EDITOR'S INTRODUCTION

The theme of the 37th Annual Lonergan Workshop was "REVERSING SOCIAL AND CULTURAL DECLINE IN A FRIENDLY UNIVERSE."

This passage in Bernard Lonergan's work inspired the theme:

> Faith and progress have a common root in man's cognitional and moral self-transcendence. To promote either is to promote the other indirectly. Faith places human efforts in a friendly universe; it reveals an ultimate significance in human achievement; it strengthens new undertakings with confidence. Most of all, faith has the power of undoing decline. (Bernard Lonergan, Method in Theology, 117)

At this Lonergan Workshop the speakers took the theme with exceptional seriousness.

One of Lonergan's greatest contributions was his emphatic affirmation of the achievements brought about by the rise of modern science while also exposing the counter-positions of the Enlightenment's construction of a "cover-story" that was part of a strategy to overcome belief in God as the author of the universe's intelligibility. Patrick H. Byrne illuminates this aspect of Lonergan's thought. His paper, "Intelligibility and Natural Science: Alienation or Friendship with the Universe?" is a wonderful example.

The papers by David Coghlán, and Charles T. Tackney use perspectives from Lonergan's thought to elucidate concrete issues of commerce and business. In "From Individual Insight to Collective Action: Lonergan's Wheel as a Framework for Organizational Learning," Coghlán shares his long experience of the dynamics that improve the operations of organizations. With the benefit of research into the conduct of international – especially Japanese – corporations and corporate law, Tackney's "John R. Commons, Heinrich Pesch, and Bernard J. F. Lonergan: Three Seminal Thinkers on the Working Rules of the Going Concern and the Illusion of Free Enterprise" uses a German moral theologian and an American institutional economist who was rather like Lonergan in many ways to demonstrate ad oculos
that what Lonergan has meant by a free enterprise system based on morality is not the same as what is generally understood by neoliberal conceptions of “free enterprise.”

By a happy coincidence, Francis M. McLaughlin’s first paper for a Lonergan Workshop is a study of that same genial institutional economist, John R. Commons. McLaughlin’s paper, “John Rogers Commons: Are His Insights Important in Teaching Modern Labor Economics?” both complements and contextualizes the insights offered by Tackney’s and Coghlan’s papers. Commons’s analysis of the recurrence schemes proper to both entrepreneurial and managerial roles of CEOs, administrative staffs, and workers gives to students of Lonergan’s macroeconomic dynamics an insightful entrée to the institutional dimensions of production and consumption.

Two professors from Evangelical Christian universities, Steven Cone and R.J. Snell, note a deep affinity between their background concerns and aspects of Lonergan’s thought. In transposing one of the most unobtrusive yet pernicious of the seven capital sins into the framework of Lonergan’s thought, Snell’s “Sloth Transposed” deepens our understanding of the roots of the biases. Similarly, Cone’s paper, “Religious Conversion as Foundational for Reversing Decline,” explains how Lonergan’s at once capacious and radical notion of religious conversion is indispensable for overcoming the objective surd of structural evil flowing from individual, group, and general bias.

Michael E. McCarthy has spent decades coming to terms with the political philosophical implications of the work of both Hannah Arendt and Bernard Lonergan. From this background, “An Ethics of Authenticity: Personal and Communal,” aids us in understanding the virtualities in Lonergan’s thought for reframing the issues in Charles Taylor’s book, The Ethics of Authenticity. It provides an overarching framework for the entire Workshop. Reenforcing McCarthy is “The Human Person in Wojtyla and Lonergan” by Robin Koning (an Australian Jesuit who had just been a Lonergan Fellow). That Pope John Paul II’s personalism was grounded in Scheler’s phenomenology and in the mysticism of John of the Cross has inspired many erroneously
to contrast his approach to the human person with Lonergan's. Koning brings out the real affinities between the two thinkers, while providing a balanced account of their differences.

*Donna Perry*, who did her dissertation using Lonergan's thought in BC's School of Nursing, presented a paper that brings many of the ideas discussed more academically in our Workshop down to earth. "Beyond Negotiation: Combatants for Peace and Authentic Subjectivity in the Israeli-Palestinian Conflict" reports on the work in which she was involved with persons on both sides of this long-standing and seemingly intractable conflict, since, as David Burrell said at an earlier Workshop, "There are atrocities on both sides." This initiative explores the concrete possibilities for reconciliation that may and actually do emerge from interpersonal interaction and mutual self-mediation on the part of both Israelis and Palestinians.

For those accustomed to the secular contrast between Edmund Burke's stress on "loving the little platoon" and Jean-Jacques Rousseau's emphasis on the General Will as linked to *humanité*, Paulette Kiddr's discussion of Martha Nussbaum and Lonergan in her paper, "Cosmopolis and Cosmopolitanism," will suggest resources for solving the dilemma of modern "universalism" versus postmodern "multiculturalism." Crossing over into theology, Grant Kaplan's paper, "Widening the Dialectic: Secularity and Christianity in Conversation," takes up the problematic of modernity insofar as it opposes the Christian belief that (in words of the late Herbert McCabe) "God wants each kind of creature to flourish in the way appropriate to it, and he wants his human creatures not only to flourish in a human way but to share his own life and happiness forever." Can the secularist standpoint do justice either to the conversational nature of either human consciousness or to the "mystery of love and awe"?

In "A More Cosmopolitan Salvation: Aquinas, Formation for Beatitude, and the Cross," Gilles Mongeau explores whether Aquinas's ideas about the dynamics of Christian discipleship as the quest for human

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flourishing culminating in the redemptive law of the cross a “more cosmopolitan” solution to the reversal of the longer cycle of decline than is often supposed. In its insistence that humanism has to go beyond itself, is more in harmony with the human “capacity to ask, to reflect, to reach an answer that at once satisfies his intelligence and speaks to his heart” than the modern solutions to the problem of evil based on “laws with teeth in them” or on “commerce as a replacement for war.” William E. Murnion considers “Faith and Reason in Aquinas” in terms of the work of “the Latin Lonergan” during his teaching years at the Gregorian University in Rome. Murnion takes up the sweep of Thomas’s theology of the drama of salvation in which faith sublates reason by completely liberating theology’s handmaiden, philosophy. Like Murnion, who spent decades appropriating the length and breadth of Aquinas’s oeuvre in the spirit of Lonergan’s “reaching up to the mind of Aquinas,” Jeremy Wilkins has also been tracing in detail the parallel theologies of Lonergan and Thomas Aquinas. Against this background, he launches his first foray into the ongoing collaborative discussion of “Grace in the Third Stage of Meaning: Apropos Lonergan’s Four-Point Hypothesis.”

Maurice Schepers, O.P., a Dominican friar who (after teaching for some years at St Joseph’s University in Philadelphia) has devoted most of his life to teaching in seminaries in Zambia and Uganda, gave his first Workshop paper: “The Structure of the Human Good: An Exercise in Personal Appropriation (Reaching up to the Mind of Lonergan),” a meditative exegesis on the structure of the human good as an exercise in both personal and communal self-appropriation. Schepers regards this exercise to be the indispensable preparation for elaborating a theology of the church as a self-constituting reality (as sketched by Lonergan in chapter 14 of *Method in Theology*).

The paper of Robert M. Doran, “Functional Specialties for a World Theology,” expands his recent reflections on the nature and task of systematic theology into the plausible and exciting suggestion that Lonergan’s further transformation of *lectio, dispositio,* and *praedicatio* into the eight theological functional specialties offers a basis for the collaboration of a world theology.

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Two papers discussed the work of two great Christian pioneers in world theology. Christian Krokus's – "Louis Massignon's Secret of History Read in the Light of Bernard Lonergan's Law of the Cross" – recounts the core thesis of his doctoral dissertation that summarized and analyzed Louis Massignon's life, thought, and work. Massignon, who in virtue of his friendship with Paul VI, influenced Vatican II's statements on non-Christian religions, was an extraordinary French Catholic scholar who entered into an intimate relationship with Islam. He authored the three-volume biography of the Sufi mystic, Al-Hallaj, who intended to reenact Jesus's redemptive death. The second paper, Ivo Coelho's "Retrieving Good Work: De Smet on Sankara," paid tribute to the extraordinary achievement of Richard De Smet (1916-1997), a Jesuit missionary and Indologist, whose papers Coelho (in a labor of love) has edited and published in two volumes. Coelho sets forth the contours of an interreligious dialogue with Hinduism that earned a high degree of respect from learned Hindus who bestowed upon De Smet the epithet, guru. The paper explains De Smet's insight into parallels between Sankara's ideas and the metaphysics of person that emerged in the Christian context of Christological debates.

A third paper related to world theology was "Identifying and Naming Religious Consciousness in a Friendly Universe." In his first Workshop paper following the completion of his doctoral dissertation on the theology of grace in Lonergan and Rahner, Matthew Petillo draws upon the work he did on Buddhism under the direction of John Makransky (BC Theology Department) to help his readers experience, understand, identify, and name religious consciousness. This is a delicate task because religious experience specifically involves only experience as conscious rather than experience as known.

Richard Grallo is a professor of applied psychology. His proposal of "Reframing Applied Psychology in Terms of Self-Transcendence: Selected Challenges, Problems, and Prospects" was overwhelmingly convincing. Through the years Richard has conducted regular afternoon Workshops

on "Lonergan and Psychology." We believe that he has never missed a Boston Workshop; and in June 2010, he spoke at a Lonergan Workshop for the first time.

Our gratitude to Regina Gilmartin Knox and Kerry Cronin for their invaluable work on this volume.

Fred Lawrence
Boston College, 18 February 2012
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INTELLIGIBILITY AND NATURAL SCIENCE: ALIENATION OR FRIENDSHIP WITH THE UNIVERSE?

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One of Bernard Lonergan's more poignant remarks in Method in Theology comes in the section where he broaches several unique ways of posing the "Question of God":

Is moral enterprise consonant with this world?... is the universe on our side, or are we just gamblers and, if gamblers, are we not, perhaps fools, individually struggling for authenticity and collectively endeavoring to snatch progress from the ever mounting welter of decline? The questions arise and, clearly, our attitudes and our resoluteness may be profoundly affected by the answers. Does there or does there not necessarily exist a transcendent, intelligent ground of the universe? Is that ground or are we the primary instance of moral consciousness? Are cosmogenesis, biological evolution, historical process basically cognate to us as moral beings or are they indifferent and so alien to us?¹

Lonergan's question is most pertinent to the theme of this year's Lonergan Workshop: "Reversing Social and Cultural Decline 'in a Friendly Universe.'" The passage more than hints at a climate of opinion which holds that the natural world is an alien realm unfriendly to human moral striving and ethical endeavor. This is a body of opinions

that arose out of the massive advances in the modern natural sciences (e.g., “cosmogenesis, biological evolution”) which regard the universe as inhospitable to authentic human moral enterprise.

In this article I will propose that Lonergan’s magnum opus, *Insight*, can be read in large part as an extended reply to precisely this problem. He repeatedly draws the reader’s attention to the “extra-scientific opinions” that must be addressed in order to reach a worldview that does justice both to the genuine achievements of science and the fundamental realities of human existence. That is to say, it is not the scientific methods or scientific results in or of themselves that lead to despair about the worth of ethical authenticity. Rather, in Lonergan’s view it is their fellow travelers, the unexamined opinions about what the sciences reveal, which lead to conclusions that undermine confidence about moral endeavor.

In this article I will explore how Lonergan’s unique and difficult treatment of the natural sciences leads to a quite different conclusion – namely, that the world of the natural sciences is intelligible and meaningful. I will also explore further how his more extended account of reality in general (being) – of which the reality of the world of the natural sciences is but one part – leads him to the claim that the totality of reality (being) is intrinsically and completely intelligible. This conclusion sets the stage for his further argument that every event is purposeful and valuable, and that human striving is not at all in vain, but indeed a continuation of a dynamic, intelligible order which is the true and authentic implication of the modern natural science.

Let me also take this occasion to honor my teacher and mentor in Lonergan’s thought, the late Rev. Joseph F. X. Flanagan, S.J. For years he tutored me with the mantra, “Being is completely intelligible.” I spent many years pondering that mantra, and out of my meditations it has now become clear to me that the most fundamental characteristic of a complete intellectual conversion is the firm, virtually unconditioned conviction that being is completely intelligible. Moreover, from this conviction it follows that if the being is indeed completely intelligible, then the natural universe has meaning and purpose with which human ethical authenticity is entirely consonant, though surely not without its periods of dark obscurity, deep doubts, and desperate travails.
I. WHY DOES INSIGHT BEGIN WITH SCIENCE?

Bernard Lonergan’s *Insight* is a difficult and demanding philosophical work. Among the greatest obstacles to any beginning reader of *Insight* is the way this book begins. The first five chapters engage in intensive discussions of modern mathematics and empirical science and their methods. Even before the end of the second chapter, Lonergan has covered irrational surds, uncountable infinite magnitudes, Hilbert’s implicit definition, the invariance principles of relativity theory, differential equations and statistical methods. Why begin the book with such difficult material? To put the question more sharply, if Lonergan indeed intended to issue a “personal invitation to know oneself,” then why begin with five such formidable and daunting chapters? Why begin with such “impersonal” material on the natural sciences that is so unfamiliar to most readers?

Lonergan actually offers several explanations for beginning in this fashion, but they are not all convincing, nor perhaps even compatible. Elsewhere I have discussed those explanations and the difficulties they face as adequate accounts for beginning with these intense explorations of the methods of the modern natural sciences.

In my view, there is a deeper reason for the way that Lonergan begins *Insight*. I think that he hints at his deepest reason for what he is up to in those first five chapters when he writes, “it has taken modern science four centuries to make the discovery that the objects of its inquiry need not be imaginable entities moving through imaginable processes in an imaginable space-time” (15). That is to say, it is the dramatic transformation of our notions of reality and the natural universe by twentieth-century science that Lonergan regarded as having such great philosophical import. This means that a new and deeper reexamination of the methods of science will lead to a transformation in our vision of the natural world. The natural world will be revealed

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3 Patrick H. Byrne, “Lonergan’s Philosophy of the Natural Sciences and Christian Faith in *Insight*,” *Going Beyond Essentialism: Bernard J. F. Lonergan, an Atypical Neo-Scholastic* (Naples: Istituto Italiano per gli Studi Filosofici [forthcoming]).
as intelligible, open and dynamic, and not as a brute, unintelligible, material, and systematically deterministic world contained within the limits of a mechanistic imagination. Such, I would argue, is the deeper intention behind Lonergan’s placement and treatment of science at the beginning of *Insight*.

II. PREVAILING OPINIONS ABOUT THE WORLD OF THE NATURAL SCIENCES

Views contrary to Lonergan’s abound in modern and postmodern culture. Indeed, some of the well-known and influential voices intertwine and combine to create a completely opposite climate of opinion. Consider the following sample of but a few such voices. Famously, Bertrand Russell begins his “A Free Man’s Worship” with Mephistopheles’s cynical retelling of the Creation story to Faustus. Russell then continues in his own words:

> even more purposeless, more void of meaning, is the world which Science presents for our belief. Amid such a world, if anywhere, our ideals henceforward must find a home. That man is the product of causes which had no prevision of the end they were achieving; that his origin, his growth, his hopes and fears, his loves and his beliefs, are but the outcome of accidental collocations of atoms; that no fire, no heroism, no intensity of thought and feeling, can preserve an individual life beyond the grave; that all the labours of the ages, all the devotion, all the inspiration, all the noonday brightness of human genius, are destined to extinction in the vast death of the solar system, and that the whole temple of Man’s achievement must inevitably be buried beneath the debris of a universe in ruins – all these things, if not quite beyond dispute, are yet so nearly certain, that no philosophy which rejects them can hope to stand.⁴

Although later in the essay Russell himself endeavors to give his own humanistic answer to this challenge, he completely accepts this characterization of the universe as fundamentally indifferent, if not

hostile, to human intellectual and ethical endeavors. Again, biologist and Nobel prize recipient Jacques Monod has written:

The ancient covenant is in pieces; man knows at last that he is alone in the universe's unfeeling immensity, out of which he emerged only by chance. His destiny is nowhere spelled out, nor is his duty. The kingdom above or the darkness below; it is for him to choose.5

Or more recently still, Richard Dawkins writes:

I think "nature red in tooth and claw" sums up our modern understanding of natural selection admirably.6

Clearly several influential twentieth-century authors did not regard the natural universe as friendly to the works of the human spirit. Many more voices could be added to this chorus.

Among the most prominent voices contributing to this prevailing opinion about the indifference of the universe is that of Max Weber in his very influential essay, "Science as a Vocation." Weber argues that any true scientist, any one who has a genuine vocation to science

knows that what he has accomplished will be antiquated in ten, twenty, fifty years. That is the fate to which science is subjected; it is the very meaning of scientific work...Every scientific "fulfillment" raises new "questions"; it asks to be surpassed and outdated. Whoever wishes to serve science must resign himself to this fact... [to] engage in doing something that never comes, and never can come, to an end.7

Notice that Weber does not claim that scientific methods produce "cumulative and progressive results" as does Lonergan.8 Rather,

8 Method in Theology, 4. Nor is Weber able to envision the possibility that progressive
Byrne says Weber, science ruthlessly produces obsolescence. It is a process which has no end – not only in the sense of no end in time, but also no culminating achievement which would endow the outmoded researches as essential contributions to a worthwhile outcome. Rather, relentless scientific change is said to be part of a “process of intellectualization which we have been undergoing for thousands of years,” a process of mastering the world by calculation, a process which “means that the world is disenchanted.” For Weber, therefore, neither scientific work nor the world that it brings to light have any inherent or ultimate end or purpose. At best, scientists can only resign themselves to their fate and heroically forge onward, like Nietzschean Übermenschen, realizing that their work will have no lasting worth and accepting their fate anyway. Weber explicitly proclaims that science itself can offer no answer to the question of the meaning of science, or the meaning of the world as known by science, while at the same time offering his extra-scientific account of what science reveals.

In Weber’s view, therefore, it is precisely the modern sciences – human sciences (Geisteswissenschaften) as well as natural sciences (Naturwissenschaften) – that strip the scales from our eyes and confront us with the cold, harsh reality of a disenchanted universe devoid of ultimate meaningfulness. This view of the science and the world implies that authentic moral agents – people endeavoring to bring about good in the world – are indeed just gamblers, because the universe is a cold and purposeless place. In his view it would be foolish, therefore, to believe that “the universe is on our side.”

I would like to propose that the remarks of these various twentieth-century thinkers share the assumption that the modern natural sciences reveal the universe as completely and systematically governed by brute matter and brute force. As I will show, this view stands in stark contrast to Lonergan’s view, in which the universe revealed by the methods of modern science is not material in this sense, but is instead thoroughly intelligible.

Michael Buckley has carefully analyzed the complicated rise of the

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view of the universe as completely materialistic in his *At the Origins of Modern Atheism*. He shows how the scientific work of Rene Descartes and Isaac Newton, despite their explicit intentions to the contrary, were recast by their successors into a purely materialistic, systematic worldview. Descartes’s new model of scientific explanation was rooted in his conception of corpuscles (i.e., little bodies) as “space filling”:

By “body,” I understand all that is suitable for being bounded by some shape, for being enclosed in some place, and thus for filling up space so that it excludes every other body from that space.11

Descartes endeavored to derive his three laws of motion from this concept, whereby one material body in motion will displace another because, by definition, both cannot occupy the same place at the same time. Unfortunately, Descartes formulated his laws in qualitative and seemingly inconsistent fashions, which inevitably invited their replacement.12

Initially, Isaac Newton was greatly impressed by his reading of Descartes’s *Principles of Philosophy* and its corpuscularian worldview. Eventually, however, he became critical of some of Descartes’ explanations (such as his account of the laws of motion and his theory of the celestial vortices). Newton set forth an alternative approach, although its dramatic differences from that of Descartes often escape notice. As Buckley tells it, Newton replaced Descartes’s concept of matter with a new concept of force. Newton distinguished two basic kinds of forces (with several subspecies): external or impressed forces, and inertial mass as “an innate force, by which [mass] tends to resist alien forces and to continue in its present state.”13 In combination these forces would both correct the problems in Descartes’s approach and also offer a unified explanation of both terrestrial and celestial motions. Newton’s alternative approach

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13 *Origins*, 112.
allows celestial and terrestrial [sic.] phenomena not only to be considered mathematically, but to be resolved by a single principle, a principle so pervasive as to make mechanics universal.\textsuperscript{14}

But neither Descartes nor Newton subscribed to the radically materialistic worldview that has become pervasive in our contemporary culture. That worldview was produced out of the interplay among numerous thinkers through a complex process. This process reached its culmination according to Buckley in \textit{Le Système de la nature ou des loix du monde physique e du monde moral} of Baron Paul Henri d'Holbach. As Buckley puts it:

The \textit{Système} came at the climax or crisis of [many discussions], but it came as their synthesis, not their creator. It assimilated and transposed the ideas of the most critical figures of the decades that preceded it.

The major conjunction it made was between...Descartes and Newton. Their union was effected through doctrines neither of them would have accepted and through a project which the masters themselves would have thought reprehensible in its intention and impossible in its execution: a universal materialism that would eradicate or replace the notion of god.\textsuperscript{15}

Three elements combined in this worldview: brute matter, brute force, and universal system as the paradigm of scientific explanation. I say brute matter because of the Cartesian ideal of mechanical explanation. Why does one body recoil from the impact of another as it does upon impact? Because by definition two bodies cannot occupy the same space at the same time. But this does not really answer the question for intelligence. Among other things, it offers no basis for explaining why the two bodies move with specific velocities and directions after the impacts. (This was one of the drawbacks of Descartes's qualitative formulation of his laws.) The appeal of this way of explaining changes in motion, rather, is commonsensical and descriptive. We all have had the bodily sensations of pushing and being pushed, and these experiential

\textsuperscript{14} \textit{Origins}, 114.
\textsuperscript{15} \textit{Origins}, 260.
Intelligibility and Natural Science

descriptions form the bases for our idea that, of course, one body has to
give way to another. However, once twentieth-century physics revealed
that all macroscopic bodies contain far more empty space than particles,
the Cartesian explanation no longer makes sense. It is no longer the
case that one body recoils from another because they cannot occupy
what in fact is the largely empty space contained inside their surfaces.
Rather, they displace one another because surface electrons mutually
repel one another according to Coulomb’s law of electrostatic force:

\[ F = -k \frac{q_1 q_2}{r^2} \]

In fact brute matter explains nothing. Rather, it is Coulomb’s law (what
Lonergan will call a classical correlation) that carries the explanatory
power for why macroscopic objects recoil upon impact.

Although Coulomb’s force law was not articulated until almost a
century after Newton’s Philosophiae Naturalis Principia Mathematica,
Newton and his immediate followers did develop mathematical
formulations of different kinds of “alien” forces, such as the law of
gravitational force.

\[ F = -G \frac{m_1 m_2}{r^2} \]

Yet gravitational force proved vexing to Newton as well as to his
successors. Its mathematical formulation implied that it was an “action-
at-a-distance” force. That is to say, two (or more) massive objects attract
one another instantaneously without any conceivable mechanism that
communicates that force across vast distances. Newton himself as well
as others made various attempts to “explain” the formula of gravitation
force by means of showers of particles or subtle ethers, to no avail.
When Newton pronounced his famous Hypotheses non fingo (“I make no
hypotheses.”), he meant specifically that he could offer no mechanism
of a Cartesian materialistic kind that could explain the mathematical
formula of gravitational force.

Hence, neither gravitational force, Coulomb’s electrostatic force,
nor the other forces used during the reign of Newtonian science are
self-explanatory, although descriptively they can seem to be so. One
might legitimately ask, “Why do they have this form and not some
other?” about any of the correlations that formulate natural laws of
force. Such questions point to the fact that unless accompanied with
ulterior explanations, forces are just brute facts and not intelligible in themselves. This seemed to escape d'Holbach and those who found his *Système* not only convincing, but more importantly self-explanatory and comprehensively explanatory of everything else.

Lastly, as Buckley argues, the world of d'Holbach is not only governed by brute matter and brute force but is also closed. No event falls outside its universal, comprehensive system. In opposition, Lonergan offers a powerful argument showing that classical correlations (the scientific "laws" of force and otherwise) are just as compatible with a non-system as with a system and thus undercuts one of the major tenets of the materialistic worldview.

Hence, although many modern and contemporary thinkers came to share this view of science and the natural world, Lonergan does not. He points out that it is not science, but rather "extra-scientific opinions" that produce such a view:

> There are precise manners in which common sense can be expected to go wrong; there are definite issues on which science is prone to issue extra-scientific opinions; and the reorientation demanded and effected by the self-knowledge of the subject is a steadily exerted pressure against the common nonsense that tries to pass for common sense and against the uncritical philosophy that pretends to be a scientific conclusion. (424)

Implicitly Lonergan undertakes a reply to the worldview that stretches from d'Holbach through more contemporary thinkers such as Russell, Weber, and Dawkins. He does so by means of his "intentionality analysis" of modern scientific methods and their results. He undermines the extra-scientific assumption that the natural world is a cold, purposeless realm systematically dominated by brute matter and brute force. Against the pervasive extra-scientific opinions that the universe is merely a *material* system without ultimate meaning and purpose, Lonergan argues to the contrary that the natural universe (as known through the methodical research of modern science) is ultimately *intelligible* - ultimately meaningful. He uses his analysis of scientific

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16 Weber himself explicitly acknowledges that his own answers to these questions are extra-scientific, although this is seldom acknowledged by others.

17 In *Insight* Lonergan equates intelligibility and meaningfulness - e.g., "insight into
methods as the first step in his argument. His countercultural analysis of science is therefore a decisive first step in *Insight*.

When viewed in this light, Lonergan's analysis of science in *Insight* parallels Kant's endeavor to "make room" for faith and morals. There is an important difference, however. Kant assumed that the rise of Newtonian science implied a materialist, deterministic, and systematic universe. Kant recognized very clearly that such a universe undermined the reasonableness of morals and faith and human dignity. Thus his critique of pure reason was intended to isolate the results of modern science in the merely phenomenal realm, so that they would not imperil the noumenal realm of morals, dignity, and faith. While Kant's achievements were impressive in many ways, it must be acknowledged that this aspect of his project failed miserably. Subsequent generations accepted Kant's account of science and the phenomenal realm as the account of the whole of knowledge and the whole of reality, leaving behind his more problematic discussions of the noumenal realm and its implications for faith and morals. Weber represents just one of the progeny of Kant's failed attempt.

Lonergan on the other hand rejected Kant's assumptions about the universe because even more fundamentally he first rejected Kant's analysis of science and human reason. Therefore, let us now turn to Lonergan's analysis of the methods of modern science and to the implications that he drew regarding the meaningfulness of the natural universe.

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insight includes the apprehension of the meaning of meaning" (5) and the anticipation of unconditioned intelligibility by the notion of being is "the core of meaning" (381). After *Insight*, of course, Lonergan recognized the need to expand his analysis of meaning. While not renouncing the centrality of intelligibility to meaningfulness, he expanded the horizon in a way that includes but goes beyond the construal of meaning strictly in terms of intelligibility. Clearly much more needs to be said on this topic.


Lonergan’s method of intentionality analysis and self-appropriation reveals something more primordial than the extra-scientific opinions about natural science. Lonergan achieved a remarkable, critical retrieval of the intentional and conscious activities that are the dynamic, generative sources of all natural scientific knowledge. He was thereby able to show that the natural sciences themselves imply an open, dynamic, and intelligible universe. For Lonergan, the natural processes of the universe are both intelligible and random; there are both “natural laws” as well as emergent novelty and genuine human freedom. In what follows, I show how Lonergan draws attention to these more fundamental sources in modern science, and how he worked out their implications for an understanding of the natural universe that provides a proper home for authentic human endeavors.

Lonergan says that his analysis of scientific methods reveals that their ground is “the dynamic structure immanent and recurrently operative in human cognitional activity” (16). “Dynamic” here is clearly meant to be contrasted with “static,” and what Lonergan has in mind is the static, classicist notion of science as rooted in deductive logic.20 Ever since Aristotle’s seminal reflections on science in his Analytics, it has been almost universally assumed that deductive logic forms the basic core of all scientific knowledge and method. But the methods of logic are quite static. Logic has to operate with concepts and propositions (premises) as already fixed and given. While logic can draw new conclusions from these premises, the range of possible new conclusions is quite limited.21 Rigorous adherence to the operations of logic cannot yield new premises or concepts.

Lonergan departed from this widely shared assumption about science. Logic itself plays a part, but only a part, in the much larger enterprise of modern science. Scientific inquiry is both more fundamental and more profound than logic. While logical operations, along with the other operations of observation and of the formulation


of hypotheses, laws, and theories, all have important roles in modern scientific methods, much more fundamental than any of these is inquiry, questioning, wonder. The most basic thing that scientists do is to inquire. According to Lonergan, “There is, then, common to all [people], the very spirit of inquiry that constitutes the scientific attitude” (197, emphasis added). Moreover, inquiry is not just one part or one operation among others within the methods of science. Inquiry itself constitutes and structures the relationships among all of the other operations of scientific practice. Inquiry not only leads scientists to make observations in order to answer questions; inquiry also turns new observations into sources of more questions and novel discoveries. Indeed, all of the procedures of scientific methods are underpinned by and in the service of the objectives determined by scientific inquiry. As Lonergan puts it:

Just as inquiry into the data of sense yields insights that are formulated in classical and statistical laws, so inversely, the laws provide premises and rules for the guidance of human activity upon sensible objects. Such activity, in its turn, brings about sensible change to bring to light fresh data, raise new questions, stimulate further insights, and so generate the revision or confirmation of existing laws and in due course the discovery of new laws. (97-98)

These further questions stimulate a self-correcting, cyclical process that heads toward verified scientific knowledge in the fullest sense.

In light of this more fundamental characterization of scientific method in terms of the dynamism of inquiry, logic is seen as no longer basic. Logic is recognized instead as an aide to the grander project of science. Logic serves to compare and contrast with one another the formulations of insights — whether these be formulations of observations or formulations of potentially explanatory hypotheses. Once logic detects incoherencies among formulations, it hands the direction of the scientific enterprise back to the further questions it provokes, as self-correcting inquiry heads toward revision, rejection, or eventual confirmation of insights into the data of sense.

By focusing our attention on the fundamental role played by inquiry, Lonergan also reveals that the intentionality of scientific
inquiry is toward intelligibility. That is to say, the tension of inquiry into the data of sense is always a purely intellectual tension that finds its proper release and fulfillment in this or that insight. Insights in turn are always cognitional acts that grasp intelligibility: “By intelligibility is meant the content of a direct insight” (44). Hence, scientific inquiry always seeks insights into the possible intelligibilities that pertain to scientific data.

Yet scientific inquiry does not rest content with merely possible, hypothetical intelligibilities. Scientific inquiry also heads beyond the grasp of the merely hypothetical toward judgments about the actual intelligibilities that are true of the natural world. Spontaneously, therefore, scientists act as though the world is intelligible and that they are reasonable in their efforts to discover and verify such intelligibility. As Albert Einstein once said, “The most incomprehensible thing about the universe is that it is comprehensible.” Lonergan’s analysis of the inquisitive dynamism of science reveals that this commitment to the intelligibility of the natural world is deeply embedded in the very methods of science.

IV. SCIENTIFIC EXPLANATION VERSUS COMMONSENSE DESCRIPTION

As Lonergan argues later in Insight, the commitment to the intrinsic intelligibility of the world is not unique to modern scientific methods. This tacit commitment to intelligibility is to be found in all modes of human knowing – practical and interpersonal (“dramatic”) modes of commonsense knowing, as well as in the realms of scholarly, historical, artistic, philosophical, religious, and theological knowing. The self-correcting process of inquiry, insight, and judgment runs throughout all of these domains. The spirit of inquiry – the pure, unrestricted desire to know – is the “supreme heuristic notion” (380) that underpins all forms of human knowing. This means therefore that even though dynamic inquiry in search of intelligibility is foundational to modern science, this alone does not make science be science. Rather, according

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22 An exact citation is difficult to find but see “The eternal mystery of the world is its comprehensibility...The fact that it is comprehensible is a miracle.” Albert Einstein, “Physics and Reality,” in Ideas and Opinions (New York: Dell Publishing, 1954), 285.
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What is distinctive about modern science are the kinds of intelligibility that it intends and seeks methodically.

In order to identify the kinds of intelligibility that distinguish scientific from other kinds of knowing, therefore, Lonergan invokes a distinction between what he calls explanation and description. Of course this pair of terms has been used in various ways by many different philosophers — Edmund Husserl for example — so it is important to understand accurately Lonergan's own unique way of drawing this distinction. As he puts it, "Description deals with things related to us. Explanation deals with things related to one another" (318). This simple formula certainly calls for fuller explication.

