their own religious community and the community of scientists regarded each other with great skepticism and antagonism, Teilhard and Lonergan devoted themselves to the task of attesting to the underlying unity of their great loves for Christ, science, and the universe it envisions.

In this essay I explore the complementarity between their unique approaches. I propose that the relationships between their approaches can be understood in terms that Lonergan later developed—namely the relationship between the theological tasks that he called Systematics and Communications. I will also attempt to show why the communicative approach of someone like Teilhard needs a systematic approach of someone like Lonergan, just as the systematic approach also stands in need of a communicative approach.

TEILHARD'S SYMBOLIC COMMUNICATION: FROM COSMOGENESIS TO CHRISTOGENESIS

It will be helpful to begin this comparison with an overview of evolution and its stages as Teilhard portrays them. In *The Human Phenomenon,* Teilhard covers the now very familiar stages in the evolution of the universe, but he does so by using language that underscores his overarching vision of the unity of all natural and human evolution in Christ. "Fuller being is closer union. Such is the kernel and conclusion
of this book.\textsuperscript{6} The human phenomenon appeared to Teilhard as a continuous unity — "a whole which unfolds" — evolving from the beginning of the universe.\textsuperscript{7} In other words, for Teilhard the evolution of the whole universe and all biological and human species is the human phenomenon — the evolution of human life and civilizations is the most recent and defining stage of a single, unified evolutionary process. Teilhard assembles a remarkable range of the then-known results from the researches of the modern sciences — physics, cosmology, chemistry, geology, paleontology, and biology — and weaves them into his integral vision of unity.

**Cosmogenesis**

Teilhard uses the term "cosmogenesis" in two senses. First, it is his generic term for the entirety of evolution; but second, it refers more specifically to the evolution of the universe up to the emergence of the planet earth. He begins his account of evolution with a discussion of matter. His reflections rely upon what were then radically new findings from physics and astrophysics. Without mentioning it explicitly, Teilhard draws upon the Indeterminacy Principle $(\Delta x \cdot \Delta p \geq \hbar / 2\pi)$ from quantum mechanics. He uses this principle to argue that particles of matter are not localizable — that is, that $\Delta x$ could be as large as the entire universe. He joins this observation to the discovery that the universe itself is bounded (from the General Theory of Relativity), and concludes:

> the radius of action proper to each cosmic element must be prolonged in theory to the utmost limits of the world itself... we are bound to admit that this immensity represents the sphere of action common to all atoms. The volume of each of them is the volume of the universe.\textsuperscript{8}

Teilhard understands each individual particle as overlapping and coextensive with all the others, differentiated only by their center of origin. Matter and energy, for him, are an "entirety of infinitesimal

\textsuperscript{6} Wall, *The Phenomenon of Man*, 31, 35.
\textsuperscript{7} Wall, *The Phenomenon of Man*, 29 (emphasis added).
\textsuperscript{8} Wall, *The Phenomenon of Man*, 45.
centres which share the universal sphere among themselves.”

Just as the elements are not confined to particular regions of space, neither are they confined to particular points in time. Drawing again tacitly upon the Theory of Relativity, Teilhard understands the primordial elements to be “temporal fibres” stretching into the past and the future. This means that “the entire spatial immensity [of the whole universe] is no more than a section ‘at the time t’ of a trunk whose roots plunge down into the abyss of an unfathomable past, and whose branches rise to a future that, at first sight, has no limit.”

This spatio-temporal “tree” of the universe evolves through the interactions of the radiating centres according to the “law of complexification.” Complexification produces diverse kinds of centered circulations at many different levels: electrons in atoms, atoms in molecules, planets in star systems, and stars in galaxies. In addition, as elemental matter concentrates “in the heart and on the surface of the stars,” the law of complexification produces nuclei for heavier chemical elements.

Geogenesis

According to Teilhard, “the earth was probably born by accident” as an especially stable part of the sun broke off, inaugurating the evolution of the earth. But as soon as this accident happened, “it was immediately made use of and recast into something naturally directed” into the process of geosynthesis. Initially this geogenesis organizes chemical elements (which originated in stars) by highly regular crystallization into “the rich variety of the ‘mineral world.’” These processes of crystallization successively form the spherical layers of the earth: “barysphere [metallic core], lithosphere [rock layer], hydrosphere, atmosphere, and stratosphere.”

9 Wall, The Phenomenon of Man, 46.
10 Wall, The Phenomenon of Man, 47.
11 Wall, The Phenomenon of Man, 48.
12 Wall, The Phenomenon of Man, 49-50.
13 Wall, The Phenomenon of Man, 74, 67.
14 Wall, The Phenomenon of Man, 74.
15 Wall, The Phenomenon of Man, 69.
entrapped great quantities of the chemical elements and “closed them prematurely in upon themselves ... unfitted for growth.” Yet this process was “not completely” regular. The “liberation” of energy during these processes complexified regular crystalline structures into larger and more widely diverse molecules — polymers and organic compounds — especially in the hydrosphere (i.e., the region where water is in liquid state, both on land and sea). This sets the stage for the next epoch of evolution.

Biogenesis

Teilhard remarks that there seems to be a radical discontinuity between the living and the non-living. He considers this to be a problem because it would seem to undermine the idea of the unity of all evolution. He argues to the contrary that advances in scientific research tend to narrow the gap between the most complex assemblies of non-living molecules and the most primitive living cells. For this reason, he does not endeavor to explain the features that definitively distinguish the first living cells from the merely chemical complexes from which they emerge. He says only that it must have been a “new type of corpuscular grouping, allowing a more supple and better centered organization” accompanied by “a new type of conscious activity and determination.” If this were so, then the transition from pre-life to life would not pose an obstacle to a unified evolution.

He next observes that, however and whenever the first cellular life-forms originated, they “multiplied almost instantaneously.” He goes on to argue that this propagation of life “could neither have been established nor maintained without some network of influences and exchanges which made it a biologically cohesive whole ... a sort of diffuse super-organism” or an “evolutionary solidarity ... mysteriously guided.” He claims that this means that the laws of probability that pertain to ordinary matter don’t apply to the spread of life: “it would be inadequate and false to imagine life ... as a fortuitous and amorphous

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16 Wall, The Phenomenon of Man, 68-69.
17 Wall, The Phenomenon of Man, 81-83.
18 Wall, The Phenomenon of Man, 89-90.
19 Wall, The Phenomenon of Man, 92.
proliferation,” and that “we are definitely forced to abandon the idea of explaining every case as simply as the survival of the fittest.”

The geometrical progression of reproduction by cell division, he notes, has the capacity to fill the entire surface of the earth quite rapidly. In the process of spreading, cells first form symbiotic groupings and then eventually form ordered, multicellular organisms. Reproduction also introduces variation. Yet according to Teilhard, “life would have spread and varied, but always on the same level” were it not for an additional factor that “acts as a vertical component” to accelerate diversification “in a pre-determined direction” that is “more and more improbable.” Teilhard acknowledges but minimizes the role played by the struggle for existence in the evolution of life. Out of this struggle, he claims, there is nevertheless an “orthogenesis” as life “gropes” toward a goal with a kind of “directed chance.” This he claims is responsible for the organization of life forms into phyla, classes, orders, families, genera, and species that make up the “tree of life.”

The extensive proliferation, differentiation, and mutual interactions among biological species densely populate the earth. Because of its far greater volume, the physical body of the planet earth appears from “without” to be the much more significant body than the “negligible thickness” of the outer shell occupied by living organisms. But according to Teilhard, an ability to see the “within” of things makes it possible to recognize that this “biosphere” has evolutionary importance in inverse proportion to its size. The full force of cosmic evolution itself becomes concentrated in this “biosphere.”

**Psychogenesis**

Teilhard marks the transition from his discussion of biogenesis to psychogenesis with the following comment: “Asked whether life is going anywhere [whether evolution is directed] ... nine biologists

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20 Wall, *The Phenomenon of Man*, 94-95, 150.
out of ten will today say no, even passionately.”25 Teilhard of course takes the opposite view. He presents as his “evidence” the increasing complexification of the nervous system as animal life evolves, which “could not be the result of chance . . . [and] proves that evolution has a direction.”26 Consciousness emerges along with the increasing complexity of the nervous system. Because the brain is “the sign and measure of consciousness,”27 therefore the rise of consciousness confers upon life a sense of directedness. In fact, “the story of life is no more than a movement of consciousness veiled by morphology.”28 The vast diversity of animal species is a sign of “psychism seeking for itself through different [life] forms.”29 As brains and nervous systems become more complex, consciousness in the forms of sentience and instinct also becomes more complex.30 Teilhard argues that the body plans of arthropods (that is, their external, chitinous skeletons) make it impossible to develop large-sized brains. Hence, only the vertebrates have the capacity to truly realize the objective drive of evolution toward complex consciousness.31

Anthropogenesis (or Hominisation)

Teilhard complains that modern science “neglects the essential factor” – namely, thought – that makes human beings be human.32 His concern however is not simply to criticize that neglect. Rather, he endeavors to show not only how thought is a proper stage in the evolutionary process for scientific investigation, but even more so, that human thought is the very self-realization of evolution itself – its goal all along.

This is because the distinctive feature of human consciousness and thought is “reflection.”

25 Wall, The Phenomenon of Man, 141.
26 Wall, The Phenomenon of Man, 146.
27 Wall, The Phenomenon of Man, 146.
28 Wall, The Phenomenon of Man, 168.
29 Wall, The Phenomenon of Man, 151.
30 Wall, The Phenomenon of Man, 167.
31 Wall, The Phenomenon of Man, 154.
32 Wall, The Phenomenon of Man, 163.
From our experimental point of view, reflection is, as the word indicates, the power acquired by a consciousness to turn in upon itself as of an object endowed with its own particular consistence and value: no longer merely to know, but to know oneself; no longer merely to know, but to know that one knows. By this individualization of himself in the depths of himself, the living element, which heretofore had been spread out and divided over a diffuse circle of perceptions and activities, was constituted for the first time as a centre in the form of a point at which all the impressions and experiences knit themselves together and fuse into a unity that is conscious of its own organization.33

According to Teilhard, this capacity for self-reflection provides the ground for the rise of art, logic, mathematics, reasoned choice, inventions, and so on.34 Consciousness become self-consciousness—"the reflective psychic centre." Self-consciousness

centres itself further on itself by penetration into a new space [the noosphere], and at the same time it centres the rest of the world around itself by the establishment of an ever more coherent and better organized perspective in the realities which surround it.35

What Teilhard seems to have in mind is that when consciousness becomes self-reflective, it explicitly recognizes "within" itself that it participates in the dynamism of the very same orthogenesis that brings everything (including itself) into existence. Hence, science, logic, art, deliberate free actions, and indeed scientific knowledge of evolution itself, only come about with the rise of reflectiveness.36 With the rise of the science of evolution, humanity discovers that it "is nothing other than evolution become conscious of itself."37

33 Wall, *The Phenomenon of Man*, 165.
34 Wall, *The Phenomenon of Man*, 165.
While reflectiveness is in the first instance an individual achievement, it does not long remain merely an individual possession. Just as crystallization, polymerization, life, and animal consciousness all spread across the whole of the earth after initially arising at some one point on its spherical surface, so also human reflective thought spreads as it is shared through human communication. The spread and complexification of shared and communicated thoughts build up what Teilhard calls the “noosphere” – the penultimate in the series that began with cosmogenesis and continued onward to produce the baryspHERE, lithosphere, hydrosphere, atmosphere, stratosphere, and biosphere. Here properly human dimensions of the noosphere are added to pre-human tendencies in the earlier spheres. The “evolution of love, evolution of war, evolution of research, evolution of social sense” all operate in primitive ways within earlier biological and psychic layers. These are “enriched by new possibilities, new colours, new fertility” as a result of collective human reflective thought. Teilhard calls this process “hominisation” – that is, the humanizing of the whole of the evolutionary process and the whole earth – “a transformation affecting the entire planet.”

Teilhard organizes the results of many years of research in paleontological anthropology into his account of the process of hominisation. He argues that reflection was already present during this process that traverses the many stages of hominids culminating in the rise of homo sapiens. He also traces the spread of thought-based cultural interdependence through a very long pre-modern history culminating, in his view, in the rise of Western civilization. “Hominisation can be accepted in the first place as the individual and instantaneous leap from instinct to thought, but it is also, in a wider sense, the progressive phyletic spiritualisation in human civilization of all the forces contained in the animal world.” Here, at last it is possible to “contemplate the earth in its totality. That is to say, it is finally possible to contemplate the very being of the earth itself as situated within the much more comprehensive, unified evolutionary processes

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38 Oddly, Teilhard does not mention a “psychosphere,” which would seem to follow from his treatment of the rise of consciousness in animals.


40 Wall, The Phenomenon of Man, 191-212.
that precedes geogenesis and that unites it with the homonisation which follows.\textsuperscript{41}

**The Omega Point and Christogenesis**

With the conclusion of his account of noogenesis and homonisation, Teilhard completed his work of synthesizing the great many findings of the modern sciences known to him at that time. Still, he claimed, the account of what is known up to the present naturally points beyond itself. If we wish to comprehend the ultimate meaning both of humanity and the whole of evolution — “the specific nature of [humanity] and [its] divine secret” — we must look at what previous evolution “announces ahead.”\textsuperscript{42}

In Teilhard’s view, this question of what lies ahead arises in a context of crisis. The next stages of evolution can only take place through the thoughtful and willing actions of human beings. But once human beings as reflective come to know the fact of evolution itself, and know themselves as participants in evolution, such knowledge produces “anxiety” that can paralyze human action. For one thing, the “immensity” of the spatial size, temporal age, and number of occupants of the evolving universe can make all human effort seem infinitesimal and futile.\textsuperscript{43} Yet, says Teilhard, “half of our present uneasiness would be turned into happiness” if we could place “modern cosmogenesis within a noogenesis.”\textsuperscript{44} In doing so, we could form the conviction that we are “contributing infinitessimally . . . to the building of something definite.”\textsuperscript{45} In other words, if we reflectively recognize our own thought-guided actions as contributing to an evolving wholeness, then our own efforts would be understood as connected to, rather than alienated from, the immensities of the universe.

However, according to Teilhard, this is only half the battle. For even if we recognize and embrace the meaningfulness of our actions

\textsuperscript{41} Wall, *The Phenomenon of Man*, 180.

\textsuperscript{42} Wall, *The Phenomenon of Man*, 190.


\textsuperscript{44} Wall, *The Phenomenon of Man*, 229.

\textsuperscript{45} de Chardin, *The Divine Milieu*, 56.
in the context of the wholeness of evolution thus far, this does not guarantee that evolution toward ultimate wholeness will continue. “Will it still be in motion tomorrow?” Teilhard asks. Will there be “an outcome – a suitable outcome – to that evolution”? If we willingly cast our lot with the movement of evolution, “are we simply dupes?” Even more than the overwhelming of immensity of the universe, it is the uncertainty about the future that is responsible for “the truly cosmic gravity of the sickness that disquiets us.” We lose the conviction needed to act, when we worry that evolution that may have no future. In particular, the inevitability of our own death raises in a radical way whether our efforts will have any lasting worth.

Teilhard proposes a solution to this existential crisis in the form of “super-soul” or “hyper-personal” “Omega Point.” “Omega” functions like an “x” in an algebraic equation. It is an unknown, defined not directly but indirectly by means of how it is related to other known entities. The Omega would be the harmonious continuation of the various unifications that have occurred at every prior level of evolution (e.g., intertwining of chemicals in geogenesis, of organisms into ecosystems in biogenesis, of the growth of human cultural interdependences in noogenesis). This idea of the Omega implies that

the whole earth which is required to nourish us . . . [is like] some great body which is being born . . . the body in fact of that great Thing [the Omega] which had to come to fulfil the ambitions aroused in the reflective being by the newly acquired consciousness.

Omega can be conceived on the analogy of taking the limit of a series in mathematics. Some series of rational numbers can have a non-rational limit (such as π or e). So also, Teilhard conceives of Omega as the limit point, the unification toward which all of evolution has been, and with human cooperation, will continue.

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46 Wall, The Phenomenon of Man, 229-30.
47 Wall, The Phenomenon of Man, 232.
48 Wall, The Phenomenon of Man, 270; see also de Chardin, The Divine Milieu, 81-82.
49 Wall, The Phenomenon of Man, 246.
50 Wall, The Phenomenon of Man, 247; π, for example, can be defined as the limit of the sequence .
Given this “limit definition,” Teilhard argues that Omega would have certain properties. Because it is the absolute limit of evolution, it is the fullest meaning of evolution to which human actions contribute. In addition, it would also itself be a personal centre that is completely Universal and thereby would effect a unification of individually centered human personalities in itself without annihilating those centers.

what is the work of works of [humanity] if not to establish, in and by each one of us an absolutely original centre in which the universe reflects itself in a unique and inimitable way? And those centres are our very selves and personalities. The very centre of our consciousness, deeper than all of its radii; that is the essence which Omega, if it is to be truly Omega, must reclaim . . . each particular consciousness remaining conscious of itself . . . [and] becoming still more itself and thus more clearly distinct from others the closer it gets to them in Omega.51

Finally, Teilhard proclaims that this “synthesis of centres, centre to centre” is love.52 Only love “is capable of uniting living beings in such a way as to complete and fulfil them, for it alone takes them and joins them by what is deepest in themselves.”53 And what is deepest in the “centre” of every human being is the very thrust of evolution toward ultimate fulfillment that produces every evolved being.

In this way Teilhard postulates an Omega, the knowledge of whose existence would empower humanity is to gain the confidence it needs in order to take up its role in continuing evolution toward the future. In order for Omega to perform its function of motivating human continuation of evolution, therefore, it cannot be merely the point that would eventually be reached by the process of evolution itself. Rather, Omega would have to exist and be accepted as “already in existence and operative at the very core” of the noosphere.54 But while Teilhard as a scientist/philosopher can specify that this Omega would be needed for evolution to reach its culmination, he cannot prove its existence by the same means that he has traced cosmogenesis up to this point.

52 Wall, The Phenomenon of Man, 263.
53 Wall, The Phenomenon of Man, 265.
54 Wall, The Phenomenon of Man, 291.
Rather, it is necessary to introduce "boldly into our intellectual framework another category," a necessary supplement to science. For Teilhard this additional "category" is faith. He argues that science is not radically opposed to faith as Enlightenment thinkers held. For one thing, the conviction that scientific investigation is worth undertaking—that science will find answers—is not scientifically demonstrable. Confidence in pursuing investigations scientifically is, rather, a matter of a certain kind of faith, without which scientific investigations would never be conducted. There is therefore "less of a difference between research and adoration" than most people suspect. Nevertheless, faith in the existence of the Omega is an even further, distinct kind of faith. This kind of faith in the existence of Omega is needed to "give each and every element [in evolution] its final value by grouping them in the unity of an organized whole."

In Teilhard's view, science and philosophy can take us only this far—that the evolutionary process of the entire universe culminates in human reflective consciousness, in the crisis that results from human self-awareness of its place in evolution, and the need for an actually existing Omega to overcome that crisis. But in the "epilogue" to The Human Phenomenon, Teilhard as a Christian takes a further step, professing in faith that the Omega is Christ. He deliberately avoided using the term Christ (or God for that matter) in the main body of his book, in order to show that the existence of Omega is essential to the wholeness of evolution strictly in scientific, or at least in philosophical terms. But in the epilogue he explains why the Christ as professed in his faith is identical with that which is anticipated in the philosophical argument about the nature and future of evolution.

Clearly, if Omega is conceived of as the Center unifying all centers through love, then this conception corresponds to what Christians believe was about Christ Incarnate. The core of the Christian faith is that Christ is the self-communication of God's unconditional love for humanity and the universe. In fact the highest sphere, the way

55 Wall, The Phenomenon of Man, 247.
56 Wall, The Phenomenon of Man, 250.
57 Wall, The Phenomenon of Man, 250.
58 Wall, The Phenomenon of Man, 293.
Forward, the “new state of consciousness... [is] Christian love.”

Christ is the Omega because he unifies the world by “uniting it organically with himself.... By partially immersing himself in things, by becoming ‘element’, and then from this vantage point in the heart of matter, assuming the control and leadership of what we now call evolution.”

Tangential and Radial Energy

Teilhard postulates what for him is a most important point – that there “must be a single energy” differentiated into two interconnected forms: tangential (or physical) energy and radial (or spiritual) energy. He introduces these two interconnected forms of energy for two reasons and criticizes science for having ignored the relationship between them. On the one hand, he thinks the interconnection of these two forms of energy is needed to make sense of certain elements of human experience: “The loftiest speculation, the most burning love are... paid for by an expenditure of physical energy.”

On the other hand, Teilhard thinks this distinction between tangential and radial energy is necessary in order to provide a complete explanation for all of the phenomena of evolution. Tangential energy links emerging entities with “all others of the same order” and is responsible for the diffusions and associations that form the levels of the successive spheres – for example, crystallization forming the geosphere, species reproduction and competition forming the biosphere, human communication forming the noosphere, and so forth. Radial energy, on the other hand, is required to adequately account for the “orthogenetic” direction of evolution and to bring about the emergence of the successive layers of spheres. He says, for example, that “internal (‘radial’) energy is modified to correspond with the external (‘tangential’) constitution of the cellular unit.” Teilhard firmly denies that either the direction or the increasing “complexity or

59 Wall, The Phenomenon of Man, 295.
60 Wall, The Phenomenon of Man, 294.
61 Wall, The Phenomenon of Man, 63-65.
63 Wall, The Phenomenon of Man, 88.
centricity” of evolution can be accounted for by chance or survival of the fittest alone. Some transformation of tangential energy into radial energy (albeit an “extremely small amount”) is required, therefore, to account fully for the novelties and complexity of evolution.

Although the book traces the evolution of the universe from the earliest stages of matter and energy, it is entitled *The Human Phenomenon*. In Teilhard’s view it is impossible to understand either the universe or the human phenomenon correctly and fully unless one understands that humanity is intrinsic to the wholeness of evolution within which humans emerged. Teilhard may have had his first real epiphany of this unity of humanity when he was saying Mass for soldiers during the First World War. That original epiphany gradually unfolded into a remarkable synthesis of the many things modern science had come to understand about nature and human beings, with the fundamental tenets of Christian faith.

**PRAYER AND SYMBOLISM IN TEILHARD’S COMMUNICATION OF UNITY**

The preceding section relied mainly upon *The Human Phenomenon* for two reasons. First, that is the book in which Teilhard sets forth the most detailed articulation of his vision of the wholeness of evolution. And second, that wealth of detail facilitates the comparison with Loneran’s understanding of the wholeness of evolution.

However Teilhard’s success in communicating his vision was not limited to *The Human Phenomenon*. His other writings and his engaging personal conversations were at least as important for the reception of his vision of the unity of nature and humanity with God in Christ. Indeed one of the most influential expressions of his vision came quite early in his 1923 Eucharistic prayer, “The Mass on the World.” He composed this prayer during his first paleontological expedition to China in the Ordos desert. There he had neither bread

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64 Wall, *The Phenomenon of Man*, 65.
nor wine with which to celebrate the sacrament of the Eucharist. At the culmination of that prayer he wrote:

the very purpose of my being and all my love of life, all depend on this one basic union between yourself [my God] and the universe. I have no desire, I have no ability, to proclaim anything except the innumerable prolongations of your incarnate being in the world of matter.

In the last month of his life, Teilhard reflected on those days writing: "Today, after forty years of constant reflection, it is still exactly the same fundamental vision" as the one he set forth in "The Mass on the World" and The Divine Milieu. In that latter work, composed less than four years after the "Mass on the World," Teilhard again proclaimed that "even material reality" is being integrated into one profound unity; "one single thing is being made: the mystical body of Christ, starting from all the sketchy spiritual powers scattered throughout the worlds." Teilhard's was a mystical vision of unity. He himself employed the term "mystical" liberally throughout his own writings. Yet as Harvey Egan and Bernard McGinn have rightly pointed out, mysticism does not arise within a vacuum. Mysticism is the culmination of prolonged prayer and reflection within a religious tradition. Teilhard's mystical apprehension of unity arose out of his Roman Catholic tradition which nourished his prayer and reflections. In particular, the epistles of St. Paul and the Gospel of John were rich sources for his prayerful reflections concerning "the Cosmic Christ." These were important sources out of which grew his vision of the unity of the universe of modern science with Christ. The Human Phenomenon was intended

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68 King, Teilhard's Mass, x.
69 King, Teilhard's Mass, 36-37.
70 de Chardin, The Divine Milieu, 155, where it states that this book was composed in 1926-27.
71 de Chardin, The Divine Milieu, 56, 143.
72 See, for example, The Divine Milieu, 116: "Christianity alone saves mysticism."
74 Henri de Lubac, Teilhard de Chardin, 35-44.
to clarify, expand, and answer some misunderstandings that arose in reaction to Teilhard’s earlier writings. Hence it is important to bear in mind that The Human Phenomenon is a grand elaboration of the original vision of unity expressed compactly in that early prayer and must be read in that spirit.

Arising out of such meditations, The Human Phenomenon and Teilhard’s other communications were enormously successful forms of communication because they speak so strongly to people’s desire to find meaning in the universe and in their own lives. Teilhard was explicit about his intention to offer his readers an answer to the question, “what is the meaning of this movement of expansion” of the universe, of life on earth, and of human thought? The emergence of the human species, he insists, is not just another “genus or family . . . one more pigeon hole in the edifice of our systematization.” In place of just “an additional order or branch,” Teilhard offers the symbol of the noosphere which supervenes upon and “crowns” the spheres symbolizing the previous stages of evolution. The noosphere manifests the penultimate meaning of the rise of those previous spheres, while the Omega reveals the ultimate meaning.

The power and success of Teilhard’s communication of the unity of the universe in Christ, therefore, is heavily dependent upon his richly symbolic expressions. It is this symbolism that carries the passion, faith, hope, love, and joy with which he beheld that unity. His work received an enthusiastic reception, and it was probably the symbolic richness, more so even than the force of his philosophical arguments, that was responsible for that reception. The richness and complexity of his symbolism deserves a study unto itself, but here I can highlight just a few components

“Radiation” for example is one of the most significant and pervasive symbols in Teilhard’s communication of the unity of the evolving universe. Radiation in Teilhard’s sense is a compact symbolism integrating symbols of light, centeredness, and orientation.

Radiation is, first of all, a symbol of light, illumination, and enlightenment. The symbol of illumination is already present in the title, The Human Phenomenon. Deriving from its Greek roots, “phenomenon”

75 Wall, The Phenomenon of Man, 141 (emphasis added).
76 Wall, The Phenomenon of Man, 182-83.
is what appears, what shines forth. In fact Teilhard’s very first sentence underscores the importance of this symbol in the book:

This work may be summed up as an attempt to see and to make others see what happens to [humanity when] ... placed fairly and squarely within the framework of phenomenon and appearance.77

To “make others see” is another way of saying “to illuminate appearances so as to enlighten others.” The Human Phenomenon abounds with the language of the symbolism of the radiance of light. In its most primordial state, the universe was “unresolved simplicity, luminous in nature”;78 the “inherent kinship” of all complex living organisms “shines through” in the connections among ontogeny and phylogeny.79

This symbol of light and illumination is also connected with his notion of the “within” of things. The within is not as easily perceived; it needs to illuminated. Once the within is illuminated, then investigator becomes enlightened and has “direct intuition of”80 the unifying source of the great diversity of “external” differences among beings. As life spreads it is “diffracted and becomes iridescent”;81 only when “looked at in the proper magnification and light” is it possible to “see” the entirety of a biological phylum as a unified, dynamic “collective reality”;82 mammalia do not reach “full florescence” until the Tertiary Period;83 with the rise of “the most powerful brains” and their accompanying sophisticated consciousness, a “glow” that burns with “a point of incandescence”;84 aliens would notice the “phosphorescence of [human] thought” more even than the great oceans.85 Throughout the world religions, light abounds as a symbol of sacred reality and the divine intelligence, and it is especially central in the Christian Johannine

77 Wall, The Phenomenon of Man, 31.
78 Wall, The Phenomenon of Man, 47.
79 Wall, The Phenomenon of Man, 99-100.
80 Wall, The Phenomenon of Man, 55.
81 Wall, The Phenomenon of Man, 105.
83 Wall, The Phenomenon of Man, 122.
84 Wall, The Phenomenon of Man, 160.
85 Wall, The Phenomenon of Man, 183.
literature that had such a profound influence upon Teilhard.

Radiation also contains the symbolism of the center. The radii of a circle radiate from a center, and symbolic centers abound in *The Human Phenomenon*. Teilhard traces the whole arc of evolution through the symbolism of successively unfolding series of spheres — space as a whole, then the geosphere (barysphere, lithosphere, hydrosphere, atmosphere, and stratosphere), biosphere, noosphere, and Christosphere. He repeatedly draws attention to the centers of these spheres, to each of which in succession is transferred the real meaning of evolution.

Mircea Eliade analyzed the importance of the religious symbolism of the center and its role in forming a unified cosmos for religious people. The center is the place of the sacred. Only that which is connected with the sacred center has meaning and genuine reality. Nothing that is cut off from the center has reality; all that is cut off is profane, chaotic, without meaning. Eliade also draws attention to how religious symbolism accommodates a multiplicity of centers as epiphanies of the primordial center, which in turn functions as a kind of “Center of centers” to use Teilhard’s phrase: “The universe fulfilling itself in a synthesis of centres . . . God, the Centre of centres.” Teilhard also invokes another symbol of the center — the “axis of the world” — a symbol that Eliade observes is used widely throughout the religions of the world. For example Teilhard speaks of the “axis of duration” as a crucial factor in the emergence of any new life form. He also uses the center-symbolism of axis in describing a vision of unity he had upon encountering the story of a solitary nun praying in an out-of-the-way chapel.

All at once he sees the whole world bound up and moving and organizing itself around that out-of-the-way spot, in tune with the intensity and inflection of the desires of that puny, praying figure. The convent chapel had become the axis around which the whole earth revolved.

88 Wall, *The Phenomenon of Man*, 84.
89 de Chardin, *The Divine Milieu*, 133.
Radiation is also a symbol of orientation. What radiates not only originates from a center but is also sent out along a path or a mission toward something. Teilhard characterizes evolution in terms of its goals. The process of evolution is "convergent." It is heading toward greater complexity and consciousness (as he understood it). He calls evolution by goal-related names: cosmogenesis, biogenesis, and Christogenesis. For him these are different names adopted from different stages for one single, goal-directed process that is unified from beginning to its ultimate culmination.

Since, in concrete fact, only one single process of synthesis is going on from top to bottom of the whole universe, no element, and no movement, can exist at any level of the world outside the "informing" action of the principle center of things.90

Elsewhere he writes, "Instead of simply radiating from each centre in the process of division the rays of life now anastomose"91 that is, connect in mutual interdependencies. And, of course, Teilhard casts evolution as a directed orthogenesis "through which we see every living creature pass" as it is oriented toward "anthropogenesis."92 Evolution in all of its earlier stages is oriented because in its very being it provides humanity "with a natural framework and with a cradle."93

In various places, these several dimensions of radiation symbolism come together in a single passage. For example:

The elemental ripple of life that emerges from each individual unit does not spread outwards in a monotonous circle formed of individual units exactly like itself. It is diffracted and becomes iridescent [light symbolism], with an indefinite scale of variegated tonalities. The living unit is a center [symbolism] of irresistible multiplication, and ipso facto an equally irresistible focus of diversification [orientation symbolism].94

91 Wall, The Phenomenon of Man, 106.
94 Wall, The Phenomenon of Man, 105.
Teilhard's communication of his vision of the unity of evolution with Christ comprises many other symbolic elements. For example, Ilia Delio draws attention to his use of the symbolism of Heart and Fire.95 Again, Teilhard frequently draws upon music as symbolic of the dynamic unity of evolution. He writes of geological evolution as "a continuous bass underlying the rhythms of the earth [with] ever increasing harmonies,"96 and regularly says that evolution moves with pulsations and rhythms. Likewise the symbolism of return, doubling back, folding in upon itself permeates his writing.97 The universe is a "curved and closed space within which all the lines of our experience turn back upon themselves";98 "free energy of the new-born earth became capable of reacting upon itself in a work of synthesis",99 there is a "double related involution, the coiling up of the molecule upon itself and the coiling up of the planet upon itself";100 the great diversity of walking vertebrates "folds back and closes in upon itself" when traced back to the original ancestors;101 the rise of human thought is marked by reflectiveness, "a doubling back upon oneself" that makes real self-knowledge possible102 and makes "the noosphere . . . close in upon itself – and to encircle the earth."103 The symbolism of return and enfolding upon itself culminates "finally to make all things double back upon someone."104 This supreme symbol of the whole evolving reality is the doubling back and returning to the Omega point, which as a Christian Teilhard identifies as Christ (who is Alpha and Omega, the eternal return par excellence).

The richness of Teilhard’s symbolism deserves a thorough study. But these examples will have to suffice for the present.

96 Wall, The Phenomenon of Man, 148.
98 Wall, The Phenomenon of Man, 46.
99 Wall, The Phenomenon of Man, 70.
100 Wall, The Phenomenon of Man, 73.
101 Wall, The Phenomenon of Man, 130.
102 Wall, The Phenomenon of Man, 165.
103 Wall, The Phenomenon of Man, 206.
104 Wall, The Phenomenon of Man, 290.
LIMITATIONS OF TEILHARD’S SYMBOLIC COMMUNICATION

While a great many people were deeply inspired by Teilhard’s writings, not everyone was so enamored. Nobel Prize winning biologist Peter Medawar, for example, published a scathing review of The Human Phenomenon. He wrote that much of the book "is nonsense, tricked out with a variety of metaphysical conceits, and its author can be excused of dishonesty only on the grounds that before deceiving others he has taken great pains to deceive himself.” Medawar complained specifically about the exuberance of Teilhard's “tipsy, euphoristic prose-poetry” style that "creates the illusion of content.” In particular he cited with scorn passages that contain several of the symbolic elements discussed in the previous section. He criticized for example Teilhard's remarks about reproduction: “The elemental ripple of life . . . is diffracted and becomes iridescent . . . The living unit is a center of irresistible multiplication.” He contended that Teilhard misunderstood the genetics of reproduction in elementary life forms, and confused "the versatility of a population and the adaptability of an individual.”

Elsewhere Medawar’s criticisms from a scientific point of view were much more damaging. He disputed Teilhard’s most fundamental claim, namely

that evolution must have a “precise orientation and a privileged axis” at the topmost pole of which lies Man, born “a direct lineal descendant from the total effort of life.”

In opposition to Teilhard's claim, Medawar wrote

that evolution flouts or foils the second law of thermodynamics is based on a confusion of thought; and the idea that evolution has a main track or privileged axis is unsupported by scientific evidence.

He was also critical of the way Teilhard used radial energy to characterize consciousness. Yet the difficulty that Medawar identified is not the only scientific problem with the idea of radial energy. Teilhard argued

106 See Wall, The Phenomenon of Man, 105.
that in order to account the novelties and complexity of evolution, some amount of tangential energy must be converted into radial energy. But this contradicts the law of the conservation of energy, one of the most fundamental laws in all of physics. To his credit, Teilhard acknowledged this contradiction. He attempted to answer it by saying that only an “extremely small amount” of tangential energy needs to be converted into radial energy, and that “for an approximately constant number of initial particles in the universe, the sum of the cosmic tangential energies remains practically and statistically invariable in the course of the transformations.” However, this definitely is not “all that science requires” as Teilhard alleges. The hypothesis that energy is conserved only statistically has been proposed and refuted numerous times.

Teilhard made matters difficult for himself. He insisted that The Human Phenomenon must be taken as a “scientific treatise,” and that it was neither a theological nor a metaphysical work. He believed that he was simply drawing inevitable conclusions from the wealth of scientific discoveries that he wove together. But in spite of his protestations, The Human Phenomenon and almost all of his other influential writings were not in fact scientific. They were works of theology, philosophy, and metaphysics after all. In fact his metaphysics was heavily indebted to that of Henri Bergson, whose Creative Evolution was a major influence on the young Teilhard.

Teilhard’s mystical vision of unity and its symbolic expressions also led him into difficulties on other fronts, especially regarding sin and evil. Gabriel Marcel in particular was shocked when, in the face of atrocities at Dachau, Teilhard persisted in his faith in the inevitability of human progress. Marcel’s reaction was probably not due to the fact that Teilhard subscribed to the very profound Christian doctrine

108 Wall, The Phenomenon of Man, 66.
110 Teilhard read Bergson’s Creative Evolution while he was in studies in Hastings, sometime between 1908-11 (King, Teilhard’s Mass, 3-4).
that God "will make evil serve a higher good." More likely it was Teilhard’s position about the inevitability that so troubled Marcel.

Teilhard was also censured by Catholic and Jesuit authorities. Their condemnations grew out of the way Teilhard seemed to be articulating a form of pantheism, as well as from his attempts to rethink the doctrine of original sin. He legitimately puzzled about how to reconcile the findings of paleontology and evolutionary biology with the biblical claims that the human race emerged from a single couple (monogenesis), and that death came about because of the sin of that first human couple. But in 1920 he attempted to achieve this reconciliation by speculating that original sin did not originate in particular acts of particular human beings, but instead "symbolizes the inevitable chance of evil" that is built into the very structure of the whole universe. This seems to carry the implication that the Creator is responsible for sin and evil. This could not be viewed as a legitimate reconciliation because it does not retain fundamental tenets of Christian faith.

Again, his emphasis on the Cosmic Christ as Omega seemed to minimize the role of Christ as Redeemer. While Teilhard modified this position in The Divine Milieu, still as late as 1947 he proposed that the primordial state of the universe ("the multiple" as he called it) was structured in such a way that "Statistically . . . it is absolutely inevitable" that suffering and sin would evolve.

LONERGAN'S SYSTEMATICS:
FROM EMERGENT PROBABILITY TO THE MYSTICAL BODY OF CHRIST

Although Teilhard communicated his vision of the unity of the universe and humanity in Christ with passion, even ecstasy, his ways of using symbolism led to implications that could not be easily reconciled with some of the most basic affirmations of the scientific and the Catholic communities. In his careful scholarship Henri de Lubac performed the great service in defending and rehabilitating Teilhard’s thought.
from the most severe and unfair criticisms on matters of faith.\textsuperscript{114} Yet even de Lubac admitted that “his thought is still incomplete” and that “Teilhard was a little too hasty in his search for ‘coherence’ and increasingly looked for it along roads that were rather too direct.”\textsuperscript{115} Karl Rahner, S.J.’s also adopted a positive though qualified view of Teilhard’s work:

Let us agree that even if Teilhard de Chardin has not in every respect succeeded in doing justice to dogma, then I would say \textit{in magnis volelisse sat est}. That it isn’t as bad as when we teachers of theology give forth with a very orthodox but sterile theology that is of interest to no one.\textsuperscript{116}

On the other hand, Medawar accused Teilhard of using “in metaphor words like energy, tension, force, impetus and dimension \textit{as if} they retained the weight and thrust of their specific scientific usages.” This comment goes right to the heart of the issue. Teilhard was successful as a communicator precisely because he testified to the religious meaningfulness of scientific findings by his use of symbolism (metaphor).\textsuperscript{117} But Teilhard supersaturated his terminology into compact symbols, fusing scientific, explanatory meanings with symbolic meanings in ways that caused confusion and seemed to legitimate untenable inferences.

This is a significant limitation of Teilhard’s work. It is the sort of limitation that was of great concern to Lonergan. He dedicated much of his career to developing methods that would preserve authentic meanings but also refine them so as to remove unintended negative implications.

\textsuperscript{114} See, for example, de Lubac, \textit{The Man and His Meaning}, 46, 89, 103, 106.
\textsuperscript{115} de Lubac, \textit{The Man and His Meaning}, 101, 46.
\textsuperscript{116} Quoted in Henri de Lubac, S.J., \textit{Teilhard Explained}, trans. Antonoy Buono (New York: Paulist Press, 1966), 3. The Latin is taken from Sextus Propertius, \textit{Elegies} II, x, 5. [“To simply have wanted is enough in great deeds.”]
\textsuperscript{117} Medawar was condescending about Teilhard’s success and tried to explain it away, saying that the “spread of secondary and latterly tertiary education has created a large population of people, often with well-developed literary and scholarly tastes, who have been educated far beyond their capacity to undertake analytical thought.” His criticisms of Teilhard for lack of differentiation seem to me legitimate. His haughty dismissal of the popular hunger for the symbolic mediation of modern science does not.
Key to Lonergan’s approach is his conception of the method in theology that comprises eight interdependent “functional specialties.” Of particular interest for present purposes are the relationships between the functional specialties of Systematics and Communications. The task of Systematics is “to work out appropriate systems of conceptualization to remove apparent inconsistencies, to move towards some grasp of spiritual matters both from their own inner coherence and from the analogies offered by more familiar human experiences.” Communication on the other hand “induces in the hearer some share in the . . . meaning of the speaker.” These two functions are mutually interdependent. On the one hand, the work of Systematics and the six other functional specialties upon which it relies would “be in vain” unless they issued in a communication of the meanings so painstakingly discerned. On the other hand, “To communicate one has to understand what one has to communicate. No mere repetition of formulas can take the place of understanding.”

The need for a specialized form of Systematics arises because of what Lonergan calls the problem of the differentiation of consciousness. Undifferentiated consciousness does not distinguish between dramatically different kinds of meanings. It operates with expressions that are largely symbolic. Symbols fuse multiple meanings together. While these compact symbolic expressions are a major source of their success in communicating, this symbolic fusion can also suggest

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118 Bernard Lonergan, Method in Theology (New York: Herder and Herder, 1972), 132. In its fully mature form, Systematics would “promote an understanding of what is affirmed in the previous specialty, doctrines.” (Method in Theology, 335) Given the context of Method in Theology, one might assume that Doctrines is concerned only with affirmations of religious truths. But I think Lonergan saw Systematics as striving for a comprehensive and coherent understanding among both the affirmations of faith and the affirmations of “immanently generated knowledge” (Bernard Lonergan, Insight: A Study of Human Understanding, vol. 3 of the Collected Works of Bernard Lonergan, ed. Frederick E. Crowe and Robert M. Doran (Toronto: University of Toronto Press, 1992), 725; cited hereafter as Insight.). If this is correct, then Lonergan and Teilhard shared the ambition to reconcile the positions of evolutionary science with the doctrines of Christian faith.

119 Method in Theology, 356.

120 Method in Theology, 355.

121 Method in Theology, 351.

122 See, for example, Method in Theology, 305-306.
meanings that are contradictory and contrary to the intention of the communicator.

For doctrinal expression may be figurative or symbolic... It may, if pressed, quickly become vague and indefinite. It may seem, when examined, to be involved inconsistency and fallacy.¹²³

Systematics seeks to hold on to what is normative in symbolic and other expressions while resolving inconsistencies and fallacies such as those that Teilhard ran up against. It performs this function by using "derived categories" passed along for its use by the functional specialty of Foundations. Such categories are not derived from some prior set of categories regarded as more foundational. Rather, these categories are derived from converted human beings and their structured acts of consciousness.¹²⁴ Converted human beings and the ways that they do their thinking and living count as what is most fundamental in Foundations.

Lonergan briefly mentions in Method in Theology that some of the work of deriving such categories had already been carried out in large sections of Insight.¹²⁵ In particular, he mentions that his treatments of the method of metaphysics and emergent probability are instances of the derivation of such categories, and these will be the focus of the next section.

LONERGAN'S VISION OF UNITY: THE METHOD OF METAPHYSICS AND GENERALIZED EMERGENT PROBABILITY

Teilhard sought to reconcile the affirmations of modern scientific research with the doctrines of the unity of all things in Christ and the Mystical Body of Christ. On more than one occasion, Lonergan explicitly said that formulating a systematic understanding of the doctrine of the Mystical Body would be a very complex affair and would require a

¹²³ Method in Theology, 132.
¹²⁴ Method in Theology, 285-86.
¹²⁵ Method in Theology, 287-88.
considerable effort to complete satisfactorily. Given the enormity of that task, in this essay I must limit myself to showing how some of his “derived categories” in *Insight* are a partial contribution to that task, and how they solve some of the difficulties that Teilhard encountered. In particular, I will explore how his treatment of generalized emergent probability and the metaphysics of unity contribute to this task.

The vision of unity is central to Teilhard’s project, and likewise Lonergan’s Systematics approach to the question of unity is crucial to the task reconciling scientific and religious affirmations. Teilhard approached the question of unity primarily in terms of the symbolism of radiation and the Center of centers. Lonergan, on the other hand, systematically worked out different meanings of unity in his “critical metaphysics.” In calling his metaphysics “critical,” he meant that its terminology and claims would be derived from the structured activities of human knowing. In this critical metaphysics, empty or misleading terms and relations can be eliminated, while valid ones can be elucidated by the conscious intention from which they are derived . . . it provides a criterion for settling the difference between literal and metaphorical meaning and, again, between notional and real distinctions.

Lonergan developed his critical account of unity in stages through almost the entirety of *Insight*. That account was not complete until its very last chapter (which was then followed in the “epilogue” by a frank acknowledgement that much more remained to be done). I first offer a succinct overview of Lonergan’s account of unity in *Insight*. This is followed by a fuller elaboration of each stage. I will then conclude by drawing out connections with the issues and concerns that arose from Teilhard’s work.

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126 See “The Mystical Body of Christ,” a domestic exhortation at Regis College, Toronto, November 1951, unpublished, mimeographed typescript. See also *Insight*, 754n1 and 763.

127 *Method in Theology*, 343.

128 *Method in Theology*, 343.

129 *Insight*, 754n1.
Overview: Unity and Intelligibility

The key to unity for Lonergan is intelligibility.\textsuperscript{130} Intelligibility, in turn, is defined by reference to an operation of consciousness: "By intelligibility is meant what is to be known in understanding."\textsuperscript{131} Understanding comes about through insights, which are unifying acts of consciousness. Insights understand intelligible connections that were previously unknown. It is for this reason that Lonergan claims that insights and intelligibility are the keys to the meaning of unity. Defining intelligibility and unity in this fashion makes them "derived categories" in Lonergan's sense. This means that the meaning of unity is grounded in acts of consciousness (insights), whose occurrences and implications can be verified in the data of consciousness.\textsuperscript{132}

While intelligibility is the key to unity, still there are different kinds of intelligibilities, and so different kinds of unities. The opening chapters of \textit{Insight} focus on insights that bring unity to disparate data through insights that grasp either commonsense/descriptive or scientific/explanatory relations. Later chapters analyze insights that more directly grasp the intelligible "concrete unity, identity, whole" that constitutes what Lonergan calls "things."\textsuperscript{133} In addition to these kinds of intelligible unity, there is a fuller unity that encompasses both things and events. Lonergan typically refers to that more comprehensive unity as "the universe."

What he means by "the universe" departs dramatically from what commonly comes to mind – the idea of a large container of all material things. By way of contrast Lonergan understands the universe to be a dynamic, intelligible process. He arrives at his account of the intelligibility of this process by carefully probing the methods of empirical sciences and by identifying the distinct kinds of intelligibilities

\textsuperscript{130} \textit{Insight}, 543.
\textsuperscript{131} \textit{Insight}, 523.
\textsuperscript{132} \textit{Insight}, 5.
\textsuperscript{133} \textit{Insight}, 271. Later, when Lonergan explicitly introduces metaphysical analysis, he returns to these preliminary treatments in a more methodical and explanatory way. There he argues that every finite reality (i.e., every "proportionate being," including human realities) is either the unity of an event (a unity of a conjugate potency, form, act) or the unity of an existent (a unity of a central potency, form, act) whose precise meanings are settled by their connections with the facts about human consciousness that are verifiable in the data of consciousness (\textit{Insight}, 457-63).
that they pursue. He then argues that the natural-human universe has a unity that synthesizes these distinct kinds of intelligibilities into a more unified intelligibility, which he calls “generalized emergent probability.” Generalized emergent probability is therefore what Lonergan means by the intelligible unity of the universe.

Yet even this finite unity of generalized emergent probability is not in itself fully intelligible. It is somehow lacking in the fullness of unity. We can ask, for example, why the universe has this kind of dynamic intelligibility, rather than some other kind. The answer to this question, according to Lonergan, lies beyond our merely contingent universe. Hence the methods of the empirical sciences alone are not adequate to provide an answer. Lonergan therefore extended his philosophical method to seek after an “imperfect, analogous” understanding of God.134 By means of this analogical understanding, Lonergan could claim that the answer to why the universe has the kind of intelligibility it does have resides in God’s unrestricted understanding and valuing, which “is the ultimate cause of causes for it overcomes contingency at its deepest level.”135 In addition, because human beings and their actions are riddled with the fragmentations of irrationality and sin, the value of the universe as God creates it includes a kind of intelligibility that goes beyond anything envisioned in generalized emergent probability. That further intelligibility is the unity of a divine-human collaboration which draws unity and goodness out of the brokenness of evil and sin. Although that unity is affected by God’s supernatural initiative, it is nonetheless “a harmonious continuation of the actual order of this universe,” that is, generalized emergent probability.136

The preceding is just an overview. The following sections explain each of its components in greater detail.

Science as Heuristic

In The Human Phenomenon, Teilhard synthesized a vast range of the scientific facts already known up to the time he wrote that book. By way of contrast, Lonergan did not rest his account of unity upon any provisional results of scientific research reached in the past.

134 Method in Theology, 339.
135 Insight, 679-80.
136 Insight, 718.
Instead, he rested his argument upon the methods that scientists actually use. In this way, his account of unity does not depend upon specific scientific findings, but rather is open to any findings that will eventually be arrived at by using these methods. Moreover, Lonergan did not claim that his account was a scientific treatise, as Teilhard did. Instead, he regarded his account of unity as a heuristic framework capable of integrating any future contributions resulting from the scientific methods.

Lonergan argued that scientific methods are "heuristic"—meaning that science is fundamentally a matter of inquiry, that inquiries anticipate certain types of insights and that research can use these anticipations methodically so as to facilitate arriving at the insights that answer those inquiries. While acknowledging the great variety and many differences among the methods employed in different branches of science by individual scientists, Lonergan proposed that there are two basic kinds of heuristic methods (classical and statistical) used by all natural sciences, a third kind (genetic) added to the first two which is employed specifically in the biological sciences, and a fourth kind (dialectic) that is needed along with the other three in the human sciences.\(^\text{137}\)

**Classical Heuristic Method and Conditioned Correlations**

Lonergan argued that classical method pursues insights into the intelligible "correlations" among events and things. In physics, these correlations are formulated in equations that express the relations of variables to one another. These relationships play so fundamental a role in modern science that we honor them with juridical metaphor—"law" of science or "law" of nature.

But the metaphor of law can easily obscure two of the most important features of the insights behind the equations and other correlations. First, these insights grasp the intrinsic intelligible relationships that abound in nature. Natural entities behave in the ways they do because of how they are intelligibly and intrinsically related to one another. That is to say, natural entities behave in their characteristic ways because of what they are intrinsically, not because some extrinsic, arbitrary law is imposed upon them and forces

\(^{137}\) *Insight*, 509.
them to behave in those ways. Second, these correlations are highly *conditioned*. Classical correlations are extremely generic, and they manifest themselves quite differently, depending upon environmental conditions. The classic example is Newton’s laws of motion and gravitation. The very same laws manifest themselves in very different and indeed incompatible ways under different conditions. Depending upon the relative energies, momenta, and positions even of just two celestial bodies, their orbital paths could be hyperbolic, parabolic, elliptical, or circular. If more than two bodies are involved, the concrete forms of their relationships yield even more complex possible orbital patterns. Contrary to the connotation of “law” as an unconditional imperative, the laws discovered by classical methods do not solely by themselves determine the concrete events of the universe. The actual, concrete events of the universe depend also upon the conditions under which the laws operate. But the classical laws themselves do not determine the conditions under which they will operate. Their role in determining events is conditioned by conditions that are outside of their control.

**Complexity and Emergence**

Lonergan relies upon these general features of classical correlations to show how scientists approach the explanation of emergence and complexity. He focuses upon the cycles or “schemes of recurrence” that permeate so much of the universe as well as the terrestrial realm. These cycles are repeating sequences of events. For purposes of illustration it will be helpful to consider one of the cycles that is fundamental to almost every form of life on earth – the adenosine triphosphate (ATP) cycle of using and replenishing energy. This cycle involves the sequential combination of two different chemical reactions. First, the ATP molecule is transformed into an ADP molecule plus a phosphate molecule along with energy that is subsequently transferred to some other biochemical synthesis. Second, energy is supplied from some outside source to resynthesize the ADP and phosphate molecules, thereby restoring the ATP molecular state. Each of the chemical reactions in the ATP cycle occurs in accord with some chemical law. The cycle as a whole, therefore, is a very concrete and

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138 *Insight*, 141.
particular way of combining these classical correlations. But this cycle
as a whole emerges and recurs only under very specialized conditions,
such as those provided in the interior of a cellular mitochondrion, for
dexample.

ATP and even more complex cycles are possible precisely because
classical correlations are highly conditioned and can have many different
manifestations under varying conditions. A specific combination of
these classical correlations constitutes the unique intelligibility of each
kind of cycle. These combinations of correlations, whether simple or
complex, can only arise and continue to repeat themselves if the proper
conditions happen to be fulfilled in some way. In other words, once
the requisite conditions are fulfilled, the intelligibility of this cycle will
emerge into reality. In no way does the emergence of these complex
cycles require a special intervention of an élán vital or radial energy
over and above the classical laws. What is required over and above the
classical laws, however, is that special and sometimes highly unusual
sets of conditions come to pass.

Lonergan noted further that throughout the universe, simpler
cycles can and do provide the conditions for the emergence and
recurrence of ever more complex cycles. For instance, simpler solar
fusion cycles form conditions for the terrestrial hydrological cycles.
The hydrological cycles distribute and replenish water supplies that
form the conditions for the cycles for the growth, reproduction, and
evolution of plants. Plant cycles in turn constantly replenish supplies
of carbohydrates consumed by herbivorous animals. The consumed
carbohydrates are broken down and provide the conditions for Krebs
cycles in the interiors of animal cells, and the Krebs cycles provide
conditions for the emergence and recurrence of ATP cycles. There
is then a long, complex network or "series of conditioned schemes of
recurrence" reaching from the interior of the sun to the interior of
animals' cellular functionings.

Statistical Heuristic Method

The idea of a series of conditioned cycles provokes an interesting
question: Is the whole universe therefore just one big complex

139 *Insight*, 141.
140 *Insight*, 142 (emphasis added).
systematic nesting of cycles — one immense, deterministic, totalizing system? Lonergan’s answer is No. He argues instead that the universe has a vast, non-systematic, random dimension to it.\textsuperscript{141} Since cycles of complexity can only begin to function once their proper conditions have arisen, they must rely upon some source other than themselves to provide those conditions. In general, this means that these sets of conditions arise and fall away in random, non-systematic fashions.\textsuperscript{142}

Lonergan argues, therefore, that a second major kind of scientific method, statistical method, arose in order to investigate the intrinsically non-systematic and random dimensions of nature. Statistical methods seek to understand populations of events and things. Statistical methods use techniques of counting and sampling in order to determine the actual numbers of occurrences of various kinds of events and things. But statistical method goes beyond merely counting \textit{actual} frequencies. It seeks to discover in them a distinctive kind of intelligibility – \textit{ideal} relative frequencies (called probabilities). The actual frequencies of events in the universe fluctuate non-systematically (randomly) around the intelligible norms of ideal frequencies (probabilities).\textsuperscript{143} But this means that the intelligibility of these probabilities is just as much a constituent of the universe as is the intelligibility of the classical correlations (or laws of science).

\textbf{Emergent Probability}

Just as classical correlations can be intelligibly combined to produce the more complex intelligibilities of schemes of recurrence, so also classical correlations and statistical probabilities can be combined to produce even more complex forms of intelligibilities. As Lonergan puts it, “classical laws tell what would happen if conditions were fulfilled; statistical laws tell how often conditions are fulfilled.”\textsuperscript{144} This means that statistical methods also can be applied to determine the probabilities of emergence and survival of various kinds of schemes of recurrence. Since schemes emerge when complex arrangements of conditions are fulfilled, therefore statistical investigators can

\textsuperscript{141} Insight, 109-21.
\textsuperscript{142} Insight, 131; see also 109ff and 149-50.
\textsuperscript{143} Insight, 78-86.
\textsuperscript{144} Insight, 131.
determine the probabilities of such arrangements. Lonergan goes on to argue that once the proper environmental conditions are in place, the probability of emergence of a scheme increases dramatically.  

Lonergan introduces the term "emergent probability" to denote this synthesis of the intelligibilities of classical and statistical investigations. Classical methods explain how and why organized complexity functions. Statistical methods analyze the probabilities of conditions coming together for the emergence and survival of complex cycles. Cycles arise when appropriate conditions are assembled in the same vicinity at the same time. This assembly occurs in relatively random and non-systematic ways, and yet in ways that conform to the ideal frequencies of probabilities. In other words, there are probabilities of events coming together to make possible the emergence of new, organized schemes of recurrence. Emergent probability is Lonergan's first approximation to the intelligible unity of the evolving universe.  

As he puts it, the universe has an "upwardly but indeterminately directed dynamism." The process is "upward" because earlier and simpler schemes set the conditions for the emergence of later and more complex schemes. It is "indeterminate" because the sets of conditions are assembled non-systematically. But the whole process is nevertheless "directed," because probabilities mean that out of large numbers of random events over long periods of time, sets of conditions with non-zero probabilities will eventually appear and lead to the emergence of corresponding cycles. And once these cycles emerge, they in turn shift the probabilities for more complex cycles from zero to some finite fraction. The occurrences of such conditions and the emergences of cycles from them must oscillate non-systematically around the ideal frequencies of probabilities.  

Hence the complex and ever shifting combinations of classical correlations and probabilities is responsible for increasing complexity and diversity in the universe. There is no need to postulate any special super-force, radial energy, or constantly intervening intelligent designer that directs this process over and above what is discovered by classical and statistical methods. This upwardly but indeterminately directed pattern is a natural consequence of the methods that scientific

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145 Insight, 143-44.  
146 Insight, 501.
investigators find in the course of their researches.\textsuperscript{147}

Therefore, the directedness of evolution in Lonergan’s sense is compatible with randomness. Evolution does happen randomly, but not just randomly. Evolution (emergent probability) does not happen without randomness, but randomness is not the whole story. Rather, it would be more accurate to say that evolution happens probabilistically. Randomness is intimately connected with what is probable, and vice versa. Randomness is not just complete chaos. Rather, randomness is non-systematic oscillation around an ideal frequency (probability). But probability is an intelligibility, and this means that the appearances of conditions and emergences have probabilisitic inevitability about them, even though the exact times and places of their occurrences are indeterminate and random. This is one of the most important ideas that Lonergan contributes to the discussion of evolution.

**Hierarchy in Science and Higher Orders in the Universe**

The fact that the actuation of earlier cycles can set conditions for the emergence of more complex later cycles does not by itself imply that there are higher orders of events and things. For example, it is possible that the classical correlations of physics could have explained every scheme of recurrence however great its complexity. If so, the complex schemes would have just been extremely complex combinations of the classical correlations discovered by physicists.

Like Teilhard, however, Lonergan disagreed with the reductionism which holds that all realities can be adequately explained by laws of physics alone. Instead he presented an argument showing that the emergences of distinctly higher orders of more complex schemes are completely compatible with and need to be investigated by the methods of science. The centerpiece of his argument resides in his attention to regularity. If there are regularities in nature that cannot be adequately explained by systematic combinations of the laws of physics – if physics “has to regard as merely coincidental what in fact is regular”\textsuperscript{148} – then there really are higher generic orders in the universe. This in

\textsuperscript{147} This does not imply that there is no divine creator, however. See Patrick H. Byrne, “Lonergan, Evolutionary Science, and Intelligent Design,” Revista Portuguesa de Filosofia: Special Edition – Bernard Lonergan and Philosophy 63 (2007): 893-913.

\textsuperscript{148} Insight, 281.
turn would mean that there is a hierarchy of scientific methods, each of which investigates its own order of classical correlations and their associated probabilities. The methods and findings of the higher sciences would not be logically deducible from those of the lower sciences. Rather, these distinct, autonomous sciences would be related by means of what Lonergan called “higher viewpoints.”

Higher viewpoints constitute intelligent, though not deductive, relationships among distinct scientific realms.

Lonergan went beyond offering an argument that establishes the possibility of a hierarchy of empirical sciences and higher generic orders. He also proposed that there actually are at least five orders in this hierarchy of natural sciences – physics, chemistry, biology, sensitive or animal psychology, and rational or human psychology – in ascending order. So it follows that there are at least five distinct kinds of intelligibilities (classical correlations) that correspond to each of the sciences. The need for these distinct types of correlations arises from the order of nature itself. According to this idea, there was a long period in which various kinds of purely physical schemes of recurrence were emerging and setting conditions for the emergence of still other physical schemes. But at some point in time, a sufficient concentration of physical events and schemes brought about a shift in the probabilities of emergences of the simplest kinds of chemical schemes. Chemical schemes functioned with regularities that cannot be accounted for by the laws of physics alone. Likewise, after a considerable period of time when a diversity and complexity of chemical schemes proliferated and the physical conditions (such as temperature) reached the appropriate state, they dramatically increased the probabilities for the emergence of life forms. And likewise, bacterial and botanical life forms eventually set the conditions and shifted the probabilities for the emergence of animals with simple nervous systems. Then gradually ever more complicated nervous systems emerged, finally setting the conditions for the emergence of human beings.

The Higher Human Order

In an important sense, Lonergan himself should be regarded as having contributed to the higher science of rational or human

149 Insight, 37-43, 281.
psychology. He would define human beings as those sensate animals that have the capacity for higher acts of consciousness such as insights, judgments of fact and value, acts of feeling response to all values, free decisions, and acts of love. Furthermore, what makes human beings distinctively human is the manner in which these acts of consciousness are organized into a recurrent and self-correcting structure by an unrestricted desire to ask questions about what is intelligent, reasonable, valuable, responsible, and loving. Hence human beings in the full and proper sense arise only with the emergence of sensate beings who actually perform conscious activities structured in this way.

Human beings use these activities to construct social and cultural patterns and institutions. With the advent of human beings, emergent probability begins to advance not only intelligibly but also intelligently. Lonergan remarks that human intelligence is an endless source of new intelligible, recurring schemes. Pre-human schemes emerge intelligibly as appropriate conditions are fulfilled non-systematically in accord with ideal frequencies (probabilities). But these processes do not involve consciousness (here Lonergan differs from Teilhard). With the rise of humanity, however, new schemes originate once human beings intelligently have insights and put them into action. Human intelligence devises ever novel intelligible possible orders. Human insights make possible the production of new kinds of goods and services – new technologies. Human insights also discover ever new ways of determining who should receive those goods and services – new economic arrangements. Insights also make possible new forms of human cooperation – social and political orders – and new ways of evaluating the justice and goodness of the economic, social, and political arrangements – cultural institutions and practices. Human insights also devise new ways of teaching one another these innovations so that the intelligent achievements of a few can become widely available to many. This intellectual transformation of the world, this intelligent process of emerging complex sets of properly human schemes of recurrence, corresponds to what Teilhard calls hominsation, or the noosphere.

150 Insight, 291-92.
Generalized Emergent Probability

Lonegan claimed that in addition to classical and statistical methods, two additional types of scientific methods are needed to fully and adequately investigate the natural and human universe – genetic and dialectical methods. Genetic method is needed to understand the distinctive kind of intelligibility that characterizes embryological and other forms of development. Development is a distinctive kind of self-modifying process. In any stage of a development an organism is modifying its underlying biochemical constituents. In doing so it is changing the conditions under which its own recurrent schemes have been operating. A developing stage of an entity will change its underlying conditions so radically that it undermines its own ability to continue. This stage’s self-modifications destroy the stage itself. Yet at the same time and rather remarkably these modifications put in place conditions for the emergence of a new and more complex scheme of recurrence that is more differentiated and nuanced than the stage it succeeds. This distinctively intelligible form of self-modification also pertains to the growth of self-correcting understanding in individual human beings and to genuine advances in human social orders as well. This remarkable linking among self-modification, self-replacement, and emergent maturity of functioning is the kind of intelligibility that genetic methods seek to understand.\textsuperscript{151}

Dialectical method, on the other hand, is needed to address a problem unique to human affairs – namely that people do not always act intelligently. Human affairs are compounds of intelligent actions and irrational deeds. This combination of intelligent and biased actions produces a complex situation that Lonergan called “the social surd.”\textsuperscript{152} Positively, when individuals’ actions are intelligent, their results set conditions for further questions, further insights and further intelligent actions by both the originators as well as by others affected by those actions. This series of intelligent actions leads to ever more intelligible improvements to the human situation. Yet on the other hand, biased, irrational actions set the conditions for increased misunderstanding, frustration, anger, ressentiment, and further biased actions both

\textsuperscript{151} \textit{Insight}, 476-92.
\textsuperscript{152} \textit{Insight}, 255.
from the perpetrators as well as from others affected by the results of their actions. In order to deal with the complex, conflicting ways in which human affairs unfold, Lonergan identified the need for a fourth, dialectical method.

Both developments and dialectical conflicts complicate the sets of conditions from which successive stages of the evolving universe emerge. Just as earlier schemes of recurrence set conditions for the emergence of later schemes of recurrence, so also primitive developing organisms can set conditions for the later emergence of more sophisticated developing organisms. The same can be said of the ways in which one kind of dialectical process sets the conditions for more complex dialectical processes. Again, just as the emergence of earlier schemes of recurrence change the probabilities of emergence for later ones, the same holds true for the emergence of earlier developmental and dialectical processes. They also shift the probabilities for the emergence of subsequent schemes of recurrence, developments and irrational conflicts.

This conditioned series of emergent cycles, developments, and dialectical processes is more general than emergent probability based on classical and statistical methods alone. This generalization is Lonergan’s way of speaking of the intelligible unity of the evolving universe. For this reason he claims that the actual unity of the universe is “an immanent intelligible order, which we have found reason to identify with a generalized emergent probability.”

**A Transcendent Unity: Collaboration with God**

However, the dialectical elements in generalized emergent probability pose a problem for the notion of unity. The unity of the universe accessible by scientific methods alone remains a fractured unity. The evil and sinful states of affairs that result from freely chosen but unintelligent, irrational, irresponsible human actions raise the question of whether or not the dynamism of the evolving universe is capable of attaining true unity after all. Teilhard’s optimism about inevitable progress is seriously called into question by this broken, dialectical state of human affairs.

153 *Insight*, 243.
154 *Insight*, 533.
For Lonergan, this is the problem of evil. To his mind the problem of evil is not "How can there be an all good, all understanding, and all powerful God in the face of so much evil?" In his elaboration of his "imperfect, analogous" understanding of God, he argued that God as unrestricted act of understanding exists, and is all knowing, all powerful, and all good. The problem is not, therefore, whether God can be good given the evil found in the world. For Lonergan, rather, given that God is all good, all understanding, and all powerful, there has to be some further dimension to the unity of the universe than has been envisioned so far in generalized emergent probability. That is to say, for Lonergan evil is a problem in the sense of something that requires a solution, and the further dimension in the unity of the universe is that solution.

Lonergan works out a heuristic account of the sorts of things that would have to be true of this further component to the unity of the universe. It is a "supernatural" component because it goes beyond what can be envisioned by the four scientific methods (and indeed beyond human cognition in general). Because this further dimension is supernatural, it does not emerge from earlier stages of evolution. It is rather divinely initiated in a supernatural fashion. It is "not the work of [humanity] alone, but principally the work of God." Nevertheless, this further dimension is "a harmonious continuation of the actual order of the universe," which means that it involves the emergence of "a new and higher integration of human activity." Moreover, since this collaboration "is a harmonious continuation of... emergent probability, it follows that the emergence of the solution and its propagation will be in accord with the probabilities."

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155 *Insight*, 680-84.

156 In fact, Lonergan notes that there are several possible kinds of further components which are "in some sense supernatural." Each kind would be consistent with the nature of the problem of evil and would provide different kinds of solutions to it (*Insight*, 746-50). Lonergan sketches these possibilities as aids to identifying the actual solution that God provides. I am grateful to Ivo Coelho for pointing this out to me. See his "'In Some Sense Supernatural': Making Sense of an Anomaly in Chapter 20 of *Insight.*" in this issue of the Lonergan Workshop Journal.

157 *Insight*, 741.

158 *Insight*, 719.

159 *Insight*, 720.
higher integration is a collaboration of human beings "with God in solving [humanity's] problem of evil." That is to say, human beings collaborate with God in transforming the effects of evil into good. Human beings are made capable of participating in this collaboration by God's gratuitous bestowal of the supernatural virtues of faith, hope, and self-sacrificing love of God and one's neighbor.

*Insight* is a philosophical work. It can argue that the unity of the universe must include a divine-human collaboration based on God's gifts of faith, hope, and love. But elaborating the contents of the faith that makes that collaboration possible entails leaving philosophy and engaging in theology. From a Christian theological point of view, this collaboration with God in transforming evil into good is the work of the Mystical Body of Christ. To understand the ultimate unity of the universe, therefore, is to understand the wholeness of all evolution as the evolution of the Mystical Body of Christ.

Lonergan stated that formulating a systematic understanding of the doctrine of the Mystical Body would be a very complex affair. It would require attaining and elaborating a systematic understanding not only of the Mystical Body of Christ, but also the doctrines of grace, redemption, the Trinity, the Incarnation, the missions of the Word and the Spirit, among other things. This is a project that Lonergan alone was clearly not able to finish in his own lifetime. Those working with Lonergan's method are making substantial progress toward this goal, and hopefully this discussion of unity is a contribution toward that goal.

**COMMUNICATION OF SYSTEMATICS: TEILHARD AND LONERGAN COMPARED**

There are striking parallels, and yet significant differences, between Teilhard and Lonergan in their approaches to the question of the unity of the universe, of evolution and of humanity with God.

Both took the inspiration of their visions of unity with God from the writings of St. Paul. Teilhard frequently cited as a source of his thought Colossians 1:17 ("He is before all things, and in him all things

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160 *Insight*, 741.

hold together.”) Lonergan on the other hand was inspired at an early age by Ephesians 1:10 (“In all wisdom and insight, [God the Father] has made known to us the mystery of his will in accord with his favor that he set forth in [Jesus Christ] as a plan for the fullness of times, to sum up all things [pantōn anakephalaiōsis] in Christ, in heaven and on earth.”) Each understood Paul’s phrase “all things” to apply to the entirety of the natural and human universe, and set about to elaborate St. Paul’s vision of unity in the context of modern science and history.

Both also strongly affirmed that evolution has a direction, in spite of prevailing extra-scientific opinions to the contrary. Teilhard transformed Bergson’s metaphysics into a Christian vision of evolution. He modified Bergson’s notion of an élán vital into a kind of consciousness nascent in the earliest states of matter, directing the process throughout, and gradually reaching reflectiveness in human beings. He went beyond Bergson in arguing that once evolution reaches consciousness in human reflectiveness it can and indeed must explicitly recognize that it has been headed all along toward Christ, the Omega, as the ultimate goal toward which this cosmic consciousness has been striving. Such recognition is achieved by a faith that goes beyond the scientific form of reflective knowledge.

In place of Teilhard’s cosmic consciousness providing the direction for evolution, Lonergan focused instead upon two key dimensions of scientific methodologies – the indeterminacy of classical correlations and the ideal frequencies of statistical investigations. He showed that these imply a series of schemes of recurrence and higher integrations, the later ones emerging out of earlier ones. This sequential ordering of conditioning and conditioned schemes according to ideal frequencies is sufficient to explain the indeterminate directedness of evolution. The schemes of cooperation with God in Christ form the ultimate stage in

162 Referenced at Wall, The Phenomenology of Man, 294. See also 1 Corinthians 15:28, “When everything is subjected to him, then the Son himself will [also] be subjected to the one who subjected everything to him, so that God may be all in all.” Henri de Lubac, Teilhard de Chardin, 35-44.

this directed series.

Both Teilhard and Lonergan envisioned an ascent in time across orders of beings that are dramatically distinct from one another from the earliest physical state to the advances of human culture and the entry of God into human history. Teilhard conceives of this advance as an ever expanding, complexifying, and increasingly conscious series of concentric spheres. Lonergan conceives of it as the emergence of an ever expanding, hierarchical, generically distinct series of “explanatory genera” of cycles. Teilhard draws upon these images of concentric spheres to symbolize the unity in terms of a “Center of centers.”

By way of contrast, for Lonergan, the rise of the hierarchy of scientific disciplines confronts each human being “with a universe of being in which it finds itself, not the center of reference, but an object coordinated with other objects and, with them, subordinated to some destiny to be discovered or invented, approved or disdained, accepted or repudiated.” Rather than a centered unity, Lonergan envisioned a mysterious, unimaginable, decentered union in the Mystical Body of Christ.

It is important to emphasize that in Lonergan’s account, the emergence of new cycles and new genera do not require any special kind of radial energy or *élan vital*. Except for the final supernatural level, all the prior stages of emergence and complexity are explainable as the natural and expected outcomes of the intelligibilities of the laws of science. The classical laws determine what will occur under varying conditions, and statistical laws determine how frequently the appropriate conditions can be expected to be fulfilled. Lonergan agrees with Teilhard that mechanical laws of science alone cannot do justice to the reality of evolution. Yet he disagrees that it is necessary to postulate a radial energy in order to account fully for the intelligibility of evolution. Instead he draws attention to an implication of statistical method that is often overlooked. That is to say, if the probabilities found in statistical studies are correct, then they identify a certain kind of normativity in the universe. If \( p \) is truly the probability of some scheme of events, then such schemes do happen, although the precise times and places are not determined. In addition, since the probabilities of later schemes shift from zero toward larger values as lower schemes

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164 *Insight*, 498.
165 *Insight*, 505.
begin to function, then the universe as a whole becomes “increasingly systematic” since it has an ever increasing probability of becoming filled with ever more complex schemes.  

Both Teilhard and Lonergan claim that the evolutionary dynamism of the universe becomes conscious in humanity. For Teilhard, humanity discovers that it “is nothing other than evolution become conscious of itself.” For Lonergan, “the tension that is inherent in the finality of all proportionate being becomes in [humanity] a conscious tension.” There is a significant difference, however, in the nature of this consciousness. Teilhard needs a kind of cosmic consciousness to direct pre-human evolution from the very beginning. This consciousness becomes self-reflective in human beings. For Lonergan, on the other hand, the finality of the natural universe operates in the interplay between random assemblies of the “empirical residue” of conditions according to probabilities followed by emergences according to classical correlations. This natural unsettledness of the universe becomes conscious, not because human beings are reflective, but because we are endowed with inquiry in the form of an unrestricted, inquisitive desire to understand and know everything about everything.

Again, both Teilhard and Lonergan remark on the challenges facing humanity once its growth in knowledge recognizes the enormity and complexity of the evolving world, and that humanity itself participates in that unfolding. For Lonergan, this intellectual development “reveals to a [humanity] a universe of being in which [each] is but an item, and a universal order in which [one’s] desires and fears, [one’s] delight and anguish are but infinitesimal components in the history of [humankind].” According to Teilhard, in the face of such discoveries our anxiety could be set at ease if we could form the conviction that we are “contributing infinitessimally ... to the building of something definite.” For Lonergan this anxiety is overcome by discovering the unity and the destiny of the movement of the universe, and approving,

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166 Insight, 149.
167 Wall, The, Phenomenology of Man, 221 (quoting Julian Huxley).
168 Insight, 497.
169 Insight, 498.
170 de Chardin, The Divine Milieu, 56.
The Unity of Science, the Universe, and Humanity

accepting, and cooperating with it.\textsuperscript{171}

Lonergan’s Systematics has a certain advantage over Teilhard’s symbolic mode of communication. He does not need to invoke radial energy but can work out issues strictly in terms of methods and findings that scientists agree upon. He does not have to maintain that sin is inevitable. Rather, Lonergan’s account of human “essential freedom” conserves the traditional position that sin is a radically free choice, in no way predetermined by the original state of the universe.\textsuperscript{172} Nevertheless, Lonergan does leave open the possibility that “statistical laws . . . indicate the probable frequencies” that subsequent human actions will be sinful responses to the conditions of the “social surd” generated from other human beings’ previous sinful actions.\textsuperscript{173} His approach to theological method enabled him “to remove apparent inconsistencies, to move towards some grasp of spiritual matters,”\textsuperscript{174} in a way that is beyond the capacity of Teilhard’s compact symbolic approach.

While for Teilhard, affirmation of the existence of the Omega has to be a matter of faith, for Lonergan the matter is a bit more complicated. Because of the manifold distortions that creep into human consciousness through the propagation of sin, human intelligence and reasonableness is weakened almost to the point of extinction. Thus, in his account of the further dimension, Lonergan argues that God’s gift of faith will make it possible for humans to believe what they could in principle have thought out themselves, were it not for the distortions of sin. This includes believing that God exists, and believing that God could in principle be known analogically by human intelligence and reason. Again, the gift of faith would also make it possible to believe that God endows humanity with special gifts enabling it to enter into the higher collaboration and higher unity with God. Lonergan adds still further that the gift of faith might make it possible to believe things about God and God’s interactions with humanity that could not even in principle be known directly solely by “immanently generated” human knowledge. Hence, the gift of faith is needed even more in order

\textsuperscript{171} Insight, 498.
\textsuperscript{172} Insight, 641-45, 689-91.
\textsuperscript{173} Insight, 767.
\textsuperscript{174} Method in Theology, 132.
to believe that God has offered the actual solution and higher unity in Christ and the Holy Spirit.

Teilhard died before *Insight* was published, so he had no opportunity to comment on Lonergan’s thought. On the other hand, Lonergan did have that opportunity and used it to comment positively on Teilhard’s efforts. He did so in several places. The most detailed came at the 1962 Institute on “The Method of Theology” sponsored by the Regis College Jesuit Community at the University of Toronto. There Lonergan responded to a question from the audience regarding Teilhard:

There is no easy unification of theory and common sense. There are ultimate limitations, and we must recognize them and build on them. Is this the problem that Teilhard was working on? The fundamental problem today is that there are all sorts of people at the peak of human culture whose ideas on religion are most elementary. Teilhard was able to talk religion to such people. Such limited objectives are legitimate. But Catholic truth is not contained within the limits of these limited objectives... [A fuller theological method] has to be mediated by the subject for fundamental concepts and operations and for the elimination of the influence of horizon and lack of conversion. These are the fundamental problems. Clearing them up is the only way to get beyond the overload on dogmatic theologians.175

Lonergan clearly endorsed the positive contributions Teilhard made to communicating a more mature vision of God to those who understood evolutionary science. Teilhard himself explicitly said that he wrote *The Divine Milieu* for “waverers,” rather than for people of faith.176 It is noteworthy, however, that when Lonergan endorsed Teilhard’s mission to people “whose ideas on religion are most elementary,” he did *not* indicate that this mission was limited to non-Catholics. Teilhard’s writings made an especially strong contribution among scientifically educated Catholics – who also, it would seem, had not gotten beyond

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elementary ideas on religion from the kinds of Catholic religious instruction that had been in vogue just prior to the publication of Teilhard’s works.

Nevertheless, it is also true that Lonergan regarded Teilhard’s work as only a partial contribution to the task of communicating the fullness of Catholic faith. He saw his own work in Systematics as a necessary supplement to and refinement of the communicative strategies of thinkers such as Teilhard.

On the other hand, Teilhard has certain advantages over Lonergan. The removal of apparent inconsistencies of symbolic expressions is often achieved only through the use of the technical language and subtle distinctions that are required in the work of theory and Systematics. Yet that work needs to be mediated to people who do not specialize in such work. Even though Lonergan assigned great importance to the work of Systematics, he used the symbol of the “chasm” from Luke’s Gospel (16:26) to emphasize how foreign and deeply separated this work would seem to most people. Yet the consequences of failing to either do the work of Systematics or to bridge that chasm are serious indeed. That failure is evident in the undifferentiated suppression of Teilhard’s writings at exactly the time when there was such a tremendous hunger and thirst for the kind of communication of unity that he strove to achieve. This is what Lonergan meant when he said that this combination of Systematics with Communications was “the only way to get beyond the overload on dogmatic theologians. . . . The alternative is the magisterium simply takes over.”

Hence the kind of work in the Systematics of unity that Lonergan envisioned needs to be followed up by work as rich in symbolism as was Teilhard’s. Symbols communicate more than Systematic words can. As we have seen, this can often lead to unintended implications and distortions. But the something more is also needed in order to “induce in the hearer some share in the meaning of the speaker” when that meaning has implications for the human heart and human feelings. Then symbolism must be added to the Systematic meanings, but now freed from inconsistencies and false implications.

Dante sought to give poetic expression to the systematic theology of Aquinas. Teilhard gave symbolic expression to the metaphysics of Bergson and the vision of St Paul. Something comparable remains to be done for the kind of Systematic theology that Lonergan began and others are completing regarding the unity of the universe and humanity with God in Christ. Teilhard offers an inspiring example for the kind of work in Communications that lies ahead.
I am honored to share the podium with Michael McCarthy this morning. We had not conferred with one another about our talks, but I can wholeheartedly support what he just presented in “Reforming the Church, Redeeming the World.” I will now simply complement what he was saying with three pastoral situations. My experience of “The promise of Vatican II” is in local Detroit parishes, where I have been working for more than forty-five years. I was a student at the Gregorian during the four years of the Vatican Council. When I returned to the States and plunged into parish ministry, I came to realize that I had absorbed a degree of pastoral attitude from professors like Rene Latourelle, Frank Sullivan, Joseph Fuchs, and Bernard Lonergan—and a great deal from the proceedings of the council itself.

After about twenty years, I decided to come to the Lonergan Workshop. The first people I met at breakfast on Monday morning were Therese and Mel Mason from Toronto. They were brimming over with enthusiasm for the Thomas More Institute as an opportunity for developing lay leadership, and I was fascinated with their appreciation of Lonergan’s pastoral sense. Bernard Lonergan was not a household

1 The Thomas More Institute for Adult Education was founded in Montreal in 1945 by Jesuit Fr. Eric O’Connor. An affiliated program operates in Toronto. Thomas More (1478-1535) was one of the great humanist scholars of the Renaissance. He contributed to the shift from the medieval to the modern world by articulating and promoting, for men and women alike, a new conception of education based upon open inquiry and critical thought. In like manner, the institute aims to provide opportunities for lifelong learning and liberal education for adults. Students participate on the basis of their curiosity about a specific question and their wish to expand the horizon of their understanding. They
In my remarks today, I will be reaching up to the mind of Lonergan as it was fermenting at the time of the council. Seven of those eleven papers were delivered at the Thomas More Institute in Montreal; they give us a nice glimpse into Lonergan’s thinking at work, in particular when he was talking with “ordinary folk.” In addition the original Collection is an extraordinary bird’s-eye-view of the ferment during the council years, for example, “Metaphysics as Horizon” (1963), “Cognitional Structure” (1964), and “Existenz and Aggiornamanto” (1964). And now we have the bookends of Lonergan’s work during those years in volume 22 of the Collected Works.

I call your attention to the trilogy of “meaning” lectures, which help us understand the council itself, and the debates that have transpired these fifty years since. “Time and Meaning” and “The Analogy of Meaning” were both given at the Thomas More Institute a few days before the first and the second council sessions respectively. Then, shortly after the council closed, Lonergan gave “Dimensions of Meaning” at Marquette University. These lectures, many of which were delivered endorse the Socratic method: people of all ages and all backgrounds coming together to exchange their views on what a reading means to them. The shared inquiry unfolds in a specially designed sequence. The discussion leaders have special knowledge in a particular field, but they call themselves students as well. Fr. O’Connor invited his friend Bernard Lonergan to lecture there frequently for more than twenty years.


4 Collection, 188-245.


6 In this regard, see Massimo Faggioli, Vatican II: The Battle for Meaning (New York: Paulist Press, 2012).

7 Collection, 183-213.

8 Collection, 232-45.
to lay leaders precisely during the Vatican Council years, capture the Promise of Vatican II – the importance of communicating the meaning of the Good News, effectively, among all the faithful, and to the world. I say among the faithful and to the world because that is the spirit in which Pope John called the council. It is the spirit of Pacem in Terris, which he wrote as his Last Will and Testament to the church, but also addressed “to all those of good will.” Pacem in Terris became the North Star, orienting the council’s work. Its dual commitment to the faithful and to the world is evident in the cornerstone constitution Dei Verbum, in Lumen Gentium, it runs through Gaudium et Spes from the first line to the last, and it inspired Dignitatis Humane and Nostra Aetate.

Today I will propose three pastoral situations that illustrate some of these ideas that Lonergan was fermenting: Care of Contrary Catholics, empowering African-American leadership in the White Catholic Church, and how to respond to the diminishing numbers of young Catholics.

CARE OF THE CONTRARY

Anyone in pastoral ministry can regale friends with stories about contrary people, and I could easily overextend my time here today with any one of several. We are often challenged to give compassionate and responsible pastoral care to persons who do not fit the ideal Roman Catholic lifestyle.

Meet Roman.⁹ I had never met Roman when he called the rectory. He gave me his address, and I confirmed that he was in our parish. “Well, then, you are my pastor!” he said. “I’m dying; I think you should come to visit me.” Roman’s neighborhood is seriously blighted, and his street is devastated. His house was extremely cluttered, with a narrow path leading from the front door to the kitchen, where he was sitting at an aluminum folding table. The smell was rank and oppressive. There were no curtains – newspaper pages were glued over every window pane. Countless extension cords were snaking throughout the house, connecting all sorts of small appliances. Half-eaten Meals on Wheels were strewn at one end of the table. Roaches roamed freely, and an occasional mouse skittered across the floor.

⁹ Names are changed, but all the people in this narrative are very real.
He wanted to make me a deal. He wanted to be buried at St. Hedwig Cemetery, and he would give me his house if I would get a gravesite for him. I asked if he had plans for his funeral; he did not. It was clear to me that no one would buy his house, and if even if someone did, it would not cover the cost of even the cheapest funeral. But "to bury the dead" is a corporal work of mercy, so I agreed to help him.

Why St. Hedwig’s? He had become a Catholic as a young man, then drifted away. But a few years ago he happened to attend a Mass at St. Hedwig’s on All Soul’s Day. During the Mass he had an overwhelming experience of being surrounded by all the souls of the people buried there. He told me, “I could hear the saints quietly talking to the souls of the dead! When the Mass was over, I wandered through the cemetery until after dark. The guards had to ask me to leave so they could close the gates. I knew that I needed to be buried at St. Hedwig’s. I want my soul to be there with all those saints!” With a deep sigh he looked at me intently: “I’m known as the neighborhood atheist; but I never stopped believing in God. I just thought I had too much else to do. It’s been a while! It’s time for me to come back.”

I brought him Holy Communion. We said the prayers, and I presented the Body of Christ – the first time in many years. We paused in silent prayer. I was startled out of my contemplation with Roman asking, “Where’s the wine?” I affirmed that there is both consecrated bread and wine at Mass, but when they bring communion to the sick, they don’t bring the wine. “Well, they should!” he exclaimed. Roman is a head-strong guy. As I was leaving he reminded me, “Next time, bring the wine. I like Chianti!”

I was not about to start a new custom of Communion Ministers carrying consecrated wine all over the parish, so I came to a compromise. I got a small jelly jar with a tight lid and filled it with Chianti. I gave him the Body of Christ, then handed him the wine. He took a sip, said an extemporaneous prayer, and handed it back. I put the lid back on, and set it among his pill and vitamin bottles. I figured he would drink the rest of it on his own. But he did not. The next time I brought communion, the jar was untouched. It lasted for several visits. He prayed some of his most heartfelt prayers in union with the Blood of Christ after sipping the wine. I considered the wine a sacramental that facilitated Roman’s prayer.
One day Roman gave me the keys to his shed. “There’s some good tools out there. Go get them before they get stolen.” Our parish has a service corps of young people who volunteer a year or two to teach in our school and do community organizing. I pressed the two guys into service (both are named Philip), and we filled a pickup truck. We noted how final it seems when a man gives away his tools.

I asked if he had any relatives who might want some of his things. He shook his head firmly. “Nobody. I was married once, but it didn’t last.” I asked if he had children. “A son. I never held him.” Then he changed the subject. Over the months I brought up the question of his son a couple more times, but he insisted, with an attitude both sad and defiant, that he had no idea where he was, living or dead.

The weeks turned into months. Roman called hospice on his own and had a doctor certify that he was terminal; but then he rallied and refused to let the hospice people come to his house, which was cluttered with piles of stuff three or four feet high, some of it in its original shipping packages. Roman was a compulsive buyer and hoarder. He was computer savvy, and by mail-order he spent his entire monthly Social Security on stuff he could never use. Meanwhile he got a shut-off notice from the gas company. He contacted a Helping Hands charity and convinced them to pay part of the bill.

Roman became bedridden. He slept on a folding cot with a flimsy mattress. When I would visit, I sat next to him on his cluttered bed, and put my arm around his skin-and-bones shoulders as we said the prayers and he prayed over the blood of Christ. A neighbor woman, Maebell, came in to make him breakfast every day. She would place snacks and bottles of water on the chair next to his bed and carry out the bottles of urine and soiled diapers. One morning I conferred with her quietly in the kitchen. “One of these days, one of us is going to come in here and find that Roman did not make it through the night. If that happens, he has his funeral arrangements all made. Here is the phone number.” She started to cry. Then I started to cry. Roman was a cantankerous old character, he could be demanding and manipulating; yet something about him touched us.

Very early one morning the phone rang. It was Roman. He was in such pain that he was calling hospice to take him to the hospital. He asked me, “Can you come over? I don’t want to be alone.” This was
a startling admission from an independent old cuss who had made a science out of living on his own. It occurred to me that we are held in people's arms at our birth – and we want to be held at the end.

I went over to his house and simply sat by him. We did not talk much. He would doze for a few minutes, then wake up in pain and call the hospice office (which was not yet open) and Maebell (who had turned off her phone for the night). Roman asked me to rummage around under the bed until I found a pouch with a .32 caliber pistol. "You might need that to protect the house," he advised. Hospice sent an ambulance. I visited him later in the day, and found him as feisty as ever, and now unhappy about being in the hospital. "OK, I've had enough of this place," he told me. "Get me back home tomorrow."

I could not in good conscience bring him back to his filthy bed, but I knew there was a new mattress still in its shipping wrappers. The two Philips and I balled up his bedding with duct tape and bagged up some other obvious trash and hauled it to the dumpster. As we were working, I reminded them, "You know when Jesus said, 'I was sick and you visited me.'? This is what Jesus had in mind!" They nodded soberly. Roman died that evening. We went back to the house the next day to do more cleaning. Despite the overwhelming mass of filth, my two helpers were extraordinarily sensitive with this intimate task of sorting through the personal effects cluttered around Roman's deathbed. We found his Bible and a large bronze belt buckle with the image of Christ Crucified on it.

We noticed that Roman's Bible had a few passages marked with little slips of paper. They were quite meaningful – a reading from Job, the finding of the Lost Sheep, the healing of the leper, the Sermon on the Mount. Not many people leave their Bibles carefully marked to be used at their funerals, but I felt that Roman had done precisely that. At the funeral we passed his Bible around for people to read his selected passages, and in my homily I reflected on Jesus teaching the Sermon on the Mount. Matthew implies two distinct audiences: a crowd of people was gathered, and the disciples were up in front. I proposed a "third audience" – from his viewpoint on the mountain side, Jesus could see the whole town spread out below him: people toiling on the land, carrying water, mourning a loved one's death, two people in an argument. These people could not hear Jesus teaching, but he could
see them, and he was talking about them, and to them. Roman was in that third audience. I passed around his belt buckle, with the worn image of Christ on the Cross. He was the "neighborhood atheist," yet he wore a crucifix on his belt. Jesus was gazing at Roman with love, even when he did not happen to be hearing Jesus' words.

Roman was a study in dialectic. He was no saint. He was addicted and egocentric. But he prayed for the people who were looking after him, and there were moments when he fervently offered his suffering in union with the blood of Christ. He kept researching the best way to live with his illness, but was realistic about its fatal prognosis—not many people call hospice on their own. He could not discipline his spending, but he was determined to live in his home as long as he could. He read the Bible intelligently and apparently in a very heartfelt way. Not a paragon of virtue, but, like Jacob wrestling with the angel, he was determined to live, and die, as authentically as his contrary nature allowed him to. In pastoral ministry we often deal with people who do not quite fit our idealized patterns of faith, hope, and love. But using Lonergan's *Realms of Meaning*, I could see that, despite his limitations, he was engaging in all four: common sense, theory, self-appropriation, and transcendence.

**REALMS OF MEANING IN ROMAN'S FAITH**

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th>Common Sense</th>
<th>Theory</th>
<th>Self-Appropriating</th>
<th>Transcendent</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Becoming Catholic at age 20</td>
<td>X</td>
<td>X</td>
<td>X</td>
<td>X</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Wearing crucifix but not attending church</td>
<td>X</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>X</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Experience of the Saints and Souls in cemetery</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>X</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Desire to be interred with these souls</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>X</td>
<td>X</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Desire to connect with pastor in facing death</td>
<td>X</td>
<td>X</td>
<td></td>
<td>X</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Marking relevant passages in his Bible</td>
<td>X</td>
<td></td>
<td>X</td>
<td>X</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
Clore

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Wearing three medals: St. Jude, Mary, Sacred Heart</th>
<th>X</th>
<th>X</th>
<th>X</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Desire to receive Body and Blood of Christ</td>
<td>X</td>
<td>X</td>
<td>X</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Designing his grave marker (Christ, Mary, St. Jude)</td>
<td>X</td>
<td>X</td>
<td>X</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Desire to have pastor with him at the end</td>
<td>X</td>
<td></td>
<td>X</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

We make allowances for people's foibles when they are on their deathbeds. But the reason I am bringing up this case is to illustrate that we need to accommodate our ministry to all sorts of complicated, contrary pastoral situations. It has been said more than once, "If you ask a Catholic priest a question he will quote you a rule." I admit, in the order of transcendental precepts, quoting a rule is more intelligent than giving an off-the-cuff prejudice; but it may not be good judgment. One of Pope John’s purposes for the council was to update Canon Law, to improve our ability to make good pastoral judgments. But even the best of laws are universals, and when it comes to particular judgments in actual lived practice, we may need to employ *epikeia*[^10] or to engage apparently dialectical virtues.

Let me refer to a Rahner scholar, James Bacik, of the University of Toledo. In a concise analysis of Rahner's anthropology in 1986, Bacik proposed pairs of seemingly contrary "dialectic" virtues that enable us to deal with the existential tensions of daily life: Committed-Openness, Hopeful-Realism, Enlightened-Simplicity, and Prayerfully-Prophetic[^11]. Here at Boston College in 2005, at the conference "The Roman Catholic Priesthood in the 21st Century," Bacik added Humble-Confidence[^12]. He


has since included Reflective-Activity and Flexible-Discipline. I would add Communal-Self Interest.

Ministering to Roman was an exercise in dialectic virtue. At times it was humiliating, especially for the women, yet we were confident that he saw the face of Christ in us, and we saw Christ in him. We needed to be flexible in our service of Roman’s needs – housekeeping without really cleaning, nourishing him simply by making breakfast. We had to be disciplined in setting boundaries around his impetuous demands. In our commitment we brought the grace of God into the fetid atmosphere of his ramshackle house. We hoped that the few minutes spent with him at any given time were actually doing him some good, despite the circumstances; and his prayers in union with the Blood of Christ made real the salvific effectiveness of the Cross (as we were discussing last evening with Bob Imbelli). Our experience with Roman now keeps us reflecting more deeply about other encounters we are having. Looking back, we see how our service to Roman was a gift to us – we stand more enlightened in the gritty simplicity of it all.

Today’s world (and today’s church) is nothing if not dialectical. There are many pastoral situations that do not comfortably embrace “the rules” with “the real.” We often find ourselves challenged to accommodate people who do not fit the norm. Countless people feel excluded from the church because their first marriage failed. Gays and lesbians do not feel at home in a church that refers to them as intrinsically disordered. Lonergan lists Dialectic as the fourth functional specialty, but since dialectic is related to transcendence, it operates in all the specialties.13 St. Ignatius of Loyola called the apostolic life Contemplation in Action – an apparent contradiction, but a very real daily dialectic. I propose that the eighth functional specialty, the pastoral theology of Communications, requires healthy doses of what Bacik calls Committed-Openness, Hopeful-Realism, Reflective-Activity, and Flexible-Discipline.

13 Lonergan presented the eight functional specialties as distinct, but he was clear that they are interrelated. There is plenty of dialectic in systematics nowadays, and (as Bacik illustrates), there is plenty of dialectic in day-to-day living, in communications. (Boston College Lectures, Transcendental Philosophy and the Study of Religion, July 1968, Early Works on Theological Method I), 464-66.
Let us consider a more complicated example of dialectic in parish ministry: promoting minority leadership in a multicultural congregation. Patrick Brennan surveyed several parishes in the Chicago and Milwaukee area that were noted for their energetic participation. He found that the multicultural parish had the most problems eliciting parish-wide participation and developing lay leadership.\(^{14}\) I have worked in multicultural ministry since my first assignment in 1966. I can concur with Brennan’s findings.

The parish where I am pastor has been conscious about being welcoming and racially inclusive for more than thirty years. African Americans, Vietnamese, Hispanics, and Anglos almost universally say that they feel very much at home at Christ the King. We are a small but energetic city parish, we pay our bills, we are among the last city parishes in Detroit to still run a school — but nevertheless, our church is not overflowing and we are on the list to be clustered or merged.

Two and a half years ago, we did a goal-setting process — our Number One Goal is to grow the parish. Our Number Two Goal supports the first: take positive steps at inclusion — race, gender, age, and sexual orientation. In particular, since most of Detroit is African American, we want neighborhood people to recognize, the first time they walk through our doors, that Christ the King should be their home church. As we have been promoting this second goal, we find that we have four distinct groups of parishioners:

1. We have white people who consciously choose to be members, who see our racial integration as a unique experience of a loving community. They fear that stirring up trouble will destroy our union.
2. We have black people who consciously choose to be members, who see our racial integration as a unique experience of a loving community. They fear that stirring up trouble will destroy our union.
3. We have black people who know we must be more assertive about involving African Americans in all levels of leadership, really

“owning” their participation in the church. They are vocally prophetic about confronting the remnants of racism here in our parish.

4. We have white people who know we must be more assertive about involving African Americans in all levels of leadership, really “owning” their participation in the church. They also are vocally prophetic about confronting the remnants of racism here in our parish.

Vatican II parish ministry calls for building community. Lonergan analyzed community in terms of common meaning in “Existenz and Aggiornamanto.” In that paper he is focused on being oneself, but an individual person can be an authentic self only within the limits of his or her community. Community is not just a bunch of people within a geographical border. It is an achievement of common meaning:

Common meaning is potential when there is a common field of experience [that’s us at mass on Sunday]. Common meaning is formal when there is a common understanding [that is beginning to happen as we listen to one another’s stories]… Common meaning is actual inasmuch as there are common judgments, areas in which all affirm and deny in the same manner [we are still struggling with this]… Common meaning is realized by will, especially by permanent dedication, in the love that makes families, in the loyalty that makes states, in the faith that makes religions. [This is our goal, and I will let you know in three or four years how it is going!] Community coheres or divides, begins or ends, just where the common field of experience, common understanding, common judgment, common commitments begin and end.\(^1^5\)

We have been calling ourselves a community. But suddenly we do not seem to be sharing common meaning. Groups 1 and 2 think we all have a common field of experience and understanding, but now they are disturbed by the prophets in groups 3 and 4 who do not share that

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\(^{15}\) “Existenz and Aggiornamanto” (Regis College, to Jesuit students, September 14, 1964; published in the Regis College student publication Focus: A Theological Journal, 1965: 5-14; Collection, 222-31, 226.
rosy judgment. And, of course, the whites in group 1 and the blacks in group 2, even though they happen to agree with each other on this issue, can't help but have different horizons due to whole lifetimes of vastly different experiences. The same is true of groups 3 and 4. This is clearly a situation of differing horizons in a dialectic relationship. It is beginning to feel like Lonergan's most grim assessment of dialectic in *Method in Theology*:

> What in one is found intelligible, in another is unintelligible. What for one is true, for another is false. What for one is good, for another is evil. Each may . . . in a manner include the other. But such inclusion is also negation and rejection. For the other's horizon . . . is attributed to wishful thinking, to an acceptance of myth, to ignorance, to blindness or illusion . . . to bad will, to a refusal of God's grace. Such a rejection of the other may be passionate, and then the suggestion that openness is desirable will make one furious. But again rejection may have . . . a wan smile.\(^{16}\)

At Christ the King we are experiencing a serious case of dialectic as we begin to realize, to our considerable surprise, that we live in different horizons – even though we have been consciously working at interracial integration for more than thirty years! And as Lonergan pointed out: "The horizon is prior to meaningful statements. Stated problems and their solutions have meaning only within the horizon within which they arise."\(^{17}\) It would be impossible, in fact, undesirable, to try to merge these horizons completely – part of the creative dynamic of our parish is precisely the diversity in backgrounds and experience. But can we bring these differing horizons into greater overlap, and if so, how?

We need to keep reminding one another that dialectic has a hopeful purpose: "[D]ialectic aims at a comprehensive viewpoint. It seeks some single base or some understanding of the character, the oppositions, and the relations of the many viewpoints exhibited in conflicting Christian movements, their conflicting histories, and their conflicting interpretations."\(^{18}\) The chairperson of our Pastoral Council

\(^{16}\) *Method in Theology*, 236-37.

\(^{17}\) "Metaphysics as Horizon," in *Collection*, 4, 198.

\(^{18}\) *Method in Theology*, 129.
is African American, and the co-chair of our Adult Faith Committee is White. Early this year the two of them decided to convene an Inclusion Commission, hoping to have members from all four of these groups participate. They took the pulpit one Sunday and invited everyone to come to the organizing meeting of the Inclusion Commission, with the assurance that everyone's particular convictions are welcome and would be listened to. The co-chairs realize that all four groups of parishioners need to be represented. If the commission is mostly prophets from groups 3 and 4 (which is likely), the people in groups 1 and 2 (who are fairly numerous) will dismiss the group with resentment as a small cabal of agitators.

Predictably, some of the most passionate individuals are not attending. Also predictably, there are not an equal number of African Americans. Nevertheless, we have representatives from each of the four horizons. We agreed to encourage people to speak about their experiences, both pleasant and problematic, without comment by the group. This took several meetings. It was difficult to report the minutes from these sessions because we did not want to label each speaker by race, yet some of the things said by black folks would sound quite racist if people thought they were spoken by whites. These early meetings could be comparable to Lonergan's functional specialties Research, Interpretation, and History. And there was plenty of Dialectic. Gradually, within this small group at least, they began to sense some mutuality.

About a month ago we began to summarize our discussions. We spent two meetings in four subgroups, drafting questions and observations. We intend to sort these insights into four categories:

1. What are the really fundamental, basic convictions that we can all agree to? For example, we agree that we want to remain a racially mixed “mosaic” parish – rather than retaining the appearance of a typical white-dominant Catholic parish, or on the other hand, becoming a predominately all-black parish. These statements would combine what Lonergan styled as Foundations and Doctrines.

2. Secondly, what are the points of lively discussion where there are still different points of view? For example, how do we invite
people of color to participate without making them feel like tokens? How do we resolve the currently popular "color blind" attitude among white liberals that actually is a ploy to maintain white dominance? These questions and statements comprise the Systematic function.

3. Thirdly, what practical steps toward promoting mutual participation are already in place? For example, last spring we needed a new music minister — no easy job even in a homogenous community! We set up an inclusive search committee, to recruit candidates and to select the most attractive one. Predictably, the transition has been painful for the choir, because changing choir directors is always traumatic. But, as you might expect, some people think it is because the new choir director is Bback.

4. Finally, what suggestions have we surfaced for further action?

These two latter groups, strategies 3 and 4, relate to Lonergan's Communications function.

We listed about two dozen statements and questions to sort and evaluate, hoping to assign each of them to one of the four categories: foundations, ongoing discussions, steps already taken, and steps to be taken. The first item asked, "What is the difference between inclusion and integration?" We spent an hour and a half chewing over that! We drafted this goal on inclusion two and a half years ago, yet as of this writing it seems we have made glacial progress. But this is what the church as "People of God" means. And this is how the process of experience, understanding, judgment, and decision works in real life.

Our work is only beginning, because once our little committee is ready to move from awareness and judging to actually doing the right thing, we have to facilitate the whole parish to begin sharing the same horizon of experience, and a community of common understanding, common judgment, and common commitments, marked by love, loyalty, and faith. This will involve more and more parishioners, in broader and broader circles, going through the same face-to-face encounter. The bishops of the council had a transforming experience, allowing them to see church, liturgy, service, and so forth in a new light. But then they flipped back to their old method of communication: "This is what we decided, so now everyone get in step." We cannot
short-circuit people's experience. All the people who did not join the Inclusion Commission need to have their opportunity to tell their story, reflect, ask questions, discover insights, have their insights rub against other people's insights, hammer out judgments. We hope that our sharing and communication is bringing us to mutual beliefs, and trust, freedom, mutual fidelity, and responsibility.

Last evening Fr. Sullivan pointed out that the revised code of Canon Law provides for an extraordinary council when a local church faces an extraordinary challenge. The sex abuse scandal is certainly an extraordinary challenge. The bishops took up this crisis at their meeting in Dallas, and they did invite seven lay persons to speak at the beginning. But what would have happened if the bishops had called a plenary council? A council includes voices of many clergy, religious and laity, experts and common folk, who contribute to addressing the crisis from beginning to end. Whatever specific strategies might have come, I think the church at large would have moved toward healing the tragic disrespect for the bishops' leadership and integrity that currently exists. As Lonergan says, each of us is responsible individually for the lives we lead, and collectively for the world in which we lead them.¹⁹

There is another imperative driving this arduous People of God work – I am the last resident pastor this small parish will have. When I am gone, lay members and staff need to be determined, clear-minded, collaborative leaders. I am tempted to guide the discussion with my own brilliant insights and judgments, but I must resist, if I expect the People of God to come to their own judgments. I gave some suggestions about how to focus the meetings in a systematic way (see the next page). I attend the meetings, and sometimes make comments; but it is their work, and they have to make their decisions. When I am gone, whoever the circuit-riding priest will be, he needs to be made welcome and to feel grateful for such energetic and competent lay leadership, and they have to prove their worth and reliability.

Finally, our local parishes need to promote minority leadership as a witness to the larger church. The U.S. bishops have given logical arguments for racial inclusion, but we are still a white church. We seem to be totally clueless about how to promote minority leadership in our old-boys-club clergy and episcopacy. Demanding a celibate male

priesthood is very restrictive; it seems to me to be a remnant from classical culture; it is not providing leaders. This brings me to my third point, drifting and searching.

WE HAVE COME THIS FAR BY FAITH

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>The Process</th>
<th>The Dialectic Virtues</th>
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<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Research</td>
<td>Humble-Confidence</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Tell the story of the parish. For example: recall how the KKK burned a cross on the streetcar line in the middle of Grand River when they heard that a Catholic church was going to be built here. Tell your story about belonging to Christ the King. Recall old-time members that you admire, who represent the “Spirit of Christ the King.”</td>
<td>None of us stands on our own. We have received countless gifts of faith and love from God and those who love us. Yet I am not a “nobody.” I have something to contribute, and our parish counts on me.</td>
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<tr>
<td>Interpretation</td>
<td>Reflective-Action</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Our experiences are different, sometimes not at all similar. Yet we can come to some insights about them. Brainstorm: What might this collection of experiences mean – to each of us personally? - to us and to our friends? - to our parish?</td>
<td>We are very busy people, and the very fact that we are meeting together is one more thing to do in our busy lives. When do we sit back and think – and pray?</td>
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</tbody>
</table>
### History
During turbulent times, like war, or a depression, or a parish in transition, we say “History is the judge.” Our parish has great things to brag about, but it is not perfect. In any case, it is what it is, and (hopefully) it is worth fighting for.

List some achievements of the parish.

Note some shortcomings of the parish.

Pick an arbitrary date in the recent past, such as our 80th anniversary (since 1927), and come to some judgments about where we have come so far at Christ the King.

### Communal-Self-Interest
We are very conscious of self-reliance, achievement, freedom, independence. We expect this of our children and of one another. Yet no one is an island. Sometimes we must make a judgment on our own, but it is usually better to talk and consult with others. And we must always consider what is best for the common good.

### Dialectic
Dialectic recognizes that there are differences and conflict in human experience. It presumes that every side of a difference has some truth, and that the goal lies over the present horizon. It transcends the human limitations in our project. It seeks some common relationship among many viewpoints and conflicting interpretations. It invites us to be comprehensive. It requires prayer and God’s grace.

Come to a consensus about how Christ the King has been a sign of God’s presence in this community.

### Prayerful-Prophetic
Some people are serious about prayer but do not show much concern for the disadvantaged. Others are dedicated to making the world better, but they do not spend much time listening to God. The prophets, from Elijah to John the Baptist, spoke and acted out of their contemplation of the Face of God.
### LOOKING FOR AND WORKING TOWARD THE REIGN OF GOD

#### The Process

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Foundations</th>
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<tr>
<td><em>Foundations</em> establish the universe of meaning (e.g., for Christians, the life, teachings, death, and resurrection of Christ; for Buddhists, the four noble truths).</td>
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**Note:** This discussion is about the **ultimate vision**, not the practical details.

What are our fundamental convictions about Christ the King? How will we know that the reign of God is beginning to take root here in Northwest Detroit? Review *Parish Mission Statement*.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Doctrines</th>
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<tr>
<td><em>Doctrines</em> are judgments of fact (e.g., for Christians, the Holy Trinity, the two natures of Christ; for Buddhists, the eightfold path).</td>
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</table>

Review the Goals that we have set for ourselves in the previous long-range plans. Which ones are enduring? Consider the current seven goals that we have set for our parish 2010-15. How is our parish helping one another to be faithfully judged as children of Light? How is our parish contributing to Jesus’ judgment of the world in which our parish is situated?

#### The Dialectic Virtues

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Enlightened-Simplicity</th>
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<tr>
<td>We are striving for a purity of heart that is based on a serious and prayerful reading of the Gospel, a humble charity that desires the love of God, a creative use of our talents that utterly depends on God. The simple Good News is that there is a gracious God who loves us despite our unworthiness.</td>
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<tr>
<th>Committed-Openness</th>
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<tr>
<td>We affirm our commitment to the mission statement and goals for our parish, but in our discussion we are open to listening to the convictions of the other members. We want to support one another, even if we notice different ways of stating our truths. We have the confidence to be open to the truth wherever we find it.</td>
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Systematics

*Dialectic Communications*

Systematics grapple with understanding old and new questions (e.g., How is the church a *People of God*?)

We have *set objectives* to achieve our parish goals. They are practical strategies, but not set in concrete. Which objectives are working—in particular, regarding inclusion? Which ones need to be reformulated? What new objectives should we set?

Flexible-Discipline

We need the discipline to keep our sights set on the practical objectives that we believe will contribute to the health and growth of our parish.

At the same time we need to be creative and flexible to try new ideas and test them.

Communications

*Communications* is the practice of pastoral theology (forms of worship, methods of education, programs of service).

How are we translating our goals and objectives into everyday parish life?

How do we communicate our parish's vision of the Reign of God to one another? To our neighbors?

Flexible-Discipline

We need the discipline to keep our sights set on the practical objectives that we believe will contribute to the health and growth of our parish.

At the same time we need to be creative and flexible to try new ideas and test them.

Hopeful-Realism

We need to move beyond wishful thinking to a spiritual maturity that is practical, in touch with reality (including the obstacles). But we do not want to fall into cynical pessimism. Christ is risen! He has conquered death and suffering!

DRIFTERS AND SEARCHERS

In this third section I will raise questions for understanding, but the jury is still out about what is the real deal. My experience is that fewer young adults, single or married, are coming to church. Many middle-aged and older Catholics are saddened that their adult children no longer go to church. The conventional wisdom was that this is a normal rebellion of youth; when they settle down to get married and have children, most of them return to church – especially Catholics. That seems to be changing. The Pew Forum reported (in 2008): “Sizeable numbers of those raised in all religions – from Catholicism to Protestantism to Judaism – are currently unaffiliated with any particular group,” with the largest losses among Roman Catholics – one third of Americans raised Catholic no longer say they are Catholic.”20

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What is happening? Young people are many tribes. A small number explicitly call themselves atheist or agnostic (the “new atheists”); a larger number attend non-denominational evangelical churches. Many still believe in God and Christ but call themselves “spiritual but not religious.” In a 2010 self-report survey, 25 percent of Millennials (born after 1980) were unaffiliated with organized religion, as compared with 20 percent of Generation X at age 20 to 30, and twice as unaffiliated as Baby Boomers at that age (13 percent). Some are explicitly motivated by their spirituality but others are simply indifferent.

There is a serious trend within this unaffiliated group. Women of all ages are historically much more engaged in religion than men; but recently, Patricia Wittberg noted that young women, especially among Catholics, are now actually less affiliated with organized religion than their male cohorts. A corresponding finding is that while the U.S. Catholic population has increased by 17 percent in the last forty years, the number of Catholic marriages has declined nearly 40 percent since 1972, from 415,487 to 168,400. Since the bride is usually driving the wedding, this trend seems to confirm a lack of interest on the part of young women. And if couples are not inclined to make a sacrament of their marriage, how dedicated will they be to teaching their children, especially without the reinforcement of a Catholic school?

The bishops blame this phenomenon on “poor catechesis” after the Vatican Council, but the thousands of priests, religious, and laity who taught high school religion in the years following the council are insulted by this explanation. True, we did define grace as God’s love, and we backed off accusing everyone that they commit mortal sins practically every day. But we did teach the Word of God, responsible morality, liturgy, sacraments, church history. And now we hear from

these former students on Facebook about how much they appreciated our work with them. But they are not going to church.

Something much larger has been going on since the Second World War. Charles Taylor calls it "an expressive revolution."25 We are no longer primarily motivated by external influences, but insist on personal choices and individual fulfillment.26 Obviously we are all still strongly influenced by our family upbringing, but that very upbringing has become quite fragmented by a significant cultural upheaval. In his comprehensive study, *A Secular Age*, Taylor speaks of the "Age of Mobilization" and the "Age of Authenticity."27 The social interweaving of family life, religious practice, and patriotism is unraveling. This revolution in existential thinking, psychological self-awareness, and social pluralism is not confined to the United States; it is worldwide. It was already underway by 1960. The Catholic bishops who met for four years at the Vatican were actually on the leading edge of this revolution. Bernard Lonergan was on this leading edge when he asserted that the "classical" culture had given way to "modern" culture.28


26 One young woman told me recently: "I think we all need to choose the story that makes sense for each of us. While I completely respect and don't want to argue with anyone that believes in the divine, it just doesn't make sense to me anymore. I think morality – living a 'good' life – that most world religions agree on can be defended from lines of reasoning that are independent of a God or gods. This is the main reason why none of us any longer follows the religion of our parents: it's the increasing globalization. It's daily interactions with people from many different cultures and across borders, and the unavoidable questioning of one's own beliefs when confronted with contrasting ones. I think a lot of people end up realizing the common denominators among these religions and feel comfortable discarding the more specific parts."


28 Bernard Lonergan, "Dimensions of Meaning": For the Greek mediation of meaning resulted in classical culture and, by and large, classical culture has passed away. By and large, its canons of art, its literary forms, its rules of correct speech, its norms of interpretation, its ways of thought, its manner in philosophy, its notion of science, its concept of law, its moral standards, its methods of education, are no longer accepted. What breathed life and form into the civilization of Greece and Rome... today, nearly everywhere, is dead and almost forgotten. Classical culture has given way to a modern culture, and, I would submit, the crisis of our age is in no small measure the fact that modern culture has not yet reached its maturity. The classical mediation of meaning has broken down; the breakdown has been effected by a whole array of new and more
One demographic that complicates predictions is the number of Latinos who are entering the country, 90 percent of which are Catholic, and a high percentage of whom are young. Young Latinos tend to be somewhat more orthodox than Anglo Catholics; but we may ask whether they will influence the U.S. Catholic Church’s daily religious practices, or will they become “Americanized” and in a few years join the young unaffiliated and “spiritual but not religious tribes.”

The heading of this section is Drifters and Searchers. Active churchgoers may say that these young people are “drifters” – and, in fact, some of the indifferent unaffiliated may be. But on the other hand, many are searchers. Lonergan used the term “drifters” to describe people who are unwilling to make the intellectual and moral conversions necessary to move from concrete experience, through understanding and on to reasonable judgment. Searchers would be people who are willing to face the challenge of conversion, but who have not yet arrived at convincing insights and confident judgment.

Diana Butler Bass, in Christianity After Religion, describes three “awakening” movements that have occurred in American religion and proposes that we are on the cusp of a fourth – younger people are less motivated by their elders’ religious beliefs and practices and are more focused on their own searching for meaning in their personal experiences and are grappling with personal judgments and decisions.

effective techniques; but their very multiplicity and complexity leave us bewildered, disoriented, confused, preyed upon by anxiety, dreading lest we fall victims to the up-to-date myth of ideology and the hypnotic, highly effective magic of thought control. [Lonergan illustrates his point by using modern science as his example. “We do not trust the prudent man’s judgment, but employ computers to keep track of inventories and to forecast demand.” This in 1965!] (Marquette University, May 12, 1965, in Collections), 238.


30 “The opposite to this open-eyed, deliberate self-control is drifting. The drifter has not yet found himself; he has not yet discovered his own deed, and so is content to do what everyone else is doing; he has not yet discovered his own will, and so is content to choose what everyone else is choosing; he has not yet discovered a mind of his own, and so he is content to think and say what everyone else is thinking and saying; and the others too are apt to be drifters, each of them doing and choosing and thinking and saying what others happen to be doing, choosing, thinking, saying.” “Existenz and Aggiornamanto,” in Collection, 224.

31 Diana Butler Bass, Christianity After Religion: End of Church and Birth of a New
Putman and Campbell suggest that the rise of the Religious Right may have backfired for organized evangelical religion, which seems to be alienating a whole generation of young Christians, who are fed up with wholesale condemnations and hostile defensiveness.\textsuperscript{32} Young evangelicals are searching. They are leaving their parents' churches and starting less structured and more inclusive groupings that we have come to know as the emerging or emergent church.\textsuperscript{33} Their most influential theologian is Brian McLaren.\textsuperscript{34} This is not new. Fifty years ago, Lonergan was thinking about these same questions:

\begin{quote}
[T]he classical mediation of meaning has broken down. It is being replaced by a modern mediation of meaning \ldots that takes the whole of human history for its kingdom to compare and relate languages and literatures, art forms and religions, family arrangements and customary morals, political, legal, educational, economic systems, sciences, philosophies, theologies, and histories. \ldots
\end{quote}

These forces describe a much more profound situation than the rise of a few more drifters than normal. Lonergan suggests the challenging task that faces contemporary people who must make judgments and decisions with such unreliable cultural support:

\begin{quote}
"But the vast modern effort to understand meaning in all its manifestations has not been matched by a comparable effort in judging meaning.\ldots Judging and deciding are left to the individual, and he finds his plight desperate. There is far too much to be learnt before he could begin to judge. Yet judge he
\end{quote}

\textsuperscript{32} Putman and Campbell, \textit{American Grace}, 120-33, 401-18.
\textsuperscript{34} Brian McLaren, \textit{A Generous Orthodoxy: Why I am a missional, evangelical, post/protestant, liberal/conservative, mystical/poetic, biblical, charismatic/contemplative, fundamentalist/Calvinist, Anabaptist/Anglican, Methodist, catholic, green, incarnational, depressed-yet hopeful, emergent, unfinished Christian} (Grand Rapids, MI: Zondervan, 2004); Brian McLaren, \textit{A New Kind of Christianity: Ten Questions that Are Transforming the Faith} (New York: HarperCollins, 2010).
\textsuperscript{35} "Dimensions of Meaning," in \textit{Collection}, 244.
must and decide he must if he is to exist, if he is to be a [hu] man."

This challenge will overwhelm a drifter; but an intrepid searcher will rise to meet it.

I think the fact that so many former Catholics, Lutherans, and Episcopalians are finding their way to contemporary evangelical non-denominational churches, such as the Association of Vineyard Churches, suggests that they are authentically searching for God in their daily lives. The core values stated by Vineyard, for example, are quite appealing to young adults today:

The Vineyard seeks to plant churches that are culturally relevant in a wide variety of settings. We lean toward the lost, the poor, the outcast, and the outsider with the compassion of Jesus, knowing we are sinners whose standing before God is utterly dependent on his mercy. We believe that ministry in Jesus' name should be expressed in concrete ways through the local church. The poor are to be served as though we serve Jesus himself... Compassion is a hallmark of the One who was "moved with compassion" in the face of human need. This being the age of grace (and "the year of the Lord's favor") compassion should constitute the leading edge of our service to God, each other, and our broken world. With humility, we seek to avoid unauthorized judgments of others, realizing that we suffer and struggle along with the rest of humanity.

Jesus is reconciling people to God, to each other, and to the entire creation. He breaks down divisions between Jew and Gentile, slave and free, male and female. Therefore, Vineyard churches are committed to being communities of healing, engaged in the work of reconciliation. We also seek to be diverse communities of hope that realize the power of the cross to reconcile what has been separated by sin. This requires that we move beyond our personal preferences and engage those whom we perceive to be unlike us. We must actively work to break down barriers of race, culture, gender, social class, and

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36 "Dimensions of Meaning," in *Collection*, 244.
Most Catholic, Lutheran, and Episcopal churches would say, “We believe in all that—join our Christian Service committee!” Young people’s response would typically be a roll of the eyes. That is not what they experience if they happen to wander into one of our churches on Sunday morning. Even after fifty years of attempting “full participation,” what they experience is an unusually quiet crowd of apparently anonymous persons, an occasional strangely flat song, a boring lecture, shuffling communion procession (sometimes introduced by the stern warning that no one is welcome to approach unless they are a perfect Catholic), and a sudden vacuum during the final announcements. No one looked them in the eye and asked their name; they wander out to their car without a personal encounter with even one member.

Butler Bass makes an important observation about the difference between traditional religious institutions and the new “emergent” faith. The typical religious institution begins with statements of the creed, which lead to righteous behavior, which results in a sense of identity as a Presbyterian, Baptist, or Catholic (believing => behaving => belonging). The emerging churches progress the other way around (belonging => behaving => believing). They begin by immersing you in the experience of loving and being loved by God through Jesus and the Spirit, which gives you immediately a sense of belonging and identity. Then you are invited to participate in one or more of the many works of the Kingdom that are flourishing in this faith community. Finally, this engagement helps you solidify and articulate your faith.

Beginning with experience, of course, is pure Lonergan, and, as he states in Method in Theology:

Faith is the knowledge born of religious love. . . . [I]n religious matters love precedes knowledge and . . . the very beginning of faith is due to God’s grace. . . . The apologist’s task is neither to produce in others nor to justify for them God’s gift of his love. The apologist’s task is to aid others in integrating God’s gift

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37 http://www.vineyardusa.org/site/about/article/core-values (accessed May 31, 2012). Interestingly, this summary of Vineyard’s Core Values no longer appears on their website in this compelling wording.

with the rest of their living. . . . We have distinguished between faith and religious beliefs . . . there is a realm in which love precedes knowledge."  

It is good psychology, good epistemology, and good pastoral practice to begin with experience. This is the reason that Dei Verbum envisioned “a new impulse of spiritual life” (26), and that Sacrosanctum Concilium directed full, conscious and active part in the liturgical celebration (14).

I recently had a conversation with a group of young Catholics (twenty-somethings), members of the Volunteer Service Corp at Christ the King for the past one or two years. They were all reared Catholic but in different states: California, Illinois, Ohio, and Michigan. They referred to their childhood parish as “back home,” whereas they referred to Christ the King as “our parish.” As college graduates, they also had experiences with campus-based parishes. I asked them two questions: (1) What is it about being a Catholic that you like, that supports your faith? (2) What is it about the Catholic Church that you (and people you know) find stupid or repulsive?

They universally like the sense of community they feel here at “our parish.” Some appreciated a similar experience of an engaging community at their college parish. One, from a state college, had been strongly recruited to join an evangelical campus group. She enjoyed this, and at one point even considered joining their church; however she began to get the feeling that the group was fairly shallow. Nevertheless, the Bible study group she joined got her thinking more about her own Catholic faith and ritual, and by the time she was finished with college, she had made a stronger commitment to her Catholic religion.

All of them enjoyed some experience of direct service to the poor, mostly through the campus St. Vincent de Paul society. One male member is motivated almost exclusively by the opportunities for service. It would not have made any difference to him what religion sponsored the service corps – it is the dedication to service that he desires. All of them chimed in that the opportunity and challenge to imitate the life of Jesus was a strong motivator (this stands to reason, of course, since they are members of a “service” corps!) Most are aware that their home parishes do have some kind of service component, but that they felt their church’s finances were mostly focused on internal

39 Method in Theology, 115, 123.
“church” affairs, with very little emphasis on the larger community. It is important to be filled with “God’s Energy” and to pass it on. They all appreciate Christ the King’s overt efforts at being inclusive. They enjoy the liturgy, the fact that lay members take an active part, sometimes at the pulpit, and the extended and joyful greeting of peace.

What is it about the Catholic Church that you find stupid or repulsive? Some priests think that the parish is there to serve the priest, rather than the priest to serve the people. Priests don’t listen; they immediately know all the answers. In fact, the whole Catholic Church thinks it knows everything and is not willing to allow questions. The Catholic bishops harp on certain negative campaigns but don’t seem to put much energy into serving the poor. Poor leadership – more concerned with image rather than honesty. I was put in mind of Pope Paul VI’s encyclical on evangelization, where he states:

The first means of evangelization ... is the witness of an authentically Christian life. Modern men and women listen more willingly to witnesses than to teachers, and if they do listen to teachers, it is because they are witnesses. ... It is therefore by its conduct and by its life that the Church will evangelize the world, in other words, by its living witness of fidelity to the Lord Jesus – the witness of poverty and detachment, of freedom in the face of the powers of this world, in short, the witness of sanctity. (note 41)

This was not a random sample, but these young people fit the trends reported in professional religious research. What we may be witnessing is a genuine shift toward the ancient meaning of religion, which supports the hunch that emergent religion is not just a passing fad. To quote a contemporary of Lonergan, Wilfred Cantwell Smith, “Unlike religion as a system of belief, religio meant faith – living, subjective experience including love, veneration, devotion, awe, worship, transcendence, trust, a way of life, an attitude toward the divine or nature, or a particular way of seeing and feeling the world.”

These data are significant: Over the last decade, a consistent 30 percent of people call themselves “spiritual only,” and a small number

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(9 percent) continue to say they are neither spiritual nor religious. But in those ten years there has been a shift away from “religious only” (54 percent to only 9 percent in 2009) toward “both spiritual and religious” (6 percent in 1999 to 48 percent in 2009). The Service Corps members call themselves both spiritual and religious (even the young man who did not care about the sponsoring religion agreed that he liked the overt spiritual atmosphere that a faith-based community offers the service projects).

Recall Lonergan’s famous prediction about what will be happening in the post-classical culture:

There is bound to be formed a solid right that is determined to live in a world that no longer exists. There is bound to be formed a scattered left, captivated by now this, now that new development, exploring now this and now that new possibility. But what will count is a perhaps not numerous center, big enough to be at home in both the old and the new, painstaking enough to work out one by one the transitions to be made, strong enough to refuse half measures and insist on complete solutions even though it has to wait.

There is a sector of the church determined to live in a world that no longer exists. And we see a scattered left, captivated by now this, now that new possibility. Vineyard and other manifestations of emergent Christianity may be one of these scattered possibilities. But there appear to be sufficient data that the crisis of culture is real, and the judgments we need to make must be big enough to be at home in both the old and the new, and painstaking enough to work out the transitions to be made. Lonergan distinguished faith from beliefs; and this recent emergent trend in religion may, in fact, be the “not numerous center, big enough to be at home in both the old and the new, painstaking enough to work out one by one the transitions to be made.” This center may be not numerous now, but it may become the new normal.

How do we participate in this emergence? Some Catholic scholars and spiritual writers are aiming at this emerging audience – authors like Richard Rohr, Ron Rolheiser, Luke Timothy Johnson, Elizabeth

\[41 \text{Butler Bass, } Christianity After Religion, 92.
\[42 \text{“Dimensions of Meaning,” in } Collection, 245.\]
Johnson. The *National Catholic Reporter* mounted a series, *In Search of the Emerging Church*, by Tom Roberts, which is available online,\(^43\) and has recently been highlighted in a paperback book.\(^44\)

One simple way to evangelize a young adult is to give him or her a copy of Greg Boyle’s *Tattoos on the Heart*.\(^45\) This book is filled with compassion and pathos, humor, grace, determination, and promise, building the Reign of God one homeboy and homegirl at a time. Boyle is a good example of someone who integrates the classical Catholic Church and the emerging Christianity.

Young people are searching for meaning. The Vatican Council and Lonergan’s academic career are all about communicating meaning. Young people communicate meaning through music. Sometimes they acknowledge the transcendent dimension of meaning fairly clearly, as in several songs by U2, such as *Grace*,\(^46\) or a call for moral conversion as in *Peace on Earth*.\(^47\) But the meanings are often ambiguous and multiple. Anyone can read the lyrics from a contemporary song on www.songmeanings.net and browse through hundreds of comments by members. Comments range from the inane to the thoughtful:

> As a singer, musician, and songwriter, I perform music for other people. Sometimes that means something simple like a love song where almost anyone can read it and say “Yeah, that’s pretty much a love song,” and either identify with it or not. Other times it’s going to be a song that’s a little (or a lot) vague, where you’re able to involve the audience and make them active participants in the performance by making them examine the song to find meaning, whether it’s the one I intended or not. This is half the reason that cover songs can be

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\(^43\) Tom Roberts traveled the country for a year and a half, interviewing a variety of church leaders – laity, religious and clergy – who seem to be on the cutting edge of an Emerging Catholic Church. Twenty-nine installments, beginning May 7, 2009 extending to December 3, 2010. http://ncronline.org/blogs/ncr-today/tom-roberts-emergingchurch-book-now-available.


\(^46\) http://www.youtube.com/watch?v=EBGBNaOL41Zc.

\(^47\) http://www.youtube.com/watch?NR=1&feature=endscreen&v=3A6mKiE8ZBo.
so much fun. When they’re done properly it gives you a chance to look at a song you already have an opinion about, and see the interpretation that someone else put on it. Try to think about what the song means to you, and not just what it means to the person who wrote it. You might learn something about yourself.48

Many contemporary songs are about relationships, often troubled ones, as in Coldplay’s *Fix You*, in which the chorus has a transcendent note: “Lights will guide you home, and ignite your bones, and I will try to fix you;” 49 or The Fray, *How to Save a Life;*50 or Linkin Park, *Burn it to the Ground.*51 A current song by Jack White, a Catholic boy from Detroit, *Love Interruption,* has very mysterious lyrics.52 Gotye and Kimbra sing a very realistic song about the anger and disappointment in a failed relationship, *Now you’re just somebody I used to know,* with “somebody” stated as two words. You need to watch the video to appreciate the meaning in this song, right up to the last few seconds, when the desperate look on his face seems to say “Oh, no; is there any way to save this?”53

Young people sing about forging a personal identity, as in Incubus, *Drive*—“Whatever tomorrow brings I’ll be there.”54 They

48 Comment posted by Obryon about a song by Finger eleven, *One Thing*. Most people think the song is about a lost relationship, but this comment suggests thinking more deeply. Shortly afterwards, refreshing29 comments: This song reminds me of Soren Kierkegaard’s book, “Purity of Heart Is to Will One Thing” (highly recommend it). Though beautiful women are shown [in the video], I think the meaning is much deeper. I think it points to more eternal things. The “one thing” in theology and philosophy is often associated with God/the divine. “The One.” http://www.songmeanings.net/songs/view/3530822107858486104/2/ASC/#comment

49 http://www.songmeanings.net/songs/view/353082210785843356/.

50 http://www.songmeanings.net/songs/view/3530822107859303985/.

51 One comment on this song: I don’t think it’s either about the Arab Spring nor the Middle East problem (though it could be), it’s indeed about an unstable relationship which the two partners constantly try to make work out but fail each time (like most relationships in fact!). http://www.songmeanings.net/songs/view/3530822107859429551/.

52 http://www.songmeanings.net/songs/view/3530822107858892081/.

53 http://www.youtube.com/watch?v=8UVNT4wvIGY The lyrics are at http://www.songmeanings.net/songs/view/3530822107858874763/.

54 Sometimes I feel the fear of uncertainty. And I can’t help but ask myself how much I’ll let the fear take the wheel and steer. http://www.songmeanings.net/songs/view/218/.
speak of learning and earning life values, as Mumford & Sons, *The Cave*, Sarah McLachlan, *Building a Mystery*, which might portray an unattainable sexual partner, but it could be a religious figure; Arcade Fire, *Ready to Start* and Sheryl Crow, *Every day Is a Winding Road*. There are pleas for forgiveness and reconciliation: Staind, *It's been a while* and Metallica, *The Unforgiven*.

There are cries of desperation from the depths of depression, sometimes addressed to God; for example, The Fray, *You Found Me*. Many songs today are about death, for example, Of Monsters and Men, *Little Talks*. Death Cab for Cutie, *I will follow you into the dark* speaks of profound love that is stronger than death (whether or not the artist knew of the Song of Songs 8:6); but there is also an explicit rejection of conventional religious values regarding this love (not deserving hell but not good enough for heaven).

There are strong statements about the impending death to our planet, as in Crash Parallel, *World we Know*; the chorus is: “Tell me, what are we waiting for?” and Gotye, *Eyes Wide Open*. This is another song that you need to view the video to appreciate.

Adam Yauch died recently. He was the frontman for the Beastie Boys, known for their raucous punk behavior. Over the years he

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55 http://www.songmeanings.net/songs/view/3530822107858766939/.
56 http://www.songmeanings.net/songs/view/5749/.
57 http://www.songmeanings.net/songs/view/3530822107858832977/.
58 http://www.songmeanings.net/songs/view/47624/.
59 http://www.songmeanings.net/songs/view/17641/.
60 http://www.songmeanings.net/songs/view/10263/.
61 http://www.songmeanings.net/songs/view/3530822107858749688/.
63 If heaven and hell decide that they both are satisfied, and illuminate the NOs on their vacancy signs. In Catholic school as vicious as Roman rule, I got my knuckles bruised by a lady in black. I held my tongue as she told me. Son, fear is the heart of love, so I never went back. http://www.songmeanings.net/songs/view/3530822107858552882/.
64 http://www.songmeanings.net/songs/view/3530822107858726398/. Comment on songmeanings.net: We think God will repair everything, but it's our planet.
65 http://www.songmeanings.net/songs/view/3530822107858850991/. Comment on songmeanings.net: “We walk the plank with our eyes wide open” indicates that you are KNOWINGLY walking to your death, you are aware of it. So to apply it to the topic, we as a species are knowingly destroying the Earth and walking to our deaths because of it...
66 http://www.youtube.com/watch?v=oyVJsg0XiIk.
evolved. “Everybody has phases where they act like a fool. But ours are on video.” From beer-guzzling hell-raiser he became a Buddhist, outspoken feminist, music video director, Tibetan activist, friend to Dalai Lama, vegan, husband, father — “He was all of these things, trading in outmoded selves like used vinyl when enlightenment beckoned.” When he was diagnosed with cancer, and it was progressing to the terminal stages, Cheryl Crow offered him her ranch to rest.

I was expecting to see somebody really weak and pale. But he looked so radiant, as light as the most awake person I’ve ever encountered. He was just hopeful to the very end. He was always in line with his search for serenity and peace and understanding. And I loved that about him. Here he was, one of the Beastie boys, and he was one of the wisest people I’ve known.67

Today’s troubadours make it clear that we are living in a new culture, and we church leaders need to accommodate ourselves to their searching. John XXIII and the Vatican II bishops knew this. Catholic religious leaders, at all levels, need to take more overt and public measures to be a welcoming and inclusive community, modeled on the public life of Jesus. Pope John called for that, and the council bishops proclaimed this call in all four constitutions, especially in Gaudium et Spes. Note the opening words of this Pastoral Constitution, “The joys and hopes, the grief and anguish of the people of our time, especially of those who are poor or afflicted, are the joys and hopes, the grief and anguish of the followers of Christ as well.” They do not say “of the church-going people,” nor do they say “of the intrinsically straight people,” nor do they say “of the people in valid marriages.” Christ’s mission is to everyone. Gaudium et Spes is sometimes preachy and gets bogged down in specifics when it states principles; but it is nevertheless the beacon for the emerging Catholic Church. We must read the signs of our times as they were reading theirs and develop an openness to communicating with the current generation.68

In a talk given at the Thomas More Institute in September 1964 (just before the Vatican Council’s third session), “Philosophical Positions with Regard to Knowing,” Lonergan was addressing the “inevitability” of a conscious subject moving from observing experience to asking questions for understanding and then forming a judgment. In the question and answer period, he mentioned the possibility of “drifting” (that is, some people do not go to the trouble to actually do this inevitable process; they drift). A questioner, coming to insight, asked, “Can you still be intelligent and drift?” Lonergan’s direct answer: “Oh, yes.”

In the face of an emerging church, one might ask, “Can you be an intelligent, very convinced church leader and drift?” I think the answer to this question also is “Oh, yes!” As church leaders we are called to do more than learn the logic of closed conceptualism. Lonergan discusses this in his paper, *The Natural Desire to See God*. In conceptualism, our convictions arise from principles built on unconscious abstractions from sensible data. But principles arising from one horizon make no sense to people in another. An alternative way of knowing, imperative for religious leaders, is an *open intellectualism*:

Again [in open intellectualism], conclusions result from principles, and principles result from their component terms. But the terms are expressions of acts of understanding. The selection of certain terms as basic, the elucidation of their precise meaning and import, the validation of such choice and determination are all the work of wisdom; and wisdom is the cumulative product of a long series of acts of understanding. . . . Hence it is that there exists a natural desire to understand, the development of understanding, and the consequent development of science, philosophy, and theology. Hence it is that any finite wisdom must expect paradox; only perfect wisdom can understand and order everything satisfactorily.

Wisdom is neither rupture nor rigid reaction; it is true to tradition while being open to new horizons.

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70 “The Natural Desire to See God” (1949) in *Collection*, 86.
To sum up, the Vatican Council was a good example of church leaders moving beyond the classicist model of closed conceptualism. The bishops demonstrated this by rejecting most of the early drafts that had been drawn from the older “manual” style theology textbooks. Then they demonstrated their desire to base their teachings on experience, understanding, and judgment by the way they selected certain terms, such as “people of God” and “full participation” as basic to understanding salvation and the church. They forged new meaning and set new priorities for the questions they addressed, and they validated pastoral explorations like liturgical renewal, ecumenical dialogue, and civil liberty. They affirmed the innate dialectic in any intellectual exercise, both by engaging in the painstaking discussions in the various drafting committees, as well as by the way they were willing to include a wide range of theological opinions in each of the documents. Although some statements in the finished products may seem confusing or self-contradictory, this in itself stands as a model of inclusiveness and tolerance for different viewpoints and horizons of experience. A certain tension is healthy. It is not disloyal.

In our own local ministries – parish, school, research – each of us is called to an existential challenge to engage our tradition with fidelity while embracing new challenges and opportunities with love and hope. This is the hermeneutic of development. As Lonergan wrote in *Dimensions of Meaning*:

> What are we to choose to make of ourselves? In our lives there still comes the moment of existential crisis when we find out for ourselves that we have to decide for ourselves what we by our own choices and decisions are to make of ourselves... And when we turn from our mysterious interiority to the world about us for instruction, we are confronted with a similar multiplicity, endless refinement, a great technical exactness, and an ultimate inconclusiveness."\(^{71}\)

Let me conclude with the lyrics of a song titled *Rain Delays* by Crash Parallel:

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Sleepless nights and endless days, mini-skirts and serving trays,
Waking up from rain delays and selling sex for pocket change,
Living off the alcohol with no one but a cab to call.
Lost inside a bathroom stall, this carbon copy life withdraw.
I need someone to believe in.
Driving cars we can't afford, just making sure we're never bored,
Living off our own accord, between coffee grinds and
corner stores,
Limousines and cigarettes, we're chasing dreams with
fishing nets,
Long weekends without regrets – no one here is taking bets.

I need someone to believe in,
someone to fill this space with grace, to look into my eyes and
touch my face to make me feel alive today.
Someone to make me strong, someone to make me belong
Someone to make it right, someone to make me feel alive.
I need someone to believe in. 72

This last line is sung as a desperate cry for help from out in the
wilderness. As bearers of Good News, we emergent Catholics are here
to say that Jesus Christ is someone you can believe in!

72 http://www.songmeanings.net/songs/view/3530822107858735592/.
“IN SOME SENSE TRANSCENDENT OR SUPERNATURAL”
MAKING SENSE OF AN ANOMALY IN CHAPTER 20 OF INSIGHT

Ivo Coelho, SDB
Jerusalem

SOME YEARS AGO I had reflected in passing on Lonergan’s distinction in chapter 20 of Insight between natural, relatively supernatural, and absolutely supernatural solutions to the problem of evil, suggesting that some religions exemplify a natural solution, while others a relatively supernatural solution or an absolutely supernatural solution.¹ The 50th anniversary of the Second Vatican Council, with its remarkable opening and openness to the religions, is a good time to return to Lonergan’s intriguing distinction and to the reflections of which it forms a part.

There is a further personal angle. Since September 2011, I have been living in Jerusalem, the Holy City, Hagia Polis to the Christians of old, Al Quds to the Muslims even today.² The theological seminary in which I work is itself housed in a lovely and venerable French building of the 1870s, the Ratisbonne Monastery. The monastery and the congregation that ran it were founded by Alphonse Ratisbonne, famous Jewish convert to Catholicism, with the express purpose of the conversion of his co-religionists. In the wake of the Second Vatican Council this aim changed gradually to interreligious dialogue, but

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² The name Hagia Polis is very clearly visible on the famous Madaba mosaic map of Jerusalem in Jordan. Al Quds is its Arabic equivalent, meaning The Holy.
from the beginning Ratisbonne reached out to Jews, Christians as well as Muslims, and during the 1948 war the monastery gave shelter to a large number of Jewish evacuees. Such is the regard in which the monastery is held that in 1994 it became the site of the secret negotiations between the Vatican and the State of Israel, negotiations that led eventually to the recognition of Israel by the Vatican.3

In this paper, I will take off from the anomaly, in chapter 20 of *Insight*, of a natural solution to the problem of evil that is in some sense supernatural. This will lead to some qualification of my suggestions that some religions are natural, some relatively supernatural, and others absolutely supernatural. I had also hoped that it would lead to some interesting reflections about the evolution of Lonergan's attitudes towards the religions, but perhaps it will serve at least to raise questions and pointers.

**THE ANOMALY: A NATURAL SOLUTION THAT IS SOMEHOW SUPERNATURAL**

Let's begin with the way Lonergan specializes the heuristic structure of the divine solution to the problem of evil in the thirtieth place of chapter 20 of *Insight*:

In the thirtieth place, while every solution is transcendent in the sense that it involves a new and higher integration, and while every solution is religious inasmuch as it is constituted by a faith and hope and love that look primarily to God, in the measure that the higher integration goes beyond the minimal essentials of every solution, in that measure there will be revealed to faith truths that man never could discover for himself nor, even when he assented to them, could he understand them in an adequate fashion. For the greater the proper perfection and significance of the higher integration,

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3 Initially a school for Muslim, Jewish, and Christian children, the monastery - a handsome building designed by the French architect Daujat and completed in the late nineteenth century - was transformed, in the wake of Vatican II, into a Centre of Dialogue between Jews and Christians. For various reasons, this center was eventually transferred to the Gregorian University, but the Religious of Sion continue to run a smaller library and center in the monastery, the larger part of which was entrusted to the Salesians of Don Bosco in 2004.
the more it will lie beyond man's familiar range, and the more it will be grounded in the absolutely transcendent excellence of the unrestricted act of understanding.

Accordingly, if we specialize the general heuristic structure by adding further alternative hypotheses, we are led to distinguish between natural solutions, relatively supernatural solutions, and absolutely supernatural solutions. All three types would have the common feature that they provide solutions to man's problem of evil.⁴

The anomaly arises from the fact that the solution, whether natural, relatively supernatural, or absolutely supernatural, will be “in some sense transcendent or supernatural,”⁵ or, as Lonergan notes above, both transcendent and religious. Here then lies our anomaly: a natural solution that is in some sense supernatural. What sense are we to make of this?

**SOME CLARIFICATIONS**

In the text under consideration, Lonergan seems to be drawing his terms clearly from the Latin theology that he used to teach. *De ente supernaturali* (1946-47), for example, conveniently provides us with the meaning of relatively and absolutely supernatural. If the supernatural is “that which exceeds the proportion of another nature and is superior to it in being and perfection,” the relatively supernatural is “[t]hat which exceeds the proportion of this or that nature,” and the absolutely supernatural, the supernatural without qualification, is “[t]hat which exceeds the proportion of any finite substance whatsoever, whether created or creatable.”⁶ The divine solution to the problem of evil will

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⁵ *Insight*, 719.

⁶ Bernard Lonergan, *Early Latin Theology*, vol. 19 of the Collected Works of Bernard Lonergan, trans. Michael G. Shields and ed. Robert M. Doran and H. Daniel Monsour (Toronto: University of Toronto Press, 2011), 81. In general, however, the relatively supernatural (*supernatural secundum quid vel relativum*) is simply what exceeds the proportion of some particular nature. “Thus what is natural and specific to a human being is relatively supernatural to a dog or horse” (Bernard Lonergan, “De ente supernaturali:
either remain completely within the proportion of human nature, or else will exceed that proportion relatively or absolutely. That this is indeed the sense in which the terms are being used in *Insight* is confirmed by Lonergan’s clarificatory note:

I should explain that I use the word “supernatural” . . . as the English equivalent of the medieval theologians’ *supernaturale*. It was a technical term that referred to the entitative disproportion between nature and grace, reason and faith, good will and charity, human esteem and merit before God.7

It might be useful to note that the categories used here were not peculiar to Lonergan. Joseph Pohle, for example, writing a few decades before *De ente supernaturali*, speaks precisely of the relatively and the absolutely supernatural, regarding them as species of the *supernaturale quoad substantiam*:

The *supernaturale quoad substantiam* may be subdivided into two well-defined species, according as the supernatural gift which God communicates to the creature transcends the sphere and power of Nature absolutely (*simpliciter*) or in a relative sense only (*secundum quid*). The *supernaturale simpliciter* is the Supernatural in the strict and proper sense of the term (*supernaturale stricte dictum*). The *supernaturale secundum quid* is also called Preternatural. There is an essential difference between the Preternatural and the Supernatural. The Supernatural involves divine perfections, that is, such as by nature belong solely to God. The Preternatural

cur tractetur,” 5, cited in Michael J. Stebbins, *The Divine Initiative: Grace, World-Order, and Human Freedom in the Early Writings of Bernard Lonergan* [Toronto: University of Toronto Press, 1995], 315n62. The text is available at http://www.bernardlonergan.com/pdf/16800DTL040.pdf, 5). Stebbins explains: “The absolutely supernatural . . . though it can be understood by analogy with the relatively supernatural, is something radically different . . . . But whatever exceeds the proportion of any and every possible finite substance must be proportionate to an infinite substance; that is, it must be proportionate to God *uti in se est*. Hence, the absolutely supernatural does not designate the next possible level above the angels in the hierarchy of being, or even the next level above some possible creature that itself is of a higher proportion than the angels. It transcends utterly whatever is not divine” (Stebbins, 55).

7 *Insight*, 746n2.
In some sense transcendent or supernatural

Communicates only such perfections as, though belonging to a higher order, do not transcend the creatural domain. Thus freedom from concupiscence is natural to an angel, because his nature demands it; but it is not natural to man. If, therefore, God grants freedom from concupiscence to a man, he gives him a real grace, that is, something which is not due to his nature, and which is consequently supernatural. However, since such a supernatural perfecting of man does not in principle transcend the creational order, a grace of the kind just mentioned is merely a praeternaturale. It is quite otherwise with the supernaturale stricte dictum. The strictly supernatural absolutely transcends the sphere and power of all real and possible creatures. The possession of such strictly divine prerogatives such as the beatific vision or sanctifying grace, therefore, always entails a sort of deification (deificatio, ἄρωμα) of the rational creature. For the creature to claim such prerogatives as strictly due to its nature, would be tantamount to a demand to be made like unto God.8

We will not concern ourselves further with the relatively and absolutely supernatural, except to note that the absolutely supernatural conjugate forms are also couched in language that echoes Lonergan's early Latin theology. Thus hope "is for a vision of God that exhausts the unrestricted desire of intelligence," and charity "is the transport, the ecstasy and unbounded intimacy that result from the communication of the absolute love that is God himself and alone can respond to the vision of God."9 Communication of absolute love, vision of God, unbounded intimacy: in De ente supernaturali Lonergan speaks of "a created communication of the divine nature" which "exceeds the proportion not only of human nature but also of any finite substance, and thus is absolutely supernatural,"10 of the beatific vision by which

8 Joseph Pohle, God the Author of Nature and the Supernatural (De Deo Creante et Elevante): A Dogmatic Treatise, translation based on the Fifth German Edition and compared with the Sixth, with some abridgement and many additional references, by Arthus Preuss, 2nd ed. (St. Louis, Mo./Freiburg (Baden) [etc.]: B. Herder, 1912; Forgotten Books, Classic Reprint Series), 187-88.

9 Insight, 746-47.

10 Early Latin Theology, 65, 79.
God is attained as he is in himself, and of the infused virtue of charity as mutual love and friendship with God.11

We go on to note that the specializations of the general heuristic structure are alternatives: since the solution to the problem of evil is one,12 it will be either natural, or relatively supernatural, or absolutely supernatural. The specializations cannot therefore be taken as referring to different types of religion.

Further, we note that “going beyond the minimal essentials of every solution” is illustrated by means of the conjugate form of faith, and more specifically the truths revealed to faith: “in the measure that the higher integration goes beyond the minimal essentials of every solution, in that measure there will be revealed to faith truths that man never could discover for himself nor, even when he assented to them, could he understand them in an adequate fashion.” This emphasis on faith is noteworthy, given also that chapter 20 of Insight does devote a very large amount of space to belief and to faith. This, as is well known, is one of the points of major change in Lonergan’s notion of religion. At any rate, given that there are three alternative types of solution, we can envisage solutions characterized by three types of truths, natural, relatively supernatural, and absolutely supernatural.

Despite the emphasis on faith, however, we must recognize that the conjugate forms of hope and charity will also vary on each hypothesis.

**NATURAL SOLUTIONS**

The natural divine solutions to the problem of evil are described thus: they “would not offer to faith any truths that man could not discover for himself through the development of his own understanding; they would not offer to hope more than the natural immortality that can be deduced from the spirituality of the human soul, and the knowledge of God that is consequent upon the separation of the immortal soul from the mortal body; they would not offer to charity more than the perfection of a total, self-sacrificing love in a creature for his or her creator.”13

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11 Early Latin Theology, 659.
12 Insight, 746, 718.
13 Insight, 746.
We can assume that the natural solutions would have the contours of the general heuristic structure of the solution, given that this general structure itself represents the minimal essentials of any solution. Thus the general anticipation about the act of faith in the twenty-first point can be seen as providing us with details about the truths pertaining to the ‘natural’ conjugate form of faith:

In the twenty-first place, the act of faith as specified by its object will include an affirmation of man’s spiritual nature, of his freedom, responsibility, and sinfulness, of God’s existence and nature, and of the transcendent solution God provides for man’s problem of evil. It will include basic truths about man and about God, not because the ordinary collaboration of men cannot arrive at them, but because it invariably fails to reach unanimity upon them. It will include an announcement and an account of the solution because, as has been seen, though man cannot originate the solution nor preserve it, still he must be intelligent and reasonable in his acknowledgement of it and his acceptance of it.14

In a similar manner, the general heuristic anticipation about the conjugate form of charity echoes the “natural” conjugate form of charity described above: it involves loving God because of his goodness rather than from any selfish motive, and loving all persons because of love of God; it is a love that is self-sacrificing, repentant, as well as joyful.15

We remind ourselves that we are speaking here about a “natural” charity or love of God. If this sounds strange to us today, this was not the case with the early Lonergan, to whom the distinction between a natural and a supernatural love of God was quite familiar. In his doctoral dissertation, for example, he notes that Philip the Chancellor “distinguished natural and rational appetite; asserted the former to be self-regarding, the latter to tend absolutely to the honestum; and then sub-distinguished two rational appetites, one following reason, another following faith; the former of these is the dilectio naturalis, the latter is charity.”16 And of course the distinction is found in Aquinas himself,

14 Insight, 742.
15 Insight, 720-22.
16 Bernard Lonergan, Grace and Freedom: Operative Grace in the Thought of St
who notes, for example, that from natural love (*dilectio naturalis*) both angels and human beings love God before themselves and with a greater love, for if either of these loved self more than God, it would follow that natural love would be perverse, and that it would not be perfected but destroyed by charity. In *Summa Theologiae* I-II, q. 109, a. 3, Aquinas allows a natural love of God to human beings before the Fall, though not to human beings in the fallen state, even going to the extent of saying that to love God above all things is in a certain way connatural to human beings.

As for the natural conjugate form of hope, we could surmise that, like the general anticipation of the conjugate form of hope, it would exclude both despair and presumption, in the confidence “that God will bring man’s intellect to a knowledge, participation, possession of the unrestricted act of understanding.” It would therefore be a habitual determination by which the will makes the intellect good, a habit that aids, supports, and reinforces the pure desire.

We might add here that the early Lonergan, following Aquinas, also recognizes a distinction between a natural and a supernatural virtue of religion: “there is one virtue of religion that is human and another that is wholly supernatural and a matter of divine positive law.” In the *Summa Theologiae*, Aquinas maintains that religion is a distinct virtue whose purpose is to render God the worship due to Him as source of all being and principle of the government of all things. Since, however, the immediate object of religion is the reverence due to God rather than God himself, religion is not a theological virtue. It is usually classified as a moral virtue that is part of the cardinal virtue of justice, since by it we give God what is due to him.

Finally, it would seem that Lonergan is quite willing to regard Islam as in some sense a natural religion. In a remark made in passing during a discussion session at the 1962 Regis course he says: “The

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17 *STh* I, 60, 5. In the clarificatory note about the meaning of the supernatural, chapter 20 of *Insight* speaks of a distinction between good will and charity rather than natural love of God and charity; see *Insight*, 746n2.


19 *Early Latin Theology*, 123. See *STh* II-II, qq. 81-91.

20 *STh* II-II, q. 81, a. 5.
advantage of Islam is that it doesn’t involve you in the supernatural, which is hard for human pride.” The context of this remark is the observation made by the questioner that in the United States a large group of intellectuals had joined Islam, regarding it as the “great saving order of man.” That the supernatural is hard for human pride is a familiar point in chapter 20 of *Insight*: “if the solution which in fact is provided for man happens to be supernatural, and in particular if it happens to be absolutely supernatural, there will result a heightening of the tension that, as we have seen, arises whenever the limitations of lower levels are transcended.” If, then, it is true that Islam remains within the proportion of human nature, especially as far as its beliefs are concerned, there will be no question of this kind of challenge.

However, all this merely indicates the outlines of a purely natural solution, without casting light on the anomaly itself. We have still to make sense of the way in which a natural solution to the problem of evil would be somehow supernatural. For clues we turn once again to Lonergan’s early Latin theology.

**CLUES FROM LONERGAN’S EARLY LATIN THEOLOGY**

In our effort to understand the anomaly, let us ask whether there are graces that are “somehow” supernatural. A recourse to Lonergan’s early Latin theology throws up some interesting possibilities.

**The Supernatural *quoad modum***

In the first place, we have the distinction between the *supernaturale quoad substantiam* and the *supernaturale quoad modum*. We find a hint of this distinction in his doctoral thesis, when Lonergan refuses to enter into a “learned debate” about whether Thomas considers grace prior to justification as entitatively supernatural, on the grounds that the question itself is badly put:

Modern theologians divide grace into *entitative supernaturale*, such as sanctifying grace, and *supernaturale quoad modum*,

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such as miracle or prophecy. The student of St Thomas, if he would ask intelligent questions about St Thomas’s thought, must base his divisions of the supernatural in St Thomas’s thought. It is not sufficient to have some sort of approximation. Now it seems to me that St Thomas’s thought calls for a distinction within the later category of the entitative supernaturale. However, to prove this point would call for another thesis, and so, in the present work, we propose to doubt the legitimacy of this recent debate and so to prescind from it entirely.\textsuperscript{23}

Despite not wanting to enter into the debate, however, we see that Lonergan does leave a hint: the grace given prior to justificationis a type of grace within the category of the entitatively supernatural, the supernaturale quod substantiam. It is in \textit{De ente supernaturali} of 1946-47 that we find him expanding on this hint. Within the category of the entitatively supernatural he distinguishes acts that are formally supernatural, and those that are virtually supernatural. Behind this distinction lies the fact that the supernatural acts of faith, hope, and so forth can be performed even before justification, that is, before the infusion of the relevant virtues, and that when sanctifying grace departs, these acts become uninformed and cease to be meritorious. Only charity is not exercised in the absence of the infused virtue, and so only charity is formally supernatural and meritorious per se. Acts that are formally supernatural attain God as he is in himself, while acts that are virtually supernatural do not, but only in some respect, as in the case of faith and hope.\textsuperscript{24}

The category of the entitatively supernatural, however, whether formal or virtual, is not useful when it comes to understanding our anomaly of a natural solution that is somehow supernatural. The more promising category seems to be what was mentioned only in passing: that of the supernaturale quod modum, an example of which is the grace that pertains to miracles and prophecies. This is a category that is quite familiar in the context in which Lonergan was writing. Joseph Pohle, whom we have mentioned already, divides grace into supernaturale quod substantiam and supernaturale quod modum:

\textsuperscript{23} Grace and Freedom, 246.
\textsuperscript{24} Early Latin Theology, 125.
[A] gift of God may be an *indebitum*, i.e., a supernatural grace, either with regard to the manner of its production (*supernaturale quoad modum*, as, for instance, a miraculous cure), or with respect of its very substance (*supernaturale quoad substantiam*). There is an essential distinction between these two categories of the Supernatural. The *supernaturale quoad modum* has its seat not in nature, *i.e.*, in the creature itself, but outside of it, *viz.*: in the divine causality. It is Supernatural only with regard to the manner in which it is communicated to the creature, as when a man is raised from the dead. The gift itself (in the case mentioned, *life*), is something intrinsically and essentially natural. This species of the Supernatural appertains to the domain of Apologetics. Dogmatic Theology proper is concerned mainly with the *supernaturale quoad substantiam*, *i.e.*, that which essentially and intrinsically transcends the bounds of Nature.25

Returning to Lonergan, we find another interesting category in *De ente supernaturali*: a distinction between interior actual graces that are supernatural in a strict sense and in a broad sense:

*supernatural*: can be taken in a strict or in a broad sense.

Strictly speaking, it means an act whose formal object is absolutely supernatural, as in the case of the infused virtues.

Broadly speaking, it is an act that is entitatively natural, but immediately and gratuitously produced by God: for example, that a sinner be able to observe substantially the whole of the natural law.

... Our answer is that interior actual grace ... consists not only in entitatively supernatural acts that are *per se* ordered to possessing God as he is in himself, but also in other truly gratuitous acts that are *per accidens* so ordered.

... Again, interior actual grace received in the will is an act of willing a supernatural end (or, *per accidens*, willing a natural

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moral good \([\text{bonum naturale et honestum}]\) not otherwise willed)....

We note that only in the strict sense is an interior actual grace absolutely supernatural, with an absolutely supernatural formal object. In the broad sense the acts, though supernatural in the sense that they are produced immediately and gratuitously by God, are entitatively natural insofar as the formal object is natural. That this category is identical with that of the supernatural \([\text{quoad modum}]\) seems to be confirmed by \textit{Analysis fidei} (1952) when Lonergan says:

Grace that is supernatural in its substance \([\text{quoad substantiam}]\) ("elevating grace") is required for eliciting those acts that are proximately related to faith itself.

The reason is that these acts are supernatural and specified by a supernatural formal object....

According to the different needs of individuals, grace is required to elicit those acts that remotely lead to faith. In itself, this grace is "healing grace," supernatural in its manner \([\text{quoad modum}]\).

.....

The reason is that what is directly intended is natural.  

For the first two steps by which the unbeliever is led to faith, the steps that constitute the remote process, "the action of divine providence, both exterior and interior, is sufficient, along with the healing graces that respond to the needs of each individual." For the third and fourth steps, which constitute the proximate process, "the absolutely supernatural graces of enlightenment and inspiration are required."

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26 All three quotes from \textit{Early Latin Theology}, 230-31. See also pages 106-109 of that text, where Lonergan distinguishes between operation \([\text{quoad substantiam}]\) and \([\text{quoad modum}]\). \textit{Quoad modum} may be taken in a strict sense, referring to the modalities of operation which can change while its essence remains the same (facility, promptness, and so on), or in a broad sense. In a broad sense, \textit{quoad modum} "extends to anything accidental or extrinsic. Thus the eyesight of one who was blind and now is miraculously cured is said to be supernatural in its manner \([\text{quoad modum}]\)." See Stebbins, \textit{The Divine Initiative}, 102-103, who explains that the blind man sees, and that his seeing is not characterized by any special facility or acuity; "all that sets it apart from normal instance of seeing is the manner in which the man received his power of sight."

27 \textit{Early Latin Theology}, 449.
The supernatural *quoad substantiam* is clearly identified with *gratia elevans*, and the supernatural *quoad modum* with *gratia sanans*. While acts pertaining to the former are entitatively supernatural, acts pertaining to the latter are entitatively natural; and the context is the *praemacula fidei*, the process leading to the act of faith.  

**Absolutely Supernatural Acts with Natural Objects**

*De ente supernaturali* of 1946-47 also indicates, within the context of Christian living, the possibility of properly supernatural acts with natural objects. Such acts have an absolutely supernatural formal object-by-which (*obiectum formale quo*) and a merely natural formal object-which (*obiectum formale quod*). The argument is as follows:

[F]rom the fact that the formal object-by-which is absolutely supernatural it does not necessarily follow that the formal object-which is absolutely supernatural. The converse is true, of course, because a resultant does not exceed its principle. Nor is the resultant necessarily at the same level as its principle. And as far as acts of virtue are concerned, it seems quite clear that all just deeds done by a Christian are not different in their formal object-which from works of human justice; otherwise, how could civil society make laws in matters of justice for believers and unbelievers alike?

Lonergan is not saying that all Christian virtues differ from the corresponding acts of human virtue only because of their motive, their formal object-by-which. The Christian virtue of religion, for example, differs from the human virtue of religion both by reason of the formal object-which and the formal object-by-which. Nevertheless, he insists, it is not true that every act of Christian virtue has a special formal object-which. It is, in other words, possible to have an act of virtue with a supernatural formal object-by-which and a merely natural formal object-which.  

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28 *Early Latin Theology*, 453. Lonergan points out that the term *quoad substantiam* is equivalent to *quoad essentiam*, *essentialiter*, and *entitativus*. See also pages 106-107; Stebbins, *The Divine Initiative*, 326n26.

29 *Early Latin Theology*, 119.

30 *Early Latin Theology*, 123, 125.
to Christians.\textsuperscript{31} Thus, to the objection that an absolutely supernatural formal object-by-which is pointless unless the formal object-which is also supernatural, he replies: “If an act as virtuous is absolutely supernatural, this does not mean it is pointless, even if the act as act can be performed by a non-believer – Mahatma Gandhi’s protracted fast, for example.”\textsuperscript{32} The implication here is that for a Christian, the act of fasting can be supernatural, while for Gandhi it is merely natural. The difference seems to lie in the fact that the Christian has an absolutely supernatural formal object-by-which or motive while Gandhi presumably does not have such a motive.\textsuperscript{33} We might note here that we are dealing with acts that are absolutely supernatural, though by reason of their formal object-by-which rather than by reason of their formal object-which.

**Supernatural Acts quoad modum with Natural Objects**

But there is also the possibility of acts that are supernatural *quoad modum*, with natural objects. In *Analysis fidei* (1952), as we have seen, Lonergan grants that *gratia sanans* is sufficient for the first two steps leading to the act of faith. *Gratia sanans* is grace that is supernatural in its manner: “According to the different needs of individuals, grace

\textsuperscript{31} See *Early Latin Theology*, 117: acts of other virtues elicited in the rational part of a person and done in accordance with one’s Christian duty are absolutely supernatural in their substance, because their formal object quo, which is faith, hope, and charity, is absolutely supernatural.

\textsuperscript{32} *Early Latin Theology*, 123.

\textsuperscript{33} See *Early Latin Theology*, 97, 117: “in accordance with Christian duty.”

In another passage, however, Lonergan qualifies this statement. “But acts of the other virtues, which have to do not with the divine life in us but rather with transforming our lives through the presence of the divine life in us, are absolutely supernatural as virtuous by reason of their formal object-by-which, but are not absolutely supernatural, or at least not all or individually, as acts and by reason of their formal object-which” (*Early Latin Theology*, 125). By reason of their formal object-by-which, and as virtuous, such acts are absolutely supernatural; but by reason of their formal object-which, and as acts, they are not all absolutely supernatural. This seems to go along with the example of taking care of the sick in the Regis course of 1962, which Lonergan refers to as *quoad modum* supernatural rather than absolutely supernatural: “Just as taking care of the sick can be directed to God, so also can science, and particularly the science that regards God. But in itself, it’s performing operations that are *quoad modum* supernatural in that they presuppose the truths of faith” (*Early Works on Theological Method* 1, 322). Such acts would seem to be supernatural because they are directed to God and because they presuppose the truths of faith; and only *quoad modum* supernatural because their formal object-which is natural.
is required to elicit those acts that remotely lead to faith. In itself, this grace is ‘healing grace,’ supernatural in its manner [quoad modum].” It is supernatural in its manner because what is directly intended is natural. Those acts that remotely precede faith do not, in fact, exceed the natural proportion of the human intellect. However, Lonergan does not exclude that de facto the grace that is given in the praeambula fidei might be gratia elevans:

We do not directly reject the opinion of those who hold that all grace that is actually given is elevating grace, which is absolutely supernatural. When we say that healing grace is sufficient for certain acts, we are speaking of cases that are hypothetical and abstractly defined. Those who maintain that all grace is elevating can prove their assertion by showing that those hypothetical cases never actually exist.

In other words, Lonergan admits here, within the praeambulae fidei, two possibilities: (1) acts that are supernatural quoad modum but with natural objects; (2) acts that are absolutely supernatural but with natural objects. He repeats this position in the Regis course of 1962. In the praeambula fidei, he says, it is not necessary that there occur any type of supernatural act. De facto, however, because of our fallen condition, gratia sanans is needed. Further, because of the way in which grace is granted in the present order (in which the absolutely supernatural solution has been realized), there will normally be (absolutely) supernatural acts even before they are strictly necessary (i.e., before the act of reflective understanding which is the pivot of the faith process). Still the objects prior to that reflective act of

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34 Early Latin Theology, 448-49. The teaching that those not yet justified can perform genuinely holy acts with the help of grace (H. Denzinger, Enchiridion symbolorum 1925, etc.) led to a further theological distinction: supernatural grace is absolutely necessary for supernatural good acts, but for simply honest acts (the honestum), i.e. those that fulfill the natural law, gratia sanans need not be supernatural in the fullest sense but only relatively. (See E. M. Burke, F. Colborn, and S. Kenen, “Grace (Theology of),” in New Catholic Encyclopedia, 2nd ed., 6:399)

35 Early Latin Theology, 449.

36 Early Latin Theology, 453.
understanding need not be supernatural. And again, in a question session later in the same course:

**Question:** Where do gratia sanans and elevans fit in?

**Lonergan:** There is gratia elevans in the end, and there is gratia elevans with regard to the praeambula, the process to this final act, because man cannot long observe the natural law quoad substantiam without grace; and in particular because this process is heading towards a supernatural end, you need a superior direction there coming in. The man is directing himself to an unknown objective. Now those graces could theoretically be non-supernatural. However, there is a theological opinion to the effect that de facto in this order all graces are supernatural, elevans. There is never a grace that is merely sanans and not also elevans. That’s an opinion.

What is interesting here is the reason Lonergan gives for the presence of gratia elevans instead of merely sanans in the praeambula: “in particular because this process is heading towards a supernatural end, you need a superior direction there coming in.” As he did in Analysis fidei, Lonergan points out that theoretically the graces involved could be non-supernatural – that is, that they could be supernatural quoad modum. But once again he admits that there is a theological opinion to the effect that “in this order” all graces are supernatural in the sense of elevans, supernatural quoad substantiam. Petrus Parente, for example, writing in 1948, holds strongly that all grace is the grace of Christ, and therefore essentially supernatural, healing as well as sanctifying:

In this sense, grace is taken as a help that is internal, unowed [to human nature], and in fact supernatural. For there are those who think it to be a grace that is essentially natural but supernatural secundum quid, which they even call sanans. But this opinion does not seem to be in keeping with traditional doctrine: for the sources of revelation, the Fathers and the ancient Doctors do not, in the present order, recognize any grace

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37 Early Works on Theological Method 1, 147.
38 Early Works on Theological Method 1, 329.
apart from the grace of Christ, which is one and essentially supernatural, sanans as well as sanctifying.\footnote{39} However, there is another importance nuance in Lonergan’s teaching of 1962, one that is of immediate relevance to our inquiry: the hypothetical possibility of God revealing “in this order” only natural truths.

Even if God revealed in this order only natural truths, he could have done so through the type of prophecy and miracles and so on that are appealed to in the praemula fidei. But in that case those praemula would not be heading to the mysteries. There would be nothing supernatural quoad se, quoad substantiam, in any of the acts and, consequently, not in the praemula.\footnote{40}

The contrast here is between an absolutely supernatural order or solution, and a purely natural order or solution. In an absolutely supernatural order, there arises the possibility of absolutely supernatural acts even in the praemula, because the process is heading towards the mysteries. In a purely natural order, however, the supernatural quoad modum would suffice, because in this case the praemula would not be heading towards the mysteries. This is perhaps one of the rare allusions that Lonergan makes to the purely natural solution to the problem of evil outside of Insight, and it is clear that the divine intervention here is supernatural quoad modum, “in some sense supernatural.” But we also take note of the possibility, on the hypothesis of an absolutely supernatural order, of acts with natural objects that are nonetheless absolutely supernatural, quoad substantiam.

\footnote{39} Gratia hic in sensu proprio sumitur prout est auxilium internum, indebitum, immo supernaturale. Sunt enim qui adstruunt quamdam gratiam essentialiter naturalem sed supernaturalem secundum quid, quam etiam sanantem vacant. Sed huiusmodi opinio cum traditionali doctrina consonare non videtur: fontes enim revelationis, Patres et antiqui Doctores non aliam agnoscent gratiam in praesenti oeconomia praeter gratiam Christi, quae unica est et essentialiter supernaturalis, sanans et sanctificans” (Petrus Parente, Anthropologia supernaturalis: De gratia et virtutibus [Rome/Turin: Casa Editrice Marietti, 1948], 81).

\footnote{40} Early Works on Theological Method 1, 147.
CONCLUSION: A NATURAL SOLUTION THAT IS
SUPERNATURAL IN A BROAD SENSE

The three clues in the previous section can be synthesized into two broad categories relevant to the question of natural solutions to the problem of evil that are in some sense supernatural, and to the question of religion in general: the supernatural quoad modum, and absolutely supernatural acts with natural objects.

First, the supernatural in a broad sense (quoad modum), that involves acts that are entitatively natural but nonetheless produced gratuitously by God. As far as the praeambula fidei are concerned, examples would be the miracles and prophecies. As far as the unjustified or sinners are concerned, examples would be the possibility of observing the natural law quodd substantiam.

Second, absolutely supernatural acts with natural objects. In the context of the praeambula fidei, even though what is required is merely gratia sanans, the grace given can well be elevans. This is open to non-Christians. In the context of Christian life, we have certain virtuous acts that have a natural formal object-which, but a supernatural formal object-by-which, and so are absolutely supernatural. This possibility is not open to non-Christians.

The first category, that of the supernatural in the broad sense (quoad modum), helps us make sense of a natural solution to the problem of evil that is “in some sense transcendent or supernatural.” Such a solution, while involving conjugate forms and acts of faith, hope, and charity that are purely natural, still involves divine intervention. The intervention would be supernatural, but quoad modum, not quoad substantiam. It would be a purely gratia sanans type of solution to the problem of evil, involving the minimum necessary to overcome the problem of evil.

The second category is, we could say, forward looking. Only one of the cases here, that of gratia elevans in the praeambula, explicitly envisages properly supernatural, if actual, graces given to people other than Christian, but even here Lonergan does not really commit himself, being content to mention the opinion of theologians who hold that all grace is the grace of Christ and therefore essentially supernatural, even in the context of the praeambula fidei. In the other case, on the hypothesis that sanctifying grace is given to all, there arises the
possibility not only of Mahatma Gandhi but everyone else being able to perform virtuous acts that are absolutely supernatural, even when their formal object—which remains natural.

What about the religions themselves? On the hypothesis that an absolutely supernatural solution has been realized, and that sanctifying grace is given to all, what can be said about the religions? I think we could still project the possibility of religions that are natural, relatively supernatural, and absolutely supernatural by virtue of their beliefs. Lonergan's remark about Islam being a religion that "does not involve you in the supernatural" would certainly still be understood in the sense that Islam has no place for mysteries that surpass the capacity of human reason. In another sense, however, Islam could well be understood, in its positive moment, as a fruit of the gift of the Spirit, and so, adapting the language of Insight, as a natural religion that is in a true sense absolutely supernatural.

With the overcoming of faculty psychology and the elements of classical fundamental theology that persist in the final chapters of Insight, the reversal of the priority of knowing over loving, and, most importantly the conjoining of this reversal with the distinction between consciousness and knowledge, Lonergan's acceptance, around the year 1967, in the wake of the Second Vatican Council, of the universal salvific will of God, led to his new universalist notion of religion. How exactly that new notion is related to the notion of religion in Insight is something that, at least for me personally, calls for far greater study of both ends of the transition than I have been able to put in. I am aware that much work is going on in this regard, but, as I have said, I am unable just now to commit myself to any opinion. Allow me to just say that, from the time of my first contact with Method in Theology, I have been struck by the difficulty as well as the apparent looseness of the terms "gift of God's love" and "dynamic state of being in love with God." The intriguing question always was, do we or do we not have a role in this giftedness and this state? The answer lies certainly in the direction of a yes; the question is, where exactly and how does human consent enter? Does the gift, or the dynamic state, or

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both, involve human consent – by definition as it were – only in their cooperative moment? What then of the fact that Lonergan, following Aquinas, describes the infused virtue of charity in terms of mutual love and friendship? Do these involve only the virtue as cooperative? Or does the gift of love, as operative, involve a being swept off our feet by love, a mutuality, and a friendship, so that only subsequently we come to knowledge and consent? Are there instances where we have felt loved into loving, as it were, where the gift is, if we can say so, the gift of a response? These questions sometimes seem atrocious, but they are still questions to me, questions pertaining to the transition and transposition from a metaphysical to a properly methodical theology.

42 See STh II-II, q. 23, a. 1 c: Early Latin Theology, 633, 659.
MOVING VATICAN II FORWARD:
THE MULTI-RELIGIOUS CONTEXT

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The present paper combines emphases (and if truth be told, paragraphs) found in two other papers I delivered earlier this spring, the first at the West Coast Methods Institute at Loyola Marymount University on April 14, and the second at the meeting of the Catholic Theological Society of America in St. Louis on June 9. The West Coast lecture was entitled “Rehabilitating and Transposing the Theorem of the Supernatural: A First Installment,” and the Catholic Theological Society of America lecture, “The Structure of Systematic Theology.” The two lectures have in common an appeal to the multi-religious context of contemporary Catholic systematic theology, and the first lecture in particular makes explicit reference to the Second Vatican Council as setting the stage for the emergence of this context.2

I begin, however, with a brief word about my title. In one of his lesser known essays, Frederick Crowe reminds us that the Italian word “aggiornamento” shares the same roots as the English word “adjournment.”3 When I saw this piece just a few weeks ago, I asked myself immediately whether it was not only the Council but also its aggiornamento that has been adjourned. At times it seems that we have put the Council behind us as a temporary blip in the church’s pattern

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1 This paper was presented at the Lonergan Workshop, Boston College, on June 18, 2012.
2 The two papers may be found on the website www.lonerganresource.com, as Essays 44 and 45 in “Essays in Systematic Theology,” under “Scholarly Works/Books.”
of arriving on the scene breathlessly and a bit late, its determination to live in a world that no longer exists. The problem, of course, is more complex than this, and in particular more theological. As the hierarchy becomes less Aristotelian and Thomist in its basic orientation and more Augustinian, Bonaventurian, and Balthasarian, more methodologically monophysite, the less likely it is that any effort at mutual self-mediation between the church and contemporary cultures will occur. The result is serious, however, and not only for theology. The church is hemorrhaging women, gay people, and intelligent observers of contemporary events. Still, I believe that the most viable response to major inauthenticity in the contemporary Catholic church, that is, efforts, however indeliberate, to establish an inauthentic tradition, is not to do battle with resurgent rear-guard clericalism and triumphalism, but simply to move the council forward and stay at least one step ahead of those who would reverse its gains, and to do so not only with ruthless honesty but also with complete fidelity to the authentic tradition and especially to its dogmatic-theological elements, that is, with an effort to promote major authenticity. This suggestion imposes a great collective responsibility on the community of theologians in the church today, but it is a responsibility that by and large I believe that community is prepared to accept. I suggest that one way of doing what I am talking about is to make capital out of the council’s advances with regard to the church’s role in the multi-religious situation of our time.

VATICAN II’S QUESTION

The Second Vatican Council raises questions that it did not answer. Nothing can move the council forward better than attempting to answer the questions that the council invited us to entertain but did not itself pursue. In the case that I wish to discuss, the question was raised in section 22 of “Gaudium et Spes,” the Pastoral Constitution on the Church in the Modern World. First, the text emphasizes the revelatory function of the visible mission of the Word. “It is Christ, the last Adam, who fully discloses humankind to itself and unfolds its noble calling by revealing the mystery of the Father and the Father’s love.” That
revelatory mission is redemptive. “[B]y his incarnation the Son of God united himself in some sense with every human being” (“Gaudium et Spes,” 22). Second, however, if this is the case, the council must admit, as it does, that it is not only Christians who receive “the first fruits of the Spirit” (Romans 8:23), which enable them to fulfill the law of love. Rather, “Gaudium et Spes” asserts, “This applies not only to Christians but to all people of good will in whose hearts grace is secretly at work. Since Christ died for everyone, and since the ultimate calling of each of us comes from God and is therefore a universal one, we are obliged to hold that the Holy Spirit offers everyone the possibility of sharing in this paschal mystery in a manner known to God” (“Gaudium et Spes,” 22).

The council is affirming a doctrine – “the Holy Spirit offers everyone the possibility of sharing in this paschal mystery” – but in the words “in a manner known to God” it is suggesting a systematic-theological question: How can this be? The same combination of a doctrinal affirmation of the universal offer of the Holy Spirit and a systematic question as to how the doctrine is to be understood appears in two encyclicals of Pope John Paul II, “Redemptor hominis” and “Redemptoris missio.”

In the lecture “Rehabilitating and Transposing the Theorem of the Supernatural,” I suggested that valuable hints toward answering the question, How can this be?, may be found in texts of Aquinas that Lonergan interpreted in his doctoral dissertation. In a sense

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4 “This [the Council’s affirmation] applies to everyone, since everyone is included in the mystery of Redemption, and by the grace of this mystery Christ has joined himself with everyone for all time . . . Every individual, from his or her very conception, participates in this mystery . . . Everyone without exception was redeemed by Christ, since Christ is somehow joined to everyone, with no exception, even though the person may not be conscious of it” (“Redemptor hominis,” section 14). As I suggested in the West Coast Methods Institute paper, the distinction between consciousness and knowledge would render the conclusion of this quotation better, if we may take the liberty of rendering papal statements, even good ones, better than they really are: “even though the person does not know that this is the case.” Again, elsewhere Pope John Paul II writes: “Universality of salvation does not mean that it is given only to those who believe explicitly in Christ and join the Church. If salvation is meant for all, it must be offered concretely to all . . . The salvation of Christ is available to them through a grace which, though relating them mysteriously with the Church, does not bring them into it formally but enlightens them in a way adapted to their state of spirit and life situation” (“Redemptoris missio,” section 10).
the breakthrough text for Lonergan in the history of Thomas’s views on what would come to be called actual grace is the early text *De veritate*, question 27, article 5. Here, in contrast with his position in the commentary on the *Sentences* and, it would seem, even with his position earlier in the *De veritate*, which we know was written over a number of years, Thomas does not limit *gratia gratum faciens*, the grace of justification, sanctifying grace, to the habitual grace infused in baptism. Consequent upon the discovery of the theorem of the supernatural, this baptismal grace, as Lonergan insists was important in resolving difficulties in medieval theology. Thomas writes, “The grace that makes one pleasing is understood in two ways: in one way for the divine acceptance itself, which is a gratuitous will of God; in another way for a certain created gift, which formally perfects man and makes him worthy of eternal life.”5 The second of these two ways is the habitual gift bestowed in baptism. But regarding the first of these two ways Thomas writes that “every effect that God works in us from his gratuitous will, by which he accepts us into his kingdom, pertains to the grace that makes one pleasing”6 and so to sanctifying grace, the grace of justification. That these latter are to be acknowledged as “sanctifying graces” is explicitly affirmed by Lonergan.7 There are other texts in Aquinas that make the same point, including the texts that Jacques Maritain relies on to argue that in the first moral act of every individual justification and elevation to a share in divine life are at stake.8 But I am selecting this text because Lonergan emphasizes its importance in Thomas’s development. Thomas is on his way toward a theology of actual grace, and it is a theology that would acknowledge that at least some instances of actual grace are also sanctifying graces.

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5 “Gratia vero gratum faciens... dupliciter accipitur: uno modo pro ipsa divina acceptatione, quae est gratuita Dei voluntas; alio modo pro dono quodam creato, quod formaliter perficit hominem, et facit eum dignum vita aeterna” (Thomas Aquinas, *De veritate*, q. 27, a. 5).