First, then, Lonergan expands his formula as follows:

Both ordinary description and empirical science reach their conclusions through the self-correcting process of learning. Still they reach very different conclusions because, though they use essentially the same process, they operate with different standards and criteria. What is a further, pertinent question for empirical science is not necessarily a further, pertinent question for ordinary description... Because he aims at ultimate explanation, the scientist has to keep asking 'Why?', until ultimate explanation is reached. Because the layman aims at knowing things as related to us, as entering into the domain of human concerns, his questioning ceases as soon as further inquiry would lead to no immediate, appreciable difference in the daily life of [humans]. (320)

Lonergan regards descriptions as among the tools, so to speak, employed by common sense in its pursuit of meeting ordinary human needs, interests, and concerns. Thus in his view, the range of relations that things can have to ordinary human interests is considerably narrower

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23 See, for example, Edmund Husserl, The Crisis of European Sciences and Transcendental Phenomenology, trans. David Carr (Evanston, IL: Northwestern University Press, 1970), §64.

24 Here Lonergan is deliberately transposing into a contemporary context Aristotle's famous distinction between what is "more intelligible than" [gnorimoteron] according to us, versus what is more intelligible by nature. See, for example, Posterior Analytics I.2 72a1-5; see also Physics I.1 184a17-25.
than the vast, all-encompassing range of relations that things have with all other things.\textsuperscript{25}

Second, the differences in further pertinent questions lead to significant qualitative differences in the kinds of intelligibilities that are sought after. Explanation leads into a "comprehensive, universal, invariant, non-imaginable domain," whereas description "remains within the familiar world of common sense" (202) and is concerned with the "particular, relative, imaginable domain" (319).

Third, even though descriptive inquiry is more limited than explanatory inquiry, Lonergan does not believe explanation is somehow more important than description. He is opposed to the reduction of the rich concreteness of human experience and the multifaceted wisdom of the many cultural varieties of common sense into the cold categories of mechanistic explanations. He insists rather that the "rational choice is not between science and common sense; it is a choice of both" (203). The explanatory and descriptive modes need and complement one another (202-203, 316-24). It was the mistake of Renaissance science, says Lonergan, to devalue the descriptive wisdom of tradition and common sense. That devaluation was the result of too heavy a reliance on the superficial distinction between primary and secondary qualities introduced by Galileo (319; see also 107-108).

Fourth, while Lonergan emphatically intends to preserve all the richness and nuances of human experience and ordinary commonsense descriptive knowing, he also observes that, "since we are things, the descriptive relations [of things to us] must be identical with some of the explanatory relations [of things to one another]" (419; see also 515-20, 529). What he means is that every descriptive understanding of how things are related to this or that human being will be transformed and enriched by being incorporated into a more comprehensive context. That is to say, common sense inevitably takes an individual or a particular group of human beings as the ultimate focal point of descriptive relationships. But this cannot be the whole story. Each person and human group is itself always and intrinsically related to all other people and indeed to all other non-human objects — and not only in the present state of the universe but throughout the whole of time. As Lonergan observes:

\textsuperscript{25} See *Insight*, 529.
There is, then, a subtle ambiguity in the apparently evident statement that common sense relates things to us. For who are we? Do we not change? Is not the acquisition of common sense itself a change in us? (204)

Who are we indeed? In large part, Lonergan’s answer is that we are actors and participants in the drama of history – the grand history of the human race, and the even grander cosmic drama of the unfolding of the whole universe within which human history is situated. Thus our advance in explanatory understanding eventually reveals to man a universe of being in which he is but an item, and a universal order, in which his desires and fears, his delight and anguish, are but infinitesimal components in the history of mankind. It invites man to become intelligent and reasonable not only in his knowing but also in his living, to guide his actions by referring them not as an animal to a habitat, but as an intelligent being to the intelligible context of some universal order that is or is to be.26 (498)

Descriptive knowing, then, is expanded and enriched by explanatory knowing – at least in Lonergan’s senses of those terms. Indeed, this enrichment of descriptive and commonsense knowing confronts us with a significant challenge to self-understanding and responsible action. This is no less true for scientists themselves than it is of ordinary people who operate in the realms of commonsense descriptive knowledge.

But what does Lonergan mean by “some universal order”? And, how does it relate to the question of the ultimate meaningfulness of “cosmogenesis, biological evolution, historical process,” and the struggle to guide our actions intelligently and to live a morally authentic life? Lonergan answers these further questions by identifying basic differentiations of explanatory knowing into the basic heuristic structures of scientific method.

26 With due apologies for the gender non-inclusiveness of this citation.
Lonergan identified still further differentiations within scientific explanatory knowing itself. While acknowledging the many varieties and great differences among all of the specialized methods employed in different branches of science, he identified three basic kinds of heuristic methods which become specialized in various ways. According to him, all natural sciences now employ classical and statistical heuristic methods. In addition, the biological sciences also employ a third kind of heuristic method—a genetic method, which seeks correct understanding of development (embryological development, for example).28

Lonergan dubbed the first kind of scientific method “classical heuristic method” (60-70). It is a structured seeking of insights into the intelligible correlations among events and things. In physics, these correlations are expressed in equations that relate variables to one another. In chemistry, the periodic table provides a point of departure for investigating molecular reactions and correlations. In biology, comparative methods seek to understand both correlations among parts of organisms and among parts of different organisms. In biochemistry, scientists seek to understand how disparate chemical reactions are related to one another in complex sequences to form the basic constituents of organic functioning.

These classical correlations play so fundamental a role in modern science that we emphasize their role by use of a metaphor—the “laws” of science. For example, in physics we speak of Newton’s “law” of gravitation and the “laws” of conservation of energy and momentum. In
chemistry, there are similar correlations, such as the “law” of balancing oxidation and reduction states in chemical reactions, and in biology, Darwin regarded as his supreme achievement that his “law” of natural selection explained the “two great laws – Unity of Type, and Conditions of Existence.”

This phrase “laws of science” signals the prominence of this type of investigation in modern science (although it also carries certain misleading implications that have been drawn from this juridical metaphor). Hence classical heuristic methods seek to discover to what extent the natural universe is constituted by the intelligibility of classical correlations (or “laws”).

During the nineteenth century scientists began to develop the second kind of scientific method, statistical method, to investigate the intrinsically non-systematic and random dimensions of nature (70-89). Statistical methods seek to understand populations of events and things. Statistical methods are heuristic because they, too, anticipate and methodically pursue a kind of intelligibility that is characteristic of populations. The operations of counting lie at the heart of statistical method – counting events and things in populations in order to determine their actual relative frequencies of occurrence.

However, statistical methods do not rest content with determining mere actual frequencies. Actual frequencies are transient and ephemeral, because actual populations are subject to non-systematic and random fluctuations in their memberships. Hence, statistical methods seek to go beyond the mere determination of actual frequencies. They use various theoretical and practical techniques (e.g., theories and practices of “sampling”) in order to arrive at hypotheses about a type of intelligibility quite distinct from classical correlations. This distinct type of intelligibility is that of ideal relative frequencies (called probabilities). The actual relative frequencies of events will fluctuate non-systematically and randomly around the ideal relative frequencies (probabilities). Populations can thereby be characterized by their “schedules of probabilities” as Lonergan puts it – that is, the

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30 Mathematical treatments of probability and statistics certainly predate the nineteenth century. However, it was not until the nineteenth century that applications of statistical methods to natural phenomena reached a high level of sophistication.
lists of probabilities in association with different categories of events that occur in various populations. These probabilities form the norms, from which the actual frequencies in populations fluctuate only non-systematically. In spite of these transient fluctuations, populations retain the unchanging norms of intelligibility in the form of their lists of probabilities.

The third type of heuristic scientific method is what Lonergan referred to as genetic method (476-507). Genetic method seeks insights into and judgments that verify hypotheses about yet a third, distinctive type of intelligibility. This third type is the unified intelligibility characteristic of development in the proper sense. Like statistical method, genetic method also began to emerge in the nineteenth century. Historian of biology William Coleman argues that biology established itself as a distinct modern science only in the nineteenth century. He emphasizes the important role that investigations of developmental and embryological phenomena in plants and animals played in this rise of modern biology. As Coleman puts it, the phenomena of embryological development could not be adequately comprehended by means of mechanistic explanations alone. Thus, it was necessary to forge a distinct type of method (genetic method) with its own heuristic anticipation of a distinct type of intelligibility (development). While genetic method was initially applied almost exclusively to embryological development, its applications were eventually extended to other fields, most notably in the twentieth century to developmental psychology in the pioneering work of Jean Piaget.

Coleman and Lonergan both observe that genetic method had an especially difficult time breaking loose of certain kinds of descriptive modes of thinking. Gradually, however, the descriptive, anthropomorphic projections of vitalism were abandoned in favor of more explanatory modes. Lonergan articulates this explanatory mode in a highly technical definition of the heuristic notion of development. In understanding the development of anything, Lonergan argues, the scientist seeks to understand the intelligibility of its "flexible, linked sequence of dynamic and increasingly differentiated higher integrations that meet the tension of successively transformed

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underlying manifolds through successive applications of the principles of correspondence and emergence” (479).

Although this technical definition is complex, its centerpiece is the term “sequence.” In the explanatory sense, a development is not just a single event but rather an intelligibly integrated sequence of events. More precisely, it is an intelligibly integrated sequence of stages of events. Stages differ from one another by the differences in the patterns among the many events occurring within each stage. Hence, the stages are not just static; they are “higher integrations” of recurring processes of events. Moreover, those stages (higher integrations) are self-modifying. As they function, they also modify their own cellular and biochemical constituents. Eventually this self-modification reaches an extreme where the higher integration can no longer function as it has been and that particular stage must come to an end. What is truly distinctive and remarkable about a developmental sequence, however, is that this self-modification of one stage sets the conditions both for its own demise, and simultaneously for the emergence of its replacement by a more differentiated successor stage. Genetic method anticipates insights and judgments about not of just this or that stage, but rather of the entire sequence of interrelated stages. Genetic method therefore seeks the explanatory intelligibility of an interconnected sequence of successor and predecessor stages.

In summary, then, Lonergan identified three broad but distinct types of heuristic methods in modern empirical sciences – the classical, statistical, and genetic methods. In turn, these three methods correspond to three distinct types of intelligibilities that the sciences anticipate to be constitutive of the natural universe – correlations, probabilities, and developments, respectively.

VI. SCIENTIFIC METHODS COMBINED AND THEIR WORLDVIEW

After offering his analyses of these very broad methodologies, Lonergan next considered how they connect with and complement one another. First, he observed the “creative and constructive” role played by a subtle but important set of additional insights. These insights find ingenious ways to combine classical correlations and laws by selecting
from among them, particularizing their parameters, and matching them with sets of initial conditions. These creative combinations of classical correlations yield new kinds of intelligibilities – which Lonergan called “systematic processes” and “schemes of recurrence” (70-71, 141-45). Such intelligible combinations may yield no more than merely speculative possibilities, or they may reveal intelligibilities that truly explain complex natural processes. As it happens, of course, some systematic and recurrent processes do abound throughout our planet and the entire universe.

Nevertheless, these systematic processes and schemes of recurrence share the inherent indeterminacy of the classical laws that they bring together. As Lonergan observes, “each scheme presupposes materials in a suitable constellation that the scheme did not bring about, and each survives only as long as extraneous factors do not intervene” (110). This is one of the most important and original findings in Lonergan’s analysis of the methods of modern science. While d’Holbach and his followers subscribe to the opinion that the laws of science completely determine the course of events in a systematic fashion, Lonergan realized that classical correlations are in fact inherently under-determined (113). The very same sets of correlations can manifest themselves in very different and indeed incompatible ways under different conditions. Applying Newton’s laws to just two celestial bodies, for example, can yield orbital paths that are hyperbolic, parabolic, elliptical, or circular, depending upon their relative energies, momenta, and positions. Likewise, the laws of relationships among chemical elements lead to very different kinds of chemical reactions, depending upon the different conditions of temperature, concentration, pH level, and so on. This under-determination of classical laws themselves is likewise passed along to their constructive combinations into systematic processes and schemes of recurrence, for both the laws and their combinations depend upon conditions that are completely extraneous.

This under-determination of the schemes makes possible a still more complex combination of classical correlations. Since schemes of recurrence depend upon extraneous conditions, it is possible that certain kinds of earlier schemes can be the conditions for other kinds of later schemes. For example, the radiation schemes of our sun supply conditions for the schemes of plant cell life on the earth. This
conditioning process can be repeated indefinitely to form a “conditioned series of schemes of recurrence.” Once the most elementary systems and schemes emerge, they themselves can form the conditions for other, more complex, schemes of recurrence. These in turn can become the conditions for still later schemes. Just as solar schemes condition plant-life schemes, so also plant schemes condition the schemes of herbivorous animal life. Herbivorous animal lives are conditioned by supplies of oxygen, and they produce carbon dioxide. But the very same conditioned plant-life schemes also condition schemes transforming carbon dioxide back into oxygen. The numerous examples of these mutually conditioning schemes of recurrence constitute the complex intelligibilities characteristic of most of the natural world.

Lonergan went on to point out a most important way in which these complex combinations of classical correlations can be further combined with statistical intelligibilities. “In other words, classical laws tell what would happen if conditions were fulfilled; statistical laws tell how often conditions are fulfilled” (131; 109-21). Statistical methods reveal the inherently non-systematic manner in which such conditions are fulfilled. But they also reveal the ideal frequencies or probabilities that intelligibly govern the conditions for the emergence and extinction of schemes of recurrence. Lonergan focused attention on these probabilistic, inherently uncontrollable, non-systematic dimensions of science and the natural universe. But unlike the extra-scientific opinions that regard these dimensions devoid of meaningfulness, Lonergan showed that combined scientific researches reveal these dimensions to be intelligible through and through. It is the expectation of simplistic, material, and systematic explanations that has led to the premature extra-scientific opinions about meaninglessness and inhospitality toward the noblest human aspirations.

Lonergan went on to argue that “the combination of the conditioned series of schemes with their respective probabilities of emergence and survival” yields the worldview that he called “emergent probability” (145). As he puts it, “Emergent probability is the successive realization in accord with successive schedules of probability of a conditioned series of schemes of recurrence” (148-49). This worldview is called “emergent” because schemes or systems of increasing complexity emerge, begin to function, and survive as long as their requisite conditions are in place.
Emergence is characterized by probability, because the conditions for the schemes come together non-systematically and relatively randomly, but nevertheless do so in compliance with ideal frequencies. In addition, the worldview is called “emergent probability” because the emergence of lower and simpler schemes actually increases the probabilities for the emergence of subsequent, more complex schemes. Finally, once conditioned series of schemes emerge, their continued survival is still conditioned by extraneous conditions that are fulfilled not necessarily but only in conformity with probabilities of survival.

Later on, Lonergan observed that this notion of emergent probability is transformed into a “generalized emergent probability” once genetic heuristic method is added to classical and statistical methods (487, emphasis added). That is to say, just as primitive schemes of recurrence form conditions for the emergence of more sophisticated schemes of recurrence, so also primitive developments form the conditions for the emergence, survival, and maturation of more sophisticated developments. For example, developing insects provide nourishment for developing birds, and again, primitive species of developing insects evolve into more sophisticated species. More generally, the natural history of biological evolution is overwhelmingly a matter of earlier developing organisms setting the conditions for the emergence and survival of later developing organisms.

Yet as is the case with emergent probability, so also the distribution of developing organisms that condition other developing organisms is only statistical. Hence, the emergence and survival of developing beings – of generalized emergent probability – remains ultimately a matter of actual frequencies of conditions for developments that fluctuate around ideal frequencies (probabilities).

From his analyses of the methods of the modern empirical sciences and from their implications, Lonergan concluded that the scientific universe would be a “world process in which the order or design is constituted by emergent probability” (125; see also 139). That is to say, the universe intended by the possible ways of combining the results of the three general, heuristic methods of the modern empirical sciences is a universe with a very intricate but nonetheless very intelligible order immanent in its processes. The universe has “an upwardly but

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32 The argument for this claim is beyond the limits this article. See Insight, 143-51.
*indeterminately* directed dynamism" (659, emphasis added; also 497). It is “an incomplete universe heading toward fuller being,” but in an indeterminate fashion (471). Nevertheless, even though the direction of the universe is indeterminate, the manner in which that direction unfolds is truly intelligible. The intelligible order of generalized emergent probability does not imply a determinate plan; there is no predetermined future somehow pulling the universe into increased complexity. Nevertheless, intelligibility does permeate the order of the evolving universe. As Lonergan explains,

The increasingly systematic character of world process can be assured. No matter how slight the probability of the realization of the most developed and most conditioned schemes, the emergence of those schemes can be assured...For actual frequencies do not diverge systematically from probabilities. (149)

The precise places and times of the emergent schemes are of course radically under-determined. Nevertheless, even under-determined contingent emergences occur with an intelligible inevitably in accord with the intelligibility of generalized emergent probability.

As people living with the inheritance of modern science, we are challenged to take seriously what modern science has to say about our natural world. Generalized emergent probability is what Lonergan meant by “the intelligible context of some universal order” (498). Generalized emergent probability is Lonergan’s version of cosmogenesis. Generalized emergent probability is the intelligibility of the natural world within which we human beings are invited to become intelligent and reasonable not only in our knowing but also in our living (498). As Lonergan argues, to take modern science and its account of the evolving universe with complete seriousness means that we must take our actions to be not merely those of animals in habitats but rather as those of intelligent beings participating in the intelligible context of this intelligible universe.

Thus human moral endeavor is not alien to a universe so conceived. Everything originated by human intelligence, valuation, and free, responsible choice is itself a conditioned emergence and development. Our insights emerge only when the sensible or imaginative conditions are assembled. Such conditions are assembled only when our
neurophysiologies are sufficiently developed and have the proper nourishment, rest, and stimuli. In other words, the emergence of our insights is part and parcel of the intelligible pattern of generalized emergent probability. So too are our ethical activities. While our free and responsible choices are radically up to us, nevertheless we can only actualize our choices to make our insights effective when the prior conditions and developments have set the proper conditions for the emergence of our actions. Again, when we do act with attentiveness, intelligence, reasonableness, responsibility, and love, we set conditions for further emergences and developments. Human endeavors to make valuable intelligibilities real, therefore, are not alien from cosmogenesis or biological evolution, rightly understood. Rather, human ethical endeavor is a natural continuation and even an acceleration of generalized emergent probability.\textsuperscript{33}

By his analyses of the methods of science, therefore, Lonergan goes a long way toward answering his own questions. The natural world as intended by modern natural scientific methods is not the cold, heatless disenchanted world envisioned by d'Holbach, Weber, Dawkins, and many others. \textit{That} disenchanted world is not the product of modern scientific investigations themselves. Rather, the disenchanted universe is no more than the figment of a very long, complex, and dark growth of extra-scientific opinion. Again, the systematically deterministic world assumed by Kant is likewise a matter of extra-scientific opinion; it is not an inevitable outcome of science, Newtonian or otherwise.

Lonergan acknowledges that the methods of modern science do imply an evolutionary universe in which randomness is indeed an essential feature. And yet he argues that randomness does not completely characterize the natural universe. Beyond its randomness, the universe of the natural sciences is also an intelligibly evolving universe in which random combinations set the conditions for the rise of novel, emergent intelligibilities. This is not a naturalistic universe

\textsuperscript{33}The limits of this paper make it impossible to pay proper attention to the obvious objection that human actions so often pervert rather than further the intelligible process of generalized emergent probability. Witness the great variety of ways in which we destroy the natural environment. In order to address this issue adequately, it would be necessary to introduce the various dynamics of what Lonergan calls the biases, and to show also how insidious they can be in leading us to believe that we are promoting generalized emergent probability when in fact we are really subverting it.
of mere brute matter and brute forces. The universe as intended by modern scientific methods is indeed a natural universe, but one which is radically open because it is radically contingent. It is a universe whose natural yet contingent intelligibility calls out for further, extra-scientific philosophical inquiry (versus by extra-scientific opinions) about its ultimate source and meaning. Hence there is no need carve out an unknowable noumenal realm as Kant attempted, in order to provide a home for human freedom. The "upwardly but indeterminately" directed intelligible universe intended by natural scientific methods already is that home.

VII. BEING IS COMPLETELY INTELLIGIBLE

But is the intelligibility of the natural universe ultimately meaningful? After all, precisely this further question in precisely this form must be faced in order to bring some sort of closure to Lonergan's original concern as to whether the world of cosmogenesis and biological evolution is alien or friendly to us. Lonergan does indeed take up these further questions later in *Insight*, and the key to this further step is his claim that not just the natural universe but being itself is completely intelligible.

Lonergan offers "proof" for the complete and intrinsic intelligibility of being, but it is severely compressed. He argues:

Now if by being one means the objective of the pure desire to know, the goal of intelligent inquiry and critical reflection, the object of intelligent grasp and reasonable affirmation, then one must affirm the intrinsic intelligibility of being. For one defines being by its intelligibility; one claims that being is precisely what is known by understanding correctly; one denies that being is anything apart from the intelligible or beyond it or different from it, for one's definition implies that being is known completely when there are no further questions to be answered. (523)

Now being is completely intelligible. For being is the objective of the detached, disinterested, unrestricted desire to know; this desire consists in intelligent inquiry and critical reflection; it
results in partial knowledge inasmuch as intelligent inquiry yields understanding and critical reflection grasps understanding to be correct; but it reaches its objective, which is being, only when every intelligent question has been given an intelligent answer and that answer has been found to be correct. Being, then, is intelligible, for it is what is to be known by correct understanding; and it is completely intelligible, for being is known completely only when all intelligent questions are answered correctly. (695)

In all likelihood this compressed argument was perfectly clear to Lonergan himself. But, most of us mortals do not recognize these compact versions as arguments as such, and we would like to have the premises spelled out in some greater detail. While Lonergan does address in some detail the common assumption that intelligibility must be extrinsic to reality, he does little to help the reader sort through the positive argument that intelligibility is intrinsic to being. Here I attempt to at least some elaboration of that argument.

First, then, Lonergan defines being as “the objective of the pure desire to know ... the dynamic orientation manifested in questions for intelligence and for reflection” (372). In one sense, one can define a word in any way one pleases, but in another sense one cannot. For words come with traditions of meanings and associations. In principle at least, philosophical analyses and redefinitions should be for the sake of clarifying and refining certain of those meanings and perhaps exposing other associated meanings as confusing, distorted, or erroneous. In my view this is exactly what Lonergan does with his “second order” definition of being, and he provides some justification for doing so in his extended section, “Theories of the Notion of Being” in chapter 12 of *Insight*. Still we may ask why should this unrestricted desire manifested in questions for intelligence and reflection be called a notion of being? It is because our questions for reflection ask “Is it?” They ask after the being of the ideas that come to us as mere insights. Indeed, the interrogative state of reflective inquiry is more primordial than the linguistic terms themselves (i.e., “is” or “being” in English). Those inquiries provide our primitive and prelinguistic consciousness of being. When we judge affirmatively that something “is,” our judgment takes its cue and normativity from the prior sense of reflective inquiry to which an affirmative judgment of correctness responds authentically. Hence, the objective intended by a
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desire that intends what is to be known in answering all such reflective inquiries by means of virtually unconditioned affirmations of fact is properly called a notion of being after all.

Yet each and every “Is it so?” question intending being presupposes some “it” about which its “isness” is being asked. Lonergan’s invitation to undertake careful and discerning self-appropriation will lead to the realization that in every case the presupposed “it” is always the content of some insight. So whenever one can say correctly, on a virtually unconditioned basis, that some “it” indeed “is,” the “it” that “is” is the content of an insight. But this means that the “it” is intelligible: “By intelligibility is meant what is to be known by understanding [insight]” (523). So in each and every instance, when we affirm on virtually unconditioned grounds the correctness of our understanding, we are affirming the “is” of some intelligibility.

Still, any particular judgment only knows a being, not the whole of being. As Lonergan remarks elsewhere,

Judging is a complete increment in knowing; if correct, it is a knowing of being; but it is not yet knowing being, for that is attained only in the totality of correct judgments. (378)

But each judgment of fact affirms that some intelligibility is. Hence, in each and all of the totality of judgments there is unrelenting affirmation of intelligibility. All that is, is intelligible. Being is intrinsically intelligible because our self-appropriation reveals that each and every instance of what “is,” is an intelligibility.

Moreover, being is not only intrinsically intelligible. It is also completely intelligible. Might there be something that is not intelligible? Not according to self-appropriation. For it reveals that every virtually unconditioned affirmation of what is, is an affirmation of an intelligibility. If being is to be known through the totality of such affirmations, then no instance of an affirmed “is” will be lacking its intelligible component. Being, therefore, is both intrinsically and completely intelligible.

This expanded argument may still seem puzzling at first blush. Some of that puzzlement is due simply to the inherent difficulties of the ideas under discussion and the length of time required to think
them through sufficiently. But some of the puzzlement comes from a different source. That different source is the other sense of reality that we carry with us as part of our evolutionary heritage as animals. According to Lonergan, the specific evolutionary advantage that sensation bestows upon animals is extroversion. In animals, there is a biological patterning of

consciousness [which] is a higher technique for attaining biological ends... Moreover, the means lie in external situations, and so the anticipation is extroverted. The kitten’s consciousness is directed outwards towards possible opportunities to satisfy appetites. (276)

Furthermore, these biological appetites, needs, and interests determine what is “real” for purposes of biological survival: “the extroversion is concerned with the ‘real’: a realistic painting of a saucer of milk might attract a kitten’s attention, make it investigate, sniff, perhaps try to lap ...[but] painted milk is not real” (276). That is to say, painted milk does not have the reality that satisfies biological needs.

However, this sense of reality that serves evolved animals so well proves a trap when it makes us skeptical about the reality of intelligibility. It is for this reason that intelligibility can seem to be merely the content of one’s thoughts, not the content of reality. Even when we affirm intelligibilities to be, such affirmations lack the comforting assurance that accompanies successful gratifications of biological needs. This is why an intellectual conversion is needed to respond to the sense that the universe is only extrinsically, not intrinsically, intelligible. We need to let go of the reassurance of biological reality in order to make our own the intelligible reality of being. No doubt d’Holbach, Russell, Monod, Weber, and Dawkins would concede that the ideas scientists have in their minds about the universe are intelligible. But their uncritical adherence to the reality of brute matter and brute force excludes intelligibility as an essential constituent of the real universe. Intellectual conversion means taking with absolute seriousness the unrestricted trajectory of our inquiry, and the implications to which it leads us, sometimes only by overcoming our great resistances. The most profound of those implications is that being is intrinsically and completely intelligible.
Intelligibility and Natural Science

Authentic appropriation of the methods of the natural sciences set the stage for the "startling strangeness" of this conclusion.

VIII. THE PRIMARY INSTANCE OF MORAL CONSCIOUSNESS?

Once he establishes his conclusion that being is completely intelligible, Lonergan is able to argue that the universe is not inhospitable, but instead "cognate to us as moral beings." In order to do so, he shows that the complete intelligibility of being implies the reality of being beyond that of the universe of generalized emergent probability. Toward that end he develops his analogical conception of God as the "unrestricted act of understanding." He writes,

Our subject has been the act of insight or understanding, and God is the unrestricted act of understanding, the eternal rapture glimpsed in every Archimedean cry of "Eureka!" (706)

He explores the implications of this analogical conception of God in great detail. Toward the end of that exploration, he proposes that virtually all that can be affirmed about this unrestricted understanding are also the sorts of things that traditional theists would affirm about God (although with subtle refinements). Most importantly, Lonergan argues, the passionate, unrestricted act of understanding would understand the ultimate intelligibility – the ultimate reason why the order of the universe is being realized (679-80, 686-88). That is to say, God would understand the transcendent value and purpose that make it worthwhile to realize the actual universe of generalized emergent probability. Because of God's unrestricted understanding of the value of our universe, therefore, our efforts to live by responsibly engaging in actions of virtually unconditional value, are consonant with the ultimate intelligibility and meaningfulness of the universe

IX. CONCLUDING COMMENT

Lonergan would at least agree with Weber to this extent: the methods of the natural science themselves would have to leave the question of the ultimate meaningfulness of the universe undecided. While they do
reveal a universe shot through with ineligibility and meaningfulness, the question of ultimate meaningfulness must defer to another, non-scientific method of inquiry. But Lonergan’s more fundamental method of self-appropriation provides a way of answering this extra-scientific question with philosophically and theologically grounded wisdom, not merely with extra-scientific opinion. In the light of his methodical approaches to questions of being and God, Lonergan can argue convincingly that what would be properly regarded as undecided by the methods of natural sciences, can be comprehended as special, important, indeed transcendentally valuable and worth realizing by the unrestricted act of understanding. As Lonergan puts it, God’s unrestricted understanding “is the ground of value, and it is the ultimate cause of causes for it overcomes contingency at its deepest level” (679-80).

Insofar as these further claims hold true, then we can say with great joy: Yes, those who endeavor to live in accord with authentic moral values are neither gamblers nor fools. They are indeed genuine participants and contributors to an order consonant with cosmogenesis, biological evolution, historical process – in other words, with the generalized emergent probability that is ultimately intelligible, meaningful, valued, and authored by God.

Of course the details of these further stages of the argument in *Insight* are beyond the scope of this article, but this will have to suffice for the present occasion. What I have tried to show in this article is merely how Lonergan’s radical reinterpretation of the methods of science and the meaningfulness of the natural universe known by their means rebut the pervasive and corrosive extra-scientific climate of opinion that the universe is itself meaningless and that human ethical endeavor is a quaint but ultimately futile exercise.

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RETRIEVING GOOD WORK:
DE SMET ON SANKARA

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1. INTRODUCTION

My paper of last year at the Lonergan Workshop, “From Person to Subject: Lonergan’s Methodical Transposition as Upper Blade for Reading Sankara,” was situated in the context of an effort to edit the work of Richard De Smet on the topic of the person in Indian thought. My procedure was to first examine Lonergan’s transposition of the metaphysical term, person, into the experiential term, subject, and then to use this transposition as an upper blade in examining De Smet’s work. My current context, instead, is the related one of collating and editing De Smet’s studies on the great Vedantin Sankaracarya. The question this time is: How does one go about retrieving good work? How could De Smet’s work on Sankara be retrieved in a methodical key?

One answer would be: By means of the functional specialty, dialectic, given that De Smet’s is one of the many interpretations of Sankara, and that dialectic is the place where different contributions begin to be pulled together. Supposing Philip McShane is right, however, that dialectic can be done only on the basis of properly explanatory interpretations, we have a first suggestion about retrieval of good work: it involves prior transposition of commonsense scholarship into an explanatory key.

But how exactly is such transposition to be carried out? I find it helpful here to turn to the canons of interpretation of chapter 17 of

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Insight. The canon of relevance "demands that the interpreter begin from the universal viewpoint and that his interpretation convey some differentiation of the protean notion of being." The canon of explanation adds that the interpreter's differentiation of the protean notion of being "must be not descriptive but explanatory. It will aim at relating, not to us, but to one another, the contents and contexts of the totality of documents and interpretations."

At first sight the canon of explanation seems redundant: does not starting from the universal viewpoint already guarantee explanatory interpretation? The answer is no, for it is one thing to read a text with the upper blade of the universal viewpoint (which is really a set of general categories), and another to relate such an effort with other efforts; and it is only with the latter that interpretation becomes properly explanatory. Concretely: it is one thing to read Sankara with the universal viewpoint as upper blade; it is another, distinct, procedure to relate Sankara to earlier, contemporary, and later writers, and to discover the genetic and dialectical relations between them.

Let me draw one more point from Insight that might be of relevance in determining the meaning of "retrieval of good work." The canon of successive approximations envisages a division of labor that is made possible by principles of criticism that will select what is satisfactory and reject what is unsatisfactory in any single contribution. The first principle of criticism seems to be related to the canon of relevance: it applies this canon to contributions that fail to present results in terms of the universal viewpoint and notes that a critic can proceed from the universal viewpoint to determine the contributor's particular viewpoint, identify valid elements, and point out to others working in the contributor's special field the points needing revision.

Summarizing, we could say: retrieval of good work involves:

1. reading the author from the universal viewpoint; 
2. relating his insights and context to earlier, contemporary, and later insights and contexts; 
3. determining the particular viewpoint of the author; 
4. identifying valid elements in his work; 
5. indicating to the experts the points needing revision.

4 Insight, 609.
5 Insight, 611.
How does all this transpose to the general method of 1972? I suggest that (3) belongs to dialectic, since it involves determining the viewpoint of the author; that (2) finds its place in history, since it moves out of a hermeneutical context into a historical one; and that (1) is the work of interpretation. This last is justified by the enigmatic ending of Method’s chapter on Interpretation, which calls for a shift from description to explanation with the help of transcendental method, as well as by the ending of the chapter on Foundations, which speaks of a circular procedure in which the categories forming the upper blade of method are increasingly determined in ongoing interaction with the data on which they operate.⁶

The interesting point here is the mention of transcendental method, which takes over many of the functions of the universal viewpoint. This is my reason for proposing that the hermeneutical canon of relevance be seen as integrated into the functional specialty, interpretation. This should not be taken as a reversal of the gains of Method. I am not proposing, for example, that method involves operating from the universal viewpoint; only, that such operation, while not an essential requirement, cannot, on the other hand, be excluded. For it is possible that there are investigators who have attained the universal viewpoint, and these will certainly be using that viewpoint as an upper blade in their exegetical efforts. Or, again, it is possible that repeated use of the method leads a certain number of interpreters to the attainment of the universal viewpoint; and in that case also their subsequent efforts will involve using the universal viewpoint as an upper blade. In other words, there is the possibility — and successful implementation of the method demands — that a certain number of investigators will be operating on the basis of an explicit appropriation of transcendental or general method.

So: retrieval of good work would involve several components. On the level of interpretation, it is the effort to read such work with the universal viewpoint/transcendental method as upper blade. On the level of history, it is the effort to relate insights and viewpoints, contents and contexts, among themselves. On the level of dialectic, it is a question of objectifying subjectivity to reveal viewpoints, extending and accepting

⁶ See Bernard Lonergan, Method in Theology (Toronto: University of Toronto Press, 1990), 172-73, and 293.
invitations to conversion on intellectual, moral, and religious levels. It would seem, therefore, that only on the basis of the further determination of meaning that accrues from the effort of relating authors and texts to antecedent, contemporary and subsequent authors and texts, that we have the properly explanatory interpretations and histories that are demanded by dialectic. McShane's insistence that dialectic cannot be done on the basis of merely descriptive interpretations makes more and more sense to me – especially, I may add, if we are still working alone, in the phase of the “objective dialectic” that is not yet dialogue.

In what follows, then, I will first read De Smet on Sankara with the most basic categories drawn from interiority – knowing, being, and objectivity – and then make a small attempt to relate Sankara to earlier, contemporary, and later writers.

2. DE SMET ON SANKARA: INTERPRETATION

2.1 Stage of Meaning

One of De Smet's great contributions to Sankara research was to show that Sankara was not so much a purely rational philosopher as Radhakrishnan and others made him out to be, but a *srutivadin* – a theologian or an exegete of the *Sruti*, the Hindu sacred scriptures. He also made it clear that, while Sankara was the first great systematic Advaitin, and while his metaphysical insight has never been equaled

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7 See Richard De Smet, "The Theological Method of Sankara," doctoral thesis directed by R. Arnou, SJ (Rome: Pontifical Gregorian University, 1953). In several early articles, De Smet carefully marks out the similarities and differences between Sankara's theology and Christian theology. The starting point of both is supra-rational and infallible testimony; both aim at perfect wisdom, which is not attained short of perfect knowledge of the Absolute or blissful intuition of the divine essence; both are the work of reason, though not of unaided reason; both acknowledge that theology, while it can produce the most proximate disposition, is powerless to produce that intuition. However, they disagree about the proper domain of unaided reason. Christian theology holds that unaided human reason can develop a valid metaphysics, including a theodicy. This knowledge can then be perfected by divine revelation and culminate in direct experience. Thus natural reason and supernatural revelation are complementary. In Vedanta, there is no such complementarity. *Sruti* cannot be said to complement natural reason; it simply supersedes it. See, for example, his "Theological Method and Vedanta," *Oriental Thought* (Nashik) 4, no. 12 (1960): 20-35.
in other Indian systems, still Sankara did not set about creating a system of metaphysics, his sole aim being to lead the aspirant to moksha, the realization of Brahman. As a srutivadin, Sankara believed that his only task was to put forth the first class truth that the supreme Brahman is the innermost Atman of all, leaving to others to establish the second class truths regarding the human being and the world. It would be a mistake, therefore, to seek in his writings an unlimited philosophy complete with ontology, cosmology, epistemology, psychology, and ethics. He concentrates on the transcendent Reality and the transcendental relations of it to the universe of things and selves. It would seem, therefore, that Sankara's mode of thought is "mixed," the dialectical result of the two pure modes of thought, the symbolic and the theoretic.

Our focus, however, is not on Sankara but on De Smet as interpreter of Sankara, and so we have to ask about De Smet's mode of thought. Given that he taught general metaphysics, logic, as well as philosophy of God for many years, I propose that De Smet was operating from the systematic mode, but that his categories were metaphysical rather than properly methodical, despite the fact that his starting point, as a follower of Maréchal, was the sensitivo-rational judgment.

2.2 Upper Blade: Methodical Categories

Let me try to tease out De Smet's understanding of knowing, being, and objectivity without pretending to be exhaustive, working mostly on the basis of his interpretation of Sankara, but not excluding

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his other work, such as his notes on metaphysics\textsuperscript{12} and his "Guidelines in Indian Philosophy."\textsuperscript{13}

\textbf{2.2.1 Knowing}

The starting point of metaphysics, for De Smet, is the sensitivo-rational judgment.

\textit{The starting point of metaphysics is our sensitivo-rational experience, especially as it manifests itself in the direct judgment.}

\textit{An experience:} is "an immediate and direct perception of reality."

The experience is sensitive when the perception is had through organic faculties or powers, such as our eyes, ears, et cetera.

The experience is rational, not in the sense here that it is already putting several propositions together, but in the general sense that it is done by our intellect which, not being intuitive, knows and achieves its first basic act of knowledge by a judgment.

\textit{Judgment:} is "an act of the intellect in which we say something of an object, by way of affirmation or denial."

\textit{A direct judgment:} is "an act of the intellect in which we say something of an object presented to our senses." More elaborately the direct judgment can be described as: "an act of the intellect by which it reacts on some sensible representations

\textsuperscript{12} I have been unable to find a copy of De Smet's "Metaphysica Generalis" (Pune: Papal Athenaeum), but I have it on the authority of De Smet himself that the metaphysics notes of Fr. Jean de Marneffe, S.J., used in Jnana Deepa Vidyapeeth, Pune, in the 1970s and 1980s, were largely based on his [De Smet's] own Latin notes. This is also acknowledged by de Marneffe: "I gladly acknowledge that these pages use freely material previously contained in the Latin Course of General Metaphysics which Father R.V. De Smet S.J. had prepared earlier and which each of us have been using for several years while teaching Metaphysics at the Pontifical Athenaeum of Poona." See "Preface," "General Metaphysics: Study Guidelines Prepared by J. de Marneffe, S.J.," cyclostyled notes for students, unpublished (Pune: Pontifical Athenaeum, 1966), 2. I will therefore be using de Marneffe's notes as representative of De Smet's thought.

\textsuperscript{13} Richard De Smet, "Guidelines in Indian Philosophy," cyclostyled notes for students, unpublished (Poona: De Nobili College, 1968-1975).
and performs a complete intellectual operation; in doing this, the intellect interprets sensible determinations and it forms within itself some concepts which point to what is intelligible in these determinations; then the intellect asserts the correspondence of itself and of its acquisitions to the thing, i.e. to the object thus known.” – The direct judgment appears thus to contain the two following syntheses:

The concrete synthesis: “the synthesis which joins a predicate of itself universal with an individual subject and thus restricts the concept to the individual.” (This is a table) (If there was nothing more in the judgment, the word ‘is’ would have only the function of a link between the subject and the predicate).

The objective synthesis: “the position of a correspondence between ourselves as possessing the complex totality of sensible and intelligible signs and the thing which is represented or signified by them.” (This is a table). Here we recognize the existential function of the word “is”: there exists something which is both “this” and “table”).14

It would seem, then, that De Smet has a tripartite analysis of knowing that echoes Lonergan: what is presupposed by the concrete synthesis, the concrete synthesis itself, and the objective synthesis. However, De Smet is wary of what he calls the Epistemological Staircase Theory, as may be seen in the following remark he makes in connection with the Nyaya understanding of pratyaksa (perception) as involving a first phase (not yet a complete act) of mere sensation, and then a second phase where it is a determinate conception and is associated with a name: “Thus Nyaya avoids the fallacy of the epistemological staircase theory that we have first sense-experience, then conception, and then judgment. Perception is not a combination of three acts but a unitary perceptual judgment (yet analyzable into phases).”15

De Smet's notion of understanding is somewhat static, with its description of the joining of a universal predicate to an individual subject. Still, this is balanced by the fact that he inherits the Maréchalian emphasis on the dynamism of intellect. Both these aspects

come through in his interpretation of Sankara. According to De Smet, Sankara inherited the similarity postulate that like is known by like, and the consequent mirror theory of knowledge. Only slowly he seems to have substituted this with his own synthetic and dynamic notion of understanding.\(^{16}\) Whether this is a development in Sankara or in De Smet’s understanding of Sankara is a matter bearing independent study, but De Smet is worth quoting here:

Let me finally draw your attention to one feature in Sankara’s profile by which he stands out among Indian thinkers. It is his presupposition that human intelligence is dynamic and interpretative rather than static and mirror-like. It is interpretative because “the intellect has the power of considering as a whole” (samasta-praty-avamarsini buddhi: Taittiriya Upanisad Bhasya 2.3) the successive data of the senses which it synthesizes and judges. It is dynamic because it is driven by a constitutive desire to know (jijnasā) which is not limited to finite realities but reaches beyond them to the supreme Reality.\(^{17}\)

De Smet does not now hesitate to speak of “the intellectual dynamism of Sankaracarya.”\(^{18}\) Significantly, he lists this discovery as one of his four chief contributions to the study of Sankara. He speaks of a constitutive desire to know that reaches out to supreme Reality. He notes that this desire, which makes human intelligence dynamic, is made explicit by Sruti and directed clearly to Brahman, the supreme goal of the human being (parama purusartha). He repeatedly cites Jaimini, author of the Mimamsa Sutras, who had defined a purusartha as a natural goal, “that object to which human desire is inherently attached because it cannot be disconnected from it.”\(^{19}\) The desire to know Brahman is innate, unprecedented, original, yet common to all human beings.\(^{20}\)


\(^{17}\) De Smet, “Forward Steps,” 45.

\(^{18}\) De Smet, “Forward Steps,” 45.


\(^{20}\) Richard De Smet, “From Catholic Theology to Sankara Vedanta and Return with Fr
Interestingly, already in an article of 1970 De Smet had proposed that the Brahman-Atman as Saksin (witness), inner ruler and illuminer of our very knowing, is the Indian counterpart of the divine agent intellect of the West. The ego-reflection, the human subject that is ruled and illumined, could thus be considered a participation in the divine agent intellect. Agent intellect is of course the metaphysical counterpart of the pure desire to know.

Further, De Smet’s notion of consciousness seems to be consciousness-experience rather than consciousness-perception, going by the fact that he quotes with approval Sankara’s option for knowledge by identity rather than by confrontation when he has to speak about the pre-existence of effects in Brahman. All names-and-forms (nama-rupas) pre-exist in Brahman in the manner of something future (bhavisyena-rupena), that is, virtually, as effects pre-exist in the actual power of their cause. These nama-rupas are identical with the Brahman-Atman in their unmanifested state (Aitareya Upanisad Bhasya 1.1.2). The Samkhya system with its theory of satkaryavada had also held the pre-existence of effects as possible futures in their cause, but where it understood these effects as pre-existing in the material cause Prakrti, which it distinguished sharply from the spiritual Purusa, Sankara admits “only a previous state [of the world] dependent on the highest Lord, not an independent state” (Brahma Sutra Bhasya 1.4.3). Again, in Brahma Sutra Bhasya 1.1.5 Sankara puts the question, “What was the object of Brahman’s thinking before


the creation?” and replies: “The object of thinking is unevolved names and forms (namarupe avyakrte) which are not definable as ‘that’ or ‘other’ (tattvanyatvabhyam anirvacaniya) and which are going to be manifested.” The point is that Brahman knows everything by knowing himself; but this is an instance of the Aristotelian-Thomist theorem of knowledge by identity.

Again, De Smet is appreciative of the position of Prabhakara that knowledge is not eternal but a self-luminous (sva-prakasa) event which arises and vanishes as a moment in the cognitive process. The human self (jivatman) is conscious, but is not defined by consciousness — for it undergoes moments of dreamless sleep.24

Further light is cast by a consideration of De Smet’s discussion of Prabhakara’s tri-puti-pratyaksa-vada. Prabhakara points out that knowledge is always a triple revelation: of itself, of the knowable as its object, and of the knower as “I.” Thus knowledge has simultaneously three terms (tri-puti).25 Bhatta rejects Prabhakara’s tri-puti-pratyaksa-vada in favour of his own jnatata-vada. For him, the only immediate datum in cognition is the cognizedness (jnatata) or illuminedness (prakatya) of the object, that is, the object as cognized. Both the act/process of knowing and the knower have to be inferred. Knowledge is an adventitious modal change in the self. Cognizedness is a peculiar result which knowledge produces in the object, and from which it is inferred.26 De Smet comments:

Prabhakara’s theory seems to be closer to the fact. But he fails to distinguish the implicit (awareness of the ego and the knower) and the explicit (awareness of the object as known) in the immediate content of cognition which he erroneously considers as totally explicit. Hence Bhatta wants to correct him but for the same reason he reduces the immediate to the explicit and thinks that the implicit is not immediate but mediate and inferable only.27

So De Smet is proposing that we are explicitly aware of the object, and

24 De Smet, “Guidelines,” 220; see 216.
27 De Smet, “Guidelines,” 221.
only implicitly or immediately of the knower and the act of knowing. Both Prabhakara and Bhatta fail to distinguish implicit awareness and explicit awareness, immediate (consciousness) and mediate (knowledge). With Lonergan perhaps we should say that the whole process of knowing is conscious; that we are aware of object, knower, as well as act of knowing; that awareness is usually, however, focused on the object, but that it can sometimes be heightened and broadened so as to include also act and knower within that focus; and that we can, with some effort, pass on to objectification of this awareness.

2.2.2 Being

Given De Smet’s appreciation of intellectual dynamism, we must say that he certainly operates on the basis of the spontaneous notion of being that is the pure desire to know. Given that he distinguishes between the concrete synthesis and the objective synthesis, he has the notion of being as all that is intelligently affirmed. From the notes of de Marneffe we have the following description of the notion of being:

*The Notion of “Being”:* Since the direct judgment contains an objective synthesis, it manifests that we know what it means “to be,” and thus that we have immediately the notion of “being.” In fact we see that the objective synthesis is itself fundamental in every direct judgment. For the terms of the concrete synthesis may change: we now say “this is a table” and then “this is a chair”; but we always mean first: “This is, that is, “there is here something which exists in its own way.” This will be the basic meaning of the notion of being.

We shall see at the end of the course (cf. analogy of being) that the notion of being can be used in a variety of ways, sometimes in its proper sense, at other times by a kind of attribution which goes beyond the proper sense. But now we have already its basic meaning, and this reveals the most basic standpoint of the mind in metaphysical knowledge.28

See also De Smet’s remark about Prabhakara’s dis-essentialized notion of being:

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There are many *jatis* but no highest one, called *satta* (beingness), as acknowledged by Nyaya. Indeed, we can find groups of characteristics common to classes of beings but no set of characteristics common to all. Beings are ultimately disparate. When we call them all *sat* (being) we do not mean that they have something like a common essence but that each one is an individual "existing in its own way" as endowed with its own particular essence (*svarupa-satta*). Note the interest of this dis-essentialized notion of being.\(^{29}\)

### 2.2.3 Objectivity

Among the principles that are "immediately evident" in the direct judgment, De Marneffe lists the principle of the objectivity of human knowledge:

**Enunciation:** "There is truth."

**Source of this knowledge:** This is a spontaneous primary evidence which we recognize by reflecting on what we find within us; it is even a conviction which one cannot reject without restating it. St Thomas has well expressed this, when he writes: "Veritatem esse est per se notum: quia qui negat veritatem esse, concedit veritatem esse. Si autem est aliquid verum, opportet quod veritas sit..." (Sum. Theol. I, q.2, a.1, 3rd objection). The answer to the objection adds that the truth which is claimed to exist is at least "truth in general," and this is just what our principle claims.\(^{30}\)

De Smet quotes with approval Prabhakara's thesis about the *svaparakasatva* or self-validity of knowledge. Anything else would land us in an infinite regress, he says. Judgment by itself is true, and if it happens not to be in some cases, this is accidental, due to an adventitious cause other than judgment itself.\(^{31}\) Sankara follows Prabhakara on this point:

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\(^{29}\) De Smet, "Guidelines," 218.

\(^{30}\) De Marneffe, "General Metaphysics," 25.

Sankara, in particular, teaches that judgment as such is self-evident (svayam prakasa), absolutely self-established (atyanta prasiddham jnanam). It has a necessity of its own because, having for its object existent things as they really are (yathabhu tavastuvastusayam), it depends upon the things themselves and not upon man’s intelligence (na vastu-yathatmyajnanam purusabuddhyapeksam kim tarhi vastutantrameva tat. Vedanta Sutra Bhasya L.1.2). This is why Sankara refuses to call knowledge an action, even a mental action (manasi kriya), because, as he tells us, “the term action applies only to that which is enjoined independently of the true nature of things and it depends entirely upon the initiative of the human mind; ...Knowledge, on the contrary, originates from the pramanas (the sources of valid knowledge) and these concern reality as it is in itself, hence, knowledge...depends exclusively upon reality and not upon an injunction or upon (the will of) man” (Kriya hi nama sa, yatra vastusvarupanirapeksaiva codyate, purusacittavyaparadhinacca....Jnanam tu pramanajanyam, pramanam ca yathabhu tavastuvastusayam, ato jnanam...kevalam vastutantrameva tat, na codanatantram, napi purusa-tantram. Vedanta Sutra Bhasya 1.1.4).  

De Smet’s remarks on Sankara’s notion of truth are also revealing. The classical tradition is unanimous in upholding the notion of samyag-jnana (conjoined, that is, exact knowledge) or yatharthajnana (knowledge of the object as it truly is) as synonymous with prama (exact mensuration or evaluation) or truth. All the acaryas, De Smet notes, define true knowledge as knowledge conforming to reality, or yatharthajnana. Sankara himself understands truth as the conformity of a “knowledge” (jnana) whose object (visaya) is an existent (vastu), with its ontological reality (yatha-bhuta). This conformity or objective identity is called yathatmya, which seems to be a good equivalent of our “objectivity.” It turns that “knowledge” into prama –

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32 De Smet, “Indian Contribution,” 344. Compare Insight, 356, where Lonergan rejects demonstrating that we can know and speaks of pragmatic engagement in the process of knowing as the deepest foundation of knowing.

33 De Smet, “Indian Contribution,” 344, 346.
knowledge of the truth as ascertained through a pramana.\textsuperscript{34}

The *yatha* in *yathatmya* suggests that knowledge must be similar to things known. But what is the nature of this similarity? Not a few Indian thinkers held a mirror theory of knowledge, as if the complexity of knowledge reflected the complexity of things. But Sankara surmounted this naive realism thanks to his understanding of understanding as dynamic and synthetic. For him understanding is interpretation, either of sense data or of the successive words of sentences. Intellect has the power of "considering them as a whole" (*Taittiriya Upanisad Bhasya* 2.3). It can unify all the indications it receives, and it is by the synthetic unity of the resulting knowledge that the latter is similar to the known.\textsuperscript{35}

\textbf{2.2.4 Cognitional Theory and Interpretation}

I have been attempting to isolate De Smet’s understanding of knowing, being, and objectivity, with the aim of seeing how these determine his interpretation of Sankara. Before we get on to this point, however, it is most interesting to note that De Smet himself became aware of this kind of link between cognitional theory/epistemology and interpretation in his later years. Let me attempt to outline this development.

We have noted already his observation of 1987:

Let me finally draw your attention to one feature in Sankara’s profile by which he stands out among Indian thinkers. It is his presupposition that human intelligence is dynamic and interpretative rather than static and mirror-like.\textsuperscript{36}

In that same text he goes on to note the pertinence of this fact for an analogical understanding of the great sayings:

It is because intelligence is focused by its inner dynamism upon the highest Object that it can pursue it along the *laksana* indications of the "great sayings" beyond any expressed meaning of words. Its intentionality breaks through the limits

\textsuperscript{34} De Smet, “Sankara’s Perspective on Meaning and Truth,” 55.

\textsuperscript{35} De Smet, “Sankara’s Non-Dualism,” 86-87.

\textsuperscript{36} De Smet, “Forward Steps,” 45.
of effability to rush into the domain of the ineffable. It frees it from the dual structure of sentences to ascend through *laksana* to the *Paramartha*.\(^{37}\)

In 1994 we find him pushing this insight even further. He now suggests that the great diversity of Vedantic interpretations of the one *Sruti* is rooted in the extra-textual factor of different conceptions of the sentence (*vakya*).\(^{38}\) He exemplifies this insight by examining four great Vedantins, Sankara, Ramanuja, Madhva, and Vallabha. We will restrict ourselves here to comment on the first two.

**Sankara** believes that sentences, or better, propositions, have not only an expressive power but also an indicative power: they signify not only according to their direct and primary meaning, but also in an indirect way to indicate what cannot be directly expressed. Again, he points out that definitions can be by means of intrinsic characterizers (*visesanas*) but also by extrinsic characterizers (*upadhis*). An example of the first is “The lotus is a big, blue, sweet-smelling flower,” where “lotus” is a substance and “large,” “blue,” and “sweet-smelling” are its intrinsic characterizers. An example of the second is “Devadatta is the princess,” where Devadatta is indicated by means of the female stage-dress, which is merely on extrinsic characterizer. Thirdly, Sankara believes that certain terms are not necessarily restricted only to the finite world but are capable of a supreme meaning, for example, reality, knowledge, bliss. Used in apposition, they mutually control one another, excluding the finite modes of realization and becoming indicatives, without losing their proper meaning (*svarthta*). But above all, Sankara maintains that neither assertive sentences nor the human intellect mirrors reality. There is no one-to-one correspondence between terms and parts of reality. Rather, the intellect is a synthesizer. “The intellect considers as a unitary whole [the plurality of words or other data it receives]” (*samasta-praty-avamarsini-buddhith*) (*Taittiriya Upanisad Bhasya* 2.3). The intellect does not consider a sentence as a duplicate of reality but as a sequence of signs. Whether these are descriptive or otherwise expressive, merely indicative or allusive, it unifies all their syntactical significations so that they converge into a unitary

\(^{37}\) De Smet, “Forward Steps,” 46.

understanding. Interpreting any understanding is an active process which results in the single flash of knowledge finally attained.\textsuperscript{39} Ramanuja's conception of the sentence is very different. He admits that sentences have two types of powers, expressive and indicative, but, in contrast to Sankara, will not give primacy to the latter, even when it comes to interpreting scripture. He rejects, therefore, Sankara's recourse to analogy (laksana) in interpreting Sruti. Further, he holds that assertive sentences do mirror reality and draws the conclusion that the complexity of the sentence is matched by a corresponding complexity in reality. This is called by the Grammarians samanadhikaranya, a positional construction. The fact that a plurality of terms, whose use is motivated by a plurality of objective grounds, denotes one and the same thing. It aims at making one and the same thing known as differenced (visista) by a plurality of differencing terms (vivesara)\textsuperscript{40}

The difference between Ramanuja and Sankara, then, is the difference between naive realism and critical realism or intellectualism. It is this difference in cognitional theory and epistemology that leads to their markedly different interpretations of the same scriptures.

Ramanuja will hold that there is differentiation even in the supreme Reality, Brahman (hence his visistadvaita or nondualism of the differentiated Brahman). He will explain its simplicity (affirmed in scripture) by means of a theory of modes, thus opening himself to the risk of pantheism.

Sankara will hold with scripture (1) that Brahman is ineffable: it is that from which words fall back (Taittiriya Upanisad 2.4), which is unexpressed (Taittiriya Upanisad 2.7); (2) that Brahman is ontologically simple (akhanda), one only without a second: it transcends all genus and species; it is nirguna, not endowed with qualities and other accidents, free from all internal distinctions as between substance and accidents; it transcends all categories (Bhagavad Gita Bhasya 13.13). But he also holds, as we have seen above, (1) that propositions can be expressive as well as indicative; (2) that definitions are not only by visesanas but also by upadhis; (3) that certain terms are capable of an unrestricted meaning and therefore not necessarily restricted to the empirical

\textsuperscript{39} Sri Bhasya 1.1.1, cited in De Smet, "The Presuppositions of Jaimini," 82-83.

\textsuperscript{40} De Smet, "The Presuppositions of Jaimini," 84.
world; and (4) that the intellect is not a mirror but a synthesizer. Thus he is able to say: (1) that while Brahman cannot be expressed (vac-), it can be indicated (laks-); (2) that Brahman can be defined by extrinsic denominators or upadhis which serve to differentiate it from all other entities; (3) that Brahman can be defined also by visesanas, provided these terms are capable of an unrestricted meaning and provided they are used in apposition so as to exclude their expressive meaning, while retaining their proper meaning (svartha).41

In what follows, I will present an outline of De Smet’s interpretation of Sankara. Hopefully this outline will highlight the influence of both De Smet’s understanding of understanding and meaning as well as Sankara’s own understanding of vakya and intellection as influencing interpretation.

2.3 De Smet’s Interpretation of Sankara

In contrast to the Purva Mimamsakas who concentrated on the karma-kanda or the practical or ritual part of scripture, Sankara concentrated on the jnana-kanda or the knowledge part, and within this on the great sayings or mahavakyas concerning the Ultimate Reality, Brahman. These constitute several different types of definitions of Brahman; De Smet distinguishes five: the negative, the superlative, the relational, the identification statements, and the essential. All of these must be taken in combination because they complete one another by correcting one or other aspect of our innate ignorance.

The negative definitions of the neti neti (not this, not this) type posit the Brahman as exempt of all finitude and exceeding the primary scope of words and concepts. They assert its absolute transcendence and remove all temptations of pantheism. They root us in apophatism by excluding the Brahman from the expressive power of mind and speech.42

The superlative definitions posit the Brahman not as a relative absolute such as the Isvara of Nyaya, but as the absolute Maximum, the Purna. These definitions must be grasped in coordination with the neti laksana. We note that the superlative mode does not express this maximality but can point it out with vigor and precision.43

42 De Smet, “Forward Steps,” 38.
The relational definitions (upalaksana or tatastha-laksana) posit Brahman as the Root of the universe, as the total Cause. The risk here is anthropomorphism. So we must approach these with a mind imbued with the teaching of negativity and maximality. Brahman's causality is total, it is both upadana-karana and nimitta-karana, it gives reality as well as order. But it is the reality-giving cause without being subject to change (parinama), and it is the ordaining cause without need of pre-existing materials, calculation, tools, or wants to fulfill. It is absolutely free and immutable. It causality is so ontologically total that it is the innermost Atman of every reality.\(^4^4\)

But causality and immanence are relations of Brahman to the world; do they not add something to its essence? Sankara says they are not visesanas but upadhis or extrinsic denominators. De Smet explains further that the relations are not reciprocal, quoting Sankara to the effect that names-and-forms (nama-rupa) have Brahman as their Atman, but Brahman has not its Atman in them (Taittiriya Upanisad Bhasya 2.6.1). Thus the relational laksanas are true in what they affirm, not in the way they affirm it. “What they affirm is the communicativity of the changeless Absolute but they affirm it in terms of our experience of ontological relations.”\(^4^5\)

The identity statements. Tattvamasi (That thou art) and Aham Brahmasmi (I am Brahman) are cardinal mahavakyas expressing the tadatmya relation between knower/agent and Brahman. Tadatmya is not reciprocal identity, as in “I am my parents’ first son,” but the unreciprocal relation of “having Tat [That] as one’s Paramatman.” In Upadesasahasri 18, Sankara explains the ego as a reflection of the Atman. Because of the similarity, closeness, and intimate dependence of the reflection-ego on the Atman, there is lack of discrimination between the two. But for this very reason also, Tattvamasi can be a door to the supreme Tat. That is why Sankara can use the method of anvaya-vyatireka (agreement and difference) to explain this sentence. To understand him we must remember the rule of Dinnaga that words placed in apposition restrict one another’s meaning. Thus in “black horses,” black excludes all non-blacks, including non-black horses, and “horses” exclude all non-horses even if they are black.


Because the words "tvam" and "Sat" (for "Ta") refer to one and the same entity, they function like the words "black" and "horses." Through being brought into apposition with the word "Sat," which expresses absence of pain, the word "tvam" loses its reference to anything connected with pain and is left with the meaning "Sat." And similarly through being set in apposition with a word signifying "inmost self" (pratyag-atman), the word "tvam" is left with the meaning "Sar." (Upadesasahasri 18.170-71)

Without giving up their own meaning (svartha), the words tvam and Tat/Sat convey a specific (visista) meaning. And they lead to immediate awareness (avagati) of the inmost Atman. Apart from this meaning, there can be no other one which would not result in a contradiction (Upadesasahasri 18.173).

Sankara's innovative application of the anvaya-uyatreki method is equivalent to the jahad-ajahal-laksana employed by Suresvara, one of his direct disciples. It is used to understand a "great saying" whose primary meaning cannot be accepted. One must then seek for the secondary meaning suggested by the context; this can only be their supreme meaning. This seeking progresses through negation which excludes all the finite objects denoted by the primary meanings of the terms: this is the jahat moment. But it preserves the proper notion (svartha) of the terms: this is the ajahat or inclusive moment. The two svarthas are then elevated to their highest value. "The logical link between primary and supreme meaning is the svartha but dynamically what sets the process into motion is the suggestion that the jivatman is a reflection of the supreme Atman and thus in tadatmya relation with it."46

Tadatmya is not peculiar to the human self (jivatman) but is the founding relation imbuing all effects of Brahman. Its characteristic notes are non-reciprocality, dependence, indwelling, non-separation, non-division, non-otherness, distinction, and extrinsic denominativity. The effects, as we have explained already, are not ontological adjuncts.

46 De Smet, "Forward Steps," 41.
but upadhis. This does not mean they are illusions, for they have satta.47

How can this assertion of the ontological reality of effects be reconciled with the fact that Sankara's doctrine is said to be a form of mayavada? Here De Smet refers to an earlier article, "Maya or Ajnana" (1966), in which he points out that maya and ajnana/avidya occur in the proportion of 2:10 in Sankara's principal work, the Brahma Sutra Bhasya, and that it is the latter rather than maya that is a technical term in his writings. When he does use maya, it is in the traditional sense of "extraordinary power"; in the sense of "magic" or "product of magic," he uses it in a very limited number of cases and that too as a mere comparison, to point out the fact that Brahman is unchanged by its causality. He carefully explains avidya, instead, as superimposition either of the properties of the Absolute on the relative or vice versa. Thus, for example, when we apprehend things and persons as independent subsistents and fail to take into account their ontological rootedness in Brahman, it is avidya. Equally, when we think that Brahman undergoes changes because of its causality, it is avidya. The mutation of Sankarism into mayavada took place only with Vimuktatman (about thirteenth century CE).48 It was the failure to understand Sankara that led to efforts by his followers to defend the immutability of Brahman by recourse to vivarta and maya understood in terms of illusion.

The essential definitions (svarupa-laksana) are of the type, "The Brahman is Reality, Knowledge, Infinite" (satyam jnanam anantam Brahm'eti, Taittiriya Upanisad 2.1). Here also Sankara applies his method of anuya-uyatireka. The three terms satyam, jnanam, anantam stand in coordination and not subordination, since Brahman is exempt from genus and difference; by virtue of this contiguity they control one another, thus excluding the express meanings and becoming indicatives of Brahman. However, they do not lose their proper meaning (svartha). The process of interpretation is therefore jahad-ajahal-laksana. The svartha of satyam is being, ontological truth, stable reality; its connection with jnanam excludes materiality, and its connection with anantam excludes finitude. The svartha of jnanam is knowing; coordinated with the other two terms, it means the

47 De Smet, "Forward Steps," 41-42.
48 De Smet, "Forward Steps," 42-43.
unrestricted actuality of pure knowing (jna-).\textsuperscript{49} By the paramartha of satyam and jnanam the Brahman is indicated but not expressed (tal-lakṣyate na tu-cyate, Taittiriya Upanisad Bhasya 2.1.1).\textsuperscript{50}

The paradoxical language of Vedanta may be understood also by keeping in mind that Sankara uses being and non-being on different levels, which De Smet clarifies by a judicious use of capitals. On the ordinary level, effects and their Cause are beings (sat). But Brahman transcends its effects so much that compared to them it is non-being (a-sat). This consideration is the root of apophatism. Brahman, however, is not absolute Non-being (atyanta A-sat). It is non-being (a-sat) only because it is absolute Being (atyanta Sat). Compared to it, creatures are non-Being (a-Sat) although they are not absolute Non-being (Asat). They are Sad-Asad-vilaksana, unable to be denoted either by Sat or Asat in the supreme sense of these terms.