6 “... omnem effectum quem Deus facit in nobis ex gratuita sua voluntate, qua nos in suum regnum acceptat, pertinere ad gratiam gratum facientem...” (Thomas Aquinas, *De veritate*, q. 27, a. 5).


in the strict sense of the term, in that they include the infusion of supernatural charity. Lonergan interprets Thomas's text precisely in this way. Supernatural habits, and especially of course charity, may not only be infused with baptism but also given in the assent to at least some of the inner promptings of the Holy Spirit by which a person is joined to God in the concrete circumstances of his or her own life; and they may be developed due to fidelity to such promptings. The issue would then be one of naming which instances of actual grace qualify also as infusions of charity and thus of sanctifying grace. In De veritate, these graces are not yet “operans” but “cooperans,” but in the later Quodlibetum primum the grace of conversion, an actual grace that occurs before and independently of baptism, can be interpreted in no other way than as “gratia operans.” And in the Prima secundae actual grace, like habitual grace, is both operative and cooperative, and to both habitual grace and actual grace may be assigned the term “gratia gratum faciens.”

9 The dates of the De veritate are 1256-59 and of the Prima secundae 1271-72. The Quodlibetum primum was written slightly before the Prima secundae.

10 The paper “Rehabilitating and Transposing the Theorem of the Supernatural” argues this from an exegesis of Summa theologiae, 1-2, q. 111, aa. 1 and 2, and especially from the connection between the two articles. I quote: “Article 1 asks whether it is appropriate to distinguish grace into gratia gratis data and gratia gratum faciens, grace gratuitously given and grace that makes one pleasing. These two terms occur throughout the development that Lonergan is researching in Grace and Freedom, both prior to Aquinas and in Thomas’s own work. But they constantly shift their meaning. The division in the Prima secundae (as contrasted with earlier divisions given the same names both in Aquinas and especially in his predecessors) is a distinction between God’s immediate action on the recipient (gratia gratum faciens) and God’s use of other people as instruments to lead their fellow human beings to God, for instance, in the preaching of a sermon or homily. The latter is the exclusive meaning of gratia gratis data in article 1 of question 111. God’s immediate action on the person, on the soul, is gratia gratum faciens, and God’s use of others is gratia gratis data. In other words, over the course of the history of the use of these two terms, there can be discerned a broadening of the meaning of gratia gratum faciens and a narrowing of the meaning of gratia gratis data. In Thomas’s early commentary on the Sentences of Peter Lombard, as Lonergan emphasizes, gratia gratis data referred to every gratuitous gift of God other than the habitual grace infused with baptism, which alone merited the term gratia gratum faciens. But in article 1 of question 111 of the Prima secundae, “gratia gratum faciens” refers to every grace “per quam ipse homo Deo coniungitur,” while “gratia gratis data” refers exclusively to the gift of one person being provided by God to help another and lead that other to God. Obviously, both the habitual grace infused with baptism and the actual grace that is an interior movement caused immediately by God are instances of “gratia gratum faciens,”
Next, as for the issue of determining which instances of actual grace qualify also as infusions of sanctifying grace, I turn to the passage already cited from Vatican II. What the Holy Spirit offers everyone in a manner known only to God is ‘the possibility of sharing in this paschal mystery.’ Paradigmatic of the instances of actual grace that are justifying, that are also sanctifying graces, are those in which the recipient is called to participate in the dynamics of what Christians know as the Law of the Cross, the dispensation whereby the evils of the human race are transformed into a greater good through the loving and non-violent response that returns good for evil. That dialectical posture is for the Lonergan of chapter 20 of Insight a function of supernatural charity. It is by no means limited to the baptized members of Christ’s church or even to those outside the church who have in some way become heirs of the positive Wirkungsgeschichte of Christ’s historical causality, an influence of which René Girard makes so much.\(^\text{11}\)

In “De ente supernaturali” Lonergan proposes an original thesis on the meaning of actual grace. Thesis 5 reads, “Interior actual grace consists in vital, principal, and supernatural second acts of the intellect and the will.”\(^\text{12}\) The key word for my purposes is “principal.” Principal


acts stand as efficient causes of other acts. In the order of knowledge, principal acts are insights, acts of understanding, whether direct or inverse or reflective or deliberative. In the order of decision, principal acts are the willing of the end, which may be correlated with what the later Lonergan, following Joseph de Finance, will call acts of vertical liberty whereby one moves from one horizon to another. Supernatural interior principal acts are acts produced by God immediately in us without any efficient causality on our part: acts of insight and the willing of horizon-elevating objectives or ends, where the insight and the willing are gratia operans, to which, by God’s grace, we are enabled to assent (gratia cooperans). Among the principal supernatural acts that qualify as actual graces, then, are (1) the inverse insight that the violence that returns evil for evil solves nothing, (2) the direct, reflective, and deliberative insights entailed in concrete instances of non-violent resistance and the return of good for evil, and (3) the divinely proposed invitation to participate in a manner of living that concretely and, whether acknowledged as such or not, is patterned on the just and mysterious Law of the Cross. As I wrote in the paper from which I am drawing, “We are here moving into the territory staked out by charity, and charity and sanctifying grace are inseparable. There is never one without the other. The grace-enabled assent to the promptings of the Holy Spirit regarding an act of charity that would return good for evil brings with it the justification that is meant by gratia gratum faciens. At least these actual graces are also sanctifying graces, and they are so by definition,” because of the intimate relation of charity with sanctifying grace. When one takes seriously the theological doctrine that sanctifying grace and charity are participations in and imitations of, respectively, the divine relations of active and passive spiration, one easily grasps that they entail elevation to participation in divine life.

THE MULTI-RELIGIOUS CONTEXT AND THE STRUCTURE OF SYSTEMIC THEOLOGY

In “The Structure of Systematic Theology” I repeated the emphasis that I stressed in What Is Systematic Theology? to the effect that each of the major elements among the mysteries of faith that systematics is
charged to understand and elaborate must be expressed in categories that indicate the significance for human history of the realities named in Christian constitutive meanings: of God, Trinity, the Holy Spirit, the Incarnation, revelation, creation, original sin, redemption, sacraments, church, eternal life, praxis, and so on. Systematics is to be a theological theory of history. Its mediated object is *Geschichte*, as Lonergan emphasized in his notes at the time of the breakthrough to functional specialization.13

In the systematics that I am proposing, the scale of values that integrates the complex dialectical structures of personal integrity, cultural meanings and values, and the social order provides the principal general categories, the categories that theology shares with other disciplines, while the so-called four-point hypothesis that appears at the very end of Lonergan’s systematic treatise on the Trinity establishes the most basic special categories, the categories peculiar to theology. In terms of the theological difficulties that I mentioned at the beginning, Aristotelian-Thomist persuasions will be far more oriented to accepting responsibility for general categories than will be Augustinian-Bonaventurian-Balthasarian persuasions. The claim regarding the link of the four-point hypothesis to the basic special categories is especially true of the relations of sanctifying grace and charity in that hypothesis, since these provide what I would call the special basic relations of systematic theology.14 The theory of history expressed in *Theology and the Dialectics of History* and the hypothesis that links the divine processions and relations with the divine missions constitute together what I have called the unified field structure of systematic theology.

To the cultural factors of modernity in terms of which Lonergan understood the massive shift that called for a thorough exploration of theological method — modern science, modern historical consciousness, and modern philosophy — must be added the deference to the other

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13 See, for instance, the breakthrough page itself: 47200D0E060 on www.bernardlonergan.com.

that constitutes the postmodern phenomenon. In particular I stress the interreligious context within which all Christian theology must be conducted from this point forward, as well as the vast call that both God and humanity are uttering for social and economic justice, for gender equity, and for an up-to-date notion of sexual differentiation. The triune God with which a contemporary systematics begins is a God whose gift of grace is offered to all women and men at every time and place and in a manner that calls for the transformation of cultural meanings and values and the elaboration of social structures that deliver the goods of the earth in an equitable fashion to all. The Incarnation of the Word of God is the revelation of that universal offer of grace and of the demands that come with it. Once meaning is acknowledged as constitutive of the real world in which human beings live and know and choose and love, soteriology can be phrased in revelational terms: the introduction of divine meaning into human history, which is what revelation is, is redemptive of that history and of the subjects and communities that are both formed by that history and form its further advance in turn.\textsuperscript{15} It is first and foremost the mission of the Holy Spirit that constitutes the universal realm of religious values in the integral scale of values, and by and large the systematics that I envision would articulate the relation of that mission and of the consequent and revealing visible mission of the Word to realities at the other levels of value: personal, cultural, social, and vital. But we must insist too that the invisible mission of the Spirit is not isolated from an equally invisible mission of the Word. The elaboration of the gift of the Spirit enables us to develop a new variant on the Augustinian-Thomist psychological analogy for understanding the divine processions. As the gift of God’s love comes to constitute the conscious \textit{memoria} in which the human person is present to herself or himself, the summation, as it were, of life experiences as these constitute one’s self-taste, it gives rise to a set of judgments of value that constitute a universalist faith, a faith that gives thanks for the gift, a faith that in fact is the created term of an invisible mission of the Word. Together this self-presence in \textit{memoria} and its word of Yes in faith breathe charity, the love of the Givers and a love of all people.

and of the universe in loving the Givers of the gift.

Thus the theology that would move Vatican II forward, I believe, has to follow Frederick Crowe in understanding the visible mission of the Word in the context of the universal offer of divine healing and elevating grace in the invisible missions of the Holy Spirit and of the Word. This emphasis on the invisible missions of Spirit and Word introduces multi-religious advances on the theological situation, and these change everything in that situation. They do so in ways that are enriching but at the same time for many anxiety-producing. They also do so in ways that are as yet unforeseen. We do not know what God has in mind. As Crowe has insisted, there is no answer as yet to the question of the final relationship of Christianity to the other world religions. We are working that out. It is a set of future contingent realities, and nothing true can be said about them now. There will be no answer to that question until we have worked it out, and we are at the very beginning of that elaboration.\footnote{16 See the concluding comments in Frederick Crowe, \textit{Christ and History} (Ottawa: Novalis, 2005).}

It was with this in mind that I suggested here two years ago that the functional specialties in which Lonergan elaborates the overall structure of theology, a structure in which systematics is but one set of tasks among many, need to be considered as functional specialties for a global or world theology.\footnote{17 See Robert M. Doran, “Functional Specialties for a World Theology,” in vol. 24 of the \textit{Lonergan Workshop Journal}, ed. Fred Lawrence (Chestnut Hill, MA: Boston College, 2013). This paper can also be found in \textit{Essays in Systematic Theology} on the website www.lonerganresource.com, as Essay 36.} The functional specialties, which I number as nine rather than eight,\footnote{18 See Robert M. Doran, “The Ninth Functional Specialty,” \textit{Method: Journal of Lonergan Studies}, n. s., 2, no. 1 (2011): 12-16. This paper can also be found in \textit{Essays in Systematic Theology} on the website www.lonerganresource.com, as Essay 38.} are really functional specialties for a vast expansion of theology, and of every functional specialty in theology, beyond what even Lonergan had explicitly in mind. The data relevant for Christian theology become all the data on the religious living of men and women at every age, in every religion, and in every culture. For the Holy Spirit and the invisible Word are at work, on mission, everywhere, and not simply in the post-resurrection, Pentecostal context of Christian belief. It is the responsibility of
Christians to discern the workings of the Holy Spirit and the Word on a universal scale, and in theology that responsibility will take the form of interpreting the religious data, narrating what has been going forward in the religious history of peoples, dialectically and dialogically discerning what is of God from what is not, discriminating genuine transcendence from deviated transcendence, in the various religions of humankind including Christianity and Catholicism, and taking one’s stand on what is of God wherever it may be found, articulating this in positions that all can accept, and understanding the realities affirmed in such judgments. At the heart of that discernment is the Law of the Cross that returns superabundant good for evil done.

CONCLUSION

By way of conclusion, let me relate what I have said to Charles Taylor’s four disjunctions of the contemporary church from the world it purports to address, disjunctions that would lead us to pass a quite negative judgment on the manner in which the church has heeded the challenge of the council: a disjunction from the spiritual seeking that asks questions the church does not want to entertain, a disjunction in the model of authority that the magisterium is desperately holding onto, a disjunction from the sexual morality and gender equity that contemporaries increasingly accept as correct, and a disjunction from plural forms of spirituality. The emphasis on the primacy and universality of the mission of the Holy Spirit and the invisible mission of the Word will be one source of the church’s redirection of its energies so as to heal these disjunctions. Vatican II, I suggest, began with what is first for us: the church. It followed the way of discovery. As a pastoral council it acted appropriately in so proceeding. But now we must acknowledge that the theology of the church is not first in the order of teaching but close to last, and so that a theology and an ecclesial praxis that would understand the topics that in reality come before the church – Trinity, the Holy Spirit, the Incarnation, revelation, creation, original sin, redemption, and at least the sacraments of baptism and

19 These disjunctions are listed in an unpublished note that is being employed to generate multidisciplinary conversations and writings.
Eucharist – a theology that would understand these realities in terms of an assumed ecclesiology rather than understanding the church in terms of these prior topics, is itself a distorted theology. The mission of the church is an extension of the missions of the Spirit and the Word, of divine Love and divine Truth. “As the Father has sent me, so I send you.” The appropriate systematic-theological understanding of the church can occur only within the dogmatic-theological context set by an adequate Trinitarian theology and within the unified field structure established by joining that Trinitarian theology to the integral scale of values. In accord with Vatican II, we may justly list the paschal mystery as the central articulation of what the mission of the Holy Spirit is always about: incarnating, whether the gift is recognized as such or not, the Law of the Cross in the dynamics of human history, the law that enjoins human beings in the promptings of grace to cease returning evil for evil and to begin to resist in a new way, by heaping up superabundant good in the face of hatred, malice, corruption, ignorance, and decline. I am suggesting in this paper that we do precisely this in the face of the resistance the council is currently undergoing in the church. As the title of a movie some ten years ago put it, rather than paying back, Pay It Forward. Move the council forward. Do not spend time fighting the resistance against the council found in prominent powers in the church today. Join the Spirit responsible for the council and move forward the impulses of grace. Against such love there is no law.
BEYOND *INTER MIRIFICA* (VATICAN II) AND A LONERGANIAN VIEW OF INFORMATION TECHNOLOGY

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On June 3, 2012, a Nigerian airliner, Dana Airlines, carrying 153 passengers and six crew members on a routine flight from Abuja to Lagos, crashed in a village ten minutes before landing. In Nigeria, such news usually takes at least forty-eight hours to filter through the news media, for instance, radio, newspapers, television networks, and general public. However, in the wake of information and communication technology (ICT) in Nigeria in the last eleven years, the news of this magnitude took less than ten minutes to filter through the population of millions of people. However, it was not through the regular news media but through mostly young individuals who had different mobile telecommunication devices.

News of the tragedy spread like wildfire in harmattan, but that was not exactly a result of an effective news media. Before news hounds from the traditional media such as newspaper, radio and television could get to the crash scene, some people... were already on ground, taking shots and recording the inferno with their BlackBerry and camera phones and forwarding same to others who were still in church or attending to other social functions at the time of the tragedy. They were reporting the plane crash minute by minute using their mobile devices and other social media platforms thus changing the dynamics of news reporting from “immediate” to “instantaneous.” The
plane billed to land at 3:21 pm crashed at about 3:43 pm, and by 3:50 pm news of the crash had reached virtually everybody who owned a mobile device.¹

The instantaneous nature of the modern telecommunication technologies has changed the very things we do, how we do them, and most importantly the way we think about our societies and about ourselves. I too received the news of the crash through SMS on my mobile phone about 3:55 from a friend who was waiting at Lagos International Airport for a passenger in the ill-fated flight. In Nigeria and in most African countries, the ways that news and information are shared through mobile devices, internet, and social networks like YouTube, Facebook, Myspace, Google Plus, Yahoo Messenger, BlackBerry Ping, Skype, SMS, and others totally subverts the traditional understanding of mass communication. The real tragedy of the accident is not just the plane crash, but the fact that the young people who arrived first on the scene were more concerned about capturing pictures and videos to share with the rest of the world. It seems that the real heroes were not those who came to help but those who took pictures and shared through information and communication technologies. Are there really two opposing or conflicting interest groups of the designers of social communications and the traditionally intended audience or users?

This article, therefore, will explore the Second Vatican Council Decree on The Means of Social Communication, Inter Mirifica,² which laid the foundation for the church’s theological, pastoral, and practical involvement in what came to be known as “means of social communication.” It will examine the different documents, encyclicals of the church that have arisen due to Inter Mirifica, and how each tries to reflect the church’s understanding of the moral and spiritual consequences of the use of ICT in the last forty-nine years. Then, it will examine Lonergan’s view of technology as a “texture of civilization” and as the canon of operations and a good of order. From a Lonerganian view of technology, it will explore how Lonergan’s view of technology


and its role in human society helps us understand ICT, not just from an instrumental point of view like Inter Mirifica, but from a broader view of emergent probability. Finally, it will end with a conclusion.

**INTER MIRIFICA AND FORTY-NINE YEARS AFTER VATICAN II**

The Decree on the Means of Social Communications (*Inter Mirifica*) in the Vatican II Council was one of the very first two documents promulgated by the council on December 4th, 1963. The other document is *Sacrosanctum Concilium*, on Sacred Liturgy. Originally, this document was not foreseen as one of the possible themes for deliberation until the “modern means of the apostolate” was being discussed and the erection of a special commission through the *Motu Proprio Superno Dei Nutu*, that a proposal to draft a document for discussion was made. The result is this 114-paragraph document on means of social communications. During the council, the first draft of the decree was divided into an introduction (1-5), the doctrine of the church (6-33), with emphasis on the rights and obligations of the church, individuals, and the state. The second section dealt with the apostolate of the church in means of social communications (34-48) and an ecclesiastical order (49-63). And the fourth section considered the means of communication individually (64-105), the press (49-63), film (84-94), radio and TV (95-105), and others (106-111) and then a conclusion (112-14). The decree was discussed in about three sessions from November 23 to 27, 1962 with only forty-three interventions. One of such interventions was from Auxiliary Bishop Karol Wojtyla, later Pope John Paul II, who added the dimension of culture for communication. The council, after all deliberation, agreed to reduce the document to its essentials and to assemble a panel of professionals to work on a more detailed pastoral document. It got the highest possible “no” votes of 503. It was further reduced from the status of a constitution to that of a decree. With the help of experts, as recommended by the council (*Inter Mirifica*,

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4 Eilers, “Church and Social Communication,” 1.
23), "Pastoral Instruction on the Means of Social Communication,"\(^5\) Communio et Progressio on May 23, 1971, was written. Communio et Progressio acknowledges that "the way men live and think is profoundly affected by the means of communication" (Communio et Progressio, 1). It asserts that for the church, the media are "gifts of God" that have a salvific dimension (Communio et Progressio, 2). From a pastoral, evangelical, and ecumenical point of view, the church sees the media as an opportunity to propagate the faith, the responsibility of every Christian. The moral order in which the media is designed, operated, and used become the main concerns of the decree. The main emphasis therefore is on the "right to information as a moral right and part of human dignity (Inter Mirifica, 6-7). The responsibilities of recipients, communicators, and civil authorities are mentioned (Inter Mirifica, 9-12).

What is the historical impact of this decree? In the history of ecumenical councils, it is the first time the means of social communication is considered; it introduced the expression "social communication" which is accepted by even non-church related institutions.\(^6\) The introduction of this decree has opened up discussions and understanding of communication. It has also broadened the understanding of media to include traditional forms of storytelling, rumors, drama, dance, and music. And today, more can be added to the list of social communications in the global village to include social networks, the internet, and modern text, picture, and video sharing devices. Hence, the Vatican office on press and film is extended to all means of communication (Inter Mirifica, 19). Inter Mirifica builds on the encyclical of Pope Pius XI, Vigilanti Cura (1936), which called for national film offices (Inter Mirifica, 21). It also made social communication the responsibility of every bishop in his diocese to promote and use the means for the propagation of faith and finally, Inter Mirifica set a World Day of Social Communication in which the faithful will be reminded of their duty (Inter Mirifica, 18).

Furthermore, a look into the actual document reveals the church's interest in social communication. Firstly, it acknowledges the contribution of human "genius" as dependent on God's help since all

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\(^6\) Eilers, "Church and Social Communication," 3.
inventions come from creation (Inter Mirifica, 1). The interest in social communications is not for its own sake but for the fact that the influence of information on the human mind is recognized. The church’s interest is on those communications that “directly touch man’s spirit ... not merely single individuals but the very masses and even the whole of human society” (Inter Mirifica, 1). This includes therefore all means of social communications, including storytelling, the press, radio, television, and so forth. And more recently, it includes the internet and the mobile-internet, which contains all these media and even more at a very high speed. These “means of social communication” are broader and more complicated than they were forty-nine years ago.

Secondly, the document recognizes that “if these media are properly used they can be of considerable benefit to mankind. They contribute greatly to the enlargement and enrichment of men’s minds and to the propagation and consolidation of the kingdom of God ... that man can use them in ways that are contrary to the Creator’s design and damaging to himself. Indeed, she grieves with a mother’s sorrow at the harm all too often inflicted on society by their misuse” (Inter Mirifica, 2). By this it reiterates the evangelical dimension of social media.

And thirdly, the mission of the church also involves teaching humankind how to use these social means of communication (Inter Mirifica, 3). The church’s birthright is to “animate these media with a Christian and human spirit and to ensure that they live up to humanity’s hope for them, in accordance with God’s design” (Inter Mirifica, 3). The recognition of the moral order and God’s design for the technology is one thing, the other is that “information is very useful and, for the most part, essential. If news or facts and happenings [are] communicated publicly and without delay, every individual will have permanent access to sufficient information and thus will be enabled to contribute effectively to the common good” (Inter Mirifica, 5).

Fourthly, the decree declares the task of the media offices as that of the “formation of a right conscience” (Inter Mirifica, 21), and for the protection of those who use the media so that they do not “suffer damage” (Inter Mirifica, 24). The young especially “should learn moderation and discipline in their use of them. They should aim to understand fully what they see, hear, and read” (Inter Mirifica, 10). In
In general, both the publishers and the recipients are to avoid publications that endanger faith and morals. Given the media that was obtainable in the 1960s and 1970s, film, television, radio, and so forth, there were usually prepackaged programming the shows two seemingly opposed or conflicting groups of "programmers" and "recipients."

What has really changed in the last forty-nine years after the promulgation of this decree? The consciousness of the importance of social communications has grown in the church and in the larger society. Inter Mirifica was followed by the pastoral document, Communio et Progressio (1971), and Aetatis Novae (1992), and other documents of the Pontifical Council for Social Communication, for instance, on Ecumenical and Interreligious Cooperation (1989), Pornography and Violence (1989), Ethics in Communication (2000), Advertising (1997), Internet (2002) and the pastoral use of the Internet (2002). Different synodal exhortations of different regions of the world all deal with this issue. For instance, in the last two editions of an African bishop's synod Ecclesia in Africa (2009) and Africæ Munus (2011), the importance of social communications is emphasized. Also, the last Apostolic Letter of John Paul II on the subject is Rapido Sviluppo (January 24, 2005).

In another Vatican II document, Gaudium et Spes, the Church in the Modern World, the means of social communication is seen from the perspective of human society, culture, and new technical developments. This document was published two years after Inter Mirifica. It sees mass media as "contributing to the spread of knowledge and the speedy diffusion far and wide of habits of thought and feeling, setting off chain reactions in their wake." It contributes also to "the intense development of interpersonal relationships due in no small measure to modern technical advances..." (Gaudium et Spes, 23). In a positive note it states, "Heightened media exchange between nations and different branches of society open up the riches of different cultures to each and every individual, with the result that a more universal form of culture is gradually taking shape, and through it the unity of mankind is being fostered and expressed in the measure that the particular characteristics of each culture are preserved" (Gaudium

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7 Eilers, "Church and Social Communication," 4.
et Spes, 54). A positive global culture emerges in a global village, hopefully ensuring the preservation of the uniqueness of each culture, sharing them without destroying them.

Similarly, Pope John Paul II in Redemptoris Missio shares his understanding of a “new culture” which in reality leads to a paradigm shift. In calling the world of communication the “first areopagus (marketplace) of the modern age,” he also affirmed that “the means of communication have become so important as to be for many the chief means of information and education, of guidance and inspiration in their behavior as individuals, families, and within society at large” (Redemptoris Missio, 37c). In such a global culture powered by this social means of communication, the question of who man truly is, cannot be over emphasized. It also heightens the role of social means of communication in the unity of persons, bond of interdependence between peoples, in real time, who are separated by great distances. How then would this contribute to their betterment and improvement in “spiritual maturity, more aware of the dignity of the human person and more responsible, and respecting cultural differences”?11

Similarly, John Paul II in his Apostolic Letter, The Rapid Development,12 expressed the need for proper formation of the mind against the possible adverse effect of the social communications. He argues that “The new vocabulary they introduce into society modifies both learning processes and the quality of human relations, so that, without proper formation, these media run the risk of manipulating and heavily conditioning, rather than serving people. This is especially true for young people, who show a natural propensity towards technological innovations, and as such are in even greater need of education in the responsible and critical use of the media (Rapid Development, 11).

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10 Compendium of the Social Doctrine of the Church, no. 192.

11 Compendium of the Social Doctrine of the Church, no. 415.

He advised that “Everyone should know how to foster an attentive discernment and constant vigilance, developing a healthy critical capacity regarding the persuasive force of the communications media” (Rapid Development, 13). In The Church and Internet, the twofold role of the church is emphasized, on one hand it is to encourage the right development and right use of social media for the common good and in a spirit of solidarity. On the other hand, it is a sympathetic understanding of the media and encourage those responsible for its development. It must also ensure that the promotion of humanity and the propagation of the gospel are not hindered by the media.13

In addition, the Apostolic Exhortation Ecclesia in Africa14 states that “modern media is not only seen as means of communication, but themselves a world to be evangelized” (Ecclesia in Africa, 142).

The new information technologies are capable of being powerful instruments for unity and peace, but also for destruction and division. From a moral standpoint they can offer either a service or a disservice, propagate truth as well as falsehood, propose what is base as well as what is beautiful. The flood of news or non-news, to say nothing of images, can be informative but also powerfully manipulative. Information can readily become disinformation, and formation deformation. The media can be a force for authentic humanization, but just as easily prove dehumanizing.” (Ecclesia in Africa, 143)

Ecclesia in Africa calls it a world, a culture, and a civilization, an areopagus of modern age (71).

Our concern in Inter Mirifica is not how well it has been implemented by different bishops or by non-Catholic Christians, but precisely on its understanding of social communication and its particular

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inclusion to focus solely on the pastoral potential of the media for the propagation of faith. Inasmuch as the decree is concerned about the utilization of these means of social communication for the gospel, it obviously sees both the power of their "contents" as transformative. People are changed by the message that they receive from the social means of communication, especially young people. It sees both the evangelical potentials of the means of social communication and possibility of evangelizing the media itself.

LONERGANIAN VIEW OF TECHNOLOGY AND HUMAN CIVILIZATION

To gain a better comprehension of the extents of the means of social communication, we ought to go beyond Inter Mirifica. A Lonerganian point of view goes beyond the pastoral benefits of social media and rather emphasize that people are changed not just by the content of the social media, but that people are cognitively transformed by the creation, use, and implementation of the media. The emphasis of knowing is not just in the content of knowledge but in the knower, "You!" Is not the knower, a unity-identity-whole?¹⁵ As Time magazine named the person of the year 2006 as YOU,¹⁶ the fact that anyone with a mobile device or has access to the internet, email, and any advanced form of ICT, irrespective of age, sex, nationality, race, religion, sexual orientation, is both the designer of the means of social communications and a consumer of social communications, changes the traditional view of social communications. Time magazine declares, "And for seizing the reins of the global media, for founding and framing the new digital democracy, for working for nothing and beating the pros at their own game, Time's Person of the Year for 2006 is you."¹⁷ Tell magazine concluded that this shift in paradigm in the means of social


communication is now “the preferred methods of dissemination, putting the power of communication in the hands of Nigerians irrespective of age, gender, and social status.”

The “culture of silence” and “sacredness of information” has been overthrown by a culture of constant ICT connection and constant bombardment of information. In such an era whereby “false news,” rumors, propaganda, and misinformation are transmitted in the same rate as “true news,” actual facts, authentic information, one needs to go beyond *Inter Mirifica* in order to safeguard against instant biases and face value facts communicated instantaneously as insights. A caption of one of the social networks, www.youtube.com, for sharing videos and comments reads, “Broadcast yourself.” Who is that “you” that is being broadcast? As *Time* magazine points out, the contemporary media and the collaborative spirit it encourages “will not only change the world, but [will] also change the way the world changes.” There is no doubt that Web 2.0 as it is commonly called “harnesses the stupidity of crowds as well as its wisdom. Some of the comments on YouTube make you weep for the future of humanity just for the spelling alone, never mind the obscenity and the naked hatred.” This is the reality of the advancement of information technology. The insights as well as the biases of each individual in conjunction with that of the technology complicate the entire enterprise.

Thus, the interest in information and communication technology from a Lonerganian point of view brings into question the significance of technology as a catalyst of human civilization. Technology is not just a useful mechanism with potential side-effects, technology is a process through which other human processes change. Technology and human cooperation not only change human relationship to technology and human cognition, but most importantly change the way future developments and changes take place. In order to understand information technology from a Lonerganian viewpoint, we should consider Lonergan’s general idea of technology. For Lonergan, development of technology starts with a single idea of an electronic device and appliance. When this fundamental idea is put into practice, it releases the possibility of a whole series of other ideas. Lonergan

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19 www.youtube.com (retrieved on September 10, 2014).
says, for instance that “the roads that we have now did not exist fifty years ago, and one of the main reasons they exist now is the existence of the motorcar. One idea leads to another and makes the realization of other ideas possible.” This is certainly true with the idea of developing a device for computation. Lonergan was optimistic given his limited experience of computing technologies. He observed that it would simplify the task of finding a curve in a graph. This he thought would work well with Galileo’s falling object. For instance, “any curve going through a set of points in a space can be represented by a formulae such as this: \( s = vt + gt^2/2 \) - distance is equal to the initial velocity by the time minus the acceleration of gravity by the time squared over 2. Any curve that can be drawn on a graph can also be represented in an algebraic formulae; the relation between the two is analytic or coordinate geometry.” Lonergan observed Professor James W. Murphy, S.J., a professor of chemistry at St. Mary’s University in Halifax. Murphy was using a computer to calculate the “series of measurements for the temperatures of a molten salt and the electric conductivity through the salt.” Lonergan observed the input of the data and the output of information. He acknowledged that the machine gave the best answer in a short time.

He [Murphy] would type these measurements out, punch the tape, then put the tape into the machine; the machine retyped them and provided the information. He would press a couple of buttons and the machine calculated in a minute and a quarter the best formula of the type \( y = a_b x \). And when I say the best, I mean the best fit according to mean root square deviation, the standard deviation. To calculate that would take a considerable amount of time.

Lonergan was very enthusiastic about the results of a computer. He says it gave the “best” result. There is a positive potential of

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21 *Topics in Education*, 54.

22 *Topics in Education*, 134.

23 *Topics in Education*, 134-35 (my emphasis).
information technology which Lonergan recognizes. The result of this computation in question, is the “information” derived from the computer technology. Information technology is a product of insights, inverse insights and their accumulation, and further questions leading to higher and higher viewpoints in a world process of emergent probability. For Lonergan, the canon of operations, as an empirical method, aims at the accumulation of insights in a fuller circuit that adds observations, experiments, and practical applications. It is a principle of cumulative expansion because of the indefinite possibility of moving from laws to new laws and further activities based on the laws. It is also a principle of construction. For Lonergan, insight is best illustrated with technology, thus, he used artifact or cartwheel that marks the deviation from the use of beast of burden to human ingenuity. Lonergan is optimistic about human intelligence. He says, “Man knows best what man makes for himself.” Scientific theories and its development may not surpass human intelligence because man can understand what he makes: “the more refined and resourceful technology becomes, the greater the frequency of the artificial synthesis of natural products. Thus nature itself becomes understood in the same fashion as man’s own artifacts.” We must note that nature in this case does not exclude the human intelligence despite its dependence and independence from emergent probability. Man’s own technology becomes a second nature that cannot be created or re-created outside the world process of emergent probability.

[Therefore] technology is a recurrent process of insights and oversights, accumulated insights and higher-view points and their intersection with the world process of emergent probability in nature and pure human cooperation. Technology is a material possibility, probability and actualization of the intersection of insights and emergent probability and its incompleteness both in the subject and in its material

24 Insight, 98.
25 Insight, 98 (my emphasis).
development. It is not simply an applied science, but also an
incentive to understanding science, the natural world and
the human recurrent schemes. For instance, information
technology is a material realization of accumulated insights
on numerical constitution of the world process of emergent
probability and a possible tool in understanding that same
constitution. Information technology, therefore, consists of pure
abstract science, mathematics, physics, chemistry; empirical
cognitional science and material realization and continued
realization of insights in the technological process.\textsuperscript{27}

Information technology is an excellent example of what Lonergan
means by technology because of its potential to bridge the gap between
the notion of emergent probability of nature and that of human
cooperation. Insight without action and the subsequent influence on the
emergent probability and survival of the human society is worthless.
Due to his practical intelligence, cognitional structure, insights, and
higher viewpoints, man is a tool-making animal, both a subject and an
object of emergent probability. According to Sherry Turkle, technology
is “evocative,”\textsuperscript{28} man changes the world and he is in turn changed
by the technology. Similarly, according to Marshall McLuhan, “Societies have
always been shaped more by the nature of the media by which men
communicate than by the content of the communication.”\textsuperscript{29} Like electric
technology, information technology “is reshaping and restructuring
patterns of social interdependence and every aspect of our personal
life. . . . Everything is changing – you, your family, your neighborhood,
your education, your job, your government, your relation to “the others.”
And they’re changing dramatically.”\textsuperscript{30} McLuhan argues that media
technology is pervasive in its effect on personal, political, economic,
aesthetic, psychological, moral, ethical, and social consequences.
Thus, “any understanding of social and cultural change is impossible

\textsuperscript{27} Ekweme, Emergent Probability, 126-27.

\textsuperscript{28} Sherry Turkle, Alone Together: Why We Expect Too Much from Technology and Less from Each Other (New York: Basic Books, 2011), ix.


\textsuperscript{30} McLuhan, The Medium Is the Message, 9.
without a knowledge of the way media work as environments." The extension of our human faculties through technology alter the human perception of reality and in turn our human action. The "medium is the message" because the medium shapes and controls the scale and form of human association and action. McLuhan asserts that "it is only too typical that the 'content' of any medium blinds us to the character of the medium." In light with this Lonergan asks, "How, indeed, is a mind to become conscious of its own bias when that bias springs from a communal flight from understanding and is supported by the whole texture of a civilization?" The texture of a civilization is the technology, the first level of operations in human common sense and scientific endeavors. Given that the medium is the message, and the content of any medium blinds us to the character of the medium, such a dramatic bias enlightens us to the moral questions that modern means of social communications bring to the fore.

Thus, the biases of either the designer group or consumer group all have effects on the emergent moral sphere of the global village. The use of information and communication technology has widened the potential effects of the message. As Kenneth Melchin points out, naturally, a person relaxing on a deserted beach and suddenly hears a scream, "Help!!!" This person, if he is a moral person, will spring to action "dynamized by a concern, a desire, a commitment to action." He may question himself in haste, "Who screamed? Are they drowning? Where are they? How to help them? Find out! Get to them! Save them! Keep them alive!" However, with modern means of social communication almost everyone is constantly in possession of ICT devices, for instance, camera, smart phones, iPads, and so on. The average person is constantly connected to the internet and more than

37 Melchin, *In Living with Other People*, 17.
38 Melchin, *In Living with Other People*, 17.
willing to share information through the social networks. Melchin's assertion is that a moral person will instinctively jump to action out of concern for the life of the one in danger. However, with the possession of ICT devices and constant connection to the internet, the modern person is more than inclined to jump to action while carrying audio, video, or picture-capable computing devices. Information and communication technologies, more than most technologies, form an indispensable extension of the human self. The example of Dana Airlines comes to mind. Almost all those who first responded to the plane crash were first concerned about capturing the moment and sharing it on the internet. Modern man's view of reality and information sharing has changed the human conception of reality. Thus, data such as SMS, texts, emails, files, pictures, video, audios, and so on are to be captured and shared with as many people as possible.

In such an era whereby "false news," rumors, propaganda, and misinformation are transmitted at the same rate as "true news," actual facts and authentic information, one needs to go beyond Inter Mirifica in order to safeguard against instant biases and face value facts communicated instantaneously as authentic subjectivity. It seems highly improbable that the demands of Inter Mirifica that the church's interests rests on those communications which "directly touch man's spirit ... not merely single individuals but the very masses and even the whole of human society" (Inter Mirifica, 1). As it were, it is the masses that are using the communications media to disseminate information. It is no longer the task of the offices of the social media to be concerned with the "formation of a right conscience" (Inter Mirifica, 21) of the masses or the protection of those who use the media, so as not to suffer damage (Inter Mirifica, 24). It becomes the birthright of the church and all people to "animate these media with Christian and human spirit and to ensure that they live up to the humanity's hope for them, in accordance with God's design." (Inter Mirifica, 3). The recognition of the moral order and God's design for ICT is one thing, the other is people's willingness to share any news instantaneously. The accessibility of information and instantaneous sharing can contribute effectively to the common good (Inter Mirifica, 5). As Africae Munus puts it: "The flood of news or non-news, to say nothing of images, can be informative but also powerfully manipulative. Information can
readily become disinformation, and formation deformation. The media can be a force for authentic humanization, but just as easily prove dehumanizing” (Africae Munus, 143).³⁹

In order to be more effective and utilize information and communication technologies effectively as subjects of emergent probability, one should go beyond the prescriptions of Inter Mirifica. In as much as ICTs are instruments of evangelization, bearing in mind that ICTs need to be evangelized as well, one ought to consider the higher viewpoint. From Lonergan’s viewpoint, technology changes humanity not just through the content of what is communicated, through using the instruments for communication for both designer and consumer. Given the ubiquitous nature of ICTs in our era, everyone with ICT is capable of changing the events and emergent schemes. Human cooperation with the interlocking levels of operations generate a new reality of “digital natives”⁴⁰ those who are constantly connected, and willingly and instantaneously receiving and sending information. The church documents on ICT from Inter Mirifica to the present all focus on pastoral concerns, giving a “Marxian” view of class struggle, “those who design ICTs” on one hand and on the other “those who use them.” However, these distinctions are blurred in the new egalitarian reality. Hence, anyone irrespective of age, gender, race, tribe, nationality, or sexual orientation can upset the entire “web of the digital network.” Thus everyone is the person of the information age.

The optimism of the Communio et Progressio is that the means of social communication “serve to build new relationships, and to fashion a new language which permit men to know themselves better and to understand one another more easily. By this, men are led to a mutual understanding and shared ambition. And this in turn, inclines them to justice and peace, to good will and active charity, to mutual help, to love and, in the end, to communion” (Communio et Progressio, 12). This is achievable if what is disseminated is

⁴⁰ Turkle, Alone Together, ix.
“insight as information.”\textsuperscript{41} Information is the “intelligent acquisition of understanding and wisdom.”\textsuperscript{42} It is the “lifeblood of society,”\textsuperscript{43} a determinant of human action and understanding of reality, no matter how instantaneous. Thus, “in the world process of emergent probability of human cooperation, information holds the potential for valuable insight into emergent stages or schemes. Insight as information is neither misinformation, disinformation nor raw data, but rather supervening acts of understanding from existing internal and external data warehouses.”\textsuperscript{44} Inasmuch as information systems can be used to achieve insight as information, the ubiquitous use of information and communication technologies are only the first step of data collection. Hence, insight as information is more authentic than “unprocessed information,” misinformation, and disinformation.

CONCLUSION

In conclusion, the Second Vatican Council Decree, \textit{Inter Mirifica}, was the first of its kind to point the church and the world at large to the pastoral potentials of the means of social communication. The prescriptions, though inclined to an instrumental understanding of technology, set the foundation for an open dialogue with experts and the church to begin a dialogue on morality and technology. In the past forty-nine years, the church has produced different documents, each hinting at the values and fears of the means of social communication. In Africa, the synodal documents \textit{Ecclesia in Africa} and \textit{Africae Munus} have attempted to tackle the unflinching reality of these means of social communication, seeing their potentials as well as their dangers. However, in order to truly harness the power of social communication, one ought to consider a Lonerganian view of technology that emphasizes insight as information, rather than isolated data and face-value news instantaneously shared without any understanding and insight. The church documents generally speak of the dangers of social communications toward young people. This notwithstanding, young

\textsuperscript{41} Ekwueme, \textit{Emergent Probability}, 225.
\textsuperscript{43} Ekwueme, \textit{Emergent Probability}, 225.
\textsuperscript{44} Ekwueme, \textit{Emergent Probability}, 225.
people are in actual fact the main users of social communications in modern times. A Lonerganian views helps us see the young people as subjects of emergent probability, rather than as its victims ought, who if well oriented will play a moral role in the emergent schemes of the world process. The contemporary persons who are constantly connected to others through information and communication technology is instantaneously broadcasting himself/herself and others, what world order will it be if they were only broadcasting “insight as information.”
ON UNDERSTANDING
THE HYPOSTATIC UNION

Charles Hefling
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Chestnut Hill, Massachusetts

Unus autem non conversione divinitatis in carnem,
sed assumptione humanitatis in Deum
One, not by conversion of the Godhead into flesh,
but by taking of the Manhood into God

(Quicunque vult, the “Athanasian” Creed)

THIS IS A precarious, incomplete, and rather recherché paper. It has
to do with a single leaf on a twig on one of the branches of a limb of
the tree that is Christian theology, where the limb is systematics, the
branch Christology, and the twig the theology of the hypostatic union.
To put it less metaphorically, the discussion which follows presumes
that a great many prior questions, material and formal, have been
answered. Likewise, whatever relevance to Lonergan studies the paper
may have is narrow and technical. It belongs, roughly speaking, to the
functional specialty Interpretation, in that it reports on and attempts
to elucidate an unpublished page of Lonergan’s notes, among the
contents of which are one or two points that he never makes – or, at
least, that he never makes in the same way – anywhere else. In turn,
those points may, as he evidently intended, bear on the functional
specialty Systematics, applied to the doctrine of the Incarnation; but,
if so, any bearing they have will be a matter of dotting an i or two and
crossing an occasional t.

Even so, the paper is incomplete, in that the possible implications
of the page it discusses are merely indicated, while the concluding
section has not much to offer by way of conclusion. And even before
that, the whole paper is precarious in that it rests on the assumption that a couple of terms used in a set of notes that neither were nor were meant to be published are potentially important clues. So they may be. But they may be one-off try-outs, dime-a-dozen insights that never saw the light of print for the very good reason that Lonergan deliberately abandoned the line of thought they seem to inaugurare. It would not be the only occasion on which he did that.

INTRODUCTION AND PROLEPSIS

It is common knowledge that as he was finishing Method in Theology, Lonergan gave some thought to Christology as his next project. As things turned out, he decided to revise his work in macroeconomics instead. In 1976 he did however publish a very important essay on “Christology Today: Methodological Reflections,” which together with a few other papers, notably “The Origins of Christian Realism,” indicates the direction he might have taken, had he embarked on a full-scale Christological study. But like others of Lonergan’s later essays, “Christology Today” is telegraphic and elliptical, and at several points it raises questions of interpretation.

The unpublished page examined in the present essay is helpful in answering some of those questions. On internal evidence, the typewritten notes to which it belongs were composed on Lonergan’s faithful typewriter no earlier than 1971. Quite possibly they have some connection with the Christology seminar he was teaching at the time. For the most part they repeat material that in some cases goes back to his Roman textbooks; but in some respects P80, as I shall refer to it here, has no precedents. This is not to say it is revolutionary. It does


2 Lonergan used this title more than once. The relevant essay was delivered as a lecture and published in 1972, the year in which Method in Theology appeared, and was republished in Bernard Lonergan, A Second Collection (London: Darton, Longman & Todd, 1974), 239-61.

3 The notes are available, grouped under the number 23870DTE070 / A2387, at the Lonergan Archive website, www.bernardlonergan.com. There are five pages, numbered (by hand) 77 through 81, for reasons that someone working in the functional specialty Research may one day explain. The page I will be discussing is the fourth, which bears the number 80.
nothing to alter the substance of Lonergan's position on the constitution of the incarnate Word. It does, however, help to explain the transition from the basically metaphysical context of baroque scholasticism in which the Latin Christology expounds that position, to the context proposed in Method in Theology.

The theological *locus* to which P80 is relevant is the Incarnation; more accurately, as its heading states, the hypostatic union. To investigate this union is to ask how the incarnate Word is constituted, ontologically and, for Lonergan, psychologically. Here his concern is ontological, although there are indications that the further trajectory of the notes would enter psychological territory. Either way, such questions are not at the forefront of Christology at the present time; quite the reverse. That they are, nevertheless, worthwhile questions to raise and answer, the present essay will take for granted. The operative assumption here will be that theology, and in particular the functional specialty *Systematics*, has as part of its proper business inquiring about Christ himself, and not only, as Melanchthon famously insisted, about his benefits. To such an inquiry, conducted along the lines that *Method in Theology* lays out, P80 makes a small but valuable contribution, while at the same time it gives rise to methodological questions of its own, especially with regard to the rôle of metaphysics as a control of meaning within the functional specialty *Systematics*.

A somewhat more specific prolepsis will perhaps be helpful. The possible relevance of P80 to interpreting and extending Lonergan's published work in Christology is threefold:

1. It adds some clarity to the sense in which the term *identity* is used in the two essays mentioned above, “Christology Today” and “The Origins of Christian Realism,” with which it is more or less contemporaneous.
2. It includes what would seem to be Lonergan's only mention in English of what precisely is *supernatural* about the Incarnation.
3. It brings to light some issues concerning the interaction of different functional specialties, and in particular the influence of *Systematics* on the generation, in *Foundations*, of what Lonergan calls special theological categories.
To expand these three points a little:

1. Lonergan wrote the book *Insight* before he began to write the first of his two textbooks on the Incarnation. The conceptual exigences of that textbook, now translated as *The Ontological and Psychological Constitution of Christ*, elicited a treatment of *consciousness* which, as Frederick Crowe has pointed out, is more thorough, precise, and differentiated than the one in *Insight*. The same is true of the “difficult, recent, and primitive” notion of the (psychological) *subject* of consciousness.4 Similarly, I would suggest, the need to explain exactly why, how, and in what sense the incarnate Word, who is God and man, is nevertheless *one* led Lonergan to introduce a precise, heuristic meaning of *identity*, a term which in *Insight* is by comparison ambiguous and undifferentiated. That meaning is presumed in both “Christology Today” and “The Origins of Christian Realism,” but in neither is it altogether clearly explained.

2. The term *supernatural* as Lonergan uses it refers to realities other than God, which is to say finite beings, that nevertheless cannot be understood by deploying any of the methods that explain “proportionate” being. The supernatural exceeds the capacities of human performance, cognitional performance included. One of the absolutely supernatural realities in the actually existing universe is traditionally named sanctifying grace. Another is unique to the Incarnation. In the Latin textbooks, Lonergan generally refers to the properly supernatural constituent of the incarnate Word as *esse secundarium*, the secondary (act of) existence or being – on the face of it, a term that is virtually opaque. In P80, though apparently nowhere else, he uses instead an English phrase that is possibly more intelligible and possibly more suggestive.

3. The second, mediated phase of a methodical theology constructed in keeping with Lonergan’s model aims, among other things, at a control of meaning through the deployment of both “general” and

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4 Bernard Lonergan, “Christ as Subject: A Reply,” in *Collection*, vol.4 of the Collected Works of Bernard Lonergan, ed. Frederick E. Crowe and Robert M. Doran (Toronto: University of Toronto Press, 1988), 153-84 at 162. This essay, originally published in 1959, answers an attack on *De Constitutione Christi*, to which the editors of the Collected Works refer, not inaptly, as “one of the most neglected masterpieces of this century” (*Collection*, 290).
"special" theological categories. Among the general categories, which theology shares with other explanatory disciplines, are those of the metaphysics Lonergan had developed in Insight. Special categories, on the other hand, derive from what is in fact supernatural — though it may not yet be so conceived — namely religious experience, the orientation to transcendent mystery that Method in Theology identifies with sanctifying grace. From a methodological standpoint, the experiential basis of the special categories is first described in phenomenological terms, and only then in terms systematically related to one another. One question that Method in Theology suggests, but does not answer, is whether any of these special categories will be in some sense metaphysical. The question becomes acute in relation to P80.5

A QUESTION FOR SYSTEMATICS

While the text of P80 is interesting in itself, it does, as I have suggested, bear on what it might be to deploy the functional specialty Systematics with respect to the theology of Christ. Such a Christology would endeavor to explain the Incarnation, in the sense of understanding it in relation to other things. Among those other things, the explanation would take account of the conditions on which the Incarnation is possible:

To affirm the possibility of the Incarnation is to affirm that these conditions can have been fulfilled. To affirm the Incarnation as a fact is to say that these conditions have been fulfilled. To say what the Incarnation means is to explain the conditions of its possibility.6

So says Lonergan in "The Origins of Christian Realism," where he lists the four conditions he considers relevant. Before these are discussed, it needs to be pointed out that, as it stands, the passage just quoted begs an enormous question. There is a real and important sense in

5 For this paragraph, see especially Method in Theology, 287, 282. The point bears on how the first two full paragraphs of Method in Theology (343) are to be understood and implemented.

which explaining the conditions of the Incarnation is explaining what it means only if what “the Incarnation” refers to is already settled. The conditions that Lonergan enumerates do not explain the possibility of the Incarnation in (say) Paul Tillich’s sense of the word; they explain what Lonergan himself means by the Incarnation and what he rather plainly thinks everyone else ought to mean. In other words, unless the passage above is a mere tautology, it presupposes a normative judgment that singles out the “orthodox” definition of what has to be explained. Stated from a methodological standpoint, Lonergan’s assumption is that the four mediating functional specialties have done their work, and that on the basis of adequate and authentic Foundations the functional specialty Doctrines has affirmed that truth about the incarnate Word which Systematics has to explain.8

To assume the truth of what is going to be explained is perfectly legitimate within the functional specialty Systematics. That is precisely its specialized goal: not to establish or defend the doctrines it examines, but only to propose how they can best be understood. Still, it has to be acknowledged that functional specialization generally, and in particular the distinction between grounding a doctrinal judgment of belief and shedding light on what such a judgment affirms – the distinction between Doctrines and Systematics respectively – have yet to commend themselves to theological discourse as it is now being conducted. That is part of the difficulty that faces anyone who would introduce a “Lonerganian” voice into current Christological conversations. The difficulty is exacerbated by the fact that the doctrine which Lonergan acknowledges as true is the doctrine formulated at the early Christological councils, Chalcedon above all. For, apart from the work of certain English philosophical theologians committed to a basically

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8 Lonergan’s assumption is not arbitrary or dogmatic in the dyslogistic sense. In De Verbo Incarnato he had himself carried out the sort of investigations that Method in Theology would assign to Research, Interpretation, History, and Dialectic, and had gone on to add what amounts to Foundations and Doctrines. In brief, the question of what there is to be understood was settled. I have outlined an answer to that question, on the basis of Lonergan’s stated views, in “What a Friend We Have: Jesus and the Metaphysics of the Incarnation” (forthcoming), which in this and other respects, complements the present essay.
logical control of meaning, Christology today is apt to be adoptionist or Nestorian or kenoticist — positions that the Chalcedonian definition excludes, as it does “Spirit Christology” also. Why and in what sense Chalcedon is to be preferred is thus a real and pressing question. It is not properly a question for Systematics, however, except in so far as explaining what was defined at Chalcedon might, indirectly, remove an objection to affirming it — the objection, namely, that the definition is obscure.

In any case, the conditions of the possibility that Lonergan sets out pertain to the possibility of Chalcedon’s doctrine. That is what he means by the Incarnation. Its conditions are four. Three of the four are Trinitarian: they state how it is conceivable for God the Son, but not God the Father or God the Spirit, to be not only God and not only Son but also something other than God — a human being. In some ways these first three conditions are the most important, pertaining as they do to the “main component of the hypostatic union.” To expound them adequately would require nothing less than a systematic theology of God’s Trinity, conceived on the psychological analogy. So much is clear, if not in “The Origins of Christian Realism” itself, certainly in “Christology Today,” which makes reference to virtually the whole of Lonergan’s own Triune God: Systematics. In the present context, however, the condition that is most directly relevant is the fourth, which pertains to the human being, the man, that God the Son became. To quote Lonergan’s formulation:

A fourth condition is that a man may have his identity not in himself but in another.

The meaning of this statement is not immediately evident. A man, we are given to understand, may have his identity in another; Jesus of

9 “Christology Today,” A Third Collection, 93.


11 In deference to contemporary sensibilities, I shall try, when it is possible, to use “human being” rather than “man” to refer to a concrete, individual member of the human race. It is not always possible, without ambiguity. “Being” is apt to be a misleading term. There is a perfectly intelligible sense in which my nose is a human being, but the Son of God did not become a nose.

Nazareth does have his identity in another, namely in the eternal Word. Whatever else this assertion may mean, it evidently means that Jesus differs from other men and women, none of whom is God incarnate. Since the sense in which Jesus is or is not similar to everyone else has been a major bone of contention in modern theology, there is all the more reason to spell out just what Lonergan is driving at. Can he, in particular, avoid what many theologians appear to regard as the most heinous – perhaps the only – Christological heresy, namely docetism, which teaches that Jesus was not really a man but only seemed to be? This and other questions about Lonergan’s position turn on what he means by identity. As he uses the term in setting out the conditions of the Incarnation, its meaning conforms to something like the following logic.

Suppose that J is someone, a really existing human, a man. Either of the following propositions may be true:

\[ (J_1) \text{ J “has his identity” in someone who} \]
\[ (a) \text{ is all that J is, and} \]
\[ (b) \text{ is nothing and nobody else.} \]

\[ (J_2) \text{ J “has his identity” in someone who} \]
\[ (a') \text{ is all that J is, and} \]
\[ (b') \text{ is, as well, all that someone other than J is.} \]

The only difference between propositions \((J_1)\) and \((J_2)\) is the difference between \((b)\) and \((b')\).

If proposition \((J_1)\) happens to be true, J is Jones, Lonergan’s stand-in for any ordinary human individual. Who is all that Jones is? Jones himself, for whom to be and to be Jones are the same. The one who is Jones, the identity of Jones in the relevant sense, and the one that Jones is, the intelligible unity of all that he is and was and will be, have the same definition. What Jones is and is becoming determines who Jones is. Notice that this meaning of identity goes against the commonsense meaning. To know Jones’s identity is not, as in ordinary parlance, to understand everything about him; it is to judge that he and no one else is whatever he happens to be.

Proposition \((J_2)\) is true if J is Jesus of Nazareth. The difference between \((b')\) in this proposition, and \((b)\) in proposition \((J_1)\), implies
that the one who is Jesus, namely God the Son, does not simply share a definition with all that Jesus is and was and will be. The incarnate Word is indeed so defined, but not only so. Otherwise stated, the man Jesus, like the man Jones, is all that he is; but he has his identity in someone who is defined both by what it is to be Jesus and also by what it is to be God. All that any man is and all that God is are not the same; on the contrary they are utterly different. Nevertheless, to be all that this man is and to be all that God is are, for the incarnate Word, one to be. To put it in Chalcedonian language, one and the same Lord Jesus Christ is consubstantial both with us (in that he is a man) and with the Father (in that he is God). Who, in brief, is all that Jesus is? The incarnate Word.

Such is the logic of Lonergan’s fourth condition of the Incarnation. It rests, as may be evident, on a distinction between two meanings of one:

(i) What is one in the sense of one and the same is one simpliciter, one in the transcendental sense – an identity.

(ii) What is one in the sense of unified or whole is one per se, one in the natural or formal sense – a unity.  

Those who are familiar with Insight will notice that its characterization of a “thing” includes both unity and identity (along with whole). There need be no contradiction, since a thing as Lonergan’s conceives it is, as a rule, one in both the transcendental and the formal sense. There is nevertheless a distinction in principle, and there is in fact an exception to the rule. The incarnate Word is transcendentally one but formally or naturally two. Although he is one thing, his unity as a man does not coincide with his identity. That is the purport of proposition (J₂) above.

The foregoing paragraphs do no more than clarify Lonergan’s

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13 It may be noted in passing that Lonergan usually avoids the phrase “numerically one,” which is ambiguous. It might apply to what is one in the first sense above, or instead to what is one in yet a different sense, the sense in which countable items or units or instances are one and another one and so on. With this latter, “material” sense of one we need not be concerned, although it is true that the incarnate Word is materially one inasmuch as he is a numerable instance of the human species.

14 The principle – what comes first in an ordered series – is, as always in Lonergan, cognitional. Identity, that which is one in sense (i) is known to be one by judgment, whereas that which is one in sense (ii), is known by understanding, which grasps the unity in some multitude.
usage, in the relevant context, of the term *identity*. To turn now to P80, Lonergan’s exposition of the foregoing points is somewhat different, if ultimately equivalent. What makes the page interesting is that it offers an implicit definition of that term as part of an interlocking set. The intelligibility of the whole set can perhaps best be grasped if the terms are arranged as in the following table.\footnote{The bottom line of the table has been added; otherwise, the wording of each item is transcribed nearly *verbatim* from P80, except for square-bracketed completions of words that run off the typewritten page, and one condensation, in the lower left-hand corner, which has been substituted for reasons of space and similarly bracketed. I have, however, put all the major terms in upper-case letters.}

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>CENTRAL ACT</th>
<th>ACTUAL IDENTITY</th>
<th>ACTUAL ASSUMPTION</th>
<th>DECENTRALIZING ACT</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>the act of CENTRAL FORM</td>
<td>what is itself and nothing else</td>
<td>the actuation of POTENTIAL ASSUMPTION</td>
<td>POTENTIAL ASSUMPTION becomes what someone else is</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>(judgment: what a thing is and is not)</td>
<td></td>
<td>what is so actuated that it does not become itself and nothing else and does become a further nature of some other identity</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>SPECIFIC DIFFERENCE</th>
<th>CENTRAL FORM</th>
<th>POTENTIAL IDENTITY</th>
<th>POTENTIAL ASSUMPTION</th>
<th>CENTRAL POTENCY + CENTRAL FORM</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>the difference between things understood in basically different ways: periodic table of elements, animal species</td>
<td>grounds natural unities, e.g., of man, dog cat, chemical elements</td>
<td>what is capable of being itself and nothing else: i.e., either materially or specifically it differs from everything else</td>
<td>what is capable of being assumed by some other identity</td>
<td>= nature indiv[idual]</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>MATERIAL DIFFERENCE</th>
<th>CENTRAL POTENCY</th>
<th>POTENTIAL IDENTITY</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>difference of things understood in basically the same way: [Fords, H₂, molecules]</td>
<td>potency to CENTRAL FORM</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

| the case of an ordinary finite being / thing | the case of the Incarnate Word |
To begin with the left-hand column: the cognitional theorem on which the whole set rests is that similars are similarly understood. They may nevertheless differ, as do hydrogen molecules, one from another, in which case the difference is material. On the other hand, if they are not similarly understood, the difference is specific. Hydrogen differs, in relation to other chemical elements in the periodic table, from oxygen or plutonium or what have you.

The second column correlates these differences with two of Insight's six metaphysical elements, central potency and central form, and adds a third, central act. Note that central form is basic; central potency and central act are defined, as in Insight, in relation to it.

The third column expands Insight by introducing the notion of a "compound" of central potency and central form. Inasmuch as such a compound is either materially or specifically different from everything else, it is potentially an identity, where by identity is meant that which actually is itself and nothing else. To illustrate with the case that is relevant here, it is by reason of central form that a human being differs from a cow or a centipede, and by reason of central potency that he or she differs from other humans. This is not, of course, to say that a compound of central potency and central form is an actual human being; properly speaking, no such compound is at all. In some ways, that is the crux of Lonergan's position. The metaphysical ground of difference from everything else constitutes a potential identity, capable of being itself and nothing else. But it lacks the central act by which any actually existing thing actually exists.

If the first three columns of the table offer certain refinements of Insight, the fourth and fifth columns go beyond it. Three new terms are introduced. What is meant by potential assumption is the same as what is meant by potential identity: a compound of central potency and central form. As the terminology itself implies, however, this potentiality may be actuated in either of two ways. Ordinarily, the actuation constitutes an identity. What could be itself and only itself, since it differs from everything else, actually is all that it is, and is not any other. The fourth column of the table, however, posits an alternative actuation, constitutive of what Lonergan calls assumption. In that case – the case of the incarnate Word – the compound of potency and form, instead of becoming itself and only itself, becomes what someone else, an identity that already is itself and nothing else, also is.
As may be clear already, the two cases represented by the third and fourth columns of the table correspond respectively to the two propositions about J above. The third column sets out the metaphysical constitution of Jones (J), whose actual identity is determined by what he is capable of being, namely the particular man he is. Jones has his identity in himself. The fourth column states what would be the case if a man did not have his identity in himself. As in the third column, the second line names the metaphysical equivalent of "all that this man is," the compound of potency and form; but although it is capable of being what one particular man and no one else actually is, the compound is not, in this case, so actuated. It is actuated; there is in fact a man, Jesus, defined by this central potency and this central form; but he who is this man is not only this man (J). What specifies him as one instance of one species does not limit his identity.

Notice, however, that the identity of this man – the identity which is the eternal Word, and which is the "main component of the hypostatic union" – does not appear in the table. It is true that, on Lonergan's position, the act by which the incarnate Word is all that he is, both as God and as man, is the unrestricted act of understanding and affirming and loving, in one of its three identities. Accordingly it might seem that this divine act belongs at the top of the fourth column, where it would correspond to the metaphysical element of (human) central act in the second. Not so. Were it so, the implication would be that unrestricted act is a constituent of a finite being, in which case it would not be unrestricted. The idea that in the incarnate Word the act which is God takes the place of a human central act is attractive in its simplicity, and there have been theologians who espoused it. Lonergan is not one of them. God, he maintains, is not a component of anything, not even the incarnate Word. To turn to what does in some sense correspond to central act in the Incarnation is to turn to the second topic, point (B), that was mentioned in the first section above: the strictly supernatural constituent of the Incarnation.

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16 Note that understanding, affirming, and loving do not refer to Father, Son, and Spirit respectively. Each of the divine identities understands, affirms, and loves, since each is God. For the phrasing, see Insight, vol. 3 of the Collected Works of Bernard Lonergan, ed. Frederick E. Crowe and Robert M. Doran, 681, 683, where the context is not even implicitly Trinitarian.

17 Notably Maurice de la Taille.
SUPERNATURAL ACT(UATION)

Both of the terms in the upper right-hand corner of the table are remarkable. Actual assumption appears nowhere else in Lonergan’s English writings; decentralizing act appears nowhere else at all. Both are peculiar to the systematic theology of the Incarnation, apart from which there would be, for reasons that will become clear, no use for either of them. As the table suggests, the two terms are in some sense equivalent. What calls for some exposition is their meaning. This will require some input from Lonergan’s Christological textbooks, which the reader will have to take on trust.

Whatever else they may mean, these terms do not refer to a component or principle of the hypostatic union, properly so called. What the Incarnation unites is, on the one hand, the unrestricted act by which the Word is, and on the other hand a compound of central potency and central form such as would qualify someone as a man. Both of these constituents, and these only, are required by the “grammatical” prescriptions of the Chalcedonian definition.18

To say, however, that in the Incarnation the divine Word is united with a finite reality is to assert a contingent predication with respect to God. That the Word became a man is true, but not necessarily true. There might have been no Incarnation at all; it might have been the Father or the Spirit who became incarnate;19 it might have been some other finite reality that was united with God. Now by the rules of theistic “grammar” that chapter 19 of Insight lays down, no contingent predication about God can be true unless the fact it asserts is such as to make some difference in the finite world that actually exists.

18 Strictly speaking, Chalcedon does not state explicitly that the τρόποςων of the Lord Jesus Christ, which it does insist repeatedly is one and the same, is divine. Some theologians have made much of this lack of specificity. Lonergan has not much patience with them. See his rejoinder to Piet Schoonenberg (a bête noire of his) in “The Origins of Christian Realism,” A Second Collection, 255-58, which digests the more detailed historical investigation in De Verbo Incarnato. See also “Christology Today,” A Third Collection, 90, second full paragraph, and 91, first full paragraph.

19 Or both, or any other two, or all three. The point is that the fact of the Incarnation cannot be deduced as a necessary consequence of what can be known about God apart from that fact. If that is (as it seems to have been) what Anselm meant by averring that the Incarnation was necessary, Lonergan would and does disagree. He would likewise disagree if what Anselm meant is that there was no other way for the human race to be saved – which in the long run comes down to the same mistake.
Unless and until it is actually raining, it cannot be true that God is making the clouds pour down rain. Nor is it true that God the Son has united himself with a human compound of central potency and central form, unless and until that fact, the fact of the hypostatic union, has as its consequence some change in the created universe. Similarly, to mention a closer analogy which there will be occasion to revisit, it is not true that the Holy Spirit has been given unless and until “the love of God has been poured into our hearts.”

In brief: Chalcedon’s doctrine of the hypostatic union and Insight’s philosophy of God both impose controls on the meaning of God incarnate, in the sense that they allow certain meaningful statements about his Incarnation and rule out others. When the two “grammars” are combined, it becomes evident that the Chalcedonian definition has a corollary – some appropriate “external term” because of which it is true that divine and human realities have been united. It is to this corollary that the terms actual assumption and decentralizing act refer.

The argument for some external term is roughly this: to affirm the Incarnation as Chalcedon defines it is to affirm in the man Jesus of Nazareth a relation to the Word, who is all that this man is. From a metaphysical standpoint, the relation in question, like any other relation, must have a ground. What Systematics has to ask is how the relation is to be characterized, and what its metaphysical ground might be. It is fairly evident that the reality in question must be “central” in some sense rather than “conjugate,” because the incarnate Word is not just human, adjectivally or accidentally; he is a man, substantially and concretely. The fact that he is a man is accounted for by central potency and central form compounded; and were that compound actuated by an actual human identity he would be a man and only a man – as in statement (J₃) above and in the third column of the table. The same compound, however, is capable of being assumed by another identity. “Assumption” is the traditional name for the relation of Christ’s humanity to himself; it is so used in the “Athanasian” Creed, which declares that the incarnate Word is one “not by conversion of the Godhead into flesh, but by taking of the manhood (assumptione

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20 Something must change, or there is no contingent fact; God does not change, except perhaps in a process theology.
On Understanding the Hypostatic Union

humanitatis) into God." That Christ's humanity is capable of being assumed follows from the fact that it has been, and for no other reason.

The capability of assumption pertains to the same compound of central potency and central form that is capable of being itself and nothing else; inasmuch as it has not become itself and nothing else, and has become instead what another self is, the compound is potential assumption and its actuation is actual assumption. Thus the relation of Christ's humanity to his identity is assumeri, the (passive) act of being assumed. But as was mentioned earlier, the incarnate Word is one in that sense – one being, one thing, one "subsistent" – by reason of the divine esse, God's act of existence itself, and by nothing else. Were there a human central act as well, there would be not one Lord Jesus Christ but two – the Nestorian error.

Lonergan's Latin textbooks propose "something like central act" under the more formal but scarcely more informative name of esse secundarium, secondary act of existing. It is this reality that guarantees the truth of the contingent assertion that in Christ God and man are one. Their being united in no way depends on the secondary

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21 The reasoning here depends on what is meant by a relation, a question beyond the scope of this essay. See the relevant section of Insight, 514-20, and its penultimate sentence, which denies to relation the status of a metaphysical element beyond the six defined in the previous chapter. As dicere, literally "to speak," is a relation that accrues to someone inasmuch as a word has been uttered, so assumeri, "to be assumed," is a relation that accrues to a compound of central potency and form, a "nature," inasmuch as someone has assumed it.
esse, which on the contrary is a consequence of the hypostatic union—a finite, created, contingent reality that belongs to the man Jesus Christ inasmuch as all that he is has actually been assumed by the eternal Word, in whom he therefore has his identity. Because being assumed, being what a divine identity is, does not fall within the scope of what is intrinsically or inherently or naturally possible for any finite, proportionate being, potential assumption can be actuated only by God. Its actuation would be—as, in Christ, it is — disproportionate, supernatural in the technical sense of the word.

In P80 the term Lonergan uses for “something like central act” is decentralizing act. Apparently it is his own invention; presumably it is not arbitrary. Its connotations, interestingly, are not the same as those of esse secundarium. A secondary act of existence is secondary with respect to a primary act of existence, namely the Word’s divine esse. A decentralizing act would seem to be so named with respect to the central potency-plus-form which it actuates. Otherwise stated, the term esse secundarium points to the divine reality of the eternal Word, whose (secondary) act of existence it is, whereas the language of decentralizing act points to the human reality of what the Word has assumed. We are seemingly given to understand that this humanity, this compound of central potency and central form, is somehow “decentralized.” What might it mean to say that?

First, to repeat what has already been pointed out, decentralizing act is not a constituent of the hypostatic union. It does not explain why one and the same is both God and man; the explanation for that is the Word’s divine act of existing. Nor does it explain why he is a man; that is explained by human central potency and central form. Nor does decentralizing act fulfill any of the four conditions of the Incarnation with which this essay began. It is, rather, a corollary of the fact that one of those conditions, the fourth, has in fact been fulfilled: there is a man who does in fact have his identity not in himself but in another, and indeed in someone who is God. Thus the question of how to conceive decentralizing act is a question about this man. What difference does it make to the man Jesus of Nazareth that everything he is, whatever that may be, is that by which God is this man?

This is not a question that Lonergan addresses, at least not directly and explicitly, and it is assuredly not what he regards as the
central question of a systematic Christology. His approach is resolutely “from above,” in the sense of asking “not how this human being is God but how God is this human being” — in other words, how it is possible that the first three conditions mentioned at the outset have been fulfilled in the Incarnation. The question here is not “how God is this human being,” though neither is it “how this human being is God,” the standard question of Christology “from below.” To inquire about decentralizing act is to acknowledge and affirm that God is this human being, and to ask how a human being can be *that which* God is. To this the basic answer is, “not by conversion of the Godhead into flesh, but by taking of the manhood into God.” What, then, might this “taking of the manhood into God,” this actual assumption, be?

On the negative side, as we have seen, it is possible for a man to be that which God is on condition that what constitutes him as a man — a compound of central potency and central form — does not determine or define or limit his identity. He who is Jones is nobody but Jones, none other than himself, and nothing besides this man, the man he is. He who is Jesus is not limited by being the man he is. That is what Lonergan means by proposing that the man Jesus has his identity in another, and at the same time what he seems to mean, negatively, by speaking of decentralizing act. The positive meaning of this novel term is what the next section will endeavor to expound.

**A POSSIBLY RELEVANT HYPOTHESIS ANENT “DECENTRALIZING ACT”**

Act is known not by understanding but by judgment, and central act is known by judgment as to what a thing is and is not. Decentralizing act is known, presumably, by the judgment, implicit in the Chalcedonian definition, that the one Lord Jesus Christ is not only a man — a judgment that can be true only if the totality of what a mere man would have been is instead what someone who is God has become. That this totality has been assumed is a supernatural fact, but not for that reason inconceivable. As for how it might be conceived, there

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are several possibly relevant points which, taken together, suggest a hypothesis. These will first be assembled under seven heads; then follows a highly speculative proposal.

1. That there is a question to be asked would seem to be implicit in Lonergan's discussion of the *esse secundarium*, of which decentralizing act is the functional equivalent. In proportionate beings, he writes, central act is entirely determined by the form that receives it. This act, however, the Incarnate Word's secondary act of existence, receives its determinations

(a) from the fact that it grounds a real relation to the Word, namely actual assumption; and

(b) from the potential identity (= potential assumption = central potency + central form) in which it results, and which, as in proportionate beings, defines it.23

The question here is what it might mean to affirm point (a).

2. So far, this essay has avoided psychological language, but of course Lonergan considered that his main Christological achievement lay in extending a metaphysical analysis of Christ's constitution into a psychological context, and more particularly in solving the problem of Christ's consciousness. The key to this extension is Lonergan's repeated assertion that psychology is not outside or apart from ontology, because *to be conscious is to be*, at a certain grade of ontological perfection.24 Further, since consciousness itself has gradations, its subject, that which *is* and which *is conscious*, exists by degrees, the highest of which is the "existential" subject.25

Applied to the incarnate Word, this isomorphism implies that he is "at once subject of divine consciousness and also subject of a

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23 "[T]his secondary act of existence receives its determinations from two sources. ... Inasmuch as it is a result within this essence (inquantum autem resultat in hac essentia), it is ... determined by the essence that receives and limits it." *Constitution of Christ*, 149, 151. I have altered the Collected Works translation, which rightly avoids the implications of the English phrase "result in" but which unfortunately misleads in a different direction.

24 See *Constitution of Christ*, 189, 233, 247; and *De Verbo Incarnato*, 284-85, 302.

human consciousness.”26 It follows that he is formally one, one *per se*, both in the sense that the levels of his human consciousness unfold according to one intelligible pattern, and in the sense that in the “multidimensional manifold of the conscious events of [his] lifetime” there can be grasped the intelligible unity that Lonergan names *subjectivity*.27

3. At least once Lonergan describes the psychological subject as “the source and center of many [conscious] acts.”28

4. According to a possibly apocryphal report, Lonergan once referred to the Incarnation as “the pure instance of grace.”

5. Certainly non-apocryphal is the analogy Lonergan draws between the external term that is consequent upon the hypostatic union—that is, what P80 calls decentralizing act—and the external terms of two other unions of the divine with the human, the infinite with the finite. This structural analogy can be summed up in another table.29

6. Turning to the “later Lonergan,” there is a constellation of well-known though not altogether unambiguously worded statements in *Method in Theology*:

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>union</th>
<th>the Incarnation</th>
<th>justification</th>
<th>beatific vision</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>principle of divine</td>
<td>the divine <em>esse</em> of the Word</td>
<td>a divine subject, the Holy Spirit</td>
<td>the divine essence</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>perfection</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
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<tr>
<td>created,</td>
<td>the <em>esse</em></td>
<td>sanctifying grace</td>
<td>the light of glory</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>consequent term</td>
<td><em>secundarium</em></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>metaphysical status</td>
<td>substantial (central)</td>
<td>accidental (conjugate)</td>
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</tr>
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</table>


27 “Christology Today,” in *A Third Collection*, 98n40.

28 *De Verbo Incarnato*, 282, 286. The acts referred to are such operations as seeing, tasting, understanding, judging, and so forth.

29 The table draws mainly on *Constitution of Christ*, 155, and *De Verbo Incarnato*, 336; see also 253, 262.
(a) The identification of sanctifying grace, as operative, with a dynamic state of being-in-love without restriction.30

(b) The identification of this state with religious conversion, and the definition of conversion as the ultimate fulfillment, or the habitual actuation, of the capacity for self-transcendence.31

(c) The statement that the converted have a “new self” to understand.32

7. Possibly relevant though by no means certainly so is Lonergan’s suggestion in “Christology Today” that there is some similarity between the Incarnation and “our own experience of our own sonship,” which is proved by the sending of the Spirit into our hearts: “if the Spirit in us is God, surely God was in Jesus too.”33

These seven bits, as they stand, are something of a miscellany at best. In different ways, however, they all bear on what I shall now propose as a way of conceiving the borrowed content of a judgment that affirms “decentralizing act,” one absolutely supernatural reality that is in this world because of the Incarnation. It is an analogy that might be called an analogy of conversion to friendship, in that it extrapolates from

(a) the love of two human subjects who are friends (which in the tradition that Lonergan follows is the appropriate way to conceive agape), to

(b) the “love of God flooding the heart” of a human subject (which is the supernatural reality of which there can be, in this life, direct experience), to

30 Method in Theology, 107, 289.
31 Method in Theology, 111, 115, 283.
32 Method in Theology, 246.
33 “Christology Today,” in A Third Collection, 88. The second clause quoted is manifestly rhetorical, and it would be rash to put too much weight on it, especially since part of the point Lonergan seems to be making is that to understand Jesus as Son of God is to understand something more and/or other than “an inner reality such as is our own divine sonship through Christ and in the Spirit, so that as God in us is the Spirit, so God in Jesus is the Word.” Even so, the a fortiori argument suggested in the quotation is not invalidated, if it means only that the experience of “the love of God flooding our hearts” – to which Lonergan may be presumed to be referring – resembles in some sense the reality of the Incarnation in its human dimension.
(c) the love of Christ, a divine subject who is human, for the selfsame divine subject— which is (or may be) an appropriate way to conceive the “actual assumption” of which decentralizing act is the metaphysical ground.

A first preliminary step will be to spell out the relevant parallel between the ontological and the psychological constitution of Christ.

Ontological: Because the divine Word is united with a real, individual human nature or substantial essence or compound of central potency and central form, that reality is assumed, “taken into God.”

Psychological: Because a divine subject has become the subject of a distinct human consciousness as well, that consciousness makes present to himself the identity of the Word who is its subject.

Otherwise stated, the psychological counterpart of the secondary esse in Christ is the fact of a human consciousness’s being the self-presence of a divine subject. Notice that the point is not that the Word’s presence to himself in a human way is supernatural. The Word’s presence to himself in a human way is simply his human consciousness. It is not the human consciousness of Christ but the fact that it is his consciousness— the fact of its actual assumption— that is supernatural.  

Christ’s human consciousness, like anyone else’s, makes present the subject who is conscious inasmuch as he is seeing, hearing, tasting, questioning, understanding, judging, and so on. That subject is his identity, the one who sees, hears, and so on. But Christ is a man who has his identity in another, from which it follows that his consciousness makes present (a) another, in whom he has his identity, and who is (b) the eternal Word. His consciousness is (a) assumed, and (b) assumed by a divine subject. All this follows from the Chalcedonian definition, stated in psychological terms. Because the terms are psychological, there is at least the possibility of conceiving this assumption on the analogy of data that are available to self-appropriation. Christ the man is similar to us in all things, but not exactly the same, since his

34 A more careful statement would avoid the implication that the Word assumed a human consciousness all by itself, which of course is nonsense. The Word could not assume a human consciousness without assuming everything that human consciousness depends on— the “lower manifolds,” physical, chemical, and organic, that any (finite) consciousness sublates.
human consciousness has been assumed and ours has not. What is the difference?

A second preliminary step will be to make the question more precise. It is not the question of what it is for a divine subject to be conscious. That we do not and cannot know, in this life, and we can conceive it, as we can conceive quid sit Deus, what it is to be God, only negatively.35

Nor is the relevant question a question of how one subject can be conscious in two ways — or, better, how both divine and human consciousness can reveal one self-identical subject. We do not know that, either, although Lonergan offers as a faint and homely analogy the experience of having a good dinner and afterwards being flogged.36

We do know in some sense what it is for a divine subject to be humanly conscious, in so far as the humanly conscious divine subject who is Christ the man is similar to us. As noted, however, in the first point on the list of seven above, the actual assumption of Christ's human consciousness is determined not only by the potential identity (= potential assumption) which it actuates, and which is similar to the potential identity of any other human being, but also by the identity to which it is related and which it discloses to itself. How this latter determination might best be conceived is the question — the rather speculative question — that is now under investigation.

A third preliminary step will be to mention, in order to set aside, two possibilities that readily suggest themselves but fail upon closer examination.

(a) The consciousness assumed by the incarnate Word is the consciousness that accompanies operations on the empirical, intellectual, rational, and existential levels, just as it does in other human beings who are not dreamlessly asleep. But to conceive this human consciousness as supernaturally assumed cannot be a matter of adding new conscious operations or the corresponding conjugate forms. There are indeed supernatural conjugate forms, the beatific vision for one, and according to

36 “Christ as Subject,” in Collection, 161.
Lonergan they are to be ascribed to Christ the man. But while it may be altogether *appropriate* for Christ, a divine subject, to be endowed with the beatific vision (and the fullness of grace), these are both extras, as it were, further gifts beyond the gift of union with the act that is God. Neither of them is a logically necessary consequence of that hypostatic union, which could have taken place (although it did not) without them.

(b) The actual assumption of human consciousness in the incarnate Word is not best conceived as some sort of modification of horizontal finality or the objects that conscious operations make present to their subject. Nor is it best conceived as some sort of modification of vertical finality, the natural expansion of consciousness from an empirical level through an intellectual and a rational level to existential level. No doubt it might be argued that since Christ is “like us in all things *apart from sin*,” the self-transcendence for which vertical finality is another name would not be for him, as it is in other human beings, impeded or constrained. That is true, but irrelevant. In the first place, sinlessness as such is not supernatural. Adam and Eve, to speak symbolically, were sinless “before the fall,” which is to say that theirs was not a contracted, sub-natural human consciousness, but not that it was supernatural. And more importantly, in the second place, the explanation of Christ’s sinlessness lies, according to Lonergan, not in what he was but in who he was – not in his humanity but in his being a divine subject.

On the other hand, if vertical *finality* as such does not commend itself as a starting-point for conceiving the actual assumption of human consciousness in Christ, vertical *liberty* does offer an analogy – the analogy of existential conversion, or conversion to friendship, as it might be called. Such is the basic thesis. It can be stated in four brief points.

1. It will be recalled that Lonergan defines religious conversion, conversion in its most radical and comprehensive sense, as

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37 On “contraction of consciousness, which is the basic sin,” see *Insight*, 689.
habitual actuation of the human capacity for self-transcendence, and characterizes it as a dynamic state of being-in-love. This existential capacity, on the present proposal, is the conscious dimension of potential identity, and so also of potential assumption.

2. Love constitutes the presence of the beloved in the lover. That presence is dynamic. It manifests itself as a commitment to, an orientation towards, the beloved as good and, in the limit, the beloved as a good beyond criticism.

3. The love that is relevant to the present discussion is friendship, a love in which friends share a common life, a common horizon, and so also what Lonergan calls a common consciousness, such that each decides on behalf of the other, and each is to the other another self.

4. Lonergan explicitly, if descriptively, extends the previous points so as to apply to “the love of God flooding our hearts” in religious experience. For someone in that conscious state of loving, God may be characterized as someone transcendent, a beloved who is present within the lover as the lover’s complete self-transcendence. Otherwise stated, religiously converted human consciousness makes present, in and as the loving subject’s unrestricted loving, an unrestricted other, a transcendent friend.

It is possible, then, to conceive a conscious state such that the totality of a subject’s consciousness makes another present as beloved, as friend, because it is a state of complete self-surrender, self-transcendence, self-donation. Nevertheless, even in an extrapolation from the love of two mortal friends to a subject in love with a transcendent friend, there remains a plurality, a “we.” An unrestricted state of consciousness is still consciousness that makes me present to myself; I am I, my beloved is my beloved, and I am not my beloved, however close our union may be. To put the point differently, even in a state of complete self-transcendence there is still a self that is being transcended, an identity that is coming into being for the sake of the other self, another identity,

39 Method in Theology, 283.
40 The Triune God: Systematics, 221, 229.
41 Bernard Lonergan, “Finality, Love, Marriage,” in Collection, 35-36; Method in Theology, 33, and see also 289.
42 Method in Theology, 109.
who is thereby being loved.

If, then, such a state is to serve as an analogy, a further extrapolation is necessary, such that lover and beloved are not two but one and the same. In that limit-case, the “common consciousness” that is friendship would make a transcendent beloved present to a conscious lover who is identical with the beloved. There would be a conscious state of being-in-love which,

(a) as intentional is restricted to making present all the usual finite objects – colors, ideas, values, and so on; but which

(b) as conscious does not constitute or coincide with a correspondingly restricted center.

The source of this self-transcending state would not be a self that is being transcended; it would be identical with the goal of the (self-) transcending.

That, perhaps, is what Lonergan had in mind when he chose decentralizing act as the name for the supernatural reality in Christ the man. Intellectual conversion recovers the self from a world of immediacy to a wider world mediated by meaning; moral conversion recovers the self from the centripetal horizon of satisfactions to the openness of motivation by value; religious conversion takes the self out of the world of limited being and finite ends, into an otherworldly state of being, defined only by orientation to a mystery of love and awe. Each of these exercises of vertical liberty is an expansion of consciousness that corresponds to a new self. But in Christ, the transcendent “omega point” that is present in the successive transformations of subjectivity only as trend is instead present as source and center. The acts that constitute this subjectivity disclose not in a new self but another self, and that one divine. Humanly speaking, Christ is literally selfless.

(IN)CONCLUSION

The main conclusion to be drawn from the preceding section is that further reflection and argument are needed before the suggestions there proposed can be dignified with the status of a systematic-theological hypothesis. Since, however, this paper has gone on long enough already, I shall bring it to an end, and in that sense a
conclusion, with three brief points, which will (1) add a qualification that may head off misunderstanding, (2) tie up one loose end, and (3) add a methodological query.

1. The notion advanced here has been that a suitable psychological conception of the external term which warrants the contingent predication that the Word was made flesh might be arrived at by taking to the limit what Lonergan calls the exercise of vertical liberty. Christ’s human consciousness, as assumed by the eternal Word, would be something like a state of being-in-love so completely self-transcending that only the beloved is present and the love becomes the beloved’s own self-presence. One danger in such a conception is that it may invite an attempt to imagine Jesus of Nazareth as a man constantly bathed in glorious awareness of the divine subject of his conscious acts. But it is precisely inasmuch as the Word is the subject of those acts, which are like ours in every way apart from sin, that Christ is humanly conscious. The subject who is present to himself is the incarnate Word – not the Word in the glory of his divine subjectivity but the Word in the poverty of his human living and dying. From the standpoint, as it were, of the Word as divinely conscious, the assumption of human consciousness is kenosis, emptying, abnegation. Christ not only is a man but experiences himself, the one who is all that he is, as a man.\footnote{See Constitution of Christ, 223, 285.}

2. If Lonergan did indeed say that the Incarnation is the pure instance of grace, he no doubt had in mind that in sanctifying grace (and also in the beatific vision) God gives himself, the divine perfection, to human beings that already be, whereas the gift in the Incarnation is the gift of divine being itself, the divine act of existence, so that a divine subject may be whatever the human being he becomes is, and become whatever he makes of himself. Such, in technical parlance, is the grace of union. But because that gift has been given, “not by conversion of the Godhead into flesh, but by taking of the manhood into God,” it is possible to say that in Christ the distinction between operative and cooperative grace disappears. In other human beings, God operates immediately on antecedent willingness, to orient it to himself; but the human
beings who are so moved themselves cooperate by freely choosing to act in keeping with the new motivation they have been given. Christ the man chooses freely in every way we do (apart from sin), but the subject who elicits the choices is not cooperating with God: he is God.

The same point may be approached by a different route. While there is every reason to say, as Lonergan does, that Christ’s human subjectivity conforms in time to the divine subjectivity that is his eternally, it remains that the choices which, over time, effected the conformity were immediate “acts of God,” by which a divine subject was made aware of himself and was constituting himself conformably to his divinity. The decentralizing act that centers in the Word Christ’s human ability to choose does not constitute the hypostatic union— it is neither what unites nor what is united— but it is surely a grace, and can be called the grace of union inasmuch as without it the statement that God is a certain man would not be true. Like sanctifying grace, the grace of union in this sense affects the human capacity for self-transcendence; but whereas sanctifying grace actuates that capacity by transforming a finite subject, whose capacity it is but who does not him- or herself actuate it, what the “pure instance of grace” actuates is the capacity of the same one who effects the actuation. Sanctifying grace is a union of two subjects, one of them divine; this grace is union in a divine subject.

3. The occasion of this paper was the discovery of some jottings which, as I acknowledged at the outset, may have been, in Lonergan’s own judgment, a bright idea that did not warrant further development. While the set of terms and relations assembled in the first table above does, I believe, help to clarify a few obscurities in “The Origins of Christian Realism” and “Christology Today,” it remains that neither of those essays makes any use of the language of potential assumption, actual assumption, and decentralizing act. Everything Lonergan has to say about identity he says directly on the basis of cognitional theory and epistemology, by distinguishing different senses of the analogical term one, rather than by relating

44 “Christology Today,” in A Third Collection, 94.
45 Constitution of Christ, 149.
what he means by identity to his own metaphysics and so also to the neologisms that appear in the upper right-hand corner of my table. On the other hand, neither of the two essays says anything at all about the grace of union, in the sense I have just mentioned, either as decentralizing act or as secondary esse or as anything else. No doubt that is because Lonergan had other fish to fry. It can nevertheless be asked whether there is any reason to suppose that this absolutely supernatural reality would be included in a full-blown systematic Christology, had he written one.

Presumably Lonergan would not relinquish the idea that there is something supernatural, in the relevant sense of the word, about the Incarnation. Exactly what, and how best to conceive it, are further questions. It was pointed out earlier that Christ's secondary act of existence – to remain for the moment with that name – is a consequence of the hypostatic union, defined as Chalcedon defines it. But that consequence is necessary if, and maybe only if, the Christological “grammar” that the Chalcedonian definition prescribes is supplemented by a “grammar” of natural theology such as chapter 19 of Insight. The methodological assumption, that is to say, is that the meaning of God incarnate is to be controlled in part by the meaning of God the creator and, for Lonergan, God the unrestricted act of understanding, affirming, and loving. The sense in which this act is unrestricted governs what can be said about its union with restricted reality; that is, it governs what can be said about the supernatural.

One question that P80 raises is whether, in the case of the Incarnation, and perhaps in others as well, the supernatural is best conceived in metaphysical categories. When Lonergan announces that “the theologian is under no necessity of reducing to the metaphysical elements, which suffice for an account of this world, such supernatural realities as the incarnation,” he clearly has in mind the six elements he had previously defined. The relevant categories will have to be, as it were, special metaphysical categories, such as decentralizing act would plainly seem to be. In that regard it is worth noting that although the generation of theological categories belongs to the functional specialty Foundations, there would appear to be no reason to invent the category

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46 It may be well to reiterate note 16.
47 Insight, 756.
of decentralizing act, apart from the implications (worked out in *Systematics*) of one particular Christian doctrine that will have been selected, grounded, and affirmed in *Doctrines* on the basis of categories already generated. It could be that at some point Christian *Systematics* would similarly find it convenient to define special metaphysical categories for the purpose of explaining the supernatural reality that is sanctifying grace.

But sanctifying grace differs from the hypostatic union in two methodologically significant ways. In the first place, there is not a *doctrine* of grace as clearly defined and – until lately – as widely affirmed as the Chalcedonian definition, which itself is only a clarification that controls the meaning of the Nicene Creed.48 The Creed is silent on sanctifying grace, by that or any other name, and the deference conventionally paid to Augustine’s views is paid to a line of thought that is neither systematic nor theoretically conceived nor an authoritative doctrine. Which leads to a second point. There is no access to the meaning of God incarnate, apart from the “outer word” of revelation, however revelation may be conceived. The Incarnation occurred once. Sanctifying grace is given over and over. On Lonergan’s position, the supernatural consequence of this latter, repeated gift is conscious; it can be appropriated and described, and it is on the basis of that description that a methodical theology would develop the categories relevant to an explanatory account. As with the hypostatic union, those categories will presumably be determined in part by “natural knowledge of God.” Whether they will include modifications of the six metaphysical terms from *Insight* may be a question worth pursuing.

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48 The thesis is Lonergan’s and is discussed at length in “What a Friend We Have” (note 8 above).
RECEIVING VATICAN II:
RENEWING THE CHRISTIC CENTER

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I am most grateful for the opportunity to participate and to share some reflections and perspectives at this Lonergan Workshop honoring the 50th anniversary of the most significant ecclesial event of the twentieth century: the Second Vatican Council. I appreciate the invitation all the more since I am by no means a “Lonerganian of the Strict Observance.” Truth to tell: I might not even qualify as a Latitudinarian Lonerganian.

But, to my delight, the invitation led me to rediscover some of my own Lonerganian roots, and for that I am indeed grateful.