Thus Sankara is a radical valuationist who measures everything to the absolute Value and declares its unequality to it rather than the degree of its participation in it. His language is centered around the Absolute rather than the relative existent. This manner of speaking is legitimate but has led many into acosmistic interpretations of his doctrine.\textsuperscript{51}

De Smet himself summarizes his interpretation of Sankara in a piece published in the year of his death:

Advaita Vedanta is pure transcendentalism. Its only concern is the "goal of man," namely, to intuit the very essence of the highest Brahman. The truth it distils from the Upanisads is that this Brahman is the highest Lord and highest Atman of all the beings of the universe because it is their total Cause. In the richness of its unspeakable Fullness it exceeds all that we are or can wish to attain because it is Reality-Knowledge-Infinite and therefore absolute Bliss. Its effects can add nothing to its infinity, they exist through its causal presence within them, they are inseparable from it and cannot be counted apart from it. As to their reality it is neither Being nor Non-being in the

\textsuperscript{49} Sankara explains that it is bhava sadhana, a Paninean expression meaning the sole root without declensional endings.

\textsuperscript{50} De Smet, "Forward Steps," 43.

\textsuperscript{51} De Smet, "Origin: Creation and Emanation," 216.
supreme sense of those terms (Sad-Asad-vilaksana); it is the reality of a totally dependent effect (sat-karya). Hence, their connection with the Brahman is not duality but non-duality (advaita), which is not the same as monism (ekatva). They are similar to it, its reflections (abhasa), but cannot be reckoned with it under one common genus, for the Brahman transcends any genus and is therefore “One without a second” (ekam-eva+advitiyam).  

3. SANKARA INTERPRETATION: HISTORY

Allow me to begin with a methodological observation by De Smet in his review of F. X. Clooney’s Theology after Vedanta. After having reviewed Clooney’s suggestions for a comparative theology, De Smet adds one of his own:

I would add a sixth strategy: the placing of parallel texts within their respective long-range historical contexts, say, Thomistic texts as coming at the conclusion of a twelve-century long struggle of Catholic non-dualistic monotheism against Gnostic-Manichean dualism, a struggle rooted in the tension born from conflicting biblical ways of God-talk, either transcendent or anthropomorphic; and, on the other side, Sankara’s monotheistic non-dualism as opening up a period of many centuries during which his position and his hermeneutic of conflicting Upanisadic texts will be nibbled and pared by a Ramanuja or displaced by the dualism of a Madhva.  

This kind of suggestion certainly belongs to the genus of functional history. It is also amazing because of the way it echoes The Way to Nicea.

52 De Smet, “Sankara’s Non-Dualism” (1997), 94-95 (see note 19 above).
53 De Smet, review of Clooney, 806.
Coming now to De Smet on Sankara: Can we really speak of a functional history of De Smet's interpretation of Sankara? Yes, provided we recognize it as a subset of a functional history of Sankara interpretation. So what I am speaking about here is a functional history of Sankara interpretation. I find it useful to divide this task into two parts, the first dealing with certain categories found in Sankara and the second trying to insert Sankara within the context of prior, contemporary, and later writers.

3.1 Categories

This section will attempt to determine further or "fix" certain points we have already taken up in functional interpretation and this by relating them to prior and contemporary writers and schools. I will restrict myself to the two original points in Sankara's cognitional theory, his notions of consciousness and of understanding.

3.1.1 Consciousness

The Sautrantika Buddhists had distinguished two stages in perception. In the first stage, they held, we perceive the flux of the real but evanescent dharmas; in the second, our imagination superimposes a samanya-laksana (universal) of the type "flower," "cow," et cetera. They regarded only the first stage as valid, its object consisting of the real but evanescent dharmas; but our interest lies in the fact that they noticed an indeterminate (nirvikalpa) stage of perception.55

Thus we find Nyaya as well as Purva Mimamsa distinguishing two stages of perception, indeterminate and determinate. The Nyaya Sutra defined perception as that knowledge that arises from the contact of a sense with its object, and which is well-determined, not erroneous, and not (yet) associated with a name (Nyaya Sutra 1.1.4). Despite being described as "well-determined," however, it would seem that perception in the sense defined above is merely a first phase – and not yet a complete act – of mere sensation not yet associated with a name; hence we find it also being described as indeterminate, nirvikalpa. It is followed by a second phase – the association with a name – where

55 De Smet, "Guidelines," 217; see also 189-90, where De Smet refers to their viewpoint as "nominalistic Phenomenalism."
it becomes a determinate conception. The two phases of perception are not perceived as such, but rather inferred. We might note that this school admits not only external or sense perception, but also internal (manasa) perception, which they explain as arising from the contact of manas with psychical states such as cognition, desire, pain, pleasure, aversion, and conation.56

Kumarila Bhatta of the Purva Mimamsa explains the indeterminate stage as a mere concrete sight of the individual object, pure and simple. Against Nyaya, he holds that this stage is not simply inferred, but that we are aware of it whenever we perceive “that” there is an object without as yet knowing clearly “what” it is. He goes on to note that it resembles the perceptions of a new born infant. At the same time both Prabhakara and Bhatta maintain that at the first stage the whole reality of the object is perceived, including its genus and difference, but that the latter are not yet clearly manifested. How then does perception become determinate? Through comparison and relation with other objects, which takes place through memory. This seems a rather static understanding of perception, a severe neglect of understanding, unless we take it as applying solely to the commonsense realm where we are dealing mostly with linguistic insights rather than immanent intelligibilities.57 But Bhatta does speak, though in a different context, also of the synthetic character of understanding, which is what Sankara picks up from him.

3.1.2 Understanding

Sankara’s notion of understanding is clarified by placing it in the context of the problem of the authorlessness (apauruseyatva) or independent authority of Sruti. This theory, which seems to have originated with Jaimini, the author of the Mimamsa Sutra,58 was explained in several different ways. All agreed with Sabara, first commentator of Jaimini, that “the knowledge from speech arises apart from any contact with an object” (Mimamsa Sutra Bhasya 1.1.5). Therefore, unless one agrees with the Buddhists that such knowledge

58 De Smet notes that this thesis was proposed by Jaimini in an effort to counter the influence of Buddhism: see “The Presuppositions of Jaimini,” 79-80.
has no substantial support and, hence, no objectivity, one must accept that the words themselves provide it with a substantial support. The other alternative would be that it is created by the mind embodying its concepts in the sounds of speech; but this, besides appealing to a theory of concept that is foreign to the Indian thinkers, would make every *sabda* dependent on a *purusa*, a position unacceptable to the *srutivadins*.\(^59\) But how can words be the support of speech?

a) The *sphotavada* of Bhartrhari, Mandanamisra, and the Grammarian Patanjali postulates a metempirical, undivided, unanalyzable, eternal sound-entity (*sphota*) of each word and even of each sentence.\(^60\)

b) The early Naiyayikas postulated mental association. In sharp contrast to Bhartrhari, they regarded the link between sound and meaning as conventional\(^61\) and believed that every sound is a vibration lasting only for two or three moments (*ksanas*), which by its association within the mind with the impressions (*samskaras*) made by the previous sounds yields the meaning of words and sentences. This theory obviously implies *pauriseyatva*, and hence was unacceptable to *srutivadins* like the Purva and the Uttara Mimamsakas.\(^62\)

c) The Purva and Uttara Mimamsakas turn to *varnavada*, a theory proposed by Upavarsa, author of a vanished *vrarti* (commentary) on Jaimini's *Mimamsa Sutra*. Upavarsa is quoted with equal reverence by Sabara and Sankara and *Yoga Bhasya* 3.17.\(^63\) According to Vacaspati's *Tattva-bindu*, his theory is that the cause of the knowledge derived from speech is "the series of the syllables or letters (*varna*) themselves as recollected thanks to the accumulated impulsions produced by the direct knowledge one has had before of each letter, word and meaning of word." This implies two elements: (1) an objective one, consisting of

\(^{59}\) But see this other remark of De Smet about Bhartrhari's Sabdadvaits: "N.B. Fascinating parallels could be made between this doctrine and the rich and varied conceptions of the internal word among Christians, especially St Augustine and the medieval Schoolmen" (De Smet, "Guidelines," 226).

\(^{60}\) De Smet, "Guidelines," 280.

\(^{61}\) De Smet, "Guidelines," 245.

\(^{62}\) De Smet, "Guidelines," 280.

\(^{63}\) The *Yoga Bhasya* is now accepted as one of the probably authentic works of Sankara: see Hajime Nakamura, *A History of Early Vedanta Philosophy*, part 2 (Delhi: Motilal Banarsidass, 2004), 47-48.
the ever same letters or syllables, arranged in word-series and sentence series as we find in the Sruti texts, and (2) a subjective element, which is their correct recollection.64

d) The Prabhakaras seem to have adopted varnavada but with an emphasis on only the objective element: varnas have each an (eternal) potency of leaving a semantic impression which, combined with that of other varnas brings about the meaning of words and sentences.65 Sankara was dissatisfied with this solution "because it is too particular to the understanding of a series of syllables. We should have a general solution which would explain our understanding of other kinds of series too (line of ants, of trees, of soldiers, etc.). Besides, in any case the impressions left by the varnas must be synthesized."66

e) The Bhattas introduce a new element when they hold that the memory of words cannot by itself account for our knowledge of their synthetic meaning, as their opponents would have it, but that it is the intelligence (buddhi), aided no doubt by the memory, that constructs, from the individual meanings evoked by each word, the synthetic sense of the proposition.67

Sankara and his school adopted the position of the Bhattas. In fact, it is simpler to admit that our buddhi functions as intellectual memory, that it has the power of synthesizing elements apprehended at successive moments of time. This function is samasta-praty-avamarsini buddhi (intellect looking back on past experiences as a whole) (see Brahma Sutra Bhasya 1.3.28).68

Thanks to his grasp of the synthetic nature of human intelligence which he learned from the Bhattas, Sankara learned to overcome the similarity postulate and the mirror theory of knowing. On the other hand, my impression is that the addition of the dynamic element is all his own. For Purva Mimamsa is characterized by its insistence on ritual action; it is a late insistence on the original three goals of the human being (purusarthas), to the exclusion of liberation (moksa).

64 De Smet, "Guidelines," 280.
68 De Smet, "Guidelines," 219; see also "Langage et connaissance de l'Absolu chez Çamkara," 43.
Sankara instead regarded *moksa* as the supreme end of the human being, and we have seen how this brings him to a recognition of a natural intellectual dynamism, so that he can speak of a constitutive desire to know (*jijnasa*) that reaches out to the supreme Reality. Thus he regards the human intellect as not only synthetic but also dynamic, and De Smet is not wrong in saying that by this he stands out among Indian thinkers.

The degrees of approximation to truth that De Smet seems to find in Sankara may be a direct consequence of his recognition of the dynamism of intelligence.\(^6^9\)

### 3.2 *Sankara Interpretation: Notes for a Functional History*

Functional history will attempt to relate Sankara to prior, contemporary, and later writers; to insert him, therefore, into the genetically and dialectically related sequences of viewpoints. This kind of thing presupposes a whole range of prior interpretations of the individual writers / schools and, possibly, interpretations that attempt to be explanatory rather than merely descriptive. Here I will merely make some notes.

#### 3.2.1 Prior Writers and Schools

Sankara stands in a dialectical relationship with the various *Buddhist schools* (Sautrantika, Vijnanavada, and Sunyavada, to mention a few); but this has not always been admitted, with several of his interpreters, both disciples and opponents, being willing to regard him as a crypto-Buddhist.\(^7^0\) Precisely for this reason, a close study of the relationship would be both interesting and revealing for Sankara scholarship.

Sankara would also stand in a largely dialectical relationship with the *Nyaya-Vaisesika*, given that these schools are under the dominance of the similarity postulate and the mirror theory of knowledge. He also rejects the *asatkaryavada* theory of causality of these schools, on the grounds that it leads to ultimate duality, whereas the *Sruti* clearly declares the unicity of the ultimate Cause.

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69 See above, section 2.2.3: Objectivity.

As for the *Purva Mimamsa*, though Sankara is radically innovative in comparison to them (they are ritualists giving almost exclusive emphasis to the Vedas, while he is a “spiritualist” giving exclusive emphasis to the Vedanta or the Upanisads), I would think he stands in a largely, though not exclusively, genetic relationship. Thus, for example, he takes over their notion of consciousness which, I would say, is consciousness as experience. He also takes over from Bhatta the idea that human intellect is not static and mirror-like but synthetic but adds to this the idea that human intellect is also dynamic. He does, however, have to overcome the mirror theory of knowledge represented in Prabhakara.

From the *Samkhya*, Sankara adopts the *satkaryavada* theory of causality, because it enables him to maintain the unicity of the ultimate Cause; however, he has to modify this theory by rejecting its implication that the *upadana karana*, the reality-giving cause, undergoes modification (*parinama*). More importantly, Sankara is emphatic in rejecting Samkhya dualism, with its radical and permanent distinction between the material *Prakrti* and the spiritual * Purusa*.

Among the forbears is to be listed also Sankara’s own *Advaita Vedanta* tradition, originating in Badarayana (about the fourth century CE) and passing through Gaudapada (about the eighth century CE), thought to be his “grand-guru.” Here also we should expect to find Sankara’s enormous powers of discernment at work: he will not take even his own tradition for granted but will sift and sieve so that he can retain what is of permanent value and reject what is merely dross, especially when borrowed from his arch-opponents, the Buddhists. De Smet’s evaluation of Gaudapada is particularly interesting, especially as it impinges on the interpretation of Sankara:

> With regard to the universe, Gaudapada is an uncompromising acosmist and *sunyavadin*; with regard to the appearance of this universe, he is a *mayavadin* like the Vijnanavadins. As to the absolute *Vijnana* it is not a repository-consciousness (*alaya-vijnana*) but a substantial *Swayam-jyoti* as in the Upanisads. However, his theory ruthlessly simplifies the complexity of

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71 See, for example, his remarks about Gaudapada in “Guidelines,” 275-77 and “Radhakrishnan's Second Presentation of Sankara's Teaching,” *Prajña: Kashi Hindu Vishvavidyalaya Patrika* (Special issue for S. R.'s Centenary *smṛti*) 34 (1989): 83-84.
Upanisadic teachings to which Sankara will do better justice. Because of him, the teaching of the latter has unfortunately often been interpreted in an acosmistic way.72

Then again there is the tradition of the Sabdadvaita of Bhartrhari (probably the fifth century CE), which Sankara is wary of.73 Rather than postulating the sphota (meaning units) as eternal entities, Sankara will prefer to follow the varnavada expounded by Upavarsa and adopted by Bhatta, not without his own addition of the dynamic character of human intelligence.74 As for Nimbarka, who till recently was regarded as a post-Sankara Vedantin, we have a study that has established him as almost certainly one of Sankara’s purvapaksins.75 The implication is that, if the bhedabheda of Nimbarka is a purvapaksa, then Sankara himself cannot be said to be a supporter of bhedabheda. At any rate, there are first class studies like those of Hajime Nakamura, A History of Early Vedanta Philosophy, which will prove invaluable in this part of the functional history of Sankara.76

3.2.2 Contemporaries

Among Sankara’s contemporaries, we should mention at least Mandanamisra (800 CE) and his sphotasiddhi. Here we can expect a dialectical relationship, given that Mandanamisra follows Bhartrhari, and that Sankara rejected Bhartrhari’s Sabdadvaita.

3.2.3 Later Writers and Schools

We come then to the post-Sankara period. The Sankarian school has been the focus of attention by people like F. X. Clooney. Some of the developments have been well-traced out by De Smet and are precious

74 See above, section 2.21: Knowing.
75 Joseph Satyanand, Nimbarka: A Pre-Sankara Vedantin and his Philosophy (Varanasi: Vishwa Jyoti Gurukul, 1994). The purvapaksa is the position that Sankara opposes, somewhat in the manner of the Videtur quod non of the Western medieval scholastics.
for establishing the precise nature of Sankara's own teaching. Thus, for example, he shows how Suresvara (800 CE), one of Sankara's immediate disciples, brings in the vocabulary of jahad-ajahal-laksana and engages in a polemic with Samkhya parinamavada because of its implication of change in the ultimate Cause, but never uses the word vivarta (illusion). Then again there are interesting passages where De Smet shows how the Sankarian school mutated into mayavada. Padmapada (820 CE) is the first Advaitin who introduces vivarta, probably under the influence of Sabdadvaita. "Padmapada distinguishes vivarta from parinama and vikara, but under the influence of Sabdadvaita gives it the meaning of an external manifestation which, though objective, is yet somehow illusory; he thus unwittingly paves the way for the future mayavadins." Prakasaratman (1200 CE), commenting on Padmapada, defines vivarta in opposition to parinama, and insists on the fact that the self-manifesting Cause remains absolutely unchanged by the vivarta process of self-manifestation. Vimuktatman (about thirteenth century CE) avoids giving a definition of vivarta. He fully introduces the term maya into Advaita, and so assimilates Advaita to its chief enemy, the pure mayavada of the Buddhists. He also makes fashionable the term anirvacaniya (inexpressible), which becomes an excuse for avoiding delving deeply into the mystery of finite existence. Yet, besides refuting Duaita, he strongly rejects the pure identity of Brahman and world as implied in the Sabdadvaita theory of Bhedabheda." Vacaspatimisra (840 CE) does not contribute anything new: Sarvajnatman (900 CE) sees that no theory can measure up to the reality of the mystery. Parinamavada is a first approach; it is cancelled by vivartavada; which is itself cancelled by a perfect intuition which completely sublimates causality as a conception. Prakasananda (latter half of the sixteenth century CE) hardens this view, and his monism (rather than nondualism) seems to Dasgupta "surprisingly similar to the idealism of Vasubandhu." Indeed, his drsti-srsti, which is quite

78 Perhaps this should read "unwittingly."
79 S. Dasgupta, A History of Indian Philosophy, vol. 2 (Delhi: Motilal Banarsidass, 1975), 19. Vasubandhu was an Indian Buddhist scholar-monk and one of the main founders of Indian Yogacara. In volume 1 of his History, Dasgupta gives his dates as 420-500 CE, but in volume 2 he corrects himself to 280-360 CE: see 2: 19, note 2.
alien to Sankara’s Advaita, eliminates all forms of ontological causality, and he expressly states that *vivartavada* is a mere pedagogical device.\(^\text{80}\) The Sankarian school is a complex subject of study, and from what we have been seeing, surely we will expect to find not merely genetic but also and above all dialectical relationships with the teaching of Sankara. It is very probable that, like that other great thinker, Thomas Aquinas, Sankara was betrayed by his own followers and successors.  

Then there are the well-known opponents of Sankara: Ramanuja and his *Visistadvaita* or qualified nondualism; Madhva with his *Dvaita* or dualism; Vallabha and his *Suddhadvalta* or monistic nondualism. Paul Hacker has shown that the position of Sankara that Ramanuja outlines and criticizes is actually not Sankara’s but that of one of his followers.\(^\text{81}\) Again, the fact that Ramanuja knew of the importance of *laksana* in Sankara, and rejected that primacy in favor of his own emphasis on the direct meaning of the texts,\(^\text{82}\) goes to support De Smet’s own championing of analogy in Sankara. We have already had occasion to comment on the radically different notions of understanding and meaning espoused by Sankara and Ramanuja. Where the former is an “intellectualist” and at least a “dogmatic” realist, the latter seems to slip back toward the mirror theory of knowledge that Sankara had rejected.  

A peculiar case will be the Jesuit missionary Robert de Nobili (1577-1656). De Nobili’s description about “the *Jnanis* or Spirituals whose theology is called Vedanta” seems to fit the teachings of Padmapada, direct disciple of Sankara and founder of the Vivarana school. They certainly witness to the state Sankara Vedanta had reached in South India in the seventeenth century, in the teachings of Anandapurna, Nrsimha, Appaya Diksita, and Rama Tirtha.\(^\text{83}\) While De Nobili is genuinely appreciative of many facets of Vedanta, he was so firm in his rejection of their *mayavada* that he earned for himself the title *Tattuvu-Podagar* or *Tattva-Bodhaka*, Teacher of Reality.

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\(^{80}\) Richard De Smet, “*Maya or Ajñana?*” *Indian Philosophical Annual* 2 (1966): 224-25.  

\(^{81}\) Hacker shows that Ramanuja’s *Sri Bhasya, Mahapurvapaksa*, does not represent the real Sankara but a later development. Contrary to this presentation, Sankara in his theory of knowledge does not go from perception to Self but from Self to perception and produces a metaphysics of knowledge. See De Smet, review of Hacker, 269.  

\(^{82}\) De Smet, “The Presuppositions of Jaimini,” 84.  

Finally, there is the vast series of contemporary interpretations of Sankara, within which De Smet takes his place: Indian scholars such as S. Radhakrishnan and T. M. P. Mahadevan; foreign scholars such as Sengaku Mayeda and P. Hacker; Christians in India such as Pierre Johanns, J. F. Pessein, J. Monchanin, Abhishiktananda, H. O. Mascarenhas, K. Klostermaier, Bede Griffiths, P. D. Devanandan, Marc Sunder Rao, and Sara Grant.

The Sautrantika Buddhists who recognize an indeterminate and a determinate phase in the perceptual judgment, but regard only the former as "valid," are nominalist phenomenalists. The Vijñana-Vadins are subjective idealists. The Sunyavādins push the Sautrantika position in the direction of pure voidism. The Nyaya-Vaiśeṣika, with its failure to distinguish adequately between language and knowledge, ends up in an exaggerated naïve realism that regards universals as independently existing substances. The Prabhakara Purva Mimamsakas seem to have a notion of consciousness as experience as well as a decent grasp of the commonsense judgment, but tend to neglect understanding, and so are still under the spell of the mirror theory of knowledge. The Bhatta Purva Mimamsakas take a step forward in their recognition of the synthetic nature of intelligence. Sankara, finally, stands out by his recognition of the dynamic as well as synthetic nature of intelligence as well as his option for consciousness as experience; and since some at least of these positions are inspired by Śruti, he can be said to be a "dogmatic" realist. His great opponent Ramanuja slips back, as we have already said, to the naïve realism of the mirror theory of knowing, and the same is true probably also of the dualist Madhva.

Before I go on to make some jottings on the last subset of the contemporary interpretations of Sankara, allow me to note the dialectical elements in this history: (1) the conflict between the mirror theory of knowledge and the synthetic and dynamic nature of human understanding, (2) the conflict between consciousness as perception and consciousness as experience, and (3) the conflict between the Śruti concept of being as the permanent and the unchanging and the notion of being implicit in the pure desire to know. The process will involve

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84 See De Smet, review of Hacker.
naive realism and idealism giving way to a critical or perhaps dogmatic realism, which in turn is swallowed up by fresh outbreaks of naive realism and idealism.

### 3.3 De Smet in the Context of Contemporary Interpretations of Sankara

Even though more circumscribed than a functional history of Sankara interpretation, the subset of contemporary interpretations is itself quite vast. So I once again take the shortcut of jotting down interesting points and possibilities from the oeuvre of De Smet himself.

I begin by noting a certain strategy emergent from De Smet's own handling of his contemporaries.

#### 3.3.1 Authenticity of Sources

One of De Smet’s common moves in evaluating the work of some other Sankara scholar is to look at her list of sources: which works of Sankara does she regard as authentic? Piantelli and Radhakrishnan, for example, regard the *vivarana* on the *Mandukya Upanisad* as authentic. De Smet, instead, calls it an “extremely doubtful” work and says that its author seems to have deliberately Vedanticized an acosmism of Buddhist origin. He further maintains that the current interpretation of Sankara in terms of *mayavada* (illusionistic acosmism) depends essentially on the *vivarana* attributed to Sankara on the *Mandukya Upanisad* and its *Agama-sastra*. H. Jacobi says that the author of the *Mandukya Upanisad Bhasya* cannot be the same as that of the *Brahma Sutra Bhasya*. V. Bhattacharya argues against its traditional attribution to Sankara. After Radhakrishnan’s composition of his *Indian Philosophy* (in which he defended the Sankara attribution of the *vivarana*), Belvalkar, Lacombe, and Renou rejected its genuineness. Mayeda, on the contrary, accepted its authenticity, having examined it in the light of the linguistic criteria determined by

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86 Richard De Smet, review of M. Piantelli, *Sankara e la Rinascita del Brahmanesimo*, *Indian Philosophical Quarterly* 4, no. 3 (April 1977): 250; De Smet, “Radhakrishnan’s Interpretation of Sankara,” 55.

Hacker; but De Smet remains doubtful. The most thorough rejection of the authenticity of the *vivaraṇa* is by Thomas E. Wood, author of *The Mandukya Upanisad and the Agama Sastra*. According to Wood, the author of the *vivaraṇa* is late, probably five centuries after Sankara; he put together the *Agama-sastras*, commented on them, and thus introduced his version of Advaita into the Sankara school, a teaching which blends Buddhistic with Advaitic views. The acosmism of the fourth section of the *Agama-sāstra* is from Mahayana: it teaches that nothing really arises and nothing perishes. Such teaching, says De Smet, contrasts sharply with that of Sankara and his direct disciples.

### 3.3.2 Sankara as Srutivadin

Another move is to ask: does this scholar regard Sankara as a purely rational philosopher or as a *srutivadin*, an exegete of scripture? Radhakrishnan is a prime example of those who consider Sankara a purely rational philosopher; in fact, it was a lecture of Radhakrishnan’s that provided De Smet with the topic for his doctoral dissertation on the theological method of Sankara. In the Introduction to his *Indian Philosophy*, Radhakrishnan refers to Sankara’s Advaitism as a purely philosophical scheme. He holds that the Advaita intuition is in simple continuity with intuition unaided by *sruti*. This opinion, says De Smet, is akin to that of Aquinas but foreign to Sankara. Radhakrishnan reports Sankara’s teaching on the role of *sruti* but without its full vigor. For Sankara, *sruti* is the only *pramana* with respect to Brahman. Unaided reason cannot win the truth which *sruti* alone can yield. Sankara’s *Brahmajijnasa* is a strong form of *srutivada* that is similar to the scripture-bound theology of Christianity or Islam. The problem was that Radhakrishnan was mixing up the historian’s aim with another aim, that of giving philosophical respectability to traditional Indian thought, and especially to Vedanta, by presenting it in terms of

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88 De Smet, “Radhakrishnan’s Interpretation of Sankara,” 55.
90 De Smet, “From the Vedas,” 2.
92 De Smet, “Radhakrishnan’s Interpretation of Sankara,” 57.
93 De Smet, “Radhakrishnan’s Interpretation of Sankara,” 57.
94 De Smet, “Radhakrishnan’s Interpretation of Sankara,” 57.
monistic and ethical idealism. He upholds creative logic in place of mere philology or scholarship. He presents most of what Sankara said, but ends with what he wants him to have said, so that it is difficult to know where Sankara's thought ends and Radhakrishnan's begins.\(^95\) Radhakrishnan wanted so much to present Sankara as a rational philosopher that he did not appreciate the essential scripturalism of the latter. He secularized Sankara's faith-reliance on sruti as a recourse to intuition and thus failed to recognize the exact place of intuition: hopefully at the end of the work of hermeneutics (sravana, manana, nididhyasana). Opposing intuition to logic, he saw the latter at work where Sankara sees only superimpositions made by avidya. Sankara limits the theological competence of the logical mind, though he never belittles the solidity of its principles and its capacity to integrate the vidya offered by sruti.\(^96\)

In a second review of Radhakrishnan's work, this time of his chapter on Sankara in History of Philosophy Eastern and Western, written twenty years after Indian Philosophy, De Smet notes that Radhakrishnan continues to remain ambiguous about the sources of Sankara's doctrine.\(^97\) The sub-heading here is "Authority, Intuition, Reason," which already weakens Sankara's exclusive reliance on sruti. Radhakrishnan says that Sankara is faithful to the spirit of the Upanisads rather than to their letter, and supports this with a quotation from Taittiriya Upanisad Bhasya 1.2.1 where Sankara speaks of the primacy of the meaning – but "meaning" here is more precise than "spirit." Radhakrishnan goes on: Sankara claims not only the authority of the scriptures but also intrinsic reasonableness and direct experience. He no longer says, however, as in Indian Philosophy, that such reliance on reasonableness makes of Sankara's nondualism a great example of a purely philosophical scheme.\(^98\) So in History of Philosophy Eastern and Western, Radhakrishnan considers sruti, intrinsic reasonableness, and direct experience as three different types of knowledge. But he tends to consider sruti as if it were intuition, since

\(^{95}\) De Smet, "Radhakrishnan's Interpretation of Sankara," 58.

\(^{96}\) De Smet, "Radhakrishnan's Interpretation of Sankara," 67-68.


\(^{98}\) De Smet, "Radhakrishnan's Second Presentation of Sankara's Teaching," 84-85.
only direct experience can bring us into contact with reality. Sankara did say that sruti is pratyaksa, that it is what the seers saw and heard, and that Brahmajijnasa culminates with intuitive penetration. But these are about origin and goal; they do not mean that the process itself is intuitive. So long as one is inquiring, one does not experience.99

W. Halbfass, on the other hand, seems to back up De Smet’s claims: “my comprehension of it [the relations of reason and Vedic revelation in Sankara] has been both confirmed and enriched by the author’s penetrating and sensitive study.”100 Again, in his 1994 review of Clooney, De Smet begins by saying that by the time Clooney writes, the point that Sankara is a srutivadin is no longer in dispute. Clooney himself supports De Smet’s thesis: “among the schools of Vedanta, Sankara’s school is distinguished by its consistent and thorough dependence on exegesis.”101 But De Smet is strangely ambivalent on the point, for a little later he writes: “Clooney is...aware that in calling Advaita ‘theology,’ he is out of line with the majority of authors.”102 At the end of the review also he notes that, during the forty years since his dissertation, the will to reduce Sankara’s Brahmajijnasa to a merely rational intuitive philosophy has on the whole remained predominant. K. Satchidananda Murty’s Revelation and Reason in Advaita (1959) is an exception. In recent years, however, there is “a still timid change towards the recognition of the true nature of Sankara’s writings.” Thus in 1991 there was Anantanand Rambachan’s Accomplishing the Accomplished: The Vedas as a Source of Valid Knowledge in Sankara.103

3.3.3 Sankara’s Use of Analogy

A third move is to ask: Does the scholar being studied recognize that Sankara makes wide, sustained, and fundamental use of the theory of the polysemy of words and the method of laksana (analogy)?

99 De Smet, “Radhakrishnan’s Second Presentation of Sankara’s Teaching,” 85.
102 De Smet, review of Clooney, 797.
Piantelli, for example, notes the way secondary meanings of words can indicate a reality beyond the area of the expressive power of its primary meanings. In particular, some words whose primary meanings abstract from finiteness and infinity can be contextually infinitized: for example, satya, jnana, ananta. Thus Piantelli is aware of Sankara’s use of laksana; but he does not expose its full scope. “Further, in denying its affinity with the Thomistic theory of analogy, he is only half-right. This theory, indeed, is primarily a theory of the secondary meanings of terms which differs little from the theory of laksana, especially in its Sankarian application; but it is prolonged by a theory of ontological participation which is foreign to Sankara.”

About Paul Hacker, after a warm appreciation, De Smet says:

Yet, I always regretted that he never really entered into a perspective which I consider fundamental to Sankara’s undertaking. I mean Sankara’s perception that the theological language of the Upanisads is radically analogical or, to say it in Indian terms, laksana-ic, laksana designating the process by which we pass from the primary but mundane meaning of terms to some secondary meaning (as required by the context), in this case to their most elevated meaning (paramarthta). Thus the decisive terms of the Upanisads, i.e., all those which ‘indicate’ (though they cannot ‘express’) the Brahman-Atman, have to be focused upon according to their highest possible meaning (paramarthathatah), as Sankara explains so lucidly in his exegesis of the essential definition of Brahman as “Reality-Knowledge-Infinite” (Taittiriya Upanisad 2.1: Satyam-jnanam-anantam). This type of exegesis commands in Sankara’s writings important notations regarding the capacity of the human mind to transcend the primary level of mundane language and concepts. Hacker with his thorough scholarship would have been able to follow up these notations and to give us a really new understanding of Sankara Bhagavadpada.

Yet De Smet is also aware that recognition of laksana alone is not enough. Thus Olivier Lacombe, for example, had assimilated to

104 De Smet, review of Piantelli, 252.
105 De Smet, review of Hacker, 273.
the doctrine of analogy Sankara’s interpretation of the Upanisadic definitions of Brahman by recourse to laksana.¹⁰⁶ But Lacombe did not transcend the current interpretation of Sankara as acosmist and monist.

3.3.4 Maya

A fourth move is to ask: Does the scholar being studied recognize that maya was not a technical term for Sankara, but that it was introduced somewhere down the line, some five centuries later, by Vimuktatman?