“COMMUNICANTES ET MEMORIAM VENERANTES”
SULLIVAN, LONERGAN, CROWE

I would like to begin by paying tribute this evening to three figures from my student days at Rome’s Gregorian University. Providentially, those years (1962-66) coincided with the four sessions of the council.

First, a grateful tribute to Father Francis Sullivan who is happily with us this evening and who recently celebrated his 90th birthday.

I had Frank Sullivan in class in 1963 for the course, “De Ecclesia.” He lectured in Latin with a pronounced New England twang; and had just published a brand new Latin manual on Church which the “ressourcement” and “aggiornamento” taking place across the Tiber soon rendered out of date. Frank remarks wryly: it was the last Latin manual ever published.

Second, to Father Bernard Lonergan himself, whom I had in the second year of theology for “De Verbo Incarnato.” Since I lived
at Collegio Capranica, close to the Greg, I was able of an afternoon to visit some of the professors in their truly Spartan quarters. One day I visited Lonergan and asked him, perhaps presumptuously, to recommend a theological approach more attuned to the aesthetic and affective dimensions of experience. Far from being offended, he immediately directed me to the work of Hans Urs von Balbhasar!

Third, to the recently deceased, Father Fred Crowe, whom I had in third theology for “De Deo Trino.” Lonergan’s two volumes had recently appeared, but he himself was back in Canada for medical treatment.

I recall having Fred for my final oral exam that year, and ended the session by responding to his last question with a flourish: “eminentissimus professor multum loquitur de ‘complacency and concern’.” Needless to say: I received a “10!” I, like you, am thankful for the dedicated, creative, and generous labors of these men from whom we have received and continue to receive so much

“I WOULD NEVER HAVE BELIEVED THAT!”
(YVES CONGAR: NOVEMBER 20, 1962)

Congar wrote these words in his journal on what was, perhaps, the most electrifying day of the entire council. A vote had just been taken on the schema: “De Fontibus Revelationis.” Sixty-two per cent of the bishops voted against the schema; and Congar expressed his overjoyed amazement – “I never would have believed it!”

However, despite this large expression of dissatisfaction with the document, the rules governing the council’s procedures stipulated that two-thirds had to reject a schema for it to be returned to the appropriate committee to be reworked.

John XXIII, showing his blessed good sense, intervened and established a new joint commission to oversee the revision: Cardinal Ottaviani’s Theological Commission joined with Cardinal Bea’s Secretariat for Christian Unity.

As a French wag remarked: Ottaviani and Bea were, in effect, “les deux sources!”

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I enjoy tweaking my more “liberal” colleagues by opining that Pope John’s intervention was an exercise of papal primacy to which Hans Künz has never objected.

In many ways, November 20, 1962 marks the real beginning of the council. What emerged from the reconstituted commission and the labors of bishops and theologians (among them the young professor from Bonn, Joseph Ratzinger) was the extraordinary Constitution on Divine Revelation: Dei Verbum. Jared Wicks, S.J., who is among the foremost interpreters of the history of the council, even postulates the primacy of Dei Verbum among the conciliar documents. He writes:

Some editions place Lumen gentium at the head of the Vatican II constitutions, but would not the conciliar ecclesiology be better contextualized if placed after the council text starting with “hearing the word of God reverently and proclaiming it confidently…” and ending with “the word of God… stands forever,” as does Dei Verbum?2

THE PRIMACY OF DEI VERBUM AND THE CHRISTOLOGICAL CENTER OF VATICAN II

In interpreting the vision of Vatican II the Extraordinary Synod of 1985 recommended that special attention must be paid to the four Constitutions. It taught:

The theological interpretation of the conciliar documents must show attention to all the documents in themselves and in their close inter-relationship, in such a way that the integral meaning of the Council’s affirmations – often very complex – might be understood and expressed. [Nevertheless,] special attention must be paid to the four major Constitutions of the Council, which contain the interpretative key of the other Decrees and Declarations.3

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And, though each Constitution has abundant riches, and should certainly be read “intertextually,” I would argue, with Jared Wicks, that *Dei Verbum* enjoys, a theological primacy, a *prima inter pares*, if you will.

My reason for saying this is that it establishes the *revelatory given* which is foundational to all else that the Council says, the Word from which all else derives. And that foundation is Christological: Jesus Christ is the foundation upon which all is built.

Thus, though many of the Council’s explicit concerns and documents are, of course, ecclesiological in focus, the depth structure supporting them is Christologically grounded.

*Dei Verbum* provided a *personalist* and *Christocentric* understanding of Divine Revelation that decisively determined both the *content* and *style* of the Council’s deliberations. Jared Wicks has analyzed the contributions of both the Bea Secretariat and the young Ratzinger in furthering this personalist and Christ-centered reading of Revelation in contrast to the preparatory schema.4

I have sought to illustrate this *robust Christocentrism* in the quotes from the council here transcribed. I believe they confirm my conviction about how *Christologically saturated* the documents of Vatican II are:

**Dei Verbum: The Dogmatic Constitution on Divine Revelation**

“In Christ, the mediator and fullness of revelation, the deepest truth about God and human salvation is made clear to us” (*Dei Verbum*, 2).

**Lumen Gentium: The Dogmatic Constitution on the Church**

“Christ is the Light of the nations . . . The Council greatly desires to enlighten all with the brightness of Christ” (*Lumen gentium*, 1).

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Sacrosanctum Concilium: The Constitution on the Sacred Liturgy

"It is through the Liturgy, especially the divine sacrifice of the Eucharist, that believers most fully manifest in their lives and to others the mystery of Christ and the true nature of the Church" (SC 2).

Gaudium et Spes: The Pastoral Constitution on the Church in the Modern World

"Only in the mystery of the incarnate Word does the mystery of man take on light . . . Christ, the last Adam, by the revelation of the mystery of the Father and his love, fully reveals humankind to itself and makes humanity's sublime calling clear" (Gaudium et Spes, 22).

"For the Word of God, through whom all things were made, was made flesh so that as perfectly human he would save all human beings and sum up all things. The Lord is the goal of human history, the point on which the desires of history and civilization turn, the center of the human race, the joy of all hearts and the fulfillment of all desires. He it was whom the Father raised from the dead, exalted and placed at his right hand, making him judge of the living and the dead. It is as given life and united in his Spirit that we make our pilgrimage towards the climax of human history which is in full accord with the designs of his love, 'to unite all things in Christ, things in heaven and things on earth' [Eph 1:10]" (Gaudium et Spes, 45).

Nostra Aetate: The Declaration on the Relation of the Church with non-Christian Religions

"As the Church has always held and continues to hold, Christ, in his immense love, freely suffered his passion and death for the sins of all people, so that all might attain salvation. Hence it is the task of the Church to proclaim the cross of Christ as the sign of God's universal love and the source of every grace" (Nostra Aetate, 4).
Presbyterorum Ordinis: The Decree on the Ministry and Life of Priests

“The most blessed Eucharist contains the entire spiritual treasure of the Church, that is, Christ himself” (Presbyterorum Ordinis, 5).

Optatam Totius: The Decree on Priestly Formation

“...theological disciplines should be renewed by livelier contact with the mystery of Christ . . .”[vividior cum mysterio Christi contactus] (OT 16).

In his important study of the Council, John O'Malley writes: “Among the recurring themes of the Council, expressive of its spirit, the call to holiness is particularly pervasive and particularly important . . . It is the theme that to a large extent imbued the Council with its finality.”5 While I gladly acknowledge O'Malley's perceptive insights in his work, I suggest that from a theological point of view his analysis falls short. The true golden thread uniting and integrating the Council's documents is the Holy One, who issues the call to holiness: Jesus Christ who is the light of all peoples, the alpha and omega of all God's promises. The quotes I have given (which, of course, might be multiplied) show the pervasive Christocentric nature of the vision of Vatican II.

THE NEGLECT OF DEI VERBUM AND THE POST-CONCILIAR CHRISTOLOGICAL REDUCTIONISMS

The aftermath of the Council witnessed, however, a surprising and harmful neglect of Dei Verbum in theological circles. (There are exceptions, of course. Scripture scholars sometimes made appeal to it; and we were often enough reminded that the Magisterium is not over, but under the Word of God.)

But much commitment and energy went into liturgical reform (thus the prominent invocation of Sacrosanctum Concilium); or into intra-ecclesial issues (hence the recourse to either chapter three or chapter two of Lumen Gentium – depending on which side of the debate you were/are on); or into the single-minded advocacy of dialogue with

the world and commitment to social justice with almost unique appeal to *Gaudium et spes*.

However important and valid each concern is, when pursued in an exclusivist way, it runs the risk of declining into a “cafeteria conciliarism.”

Now this narrowing may only be the inevitable outcome of human predilections and limitations. But I wonder whether something more is at stake? Namely an uneasiness with absolute claims regarding Jesus Christ himself, claims that appear to run counter to societal and cultural urgings regarding openness and tolerance toward all, most especially other religions.

In some quarters and among some authors *Dei Verbum* came to be considered too exclusively Christocentric, insufficiently accommodating – a charge leveled against two documents heavily reliant on *Dei Verbum*: John Paul II’s 1990 encyclical, “Redemptoris Missio” and the Congregation for the Doctrine of the Faith’s Declaration of 2000, “Dominus Jesus.”

I see three symptoms of declension from the Council’s comprehensive Christocentrism:

**Jesus as Prophet in Israel**

The emphasis upon Jesus as prophet may derive from the laudable desire to indicate the *continuity* of Jesus with the faith and people of Israel. However, left unqualified by equal emphasis upon the “more than a prophet,” it runs the considerable risk of compromising the *novum* that Jesus brings and embodies. Here Saint Irenaeus’ exultant confession serves as salutary recall: “*omnem novitatem attulit, semetipsum afferens*” – “he brought all newness, bringing himself!” (Ad Haer, IV, 43, 1). As Cardinal Newman, speaking for the Great Tradition, insisted: the Incarnation of the Son of God is the article of faith upon which the Church stands or falls.

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Moralism

An exclusive focus on morality (whether in nineteenth-century liberal attire or in twentieth-century revolutionary fatigues) reduces the Gospel to an ethical cause and program, however worthy – building the Kingdom according to our own designs and specifications. Jesus becomes the exemplar of fidelity to God and service to neighbor. But there is little sense of him as Savior and unique Son of God.7

Lastly, and arguably most basically:

Marginalizing the Cross

If one were to bring to a variety of contemporary Catholic theological works the question whether anything salvific happens on the cross, in many cases the answer implied or professed is “no.” The salvific activity of Jesus transpired during his earthly ministry of teaching, healing, and challenging the powers that be. He so threatened the established authorities that they united to eliminate the mortal threat. Consequently they crucified him; but his saving action preceded his execution.

The theologian, William Frazier, has termed this approach “the consequential cross.”8 Here the cross is viewed as the baneful consequence of a provocative life; but nothing of salvific consequence transpires on the cross. This attitude stands in radical contrast to the liturgical and theological tradition that confesses the cross as the epitome and climax of God’s saving activity and celebrates the cross as the ground of humankind’s hope: “Ave, Crux, Spes Unica!”

In the discernment of some, these three tendencies bespeak a “Christological collapse” in the post-Conciliar church. Let me call upon three witnesses to this discernment.

7 For a treatment of post-conciliar Catholic “liberalism” that is both appreciative and critical, see Frans Josef van Beeck, S.J., Catholic Identity after Vatican II: Three Types of Faith in the One Church (Chicago: Loyola University Press, 1985), chap. 2, “The New Openness and the Problem of Identity.”
Luke Timothy Johnson

The phrase, “Christological collapse,” derives not from some ultra-conservative author, but from the distinguished New Testament scholar, Luke Timothy Johnson. He contends that, in much contemporary Catholic scholarship “the truth of the Gospel concerning Jesus the Lord has been challenged and eroded.” And this dire situation has not remained immured in the groves of academe, but has trickled down to the level of religious educators and pastoral agents, thereby contributing to the restriction of faith’s gaze to a merely human Jesus to whom I can, presumably, relate more easily, because he is “more like me.”

And Johnson draws the inevitable soteriological consequences: “if Jesus is not the divine Word of God made flesh, if God does not, in Jesus, enter fully into human existence ..., then neither has God shared fully in human suffering and death, nor has God transfigured human suffering and death. Nothing fundamental has changed in the human condition.”

Benedict XVI

No less an authority than Pope Benedict XVI has voiced an analogous alarm. Lamenting the gulf that some have postulated between the “historical Jesus” and “the Christ of Faith,” Pope Benedict, in the “Foreword” to the first volume of his work, Jesus of Nazareth, writes movingly: “This is a dramatic situation for faith, because its point of reference is being placed in doubt: Intimate friendship with Jesus, on which everything depends, is in danger of clutching thin air.”

The Pope assigns some of the blame for this situation to the almost exclusive reliance upon the historical-critical method in modern biblical exegesis. While not denying the method’s contribution, he nonetheless strongly affirms the need for complementary hermeneutics lest a...

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A reductionistic approach compromise the substance of Christian belief. Hence he advocates a “Christological hermeneutic:” “which sees Jesus Christ as the key to the whole and learns from him how to understand the Bible as a unity.” He acknowledges that such a Christological approach demands “a prior act of faith,” but insists that “this act of faith is based upon reason – historical reason – and so makes it possible to see the internal unity of scripture.”

Avery Dulles

The final witness, whose discernment I call upon, is Cardinal Avery Dulles. Dulles dedicated the very last months of his life to compiling his essays into a book, published posthumously as *Evangelization for the Third Millennium*. In the key chapter, “The New Evangelization and Theological Renewal,” he examines aspects of contemporary theology and culture that weaken the commitment to evangelization. Among these tendencies Dulles depicts a “soteriological pluralism” which holds that Christ is indeed Savior for Christians, but thinks it hegemonic to maintain that he is universal Savior of all people.

In the face of this retreat from the robust proclamation of the uniqueness of Christ found in the New Testament and the subsequent Tradition, Dulles urges that

... theology should be alert to root out any tendencies it may have had that stand in the way of evangelization. In becoming authentically evangelical, theology can better achieve its own objective, which is to understand and serve the faith that comes through Christ and the apostles. By opening itself more fully to the word of God, it can assist the church to adhere to that word more faithfully and proclaim it more effectively, so that the whole world, in the words of Vatican II, ‘by hearing the message of salvation, may believe, and by believing may hope, and by hoping may love’ (DV 1).”

It is noteworthy that Dulles refers, at the end of the cited quote, to the Constitution *Dei Verbum*, a telling reminder of the ongoing

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12 Ratzinger/Pope Benedict XVI, *Jesus of Nazareth*, xix.
13 Avery Dulles, S.J. *Evangelization for the Third Millennium* (New York: Paulist Press, 2009), 89.
importance of that document for evangelical and ecclesial renewal. If this discernment reflects some aspects of the contemporary theological/pastoral situation, what is the way forward?\textsuperscript{14}

**TOWARD A CHRISTOLOGICAL MYSTAGOGY**

A good friend, a fine theologian, expresses his dismay at the Christological collapse by beginning his course in Christology with the provocative question: “Does anyone love Jesus any more?”

There was scarce need to pose the question in early Christianity. The First Letter of Peter bears striking witness to the fact: “Without having seen him, you love him; though you do not now see him, you believe in him and rejoice with unutterable and exalted joy” (1 Peter, 1:8&9)

As the noted Patristic scholar, Robert Wilken, writes:

The church gave men and women a new love, Jesus Christ, a person who inspired their actions and held their affections. This was a love unlike others. For it was not only that Jesus was a wise teacher or a compassionate human being who reached out to the sick and needy, or even that he patiently suffered abuse and calumny and died a cruel death, but that after his death God had raised him from the dead to a new life. He who once was dead now lives. The Resurrection of Jesus is the central fact of Christian devotion and the ground of all Christian thinking.\textsuperscript{15}

Because Jesus lives and continues to love the members of his Body, we can respond to his love by loving in him in return. This experiential conviction needs to be recovered in the contemporary Church if the promise of Vatican II is to be realized. Here again I invoke three prominent Catholic thinkers to support this claim.

\textsuperscript{14} For a welcome and balanced critique of Christological reductionism in contemporary Catholic theology, see Thomas P. Rausch, *Eschatology, Liturgy, and Christology: Toward Recovering an Eschatological Imagination* (Collegeville, MN: Liturgical Press, 2012).

Karl Rahner

In an often quoted, but perhaps still insufficiently heeded injunction, Karl Rahner asserted that “the devout Christian of the future will either be a ‘mystic,’ one who has experienced something, or will cease to be anything at all.”16

For all his heralded commitment to a “transcendental method” in theology, contemporary Rahnerian scholarship rightly stresses the Ignatian foundations of the Rahnerian theological enterprise.17 For all the abstract speculation in which he excels, Rahner’s theology is never bereft of pastoral concern and is imbued with spiritual resonances. Indeed, Ignatian spirituality is the matrix and ongoing referent for Rahner’s theological investigations. I would even suggest that Rahner’s transcendental approach might be described as the unfolding of the conditions for the possibility of Ignatian mysticism.

Benedict XVI

Though the young Joseph Ratzinger and the older and more established Karl Rahner collaborated in their role as periti at the Vatican Council, and though Ratzinger later famously characterized themselves as dwelling on “different theological planets,” one ought not ignore their common pastoral concern and spiritual commitment. Indeed, one might hazard to say that Ratzinger would subscribe to Rahner’s contention regarding the Christian of the future and the exigency of a personal appropriation of the faith in a situation marked by the disappearance of a supporting and sustaining Catholic subculture.

From the beginning of his Petrine ministry, the Pope has forcefully insisted that being Christian is not the adhesion to an abstract idea or a moral ideal, but it is the result of “an encounter with a person who gives life a new horizon and a decisive direction.”18 His homilies,

perhaps the most impressive from a Roman Pontiff since Leo the Great, consistently have as their central focus the call to relationship with the living Lord as the very heart of Christian discipleship. Benedict's mystagogic or, more precisely, "Christogogic" mission is carried forward not only in homilies, but in his impressive catecheses and theological explorations.

Benedict's underlying persuasion finds succinct expression in *Verbum Domini* (the "Apostolic Exhortation" he wrote as the fruit of the 2008 Synod of Bishops devoted to "The Word of God in the Life and Mission of the Church"). He writes: "while in the Church we greatly venerate the sacred Scriptures, the Christian faith is not a 'religion of the book:' Christianity is the 'religion of the word of God,' not of 'a written and mute word, but of the incarnate and living Word.'"\(^{19}\)

Remarkably, this Christ-centered vision, undoubtedly influenced by his studies of Saint Bonaventure and the works of Henri de Lubac and Romano Guardini, appears early in Joseph Ratzinger's theological labors. A programmatic article, "Christocentrism in Preaching?" originally dates from 1961 – long before he became a bishop, much less Cardinal Prefect or Pope. In many ways it outlines the pastoral theological program he has faithfully pursued over fifty years. At the time of its inclusion in the book of essays he published in 1973, Ratzinger added this striking paragraph to the essay:

Perhaps nothing in recent decades or even centuries has done more harm to preaching than the loss of credibility that it incurred by merely handing on formulas that were no longer the living intellectual property of those who were proclaiming them. This is probably also the only way to comprehend the abrupt change in the Church during the postconciliar period, in which emphatically delivered dogmatic formulas were suddenly replaced by the same emphasis on secular slogans. There is no continuity of content to be found on this verbal market-place. The only thing that has remained the same in this rapid external transformation seems to be, in quite a

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few cases, the zeal with which foreign formulas are repeated, without becoming any less foreign.\textsuperscript{20}

With this injunction to the crucial importance of personal appropriation, I pass to the third figure I explore for resources to aid in clarifying the grammar of a Christological mystagogy. For, as already indicated, this renewing of the Christic center is imperative if Vatican II is to be fully received and its promise realized.

**Bernard Lonergan**

I approach this section with some diffidence, since I have not been directly involved in Lonergan studies for some time. What I suggest may have already been discussed over the years in this and other venues. However, the perspective of a relative outsider may also be of interest. What impels me are the possibilities within the Lonergan corpus of what I will term a radical “Re-Sourcement” – a return to the Source who is Christ himself. This would constitute a further approach and support to what I consider to be Pope Benedict’s fundamental theological and pastoral program.

The four items I list under this head do not presume to be more than an initial sounding of possibilities.

**Faith/Beliefs Revisited?**

In a recent review of the English translation of Lonergan’s *The Triune God (De Deo Trino)*, Jeremy Wilken remarks:

“If in 1964 Lonergan’s burden was to vindicate theological understanding as a good distinct from dogmatic certitude, today his clarity about the subalternation of systematic theology to the articles of faith may be equally important; for though theological understanding has yet to come into its kingdom, dogma is reduced to titular sovereignty”\textsuperscript{21}


\textsuperscript{21} *The Thomist* 75, no. 3 (July 2011): 490.
Receiving Vatican II

So I wonder: if in 1972 Lonergan thought it important, both in se and for the purpose of inter-religious dialogue, to distinguish (not separate) “faith” and “belief,” quadragesimo anno it may be desirable to re-weave their ties. This is especially the case because some have translated Lonergan’s distinction into a diremption, resulting in a rather contentless “faith.”

Cardinal Avery Dulles in his 1994 study, The Assurance of Things Hoped For cautioned strongly against just such a separation. Dulles expresses his worry thus:

Since he relates faith and conversion almost exclusively to the “inner word” of God’s love poured into the heart, Lonergan can easily be understood (or misunderstood) as denying the salvific importance of God’s outer word. In some passages he gives the impression of holding that all religious people have one and the same faith, and that they are divided not in faith but in beliefs.22

Dulles instances the claim of Charles Davis that he would not have been able to leave the Catholic Church were it not for his reading of Lonergan! Dulles concedes that Lonergan would have rejected this reading of his views on faith; but suggests: “[Lonergan] would have had to say more about the historical mediation of revelation in order to protect himself from this kind of accusation.”23 Dulles goes on to question “whether a true and sufficient act of faith can be made in the absence of any special or historical revelation.”24

Lonergan does insist, of course, that “One must not conclude that the outward word is something incidental. For it has a constitutive role.”25 The issue, perhaps, is whether the “constitutive” reality of the outer word of belief needs to be elaborated upon, especially given the tendency, since the writing of Method, to separate faith from belief.

Moreover, as I read Method in Theology, chapter four, Lonergan is actually trading upon distinctive Christian belief in his exposition both

23 Dulles, The Assurance of Things Hoped For, 155.
of "the prior word" and of "faith as the eye of religious love." For example, does not Lonergan's dependence on and use of the work of Friedrich Hei ler take biblical revelation as normative for "genuine religion?" Indeed, does his appeal to "the word of the gospel that announces that God has loved us first and, in the fullness of time, has revealed that love in Christ crucified, dead, and risen" not indicate that Lonergan's account of "faith" is already imbued with Christian "belief?"26

In my view, Romans 5:5 — "God's love has been poured into our hearts through the Holy Spirit which has been given to us" (so often invoked by Lonergan) can hardly be abstracted from Romans 5:8 — "But God shows his love for us in that while we were yet sinners, Christ died for us." I wonder, therefore, if an explicit acknowledgment of this is called for and the implications drawn out. These implications may entail the thematization of specific Christic conversion.

**Christic Conversion?**

From my first foray into *Insight* while studying theology in Rome, one of the features that struck me is how acute a "pathologist" Lonergan was. This spiritual discrimination is evident as well in *Method* and many of his shorter writings. Discussion of "bias," "inauthenticity," "progress and decline," the "truncated subject" and the "drifter" graphically illustrate that "self-transcendence is always precarious."27

It is in light of this recognition of the human predicament that, I think, the crucial imperative of conversion looms so large in Lonergan. For "conversion is from inauthenticity to authenticity."28 Significantly, such conversion is "a fundamental and momentous change in the human reality"29 we are: "for the converted have a self to understand that is quite different from the self the unconverted have to understand."30

And, though in *Method in Theology* Lonergan had differentiated a "threefold conversion," religious conversion remains "the basic fulfillment of our conscious intentionality."31

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26 *Method in Theology*, 110, 111, and 113.
27 *Method in Theology*, 110.
28 *Method in Theology*, 268.
29 *Method in Theology*, 270.
30 *Method in Theology*, 271.
31 *Method in Theology*, 105.
As is well-known Lonergan characterizes religious conversion as "a total being-in-love as the efficacious ground of all self-transcendence." It is conversion to "being in love in an unrestricted fashion . . . without limits or qualifications or conditions or reservations." Thus "religious conversion transforms the existential subject into a subject in love, a subject held, grasped, possessed, owned through a total and so other-worldly love. Then there is a new basis for all valuing and all doing good."

My reading of these densely suggestive sentences is that religious conversion is the human subject’s free response to the free outpouring of God’s love into our hearts. The sheer grace of God’s loving invitation evokes the subject’s graced response. Indeed, in another, but related context, Lonergan explicitly says: "The dynamic state of being in love has the character of a response. It is an answer to a divine initiative." And, since that response is "total:" "without limits or qualifications or conditions or reservations," it is other-worldly, supernatural. For the only proper object (or better Subject) of such love is God.

Since such religious conversion provides "a new basis for all valuing and doing good," Lonergan claims that it "occupies the ground and root of the fourth and highest level of man’s intentional consciousness." However, given that so much of the language Lonergan employs to elucidate the experience of religious conversion is interpersonal – his reference to the Newman’s motto, "cor ad cor loquitur," and to Pascal’s "heart" – I suggest that the thrust of Lonergan’s thought supports the view of those (like Robert Doran and Patrick Byrne) who identify a "fifth level of intentional consciousness" embracing the interpersonal dimension of experience. This development would resonate with John Henry Newman’s espousal of what he terms, in the second of his Oxford University Sermons, the “method of personation.” For Newman, the

32 Method in Theology, 241.
33 Method in Theology, 105 and 106.
34 Method in Theology, 242.
35 Method in Theology, 119.
36 I am grateful to Patrick Byrne for his aid in clarifying my thinking. But he is not responsible for, and not necessarily in agreement with, my formulation.
37 Method in Theology, 107.
38 Method in Theology, 113 and 115.
“method of personation” finds its supreme manifestation and normative embodiment in Christ.

Building upon the section above regarding re-weaving the ties between “faith” and “belief,” my contention is that “Christic conversion” serves implicitly as the paradigmatic instance of religious conversion for Lonergan. Let me sketch quickly some New Testament resources that could be brought to bear in delineating “Christic conversion.”

The love mysticism that permeates the discourse at the Last Supper in the Gospel according to Saint John finds a condensation in the words of Jesus: “As the Father has loved me, so I love you” (Jn 15:9). This outpouring of love “to the full” (John 13:1) is accompanied by the imperative invitation: “abide in my love!” (John 15:9).

But the New Testament tradition also indicates the radical commitment this entails: a commitment that is “total,” “without limits or conditions or qualifications.” “Whoever loves father or mother more than me is not worthy of me, and whoever loves son or daughter more than me is not worthy of me, and whoever does not take up his cross and follow me is not worthy of me (Matthew 10:37 and 38). And the universal scope of that commitment to Christ is revealed in Jesus’ eschatological assurance: “Amen, I say to you, whatever you did for one of these least brothers of mine, you did for me” (Matthew 25:40).

The realization and reception of the gift that is the love of Christ finds classic expression in the conversion expressed in Paul’s ecstatic cry: “I have been crucified with Christ; yet I live, no longer I, but Christ lives in me; insofar as I now live in the flesh, I live by faith in the Son of God who has loved me and given himself up for me” (Galations 2:19 and 20). Christic conversion entails this radical de-centering of self and re-centering in Christ: a transformed subjectivity.

And as Paul’s stirring confession in Philippians chapter three attests, his conversion to Christ provided him with (as Lonergan phrases it) “a new basis for all valuing and doing good.” Paul says: “What were once my assets I now through Christ Jesus count as losses . . . if only I can gain Christ and be given a place in him . . . that I may come to know Christ and the power of his resurrection, and partake of his sufferings by being conformed to the pattern of his death, striving toward the goal of resurrection from the dead” (Philippians 3:7-11).
Moreover, this love of Christ, "without limits or qualifications or conditions or reservations," as already intimated, cannot be a private relationship of the "Jesus and me" variety. It is fully interpersonal, embracing what Augustine would later term, the *totus Christus*: head and members. In a memorable passage of his *Commentary on the First Letter of John*, Augustine exclaims:

No one can any love the Father except he love the Son, and he that loves the Son of God, loves also the sons of God. Who are the sons of God? The members of the Son of God. And by loving he becomes himself a member, and comes through love to be in the frame of the body of Christ, so there shall be one Christ, loving Himself. For when the members love one another, the body loves itself.  

Augustine's stunning rhetoric well captures the persuasion of both Paul and John of the intimate relationship of Christ and Christians. Whether in Pauline terms of the body and its members or in Johannine terms of the vine and the branches, the coinherence, the mutual indwelling, of those who are "in Christ Jesus" [*en Christoi*] characterizes a crucial dimension of the *novum* of the New Testament. For "whoever is in Christ is a new creation: the old things have passed away; behold, new things have come!" (2 Corinthians 5:17). Thus "there is neither Jew nor Greek, there is neither slave nor free, there is neither male nor female: for you are all one [heis] in Christ Jesus" (Galatians 3:28). And, perhaps even more radically, the growth of the body will eventuate eschatologically in the attaining of "the unity of the faith and the knowledge of the Son of God, to mature manhood [eis andra teleion] to the measure of the stature of the fullness of Christ" (Ephesians 4:13).

**The Law of the Cross**

If one of the symptoms of "Christological collapse" is, as I have suggested, the marginalization of the Cross in contemporary theology, Lonergan's exposition of "the law of the Cross" provides a potent antidote. Not the "consequential cross," but "the cross of consequence."

Charles Hefling has a splendid essay on "Grace, Christ, Redemption" in the 1998 *Lonergan Workshop Journal* which insightfully

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draws out some of the consequences. Hefling speaks of the cross as an “act of communicative meaning” wherein sin is not forgotten, but remembered with love, thus becoming the occasion for greater good. Hence the law of the cross is the transformation of horrific evil into forgiveness and reconciliation.40

What perhaps needs further accenting is a complementary consideration of “the law of the resurrection” that moves beyond forgiveness and reconciliation to the celebration of joyful communion in the risen Christ, the wedding feast of the Lamb. Thus integral to the aim of Jesus, to the meaning and value he communicates, is what I call Jesus’ “passion for communion” and the eucharistic imagination this inspires. Christ establishes communion in his own body, a communion that perdures beyond death and inaugurates the new and eternal covenant.

By his resurrection Christ has become “life-giving Spirit” (1 Corinthians 15:45) whose body, transformed in the Spirit (soma pneumatikon) is eucharistized, gathering all people into communion in the Spirit. Here the missions of Word and Spirit achieve their perichoretic fullness. To be “in Christ” is to be “in the Spirit,” and all grace is perichoretically Christic and pneumatic: gratia Christi atque Spiritus Sancti. Here the sensitivities and perspectives of the Western and Eastern traditions of the Church join in Trinitarian harmony.41

“Being in Christ Jesus as Subject”

Lonergan’s suggestive intimations in the article “Existenz and Aggiornamento,” were taken up by Fred Lawrence in a fine lecture here at Boston College a year or so ago. Lonergan contrasted “being in Christ Jesus as substance” and “being in Christ Jesus as subject.” Lawrence exegetes the former thus: “Being in Christ Jesus as substance is known by believing, trusting those who hand on the tradition . . . assent[ing] to the truth expressed in creedal and theological statements.” This is truly being in Christ Jesus and many come to holiness in this way.


41 Gaudium et Spes, 22, offers a doctrinal teaching that cries out for systematic elaboration: “For, since Christ died for all men, and since the ultimate vocation of man is in fact one, and divine, we ought to believe that the Holy Spirit in a manner known only to God offers to every man the possibility of being associated with this paschal mystery.”
However, Lonergan discerned a richer, fuller participation in Christ which he called “being in Christ Jesus as subject,” “where the hand of the Lord ceases to be hidden,” and “being in love with God can be as full and dominant, as overwhelming and as lasting, an experience as human love.”

In Lawrence’s reading this transition in apprehension and concern had momentous consequences for Lonergan’s understanding of the theological task. It entailed “working out theological foundations accessible to conscious human experience;” indeed, seeing “spirituality/mysticism [as] the very basis for theology and for Christian life.”

In effect, this descent to the mystical, encouraged by Lonergan, seems to me to correspond to the discernment of the contemporary need we saw articulated by Karl Rahner. The two Jesuits, schooled in Ignatian spirituality, perceived that, in a new and sometimes hostile cultural situation, the Christian (and theologian!) of the future will either be a “mystic”—one who has experienced the love of God in Christ—or will not be.

I find this recovery of the experiential and mystical dimension of Christian faith especially significant and worthy of further attention. It is a recovery which unites Rahner and Lonergan with von Balthasar and Ratzinger. The suspicion of “experience” that was one of the bitter fruits of the Modernist condemnation, and the consequent relegation of the mystical to the extraordinary few, impoverished Catholic theology and spirituality for some time. Thus the retrieval of the experiential by these four great Catholic theologians and their insistence upon the inseparability of theology and spirituality opens a promising path forward for Catholic theology in the twenty-first century.

However, in the face of a too facile and undifferentiated appeal to “experience,” what needs to be strongly insisted upon is that Christic experience is the experience of the converted subject who is being transformed in the image of Christ, crucified and risen. Being in Christ Jesus as subject is being consciously and passionately in love with him who asks us, as he did Simon Peter: “Do you love me?”

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43 Fred Lawrence, “Growing in Faith as the Eyes of Being-in-Love with God” (Typescript, pp. 7 and 1).
21:17). In his seminal essay, "Faith, Philosophy, and Theology," Joseph Ratzinger wrote: "Faith can wish to understand because it is moved by love for the One upon whom it has bestowed its consent. Love seeks understanding. It seeks to know even better the One whom it loves." \(^{44}\)

Who, then, is the converted subject in Christ Jesus? The subject who has been incorporated into Christ, as a member of his body. Hence the "new self" that issues from Christic conversion is the relational self. One might specify even further and suggest that the new self is the Eucharistic self, engendered by the Christ whose being, by his paschal mystery, is to be eucharist. As Joseph Ratzinger has written:

The Eucharist is never an event involving just two, a dialogue between Christ and me. Eucharistic Communion is aimed at a complete reshaping of my own life. It breaks up man's entire self and creates a new 'we.' Communion with Christ is necessarily also communication with all who belong to him: therein I myself become a part of the new bread that Christ is creating by the resubstantiation of the whole of earthly reality. \(^{45}\)

Ratzinger’s reflections prompt a final probing. The descent to the mystical he espouses and encourages is a conscious and intentional appropriation of Eucharistic mysticism: an experience of the Christ who is Eucharist-engendering-ecclesia. Eucharistic mysticism is the lived realization (in Newman’s strong sense of the word) of Christ’s Eucharistic and ecclesial body in which we are incorporate. Here we will re-discover that being consciously in love with Christ in an unrestricted fashion is the fulfillment of our conscious intentionality on the fifth, intersubjective, level of intentional consciousness, and hence the transfiguration of our very capacity for self-transcendence. \(^{46}\)


\(^{46}\) See *Method in Theology*, 105 and 106.
PORTA FIDEI

In his Apostolic Letter, Porta Fidei, announcing the "Year of Faith" to begin on October 11, 2012 – the 50th anniversary of the opening of the Council – Benedict XVI characterizes his initiative as follows.

"The Year of Faith... is a summons to an authentic and renewed conversion to the Lord, the one Savior of the world. In the mystery of his death and resurrection, God has revealed in its fullness the Love that saves and calls us to conversion of life through the forgiveness of sins (cf. Acts 5:31). For Saint Paul, this Love ushers us into a new life: "We were buried... with him by baptism into death, so that as Christ was raised from the dead by the glory of the Father, we too might walk in newness of life" (Romans 6:4). Through faith, this new life shapes the whole of human existence according to the radical new reality of the resurrection. To the extent that he freely cooperates, man's thoughts and affections, mentality and conduct are slowly purified and transformed, on a journey that is never completely finished in this life. "Faith working through love" (Galatians 5:6) becomes a new criterion of understanding and action that changes the whole of man's life (cf. Romans 12:2; Colossians 3:9-10; Ephesians 4:20-29; 2 Corinthians 5:17)."47

I can think of no more concise expression of the Christological mystagogy to which we aspire and which our present situation so desperately requires.

THE ETHICAL CHALLENGES OF MEDICINE TODAY: DRAWING ON THE WISDOM OF VATICAN II

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A doctor in the neuro intensive care unit writes a “Do not resuscitate” (DNR) order on the chart of a 66 year-old man who suffered a brain aneurism. The MRI scan reveals that over 70 percent of his brain cells are dead. A shunt in his head is draining blood from his brain. If the shunt is left in much longer an infection will occur which will eventually kill the patient. If the shunt is removed the patient will probably die very quickly. There is no medical reason to replace the shunt and the physician will not approve it. The family is unaware of the DNR order. There is ambiguity about it because the physician has a reputation of being intolerant of so called “bed blockers” when others who stand a chance for effective treatment could be using the resources. The family is not willing to withdraw treatment even though the physician has indicated the treatment is not medically helping the patient but only prolonging his death. The family is praying for a miracle.

A sonar scan is taken of the womb of a woman in her early forties who is pregnant with her first child. Her physician tells her that the brain of the fetus is outside its skull. The fetus will not survive birth. Her physician recommends abortion as soon as possible as bringing the pregnancy to term could threaten the mother’s life.

A physician and researcher in India is having enormous success treating people diagnosed with multiple sclerosis, renal disease, diabetes, paralysis, Alzheimer’s, Lyme disease, and cerebral palsy by injecting them with embryonic stem cells. There is little or no legislation on the use of embryonic stem cells in India. However, this treatment
is completely unregulated and researchers and physicians in Europe and North American are critical of the unsubstantiated evidence of the procedures. In addition, the treatment is very expensive.

A fifty-five year old man is diagnosed with early onset Alzheimer’s disease. He is devastated by the diagnosis. Already he has been experiencing something that he can only describe as a gradual loss of himself. He feels that he is losing the person he has always been. He is terrified of this only getting worse. He feels desperate and panicky. He asks his doctor to give him something that he can take to end his life when he wants rather than wait for the ravages of the disease to take its course.

The imbalance of medical resources between developed and developing nations is striking. People in developed nations are on average living longer and healthier lives than ever before. In developing nations where resources are scarcer and sometimes almost non-existent, people continue to die from malnutrition and diseases that are routinely treated in developed nations.

The drama of human existence is played out at every moment in the world of medicine in the twenty-first century. The complexity of the questions and ethical dilemmas is staggering. From the short examples above, we see the enormous range of difficulties and challenges. In many cases, ethical questions emerge precisely because medical and technological advances relentlessly move forward. The ingenuity of human action outpaces our capacity to think about what we are doing.¹

My goal in this paper is to make some linkages between these challenges and a document that was composed almost fifty years ago. I am referring to one specific document in the corpus of the Documents of Vatican II, *Gaudium et Spes: The Church in the Modern World*. The subtitle of my presentation, “Drawing on the Wisdom of Vatican II,” claims that there is something significant and vital that Vatican II has to contribute to our reflections on the ethical challenges of twenty-first century medicine. While there are many ways I think this is so, I will elaborate on three – that, in my view, are foundational. The first has to do with the vision that underlies the documents of Vatican

II. *Gaudium et Spes*, more than any of the other documents, reveals Pope John XXIII's vision in calling the council, a vision that is both immensely radical and very simple. It is a vision that scandalized many who still viewed the Church from a classist worldview, untouched by history. The second and third contributions are subsequent to the first yet each is vital. The second can be found in chapter 1, part I of *Gaudium et Spes*. It is titled "The Dignity of the Human Person" and it reveals something about the human person that can best be described as the *dynamism* of persons, which propels forward both individuals and communities. The final insight from *Gaudium et Spes* that I draw on in relation to contemporary ethical challenges of medicine is the manner in which the document speaks about responsibility. Among the many deeply troubling events of the twentieth century, the Second World War raised moral issues never envisaged before: concentration camps, Nazi experiments on human subjects, the extermination of entire peoples and cities. While science and technology in most cases is developed to improve human life, World War II demonstrated in an unprecedented manner the massive destruction technology could wield. The aftermath of the Second World War left people pessimistic about themselves and the future. What was called for in the midst of the existential angst was a new interpretation of the concept of responsibility. The expression of this responsibility in *Gaudium et Spes*, broadened our understanding of its importance. "[W]ith increase in human powers comes broadening of responsibility" (#34). Briefly considering this important contribution concerning responsibility allows me to link it to dignity and respond to what I believe is a core challenge in twenty-first century medical ethics.

**THE DYNAMIC VISION OF POPE JOHN XXIII**

When Pope John XXIII gave his opening address to the first session of the Second Vatican Council, he spoke of the church and Christians as called to be present to the world in a particular manner. His purpose in calling the council is directly linked to this and his emphasis on it being a *pastoral* council gave some direction to the vision he wanted.
to communicate. As Lonergan clarifies in his short essay titled "Pope John’s Intention," by emphasizing this would be a pastoral council Pope John conveyed his conviction that the world did not need a gathering of bishops and cardinals "merely to repeat what anyone could find in familiar theological handbooks." 3 There was no point in seeking to clarify obscure, ancient decrees that would be of little interest to most. Rather, what was needed, indeed, what was imperative, was to reflect upon and discuss the church, its mission and teaching in such a way that the needs of the modern world would be addressed. In essence, what needed to come to the fore was a pastoral church.

Some criticized Pope John and insisted that, in fact, all the councils were pastoral. But Pope John’s vision presented something distinctly different. It was a vision stemming from a deep conviction that human beings are essentially good and so the world also is essentially good. Thus, the pastoral council was first of all to approach the world with open hearts rather than condemnation. This approach was undergirded by the hope for "widespread and fervent renewal in the life of the church." 4 A renewal that might manifest into new means of spreading the gospel to the world, it might also manifest into a deeper awareness of the church’s responsibility for the spiritual and material betterment of all human beings. What seemed to underlie his entire message was his conviction that the church needed to “turn around,” face the world, and enter into dialogue with it, realizing that dialogue meant both church and world had something to offer. Each would impact the other and so necessarily change the other. Pope John was fully aware of the first duty of the council as being faithful to the basic truths of the Christian faith and of the church’s teaching. Yet he saw this not so much as “protecting” or “hoarding” a great treasure. Rather, it meant listening to the world, to the questions and concerns that emerged from concrete human experience. It meant discerning how the gospel and church tradition might address these questions and concerns. “Pastoral,” for Pope John, was concrete, not abstract. By its very nature, pastoral points to something dynamic and constantly changing. When the church enters into dialogue with the world and


4 “Pope John’s Intention,” 225.
asks, "What are you going through?" the answer and the resulting needed action are unpredictable.

What did this mean in relation to the Second Vatican Council? It is expressed well in Pope John's opening address when he states that what is expected is a "leap forward" to communicate the faith in such a manner that it would be intelligible for the world – today. Again, its concern was pastoral and so Pope John's vision was related in a positive manner to the concrete living of men and women in the modern world.

In many ways Gaudium et Spes is significantly different from other council texts. "The text, the first and so far the only example of a new genre of texts – a constitutio pastoralis was hitherto unheard of – was a sign of the spirit of renewal which John XXIII had called aggiornamento." John XXIII embraced an historical consciousness that recognized "that contemporary human beings live in a new era which cannot be understood by means of traditional ways of thinking and understanding." New tools of analysis are required and judgment based on significantly different criteria. There is something singularly new in this approach that takes its starting point from contingent historical situations rather than permanent doctrine. This is a remarkable shift and it reflects the shift that historical consciousness requires. John XXIII's dynamic vision appears precisely in this shift. It is recognition of the developmental nature of human living and of human beings and human communities. It is recognition of the contingency upon which human existence evolves and how difficult it is to attempt to understand a concrete situation from a starting point of doctrine rather than encounter.

Hence, giving witness and voice to the faith of the whole people of God gathered together by Christ, this council can provide no more eloquent proof of its solidarity with, as well as its respect and love for the entire human family with which it is bound up,

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6 "Pope John's Intention," 226.

than by engaging with it in conversation about these various problems. The council brings to mankind light kindled from the Gospel, and puts at its disposal those saving resources which the church herself, under the guidance of the Holy Spirit, receives from her Founder. For the human person deserves to be preserved; human society deserves to be renewed. Hence the focal point of our total presentation will be man himself, whole and entire, body and soul, heart and conscience, mind and will. (Gaudium et Spes, 3)

This is the first important insight that I wish to highlight from Vatican II and it has to do with point of departure. What is clear when faced with the limiting situations described at the beginning of this paper is how impossible it is to understand the profound suffering of our fellow human beings without encountering them and asking, “What are you going through?” This concrete situation is the starting point of all ethical deliberation. It is the arena where the good is worked out, in the concrete lives of men and women in the world. This is abundantly clear in the clinical context where the fragility of human existence calls for the careful deliberation of all those involved. The profound wisdom and insight of John XXIII emerges in his recognition of this need for the Church to turn to the lives of concrete human beings who live in the world. The escalating challenges that people face in a world of advancing technology requires the light and life of the Gospel message understood and communicated in relation to the concrete situations of individuals and communities.

THE DIGNITY OF THE HUMAN PERSON

Our self-understanding as human in a technological age is becoming increasingly complex. Questions emerge that probe this self-understanding. They emerge from concrete existence and from the concrete experiences of human beings. Is my father still human when more than 70 percent of his brain cells are dead and when the parts of the brain that are damaged are the parts that account for personality and a sense of self? Is this fetus whose brain is outside of its skull human or is it an aberration that should be destroyed? Am I still human when I forget who I am, when I forget my loved ones and can
no longer recognize myself in the mirror? If embryonic stem cells will cure my daughter of a life debilitating illness have I somehow reduced my humanity to a means for an end?

In an age the pays lip service to human dignity, one wonders what constitutes the dignity of the human person. Indeed, the question of the concept of human dignity adding value to ethical deliberation in clinical and bioethics is under attack. Ruth Macklin, professor of medical ethics at the Albert Einstein College of Medicine in New York, judges dignity a “useless” concept. For Macklin, dignity “means no more than respect for persons or their autonomy.” She argues that “dignity” is used in a “mysterious” and vague manner that adds nothing that is not already captured in medical ethics’ important principle identified as “respect for persons,” meaning “the need to obtain voluntary, informed consent; the requirement to protect confidentiality; and the need to avoid discrimination and abusive practices.”

University of Alberta professor Timothy Caulfield also sees the concept of “dignity” as problematic due to the lack of clarity in its meaning. Caulfield does not think it is a useless concept but is he concerned that the lack of clarity around its use makes it “in danger of devolving into a hollow rhetorical slogan.” Caulfield asserts, “[i]f public debate is to be framed in terms of issues that relate to human dignity, the public will only become fully engaged with the key questions if the advocates of respect for human dignity are absolutely clear in declaring their meaning.”

I draw on these two authors because they represent a source of critique opening the way to a consideration of the use of human dignity in Gaudium et Spes.

The first chapter of Gaudium et Spes is entitled “The Dignity of the Human Person.” While the document places great emphasis on solidarity and interdependence, it begins its reflections by probing

11 Caulfield and Brownsword, “Human Dignity,” 75.
12 For by his innermost nature man is a social being, and unless he relates himself to
the question of human identity and human dignity, shedding light on the notion of human dignity. It is a light that is directed by faith. “For faith throws a new light on everything, manifests God’s design for man’s total vocation, and thus directs the mind to solutions which are fully human” (Gaudium et Spes, 11). The light of faith reveals the human person “in [his or her] fullest and most profound dimensions.” While it may initially appear counterintuitive, the dignity of the human person is related to an inner dynamic that calls him or her to obedience and freedom. Human beings are self-determined, still it is a self-determination that calls for a profound authenticity. This authenticity consists of acting in the world with knowledge of what one is doing. Gaudium et Spes speaks of this phenomenon as “fidelity to conscience” (16).

In the depths of his conscience, man detects a law which he does not impose upon himself, but which holds him to obedience. Always summoning him to love good and avoid evil, the voice of conscience when necessary speaks to his heart: do this, shun that. For man has in his heart a law written by God; to obey it is the very dignity of man; according to it he will be judged. Conscience is the most secret core and sanctuary of a man. There he is alone with God, Whose voice echoes in his depths. In a wonderful manner conscience reveals that law which is fulfilled by love of God and neighbor. In fidelity to conscience, Christians are joined with the rest of men in the search for truth, and for the genuine solution to the numerous problems which arise in the life of individuals from social relationships. Hence the more right conscience holds sway, the more persons and groups turn aside from blind choice and strive to be guided by the objective norms of morality. (Gaudium et Spes, 16)

Human dignity and humanness itself are intricately linked to a dynamic within the human person that accounts for and promotes authenticity or being true to oneself. This dynamic is identified as conscience and conscience is understood in three linked senses: as capacity, as process and as judgment. All human beings have the capacity to discern right courses of action. Whether or not it is used, even if it is damaged through others he can neither live nor develop his potential” (Gaudium et Spes, 12).
some form of cognitive impairment, the capacity exists. But capacity is not enough. All human action demands discernment. The process of discernment requires initially paying attention to one’s experiences. For example, Dr. Smith appears to routinely put DNR orders on patient’s charts without consulting with the patient or the family. Attentiveness prompts me to wonder about my experience, to ask questions. Is Dr. Smith really doing this? If so, why? What is the motive? Is this legal or is Dr. Smith breaking the law? Questions for understanding prompt confirmation of one’s understanding. What is the evidence that Dr. Smith is doing this? Is my insight correct? Is my understanding correct that his motive is to keep patient flow moving efficiently? Once I have confirmed a correct understanding, I have come to knowledge of facts. I am able to state with certainly that Dr. Smith is writing DNR orders on patients’ charts without proper consultation because of the shortage of hospital beds. However, human beings are not satisfied with facts alone. Facts prompt us to ask a different kind of question, a question that has to do with value and commitment. What am I going to do? What is the right thing to do? What should I do? Thus, conscience is also judgment in the sense that I must judge what I must do and I must have the courage to do it. I judge that the right thing to do is speak with Dr. Smith about what I have discovered. This will take enormous courage on my part and at one level I would like to forget the whole thing and pretend, even to myself, that nothing is wrong.

According to Christian tradition and certainly expressed in Gaudium et Spes, “The quintessence of dignity and freedom of conscience is to be found in judgement (conscience/3). I must always do what I believe to be right and avoid what I believe to be wrong.” Human dignity is not some static essence within the human person but rather a dynamic within us that propels us to know and value others, our world and ourselves. Living ethically and promoting human flourishing is always linked to persons willing to follow their conscience. We have a law inscribed in our heart and to be fully human,


fully authentic means obeying that law. This is the paradox of human existence. What appears to be the least free – obedience – results in that which promotes our greatest liberation – self-determination. I decide to follow what I have discovered is true and good. No one can do this for me.

I come back to the critiques of dignity by Macklin and Caulfield among others. It strikes me that by focusing on human rights and autonomy, as the underlying basis of human dignity there is a huge reduction of the dynamic potential of a deeper understanding of human dignity. The danger of this reduction, of getting rid of the "useless" concept of dignity, is the diminishment of our relational human nature to which dignity points. It is not human rights that underlie our dignity but rather our dignity underlies human rights. Human rights demand recognition of our relational selves that human dignity brings to the fore. Dignity emerges always in relation to others and this leads me to my last point, the issue of responsibility.

THE ETHICS OF RESPONSIBILITY

John XXIII's dynamic vision behind his calling of the Second Vatican Council is intricately related to a respect for and fostering of the dignity of the human person. The church was being called to foster reciprocal relations with all people regardless of religion, gender, or clerical status. It was being called to promote the dignity of the human person through respect for the self-determining vocation of each person. The church was to enter into a world of adults. This is expressed in Gaudium et Spes through highlighting the imperative of our responsibility, heightened by technological and scientific advances in the modern world.

The Second Vatican Council played an important role in the revival of an ethics of responsibility at a time when individual rights and autonomy were being emphasized. Its assertion that with an increase in human powers comes a broadening of responsibility (Gaudium et Spes, 34) speaks to its recognition of human capacity to create. Humans are both creatures and creators. Thus, despite the negative outcome of many forms of technology that had already been witnessed in the early 1960s, the problem was not with technology itself but with the
human heart. Along with the negative outcome of technologies, there are many positive ones and *Gaudium et Spes* identifies in particular the building of solidarity among people.

One of the salient features of the modern world is the growing interdependence of men one on the other, a development promoted chiefly by modern technical advances. Nevertheless brotherly dialogue among men does not reach its perfection on the level of technical progress, but on the deeper level of interpersonal relationships. (*Gaudium et Spes*, 23)

If the focus of chapter 1 of *Gaudium et Spes*, and its starting point, is to understand the modern world and to encounter those who are in need of its help, chapters 2 and 3 are concerned with solidarity among people and humanity's responsibility to build a world that fosters community. *Gaudium et Spes* is first and foremost about solidarity among human beings and how this is promoted.

In medical ethics, nothing is as important in decision-making as the autonomy of the patient or the patient's substitution decision maker who speaks on behalf of the patient. Indeed, autonomy is considered sacrosanct among medical ethicists and as a result among clinicians, medical teams and research ethics committees. We witness here a great respect for the rights of the individual and, in fact, of the four principles of bioethics (the other three principles are nonmaleficence, beneficence and justice) autonomy has the most moral weight. Yet, the dignity of the human person brings to the fore something deeper and more pervasive than autonomy and human rights. Jewish philosopher Emmanuel Levinas draws attention to this through the lens of the Hebrew scripture. Levinas asserts that an encounter with another begins not with the control of reason but with a call to responsibility. For Levinas, when the other approaches and makes a claim on me, an ethics of justice and of love emerges. Dignity and responsibility are interrelated, they depend on each other. The dignity of the other calls me to responsibility. My intrinsic responsibility recognizes the dignity of the other.

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15 This was the underlying message expressed in the World Council of Churches' 1989 document, "Peace and Justice for the Whole Creation."
The specific "case studies" I communicated at the beginning of this paper raise very difficult questions that require careful deliberation among all those involved. Part of that deliberation may inform a broader audience through policy recommendations or media coverage. It may be a case that is cited in academic journals by authors deliberating about similar situations. It may play a role in changing a law in a particular jurisdiction. Yet, what is important is that deliberation takes place. What is important is that questions continue to be asked and face-to-face encounters, more than principles and doctrine, continue to influence outcomes. This in no way is meant to promote ethical relativism because there is an underlying foundation to ethical deliberation that keeps all those involved on course. The underlying foundation is the dignity of the human person in his or her capacity to come to know what is true and what is good and to act on the knowledge.

This was John XXIII's profound insight and in some ways it involves a risk. The risk is one of letting go of control, a control that, in any case, ends up being an illusion. What is important is promoting the dignity of the human person by fostering ever-deepening understanding among people that their freedom lies in being true to their human dignity. This reality is intensely lived out in the clinical context of a hospital in the twenty-first century where one sees juxtaposed incredible technological advances that present us with agonizing choices. The answers we seek will come from our deliberation in the concrete situation and not from remote doctrine. Doctrine provides important information but in the end doctrine does not make decisions, human beings do. Therein lies our dignity and our responsibility.
RE COURSE TO PSYCHOLOGY
WITHIN THE VOCATIONAL JOURNEY:
VATICAN II AND POST-CONCILIAR DOCUMENTS

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"A theology mediates between religion and a cultural matrix
and the significance and role of a religion in that matrix."

( Method in Theology)

"Although the church has contributed largely to the progress
of culture, it is a fact of experience that there have been
difficulties in the way of harmonizing culture with christian
thought, arising out of contingent factors."

(Gaudium et Spes)

THE USE OF psychological testing and services has become a
commonplace in the American dioceses and houses of formation.
However, the routine and special recourse to psychology is not without
its problems and critics. On the one hand, church leaders acknowledge
their limitations in the realm of psychology and the advantages of
collaborating with professionals to provide assistance to vocational
candidates. On the other hand, those same church leaders are
aware that an ecclesial vocation and the life of faith are not simply
psychological phenomena. This fact constitutes a significant challenge
to the effective communication between formators and psychologists.¹

¹ G. J. McGlone, F. A. Ortiz, and D. J. Viglione, "Cause for Hope and Concern. A
Commentary on the Vatican statement 'Guidelines for the use of Psychology in the
While the church recognizes (1) a formal distinction between human and spiritual development and (2) that full Christian maturity includes an integration of these two areas, that differentiation and integration are borne by a division of labor and in terms of roles and institutional procedures for collaboration. Such a division of labor is, at best, an ad hoc solution that, in fact, fails to appreciate and to develop key insights in recent church documents. A more complete and authentic response to the current situation would seem to rest on the transposition of earlier achievements in the ongoing collaboration of theologians and psychologists into the context of interiority analysis and the third stage of meaning. In this paper, I hope simply to point out the current state of affairs with its recent history and to suggest a way forward.

The Second Vatican Council acknowledged the historical fact that the contemporary question, What is humanity?, is raised within the context of modern disciplines. In fact recent research and discoveries in the sciences, in history and philosophy bring up new problems which have an important bearing on life itself and demand new scrutiny by theologians. The council generally, and Gaudium et Spes specifically, seem to many to have initiated an interdisciplinary approach to anthropological questions. Luigi Rulla and colleagues argued, “Such an interdisciplinary approach makes it possible to attain a more concrete vision of the human person, both doctrinal and pastoral, and to provide the general outline of an anthropology that is more complete, more explicit, and so more realistic and more useful in pastoral terms.” They spoke of a possible and not a completed Christian anthropology. Calling attention to the notes in Gaudium et Spes regarding the division of the text, the authors observe that the first part of the

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4 Gaudium et Spes, 62.

document develops the church's anthropology and the second part gives closer attention to changeable circumstances. However, part one gives "only the general outlines of an anthropology, and further, as noted by Lambert, many points in Gaudium et Spes remain implicit and schematic, as indications and orientations toward a new Christian vision of anthropology." If Rulla and colleagues are correct, then the bishops at the council recognized that fundamental anthropological questions cannot be addressed simply theoretically and prior to engagement with modern disciplines. Rulla himself has devoted great energy to developing a Christian anthropology by employing classical and modern disciplines.

Charles A. Curran, a psychologist and expert at Vatican II, reflected that the council awakened a new Christian self-concept that incorporates into the very idea of church the concrete personal, social, and historical aspects of human nature along with the divine:

The Church is not only divine, but existential. It exists in moments of time through "the men who belong to it." Its confusions and conflicts do not touch its transcendent and supernatural divinity. They consider rather its human agency. But, being human, the Church has all the strengths as well as the weaknesses of men. So perceiving itself rightly and defining for itself human and realistic self-ideals, the Church should, like an individual person, be able with constant effort and insight to approach to this fully functioning personal state. The Church can, then, like a person, under the right psychological as well as religious conditions, grow more mature, responsible, and committed to the age and circumstances in which it lives.

Curran believed that this this new Christian self-concept would also be the source of human and spiritual growth in the church. The invitation and challenge of the council is to "a new Christian relationship characterized by penetrating understanding, mutual respect and acceptance, and growing self-regard and regard for others. Such qualities in an individual relationship or in a group epitomize the best

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elements we know for furthering psychological and spiritual growth and development." If Curran is correct, then in addition to ideas in anthropology, essential concepts related to ecclesiology also cannot simply be sorted without engaging human disciplines.

My focus in this paper is to identify the challenge and invitation of the council with respect to the discipline of psychology as these have been carried out in the post-conciliar period. I will argue that the significance of the church’s recourse to psychology lies in a new attention to existential realities, in a more explicit recognition of methodological concerns, and in an exigence for a shift from the second to third stage of meaning. These issues arise within a horizon of concern oriented on formation and the promotion and integration of full human and religious development in all people.

NEOSCHOLASTICISM AND THE HUMAN SCIENCES

In some sense, it would be fair to say that the church has had an interest in an interdisciplinary approach to modern anthropology at least since 1882. Much of the program for the renewal of scholasticism included engagement with modern sciences (as I will point out in the examples of neoscholastics like Cardinal Mecier at Louvain). The period from the birth of modern psychology up to the Second Vatican Council was marked by notable efforts to preserve traditional doctrines while finding a way to integrate valuable achievements of modern science and history.8


9 The struggles are well-known and were, indeed, painful. Advances in what we may still, perhaps, call the Catholic intellectual tradition met with a diversity of responses from the Catholic hierarchy. C. Kevin Gillespie contrasts the markedly authoritarian reactions of Pope Pius X to threats of modernism with the more “dialogical openness” of the church to conversation with non-Catholics and with scientists in many areas under Pope Leo XIII. He recalls a comment by Josiah Royce in 1903: But will Catholic officialism . . . permit the new Catholic scholarship liberty to develop on these lines? Will not the new pope . . . undertake to bring to a pause the evolution of these tendencies toward a reform of Catholic philosophy, and towards an era of good feeling between Catholic and non-Catholic science and scholarship? I confess to a good deal of doubt upon this subject. I confess also that I am rather disposed to anticipate a reaction against all this natural, but, as I fancy, unexpected growth that has taken place in the world of Catholic scholarship within the last two decades. (C. Kevin Gillespie, Psychology and American Catholicism: From Confession to Therapy? [New York: Crossroad, 2001] 30).
In a survey of the history of psychology and Catholicism up to Vatican II, Robert Kugelmann observes that official church interest in modern psychology may be dated from 1882 when Pope Leo XII sent Monsignor (later Cardinal) Mercier to Louvain to establish a program to work on a Thomistic synthesis with modern natural sciences. Mercier spent part of that year in Paris studying with the French neurologist Charcot who was already famous for his work on hysteria and hypnosis. Mercier's own work included the publication of *The Relation of Experimental Psychology to Philosophy and Origins of Contemporary Psychology*. Mercier attempted to lay a metaphysical foundation for the integration of experimental psychology and traditional philosophic psychology with a view of the human being as an integral unity of body and mind.

The growth of experimental psychology and psychiatry met with a diversity of responses. Critics feared that the methodologies of experimental psychology and Freudian doctrines presented a reductionist view of the human person. To many observers modern psychology appeared to be a "psychology without a soul" that ran contrary to classical anthropology and Catholic teaching. However, many Catholic psychologists like Mercier and Edward Pace affirmed the positive relationship between philosophy and psychology. Others, like Rudolf Aller, while highly critical of Freud's mistakes, praised the Individual Psychology of Alfred Adler. In "The Psychology of Character (1932), Allers used Adler's theory to develop a Thomistic approach to character development." After several highly publicized attacks on psychoanalysis by notable religious leaders, including Fulton Sheen in New York and Pericle Felici in Rome, Pope Pius XII responded with two statements on the value and limitations of psychoanalysis and psychotherapy to the First International Congress on the Histopathology of the Nervous System (1952) and to the Fifth

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In some sense, perhaps, the relationship between Catholicism and modern psychology was just one instance of this general development.


International Congress on Psychotherapy and Clinical Psychology (1953). The Pope warned against theoretical errors, like atheism, materialism, and determinism, as well as practical abuses, in effect the use of techniques that amount to material sin by unleashing the sexual instinct. However, he affirmed the capacity of psychoanalysis and psychotherapy to contribute positively to knowledge of the soul and religious dispositions.

The Pope also reaffirmed a Neoscholastic metaphysical framework for the integration of psychoanalysis, scientific psychology, and philosophy and theology. He affirmed the role of psychotherapy in human life, provided that the legitimate attention to the individual, concrete human person does not blind psychologists to the individual who is subject to "the metaphysical and ontological laws of human nature." He reaffirmed the metaphysical principle that the soul is the form of the human person assigning to theoretical and practical psychology the domain of what is consequent to that form and the accidental. He spoke of a distinction between the metaphysical and the personal, the essential and the existential:

The study of the constitution of real man, ought, in fact, to take as object "existential" man, such as he is, such as his natural dispositions, the influences of his milieu, education, his personal development, his intimate experiences and external events have made him. It is only man in the concrete that exists. And yet, the structure of this personal ego obeys in the smallest detail the ontological and metaphysical laws of human nature. . . . They have formed it and thus should govern and judge it. The reason behind this is that "existential" man identifies himself in his intimate structure with "essential" man.

The Pope's address operates in the realm of theory and the second stage of meaning. The limitations of this metaphysical approach would
become evident within the next decade as many Catholic psychologists embraced phenomenology as their fundamental framework. Mercier’s own vision of the integration of mind and body was comprehensive; however, he sought his synthesis with an ideal of knowledge guided by a metaphysical study of the soul (which Lonergan later distinguished from the self-affirmation of the subject) and of abstraction informed by Wundt. Mercier thus affirmed the same methodology – the application of the principle of sufficient reason to data of consciousness and of sense – and approached consciousness as a series of impressions linked by laws of association. Consequently, Mercier’s synthesis was held by more phenomenologically minded psychologists, like Stephen Strasser and William L. Kelly, to be forgetful of the distinction between natural and human science. Also, if there is the hint in the Pope’s address of a recognition of the existential gap between what one is and what one thinks of oneself, it is overshadowed by the expectation of classical laws. In Kugelmann’s recounting, this radical critique of Neoscholastic psychology, as much as anything else, contributed to the end of the Neoscholastic revival at the time of Vatican II. It is this and the fact that the address operates in the theoretical realm to which I want to call attention.

RE COURSE TO PSYCHOLOGY WITHIN THE VOCATIONAL JOURNEY

Pope Pius XII’s positive, if critical, response to developments in psychology was re-affirmed by the Vatican Council in Gaudium et Spes as part of the general principle of rightful autonomy of the human disciplines. It was also implicitly affirmed in the Decree on the Training of Priests which advocated the use of suitable insights from psychology and sociology in fostering vocations and for an examination of the psychological health of seminarians. Subsequently, church documents have reflected both confidence and caution regarding possible contributions to Christian life from the human sciences.

In Gaudium et Spes the council invited church officials and

17 See Kuggleman, Catholicism and Psychology.
LaChance

theologians to cooperate with human scientists to bring the fruits of the theological and human disciplines to bear on the process of Christian maturity: "In pastoral care sufficient use should be made, not only of theological principles, but also of the findings of secular sciences, especially psychology and sociology; in this way the faithful will be brought to a purer and more mature living of the faith."\(^{18}\) The pastoral focus of the council, the document, and this specific passage are important. Where the question of psychology has arisen since council, it is always within the context of sociocultural meanings and practical matters related to formation. For this reason, the common approach has been to make a pragmatic distinction between formators and secular collaborators. The church has paid special attention to the formation of priestly candidates, and I will focus my attention on the admission and formation of seminarians. However, in keeping with the theme announced in \textit{Gaudium et Spes}, the church has also adverted to psychological aids to human development and the interrelationship between human and spiritual or Christian development in the lives of all Christians.\(^{19}\) The orientation on the existential is evident in the attention to the individual seminarian and to social and historical factors that shape vocational discernment and formation. Methodological issues arise in the diverse ways in which the church admits of recourse to psychology and in the execution of collaboration. Together these realities constitute an exigence for interiority.

Psychology and psychotherapy are accepted by the church as possessing unique expertise in the area of psychopathology and in promoting normal human development. The church makes use of both of these areas of expertise, but bishops have shown great caution where psychological knowledge shares common concern with religious knowledge and traditions. In such cases psychology is seen as a threat

\(^{18}\) \textit{Gaudium et Spes}, no. 62.

\(^{19}\) One brief example of the broader concern may be seen in attention paid to the human and professional development of lay persons in Catholic schools to the experience of faith. The Congregation for Catholic Educations' document, "Lay Catholics in Schools: Witnesses to Faith" (1985), distinguishes between the professional and religious formation and calls educators to "a mature spiritual personality, expressed in a profound Christian life" (para. 60). The congregation was clear that a multifaceted formation is necessary in order that educators might effect in themselves a "personal synthesis of faith and culture" and help students engage in a dialogue between the two in order to arrive at a personal synthesis of their own (para. 64).
to a genuine appreciation for and dependence on grace. In order to keep this in mind, church leaders speak of an ordinary and extraordinary use of psychology. In extraordinary cases of clinical concern (e.g., psychopathology or relational issues), psychology possesses unique competence, and formators are well-advised to appeal to experts in the psychological sciences for help. In the ordinary case of promoting general human development, formators themselves are directed to obtain the necessary competences. Again, a distinction is made between the use of psychological services during the periods of discernment and of formation.

Recourse to Psychology in the Time of Discernment

The Congregation for Catholic Education’s 2008 “Guidelines for the Use of Psychology in the Admission and Formation of Candidates for the Priesthood” (hereafter Guidelines) stress that ability to discern a true vocation is a religious matter.20 A vocation is a gift and its discernment and development lie beyond the domain of psychology. Vocations derive from and exist within an ecclesiastical context. However, vocations are to be undertaken freely, psychology may help to discern the candidates effective freedom: “Inasmuch as it is the fruit of a particular gift of God, the vocation to the priesthood and its discernment lie outside the strict competence of psychology. Nevertheless, in some cases, recourse to experts in the psychological sciences can be useful. It can allow a more sure evaluation of the candidate’s psychic state; it can help evaluate his human disposition for responding to the call.”21 Consequently, it appears that the concern to restrict psychological assessment to certain cases is an effort to avoid conflating the human and the spiritual aspects of discernment.22


21 Guidelines, no. 5.

22 If the church is jealous of her role in discerning the work of the Word and Spirit in the world through the gift of vocations, it may be in part due to the extensive use of psychological testing and of research into the relationship between personality characteristics and job satisfaction among the clergy and religious. A great deal of this work is being undertaken by collaborators who express an awareness of the unique religious nature of vocations. Such research includes the identification of personality profiles

In practice many dioceses and houses of formation make regular use of psychological assessment in the admissions process. A 2010 report by the Center for Applied Research in the Apostolate indicates that psychological assessment is included in the admissions process by almost all of the dioceses and religious institutes surveyed. This practice may be at odds with the Guidelines for the Use of Psychology, which indicates that formal psychological assessment should be the exception. Those who are responsible for the decision to admit a candidate are expected to have adequate psychological training in order “to be able to accurately comprehend his personality; potentialities; dispositions; and the types of any psychological wounds, evaluating their nature and intensity.” If the formator determines that there may be psychological disturbances, then psychological assessment may be necessary to determine whether therapy should be carried out before admission to the seminary. Center for Applied Research in the Apostolate, Psychological Assessment the Testing and Screening of Candidates for Admission to the Priesthood in the U.S. Catholic Church (Arlington, VA: National Catholic Education Association, 2010) no. 8.

The concern of some is that psychological testing is employed more regularly than the Congregation for Catholic Education warrants and for the wrong reasons. Benedict Groeschel has extensive experience in psychological assessment. He affirms the wisdom of a very cautious use of assessment to identify individuals who evidence psychological difficulties that are obviously unfit for a particular vocation: “Psychological testing and evaluation could determine fairly accurately who should not try to follow such a vocation—for instance, those suffering from chronic mental illness or psychosis should not. Others who are not actually mentally ill but struggle with a wide variety of serious symptoms, ranging from severe obsessive-compulsive traits to active psychosexual dysfunctions of many kinds, should not attempt a religious vocation. Psychological tests that evaluate the person from a variety of different perspectives will indicate serious problem areas as a rule” (Benedict Groeschel, “Our Priesthood on the Couch,” CatholicCulture.org. http://www.catholicculture.org/culture/library/view.cfm?recnum=1441). However, psychological assessment instruments are not designed to determine positively who possess the required qualities of any particular vocation and are open to significant abuse. Echoing this concern, William Van Ornum argues that psychological testing is an adjunct and not an essential part of a vocation director’s decision-making process, and it
contributions of psychology to priestly vocations regards the screening and assessment of applicants to seminaries and houses of formation. Professional psychological assessment involves more than just the administration of tests, which are valuable tools but are no substitute for the clinical interview. And, while some form of psychological testing for applicants has been common since the 1950s, it was also clear that psychological assessment could aid but not replace religious discernment. Psychological assessment is seen as necessary whenever there is a suspicion of psychopathology. On this point the Guidelines are clear: “the help of experts in the psychological sciences can be necessary principally on the specifically diagnostic level, whenever there is a suspicion that psychic disturbances may be present” (No. 8. Further, psychological issues may not emerge until later in the formation process or years after formation. At such times recourse to psychological professionals for assessment and intervention is a responsible step.

A vocation is an ecclesiastical reality in that it is constituted in and constitutive of the church. But it is also constituted by sociocultural conditions. Vocations emerge within a particular context. “Every vocation is born in a precise place, in a concrete and limited context, but it does not turn in on itself, it does not tend towards private perfection or the psychological or spiritual self-realization of the one called, rather it flowers in the Church, in that Church that journeys through the world towards the Kingdom, towards the realization of a history that is great because it is the history of salvation.” For this reason the church has attended carefully to the social and cultural context of vocations – to the positive and negative social influences, and notably to the hidden benefits within what appears to be a negative situation,

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24 Guidelines, no. 8.  
in order to highlight the fact that an individual's vocation is a divine gift within the dialectic of history. Also, for this reason, the recourse to psychotherapy and spiritual direction within the vocational journey is an engagement in dialectics and foundations. It enlivens within one's life and the life of one's community the divine meanings that heal and elevate human life and it names and appropriates these through autobiography.

Vocations are constitutive of the church and of God's work in the world. Each vocations comes as a divine participation in the social process and relates to the constitutive meaning that constitutes the people of God. The gift of a vocation, coming from the heart of God, is a gift for the community and constitutes the entry of the Word and Spirit into social process. The vocation exists neither prior to nor posterior to the church itself. It is part of God's "constitutive plan for the Church." The Congress on Vocations to the Priesthood and to Consecrated Life (1997) explained that: "The particular Church discovers her own existential and earthly dimension in the vocation of all of her members to communion, to witness, to mission, to the service of God and the brothers and sisters."26 The Congress went on to affirm that "every vocation reveals the profound dynamic of the Trinitarian communion, the action of the Father, Son and Holy Spirit, as the event that makes those called be in Christ as new creatures modeled on Him."27

While acknowledging and wanting to preserve the divine character of vocations, the church also recognizes that an authentic vocation requires a full human response. Optatam totius includes the instruction that every candidate's "spiritual, moral and intellectual stability should be examined, as should his physical and psychological health."28 The Congress on Vocations to the Priesthood and to Consecrated Life conceived vocation as an individualized journey undertaken in freedom

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27 "New Vocations," no. 25d.
28 "New Vocations," 19c.
Recourse to Psychology within the Vocational Journey

and grace: "The pedagogical vocational itinerary is a journey towards *maturity in the faith*, like a pilgrimage towards the *adult state* of a believing being, called to decide about himself and his life *in freedom and responsibility*, according to the truth of the *mysterious project willed by God* for him." They explained that:

> Just as holiness is for all the baptised in Christ, so there exists a specific vocation for every living person; and just as the first is rooted in Baptism, so is the second connected to the simple fact of existing. The vocation is the providential thought of the Creator for each creature, it is his idea-plan, like a dream found in God’s heart, because the creature is found in his heart. God the Father wants this to be different and specific for each living person. Every creature expresses and is called to express a particular aspect of the thought of God. There he finds his name and his identity; he affirms and ensures his freedom and originality.

Each individual’s life is marked by a quest for meaning that is constitutive of the person. Reminiscent of Lonergan’s own appreciation of Ira Progoff, the congress also specified a genetic-historical method for discerning the divine project, according to which the subject “searches out and finds in one’s own biography the steps and traces of God’s passage, and therefore also His voice that calls.” It called for an educative process in “reading a life” that is “a highly spiritual operation, not only psychological, because it leads us to recognize in it the illuminating and mysterious presence of God and His Word.” The qualifier “not only psychological” does not disqualify the psychological but acknowledges that the reading itself is a dialogue between the subjectively lived life of the individual and the life of the church. Here it seems the members of the congress were reaching for a framework to distinguish and integrate the human and divine aspects of vocations. That effort brings them to phenomenology, biography, and dialectic, and finally to the threshold of interiority analysis.

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30 “New Vocations,” 34a (italics in the original.)
32 “New Vocations,” 35c.
33 “New Vocations,” 35c.
Recourse to Psychology in the Period of Formation

In the course of formation, the church’s statements regarding the ordinary use of psychology cover instances in which grace and nature work together to effect full human maturity. Human growth as promoted by psychological sciences is understood by the church to be distinguished from such growth promoted by the healing and elevating power of grace. Church documents have looked upon human development in virtue as marked by struggles and difficulties for which adequate support may be given by grace within the church and as part of one’s own life of prayer and sacrifice. The Congregation for Catholic Education’s 1974 document, “A Guide to Formation in Priestly Celibacy” distinguishes spiritual from human development asserting that under the influence of grace there emerges what must be called a particularly Christian form of development and maturity that is not separated from human maturity but which gives it a unique orientation. The document emphasizes the healing power of grace and redemption in human life and growth. Christian life promotes positive self-acceptance, which is “an essential prerequisite for the personal maturing process at all levels” of human development. Pope John Paul II, in Pastores dabo vobis, highlighted the role of grace in promoting both human and spiritual development, and the Guidelines affirm that:

Even formation for the priesthood must face up to the manifold symptoms of the imbalance rooted in the heart of man, which is symptomatized, in a particular way, in the contradictions between the ideal of self-giving love to which the candidate consciously aspires, and the life he actually leads. Formation must also deal with the difficulties inherent in the gradual development of the moral virtues. The help of the spiritual director and confessor is fundamental and absolutely necessary for overcoming these difficulties with the grace of God. In some cases, however, the development of these moral qualities can

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34 Curran draws upon H.S. Sullivan’s “consensual validation” by which individuals gain a sense of self-worth through loving interpersonal relations to explain that “A climate that produces a respectful and insightful self-love, then, is a basic prerequisite to the achievement of Christian human belonging... Only in such a climate can Christian love really come to final fruition and maturity” (“Vatican II,” 101-102).
Ordinarily, individuals negotiate the difficult path to virtue and human maturity through the practices of Christian life, confession, and spiritual direction. However, church officials also acknowledge that Christian life does not "destroy neurotic inclinations acquired in childhood or deriving from a mistaken or incomplete type of religious upbringing."36 The unique admission here is that psychological difficulties may have their root in inauthentic religious upbringing and that for some people religion may be part of the problem. As far as I know, subsequent documents have not addressed this issue or commented on how psychotherapy could aid in the discovery of a more authentic form of religiosity. The overwhelming tendency is to keep interventions in the human and spiritual domains separate.

Pope John Paul II reiterated that psychological intervention is uniquely qualified to meet specific and deep problems in human development. In these special cases recourse to professional psychological assistance is warranted. But the specific type of psychological assistance is circumscribed. When concerns about a candidate's psychological state emerge, psychologists "can provide extra assistance for the candidate's human growth. These experts can offer formators an opinion regarding the diagnosis of - and, perhaps, therapy for - psychic disturbances. Moreover, by suggesting ways for favoring a vocational response that is more free, they can help support the development of the human (especially relational) qualities, which are required for the exercise of the ministry."37 That is, formators may turn to external experts for help when candidates face unique psychic problems. However, formators should principally expect from experts advice on shaping a path of formation tailored to remediate the individual's difficulties or deficiencies. Therapy may be warranted, but it is not the principal reason for turning to the experts.

The United States Conference of Bishops has spelled this out more clearly by distinguishing between brief psychological assistance

37 John Paul II, Pastores dobo vobis, no. 5.
appropriate to the period of formation and extensive psychotherapy that should be completed before entering formation:

On occasion, consultation with a psychologist or other licensed mental health professional can be a useful instrument of human formation. Some patterns of behavior, for example, which became set in the candidate's early family history, may impede his relational abilities. Understanding one's psychological history and developing strategies to address elements of negative impact can be very helpful in human formation. This kind of counseling or consultation ought to be distinguished from extensive psychotherapy, which may be needed to address deeply entrenched personal issues that impede full functioning of the person. If such extensive and in-depth therapy is necessary, it ought to take place outside of the seminary context prior to the decision concerning admission; or, if the necessity for such therapy emerges after admission, then the student ought to withdraw from the program and pursue the therapy before being considered for re-admission to the seminary and resuming his advancement to orders.  

Psychotherapeutic intervention during formation is to be exceptional, but the goals of human formation are also the goals of therapy. The church has acknowledged the rich resources available from psychological sciences. Formators themselves are expected to acquire a sophisticated level of psychological knowledge in order to assist seminarians in reaching a mature level of human and spiritual development needed to fulfill their ministry. In the decree on priestly formation, Optatam totius, the council wrote that "A well planned formation program should therefore develop in the students a proper degree of human maturity, showing itself in a certain stability of character in the ability to make carefully considered decisions, and in a sound judgment of events and people." Similarly, Pope John Paul II outlined four areas of formation: human, spiritual, intellectual, and pastoral. The Pope affirmed that human development and spiritual or

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39 Optatam totius, no. 11.
Christian development are interrelated; that the personal task of each individual is to effect an integration of both kinds of development; and that human formation is the foundation for each of the others. The Pope also noted that seminarians must achieve a certain psychological and sexual maturity and that the “spiritual director should help the seminarian so that he himself reaches a mature and free decision, which is built on esteem for priestly friendship and self-discipline, as well as on the acceptance of solitude and on a physically and psychologically sound personal state.”

The Vatican Guidelines affirmed that “The priestly ministry, understood and lived as a conformation to Christ, Bridegroom and Good Shepherd, requires certain abilities as well as moral and theological virtues, which are supported by a human and psychic – and particularly affective – equilibrium, so as to allow the subject to be adequately predisposed for giving of himself in the celibate life, in a way that is truly free in his relations with the faithful.” The congregation then detailed what is expected of mature candidates. The document stresses affective maturity and calls attention to

the positive and stable sense of one’s masculine identity, and the capacity to form relations in a mature way with individuals and groups of people, a solid sense of belonging, which is the basis of future communion with the presbyterium and of a responsible collaboration in the ministry of the bishop; the freedom to be enthused by great ideals and a coherence in realizing them in everyday action; the courage to take decisions and to stay faithful to them; a knowledge of oneself, of one’s talents and limitations, so as to integrate them within a self-esteem before God; the capacity to correct oneself; the appreciation for beauty in the sense of “splendour of the truth” as well as the art of recognizing it; the trust that is born from an esteem of the other person and that leads to acceptance; the capacity of the

40 Pastores dabo vobis, no. 50.
41 Pastores dabo vobis, no. 66.
42 Guidelines, no. 2
candidate to integrate his sexuality in accordance with the Christian vision, including in consideration of the obligation of celibacy. The church expects that a priest will “seek to reflect in himself, as far as possible, the human perfection which shines forth in the incarnate Son of God.” To reach this goal the council emphasized the need for “suitable educators,” “prepared by sound teaching, appropriate, pastoral experience, and spiritual and pedagogical training.” The Congregation for Catholic Education subsequently explained that those responsible for the education and formation of seminarians and the religious should not rely on their own common sense but must possess “a good knowledge of the human sciences . . . in order to go beyond appearances and the superficial level of motivations and behavior, and to help the candidate to know himself in depth, to accept himself with serenity and to correct himself, and to mature, starting from the real, not illusory, roots and from the ‘heart’ of his person.” The Guidelines also acknowledges that a sound program of formation must be differentiated according to each individual’s needs and advises formators to establish professional relationships with experts in psychology in order to “compare notes and obtain clarification on some specific issues.”

This constitutes the ordinary use of psychology. Formators are given a responsibility that appears all the more onerous when we consider the complexity of modern society and the diversity of seminary students. Rectors and teachers find themselves responsible for individuals with a wide variety of educational histories and abilities, personal histories, and sociocultural backgrounds. They are also called upon to face questions of policy and long-range planning that orients formation programs not simply on the formation goals of the seminarians but on the needs of the church and in response to the Holy Spirit. To meet each of these challenges formators require a theoretical

43 Guidelines, no. 2
44 John Paul II, Pastores, no. 43.
45 John Paul II, Pastores, no. 5.
47 Guidelines, no. 4.
knowledge of human development and interpersonal relations beyond their own common sense.

**Psychology and Spiritual Direction**

The importance of psychology is also seen in how Pope John Paul II speaks about spiritual direction. He quoted Pope Paul VI's words about spiritual direction as involving an "immensely valuable psychological means ... and psychological art." Spiritual directors, as all other formators, are assigned the task of overseeing the full human development of seminarians and of helping them to effect an integration of human and spiritual maturity. It would seem that those who undertake this role would be well served to possess a dual competence in spiritual formation and psychotherapy.

An important aspect of spiritual direction is attention to the dialectical development of religious faith. Along these lines the Pope made a distinction between religious experience and Christian formation. He noted, as a positive factor constituting the context for priestly formation, that the “thirst for God and for an active meaningful relationship with him is so strong today that, where there is a lack of a genuine and full proclamation of the Gospel of Christ, there is a rising spread of forms of religiosity without God and the proliferation of many sects.” This emergence of religiosity, in the Pope’s estimation, is partly born by the collapse of specific ideologies and the emergence of new social ideals. The contemporary appropriation of secular disciplines, then, is a matter of adjusting the practice of formation to life in grace understood explicitly as experience of God that is not yet knowledge of God. That movement from experience to knowledge and the development of a Christian personality is conditioned by psychological and sociocultural factors.

The Pope acknowledged that social patterns promote forms of psychological life that subsequently impact religious development:

This is particularly reflected in that “outlook on human sexuality” according to which sexuality’s dignity in service to communion and to the reciprocal donation between persons.

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48 *Pastores dobo vobis*, no 81.
49 *Pastores dabo vobis*, no. 6.
becomes degraded and thereby reduced to nothing more than a consumer good. In this case, many young people undergo an affective experience which, instead of contributing to an harmonious and joyous growth in personality which opens them outwards in an act of self-giving, becomes a serious psychological and ethical process of turning inward towards self, a situation which cannot fail to have grave consequences on them in the future.

In the case of some young people a “distorted sense of freedom” lies at the root of these tendencies. Instead of being understood as obedience to objective and universal truth, freedom is lived out as a blind acquiescence to instinctive forces and to an individual’s will to power. Therefore, on the level of thought and behaviour, it is almost natural to find an erosion of internal consent to ethical principles. On the religious level, such a situation, if it does not always lead to an explicit refusal of God, causes widespread indifference and results in a life which, even in its more significant moments and more decisive choices, is lived as if God did not exist. In this context it is difficult not only to respond fully to a vocation to the priesthood but even to understand its very meaning as a special witness to the primacy of “being” over “having,” and as a recognition that the significance of life consists in a free and responsible giving of oneself to others, a willingness to place oneself entirely at the service of the Gospel and the Kingdom of God as a priest.\textsuperscript{50}

The profound recognition of the complex interplay of social forces, psychological development, the experience of faith, and knowledge of God, is coupled with a call for a dialectical approach to the reading of the signs of the times. The Pope emphasized the need not just to collect and correlate data but to engage in interpretation and dialectic. The Pope’s words signal the relationship of the social dialectic to the personal dialectic and the psychological patterns and operations that mediate the appropriation of inauthentic as well as authentic elements of one’s society and culture.\textsuperscript{51}

\textsuperscript{50} Pastores dabo vobis, no. 8.

\textsuperscript{51} This collaboration with social scientists with an orientation to supporting the church’s pastoral work underlies the establishment of the Pontifical Academy for Social
The inclusion and deepening of spiritual direction in support of human and religious formation, then, is a matter of scholarship, phenomenological investigation, and psychospiritual intervention. The most significant demand, however, is for the development of an understanding of grace from the point of view of interiority that can assist spiritual directors in the promotion of authentic human and spiritual development. Needless to say, this will not be effected by an institutionalized division of labor. The most significant control over the recourse to psychological and spiritual interventions could be gained by differentiating the forms and patterns of human and spiritual development. Lonergan provides a signpost here: “the fundamental thing in the spiritual life is God’s grace and until you get an adequate account of that, which is entirely concerned with motives, talk about motives is mistaken. You don’t know what the fundamental motivations in you are; just as people prior to Freud, and the depth-psychologists, didn’t know a lot about their motivations.” There are, of course, motives in the spiritual life, however. “When you learn about divine grace you stop worrying about your motives; somebody else is running the ship. You don’t look for reasons why you are doing thus and so.”

Still, psychology is not simply a science of motives, and many other aspects of concrete human living will have to be understood in relation to the fundamental movement of divine grace.

Psychology and Celibacy

Church officials have also been keen to keep psychological and spiritual issues separate in discussions of priestly celibacy. Those who question the wisdom of required celibacy for the priesthood argue from

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Sciences in 1994. “A major part of the Academy’s mission is to offer the Church elements that may be useful in the development of her social though t . . . and to look critically at each of the social sciences from the perspective of Catholic social thought and to try to discern the extent to which they are consistent with Christian anthropology” Edmond Malinvaud and Mary Ann Glendon, *Conceptualization of the Person in Social Sciences* (Vatican City: Pontifical Academy of the Social Sciences, 2006), xxiii. The Academy’s 2005 collection of essays is unique in that it addresses issues related to psychology rather than exclusively to social sciences.

human sciences as well as historical studies of church practice and the existence of married priests today. Pope John Paul II responded that “To give decisive weight to solutions based on criteria deriving more from certain currents of anthropology, sociology or psychology than from the Church’s living tradition is certainly not the path to follow. We cannot overlook the fact that the Church comes to know the divine will through the interior guidance of the Spirit (cf. John 16:13), and that the difficulties involved today in keeping celibacy are not sufficient reason to overturn the Church’s conviction regarding its value and appropriateness, a conviction constantly reaffirmed by the Church’s Magisterium, not least by the Second Vatican Council (cf. Presbyterorum ordinis, no. 16).”

Giuseppe Versaldi has argued that the principal cause of distress over priestly celibacy in the post-conciliar period is due to a psychological fragility within the individual that has nothing to do with the spiritual and traditional wisdom of celibacy. His argument appeals to issues of methodology, in particular the canon of selection: “There must be agreement or at least compatibility between the object of research and the anthropological premise implicit in the work instrument.” His criticism of those studies that find fault with the church practice of celibacy is that they lack the conceptual framework of a Christian anthropology. He quotes from Luigi Rulla in support of his critic:

...an anthropology of Christian vocation cannot borrow from other anthropologies without making an appropriately critical analysis of their basic presuppositions and of the dialectical differences of horizon that may exist between their views of the human person.

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55 Versaldi, “Priestly Celibacy,” 147.
In particular a Christian anthropology must privilege the ecclesial teaching and practice as the witness to the will of the Holy Spirit. I have to wonder whether Versaldi’s argument and his use of Rulla do not imply that the adequate conceptual framework already exists. Is there not a need for a *Summa Psychologicca* and the development of the explanatory categories of depth psychology?

**CONCLUSION**

The church’s concern and commitment to support seminarians in all areas of development constitutes an orientation on the existential that has brought to the fore the need for a vision of the human person not rooted solely in the religiously differentiated common sense of a community but in an integration of these with the best available theoretical knowledge from the human sciences, including psychology. The challenge of this post-conciliar work is not simply its interdisciplinary character but the exigence for methodological control. In the period following the council, questions about the discipline of psychology arise in a much more historical, pastoral, vocational, and, therefore, existential context. In order to effect this transition, church officials and psychologists find that they have to deal with both theoretical study of the human person, on the one hand, and scholarly and phenomenological exploration of individuals’ lives on the other. This situation constitutes an exigence for methodological control and for the transition into interiority and the third stage of meaning.