Thus Radhakrishnan calls maya the chief characteristic of the Advaita system.¹⁰⁷ He could not free his mind completely from the pervasive influence of the current interpretation of Sankara in terms of vivarta and illusionistic mayavada.¹⁰⁸ He fails to take note of the fact that Sankara used the term maya very sparingly, and that he avoided vivarta completely because it belonged to the Sabdadvaita conception of bhedabheda. Radhakrishnan also does not seem to be aware of the way Sankara’s followers introduced the terms vivarta, maya, and anirvacaniya into the system.¹⁰⁹ In addition, he regards the doctrine of divine causality and lordship as only a product of logic, to be superseded by the monistic insight of intuition; but Sankara does not sustain this.¹¹⁰

Paul Hacker’s study revealed the low frequency of maya in the Brahma Sutra Bhasya as compared to avidya and ajnana.¹¹¹

Piantelli notes that Sankara speaks very little in terms of maya, but more of avidya. He does note Brhadaranyaka Upanisad 4.4.7 which says that, while ordinary knowledge is imbued with avidya, it does not mean that its objects have no reality at all, but that they are undefinable in terms of sat or asat. The independent reality we attribute to them disappears on our awakening to Vidya. He facilely says that acosmism is imposed by our awakening. Still, his intricate

¹⁰⁷ De Smet, “Radhakrishnan’s Interpretation of Sankara,” 64.
¹⁰⁸ De Smet, “Radhakrishnan’s Interpretation of Sankara,” 55.
¹⁰⁹ De Smet, “Radhakrishnan’s Interpretation of Sankara,” 56.
¹¹⁰ De Smet, “Radhakrishnan’s Interpretation of Sankara,” 63.
¹¹¹ De Smet, “From the Vedas,” 3.
explanations are more refined: they amount to a defense of nondualism against monism or dualism, though he does not really deal properly with monism or the doctrine that the aseity of the Absolute renders it incapable of true creativity.\textsuperscript{112} Sankara instead devotes numerous stretches of his writings to creative causality; Piantelli nowhere considers these seriously.\textsuperscript{113}

### 3.3.5 General Observations

We have been noting four ways in which De Smet engages in dialectic with his contemporaries: (1) authenticity of the sources, (2) mode of expression, (3) use of polysemy, (4) use of the term maya.

The second, third, and fourth moves might possibly fall in the category of "data-based" differences: Does this author regard Sankara as a srutividin or not? Does she recognize that Sankara makes use of the polysemy of words or not? Does she recognize that maya is not a technical term for Sankara or not?

It is the first move that is tricky, because it is circular: it relies solely on intrinsic criteria, which means that one's own interpretation of Sankara will color one's judgment. De Smet's argument—and perhaps that of the scholars whom he cites in support—is that a particular work is not authentic because it obviously espouses an acosmism of Buddhist origin, and Sankara rejected Buddhist acosmism, and was himself not an acosmist. But then that is precisely De Smet's own stand, that Sankara is no acosmist. We might recall that Lonergan himself recognized this kind of argument: he regarded the \textit{De natura verbi intellectus} as definitely not attributable to Thomas on the grounds that it is conceptualist, while Thomas is intellectualist.\textsuperscript{114}

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\textsuperscript{112} On this point, see Richard De Smet, "Love versus Identity," \textit{Indian Philosophical Quarterly} 7, no. 4 (July 1980): 519-23.

\textsuperscript{113} De Smet, review of Piantelli, 253.

\textsuperscript{114} It is worth reading this text again: "In other words, behind the difference of opinion between Mandonnet, who regarded the \textit{De natura verbi intellectus} as doubtful or spurious, and Grabmann, who found no extrinsic evidence against its authenticity, there is the far deeper opposition that separates the constructive tendencies of intellectualism and the atomistic tendencies of conceptualism. Nor can one go to the root of that division without tackling the critical problem and, indeed, without conceiving the critical problem not as the easy question whether we know but as the real issue of what precisely occurs when we are knowing." Bernard Lonergan, "Theology and Understanding," in \textit{Collection}, vol. 4 of the Collected Works of Bernard Lonergan (Toronto: University of Toronto Press,
Perhaps we should recognize a fifth move, best exemplified in De Smet's two reviews of Radhakrishnan's interpretations of Sankara.\footnote{115} This is the insight into cognitional theory as governing interpretation. Radhakrishnan, he points out, considers Sankara a purely rational philosopher, and exalts experience, intuition, and logic in Sankara. But Sankara was a \textit{srutivadin}, and he exalted the \textit{apauruseya sabda} of \textit{Sruti}. He did recognize intuition, but only as coming at the end of the whole process of \textit{Brahmajijnasa}, and that too perhaps not completely within the control of human beings, but as the result of grace.

Let me end my observations by noting that De Smet probably qualifies as a critical realist. The evidence for this is his ability to recognize certain things in Sankara: his notion of consciousness as not involving an ultimate duality; his overcoming of his inherited postulate of similarity and mirror theory of knowledge; his affirmation of the dynamism of human intellect and the dynamic and synthetic notion of understanding.

4. CONCLUSION

Relying on indications from the canons of relevance, explanation, and successive approximations, I have attempted a retrieval of De Smet on Sankara consisting of a functional interpretation followed by notes for a functional history of Sankara interpretation. In doing so, I have tried to lay bare De Smet's basic horizon, which is largely that of critical realism. In the process, I have obviously given enough data about my own dominant horizon.

I have not attempted dialectic, but it has become obvious that what I have tried to do – even if stumbling and excessively naive – tends to be a run up to dialectic. De Smet has himself been able to narrow down the field of dialectic considerably by his highlighting of differences that are data-based and others that are truly dialectical.

I conclude with a bow to both Sankara and De Smet. Years ago, when I was just beginning my philosophical studies, I was inspired by De Smet's teaching on Sankara, and I believe I came to a point

\footnote{115} See De Smet, “Radhakrishnan’s Interpretation of Sankara,” 53-70, and “Radhakrishnan’s Second Presentation of Sankara’s Teaching,” 83-96.
where I understood the point he was making: "I am Brahman" does not mean that my empirical self is God; it means that the Root of my finite self is God, and that I am grounded and sustained by that Root at every moment of my existence. In this last year, as I went through De Smet's work on Sankara once again, at hopefully greater depth, I was inspired once again by Sankara's passion for the Ultimate before which all else pales into insignificance, so much so that we might call it non-Being, un-Real. I find in myself a deep appreciation and even love for this great Indian master and sage. As for De Smet, I think he shows us that it is possible to accept what Sankara is saying without necessarily having to subscribe to acosmistic illusionism. Sankara is not doing metaphysics; he is a valuationist, and he is insisting again and again that the supreme Value is That, before which all else is not.
IN THE FIELD of organizational studies, taking organizing as the focus of trying to understand organizations provides a more dynamic perspective that the more static notion of organization.¹ The perspective of organizing opens up seeing it as a moral project contributing to the good of order. In the organizing process, individuals are linked in common acts of meaning that lead to schemes of recurrence that are grounded in the moral obligations of role. Working from a terse account by Lonergan in which he outlines a process whereby individual learning may become collective action, I seek to explore the following questions. How does individual insight become collective (organizational) action? How does the general empirical method work beyond the individual level? I draw on constructs from the field of organizational learning to explore these questions.

In Topics in Education, Lonergan describes the process of civilizational development. A situation provides a set of data. Someone understands something, that is, gets a bright idea of what would happen if it were put into action. That someone takes counsel with others. A policy is devised. Consent is won and human action takes place in the light of the new idea.

The process functions as wheel: situation, insight, counsel, policy, common consent, action new situation, new insight, new policy, and so

The wheel can turn indefinitely. Figure 1 presents a representation of the cyclical process. This terse account needs further explication, which I provide now through three frameworks from the subject area of organizational learning.

Figure 1. Lonergan's wheel of civilizational development

**ORGANIZATIONAL LEARNING**

While individual learning theories have been developed for a long time now, it is only relatively recently that theories of organizational learning have emerged. There has been a burgeoning of literature on learning in organizations over the past thirty years and serious efforts to pursue what it means. At the outset let me state that there is both a conceptual and a practical difficulty about the notion of organizational learning. What does it mean to say that an organization learns? From the field of education and psychology we know about how individuals learn, but to transfer this characteristic of individuals to collective settings, such as a group or organization, is problematic. When chief executives or senior managers say that the organization has learned, to what are they referring – all or some of the members of the management, the entire workforce? What precisely have they learned? At what level have they learned (at a commonsense or theoretically differentiated level)? Have

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these individuals learned the same thing? Do they all agree on what they have learned or even that they have learned? Does this mean a change in behavior? Will they repeat a mistake? Kleiner and Roth put the difficulty clearly: “People in organizations act collectively, but they learn individually. That is the central tenet – and frustration – of organizational learning.”

There are many definitions of organizational learning. For example, Fiol and Lyles provide this definition, “Organizational learning is the process of improving action through better knowledge and understanding.” Nevis, DiBella, and Gould define it as, “the capacity or processes within an organization to maintain or improve performance based on experience.” Capacity suggests that learning is something that not only can happen, but that can be built on as a capability so that it can be developed. Experience points to the potential to capture what actually happens in an organization and to reflect and build on it. It is focused on performance and not directed to something peripheral. As March presents it, learning needs to be both explored (that is, new learning be developed) and exploited (that is, benefit be derived from what is learned).

THE PROCESS OF ORGANIZATIONAL LEARNING

How then does an organization learn? The literature on organizational learning and the learning organization typically juxtaposes individual learning and organizational learning. As Peter Senge puts it: “organizations learn only through individuals who learn. Individual learning does not guarantee organizational learning. But without it

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no organizational learning takes place.” As organizational learning is a systemic phenomenon going beyond the learning of individuals, any description of its elements must take account of the processes whereby individual learning becomes organizational learning.

**Argyris and Schon’s Theory of Organizational Learning**

Argyris and Schon build their theory of organizational learning on the common incongruence between espoused theory and theory-in-use that is due to ineffective skills in implementing theory-in-use. In other words, people do not know how to implement what they espouse. Most organizations work from unquestioned shared assumptions that inhibit learning. This typically involves making inferences about others’ behavior without checking whether they are valid and advocating one’s own views abstractly without explaining or illustrating one’s reasoning. This is shaped by an implicit disposition to winning (and to avoiding embarrassment). The primary action strategy looks to the unilateral control of the environment and the task plus the unilateral protection of self and others. As such, this often leads to deeply entrenched defensive routines, and these can operate at individual, group, and organizational levels. Argyris and Schon describe defensive routines as actions, which aim to prevent people from experiencing embarrassment, and consequently self-reinforcing and self-proliferating systems of self-protection are established. These are implemented skillfully and lead to organizational defensive routines which protect them and keep them from being discussed. What is undiscussable becomes undiscussable and the undiscussability of the undiscussable itself becomes undiscussable. These organizational defensive routines are anti-learning, overprotective and self-sealing. In Argyris and Schon’s view, the challenge then is to transform individuals’ theory-in-use by learning and implementing a new set of governing values. Argyris’s discussion of the Presidential Commission inquiring into the 1986 Challenger disaster demonstrates that organizational defensive routines proliferated and were covered up, albeit with the best intentions and by intelligent well-meaning people.  

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Crossan’s Four I’s

The second framework I introduce is by Mary Crossan and her colleagues who understand organizational learning to be a dynamic process and presents it as an iterative process between the individual, the group, and the organizational levels. They outline four premises that underpin organizational learning:

1. Organizational learning involves a tension between assimilating new learning (exploration) and using what has been learned (exploitation).
2. Organization learning is multi-level: individual, group, and organization.
3. The three levels of organizational learning are linked by social and psychological processes: intuiting, interpreting, integrating, and institutionalizing (four I’s).

Organizational learning is a dynamic process where, not only does it occur over time and across levels, but it creates a tension between exploring new learning (feed forward) and exploiting what has already been learned (feed back). New insights flow from the individual to the group to the organization and at the same time what has been learned feeds back from the organization to how individuals think and act.

To elaborate Crossan and her colleagues’ framework of the cognitive operations of the four I’s: intuiting is a preconscious recognition of patterns or possibilities inherent in a personal stream of experience. Interpreting refers to more conscious elements of explaining an insight. Integrating is the process of developing shared understanding among individuals and of taking coordinated action through mutual adjustment. Institutionalizing is the process of ensuring that routinized actions occur. Taking the four I’s to the process of organizational learning, Crossan and her colleagues place intuiting and interpreting in individual learning. They see group learning as a process of integrating, whereby shared understanding is worked at through conversation among group members in order to

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attain coherence. They understand the process of *institutionalizing* as that which makes organizational learning distinctive from individual and group learning and which is a means for organizations to leverage and consolidate the learning of its individual members.

The four I’s hold the tension between exploration and exploitation. The tension between exploration and exploitation is viewed as feed forward and feedback mechanisms (Figure 2). Feed forward (exploration) is characterized by interpreting-integrating and requires a shift from individual learning to team/group learning. Feedback by institutionalizing-intuiting works from the organizational to the individual level and may be problematic because institutionalization may inhibit or drive out intuition.

**Figure 2. Organizational learning as a dynamic process**
(Crossan, White, and Lane, 1999, 532)

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**The Interlevel Dynamics of Organizational Learning**

The third framework I introduce is from my own work on interlevel dynamics.\(^{12}\) Here I explore how organizational learning comprises

\(^{12}\) David Coghlan and Nicholas S. Rashford, *Organizational Change and Strategy: An
individual, team, and organizational learning. As doing in organizations is undertaken by individuals, by teams/groups and across the interdepartmental group, learning needs to be considered not only at these levels but also between these levels. Organizational learning not only comprises individual, team/group, and intergroup learning but that the process by which organizations learn are iterative cycles of interaction between individual learning, team/group, intergroup learning, organizational and interorganizational learning (review for sense).\(^\text{13}\)

The four psychological reactions to change – denying, dodging, doing, and sustaining – map the sequences whereby learning and change move through an organization from the initial individual to the organization as a whole. There is a domino effect, because the hierarchy of the organization, after recognizing the need for change, intervenes in the change process. Key individuals are confronted with the disconfirming data, assess it and respond to it, which may be in a denial and then dodging mode initially before moving to a doing stage where the information is taken to the team for analysis and acceptance. Team members, confronted with disconfirming information, may also engage in denial and dodging before accepting the need for change and taking the issues to the wider interdepartmental group for acceptance and action. Reaction at the interdepartmental group level leads to intergroup negotiation about what changes, how it changes, to those benefit and what subsystems of the organization are affected. When the change has been initiated at the interdepartmental group level and is affecting the organization’s products or services to its external market, the key individual goes into a sustaining mode and looks for ways to maintain the change in the organization’s structure or critiques the change as to whether the changes is meeting the original or emergent needs for change adequately.

Denying and dodging are natural reactions to the unexpected news that change is needed. Because change involves a movement from what is familiar and accepted, it usually has threatening and stressful

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elements. Therefore, the initial reaction is that change is not necessary; such a reaction typically shifts to an avoidance or dodging stance. As Schein points out, the critical issue for movement is the creation of psychological safety in order to minimize paralyzing anxiety.14

The argument across these three frameworks is that organizational learning is a dynamic inter-level process. It is obvious to note that organizational learning involves people learning together as part of a system. Accordingly, as organizations build culture, hold cognitions, and have a memory, norms, and myths, these elements contribute to how learning can take place in an organization. Given that individual members of an organization may learn more than the organization as a whole might, systemic thinking and working is critical to grasping how the elements of individual and organizational learning interrelate.

Indeed, Argyris and Schon highlight the issue of levels of aggregation as one of the important issues in the debate about organizational learning. They pose the following question: At what levels of aggregation – individual, interpersonal, group, intergroup, or the whole organization – does it make sense to speak of productive organizational learning? Their answer is to place the emphasis firmly on interpersonal inquiry, which occurs within what they call “the constraining or enabling context of an organizational learning system, focusing on how such inquiry interacts with processes described as occurring at higher levels of aggregation.”15 What this seems to mean is that learning is enabled or inhibited, in so far as individuals, whether in teams or across the interdepartmental group, do or do not engage in joint exploration of assumptions and reasoning processes. If these assumptions and reasoning processes are not tested publicly, then the result is organizational defensive routines and inhibited learning.

**DISCUSSION: ELABORATING ON LONERGAN’S WHEEL**

Let us return to Lonergan’s wheel and explore it in the light of the organizational learning frameworks of Argyris and Schon, Crossan and her colleagues, and my own work on interlevel dynamics. Figure

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15 Argyris and Schon, *Organizational Learning II*, 100.
From Individual Insight to Collective Action

3 seeks to draw these together and to capture how Lonergan’s wheel may be informed by work from the field of organizational learning in answering the question as to how individual insight becomes collective action. Lonergan’s continuing cycles of situation, insight, counsel, policy, common consent, action, new situation, and new insight to new policy, involve movement from individual to group to organization and back in feed forward and feed back movement. These movements require different operations at different organizational levels: intuiting and interpreting at the individual level, integrating at the group level, and institutionalizing at the organizational level. The movement from the individual to the group to the organization and back involves engaging with individual and group bias, power, and politics as dialectic is confronted through dialogue.

![Figure 3. Lonergan's wheel and organizational learning](image)

In terms of the feed forward process in Crossan and her colleagues’ framework, individual intuition corresponds to experience and insight and interpreting to insight and judgment of value. The individual brings his/her insight to the group. Here we have dialectic where the conversation emanating from individual experience, understanding, and judgment of value seeks to become shared judgment, and organizational
institutionalizing works to become a scheme of recurrence. In feeding
back, the scheme of recurrence works back to individual experience.
Moving from interpreting to integrating requires a shift from individual
learning to learning among individuals or groups.

The feed forward and feed back processes contain serious
challenges. Taking individual insights and integrating them in a way
that develops shared understanding in group members is as inherently
difficult and complex as it is highly political. It poses questions about
what level of understanding is required/wanted for whom on what.
Many organizational members may be required to develop a partial
commonsense understanding that enables them to operate in their
functional roles; others may be required to develop a theoretically
differentiated understanding. It involves engaging with individual and
group bias as individuals and groups engage in denying and dodging
the imperatives for change and learning. Success cannot be assured,
and it makes high demands on the quality of how influence is exercised
and on both communication and of the atmosphere in the group.
Schein explores two ways of talking together. There is the
traditional discussion mode in which the emphasis is on advocacy, competing,
and convincing and the dialectic of exploring opposites predominates
through debate. There is the mode of dialogue which is marked by
suspension of one's own presuppositions and engaging in internal
listening, accepting differences and building mutual trust, revealing
feelings, building common ground, and challenging assumptions and
learning to think and feel as a whole group and building new and
shared assumptions. In Schein's view, if new organizational responses
are needed that involve changes in cultural assumptions or learning
across subcultural boundaries, dialogue in some form is necessary and
integral to organizational learning because it involves going beyond
the cultural status quo. In the dialogue form, the general empirical
method operates as the basis for inquiry. Members of dialogue groups
may inquire into the insights of others and work to develop shared
understanding, judgments, and planned actions.

16 Edgar H. Schein, “On Dialogue, Culture, and Organizational Learning,”

17 David Coghlan, “Toward a Philosophy of Clinical Inquiry/Research,” Journal of
Reflective Conversation

Scharmer offers a process archetype for organizational conversation which describes four generic stages of listening and conversing.18 Conversations can be distinguished using two frames. First, there is conversation oriented toward the whole (primacy of the whole) or the parts (primacy of the parts). Second, the conversation can be follow a reflective or non-reflective mode. When combined, these two frames form four modes of conversation in four fields, which suggests that conversations follow a path from “talking nice” through “talking tough” into a reflective mode of conversation to “generative dialogue” (Figure 4). The insight from Scharmer’s work seems to be that the move from individual insight to collective action involves both participants to take a higher viewpoint, requiring insights on how to both focus on the whole rather than the parts into both the focus on the whole rather than the parts and on the forms of conversation required in order that learning may take place.

Regarding the feedback between institutionalizing and intuiting, institutionalization can easily drive out intuition. What is institutionalized at the organizational level often becomes difficult to change. Shared assumptions, typically hidden and out of consciousness, operate as culture and shape how members of organizations think and behave.19 As discussed above, Argyris and Schon explore how organizational defensive routines influence how individuals think and act within organizations. These routines are schemes of recurrence and are defensive circles and act as barriers to learning. Seo describes several strategies to confront these barriers.20 Building trust is a mechanism for dealing with emotional barriers, leveraging the dialectic of opposing forces for working with political obstacles and barriers and reframing issues within an alternative institutional logic as a way of bringing external legitimacy.


CONCLUSIONS

In this paper I have sought to expand on Lonergan’s terse account of the cycle of development from individual insight to collective action by discussing it in terms of some frameworks from the field of organizational learning.

In summary, organizational learning is an experiential, cognitive/behavioral, social, and organized process.21

- It is experimental in that it operates within the realm of common sense as organizations seek to improve their actions.
- It is cognitive/behavioral in that it involves experience, understanding, and judgment of value, decision, and action.
- It is social in that it engages communities of meaning in shared experience and exploring insights to develop patterns

of cooperation by means of shared understanding, shared judgments, and patterns of cooperation for the good of order.

- It is *organized* in how it is engaged through Lonergan’s cycles of situation, insight, counsel, policy, common consent, action, new situation, new insight, new policy, and so on as schemes of recurrence are institutionalized and become normative behavior.

From this brief paper, there is clearly much more that can be said. Each of the above issues invites further exploration and more in-depth consideration. What I have not explored is the nature of what is learned and how that has an impact on the process. Exploring such a question would take us into different levels of learning, in Lonergan’s terms, whether learning involves merely substituting one equivalent horizon for another or developing a new one. That is a topic for another day.
RELIGIOUS CONVERSION AS FOUNDATIONAL FOR REVERSING DECLINE

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My intention is to offer a possibly relevant interpretation of Lonergan's thought on religious conversion and decline as presented in Method in Theology.

INTRODUCTION

Conversion is a sea-change in the operation of the human spirit in which we come to live more authentically in the most significant ways. As explained in Method in Theology, religious conversion is the most significant of these, an apprehension of transcendent value that forms the foundation for our right pursuit of being and value. Religious conversion is especially necessary for we fallen ones whose lives and societies have become disordered by decline. In decline, our authenticity becomes unauthenticity as absurdity comes to characterize our lives. Religious conversion reorders and renovates the way in which we love, changing us to be in love with God and thereby giving us the motivation, and the right apprehension of value, to live in a righteous way.

CONVERSION

In the context of Method in Theology, conversion is a change in orientation in the operations one undertakes and the sets of relations that those operations establish and continue.¹

Because all things have not gone well, and so much of the human good is a lack of the good, we must speak not just of orientation but also of conversion. *Method in Theology* lists three conversions – intellectual, moral, and religious. Conversion is used analogously in each of these cases. Undoing the epistemological myth that knowing is like seeing differs from choosing values over satisfactions as the moral basis of one's life. Being set in right relation to transcendent value is, again, a horse of a different color. But in all these cases there is a sense of the subject's turning around, going a different way.

The conversions provide human subjectivity with a different principle of operation. In each conversion the subject evidences a vertical exercise of freedom, in which he or she moves from one horizon to another. They are the most significant cases in which we come to a point of vertical decision, in which as free and graced beings we are able to select (or be placed in) a different horizon in which we will continue to develop.

The actuation of our self-transcendence, then, and the operation of our conscious intentionality that occurs within our horizons, depend greatly on conversion. Conversion is the radical revision of our former way of thinking and choosing whose presence grounds the formulation of our horizons. It establishes us in a new horizon in which we are more likely to experience more attentively, understand more intelligently, judge more reasonably, and decide more responsibly. In all of this, we come to love in a way we did not love before.

Conversion can be understood in relation to emergent probability. Conversions significantly affect the probability schedules according to which we move from what we have been to what we may become. Whereas previously our probability schedules were dominated by the dynamics of sin, as the result of conversion they can come to be dominated by dynamics informed by wisdom and righteousness.

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4 *Method in Theology*, 338.
6 All of the development of the human good can be so understood. See *Method in Theology*, 49 and 49 n16. On emergent probability, see *Insight*, 145-95.
7 *Method in Theology*, 243, for an account of the causal relationships between the conversions.
Religious conversion is a change in horizon made immediately by God in the subject and has the effect of rightly relating the converted subject to God, who is ultimate value. And, recognized as such or not, it forms the foundation for any such ongoing right relationship.

Religious conversion concerns an inner word, the action of God’s love. The inner word will take place in the context of some outer word of tradition – religious, philosophical, political, or moral – and this outer word is constitutive. There ends up being an intimate relationship between the two. Yet religious conversion itself is the inner word.

This conversion is experiential, indeed, the central religious experience. In this most significant instance, the subject’s feeling or knowing God’s love does not constitute the religious experience. Rather, the subject is changed into one who is in love with God. All of the operations of the subject’s conscious intentionality are affected by this change. This is an experience of God, for only God, immediately, makes such a change (or can do so).

Such a transformation can be described as the actuation of an obediential potency, a created communication of the divine nature in which the operations of our consciousness come to participate in the life of God. In much earlier terms it can be identified as the foundation of that hope that does not disappoint us, the love of God poured out into our hearts through the Holy Spirit (Romans 5:5). However the change is described, it constitutes the difference between living a life whose loves are circumscribed by the created world and living a life oriented by love for the mysterious God.

8 Method in Theology, 240-42.
9 Method in Theology, 115, 119.
10 Method in Theology, 122-23.
11 This is the import of the “consolation without a cause” that Ignatius (as interpreted by Karl Rahner) found so central to making an election, to which Lonergan refers when speaking of being changed fundamentally by God’s love. Method in Theology, 106, 282-83.
13 Method in Theology, 105, 278, 282.
DECLINE

Decline involves the cumulative distortion and loss of the human good. It is the incorporation of inattention, oversights, irrationality, and irresponsibility into the operations and meanings that constitute human reality. That is, we reject or neglect, rather than striving toward, the transcendental notions of Being and Value.

Each of the transcendental precepts (be attentive, be intelligent, be reasonable, be responsible) governing our pursuit of Being and Value is a moral imperative indicating the way we should operate. The affective insights that illuminate value to us, and that are central to the fourth phase of intentional consciousness clearly are affected when our feelings— that is, our intentional responses to value— become disordered. However, there is a moral component in our knowing, as well. Judgments of fact are not automatic, nor is the formulation of concepts, nor is being attentive to experience. The feelings that give our processes of cognition momentum have a role in these choices, in that they are the responses that reveal value to us (in these cases, the value of being attentive, intelligent, or reasonable). In this way, affective insight constitutes a remote condition for the rectitude of our conscious operations in its first three phases of conscious intentionality as well as being the insight at the core of the fourth level.

This mis-pursuit of Being and Value therefore reflects and partially results from a disorientation in our affections. Moral wrongdoing and sin do not result from mere ignorance, a defect in practical wisdom. Without devaluing other factors, our affective self-transcendence (or the lack thereof) is of crucial importance for the right pursuit of Being and Value. Indeed, Lonergan describes the way in which feelings must be corrected, developed, and cultivated before they are capable of being reliable guides in discerning value.

The process of decline brought on by aberrations in feeling can be understood using emergent probability. In the case of decline, emergent probability describes the way unintelligibility comes to characterize the actions of persons and sets of social situations. Note that emergent probability does not thereby give a direct intelligibility to decline.

14 Method in Theology, 117.
15 Unless that defect is the result of our negligence or refusal of intellectual betterment.
Religious Conversion as Foundational for Reversing Decline

There is none, for decline is a strict privation of intelligibility. However, emergent probability does describe the way that different kinds of unintelligibility distort the sets of relations and operations evident in the human good.

The biases that drive decline operate in ways that suppress the development and integration of insights that we rightfully should develop. In this way, they enact psychologically continuous probability schedules that lead us away from self-transcendence, toward alienation, unauthenticity, and absurdity. As individuals, and as members of societies, we are incarnate acts of meaning. To the extent that the biases are operative, alienation, unauthenticity, and absurdity come to characterize the meanings that we are.

What are the factors that enact these probability schedules? Without devaluing the role of ignorance and wrong conception, our feelings – intentional responses to value – have become disordered, and, this disordering of our motivation has had a deep and powerful effect on our lives.

Hence, Lonergan repeatedly speaks of preference scales in the context of our apprehension of values, something deeply affected by our feelings. A preference scale has to do with how we rank one value relative to another; especially it is connected with feeling in the apprehension of value. In human decline, our preference scales become distorted. We become motivated not toward Being and Value but toward deeper absurdity. Such a distortion is not necessarily something we always consciously choose. In that these feelings often live in the non-objectified twilight of our consciousness, both our unconscious motivations and the symbols that mediate between the world of immediacy and the world mediated by meaning are also important factors in our decline.

Decline has not just to do with moral and intellectual failings but also with the dialectics of sin. The deepest disordering of feeling is

17 Method in Theology, 46-51.
18 Method in Theology, 40, 50, 52, 240.
19 Method in Theology, 33-34, 34n5, 34n6.
20 Method in Theology, 54-55.
with respect to love. Lonergan describes the root of the fallen condition this way:

Sinfulness similarly is distinct from moral evil; it is the privation of total loving; it is a radical dimension of lovelessness. That dimension can be hidden by sustained superficiality, by evading ultimate questions, by absorption in all that the world offers us to challenge our resourcefulness, to relax our bodies, to distract our minds. But escape may not be permanent and then the absence of fulfillment reveals itself in unrest, the absence of joy in the pursuit of fun, the absence of peace in disgust — a depressive disgust with oneself or a manic, hostile, even violent disgust with mankind.²¹

Beyond and behind each individual moral failing, then, lies a privation of being-in-love. We can anesthetize ourselves to some extent concerning this lack, but in the end the disordered feelings accompanying it will seep into the operations of our consciousness as discord, as a hostility, or even as disgust with ourselves and with our fellow human beings. To say that such a privation affects our moral functioning, and our existential being, is to labor in understatement.

**REVERSING DECLINE**

To reverse decline will require then, a reordering of our love. It will take a revolution in the structure of human motivation that sets us in authentic relation to what is truly of value. In religious conversion, humans receive the dynamic orientation that draws us to authenticity through the gift of God’s love.²² In order for our conscious intentionality to reach authenticity, the functioning of our consciousness must be healed and elevated by God’s love. Religious conversion is thus the gift of self-transcendence toward a reality beyond any possible human horizon.²³

and acts rightly.\textsuperscript{24} In religious conversion, the subject experiences a monumental change in the human reality he or she is.\textsuperscript{25} One experiences a revision of one's horizons toward authenticity. This change is sufficient to reverse the absurdity of sin because (and only because) it is founded on God's grace. The created communication of the divine nature is, by its source, free from sin and able to overcome sin's effects in our conscious operations.

One can use emergent probability to understand religious conversion. Prior to religious conversion, we have preference scales characterized by the lack of love. Through an apprehension of transcendent value, we receive preference scales oriented toward self-transcendence. We receive the possibility of choosing supernatural value, which we did not have before. We receive the "universal antecedent willingness" Lonergan spoke of, that gives us a greater likelihood of being attentive, intelligent, reasonable, and responsible, because we have an anchoring apprehension of and orientation toward transcendent value.\textsuperscript{26}

There is no mechanical, automatic, set of rules to follow to achieve truth and virtue. However, authentic subjectivity does bring one to be more attentive, intelligent, reasonable, and responsible. Attentiveness, intelligence, reasonableness, and responsible action over time bring about true knowledge and moral achievement. By grace, religious conversion orients one toward acting in this way, because knowing, caring about, and choosing in favor of the other is a natural thing for someone in love.

\begin{itemize}
\item \textsuperscript{24} \textit{Method in Theology}, 267-68.
\item \textsuperscript{25} \textit{Method in Theology}, 270.
\item \textsuperscript{26} Frederick Lawrence put it this way:
\begin{quote}
In being converted, in repentance, we enter a conversation within what might be called redemptive tension as we experience the interplay between inner word (gift of the Spirit) and outer word (Jesus, who lived, suffered, died, and rose again) in the process of ongoing conversion, since conversion as a Christian involves a two-sided response to God's outgoing love: a response to the operative grace of conversion that bestows a universal antecedent willingness through the gift of the Spirit; and a (not necessarily separate) response to the outer word of the Risen Lord.
\end{quote}
\end{itemize}
One cannot simply enter into one's heart and change the logic it follows.\(^{27}\) God can do this, and the result is religious conversion. However, it is given to us to cooperate with the gracious work of God. In educating one's feelings, or in fostering that education in others, one can enter into that conspiracy with the Divine that culminates in religious belief, religious hope, and religious love.

Methodically to ground this notion of religious conversion, Lonergan uses the later psychology of Abraham Maslow. In his later psychology, Maslow reworked his earlier analysis of self-actualization, coming to believe that very few people achieve this state.\(^{28}\) However, Maslow observed many people to live, at least temporarily, in a self-actualized way on the basis of peak experiences. Recognized or not, the transforming character of peak experience, in Maslow's estimation, allowed people who would otherwise not be able to live in a self-actualized way to do so. The restrictive logic of normal expectation is overcome by an experience that moves the receiving subject toward self-transcendence.