That exigence was the occasion for Lonergan’s essay “Moral Theology and the Human Sciences.” It is wise in closing to keep that essay in mind. Psychology is a young discipline whose “representatives are divided ideologically.” There exists today, among many psychologists, a new openness to religion and a recognition that

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human beings cannot be investigated simply as objects occurring within the domain studied by the natural sciences. But these exist alongside a notable philosophic pluralism. In some quarters a willingness to integrate spirituality into psychology may be less the product of an internal critique of psychology, and hence represent an advance within the discipline, and more a response to the sociocultural mood of the moment. Psychologists today frequently speak now about a "biopsychosocial-spiritual" model of the human person. Not infrequently, the spiritual dimension is apprehended as a form of culture. Often, it is also claimed that religion and psychology are, as it were, "two sides to the same coin." Consequently, attention paid to vaguely defined spiritual concerns within psychology may be reductionistic. At other times one gets the sense that something new is emerging, perhaps in response to collaboration. It has been observed that the Guidelines assign a new task to psychology:

investigating in a more profound way whether and to what degree the candidate has attained the special interpersonal skills and sensitivity necessary to be a priest. Does the candidate have the capacity to "love chastely, to form relationships

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60 Plante opined, that the recent enthusiasm among many psychologists may be "due to the increased interest among the general population and psychotherapy clients in spirituality and health integration as well as the increasing media attention to this topic" (Plante, "Integrating Spirituality" 892). Similarly, Frame observes that the increase interested in spirituality reflects a shift toward postmodern thinking: "The postmodern movement has been a bridge over the chasm between science and religion and has opened up new possibilities for integrating a wholistic approach to psychotherapy. That philosophical trend, coupled with a renewed interest in religion (Richards and Bergin, 1997), makes the time ripe for committing ourselves to using religion and spirituality in mental health practice" (Frame, *Integrating Religion*, 17).
appropriately, a sense of freedom; does the person possess a sense of belonging and collaboration?"  

Perhaps the most significant challenge to psychologists in the church’s invitation to collaboration is the need for an anthropology rooted in ecclesiology. The biopsychosocial-spiritual model would then be open to religions transcendence and grace in a way that does not reduce them to something else.  

The new Christian self-concept awakened at Vatican II and carried forward in the documents looked at here is neither simply theoretical nor religious, but fully existential. The time is ripe for theologians and psychologists to articulate such a viewpoint within the horizon of the church’s concern for vocations and to assist the church in the transition to the third stage of meaning. There are a great many practical and theoretical details to be worked out, but I for one find the direction of the post-conciliar church exciting.

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SELF-APPROPRIATION IN THE WORLD OF MEANING: WORK IN PROGRESS

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On 14 November 1963, at the request of the Canadian Bishops he and Rod McKenzie were appointed periti at the Council. He was rather proud that he was "the only dogma prof at the Gregorian with the distinction even though the decision came in time to extinguish the candles for the 2nd session."

I myself was greatly inspired by the surprising emergent creativity of Vatican II, especially its efforts to engage with the modern world. So I found myself moved in preparing this paper to read in detail some of Lonergan's significant writings during the council period. These included "Openness and Religious Experience," "Existenz and Aggiornamento," and "Dimensions of Meaning;" each a synopsis of books that desperately need to be written. What has struck me about them was that Lonergan was in his own way in them going through his own Aggiornamento of his own thought processes. A great creative transformation was going on in him between about 1961 and 1965 when he had the insight into the functional specialties. He was not uninfluenced or unmoved by the presences and debates and atmosphere that surrounded him in Rome at the time. The present paper is an attempt to point out a few of the new creative expansions that were emerging in his thinking on the question of the self and self-appropriation.

1 Archives, Letter no. 68, from Bernard Lonergan to Frederick Crowe, Nov. 21, 1963. The text is from a personal draft in my files.
SOME DIMENSIONS OF THE PROBLEM OF THE SELF

In dictionaries typically the meaning of the word self is defined as “a person’s essential being that distinguishes them from others, especially considered as the object of introspection or reflexive action,” and “as the qualities that make a particular person unique.” It is said that as a youth the poet Gerard Manley Hopkins was fascinated by the question: What would it be like to be someone else? Soon finding himself in a dead end he gave up. The meaning of the word self is surrounded by a complex of terms including concrete, conscious, elusive, mythical, mysterious, dangerous, spirit-like, mystical. Related are a series of methodologies: introspective, analytical, phenomenological, existential, dialogical, and hermeneutical. The day you think you have it pinned down is the day you have lost your way.

Galen Strawson wonders what holds selves together. He distinguishes between the enduring or narrative and impermanent or episodic or non-narrative accounts of the self. He takes himself, that is to say his own self-consciousness, to be impermanent or episodic and he is strongly anti-narrative. He then devotes an enormous amount of his book to the topic of the phenomenological foundations of a metaphysics of what, for him, remains of the self. There is a great need for such a phenomenology, but his would not be mine.

In her essay “Modern Fiction” Virginia Woolf felt that in their novels, Wells, Bennett, and Galsworthy, with immense skill and industry, wrote about what seemed to her unimportant, the externals of a life. By way of a contrast with their “materialism” she offered an invitation.

Look within and life, it seems, is very far from being “like this.” Examine for a moment an ordinary mind on an ordinary day. The mind receives a myriad of impressions – trivial, fantastic, evanescent, or engraved with the sharpness of steel. From all sides they come, an incessant shower of innumerable atoms; and as they fall, they shape themselves into the life of Monday or Tuesday, the accent falls differently from of old; . . . Is it not the task of the novelist to convey this varying, this unknown and uncircumscribed spirit, whatever aberration of complexity

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it may display, with as little mixture of the alien and external as possible?"”

Woolf goes on to suggest that James Joyce in his *Portrait of the Artist*, and *Ulysses*, which she was reading at the time, attempted to come closer to life and record the atoms of the mind as they fall. In the background is the influence of William James’s streams of thought. From this perspective, Hermione Lee, Woolf’s biographer, asserts that her 1919 “Modern Novels” “sets up the terms for the representation of consciousness in fiction.”

In her diary entry on Monday, 26 January 1920, Woolf records that that afternoon she had arrived as an idea of a new form of novel. What Woolf was struggling with in her explorations was an emergent notion of selfhood.

Woolf’s novel, *Mrs. Dalloway*, was a phenomenological exploration of these questions. It and *Saturday* by Ian McEwan are of the form of literary phenomenologies of the daily emergences of the conscious and intentional subject. The action, involving a central character, Clarissa Dalloway in one and Henry Perowne, the neurosurgeon, in the other, takes place on a single day and ends with a dramatic dinner party. Clarissa’s scheduled dinner party pervades and directs her early morning thoughts and attention. Peter Walsh’s unexpected visit was a surprising emergence. When she was a young girl he asked her to marry him but she chose the safer Richard Dalloway. Their early meeting would give rise to later associated streams of thoughts in both. In the meeting there emerges a powerful presence of her past in her present and with it a wonder of what her life might have been like if she had taken the other road. One could say that the living out of the decision she made gave rise to a huge component of her emergent self on that day. It was not something in the past, disconnected.

As Woolf’s notebooks also make clear, the figure of the shell-shocked Septimus Smith represents the inescapable presence in Woolf’s lived self of her extreme bipolarity, constant reminders to both of their mortality. In writing the novel she was challenged by the question: How does one combine descriptive accounts of normal sane self-experiences and language with those of insanity? Distressed,

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as she herself was, by the intrusive and insensitive pressures of the medical doctors, Septimus, this day will find himself faced with a life or death decision. In quite different ways, creative and destructive, Clarissa's marriage and Septimus's illness are reflections of Woolf's own life. Her marriage to Leonard, her vocation as a writer and her illness, underline constants throughout the fleeting emergence of the daily flux of new atoms of thought and feelings that in their different ways hold her life together.

What we find in novels such as Mrs. Dalloway, Saturday, and Ulysses, all of which are concerned with the inwardness that accompanies the journey of our embodied mind through a particular day in our lives, is a phenomenology of the kind that philosophers and neuroscientists need to take note of. We can in turn read them on many different levels: for enjoyment with a somewhat empty head, for engagement with the drama that is unfolding in them, or we can read them with the questions about the self which caused Virginia Woolf and the others to write them. It was her dream to break beyond the kind of mundane materialism of the self that she had found in the novels of Wells, Bennett, and Galsworthy.

ELEMENTS OF SELF IN INSIGHT

In Insight Lonergan states: "By the self is meant a concrete and intelligible unity-identity-whole." The self is not an abstraction but something factual, locatable, earthed, distinctive. The term "concrete" will becomes central in his later works. Lonergan has little to say directly about the nature of the "intelligible unity-identity-whole." He does signal the unity and unities of properly human cognitional consciousness, the data relevant for self-affirmation. It is here that the cliff face of the definition opens up in the distinction between the

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5 Indirectly the passage in chapter 14 of Insight: "Philosophical evidence is within the philosopher himself. It is his own inability to avoid experience, to renounce intelligence in inquiry, to desert reasonableness in reflection ... which I take to be largely autobiographical, illuminating the journey of composing Insight, is highly significant. We could possibly read Lonergan’s explorations of development and genetic method in chapter 15 as suggestions. To them we could add the dialectical insights of chapter 7." The intelligible unity is developmental, including a genetic and a dialectical element. But what is offered is largely theoretic, not concrete.
conscious and the intentional dimensions of our mental activities. Ray Jackendoff in his *A User's Guide to Thought and Meaning* uses the very common language: “Pat is conscious of the noise out in the street,” adding that we could also use the term, aware. For Lonergan this awareness is not conscious but intentional. He would write: Pat was aware of himself hearing the noise out in the street. Conscious awareness is of the operations of the self: intentional awareness is of the object.

The data of self-consciousness are not to be found anywhere in the world explored directly by the empirical sciences. In a manner whose peculiarities were well brought out by Virginia Woolf, in their highly elusive way they always accompany our living in and exploring the intentional world. Consciousness in the sense of awareness of oneself seeing, hearing, inquiring, wondering, suddenly getting the point of the problem and so forth is almost entirely absent from contemporary “consciousness” studies.

The seed potential from which the *Insight* book emerged, after a great deal of work, was Lonergan’s insight into cognitional structure. In the fleeting spread out data of self-consciousness in the learning process he came to discover a recurring emergent cognitional universal structure; a human universal. If initially he had some grasp of the particular elements that went into the structure, it was with his parallel shift from the concept to the notion of being that he understood a dynamic unifying component in the conscious and intentional life of the self. Its central function was to hold together and unify the different components in the different levels in the structure. This was the pure desire to know, the notion of being, everything. In its pursuit it opens up the subject to the elements of the problems in the world and then at the proper time integrates them. Being a human universal that structure does not add any light on anything the self or subject might come to know concretely in the unfolding of their lives.

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“Existence and Aggiornamento” followed directly after “Cognitional Structure” in 1964. The contrast is startling. *Existenz*, for him, is a matter of concretely being oneself in all its complex psychological, dramatic, intellectual, and mystical dimensions. To speak about it to others in public is to speak about what is private, intimate, more intimate than perhaps one has explicitly conceived. That speaking is not a lecturing or an ego trip but “a becoming aware, a growth in self-consciousness, a heightening of one’s self-appropriation, that is possible because our separate, unrevealed, hidden cores have a common circle of reference, the human community, and an ultimate point of reference, which is God, who is all in all.”

Lonergan relates the term *Existenz*, not with substance but with a dynamic human subject whose being is becoming and who can speak in public about his or her innermost private experiences. There follows a brief account of the increasing autonomy of the subject in her or his decision making up to the point of realization “that the deeds, decisions, discoveries, affect the subject more deeply than they affect the object with which they are concerned.” *Insight* invited a form of self-appropriation that concentrated on the universal structure of the cognitional. I would suggest that *Existenz* and *Aggiornamento* is here tacitly proposing or even inviting a form of self-appropriation that concentrates on the ethical, on concrete decision making, and selfhood. The invitation is to appropriate concretely how one’s major decisions have actually constituted one’s emergent selfhood, subjectivity.

The decisions that we make in our lives are not all of equal significance. The effects of many will be short term, their absence seemingly not having any great consequences. But there are others that are more of the form of major roads taken on which the life of the

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8 In *Insight* there is the subject and object of the world of emergent probability and of common sense.


10 This also I believe can be linked in with Lonergan’s interpretation of application in Aquinas in his doctoral thesis, on how God through providence applies every contingent agent to its operation. See *Insight*, 664 (old). Michael Lewis’s recent commencement talk to the Princeton Baccalaureate Class of 2012 emphasises the role of luck in decision making and implores the lucky to be sensitive to the unlucky. Available on You Tube.
subject will journey for considerable periods of time. \textsuperscript{11} If they were not taken one would become a significantly different self. Such decisions could relate to one’s work and career, to one’s marriage and family, and one’s religion. This links in with Ira Progoff’s journal writing exercise concerned with the roads taken and not taken in a life. Some decisions, root decisions like pursuing a career in medicine, can remain in place for all of our working lives. Other can branch out from such root decisions. Some significant decisions might place us on a wrong road from which we have to backtrack. Root and branch decisions can occur in relation to works, persons, and beliefs in our lives.

In Lonergan’s life we can identify a number of such roads taken and related decisions. Significant in them is their time in his life. There are times in our lives when decisions of one kind or another are up:

1. Lonergan’s letter of 1935 to his provincial expresses his anxiety about his future at a time when a decision was to be made about his future work as a Jesuit. Surrounding it was the dramatic story of how, by accident, he got to Rome in 1933, was chosen for postgraduate studies in 1937, and changed to theology in 1938.
2. The decision after his lectures on Thought and Reality in 1945-46 to write *Insight*. It was only implemented in 1949.
3. The letter to O’Connor about his conversation with Michael Longman in 1958 in which he outlines how it was through that conversation that he was brought to the decision to write *Method in Theology*.
4. His letter to Cardinal Seper in 1974/5 on Moral Theology and . . . where in between the lines we find Lonergan thinking his way back to make the decision to work on economics.

Each of these decisions was at a particular time which he had been brought to in his life. If you follow the drama in *Lonergan’s Quest* of the accident of his move to Rome and subsequently the circumstances which changed him from philosophy to theology it fleshes out the bare bones of the listing.

\textsuperscript{11} In my “Memoir, Biography and the Dynamism of Consciousness,” vol. 23 of the *Lonergan Workshop Journal*, ed. Fred Lawrence (Chestnut Hill, MA: Boston College, 2012), I articulated what I understand the major decisions made for and by Lonergan in the course of his life. See also the Bernard Lonergan index in *Lonergan’s Quest* under *Decisions made by and made for*. 
Such major decisions are constitutive of Lonergan's subjectivity, selfhood. They don't follow a rule, a calculation, a law in his life. Some can be quite accidental in their emergence, but in them through memory can be identified an emergent one and the same self. After each is made one begins again like an "infant," to live out their consequences, the new chapter they open up in one's life. Although the making of the decision is a signpost, the journey to its destination within the life can be quite zig zag and challenge one's authenticity many times.

Every such decision is concerned with a particular value at a particular time in his life. The 1933-37 decision was concerned with finding for him a worthwhile future in the academic life for which he was clearly suited. The switch from philosophy to theology changed the details, so to speak, and opened him up to the value of contributing to the renewal of theology. After the Thomas More course on Thought and Reality the writing of *Insight* became his core value, the worthwhile thing to do with his life. When it was finished his conversation with Longman made clear that *Method in Theology* was the priority value from among a number of possibilities. Finally, after finishing *Method in Theology* he had to make a decision about what it was worthwhile to do in his retirement. As in these he was pursuing values in the world, he in turn was living through them a worthwhile life, he was becoming a worthwhile human being.

In our lives we can spontaneously and unreflectively live through such experiences. We can occasionally remember and even list some of the major decisions that have shaped our emergent selfhood. As we develop a sense, despite the elements of the contingent, of the emergent continuity of our selfhood in the sequence, the further question arises, what holds them together? At this level we begin to understand in them the transcendental notion of value and the succession of particular values that we have chosen on our journey. Involved is the pursuit of worthwhile things to be done in the world, through which one lives a worthwhile life. Underpinning the sequence with its accidental twists and turns is a deep-rooted desire in us to do something worthwhile in the world and become someone worthwhile.
Pushed toward its limit the emphasis on the role of decision making in our self-constitution in *Existenz* and *Aggiornamento* brings us into the highest and irreducible level of consciousness. David Whyte, in his *The Three Marriages*, writes about the three loves, work, family and self. In a natural manner in our pursuit of the worthwhile we can find ourselves drawn into and living out those love relations. Self-appropriation becomes a dialogue, a conversation between the three.\(^\text{12}\)

**DIMENSIONS OF MEANING:**
**THE SOCIAL AND CULTURAL SELF AND THE WORLD CULTURAL SELF-APPROPRIATION**

A further advance I believe occurs in “Dimensions of Meaning” in which Lonergan chooses as his central topic not Reality or *Existenz* but Meaning. It was a marginal concept in *Insight*, limited to a few obscure remarks on the notion of being as the core of all meaning and on sources, acts, and terms of meaning. Being, for him, is the all-inclusive term of meaning. Miss them and you will never recover! In “*Existenz* and *Aggiornamento*” the category of common meaning in relation to the subject’s membership in the community emerged as highly significant. Needless to say this is a huge topic.

The expansion in his use of the term in “Dimensions of Meaning” is signaled in the following quotations:

> Beyond the world we know about, there is the further world we make. But *what we make we first intend*. We imagine, *we plan, investigate possibilities*, we weigh pros and cons, we enter into contracts, we have countless orders given and executed. From the beginning to the end of the process, we are engaged in *acts of meaning*, and without them the process would not have been achieved. The pioneers in this country found shore and heartland, mountains and plains, but they have covered it with *cities*, laced it with roads, exploited it with industries, till the world of man stands between us and a prior world of nature. Yet the whole of that added, man-made, artificial world

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\(^{12}\) The relation between my position and the neuroscientific one of Ken Robinson with Lou Aronica in *The Element: How Finding Your Passion Changes Everything* (London: Allen Lane, 2009) has yet to be worked out.
is the cumulative, now planned, now chaotic, produce of acts of human meaning.13

Not only is the self constituted by acts of meaning, but so also is the humanly constructed world.14 It is a world in which, with its global consciousness, its technology and media, diversity and extremes, we find ourselves out of our depth. Given that shortly a massive proportion of the human population will live in massive or mega cities, there is the beginning of serious work at the moment on the biographies of cities. A city is, in the above sense, a concrete and somewhat serendipitous aggregate of human meanings. Jane Jacobs’s *Life and Death of Great American Cities* was a trendsetter in this.

Even more radical are his remarks on the transformation of the human meanings in our properly human worlds.

Religions and art forms, languages and literatures, sciences, philosophies, the writing of history, all had their rude beginnings, slowly developed, reached their peak, perhaps went into decline and later underwent a renaissance in another milieu. And what is true of cultural achievements, also, though less conspicuously, is true of social institutions. The family, the state, the law, the economy are not fixed immutable entities. They adapt to changing circumstances; they can be reconceived in the light of new ideas; they can be subjected to revolutionary change.

In anthropology itself I would select the work done between 1970 and 2000 on the Out of Africa Theory of Human Origins as a massive cultural transformation in human meaning. Through showing conclusively that there is only a single human race originating in and spreading out of Africa, it has demolished the earlier colonial notion. In economics the current Euro crisis is calling for a radical transformation in the meaning of an economy; not just a tinkering with the details. Currently

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14 For a treatment of the same “topic” from very different foundations consult John R. Searle, *The Construction of Social Reality* (London: Penguin, 1995) and Ciaran Benson, *The Cultural Psychology of the Self: Place, Morality, and Art in Human Worlds* (London: Routledge, 2001). Benson is very influenced by Damasio and the neurosciences in his foundations. Searle tries to escape from their reductionism but is not convincing. None the less both authors pose good questions.
as I write, Angela Merkel and Wolfgang Schauble, her finance minister, are redefining the meaning of the Euro as a currency and who will or will not participate in it.

The New Notion of Science

Having established the importance of the category meaning, Lonergan continues by contrasting two meanings of the word “science,” classical and modern, whereby science he seems to mean a science of the human being. Classically oriented science focuses on the essential, universal, and necessary and ignores the accidental, universal, and the contingent. For if

Man is a rational animal, composed of body and an immortal soul, endowed with vital, sensitive and intellectual powers, in need of habits and able to acquire them, free and responsible in his deliberations and decisions, subject to a natural law which, according to changing circumstances, is to be supplemented by positive laws enacted by duly constituted authority.

Such science applies to all human beings independent of their particular talents and their stage on life’s way. The variety of contingent developments and breakdowns are beyond the scope of classically conceived science. Modern human science deals not with abstract humanity but all human beings of every time and place, all their thoughts and words and deeds, the accidental – good luck and bad luck, the contingent and the particular as well as the essential, necessary and universal.¹⁵

Indeed, once philosophy becomes existential and historical, once it asks about man . . . as in fact he is here and now in the concreteness of his living and dying, the very possibility of the old distinction between philosophy and theology vanishes.

This concreteness is beautifully illustrated in his remarks on the phenomenology of intersubjectivity:

¹⁵ On this see Michael Lewis, Princeton Baccalaureate Commencement Speech on You Tube which addresses the significance of the phenomenon of good luck in a person’s career.
Human communication is not the work of a soul hidden in some unlocated recess of a body and emitting signals in some Morse code. Soul and body are not two things, but co-principles in the constitution of a single thing. The bodily presence of the incarnate spirit of the other; and that incarnate spirit reveals itself to me by every shift of eyes, countenance, color, lips, voice, tone, fingers, hands, arms, stance. Such revelation is not an object to be apprehended. Rather it works immediately upon my subjectivity to make me share the other's seriousness or vivacity or embarrassment, joy or sorrow; and similarly my response affects his subjectivity, leads him on to say more, or quietly and imperceptible rebuffs him, holds him off, closes the door.

It seems to be much more difficult to do a phenomenology of the cultural self as contrasted with the existential self. In the light of this distinction Lonergan now makes his central point about the importance of human meaning.

I wish now to add that reflection on meaning and the consequent control of meaning are still more important. For if social and cultural changes are, at root, changes in meanings that are grasped and accepted, changes in the control of meaning mark off the great epochs in human history.

All this as Vatican II was winding to a close and he was struggling with the problem of a method for a historically and culturally conscious theology. Originating in his notion of a universal viewpoint in *Insight*, the solution came to him the following February in terms of the eight functional specialties. Perhaps in that insight we get some clues as to what might be meant by the new notion of science and a modern, as contrasted with a classical control of meaning.

**WHAT DOES LONERGAN MEAN BY MEANING?**

Acknowledging that meaning and within it human freedom, is constitutive of human beings and their hugely complex dynamic social and cultural worlds, this leads us to the question: What does Lonergan mean by meaning in his later writings, including *Method in Theology*? The dictionary defines *meaning* as "what is meant by a
word, text, concept or action.” Interesting it is its inclusion of action which linguistic analysis seems largely to ignore. It defines mean as: intend to convey, indicate, or refer to a particular thing: I mean X, not Y. This includes in it the one who means.

What should becoming clear is that the “meaning of meaning” is a question about the foundations of the human sciences, both cultural and hermeneutical. Lonergan defines meaning by the set of terms and relations constituting both the subject and object of the conscious and intentional operations of transcendental method. It incorporates the sources in the world that give rise to the emergence of meaning, operations or activities of the subject who means as well as what through those operations is known, made, meant.

**Sources of Meaning:** any data, cognitive activates, terms or meant. Data could include one’s landscape and its natural resources, city with its navigational challenges. This seems to imply that the whole universe and its conscious and intentional agents is the complete source of meaning. No single individual or generation has access to all the sources of meaning. Such access is cumulative.

**Terms of Meaning:** What is meant, both the known and the constructed. All terms of meaning are intentional objects; knowledge of X, and artifacts. This implies everything that is known, the referent of all of the books in all of the libraries of the world, and the concrete products of all of the acts of planning and construction in the world. In *Insight* for Lonergan being is the all-inclusive term of meaning. Everything that can be known and chosen by the notion of value is a term of meaning.

**Acts of Meaning:** Crucial is the role in his definition of acts of meaning – all cognitional/ethical operations of the subject/self. All such operations are self-conscious having intentional objects. This is the crux of the matter as the data of self-consciousness are elusive, even denied to exist by many or considered to be unconscious by Jackendoff. Whereas the sources and the terms remain and are easily remembered, the acts of questioning, understanding, judging, and deciding that mediate between the sources and the terms of meaning are elusive. Once they have produced their product they fade very quickly from memory. Also as conscious, are real but unimaginable awarenesses.
What Lonergan is talking about in acts of meaning and also, the notions of being and of value, is the human spirit. I was always impressed by the title of the 1964 Festschrift that was brought out for him: *Spirit as Inquiry*. In this sense all the curiosity of the great creative scientists is an activity of spirit. Similarly there was a work by Rahner entitled *Spirit in the World*. All the activities of the Steve Jobs and others in the world producing products are again activities of the spirit. The acts of meaning in Lonergan’s account of meaning are activities of the human spirit in the world. This dimension of the phenomenon of meaning is a blind spot in Searle’s explorations of *The Social Construction of Reality* and Ciarán Benson’s *The Cultural Psychology of Self, Place, Morality and Art in Human Worlds*. Benson considers the acts of meaning to come from Damasio’s Autobiographical Self. Lonergan transcendental notions, of being and of value, are fundamentally spiritual categories.

The properly human world is not just mediated by meaning; it is constituted by it. It seems that in his analysis of sources, acts, and terms of meaning Lonergan is doing something like the equivalent for the world of human meaning as his cognitional structure did in *Insight* for human cognition. In his sketch of sources, acts, and terms of meaning there is, in kernal the foundations for modern cultural and hermeneutical sciences. In this properly human world two distinct but related transformations take place: the transformation of the world of nature into the meaningful human-made world, and our own self-transformations. Until the transformation of self-appropriation in relation to meaning is made, the foundations of the human sciences will forever be in a state of confusion. Two further elements need greater stress; firstly the problem of the linguistic correlates of the elements and functions of meaning, and secondly the manner in which they both transcend and are dependent of brain/neural activities and processes.

**Where Might the Functions of Meaning Be Going in Concrete Human Living?**

Mentioned in passing in “Dimensions of Meaning,” *Method in Theology* has a distinct section on the functions of meaning: cognitive, efficient, communicative, and constitutive. Again, like his articulation of cognitional structure they are remote from the concrete details
of human living. How are they to be read? It is an enormous task, especially on the social and cultural level. For present purposes I will limit my suggestions to our personal living, drawing on David Whyte’s *The Three Marriages*. There can be involved in our living thee loves; of work, of spouse and family, and of self. To these could be added love of one’s country and of God.

There used to be a time when work skills were once and for all. Recently I heard of an eye surgeon who had to update his skills through a learning process four or five times. The modern workplace is dynamic. The role of the cognitive function of meaning is to develop the skill of learning itself and live it out throughout one’s life. The same is true of marriage. Now the parties have to come to terms with the fact as Whyte puts it: after the honeymoon they discover they are living with a stranger. They have to start learning the art of marriage after the romantic phase. Involved is the cognitive function of meaning, of lifelong learning about the concrete specifics of the sequences of unfolding situations and the succession of metamorphoses in one’s selfhood. The cognitive and the efficient functions can in all of this interact and develop out of their relations. Appropriating the cognitive function of meaning will be helped by remembering some of the details of one’s own personal intellectual journey in life.

Although communication can play such a large component in daily living, it has not been integrated into the project of self-appropriation. Such communication can be in the theatre of the workspace, the media, workgroups, the family. Central is a dialectic between confidentiality and transparency. My own experience has been of periods of easy communication in the work space giving way to changing circumstances and subsequent periods of considerable difficulties in communication. There are all kinds of workshops in process trying to help us with those who dislike us or vice versa. Such differences have to be addressed if the progress of creativity rather than the retreat of decline is to come out on top.

Finally there is constitutive meaning. On the individual level Lonergan described it as “part of the reality of the one that means: his horizon, his assimilative powers, his knowledge, his values, his character.”16 Earlier he related it with memory:

16 *Method in Theology*, 356, is on the ontology of meaning and gives a different
A person suffering from amnesia does not know who he is. If I were to forget that I was a Jesuit, a priest, a professor of theology, and so on, my possible activities would be entirely out of conformity with what I am. My memory of myself is constitutive, a fundamental determinant, of what I do.\footnote{17}

By way of a response I will conclude by suggesting that self-appropriation in the world of meaning involves an ongoing dialogue between one’s concrete unfolding life and the functions of meaning. Their dialectical functioning is a part of the dynamism of one’s concrete living. Appropriating the cognitive function will involve moving from the cognitional structure of \textit{Insight} to the mind narrative that the pure desire to know authors in the course of a lifetime. Appropriating the constitutive level will involve understanding the ongoing process of personal individuation under the influence of the transcendental notions. What happens on a personal level also has to be addressed on a group and national and global level. In relation to the functions of meaning the question is, not what they are, but, to follow John Haughey, where are they going in our personal lives and in our social world?

The challenges opened up by Lonergan in his later writings on meaning are not ones that can be mastered on the individual level. What is needed here as in almost all of his work is a response on the level of collaborative and interdisciplinary creativity.

REFORMING THE CHURCH, REDEEMING THE WORLD

Michael McCarthy
Vassar College
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“Behold I make all things new.”
(Revelation 21:5)

“Out of the quarrels with others we make rhetoric, but of those with ourselves poetry.”
(William Butler Yeats)

For Fred Crowe, who exemplified the virtues of humility and wisdom our church should strive to embody.

A LIGHT UNTO THE NATIONS (ISAIAH 49:6)

To understand the history of Christianity we must understand the history of Judaism. Jesus of Nazareth was a Jew, raised in a Jewish family and community, educated in the Hebrew Scriptures. As he said of himself, he came to fulfill the law and the prophets not to abolish them. Fulfilling the scriptures meant advancing the historical mission of the Jewish people, to be a light, a source of wisdom and active goodness, unto the nations. The gospel, the good news proclaimed by Jesus, is a profound source of revelation about the God of his ancestors, the God of Abraham, Isaac, and Jacob. And the heart of the good news is this: that God so loved the world that he sent his divine son to redeem it from sin and the divine spirit to make it holy and just.

Before and after his death Jesus created a community of followers to continue his redemptive work: to bear witness to the gospel in their
lives and their teaching, to embody God's active love in the world. The two thousand year history of Christianity is a record of very imperfect witness to the gospel. But this was also true of the Jewish people, as their prophets regularly reminded them. The candid realism of Scripture is a salutary reminder that the pilgrim people of God are a sinful people however great their historical calling. As Jesus repeatedly said, he came into the world on behalf of sinners not those who are righteous. Both the New Testament and Christian history make clear it is repentant sinners who respond most fully to God's call to holiness. Think of Mary Magdalene and Peter, Paul and Augustine, St Matthew and Ignatius Loyola, among countless others.

While the redemptive mission of the church remains constant, so does its need for reform and renewal. The Holy Spirit dwells in the community of faith, not to keep it sinless and error free, but to make Christians more effective in bringing God's light to the nations. Thus the Spirit strengthened the wavering apostles at Pentecost, called Saul to preach the gospel to the Gentiles, inspired the wisdom of the Greek and Latin Fathers, helped create the monastic movement and the medieval universities and sent dedicated missionaries to all corners of the earth.

Church councils have been important sources of reform from the assemblies at Jerusalem and Nicaea to the present day. This week we are reflecting together on the Second Vatican Council called into being by John XXIII during his brief but inspired papacy. Though fifty years have passed since the council began, we are still living with its historical effects. So we need to be humble and prudent in seeking to understand and appraise this landmark event in our history. But understand and appraise the church we must, for that is our responsibility as thoughtful Christians called to make sense of our common past. We make sense of history by telling stories about it. In my paper, I offer the basic outline of a story, a rough sketch of the council as I understand it today. This story has four basic parts: the pre-conciliar context that John O'Malley calls "the long nineteenth century"; the critical events, documents and spirit of the council itself; the hierarchy's disappointing record in implementing the council's initiatives; finally, the agenda of needed reforms created by post-conciliar developments in the church and the world we are called to redeem.
Before I begin my story, let me be explicit about my interpretive stance as a narrator of these momentous but unfinished events.

**CRITICAL BELONGING**

"Men will not receive the truth from their enemies, and it is very rarely offered to them by their friends."

(Alexis de Tocqueville)

I am a Catholic Christian. I was baptized as a child, raised in a Catholic home and educated in Catholic schools until graduating from Notre Dame nine months after the council began. For the last forty-eight years, I have studied and taught philosophy in secular settings, first at Yale, then at Vassar. During two sabbatical leaves from Vassar, I shared in the work of the Woodstock Theological Center at Georgetown and of the Lonergan community here at Boston College. My wife Barbara and I are faithful and observant Catholics, though most of our friends, family and colleagues are not. Many of the people I admire most feel estranged from the Catholic Church though they bear powerful witness to the gospel by the quality of their lives. There are several historical communities I love and to which I am loyal. I love my country, the college that still serves as our home, and the Catholic community of faith. In each case, I would describe my allegiance as critical belonging. Though I love the United States, I recognize the collective sins in our history and deplore the polarized state of contemporary politics. Though I'm deeply loyal to Vassar, I acknowledge the serious limitations among our faculty, students, and administrative officers. For me, informed and responsible criticism is an essential part of genuine belonging. The same principle applies, I believe, to faithful membership in the Catholic Church. Like Bernard Haring, the great moral theologian, I would characterize my life in the church as “faithful and free.”

To what in particular am I faithful? The daily practice of prayer, the attentive reading of scripture, the celebration of the Mass and the Eucharist, the church’s creeds and traditions, the commandments of love in their full application. These constitutive aspects of our faith
are essential to my life and identity. I am also faithful, to the best of my ability, to the unrestricted quest for understanding and truth, to supporting and achieving what is really worth while, to exploring receptively the mysteries of God and God's unfathomable love for creation. For me, these two forms of fidelity, religious and spiritual, are mutually supportive.

I accept Lonergan's useful distinction between essential and effective freedom. As we humanly develop, we become able to think, to speak, to choose, to love and to ask for forgiveness when we perform these activities badly. No matter our age, we continually strive for effective freedom, the acquired capacity to do these things wisely and well. Or, in Lonergan's later language, to live authentically and genuinely in the many dimensions of our complex personal existence. Essential freedom allows us to grow in the dual fidelity I described. Effective freedom allows the fruits of our fidelity to profoundly enrich the lives of others.

Through long experience as a husband, father, teacher, and citizen, I've learned that I must respect every person's essential freedom in helping them grow in effective freedom. I deeply believe that this is how God works as well. God's created gifts are the ultimate source of our essential freedom; God's redemptive graces are indispensable sources of our effective freedom. To state the matter bluntly, God calls each person to holiness, to fullness of life, without coercion, threats, bullying, fear, or intimidation. In living authentically with others, we are called to follow God's lead.

There is also a public aspect to freedom, what Tocqueville called political liberty, the liberty of citizens. As Lonergan recognized, we are not only responsible for what we do with our lives, but also for the historical communities in which those lives are embedded. As we mature, intellectually and spiritually, we gradually recognize our obligations as citizens not only to our country and our places of work and study, but also to the community of faith. Though the substantive content of these obligations varies from one community to another, the transcendental precepts hold constant: to be attentive to the full range of experience, personal and communal; to strive to understand whatever experience discloses; to assent to evidence and truth,
however unwelcome; to act responsibly with our peers in fulfilling our obligations to the natural and historical worlds to which we belong.

In my experience, the church communicates most effectively with the secular world when they are willing to learn from each other. The church teaches the mystery of creation; the natural sciences disclose nature's dynamic intelligible structure. The church teaches the history of redemption; critical scholarship reveals what actually happened in the past. The church teaches the sacramental character of ordinary things; common sense guides our practical use of those things in creating a home or building a world. The church teaches the obligations of neighborly love; parents, teachers, doctors, nurses, farmers, engineers, public officials, social workers (the list is long), show us how to make active love truly effective. The church teaches the ultimate meaning and purpose of life; the world teaches how that meaning and purpose are partly revealed in poetry, painting, music, film, dance, and the varied expressions of human creativity. When the world is closed to the church it lacks reverence and depth. When the church is closed to the world, it loses connection with the real lives of its members and surrenders the redemptive mission Christ gave it.

No one knowledgeable about the past has any illusions about the checkered histories of the church and the world. While both are guilty of numerous sins, often the same sins, the church still calls us to prayer, offers us the sacraments, proclaims the word of God, teaches us the mysteries of faith, charges us to love our neighbor and ministers quietly to the poor and the vulnerable. And while the world is full of greed, violence and vulgarity, it still provides the economic, political and cultural institutions we need to live together in some measure of justice and peace.

Both religious and secular institutions are in constant need of reform. Both are tempted to deny or conceal unwelcome and embarrassing facts. Both cling to myths of their superior excellence and probity. Both need loyal and discerning members, free of bias and partisan ideology, prepared to serve their communities by speaking the truth with humility and love. That is my modest aim in this paper.
THE LONG NINETEENTH CENTURY (1789-1958)

“When the natural and human sciences are on the move, when the social order is developing, what is needed is not a dam to block the stream, but critical control of the river bed through which the stream must flow.”

(Bernard Lonergan, Second Collection, 52)

One of the most important documents of the Second Vatican Council, Gaudium et Spes, addresses the church’s relation to the modern world. The document is of historic significance because it seeks to transform an adversarial relationship to one of fraternal solidarity. In this section, I want to sketch in broad strokes how that adversarial relationship developed, particularly during the century and a half that preceded the papacy of John XXIII. Though the church’s hostility to modernity intensified after the French Revolution, it did not begin then. We only need to recall the scandalous immersion of the papacy in Renaissance culture that helped provoke the Protestant schism. The Reformation shattered the unity of Latin Christendom, prompted the disciplinary reforms of the Council of Trent and led to merciless wars that weakened respect for Christianity and subverted the intellectual and moral authority of all Christian leaders.

In the seventeenth century, Descartes constructed a method of autonomous reason that challenged clerical control over philosophy and science. By integrating the new mathematics and physics, Galileo and Newton undermined the traditional cosmology based on Ptolemy and Aristotle. And Francis Bacon heralded the close alliance of modern science and technology aimed at making human beings in Descartes’s terms “the lords and masters of nature.”

Politically, the rise of the centralized nation-state in England, France, Scandinavia and Spain led to dangerous alliances between throne and altar, heightening religious intolerance and sectarian hatred. The colonization of the Americas largely replicated the European pattern, creating a predominantly Protestant north and Catholic south with French Canada the striking exception. From the late seventeenth century forward, modern cultural developments became entangled with a sustained political critique of Catholicism, especially in France. In defending itself against criticism, the church often failed to acknowledge
the substantive merit of these developments in their own right. Thus the church gradually associated modern science with agnosticism and atheism, even though many of the leading scientists had been Christians. And it opposed modern critical scholarship, even though the earliest proponent of biblical criticism was Richard Simon, a French Catholic. Indirectly, the church strengthened the agnostic claims of its cultural critics by treating the new learning as a primary source of unbelief.

These historical reminders set the stage for the long nineteenth century and the deepening antagonism between Catholicism and modernity. The critical event in this conflicted and unfortunate story is the French Revolution. The beginning of the Revolution in 1789 was preceded by an intellectual and political critique of the Ancien Regime. Late eighteenth century France combined a centralized monarchy centered at Versailles with a traditional feudal social structure. The monarchy with its enabling lawyers, bankers and political councilors was substantially modern. The social structure was largely based on medieval hierarchies. At the peak of the French pyramid were the Bourbon kings. Beneath them were the three traditional estates, the aristocratic nobility, the princes of the church and an amorphous third estate consisting of bourgeois merchants, agricultural peasants and a growing urban working class. Before the Revolution, the principal targets of criticism were the nobility and the Catholic hierarchy. As the Revolution unfolded, moderation gave way to terror. The radical Jacobins mercilessly executed the King and large portions of the French nobility. They also heightened their attack on the church seeking to transform Catholic France into a secular kingdom of enlightenment and reason. This attack produced a political backlash, particularly in the provinces where loyalty to catholicism remained strong.

The excesses of the Revolution triggered a prolonged European war. The Napoleonic armies carried the revolutionary banner of liberty, equality and fraternity from the eastern Atlantic to Moscow. But they also galvanized national opposition in Prussia, Russia, and Spain. When the anti-Napoleonic forces defeated the French emperor at Waterloo, a Bourbon king was restored to the throne. But as their critics caustically repeated, the Bourbons had learned nothing from the Revolution and forgotten none of the grievances committed against them and their political allies. In one sense the French Revolution
was over, but in a much deeper sense it was not. Despite Metternich's attempt to return order and stability to Europe, the old continent would never be the same.

Though political conservatives wanted to restore the Ancien Regime, this was no longer possible, not only in France but throughout all of Europe. If we focus on France, we find the following constellation of forces after the Restoration: those still loyal to the Bourbon dynasty; those willing to compromise with the bourgeois monarchy of Louis Philippe; the liberal republicans opposed in principle to monarchy and favoring a parliamentary republic; finally, the revolutionary socialists, the fierce partisans of urban labor, who insisted that the French Revolution remained incomplete. French Catholics were divided across the political spectrum, with some of their ablest thinkers like Lamennais and Montalembert seeking to make peace with the principles and practices of liberalism. But the Vatican and the French hierarchy were openly anti-republican, identifying themselves with some version of monarchical restoration. As Tocqueville ruefully remarked, in nineteenth century France, the friends of religion became enemies of liberty while the friends of liberty became enemies of religion. He found this polarization profoundly destructive, for it meant that France would be politically and culturally at war for the next hundred years.

Deep public unrest was not restricted to France. Nineteenth century Europe was also undergoing a socio-economic revolution. Here England was the leader, but the repercussions of Industrial Capitalism extended throughout northern Europe. Eighteenth century capitalism had been largely commercial, marked by the enterprise of a rising merchant class. Nineteenth century capitalism brought the creation of the factory system, as productive manufacture left the home and the cottage for the large urban factory. Advancing technology also transformed the economy of the West as mines, railroads, shipbuilding and textiles became new sources of national wealth. Political power in the north gradually shifted from the landed gentry to the new captains of industry and finance. European workers in massive numbers abandoned rural farms for the rapidly growing cities where employment was now concentrated.

The new capitalist wealth carried a terrible social cost. To the religious and political divisions generated by the French Revolution
were added the radical class conflicts of industrial capitalism. If the European republicans were often anti-clerical in spirit, Karl Marx and his followers opposed religion as such, scorning religious devotion as “the opium of the people.” For Marx, completing the French Revolution required abolishing Christianity in Europe.

An important cultural consequence of these revolutions was the development of historical consciousness. Hegel made the spiritual history of the West the centerpiece of his philosophy. French liberals like Constant and Tocqueville emphasized the contrast between ancient and modern notions of liberty. Marx’s dialectical materialism interpreted world history as a series of ascending class struggles. Lyell in geology and Darwin in biology brought the dynamics of change into the core of natural science. Ranke and his colleagues created critical methods for the impartial study of the past. In what Lonergan called the Second Enlightenment, the specialized methods of critical reason were directed at history as well as at nature.

The new historical consciousness helped promote new philosophies of history. At stake in these rival theories were conflicting interpretations of modernity, especially of the scientific, democratic and industrial revolutions. Romantic conservatives saw the modern world as a terrible decline from the unity of Latin Christendom. Liberals saw a future of indefinite progress as the principles of the Enlightenment fully penetrated modern institutions. Marxists believed that the injustices of capitalism had thwarted the great promise of the French Revolution. Nietzsche believed that Judaism and Christianity had corrupted the warrior ethic of antiquity, and that socialism was the pale secular shadow of Christianity’s moral demise.

The critical interpretation of ancient and modern cultural artifacts was an important aspect of the new focus on history. How were the cultural treasures of the past, including the Hebrew and Christian scriptures, to be read and interpreted? In a spirit of reverence and awe, in a spirit of detached criticism, in a spirit of deep cultural suspicion? Marx, Nietzsche and Freud, the “masters of suspicion,” attempted to subvert religion’s powerful influence on knowledge, morality and culture. Even when their subversive critiques of religion were challenged, they profoundly influenced the self-understanding of the late modern West.
Another major development of the Second Enlightenment was the creation of the empirical human sciences: archaeology, linguistics, economics, psychology and sociology. An unresolved question hovered over their emergence. Should they be modeled on the most successful natural sciences, physics and biology? Or, were they primarily sciences of interpretation heavily dependent on the methods of critical history and hermeneutics? Though Dilthey proposed a persuasive way to distinguish the natural from the human sciences, the reductionist strain in contemporary naturalism has kept this heuristic controversy alive.

All three of these intellectual developments, historical scholarship, critical hermeneutics and the human sciences revealed the institutional and cultural diversity of the human past. The heuristic focus shifted from what is universal and constant in human existence to the social, economic and political influences on how human beings have actually lived. Philosophers have tended to follow this heuristic shift, abandoning the Kantian emphasis on pure reason to focus on the embodied, culturally situated and expressive symbolic subject.

The new attention to history and pluralism strengthened an important political development in Europe: the marked rise in national consciousness. While the Enlightenment favored a cosmopolitan conception of Europe, the Romantic tradition did the opposite, stressing the linguistic, religious and cultural diversity of the European peoples. The political import of nationalism cut different ways: in Italy and Germany it heightened the demand for a unified national state; in the multi-ethnic empires, it strengthened liberation movements among Serbs, Czechs and Irish nationalists. Both the unification of Italy and Germany led to open conflicts with the church. The Risorgimento demanded surrender of the papal territories into a newly unified Italy. In Germany, it led to a Prussian inspired Kulturkampf, a cultural war against Catholic influence in the new German state.

A pernicious consequence of European nationalism were the imperialist initiatives to which it led. England, France, Italy, Belgium, the Netherlands and Germany sent their merchants, armies, civil servants and missionaries into Africa and Asia. The primary aims of European imperialism were increased wealth, power and prestige for the home country. But these gains came at a terrible cost for the indigenous peoples subjected to their rule. When the cross followed
the flag into Asia and Africa, Christianity both gained and suffered from its close alliance with imperialism, making it hard to separate the gospel message from European racism.

National and imperial rivalries eventually led to global war. The destructive consequences of World War I cannot be overstated. Europe was bled dry in lives, treasure and prestige. The great European empires collapsed. The Bolsheviks imposed ideology and terror on Russia. Defeated Germany brooded under the punitive conditions of a retributive peace. A massive and lasting depression wrought havoc in the economies of the world. Violent fascist movements took control of Spain and Italy. Germany embraced the anti-Semitic thuggery of Hitler and his henchmen. The liberal democracies in England, France and the United States failed to meet the grave economic and political challenges. An even more terrible war followed that ended with the devastating use of atomic weapons at Hiroshima and Nagasaki. And the unspeakable toll of ideology and terror was starkly revealed in the Nazi extermination camps and the Gulag Archipelago.

By war's end, the age of innocence and "progress" was over. Christian Europe had nearly destroyed itself and the rest of the world. The alliance of science and technology had proven to be a double edged sword. Remarkable discoveries about nature and history had not prevented cultured Europeans from succumbing to the dark prejudices of racism, anti-Semitism and class hatred. The Christian heritage of Europe was ineffective in checking those prejudices and the savage violence they allegedly justified. Spain, Italy, Germany, Austria, Belgium, and Russia, these were Catholic or Orthodox nations that had collectively betrayed the gospel and Christ's message of charity and peace.

The United States emerged from World War II as the dominant power in the West. England, France, Belgium, and the Netherlands began to dismantle their colonial empires. The Soviet Union and China created a communist bloc that extended from central Europe to the western Pacific. Tempered by the prospect of nuclear annihilation, the great powers refrained from direct military engagement, though their surrogates repeatedly clashed in Korea, Cuba, Southeast Asia, and Africa. Former national adversaries took the first steps towards economic and political union in Europe, while the united Nations
Charter on human rights made religious and political liberties a matter of global concern.

These momentous and often terrible changes bring us to the very eve of the council. But before we examine Vatican II in its own terms, we must ask how the Catholic Church, especially the papacy and the Vatican, responded to these many world transforming events. When the nineteenth century began, the European church found itself in open conflict with the Protestant kingdoms of the North, secular intellectuals and critics across the continent, the friends of democratic equality and liberty, and the liberal spirit of progressive individualism that educated Europeans of all classes freely embraced.

During the next one hundred and fifty years things only got worse. In the eighteenth century, the church lost the support of European intellectuals; in the nineteenth century it lost the loyalty of the European working class. Catholic political responses tended to be too little or too late. In the French Revolution, Catholic leaders defended the Bourbon monarchy; in the industrial revolution they belatedly supported the interests of labor, but by then much of the working class had been radicalized. Catholic social thinking remained tied to agrarian models while rural peasants and farmers were leaving the land to seek work in industrial factories and mines.

In the intellectual sphere, the church resisted the new historical consciousness, the critical reading of scripture, the Darwinian emphasis on evolutionary change, the secular demand for democratic rights and liberties and the development of the new human sciences. The church was not anti-intellectual; it continued to defend the complementarity of reason and faith. But its models of reason and science, education and culture, high art and leisure tended to be classical or medieval, while modernity had deliberately distanced itself from these earlier cultural paradigms.¹

The cultural nadir occurred during the late nineteenth and earlier twentieth centuries. When the Risorgimento in Italy threatened the territorial holdings of the papacy, Pius IX retaliated with his infamous Syllabus ofErrors, in which he openly condemned the position that the

Pope “can and ought to reconcile himself with progress, with liberalism, and with modern civilization.” In 1870, the first Vatican Council formally declared the infallibility of the Pope in his dogmatic teaching on faith and morals. Although the practical scope of this doctrine was relatively narrow, it tended to do two things at once: to elevate the spiritual authority of the papacy as its temporal power declined; to create an aura of Catholic inerrancy and magisterial certitude, just as the natural and human sciences were acknowledging their fallibility and immersion in history.

As Garry Wills has shown convincingly, the principle of papal infallibility too often led to deceit and distortion, the erroneous view that the pope and the church are always right. Just when the Catholic community needed exceptional candor to acknowledge past failures and sins, church leaders sought to give the impression that its conflicts with modernity were exclusively caused by the faults of its rivals and critics. Like all forms of political propaganda, this stance was essentially dishonest. But sustained dishonesty exacts a heavy price. In this case “it led to ecclesiastical disaster, like the suppression of the modernists in 1907 and after, which stamped not only upon error and wildness, but upon the most promising and courageous ways by which Catholics of that generation might aim to meet the intellectual challenges of the age.”

The anti-modernist culture of fear and repression affected every aspect of the church. Inwardly, Catholic leaders silenced their most original and creative theologians and thinkers. Catholic education for both clergy and laity became excessively traditional. Catholic philosophy and theology were dominated by neo-scholasticism. With its claim to full possession of the truths that really mattered, the church prided itself on its refusal to change. In its external relations, the church lacked broad moral authority in a century defined by total war and global depression. It sided with Franco in Spain, reached a timid agreement with Mussolini in Italy and lacked the technical competence to participate meaningfully in the great economic debates of the time. The critical test in the papacy of Pius XII concerned relations with Nazi Germany. Why did the Pope not publicly condemn the brutal anti-Semitism of Hitler’s regime and intervene more effectively on behalf of the Jews? No one can say for certain why the Pope remained
largely silent, but one thing is clear. Rome spoke with a firm critical voice when condemning Communist regimes that openly threatened its interests, but it proved far more accommodating with Fascist governments whose relations with the Vatican were less hostile. It was hard to avoid the demoralizing impression that the highest Catholic priority was protecting one’s own.

Fear, defensiveness and ultra-montanism aside, the deepest reason for Catholic resistance to modernity was a set of metatheoretical assumptions and attitudes that Lonergan identified as classicism. Throughout the modern era, the dominant Catholic mindset was classicist. What did a classicist mentality believe? It accepted the Aristotelian notion of science as true, certain knowledge of causal necessity. Not only did the church struggle with the substantive content of modern science, it also failed to understand the very nature of the modern scientific enterprise. Leading Catholic thinkers continued to treat “science” as a source of certain and permanent truths, when its theoretical discoveries were constantly subject to critical revision and amendment.

In the second phase of the Enlightenment, Western Europe became historically minded. Evolutionary thinking emphasized the history of the cosmos and of the biological species that inhabit the earth. But historicity also permeated human affairs, both theoretical and practical. The natural and human sciences experienced major revisions, but so did philosophy and theology, as well as the diverse forms of common sense. What historical reflection revealed was cultural plurality and difference; not only different beliefs and moral codes, but different ways of thinking and speaking, of socializing and governing, of teaching and learning, of responding to life and death.

But the classicist mindset tended to view history as culturally irrelevant. Classicists share a normative conception of culture that treats the cultural forms of antiquity or Latin Christendom, for example, as universally and permanently binding. This static notion of culture led Catholic classicists to canonize the cosmology, sociology, anthropology and theology of the Middle Ages. If Latin Christendom had the last word on nature, humanity, society, and God, then the new learning had nothing important to offer.
The reign of classicism in Catholic philosophy and theology was eventually undermined by critical history and disciplinary specialization. Critical history revealed the plurality of interpretive contexts in which philosophical and theological statements are made. Although these diverse contexts can be intelligibly related, this achievement cannot be accomplished by logic, the classicist model of reasoning. Nor can logic coherently integrate the discourse of the autonomous sciences into a unified system of knowledge. Although Lonergan insists that classicism was never more than the "shabby cultural shell" of Catholicism, its hold on Catholic thought and scholarship was considerable. Even now, the great majority of Catholics underestimate the formidable distance separating classicist assumptions from the intellectual culture of modernity. For that reason, Lonergan repeatedly emphasized the "mountainous tasks" and "Herculean labors" confronting Catholics as they struggled to appropriate the highest theoretical and practical achievements of their time.

WHAT HAPPENED AT VATICAN II?

Great leadership often appears in unexpected forms. This was surely the case when Angelo Roncalli became Pope John XXIII in 1958. Widely expected to be a minor transitional Pope, John electrified the church and the world during his short papacy (1958-63). His style and manner were very different from those of his immediate predecessors. He was earthy, warm and unpretentious. He had served the church diplomatically in non-Catholic countries, and had an open ecumenical spirit. Perhaps most importantly, he was not defensive and polemical, but humble and welcoming with Catholics and non-Catholics alike.

Pope John changed the direction and spirit of the church with his bracing call for aggiornamento. The Italian term he used means renewal, revitalization, bringing things up to date. To use Lonergan's favored idiom, the pope was asking his fellow Catholics to rise to the level and challenge of their time. The papal banner of aggiornamento

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3 Collection, 244-45; Second Collection, 44.
required a major shift in the Catholic stance towards modernity. The post-Tridentine church had been an unspiring critic of the Copernican Revolution, the philosophical turn to subjectivity, the democratic movements for equality and liberty, the critical study of history and scripture. In the wake of the Reformation and the Enlightenment, European Catholics felt under attack and reacted defensively. They maintained this defensive posture for five hundred years at a great cost to themselves and their peers. To put it simply, with John XXIII love and hope for the world replaced fear and mistrust as the governing emotions of the church’s visible leader.

The defining event of John’s papacy was the Second Vatican Council he called into being. The first Vatican Council of 1870 is best remembered for its assertion of Rome’s magisterial authority. John wanted Vatican II to be different. It was to be a “pastoral council” in which the church sympathetically addressed the needs and concerns of its contemporaries. Like earlier church councils, it offered an occasion for reform and renewal, for reaffirming the best of the old and critically assimilating all that is good in the new. The intellectual foundations for Vatican II had actually been laid in the anti-modernist era, largely by French thinkers like Congar, Peguy, Danielou, and de Lubac. The American Jesuit, John Courtene Murray, also played a critical role in reshaping the church’s position on religious liberty.

The thematic backdrop to the council was the dramatic expansion of papal primacy during the long nineteenth century. This expansion was evident in the assertion of papal infallibility, the declaration of new Marian doctrines and the grant of increased authority to the Roman curia. As plans for the council developed, curial leaders, especially Cardinal Ottaviani, sought to control the council’s agenda. Clerical conservatives, fierce defenders of papal prerogatives, they wanted to preserve the Catholic status quo. They were opposed by a growing majority of bishops, many from northern Europe, eager to end the stale polemics against Protestants, liberals and scholars both inside and outside the church. These bishops were sympathetic to change and reform, to a collegial sharing of authority, to an enhanced role for the laity, to fresh ways of engaging the non-Catholic world. The dramatic tensions between these opposing visions of the council were never

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really resolved, though it’s important to remember that the assertive minority was quite small, at most fifteen percent of the assembled participants. But the curial opposition was strategically placed to fight a rearguard action against the plans of the majority right up to the end and beyond.

At Vatican II the Catholic Church confronted the reality of history. The classicist mindset prioritized constancy and minimized the importance of change. But the critical study of scripture, church doctrines, institutions, and practices showed that change was essential to a living community of faith. Newman had recognized this truth in the nineteenth century. Twentieth century scholarship only confirmed Newman’s basic approach. The real issue was not whether the church changed, but how significant changes in its teaching and practice should be thoughtfully understood and appraised.

John O’Malley provides a useful typology of the types and sources of change intensely debated at Vatican II. He distinguishes three types of change: updating, development and significant reversals of earlier public positions. Through major liturgical reforms the church updated the language and style of its worship. By emphasizing collegiality and lay participation in decision making, the church developed neglected aspects of its earlier practice. And through its ecumenical outreach and strong support for religious liberty, the church reversed its Tridentine stance of opposition to those outside the community of faith.

In considering the sources of change, O’Malley discovers an interesting paradox. One clear source of change is reading “the signs of the times,” learning from critical events in the secular world like Hiroshima, Auschwitz, the death of imperialism and the insistence on universal rights. Another profound source of change is retrieving earlier forms of Christian witness and worship, by returning to the scriptures, the patristic writings, the liturgical practices of the ancient and medieval church. Some of the most “progressive” thinkers at the council found their inspiration in these hidden sources of Christian wisdom.

O’Malley’s paradox complicates a familiar story line about the council pitting the defenders of “tradition” against the champions of “progress.” For the “defenders of tradition” were actually partisans of a narrow slice of church history, and the “champions of progress” drew
their inspiration from church traditions long neglected or forgotten. Thus the council reaffirmed a basic truth of Christianity: a living church is a learning church open to inspiration and insight from sources old and new.

The most important conciliar documents are the products of compromise between the majority and the minority. They rarely repudiate the old explicitly, but on balance, they are open and welcoming to the new. In several cases, by critically retrieving the vetra (biblical and patristic insights, symbols and language) they offer a perspective on the church and its history very different from that of the staunch anti-modernists. Four documents in particular illustrate the contrast between the ecumenical and historical spirit of the council and the narrow catholicity of the long nineteenth century.

Lumen Gentium, the light of the nations, proposes a scriptural rather than a juridical conception of the church. It defines the church as the pilgrim people of God in history and reaffirms the redemptive mission to which all Christians are called. Without repudiating papal authority, it stresses the collegial and collaborative nature of church governance and emphasizes the importance of the laity in the comprehensive Christian community. 

Dignitatis Humanae, of human dignity, clearly affirms the principle of religious liberty, of freedom of worship and conscience, for the residents of every country on earth. The older Catholic position that “error has no rights” is tacitly abandoned. The new emphasis is on the intrinsic dignity of each human being, divinely created in God’s image and likeness and on the intellectual, political and religious implications entailed by such dignity.

Nostra Aetate, our age, addresses the relation of the church to non-Christian religions. Instead of treating them as rivals and adversaries, Nostra Aetate acknowledges the solidarity of the human race, the universal search for the meaning of life and death and the enduring wisdom of the great world religions, including Hinduism, Buddhism, Judaism, and Islam. “The church, therefore urges her sons to enter with prudence and charity into discussion and collaboration with members of other religions. Let Christians, while witnessing to their own faith and way of life, acknowledge, preserve, and encourage the spiritual and moral truths found among non-Christians.”
Reforming the Church, Redeeming the World

Gaudium et Spes, joy and hope, "the Pastoral Constitution on the Church in the Modern World," was the final conciliar document approved. Symbolically, it testifies to the fundamental change Vatican II effected in Catholicism. In the preface to this pastoral teaching addressed to all humankind, the church openly identifies itself with the joy and hope, the grief and anguish of the men of our time, especially of those who are poor or afflicted in any way, and expresses its profound solidarity with the entire human race and its history. Whatever the substantive merits and limitations of its analysis and recommendations, the ultimate intention of Gaudium et Spes was welcome and clear. The church was re-embracing an Incarnational approach to the world and offering the promise of redemption to all the world's peoples and problems.

While O'Malley recognizes the substantive importance of these documents, he pays special attention to the collaborative method by which they were developed and the rhetorical style in which they were written. In fact, he finds in this method and style the interpretive key to the identity of Vatican II. The majority deliberately chose to avoid the adversarial posture of the long nineteenth century. It acknowledged past failures of the church and refrained from condemning the weaknesses of its critics. The majority's choice of dialogue as its form of internal and external communication is equally significant. The council's communicative aim is to win assent for its teaching by heightening appreciation of profound Christian truths. The council's forms of address are also noteworthy. It speaks horizontally to brothers and sisters, recognized equals, collaborative partners in seeking the good of humanity. The council issues invitations rather than commands, appeals to conscience rather than threats and portrays church leaders as ministering servants rather than hierarchical masters.

At the Second Vatican Council, the church wisely followed the example of Jesus in communicating the gospel. The council's aims were inclusive rather than sectarian. It emphasized the mystery and compassion of God rather than strict observance to codified law. It rejected nothing of what is true, good or holy in the achievements of others without concern for their religious affiliation. And by following Christ's model of charity in word and deed, the council regained the admiration and respect of the world Christ called it to serve and redeem.
REVERSAL AND RENEWAL

What was the high promise of Vatican II when the final session concluded in 1965? It was, I believe, the promise of a more mature, inclusive, self-confident and dialogue based church, committed to teaching and learning from the world. The council affirmed a universal call to holiness and an Incarnational vision of the human person. It encouraged the active participation of the laity in the liturgy and life of the church. It supported a collegial model of authority, a collaborative pattern of governance and a commitment to continuing renewal among all the people of God.

Though the agenda of the council had been broad, several controversial matters were excluded from open debate. These included the reform of the curia, the celibacy requirement for ordained priests and the ban on artificial contraception. It was also unclear how the renewed affirmation of collegiality would be concretely implemented at the local and regional levels of church governance. When the majority left Rome, they evidently hoped that these difficult matters would be discussed and debated in the collaborative spirit the council exemplified.

Has the high promise of Catholic maturity been fulfilled or obstructed since the council concluded? Have the majority's hopes for continuing reform been achieved? These are the hard questions to which I'll devote the final sections of my paper. Let us start with realities that are hard to dispute. The council lost its most powerful advocate when John XXIII died in June of 1963. Though Paul VI generally tried to honor John's legacy, he actively sided with the minority at critical stages in the council's unfolding. Paul was certainly not hostile to the majority, but he was uneasy about growing divisions in the church and about challenges to papal authority. Though the majority clearly called for structural reform of the curia and for greater authority for bishops and episcopal synods, the curial minority remained in the Vatican to implement the conciliar reforms. Carefully crafted words on paper are one thing, their practical implementation is a quite different matter. In John O'Malley's judgment, "the principle of collegiality proved no match for a deeply entrenched Vatican center."

The spirit of the council was one of respectful but significant reform. The cultural animus of the late sixties and seventies had a far more radical anti-authoritarian cast. Powerful social and political
movements in the West demanded civil rights for blacks, an end to colonial wars, new respect for women, homosexuals, the poor and disabled, and heightened attention to the environmental dangers of the global economy. Distrust and suspicion extended to all institutional authority: government, business, the academy, the patriarchal family and the equally patriarchal religious establishment. The counter-culture was often sweeping in its condemnations and uncritical in its enthusiasms. Traditional prohibitions against premarital sexual relations were cavalierly dismissed as a more permissive sexual ethos prevailed. In Bob Dylan's memorable words, "The times they were a changing." And the radical spirit of the times and the reformist spirit of the council were easily confused by their conservative critics, religious and political.

The spring and summer of 1968 proved a turning point. Student riots at the Sorbonne and at Columbia, blood flowing in the streets of Chicago, the Soviet occupation of Czechoslovakia, the racial backlash of the Wallace campaign and the Vatican's publication of *Humanae Vitae*. Despite a clear majority on the Pope's appointed commission for lifting the birth control ban, Paul VI decided unilaterally to maintain it. Apparently, he feared a loss of the church's moral authority if he rejected the conclusions of *Casti Connubii* (1930). Consistency with earlier papal teaching seemed to him more important than respecting the collaborative decision making process that Vatican II had embraced. It wasn't only that married couples on the commission had argued persuasively for lifting the ban; it was the clear violation of Vatican II's method and spirit that made Paul's unilateral decision so troubling. Ironically, Paul's actions served to weaken the Pope's teaching authority, the very result he had hoped to prevent. For opposition to *Humanae Vitae* was not confined to married Catholics. It spread throughout the church, affecting clergy and laity alike. A similar decision reached in a similar manner on clerical celibacy further deepened the Pope's isolation. In the ten remaining years of his papacy, Paul VI never issued another encyclical.

The open public dissent from *Humanae Vitae* stood in marked contrast to the strict uniformity of the anti-modernist church. How far could this dissent be expected to reach? How candidly would church authorities respond to its challenge? How fragile was the commitment
of Catholics to the church’s traditional sexual ethics? These questions grew in urgency before Paul VI died and Karol Wojtyla was selected to replace him. John Paul II was a Polish pope, deeply versed in Polish history and disciplined by Polish Catholic resistance to Communist power. As *Humanae Vitae* was evolving, Bishop Wojtyla had urged the Pope to preserve the traditional ban. Having assumed Paul’s authority, the new pope was not about to change course. He explicitly affirmed *Humanae Vitae* as official church teaching. In a series of books and encyclicals, he argued forcefully for its wisdom and importance. He developed a theology of the body as an interpretive key to human sexuality. But despite the Pope’s prolific activity, the great majority of married Catholics never found his arguments persuasive. John Paul’s idealized account of married love proved hard to reconcile with the lived experience of most married couples.

John Paul II had a very long and very visible papacy. He was a strong and highly charismatic figure with a deeply autocratic personality. He spoke far more than he listened; he taught far more than he learned. If Paul VI was troubled by perplexity and doubt, John Paul was a tower of certitude. He knew what he believed and he expected the church to follow his lead. Though he claimed to be implementing the reforms of the council, his approach to reform more often resembled the stance of the conciliar minority.

Let us briefly examine four important instances of this disheartening pattern. *Lumen Gentium* had emphasized the principles of collegiality and shared authority. It called for meaningful collaboration and dialogue between the bishops and the pope. It recognized that responsibility for leadership in the church extends in different ways to all the people of God. The church is a collaborative community that speaks with wisdom and genuine authority when all its members are heard and respected. Whatever lip service John Paul gave to these principles, he did not observe them in practice. In nearly all the critical controversies of his papacy, the decisions on contraception, priestly celibacy, the ordination of women, divorce and remarriage, the independence of the bishops and the Vatican response to conscientious dissent, he expected his word to be law. Either explicitly or implicitly he equated his personal convictions with the teaching authority that belongs to the people of God as a whole. And to secure institutional
support for these convictions, he made them litmus tests in the papal appointment of future bishops and cardinals.

In *Dignitatis Humanae*, the council affirmed the importance of religious and political liberty for all human beings. In line with this teaching, John Paul became a powerful spokesman for human rights throughout the world. He did this with special effect behind the Iron Curtain, effectively contributing to the collapse of Communist power. This laudable record made his refusal to honor human rights in the church all the more disappointing. He rudely rejected the appeal of women for full participation in the church’s ministries. He authorized Cardinal Ratzinger to repress theological dissent with minimal respect for due process. He undermined liberation theology by appointing highly conservative bishops throughout Latin America. He sought to restrict the academic freedom of Catholic universities by imposing a Vatican certified “mandate” on their faculties of theology. And he scandalously tolerated hierarchical “cover ups” of priestly sexual abuse, placing the reputation and “honor” of the church before the most basic needs of children and adolescents. For contemporary Catholics accustomed to democratic pluralism, the rule of law, secure civil liberties, and institutional accountability, these decisions only deepened their estrangement from his autocratic papacy.

In *Nostra Aetate*, the council acknowledges the wisdom of the great world religions, emphasizes the Jewish origin and heritage of Christianity and seeks fraternal solidarity with all people of good will. John Paul II went much further than any of his predecessors in repudiating Christian anti-Semitism. And his extensive travels brought him into fraternal contact with religious and secular leaders on every continent. In one sense, he was the most global, non-parochial pope in history. But as Robert McAfee Brown has written, ecumenical relations with Protestant Christians chilled markedly during his papacy, both before and after the publication of *Dominus Jesus* in 2000. If the aim of ecumenical dialogue is to achieve reconciliation in diversity, to recognize diverse ways of being faithful to the gospel and to abandon all forms of “extra ecclesiam nulla salus” (outside the Catholic Church there is no salvation), then the ecumenical spirit of the council was far more authentic and credible than the spirit evinced in John Paul’s papacy.
What of the Pope’s outreach to the modern world? His recurrent defense of human rights was impressive. His insistence on economic justice, particularly in the relations between the global North and South, was timely and important. He was a consistent voice for peace in international affairs. And his emphatic contrast between the “cultures of life and death” highlighted the moral dangers of abortion, euthanasia, capital punishment and the brutal recourse to violence against the weak and the vulnerable. But in my judgment, the Vatican’s teaching in these matters would have been far more persuasive, if its stance on contraception had been credible, its treatment of women more respectful, its protection of children more consistent, its respect for dissent more mature and its ties to highly conservative allies like Opus Dei and the Legionnaires of Christ less cozy and blind.

In some ways, John Paul II advanced the concerns of Vatican II, but on balance he more often reversed them. It’s a serious mistake, however, to identify the church with its hierarchical leadership. Though I’m profoundly disappointed with the failures of that leadership since 1968, I’ve repeatedly seen how the method and spirit of the council continue to inspire the people of God. For most Catholics, their deepest and most vital connection to the church is through their parish. A spirit filled pastor helps to create a spirit filled parish with a genuinely collaborative and respected parish council. Such parishes regularly staff homeless shelters, food kitchens and services for the elderly and homebound, engage in interfaith dialogue and ministries and work for justice and peace in their local communities.

I’ve also witnessed directly the intellectual and moral vitality of Catholic universities like Boston College, Georgetown, Notre Dame, and Fordham, as well as the critical work of integrative centers like Woodstock. The church and the world have benefitted immensely from the intellectual independence and honesty of Catholic thinkers like Bernard Haring, Karl Rahner, Bernard Lonergan, Charles Taylor, John Dunne, Peter Hebblethwaite, Garry Wills, Peter Hebblethwaite, James Carroll, Peter Steinfels, and Eugene Kennedy, to name only a few. At their best, these thinkers exemplify the critical appropriation of the old and the new. They preserve what is deepest in the Catholic tradition; they remain open and responsive to the singular and irreversible achievements of the modern age.
On a personal note, let me cite an important source of renewal from which I have greatly benefitted. In 1975 Barbara and I made a Marriage Encounter weekend. For the next twenty-five years, we belonged to an Image, an enduring group formed from about eight other couples who had also made a marriage encounter. The Image met once a month except during the summer. The core purpose of Marriage Encounter is to strengthen existing marriages by deepening the quality of interpersonal communication between husband and wife. The goal of the Image is to buttress that commitment through communal sharing and dialogue. In our Image, none of the other couples were connected to Vassar; most but not all were Catholics. The level of trust, affection, and depth grew steadily over time, as people spoke from the heart about the most important matters in their lives. Each meeting began and ended with spontaneous personal prayers. With very few exceptions, I would think as the monthly image ended, “when two or more are gathered in my name, there am I in the midst of them.” Christ was actively present in those meetings, in those marriages, and in the hearts of those free and dedicated Christians who regularly shared their joy and their sorrow, their wisdom and compassion, their mature love for God and each other. In such small, often invisible, ways the people of God are renewed.

REFORM AND REDEMPTION

Since the close of Vatican II, the Catholic Church in the West has grown increasingly divided. For many faithful Catholics the hopes for reform and renewal raised by the council have not been fulfilled. For other faithful Catholics the opening to the modern world proclaimed in Gaudium et Spes was insufficiently critical and discriminating. Massive numbers of priests and religious have resigned their ministries. Even larger numbers of lay Catholics have left the church altogether. The evident crisis in priestly and religious vocations has evoked a strong call for optional celibacy and the ordination of women. The Vatican’s ostrich like response has been staunch opposition and a concerted effort to silence these urgent appeals for change. The more resistant the Vatican to open, critical dialogue among the faithful, the less effective its authority becomes. In fact, the repeated assertion
of magisterial authority has only weakened its hold on much of the Catholic community.

This decline in effective authority is not easily remediable. For it is rooted in two profound cultural currents moving through the contemporary church. While the influence of these currents is not yet universal, in western countries at least it is already strong and deep. Effective authority is not based on the possession of power but on the exercise of legitimate power. Power has its source in human cooperation. Legitimacy is grounded on the reasons for cooperation and on the manner in which power is used. Effective authority arises through a free and reciprocal agreement between those who bear leadership and those who accept its legitimacy. As Joseph Komonchak makes clear, such authority is rooted in trustworthiness and trust. Are those who exercise authority genuinely trustworthy? What virtues must they acquire and display? What institutional and personal vices must they clearly avoid?

Trustworthy authorities must be truthful, open, humble and motivated by charity. They must recognize the limits of their competence and knowledge. They must be deeply respectful of and genuinely responsive to those whom they govern and teach. The corrupting vices that turn authority into despotism are several. Despots, political or religious, tend to be arbitrary, repressive, dishonest, evasive, sectarian and self-serving. They are generally unwilling to admit error or to acknowledge the validity of the opinions and perspectives of others. Does trustworthiness always command trust? Not necessarily. Congenital suspicion and skepticism of authority can lead people to reject even its legitimate forms. Inflated images of autonomy can make the very idea of authority repugnant. And those subject to authority can exaggerate their own merits and deny their evident limitations. The bonds of inherited authority can also weaken over time. As trustworthiness declines from above, trust is withdrawn from below. The vices of leaders manifestly eclipse their virtues. Their exercise of power seems increasingly arbitrary; the reasons they offer in support of their decisions lack credibility. To cite Komonchak again: a loss of credibility always portends a crisis in authority.

The existing crisis in the church reflects a serious decline in trustworthiness and trust. But it also reflects the other historical
current to which I alluded. Educated Catholics are not hostile to authority per se, but they increasingly expect legitimate authority to be combined with personal and public liberty. They not only expect reciprocal freedom in the constitution of authority; they also expect effective authority to be collegially shared. They require meaningful collegiality within the church’s ministry, but they also require the effective participation of the laity in shaping the church’s identity and direction. They refuse to equate the church with its appointed hierarchy; for them the church is the global people of God moving through history under the inspiration of the Holy Spirit. They deeply believe that the Spirit speaks through their experience as well as through the church’s episcopal leadership.

Let me be more concrete. The rejection of patriarchy by women and men is one of the profound historical changes of the last fifty years. It is, I believe, an irreversible change, deeply welcome and long overdue. But like all changes of this magnitude, it has aroused fierce resistance from those who fear its moral and practical implications. The most troubling failures of church leadership in the post-conciliar era have been failures of justice. I am referring to the pastoral failure of priests, bishops, and others in authority during several decades of sexual abuse of the young. But I am also referring to the Vatican’s unwillingness to grant women full equality in the church. The sins of sexism are not limited to Catholic Christianity. The inherent dignity of women has been denied in every culture shaped by traditional patriarchy. But during the last five decades as a rising feminist consciousness swept the globe, and women rightfully demanded their political, economic and cultural rights, Catholic leadership has been scandalously slow to adjust its attitudes and practices. The most contentious issue is the ordination of women to the priesthood. In my judgment, their acceptance for priestly ministry is a clear matter of justice and full Christian equality. But a much deeper institutional and cultural change is called for. The experience and talents of women, their insights and judgments, their faithful criticism and dissent, their greater flexibility and compassion, their habitual openness to dialogue are desperately needed to reform and renew the church at every level of its being.
The Catholic Church has often paid a heavy price for its reluctance to change. Lonergan once said that the church lost the allegiance of intellectuals in the eighteenth century due to its entanglement in the *Ancien Régime*. Then it lost the loyalty of the urban poor because it passively accepted the scandalous inequities caused by industrial capitalism. But an even more serious loss of allegiance threatens the church today. Large numbers of dedicated Christian women have already decided that second class citizenship is intolerable. My growing fear is that this threatening trend will become a torrent. That the church will lose many of its most faithful and gifted members; and that by clinging rigidly to the injustices of the past, it will forfeit this historic opportunity for internal reform. (The recent rebuke of American nuns for their invaluable pastoral ministry shows just how skewed the Vatican’s priorities really are.)

What must the actual life of the church be like if it is to be a credible light to the nations? It clearly cannot be a centralized monarchy in a democratic age, nor a sexist institution in an era of global feminism. It cannot be a persuasive voice for worldly justice and peace when its own conduct is unfair and repressive. All people of good faith will listen more attentively to its message of redemption when its deeds begin to align with its words. What reforms in the institutional culture of the church would make its exercise of authority more effective? It is often said that the church is not a popular democracy; and this claim is true as far as it goes. But what should its structure of internal governance be like? Should it be deliberately anti-democratic as a way of proving its counter-cultural integrity, as a way of rejecting the traditional adage “vox populi est vox Dei”?

The insights of history and our knowledge of human institutions teach us that centralized and autocratic forms of governance tend to be despotic rather than just. History also teaches that those who hold power are reluctant to surrender it, often justifying their resistance with self-serving, ideological arguments. During the long nineteenth century the Catholic Church increasingly emphasized the exercise of authority from above. The Vatican claimed to receive its authority directly from God and to govern and teach the faithful in God’s name. This divine right model of authority has made it very difficult to implement true collegiality. If command and instruction come solely from above, what
is there for other Catholics to do but obey and assent? But as repeated experience has shown, obedience and assent will be withheld when the bonds of trust and credibility are weakened or broken. I don't have a perfect recipe for authentic collegiality, but I know that it will need to combine both authority and liberty, both trustworthiness and trust, at all levels of the church.

How does public or political liberty apply to the people of God? Genuine liberty requires mutual respect, open critical dialogue, a collaborative process of learning and teaching. Tocqueville has taught us that local institutions are the strength of free communities. If these institutions are to enlist and retain the active participation of their members, they must enjoy real independence and decision making power. The church has recognized the principle of subsidiarity in its political teaching, but has minimally respected subsidiarity in its own affairs. I believe that this important principle of freedom, that what can competently be resolved at the local level should be resolved there, has a nearly universal application. Subsidiarity is a vital way of sustaining popular participation, protecting individual rights, respecting cultural pluralism, insuring diverse and balanced representation in episcopal appointments and insuring that higher levels of authority are really accountable. It is also an effective way of limiting bureaucracy, cronyism, a papal dominated episcopacy and the despotic centralization of power.

The Catholic Church is actually well organized to practice subsidiarity as well as preach it. If viewed from the bottom up, it has parishes, dioceses, universities, regional and national episcopal conferences, an international college of cardinals and curial officers and the pope. On the nineteenth century model favored by John Paul II and Benedict XVI, Rome speaks and everyone else is expected to obey. But on the model of subsidiarity, the experience, reflection, initiatives and actions of Catholics and Catholic conferences throughout the world fill the church with vitality, freedom and the promise of greater procedural and substantive justice. My point is not that Rome is always wrong and that local and national communities are always right. Not at all. It is rather that if genuine and authentic dialogue existed in both directions, and clerical authority really respected the public liberty of the clergy and laity, and the magisterium was open to learning and
correction, and the Vatican abandoned its imperial pretenses, then a church in the spirit of Vatican II and John XXII, a church in the spirit of Christ himself might gradually emerge.

Let us always remember that Jesus of Nazareth did not cling to equality with God but emptied himself, taking the form of a servant even unto death. He came among us in humility, becoming like us in all things except sin. He fasted in the desert, rejected the temptations of earthly power, refused to rely on coercion and the sword, trusting in the power of his word and example to redeem the world. The church founded by Christ is still called to continue his redemptive work in history. Our very broken world is in sore need of redemption, as is our deeply divided church. As always, the harvest is great and the laborers are few.

In concluding this paper, let me emphasize the first person plural. The Catholic Church is our deeply imperfect Christian home, and we are responsible together with our priests, religious and bishops for its future. For the church is the entire people of God on every continent, in every age, women and men, old and young, conservative and progressive, all summoned by Christ and inspired by the Spirit to continue the great work of redemption. Let us respond to that humbling summons as wisely and as well as we can.
REFLECTIONS ON BERNARD LONERGAN'S MACRO THEORY, CATHOLIC SOCIAL TEACHING, AND ETHICS

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LONERGAN'S MACRO THEORY AND THE TABLEAU ECONOMIQUE

The physiocrats or economistes are considered to be the first example of a school of modern economic thought. They were the center of attention for a brief period in France in the late eighteenth century. The founder of the school was Francois Quesnay (1694-1774). His major theoretical work is Le Tableau Economique. In it he describes the essential structure of a nation's economic system and the necessary flows of product and money among the sectors of the economy that are required for the economy to be healthy, prosperous, and growing. Although Lonergan's macroeconomic thought is quite different from Physiocratic thought, there is a family resemblance between Lonergan's economics and that of the Physiocrats. Both described what they regarded to be the key features of the economic system with a focus on the flows of product and money, as they must be to ensure economic health and prosperity. And both held to the view that this desirable economic outcome can be achieved if the structure and operations of the economic system are correctly understood, and if people act intelligently and morally in the light of this understanding.

Francois Quesnay was a country surgeon at a time when surgery was little better than butchery. As a result of the low esteem in which

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surgery was held, the Surgeon’s Guild in France was dominated by the Physician’s Guild headed by a prominent physician, Jean Baptiste de La Silva, a specialist in blood letting as a therapeutic technique. On the basis of knowledge of William Harvey’s discoveries about the circulation of blood Quesnay challenged the science behind de La Silva’s theory of the beneficial effects of blood letting, and presented experimental evidence to support his opinion. The quality of Quesnay’s experimental evidence would not pass muster today, but in the spirit of the time, with its growing interest and confidence in empirical evidence and experimentation, Quesnay bested de La Silva and carried the day. Quesnay’s prestige rose. He was invited to Versailles and appointed physician to Madame Pompadour, the mistress of the King.

As a country surgeon Quesnay long had been interested in agriculture and agricultural matters, but at Versailles he turned his intention to more intensive study of economics and Le Tableau Economique was the result. His thoughts about the structure and operation of the economy were undoubtedly influenced by his interest in and knowledge of Harvey’s discoveries about the circulation of blood. Quesnay appears to have used the human body and the circulation of blood through the body as a model for his description of the economy as a social body with the flows of product and money through the economy regarded as analogous to the flow of blood through the body of an animal organism. Quesnay conceived of the economy as composed of three distinct sectors identified as the proprietal, productive, and barren, sectors. The productive sector was the agricultural sector and Quesnay called this sector productive because he believed it alone yielded an output in excess of the value of the inputs used in production. Quesnay named the additional output the net product and he regarded it as a gift of nature, and the only source of economic growth, and achieved only because of agricultural labor’s cooperation with nature. Artisans, manufacturers, and merchants comprised the barren class, named as such because of the Physiocratic belief that members of this class produced value equal only to the value of the inputs used. Since they were not cooperating with nature there was no net product. The proprietal class consisted of the landed proprietors who received the

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net product of agriculture in the form of rental income. This class was also called the disposable class because although a portion of what was received as a rent was a return to the proprietors for the investment they made in making the land suitable for agricultural use by clearing, draining and maintaining it, another portion was a pure rental income, a surplus, and not payment for a productive contribution. And it was this latter portion that the Physiocrats believed was at the disposal of the king as tax revenue to support the kingdom. For this reason a major policy proposal of the Physiocrats was the replacement of all taxes by a single tax on the pure agricultural rent of land. Since they believed that all taxes eventually must be paid out of that part of the net product that they considered a pure surplus, they concluded it was better to replace the complex oppressive network of French indirect taxes with this single direct tax.

There is more to Physiocracy than described above. More generally, the Physiocrats believed in the governance of economic activity in keeping with the laws implanted in nature by Providence. They assigned great importance to economic freedom and competition. Laissez-faire was their policy recommendation to the French government. Their views on economic law, and the merits of freedom and competition made them critical of mercantilist interference with trade, and these same views, in conjunction with their emphasis on the importance of agriculture, led them to be critical of what they regarded as the cumbersome and inefficient aspects of the tax system then in effect in France. They searched for means of shifting expenditure toward agriculture. They condemned man-made impediments to this expansion of expenditure by the productive class, for example, restrictions on the sale of produce by duties and other barriers to trade; hoarding; the outflow of funds to foreign lands; and the diversion of money into circuits that did not enter into agriculture markets. These restrictions had their roots in the practice of tax farming, in flotation of government loans, in monopolies and special privileges, and in the absence of a regime of economic liberty. The great stress placed on the role of investment in agriculture enters into Quesnay's comparison of grande and petite agriculture. The first involved large scale, technologically advanced methods, and heavy capital investment; and the second involved traditional methods, backward owner-cultivator
relations, and little capital. Quesnay favored the former. Thus the Physiocrats advocated abolishing small farms in favor of agrarian capitalism along the English model. They also appreciated the power of self-interest, the workings of a system of independent prices, the role of private property, and a regime of economic liberty and competition. They believed in the existence of a discoverable natural order that people must comply with if they are to be prosperous and happy.

But, the Physiocrats were not concerned with economic output and investment to the exclusion of justice and good morals. They believed in a moral order that was discoverable by natural reason, and they believed that the positive laws of France ought to conform to that moral order in the interest of a just society. Economic life for Quesnay and his followers was subordinated to the requirements of justice. Maximum economic production was not the end of all human activity. Their advocacy of the government of all human societies through the system of natural law included both the natural laws of economics, and the principles of natural justice. They supported enlightened and vigorous action to develop and maintain the ideally just legal order, which would fully formulate and enforce the principles of ethical natural law, right, and justice. Only within that legal framework would the natural laws of the economy be allowed to work automatically to ensure full and optimum use of resources to maximize the well being of the individuals that made up the society. Their notion of natural law covered both rules and standards of ideal conduct that men ought to obey, and social scientific laws of the social processes, which follow upon actual obedience to the standards of ideal conduct. In other words men as free and rational moral agents ought to act, and can act, so that the results of their actions will set up a system of social processes as favorable as possible to their common welfare. Quesnay's system thus includes three ideas: prudent rational action by individuals in satisfying their own desires; justice among men in their relations with each other, allowing only those prudent actions which at the same time are just to all affected persons; and the quasi mechanical laws of the social economic processes that will go on if both the rules of prudence and of justice are universally obeyed.³

³In describing Physiocracy I have made liberal use of the writing of Spengler, "Physiocractic Thought," and Charles Gide and Charles Rist, "Chapter 1: The Physiocrats,"
LONERGAN'S MACRO THEORY: A DESCRIPTIVE ACCOUNT

The central thrust of the approach to macroeconomics proposed by Bernard Lonergan in *Macroeconomic Dynamics: An Essay in Circulation Analysis* is that in all national economic systems there are two distinct circuits of economic activity. He called these the basic and the surplus circuits and maintained that both conventional macroeconomic theory and Catholic social teaching on economic life had not attended adequately to this critical feature of the economic process.

Lonergan identified the output of the basic circuit as a standard of living and described this circuit as containing all activities that produce and distribute the final goods and services that enter into the standard of living of the economy's population. Lonergan made it clear that the standard of living is enhanced by many human activities not directed toward the production of marketed goods and services. But to keep a description of the central features of his economic theory as simple as possible this account will focus on the economic activities connected with market produced goods and services.

In a modern market economy the basic circuit encompasses an extraordinarily wide range of economic activities. It includes all market activities connected with the direct production of both final consumption goods and services and the intermediate inputs needed to produce the final goods. It includes all market activities by which the income produced by production activities is distributed to those who supply the labor and other inputs needed to produce the enormous variety of final and intermediate goods and services. Production activities in the basic circuit require the employment of given stocks of producer goods of various types, given stocks of energy and raw materials, a given set of labor skills, and a given body of technological knowledge. The business establishments active in the basic circuit hire inputs of labor, buy material inputs, and produce the whole range of goods and services that enter the standard of living. All this activity requires money payments to workers and firms. The functioning of the circuit thus requires continual circular flows of both money payments and real goods and services.

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In principle, the circular flows of production, income, and money described in the basic circuit could be repeated indefinitely over time producing in each time period a fixed or given standard of living, except for several real world considerations. Firstly, fixed capital, that is, equipment, machinery, and tools, wears out and must be replaced. Secondly, population may grow requiring additional machinery and equipment to produce the same standard of living for a larger population. Thirdly, an improvement in the average standard of living requires an increase in the stock of equipment, machinery, and tools. Fourthly, if new technology is developed, new machinery embodying the new technology must be produced to replace the outmoded equipment if the improvement in the standard of living implicit in the new technology is to be realized. Fifthly, the repeated production of a given or improving standard of living also depends on resource availability. In order to keep the exposition as simple as possible this last consideration will be put aside in this account of the economic process as envisioned by Lonergan.

It is clear from what has been described above that there is a need in a continuously functioning and growing economy for what Lonergan called the surplus circuit. The output of this circuit consists of the capital goods needed by producing establishments in the basic circuit to produce the final goods and services that provide the standard of living. Part of surplus circuit output will consist of new capital goods that add to the total stock of capital goods in the basic circuit needed to produce the standard of living. A second part will consist of replacements for capital goods used up that must be replaced to maintain output of both circuits at the existing level. A third part will consist of replacements of existing capital goods by new capital goods with an improved technology. The surplus circuit thus encompasses all those market activities that are involved in the direct production of capital goods and intermediate inputs needed to produce capital goods. Similarly to the basic circuit firms and industries in the surplus circuit employ given stocks of producer goods of various types, given stocks of energy and raw materials, a given set of labor skills, and a particular body of technological knowledge. Business establishments active in the surplus circuit buy inputs of labor and materials and they produce the whole range of capital goods and services needed by producers of
both basic circuit goods and surplus circuit goods. All this requires money payments to workers and firms. As with the basic circuit, the functioning of the surplus circuit requires continual circular flows of both money payments and goods and services through commodity and factor markets.

It is obvious from what has been described above that the simplest version of the Lonergan schema requires crossover relationships between the two circuits. Goods produced by basic circuit firms are needed by workers employed in surplus circuit firms, and goods produced by surplus circuit firms are needed by basic circuit firms. Money payments must flow between the two circuits for these transfers of production to be effected. In addition to the exchanges that take place within each circuit and in the crossover relationships between the circuits there are also redistributive exchanges in the economic system. These redistributive exchanges play an important role in the operation of the system and can have important effects, both negative and positive, on economic performance. But since redistributive exchanges are not directly connected with the parts played in the production of the standard of living by basic and surplus circuit firm and industry activities they will not be discussed in this paper in order to keep the exposition of Lonergan’s central point as simple as possible.

LONERGAN'S MACRO THEORY: AN EVALUATIVE COMMENTARY

Lonergan was correct in noting that all national economic systems produce two different kinds of goods and services, and that the circuits for the production of both can be distinguished in the way he has distinguished them. As described above the basic circuit contains all those productive sectors and firms which produce goods and services that enter directly into the standard of living, and the surplus circuit contains all those productive sectors and firms which produce the tools and equipment used in the production of both the goods that enter the standard of living directly, and the goods produced in the various productive sectors of the surplus circuit.