Peak experience, as Lonergan assesses it, has an ultimate reference to being in love with God.\(^{29}\) Not every peak experience is characterized by being in love with God, of course, but being in love with God is the summit of peak experience. Lonergan repeatedly noted Maslow's assessment that rather than being confined to a few mystics, peak experiences are common; however, the subjects who are having them may not recognize them as such.\(^{30}\) Similarly, being in love with

\(^{27}\) Feelings are not under our conscious control the way our body parts are, but arise spontaneously and can be affected by approval and disapproval. Lonergan's use of "feelings" sublates the work of Dietrich von Hildebrand and Max Scheler (\textit{Method in Theology}, 57-59).


God can work as an undertow in the operations of our consciousness.31 Whether as an un-thematized experience, or as something reflected on and known, being in love with God influences the subject to act in a more self-transcending way.32 Because of being in love with God, a person who, in other terms, may have no right to expect healthy and self-transcending operations, acts in a more healthy and self-actualized way. This dynamic underpins the ability of the human subject to follow the transcendental notion of value.33 In other words, being in love with God (realized or not) provides the basis upon which moral disinterest prevails, and the subject is better able to pursue what is truly of value.

Religious conversion, being changed by God's love, acts as a peak experience or peak dynamic state that changes our moral being.34 It establishes in us a dynamic of growth-motivation in which we are oriented toward transcendent value and thereby to self-transcendence.

Self-actualization, the fruit of being shaped by the gift of the love of God, is therefore not reserved for a special few. The dynamic state of being in love with God effects a transformation on the whole structure of the human good, in every aspect of the human capacity to meet...
human need. It sublates the pursuit of lower needs, placing them in a wider and higher context.

As Lonergan says, our capacity for self-transcendence becomes an actuality when we fall in love.

Then one's being becomes being-in-love. Such being-in-love has its antecedents, its causes, its conditions, its occasions. But once it has blossomed forth and as long as it lasts, it takes over. It is the first principle. From it flow one's desires and fears, one's joys and sorrows, one's discernment of values, one's decisions and deeds.

Because of the new orientation toward transcendent value, we act in a way (self-transcendent) that we would otherwise have been unable to act (either consistently or at all).

The orientation toward transcendent value, then, becomes a condition for the rectitude of our conscious operations. It changes the way we come to affective insights, replacing our prior responses to value with responses appropriate to the horizon of faith. In that the rectitude of the functioning of all our conscious operations is dependent on value responses — remember, the transcendental precepts are moral imperatives — religious conversion becomes a proximate or remote condition of the well-functioning of the human good. Religious conversion by itself does not reverse decline — the rectitude of the human spirit and thereby of the human good requires comprehensive healing and elevation, involving all that we are. But religious conversion, by anchoring the process of the human good to transcendent value and reordering it in the ordo amoris, does thereby provide the foundation necessary for undoing decline.

35 Method in Theology, 114-17.
36 Method in Theology, 105.
FUNCTIONAL SPECIALTIES FOR A WORLD THEOLOGY

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In this paper I wish to make a suggestion regarding the significance of Bernard Lonergan's breakthrough to functional specialization, a significance that has to do with the future of Catholic theology in the world church that Karl Rahner correctly says was mediated into thematic self-recognition at the Second Vatican Council. My suggestion is at once theological and methodological. The theological ground of the hypothesis is the doctrine of the universal mission of the Holy Spirit. The methodological component is Bernard Lonergan's notion of functional specialization. The significance of Rahner's vision of the Second Vatican Council for functional specialization is, I believe, that the eight functional specialties are to be applied by Catholic theology to the universal religious situation of humankind.

More radically, the methodological component in this proposal is the invariant structure of intentional consciousness that, when complicated, becomes, among other things, functional specialization.¹

¹ "Similarly, the second chapter, on functional specialties, was a complication of the basic structure. We have the four levels (experiencing, understanding, judging, deciding) occurring in two phases; and the effort concentrates on the end of the first level, the second level, the third level, and the fourth level. This happens twice and so you get eight. It's a complication of the basic structure. As presented, it was a complication of the basic structure...something similar will be required whenever you have an academic discipline that deals with man's past with a relevance to his future." Bernard Lonergan, Early Works on Theological Method 1, vol. 22 of the Collected Works of Bernard Lonergan, ed. Robert M. Doran and Robert C. Croken (Toronto: University of Toronto Press, 2010) 478-79. (The chapter on functional specialties was at the time — 1968 — projected to be chapter 2 in Method in Theology. The occasion of the cited comment was the set of lectures that Lonergan delivered at Boston College in 1968, where, to my knowledge, he first went public with the notion of functional specialization.)
This methodological component meets the theological ground, the gift of the Holy Spirit, when it is acknowledged that the gift of God's love is the supernatural fulfilment of the obediential potency of nature, that is, intentional consciousness as a principle of movement and rest in search of true meanings and a normative and nuanced scale of values. When the two meet, there is achieved the foundation for an integration of religious studies and theology, a major fruit of what Lonergan called the ongoing genesis of methods.

I presume familiarity with the methodological component. While there are still needed clarifications regarding intentional consciousness, the judgment that the structure is not subject to radical revision is common currency among Lonergan students. But the debate surrounding the theological component rages on—perhaps much to the consternation of the Holy Spirit herself, who I suspect might like us to gain greater clarity and agreement in her regard.

I would like to locate this presentation within a larger ongoing context. That context is partly located in a public discussion that began in October 2009 at Marquette University. I hope this discussion will continue over the years at Marquette, in an annual colloquium on “Doing Catholic Theology in a Multi-religious World.” My hope for the colloquium is that, after some years of debate and discussion, we will have arrived at the broad outlines of a genuinely Catholic theology of religions. At the first of these colloquia, which are sponsored by the

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2 My understanding of the relation of nature and grace is based on Lonergan, not on Rahner. See Jeremy Blackwood, “Lonergan and Rahner on the Natural Desire to See God,” METHOD: Journal of Lonergan Studies, new series, 1, no. 2 (2010): 85-103. Like functional specialization, the scale of values is a complication of the structure of intentional consciousness elevated by divine grace, one that opens on the collective responsibility that is made operative as grace takes on social and cultural effectiveness. See Robert M. Doran, “Social Grace,” paper delivered at the 2010 West Coast Methods Institute, Loyola Marymount University, now published in METHOD: Journal of Lonergan Studies, new series 2, no. 2 (2011): 131-42.


Marquette Lonergan Project, papers by JohnDadosky, Darren Dias, and myself emphasized the universal mission of the Holy Spirit, and so the theological component of my present hypothesis, as a central locus of twenty-first-century Catholic systematics. The papers stressed Frederick Crowe’s position on the relations of the missions of the Holy Spirit and of the Son, and brought into play and updated with Lonergan’s help some central Ignatian insights regarding discernment and dialogue.6

The upshot of the first colloquium was twofold: a shared recognition, acknowledged from the beginning by the speakers but definitely heightened in the course of the discussion, of the need for greater clarity regarding the mission of the Son in relation to that of the Holy Spirit, but also a tacit agreement, it would seem, with a statement in my paper to the effect that the global implications of the scale of values would provide an extraordinary litmus test regarding the major authenticity of the various religious traditions in our world, where “major authenticity” refers not to the authenticity of individuals vis-à-vis their traditions but to the authenticity of the traditions themselves as currently appropriated and implemented or exercised. These two results of the first colloquium became the starting point for the second, which was held in early November 2010. In my own presentation for that colloquium, I related the two results to one another, by attempting to specify the relation between the mission of the Word, understood in terms of incarnate and linguistic meaning, and the cultural and social manifestations of the mission of the Spirit in the gift of God’s love.7 But in the present paper, I want to specify further the implications of the position that I am taking regarding the mission itself of the Holy Spirit, and I want to indicate what I think these implications mean for our very notion of theology and especially for the notion of a Catholic theology explicitly structured by functional specialties.


6 The three papers can be found in PDF and audio on the new website www.lonerganresource.com, under Events: Conferences: October 29-30, 2009.

I will begin with a short section on the mission of the Holy Spirit, where I rely more on Crowe's position than is clear from what I have time to say here. In fact, if Crowe's position is not correct, then what I am proposing regarding functional specialties for a world theology needs to be rethought. The position proposed here depends on Crowe's theological doctrine regarding the mission of the Holy Spirit in relation to that of the Son. In a second section, I will offer my own position on the structure of the gift of the Holy Spirit, repeating in summary form the major points of my paper at the Lonergan Workshop in 2009. I will conclude with a proposal regarding the implications of these positions for a methodical theology, that is, for a collaborative effort structured by functional specialization.

1. THE MISSION OF THE SPIRIT

The Holy Spirit is God's first gift. The Holy Spirit is, first and foremost, the gift that the Father and the Son give to each other as together they communicate the divine nature to the relation of love that unites them. But the divine missions are the divine processions linked to a created, contingent, and consequent term. The gift of the Holy Spirit mutually uniting the Father and the Son is historicized and universalized, and recognition of this establishment of the so-called economic Trinity yields the theological and, I dare say, ecclesial doctrine that everyone is offered the gift of the divine favor and its transforming power, irrespective of all contingent circumstances, including religious affiliation. The doctrine of the universal salvific will of God means that wherever there has been the obediential potency that is human attentiveness, intelligence, rationality, and moral responsibility, there has been the offer of the gift of God's love, that is, the gift of the Holy Spirit. Then, in the fullness of the Holy Spirit's time, the Father sent the Son, who was conceived by the Holy Spirit in the womb of the Virgin Mary, driven by the same Spirit into the desert for forty days, led back by the Spirit to preach the coming of God's reign, and raised to life from death by the Father in the power of the Holy Spirit. In other words, the mission of the Holy Spirit is not only intensified but also revealed, made thematic, in the mission of the Son, where it plays a constitutive role. That Holy Spirit was then sent by the Father and the Son on the apostles and the
other women and men gathered in the upper room on Pentecost. This sending was to fulfill the twofold mission of the Son and the Spirit and to acknowledge that what happened in Jesus was indeed the revelation of what the triune God has always been doing in human history. The time since then, the celebration of which in the liturgical cycle we call “ordinary time,” is really, as Fred Crowe loved to say, the time of the Holy Spirit. It is the ongoing fifth act in the drama of salvation as the latter is conceived by Raymund Schwager, an act in which we are all among the principal protagonists. The mission of the Word is, among other things, the explicit revelation through linguistic and incarnate meaning of what God has always been doing and continues to do in the inner word of the mission of the Holy Spirit, namely, pour out divine love upon us. That is the good news. “God loved the world so much that he gave his only Son” (John 3:16). The move that Frederick Crowe makes in the paper on which so many of us have come to rely is that we share a religious community with all human beings, including the people of the world’s religions, a community grounded both in the common orientation of nature through intentional consciousness to the mystery of love and awe that in fact is the transcendent triune God and in the universal gift of the transcendent God’s triune life through what Christians would confess to be the indwelling Holy Spirit. I cannot elaborate further on Crowe’s rich paper here, but I suspect that many of you are already familiar enough with its basic thesis that I can move on with my own argument. Pneumatology will, I believe, be the most important area of serious systematic theology in this century, and I hope and believe that Crowe’s position, which most likely is also Lonergan’s, will become part of the foundation of a twenty-first-century pneumatology.

8 See Raymund Schwager, Jesus in the Drama of Salvation: Toward a Biblical Doctrine of Redemption, trans. James G. Williams and Paul Haddon (New York: Crossroad, 1999). The five acts are: (1) Jesus’ preaching of the reign of God, (2) the conflict with the religious authorities because of his preaching of the reign of God, (3) the crucifixion and death of Jesus, (4) the resurrection of Jesus from the dead, and (5) the gift of the Holy Spirit at Pentecost. The latter I am conceiving not as the first and original gift of the Holy Spirit to humankind, which is a universal reality, but as the special confirmation by the Holy Spirit that the mission of the Word was indeed the genuine revelation of what God has been doing all along in the universal gift of the Spirit.
2. THE GIFT OF THE HOLY SPIRIT

Ever since writing and publishing the controversial article "Consciousness and Grace," I have been working at further clarification regarding the immanent constitution of our life in God. The position that I have arrived at, largely by laboring over Lonergan's 1951-52 notes on sanctifying grace, is remarkably similar to the one I proposed in "Consciousness and Grace." The present articulation of my position goes as follows (in brief compass).

There is an uncreated gift given to us by the Father, a gift whom Christians name the Holy Spirit. The gift, as uncreated, is constituted by God alone. By the gift the triune God assumes a constitutive role in our living, not as an inherent form or quasi-form, as Karl Rahner might say, but as the term of a set of created relations. The human subject of the first of those relations, the relation to the Holy Spirit, is the central form, the soul, the core of identity, of a subject elevated by sanctifying grace. The term of that created relation is the uncreated Holy Spirit.

This divine self-communication, constituted by God alone, really allows each of the persons of the Trinity to be present to those to whom the created grace of God's favor (gratia gratum faciens) has been given. The major point in my position lies in an attempt to understand how this can be, how the gift of the Holy Spirit as the uncreated term of a created relation allows the other persons of the Trinity to be present as distinct terms of a distinct created relation. I hold that it is specific and peculiar to Christianity that it makes this set of interpersonal relations, which are always given by God, explicit; it elevates them from the vécu to the thématique. But that is doctrine, and the difficult point is not the doctrine but understanding it. The doctrine is given explicitly in scripture, at least in the Gospel of John. But how it is to be understood has been the subject of nearly endless debate, and while I have attempted to express an understanding that I believe works, I am not sanguine enough or foolish enough to believe that it puts an end to the disputes.

The created gift by which God draws us into participation in

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Functional Specialties for a World Theology

divine life, and by which it is true that the Holy Spirit is given to us and dwells in us as the term of a created relation, is to be conceived as *effected*, created, by the love that is common to the three divine persons; but it is also to be conceived as *immanently constituted* in terms of created participations in what Aquinas calls the “notional acts” proper to each of the divine persons. While sanctifying grace is effected by the love common to the three divine persons, it establishes in us distinct relations to each of them and a distinct participation in the divine life of each of them, in keeping with the distinct fashion in which each of them exercises the divine creative love. The question for systematics is, How can this be?

The first of these created relations we have already seen, the created relation to the uncreated Holy Spirit. This is the fundamental divine gift, the gift to us of the same Holy Spirit whom the Father and the Son give to one another eternally. But the affirmation that the Holy Spirit is sent to us can be true only if there is a created condition consequent on the mission by which it is possible to affirm the mission itself. That created consequent condition is the elevation of the central form, the “I,” of the human being to a participation in divine life that makes possible a created *relation* to the uncreated Holy Spirit. The subject of that relation is the elevated central form, substantial form, soul. As a created relation to the Holy Spirit, this relation imitates and participates in the uncreated relation to the Holy Spirit that the Father and the Son are. That is, it imitates and participates in what the psychological analogy has traditionally called active spiration. Thus the created gift called sanctifying grace, which is nothing other than the reception of actively spirating love as it elevates central form to a created supernatural relation to the uncreated Holy Spirit, is a created participation in the Father and the Son together actively “breathing” the Holy Spirit. It is experienced, at least as recollected and made thematic in memory, as being on the receiving end of unconditional love. We have been given a share in the relation to the Holy Spirit that in God is the Father and the Son actively loving each other and in that loving “breathing,” “spirating,” the Holy Spirit. In this active loving, the Father communicates divine love to the Son, who responds precisely as *Verbum spirans Amorem*, an eternal Judgment of Value that breathes eternal love, the proceeding love that is the Holy Spirit
issuing as the mutual love of the Father and the Son. Because of the participation in the Verbum spirans Amorem, the change in us entails a created judgment of value or, better, set of judgments of value, from which there proceeds the created love that shares in the Proceeding Love that is the Holy Spirit. This created love is the love that we call charity. Charity relates us back to the Father and the Son in a created participation in the passive spiration of the Holy Spirit, setting up an inverse created relation to the uncreated Father and Son, who also dwell in us as terms of a created relation.

Aquinas and the early Lonergan thus distinguish charity from sanctifying grace. That distinction is based in the Aristotelian metaphysics of substance and accidents, where the soul is substantial form and the will is a conjugate faculty of the soul. Sanctifying grace is an entitative habit rooted in the soul while charity is an accidental or conjugate habit emanating in the will. I remain convinced that there is a validity to this metaphysics, that it is not to be jettisoned but transposed, and that the solution to the problem with which I am concerned lies in effecting an appropriate transposition of that metaphysics into the terms and relations of a religiously differentiated consciousness informed by Christian revelation.

In that transposition, charity, as a created participation in and imitation of the Holy Spirit, sets up an inverse created relation to the Father and the Son, who thus are also present to us, dwelling in us, as terms of a created relation. The biblical doctrine of the indwelling of all three divine persons is transposed by a technical systematic theology into the affirmation of the indwelling of all three divine persons as terms of distinct relations. The further “interiority” transposition of “the habit of charity” would be captured in an affirmative response to the fourth form of the question of God, as this is expressed on page 116 of Method in Theology: “...now it is primarily a question of decision. Will I love [God] in return, or will I refuse? Will I live out the gift of [divine] love, or will I hold back, turn away, withdraw?” In this transposition, the gift that a metaphysical theology called sanctifying grace is the gift of divine love, of the grace that makes us pleasing to God in the special way that indicates God’s desire that we be God’s friends, and so that establishes a created relation to the uncreated Holy Spirit; it is God’s being in love with us; and charity is the reciprocal dynamic state of our
being in love with God. Sanctifying grace is “gratia operans,” and charity “gratia cooperans” in the realm of habitual grace. Interestingly enough, the recently published volume 22 in the Collected Works of Bernard Lonergan reveals that as late as the 1968 institute at Boston College, Lonergan identified “being in love with God,” not with sanctifying grace, as in Method in Theology, but with charity. This is part of the position that I defended in “Consciousness and Grace,” and I would suggest that we return to it. Lonergan later admitted in a discussion session at a Lonergan Workshop in 1974 that in Method in Theology he had amalgamated sanctifying grace and charity. It has been my position since I wrote “Consciousness and Grace” that that amalgamation was a step back from religious differentiation, and that we should return to the distinction between sanctifying grace and charity affirmed by Aquinas and by the early Lonergan, and work at further refining the interiority transposition of that distinction. In fact, I think, that distinction will give us the “special basic relations” that, strangely, are not mentioned in the basic methodological position expressed on page 343 of Method in Theology: “...the basic terms and relations of systematic theology will be not metaphysical, as in medieval theology, but psychological...general basic terms name conscious and intentional operations. General basic relations name elements in the dynamic structure linking operations and generating states. Special basic terms name God’s gift of his love and Christian witness. Derived terms and relations name the objects known in operations and correlative to states.” Special basic relations would be the relations between receiving the favor of God and living out the gift of divine love by loving God in return.

I have spoken also of a set of judgments of value that proceeds from the reception of the gift of God’s love. I would like to propose that this set of judgments of value constitutes the universalist “faith” that Lonergan distinguishes in his later work from the beliefs of particular religious traditions. If this is the case, the judgments of value are crucial to any attempt to build a Catholic systematic theology of religions. The faith reflected in such judgments of value can be and is found in diverse traditions, and is responsible, it would seem, for Lonergan’s hope that

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10 This comment occurs in the last of the question-and-answer sessions in the 1974 Workshop. The recording of this session is now available as 81500A0E070 on the website www.bernardlonergan.com, with a corresponding transcription at 81500DTE070.
the religions of the world will find common ground and common cause
in the gift of God's love. Such faith is "the knowledge born of religious
love," a knowledge contained in judgments of value consequent upon
the reception of the gift of unqualified love. This knowledge called faith
grounds the proceeding charity that is our created participation in the
passive spiration that is the Holy Spirit.

Thus the analogy that I suggest starts with the reception of the
gift of God's love, recollected in memory and grasped as sufficient
condition for there to proceed a set of judgments of value; from these
two there flows the charity that is the love of God in return. What
makes this analogy different from those proposed by Augustine,
Thomas, and both the early and the later Lonergan is not its structure,
which is identical in all of these analogies, but rather the fact that it
is explicitly an analogy, not from nature to the supernatural order, but
within the supernatural order itself. Created grace has a Trinitarian
form. The analogy in the order of grace begins with the gift of God's
love, retrospectively interpreted as a gift of being on the receiving end
of a love that is without qualification and that has about it something
that seems to emanate from the foundation of the universe. The initial
step in the analogy is composed of the gift of God's love recollected
and acknowledged in memory. This step, grasped as grounding an
assent, issues in the inner word of a judgment of value proceeding from
memory and acknowledging the goodness of the gift. This judgment
of value is the foundation of a universalist faith that is present in all
authentic religion. The recollection and judgment of value together
constitute a created share in, participation in, imitation of, divine
active spiration, the active loving of the Father and the Son for each
other from which divine Amor procedens, passive spiration, the Holy
Spirit, originates. Memoria and its verbum spirans amorem give rise
to the disposition of charity, the antecedent universal willingness
that is a created participation in and imitation of the Holy Spirit, a
disposition that establishes a reverse relation of love for the Father
and the Son. The relation between the love acknowledged in memoria
and its word, on the one hand, and charity on the other, is analogous

11 Method in Theology, 115. For Lonergan's understanding of this universalist faith
and its distinction from the religious beliefs of particular traditions, see Method in
Theology, 115-19.
to the relation between active and passive spiration in the triune God. The three divine persons dwell in us and among us, are present to us, precisely as the uncreated terms of two created supernatural relations: supernatural, because their term is God as God is in God’s threefold conscious self, which is beyond the proportion of any created nature and so absolutely supernatural. And all of what I have just said constitutes a twofold transposition – theoretical and methodological – of the very movement of the Spiritual Exercises of St Ignatius: from the reception of divine love at the beginning to the “Contemplation for Attaining Love of God” in return at the very end. That contemplation contains the basic structure that I am suggesting: memory recollecting and making thematic the gift that one has received, the judgment of value that this is indeed very good, and the awakening of love for the One who has first loved us. Memory and judgment of value together are a created share in active spiration, and the awakening of love in return is a created participation in passive spiration.

3. FUNCTIONAL SPECIALITIES FOR A WORLD THEOLOGY

Finally, and all too briefly, I come to the main distinguishing point of this particular presentation.

Lonergan says in Method in Theology that the correct answer to the question, What data are relevant to Christian theology? occurs, not in the functional specialty concerned with the data themselves, that is, research, but in the sixth functional specialty, the one concerned with doctrines. But, he goes on to ask, “How can the sixth specialty be reached, if one does not know which are the areas relevant to theological research, and how each area is to be weighted?” His answer is typical: “...let Christian theologians begin from where they already stand. Each will consider one or more areas relevant to theological research. Let him work there. He will find that the method is designed to take care of the matter.”12

Now, my question is, What happens with respect to the question of the areas relevant to theological research if a Christian theologian stands on Frederick Crowe’s theological doctrine regarding the relation of the mission of the Holy Spirit to the mission of the Son?

12 Method in Theology, 150.
What happens if such a theologian affirms that we Christians share a religious community with all human beings, including the people of the world's religions, precisely because the divine person whom we call the Holy Spirit has been sent to all; again, precisely because the created participations in Trinitarian active and passive spiration that Christian theologians are enabled to make thematic are in fact a universal offer on the part of the triune God to all women and men at every time and place in human history, whether that offer be vécu or thématique?

What happens is that the relevant data for Christian theology are magnified exponentially; and the consequences for the other functional specialties in the first phase of theology are enormous in their implications. For all the data on human religious living, whether that living be explicit or compact, are now to be made available for Christian theology itself; they are to be interpreted in accord with the hermeneutic theory presented in both chapter 17 of Insight and chapter 7 of Method; and the relevant history for Christian theology itself expands to include the religious history of all of humanity. That such a proposal does not mean the collapse of theology into positivist religious studies is guaranteed by accepting the functional specialization of theological tasks; for then, beyond research, interpretation, and history, which is where religious studies would stop, there remains, in the first phase, the dialectic that would mediate the differences, and then there is the normative subject, the concrete universal moving the whole of theology to a second phase; and in that second phase there will emerge vastly expanded functional specialties of foundations, doctrines, systematics, and communications. The result will be a vast collaboration constructing what we may call a world theology or a theology for a world church, a theology that takes its stand on the theological and ecclesial doctrine of the universal mission and gift of the Holy Spirit, and that applies the methodological doctrine of functional specialization to the task of mediating from data to results an entire worldwide community of men and women receiving and responding to what Christians know as the third divine Person, the Holy Spirit of God, proceeding Love in the Trinity poured out in the hearts of all by the gift of the triune God to all. The content of all eight functional specialties is expanded vastly if we take our stand on Crowe's theological doctrine.
Such is the vision, in very brief compass. I do not have the time to pursue it further here. But I know I cannot consider the work that I'm currently doing on *The Trinity in History* complete even in a first installment until this vision has been explored and mined further. But I must stop here at present.\(^{13}\)

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\(^{13}\) Since I delivered this paper at the 2010 Lonergan Workshop, there have been two developments in my thinking relevant to the problems treated here. In "Social Grace and the Mission of the Word," the universalist faith mentioned above is affirmed to be a participation in an invisible mission of the divine Word. And in a paper published in *Method: Journal of Lonergan Studies*, (new series 2, no. 1 [2010]: 13-16), "The Ninth Functional Specialty," the objectification of the normative subject is removed from the functional specialty Foundations to become a ninth functional specialty, Horizons, mediating between the first and second phases of theology. What is left in the place of Foundations in Lonergan's schema of the functional specialties I now call Categories.
RE-FRAMING APPLIED PSYCHOLOGY
IN TERMS OF SELF-TRANSCENDENCE:
SELECTED CHALLENGES, PROBLEMS,
AND PROSPECTS

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INTRODUCTION

Self-transcendence is the achievement of conscious intentionality, and as the latter has many parts and a long development, so too has the former. There is a first step in attending to the data of sense and consciousness. Next, inquiry and understanding yield an apprehension of a hypothetical world, mediated by meaning. Thirdly, reflection and judgment reach an absolute: through them we acknowledge what really is so, what is independent of us and our thinking. Fourthly, by deliberation, evaluation, decision, action we can know and do not just what pleases us, but what truly is good, worthwhile. Then we can be principles of benevolence and beneficence, capable of genuine collaboration and true love. But it is one thing to do this occasionally, by fits and starts. It is another to do it regularly, easily, spontaneously. It is, finally, only by reaching the sustained self-transcendence of the virtuous... that one becomes a good judge, not on this or that human act, but on the whole range of human goodness.¹

How can some of the major ideas of Bernard Lonergan be used to transform the expanding domains of applied psychology? More

specifically, how can the phenomena of cognitional and moral self-transcendence identified by Lonergan be imported into various areas of applied psychology?

The American Psychological Association currently lists over fifty sub-specialties in psychology, and any one of them can fall under the general rubric of “applied psychology” as long as attempts are made to use theory and research findings to address practical problems. As such, applied psychology is not primarily concerned with the development and testing of theories, but employs research findings in practical situations.

The present paper explores some connections between selected ideas in the work of Bernard Lonergan and themes currently under investigation in various branches of applied psychology. These explorations are part of a larger, ongoing program to apply Lonergan’s ideas about cognitional structure, intentionality analysis, generalized empirical method, bias and intellectual and moral self-transcendence to selected areas of applied psychology, including: developmental, educational, counseling, and organizational. Cognitional structure refers to groupings of conscious activities and events that occur in problem solving. Intentionality analysis identifies how comprehensive problem solving requires the fulfillment of distinct intentions to understand possibilities, resolve issues of fact and value, and find reasonable bases for action. Generalized empirical method illuminates how similar problem solving activities cut across efforts at solving problems in science, mathematics, and common sense. Bias, as described by Lonergan, is a basic interference with the problem-solving process, resulting in distortions of all types. Finally, self-transcendence (both intellectual and moral), when it is achieved, encompasses growth of humans beyond their current “self.”

The work described in this paper has been guided by four clusters of questions which, taken together, would provide remarkable unity to psychology if answered correctly. These groups of questions pertain to learning, mis-learning, personality functioning, and personality development. The general constructs of learning and personality are central to most sub-specialties in psychology. Hence answers to the following questions should shed a unifying light on those areas of

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human activity and personal change that require complex problem solving.

**Cluster 1 – Learning as Problem Solving**

Examples of the questions about learning include Lonergan's initial formulation: "What are we doing when we are knowing?" as well as possible reformulations such as "What are we doing when we are acquiring knowledge?" or "What are we doing when we are learning something?" The learning referred to in these questions is an active and complicated process that is often referred to in the psychological literature as "complex human problem solving." This is often distinguished from simpler forms of learning such as paired-associate learning or memorization.

**Cluster 2 – Mis-learning**

A second set of questions pertains to what may be termed mis-learning: for example, "How can human problem solving be distorted?" or "What can interfere with it?" While there may be many answers to these questions, Lonergan devoted a great deal of attention to the phenomenon of "bias" as a primary distorting principle relative to our problem-solving efforts.

**Cluster 3 – Personality Functioning**

If problem solving (as coming to know something) is important to human functioning then it is important for personality functioning in current contexts. This leads to a third set of questions as follows: "How does human problem solving affect personality functioning?" and "How does human mis-learning affect personality functioning?"

**Cluster 4 – Personality Development**

Since problem solving and current functioning can also have long-term consequences, there also emerges a fourth set of questions regarding personality development over the long term: "How does human problem

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solving affect personality development?” and “How does human mislearning affect human development?”

These four sets of general questions can be used to bring some unity to various areas of applied psychology, including its developmental, educational, counseling, and organizational branches. The aim of this paper is to explore some suggestions on how this might be done. Specifically, it will consider examples in which applied psychologists are or are not investigating the facts associated with the nature and relations of levels of consciousness, the role of question and insight in learning, and the influence of “basic biases” on the production of mislearning.

Providing such a sketch is actually a response to several challenges issued to social scientists by Lonergan himself and the scholars that follow him. Among these challenges are those of: (1) understanding the act of understanding itself in all its conditions and ramifications; (2) for psychologists to learn how to study the data of consciousness; (3) making clear to twenty-first century audiences the facts of question and insight; and (4) bringing generalized empirical method into the social sciences. All these challenges point to an ongoing need for clarity about the basic facts of consciousness and learning and interferences with them.

This kind of clarification would inform debates in applied psychology circles on such seemingly disparate topics as: the relative importance of “creative” and “critical thinking” in education, the nature of “transformational learning,” the relative strengths and weaknesses of insight in counseling, cognitive correlates for psychological defenses, and principles for the development and deterioration of problem solving in individuals and groups.

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4 Insight, introduction.
5 Method in Theology, 180.
7 William Murnion, “Method in the Arts and Sciences.”
LEVELS OF CONSCIOUSNESS
AND THEIR INTER-RELATIONS

At the beginning of *Insight* Lonergan issues his primary challenge to all serious thinkers to thoroughly understand what is involved in the very processes of understanding itself: “Thoroughly understand what it is to understand, and not only will you understand the broad outlines of all there is to be understood but you will also possess a fixed base, an invariant pattern, opening upon all further developments of understanding.”

This work is taken up in *Insight* and clarified in *Method in Theology*. In the process, distinct groups of conscious acts and operations are identified, and based on these groupings, differing levels of consciousness are described and related to one another. What emerges are types of consciousness that are distinguished from one another by intention and product, yet are at least potentially related to one another by a process named “sublation”: hence there are “four levels of conscious and intentional operations, where each successive level sublates previous levels by going beyond them, by setting up a higher principle, by introducing new operations, and by preserving the integrity of previous levels, while extending enormously their range and their significance.” Hence experiencing, understanding, judging and deciding are described, distinguished and related to one another in this manner.

There have been numerous presentations of these four groups of conscious operations (or, levels of consciousness) outlined by Lonergan. There is no need to re-summarize those descriptions here, and the reader is referred to them and to personal experience for basic clarification on these matters. Yet in reference to them, a number of important points can be emphasized.

First, to bring this type of analysis into contemporary applied

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8 *Insight*, introduction, 22.
psychology presupposes a stance regarding what Lonergan calls the "data of consciousness": that is, events in conscious experience that are other than sense experiences. For well over a century, psychologists have debated the accessibility and usefulness of such data in psychological research. The radical behaviorist tradition, as represented by John B. Watson and more recently by B. F. Skinner, is clear in its rejection of such data. Yet reflection on conscious experience is likely to reveal the behaviorist account of human learning as impoverished, since it leaves out intention and motivation, question, and insight. This brings us to a more narrow challenge issued by Lonergan to scientists of any discipline: learn to deal with the difficulties associated with the data of your field. For psychologists this becomes an exhortation to learn to deal with the difficulties of the data of consciousness (which psychologists sometimes refer to as "introspective data") as well as reports about those data.