Surplus goods must be produced prior in time to the basic goods that they are used to produce, and since on average surplus goods may be
likely to be more durable than basic goods, the demand for specific and highly durable surplus goods will decline necessarily as the available supply grows to what is needed. Once this point is reached the levels of production of specific sectors of the surplus circuit will be confined, to a significant degree, to the more modest levels demanded for replacement purposes. If this occurs at about the same time in several surplus circuit firms and sectors, employment, production, and investment expenditure in these particular firms and sectors of the surplus circuit will decline and a contraction of production and employment in these firms and sectors will take place. But the expansion in productive capacity, driven by prospective demand, brought about by the new fixed capital in the firms and sectors, in both the basic and surplus circuits, which have acquired these new productive instruments, should, in a well functioning market economy, eventually be accompanied by an expansion of production, employment, and expenditure in the basic circuit, and this expansion should offset the declines in expenditure and employment in firms and sectors in the surplus circuit.

It is possible, as Lonergan indicates, that major shifts from expenditure on surplus goods to expenditure on basic goods might have to take place to bring about the shifts in production needed to realize the improvement in the standard of living made possible by the expansion in surplus circuit production and to prevent rising unemployment in the productive sectors of the economy. In the transition to the new structure of employment and production, unemployment in some sectors will rise, and at the same time there will be labor shortages in other sectors even if the aggregate demand for labor is at a full employment level. The solution of this transitional employment problem is more difficult if the employment growth and decline is in different firms, industries, occupations, and geographic regions, although there are means to make the necessary readjustment easier and less painful for those employed in sectors of the economy where decline is occurring.

But it does not seem to me that it is necessary that all capital goods productions in all capital goods sectors must expand and contract simultaneously. The description of surplus expansions followed by contractions presented in Lonergan's manuscript can be read to suggest that he believed these shifts in investment and production would take place simultaneously through an entire circuit,
whether basic or surplus, and that there would be general expansion of production in the surplus circuit followed by decline, and an expansion in the basic circuit taking place in the basic sector to offset the decline in the surplus circuit and vice versa, and that this sort of movement in production would occur in offsetting ways between the two circuits continually in a properly operating national economic system.

Regardless of whether the expansions and contractions focused on by Lonergan are as concentrated by circuit as his manuscript appears to suggest, or are distributed more evenly across both circuits, there will be problems of coordination in any moving and expanding economy, and I think the problems of coordination are the principal focus of Lonergan's attention. Resources including labor must shift to different productive activities and productive activities that are expanding and those that are declining will be in different firms, different industries, and different geographical regions. Thus there is an immense problem of coordination and the market system will probably not coordinate the necessary shifts smoothly in a way that maintains continuous full employment. Some disruption of the lives of individuals and their families is thus inevitable in a dynamically and constantly changing economy even if every economic participant acts intelligently and virtuously. And, it is important to keep in mind that it is possible, and perhaps likely, that in any time period all expanding (or contracting) firms and sectors are not necessarily in one circuit, and all contracting (or expanding) firms in the other circuit such that expansion in one circuit takes up the slack caused by contraction in the other. What may be the case is that a continual stream of contractions and expansions take place throughout an economy without all surplus circuit expansion, or contraction, and all basic circuit contraction, or expansion, taking place at the same time. Essentially as demand for output slows down in a particular firm or sector of either circuit, demand for output must increase in some other firm or sector of the economy. And ideally it would be desirable if these expansions and contractions took place in a way that would keep labor and capital, including additions to the stock of capital goods produced in the surplus circuit, fully employed.

In a dynamic economy firms and industrial sectors are always expanding and declining, and new firms and new products are
continually coming on line. This process is continually occurring in both the basic and surplus circuits, although undoubtedly, at times, the expansions (or contractions) may be concentrated in one circuit rather than the other. What is happening in the circular flow of economic life is that the economy is churning continually, and thus there is a continuing problem of coordination. In the view of economic organization, subscribed to by most economists, markets will handle the necessary coordination. The problem is immensely complicated in a situation where the economy is growing and developing and extensive innovation is an important characteristic of the circular flow of economic life. This innovation involves the introduction of new products, or the introduction of new and superior ways of producing old products. The activities of innovating entrepreneurs upset the orderly processes of the circular flow and the coordination problem becomes much more complicated.

Modern macroeconomics began with a focus on the circular flow of economic life, and the final result of this circular flow is total national output. This includes all final goods and services, whether consumption goods, which enter directly into the standard of living, or investment goods, which are used to produce the consumption goods. It thus includes in one sum both the output of what Lonergan called the basic circuit and what he called the surplus circuit. Keynes is the most important economist connected with the development of modern macroeconomics. Like Lonergan, Keynes's work was the result of his attempt to come to grips with the economic collapse of the world's industrial economies in the 1930s. The major issue for Keynes was the high and persistent level of unemployment. He asked why it was that with abundant idle manufacturing capacity, abundant idle farm land, abundant numbers of unemployed workers desiring jobs, and masses of people in dire need of the goods that could be produced in these factories and farms, it was not possible to put all these things together to produce and distribute the goods and services so badly needed. Keynes shifted the focus of economic investigation from the long run to the short run, and from the supply side to the demand side, and asked the question about what determines the overall aggregate level of output and employment in the short run. His answer was that it is the level of aggregate spending, or the level of money demand. This led
him to focus on the distinction between consumption and investment in a way that resembles remotely Lonergan's distinction between the basic and surplus circuits. But, Keynes's distinction between the two fundamental streams of consumption and investment spending was related to his conclusion that the consumption component of spending was a fairly stable function of income, whereas investment spending was a highly volatile component of aggregate spending, and a function of such things as the degree of anxiety and uncertainty about the future, and waves of optimism and pessimism. For these reasons it was necessary to examine separately the determinants of consumption spending in the aggregate and the determinants of investment spending in the aggregate. Lonergan's focus on the distinction between basic circuit production and surplus circuit production is quite different.

THE MACRO MODEL AND CATHOLIC SOCIAL TEACHING

Lonergan undertook the work in macro economic theory described above in order to find an improved conceptual basis for the realistic and effective application of Catholic social teaching to economic life. He believed such teaching must be based on a correct understanding of economic operations. This means that taking Lonergan seriously requires an inquiry into the implications of his macro theory of the operations of a market based economy for Catholic social teaching on the economy, a theology of the workplace, and the relationship between economics and ethics. In particular we must ask about the relationship between the content of Lonergan's Essay in Circulation Analysis and the body of Catholic social teaching on economic life.

The moral principles at the core of Catholic social teaching can be found in church documents, especially in papal encyclicals such as Leo XIII's *Rerum Novarum* (1891) and John Paul II's *Centesimus Annus* (1991). These teachings include strong support for private property, although not as a natural right, but as preferable for many practical reasons to a system of collective ownership; a strong affirmation of the right of freedom of association with its implied support for trade unions, and collective bargaining, and a right to strike for serious reasons; a strong support for the right of worker participation in enterprise management; a strong support for a just
wage as a normative ideal; strong support for a wage for adult workers that enables a family to live in at least frugal comfort; affirmation of a legitimate role for government in supplementing the distributional role of the labor market when necessary to assure a minimally adequate family income consistent with income standards then prevailing in the general economy; the acceptance of the market system as a basic social organizing and distributional mechanism with such regulation of markets by legal enactment and collective bargaining as are necessary to assure that the outcome of market forces is consistent with basic human dignity; support for the principle of subsidiarity, that is, that a higher organization should never arrogate to itself what can be done at a lower level, and a recognition of what this principle implies for decentralized democratic self government; strong support of the principles of human solidarity and stewardship; and a strong emphasis on both human freedom and the importance of self-government. These principles are closely related to what Lonergan calls goods of order, which I take to mean the institutional patterns of cooperation necessary for morally correct economic outcomes. All of these principles can be used in making judgments about the economy’s operations in the absence of Lonegan’s economic work. But the question that needs addressing in light of Lonegan’s work concerns the effect of the understanding of economic operations that he has provided upon how the social principles are applied.

Kenneth Melchin has thought deeply about this key question. In personal conversation he has pointed out to me that the correct understanding of the ebbs and flows of activity in the various firms and industrial sectors of the basic and surplus circuits aimed at by Lonergan makes moral and ethical demands on economic actors both when they act as individuals, and when they act collectively through the political process. As described above, Lonergan believed a better understanding of economic operations is gained by framing theoretically the analytical structure of the economy in terms of two distinct circuits and the crossover relationships between them. This is combined with the proposition that the two circuits expand and contract at different times, with expansion in the surplus circuit preceding expansion in the

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basic circuit and with expansion in the basic circuit being dependent on the prior expansion in the surplus circuit and on the correct operation of the crossover relationships between the circuits. Melchin repeatedly calls attention to the moral obligations imposed on economic actors by the recognition and existence of the necessary relationships between the activities in the two circuits. These moral obligations concern the shifts in investment and expenditure necessary to keep the money flows in the proper relationships. If these shifts in the money flows that conform to the necessary rhythms of the two circuits are achieved, Lonergan's theoretical understanding is that this will keep the growing economy on its optimal growth path and eliminate the booms and bust of the trade cycle.

What are the specific moral obligations implied by the Lonergan economic schema? Melchin describes two. The first is collective political action to develop an accounting and public reporting system that will provide the data economic actors need to make correct decisions. The second imposes a responsibility on economic actors to use the data provided to make the decisions necessary to ensure that the appropriate shifts in expenditure needed to keep the system on an even keel take place. Melchin used the example of the Canadian firm Nortel to illustrate what he believes is required. Evidently Nortel continued to focus its production lines in a particular direction (producing fiber optics networks and computer systems for surplus circuit firms) well beyond the time when the demand for these surplus circuit capital goods had declined substantially. This engendered a boom and bust sequence in production that Melchin believes could have been avoided. He argues that the need to take the actions necessary to avoid the boom and bust sequence and the disruption and misallocation involved would have been more widely recognized if the theoretical understanding proposed by Lonergan had been more widely appreciated, and if the data generated to track the movements in the two circuits, to distinguish the movements necessary in the crossover relationships among the circuits; to recognize the consequences for the real economy of redistributive exchanges; and to distinguish flows of money payments in purely redistributive exchanges from the money flows necessary to keep the two productive circuits operating in a balanced way had been available and utilized intelligently.
Achieving the appropriate balance and taking the appropriate actions also requires the provision of data distinguishing money flows related to redistributive exchanges that are not directly part of the productive activities of the economy from the money flows connected directly with the productive activities of the economy carried out in the basic and surplus circuits and the crossover relationships between them. It is important to recognize that trading and redistributive activities do play positive roles in the economy and provide employment and income to many people who play important roles in the overall healthy functioning of the economy, and the income earned by those engaging in these activities makes possible their inclusion among those who gain access to the standard of living. But in Lonergan’s schema it is important to separate out what is going on in primary activities that contribute directly to the production of a standard of living from secondary activities that may in some instances be quite remotely connected with primary activities. It needs to be kept in mind that the standard of living is enhanced by each person having in his possession at a given point the right mix of goods and services, and exchanges that are merely redistributive can enhance welfare by enabling non zero sum trades of goods produced in an earlier period among individuals, thereby enhancing the subjective satisfaction and the productive contributions of all exchanging parties.

Discussion by those most familiar with Lonergan’s economic thinking often centers on the profit share of income, and the periodic and recurring necessity of reallocating this income from investment in surplus goods production to basic goods demand, and then at another stage, in the continually recurring cyclical patterns of the two circuits, a reallocation from basic good demand to surplus good investment. The assumption seems to be that this cyclically recurring reallocation of profits is the key to managing adequately the necessary shifts in production activities and necessary shifts in money flows. In the discussion of profits a distinction is made between normal profit and pure surplus income. Normal profit appears to be that level of profit that is necessary to ensure the required amount of capital is in the right place in directly productive activities at the right time. Thus normal profit is a cost of doing business no different from the cost of any other productive input. Pure surplus income appears to be
any profit in excess of normal profit. Evidently it can be an excessively high return on productive capital, or a return on speculative activities in the redistributive circuit. It's clearly considered to be related to an expansionist phase of the business cycle. It may involve such activities as speculative trading in the redistributive sector, and it will come to an end when the boom turns into a bust. Lonergan's point appears to be that if this rise in pure surplus income can be redirected toward spending for expanded basic good production that is possible because of the expansion in potential basic circuit output capacity made possible by the previous surplus circuit expansion, the boom and bust cycle can be tempered, or perhaps even avoided. This would seem to require an ability to identify what part of the profit received is normal profit and what part is pure surplus income. This presents practical difficulties. How can this necessary distinction be made? What will lead the receivers of pure surplus income, if identified, to begin to spend this income on basic goods and bring about the necessary contraction in the surplus circuit and the necessary expansion in the basic circuit? What brings about the necessary shifts in the opposite direction when the time comes for cutbacks in expenditure in the basic circuit and expanding savings for investment in the surplus sector when the surplus circuit ought to begin an expansion phase? Melchin links the subsidiarity principle to technological and organizational creativity. He argues that these should be fostered by some use of the profits that are a pure surplus income to sustain and take advantage of the necessary expansionary stages in the surplus circuit so that in historical time the ability of the system to produce a constantly improving standard of living is realized. In this discussion an improved standard of living will include the expanded opportunity for true leisure and well-utilized leisure time.

THE GOOD OF ORDER AND CATHOLIC SOCIAL TEACHING

In several papers Charles Tackney has identified what he regards as two important criteria for judging the goodness of a national industrial relations system from the perspective of Catholic social teaching. These

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5 For example, Charles T. Tackney, “John R. Commons, Heinrich Pesch, and Bernard J. F. Lonergan: Three Seminal Thinkers on the Working Rules of the Going Concern
criteria are the existence of arrangements for worker participation in the management of business enterprises, and worker protection against unjust dismissal. With regard to these criteria Tackney concludes the United States' employment system compares poorly with the Japanese system, which he has studied intensively. He explains that the two foundational elements on which the Japanese system was constructed were the U.S. National Labor Relations Act (NLRA) of 1935, a major legislative accomplishment of Roosevelt's New Deal, and the German system of codetermination, the roots of which are in the German Catholic social thought that undergirds the papal social encyclical tradition that began with Leo XIII's *Rerum Novarum* in 1891. In light of the importance of the NLRA in contributing to what Tackney judges to be a manifestly more just social outcome in employment relations in Japan than in the United States he speculates about whether justice in the U.S. employment system could be advanced substantially by taking advantage of what he thinks may be the latent potential of the NLRA. Various questions come to mind. Could this be accomplished administratively, or would it require legislative action to amend the NLRA? If it can be done by administrative action are the necessary administrative changes politically feasible? If legislative change is necessary, are the necessary legislative changes politically feasible? These questions concern the possibility of achieving what Lonergan calls a good of order. Answering these questions fully requires extensive legal, political, and historical analysis that is beyond the scope of this paper but an exploratory discussion is possible and my limited effort to engage in such a discussion follows.

When the NLRA was enacted in 1935 the purpose of its congressional framers was to support and encourage collective bargaining as an important way of determining wages and working conditions in the private sector of American industry. At the core of the Act are the statutory rights enumerated in Section 7, which stated simply that workers have rights to form, join, and assist trade unions and through them to bargain collectively. The Act was amended in a major way in 1947, but the language of Section 7 describing the Act’s core remained essentially intact, although additional language was added indicat-

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ing workers also had the right to refrain from organizing unions, and this additional language is not without significance. In 1935 the Act's framers wanted to assure that workers were not coerced by employers in ways that would interfere with the exercise of the rights given in Section 7, and to guarantee this they enumerated five employer unfair labor practices in Section 8. These were potential employer actions that Congress judged would interfere with the workers' free exercise of their Section 7 rights. In 1947 Section 8 was amended to add six union unfair labor practices. In a fashion parallel to what Congress had done in 1935 in specifying actions employers must avoid, the union unfair labor practices enumerated in 1947 were actions that if engaged in by a union would be, in the judgment of Congress, interferences by the union with the workers free exercise of their section 7 rights. In a very real sense the Act as it now stands pictures both employers and unions in competition for the allegiance of workers, and if the two parties are not restrained by law either or both of them might take actions that interfere with an individual worker's right to be free from coercion in deciding for or against unionization and collective bargaining. Thus from 1935 to 1947 there was a significant shift in the perspective of Congress with respect to unionization and collective bargaining.

The National Labor Relations Board (NLRB) is the administrative agency established by the NLRA to carry out the purposes of the Act. The NLRB has the two specific functions and its authority and scope are determined largely by what it needs to do to carry out these functions. The first function is the investigation and adjudication of unfair labor practice complaints, and the second is the administration of certification and decertification elections that are the primary way of determining whether or not a union will be recognized by the NLRB as the collective bargaining representative of the employees of a given employer. In practice the manner in which the NLRB functions in both these areas is influenced significantly by the past professional experience of the Board members, their views regarding unions and collective bargaining, and management rights, congressional intent, and also by the body of case and administrative law that has developed since the enactment of the NLRA in 1935. Appointments to the Board and the way in which Board members understand their roles and the decisions they make are also influenced by periodic shifts in the political culture.
It is possible in theory by means of actions allowable within the scope of authority given by Congress to the NLRB and its General Counsel, and within the legal framework imposed by Court decisions, and without legislated changes in the NLRA, to improve the ethical performance of the U.S. employment system in marginal ways along the lines indicated by Tackney. I think movement in this direction would be modest at best, but marginal improvement is possible by actions the Board could take if Board decisions were in the hands of people willing to use existing Board power and authority to speed up representation elections and make the election process fairer, and if decisions concerning unfair labor practices were handled somewhat differently. Moving in this direction depends on the industrial relations expertise of Board appointees, on their willingness to be guided in their decisions by a belief in the principles underlying the NLRA as originally enacted, and on the degree of political support they receive from Congress and the President. Given the structure and content of the NLRA, as described above, and given the political and legal culture of the United States it is my judgment that it is highly unlikely at present, or in the near term future, to expect that much will be done by the NLRB to bring about the kind of changes in practice that would be necessary to move the U.S. employment system in the direction of the Japanese system with respect to the degree of worker participation in enterprise management and greater protection against unjust dismissal. In general, I am skeptical of the possibility that improvement could be accomplished readily. My judgment is based on what I see as the limits on the authority of the NLRB imposed by the present realities of the political and legal culture of the United States.

Accomplishing more than the marginal changes described above that may be possible within the current legal framework governing the NLRB would require action by the legislature that would modify the NLRA substantially. I think the likelihood of this happening is extraordinarily small. An attempt at significant reform of the NLRA in the late 1970s, when labor union membership was a much larger proportion of the labor force than it is today and organized labor had more political clout, seemed at the time, to some observers, to be a realistic political possibility, but it came to nothing. In the early 1990s a high level Commission on Worker Management Relations
was established. It was chaired by Professor John Dunlop of Harvard University. The commission held hearings throughout the country, received testimony and submissions from all interested and affected parties, and submitted to Congress a comprehensive report containing proposals for changes in the NLRA that would bring the Act up to date, and deal adequately with the problems that had developed over the years since the NLRA had been enacted. But Congress did nothing with the Report. It was dead in the water shortly after its arrival in Congress. There is no broad based political support in the United States for serious labor law reform. In fact, in the current run up to the next election some candidates have proposed abolition of the NLRB. At times in recent years it has been virtually impossible for Presidential appointments to the NLRB to get congressional approval, and for extensive periods the Board has been without the minimum number of members necessary to make decisions in unfair labor practice cases. Given this experience my judgment is that what can be done to improve the system administratively is very little, and my further judgment is that at present and for the foreseeable future virtually nothing constructive can be accomplished legislatively. My conclusion is that there is little that might be done to improve the justice of the US employment system with respect to protection against unjust dismissal, and by broader schemes for worker participation in management, either through a broader administrative interpretation of what is possible under the NLRA, or through legislative reform of the NLRA. Nevertheless, there are possibilities for improving the U.S. system along both lines by means that lie outside the framework and scope of the NLRA.

One of the most significant accomplishments of the decentralized collective bargaining system in the United States has been the development of grievance systems within collectively bargained contracts for resolving differences between employers and workers about the meaning and application of contract provisions. In most contracts the grievance procedure provides, as a last step, final and binding arbitration of unresolved disputes over interpretation and application of collective bargaining terms. Many of these disputes concern the limitations imposed on employers with respect to their freedom to discharge. In this way collectively bargained contracts
provide some protection against unjust dismissal. An important question relating to the goods of order is whether this system, and the experience gained under it, can be the basis for bringing greater protection against unjust dismissal to the U.S. workplace in general. In the 1950s the U.S. Supreme Court in a series of cases (the Steelworkers Trilogy) deferred to this private system of dispute resolution, although in recent decades the Court has backed away somewhat from its earlier position of deference to collectively bargained arbitration arrangements in discharge cases when a question of a worker's constitutional or statutorily based rights, such as those barring discrimination in employment on the basis of race or sex, are a matter to be decided.

There has also developed in the United States a growing body of employment law imposing restrictions on dismissal by statutory enactment and public policy. This law covers such matters as race, sex, religion, ethnicity, and age. In the courts and in various other public tribunals individuals can challenge a discharge if they think the discharge was a violation of an established statutory or constitutional right. There are important questions about the conditions under which a worker can appeal to the courts concerning discharge decisions made by an arbitrator under a union management agreement to arbitrate or under arbitration agreements in a non-union setting when the discharge is alleged to have been in violation of a statutory right. There are also empirical questions about whether the private arrangements or the courts and other public tribunals are most apt to produce satisfactory resolution of workers' grievances in discharge cases.

Some scholars who have studied dispute resolution believe there is considerable scope for using experience gained under union management grievance arrangements, with arbitration as a last step, to improve systems set up in nonunion establishments, and that there is also a substantial potential role for using private systems to gain speedier and more adequate resolution of discharge grievances than can be obtained by relying on overburdened public appeal boards and courts.⁶ From the perspective of this paper the important point

is that there may be a substantial opportunity in the United States to make important progress in protecting workers from arbitrary dismissal, in an efficient and effective way, by making use of all that has been learned about dispute resolution under collectively bargained contracts, and using this experience and the methods developed to bring about a substantial improvement in efforts to prevent unjust dismissal in much wider settings. In a similar vein it may also be possible to improve the employment system in both union and non union establishments by building on the experience of those U.S. firms that have managed to improve the workplace and improve wages, working conditions, product quality, and productivity through greater use of cooperative participative mechanisms at the workplace even if such mechanisms cannot be mandated by public law. All these matters relate to improvements in goods of order that may be achievable through careful study and intelligent action. This is related to Catholic social teaching, ethics, and a theology of the workplace and may point toward improvement in the current system and practice that is achievable within the U.S. political and social culture.

A REFLECTION ON ETHICS AND ECONOMICS

What follows below is a talk I presented in April 1999 to the Boston College Chapter of Omicron Delta Epsilon, the National Honor society in Economics. I have included it here without modification because of its possible relevance to the topic of Lonergan and Catholic social teaching.

Thank you for this second opportunity to address the annual dinner meeting of Omicron Delta Epsilon. At the time of my prior appearance on this platform eleven years ago, my topic was "Economics and Moral Philosophy." Professor Schneider suggested I might give the same talk tonight, since this is probably an entirely new audience, but I thought I would rather try to say something different, although on the same topic. In the summer of 1988, following my previous talk at this annual dinner, one of our departmental colleagues, Bob Cheney, died quite unexpectedly. I offered to teach the course in History of Economic Thought that Bob had taught for fifty consecutive semesters. Since then
I've taught the course at least yearly. Economics has its roots in moral and political philosophy, and teaching History of Thought has kept the memory of Bob Cheney, and the topic of morality and economics before my eyes.

A proposition I have, on occasion, found in the literature of economics is that ethical behavior is preferable to unethical behavior on utilitarian grounds. For example, during the current semester I am teaching a course on the Economics of Labor Relations. Chapter 13 of the course text is titled "Ethical and Unethical Conduct and the Bargaining Process." The simple argument of chapter 13 is that ethical behavior in collective bargaining is better than unethical behavior. The author's preference for ethical behavior is based, to some extent, on what appear to be utilitarian considerations. He believes bargaining will be more productive for both parties if the behavior of the negotiators is ethical, and he believes also that the health of the institution of collective bargaining in the U.S. economy will be enhanced by a move toward higher ethical standards on the part of negotiators.

The textbook author presents a model of collective bargaining in which what is called distributive bargaining is distinguished from what is called integrative bargaining. In distributive bargaining the parties argue on the basis of positions rather than on the basis of underlying interests, and the presumption of the parties is that bargaining is a zero-sum game, meaning, obviously, that one party can only advance its position at the other's expense. Integrative bargaining shifts the focus of bargaining from positions to underlying interests, and concentrates the attention of both parties on a search for solutions that can help both parties advance their interests simultaneously. Thus, integrative bargaining is based on the assumption that the bargaining situation is not necessarily zero-sum. In the collective bargaining literature, integrative bargaining goes under such names as mutual gains bargaining and win-win bargaining. It is argued, by proponents of integrative bargaining, that distributive bargaining, whatever its merits in the early post World War II U.S. economy, is no longer a suitable normative model for collective bargaining in the contemporary economy. Integrative bargaining, in the opinion of the author of my

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course text, is a better normative model. The textbook author believes that the success of integrative bargaining depends upon the adoption of codes of ethical behavior by the parties to collective bargaining. This line of reasoning is why I describe the author's interest in ethical behavior as being, to some extent, motivated by considerations of utility. Utility as a basis for ethical argumentation has a respectable pedigree in the history of the discipline of economics. The utility principle was at the center of the work of both Jeremy Bentham and his contemporary James Mill, and utility continued on as an important principle in the work of James Mill's illustrious son, John Stuart Mill, whose 1848 economics text was the book through which most people learned their economics up until the time of Alfred Marshall in the late 19th century. Is the utility principle, used in the way I have described, an adequate principle for integrating considerations of ethics and justice into economics? I will leave you with that question as I describe another way in which my textbook author also dealt with ethical considerations.

The author of my course text argued that in specific bargaining situations the parties should come to agreement before bargaining begins about the appropriate code of ethical conduct to which both parties will agree to adhere during negotiations. Thus, ethical behavior by the parties to the negotiation process would mean that the parties would be faithful to a code of principles that they have agreed upon jointly in advance. In the textbook author's effort to be more concrete about the content of this ethical code, he shifted the development of his ethical argument away from the implied ethical criterion of utility, that is, that what is ethical will depend on what enhances the achievement of the objective of greater reliance by the parties on integrative rather than distributive bargaining. Instead, in explaining the formulation of the actual ethical code he emphasized primarily Immanuel Kant's principle of the categorical imperative. Kant rejected the principle of utility as the basis for moral reasoning in his effort to find a basis for ethical behavior that would not be derived from a consideration of the utilitarian end. Kantian ethics is based on a principle called the categorical imperative "so act that you can will that your maxim could become a universal law regardless of the end." Thus, for Kant ethical principles are universal maxims not derived from the end sought, and
it was on the foundation of Kant's categorical imperative that the textbook author believed the codes of conduct for ethical bargaining should be erected. In relying on Kant the textbook author was trying to find a way of reasoning to a set of universal principles that would form an ethical code that would govern behavior in collective bargaining.

This approach suggests the possibility that matters can be dealt with ethically in a non-utilitarian way and that ethical principles can be embodied in a code of professional conduct for practitioners of a trade or profession. For example, there are such codes for lawyers, physicians, arbitrators, and securities dealers. If there is not a formal code for economists one could certainly be devised. It could contain such maxims as: report results of research honestly; don't doctor your data; and avoid plagiarism. Ethics as a code or set of standards of professional conduct represents an important way of thinking about ethical responsibility. And it represents a way in which economics and ethics can and do intersect. The reasoning could apply in the same way to, for example, mathematicians.

Professional codes of behavior can be drawn narrowly or broadly, but I believe most contemporary economists would choose a broadly drawn code that includes a focus on the economist's social responsibility to the wider society. For example, I think most economists would accept the view that they are obligated ethically to use the principles and tools of their craft in a socially responsible way. I recall being at lunch in the MIT Faculty Club in the late 1960s during President Lyndon Johnson's Administration, at a time when Johnson was trying to pursue victory in Vietnam without asking Congress and the American people for a tax cut to pay for the war. To many economists it looked as if Johnson was trying to sidestep the guns and butter choice that must be made in a full employment economy. Cary Brown, who was then Chairman of Economics at MIT, was circulating a letter, addressed to Johnson, among economists in the club. He asked economists who agreed with the content of the letter to add their signatures. The wording of the letter put aside the question of whether the war in Vietnam ought to be pursued, and simply argued that if it were to be pursued, it was Johnson's obligation to face up to the need to finance the war in a non-inflationary way by asking Congress for a tax increase to pay for the war. The moral thrust behind the letter seemed to be that economists
had a particular moral responsibility to call the President’s attention to the actual and potential economic costs of the path he was pursuing. It was a prime example of the particular moral responsibility of the economist as economist, enunciated in a piece I read in graduate school written by John Maynard Keynes’s contemporary, Sir Dennis Robertson. Robertson wrote that it is the economist’s obligation to call attention to the costs of a line of action, because if the economist does not do this no one else will, because no one else has that particular professional obligation. This notion clearly represents a wider sense of the obligations of professional conduct than might seem to be suggested by the notion of a professional code, because it goes beyond narrow professional conduct to a wider notion of social responsibility. It suggests that economists have the moral obligation to offer to those in positions of political power the particular insights of their professional judgment as a way of assuring that in the exercise of political functions important economic concerns are not neglected.

But it can be argued also that the notion of a socially focused ethical and moral responsibility illustrated by this story is too ethically constraining. It seems to suggest that it is possible to split the human being, who is an economist, into two parts. As an economist the human being is expected to confine his attention to the narrow question of costs, which sets the limit of his particular professional responsibility. As an economist the larger moral question of the rightness of the war being pursued is outside his professional competence. The presumption is that if the economist chooses to express an opinion about the larger moral question he must do so not as an economist but as a human being. One might wonder whether it is possible or wise to think than the unity that is a human being can be so separated into distinct parts. It is now thirty years or more since the event I have described took place in the MIT Faculty Club. I think I signed the letter, but later that day, or the next day, I discussed the event with some of my Boston College departmental colleagues. I think it was Nan Friedlaender, who either said she had not signed the letter, or would not sign such a letter because she opposed the war and hoped Johnson would not follow the economists’ advice and seek a tax increase, because she hoped that a build up of inflationary pressure would intensify public opposition to the war. Thus, she refused to go along with the Dennis Robertson view
of the economist's professional responsibility in this instance, because of the larger moral issue at stake.

I have now reflected on four separate considerations: (1) the utilitarian or pragmatic view that we should behave ethically because it will produce improved economic results; (2) the Kantian notion that there are universal ethical principles about what is objectively right, and these should be incorporated in codes of ethical behavior that economists should use to direct their actions; (3) the proposition that there are wider social responsibilities that should be incorporated into any comprehensive code of ethical conduct; and (4) the opinion that some of these wider responsibilities trump narrowly economic considerations.

This brings me to my final point. I have focused largely on the term ethical without specific reference to the term justice. Let me now try to explain what I think is an important relation between ethics and justice. I understand ethics as intimately related to justice, and I regard justice as a moral virtue, in Aristotle's sense of a virtue as a functional excellence. When the term virtue is applied to a human being it refers to a characteristic which enables that person to carry out the function of a human being excellently. My understanding of what is a human being also has roots in Aristotle. A human being is a rational animal, and thus the faculty of reason is the characteristic that distinguishes human beings from other animals. Thus, to live as a human being in the most excellent manner is to live the life of reason in the most excellent manner, which in turn means to live virtuously, that is, to carry out the function of a human being in the most excellent manner. In other words human beings in order to live the best life, that is, the life most consistent with their nature as rational and social beings, must have the appropriate virtues, or functional excellences.

Aristotle treats of justice as a virtue in two ways, what he calls partial justice and what he calls complete justice. Partial justice is a particular virtue concerned with fairness in distribution and rectification. For Aristotle this means that a distribution must satisfy a criterion of proportionate equality. Every person gets what he deserves. For example, the profits of an enterprise should be distributed among the several contributors to the success of the enterprise in proportion to their individual contributions. In a transaction, either voluntary or
involuntary, there is a level of payment that rectifies things, i.e., makes them right. For example, for a zero-sum transaction what is given should be equal to what is received. Complete justice is a virtue that includes the virtue of partial justice. Thus, the person who is just in the complete sense is fair, but also has all the other virtues in the proper degree, for example, generosity, courage, temperance, and good humor. Given Aristotle’s view of justice as a personal characteristic it follows that just actions in the relations between individuals, and in the affairs of the political community, require that the individual persons in the community have the virtue of complete justice, since just actions are the actions of just people. Just actions in the affairs of the political community are not possible without just people, and all discussions of how to achieve a just society must begin with the question of how just people are produced. In my opinion, this is a different notion of justice than that which is employed by economists in their professional discourse, and in their political recommendations. For example, many professional economists are concerned with distributional equity as a justice issue, but they do not discuss the Aristotelian focus on habituation to virtue, and education for virtue, as the necessary foundation for a more just social economy. The usual economic argument for distributional equity might be based on utility, although it is based often also on equality as an ethical principle. But, if the economic argument for justice is presented on the basis of utilitarian or egalitarian considerations, a fundamentally different concept of justice is being used than that which is derived from Aristotle’s teaching. There is no requirement in either the modern utilitarian or egalitarian arguments that individuals must be just in Aristotle’s sense. The only requirement is that a sufficient number of people identify their subjective interests with distributional equity, and an ethics derived in this way is quite different from an ethics derived from Aristotle’s notion of human nature and the end, or *telos*, that is implicit in that nature. This fundamentally different notion of the meaning of justice is one I would like to see discussed seriously by economists.
THE NEEDED RENEWAL OF SYSTEMATIC THEOLOGY

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We are now approaching the fiftieth anniversary of the opening of the Second Vatican Council. Those of us who lived through the changes it wrought upon the lives of Catholics can attest to its significance. Those who claim that the council changed nothing, or at least little of significance, will point out (repeatedly) that the council taught no new doctrines. However, this is to focus simply on the cognitive dimension of the meaning of faith; it fails to attend to the ways in which the council changed the constitutive, effective, and communicative dimensions of the meaning of Catholic life. We were called to respond to new symbols and a new scriptural language, to find new motivations for action, to shift our multiple relations with other Christians and other faiths, and so on. These shifts had and still have enormous impact and to ignore them is to fail to attend to the agenda of the council.¹

Of the many changes that the council sought to effect, one of major significance was a renewal of the forms of theological education (largely conceived as for priests). This was driven in part by the Dogmatic Constitution of Divine Revelation, Dei Verbum, which sought to push theology back to its scriptural sources, making the Bible the “soul of theology” (n.24); and in part by the efforts of the nouvelle theologie with their agenda of ressourcement, seeking to enrich theology by a return to patristic sources of inspiration. These efforts came to fullest

expression in the Decree on Priestly Training, Optatam Totius, which spelt out its expectations for the theological program to be given to seminarians in the following terms:

Dogmatic theology should be so arranged that these biblical themes are proposed first of all. Next there should be opened up to the students what the Fathers of the Eastern and Western Church have contributed to the faithful transmission and development of the individual truths of revelation. The further history of dogma should also be presented, account being taken of its relation to the general history of the Church. Next, in order that they may illumine the mysteries of salvation as completely as possible, the students should learn to penetrate them more deeply with the help of speculation, under the guidance of St. Thomas, and to perceive their interconnections. They should be taught to recognize these same mysteries as present and working in liturgical actions and in the entire life of the Church. They should learn to seek the solutions to human problems under the light of revelation, to apply the eternal truths of revelation to the changeable conditions of human affairs and to communicate them in a way suited to men of our day. (Optatam Totius, note 16)

I leave to one side the observation that theology is characterised by the term “dogmatic.” But given the scope of the task that theological educators were meant to undertake, one can appreciate why Lonergan himself found the situation “impossible.” No longer sufficient to be master of the thought of Thomas Aquinas, one now needed to master biblical and patristic scholarship as well; and then one needed to make the whole thing relevant to “changeable conditions of human affairs.”

My own experience as a theological educator a couple of decades after the council is that most courses in theology in the decades since the council have adopted an “historical” approach, spending a couple of weeks on the Scriptural material, a few weeks on the dogmatic and patristic heritage, then onto the synthesis of Thomas, if one is lucky, then onto modern authors and issues of contemporary relevance, much

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as Optatam Totius may have outlined. What one lacked in depth one tried to make up for in breadth, but the end result could never convey a sense of coherent synthesis on any given topic. Rather one ended up with snap shots of approaches and topics which attempted to give the student some doorway into the burgeoning theological literature of the period.

It is not at all clear that this is the renewal of theology that the council had hoped for. Nonetheless it is also not clear just what might work in the present theological environment. As I shall demonstrate, current theological reflection lacks clarity about the nature of the theological task in general, and in particular about the task of systematic theology. Various distinctions which underpinned the work of earlier generations are simply no longer accepted. To renew systematic theology is to seek to renew theology as a whole, to recognize the interrelationships between different theological tasks and their cumulative impact. Such a vision is provided in Lonergan's notions of functional specialties. However, in terms of the actual practice of systematic theology, we are far from achieving such a vision, or in some cases even suspecting that such a vision is needed for a proper renewal of the discipline.

COLLapse of the Scholastic Synthesis

Of course the dominant theological mode prior to the council was scholasticism, largely drawn from Aquinas and his commentators (though some would unkindly suggest more from the commentators than Aquinas himself). This was properly dogmatic theology, a defence of the dogmas of the church and the exposition of their meaning. Scripture and the Church Fathers were mined for proof texts to establish dogmas; the errors of heretics were put to the sword; and reason was evoked to prove that dogmas, if not completely amenable to reason, at the least did not contradict it.3 To every church and theological teaching there was an appropriate note, or level of certainty, from dogmatic de fide to theologically probabilior or perhaps only a tolerated opinion (opimo tolerata).

3 A classic one-volume expression of this can be found in Ludwig Ott, Fundamentals of Catholic Dogma, trans. James Bastible (St. Louis, MO: B. Herder Book Co., 1954).
Whatever the virtues and vices of this style of theologizing, at its core lies conceptualism, as Lonergan has analyzed. This conceptualism has three effects:

1. Because concepts are taken to be universally true and accessible, this style of theology claims a universal validity. It may be expanded but never superseded.
2. Because concepts are taken as true the primary concern of theology is with truth and certainty. Theological method becomes a question of logical deduction from known truths. Understanding of truth is secondary to ascertaining its certainty.
3. Because concepts are universal, they have no history or context, and so historical methods have no place within such a theological enterprise. What are basically linguistic problems are not to be solved by reference to historical contexts, but by logical ingenuity and the introduction of the correct “distinction.”

Theology was to all intents and purposes a closed system. And like all closed systems it found it difficult to account for major development beyond the processes of logical deduction.

Of course there were those who stood outside the system. In the nineteenth century one thinks of John Henry Newman in England and the Tübingen school of historical theology in Germany. Modernism pushed matters to breaking point at the turn of the century and was dealt with harshly. However, in the twentieth century there were multiple voices expressing concern about the closed nature of the system and its failure to attend adequately to the historical data. Historical consciousness was breaking into the Catholic theological world and the closed system of scholasticism could not hold out against it. It produced renewals of Patristic studies, liturgical studies, Thomistic studies, and eventually of Scriptural studies.

One by-product of this emergence of historical consciousness was to undermine what was most central to the scholastic synthesis, the demand for certainty. Theology as “dogmatic theology” began to feel the pressure. While Catholic theology had held this problem at bay,

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a number of forces were at work in the larger theological world for a couple of centuries. These forces were about to be unleashed on the Catholic theological world.

**THE FATE OF DOGMATICS HIT BY A PERFECT STORY**

I can illustrate some of the difficulty by reference to an often cited and now regularly criticized article, "Augustine and the Theological Crisis in the West" by Reformed theologian Colin Gunton.\(^5\) Relegated to a mere footnote, Gunton comments that one of the problems present in Augustine’s *De Trinitate* is that he begins “with dogma as something given.”\(^6\) Perhaps nothing better illustrates the chasm between the contemporary theological project and more classical conceptions of that project than this "aside" by Gunton. Rather than seek to defend, explain, and understand the dogmatic teachings of the tradition, a dogma’s very existence must be justified.

The sources of this chasm between past and present are various. I shall mention three here:

1. **The suspicion of tradition engendered by the Enlightenment.** Kant encouraged his readers to “Dare to think” unencumbered by the stale, tired doctrines of the past. In light of the emerging sciences of the day, religious doctrine provided by comparison a dubious road to truth, replying simply on past “authorities” to argue for its truthfulness. This shift was not just a "faith versus reason" issue, but a total recasting of what was meant by reasoning itself. It promoted a form of reasoning in which appeal to authority had no place, with only empirical evidence providing a sound basis for judgment.

2. **The Kantian distinction between the phenomena and the noumena.** Kant’s distinction created an unbridgeable epistemological gap between the cognitional activity of the subject and the reality of the object. Cognitional activity becomes projective upon

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reality, not illuminative of reality. The *noumena*, the "thing in itself," is unattainable to human knowing. In modern theological circles this position is usually spoken of in terms of the tension between experience and interpretation, with interpretation viewed as basically a projective activity upon our more basic and fundamental experience.7

3. The emergence of historical consciousness. One of the great cultural discoveries of the last few centuries has been the discovery of critical history with a concomitant emergence of historical consciousness.8 This has forced Christianity to review all its beliefs and doctrines in the cold light of historical reason. This has not been an easy task, as witnessed by the various "quests for the historical Jesus." This emergence has impacted not only on our understanding of Scripture but also on our appreciation of doctrine. Indeed one could claim that the first mature fruit of this emerging consciousness was John Henry Newman's essay *On the Development of Christian Doctrine*, while less mature offerings have abounded in a variety of authors.

These three factors created a "perfect storm" for the declining status of dogma in the work of theologians. Dogma can variously be viewed as: (1) an oppressive burden from the past hindering the genuine search for truth – the Enlightenment critique; (2) a secondary meaning added onto the basic and primary experience of God, to be cast aside when no longer helpful in pursuing that experience – the Kantian critique; (3) a social and culturally conditioned historical phenomenon, perhaps valid in its days, but its day has long past – the critical historical critique.9 One way or another I would contend that each of these attitudes can be found in much contemporary theology. And so when


9 Of these three the one which has the most positive contribution to make is the third. Stripped of historical positivism and the impact of the other two factors, the rise of historical consciousness has deeply incarnational roots. However, how the results of historical scholarship are to be integrated into theological research is another more complex matter which cannot be addressed here.
Gunton complains that Augustine takes dogma as something given, many theologians today would concur. On the other hand, one should note the enormous effort of Lonergan himself to address each of these factors in a constructive manner without reverting to mere a-historical dogmatism.

THE BLURRING OF SYSTEMATICS AND DOGMATICS

One consequence of the fading notion of dogma is then confusion over the task of a genuine “systematic” theology. For example, in the first few pages of his What Is Systematic Theology?, Robert Doran enters into a significant criticism of the writings of Wolfhart Pannenberg, who has produced a major three volume work entitled Systematic Theology. While Doran is very appreciative of Pannenberg’s contribution to theology overall, there is, he argues, little in Pannenberg’s writings that could be characterized as systematic theology according to the conception of the discipline presented in the writings of Lonergan and further developed by Doran. Pannenberg’s approach is hampered by a conception of truth as “coherence,” and so severely blurs any distinction between dogmatics and systematics. More recently the Journal of International Systematic Theology published three articles seeking to clarify the nature of systematic theology, by Nicholas Healy, John Webster, and A. N. Williams. Williams notes, for example, that “the terms ‘systematic theology,’ ‘Christian doctrine,’ and ‘dogmatics’ have no uniformly established usage and a preference for one or the other is often arbitrary.” Healy refers to “official systematic theology” as “the form of theological inquiry and production that has some authority over

11 Robert M. Doran, What Is Systematic Theology? (Toronto: University of Toronto Press, 2006), 10: “I think it is no exaggeration to say that Pannenberg is working at one time or another in every other functional specialty, and hardly, if at all, in systematics as Lonergan conceives it.”
other forms, or ... at least claims or assumes that authority."\textsuperscript{14} This stands in contrast with what he calls “professional systematic theology” carried out in the academy or university which “is necessarily diverse in its methods, starting points and agendas, and should not be restricted by the method, starting point and agenda of official theology.”\textsuperscript{15} Of the three, only Webster, perhaps under a Barthian influence, come closest to articulating a distinction between the task of systematic theology and dogmatics. “Indeed the prolegomena to systematic theology are an extension and application of the content of Christian dogmatics (Trinity, creation, fall, reconciliation, regeneration, and the rest), not a ‘pre-dogmatic’ inquiry into its possibility.”\textsuperscript{16}

What are the difficulties that arise when the distinction between dogmatic theology and systematic theology breaks down? Elsewhere I have argued that there has been a shift in the self-understanding of systematic theology from systematics as “understanding truth” as revealed and articulated in the doctrinal tradition, to one of systematics as “understanding data” where the data are as likely to be identified as the Scriptures, but may include church councils, the early Fathers and the works of later theologians.\textsuperscript{17} The task of the theologian is then to find patterns in the data, which may or may not conform to patterns singled out by the tradition. This is evident in much contemporary Trinitarian theology where there are various theologians who propose alternatives to the traditional “pattern” or “model” of the Trinity based on “two processions,” proposals which seek to relativize or even circumvent the standing of this element of the doctrine of the Trinity. Rather than seek to understand the nature of the processions as an exercise in faith seeking understanding, such proposals are actually seeking to come to alternate judgments which would complement or even replace the dogmatic judgment which led to an affirmation of the processions, as found for example in the Nicene Creed. The more radical of such proposals would have each Person of the Trinity come from each other Person so as to avoid any suggestion of hierarchical

\textsuperscript{14} Healy, “What Is Systematic Theology?,” 27.
\textsuperscript{15} Healy, “What Is Systematic Theology?,” 38.
\textsuperscript{16} Webster, “Principles of Systematic Theology,” 57.
ordering among the Persons.  

If this is the situation in relation to Trinitarian theology, which might be considered the pinnacle of the systematic quest, other areas of theological investigation fare far worse. Generally one would not be far wide of the mark to suggest that theology is more concerned with providing a satisfying integrative flow of image and affect than with seeking genuine understanding and judgment. The theological horizon rarely raises itself above common sense to move into a realm of theory, let alone a realm of interiority.

A further consequence of the collapse of the distinction between doctrines and systematics has been spelt out by Robert Doran in What Is Systematic Theology? He briefly summarizes the process of decline identified by Lonergan in De Deo Trino, when theologians move away from the task of understanding to focus on the question of certainty.

[Lonergan] outlines the steps that lead from poorly understanding a genuine systematic achievement to rejecting that achievement, and from rejecting a systematic achievement to denying the very facts that are understood in the achievement, that is, mysteries of faith themselves.

Here again Trinitarian theology is illustrative of such a decline. With the failure of contemporary theology to appreciate the achievement of the psychological analogy in illuminating the processions of the Son and Spirit, we are witnessing the eclipse of the processions themselves. To take a couple of examples:


19 See Robert M. Doran, Theology and the Dialectics of History (Toronto: University of Toronto Press, 1990), 193: “But to the extent that one has not yet distinguished insight and judgment from sensitive and imaginative experience, one regards the real as ‘the object of a sufficiently integrated and sufficiently intense flow of sensitive representations, feelings, words, and actions’ (I:538); and to that extent one either becomes a creator of myths or falls victim to other myth-makers.” The inner quote is from Bernard J. F. Lonergan, Insight: A Study of Human Understanding (London: DLT, 1958), 538.

1. An examination of the index of Thomas Torrance in his book, The Christian Doctrine of God, reveals an interesting neglect of the theme of the processions. The procession of the Son rates a single page, while the procession of the Holy Spirit attracts more attention because of the issue of the filioque, which is dealt with in ten pages (out of over two hundred).\textsuperscript{21} Significantly the divine relations are discussed without explicit reference to the processions, whereas in the older theological tradition the processions and relations are mutually defined.

2. Similar comments can be made with respect to the work of Orthodox theologian Boris Bobrinskoy, The Mystery of the Trinity. There are a significant number of references to the procession of the Holy Spirit, as one might expect from a work coming out of the Orthodox tradition. No entry at all can be found on the procession of the Son.\textsuperscript{22}

Examples of this could easily be multiplied, especially among works which take the Trinitarian communio/perichoresis as their starting point.

This present situation stands in interesting contrast to the work of Aquinas, for whom the very first question in his material on the Trinity is, “Are there processions in God?”\textsuperscript{23} From this starting point everything else follows – relations, person, and missions. As Bruce Marshall has noted, the traditional role of the processions and their relationship to the missions has been eclipsed by the issues of the economic and immanent Trinity.\textsuperscript{24} Further, with the breakdown of the traditional approach, questions about the divine unity arise with some urgency – hence the present focus on perichoresis and communio,

\textsuperscript{21} On the procession of the son, see Thomas F. Torrance, The Christian Doctrine of God: One Being Three Persons (Edinburgh: T&T Clark, 1996), 142; on the procession of the Spirit, 185-94. Significantly on the material on the procession of the Son, the word “procession” is not actually used, but alluded to through the creedal affirmation of the Son’s being begotten.

\textsuperscript{22} Boris Bobrinskoy, The Mystery of the Trinity: Trinitarian Experience and Vision in the Biblical and Patristic Tradition (Crestwood, NY: St. Vladimir’s Seminary, 1999).

\textsuperscript{23} Thomas Aquinas, Summa Theologiae, 1, q.27 a.1.

which dominates much of contemporary Trinitarian theology. The divine unity has become problematic, with increasingly the spectre of tritheism being raised in relation to a number of theologians.25

LONERGAN AND THE RENEWAL OF SYSTEMATICS

Perhaps the most fundamental contribution Lonergan has made to the renewal of systematic theology is his distinctive recovery of the notion of understanding through insight. If systematic theology is essentially faith seeking systematic understanding, then it is vital to know just what it means to understand something; to grasp the different types of understanding (direct, inverse, reflective, and so forth); to recognize the distinction between commonsense understanding which relates things to us and theoretical understanding which relates things to one another, and so on. Without some shift into the realm of theory whereby things are related to one another, theological disputes are as interminable and fruitless as Socrates’s attempts to get the Athenians to define courage. A good example of this impasse is the current debate over continuity and discontinuity in relation to Vatican II. Without some shift into the realm of theory or perhaps interiority, for example through the deployment of an ontology of meaning, the debates over whether Vatican II represented a moment of continuity or discontinuity in the church’s tradition simply cannot be intelligently addressed.26

We should also draw attention to Lonergan’s own theological practice, in particular the methodological discipline exhibited in his two volume De Deo Trino.27 The clear distinction between the Pars Dogmatica and the Pars Systematica demonstrate the difference and relationship between dogmatic and systematic concerns in theology. The recent availability of these works in English translation may provide a prod to theologians to consider again the nature of the distinction and relationship between dogmatics and systematics, but

25 These concerns have been raised by various authors in relation to the work of Jürgen Moltmann, John Zizioulas, Hans Urs von Balthasar, and Miroslav Volf.

26 See Ormerod, “Vatican II – Continuity or Discontinuity? Toward an Ontology of Meaning.”

more likely they will be viewed as a throwback to a neo-scholastic era from which a more "enlightened" theology is happy to escape.

Next we should mention Lonergan’s particular theological work on the grace-nature issue. Here two elements stand out. Firstly his development of the so-called “four point hypothesis” which links the four Trinitarian relation to four created participations in the divine nature. Without going into details on this, what it achieves is a systematic unpacking of the relatively compact notion of grace. Of course there were within the Thomistic tradition other unpackings, but Lonergan’s is by far the most coherent, particularly in the way he relates them to the Trinitarian relations. The other element is the scale of values deployed in Method in Theology. This provides a similar unpacking of the relatively compact notion of human nature, by allowing us to distinguish that nature in its vital, social, cultural, and moral dimensions. Together these elements can transform systematic theology.

However, the most significant contribution Lonergan has made to the renewal of systematic theology is his achievement in breaking down the theological process into a number of distinct but interrelated tasks, the eight functional specialties. To this I now turn.

FUNCTIONAL SPECIALTIES AND THE RENEWAL OF SYSTEMATIC THEOLOGY

As Fred Crowe has identified, a core concern for Lonergan’s method was the introduction of history into theology. As Lonergan commented, “All my work has been introducing history into Catholic theology.” The breakthrough point for arriving at eight functional specialties was

31 Frederick E. Crowe, Developing the Lonergan Legacy: Historical, Theoretical, and Existential Themes, ed. Michael Vertin (Toronto: University of Toronto Press, 2004), 78.
the realization that he did not need to put historical research under the direct control of dogmatic outcomes.\textsuperscript{32} The diversity of outcomes evident in historical research was not a problem to be solved by recourse to dogmatic pre-judgments but by the specialty of dialectics and an appeal to conversion. While this incorporation of the positive phase of theological research is in itself a major achievement, my focus remains on the second normative phase as at least the first consideration needed for the renewal of systematic theology.

What we find in the current state of theology is a domino effect which generalizes Lonergan observation about the impact of rejection of genuine achievement in systematics. This failure to appreciate genuine achievements in systematics impacts upon doctrines, with the very nature of doctrine itself being called into question. This too has an impact on the specialty that Lonergan identifies as foundations. One of the key elements of that specialty is the task of developing categories, both general (as applies to the full range of disciples) and special (drawn from the religious tradition in relation to religious realities). What we find is that there is little if any serious and coherent work being done in relation to the development of proper categories for undertaking theological work. Rather there is something of a push from movements such as Radical Orthodoxy to eliminate general categories altogether from theology. To acknowledge the possibility of general categories is viewed as an undue concession to the "secular" realm. And so John Milbank, one of the leaders of this movement, eschews the use of the social sciences which he views as so many forms of heterodoxy.\textsuperscript{33} In theological terms the priority of grace is so strongly asserted, what Milbank and others call "supernaturalizing the natural," that the natural order (and hence general categories) has nothing left to offer us by way of theological understanding.

\textsuperscript{32} See Charles Hefling, "On Reading The Way to Nicea," in Religion and Culture: Essays in Honor of Bernard Lonergan S.J., ed. Timothy P. Fallon and Philip Boo Riley (Albany, NY: SUNY Press, 1987), for details. As Hefling notes, at the time of writing De Deo Trino, Lonergan "was not yet ready to turn historical scholarship loose on Christian texts, unsupervised by dogmatic theology . . . his aim was to include the study of history within dogmatics" (165-67) [emphasis in the original].

The further major issue of foundations is that of conversion, which Lonergan specifies in terms of religious, moral, and intellectual conversion. While the presence and absence of these conversions has a significant impact on one's approach to the question of categories, one major consequence of intellectual conversion is the clear distinction between understanding and judgment, which grounds Lonergan's distinction between doctrines and systematics. For example, I have already noted Doran's comments in relation to Pannenberg's construction of systematic theology. Whereas Lonergan makes clear distinctions between experience, understanding, and reflective judgement, Pannenberg prefers a more "Gestalt" approach, which emphasises the wholeness of the cognitional experience. He is particularly critical of the distinction between understanding and reflection:

reflection and the judgment based upon it concerning the relations between the asserted insight and its relevant data do not, however, transcend understanding, because they render explicit previous understanding and themselves express new understanding. The decisive point is that reflection in not something foreign to understanding, that on the contrary all understanding involves some degree of reflective awareness, and the process of reflection renders explicit the implications of previous understanding.\(^\text{34}\)

This preference means he (along with many others) is unable to find a precise distinction between doctrines and systematics. Dealing with the foundational question of intellectual conversion is a necessary starting point for grounding the distinction, for reestablishing the role of doctrines against the Enlightenment and Kantian critiques, and hence renewing systematic theology.

To move toward the issue of foundations is to encounter what has traditionally been called, "fundamental theology." In 1973, Lonergan noted that many eminent theologians of the day shared the sentiment that traditional fundamental theology had passed its use by date: "Key

experiments, in Europe or America, demonstrate that fundamental theology at the present time is confronted with the alternatives of either dismemberment and disappearance or of beginning a new and different life.”35 Forty years later, the recent publication by Gerald O’Collins, a leading practitioner in the field, of a work entitled Rethinking Fundamental Theology, demonstrates something of the present state of play within the discipline, noting in particular that it has been twenty years since any substantial work has appeared in the area.36 In Lonergan’s terms O’Collins work touches on a range of functional specialties (e.g., doctrines, systematics, and communication), with only a limited relationship with what Lonergan identifies as the task of foundations. While O’Collins is clearly aware of Lonergan’s work and explicitly refers to Lonergan’s contribution to the field, Lonergan has no significant impact on O’Collins’ handling of the topic.37 Indeed he concludes his book with the observation: “Bernard Lonergan’s Method in Theology raises not only questions of theological procedures in general but also the specific question: how might Lonergan’s method, and particularly his reflections on foundations reshape the whole discipline of fundamental theology in the third millennium?“38

What I am suggesting is that the needed renewal of systematic theology for the third millennium should start not with systematics per se, but with the functional specialty of foundations. Without a proper grounding in foundations, particularly in intellectual conversion, the distinction between doctrines and systematics is blurred to the point of extinction. Without a proper effort to understand what we believe, the proper goal of systematics, what we believe becomes mere matters of fact without supporting intelligibility, leading to the undermining


37 In fact, O’Collins makes a special reference to Lonergan in the opening chapter (Rethinking Fundamental Theology, 16-17) and in the concluding chapter (Rethinking Fundamental Theology, 323, 334, 340, 344), with no reference in the intermediate chapters.

38 O’Collins, Rethinking Fundamental Theology, 344.
of belief. Doctrines are then subject to the Enlightenment, Kantian and historical critiques, and have fallen under this concerted pressure. Foundations also requires a thorough exploration of theological language, of the categories both general and special within which doctrine and systematics can be faithfully and intelligently expressed. As I have noted above there is virtually no serious work being done in this area apart from those who would seek to exclude general categories altogether from theological discourse.\footnote{Within Lonergan circles perhaps the most significant effort to explore this aspect of foundations is Robert Doran’s \textit{Theology and the Dialectics of History}.} Theology needs to pay more attention to the question of the categories which are appropriate to theological discourse.\footnote{See, for example, Neil Ormerod, “Transposing Theology into the Categories of Meaning,” \textit{Gregorianum} 93 (2011): 517-32.}

\textbf{CONCLUSION}

In my less guarded moments I have been known to despair about the current state of theological research. Not that I can claim that my own contributions are a major corrective, but the current state of theological discourse leaves much to be desired. There is not a sense of a coherent body of knowledge moving forward into history, but more a diverse and disjointed project, pulling us into different and at times opposite directions. It is sobering to recall Lonergan’s own judgment of the situation in 1971 when he wrote the major essay, “Doctrinal Pluralism.” There he noted, that in light of the difficulties the discipline faced with the breakdown of classicist culture, “theologians can be tempted to desert theology for scholarship. Theologians and scholars can regard recourse to philosophy as foolhardy. Religiously differentiated consciousness can remain assured that religion is a matter not for the head but for the heart.”\footnote{Bernard J. F. Lonergan, “Doctrinal Pluralism,” in \textit{Philosophical and Theological Papers 1965-1980}, ed. Robert Croken and Robert Doran, \textit{Collected Works of Bernard Lonergan} (Toronto: University of Toronto Press, 2004), 97.} In the intervening forty years, one might suggest that nothing much has changed; his statement has been prophetic. To attempt to renew systematic theology is to seek to renew the whole of theology. While the positive historical phase of theology has flourished, the normative phase is in dire need of revitalization.
A few years ago, in a conversation about Tolstoy, a colleague of mine noted how he took offense at the author’s religious views, and consequently had a dim view of Tolstoy as a thinker. But this same colleague also shared the fact that someone whose judgment he trusted referred to Tolstoy as “the most honest man of the nineteenth century.” However unverifiable a claim, it points to a characteristic of the man about which there is near universal agreement—that he was a searcher who followed his questions unrelentingly throughout his life. The fact that he could be as dogmatic as those he criticized about the answers he discovered takes nothing away from the sincerity and the rigor with which he pursued his quest. Tolstoy’s was a life of ongoing conversion.

Of course “conversion” can be understood in many ways. In following Tolstoy’s process of conversion I will draw upon Lonergan’s work. Readers of Lonergan are aware that he identifies three primary forms of conversion—intellectual, moral, and religious. Appropriating terminology derived from Karl Rahner, Lonergan speaks of the relationship among the three conversions as they occur within a single consciousness as one of sublation. Sublation is understood as a form of self-transcendence in which “what sublates goes beyond what is sublated, introduces something new and distinct, puts everything on a new basis, yet so far from interfering with the sublated or destroying it, on the contrary needs it, includes it, preserves all its proper features and properties, and carries them forward to a fuller realization within

a richer context.” Thus religious conversion sublates moral conversion as moral conversion sublates intellectual. Yet Lonergan reminds his readers that the process of conversion does not necessarily follow a sequence from intellectual to moral to religious. In fact he argues for the causal priority of religious conversion in the sense that the gift of God’s love frees the subject to act on the basis of values and plants the seeds of intellectual self-appropriation. The order of conversion is not fixed and static; rather it manifests itself with considerable variation depending upon a person’s background, circumstances, and formative influences. Tolstoy was no exception in this regard. If the pattern of his conversion was not entirely unique it was certainly one of the most carefully chronicled in all of the nineteenth century. That in itself would make the nature of his conversion worthy of interest; but when we add to this observation the fact Tolstoy was a writer of genius, and that he was often in opposition to the spirit of his times in his insistence that only a religious solution could meet the problems of the modern world, we have additional reasons to pay serious attention to the process by which he came to his convictions.

In Tolstoy’s case, this was a lifelong process. Although he experienced a profound and relatively sudden crisis of meaning in mid life, the conditions that made it possible had been coalescing for years. The crisis only brought to a head the questions that had been germinating in him since he was a young man. For this reason I begin this account in 1847, the year in which the nineteen-year old Tolstoy started to keep a diary. My focus will be on his religious conversion. While Tolstoy’s fiction is frequently autobiographical, it is not always easy to draw inferences about his own life from the attitudes and behavior expressed by his characters. His literary creations often embody certain aspects of Tolstoy’s character and worldview, while being strikingly different from their creator in other respects. For purposes of this essay then, I have chosen to limit myself to those non-fictional sources in which Tolstoy speaks about himself; especially his diaries, and letters. For the most part I will limit myself to documents

2 Method in Theology, 241.
3 Method in Theology, 243.
written prior to 1887 (with exceptions made for later writings in which
he speaks about his early life). By the mid to late 1880s Tolstoy's
worldview had largely taken shape, and for the remainder of his life (he
lived until 1910) his views would not change dramatically – although
they would be elucidated and in some instances become more extreme.

In his Recollections (set down for the most part in 1902 and 1908)
Tolstoy recounted an experience from his early childhood that had
remained with him throughout his life:

I will only tell of one spiritual condition which I experienced
several times in my early childhood, and which I think was
more important than very many feelings experienced later. It
was important because it was my first experience of love, not
love of some one person, but love of love, the love of God, a
feeling I subsequently experienced only occasionally, but still
did experience, thanks it seems to me to the fact that its seed
was sown in earliest childhood . . . That condition manifested
itself in this way: we especially Dmitri and I and the girls, used
to seat ourselves under chairs as close to one another as possible.
These chairs were draped with shawls and barricaded with
cushions and we said we were “ant brothers,” and thereupon
felt a particular tenderness for one another . . . To be “ant
brothers” as we called it (probably this came from some stories
of the Moravian Brothers which reached us through brother
Nicholas’s Fanfaronov Hill) meant only to screen ourselves
from everyone and everything, and love one another.5

The inspiration behind the community of “ant brothers” was Tolstoy's
older brother Nicolai who told his siblings that he possessed a secret
that if revealed would lead to universal happiness, putting an end to
all sickness, trouble, and anger among people. He said the secret was
written on a small green stick buried near the edge of the forest on the
family estate. At age seventy Tolstoy would look back and observe how:

The ideal of the “ant brothers” clinging lovingly to one another
only not under two armchairs draped with shawls but of all

5Leo Tolstoy, Recollections and Essays, trans. Aylmer Maude (London: Oxford
University Press, 1960), 42-43. The connection between the Moravian Brothers and
Tolstoy’s “ant brothers” stems from the fact that “muravey” is the word for ant in Russian.
the peoples of the whole world under the wide dome of heaven, has remained unaltered in me. As I then believed that there was a little green stick whereon was written something that would destroy all evil in men and give them great blessings, so I now believe that such truth exists among people and will be revealed to them and will give them what its promises.

It may be tempting to dismiss these recollections as the nostalgic projections of the elderly Tolstoy, conjuring up past experiences that were in fact nothing more than reflections of his current preoccupations, stemming from the philosophy of life he had arrived at only much later. However, when we examine Tolstoy’s early diaries we find that experiences similar to the “spiritual condition” that united the ant brothers in love occur with some frequency. In one of his first entries from 1847 he mentions the importance of reason in the guidance of life; but he quickly qualifies this claim by insisting that if reason is to be effective and not mislead, it must be “in accord with the whole, with the source of everything.” If reason becomes one with the whole, then society will not be able to unduly influence a person. A month later Tolstoy, dissatisfied with his behavior (an aspect of his character that will become a life long preoccupation) pondered the purpose of his life. When he looked at nature he found each constituent part unconsciously furthering the development of the other parts. Human beings, while part of nature, were also gifted with the ability to consciously contribute to the development of all that exists. He noted that the disciplines of history, philosophy, and theology all testified to the humanity’s purposeful intentions. For the young Tolstoy, the most pressing question was that of finding his place and purpose within the whole. Consequently, he judged that “I would be the unhappiest of men if I could not find a purpose in my life – a purpose both general and useful – useful because my immortal soul when fully mature will pass naturally into a higher existence and one that is appropriate to it.” He concluded these reflections by noting how “I think I can safely take as the purpose of my life the conscious striving for the all-round development of everything that exists. . . . So now my whole life will

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be a constant and active striving to achieve this one purpose." For the next several years the young Tolstoy manifested an almost obsessive preoccupation with creating sets of rules by which he could order his will in a way that would serve this higher purpose. More often than not he failed (mainly due to gambling and womanizing); and his repeated promises that "this time it will be different" soon become wearying, if not comical.

Four years later, during a period in which he spent time with his brother Nicolai who was serving in the army in the Caucasus, Tolstoy experienced a crucial epiphany:

After writing my diary I began to pray to God. It's impossible to express the sweetness of the feeling I experienced at prayer. I recited the prayers I usually do: Our Father, the Mother of God, the Trinity, the Doors of mercy, an invocation to my guardian angel — and still I remained at prayer. If a prayer is defined as a petition or a thanksgiving, then I wasn't praying. I longed for something exalted and good, but what exactly it was I cannot express, although I was clearly aware of what I longed for. I wanted to merge with the one all-embracing being. I asked it to forgive me my sins; but no, I didn't ask for that, for I felt that if it had granted me this moment of bliss, it had already forgiven me. I asked, and at the same time felt that I had nothing to ask for, and that I couldn't and didn't know how to ask. I gave thanks, yes, but not in words or thoughts. In my feeling alone I combined everything, both supplication and thanksgiving. The feeling of fear had completely disappeared. Not one of the feelings of faith, hope or charity could I single out from my general feeling. No — the feeling I experienced yesterday was the love of God. It is an exalted love which combines in itself all that is good, and rejects all that is bad ... Providence is the source of reason, and reason tries to comprehend it ... Mind gets lost in these depths of great wisdom, while feeling is afraid.

8 Tolstoy, Tolstoy's Diaries, Volume I, 11.
9 For example, here is rule 16 from one of his many such lists of unkept rules: "Sacrifice all other feelings of love to universal love, and then the will will demand only the fulfillment of the needs of universal love, and will prevail over it." Tolstoy, Diaries, Volume I, 13.
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to offend it. I thank it for the moment of bliss which revealed to me my insignificance and my greatness. I want to pray, but I don't know how; I want to comprehend, but I dare not — I surrender myself to Thy will! Why have I written all this? How commonplace, feeble, and even meaningless is this expression of my feelings; and yet they were so exalted!

All the contours of Tolstoy’s religious conversion — indeed his religious struggle — are present here. Having been raised as an Orthodox Christian (albeit an indifferent one like many of his class) we find him reciting the prayers that he has been taught as a child; but in the midst of his recitation, his prayer developed into an encounter with a reality experienced as loving, forgiving, and embracing. In this experience the young Tolstoy both sought and received. Fear evaporated; faith, hope, and charity merged in the gift of divine grace. While there is a notable emphasis on the feelings accompanying this encounter, Tolstoy was also careful to point out that reason as well had its source in this wisdom. This is worth noting, for in Tolstoy’s thought reason was never separable from its divine source.

Tolstoy’s experience here accords well with Lonergan’s understanding of religious conversion as “a total being-in-love as the efficacious ground of all self-transcendence, whether in pursuit of truth, or in the realization human values, or in the orientation man adopts to the universe, its ground, and its goal.” Such conversion “transforms the existential subject into a subject in love, a subject held, grasped, possessed, owned through a total and so an other-worldly love.” Every one of the consequences of religious conversion enumerated by Lonergan was present in Tolstoy’s life — a restless pursuit of truth, an intense focus on living in accordance with the highest moral values regardless of the opinion of the surrounding society, and a deep awareness of his connectedness to the ground of all that is. If, according to Lonergan, faith may be described as “knowledge born of religious love” then the young Tolstoy was clearly a person of faith. Not only did he experience the love of God, but he named it as such and identified it as a source of knowledge and value. For Tolstoy as for Lonergan, being in love with

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10 Tolstoy, *Diaries, Volume I*, 31-32.
11 *Method in Theology*, 241-42
God meant being in love in an unrestricted fashion.¹²

Tolstoy's was a fundamentally religious vision, and nearly everything he wrote would be a development of the questions with which he wrestled in his young adulthood. All the themes and questions that would preoccupy him in his fiction and non-fiction were already present in these early experiences and reflections. At the heart of his religious consciousness was an intuitive sense of the unity and relatedness of all things. Unity and relatedness were the overarching themes of all his work; and it is no exaggeration to say that Tolstoy (who is sometimes accused of subjecting religion to the demands of his own reason) had a deeply mystical apprehension of reality.¹³ This apprehension of unity and relatedness was accompanied by an acute awareness of reality as permeated by divine presence. Tolstoy's God was a God of life and of love, and to truly live meant to recognize this and to seek union with God by overcoming separation through the way of love. Every aspect of his ongoing conversion will be tested against these early experiences. Despite various periods of crisis, Tolstoy's conversion was not sudden or even dramatic; it was lengthy and it was gradual.¹⁴ It was also marked by permanent tensions - within himself, with those who knew him, and with the wider world. Religious conversion is not a magical cure for human sinfulness, and Tolstoy's own struggles amply witness to this fact. The sincerity and seriousness with which he pursued his questions should not blind us to the fact that he was a difficult person in whom the desire to love and to be loved competed with an often alienating egocentrism.¹⁵

In terms of Lonergan's thought, Tolstoy was consumed by questions related to faith from a relatively early stage of his life. The drama of Tolstoy's religious conversion was not a matter of him

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¹² Method in Theology, 115.
¹⁴ Medzhibovskaya, Tolstoy and the Religious Culture of His Time.
¹⁵ “Throughout his life in one way or another he destroyed most of the social and personal relationships he managed to establish . . . He had no real friends with whom he shared his inner life and was suspicious of the motives of those close to him. He did not trust or love others easily. He could not bear opposition to his opinions . . . The man who had a need to belong and an urge to love all led a life estranged from the world, focused not on others but on himself” (Gustafson, Leo Tolstoy, 15-16).
discovering the importance of religious questions during and after the period of personal crisis that came upon him in the late 1870s. His preoccupation with religion had begun nearly thirty years earlier. What unfolded in his life and culminated in the crisis years is rather better understood by using the distinction Lonergan makes between faith and belief, and the further distinction he makes between major and minor authenticity. In distinguishing between faith and belief, Lonergan argued that he had secured a basis for ecumenical encounter as well as for interreligious dialogue: “Beliefs do differ, but behind this difference there is a deeper unity. For beliefs result from judgments of value, and the judgments of value relevant for religious belief come from faith, the eye of religious love, an eye that can discern God’s self-disclosures.” The distinction between belief and faith rests upon the conviction that “there is a realm in which love precedes knowledge.” This enables Lonergan to account for the diversity of belief while acknowledging a deeper unity at the level of faith. And while he certainly points out that faith often leads to an affirmation of the beliefs of one’s religious tradition, his formulation of the distinction also leaves room for the possibility that a person of faith might find himself in tension with the explicit formulations of religious doctrine. In this case there arises the “agonizing question” associated with the issue of major and minor authenticity. Minor authenticity has to do with one’s relationship to one’s tradition – to the extent that one accepts the beliefs of the tradition and acts in accordance with its precepts one is counted as an authentic member of that tradition. But in addition to this minor authenticity there is the major authenticity by which traditions themselves are judged. Traditions can decay and become distorted. In that case “if one takes the tradition as it currently exists for one’s standard, one can do no more than authentically realize unauthenticity.” Lonergan clearly describes what is at stake: “How can one tell whether one’s appropriation of religion is genuine or unauthentic and, more radically, how can one tell if one is not appropriating a religious tradition that has become unauthentic.” Regardless of where one stands on the question

16 *Method in Theology*, 119, 123.
18 *A Third Collection*, 130.
as to whether Tolstoy's critique of and break with the Orthodox Church was justified, it is certainly the case that he understood his situation in precisely these terms. His struggles had their source in the dialectical relationship between his own religious experience and the traditions of his church. By Lonergan's standard, Tolstoy was a man of great faith, but he found it difficult if not impossible to accept a large part of Christian belief as understood and formulated by the Orthodox Church of his time.

Tolstoy repeatedly tested the teachings of his religious inheritance against his own experience. In a brief diary entry from 1852 he articulated his creed at the time: "I believe in one, incomprehensible, good God, the immortality of the soul and eternal retribution for our acts: I don't understand the secret of the Trinity and the birth of the son of God, but I respect and do not reject the faith of my fathers." In March of 1855 the relationship between the twenty-six-year old Tolstoy and Orthodoxy was still such that he took communion, but returning home later that day he wrote in his diary:

Yesterday a conversation about divinity and faith inspired me with a great idea, a stupendous idea, to the realization of which I feel capable of devoting my life. This idea is the founding of a new religion appropriate to the stage of development of mankind – the religion of Christ, but purged of [doctrines] and mysticism, a practical religion, not promising future bliss, but giving bliss on earth. I realize that this idea can only be implemented by generations of people consciously working toward this end ... Consciously to work towards the union of mankind by religion is the basis of the idea which I hope will absorb me. 

Clearly, the future prophet was aware of his calling even as a young man. The child captivated by his brother Nicolai's claim that the secret to peace and harmony among all people was written on a green stick was now ready to take responsibility for bringing about the new age. It should also be noted here that this confidence in the ability of religion to unify humanity and to address the deepest human needs remained

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19 Tolstoy, Diaries, Volume I, 62-63.
one of Tolstoy's bedrock convictions, however much his own religious vision came into conflict with the beliefs he had inherited.

A particularly rich source for chronicling Tolstoy's process of conversion is his correspondence with Countess Alexandra Andreyevna Tolstaya. Alexandra Tolstaya was Tolstoy's second cousin. She was eleven years his senior and throughout her adult life she was attached to the Imperial Court in St. Petersburg, serving at various times as tutor and Lady-in-Waiting. She never married. While she had known Tolstoy since they were children, their friendship began in 1857. They were quite fond of each other, and in the early years of their relationship both seemed to have at least entertained the possibility of romance. In her correspondence with Tolstoy, Alexandra Tolstaya comes across as insightful, well read, and deeply committed to the Orthodox faith. She was one of the few people whose insights and criticism Tolstoy took seriously; and despite occasional rifts due to their religious differences, their friendship lasted until her death in 1904.

By 1859 Tolstoy found himself increasingly uncomfortable with traditional religious practices. He wrote to his cousin: "I can eat Lenten fare all my life, I can pray in my room every day of the year, I can read the Gospels and, for a time, think it's all very important; but to go to church, to stand there and listen to unintelligible and incomprehensible prayers, and watch the priest and all the motley crowd around him — that I absolutely cannot do. That's why I've stopped going to communion for over a year now." His cousin's response was sharp. She chastised him for lacking any appreciation of how the sacraments operate independently of their surroundings, and for preferring his own "gratuitous ecstasies, ravishments, and sudden transports leading you into a blissful state" to the wisdom contained in the Orthodox ritual he so indignantly dismissed. Taken aback by the forcefulness of her response, Tolstoy justified his stance in a way that both confirmed and challenged her criticisms. Pointing out that she was unaware of the intensity of his religious experience during the two-year period from

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21 Alexandra Tolstoy and Leo Tolstoy, The Letters of Tolstoy and His Cousin Alexandra Tolstoy, trans. Leo Islavin (New York: E. P. Dutton and Company, 1928). Tolstoy said of this correspondence that it was one of the best sources for his biography.


23 Alexandra Tolstoy and Leo Tolstoy, The Letters of Tolstoy and His Cousin, 30-31.
1851-52, he argued that he had to be faithful to that experience and that his criticism of Orthodox belief and practice should not be taken as a rejection of religion – quite the contrary:

From two years of mental activity I discovered something old and simple, but something I now know in a way no one else does – I discovered that there is immortality, that there is love, and that one must live for others in order to be happy for eternity. These discoveries amazed me by their resemblance to the Christian religion, but instead of discovering them for myself, I began to look for them in the Gospels, and found little. I didn't find God, or the Redeemer, or the sacraments, nothing; and I searched with all, absolutely all the powers of my soul, and wept, and tormented myself, and craved for nothing but truth. For goodness sake, don't think you can even remotely understand from my words all the power and concentration that went into my searchings at the time ... The fact is that I love and respect religion, and consider that without it a man can be neither good nor happy; that I would like to have a religion more than anything else in the world; that without it I feel how my heart shrivels up with every passing year; that I still have hope, and for brief periods almost believe; but I don't have a religion and I don't believe. Furthermore, with me it isn't religion that makes life, but life that makes religion. When I lead a good life, I'm closer to it, and feel quite ready to enter this happy world; but when I lead a bad life, I feel there's no need for it.²⁴

During the years between 1859 and the time of his spiritual crisis in the late 1870s, Tolstoy was preoccupied with significant events in both his artistic and family life. He married Sofia Behrs in 1862, began War and Peace in 1863 and completed it in 1869. He wrote Anna Karenina between 1873 and 1877. In many ways these were wonderfully happy years for Tolstoy and his family; but having completed these two masterpieces, he was emotionally and psychologically exhausted. In addition, the years during which Anna Karenina was written were a time in which death intruded frequently in the family's life. The

Tolstoys' one-year old son Peter and their infant daughter Vavara died. These sorrows were multiplied by the deaths of Tolstoy's aunts, Tatiana and Pelageya, both of whom had helped to raise him after the death of his parents. His aunts were his last link to what he always viewed as having been a happy childhood, and these losses shook him deeply. It comes as no surprise then, that it was during these years that Tolstoy began to be preoccupied with thoughts of death. In his *Confession* he recounted what happened to him in the mid 1870s:

At first I began experiencing moments of bewilderment; my life would come to a standstill, as if I did not know how to live or what to do, and I felt lost and fell into despair . . . On these occasions, when life came to a standstill, the same questions always arose: "Why? What comes next?" . . . At first I thought the questions pointless and irrelevant . . . And then what happens to everyone stricken with a fatal inner disease happened to me. At first minor signs of indisposition appear, which the sick person ignores; then these symptoms appear more and more frequently, merging into one uninterrupted period of suffering. The suffering increases and before the sick man realizes what is happening he discovers that the thing he had taken for an indisposition is in fact the thing that is more important to him than anything in the world: it is death . . . This is just what happened to me. I realized that it was not just a casual indisposition but something very serious and that if the same questions kept repeating themselves they would have to be answered . . . Before occupying myself with my estate, with the education of my son or with the writing of books, I had to know why I was doing these things . . . Thinking about the fame my own writing brought me, I would say to myself " . . . and so what?" And I had absolutely no answer.25

It may be worth emphasizing here that this crisis did not precipitate Tolstoy's turn to religious questions; as has been noted repeatedly throughout this essay, these were questions with which he was deeply concerned since he was in his twenties. As described by one

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of his biographers: "What was about to take place in his spiritual life did not represent a change or a break with the past, but rather an intensification of a development that had been proceeding slowly ever since his youth."  

Family life and his career as a writer may have allowed him to turn his attention elsewhere for a number of years, but the issues of faith and belief that had consumed him earlier remained unresolved. What happened to Tolstoy in the mid to late 1870s was caused by the convergence of the factors just mentioned: mental, psychological, and emotional exhaustion as a consequence of his writing; a series of deaths of people close to him, including two of his children; and unresolved issues having to do with belief. The intensity of the crisis was due to this convergence; it was not the case that his experience of meaninglessness suddenly prompted him to begin to look for answers in religion.

His correspondence with his cousin Alexandra during these years reflects Tolstoy's spiritual predicament and offers insight as to how and why the issue of faith and belief contributed to his existential crisis:

You say you don't know what I believe in. Strange and terrible to say: not in anything religion teaches us; but at the same time I not only hate and despise unbelief, but I can see no possibility of living, and still less of dying, without faith. And I'm building up for myself little by little my religious beliefs, but although they are all firm, they are very undefined and uncomforting. When questioned by the mind they answer well; but when the heart aches and seeks an answer, they provide no support or comfort. With the demands of my mind and the answers given by the Christian religion, I find myself in the position, as it were, of two hands endeavouring to clasp each other while the fingers resist. I long to do it, but the more I try, the worse it is; and at the same time I know that it's possible, that the one is made for the other.  

Over the next ten years Tolstoy attempted to work through this dilemma and to clarify his beliefs, and by 1886-87 the convictions that would

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guide him during the remainder of his life were largely in place. The process by which this happened was essentially a conflict structured by issues of minor and major authenticity with regard to his relationship with the Russian Orthodox Church. This relationship, while it became increasingly contentious and eventually culminated in Tolstoy's excommunication by the Holy Synod in 1901, was actually more nuanced then it is has sometimes been presented. Richard Gustafson has amply documented how much the theology of the Christian East permeated all of Tolstoy's thought, and what a caricature it is to pose the issue in terms of a conflict between reason and faith, with Tolstoy the rationalist attacking a church that defended faith as a source of knowledge. Tolstoy was never a rationalist in the ways in which that term could be understood in the eighteenth and nineteenth centuries. The privileged mode of cognition for Tolstoy was what he called "consciousness" or "awareness," a non-dualistic, self-transcending form of knowing with deep roots in the Eastern Christian and patristic tradition. In relation to consciousness, reason is primarily a tool to be used for purposes of clarification. He sometimes used an image in which reason was understood to be like a light illuminating the way on one's path; but his main point in employing the image was to call attention to the fact that reason was not very helpful in determining if one was on the right path to begin with. For that to happen, it was sometimes necessary to be knocked off the path on which one was traveling. Tolstoy did not reason his way to faith. He experienced religious conversion leading to faith, and then he employed reason as an aid in articulating his experience and expressing the content of his beliefs.

According to his Confession, what happened to Tolstoy was that in light of the fact that his newly arrived at beliefs turned out to be "undefined and uncomfor ting," he sought emotional solace in the uncritical faith of the Russian people, particularly in the implicit faith of the peasants, who seemed to possess a trust in the meaningfulness of life as well as a sense of serenity in the face of death. Having decided to imitate the faith of the people rather than trust in his own intellectual

28 Gustafson, Leo Tolstoy.
29 Gustafson, Leo Tolstoy, 217-28, 264-70.
30 Tolstoy, A Confession and Other Religious Writings, 50, 58-59, 67.
powers, Tolstoy also returned to the practice of Orthodoxy, and for a short time he scrupulously observed all the Orthodox rituals and rules of fasting. This return to Orthodoxy was short-lived, as Tolstoy became disillusioned with the unhealthy mix of superstition and faith among his fellow worshipers, the rote quality of the rituals and prayers, and the scandalous alliance between church and state. His family knew something was amiss when Tolstoy insisted, during dinner on a fast day, to be served some of the cutlets that had been set aside for some of the resident tutors who were atheists.  

While his return to Orthodox belief and practice did not last, one by-product of this experience was that Tolstoy came into closer contact with the sources of Christian tradition. If he was to clarify his own belief, he determined that he needed to study these sources. The works he produced in the course of his study are probably the least read of all his writings. Because of this, it is easy to forget that he devoted nearly ten years of his creative life to this task. His wife as well as his fellow author Ivan Turgenev pleaded with him to return to the writing of fiction, and bemoaned what they viewed as a self-indulgent, purposeless waste of his talents. But for Tolstoy there was no more important question than to investigate Christian doctrine so as to be able to understand what he believed by comparison. He pursued his task diligently and methodically, reviewing enormous amounts of scholarship on contemporary biblical criticism and spending many hours in conversation with Orthodox prelates and theologians.

This needs to be stressed in order to avoid the impression that his break with the church was based upon a superficial understanding of scripture and theology. Tolstoy was not Voltaire. In the works that emerged from his investigations — the Criticism of Dogmatic Theology and The Four Gospels Harmonized and Translated — he attempted to separate what was true from what was false in his sources. As a result of his efforts he concluded that the Orthodox Church had been misleading believers about the meaning of Christianity. His study of the gospels led to a more positive outcome. On one hand he pruned the

31 Simmons, Leo Tolstoy, 372.
32 Medzhibovskaya, Tolstoy and the Religious Culture of His Time, 251-55.
gospel accounts of anything that he believed smacked of superstition (including the resurrection and the divinity of Christ), but on the other hand he came to the conclusion that the true meaning of life was to be found in the teaching of Jesus as presented in the gospels, and that at the heart of that teaching was a commitment to non-violence. This was a tremendous breakthrough because it meant that the problem he had experienced in his religious struggles was not due to Christianity itself, but to the form in which it had been mediated through the Orthodox Church. He realized that he did not have to abandon Christianity in order to be faithful to his conscience. So significant was this discovery to Tolstoy that he maintained that *The Four Gospels Harmonized and Translated* was more important than anything else he had written.\(^\text{34}\)

One could argue that Tolstoy was guilty of astonishing arrogance in setting himself up as judge of what constituted the authentic message of Christianity. Indeed given his religious views prior to the time he began this project, some might conclude that he approached his task in bad faith, having already made up his mind what his conclusions would be based upon his preexisting convictions. In his defense, it should be recalled that Tolstoy spent nearly ten years working through these sources, which is not generally the practice of those whose minds are already made up. It should be further noted that his investigations were very much of a pattern with the kind of probing intelligence he brought to religious matters throughout his life. As has already been noted, he was constantly testing his own religious experience against the inherited wisdom of the Orthodox tradition, but not out of any particular animosity toward the tradition – he brought the same critical intelligence to bear in his encounters with any and all authorities. In this particular case however, the outcome of his search turned out to be decisive, and it would affect his thought and behavior for the remainder of his life. Although in practice he rarely admitted being wrong in his judgments and convictions, he also maintained that the conclusions he had come to with regard to the Orthodox tradition and the gospels were in accord with the dictates of *his* conscience and that he did not presume to tell others what to believe. Although he was convinced that he was right, he also respected the fact that others would not accept his views, and he had high regard for seriously held

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\(^{34}\) Simmons, *Tolstoy, Volume II*, 3-7.
belief in those who disagreed with him, including those who adhered to Orthodoxy.

In 1880, in a letter to his cousin Alexandra (who was alarmed by his recently professed beliefs and his criticisms of the church), Tolstoy clarified the issue as he now saw it:

The essence of it is that your profession of faith is that of our Church. I know it and I do not share it. But I have nothing to say against those who profess this faith. All the more as you add that the substance of this doctrine is to be found in the Sermon on the Mount. Not only do I not deny this doctrine, but if you should ask me which I prefer — for my children to be unbelievers as I have been, or to believe in the doctrine taught by the Church — I would answer without hesitation that I prefer the doctrine taught by the Church . . . In this way I find myself in closest sympathy with persons of the people who are sincere believers, just as I find myself in sympathy with faith, as it is taught by the Church and with you, provided there is sincere believing and that you look at God with your eyes wide open, without spectacles and without twinkling . . . I have hit the solid earth now, going through everything that seemed brittle, and I fear nothing now, because it would surpass my strength to smash what I stand upon — which means it is the real thing.35

Tolstoy's relationship with church authorities deteriorated as time progressed, but this response accurately captures the attitude he took toward those close to him who continued to remain within the Orthodox fold (including his wife Sofia and a number of their children). In this instance he seems to have acknowledged that despite his inability to accept Christianity as presented by the church, he recognized that the tradition continued to preserve at least part of the essential truth of Christ's teaching. This is another instance that could be cited in defense of the view that at the heart of Tolstoy's religious conversion was the question of major and minor authenticity. On the minor level he had questioned himself repeatedly and undertaken extensive study to determine whether he could consider himself to be an Orthodox

35 Tolstoy, Letters of Tolstoy and His Cousin, 174-75.
Christian. This process unfolded between 1880 and 1887 during which time he determined that in good conscience he could no longer reconcile his beliefs with the Christianity professed by the Russian Orthodox Church. But he also forced the issue of the major authenticity of the tradition, by declaring that its teachings were not those of Christ. Whether Tolstoy was correct in his judgment that the Orthodox Church of his time had declined into inauthenticity is not something that can be settled here, but there is no doubt that this is how he understood what was at stake.

Also notable in this letter is the distinction he seems to have made between faith and belief – a distinction very close to that made by Lonergan. Tolstoy found that he could not accept Orthodox belief, but he was very sympathetic toward faith as he saw it embodied and practiced in the church; a faith that he recognized and applauded among serious and conscientious believers. This becomes even clearer toward the end of this same letter when he told his cousin: “One cannot express one’s faith . . . How am I to tell by what I live? I will say it once more – it does not concern my faith, but it concerns the meaning of Jesus Christ and His doctrine to me.”

By 1887 Tolstoy had arrived at the beliefs that he would hold for the rest of his life. His conversion had entered a new stage that involved drawing out the consequences of what he now held to be the truth. Some of the ideas with which he is frequently associated – anarchism, pacifism, vegetarianism – were all developed during the years between 1887 and his death in 1910. There were some other changes in his thought as well. In his 1887 work On Life (an unfortunately neglected text) he affirmed his belief in personal immortality in an explicit fashion, after having apparently denied this in some of his earlier essays on religion. He also concluded that the truth about the best way to live was not unique to the gospels, and that similar insights could be found in other wisdom traditions. However, he continued in his belief that these truths were most clearly expressed in the New Testament.