Over the last 150 years, psychologists have displayed ambivalence in their willingness to study data of consciousness and phenomena such as insight. This was a topic of interest in the early German psychological laboratories. After falling into some disrepute, it was neglected as a topic until the Gestalt psychologists took it up again in the 1930s and 1940s. In the 1970s, there occurred what has come to be known as the "cognitive revolution" as a backlash to the limitations of radical behaviorism. In the wake of this newer initiative a number of attempts to study various aspects of insight have accumulated, ranging from the assembly of autobiographical accounts, to surveys and experimental

and quasi-experimental studies. At this point, most approaches to the study of insight as a general phenomenon are explicitly regarded as indirect and dependent upon the ability to accurately self-report.

Next, as is clear in the Lonergan tradition, there are levels of consciousness (experiencing, understanding, judging, and deciding) that appear to have different functions. Each level of consciousness is suffused with purpose of some type and each is associated with specific cognitive operations. More specifically, each type of consciousness will be associated with some conscious act or event that moves thinking forward (an "operator") as well as some process or product that brings a kind of closure or fulfillment of intention appropriate for that level (an "integrator"). The entire sequence of said activities and events constitutes a process which may unfold naturally or which may be interfered with. To move forward, a sustained desire to know must be present, thus "maintaining the intention to learn." 

For the levels of understanding, judging, and deciding, questions of specific types serve as operators, moving consciousness to fulfillment of an intention, and insights of specific types serve as integrators, bringing thinking forward to a related product. The process of self-transcendence, as it unfolds, involves passive (or receptive) aspects as well as active aspects. As psychological events, insights are not in our control, and questions are only partially in our control. Yet we do maintain a choice in whether we pursue them, in effect preserving the intention to learn.

In light of these levels of consciousness, one can then define "learning" as a transition from a state of not knowing to a state of knowing. Sub-types of learning can be worked out in terms of propositional and procedural knowing as well as conceptual learning, factual learning, values clarification, and comprehensive learning. Of all types of learning, problem solving will be the most active and

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the most complex. Lonergan views these changes in terms of self-transcendence (both cognitional and moral), and he notes how difficult it is to develop them into settled habits for the management of our own learning and growth as persons.22

This pattern of levels of consciousness is repeated time and again in comprehensive learning and results in settled habits of growth; yet, the process begins with a problem-as-experienced. For example, in personal development, a person may experience the problem of keeping a New Year's resolution. In education, a student routinely faces the problem of doing poorly in mathematics. In counseling, a client struggles with the problem of unbridled anger. In organizations, workers neglect the organizational mission. Yet in each instance, these problematic experiences could give way to increased understanding, critical reflection, and a reasoned response—thus repeating the pattern of development.

**FUNCTIONAL ROLES OF QUESTION AND INSIGHT IN PROBLEM SOLVING**

Crowe has issued the challenge to make the basic facts of insight (including associated questions) more transparent to future audiences.23 In applied psychology, the facts of question and insight are studied under the headings of "thinking and problem solving" and "cognitive psychology.

As reference points for the future, it would be useful to compare Lonergan's five conclusions about aspects of insight with the conclusions reached by psychologists using more indirect methods. In particular, Lonergan concluded that insight: (1) comes as a release to the tension of inquiry, (2) comes suddenly and unexpectedly, (3) is a function not of outer circumstances but of inner conditions, (4) pivots between the concrete and the abstract, and (5) passes into the habitual texture of the mind.24

Robert Sternberg and Janet Davidson have compiled a specialized and rather unusual collection of recent empirical studies devoted to

22 *Method in Theology*, chap. 2.
24 *Insight*, chap. 1.
the description of insight and of some conditions that seem to favor its emergence. (1) While Lonergan refers to a release of the tension of inquiry, Mary Gick and Robert Lockhart address the affective aspects of insight which they regard as a natural correlate. In some cases the "aha" experience is accompanied by delight, and in others by chagrin, depending on the content of the insight. Howard Gruber considers insights and associated emotions through consideration of specific historical examples in the overall context of learning. (2) Lonergan adverts to the suddenness of insight as do Gick and Lockhart and Gruber. Janet Davidson focuses primarily on this aspect of insight in her review of the literature and her related empirical study. (3) For Lonergan, insight is a function not of outer circumstances but of inner conditions: for example, the emergence and formulation of a question and the desire to know. Psychological researchers may attend to both inner and outer conditions. Instead of questions, they may refer to the formulation of a problem. In addition, they often attend to the behavioral and social contexts in which problem solving occurs. (4) While Lonergan adverts to how insight pivots between the concrete and abstract, psychological researchers routinely examine the extent to which insights can be generalized (which would not be possible were it not for abstraction). (5) Finally, Lonergan writes about insight passing into the habitual texture of the mind. That passing would be a movement into the background and to the diminished attention it receives. Such settling "into the habitual texture of the mind" may signal the emergence of expert knowledge, which has been the focus of some research attention: with some emphasizing the automatic aspects

25 Sternberg and Davidson, *The Nature of Insight.*
27 Howard Gruber, "Insight and Affect in the History of Science," in Sternberg and Davidson, *Nature of Insight.*
29 Maria Ippolito and Ryan Tweeney, "The Inception of Insight," in Sternberg and Davidson, *Nature of Insight.*
of it, and others emphasizing the consciously controlled reflective aspects of it.

In contrast with insight, the question as a conscious event has received even less attention. Occasionally, questions are addressed from a linguistic point of view, as a formulation of an interrogative proposition. Yet they seem neglected as a pre-verbal recognition of a gap in our understanding, knowledge, or practice; and they are also neglected as an intention to fill the gap (through learning). The literature in cognitive psychology approaches the function of the question when it examines the way in which we “find problems” and “represent problems.” The probability of successful problem solving is heightened if the nature of the gap is clear and if the intention to learn is preserved in spite of distractions and disruptions.

The nature of the question anticipates the nature of the insight sought and the kind of consciousness of which it is a part: whether it is understanding, judging, or deciding. Problem solving that is unfettered and dominated by the intention to learn is to be distinguished from “problem solving” that is disrupted.

PROBLEM SOLVING VERSUS MIS-LEARNING

A distinct set of questions pertains to what may be termed mislearning: for example, “How can human problem solving be distorted?” “What can interfere with it?” While there may be many answers to these questions, Lonergan devoted a great deal of attention to the phenomenon of “bias” as a primary distorting principle relative to our learning. In one instance he referred to bias as “a block or distortion

of intellectual development." What are typically blocked are the questions and insights that would lead to further development with all its demands and opportunities. This phenomenon was described and defined as existing in four basic forms, dramatic, egoistic, group, and general. In addition, he mapped out in some detail the deleterious effects of bias on learning and social situations. Yet currently both the social sciences and the general culture have taken up the abstract term “bias,” routinely pronounce on its seriousness and yet fail to define it.

In some usages, the term has been used as a synonym for “preference,” “interest,” “judgment,” or “value,” which of course blurs over important distinctions among psychological activities and events.

Let us use the term “basic bias” to refer to the phenomenon, discussed by Lonergan, of refusing (or at least excluding systematically) further relevant questions and insights. Each advance from question to insight, from question to knowledge, from question to reasoned action, represents a transcendence of a new more comprehensive self over a less-developed, prior version. Lonergan refers to this in his discussion of intellectual and moral self-transcendence. There is no guarantee that such growth will be pleasant, and there is no guarantee that the problem solving it requires would be devoid of hard work. Consequently, we may seek to avoid it, and we may even nurture resentments about it. Hence a dynamic tension is set up between growth and inertia, creativity and comfort, high performance and coping habits. These tensions are played out over again in a wide variety of human contexts, including personal, educational, counseling, and organizational contexts.

Consequently, the effects of basic bias and other interferences with growth-producing problem solving will be as far reaching as the objective array of problems that exist in any current situation.

If basic bias is so important, then how can it be detected? What is the evidence that it exists? At a minimum, the following kinds of evidence would need to be assembled to demonstrate the existence of a basic bias: (a) a formulated question or insight, (b) that is demonstrated to be relevant to the solution of an identified problem, (c) that is clearly blocked or dismissed on a repeated basis over time. Such a block or

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36 Method in Theology, 231.
37 Method in Theology, 35.
dismissal could be due to a conscious rejection or to an ongoing habit of inattention.

CANDIDATE THEORIES FOR COLLABORATION WITH LONERGAN

If Lonergan’s contributions on cognitional and moral self-transcendence as well as the related topics of bias, cognitional structure, intentionality analysis and generalized empirical method are to be made relevant in applied psychology, they might be connected with theories that presuppose a compatible view of human science. Theories in a compatible human science would tend to be evidence-based, give a priority to complex human problem solving, include the data of consciousness and their meaningful products, acknowledge self-correcting feedback loops and real human choice, include a principle to explain mis-learning and decline and have relevance to wide areas of human activity. Such candidate theories would not emerge from a human science that is in a positivist mold of imitation with the natural sciences.

In addition, such theories would tend to shed light on personality functioning and development in a variety of contexts.

For our purposes here, some general theories that meet the above criteria can be mentioned: (a) for personal development, Locke and Latham’s high performance cycle, (b) for education, Marquardt’s theory of active learning, (c) for counseling situations, Prochaska’s theory of habit change, and (d) for organizational problem solving, Argyris’s theory of reflective practice. In each case these theories are supported by an emerging base of evidence, give a priority to complex human problem solving, attend to meaningful products of the data of consciousness, acknowledge self-correcting feedback loops and real human choice, and have relevance to wide areas of human activity.

Development and the High Performance Cycle

In the early 1990s Edwin Locke and Gary Latham reviewed the research literature on work motivation and satisfaction. In the process, they described a general account of high performance that could be

applied in any area of human endeavor. Their account specified high performance as an outcome of a rather limited number of both inner and outer conditions. Among the inner (or more personal) conditions were included specific high goals, a belief in self-efficacy, effort, persistence, direction, strategies, goal commitment, and ability. Among the outer (or more environmental) conditions were included feedback, task complexity, and situational constraints. In addition, because high achievement was placed in an environment of self-given and other-given rewards, a specific level of satisfaction could be predicted. As is well known from behavioral and cognitive behavioral research, reward structures can increase or maintain a specific behavior.

Lonergan's ideas on problem solving can mesh well with the internal conditions of specific high goals (as sometimes specified in questions), with ability (including the ability to manage one's questions and insights and to preserve the intention to learn over the long term), and with feedback (through the self-correcting process of learning as present in alternating question and insight). The high performance cycle implicitly includes a principle for mis-learning and decline if the conditions of high performance are interfered with or not met. Finally, as the authors note, this theory can be applied to wide areas of human activity, even though their original focus was in the area of work motivation and satisfaction.

**Education and Active Learning**

Early in the twenty-first century, Marquardt combined principles of inquiry learning with those of action research to develop an educational approach known as active learning. In inquiry learning, students learn strategies for manipulating and processing information, testing hypotheses, and trying out new applications. The formulation and pursuit of key student-generated questions is crucial to this educational approach. Action research is concerned with keeping track of specific efforts to address specific problems in different kinds of practical contexts. In active learning, students generate a series of questions they deem to be useful for addressing a specific problem situation. In addition, students specify the kinds of evidence and criteria that would

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be useful in answering the questions and ultimately in resolving the problem situation.\(^{40}\)

In this type of learning, student questions clearly function as operators, moving participants through Lonergan’s levels of increased understanding, judging matters of fact and value, and deciding on a course of action. The kinds of “loops and levels” of both planning and action, as specified by Stebbins, are quite useful here.\(^{41}\) The more this kind of learning is practiced, the greater the probability of developing what Schunk and Zimmerman refer to as a “self-regulated learner.”\(^{42}\) Since in active learning questions are actively pursued, often in a social context, there is a built in self-correcting feedback loop. However, if questions are blocked through basic bias or other interferences, a force for mis-learning and decline can be identified. Finally, active learning, because of the unrestricted range of human questioning, can be applied to any area of human problem solving activity.

**Counseling and Habit Change**

One of the most difficult tasks in human development is the attempt to change a habit, whether it is a habit of behavior, thought, or affect. Yet the ability to remove habits that are misleading or harmful is most useful for personal development. The cost of such effort is the cessation of a prior personality (or “self”) that incorporated such habits, and its benefit is the emergence of a more integrated and moral personality (or “self”): hence one has achieved a form of self-transcendence.

James Prochaska and his associates have developed a general theory of habit change that meets the human science requirements specified above\(^{43}\) – the tendency to be evidence-based, to give a priority


\(^{43}\) James Prochaska, John Norcross, and Carlo DiClemente, *Changing for Good* (New
to complex human problem solving, to include the data of consciousness and their meaningful products, to acknowledge self-correcting feedback loops and real human choice, to specify a principle of mis-learning and decline, and to have relevance to wide areas of human activity. The work of the Prochaska group came out of working with both self-changers and clients in counseling who were struggling with problems of weight control, substance abuse, smoking, and other compulsive behaviors.

According to the theory, to bring about lasting habit change, a person will likely need to move through six stages in a precarious and spiraling upward trajectory. (1) There is the stage of "pre-contemplation" in which no problem is recognized by the person, or it is minimized to such an extent that no action is even considered. Simultaneously, others may have noticed some problematic effects of the habit, but for the person in question a basic insight into their own way of being is lacking. (2) In the "contemplation" stage, the problem is recognized as at least a possible problem, and some of its consequences are acknowledged. However, there is no decision in favor of action. In Lonerganian terms, this would include the emergence of a crucial insight into the problematic nature of the habit in question. (3) In the "preparation" stage, one resolves to take some kind of action in the next month, but has not yet resolved ongoing ambivalence about the relative costs and benefits of habit change. This ambivalence could easily involve backward pulling forces of habit and resentment. The person in this stage is likely to be oscillating between the "pros" for growth and the "cons" supporting the status quo. (4) In the "action" stage, one commits oneself to modifying the previous habit based on a much clearer recognition of misleading and even delusional aspects of the prior habit life. Hence this stage involves decision followed by appropriate action. (5) In the "maintenance" stage, one works to consolidate gains and to prevent relapse. Often such consolidation involves collection of further evidence to support the desirability or necessity of habit change, even in the face of opposition provided by some persons, places, or things. (6) In the "termination" stage, the former habit presents no temptation of threat. What was viewed as "necessary" or "desirable" in the past, is now viewed with either indifference or repugnance. A "revised self" has emerged to replace what previously existed. This transformation
represents a deep and comprehensive problem solving that was solidly based on experience, considered intelligible possibilities, evaluated evidence and reasons to resolve matters of fact and to clarify values, and engaged in decision and action that transformed not only situation but also self. This comprehensive problem solving can take months or years, particularly if habit change is the issue.

An old Amish saying has it that we are "too soon old, and too late smart." Developmental psychology has described how cognitive development is a protracted process; and by the time self-knowledge and self-control emerge as real possibilities, it appears that habits of all sorts have been well-established and tend to pull in a variety of directions, some of them pro-growth and some of them anti-growth. Consequently, it can be expected that for many adults, their current personality is a hodgepodge of conflicting forces and loyalties – a situation that drains energy and tends toward mediocrity or destruction, not high achievement or wisdom.

**Reflective Organizational Practice**

While developmental problems certainly exist in the individual, they get magnified and made much more complex with the group. A common problem with organizations of all types is that, while they are organized for efficiency, they are often inefficient; and while they are organized to fulfill a specific mission, they often not only fail to do it, but they somehow accomplish the opposite. Consequently, it is common to encounter the complaint telephone line that is never answered, the health department that does not dispense health advice, the schools that produce illiterate students, jails that do not rehabilitate, and so forth.

Chris Argyris⁴⁴ has developed a general approach for the study of organizational practices based on the change theory of Kurt Lewin⁴⁵ and the theory of reflective practice proposed by Donald Schon.⁴⁶ Schon, in his now classic book, *The Reflective Practitioner*, invites readers to

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attend to the data of their own experience in a variety of work-related situations; and, by attending to that data, to identify discrepancies and contradictions that impair both action and progress. Such identifications may initiate both a thought process leading to growth-promoting interventions and an action process of applying them.

Argyris has applied these principles to organizations through the study of case examples. The primary data he considers are self-report data that encapsulate workers’ problem-solving efforts, interferences with them, and surrounding or contextual thoughts and emotions that often accompany these experiences. These data are then used get workers to reflect on their own experiences to identify discrepancies and contradictions that have in fact impaired action and progress within the organization. The result is often that two quite different views of the organization emerge: a public relations account of the organization’s functioning (reserved for glossy brochures and fund-raising functions), and a “theory-in-practice,” which is a more accurate account of how things actually work. What also emerges is a description of how “mistakes” are “handled” within the organization: either indicating an embrace of the self-correcting process of learning or, more commonly, indicating the operation of a basic bias over the long term. When an organization has an operating basic bias functioning at its core, then feedback loops are distorted or blocked, legitimate criticism is stifled, and commitment to organizational goals wanes since the organization stands for not much else other than survival. To the extent these things occur, the organization plants the seeds of its own demise. Consequently, Argyris’s approach includes principles that promote complex human problem solving by (a) collecting and attending to meaningful data that reflect the thoughts and feelings of participants, (b) developing an organizational climate of reflection on those data, (c) using this reflection to identify principles for problem solving and growth within the organization, (d) using this reflection to identify instances of basic bias and decline in the organization, and (e) developing consensus to implement a program to promote problem solving and growth and to eliminate basic bias and its effects. Argyris’s approach is applicable to a wide variety of organizational situations. Consequently, it too meets the human science requirements specified above.
The examples presented here can be clearly used to complement our growing knowledge of personality functioning and development through problem solving. In addition, they are examples of a new kind of human science that does not operate on limiting positivist assumptions.

**FUTURE CHALLENGES AND OPPORTUNITIES**

Based on these and other examples, it can be argued that the seeds of a newer, more fully human science are being planted for the future. As indicated, such a human science would include theories that would be evidence-based, give a priority to complex human problem solving, include the data of consciousness and their meaningful products, acknowledge self-correcting feedback loops and real human choice, include a principle to explain mis-learning and decline, and have relevance to wide areas of human activity.

To move this process along, applied psychology in the twenty-first century can take up the challenges presented by Lonergan and his associates by addressing the following issues:

1. Psychologists will need to take a clear stand of what the data of their discipline are. More specifically, they will need to articulate a position on what Lonergan calls “data of consciousness.” If these data are admitted, then so are the data of question and insight as psychological events and not just as a post-formulated products. The fact that such events are odorless, colorless, and fleeting is not sufficient reason for their banishment, though it will present special challenges for their study.

2. Related to the data of consciousness are their meaningful expressions, reports and self-reports of all kinds that can be accepted a data for a new psychology. While there are problems with self-report data, even the so-called hard sciences could not function without them. Yet these “hazy” data can be profitably used in the development of a probabilistic human science.

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3. In addition to the automatic processes of maturation, learning is a central component in the functioning and development of the adult person. While some learning is simple (e.g., memorization), and some is almost automatic (e.g., paired-associate learning), the learning involved in problem solving is quite active and complex. This comes closest to the levels of consciousness outlined in the Lonergan program. While different types of thinking are being actively pursued by cognitive psychologists, no general theory of problem solving has gained wide acceptance.\textsuperscript{48} In addition, virtually all such theories leave out entirely the phenomena of question and insight, hence the functions filled by these events are either mistakenly placed or overlooked. Given this kind of oversight, both the possibility and the fact of cognitional and moral self-transcendence are also neglected. A more comprehensive account of human learning would not make that mistake.

4. To fill this gap what is needed is a unified theory of problem solving that can (a) take advantage of the details provided by Lonergan’s account of levels of consciousness and associated activities (generalized empirical method, G.E.M.), (b) be merged with evidence-based empirical theories in the newly emerging areas of self-regulated learning,\textsuperscript{49} high performance,\textsuperscript{50} and other cognitive models\textsuperscript{51}, (c) would be useful in identifying disruptions in the problem-solving process, (d) would have clear implications for hypothesis testing, (e) would have clear implications for a revised taxonomy of problems.\textsuperscript{52} problem-


\textsuperscript{49} David Schunck and Barry Zimmermann, \textit{Self-Regulation of Learning and Performance: Issues and Educational Applications} (Mahweh, NJ: Lawrence Erlbaum, 1994).

\textsuperscript{50} Locke and Latham, “Work Motivation and Satisfaction.”

\textsuperscript{51} Philip Merrifield, personal communication, 1988.

\textsuperscript{52} For example, if a problem is defined as a gap between a “desired state” and some other state, then human problems can be broadly classified in term of time as: (1) developmental problems – the desired state may exist in the future, (2) maintenance problems – the desired state is in the present, and (3) recovery problems – the desired
solving objectives, and associated interventions and thereby, (f) have wide applicability to problems in such areas as personal development, education, counseling, and organizations.

5. In the process of achieving these goals, G.E.M. itself may be re-framed: that is, it may be affected by and even merged with existing approaches in applied psychology. One candidate in this regard might be Philip Merrifield’s “tetrahedronal” or “four-dimensional model of intelligence.” It is quite clear that Lonergan has discussed experiencing, understanding, judging, and deciding as basic groups of conscious acts, events, and operations. Quite independently, however, Merrifield has discussed remembering, generating, evaluating, and transforming as the basic groups of problem-solving acts, events, and operations. The potential synergistic effect of these two approaches on each other is worth exploration and is currently under investigation.

6. A revised and unified theory of problem solving (UTPS) could also give rise to a number of research studies. One promising area of such research might be personal problem-solving styles (i.e., current cognitive, emotive, and behavioral events and habits that favor or disfavor the emergence of intellectual or moral self transcendence).

While the search for an adequate human science will continue, progress regarding this six-point program will assist in that effort. To be equal to the task, such a science must at least be adequate in its attentiveness to facts of sense and consciousness, some of which have been identified here.

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state was in the past.

WIDENING THE DIALECTIC:
SECULARITY AND
CHRISTIANITY IN CONVERSATION

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PART OF THE LORE AROUND Fr. Buckley involves an anecdote with a pope. When Buckley presented John Paul II a copy of his first book on atheism, the Pope asked, "And what was it that lay at the origins of modern atheism?" Without skipping a beat, Buckley responded, "Theologians, Your Holiness." This anecdote captures the provocative nature of Buckley's argument: Modern, Western atheism arose, at least in part, due to a contradiction in early modern theism itself. As Buckley puts it in *At the Origins of Modern Atheism*: "Atheism must be seen not as a collation of ideas which happened to arise in Western thought but as a transition whose meaning is spelled out by the process and whose existence is accounted for in terms of the ideas which preceded it."¹ In tribute to Buckley's important work, in this essay I ask a more expansive question: Can one understand modernity and the development of Western secularism according to this same pattern suggested by Buckley? Here I argue that Charles Taylor and René Girard offer a parallel account of modernity and its Christian roots that widens Buckley's dialectical thesis on atheism.

Of course, to enter a discussion of modernity opens the door to previous analyses of the genesis and nature of modernity. Modernity normally signifies an anti- or post-Christian worldview that has made an explicit attempt to dispose of some central, pre-modern religious and philosophical tenets in order to manifest itself. These discussions of

modernity, held by some of the greatest lights of the intellectual scene, go beyond the scope of this essay. Those familiar with such discussions, one would hope, will find the accounts of Taylor and Girard compelling and provoking. For with these two, the discussion of the relationship between Christianity and modernity does not ultimately aim toward a moral or intellectual judgment as to its legitimacy. Instead, the two offer a genetic account similar to Buckley’s treatment of the origins of modern atheism. It is posited here, without bringing Taylor and Girard into direct discussion with other genealogists of modernity, that this genetic account provides a much more helpful framework for understanding modernity. The brunt of this analysis aims to bring Taylor and Girard into conversation with one another, but also with Buckley.

To execute this argument, this essay aims to cover the following ground: first, it examines the nature of Buckley’s dialectical method. Next, it briefly mentions two dominant trends concerning secularity and modernity. Then it turns to Charles Taylor and René Girard and compares their accounts of modernity’s relationship with Christianity under the following categories: 1) the relationship of Christianity to religion; 2) the nature of Christianity; 3) the nature and cause of modernity; 4) the impact of these theses on twenty-first century Christian apologetics.

1. BUCKLEY’S DIALECTIC OF ATHEISM

Buckley’s research into modern atheism and early modern history of ideas has substantially affected the academic assessment of the history of atheism and has also deepened our understanding of modernity’s emergence. At the heart of his investigative method lies an assessment

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2 James Force writes that in *At the Origins*, “Michael Buckley has gone for broke [... The book] will undoubtedly be taken as an indispensable new focus for future discussions about the relation of reason to religious apologetics in the early modern period and about method in the history of ideas.” (“The Origins of Modern Atheism,” *Journal of the History of Ideas* 50, no. 1 (1989): 153); John Milbank states, “Buckley, however, offers his own reading as a substitute for this oft-told tale of emancipation from religious tutelage: modern atheism is rather the unintended creation of a confused and contradictory theological apologetic which arose in the 17th and 18th centuries.” He later adds that the book “is a splendid, bold endeavour” (“Review,” *Modern Theology* 8, no. 1 (1992): 90, 92). Indeed, even Charles Taylor gets in the act when he writes that his narrative in
about our capacity to understand the emergence, power, and dissolution of ideas. A review and assessment of this method is central in order to bring Buckley into conversation with Charles Taylor and René Girard.

In the "Introduction" to *At the Origins of Modern Atheism*, Buckley asks:

Does atheism also depend upon theism for its very existence? ... Does theism not only shape, but generate its corresponding atheism? Does theism not only set the meaning, but also generate the existence of the atheism which emerges in the middle of the eighteenth century? Is the content of god, the idea of the divine, so internally incoherent that it moves dialectically into its denial? (16)

After five chapters covering the religious apologetics of Leonard Lessius and Marin Mersenne, the philosophical system of René Descartes and the mechanics of Isaac Newton, their applications by Nicolas Malebranche and Samuel Clarke, and the atheistic mutations of these systems by Denis Diderot and Baron Paul Henri d’Holbach, his conclusion revisits the questions raised in his Introduction. Upon observing that the meaning of atheism has always been parasitic on the meaning of theism, Buckley pushes further: “If the meaning of atheism is shaped by the going theism, is this also true of its existence?...If theism is responsible for the patterns of atheism, did it also generate its actual birth” (338)? In his concluding chapter, Buckley affirms that an internal contradiction in Christian theology generated atheism: “There was a contradiction between this content [of the theists] and the form in which it was advanced....In this process of self-alienation, religion denied itself both a proper form to reflect upon this issue and commensurate evidence by which it could be resolved – and all of this before the question had even been raised by the intellectual culture in which the theologians wrote” (346). For Buckley, the contradictory nature of theological argument helped generate modern atheism. Its contradiction consisted in arguing through impersonal means – natural theology – for a personal God.

*A Secular Age* means to compliment the work done by, among others, Buckley. [*A Secular Age* (Cambridge, MA: Belknap Press of Harvard University Press, 2007)]. 295; Taylor elsewhere praises Buckley’s "penetrating book" and describes its thesis as a "striking fact" (225, 328)].
To describe this process of generation through contradiction, Buckley uses the language of dialectic. On the last page of his conclusion he writes: "The dialectical contradiction is pervasively present; it effects a dynamic continuity in the paradoxical developments toward and into atheism and it gives existence and shape to what emerged" (363). The language and import of this "dialectic" emerge as central to Buckley’s aim and method in At the Origins of Modern Atheism. Several scholarly reviews of At the Origins noticed the centrality of this dialectical method and centered their critique on it. After praising Buckley for writing a "highly readable book" that "has set the terms for subsequent discussions," James Force, for example, criticizes the book’s "narrowly epistemological focus." He later complains about Buckley’s appropriation of theists in accounting for the "dialectical" origin of modern atheism. Force writes that this appropriation makes him "uneasy" and argues for a more historical and contextual reading than Buckley’s "litany of logical begats." Another reviewer, David Wilson, calls the work "a big book with bold claims." Unlike Force’s assessment, Wilson focuses specifically on the dialectical method employed. Even if the historical claims of Buckley are true, asks Wilson, is the Hegelian account necessary? Wilson’s judgment is in the negative: "Buckley ... may well be right in his broad causal claim: Christian theologians probably did play some causal role in the rise of atheism. But this role can be expressed in non-Hegelian terms that anyone can understand." Paul Casner’s review resonates with the assessments of Force and Wilson. Although complimentary about the research and orientation of At the Origins, Casner bristles at the method: "Ironically, Buckley weakens his position by excessive dependence upon a Hegelian philosophical perspective." For these scholars, the heuristic of dialectical method does more harm than good because it imports a Hegelian superstructure upon the data under consideration.

These concerns also entered into more explicitly theological assessments of Buckley’s thesis. Buckley’s concern with highlighting "internal contradiction," fears John Milbank, tends to understate the

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importance of social and economic factors. Although Milbank admits the "general validity" of Buckley's claims, his judgment echoes the complaints above: "One should be suspicious both of his methodological agenda and the over-neat fit of this agenda with a subject-matter which is itself all too-precisely defined." This agenda is the dialectical approach. As an alternative, Milbank proposes a more radically historicist approach that would meet the concerns of French postmodern theorists, in particular Deleuze and Foucault. Of the dialectical method, Milbank avers, "One notices that [Buckley] insinuates all sorts of intellectual (not historical) necessities where none exist." Like Force, Casner, and Wilson, Milbank criticizes what he considers Buckley's arbitrary use of evidence, and an etiology that produces a narrative and a conclusion that is "over-tidy and over-achieved."

Almost two decades after the appearance of *At the Origins*, Buckley published *Denying and Disclosing God*, which both encompasses his earlier argument and advances it into the nineteenth and twentieth centuries. Buckley does not modify his method; rather, he doubles down on dialectic. In the preface he alludes to Milbank's review and responds: "Nevertheless, additional research has not weakened the evidence that such a dialectical negation was vitally present. On the contrary, it has strengthened the conviction that this dialectical pattern did in fact obtain and was to be found in the genesis of atheism elsewhere." Buckley uses the studies of atheism by Alan Kors and James Turner to support his claim, which he takes up most directly in the second chapter, "A Dialectical Pattern in the Emergence of Atheism." Here Buckley addresses Milbank's criticisms and reflects on the conclusions of his previous work. He remarks that *At the Origins* proposed the thesis "that the remarkable development of atheism in modernity exhibits a dialectical structure."

7 John Milbank, "Review," 90.
8 Milbank, "Review," 90, 92.
11 Buckley, *Denying and Disclosing God*, 29.
Clearly, then, the dialectical method remained central to Buckley’s approach over a span of nearly two decades. In order to understand this method with greater precision, and to address the accusation of Buckley’s alleged crypto-Hegelianism, a brief historical overview in conversation with Buckley’s own understanding of dialectics follows below.

Buckley’s work makes both an empirical claim and a more theoretical point about dialectics. The empirical claim is “that atheism as an argument and theorem was generated by the very intellectual forces enlisted to counter it.”12 His assertions about the development of atheism ultimately rely on historical evidence that either supports or undermines his thesis. It lies outside the scope of this essay to revisit these empirical claims, but it is worth reminding readers of Buckley’s own modesty about the breadth of his conclusions:

Does so faulty a strategy comprehensively account for the origins of modern atheism? Obviously not! Many other critically important influences, social as well as ideological, obtained during these two centuries....These factors and many more...would have to be charted if one were to write a comprehensive study of “the origins of modern atheism.” The dialectical contradiction...is not all. It is still only “at” the origins of modern atheism.13

The concern in this essay is with the theoretical claim about the ability of dialectics to narrate and distinguish patterns in intellectual history. A cursory look at the history of dialectics, with an emphasis on Hegel’s application, is in order.

_Dialectic_ originated among the Greeks and already had multiple meanings by the time of Aristotle.14 It could refer to the art of conversation, a part of logic, or a method of argumentation. For Plato and Aristotle, dialectic is a positive term, although both imply a pluriform understanding of dialectic. In the _Republic_, the dialectical

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12 Buckley, _Denying and Disclosing God_, 28.
13 Buckley, _At the Origins_, 362-63.
man "grasps the reason for the being of each thing," and in the Cratylus the dialectical man "knows how to ask and answer questions." In the Topics, Aristotle places dialectic between the apodictic conclusions of philosophy and the eristic of the Sophists. The Stoics identify dialectic as the art of asking and answering questions correctly. Cicero gives a more precise definition than that of the Stoics when he calls dialectic "the entire science of discerning the essence of things, of judging their qualities, and of conducting a systematic and logical argument." In the context of his definition, Cicero chides Epicurus for not doing what dialectic demands: offering a clear and precise definition – in this case, of happiness. If he had done so, he suggests, he would have not run into such great confusion.

Buckley locates the model for his method of inquiry in Plato's Seventh Epistle. According to Plato, since words do not define themselves, and individual cases do not explain themselves, some method is necessary. As Buckley puts it, "The need for the dialectical method lies precisely in the discontinuity among these three, and the movement of the dialectical conversation is toward their resolution, toward a coincidence of word, thought, and thing." Similar to the references above, Buckley associates dialectic with good reasoning so as to get to the heart of the realities in question. In his conclusion he returns to Plato's text. After distancing himself slightly from Plato's method, he states, "This Epistle and the dialectical tradition suggested the devices with which the indeterminacy of the situation of modern atheism could be given some determination and its inner consistencies discovered." Yet the reviewers cited above explicitly criticized his Hegelianism, not Buckley's reverence for classical dialectic. What changes in modern dialectic, and does Buckley incorporate this modern transition into his method of enquiry?