His cousin Alexandra was wary of the new direction Tolstoy had taken, and while she supported him in his embrace of the gospel, she repeatedly cajoled, exhorted, and otherwise tried to persuade him to return to the faith of his ancestors. Tolstoy was often irritated by her

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36 Tolstoy, Letters of Tolstoy and His Cousin, 176.
attempts to convert him, and they had several quarrels during the next several years, which sometimes resulted in the temporary breaking off of communication between them. However, by 1897 they had come to a point where they did not allow their convictions to get in the way of the fondness they had always had for each other. In what was probably Tolstoy’s last letter to her prior to her death in 1904 he wrote in a way that would have likely confirmed her opinions about his strange religious beliefs, while at the same time it would have reminded her of how much they shared at the more profound level of faith:

Yes, it is likely that we shall never meet again in this world, dear Alexandrine . . . I do not believe that we shall see each other there above in any way at all like to what we think a meeting. But I think, and I am firmly convinced, that all the kindness and faith and love you gave me in this world shall remain my own in another life too. Some similar particles, too, maybe, coming from myself, shall be kept by you. Coming nearer to the good and inevitable end, I feel that the more precise are my ideas of what is in store for us there above, the less I believe in them; and on the contrary, the more confused they are, the greater my faith that life does not end here below, but that a new and better life begins Above – my faith, I say, becomes stronger and more solid. Thus faith in God’s mercy is all in all . . . Just as I took issue from Him by birth, so I go back to Him in death, and nothing but good can result from it. “I surrender my soul into Thy hands.” Good-bye, dear, dear friend. I fraternally and tenderly embrace you and thank you for your love.\(^{37}\)

This moving letter offers compelling evidence for the view that despite a relationship marked by ambivalence and controversy, Tolstoy never transcended Christianity, nor was it his intention to do so. His conversion took place within a context marked and permeated by Christianity, and even when he was criticizing Christian tradition as he understood it, he often drew upon deeply Christian insights in launching his critique. A few months before his own death in November 1910, Tolstoy wrote a letter in which he responded to questions proposed to him by a young

\(^{37}\) Tolstoy, Letters of Tolstoy and His Cousin, 221.
lawyer named Mohandas Gandhi. In it he summarized what he took to be the most important insights he had to offer the world:

The fact that love, i.e., the striving of human souls towards unity and the activity resulting from such striving, is the highest and only law of human life is felt and known by every person in the depth of his soul ... This law has been proclaimed by all the world’s sages, Indian, Chinese, Jewish, Greek, and Roman. I think it has been expressed most clearly of all by Christ who even said frankly that on this alone hang all the Law and the prophets ... He knows, as every reasonable person is bound to know, that the use of violence is incompatible with love as the basic law of life ... The difference between the lives of Christian peoples and all others is merely the fact that in the Christian world, the law of love was expressed so clearly and definitely, as it hasn’t been expressed in any other religious teaching, and that people in the Christian world solemnly accepted this law but at the same time allowed themselves to use violence and built their lives on violence. And so the whole life of Christian peoples is an outright contradiction between what they profess and what they build their lives on...38

It appears that, over the course of a lifetime, Tolstoy had managed to integrate his earliest religious experiences with his hard won and firmly held understanding of Christianity. There are resonances here of the twenty-three-year-old Tolstoy, acutely sensitive to the unity of all and overwhelmed by the love of God. Likewise, the would-be prophet of the 1850s, committed to propagating the religion of Christ, “purged of [doctrines] and mysticism,” and “giving bliss on earth,” is present here as well, but he has evolved into the sage of Yasnaya Polyana and the moral conscience of his nation, if not the world. But to understand not only this passage, but the entire history of Tolstoy’s conversion, we must reach back even farther into his past and imagine him at age seven as a member of the fraternity of “ant brothers,” huddled together with his brothers and sisters beneath armchairs draped with shawls, professing love among themselves and for all humankind, convinced

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that "there was a little green stick whereon was written something that would destroy all evil in men and give them great blessings." This was his first experience of love, "not love of some one person, but love of love, the love of God." It was an experience of love to which he would return again and again and from which he would draw throughout his life. Much later in life he recalled with joy the game of "ant brothers" and remarked how "It was very, very good, and I thank God I played it. We called it a game, but really everything in the world is a game except that."}

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39 Tolstoy, Recollections and Essays, 43.
THE CHURCH BECOMING HERSELF:
SYNONYM FOR COMMUNICATIONS

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RENEWALS, GREAT AND SMALL

In concluding the Stuart-Larkin Lectures at Trinity College, Toronto, in 1973, Bernard Lonergan sought to distinguish between a great and small renewal: one of the whole church, that was/is intended in the Second Vatican Council, the other of theology. Of the former one might say that given the relation between the church and society, the great renewal implicitly intends humankind at large. At least that was what John XXIII had in mind! And of the latter let us say that the function of theology in the church is such that the renewal/reform of theology is at the service of the renewal of the church. Of course, without his saying so, Lonergan had something to do with both renewals, but one might say again that the latter [“small”] one was his focus.

How are the two renewals connected? The great renewal of the church is the controlling renewal, and thus makes its demands from above downward, as it were. So a renewed church calls for a renewed theology, without defining what that renewal will be. Theological renewal is best left to the theologians, as can be seen from the mediocrity of the results of some conciliar debates, notably the Decree on the

Formation of Priests. In any case, something can be learned about the connection by observing Lonergan’s own struggles and activities in the years subsequent to the council. His most notable achievement in the renewal of theology was the publication of Method in Theology in 1972. And everything he did (before and after) to explain this project, to show that the renewal of theology is to be conceived in terms of method, bears the stamp of his conviction that the renewal is to be accomplished principally by attending to the historicity of culture and religion, and thus of theology itself.

There are no indications that John XXIII was acquainted with Lonergan’s work, nor presumably had Lonergan followed the career of the Pope as a papal diplomat, so that he would have anticipated what might be expected from him after his election. There are, however, certain advances in/aspects of his thinking that resonate with the project of aggiornamento of the Second Vatican Council, even before the fact. And once the council got underway, as well as in its immediate wake, Lonergan was quite attentive to Pope John’s great renewal. His concern for the precise meaning of the term pastoral in the Pope’s vocabulary is an excellent example. Their cultural backgrounds were quite different, but their upbringings in thoroughly Catholic families of northern Italy and eastern Canada, respectively, contributed to the formation of two personalities that were, each in his own right, remarkably catholic. Again both were unswervingly devoted, even consecrated, to the pursuit of truth. There results the potential for an attractive harmony.

The small theological renewal can already be discerned in the epilogue of Insight, drafted some five years before Roncalli’s announcement that a council was to be held. Lonergan asks how this essay, which aims at thoroughly understanding what it means to understand, philosophical as it is but written from a “moving viewpoint,” will be relevant to theology (Insight, 754). In the extended response that follows, he shows how the relevance will be twofold,

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2 A. Flannery, ed. (1996) The Conciliar and Post-Conciliar Documents of the Second Vatican Council, vol. I (Basic Sixteen Documents) (Dublin: Dominican Publication)s. See especially para. 13-18, on the revision of ecclesiastical studies. My intention here is not to promote scorn for the work of the council, but simply to indicate that these recommendations are limited to generalities and invite ongoing critical application by competent theologians familiar with method.
contributing to the introduction to theology (once called apologetics) and with its method.

**JOHN XXIII'S INTENTION, A GREAT RENEWAL**

Cultural change was not a theme unfamiliar to John XXIII, and in his fertile mind that recognition triggered the idea not only of an ecumenical council, but of a council that would be tailored to the needs of the present day. He discerned that men and women of this present era need to hear the word of God in a new key, in a mode that corresponds to modern ways of living and thinking. And he thought that a gathering of bishops from the entire world should be capable of discovering and bringing into being the means to reach the hearts and minds of their contemporaries, translating for the people of this world the good news of the Christian message, and inviting them to accept in their own way Jesus' challenge to discipleship.

The words of Jesus, who primitively named himself the Good Shepherd, come to mind: “I know mine and mine know me! And I call them by name” (John 10). Not only did Christ know what it means to be human, but also his was a humanity molded by a peculiar culture. Thus we can construe the saying that the Good Shepherd knows his sheep through and through, both in the sheepfold and in the pasture, as referring implicitly to the culture in which humanity is nourished, while being continually modified by it. And so *pastoral* intent in any case, but particularly in its twentieth-century embodiment in what became the cause, so to speak, of Good Pope John, embraces not merely the permanent elements of the Christian message, but the “ways and means for making [culture] into a vehicle for communicating [that] message” (*Method in Theology*, 363).

These considerations suggest that John XXIII's insistence that the council he had in mind was to be *pastoral* was radical. His concern was with something more comprehensive than the differentiations of consciousness that a preacher, for example, must honor in communicating the Christian message. He was going beyond the obvious fact that to be effective in the world at large this message must be expressed in common sense and even symbolic language. And he was inviting the bishops, and indeed the whole church, to attend
to the emergent modern culture in its entirety as a distinctly new reality. Given the vantage point he was able to achieve in virtue of his authenticity, the Pope as *Pastor bonus* was inviting the church to consider modern culture as the present instance of what from the empirical viewpoint must be the vehicle for communicating the Christian message (*Method in Theology*, 363). In other words, he was sharing with the church committed to his care his recognition of the value of what is at work in the modern world.

But from their perch in Rome very few of the theologians, into whose hands the Pope entrusted the preparation of topics for discussion in the council, caught the drift of his invitation. Thus the *schemata* they produced in the more than three years between January 25, 1959 and November 10, 1962 did not reflect his apprehension of the value of this moment in history. And in the eventual *collegium* of the bishops as a whole the recognition of Pope John's call for a *pastoral council* dawned only gradually. What was really required was a more comprehensive theory, and that would be forthcoming only after the council, especially in the work of Lonergan.

Now the first words out of the mouth of a seminal thinker are liable to be significant, and on this account the opening paragraph of the two-page introduction to *Method in Theology* deserve special attention. They have to do with religion, culture, and theology—and how they are related. As belonging to infrastructure religion and culture are the more primitive terms, whereas theology is superstructural. Moreover, if you ask about how religion and culture are related historically, it appears that culture is first. It is matrix. In an adaptation of Voegelin's language, culture is the movement of [human] life, whereas religion is a way of understanding and giving direction to the movement.

Now there is a phase in the development of religion when religion and theology are effectively indistinguishable. For those whose lives are led exclusively within the realm of common sense this condition/situation is not only normal but normative. Even in reference to religion, however, the intellectual pattern of experience will eventually out. Somewhere along the line, human intelligence will demand to

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3 Note Lonergan's initial summary (and thought provoking) way of describing how culture changes: "It may remain unchanged for ages. It may be in process of slow development or rapid dissolution" (*Method in Theology*, xi).
know what exactly Jesus meant when he said that he and the Father are one. And the answer to this question is bound to have significance for the culture; for it is not a matter only of meaning to harbored within the spirit of the individual who raises the question. Rather its meaning is bound to be shared, to be argued about, and to be accepted and/or rejected, and to be expressed in various ways and even to be portrayed in the external religious life of the community, that is, in its art and its symbolic liturgy. Eventually questions for systematic meaning will arise, and thus theology differentiates itself (this is Lonergan’s idea) as mediating between culture and the “significance and role of religion in that matrix.” That is how theology functions and this designates its usefulness for any culture and/or religion, for the three terms are being used here in their broadest sense.

In the case of Christianity this initial differentiation will eventually have a peculiar sequence, as Lonergan observes, when “theology divides into a mediating phase, that encounters the past, and a mediated phase, that confronts the future.” In other words, there is a theological memory of the past, and this even before the emergence of the scholarly differentiation of consciousness; and likewise a recognition of theology’s responsibility for the present and the future, to answer to the need for contemporary expression of the Christian message, and thus to enter into the development of present-day culture. “These [developments] interact with one another as theology endeavors to make its contribution towards meeting the needs of Christian living, actuating its potentialities, and taking advantage of the opportunities offered by world history” (Method in Theology, 144f).

Once theology and religion are differentiated, therefore, theology will mediate between religion and culture, on the one hand, speaking on behalf of religion, and on the other, exercising a critical role vis-à-vis religion, insofar as theologians are themselves citizens of their own times. Think concretely of Augustine and his theory of the Two Cities, Aquinas and his acquisition of a chair in the University of Paris on behalf of theology, Catherine of Siena’s role in the healing of schism, Luther’s critique of church authority in the medieval context, Newman’s

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4 Method in Theology, 1972, 144. To be noted is Lonergan’s own admission that chapter 5, Functional Specialties, was originally published in Gregorianum, L (1969), 485-505, and thus stands as a kind of monument to the development of his role in the “small renewal.”
resistance to Roman claims for absolute hegemony in the church. Now the cultural matrix in which religion is embedded is of human making, a creation of the group. On this account it is a variable, for groups develop in their own right, separate from one another. Hence the clan, the tribe, the nation, and so forth. What could be more obvious? But this commonplace has not always been observed, and so we have the classical view of culture, where those whose culture is dominant tend to think of their way of life as indistinguishable from being human. Those whose way of life differs from this norm approximate being human in different degrees, and the dominant culture is the criterion on the basis of which other cultures are assessed. The most accessible example is that of Western European civilization, which in its heyday was thought to be the epitome among various ways of life, especially since it was given its coherence by the Christian religion, identified as God's definitive word to the human race in its development from a primitive state to this ultimate expression of human excellence. The present-day version of this notion is controlled more by the ideal of technological progress and economic success under the banner of liberal entrepreneurship and democracy in the free world, to liberate the poor nations and to bring the people of the South into the beatific circle of economic prosperity and political freedom.

The empirical notion of culture suggests a theory about theology, that is, that it (theology), as mediating between culture and religion, is an ongoing process, not a finished product. And John XXIII's call for a pastoral council can be seen as an implicit application of this theory, for he is thinking of a worldwide "modern" culture that invites an encounter with the Catholic religion, an encounter that from the side of religion is to be promoted by the council which the Pope himself has initiated. For his part Roncalli emphasizes very much the permanence of the meaning of the Catholic faith. He was not a professional theologian. Moreover, his initial theological studies took place in a classical intellectual atmosphere, at a moment when Leo XIII's advocacy of scholasticism was in full swing, and right at the heart of the Modernist crisis, when any notion of process in matters having to do with religion and the Catholic faith was quite suspect. In light of these circumstances the challenge he offered the bishops in his opening address regarding their task, is astounding:
Our duty is not merely to guard this precious doctrinal treasure, as if we were concerned only with antiquity, (for such work a council was not necessary!), but to dedicate ourselves earnestly and without fear to that task which this era demands of us. . . . Since the entire Christian, Catholic, and Apostolic community anticipates a step forward toward a more comprehensive and deeper doctrinal position and inner renewal of the Christian mind; what is called for is faithful and perfect acceptance of the authentic doctrine, which is to be studied, however, and set forth through the methods of research and literary forms required by our times. For the substance of the venerable doctrine of the deposit of faith is one thing, and the way in which it is presented is another. And it is the latter that must be put into prominence and promoted, with patience if necessary, while the entire project is measured by and proportionate to a teaching authority which is predominantly pastoral.5

Now you could think that what the Pope was asking for was simply a matter of style. On that supposition the council would be pastoral simply by taking the “venerable doctrine” into the marketplace, as we say, adopting the kind of language ordinary people employ in their daily life, and thus reaching the modern world at the level of its infrastructure. This in fact was the interpretation of Cardinal Giuseppe Siri of Turin, articulated in an interview given at the time that the Pope’s address was being publicized. But there is evidence that this was not the Pope’s intention. His ideas approximate more what Lonergan was describing some ten years earlier, when he wrote about cosmopolis. In that project

5 Attamen nostrum non est pretiosum hunc thesaurum solum custodire, ac si soli antiquitatii studeamus (et in modi tantum disputations habendas non opus erat ut Concilium Oecumenicum indiceretur), sed alacriter, sine timore, operi quod nostra exigit aetas nunc insitemus. . . . Quemadmodum cuncti rei christianae, catholicae, apostolicae factores vehementer exoptant eadem doctrina amplius et altius cognosceretur, eaque plenius animi imbuantur atque formentur: oportet ut haec doctrina certa et immutabilis, cui fidele obsequium est praestandum ea ratione pervestigetur et exponatur quae tempora postulant nostra. Est enim alius ipsum depositim fidei ac veritates quae veneranda doctrina nostra continentur, alius modus quo eodem enunciantur, eodem tamen sensu eademque sententia. Huic quippe modo plurimum tribuendum erit, et patienser si opus fuerit, in eo elaborandum, sc., eae inducendae erunt rationes rei exponendi quae cum magisterio cujus indoles praesertim pastoralis est, magis congruent (Acta Apostolicae Sedis, 1963, Commentarium officiale, 791f)
the data and inquiry belong to the superstructure, cooperation is on the scientific level and goes to the heart of the matter, "as theology endeavors to make its contribution toward meeting the [present] needs of Christian living, etc." (Method in Theology, 144-45). The initiatives are on this account theological. The aim is to bring about changes that tend to be long range, and in the present case the basic inquiry is about modern culture as a possible vehicle for evangelization. The proclamation of the Gospel is Pope John's passion. The question is how or why modern culture is vulnerable to that proclamation. It is an open inquiry because we have not yet gone beneath the surface to the roots of human affairs. In other words, the great ongoing renewal involves the discovery and implementation of ways of making culture the vehicle for communicating the Christian message. And we cannot let ourselves think that this sort of discovery is a superficial project, or that it can be done superficially.

This is the theory that is implicit in John XXIII's initiative in designating the Second Vatican Council as pastoral.6

### THE "SMALL RENEWAL"

The contrast between great and small renewals can conveniently be brought out in terms of horizon. In the first place, since in using the term, horizon, we are speaking analogously, the question is not precisely quantitative. We are advised to "think globally; act locally!" Global thinking, which is what John XXIII is advocating, is comprehensive. The entire human project, the whole human good, is included in the horizon of the great renewal. No terminal value, no good of order, no particular good (down to the least provision of anything that could contribute to the preservation of the physical well-being of the most needy person) is excluded. "The joys and hopes, the griefs and anxieties of the men and women of this age, especially those who are poor or in

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any way afflicted, these are the joys and hopes, the griefs and anxieties of the followers of Christ” (*Gaudium et Spes*, note 1).

The horizon of the small renewal is more limited, and this is not because the vision of theologians is impaired (though that too is possible!). Rather it is because, in Lonergan’s words “theology is not the full science of man [and] illuminates only certain aspects of human reality” (*Method in Theology*, 364). In other words the limitation is objective. Note, however, that in a second clause there is the following proviso: “. . . the church can become a fully conscious process of self-constitution “only when theology unites itself with other relevant branches of human studies” (*Method in Theology*, 364). Effectively the scope of theology is quite limited, reaching only “certain aspects of human reality,” not to mention the severe limitations in our understanding of divine reality – what can be known about God exclusively through revelation. Nevertheless it is still the case that the great and the small renewals go together as an integral whole. And paradoxically the great depends on the small, as on a *conditio sine qua non*.

The meaning of this dependence can be clarified by a re-examination of Lonergan’s “Scope of Renewal,” for in that lecture he identifies the roots of present-day theological renewal. The first thing that we notice is that in fact seeds of the small renewal, to change the metaphor, were planted long before Pope John thought about a pastoral council. And the initial phase, which Lonergan names the “Passing of Thomism,” may be thought of as clearing the ground.7 Ironically it is related to Leo XIII’s call, in the 1870 encyclical, *Aeterni Patris*, for a return to the method and thought of Aquinas, which was eventually given legal status in the 1918 revision of the Code of Canon Law, with the provision that Roman Catholic seminarians be exposed to the thought of Aquinas in their philosophical and theological studies.

In the meantime, however, real and effective contact with Aquinas was not taking place typically in seminaries, but rather in libraries

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7 Is this a misnomer? Lonergan himself always maintained that he was (or became) a Thomist by “reaching up to the mind of Aquinas,” and being changed thereby, as a result of that reaching (*Insight*, 769). It seems, however, that he thought of the term, *Thomism*, as representing an ideology, or at least a way of waving the banner on Aquinas’s behalf without grasping what he was really up to. He especially resisted being identified with the neo-scholastic version of the movement, which he saw as typically faulted by naive realism in its epistemology and stuck in its devotion to Aristotelian science.
where scholars had access not only to critical texts of his works, but also to the historical reconstruction of medieval theology, which in the long run makes it possible to establish the context of an author such as Aquinas, whose work belongs to another era. And what was happening with Aquinas was being applied also to other philosopher-theologians of the medieval period. In effect this sort of project was by the late nineteenth century just one element in the world of historical scholarship that extended back to the authors of the patristic period and, more notably, to the Scriptures. In fact these are the roots of the modern Biblical Movement, the origins of which are more Protestant than Catholic, which figured as one of the factors that stand behind the Great Renewal of John XXIII and the council.

As things turned out this is precisely how sometime later Lonergan himself was brought into contact with Aquinas, who was not read in the first cycle of Jesuit theological formation in the early decades of the twentieth century. A senior professor at the Gregorianum, Fr. Charles Boyer, had suggested that the brilliant young doctoral candidate might find something that could yield a doctoral dissertation, in Aquinas's struggle with Augustine's distinction of gratia operans et cooperans in Summa theologiae (I II, 111, 2) – and presumably wherever else that brief text might lead a more or less proficient scholar.8

A second ground-clearing factor in the small renewal has even deeper roots. It is the transition from the ancient Aristotelian science of the necessary to the modern empirical science of the possible and verifiable, always open to a revision of the system in place and inclusion in a more comprehensive viewpoint.9 The pervasive presence of empirical science in our culture is an obvious fact. Why it is significant

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8 The remark that Lonergan himself makes in Method in Theology (chapter on the functional specialty, Interpretation, 163n5), about his own scholarly experience of research and interpretation, suggests that this experience was seminal for Lonergan in his thinking through the "small renewal." Earlier on, of course, he had made oblique reference to this project as the beginning of a period of perhaps a dozen years of "reaching up to the mind of Aquinas" (1957, 769). For Lonergan the sequence was not from the passing of Thomism to something new, but rather through the discovery of Aquinas to something analogous to Aquinas's project.

9 The classic text for the story is H. Butterfield (1966) The Origins of Modern Science, 1300-1800, 2nd ed. (New York: Free Press). Notable are the boundaries the author sets, to make for a period of half a millennium. To his way of thinking this movement is the key factor in the transition from the medieval to the modern world.
for the renewal of theology may not be immediately evident. One might observe that it has subtly modified the minds of people generally to be empirical in their outlook, and open to constant growth. Modern scientific method is, after all, the core principle of all the technological changes that have transformed and continue to transform the world in which we live, and on that account the background for a new humanism in our day, and at the limit what is behind secular humanism.

There is another angle, however, that is more specific, though indirect: the claim on the part of modern science to be competent as regards all data of sense. The direct result of this claim is in the realm of philosophy, where data of consciousness is henceforth put forward as primary, and philosophical inquiry is thought to begin with the question, “What am I doing when I am knowing?” Indirectly this will eventually open the way to Lonergan’s recognition that the four levels of consciousness that are distinguishable in human knowing and decision-making yield the basis for differentiating the functional specialties in a theology that is known to be ongoing process.

The discovery on Lonergan’s part of the significance of these two aspects of the modern world apparently brought him to the brink of the breakthrough that constitute his substantial contribution to the small renewal. First, the recognition of the potential of historical scholarship opens the way to a clearer vision of the two phases of theology (the mediating first phase that brings past achievements and conflicts into focus, and the mediated second phase that aims at bringing the tradition into the culturally manifold present). Second, to recognize the empirical methods of modern science, as so many successful applications of the method that is native and normative for human knowing, provides the occasion for the discovery of an even more significant application in the realm of theological inquiry. Finally he came to recognize that the human subject fully understood is constituted by four levels of intentionality, and that “the last is first” – that is, the complete human subject is existential; and being-in-love is preeminent.10

Remove these two factors – historical scholarship and modern empirical science – and you get an intellectual ambience markedly

10 This analysis helps us to understand the content of the section, Passing of Thomism, in the lecture, “The Scope of Renewal,” already cited, for he is giving an account of the elements that contribute to Functional Specialties, his major contribution to the small renewal [of theology].
different from the one Lonergan is describing as the small renewal. And recognition of the reality of development, and consequently of the importance of historical studies that bring development into view, were precisely what were missing among those who occupied the chairs in the so-called Roman school even at the moment John XXIII convoked the council. Witness the motto on the coat of arms of Cardinal Ottaviani, who was a key figure in the composition of the early schemata: *Semper idem!* (without the exclamation point). The year of the publication of the encyclical *Human generis* was 1950, the year in which theologians were warned especially about the danger of historicizing the Tradition of the church; and in 1953 some of the best theologians in Europe (notably Congar, Chenu, Danielou, and de Lubac) were silenced by the Holy Office for the roles they were ostensibly playing in *la theologie nouvelle*.

In 1962, however, when the *schemata* prepared for discussion in the first session of the council were brought to the floor (they had to do respectively with the church, the so-called fonts of revelation, the preservation of Catholic doctrine, and promotion of individual and social moral integrity), they were all roundly criticized for being scholastic and abstract – read *non-pastoral* – and sent back to committee. And the difference was that now the committee[s] included member bishops of the council, elected by their fellows, assisted by experts (*periti*) much less scholastic and abstract in their approach. These committees were laboratories of the small renewal.

The importance of modern philosophy in all this can scarcely be underestimated, because of the enduring relation of theology with philosophical thought. Once the handmaid of theology, philosophy in its modern form made its declaration of independence at the time of the Enlightenment. And in this case independence *from* tends to become displacement *of!* Moreover, in the 200 years from the time of Kant to the present philosophers have tried every possible path to achieving a universal viewpoint, from crass empiricism to absolute idealism, without completely losing confidence in the power of human reason to finds its way. And in the course of this grand experiment there occurred a significant leap forward: the *turn to the subject* (mediated by the claim on the part of modern empirical science to all the data of sense, referred just above).
The Church Becoming Herself

With these notations as background let us go directly to what Lonergan outlines as the requisite substitute for what he has labeled Thomism, but which is more amply described as the inadequate neo-scholastic response to Leo XIII’s invitation/mandate, vetera novis augere et perficere, through recourse to the method and thought of Aquinas. There are three components:

1. An assimilation of relevant advances in bringing forward the thought of Aquinas. And this has two dimensions: first, understanding what the scholars and the scientists are up to. This does not necessarily entail becoming a scholar or a scientist (although that might not hurt!). In fact, Lonergan himself offers first aid to those who need it. For help in understanding scientific activity you have the first five chapters of Insight as a workbook; for understanding scholarship, you have parts of Method in Theology, especially the chapters on Interpretation and History. The second dimension of assimilation is philosophical in a peculiarly modern sense, and in this instance personal engagement is somehow required, consisting in the recognition in oneself of the realm of interiority, where the normative structure of the existential subject presents itself for discovery. The reference here is to something quite momentous. It is the invitation to something that goes by the name of intellectual/psychic conversion.¹¹

2. Continuity with the old. One might say that what we have described as the second dimension of assimilation of the new is the outstanding contribution of modern philosophy to the project in question, and that anyone who finds a way of making this discovery (it is altogether personal, though not private!) is making a kind of leap that is analogous with what Aquinas did in his encounter with Aristotle. And the reference here is not to the Aristotle who provided a systematic framework for an understanding of the Christian mysteries, but rather to the one who simply found light within himself.

Lonergan lays down two conditions that will promote progress (if not ensure perfect achievement) in this project of

¹¹ In Method in Theology, Lonergan takes the position that such conversion is causally dependent on religious and moral conversions, which put the existential subject in the way of discovering the value of intellectual (and psychic) self-appropriation (243).
discovering and identifying the inner light. They are, first, to reject obscurantism, and second, to be faithful to the empirical principle of verification. The rejection of obscurantism means simply (and negatively) not to dodge the meaningful questions that occur in one's journey of self-transcendence, but rather to reverence and treasure the questions. It is simple, of course, but this is not to say that it is easy and on that account typical of the existential subject. In fact, of ourselves we are not up to it (this is the meaning of the causal dependence of intellectual/psychic conversion on a prior conversion which is being-in-love)! Fidelity to the empirical principle of verification complements the first condition, because if we honor the questions that occur about our interiority, that is, about ourselves as existential subjects, insights will inevitably occur. Now insights require verification and in this project the data on which we rely is data of consciousness. And reflection on the meaning of the data of consciousness within human interiority is possible. In fact we are not foolish in affirming ourselves to be knowers, called to know all there is to be known.

3. Finally, dialectical analysis. No need to belabor this point, because fidelity in rejecting obscurantism, together with coherent follow through in verification ("continuity with the old") will bring about a measure of interior clarity, that has the potential for enabling the subject to express idiosyncratically (in his/her own way) the positional base: (1) what knowing and decision making entail (what they are); (2) what it means for something/someone to be real; and (3) how objectivity is to be achieved. This "positional base" is given in the understanding, because what is genuinely understood need not be committed to memory, because it is mine, part of who I am! Nor let it be thought that what is involved here is belittled, when it is translated into the everyday principle, "It takes one to know one!" for this sort of dialectic is again not a private matter, and can take place in very ordinary, everyday circumstances. It does not involve one's becoming a philosopher in the professional sense, and it is typically confirmed in mutual recognition. Lonergan's description may be appended in confirmation:

"[W]hile the psychological reality of authenticity and its opposite are accessible only within the consciousness of the
individual subject, it remains that these inward events and transactions have their outward manifestations in silence and speech, in words and deeds, in motives that move some and not others, in goals that some pursue and other oppose. So it is that from the inner opposition of authenticity and unauthenticity there proceeds the generally accessible opposition of positions and counterpositions . . . ; ("A New Pastoral Theology," 295).

The "small renewal" turns out to be not insignificant! Moreover, whereas it has its observable, even public, elements, for example, the promotion of scholarship, its core is to be found in the existential subject, and indeed at that level of the subject where love is born. Thus too its resonance with the great renewal intended by Pope John in the Second Vatican Council.

A THIRD RENEWAL: A FUNCTIONAL UNDERSTANDING OF THE CHURCH

Earlier Lonergan’s request for a distinction between great and small renewals was reported. The former would have to do with the whole church and would even reach beyond to the entire human family, connected as it was with John XXIII’s convocation of a pastoral ecumenical council, whose concern is the church in the modern world. The latter would have to do simply with theology, and even in its Roman Catholic form, where the question is how theology must change its ways and to what extent. Now I should like to make an appeal for a further distinction within the small [theological] renewal. And I want to approach this topic through a consideration of the role Lonergan has played in this aspect of renewal.

It is quite obvious that Roman Catholic theological renewal neither was nor is his exclusive domain. That he recognized himself as a soldier in this project can easily be seen from the way he proceeded in the lecture, “The Scope of Renewal,” in which he modestly presents his own ideas about “what is desired” only after honoring “contemporary views” of theologians such as Congar, Danielou, Schillebeeckx, Schoonenberg, Rahner, and Metz (287-92).

12 For definitions of position and counterposition in Lonergan’s thought and their ramifications, see Insight, 212-15.
I say modestly because he makes no mention of Method in Theology (1972), which had been published the previous year, and which does after all represent something quite substantial in theological renewal. Nor, however, does he mention an extended notation in the epilogue of Insight (published in 1957, of which these pages were probably written, however, in 1953), where he articulates some ways in which the process he has begun in that work might make a "contribution... to the higher collaboration which it has envisaged and to which it leads" (Insight, 754). Now the collaboration to which he refers turns out to be theological, and it is noteworthy that even at that moment he refers to it as a participative venture. And notably too both the sketchy remarks he makes in Insight and the full-dress essay in theological renewal of Method in Theology bring the reader to the mystery of the church.

Herewith then a list of contributions from Insight he thought possibly relevant:

1. Contributions to the introduction to theology, commonly called apologetics (754f). Here Lonergan reflects on the care he has taken to cultivate a viewpoint that is both rational and open, to promote an encounter with both Rationalism and various forms of anti-intellectualism.

2. Contributions to the method of theology itself.
   2.1 Articulation of the distinction between positions and counterpositions, which goes to the roots of the modernist discomfort with dogma, and at the same time, by clarifying the role of understanding in the knowing process, lays a foundation for systematic theology, so highly praised in the [First] Vatican Council (756).

2.2 Some possibly relevant technical connections (756-61).
   2.2.1 Metaphysics of proportionate being, with the question of other possible worlds, and the supernatural in this world
   2.2.2 The question of a single, true metaphysics, as grounding theological speculation
   2.2.3 Question of changeless concepts and its reappearance in theology

2.3 Elements in the metaphysical part of Insight that are related to the positions taken in the [First] Vatican Council on both
identity and difference in doctrine and the development of doctrine

2.3.1 Analysis of development (chap. 15, para. 6) (762-64)
2.3.2 Theory of the truth of interpretation (chap. 17, para. 3) (761f)

3. Contribution to a better understanding of the relation between theology and the other sciences (764-68).

4. Contribution to Leo XIII's project, *vetera novis augere et perficere*: to have promoted the intensive dimension of the thomist renewal by penetrating through to the "mind of Aquinas" (768 *usque ad finem*)

Notably too in the remarks he makes about development in the epilogue (2.3.1 above, 762ff in *Insight*) he goes beyond his treatment of the topic in its proper place (chap. 15, Elements of Metaphysics). There he had concluded the discourse on human development by invoking the problem of genuineness, and taking it right up to the point at which the question of the necessity of grace could be raised, but denying himself that inquiry to honor the limits imposed by the metaphysics of proportionate being. In the epilogue, however, that inhibition is lifted, and a divine response to our need for help in achieving genuineness is implicitly affirmed. By this inclusion the absolutely supernatural (the conjugate forms of faith, hope, and charity) is included among the levels of human being that are in line for development. And finally the four considerations that are relevant to each level are listed:

1. Development of the absolutely supernatural itself (the gift of grace), that is, how faith, hope, and charity (the "conjugate forms") grow.
2. Development of the absolutely supernatural in relation to the other three levels, that is, how the presence of grace affects intellectual/volitional, psychological/intersubjective, and even physiological development.
3. Dialectic in the development, that is, the harmony and/or conflict that occurs in the individual on account of the presence of grace (its acceptance and/or rejection).
4. The historical aspect of human development under the sign of the gift of grace (the absolutely supernatural).
Now to the question, where this last consideration might be inserted into theology as a treatise (what department?), the Author has an answer: “I would like to suggest that it might possess peculiar relevance to a treatise on the mystical body of Christ” (Insight, 763). By a kind of paradox Lonergan’s most comprehensive vision of development brings us to the subject of the great renewal, which is the church. This proposal might be called Lonergan’s ecclesiological dream; and he rounds it off with some thoughts on how the project could be accomplished. Invoking the distinction between the material and formal elements in a treatise, he observes that as regards the Mystical Body the material element of the treatise is ready at hand, in the abundant results of historical scholarship in the various fields where data on the church are to be found. But the formal element (the pattern of terms and relation that will bring the data together to make them intelligible)? This is where the dream ends, with the remark that the formal element will require a theory of history that is to the mark.

Such a theory is, of course, available, and it was ready even then, but it needed to be integrated with other terms and relations. This is how Lonergan himself saw things in this regard:

[T]he contemporary crisis of human living and human values [this is written in the early 1950s, in the wake of the Second World War] demands of the theologian, in addition to treatises on the unique [Redemptive Incarnation] and to treatises on the universal common to many instances [Grace and Theological Anthropology], a treatise on the concrete universal that is mankind in the concrete and cumulative consequences of the acceptance and rejection of the message of the Gospel (Ecclesiology). And as the remote possibility of thought on the concrete universal lies in the insight that grasps the intelligible in the sensible, so its proximate possibility resides in a theory of development that can envisage not only natural and intelligent progress, but also sinful decline, and not only progress and decline but also supernatural recovery (Insight, 763f, terms in italics, as well as emphasis in closing lines added).

Now Lonergan never made work of developing the treatise. He had other fish to fry at the Gregorianum from 1957 to 1965. And after that
he was not so interested in treatises any more, because he was thinking about functions. And on this account, when it comes to the third renewal, viz., of ecclesiology, his heritage is not the treatise of which he dreamed in 1957, but rather a functional schema of the mystery of the church, that helps us understand the community of the followers of Christ as responsible for the communication of the Christian message in all cultures, as well as being the sacramental bearer of the gift of the Spirit. Remarkably, however, in the epilogue such a schema can be seen emerging:

[I]n the fullness of time . . . there came into the world the Light of the World. It was the advent not only of the light that directs but also of the grace that gives good will and good performance. It was the advent of a light and a grace to be propagated, not only through the inner mystery of individual conversion, but also through the outer channels of human communication. If its principal function was to carry the seeds of eternal life, still it could not bear its fruits without effecting a transfiguration of human living, and in turn that transfiguration contains the solution not only to man's individual but also to the social problem of evil. So it is that the Pauline thesis of moral impotence of Jew and Gentile alike was due to be complemented by the Augustinian analysis of history in terms of the city of God and the city of the world. So it is that the profound and penetrating influence of liberal, Hegelian, Marxist, and romantic theories of history has been met by a firmer affirmation of the organic structure and functions of the Church, by a long series of social encyclicals, by calls to Catholic action, by a fuller aduertence to collective responsibility, and by a deep and widespread interest in the doctrine of the mystical body (Insight, 764 [emphasis mine]).

13 Herewith we are witness to a moment in the genetic differentiation of horizon in the mind of a representative theologian of the mid-twentieth century, obviously quite alive to historical development in the church, and to awareness in the church of that development. Lonergan's assimilation of what is happening in the church herself, especially through the council (1962-65), and his own breakthrough on method, will combine to bring forward this new "ecclesial horizon."
CHURCH AS PROCESS OF SELF-CONSTITUTION

We have in chapter 14 of Method in Theology a brief and apparently systematic presentation of the mystery of the church (Christ’s Mystical Body). In effect it occupies the closing pages (361-68), by way of conclusion, as it were! How are we to read it? Well, of course, in accord with the intention of the author, by “reaching up to his mind.” Now the generic clue to that intention is the context, which is about functional specialties. So our reading must be functional. The specific clue is textual, one might say, for the text (the topic of chapter 14) is communications, and communications is about meaning. On this account there occurs a thought from the initial sections of chapter 3 of this same work, which have to do with Bearers of Meaning, the background of which is occupied by the individual existential subject. And the thought is this: that the [functional] mind-set in chapter 14 of Method in Theology is that the church is the Bearer of Christian Meaning, and this in all the categories previously invoked (intersubjectivity, art, symbol, language, and life). This then is the rationale for the [explanatory] presence of the church in Method in Theology. Communications has to do with Christian meaning, or with the meaning that the Christian message provides to effect the “transfiguration of human living,” and thus to promote “the solution not only to man’s individual but also to the social problem of evil.” And the bearer of that message is the Mystical Body of Christ.

“The Christian Church is the community that results from the outer communication of Christ’s message and from the inner gift of God’s love” (Method in Theology, 361). The community which is to function as the communicator of the meaning of the Christian message has its origin in the absolutely transcendent community of the Blessed Trinity. The church comes into being through the Missions, which have as their created term, respectively, the human heart (from the beginning to the end of the historical process) and humankind in its historical development (in the fullness of time).14

There is here, perhaps, an ecclesial confirmation of Fr. Crowe’s hypothesis about order in the Divine Missions. Faith is the eye of

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14 The missions are the object of Aquinas’s concluding inquiry concerning the Trinity in the Summa theologiae (qu. 43). Of course, in the medieval context there was no treatise, De Ecclesia, but this connection does suggest what Aquinas’s mind might have been.
The inner gift of God's love is present from the beginning and opens human hearts to be able to perceive and receive the unnamed divine presence. There are countless symbols of this presence, which eventually will be portrayed in its fullness by the Death and Resurrection of Jesus the Christ. Now the "outer communication of Christ's message," in word and sacrament, is the extension in history of the visible mission of the Son. And the inner gift of God's love in human hearts is the fruit of the invisible mission of the Spirit. Once the second of these two missions occurs in the redemptive Incarnation, the Christian Church is in the making in its function of communicating the very realities by whom it is constituted.

The twofold basis of the church is Christological (Body of Christ) and Pneumatological (... animated by the Holy Spirit). The sacramental structure of the church is related to the mystery of the Incarnation (Visible Mission of the Word made flesh), while her mystical life is grounded in the created gifts of sanctifying grace and charity, which are affirmed to be, respectively, created participations in the divine relations of active and passive spiration (source of the Invisible Mission of the Holy Spirit) (*The Triune God: Systematics*, 472).15

"Through communication there is constituted community and, conversely, community constitutes and perfects itself through communication. Accordingly, the Christian Church is a process of self-constitution, a Selbstvollick.* (Method in Theology, 363b). This is the core of Lonergan's understanding of the church as growing through the communication of the gift of love and the Christian message, respectively. The communication of the Christian message, by Christ himself together with the Apostles, and the inner gift of God's love are constitutive of the ecclesial community. This historical community constitutes and perfects itself by the ongoing communication of the meaning of believing in Christ (cognitive function), of becoming members of his body (constitutive function), and of promoting his reign in this world (effective function). On this account the church is

15 Be it noted that the terms sanctifying grace and gift of charity are left over, so to speak, from the vocabulary of a faculty psychology and may be translated into the discourse of intentionality analysis by the experiential term of being in love in an unrestricted manner (*Insight*, 1972, 105d), with a passive component (the experience of being loved unconditionally), and an active component (the experience of being impelled to love unconditionally in return – *caritas Christi urget nos*).
self-constitutive process, because the inner gift of God’s love is never absent, any more than is the message of the Gospel. Of course, it is always both unfinished and imperfect, even broken. But the promise of Christ to be with the church “all days until the end of time” (Matthew 28:20) is fulfilled by the presence of the Spirit. Whence the presence of the capacity to develop in history, in applying the divine solution to the problem of evil, preaching the Gospel to all nations (in all times and places, i.e., to all cultures), so that the Christian message becomes a “line of development from within the various cultures.”

Especially in this project of promoting the reign of God on earth the church is not alone. The following remarks of Lonergan in this context suggest cooperation and/or collaboration:

“There are needed ... individuals and groups and, in the modern world, organizations that labor to persuade people to intellectual, moral, and religious conversion and that work systematically to undo the mischief brought about by alienation and ideology. Among such bodies should be the Christian church” (Method in Theology, 361 [emphasis mine]).

Again, “[t]o operate on the level of our day is to apply the best available knowledge and the most efficient techniques to coordinated group action. It will bring theologians into close contact with experts in very many different fields. It will bring scientists and scholars into close contact with policy makers and planners and, through them, with clerical and lay workers engaged in applying solutions to the problems and finding ways to meet the needs both of Christians and of all mankind.” (Method in Theology, 367 [emphasis mine])

In summary one might say that the reason for Lonergan’s placing the description/explanation of the ecclesial mystery in these closing pages (!) of Method in Theology is that in a Christian context the church is the agent or instrument of the tasks that are peculiar to Communications. It is often affirmed that the entire church is “in mission,” and the true foundation of that kind of language is in the relation of the church with the Trinitarian Missions. Of course, individuals are involved, intellectually and existentially, but precisely as members of the Mystical Body.
This peculiar slant of Lonergan also suggests why, as he is drafting the closing chapters of *Method in Theology*, in 1970 or later, when the documents of the Second Vatican Council are all available, providing as they do abundant material for ecclesiological reflection, there is no reference to those documents (or even to the council itself!). An ecclesiology is not to be expected here, but rather a rationale for the tasks pertinent to communications. And the community constituted by the communication of the inner gift of God’s love and the outer word of Christ’s message is invariably present to those tasks. On this account enough is said. But it is perhaps not out of order to observe that *such an approach to the mystery of the church is altogether coherent with the ecclesiology of the council*, and, moreover, with the venerable Catholic tradition, which unites the doctrine of the Mystical Body with that of the Trinitarian Missions – the *invisible* mission of the Holy Spirit who comes to dwell in human hearts through the gift of God’s love, and the *visible* mission of the Incarnate Word, whose life, saving death, and justifying Resurrection give expression to God’s design to gather all things into one.

It is, however, a perspective which separates itself from the ideal and static medieval notion of society (*perfect and imperfect*), and takes its point of departure from a modern sociological view, where togetherness is the mark of the social, and in a world where fewer and fewer people live in isolation, and human society tends to be thought of as worldwide, albeit culturally very diverse (*Insight*, 359b). Togetherness on a single planet, however, or even within the very restricted boundaries of a small country such as Bosnia, for example, do not constitute community, whereas the “ideal basis of society is community” (*Method in Theology*, 360). Such is the framework within which Lonergan will construct a dynamic statement about the church as a “process of self-constitution” (*Method in Theology*, 363), a term that requires always to be understood against the background of its initial dependence on the extension of the two missions: the inner gift of God’s love and outer word of Christ’s message, which are the “substance of the process.”

As regards this outer word of Christ’s message there is something to be said about its relation to the recognition of a diversity of cultures. Such recognition is a given from the beginning of *Method in Theology*
(xi), whereas there is something permanent and invariant about the message of Christ. This contrast brings us into contact with the "intention of Pope John," who wanted a council that would carry God's word into the marketplace of the modern world – a world marked by a cultural diversity reflected paradoxically in the body of bishops constituting the council, who met in the vast aula of St. Peter's Basilica.

The problem is not new. It occurs whenever the Christian message is proclaimed to a people who have not heard it before. The first instance was in the mission of Jesus himself to his own people, who recognized the message as novel and felt that he spoke with authority. Then in the very next generation, with the rapid expansion of the Christian religion, Jewish Christianity had to take into account the complex culture of the Roman Empire. And this initial expansion was to extend itself thence into Asia on one side, and on the other into Western Europe, including Scandinavia and the British Isles. Regularly those to whom the communication of the Christian message has been committed, have been bearers not only of the Gospel, but also of their own way of life, wherein Christian meanings and values have become imbedded; for as a rule evangelization and political expansion, even military invasion, have been paired. This becomes grossly evident later when the Gospel was carried into Latin America by the Conquistadores (or at least with them); but it was not recognized as problematic, because to the bearers of the message their culture was clearly far superior to that of the pagans, who stood to be liberated from both false religion and a primitive way of life. So also among the native people of North America, and even more recently the people of Africa.

The discovery of a plurality of cultures is after all a rather recent development, and its implementation is by no means an accomplished fact. There is much talk about the inculturation of the Christian religion, especially in regions where nations have achieved their freedom in the late twentieth century, but concrete effects are not easily put into practice. Thus it remains true that, whereas the inner gift of God's love can be counted on as the ever-present source and bond of ecclesial unity, the cultural integrity, so to speak, of the communication of the Christian message remains always as a goal to be achieved. Still by the power of the Spirit the fruits of this communication can exceed all expectations, even where the bearer of the message might be judged
as unqualified. The words of Paul in his letter to the fellowship of Christians in Philippi describe a situation in the primitive church that is relevant even in the present:

I want you to know, brothers, that my situation has turned out rather to advance the Gospel, so that my imprisonment has become well known in Christ throughout the whole praetorium and to all the rest, and so that the majority of brothers, having taken encouragement in the Lord from my imprisonment, dare more than ever to proclaim the word fearlessly. Of course, some preach Christ from envy and rivalry, others from good will. The latter act out of love, aware that I am here for the defense of the gospel; the former proclaim the gospel out of selfish ambition, not from pure motives, thinking that they will cause me trouble in my imprisonment. What difference does it make, as long as in every way, whether in pretense or in truth, Christ is being proclaimed? In that I rejoice. (Philippians 2:16ab [emphasis added])

This fellowship perfects itself and continues to make disciples by a communication, which always leaves something to be desired. Such are grounds for Lonergan’s affirming the church to be a “process of self-constitution that occurs within world wide human society” (Method in Theology, 363). Practical theology, another term for communications, goes forward in the church under the sign of contradiction, as it were, as the Christian message is proclaimed dialectically, that is, imperfectly, as Paul suggests in his letter to the Philippians. Thus the communication itself is invested with components of progress, decline, and redemption.

**CHURCH AS STRUCTURED PROCESS**

The symbol, “communication of the Christian message,” evokes the idea of an extremely complex good, and this may be the key to understanding why Lonergan describes the church as a structured process. As a good or object of reasonable choice, such communication is realized in myriad different ways, and on this account it can be related to the structure of the human good that he developed in an earlier chapter of Method in
Theology (chap. 2: "The Human Good," 47-52). There will be examples of communication that may be identified as instances of particular goods, for example, in a liturgical assembly in which several people perform ministries, while others participate more or less actively, and each of the participants, ordained or lay, are somehow touched by the message. There will be goods of order purposively organized for a more effective communication of the message, for example, the ritual program for the Christian Initiation of Adults. Again there will be the personal relationships at the heart of Christian community, wherein people communicate to one another, informally but fruitfully, for example, in a base community in which the members are looking out for one another in their common effort to "be church" in an urban neighborhood. The heuristic structure of the human good offers itself as a framework for categorizing the various ways in which the communication of the Christian message actually occurs.

This way of thinking of structured process will not have much to do, therefore, with the structure Catholics will ordinarily think of when the "hierarchical structure of the church" is mentioned. Of course, the hierarchy is a good of order within the church, which can function well or not. But behind and prior to the way in which the church is traditionally organized (with members who are hierarchical and those who are lay), there is the fact that the church is a human community, constituted by a certain set of shared meanings and functioning to communicate them. And so Lonergan's analysis of the structured way in which the human good is achieved can be employed in reference to the church, for as he asserts, the account presented there is "compatible with any stage of technological, economic, political, cultural, religious development" (Method in Theology, 52, [emphasis added]). In other words that a self-constituting process is religious, and even supplied with divine gifts such as the abiding presence of the Spirit of the Risen Christ, to make of it his Mystical Body, does not mean that it will develop along lines radically different from those at work in other processes within the human domain.

The needs and capacities of its individual members will be "plastic and perfectible," and thus require training, so that they develop those skills that correspond to the roles and tasks assigned them in cooperative setups that are designed to deliver particular goods peculiar to the
Christian life, and so forth. Think, for example, how a Basic Christian Community is formed, with its various services or ministries that need to be put into place in order for the community to function well, that is, to promote the growth of its members and their outreach. Again there is the freedom to choose one's path in life under the influence of the conversions that bring about authenticity, and the personal relations that occur and are fostered, when individuals who have chosen to follow Christ in the path of discipleship come together in fellowship. That freedom and these relations, as healed and transformed, constitute the fundamental sources of progress in the continual renewal to which the church is called (Method in Theology, 367).

**CHURCH AS OUTGOING PROCESS: CREATIVE DEVELOPMENT FROM BELOW UPWARD**

To affirm that the ecclesial self-constituting process is outgoing, that is, in the world not for its own good but for the building of the reign of God, is implicitly to affirm the connection between the inner gift of God's love and the outer communication of Christ's message (together constitutive of the Christian Church) on the one hand, with the twofold mission of the Divine Persons, on the other. For the ultimate origin of that reign is God's infinite wisdom and the creative outpouring of God's goodness, which is given in accord with the way God really is, viz., One in Three Persons. Now the invisible mission of the Spirit finds its term in the pouring forth of the gift of God's love in human hearts. The visible mission of the Word of God in the mystery of the Incarnation finds expression beyond the historical life of Jesus of Nazareth in the proclamation of the Gospel by his disciples. There is then this intrinsic relation among the mysteries of the Trinity, the Incarnation, and the church.

Now one may be reminded here of A. von Harnack's notorious saying: "Christ proclaimed the coming of the reign of God and what came about was the Church." Such heavy-handed liberal irony covers over, however, a deeper tension brought forward by Fred Crowe in his ground-breaking, reverent, and carefully written doctrinal hypothesis, where he makes reference to "the changes rocking the church these twenty years [as being] not the aftershocks of a cultural earthquake
that has occurred, but the foreshocks of one that is still to come" (Lonergan Workshop Journal, vol. 5, 19). Perhaps the reason for this foresight on his part of shocks still to come is attributable precisely to his understanding of those tensions in the divine missions – and on that account of the relation between the gift of God’s love and the proclamation of the Christian message.

It will be recalled that Fr. Crowe bases his reflections on Fr. Lonergan’s expression of his own understanding of order in the Divine Missions, where he employs as illustrative analogy the love of woman and man for one another (Method in Theology, 112f). The significant distinction is between an initial mutual falling in love that remains verbally unexpressed (un-avowed, silent), and a love that is avowed (spoken). Then citing the opening lines of the Epistle to the Hebrews, he suggests that the religions of humankind stand for the first kind of love, and that they are the fruit of an un-avowed and unidentified outpouring of the love of God in human hearts. Of course on the human side there are always symbolic representations of the divine, but it is not to be assumed that they find their origin in divine self-revelation. The probability is rather that they are grounded in the human response to the anonymous and unannounced divine presence. Nonetheless, of themselves and imperfect as they may be, inevitably mixed with magic and superstition, these religions contribute something to the building of the human good, which is itself, in its positive aspects, consistent with the reign of God.

For his part, Fr. Crowe observes that these expressions of religious experience remain “untrammeled by the kenosis of historicity” (13). In other words, it can be assumed that historical developments in the religions of humankind are the result of religious imagination rather than of the self-revealing Word of God. God’s presence may be acknowledged from the fruits, but it is an anonymous presence, as is always the case with the invisible (un-avowed) mission of the Spirit. It is different, however, with the religious tradition that begins with God’s call of Abraham and culminates in the historical event of the Incarnation in the womb of the Virgin, with the sequence of the life, suffering, death, and resurrection of the Saviour. This is a “personal entrance of God himself into history, a communication of God to his people, the advent of God’s word into the world of religious experience.
Such was the religion of Israel. Such has been Christianity” (Insight, 119a).

Fr. Crowe observes further that the two kinds of religion represent two ways of communication on God’s part with humankind. One sort of communication corresponds to the orientation of human consciousness to the outer/objective world mediated by meaning (consciousness as intentional). And this communication is accomplished in the mission of God’s objectified self-understanding, the Word who empties himself, taking flesh, and on that account is subject to death. The other kind of communication corresponds to the subjective aspect of human consciousness (consciousness as experience), and takes place in the mission of the one who is, in Crowe’s words, “divine subjectivity surging up in the infinite Love that responds to the infinite Word” (12). This is the invisible mission of the Spirit, the source of the experience of the love of God poured into the human heart (Romans 5:5).

Both of these missions are “outgoing,” of course, in harmony with the meaning of that term at work here, for they are the original source of all that is done to bring about or promote the reign of justice and peace. The abiding presence of the Spirit of God in human hearts, even without acknowledgement thereof and without reference to religious profession, makes of those in whom she dwells redeeming agents of that reign, a collective gathering force in a world wherein agents of scattering predominate. By their fruits you know them. So also whatever occurs by way of response to the Christian principle, which “conjoins the inner gift of God’s love with its outer manifestation in Christ Jesus and in those who follow him” (Method in Theology, 360). Here, of course, is the place where we anticipate the promotion of the reign of God and are often disappointed, whereas in the former case we are more often surprised.

Finally Fr. Crowe shows (15-17) that in the Christian tradition, beginning with the New Testament authors themselves, notably, Paul, Luke, and John, there is on the one hand an integration of the two aspects of the trinitarian missions, here distinguished as the experiential and the intentional, and on the other, the recognition of their distinction. As the story is told, the mystery of the Incarnation seems to be the condition of the sending of the Spirit (most obviously in the twofold Gospel, of Incarnate Word and Spirit, as formulated by Luke). And in the realm of common sense we are carried along by the narrative.
But from a viewpoint that depends less on the narrative and more on the sort of analysis that is now normal (even normative in the third stage of meaning), the un-avowed, always healing and transformative, presence of the love of God (the anonymous Spirit) can be affirmed as authoritative in its own right, and identified as the avenue leading to the event in which the outpouring of God’s love becomes historical in the Word of God Incarnate. Harmony between the two is constant; the history of their interplay is variable.

THE CHURCH AS REDEMPTIVE PROCESS HEALING OR DEVELOPMENT FROM ABOVE DOWNARD

By comparison with the creative out-going aspect of the ecclesial process of self-constitution, the redemptive aspect may be thought of as healing (“Healing and Creating in History”). Now healing and creating are mutually interdependent. “[J]ust as the creative process, when unaccompanied by healing is distorted and corrupted, so too the healing process when unaccompanied by creating is a soul without a body” (“Healing and Creating in History,” 107). Again the out-going creative process is an instance of development from below upward, while the redemptive process is in the category of development from above downward. Thus schematically the terms are related as follows:

\[
\text{Church} = \text{process of self-constitution} \quad \leftrightarrow \quad \text{redemptive} \\
\text{out-going} \quad \leftrightarrow \quad \text{creative} \quad \leftrightarrow \quad \text{healing}
\]

\[
\text{bringing about development} \quad \leftrightarrow \quad \text{from below upward} \quad \leftrightarrow \quad \text{from above downward}
\]

Of course the creative process at work here does not bring something out of nothing. Creation in this altogether proper sense is a divine prerogative. Nor is the distinction between creating and healing, as applicable in the church, equivalent to the distinction between nature and grace. The church is the Body of Christ, and on that account belongs to the order of grace through and through. So ecclesial self-constitution itself is altogether dependent, first and fundamentally, on the infinite gift of redemptive Incarnation, and then in the case of each individual
member, on the completely unmerited grace which is the inner gift of God's love, by which through Christ we become adopted children of God and even God's friends. Conversion (μετανοια) is a change of heart, wherein one does not choose the good, but rather consents to the choice that God makes of oneself to be an adopted child. It is an instance of gratia operans, where one is changed without taking any initiative whatsoever, without prejudice, however, to human freedom (the term, consensus, is used to denote this free acceptance of God's initiative).

Paul's vision is comprehensive: "[God] chose us in [Christ] before the foundation of the world, to be holy and without blemish before him. In love he destined us for adoption to himself through Jesus Christ, in accord with the favor of his will, for the praise of the glory of his grace that he granted us in the beloved" (Ephesians 1:4-6).

The church's share in the mystery of redemption is connected with Christ's redemptive death. And to understand a little of this redemptive process of self-constitution, it is helpful to return to the distinction of the various ways in which the Christian message functions. It has a cognitive function insofar as it makes us believers; a constitutive function, insofar as it make us members of Christ's body the church; an effective function insofar as it moves us to cooperate in building the reign of God. Now as regards the second function, to become Christ's body, or to have fellowship (κοινωνια) with him, entails our being governed inwardly by the self-same law which had dominion in the Heart of Christ. This was the Law of the Cross, and it is by his death on the Cross that Jesus is Redeemer of the world. So as members of his body we are called to share in the redemptive process. Paul describes it as making up in our bodies (personal lives) what is lacking to the sufferings of Christ (Colossians 1:24).

We are allowed to think that Jesus himself learned and accepted this self-same law as he grew in stature and in grace in Nazareth. It is a fact that the primitive church held most dear the so-called Songs of the Suffering Servant from the book of Second Isaiah (42:1-7; 49:1-7; 50:4-9a; 52:13-53:12), and gave primacy to them in their understanding of who Jesus was; and this gives ground for believing that the perfectly

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16 Herewith Aquinas's succinct description: in illo... effectu in quo mens nostra est mota et non movens, solus autem Deus movens, operatio Deo attribuitur, et secundum hoc dicitur gratia operans (Summa theologiae I II, 111, 2, in corp.).
human Jesus discovered himself in these Songs and thus came to a concrete recognition of the meaning of his being Redeemer. He is to be a messenger of peace and as such to be rejected. Then in a second phase of this sequence he is to overcome such hateful rejection not by force, but by loving those who are responsible for the rejection. In other words, he overcomes evil by loving those who hatefully take him by force, and accepting the suffering they imposed upon him. Jesus did love his enemies! Our participation in this mystery begins when, as members of the Body of Christ, we recognize that evil forces do play a role in our lives, and that as his disciples we will be hated. What happens after that depends on how we cooperate with God's grace (there is also a gratia cooperans). In a Christian context this is called the Law of the Cross because living it brought Jesus to Calvary.

Now to live this way with Jesus as model is denominated as redemptive. This is certainly a difficult term, but the language is not the principal obstacle. Of course, the Blood of Christ shed on the Cross is thought of as the "price (to redeem means to buy) of our Redemption," and this shedding of blood (or bloody death) is affirmed to be and described as the ultimate act of love on Jesus' part. Redemptive love, therefore, for his Father, who decreed that he should die and in whom he put complete trust; and for those who perpetrated his cruel death, on whose behalf he sought forgiveness. This is the love of Christ, self-sacrificing love in the ultimate degree! But to believe that it is meaningful, that it promotes the human good, that it reconciles us with God and with one another is not a matter of language. Rather it is an instance of "heart speaking to heart," for strictly speaking there is no rational defense for the Law of the Cross in any of its manifestations, much less in its chief revelation. Faith makes possible its recognition, and faith itself is the eye of love (Method in Theology, 243).

This redemptive process is to be replicated in the church as a whole, in each of its parts, and in everyone of its members. Here the terms, whole and part are used as they would be by sociologists, for it is their viewpoint that has been adopted. So there is a universal church, but there is also an "American Church," if you will (whatever meaning is given to American), or an African Church, for that matter. The real

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17 Again Aquinas: In illo ... effectu in quo mens nostra movet et movetur, operatio attribuitur Deo set etiam animae (Summa theologiae, I, II, 111, 2. c.)
challenge to our power of understanding is in the relation between the whole church and its members, where the term, *members*, connotes the term, *body*. The church is the Mystical Body of Christ, whereof the members as human retain their personal identity, both in the order of nature and in the order of grace (for grace *builds on* nature!). So the question about the "real me" demands a careful answer, that honors both the integrity of the Mystical Body, and the freedom/responsibility of the individual Christian.

As regards the ecclesial process as *redemptive*, however, whether in the church as a whole, in its parts, or in its members, the biggest and perhaps most common mistake is to consider and to act as if redemptive love were thoughtless or, perhaps more to the point, a matter in which the will takes precedence over the mind in a voluntaristic way. It was, after all, the *Word*, that is, the objective expression of God's self-understanding of infinite all-inclusive intelligibility and value, who *became flesh*! On this account, redemptive process requires full implementation of human potential, both where individual effort is required and in the realm of cooperation. And all this in the order that is provided by the structure of human interiority, and with appropriate respect for feelings and aesthetic concerns. The church is the place where all due reverence is to be accorded to the transcendental precepts, precisely because grace *builds on* nature. Nothing could be further removed from the redemptive process, therefore, than what would do prejudice to what is authentically human. Thus in all sectors of the church where the building of the human good is intended, due attention is to be accorded to the following altogether human procedures:

The selection of ends to be achieved (reasonable choices).
The determination of priorities (comparative value judgments).
The survey of resources and the consideration of the conditions for their deployment (attention to data).
The drawing up and coordination of plans (development of higher viewpoints).
FULLY CONSCIOUS PROCESS

The notion of a *fully conscious*, enlightened process of self-constitution, whether outgoing or redemptive, brings this ecclesiological schema peculiarly into contact with the thought of the Second Vatican Council. As the council unfolded it became clear to the participants that the conventional wisdom regarding their task, namely, that it was to complement the ecclesiology of Vatican I concerning the role of the papacy, by bringing forward the collegiality of the bishops with the Pope in the governing of worldwide church, was quite incomplete. The theme of the relation of the church to the modern world gradually emerged as significant in itself. It was, of course, implicit in Pope John’s intention that the council be pastoral, for this initiative was itself generated by his awareness that something altogether new was in the works (the modern era). The entire assembly eventually caught on, and the result was the so-called Schema XIII, which finally took form in *Gaudium et Spes* (the Pastoral Constitution on the Church in the Modern World).

By hindsight, things are clearer than they may have been in the minds of many of the Fathers of the council, but now we can see and appreciate better this second complementarity of the present council with the nineteenth-century synod, when the challenge of modernity had not come into view. The question of papal primacy and episcopal collegiality did not go away, of course, nor has it in the meantime. In fact after fifty years or so it is clearer than ever that the bed-rock opposition to an effective worldwide episcopal collegiality is an entrenched Vatican bureaucracy. In the council itself, however, the challenge that gradually captured the imagination of the bishop-participants was effectively to take into account what John XXIII recognized as a new era in history. By comparison the viewpoint of the First Vatican Council could seem somewhat narrow, focused inwardly as it was on the constitution of the church as institution, and concerned rather exclusively with the negative aspects of the Enlightenment (especially rationalism), while neglectful of the positive aspects of modern science.

Even among contemporary theologians Lonergan stands out as grasping the significance of the empirical human sciences in the “*fully conscious*” ecclesial process of self-constitution, a term not found
elsewhere in his works (as far as I can determine). Fully conscious process seems to imply a practical theology with "peripheral vision." As applicable to theology generally (and the individual theologian) he will have written that these days a credible theology requires on the part of the theologian more than a passing acquaintance (in fact a professional grasp) of one or another of the human sciences. And he seems to be thinking especially about method as practiced in the human sciences. Here in *Method in Theology*, however, the discourse is not about individuals, but about the engagement of the community of practical (pastoral) theologians with the various communities of those who practise the human sciences, for example, psychology, sociology, economics, politics, and the history that goes with each one of them. A new pastoral theology!

The integration of theology with other human sciences, in the functional specialty of communications, is required because of the limitations of theology itself, namely, that it is concerned principally with only one dimension of human life [and history], namely, religious meaning and value. There is, of course, a commonsense awareness of the fields of investigation of the human sciences, whether psychological, sociological, economic, political, or historical, with which theologians may be familiar like everyone else. And that sort of familiarity may very well stand up here or there in pastoral care or ministry. But in the long run, in order to understand these other elements of human living in a coherent and effective way, and to make a lasting contribution to development, a scientific approach is appropriate, even necessary. This is the condition of theology's being at the level of our time, for "our time" is precisely a world in which scientific method plays a role in every dimension and on every level of human life. The integration is to be accomplished by the application of transcendental method in the other spheres of human existence, conceived simply as experience,

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18 Earlier, in *Insight*, Lonergan demonstrates awareness of the relevance of theology for the empirical human sciences. In the epilogue, where he adopts the terminal viewpoint of the theologian, he affirms a twofold relevance: (1) subjective, for the scientist as scientist, who can appreciate how the limitations on the pure desire in her pursuit of a particular science can be overcome only by "accepting the ultimate implications of the unrestricted desire;" and (2) objective and practical, where the correct interpretation of the results of empirical investigation requires the recognition of the divine origin of the solution to the human problem of evil (*Insight*, 766f).
understanding, and judgment, as Lonergan suggests. Then dialectical analysis will be employed to sort out positions and counterpositions in the various spheres. All along the line, of course, progress will depend on the authenticity of the scientists in question, for achieving understanding has the same conditions in all the sciences.

Lonergan distinguishes two uses of dialectic in this coordination of practical (pastoral) theology with human scholarly and scientific studies (Method in Theology, 365). One would be the subjective application of dialectic in a critical self-study on the part of the scientist her/himself. "Charity begins at home!" The second would be the objective analysis of social process and situation (enlightened and energized by the previous subjective application) to discern the presence of alienation and ideology where they are impeding progress. Obviously the entire project is an enormous undertaking which will require much time, effort, and generosity on the part of all concerned. It is in fact the price to be paid for the church’s continual renewal. Again the primary deterrent seems to be the bureaucracy that emerges, not merely in the Vatican, but wherever movements become institutions.

The human sciences have a language of their own, but they are all practical, and on that account they perform in ways that are parallel with and complement the activities of mediated theology. To indicate the connections, Lonergan sketches out analogies between certain functional specialties in theology and common aspects of human studies. Corresponding to doctrines, which are formulated as value judgments, the human sciences produce policies. Again, corresponding to systematics, which promote an understanding of how doctrines regarding the mysteries are inter-related, human studies will engage in planning, to produce intelligible networks of possible implementation of the policies. Finally the execution of the plans will generate feedback, just as in the case of more or less fruitful pastoral practice, to begin a new cycle of policy-making, planning, and execution. All of this can take place locally, regionally, nationally, and even on a worldwide basis, with appropriate variations according to culture, while the principle of subsidiarity is observed. And whereas, from a theological viewpoint the redemptive aspect will be predominant, secular components will have a constructive appearance.\(^{19}\)

\(^{19}\)Lonergan’s anticipation of this role of the empirical human sciences in church
CONCLUSION

Pie in the sky? Given the condition of society (the social surd) and even of the church, with its manifest polarizations, bureaucratic mediocrities, and even scandals, to think that such coordination, cooperation, and collaboration is possible and feasible might seem to be a dream.

No one, however, can deny the exigence. And where the demand exists we may expect that in this new era hardy souls such as Giovanni Roncalli, Oscar Romero, Rosemary Haughton, Martin Luther King, Corrie ten Boom, Nelson Mandela, Dorothy Day, not to speak of Bernard Lonergan, and even Therese Martin, will regularly appear, though rarely perhaps at the outset, and at unanticipated places in the ecclesial body. The renewal of the church is after all as much an instance of emergent probability as other processes, to the effect that its ongoing promotion will depend on the self-transcendence of the members of the Mystical Body. Neither the passionateness of being nor the presence of sufficient grace can be denied.

renewal is manifest in the following passage, again from the epilogue of Insight: "It is not the theologian operating in his own field who reaches the accumulation of insights to be formulated in the classical laws and genetic operators constitutive of a theoretical science of physiology or psychology, of economics or sociology. Nor again is it the theologian who would add to such theory the enumeration of the dialectical alternatives it offers or the probable frequencies with which the different alternatives would in fact be chosen. Nor clearly can the theologian supply the knowhow of the technician, the analyst, the economic consultant, or the social worker" (767)
THE CHALLENGE OF VATICAN II—
AFTER FIFTY YEARS

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TWELVE YEARS AGO, in his apostolic letter Novo Millennio Ineunte, Pope John Paul II described the challenge facing the Catholic Church in the millennium that was then beginning, in the following terms: "To make the Church the home and the school of communion: that is the great challenge facing us if we wish to be faithful to God's plan and respond to the world's deepest yearnings." John Paul II went on to mention examples of what needed to be done to make the church a "home and school of communion."

Consequently, the new century will have to see us more than ever intent on valuing and developing the forums and structures which, in accordance with the Second Vatican Council's major directives, serve to ensure and safeguard communion. How can we forget in the first place those specific services to communion which are the Petrine ministry and, closely related to it, episcopal collegiality? ... Much has also been done since the Second Vatican Council for the reform of the Roman Curia, the organization of synods, and the functioning of episcopal conferences. But there is certainly much more to be done in order to realize all the potential of these instruments of communion, which are especially appropriate today in view of the need to respond promptly and effectively to the issues which the Church must face in these rapidly changing times. Communion must be cultivated and extended day by day and at every level in the structures of each church's life. To this end

1 Novo Millennio Ineunte, no. 43, Origins 30, no. 31 (January 18, 2001), 502.
the structures of participation envisaged by canon law, such as the council of priests and the pastoral council, must be ever more highly valued.²

I am convinced that the challenge that Pope John Paul II saw facing the church at the beginning of the new millennium is still a major challenge that Vatican II presents to us as we celebrate its fiftieth anniversary. And I propose that what needs to be done in order to realize the potential of these instruments of communion, is to make sure that they truly deserve the name “structures of participation.” The key word here is “participation,” because it is the English word that comes closest to the original meaning of the Greek koinonia. This is brought out in the passage in which St. Paul speaks of what we share in the Eucharist. “The cup of blessing that we bless, is it not a participation (koinonia) in the blood of Christ? The bread that we break, is it not a participation (koinonia) in the body of Christ?” (1 Corinthians 10:16)

What Pope John Paul II calls “instruments of communion” will realize their potential to be such, when they are so organized and conducted that everyone involved in them can really participate to the full measure of the gifts and capacities that God has given to them.

As we have noted above, Pope John Paul II began his treatment of the various structures of communion whose potential must be ever more fully realized, by asking: “How can we forget in the first place those specific services to communion which are the Petrine ministry and, closely related to it, episcopal collegiality?” In his Encyclical Letter “On Commitment to Ecumenism” (Ut Unum Sint), John Paul II insisted that the exercise of papal teaching authority “must always be done in communion.” There he went on to say:

[The pope] has the duty to admonish, to caution and to declare at times that this or that opinion being circulated is irreconcilable with the unity of faith. When circumstances require it, he speaks in the name of all the pastors in communion with him. He can also – under very specific conditions clearly laid down by the First Vatican Council – declare ex cathedra that a certain doctrine belongs to the deposit of faith. By thus bearing

² Novo Millennio Ineunte, no. 44-45, Origins 30, no. 31 (January 18, 2001), 503.
The Challenge of Vatican II – After Fifty Years

witness to the truth, he serves unity. All this, however, must always be done in communion. When the Catholic Church affirms that the office of the bishop of Rome corresponds to the will of Christ, she does not separate this office from the mission entrusted to the whole body of bishops, who are also ‘vicars and ambassadors of Christ.’ The bishop of Rome is a member of the ‘college,’ and the bishops are his brothers in the ministry.¹

In the light of this statement that Pope John Paul II made in 1995 in his encyclical on ecumenism, I think it would not be out of place to ask what role his “brothers in the ministry” had played in the preparation of the Apostolic Letter on the Priestly Ordination of Women (Ordinatio Sacerdotalis) that he had published in the previous year. The Pope spoke explicitly of the bishops twice in that letter: at the beginning, when he addressed them as his “venerable brothers in the episcopate,” and at the end, when he invoked upon them “an abundance of divine assistance.” He also spoke of them once implicitly, since his “brothers in the ministry” are surely among the “brethren” to whom he referred in the key sentence of his letter, where he said: “Wherefore, in order that all doubt may be removed regarding a matter of great importance, a matter which pertains to the church’s divine constitution itself, in virtue of my ministry of confirming the brethren (cf. Luke 22:32) I declare that the church has no authority whatsoever to confer priestly ordination on women and that this judgment is to be definitively held by all the church’s faithful.”²

In support of this judgment, Pope John Paul II invoked the teaching of Pope Paul VI, and the Declaration Inter Insigniores of the Congregation for the Doctrine of the Faith, which Paul VI had approved and ordered to be published. But there is no reference in Ordinatio Sacerdotalis to any way in which John Paul II consulted his fellow bishops or sought their advice in reaching his judgment about the ordination of women to the priesthood. While it is impossible to know whether Pope John Paul II may have privately asked the advice of some of his “brothers in the ministry,” it is evident that he chose not to make use of the structure that his predecessor Pope Paul VI

¹ Ut Unum Sint, no. 94-95, Vatican translation published by St. Paul Books and Media (Boston, 1995), 101-102.
² Ordinatio Sacerdotalis, no. 4, Origins 24, no. 4 (June 9, 1994), 51.
had established precisely with the function of offering advice to the pope, that is, the Synod of Bishops, about which Vatican II had said: "Acting on behalf of the whole catholic episcopate, it will show that all the bishops in hierarchical communion participate in the care of the whole church" (Christus Dominus, no. 5). Pope Paul VI announced his intention to establish the Synod of Bishops on the opening day of the fourth period of the council, and on the following day (September 15, 1965) published the Apostolic Letter Apostolica Sollicitudo by which he established it and laid down the norms by which it would be governed. Here he described its function as follows: "The Synod of bishops has, of its very nature, the function of providing information and offering advice. It can also enjoy the power of making decisions when such power is conferred on it by the Roman Pontiff; in this case, it belongs to him to ratify the decisions of the Synod."5 In his book The Reform of the Papacy, Archbishop John R. Quinn expressed the following opinion concerning the Synod of Bishops: "Even if the synod were not given a deliberative vote, it could still play an important role if it were conducted in such a way that the bishops were honestly and seriously consulted on issues about which the Pope intended to express his judgment, or which the bishops thought to be of concern in the church."6 The syntax of his sentence suggests that in Archbishop Quinn’s opinion, no synod of bishops had as yet been conducted in such a way that the bishops were honestly and seriously consulted on a specific issue on which the pope intended to express his judgment.

This might be explained as a consequence of the fact that most of the synods that had been held were not of the kind that would be well adapted to the purpose of consulting the bishops with regard to a specific issue on which the pope intended to express his judgment. Most of them have been "ordinary" synods that are held every three years, for each of which a rather broad theme is chosen by the pope. An ordinary synod lasts four weeks. During the first two weeks each bishop is allowed eight minutes for a speech on any aspect of the theme that he chooses to discuss. The special secretary then presents a report, in which he summarizes what he considers to be the principal

contributions that have been made to the discussion of the theme in the speeches given by the bishops. The bishops then divide into language groups to discuss those aspects of the general topic, and to draw up proposals concerning it. A report on those proposals is made by the special secretary, followed by discussion in plenary session, and finally a definitive list of proposals is drawn up for presentation to the pope for the preparation of a post-synodal exhortation which he will address to the whole church. A similar procedure is followed in the “special” synods, each of which is held for the church of a particular region of the world. These are attended by bishops of that region, and the theme is chosen with a view to what particularly affects the life of the church in that region.

In my opinion, it is the third kind of synod established by Pope Paul VI, the “extraordinary” synod, that would be best suited for the pope to summon when he wished to consult the bishops about a specific issue on which he intended to express his judgment. The bishops who attend such a synod are the presidents of the 113 episcopal conferences throughout the world. They are elected by their fellow bishops to the leadership of their respective conferences – a sign that they are recognized by their peers as men of sound judgment. If there were some urgency about the issue on which the pope wished to consult this synod, there would be no need of the delay involved in the process of electing its members, as is necessary for an ordinary synod, the number of whose members would be more than twice that of an extraordinary synod. The 113 bishops called to an extraordinary synod could engage in a genuine discussion of the specific issue on which the pope had chosen to consult them. If he wished, he could invite them to participate in making the decision, by granting them a deliberative vote on it. Of course the decision would need his ratification.

Two extraordinary synods have been held since the close of Vatican II, but neither was called by the pope for the purpose of consulting the bishops about a specific issue on which he intended to express his judgment. The first, convoked by Paul VI in 1969, discussed collegiality and episcopal conferences; the second, convoked by John Paul II in 1985, reflected on Vatican II twenty years after its close. Each of those popes, during his time in office, reached a decision on a matter of great concern to the whole Catholic Church, and promulgated that decision
in the form of a doctrine to which the faithful were obliged to give their assent. Neither Pope Paul VI, in reaching his decision about the morality of artificial contraception, nor John Paul II, in reaching his decision about the ordination of women to the priesthood, convoked a synod for the purpose of consulting his brother bishops on the issue to be decided.

While it is risky to speculate as to what might have happened if something had been done that was not done, I shall offer my reasons for thinking that if Paul VI and John Paul II had each convoked an extraordinary synod for the purpose of consulting the presidents of the episcopal conferences on the issue which he intended to decide, and had granted them a deliberative vote on that issue, he might have reached a different decision from the one he made. I think Pope Paul VI might have reached a different decision if he had asked the members of an extraordinary synod to study the report he had received from the special commission he had established concerning birth control, along with the reasons given him by those who disagreed with that report, and then help him form the judgment he would express on that issue. Similarly, I think that Pope John Paul II might have reached a different decision if he had asked the members of an extraordinary synod to study the reasons which the Pontifical Biblical Commission had given for its judgment that the New Testament offers no convincing arguments either for or against the ordination of women to the priesthood, and to study the arguments against their ordination that the Congregation for the Doctrine of the Faith had presented in its 1976 document *Inter Insigniores*, along with the critical observations that many Catholic scholars had made regarding the cogency of those arguments, and then to help him reach the decision he would pronounce on that question. Furthermore, if at such a synod Pope John Paul II had asked the presidents of all the episcopal conferences what doctrine they and their fellow bishops had been teaching the faithful about the exclusion of women from ordination to the priesthood, I think the Congregation for the Doctrine of the Faith might not have declared that the doctrine that the church has no authority to ordain women to the priesthood was taught infallibly by the ordinary universal magisterium.  

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7 The Congregation for the Doctrine of the Faith said this in the document "Response to a Dubium," that it published on November 18, 1995; see Origins 25, no. 24 (November
that the presidents of the episcopal conferences could have told him that this is what they and all their fellow bishops had been teaching the faithful about the reason why the church did not ordain women to the priesthood. Vatican II had made it clear in *Lumen Gentium*, no. 25, that a doctrine can be said to have been taught infallibly by the ordinary universal magisterium only if the whole body of bishops along with the pope have been agreed in teaching that doctrine as definitively to be held.

Among the instruments of communion which were recommended by the Second Vatican Council were episcopal conferences and plenary councils, in both of which the bishops of a whole nation would gather to deal with the pastoral needs of their people. Plenary councils had a long tradition of use and were canonically regulated. During the period between the first and second Vatican councils, in many nations the bishops had begun to gather once or twice a year for the same pastoral purpose, without meeting the canonical requirements of a plenary council. From the beginning of Vatican II the usefulness of such "episcopal conferences" had become evident, and this was officially recognized in the Dogmatic Constitution on the church, which said that "episcopal conferences can today make a manifold and fruitful contribution to the concrete application of the spirit of collegiality." In the Decree on the Pastoral Office of Bishops in the Church, an episcopal conference is described as "a kind of assembly (coetus) in which the bishops of some nation or region discharge their pastoral office in collaboration." And soon after the close of Vatican II, Pope Paul VI, in his Apostolic Letter "On the Implementation of the Decrees *Christus Dominus*, and *Presbyterorum Ordinis,*" decreed: "The bishops of countries or territories which have not yet established an episcopal conference, in accordance with the law of the Decree *Christus Dominus*, should take steps as quickly as possible to do so and draw up its statutes which are to be approved by the Apostolic See.")

After the close of Vatican II it is not unlikely that many bishops had drawn the conclusion that episcopal conferences had effectively

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30, 1995), 401.
8 *Lumen Gentium*, no. 23.
9 *Christus Dominus*, no. 38.
10 *Ecclesiae Sanctae*, no. 41.
taken the place that plenary councils had previously had in the life of the church. That this had not been the intention of the bishops at Vatican II is clear from the following passage of its "Decree on the Pastoral Mission of Bishops in the Church."

From the earliest centuries of the church, the bishops, while in authority over particular churches . . . have pooled their resources and coordinated their plans to promote the common good and also the good of individual churches. To this end, synods, provincial councils and finally plenary councils were established in which the bishops drew up for the different churches a uniform procedure to be followed both in the teaching of the truths of the faith and in the regulation of ecclesiastical discipline.

It is the earnest desire of this ecumenical synod that the venerable institutions of synods and councils should flourish with renewed strength, so that by this means more suitable and efficacious provision may be made for the increase of faith and the maintenance of discipline in the different churches as the circumstances of the times require.11

The reference to "the venerable institutions of synods and councils" makes it clear that here the bishops at Vatican II were not speaking of new structures, but of structures that already existed in the Latin Church, and which they "earnestly desired should flourish with renewed strength." In fact the flourishing of plenary councils with renewed strength has been made possible by changes that were made in their regard in the revised Code of Canon Law that was promulgated by Pope John Paul II in 1983. One important change made in this revision is that an episcopal conference can now convene a plenary council for the church of its nation or region, with the approval of the Holy See. This means that in June, 2002, when the bishops of the United States gathered at Dallas in their episcopal conference to decide on measures to be taken for the protection of children and young people from sexual abuse, they could have been meeting as a plenary council, if they had decided in a previous assembly of their conference to do this, had obtained the approval of the Holy See, and had invited all those who

11 Christus Dominus, no. 36.
were entitled to attend.

If they had been meeting as a plenary council, the bishops taking part would be substantially the same ones who were then present, and only they would have had a deliberative vote in making the decisions. But there was a major difference between the contribution that lay people made to the meeting of the episcopal conference that took place at Dallas, and the contribution that many others than bishops could have made if this had been a plenary council. At Dallas, the contribution made by members of the laity took place on the first day of the meeting, when the assembled bishops listened to seven talks by lay persons: one by Margaret O’Brien Steinfels, the editor of Commonweal, one by Scott Appleby, professor of history at Notre Dame; four by adults who as children were sexually abused by priests; and one by the psychotherapist Mary Gail Frawley-O’Dea, a specialist on the effects on adults of the sexual abuse they suffered as children. Those seven talks have been published in Origins.12 I think anyone who has read them would applaud the readiness of our bishops to listen to what those well-informed lay people told them about the devastating effects that the sexual abuse of minors by priests had had not only on the victims, but also on the trust that the faithful had previously had in their bishops. This was surely a salutary prelude to their discussion of drafts of a “Charter for the Protection of Children and Young People” and of “Essential Norms” that were to be observed by the bishops themselves in implementing the provisions of that charter.

At the Dallas meeting of the USCCB, when the bishops were ready to begin the discussion of those drafts, the lay people withdrew and played no further role. Prior to the 1983 revision of the Code of Canon Law, that would have been true also in a plenary council. But the changes made in the Code with regard to the part that priests, religious and lay people can play in plenary councils have transformed them into genuine “structures of participation.” If the bishops had been meeting at Dallas as a plenary council, they could not only have listened to those speakers, but could have invited them to stay and take part in the discussion. But many more than seven lay people would have been taking part, because canon 443 of the 1983 Code prescribes that when the decision has been made to hold a plenary council, a large number

12 Origins 32, no. 7 (June 27, 2002), 110-28.
of highly qualified members of the faithful other than bishops must be called to take part in it by reason of the office which they hold in institutions located in that nation. Among these are major superiors of religious institutes and societies of apostolic life, both of men and of women. Their number is determined by the episcopal conference, and they are elected by all the major superiors in the region. Also to be called are the rector of ecclesiastical and other Catholic universities, and the deans of their faculties of theology and of canon law. Some rector of major seminaries are also to be called; their number is determined by the conference of bishops, and they are elected by the rector of the seminaries in the territory. In addition to those who must be called by reason of their office, the episcopal conference can choose to invite a number of other priests, religious and lay people to participate in the council; their number is not to exceed half the number of those who must be called. All those other than bishops who attend a plenary council have a consultative vote, which means that they have the right to participate in the discussion of what is on the agenda and to express their opinion about what is to be decided.

One can hope that the very frank words addressed to the bishops by seven lay persons on that first day of the meeting at Dallas made a strong impression on them, and that this continued to have an influence on their deliberations. On the other hand, if they had chosen to meet as a plenary council, the “voice of the faithful” would have been heard far more effectively when, during the whole meeting, the bishops would have listened not only to one another, but also to the advice that many highly qualified members of the faithful would give them about what they must do to bring an end to the sexual abuse of young people by members of the clergy.

In the first part of this paper we have recalled that when Pope Paul VI had decided to settle the question about contraception, and John Paul II the question about the ordination of women to the priesthood, neither of them summoned a synod of bishops to help him make that decision. I conclude that the challenge of Vatican II will be met when synods of bishops and plenary councils, and other structures of participation such as diocesan synods and pastoral councils, will be used by those who have the authority to decide whether or not to use them.
THE LONERGAN ENTERPRISE:  
WHAT IS ITS FUTURE?

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In April of 2010, at the 25th Annual Fallon Memorial Lonergan Symposium, Loyola Marymount University, Los Angeles, I presented a lengthy paper entitled "The Lonergan Enterprise: What Is its Future?" The paper was envisioned as a further reflection on the theme introduced thirty years earlier by Frederick Crowe in his book The Lonergan Enterprise. I sketched answers to four related questions: From the standpoint of Lonergan's writings, (1) what is a communal enterprise in general, and (2) what features would distinguish the enterprise of a Lonergan community in particular? From the standpoint of actual history, (3) what is the current state of the enterprise of the Lonergan community that has in fact emerged, and (4) what measures could enhance that enterprise's future?

Subsequently I worked up a refined version of my paper's answers to the first two questions, and the result was published recently as "The Notion of a Lonergan Enterprise." The characterization with which it culminates is the following:

A Lonergan community's enterprise would be the endeavor of (1) a group of individual human beings, each of whom in her living (2) affirms and accepts basic and enriched transcendental method and its normative structural differentiations (such as the scale of values and the functional specialties), (3)

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Vertin employs that cumulative affirmed and accepted structure as the fundamental stimulus, guide, and criterion for particular historical projects by which she aims to promote human history's maximum actualization of its ultimate five-element compound terminal value, (4) pursues these structural and historical achievements in common with others in the group, and (5) possesses a common mind and heart with those others because everyone has at least partly appropriated her own lived efforts in light of Bernard Lonergan’s accounts of such efforts at their best.³

The present paper aims to provide a refined version of my original paper’s answers to the last two questions. That is to say, its perspective shifts from the general hypothetical anticipations of Lonergan’s writings to the particular verified judgments of actual history; and its twofold concern is to delineate the current state of the nominally “Lonerganian” communal enterprise that first emerged during the middle years of the twentieth century and to suggest steps that might foster its future.

The foregoing notional characterization of a Lonergan communal enterprise allows us to be quite precise in our questions about the historical undertaking that is the focus of our attention here, for it prompts us to ask about the extent to which the latter at present is distinguished by all five of the features anticipated by the ideal

³In fact, the characterization as presented here differs in three small respects from what appears in “The Notion of a Lonergan Enterprise,” 222-23. First, the words “in her living” at the end of condition 1 are an addition. Second, “affirms” in condition 2 and “affirmed” in condition 3 replace “objectifies” and “objectified” respectively. Third, the formulation of condition 5 replaces the earlier formulation, which read “possesses that common mind and heart with those others at least partly in and through exchanges with them about the ideas of Bernard Lonergan.” The intent of these three changes is to add clarity to an important distinction that was somewhat blurred in the article, namely, that between my acts of knowing and choosing merely as lived and also as appropriated. For merely as lived, those acts are non-intentionally present to me and accepted by me; but as appropriated they also are intentionally present to me and accepted by me. In particular, my acts of conversational knowing and choosing originate as lived; and their appropriation, explicitation, thematization, is a subsequent development. Among other things, this means that my references to intellectual, moral, and religious conversions on 221 of the aforementioned article should be revised to read “and the acceptance completes the thematization of intellectual conversion . . ., moral conversion . . ., religious conversion . . .”
portrayal, and how their future flourishing might best be nurtured. That is to say, although we may grant the obvious fact that the present "Lonerganian" undertaking is the endeavor of a group of human individuals, still we must ask further questions whose answers are notably less obvious. In her living, how fully does each of these individuals objectify and accept basic and enriched transcendental method and its normative structural differentiations? And employ that cumulative objectified and accepted structure as the fundamental stimulus, guide, and criterion for particular historical projects by which she aims to promote human history's maximum actualization of its ultimate five-element compound terminal value? And pursue these structural and historical achievements in common with others in the group? And possess a common mind and heart with those others because everyone has at least partly appropriated her own lived efforts in light of Bernard Lonergan's accounts of such efforts at their best? Moreover, what are the best ways to promote the future existence of such an endeavor?

It is obvious that even relatively complete answers to these questions would require a major study. Indeed, properly speaking, it would require far more than one study. For relatively complete answers would presuppose and be expressions of relatively complete self-appropriation on the part of the historical Lonergan community as such; and the latter in turn would presuppose relatively complete self-appropriation by each of the community's members and its communication to every other member.

But although such relatively complete answers about the historical Lonergan community's enterprise are far beyond my grasp (and, I believe, everyone else's) at this point, I am not without a basis for hazarding some answers, admittedly incomplete and tentative. For as an active participant in Lonergan studies for more than forty-five years, I have been privileged to develop direct and indirect familiarity, more than merely passing, with the personal commitments and projects of perhaps a few hundred people whom I would regard as Lonergan specialists.⁴ On the basis of that familiarity, I judge that all the

⁴I surmise that the individual whose personal familiarity with members of the historical Lonergan community is least inadequate in its breadth and depth is Frederick Lawrence, professor of theology at Boston College. Lawrence's unmatched knowledge of people with Lonergan interests (not to mention many other people as well) has both
features anticipated by the ideal portrayal of a Lonergan community’s enterprise are historically realized to some degree, though all of them remain historically unrealized to some degree as well. In other words, I judge that there does indeed exist a historical Lonergan community whose enterprise partially meets the standard projected by Lonergan’s writings, though it does not meet it fully.

In the body of this paper, I limit myself to offering some extremely modest contributions to the historical community’s self-appropriation exactly in the line of its fifth feature, the culminating and most distinctive feature of its common meaning. For there is a Lonergan community partly because the lived investigative and implementational endeavors of every person in a certain group are guided to some extent by Bernard Lonergan’s normative portrayals of such endeavors. How many persons are in that group, and where do they live? How have they become Lonergan specialists, and what projects have they subsequently pursued? What are some ways that they collaborate for the sake of “preserving, promoting, developing, and implementing the work of Bernard Lonergan”? And how might the likelihood of such collaboration in coming decades and centuries be increased?

More exactly, then, in Part One, I report a small group of readily accessible facts, mainly just quantitative, regarding the present situation of the historical Lonergan community’s enterprise. In Part Two, I make a small set of proposals, mainly just procedural, envisioned as parts of a workable strategy for enhancing the future situation of that enterprise. My hope is that both contributions will be improved and developed further by others, and that in due course (but without waiting too long) the strategy will then be implemented by us all.5,6

facilitated and resulted from his nearly four decades of dedicated service as director of the annual Lonergan Workshop at Boston College.

5 For a discussion of the relationship of all the features of the Lonergan community’s common meaning, see “The Notion of a Lonergan Enterprise,” 214-15.

6 From the mission statement of the Lonergan Research Institute at Regis College, Toronto, as posted on its website (www.lonerganresearch.org).

7 A valuable sequel to the present paper can be readily conceived. It would be a larger study but still manageable by a single investigator. It would be a further step in the direction of a relatively complete account of the current status and prospective future of the historical Lonergan community’s enterprise. It would include an expanded version of the quantitative research underlying the present paper, sagacious assessments both of the present enterprise’s achievements and strengths and its failures and vulnerabilities,
I. THE LONERGAN COMMUNITY’S ENTERPRISE: ITS CURRENT STATE

Part One unfolds under four headings. The first three regard individual Lonergan specialists, individual Lonergan organizations, and a (largely just potential) global Lonergan organization respectively. The fourth heading regards the relations between the first three groups and the wider society.

Individual Lonergan Specialists

The first individual I will consider briefly under this heading is Bernard Lonergan. His overt personal enterprise is primarily cognitive, investigative, scholarly, though from time to time Frederick Crowe argues forcefully that its ultimate underlying purpose is always effective and constitutive, executional, implementational.8 Taken collectively, Lonergan’s writings clearly are distinctive contributions in the lines of cognitive structural meaning (e.g., Insight and Method in Theology) and cognitive historical meaning (e.g., The Triune God). Moreover, precisely as writings, they also are distinctive contributions in the line of communicative meaning. (For a visual aid to grasping the relationship of the various functions of meaning, see Figure 1 on the following page. I originally presented this schematization in “The Notion of a Lonergan Enterprise.”)

A comprehensive catalogue of Lonergan’s scholarly work and publications from 1928 through 2004 may be found in A Primary Bibliography of Lonergan Sources, edited by Terry Tekippe (http://arc.tzo.com/padre/pri.htm). The most convenient assemblage of Lonergan’s writings is undoubtedly the Collected Works of Bernard Lonergan, a series being published by the University of Toronto Press. The first of the projected twenty-five volumes appeared in 1988; the seventeenth, in 2011. The first eight volumes were prepared under the general

Figure 1: Functions of Meaning

- **individual** (#2, etc.)
  - **structural**
    - **historical**
      - effective and constitutive
        - cognitive
      - effective and constitutive
        - cognitive
    - effective and constitutive
      - cognitive
  - effective and constitutive
    - cognitive
- individual (#1)
  - **structural**
    - effective and constitutive
      - cognitive
    - effective and constitutive
      - cognitive

editorship of Frederick Crowe and Robert Doran. Following Crowe's withdrawal from scholarly work in 2006, the general editorial task has been handled by Doran.

In commenting on further individual Lonergan specialists, I will forego naming particular persons and discussing their endeavors. Instead, I will simply offer my contributions to adequate answers to six important quantitative questions.

**Question 1:** Around the world, how many persons are there who possess graduate training and are currently doing Lonergan-related teaching and/or research? My contribution to an adequate answer: As of June 2012, the number of Lonergan scholars on the overall mailing list of the Lonergan Research Institute at Regis College (henceforth LRI) is around 400.

**Question 2:** Around the world, where are persons with graduate training currently doing Lonergan-related teaching and/or research? My contribution to an adequate answer: As of June 2012, Lonergan scholars on the LRI mailing list are located in thirty different countries. The majority are in English-speaking Canada or the United States. However, the list also registers Lonergan scholars in Australia, Austria, Belgium, Chile, China, Colombia, Denmark, England, French-speaking Canada, Germany, India, Iran, Ireland, Italy, Japan, Kenya, Korea, Malaysia, Mexico, Nigeria, Northern Ireland, the Philippines, Poland, Portugal, Russia, Slovakia, South Africa, Taiwan, and Zambia. Perhaps 20 percent of the people in this group are below forty years of age.

**Question 3:** Over the years, how many Lonergan-related doctoral dissertations have been completed? My contribution to an adequate answer: As of June 2012, the number of doctoral dissertations “on, partly on, or using Lonergan” that are held by the LRI library is 288.9 For an online list of dissertation titles and authors, go to www.lonerganresearch.org and click on “resources.”

**Question 4:** Where do students pursue graduate work in Lonergan studies? My contribution to an adequate answer: At the present time, the most common way in which students acquire advanced credentials in Lonergan studies is by enrolling in Lonergan-friendly graduate programs in theology or philosophy at schools such as the following:

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9 I received this updated information from Michael Shields, librarian of the Lonergan Research Institute library, in an e-mail message dated 31 March 2012.
Boston College, the Catholic University of America (Washington, DC), Concordia University (Montreal), Fordham University (New York), the Gregorian University (Rome), Loyola Marymount University (Los Angeles), Marquette University (Milwaukee), Universidad Javeriana (Bogotá), Saint Paul University (Ottawa), and the Toronto School of Theology at the University of Toronto. While I do not have exact figures on the collective number of new Lonergan-related doctorates emerging annually, I estimate that it is around ten.

**Question 5:** How much Lonergan-related secondary literature has emerged over the years? My contribution to an adequate answer: *The Bibliography of Secondary Sources*, edited by Terry Tekippe (http://arc.tzo.com/padre/ses.htm) lists some 3,000 books, articles, and reviews that had appeared by March 2005. Issues of the *Lonergan Studies Newsletter* from March 2005 through March 2010 list an additional 999. Hence the total number of secondary items listed by these two sources is about 4,000, at a recent rate of something more than 100 items/year.

**Question 6:** In particular, how many books at least largely on Lonergan’s work have emerged over the years? My contribution to an adequate answer: From 1990 to 2011, the number of books in this category published by the University of Toronto Press is twenty five.

It remains that Lonergan projects are by no means limited to investigative ventures, cognitive undertakings, scholarly efforts. Instead, they surely include effective and constitutive ventures, executional undertakings, implementational efforts. That is to say, Lonergan specialists are not limited to Lonergan scholars, people engaged in advanced-level teaching and research. They also include those who might be called Lonergan implementers, people drawing on Lonergan’s work in their pursuit of such goals as improving public education, fostering community health, and promoting social justice. This suggests a sequence of further questions that deserve to be addressed here, questions no less important than the preceding six. Around the world, how many persons are engaged primarily not in Lonergan studies but in Lonergan implementations? Where are

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10 I received this information from Daniel Monsour, member of the editorial staff at the Lonergan Research Institute, in an e-mail message dated 30 March 2010.

11 I received this information from Tad Dunne, co-editor of the *Lonergan Studies Newsletter*, in an e-mail message dated 3 April 2012.
such persons located? What are the characteristic features of their implementational projects? And so forth. Unfortunately, my present knowledge leaves me unable to contribute anything to answering such questions adequately. Hence, even more than in relation the earlier questions, input from other investigators is needed.

Individual Lonergan Organizations

My overall goal in Part One of this paper is to highlight certain facts about the actual state of the Lonergan community's enterprise thus far in its history. In the previous section I considered individual Lonergan scholars and implementers. In the present section I turn to individual Lonergan organizations.

In March 2010, Kenneth Melchin, of Saint Paul University in Ottawa, announced the establishment of a website aimed at serving as a general directory for the websites of all the individual Lonergan organizations worldwide. For at least the initial purposes of this website (www.lonergan-links.wikispaces.com), the twofold criterion Melchin employs for being "a Lonergan organization" is (1) being a community devoted in one way or another to preserving, promoting, developing and implementing the work of Bernard Lonergan and (2) having a website. I will have more to say about this general website in the next section, but for the moment I draw upon it for its list of twenty-five individual Lonergan organizations, each indicating one or two contact persons and highlighting up to three of its own distinctive emphases.\(^\text{12}\)

Asian Lonergan Association/Ivo Coelho/fostering communication and collaboration between Lonergan scholars in Asia

Australian Lonergan Workshop Committee/John Little and Tom Halloran/organizing Australian Lonergan Workshops each year, alternating between Sydney and Melbourne;

\(^{12}\) The general website also includes each organization's website address, which I have omitted here. (Note: Technological advances by 2013 allowed this general website to be closed and its linking function taken over by the websites of various individual Lonergan organizations. [For an example, visit www.lonerganresearch.org, click on "Resources" and then on "Lonergan Links."
The list here nonetheless provides an interesting overview of Lonergan organizations worldwide in 2012.)
promoting local discussion groups; fostering communication and collaboration between Lonergan scholars in Australia

**Australian Lonergan Centre**/Peter Beer and Robin Koning/supervising the Lonergan collections in Sydney and Melbourne

**Bernard Lonergan, Centro di informazioni e studi, Torino**/Giuseppe Badini Confalonieri/fostering communication and collaboration between Italian-speaking Lonergan scholars

**Bernard Lonergan en français, Montreal**/Pierrot Lambert/fostering communication and collaboration between French-speaking Lonergan scholars

**Bernard Lonergan . . . vida, obra, reception, Chile**/Jim Morin/fostering communication and collaboration between Lonergan scholars in the South American context

**Bernard J. Lonergan Institute, Seton Hall University, South Orange, NJ**/Richard Liddy/serving as a Lonergan research center, with substantial amounts of primary and secondary Lonergan materials available; sponsoring periodic lectures, programs, and conferences (e.g., Lonergan and economics) centered on Lonergan’s work; organizing faculty and student reading groups

**Grupo de Investigación Cosmopolis, Universidad Javeriana, Bogota**/Rodolfo Eduardo DeRoux/fostering communication and collaboration between Lonergan scholars in the South American context

**Jesuits in English Canada**/Peter Bisson/offering institutional support to Lonergan Studies; looking after Lonergan’s scholarly legacy, through the Trustees of the Lonergan Estate and the Lonergan Research Institute; employing Lonergan’s writings as guides in the work of the Jesuit Forum for Social Faith and Justice

**Lonergan Archive, Gregorian University, Rome**/Luca Sinibaldi/ translating Collected Works of Bernard Lonergan into Italian; building a collection of primary and secondary Lonergan books; and serving as a connection point for other European Lonergan students, scholars, and organizations
Lonergan Centre for Ethical Reflection, Concordia University, Montreal/Christine Jamieson/holding regular public events on Lonergan; doing interviews with Lonergan scholars and posting them online; offering workshops on ethical reflection

Lonergan Centre at Saint Paul University, Ottawa/Kenneth Melchin/collaborating with other organizations on Lonergan-related projects in theology, ethics, conflict, and business-economics; promoting and supporting research and training on Lonergan; symposia and reading groups on Lonergan in French and English

Lonergan en Latinoamérica, Universidad Ibero-Americana et al., Mexico City/James Duffy/studying the relevance of Lonergan’s work for the socio-cultural situation in Latin America and beyond; fostering dialogue between Latin Americans and other academics by means of electronic exchanges, workshops, courses, and conferences

Lonergan Institute at Boston College/Frederick Lawrence/hosting the annual Lonergan Workshop; publishing Lonergan Workshop and co-publishing Method: Journal of Lonergan Studies with the Los Angeles Lonergan Center; publishing Lonergan-related books from time to time and developing online Lonergan courses

Lonergan Philosophical Society/Elizabeth Murray/meeting annually in conjunction with the convention of the American Catholic Philosophical Association; fostering the study and discussion of Lonergan-related philosophical topics

Lonergan Research Centre of Nairobi, Nairobi, Kenya/Maurice Schepers/hosting an annual lecture in honour of Lonergan, hosting reading groups and developing a research library; meeting periodically with scholars interested in applying Lonergan’s thought to the culture of East Africa, currently threatened by political unrest and lack of concern for the values that build cosmopolis

Lonergan Research Institute at Regis College, Toronto/Gordon Rixon/completing publication of the Collected Works of Bernard Lonergan; maintaining the Lonergan and Crowe
Archives; fostering Lonergan Studies in the Toronto School of Theology and the University of Toronto

**Lonergan Resource**, Marquette University, Milwaukee/Robert Doran/maintaining a repository of secondary-source materials that could prove to be valuable for Lonergan Studies: major papers and articles on Lonergan, recordings of major lectures and conferences, and longer monographs that are either republished from books or composed for this website itself

**Lonergan Society at Marquette University**, Milwaukee/Jeremy Blackwood/hosting the annual Lonergan on the Edge graduate student conference; fostering the study and discussion of Lonergan’s work among graduate students and individual associates at Marquette University and beyond

**Los Angeles Lonergan Center**, Mark Morelli/hosting the annual West Coast Method Institute Symposium; co-publishing *Method: Journal of Lonergan Studies* with the Lonergan Institute at Boston College; supporting the M.A. program in philosophy at Loyola Marymount University, and the Lonergan Philosophical Society

**Marquette University Lonergan Project**, Milwaukee/Robert Doran/maintaining a digital repository of primary materials related to Lonergan’s work; holding periodic colloquia on the topic “Doing Systematic Theology in a Multireligious World”; fostering Lonergan interests among graduate students in theology and philosophy at Marquette University and beyond

**Oesterichische Lonergan**, Innsbruck/Roland Krismer/comparing Lonergan and European thinkers, especially German ones; maintaining the first German-language Lonergan website; serving as a connection-point for people with Lonergan interests in Germany and Austria

**The Society for the Globalization of Effective Methods of Evolving (SGEME)**, Halifax/Robert Henman and Philip McShane/facilitating collaboration towards a theoretic implementation of Bernard Lonergan’s position on metaphysics
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the Thomas More Institute, Montreal/Irene Menear/entering its third year of hosting "Listening to Lonergan," a series of lectures and discussions based on the work of scholars engaged with Lonergan's thought.

Washington Lonergan Institute, Washington, DC/Dunstan Robidoux/helping people learn theology; using Lonergan to address current social and cultural issues; studying educational strategies from kindergarten through graduate school.

Next, let me draw special attention to two types of crucially important regular contributions to the global Lonergan community by various individual Lonergan organizations: hosting conferences, and publishing periodicals.

There now are at least six Lonergan conferences that occur more or less annually. By far the best known and longest running is the week-long Lonergan Workshop (100-150 people) hosted by the Lonergan Institute at Boston College. June of 2012 marks its 39th annual meeting, not to mention several additional meetings abroad that have been organized by the same devoted people. The second longest running conference is the West Coast Method Institute Symposium (30-50 people), hosted by the Los Angeles Lonergan Center. The year 2012 marks its 27th annual meeting, yet another sterling testament to the personal generosity and organizational dedication to be found within the Lonergan community. The Australian Lonergan Workshop (25-35 people) aspires to meet annually, alternating its location between Melbourne and Sydney. In 2012 it met in Sydney. The Society for the Globalization of Effective Methods of Evolving (SGEME) has hosted five annual conferences (25-35 people) thus far at various locations in Canada and a sixth is planned for 2012. The Bernard J. Lonergan Institute, Seton Hall University, has hosted annual conferences (30-50) in 2009 and 2010, and more are expected. Finally, in recent years a set of three annual colloquia has begun to emerge under the sponsorship of the Marquette University Lonergan Project. The respective annual themes are Lonergan on the Edge; Doing Catholic Systematic Theology in a Multi-Religious World; and Lonergan, Philosophy, and Theology.
There are at least six Lonergan periodicals. The Lonergan Workshop Journal, a print work published by the Lonergan Institute at Boston College, aspires to appear annually. The first of its twenty-six volumes was published in 1978; the most recent, in 2014. It has an annual print run of 300-350. The Lonergan Studies Newsletter is a quarterly published by the Lonergan Research Institute at Regis College, Toronto. It is now available in both print and online versions. The first of its thirty three volumes appeared in 1980; the most recent began with the March 2012 issue. It has a subscription list of about 400, primarily online. Method: Journal of Lonergan Studies is a semiannual print journal published jointly by the Los Angeles Lonergan Center and the Lonergan Institute at Boston College. Its first series of twenty-three volumes appeared annually from 1983 through 2005. After a four-year hiatus, it resumed publication in 2010 with a new series; and volumes in the new series appeared in 2010 and 2011. Its annual print run is 300-350. Australian Lonergan Workshop is a print journal whose two volumes were published in 1993 and 2002 respectively. The Journal of Macrodynastic Analysis is an annual online journal sponsored by SGEME. The first four of its six volumes appeared during 2001 through 2004. It lay dormant from 2005 through 2009 but has resumed publication with 2010 and 2011 volumes. The Lonergan Review is an annual print journal established by the Bernard J. Lonergan Institute, Seton Hall University, in 2009. Its first volume was published in 2009, its second in 2010, and its third in 2011.

Finally, various Lonergan organizations sponsor an annual Lonergan lecture that is open to the public, but I have not taken pains to retrieve and delineate the details here. I also know of at least one quite serious online discussion group of about sixty members that counts Lonergan topics as part of its regular fare (lonergan_1@skipperweb.org), and I suspect there may be more.

13 I received this information from Kerry Cronin, assistant director of the Lonergan Institute at Boston College, in an e-mail message dated 7 May 2012.

14 This information comes partly from my own knowledge of the Lonergan Research Institute online subscription list and partly from the data about hard copies that I received from Wayne Lott, of the LRI staff, in an e-mail message dated 5 April 2012.

15 I received this information from Kerry Cronin in an e-mail message dated 7 May 2012.
**An Organization of Lonergan Organizations**

Consonant with Part One's overall aim of illuminating certain facts about the actual state of the Lonergan community's enterprise thus far in its history, in the two previous sections we have noted some salient points, first, about individual Lonergan scholars and implementers and, second, about individual Lonergan organizations. Let us now turn our attention to the question of a global Lonergan organization.

In June of 2009, following the end of the annual Lonergan Workshop, there was a meeting at Boston College of some twenty representatives of Lonergan centers, institutes, and projects at various places around the world. Convened by Kenneth Melchin, the gathering was devoted to exploring the possibilities of closer communication and collaboration between the diverse Lonergan organizations. The discussion proved sufficiently fruitful that similar meetings were held after the 2010 and 2011 Workshops, and one is scheduled to follow the 2012 Workshop as well. Melchin has generously continued to serve as convener.

One significant development has already followed from this initiative, namely, the announcement of the general website to which I referred in my previous section. I can indicate its purpose in more detail by quoting from its home page.

The purpose of the website is to facilitate communication and collaboration among Lonergan organizations. It is intended to be a simple *general directory and communication forum* that supplements rather than replaces the websites of these organizations. Consequently, this website is limited to indicating: (1) names of Lonergan centers, institutes, and associations; (2) their individual website addresses and animators' names; and (3) announcements and forthcoming events posted by the organizations. In addition, a discussion page allows the posting of messages. For more detailed information, you may follow the links to the organizations' own websites. Since its current goal is confined to assisting Lonergan organizations, this website does not list personal
websites. These may be associated instead with the websites of particular Lonergan organizations.

The emergence of this general website could turn out to be the initial concrete step in the establishment of a global organization of Lonergan organizations. More recently, the Marquette University Lonergan Project has complemented its digital archive of primary materials related to Lonergan’s work by establishing *Lonergan Resource*, an online repository of secondary-source materials. The latter website includes a calendar that could develop into a single central vehicle for listing and publicizing events occurring at all individual Lonergan organizations worldwide, thus further enhancing global communication and collaboration within the community of Lonergan specialists.

**The Wider Society**

Our fourth step in Part One is to ponder briefly the present relations between individual Lonergan scholars and implementers, individual Lonergan organizations, and a potentially emergent global Lonergan organization, on the one hand, and the wider society, on the other.

In principle such relations are *manifold*, since each individual Lonergan specialist, each individual Lonergan organization, and a global Lonergan organization can be related to individuals in the wider society, organizations in the wider society, and the wider society as a whole. Moreover, in principle such relations are *mutual*, with questions and discoveries being shared in both directions and resultant modifications of judgments and commitments occurring on both sides. An exhaustive consideration would take all such relations into account. My own small contribution to such a consideration is limited to four brief reportorial comments.

My first comment is that most Lonergan scholars with post-secondary teaching positions seem to be based in departments of theology or religious studies. A much smaller number are based in departments of philosophy, and a few in departments of education or various other humanities departments. I know of one person based in a mathematics department and one in a business school. I would be hard-pressed to name a Lonergan scholar based in a human science
or natural science department. (In the latter regard, someone will probably come forward with the names of one or more persons I have overlooked; but I doubt that the overall trend of distributions I have suggested will be falsified.)

Second, many individual Lonergan scholars belong to and participate in the activities of academic and professional societies cognate with their scholarly specializations. In light of the preceding paragraph, it is not surprising that the societies which attract the most Lonergan scholars appear to be ones such as the Catholic Theological Society of America, the College Theology Society, the Canadian Theological Society, the Society of Christian Ethics, and the American Academy of Religion. Lonergan scholars in the next largest group gravitate toward such societies as the American Catholic Philosophical Association, the Society of Christian Philosophers, the International Association of Catholic Bioethicists, the American Philosophical Association, and the Canadian Philosophical Association.

Third, I have heard of Lonergan scholars who sometimes participate in annual conventions of such societies as the American Historical Association, the American Political Science Association, and the Modern Language Association of America; but their number is very small. (As before, while I recognize the limitations of my knowledge here, I would be quite surprised if the general trends I am suggesting were to be radically falsified.)

Fourth, moving beyond individual Lonergan scholars, I know of two individual Lonergan organizations that participate (or at least have participated) regularly in conferences hosted by academic or professional associations. For many years, the Lonergan Philosophical Society has been holding sessions in the context of the annual conventions of the American Catholic Philosophical Association. And for four years in the early 2000s, the Lonergan Research Institute at Regis College made important contributions to consultations and conferences organized by the Canadian Catholic Bioethics Institute.

**Summary Overview**

The four preceding sections of Part I have briefly considered various aspects of the actual state of the Lonergan community’s enterprise in its history to date. Those considerations illuminate many positive elements.
The astonishing work of Bernard Lonergan himself has rightly captured the attention and enthusiasm of many thoughtful people, motivating many hundreds of them to pursue advanced graduate studies, earn positions that enable them to teach and nurture others, and commit their lives to those high pursuits in at least thirty countries around the world. Thus far, scholars have produced some 4,000 publications on or using Lonergan’s ideas, including many substantial books. There are at least twenty-five organizations worldwide devoted in one way or another to preserving, promoting, developing, and implementing Lonergan’s work, each with its distinctive emphases. There are at least six annual Lonergan conferences and six Lonergan periodicals. There is a general website that aims to foster communication and coordination between individual Lonergan organizations, and another website with a calendar that potentially could list and publicize all Lonergan events occurring anywhere in the world. Lonergan scholars flourish in many theology and religious studies departments, some philosophy departments, occasionally in some other humanities department, and every now and then in some other academic area; and they belong to academic and professional associations in similar proportions.

On the other hand, the preceding considerations also directly or indirectly illuminate certain sobering features of the Lonergan community’s enterprise at the present time. There are such facts as the aging of individuals, the diminishing of ecclesiastical and other institutional support for advanced study, the shifting of cultural priorities, and the Lonerganian venture’s relatively narrow success to date in any case. Let us review these features one by one.

First, the people who, at least in North America for the past three decades, have been the principal animators of Lonergan-oriented graduate courses and programs, Lonergan institutes and centers and projects, Lonergan workshops and symposiums, Lonergan journals and book series - all these people are well along in years and soon will be passing from the scene; and in many cases their successors are not obvious.

Second, the same three decades have witnessed a notable decline in the ability and commitment of Roman Catholic religious orders and dioceses to support students through the years of work required to complete advanced degrees, a decline that has greatly reduced a
traditionally reliable source of new Lonergan scholars. Moreover, the broader financial support often previously available to graduate students directly through institutions of higher learning has been reduced because of current economic constraints.

Third, recent technological developments have fostered an increasingly widespread cultural eagerness for large quantities of information, speed in acquiring it, and immediate utility in employing it. Correspondingly, there has emerged an increasingly widespread neglect or even disdain of holistic knowledge, the lengthy time needed to acquire it, and the issues of ultimacy that it inevitably raises. Such a cultural orientation is not one that is very receptive to Lonergan-type endeavors.

Fourth, the recognition and esteem received by Lonergan specialists in the academic context is notably less than many anticipated thirty years ago. What is one to make of the fact that Lonergan studies seems to have found its primary audience not among people engaged in the natural or human sciences, or the people engaged in the humanities taken broadly, or the typical members of a philosophy department, or the typical members of a religious studies department, or even the typical members of a Catholic theology department, but rather among a small subset of the latter? Even allowing for the intrinsic difficulty of the message, the human failings of many messengers, and the structural impediments consequent upon the present-day university’s vision of itself as simply the shepherd of many distinct and specialized disciplines, is there some more basic impediment at work here?

In sum, given this situation, with its positive elements and its sobering features, what is the future of the Lonergan community’s enterprise?

II. THE LONERGAN COMMUNITY’S ENTERPRISE: FOSTERING ITS FUTURE

If someone were to ask me whether Lonergan’s ideas will survive at least in their main features, my response would be strongly and unequivocally affirmative. To pick but three examples, I contend that Lonergan’s account of human knowing as a matter of experiencing, understanding, and judging, his elucidation of the reality and
cognitional centrality of insight, and his recognition that cognitional theory is methodically prior to metaphysics are permanently-valid contributions to the store of human knowledge. Indeed, I would personally go so far as to make such ideas the subject of a modified version of Gamaliel’s counsel to the Sanhedrin: since they are from God, you will never be able to put them down (see Acts 5:38).16

If, however, someone were to ask me whether Lonergan’s ideas will survive not just in their main features but in their details, be steadily disseminated and received ever more widely, and be developed and implemented ever more fully, my response would be notably more cautious. Like the rest of us, even great thinkers come and go. While nothing good is ever totally lost, and while the specificity of their contributions may be preserved for a few generations by enthusiastic followers, that specificity is apt to be eventually transformed beyond recognition unless it becomes institutionalized in some way. But establishing institutions – communal habits of thinking, choosing, and acting – and providing them with enough material support that they survive the demise of their establishers is a task both arduous and hazardous. At the same time, I judge it to be exactly the task that must be addressed successfully if the specificity of Lonergan’s contribution is not to dissolve before long into the common and fruitful but unidentified cognitional heritage of humankind.

Nonetheless, although my response to the second question would be cautious, it would also be marked by measured optimism. For at core the requisite institutionalization of Lonergan’s contribution would entail a vibrant, thriving, and securely supported community of Lonergan specialists committed to preserving, promoting, developing, and implementing Lonergan’s work. But the beginnings of such an institutionalization are already in place insofar as the historical Lonergan community’s enterprise is already in place, even though insufficient communal self-appropriation has left those beginnings relatively unobjectified. My optimism reflects my judgment that it is concretely feasible for the historical Lonergan community to (1)

16I first offered this thought during the course of a written interview conducted by Pierrot Lambert. The interview was part of Lambert’s ongoing project of interviewing (mainly Canadian) Lonergan specialists and posting the results on the website of his Lonergan organization, Bernard Lonergan en francais (http://francais.lonergan.org). This particular interview was posted in September 2009.
engage in fuller self-appropriation, (2) build upon the latter in order to elaborate a workable strategy for enhancing its communal future, and (3) implement that strategy. Whereas Part One of the present paper was intended as a contribution to the first of these three steps, Part Two is intended as a contribution to the second.

More precisely, then, Part One of the paper was devoted to reporting a small group of readily accessible facts, mainly just quantitative, regarding the present situation of the historical Lonergan community's enterprise. Part Two elaborates a small set of proposals, mainly just procedural, conceived as parts of a practicable approach to nurturing the future flourishing of that enterprise. Unfolding under the same four headings as Part One, these proposals in turn regard individual Lonergan specialists, individual Lonergan organizations, a global Lonergan organization, and relations between the first three and the wider society. (For a visual aid to grasping how I envisage the relationship of Lonergan specialists and human history, see Figure 2 on the following page. I originally presented this schematization in "The Notion of a Lonergan Enterprise.") Moreover, since heuristic structures can be helpful, let me state in advance the central contention of Part Two:

The most basic step in providing an adequate institutional basis for the Lonergan community's enterprise is recognizing and fostering individual Lonergan organizations as the primary sites of communal stability, creativity, and growth.17

**Individual Lonergan Specialists**

I take it as given that the basic locus of human creativity is the individual person. There is a spontaneity, randomness, unpredictability, in the emergence of cognitive and effective acts of meaning that are genuinely original; and history shows that such acts are most apt to occur when two conditions are met: the presence of a gifted individual, and her freedom from adhering closely to others' ideas, agendas, and

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17 This is primarily a structural contention rather than an historical one. Over time, new individual Lonergan organizations will probably arise, and some of the current ones may pass away. But in any case the institutional foundation of the Lonergan community's enterprise will be provided by small organizations that remain close to the data.
Figure 2

HUMAN HISTORY

PAST

FUTURE

1 - Individual Lonergan Specialists
2 - Individual Lonergan Communities
3 - Global Lonergan Community
4 - Global Human Community
schedules. As the familiar saw puts it, *Insight: A Study of Human Understanding* was not written by a committee.

Nonetheless, a human individual always exists in a context of communicative interactions with other human individuals, interactions that tend toward transforming a group of individual interactors into a community; and history also shows the significant role such interactions can have in spurring the creativity of that community’s every member. The initial creative community typically is small, having perhaps just two or three members. Its successes push it toward expansion, but such expansion always involves a trade-off between the possibility of even wider successes and the possibility of losing the intensity of the personal relations that made the initial group so successful.

The characteristic effectiveness of a small community in fostering the creativity of its members is the principal reason for my first suggestion to strengthen the institutional dimension of the Lonergan community’s enterprise. I propose that every Lonergan scholar and implementer consider formally affiliating herself with at least one individual Lonergan organization.

Which individual organization? Geographical proximity might be one factor in selecting it, but more important would be the respective correlations between one’s own background, interests, and style, and the organization’s history, distinctive emphases, and current membership. Insofar as an individual found herself attracted to more than one individual Lonergan organization, affiliation with more than one would be desirable.

What would formal affiliation involve? At a minimum, it would mean being added to the organization’s mailing list; but several further degrees of collaboration can be readily envisioned. For example, one might engage in regular exchanges with the organization’s other members, seek feedback on one’s own scholarly or implementational ventures and/or provide the same to others, participate in one or more of the organization’s distinctive projects, help publicize and communicate the organization’s work to people beyond it, maybe even serve for a time as an officer.

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19 Examples are manifest in the histories of religious orders, schools of painting, political reform movements, businesses, and so forth.
Perhaps readers will excuse me for offering an analogy with which I happen to be quite familiar. Undergraduate students belong to the University of Toronto only in and through belonging to one of the nine colleges that make it up. Each college has its own distinctive history, traditions, and academic emphases. This organizational arrangement allows students to enjoy both the advantages of belonging to a relatively small school (e.g., the antecedent similarity of students’ interests, classes that are relatively small, and the mutual stimulation generated by communicative interactions within a group of individuals who have come to know one another fairly well) and the advantages of belonging to a very large school (e.g., a great collective diversity of departments and courses, extensive library holdings, and state-of-the-art science laboratories). Without meaning to overdraw the comparison, I envision similar advantages accruing to individual Lonergan scholars and implementers if their participation in the global Lonergan community’s enterprise were mediated by their affiliation with at least one of the individual Lonergan organizations that stand within a worldwide Lonergan organization. Even though the present reality of the larger organization is largely just notional, this does not eliminate the advantages of affiliating with one or more of the smaller organizations, each of whose present reality is quite concrete.

**Individual Lonergan Organizations**

I have just suggested that individual Lonergan scholars and implementers would benefit from affiliating with at least one individual Lonergan organization. I now add that individual Lonergan organizations would benefit as well, and this in two ways. First, additional members would enhance the institutional stability and creativity of the individual organization. A larger membership would mean at least more widely extended knowledge of the organization and its characteristic projects, plus the increased potential for support

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20 Historically this was true for professors as well. I became a faculty member at the University of Toronto some forty years ago through being hired by St. Michael's College to teach philosophy and religious studies (to any undergraduate within the university who chose to enroll in my courses). Since that time, however, the authority to hire faculty members has shifted almost totally from the individual colleges to large centralized departments. The latter phenomenon is referred to locally as “the Americanization of the University.”
that such knowledge entails. Moreover, insofar as the commitments of
new members were more than merely minimal, the organization would
have a larger pool of people on whom to draw for participating in its
activities, making its work known beyond the organization, perhaps
even shouldering some of its administrative responsibilities. Second,
the ideas, intellectual and material resources, and energy brought by
additional members would increase the potential of the organization
for augmenting both the breadth and the depth of the characteristic
projects to which it is presently dedicated.

In light of the foregoing, I propose that every individual Lonergan
organization consider taking four steps. The first step would be one of
retraced and, if necessary, amplified organizational self-appropriation.
"Exactly what are the particular goals we have been pursuing, the
means by which we have been pursuing them, and our successes and/or
failures in those pursuits?"

The second step would be to ponder whether the goals and/or
means should be changed in some way. "Do the particular goals we have
been pursuing largely reduplicate what one or more other individual
Lonergan organizations are also pursuing? If so, should we collaborate
more closely with them? And even if not, should we nonetheless revise
our present particular goals in some minor or major way in order to
make them take better advantage of our specific geographical and
cultural location, to align them more closely with the actual interests
and concerns of our membership, to heighten the likelihood of our
making a more distinctive contribution to the Lonergan community's
enterprise worldwide?"

The third step would be to welcome and perhaps even solicit new
members and to incorporate their contributions into the organization's
pursuit of its distinctive particular goals.

The fourth step would be to report on its activities regularly,
posting information about them on its organizational website, in some
cases perhaps also passing it along to the Lonergan Studies Newsletter,
and requesting that the dates of its scheduled events be displayed in
the Lonergan Resource calendar.
An Organization of Lonergan Organizations

Previously I have suggested that it would be beneficial both for individual Lonergan scholars and implementers to become members of at least one individual Lonergan organization and for individual Lonergan organizations to seek such members. Now I suggest that it would be beneficial both for individual Lonergan organizations to become members of a worldwide organization of Lonergan organizations and for the latter to seek such members. For just as the flourishing of individuals can enhanced by their belonging to small communities and the flourishing of each small community can be enhanced by its inclusion of flourishing individuals, so too the flourishing of individual small communities can be enhanced by their belonging to a larger community and the flourishing of the larger community can be enhanced by its inclusion of individual small communities that are flourishing.

This latter relationship requires special attention as we ponder the challenge of further institutionalizing the Lonergan community's enterprise. For the Principle of Subsidiarity asserts that tasks that can be performed successfully at a lower level of an institution should not be assigned to a higher level; and, conversely, tasks that cannot be performed successfully at a lower level should be assigned to a higher level. Now, a key theme of Part Two corresponds in effect to the first part of this principle. I have contended that within the Lonergan community's enterprise the fundamental "tasks" of having insights into data and implementing them are "lower level" tasks, tasks most likely to be performed successfully within the communities that are closest to the data, namely, the small communities. Hence I have proposed that individual Lonergan organizations be envisaged as the principal sites of institutional stability, creativity, and growth; and I

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21 The advantages of close proximity to the data are especially obvious when one considers the challenges of providing two things that are essential to the long-term flourishing of the Lonergan community's enterprise, namely, a secure flow of people with graduate training in Lonergan studies and a secure minimum of financial support for Lonergan projects. Individual Lonergan organizations with members who hold advanced academic positions are probably the best equipped to determine how to establish and maintain Lonergan-friendly graduate programs in those members' own universities. And individual Lonergan organizations with their own distinctive Lonergan projects are probably the best equipped to find philanthropists willing to support those projects.
have urged that the concrete reality and significant achievements of individual Lonergan organizations be recognized more fully, acclaimed more vigorously, and built upon more deliberately. However, there is an obvious problem when we turn to the second part of the Principle of Subsidiarity. For, as I have already observed, thus far the Lonergan community’s enterprise really has no institutional higher level, no practical, accepted, and materially supported communal procedure for addressing higher level tasks.

The character of such higher level tasks is not difficult to discern. In general they are tasks of fostering communicative meaning between individual Lonergan organizations. More specifically, they are tasks of helping individual Lonergan organizations (1) clearly differentiate themselves from one another, so that reduplicated pursuits may be avoided and distinctive pursuits may be nurtured, and then (2) effectively collaborate with one another on projects best pursued in common.

The following is a far from exhaustive list of projects that individual Lonergan organizations perhaps might best pursue in common:

- Periodically organizing international Lonergan workshops
- Establishing a system for mentoring younger Lonergan scholars who wish it
- Establishing a resource bank of retired Lonergan scholars willing to volunteer as occasional readers of student papers, members of graduate supervisory committees, external examiners of dissertations, occasional lecturers, and/or mentors of younger Lonergan scholars
- Establishing some means for bringing additional potentially fruitful and feasible global projects to light
- Determining practicable ways of sharing the tasks involved in maintaining the organization of Lonergan organizations

Against the background of the preceding, I propose that the individual Lonergan organizations continue their collective effort, begun immediately after the June 2009 Lonergan Workshop, to establish at least a rudimentary organization of Lonergan organizations.
The Wider Society

In the corresponding section of Part One above, I sketched a few features of present relations between individual Lonergan scholars and implementers, individual Lonergan organizations, and a potentially emergent global Lonergan organization, on the one hand, and the wider society on the other. I noted that Lonergan scholars flourish in many theology and religious studies departments, some philosophy departments, and occasionally in some other humanities department; and they belong to academic and professional associations in similar proportions. I also suggested that this fact is cause for both delight and dismay: delight that Lonergan studies has found audiences where it has, and dismay that it has not found them elsewhere. I pursued the latter point a bit further in the subsequent section, remarking that the lack of recognition and esteem received by Lonergan scholars in the academic context is notably less than was anticipated thirty years ago, and asking whether an impediment more basic than the intrinsic difficulty of the message, the human failings of many messengers, and the structural impediments presented by the present-day university’s self-vision is at work here.

Part Two in general moves beyond the present realities of the Lonergan community’s enterprise and considers its future possibilities. The present section in particular is concerned with the future possibilities for relations with the wider society; and as a small contribution to sketching those possibilities I offer two suggestions for addressing the relative narrowness of Lonergan studies’ reception in the academic community.

My first suggestion is simple and obvious: we should continue our efforts. Lonergan’s writings are the works of an extremely bright and erudite man who labored over them intensely and unremittingly for some six decades, so it should not be startling that thus far we in the Lonergan community have devoted so much of our energy to explaining those writings to ourselves. Nonetheless, the task of introducing them to the wider society becomes increasingly important as the years unfold, if the Lonergan community’s enterprise is eventually to be anything more than a multi-decade artifact recounted in future history books. And one key element of properly serving external audience, like the internal one, is simply following the daily admonition of Garrison
Keillor: Do good work! We can hope and perhaps even expect that work well done will eventually be acknowledged and accepted by present or future colleagues who are initially unfamiliar with Lonergan's writings or unattracted by them. Hence, taking pains to insure the high quality of our efforts, let us maintain and extend the range of colleagues whom we engage orally and in writing, the range of scholarly associations and professional societies in whose affairs we participate, the range of the civic and religious groups with whom we interact.

My second suggestion is less simple and obvious: when aiming to introduce Lonergan to others, we should consider changing one commonly used pedagogical strategy. The strategy I think requires change is one employed by my imaginary friend Jane, and it unfolds as follows. Addressing her class or her colleague, Jane begins by explaining in detail some argument made by Lonergan. Her explanation employs Lonergan's terminology and Lonergan's examples, and she speaks enthusiastically and with great conviction. Next, she illustrates the value of Lonergan's argument by earnestly reporting her own experience in tussling for a long time with Problem X, a problem of great interest to her. She tells how Lonergan's argument completely resolved Problem X for her, and how satisfied she feels as a result. Finally, pausing at last, she waits expectantly for a reaction from her audience, only to be met with signs of indifference or even hostility. She repeats her explanation a second time, perhaps even a third; but the result is always the same. Pondering this set of events afterward, she consoles herself by recalling the intrinsic difficulty of Lonergan's thought, the lack of intellectual seriousness on the part of most of her students and colleagues, perhaps even their laziness or worse.

The strategy I propose as a replacement for Jane's is the one employed by my imaginary friend Jill. Addressing her class or her colleague, Jill attempts to discover some problem the audience finds not just speculatively interesting but existentially compelling. To this end, she asks a probing question, and she listens quietly but very attentively to the response. In light of that response she asks one or more additional questions, until the audience's Problem Y has emerged in clarity. Next, recalling an argument by Lonergan that she thinks resolves Problem Y, she explains it as best she can in words already familiar to the audience, presenting it as an argument that she herself
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finds convincing, and perhaps never mentioning Lonergan’s name at all. She illustrates the argument by extending an example already introduced by the audience in answer to one of her earlier questions. During her explanation she pauses periodically to take questions from the audience and then shapes the next step of her account in light of them. At the end of her effort, the response she receives is one of gratitude, accompanied by a request to continue the investigation at the earliest opportunity. Pondering this set of events afterward, Jill finds herself both struck by the audience’s intense involvement with Problem Y and grateful for the nuances that the audience’s questions and comments have added to her own grasp of Lonergan’s argument.

Beneath my trivial contrast of Jane and Jill lie two profound points. The first is that an approach to students or colleagues that gives pride of place to my authors, my knowledge, my problems, my examples, is apt to be perceived as an effort of domination; and no reflective adult should be surprised when it is met with studied indifference or even antipathy, no matter what particular issue is being treated. Second, while we cannot discount obtuseness and sinfulness in others, neither should we discount them in ourselves. The correlative of these two points is obvious enough. An individual or communal pedagogical strategy for introducing Lonergan to others that begins by taking full account of the questions and feelings of one’s audience, treats them with genuine respect, and proceeds with clear awareness of one’s own cognitional and moral deficiencies is likely to be notably more successful than its opposite.

Summary Overview

Academics often are tempted to think that elaborating a strategy for solving a concrete problem is sufficient for solving that problem. We tend to overlook the importance of such factors as willing people, material resources, the support of the wider society, and serendipity.

Nevertheless, while having a strategy is not a sufficient condition for solving a concrete problem, it typically is a necessary condition; and the concern of this paper’s Part Two has been the elaboration of a strategy for addressing a very concrete problem, namely, that of further institutionalizing the Lonergan community’s enterprise in order to foster the likelihood of its long-term survival and flourishing.
But in this regard I must be more exact. The aim of Part Two has not been to elaborate a total strategy: far from it. It has been merely to make some small contribution, largely just procedural, to the elaboration of one, with the hope that others will improve and complete it, and that (in due course, but not too long from now) we all will implement it.

With the foregoing proviso, I list below in summary form the proposals I have offered in Part Two, so that collectively they may be more accessible for consideration and discussion.

**Proposal 1**: that the most fundamental step in enhancing the institutional basis of the Lonergan community’s enterprise is recognizing and fostering *individual Lonergan organizations* as the primary sites of communal stability, creativity, and growth

**Proposal 2**: that every Lonergan scholar and implementer consider formally affiliating herself with at least one individual Lonergan organization

**Proposal 3**: that every individual Lonergan organization consider reviewing whether its particular goals and/or the means of pursuing them should be revised in some way

**Proposal 4**: that every individual Lonergan organization consider welcoming and perhaps even soliciting new members, and then incorporating their contributions into its pursuit of its particular goals

**Proposal 5**: that every individual Lonergan organization consider reporting on its activities regularly, posting information about them on its organizational website, in some cases perhaps also passing it along to the *Lonergan Studies Newsletter*, and requesting that the dates of its scheduled events be displayed in the *Lonergan Resource calendar*

**Proposal 6**: that the individual Lonergan organizations continue their collective effort, begun in June 2009, to establish at least a rudimentary global organization of Lonergan organizations
Proposal 7: that the initial *general* goal of an organization of Lonergan organizations be to foster communication between the individual Lonergan organizations

Proposal 8: that the initial *special* goal of an organization of Lonergan organizations be to help individual Lonergan organizations (1) clearly differentiate themselves from one another, so that reduplicated pursuits may be avoided and distinctive pursuits may be nurtured, and then (2) effectively collaborate with one another on projects best pursued in common

Proposal 9: that any individual (or individual organization) aspiring to introduce others to Lonergan’s writings experiment with *avoiding* the pedagogical strategy of (1) beginning with affirmations of how personally compelling she finds Lonergan’s arguments, (2) moving to explanations of those arguments and their value for solving problems in which she herself is keenly interested, (3) employing primarily Lonergan’s own terminology and examples, and (4) making frequent quotations of Lonergan’s writings

Proposal 10: that any individual (or individual organization) aspiring to introduce others to Lonergan’s writings experiment with *employing* the pedagogical strategy of (1) beginning by discovering one or more problems in which her audience is already keenly interested, (2) selecting arguments from Lonergan that she thinks solve those problems but initially presenting them merely in her own name, (3) employing words already familiar to the audience and examples already introduced by the audience, and (4) initially avoiding frequent quotations of Lonergan’s writings

**CONCLUSION**

I thank you for your kind attention; and I welcome your questions and comments, whether now or later, oral or written (michael.vertin@utoronto.ca).
LONERGAN AND THE YEAR OF FAITH:
ADDRESSING POPE BENEDICT XVI'S
CONCERNS ABOUT RELATIVISM AND
REDUCTIONISM

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In this paper I seek to relate Lonergan’s thought to Pope Benedict XVI’s call to celebrate the fifty-year anniversary of Vatican II with a “Year of Faith.” Two influences help me choose this approach to the theme of the conference: “The Promise of Vatican II.” The first is that I live and work in the Gregorian University in Rome, which is a Pontifical university, and where we try to be alert to the teaching of the Pope and the other teaching bodies of the Holy See such as the Congregation for the Doctrine of the Faith. It struck me as a perhaps helpful contribution to this conference to reflect not so much directly upon the event and documents of Vatican II in this year of anniversary of the Council but rather on the proposals of Pope Benedict XVI about how we should celebrate this event. A second influence motivating my enquiry in this paper is that I teach in the area of the meeting point between social ethics and fundamental theology and students sometimes ask me if the emphasis of Pope Benedict on celebrating Vatican II with a year of faith does not imply a caution about those who like to stress the importance of Vatican II for a Christian engagement with social ethics. I am convinced that this is not the case, but this point needs explaining as a superficial reading of the Pope’s statements can perhaps give this impression. Finally, I find that when one explores Pope Benedict’s full meaning on these matters one finds a number of points of dialogue with the thought of Lonergan.

This talk proceeds in four steps: first, I discuss the apostolic
letter *Porta Fidei* which proposes the year of faith. Second, I locate the apostolic letter in the context of three previous magisterial documents which are cited in it. I conclude that while Pope Benedict by no means wishes to oppose a social-ethical Christian concern he is nevertheless concerned that a number of theological approaches today that express a social concern do so based on philosophical foundations that are relativistic and reductionistic. Third, I turn to Lonergan’s thought and argue that Lonergan shares with Pope Benedict a concern about such relativistic tendencies in current philosophy. Finally, however, I comment on how Lonergan also benefits from some of the very authors he so criticizes for their relativism, adopting variations on their notions of terms like horizon, world, the subject, existence, and history. I conclude by stating that the dialectical sophistication of Lonergan in engaging with these philosophers can act as a resources for Catholic theology as well as magisterial teaching in ways that are relevant for a year of faith.

**THE YEAR OF FAITH**

The apostolic letter *Porta Fidei* was issued by Pope Benedict on October 11th of 2011 a year before the fiftieth anniversary of the opening address to the Second Vatican Council by Pope John XXIII, and it proposed the anniversary year 2012-13 should be celebrated as a “Year of Faith.” This notion of a year of faith is not new in the Church and has been proclaimed in other years of important anniversaries and has the broad object of stimulating a renewal of our practice of our faith as well as a reflection on aspects of it. As the Pope explains:

> I have decided to announce a Year of Faith . . . It is not the first time that the Church has been called to celebrate a Year of Faith. My venerable Predecessor the Servant of God Paul VI announced one in 1967, to commemorate the martyrdom of Saints Peter and Paul on the 19th centenary of their supreme act of witness. He thought of it as a solemn moment for the whole Church to make “an authentic and sincere profession of the same faith.” (*Porta Fidei*, 4)

So it is that, in principle, a year of faith is a rather open-ended thing
and stands in need of being made more specific. Pope Benedict begins to make more precise the notion of the kind of year of faith he is proposing it by relating it two other events: the twenty-year anniversary of the publication of the *Catechism of the Catholic Church*, and the synod of bishops to be held also this October 2012 that will be dedicated to the theme of the “New Evangelization”:

The starting date of 11 October 2012 also marks the twentieth anniversary of the publication of the *Catechism of the Catholic Church*, a text promulgated by my predecessor, Blessed John Paul II, with a view to illustrating for all the faithful the power and beauty of the faith. This document, an authentic fruit of the Second Vatican Council, was requested by the Extraordinary Synod of Bishops in 1985 as an instrument at the service of catechesis and it was produced in collaboration with all the bishops of the Catholic Church. Moreover, the theme of the General Assembly of the Synod of Bishops that I have convoked for October 2012 is “The New Evangelization for the Transmission of the Christian Faith.” This will be a good opportunity to usher the whole Church into a time of particular reflection and rediscovery of the faith. (*Porta Fidei*, 4)

In making this strong connection between the year of faith and the *Catechism of the Catholic Church* the Pope states that he is asking the Congregation for the Doctrine of the faith to issue a follow-up “note” with recommendations for just how the anniversary of the publication of the *Catechism of the Catholic Church* can become a central part of the celebrations of the year of faith at all levels of the church. This document, “Note with pastoral recommendations for the Year of Faith” was duly produced by the Congregation for the Doctrine of the Faith in January 2012. While it states that it proposes its recommendations “without precluding other initiatives which the Holy Spirit will inspire among pastors and faithful in various parts of the world,” it focuses entirely on outlining means in which the *Catechism* can be reflected upon and promoted at the levels of the universal Church, episcopal conference, diocese, parish, and smaller Christian community.

Now, in reading *Porta Fidei* some of my students ask if the matters it emphasizes does not ask us to withdraw energy from the
work of commitment to social and cultural transformation and to return instead to the basics of explicit development of our own faith and the explicit evangelization of others so that they become practicing Catholics. Some point to the following statement made at the beginning of the apostolic letter to support such a case:

It often happens that Christians are more concerned for the social, cultural, and political consequences of their commitment, continuing to think of the faith as a self-evident presupposition for life in society. In reality, not only can this presupposition no longer be taken for granted, but it is often openly denied. Whereas in the past it was possible to recognize a unitary cultural matrix, broadly accepted in its appeal to the content of the faith and the values inspired by it, today this no longer seems to be the case in large swathes of society, because of a profound crisis of faith that has affected many people . . . We must rediscover a taste for feeding ourselves on the word of God, faithfully handed down by the Church, and on the bread of life, offered as sustenance for his disciples . . . In the light of all this, I have decided to announce a Year of Faith. (Porta Fidei, 2, 3, 4)

In some of the courses I teach at the Gregorian I take the kind of questioning of students that I have outlined as a point of departure for a longer discussion of the relationship between an explicit faith in Jesus Christ and a commitment to a praxis of social and cultural transformation as outlined in magisterial teaching and in Christian theology in general and I seek to reflect something of this kind of line of argument in this paper. With respect to the particular questions about Porta Fidei, I proceed in the following manner. I stress that the Pope by no means wants to oppose the fact that faith issues forth in charity and that charity, today, needs to take on the sophistication of engaging in dialogue with culture for the transformation of social structures. However, I do point out that the Pope is highly concerned that after Vatican II the council has tended to be interpreted in a manner that makes use of modern and postmodern philosophies in a way that can lead to conclusions that relativize objective moral norms, exclude from consideration the possibility of supernatural revelation, and in
practice regard the exercise of responsibility by the magisterium as pretty much always an act of oppression.

To express this point in a Lonergan-based vocabulary, I would say that the Pope is highly concerned with counterpositions at work within the church regarding how Vatican II is being interpreted and received. I suggest that the Pope is asking that any argument that seeks to explain a link between Christian faith and a praxis of cultural and social transformation needs to distinguish itself from such relativistic philosophies which will often, also, express a social concern. A point here to recall is that the Pope is convinced that philosophies that have the best of intentions to be of benefit to culture and social structures will fail be so if their foundations are relativistic and if, consequently, they close themselves to the possibility of a divine intervention that heals our natural orientation to truth and goodness.

Now, I believe that Lonergan's thought exists profound continuity with these concerns but before pointing this out I find it helpful to clarify just what the Pope is saying and what he is not saying in a document like *Porta Fidei.* In order to clarify this point I turn to place this letter within a wider context of magisterial teaching on the reception of Vatican II so as to avoid superficial readings of it. I do this by referring to three magisterial documents written before *Porta Fidei* but cited by it: the report on the 1985 synod of bishops on the reception of Vatican II at the twenty-year anniversary of its closing; *Novo Millennio Ineunte* the encyclical letter of Pope John Paul II; and a short address, or *moto proprio,* of Pope Benedict in 2005 regarding what hermeneutic we should employ to interpret Vatican II.

**A Tradition of Magisterial Concern**

The document produced by the second extraordinary synod of the bishops, held in 1985, is dedicated to theme of "the celebration, verification, and promotion of Vatican II." If we keep an eye on the question of the link between Christian faith and a social-ethical concern we note that sub-headings of this document leave us in no doubt that this link is being made. A section toward the end is entitled

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"The mission of the Church in the world" and includes sub-sections with titles such as: "Importance of the Constitution Gaudium et Spes," "Aggiornamento," "Inculturation," "Dialogue with non-Christian religious and non-believers," and "Preferential option for the poor and human promotion." However, this 1985 document also stresses that there have been "shadows" as well as "lights" in the reception of Vatican II and focuses on problems emerging in Europe and North America:

In a particular way, the question must be posed as to why, in the so-called "First World," following a doctrine of the Church which has been so extensively and profoundly explained, quite often a certain estrangement is manifested towards the Church, even though in this area of the world the fruits of the Council abound. Instead, where the Church is oppressed by totalitarian ideologies or where the Church raises her voice against social injustices, she seems to be accepted in a more positive way.

In attempting to analyze this phenomenon, the synod comments on the "constant growth of an ideology characterized by pride in technical advances and a certain immanentism that leads to the idolatry of material goods (so-called consumerism) From this can follow a certain blindness to spiritual realities and values." It continues to criticize what it calls "a partial and selective reading of the Council," which can result in "the failure to correctly distinguish between a legitimate openness of the Council to the world and the acceptance of a secularize world's mentality and order of values" (1985 Synod, 2).

Next the synod document offers recommendations for how to address this problem. It calls for a more faith-based approach to the reception of Vatican II using terminology such as "discernment of spirits," "interior assimilation," and "loving reaffirmation" and "return to the sacred" (1985 Synod, 3). Then, in addition to this appeal to the more affective aspects of faith the synod proceeds to speak of the importance of doctrinal orthodoxy. Noting that in the theological

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2 Similarly, in earlier sections addressing issues *ad intra* to the church, sub-sections are devoted to "Unity and Pluriformity in the Church," "Collegiality," "Episcopal Conferences," "Ecumenical Communion."

3 1985 Synod, 2.
atmosphere after Vatican II it has become less clear just what are the doctrines of the church and what are issues open to speculation it calls for the production of a catechism of Catholic doctrine.

Very many have expressed the desire that a catechism or compendium of all Catholic doctrine regarding both faith and morals be composed, that it might be, as it were, a point of reference for the catechisms or compendiums that are prepared in the various regions. The presentation of doctrine must be biblical and liturgical. It must be sound doctrine suited to the present life of Christians.

This call by the synod would result in the publishing of the *Catechism of the Catholic Church* seven years later. In noting both this fact and the prior one that the synod associates inappropriate interpretations of the Council with problems at the level of the faith of theologians we find that the synod document anticipates both the content and the tone of *Porta Fidei*.

A second document invoked by *Porta Fidei* is the encyclical produced by Pope John Paul II in 2001, *Nouo Millennio Ineunte* (2001). This document seeks to both offer a broad vision for Christianity in the new millennium and to propose for local churches a method of pastoral planning that would that would produce “pastoral initiatives adapted to the circumstances of each community”\(^5\). This document is much appreciated by pastoral or practical theologians as providing a model for pastoral planning. Furthermore, the document gives clear attention to the fact that the mission of the church includes an *ad extra* aspect that includes a social ethical concern:

> The ethical and social aspect of the question is an essential element of Christian witness: we must reject the temptation to offer a privatized and individualistic spirituality which ill accords with the demands of charity, to say nothing of the implications of the Incarnation and, in the last analysis, of Christianity’s eschatological tension. While that tension makes us aware of the relative character of history, it in no way implies that we withdraw from “building” history. Here

\(^4\) 1985 Synod, 7.

the teaching of the Second Vatican Council is more timely than ever: “The Christian message does not inhibit men and women from building up the world, or make them disinterested in the welfare of their fellow human beings: on the contrary it obliges them more fully to do these very things.”

This having been said, Pope John Paul II devotes much time to stressing that the effectiveness of the ad extra mission of the church is dependent on the health of its ad intra life. Here he stresses “that all pastoral initiatives must be set in relation to holiness” and speaks of how, however paradoxical it may sound to “plan for holiness” we need to do this as a matter of priority. He also speaks of prayer as a “school of communion” whereby growth in individual holiness interweaves with the life of our Christian community. Repeatedly he stresses that unless the priority of a life of faith and communion is emphasized in the ad intra life of the church, planning for structures and activities, whether they be for the add intra or ad extra mission of the church, will be hollow:

"Let us have no illusions: unless we follow this spiritual path, external structures of communion will serve very little purpose. They would become mechanisms without a soul, “masks” of communion rather than its means of expression and growth."

So it is that, once again we have a document that stresses the issue of the need to prioritize the question of faith in any approach to Christian practice.

Our third document is one produced by Pope Benedict XVI in 2005, and also referred to in Porta Fidei: the Christmas address in given to the Vatican curia soon after his election to the pontificate. This address speaks about the importance of employing a “hermeneutic of reform” when interpreting Vatican II. He describes how the council, especially during its second half addressed three major “circles of questions,” the relation of the Church to modern science; the relation of the church to the modern state; and the relation of Christian faith to other religions. He acknowledges that reflection on these “the great themes

6 Pope John Paul II, Novo Millennio Ineunte, para. 52.
7 Pope John Paul II, Novo Millennio Ineunte, para. 31.
8 Pope John Paul II, Novo Millennio Ineunte, para. 43.
of the second part of the Council” are themes upon which reflection needs to continue and adds that the manner in which the council was reformulating Catholic thinking it should be conceded that there has been “some kind of discontinuity” at work. Indeed, returning to his call to a hermeneutic of reform in interpreting the council he continues:

It is precisely in this combination of continuity and discontinuity at different levels that the very nature of true reform consists. In this process of innovation in continuity we must learn to understand more practically than before.

In this delicate process of engaging with the great questions of modernity Pope Benedict adds that it is of utmost importance for theologians to find a “dynamic of fidelity” so that he or she can carry forward a tradition in a way that is both faithful to what is of permanent value in it and creative in being able to rearticulate what was contingent in the first place.

Now, if Pope Benedict enters into nuances such as these in his *moto proprio* we also need to note that he devotes considerable energy to a criticism of those he considers to be employing a “hermeneutic of discontinuity and rupture” regarding the council and of which he states: “it has frequently availed itself of the sympathies of the mass media, and also one trend of modern theology.”

He continues:

The hermeneutic of discontinuity risks ending in a split between the pre-conciliar Church and the post-conciliar Church. It asserts that the texts of the Council as such do not yet express the true spirit of the Council. It claims that they are the result of compromises in which, to reach unanimity, it was found necessary to keep and reconfirm many old things that are now pointless . . . innovations alone were supposed to represent the true spirit of the Council, and starting from and in conformity with them, it would be possible to move ahead . . . In a word: it would be necessary not to follow the texts of the Council but its spirit. In this way, obviously, a vast margin was left open for the question on how this spirit should subsequently be defined and room was consequently made for every whim.
I believe that in this energetic criticism of those who employ a hermeneutic of discontinuity and rupture we get close to one of Pope Benedict's central motivating concerns: that there are tendencies in modern and post-modern philosophy and culture which can come to inform Catholic theology and in so doing distort some key aspects of our appropriating the Word of God so as to communicate it. There are a variety of studies of the thought of Joseph Ratzinger which trace more carefully than we can here this caution about how current philosophy can exercise a negative influence on our theology. Already in these comments about a hermeneutic of discontinuity we see echoes of what other authors describe as Ratzinger's conviction about how a fundamentally relativist approach to reason results in philosophies which employ, however implicitly, the notion of a "will to power" as explaining the central human motivation.

Clearly, Ratzinger calls for a different approach to the use of reason and, above all, its capacity to affirm truth, not least moral truth, and to let reason be our guide rather than a will to power. However, Ratzinger also stresses that such is the tendency to break-down in the human use of reason that it is above all in the light of the grace of Jesus Christ that reason can be healed sufficiently so as to function properly. So it is that Benedict insists that it reason transformed by faith can be characterized by, to employ vocabulary employed by the 1985 synod, a "discernment of spirits," "interior assimilation," and "loving reaffirmation." Here, I believe we witness a link between Pope Benedict's call for a hermeneutic of reform of Vatican II and his call for a year of faith. He stresses that it is only with eyes of faith that theologians will have the humility to exercise the "dynamic fidelity" to tradition that will also provide insights that help us engage with the "great questions" of theology today. In fact, Ratzinger the theologian expressed caution about any theology that had what he called an "anthropocentric" starting point and not one rooted explicitly in the Word of God.¹⁰

¹⁰ In an early commentary on Gaudium et Spes the young Ratzinger states that an "anthropocentric" approach "probably represents its most characteristic option." He explains that he finds the existentialist account of the human person unpersuasive: "Why
LONERGAN AND POPE BENEDICT’S CONCERN

Having thus given time to studying how the Catholic magisterium is asking us to reflect upon and celebrate Vatican II, the question now arises about how to relate Lonergan’s thought to this. In the spirit of Lonergan’s dialectical method, a variety of options arise. Perhaps most immediately, we can recall Lonergan’s statement in the article “Dimensions of Meaning”

There is bound to be formed a solid right that is determined to live in a world that no longer exists. There is bound to be formed a scattered left captivated by now this, now that development, exploring now this and now that new possibility. But what will count is a perhaps not numerous center, big enough to be at home in both the old and the new, painstaking enough to work out one by one the transitions to be made, strong enough to refuse half measures and insist on complete solutions even though it has to wait.11

From a perspective rooted in this quotation, we can see that the magisterium has been concerned for a good number of years now about a scattered left that has played a role in interpreting how Vatican II has been received in the church and whose influence needs to be corrected. For those of us committed to promoting Lonergan’s “not numerous center” we can find ample resources in Method in Theology to feel at ease with this concern of the magisterium. In his account of the functional specialty of foundations Lonergan is unambiguous about how religious conversion anchors the whole theological project. Similarly, his account of intellectual conversion in this specialty assures us that the retrieval of tradition as well as its mediation to culture pays full attention to the relationship of faith to beliefs and to the objectivity of doctrinal truth claims and to the manner in which theologians are exactly the reasonable and perfectly free human being described in the first articles was suddenly burdened with the story of Christ?” (Joseph Ratzinger, “The Church and Man’s Calling,” introductory article and chapter 1, in Commentary on the Documents of Vatican II, Volume V, Part 1, The Pastoral Constitution on the Church in the Modern World [New York: Herder and Herder, 1969]).

bound to adhere to both church doctrines and doctrines of the faith. So it is that a Lonergan-based approach can find itself comfortable with the key stresses of Pope Benedict’s year of faith as outlined in *Porta Fidei* including its stress on the value of the *Catechism of the Catholic Church*.

As we continue along this line of reflection about Lonergan’s thought and the reception of Vatican II, we can note with appreciation an approach taken by Neil Ormerod in a recent article in *Theological Studies* entitled, “Vatican II – Continuity or Discontinuity? Toward an Ontology of Meaning.”\(^{12}\) This approach seeks to take up Pope Benedict’s notion of a hermeneutic of reform and to transpose it from the descriptive vocabulary in which it is formulated to a more explanatory one. Ormerod speaks of notions of continuity and discontinuity as ultimately unhelpful as there is always change in human tradition and so continuity and discontinuity are always present to some degree or other. Ormerod then seeks to “advance the position” of what Pope Benedict is saying by drawing on Lonergan’s notion of how community is constituted by meaning. In this context, he proposes categories for evaluating the reception of Vatican II in the church in terms of distinguishing trajectories of change that are “authentic” from those that are “inauthentic.” Ormerod addresses Pope Benedict’s concern for objectivity in evaluating such matters by drawing on Robert Doran’s discussion of the “ontological” aspect of meaning.

Granting that, ultimately, this tactic of “advancing the position” in this manner in magisterial teaching is likely to be the most fruitful approach, I would nevertheless like to add some reflections that I believe are distinct from this. This begins with stressing how Lonergan shares many of Pope Benedict’s concerns about the counterposition present in modern and post-modern culture, locating these counterpositions in the thought of some influential philosophers. Next, however, I point out how Lonergan also finds himself able to engage with such authors creatively and to propose an orthodox Catholic theology that benefits from their contribution. I conclude by suggesting that this dialectical approach of Lonergan, based of course on the interior differentiation of consciousness that results from intellectual conversion, can serve as a

resource for the church in both protecting orthodoxy and engaging in the kind of constructive engagement with culture for which Vatican II calls.

Of course, the approach I outline is still too broad for a single reflection such as this paper. Lonergan expressed concerns about the relativism and reductionism of modern culture as early as his essays on history in the 1930s, regularly in the pages of *Insight*, and onwards through his writing of *Method in Theology* and beyond. In this paper I want to focus on comments he makes in one limited period of his life, the late 1950s. These are years when he had completed his writing of *Insight* and was beginning an in-depth reading of phenomenological and existentialist authors. Fred Crowe identifies three summer institutes given by Lonergan during this time as constituting a kind of unit in the story of Lonergan's intellectual development. The lectures given in these institutes have been published as volumes in the Collected Works of Bernard Lonergan: *Phenomenology and Logic, Understanding and Being*, and *Topics in Education.*

According to Crowe, Lonergan's thought during this time exhibits impressive development, and in fact, an immense creativity. He has not yet quite articulated his position on a fourth level of consciousness, nor gained his insight into functional specialization, but he is well on his way to substituting a vocabulary of intentionality analysis for that of the faculty psychology that is still found in *Insight*. What I believe is particularly relevant here for our dialogue with the thought of Pope Benedict is that Lonergan at this stage is engaging with the thinkers that the Pope tends most to criticizes as sources of relativism and

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reductionism in modern culture. Furthermore, in addition to beginning to receive much from such authors at this time, Lonergan clears the ground, so to speak, by making sharp comments on the counterpositions that they also represent.

In my process of refining my focus on a question that is manageable in this reflection I proceed now to speak primarily of Lonergan's engagement with only one of the authors discussed during these institutes, Martin Husserl. An engagement with Husserl is the major characteristic of the first of the summer institutes, that given here in Boston College in 1957, and published as *Phenomenology and Logic*. Philip McShane, the editor of this volume stresses the importance of Lonergan's reflections on Husserl both as central to these lectures and important for his intellectual development through succeeding years.15

**LONERGAN AND HUSSERL**

If, in what follows, we have a special interest in what Lonergan has to say about relativism and reductionism in *Phenomenology and Logic*, we do well to recall what he had been saying on these topics in the years that precede this study. In his biography of Lonergan's development up to the writing of *Insight* William Mathews comments on the enormous significance of Lonergan's notion of being and of objectivity as outlined in that book. He suggests that it is one of the great discoveries of Western philosophy to be able to assert, as Lonergan does, that the pure desire to know intends the concrete universe of being. Nevertheless, we can recall that this discovery is made within the context of a notion of a cognitional structure that has only three levels. There is much more to be said about the realm of affectivity, value judgments, and the dramatic pattern of experience that the existential reality of the subject. This is the realm that Lonergan begins to explore in *Phenomenology*

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15 "The chapters on Husserl and on phenomenology in general are arguably the most important chapters in the third part of the volume . . . more important, it would seem than his engagement with the thinkers usually referred to as existentialists . . . The influence of Husserl was to be reflected in a number of lectures over the next eight years or so. Lonergan comes back again and again to certain themes from *The Crisis of European Sciences and Transcendental Phenomenology*, and the present volume provides the earliest account of his reading of that book (Philip McShane, editor's preface, *Phenomenology and Logic*, xiv)."
and Logic. We outline this encounter in three steps, the first two of which outline aspects of Husserl’s thought, and the third which focus on Lonergan’s negative critique of this. We delay until a concluding section of the paper comments on Lonergan’s more positive response to Husserl.

The Crisis of Science-Based Culture

Lonergan begins his discussion of Husserl with an outline of that author’s book The Crisis of European Sciences and Transcendental Phenomenology by outlining Husserl’s diagnosis of the ills of modern society, a topic close to Lonergan’s heart. He points out that, above all, Husserl criticizes the cultural assumption that key decisions for how to direct our societies could be based on a method that is considered to follow the laws of natural science.

In studying this problem, Husserl first turns to the emergence of a notion of science in ancient Greek culture. There he points out that the original intention of the Greeks in opting for this turn to theoretical thinking was “to set up human society on the basis of reason and truth.” He then proposes the use of science in modern society should be measured by the same criterion. Next, Husserl offers five criticisms of the modern scientific endeavour so as to demonstrate that it is failing to contribute to society in the way the Greeks would have wanted. First, he points out that science tends to splinter into specialties. Second, he points out that these splinters insist on maintaining an autonomy from each other. In the pursuit of this autonomy, only the authorities within each “department, section, or subsection” are allowed rule on what is an authentic method of proceeding and these authorities apply “merely traditional norms that are not questioned.” Third, Husserl states that, when we study these traditional norms we notice that a drift has occurred to “the criterion of technical competence.” Here he claims that in this unreflective context decreasing attention is given to the fact that “what counts ultimately is getting results” and increasing attention is given to a kind of policing of the “approved technique.”

Fourth, Husserl asserts that the greatest casualty of this lack of methodological reflection is social science and the consequent preparation of policy directives for government. He points out that

16 Phenomenology and Logic, 251-52.
when one wishes to study human behavior one needs to take into account of factors that distinguish humans from other beings. However, Husserl insists the lack of permission to reflect foundationally results in incompetent methods being employed, often efforts that assume that methods that seem to work for non-human levels are the only credible methods to be applied to the study of human behavior. He then makes the striking assertion that claims to scientific justification motivate most policy decisions in the modern states of the twentieth century. Provocatively, he claims that these claims are spurious and what is in fact happening is a governance of society, not by the reason for which the Greeks had hoped, but by different versions of an exercise of manipulative power: “De facto, the unification of science and the application of science to society come about by either the totalitarian state or mass democracy, and in both cases it is a unification not by reason but by power.”

Fifth and finally, Husserl makes a point that is a logical consequence of his first four. Irrational as is the situation of policy making in modern societies, these societies possess no intellectual means of analyzing this problem so as to correct it:

Finally – and this is apparently his ultimate and most damning criticism – there is the impossibility of a reorganization, a reorientation, on the present basis. A reorientation demands a general view and no general view is possible. All that can be had is a shifting set of best available opinions in more or less unrelated fields ... there is not foundation, no ground, on which you can stand.

Having outlined the dilemma of modern scientistic culture, Husserl proceeds to propose a philosophical solution.

**Transcendental Philosophy**

Lonergan next traces how Husserl’s proposed solution to the crisis of modern culture is to propose a philosophy that can “ground all other philosophies” and overcome the terrible fragmentation of modern thought that makes an overall self-correction of culture impossible.

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17 *Phenomenology and Logic*, 253-54.
18 *Phenomenology and Logic*, 254.
Husserl adds that there is a second major kind of knowing in which we all indulge: common sense. He adds a point, easy to agree with, that common sense also has little interested in reflecting on its foundations. Having clarified this he sets out to establish a foundational account of human knowing in a series of four steps. Lonergan summarizes the first two as follows:

The first point is that the subject is prior, the second point is that what the subject is the ground of is intentional.19

Regarding the first point, Husserl points out that it is the one individual who engages in acts of knowing whether they be scientific or common sense: “the subject is the source of both truths and both worlds.” Next, Husserl proposes that we perform a “transcendental reduction” on ourselves and get to the root of what are the stirrings of consciousness that occur before we advance to acts of knowing. In taking this transcendental turn he introduces a term “intentionality” that becomes central to his philosophy. Lonergan takes care to summarize this second point of Husserl. He points out that, in fact, Husserl defines subjectivity and intentionality with respect to each other. Lonergan summarizes: “what the subject is the source of is intentional,” and adds: “the subject is the source of what he means, symbolizes, represents, intends.” Now, here Lonergan stresses that in Husserl the term ‘intentional’ has no metaphysical presuppositions: “There is the intending subject and the intended object. The object is nothing more than what is intended by the subject, and the subject is nothing more than what intends the object. The two are correlative, and the fact is primary, basic, undeniable, unavoidable.”20

Now, Lonergan points out that this strict refraining of any discussion of a real thing to which intentionality might be relating places Husserl squarely within a Cartesian tradition of separating the res cogitans from the res extensa. Indeed, Lonergan notes that Husserl explicitly acknowledges this:

The third point is a reiteration of Descartes’s Cogito, a more strict repetition in which there is no leap to a soul and no leap

19 Phenomenology and Logic, 259.
20 Phenomenology and Logic, 256-57.
to a Galilean world of mechanist determinism.21

According to Lonergan, Husserl next asserts, as step four of his argument, that once you are attending to intentionality like this you have in fact begun to conduct a "transcendental philosophy." All further acts of knowledge can be understood as emerging from this most fundamental process of consciousness:

In the fourth place, there is Husserl's identification of transcendental phenomenology, transcendental psychology, and transcendental philosophy. They are all one. It is a matter of studying the transcendental subject. This yields what is necessary in minimal acts of intending and what follows from it.22

Husserl continues to explain these "minimal acts of intending" in terms of a notions of *epoché* and "transcendental reduction." He describes the former as a "withdrawal of concern with the 'really real'" and the latter as "the reduction of objects to the subject." Both of these points seem to repeat his basic argument that we must remain carefully within the res cogitans and let it function according to its own dynamics. Next, and finally, according to Lonergan, Husserl instructs others to proceed to build our account of all further acts of knowing on this attentiveness to our intentional process:

Finally he says, through the *epoché* and the transcendental reduction secure for sciences and philosophy an immovable ground . . . a philosophy that grounds all possible philosophies.23

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21 *Phenomenology and Logic*, 259. Lonergan adds that Husserl instructs the transcendental philosopher: "let him be careful to avoid Descartes' two wild leaps . . . to Galileo's real world of things with primary qualities but not secondary qualities. That is just a leap beyond the intentional. It posits what is not given. On the other hand, let them avoid Descartes' leap on the side of the subject . . . a metaphysical entity called soul" (258).

22 *Phenomenology and Logic*, 259. Explain further what these "minimal acts of intending" mean for Husserl by explaining Husserl's notions of *epoché* in terms of a "withdrawal of concern with the 'really real'" and "transcendental reduction" insists on "the reduction of objects to the subject."

23 *Phenomenology and Logic*, 260.
Lonergan’s Critique of Husserl

Only after a careful outlining of Husserl’s argument in the *The Crisis of European Sciences and Transcendental Phenomenology* does Lonergan begin his dialectical critique of it. On the positive side, he states that with regard to Husserl’s analysis of modern scientific culture:

> We can admit, in the main, Husserl’s strictures on the situation of modern science. In other words, science has problems that it cannot solve, that can be solved only in terms of a philosophy.

Furthermore, Lonergan asserts that in Husserl’s call to attend to intentionality “has got hold of something that is of great importance and has proved very fruitful in a variety of ways.” This is a key point for Lonergan because it is the shift to intentionality analysis in his own thought that will free him to make discoveries such as that of a fourth level of consciousness in cognitional theory and functional specialization in the realm of method. However, it is not our focus in this section. Rather we are interested in the counterposition Lonergan also discerns in Husserl’s thought.

Above all Lonergan states that Husserl’s account of how we advance from attending to our most primal stirrings of consciousness to any further acts of knowing are unconvincing. In the end, says Lonergan, Husserl is not proposing anything more than another version of knowing as taking a good look. For Lonergan, in *Insight*, attending to intentional consciousness allows us advance to an act of “intellectual self-affirmation” where we understand that our processes of consciousness carry us through acts of insight, conceptualization, reflective insight, and judgment. What Lonergan finds in Husserl is an innovative and helpful account of the earliest stirrings of this process followed by an inadequate account of what happens next:

> Phenomenology fails to give due weight in its psychology and in its philosophy to rationality, to affirmation, to being as known through affirmation. That is the fundamental point.

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24 *Phenomenology and Logic*, 261.
25 *Phenomenology and Logic*, 279.
26 *Phenomenology and Logic*, 275. Lonergan elaborates: “There is a radical difference
Speaking to his 1950s Catholic audience in Boston College Lonergan offers a warning that echoes the tone of many magisterial statements today:

So this is the fundamental limitation to phenomenology . . . Consequently we have to be aware of that fundamental difference and not feel that just because those people are talking about existence in a way that seems extremely acceptable to Scholastics because of its extreme difference from and other non-Scholastic philosophies, therefore they are all with us, so we can just join hands and all be happy. They are on essentially different plane.27

So it is that Lonergan arrives at his critique of the relativism implicit in phenomenology. In fact, he repeats warnings to his Boston College audience on this topic:

Phenomenology fails to give due weight in its psychology and in its philosophy to rationality, to affirmation, to being as known through affirmation. That is the fundamental point.28

Next, Lonergan sees in Husserl so close a reliance on Cartesian dualism as to constitute at least in part simply another manifestation of the myth of knowing as taking a good look:

There is a radical difference between a spontaneous orientation upon the really real — what Santayana calls “animal faith” in his book Scepticism and Animal Faith — and, on the other
hand, what is posited absolute in judgment. True judgment is the medium in quo being is known. You have to distinguish between those two. If you do not then you will not be uncovering the ambiguity in Husserl's epoché.

If by my intentional act I suspend the really real, what kind of intentional act is going to restore the really real? ... Just as there is an ambiguity to the epoché itself, so there is an ambiguity to the return from the epoché.

In some respects, one of our aims in this paper has now been achieved. We have demonstrated how Lonergan critiques the relativism of an author who exercises immense influence on culture today. In this manner we find that Lonergan is close to Pope Benedict who expresses the abiding influence of such philosophical ideas. With more time we could expand our account to trace how Lonergan in Phenomenology and Logic levels a similar criticism of relativism at existentialist philosophers such as Martin Heidegger and Karl Jaspers. For the time being, let us just list the following quotations which make it clear that accusations of relativism and reductionism that Lonergan levels at Husserl he levels also at existentialist authors:

This shows the weak point in existentialism: you can push it any way you want, and that is the weak point in unconcern with propositional truth.

While there is a great deal in existentialism on which we can and should practice the patristic maxim of despoiling the Egyptians, taking what is good in it and bringing it into our own work, we cannot just take it over wholesale without a critical appraisal and a revision in some fundamental points.

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29 Phenomenology and Logic, 276-77.
30 Phenomenology and Logic, 277.
31 In fact, a good deal of Lonergan’s lecturing in this institute demonstrated a kind of charming lack of system where he interweaves an analysis both of phenomenology and existentialism. The editor of the work published in the Collected Works of Bernard Lonergan, Philip McShane, traces this path and comments on how we are witnessing here a creative movement in Lonergan’s development where new ideas are occurring to him and where he begins to introduce some of his own original ideas in dialogue with both Husserl and other, existentialist, authors.
32 Phenomenology and Logic, 229.
... if you have nothing but an existentialist basis you cannot go on to the councils of the Church. ... The councils are concerned with propositional truth.\textsuperscript{33}

Heidegger ... discovered Sorge, Verstehen, Rede, Sprache, and so on, but he did not find anything normative.\textsuperscript{34}

In Heidegger, to a less extent in Sartre, but really in the whole movement, truth arises as the fundamental problem. ... Fr. Lotz – he was a pupil of Heidegger ... states that on Heidegger’s position it is not possible to prove the existence of God because of the method on which the position resets.\textsuperscript{35}

Having stressed how Lonergan in his detecting of such a counterpositions, let us now proceed to the final section of this paper and note how he conducts the other dimension of dialectic method, that of identifying and seeking to develop positions. To this point we turn in our final section.

**ADVANCING THE POSITION IN PHENOMENOLOGY**

At this point we do well to recall how Lonergan outlined a notion of dialectic method in chapter 17 of *Insight* that involves reversing counterpositions and developing positions.\textsuperscript{36} In *Phenomenology and Logic* we witness Lonergan employing this technique to powerful effect. Before outlining this, however, I would like to return to a

\textsuperscript{33} *Phenomenology and Logic*, 229.

\textsuperscript{34} *Phenomenology and Logic*, 315.

\textsuperscript{35} *Phenomenology and Logic*, 278.

\textsuperscript{36} “In any philosophy it is possible to distinguish between its cognitional theory and, on the other hand, its pronouncements on metaphysical, ethical, and theological issues ... the inevitable philosophic component immanent in the formulation of a cognitional theory will be either a basic position or else a basic counterposition. It will be a basic position ... if the real is the concrete universe of being and not a subdivision of the ‘already out there now’ ... if objectivity is conceived as a consequence of intelligent inquiry and critical reflection, and not as a property of vital anticipation, extroversion, and satisfaction. On the other hand, it will be a basic counterposition if it contradicts one or more of the basic positions ... Any philosophic pronouncement on any epistemological, metaphysical, ethical, or theological issue will be named a position if it is coherent with the basic positions on the real, on knowing, and on objectivity ... and it will be named a counterposition if it is coherent with one or more of the basic counterpositions ... all counterpositions invite reversal ... all positions invite development” (*Insight*, 413).
discussion of the thought of Joseph Ratzinger, not as Pope and voice of the magisterium, but as a younger man and commentator on Vatican II close to the time of its occurrence. The point I want to make here is that, recognizing the relativistic tendencies of current philosophy in a way much similar to Lonergan, Ratzinger took a philosophical option about how to respond that was different from Lonergan. For Ratzinger the way to preserve avoid relativism and reductionism lay in drawing on such thinkers as Augustine, Bonaventure, and Von Balthasar. In doing this Ratzinger expressed an uneasiness with, although not outright rejection, of attempts to arrive at objectivity by beginning with attentiveness to subjectivity.

Ratzinger’s Uneasiness with “Anthropocentrism”

In my first section I commented on how a superficial reading of documents such as Porta Fidei can seem to suggest that there exists a dichotomy between a commitment to cultural and social transformation and a lively Christian faith. In our second section we demonstrated that it is by no means the intention of Pope Benedict to propose such a dichotomization. However, the question remains regarding exactly how theology explains the link from a lively faith to a historical commitment. We might articulate the question in terms of how we should look today on Gaudium et Spes, the document of Vatican II that explicitly addressed the question of the relationship of the church and the modern world. In this respect it is of relevance to note that the young Joseph Ratzinger contributed to a commentary on the documents of Vatican II, published in 1969, where he was allotted responsibility for commenting on at least the the opening chapters of precisely this document. In his thoughtful commentary we find Ratzinger expressing considerable uneasiness with the text. Speaking of the document as a whole he points out that what he calls an “anthropocentric” approach “determines the whole theological conception of the text, probably represents its most characteristic option.” He explains this approach

38 Ratzinger, “The Church and Man’s Calling,” 177-178.
is related to Thomistic thinking that stresses the distinction between philosophy and theology, where the former treats of truths known naturally and the latter primarily truths revealed supernaturally. He then takes a distance from such Thomist presuppositions stating: “It can hardly be disputed that as a consequence of the division between philosophy and theology established by the Thomists, a juxtaposition has gradually been established which no longer appears adequate.”

Next, tracing how such a Thomist approach proceeds to engage with modern existentialism, he employs irony to critique what he perceives as a failure in the document to offer a philosophy of human freedom that leaves room for faith in Jesus Christ. He asks: “Why exactly the reasonable and perfectly free human being described in the first articles was suddenly burdened with the story of Christ?”

He next quotes with evident approval those Council fathers who during debates about *Gaudium et Spes* objected to the anthropocentric emphasis of the text proposing instead “that the starting-point should be Christ, the Second Adam, from whom alone the Christian picture of man can be correctly developed.”

Now, Ratzinger’s comments on *Gaudium et Spes* do not exclude the possibility of other, superior, attempts to adopt anthropocentric approaches to grounding dialogue between Christianity and the modern world. Strictly speaking his criticism is only of the particular text of *Gaudium et Spes* whose argument he finds unconvincing. We might recall that many of the *periti* of the council considered this to be somewhat of a rushed and unbalanced text. For example, Karl Rahner, a theologian that Ratzinger would undoubtedly characterize as “anthropocentric,” was also critical of the text. In fact, Ratzinger is careful to clarify that his criticisms of the particular text leave many wider philosophical questions unaddressed. He acknowledges that the issues at stake here are complex and that “ultimately the whole question of the relation between faith and understanding comes up for debate here.”

On this issue I would now like to return to the thought of Lonergan. Simply put, I suggest that Lonergan can make a better case for what he

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39 Ratzinger, “The Church and Man’s Calling,” 120.
40 Ratzinger, “The Church and Man’s Calling,” 119-20.
41 Ratzinger, “The Church and Man’s Calling,” 120.
would want to explain as an "anthropological" (not "anthropocentric") starting point, that is indebted to Thomas Aquinas.

**Lonergan’s Presentation of an “Anthropological” Starting Point**

In a previous section we have outlined how energetically Lonergan agrees that there is a great deal of relativism in phenomenological and existentialist thought. We turn now to outline how he nevertheless that there is a position to be developed here and not only a counterposition to be reversed. After criticizing Husserl Lonergan does not hesitate to add:

> We treat the significance of phenomenology. It has more or less swept the field in a variety of ways, and its first significance is that it provides a technique for the exploration and presentation of whole realms of matters of fact that are important but that have been neglected.⁴²

Husserl has done, with enormous labor, a fine analysis of psychological process. Two of his most brilliant discoveries are the correlation of *abschattung* and *horizont*, and again the correlation of *einstellung* and *welt*.⁴³

So it is that Lonergan is full of praise for Husserl’s notions of horizon and world, recognizing that for Husserl, "the world is the total horizon of your knowing."⁴⁴ He adds that from horizon and world emerge notions of the subject and existence and history:

> I think you will see that this idea of horizon is an idea of great philosophic significance, that it represents a concern with the transition from the per se to the concrete subject that exists, that it is concerned with a transition from the non-historical to the historical, and that it involves a study of notions that are very conspicuous in existentialism.⁴⁵

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⁴² *Phenomenology and Logic*, 269.
⁴³ *Phenomenology and Logic*, 257.
⁴⁴ *Phenomenology and Logic*, 258.
⁴⁵ *Phenomenology and Logic*, 283.
So it is that already from his reading of Husserl Lonergan is developing notions of horizon, world, subject, existence, and history, notions that will be key to the future development of his thought. It is beyond our ability in this paper to explain these notions in any depth. However, a point I want to stress is that, because of the counterposition he recognizes in Husserl’s thought, Lonergan is employing these key notions in a way that is distinct from Husserl. To explain this point we need to explain a distinction Lonergan introduces between horizon and what he calls “field.” To start with Lonergan returns to Husserl’s account of the crisis of modern science. While he agrees that a lack of foundational reflection leads to a crisis in the social sciences he insists that the natural sciences do still have an effectiveness in promoting real understanding. He therefore disputes Husserl’s claim that “Greek, Renaissance, and subsequent normative accounts of truth, science, and method are not just artificial ideals floating on popular obscurity”; rather he insists that “they are really expressions, clarifications, objectifications of the immanent normativeness of the human intellect, of our partipatio create lucis increatae. In other words, human intelligence and human reasonableness intrinsically involve norms.” So it is that Lonergan introduces the question of objectivity into horizon analysis. He asks the question that the phenomenologist is reluctant to ask: whether we are not capable of reflecting upon our horizon so as to recognize an immanent source of norms of objectivity within intentional consciousness. He introduces the term “field” to indicate a point of arrival where we recognize just such a fundamental horizon:

We have considered the fact of horizon . . . a psychology of worldviews . . . this multiplicity may be considered as an issue calling for judgment and decision . . . a philosophical question we ask is whether some horizon is the field, whether some horizon is coincident with the limits of all that there is of the universe of being. If we answer that question affirmatively, if we say that some horizon is the field, then how can that horizon be determined? The positivists, the pragmatists, the skeptics, and the relativists would deny that any horizon is the field.46

46 *Phenomenology and Logic*, 264.
47 *Phenomenology and Logic*, 264.
At this point, in a rather understated way, Lonergan asserts that intellectual self-affirmation, as outlined in *Insight* provides an answer to this question: there does exist a "field" that grounds all other horizons. He asserts that it is only through such intellectual self-affirmation that one can distinguish field from horizon:

Thus to select the true horizon is to lay down the basis of metaphysics, to lay down the criteria of what is and what is not. It is to answer the question, What is being? In the concrete fashion that says that being goes so far and there cannot be anything beyond it or there is nothing beyond it.

Finally, there is a real priority of the subject in knowledge ... Husserl's transcendental reduction to the subject is not ultimate; the ultimate reduction is of subject and object, scientific world and world of common sense, to being.

**CONCLUSION**

In this paper I have suggested that it is not least with respect to phenomenologists and existentialists that Pope Benedict recognizes a relativizing and reductionistic effect on culture. It was on this basis that I stressed how Lonergan also is clear in his identifying and criticizing these same tendencies in these philosophers. Then, in my final section I outlined how Lonergan moves beyond reversing counterpositions held by these philosophers to advancing positions also held by them. I now conclude my paper with a reference to Lonergan's article *Existenz* and *Aggiornamento* written in 1964 and so seven years after the lectures reproduced in *Phenomenology and Logic*, and featured in the announcement literature of this 39th Lonergan Workshop that celebrates "The Promise of Vatican II." Without discussing this article at length we can note that the very title indicates that Lonergan excepts to adopt the vocabulary of existentialism as a means of expressing a central

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48 "If you want to go on to a development of how one could find in the subject as subject for foundations as a metaphysics, you will find that *Insight* is structured around the lines just exposed ... where I treat the subject's self-affirmation of himself as a knower."

49 *Phenomenology and Logic*, 311.

50 *Phenomenology and Logic*, 264-65.
aspect of the call for *aggiornamento* made by Vatican II. In this article Lonergan speaks a good deal about how the individual questions of the authenticity or inauthenticity interweave with progress and decline in culture and social structures, so the link to social ethics that I have been touching upon is present. However, "*Existenz and Aggiornamento*" was originally offered as an exhortation to Jesuit scholastics preparing for the priesthood and so in a particular way it touches on issues of faith. Lonergan exhorts his listeners to let their existence become a "being in Christ." So it is that I conclude this paper with a statement of Lonergan that is particularly relevant to those of us heading toward a celebration of the year of faith:

Inasmuch as being in Christ Jesus is the being of subject, the hand of the Lord ceases to be hidden ... the substance in Christ Jesus becomes the subject in Christ Jesus. For the love of God, being in love with God, can be as full and as dominant, as overwhelming and as lasting an experience as human love ... In personal living the questions abstractly asked about the relations between nature and grace emerge concretely in one's concern, one's interests, one's hopes, one's plans, one's daring and timidity, one's taking risks and playing safe. And as they emerge concretely, so too they are solved concretely. Such concrete solutions ... may be for the world that is now and thought out in Christ Jesus. Our time is a time for profound and far-reaching creativity. The Lord be with us all – AMDG – and, as I have said, God's own glory, in part, is you.\(^5\)

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