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15 Republic 534b; Cratylus 390c.
16 Hall, "Dialektik," 172; see Topics VIII (162a); Plato similarly associates eristic with the counter-productive tactics of the Sophists (Sophist 231e).
18 Buckley, At the Origins, 6.
19 Buckley, At the Origins, 340.
The meaning and application of dialectic takes many important turns between Cicero and modernity. It is worth noting, however, that whereas some medievals began to equate dialectic with philosophy itself, Descartes criticized it as a lamentable, unscientific discipline ruinous to reason. It came to mean for Descartes what eristics had meant for Plato and Aristotle, a shoddy way of thinking that dialectic served to correct. For Descartes, dialectic became the problem. This criticism and transformation continued with Kant, who addressed the problem of "Dialektik" in his Critique of Pure Reason. In the beginning of both the "Transcendental Logic" and the "Transcendental Dialectic," he refers to dialectic as the "logic of illusion" (B 86; B 349-55) because it fails to take into account the warnings proscribed in his critical method about our inability to know realities beyond the grip of empirical confirmation. Despite evincing familiarity in his references to how the ancients used dialectic, Kant equates it with the bad metaphysics and "school philosophy." He does, however, try to transform the practice of dialectic with what he calls a "transcendental dialectic." This dialectic does not transgress the limits of metaphysical speculation.

Kant's transcendental dialectic raised the stakes among the German Idealists, especially Hegel, who has done the most to give the term its current connotation. For Hegel, Dialektik implies more than a method of knowing. Hegel conceived the history of human inquiry as bound up with a spirit moving through history that included real manifestations of the truth of freedom, or love, or religion. The understanding of spirit in history added to dialectic the conception of necessary movement. Noted Hegel scholar Frederick Beiser states, "When Hegel uses the term 'dialectic' it usually designates the 'self-organization' of the subject matter, its 'inner necessity' and 'inherent movement.'"20 Beiser emphasizes that Hegel's philosophy is not an a priori method but rather an account of the inner movement or nature of the subject matter. It is worth noting here that the triadic structure of thesis-antithesis-synthesis, so often cited as the essential feature of the Hegelian dialectic, has been misattributed to Hegel; it is found earlier in Fichte and Schelling, and Hegel in fact disapproved of it.21

20 Frederick Beiser, Hegel (New York: Routledge, 2005), 160; see also Hall, "Dialectic," 55 and Buckley, Denying and Disclosing God, 122, for the same emphasis.

21 The definitive scholarly treatment of this topic comes from the enjoyably polemic article by Gustav E. Mueller, "The Hegel Legend of Thesis-Antithesis-Synthesis,"
Which brings us back to what Buckley means by dialectics. Buckley draws not only on Plato and Hegel but also on John Dewey’s “search for the pattern of inquiry.” Apparently aware of the ambiguity and confusion over just what dialectic entails, Buckley describes this dialectical process:

To speak of positive assertions, concepts, and arguments as generating their own negations and so constituting or exhibiting contradictions within an initial subject – which is all that is meant by “dialectics” here – is not to suppose that anything finite is not liable to its own finitude, to its own inadequacies and incompletions.22

In other words, like Hegel, Buckley insists that dialectic does not impose an outside method on a given subject matter. The goal is to understand it from within. Buckley makes this point explicitly:

The dialectic must proceed not from the external application of determinations from a schema, but as the inner – even organic – progress of the subject under study. Dialectical negation and the negation of the negation must be seen to emerge as the immanent life of the subject reflected in thought.23

Although his intellectual debt to Plato (or Dewey, for that matter) is more explicit than his debt to Hegel, it seems from our survey that despite the reviewers’ overplaying of the Hegelianism, they are not altogether wrong – the central thrust of his dialectic appears to entail an inner necessity pointing more to Berlin than to Athens. Nevertheless, Buckley explains:

One need not be a Hegelian, an Absolute Idealist, or a Marxist, a dialectical materialist – as indeed I am neither – to recognize that such a dialectic can be the development both of the things studied and the process of inquiry into them, that even organic development is into otherness ... This evolving pattern, in which

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22 Buckley, Denying and Disclosing God, 29.
23 Buckley, Denying and Disclosing God, 122.
one stage supplants another as mutually incompatible while keeping an organic unity, is made possible, even necessary, by inner incoherence.24

Although his critics accused him from imposing a method from without, and more generally, critics assail dialectical method for doing so, for Buckley, and for Hegel it seems, dialectic essentially involves a discovery of this process from within the matter under scrutiny. The reviewers outlined above fail not so much in ascribing to Buckley a certain Hegelianism, but in misconstruing what Hegel meant by dialectic, as the citation from above points out.

The aim of Buckley's inquiry into atheism was to understand what made possible such a sea-change in modern thought. Rather than begin with the atheists themselves, Buckley began with the theists, in particular the Christian apologists. As Buckley explains, these apologists disseminated the contradiction that the validation of belief in a personal god was best confirmed by reliance on impersonal evidence for God's existence reflected by the cosmos. This internal contradiction could not stand. Buckley traces the initial cracks and the dismantling of the foundation upon which the house of theism rested.

2. TRAJECTORIES OF MODERNITY

Modern secularity and loss of belief presents a vexing challenge to contemporary Christians. This challenge comes into focus against the backdrop of the long Christian attempt to construct a theology of history. The expansion and flourishing of the earliest Christian communities facilitated the construction of a teleological account with the church militant eventually triumphing against pagan or other non-Christian forces. Already in the fourth century the Christian historian Eusebius cited Constantine's conversion and the corresponding elevation of Christianity within the Roman Empire as evidence for Christianity's truth and inevitable triumph. One century after Eusebius, Augustine, especially in the City of God, urged his flock to hesitate about such judgments. Although by 390 AD the now-Christian Empire had seemingly rid itself of paganism under Theodosius I, thus fulfilling

24 Buckley, Denying and Disclosing God, 122.
Eusebius's manifest destiny, Rome would be sacked by barbarian hordes in 410. Christian theology now had to answer the same question that eighth-century Israelite theology attempted to answer after the collapse of the Davidic throne and in response to the Assyrian invasion. Augustine advises us to be cautious about both triumphs and defeats, for such events do not definitively manifest God's will. The world is fallen. Attempts to bring heaven down to earth are at best mistaken and are more accurately to be read as manifestations of the same sinful superbia that motivated Adam and Eve.

Many centuries later, Christian apologists and their interlocutors have tried to understand how a Christian civilization could devolve (or evolve) into a society in which belief in God and church attendance experienced a steady decline. A host of worldviews, including secularism, took its place. This secular worldview in particular removed God from the public sphere and replaced such belief with an economy, a religionless discourse, a nation state, the elevation of instrumental reason, and an account of the good life stripped of any natural teleology. Clearly a massive shift has taken place, and any Eusebian interpretation of events in the formerly Christian West would seem to require an antiempiricism.

There are two common responses to this situation: the first is triumphant secularism, and the second is reactionary Christianity.25 According to the former, the Enlightenment ushered in the long, slow march of secularization. A triumphant scientific worldview, coupled

25 Charles Taylor describes the difference in interpretation as follows: “As I have indicated, this debate tends to become polarized between ‘boosters’ and ‘knockers,’ who either condemn or affirm modernity en bloc, thus missing what is really at stake here, which is how to rescue admirable ideals from sliding into demeaning modes of realization.” See “A Catholic Modernity?” in A Catholic Modernity? Charles Taylor’s Marianist Award Lecture, ed. James L. Heft (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1999), 36. He uses the same language of “boosters” and “knockers” in The Ethics of Authenticity (Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press, 1991), 11. Taylor returns to this theme in the “Epilogue,” to A Secular Age, where he argues, not surprisingly, that his own account, while compatible with John Milbank’s (among others’) story of modernity as “intellectual deviation,” is able to explain the rise of modern secularism more comprehensively (A Secular Age, 773-76). See also, A Secular Age, 637: “Some think that the whole move to secular humanism was just a mistake, which needs to be undone. We need to return to an earlier view of things. Others, in which I place myself, think that [...] there is some truth in the self-narrative of the Enlightenment: this gain was in fact unlikely to come about without some breach with established religion.”
with social changes like urbanization that resulted from technological advance, meant that inevitably the West would become increasingly secular. Nothing in the accounts of these secularists would allow for any reversal or stemming of the tide. Enlightenment scholars like Peter Gay, as well as such scholars of religion as Harvey Cox, emphasized the contrast between Christian and secular or Enlightenment worldviews. Of course, the rise of Islamic fundamentalism - highlighted by the 2001 World Trade Center attack – and the political emergence of Evangelical Christianity in the United States – provide counter-data to the thesis of inevitability, but do nothing to undermine the fundamentally contrasting worldviews: on the one side: premodern religious irrationality; and on the other: modern, secular reason.

We find one incarnation of this contrast in the work of the highly regarded historian of the Enlightenment, Jonathan Israel. In Enlightenment Contested, he juxtaposes two irreconcilable worldviews, modern and premodern: “From its first inception, the Enlightenment in the western Atlantic world was always a mutually antagonistic duality and the ceaseless internecine strife within it is ... the most fundamental and important thing about it.” Although Israel incorporates various strands and stratifications within his general narrative, there can be no question about what lay at the opposite end of Enlightenment, and the political stakes involved therein. Enlightenment promised to bring not only individual emancipation but transformation of entire societies. Its project, one should not forget, was met with stiff resistance: “Most men had no more desire to discard traditional reverence for established authority and idealized notions of community than their belief in magic, demonology and Satan.” Just as efforts to combine traditional theological convictions and religion with the new science and philosophy were doomed in the period under Israel’s examination, so too twenty-first century efforts at compatibility have no place. The


28 Israel, Enlightenment Contested, 10.
Enlightenment has happened, and there is no turning back. It is worth quoting Israel’s concluding salvo at length:

It is precisely this continuing, universal relevance of [the Enlightenment’s] values on all continents, and among all branches of humanity, together with the unprecedented intellectual cohesion it gave to these moral and social ideals, which accounts for what Bernard Williams called the “intellectual irreversibility of the Enlightenment,” its uniquely central importance in the history of humanity. Parenthetically, it might be worth adding that nothing could be more fundamentally mistaken, as well as politically injudicious, than for the European Union to endorse the deeply mistaken notion that “European values” if not nationally particular are at least religiously specific and should be recognized as essentially “Christian” values. That the religion of the papacy, Inquisition, and Puritanism should be labeled the quintessence of “Europeanness” would rightly be considered a wholly unacceptable affront by a great number of thoroughly “European” Europeans.29

What is relevant here is not whether all proponents or historians of the Enlightenment share Israel’s viewpoint, but that this viewpoint crystallizes an attitude about the relationship between modernity and Christianity that highlights dissonance and downplays compatibility.

In contrast, many Christian intellectuals have responded in kind to the triumphalism outlined above. Although they juxtapose modernity to Christianity, they do not view the triumph of modernity as necessary, nor do they consider Christianity intellectually inferior. It is impossible to survey all such accounts, and it is equally impossible not to paint with the same inevitably broad brushstrokes used to describe triumphant secularism. Still, efforts can be made to describe this well-trodden and many pronged response. One strategy is to pinpoint the location where the train went off the tracks due to a deviation in doctrine or practice. John Milbank’s provocative and in many ways

illuminating account of modernity drifts in this direction. For Milbank, late medieval nominalism instigated the decline:

Now this [late medieval nominalist] philosophy was itself the legatee of the greatest of all disruptions carried out in the history of European thought, namely that of Duns Scotus, who for the first time established a radical separation of philosophy from theology...The very notion of a reason-revelation duality, far from being an authentic Christian legacy, itself results only from the rise of a questionably secular mode of knowledge.30

One cannot know whether Milbank presents such sharp contrasts for heuristic purposes, or for rhetorical flourish, or because he thinks it properly descriptive. The stridency reaches almost Manichean tones in his concluding paragraph: "It is indeed for radical orthodoxy an either/or: Philosophy (Western or Eastern) as a purely autonomous discipline, or theology: Herod or the magi, Pilate or the God-man."31

Certainly a comparison between aspects of modernity, or modern philosophy, provides a sometimes stark contrast with the premodern. And there is nothing noble or intellectually superior to underplaying or diminishing these contrasts. One finds a similar juxtaposition in an essay by David Bentley Hart:

The only cult that can truly thrive in the aftermath of Christianity is a sordid service of the self, of the impulses of the will, of the nothingness that is all that the withdrawal of Christianity leaves behind. The only futures open to post-Christian culture are conscious nihilism, with its inevitable devotion to death, or the narcotic banality of the Last Men, which may be little better than death....And we should certainly dread whatever rough beast it is that is being bred in our ever coarser, crueler, more inarticulate, more vacuous popular culture; because, cloaked in its anodyne insipience, lies

31 Milbank, "Knowledge," 32.
a world increasingly devoid of merit, wit, kindness, imagination, or charity.32

Hart presents the contrast between Christianity and modernity as forcefully as possible. To be fair, Hart also enlists Nietzsche and Heidegger in this essay in order to explain how Christianity paves the way for modernity, albeit unintentionally. The citations from Milbank and Hart – two theologians whose breadth of influence would seem to ensure a trickle-down effect of their interpretations and narratives – encourage the same kind of thinking that Jonathan Israel’s work encourages. The battle between Christianity and modernity in both instances emerges as a zero-sum game, in which the latter’s gain can only mean a loss for the former, and vice-versa.

From a Christian perspective, it is difficult to find consolation in the decrease of the number of believers in Europe and North America. But when one regards modernity itself as an inauthentic development, or as a mistake to correct, then it becomes less likely that one locates the rise of modernity within Christianity itself (not merely within a divergent or heretical branch of it).33 Buckley’s dialectical method rests on the conviction that ideas do not arrive from nowhere. Rather, they are generated in part through the intellectual and heuristic edifices construed by their predecessors. Modernity and the secular age – as mistaken as they may be from a Christian perspective – are best understood when analyzed in conjunction with the Christian culture that birthed them. Precisely at this point the projects of Taylor and Girard become so helpful on account of their efforts to account for the emergence of modernity with a method similar to the one Buckley applied to atheism.


33 In a way, the project here overlaps in significant ways Randy Rosenberg’s. See, “The Catholic Imagination and Modernity: William Cavanaugh’s Theopolitical Imagination and Charles Taylor’s Modern Social Imagination,” Heythrop Journal 48 (2007): 911-31. Rosenberg uses the framework suggested by Lonergan, where one can read difference as complementary, genetic, or dialectical. Within this framework, Buckley’s approach would be genetic, not dialectical. For this distinction see Rosenberg, 912; For Lonergan, see Method in Theology (Toronto: University of Toronto Press, 1971), at 236; and the essay, “Sacralization and Secularization,” in Philosophical and Theological Papers 1965-1980 (Toronto: University of Toronto Press, 2004), 259-81.
3. TAYLOR AND GIRARD ON CHRISTIANITY AND MODERNITY

Catholic intellectuals of the highest caliber, Charles Taylor (b. 1931) and René Girard (b. 1923), have attracted legions of followers, scores of detractors, and volumes of commentary. We can only point interested parties toward some of the literature that introduces their thought. Although at this point it may seem pertinent to address how both thinkers locate the relationship between Christianity and modernity, it will prove more illuminating to begin earlier – first with an analysis of how they construe the relation between Christianity and archaic religion, and then with their accounts of the essence of Christianity.

A. Christianity and Religion

In both A Secular Age and its more compact forerunner, Modern Social Imaginaries, Taylor develops a theory of religion in order to illustrate the breakthrough of a religious vision central to Christianity. In it he borrows Karl Jaspers’s famous distinction between pre-Axial and Axial religion. The former, notes Taylor, is characterized by “a relation to spirits, or forces, or powers, which are recognized as being in some sense higher, not the ordinary forces and animals of everyday (147).” These belief systems engender a set of experiences quite foreign to us. In addition, these forces in early religion are intensely social. God


35 Taylor, A Secular Age, 146-58; Modern Social Imaginaries (Durham, NC: Duke University Press, 2004), 49-67. Subsequent citations of A Secular Age will be parenthetical.

works on the group as a whole, and the group or tribe's consciousness of well-being depends on the divine. Archaic religious practice imbues members with a heightened sense of communal belonging or "social embedding." Taylor elaborates, "Because their most important actions were the doings of whole groups, articulated in a certain way, they couldn't conceive of themselves as potentially disconnected from this social matrix."

Consequently, having a proximate and visceral theological experience meant seeing God as intimately bound to this world. It was not always the case that this God was "with us," but to whatever extent God had beneficent intentions, they became manifest in ordinary human flourishing; the pre-Axial God wanted a worshipper to be a king, or to have several sons, or to have a particularly glorious experience in battle (150). In transposing Jaspers's contrast between archaic religions and the subsequent "Axial" religions that emerged between the eighth and fifth century BCE, Taylor sees some continuity between pre-Axial and Axial religion -- not the least of which was the role of worship and belief in a ready exchange among the supernatural and the natural. Despite this continuity, the so-called Axial religions, which include Buddhism, prophetic Judaism, and the Vedas, distinguished themselves through "a notion of our good which goes beyond human flourishing" (151). This distinction happens on account of a theological shift, which in the West consisted in the doctrine of creation ex nihilo. God went from being contained in the cosmos to transcending it (152). James Alison puts it pithily: "The biblical God is much more like nothing at all than like one of the Gods." Since the notion of human flourishing was so imbedded in theological presuppositions, the Axial shift permitted a corresponding shift in its understanding of human flourishing. Post-Axial human flourishing became disengaged from a more immediate social context. St. Paul flourished, but through a mystical participation in Christ's crucifixion. The martyr Polycarp flourished but not in a way that many pre-Axial worshippers would recognize.

37 Taylor, Modern Social Imaginaries, 54.
38 Taylor does not adopt Jaspers wholesale (A Secular Age, 792n9). What matters is not so much the age, but the break between the two religious systems. For Taylor's qualifications, see pages 438-45.
Given its connection to Judaism, Christianity inherited the Israelite Axial turn. As Christianity came to be the dominant religion in the West, it brought this new religious consciousness with it. Although Taylor does not devote much space to the relationship between Christianity and pre-Axial religion, this relationship comes to play an important role in his account of how modernity and Christianity relate.

For Girard, the dominant matrix to explain pre-Axial religion is the “scapegoat mechanism,” which he first articulated in *Violence and the Sacred*. The scapegoat mechanism is humanity’s answer to the problem of the violence that stems from the rivalry borne of mimetic desire. Girard claimed that the widespread ritualized killing in archaic societies functioned as a kind of release for the tensions that resulted from a build-up of rivalry. Girard writes, “We can hypothetically assume that several prehistoric groups did not survive precisely because they didn’t find a way to cope with the mimetic crisis; their mimetic rivalries didn’t find a victim who polarized their rage, saving them from self-destruction.” Humanity, says Girard, desperately needed to discover a way to de-escalate mimetic crises, and it found one in the scapegoat mechanism and the subsequent mimetic repetition of this event through what we call ritual. Absent a theory assigning value to ritual, Romantics and Nietzscheans imagine the nobility of primitive, pre-ritualized cultures and therefore see religion as a cultural perversion and fall from a pristine natural state. Anthropological evidence, however, makes such a theory less tenable. Anthropologists and archaeologists have found abundant evidence of sacrifice and ritual at such ancient sites as Göbekli Tepe in Turkey, but as of yet no social contract. This pristine state, purport Rousseau and Nietzsche, has been jettisoned in favor of religion. Girard recalls that both Enlightenment and Romantic philosophies explain the ubiquity of ritual on account of “cunning and avid priests [who] impose their abracadabras on good people.” What comes first: the priest or the cult? For Girard, the answer is obvious: “If

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42 For Girard on Rousseau, see *Evolution and Conversion*, 187-88.

we simply consider that the clergy cannot really precede the invention of culture, then religion must come first and far from being a derisory force, it appears as the origin of the whole culture.”

Although it is easy for modern society to look down its nose at primitive sacrificial ritual and taboos, Girard concludes that these institutions saved humanity from self-destruction. Human culture was built upon sacrificial victims perceived as having broken a taboo: both the Oedipus myths and the founding of Rome attest to this. “Humanity,” says Girard, “is the child of religion.” At its origins, then, archaic religion is violent and false, yet it paradoxically allows the human species to persevere. Under a Girardian lens the apparent irrationality of incest taboos and cultic bloodletting become thoroughly rational.

Before he turned his attention to the Jewish and Christian scriptures, Girard offered a pessimistic take on the human quest for peace. *Violence and the Sacred* states, “The best men can hope for in their quest for nonviolence is the unanimity-minus-one of the surrogate victim.” Later, Girard will associate this logic with Caiaphas. Archaic religion and its subsequent religious myths tell a lie necessary for human survival: its violence is required. Christianity’s revelation consists in taking away the veil from the mythic fabrications that conceal the scapegoat’s innocence.

**B. Das Wesen des Christentums**

Although Charles Taylor says comparatively little about the nature of Christianity, three main points emerge in his distinction of Christianity from generic Axial religion. First, Christianity produces an advanced sense of inwardness; second, it contains an insatiable reforming spirit; third, it sees true religion as selfless love, or *agape*.

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47 René Girard, *The Scapegoat*, trans. Yvonne Freccero (Baltimore, MD: The Johns Hopkins University Press, 1986), 112-15. Girard writes: “Caiaphas is the perfect sacrificer who puts victims to death to save those who live. By reminding us of this John emphasizes that every real cultural *decision* has a sacrificial character (*decidere*, remember, is to cut the victim’s throat) that refers back to an unrevealed effect of the scapegoat, the sacred type of representation of persecution” (114).
To the first point: In *Sources of the Self*, Taylor reads Augustine as a proto-modern figure who, compared to his Greek ancestors, stressed the role of the will in our constitution. As Augustine attests in the *Confessions*, the Platonic maxim wherein the good would be done if it were known does not take into sufficient account the radical perversion of the will generated by original sin and bad habits. In addition, Augustine complements the previous emphasis on divine transcendence with a hitherto neglected sense of God’s closeness to us.

Taylor writes:

Our principle route to God [for Augustine] is not through the object domain but “in” ourselves. This is because God is not just the transcendent object or just the principle of order of the nearer objects, which we strain to see. God is also and for us primarily the basic support and underlying principle of our knowing activity.\(^\text{48}\)

One sees this push toward inwardness in Augustine’s psychological analogy of the Trinity, wherein the pattern of knowing – memory, intellect, and will – is one of the created world’s most telling vestiges of the Trinitarian persons. Taylor continues: “Augustine shifts the focus from the field of objects known to the activity itself of knowing; God is to be found here.”\(^\text{49}\) This emphasis serves as a precursor to the modern self. By jumping from Augustine to Descartes in his account of modern identity, Taylor passes over a millennium of thought because “it is hardly an exaggeration to say that it was Augustine who introduces the inwardness of radical reflexivity and bequeathed it to the Western tradition of thought.”\(^\text{50}\)

The second distinguishing feature of Christianity comes into view through an examination of Calvinism and its Puritan offshoot. For Taylor, the affirmation of ordinary life comes about primarily due to the reforming efforts that culminated in the Protestant Reformation.\(^\text{51}\)

No longer was friendship with God bound up with the sacramental

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50 Taylor, *Sources of the Self*, 231.

system of mediation that infuses medieval Christianity. Instead, each individual was responsible for his own faith, and his commitment to God had to be total. Following Max Weber, Taylor posits that the idea that each person’s call in life could be carried out with excellence. Together with the democratization of discipline and order, this idea made possible the notion that an entire society could be transformed.

In the years between Sources of the Self and A Secular Age, Taylor apparently became less tethered to the strict correlation of this movement with the Protestant Reformation. His more recent work emphasizes medieval efforts and argues for a more general and less specifically Protestant impulse in Christianity as semper reformans. Late medieval and early modern Christians repeatedly attempted to dissolve the radical separation between sacred and profane so that God could be experienced in everyday life. For Taylor, this reforming spirit results from a fundamental tendency or essential quality in Christianity. We feel the effects of this reform in modernity through such derivative religious movements as efforts at prohibition and the zeal for physical fitness.

A third feature, perhaps the most central one, is the ethic of agape. Exemplified in the story of the Good Samaritan (Luke 10), the unselfish love to which Christians are called extends beyond the basic communal ethic of solidarity. Agape can even disrupt that solidarity, since in an ethic of solidarity the Good Samaritan would have never stopped to help the injured man on the roadside (158; 739-42). Taylor makes two interesting comparative points: first, this loving self-renunciation, which Jesus exemplifies on the cross, differs from Stoic renunciation (17). It does so because, unlike Stoicism, Christianity does not reject the goodness of ordinary flourishing. Second, Christian agape overlaps with the Buddhist doctrines of anatta and karuna (17).

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52 Taylor writes of the Franciscan emphasis on haeceitas: “Though it couldn’t be clear at the time, we with hindsight can recognize this as a major turning point in the history of Western civilization, an important step towards that primacy of the individual which defines our culture” (A Secular Age, 94). Subsequent parenthetical numbers refer to A Secular Age.


54 See also Taylor, “A Catholic Modernity?” 30.
appeals to agape and to the example of the Good Samaritan, sprinkled throughout *A Secular Age*, support his claim about the centrality of agape for Christianity. In the incarnation and crucifixion of Christ, Christianity posits an identification of this love with God’s own being.

According to Girard, Christianity is the great anti-mythology. For the first time, the Hebrew scriptures tell stories of scapegoating from the perspective of the victim. Instead of myths that cover up the founding violence, scripture exposes the real violence that underlies their mythic superstructure. Besides this negative function, Judaism and Christianity positively reveal both a God who has nothing to do with violence, and also a God who sides with the victim. The New Testament goes a step further. God *is* the victim. This is the evangelical truth “hidden since the foundations of the world” (Matthew 13:35). Jesus’ cry from the cross – “forgive them, Father, for they know not what they do” – is based not on a Platonic theory of evil, but on the insight revealed to Judaism about the nature of human culture and the origins of human violence.55 Girard declares, “The Gospels constantly reveal what the texts of historical persecution, and especially mythological persecutors, hide from us: the knowledge that their victim is a scapegoat [...] The Gospel] indicates more clearly the innocence of this victim, the injustice of the condemnation, and the causelessness of the hatred of which it is the object.”56

The power of the gospel is so revolutionary, and yet the pull in our consciousness toward archaic religion so strong, that the gospel has not really taken root in so-called “Christian” societies. For Girard, this failure does not de-legitimize the gospel or alter its truth. Slowly, however, the gospel works its way through society, and the radical nature of its message about religions has become embedded in the West, although not always in the manner most expected.

C. The Nature and Cause of Modernity

An attempt to understand and explain modernity and secularism has occupied much of Charles Taylor’s considerable scholarly endeavors.57

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55 In this respect Girard’s account departs from the more inclusive Axial approach of Taylor.
57 One gets a sense of this from his choice of titles. *A Secular Age* speaks for itself.
Taylor declares it his intent to trace the factors that created the transition from a society in which it was nearly impossible not to believe, to a society where belief is no longer taken for granted (1-3). He opens *A Secular Age* by rejecting hitherto accepted normative definitions of the secular. These include understanding the secular as (1) its common institutions like nation state, and its social spaces in which God is absent; (2) a more generic loss of religious belief and practice marked by such, indicators as dealing church attendance. Instead, Taylor argues that secularity best corresponds to an environment where belief is no longer a given but is conceived as one option among others. For Taylor, it is important that secularism be understood outside the framework of what he calls subtraction theory, according to which a loss of belief is replaced by something like science. This only makes sense if Christian belief is antiquated, like a geocentric model of the universe. Despite many protestations, Christianity is not incompatible with modern science. The lack of any logical incompatibility, as well as the significant number of believing scientists, signifies to Taylor that the subtraction theory falls flat.\(^5^8\) It is far more interesting is to ask why so many moderns failed to see options that would allow for a greater integration, or why these options were not attractive to as many people as could have been.

Although we cannot here recapitulate Taylor's account of the emergence and nature of modernity and of secularism, we can point to a few distinguishing marks in its connection to a Christian past and its current form. One such aspect is the emphasis on ordinary life and human flourishing. Especially as inherited from the Puritan strand,

Some form of “modern” finds its way into almost all of his works: the subtitle of *Sources* reads *The Making of Modern Identity*. Additional works with the word “modern” include his Marian address, “A Catholic Modernity,” his second book on Hegel, *Hegel and Modern Society*, his precursor to *A Secular Age: Modern Social Imaginaries*, even his truncated version of *Sources: The Ethics of Authenticity*, was originally titled: *The Modern Malaise*.

\(^5^8\) In *Sources of the Self*, Taylor considers the subtraction theory in order to explain the loss in belief: “But what is questionable is the thesis that they [scientific rationality and industrialization] are sufficient conditions of the loss of religious belief. […] If religious faith were like some particulate illusory belief, whose erroneous nature was only masked by a certain set of practices, then it would collapse with the passing of these and their supersession by others; as perhaps certain particular beliefs about magical connections have. This then is the assumption which often underpins the institutional account” (402-403).
this movement made possible the large-scale application of ascetic discipline that had previously been reserved for the elites. In the new imaginary, this ascetic ideal could spread to all believers, and thus society could be transformed, not simply by common participation in a ritual, but through individuals living lives of holiness and submitting to disciplinary penitence “upon falling short”. As Taylor traces it, this ascetic zeal became detached from traditional Christianity and mutated into what Taylor calls “exclusive humanism.” As he defines it, “Exclusive humanism closes the transcendent window, as though there were nothing beyond.”59 The rest is history – the fitness studio should pay royalties to the monastery.

Additionally, a key feature in Taylor’s account is the buffered self, which Taylor connects to the process of “disenchantment” that he borrows from Max Weber and Marcel Gauchet.60 Taylor contrasts this buffered self with the premodern “porous” self (38), which feels itself seamlessly connected to both its social and natural surroundings. Today we can experience this porous self only through group activities like attending a sold-out football game or engaging in such extreme sports as surfing. That these moments feel so different from our ordinary experiences indicates how buffered the self really has become. As moderns, it is hard for us to grasp how differently we understand ourselves than our premodern ancestors. Taylor uses the example of melancholy or feeling depressed:

A modern is feeling depressed, melancholy. He is told: it’s just your body chemistry, you’re hungry, or there is a hormone malfunction, or whatever. Straightaway, he feels relieved. ... But a pre-modern may not be helped by learning that his mood comes from black bile. Because this doesn’t permit a distancing. Black bile is melancholy. (37)

Modernity no longer imagines an enchanted world, instead it replaces it with a neutral world of matter and motion, which houses people who imagine themselves originally isolated and only secondarily connected

to others. They can also imagine moods abstractly and ontologically disconnected from a material substance like one of the four humors. Taylor continues: "For the modern, buffered self, the possibility exists of taking a distance from, disengaging from everything outside the mind. My ultimate purposes are those which arise within me, the crucial meanings of things are those defined in my responses to them" (38).

Again, this conception of the buffered self arises as a mutation within the imaginative horizon of the long and winding Christian tradition. Therefore, whatever the shortcomings of the buffered self (and we need not see it as deficient in comparison to the porous self), its existence is not intrinsically disordered or sinful in Taylor's account.

A distinct moral feature of modernity is the concern for all human beings and the need to alleviate suffering. Taylor connects this feature with the gospel ethic of agape and emphasizes the uniqueness of this quality: "Our age makes higher demands for solidarity and benevolence on people today than ever before. Never before have people been asked to stretch out so far so consistently, so systematically, so as a matter of course, to the stranger at the gates." Here we think of our responses to such natural disasters as the earthquake in Haiti or the hurricane in New Orleans. One would not be surprised to hear that committed atheists worked amicably alongside conservative evangelicals in such locales. The Christian might be motivated by a modified divine command ethic or might have a particular loyalty to his pastor or parish. The atheist scoffs at the impurity of the other's motives, given that the same moral grammar might justify any abuse. For himself the atheist claims a more immanent moral rationality. Of significance for Taylor is that both share a peculiarly modern concern for alleviating the suffering of those at the margins.

Although modernity has at its disposal many different "sources," it has been unable to cobble together a synthesis between its two characteristically modern modes of knowing: instrumental rationality and expressive individualism. A worldview based entirely on varieties of scientism — strictly mechanical accounts that reduce morality to pain/pleasure, and neo-Darwinian accounts that derive (albeit not necessarily) an anthropology and a corresponding ethic based on the laws of evolution — fails to appropriate Romantic expressive individualism.

Romantics attach profound importance to self-given meaning that constitutes the inner depths of being human. As Taylor argues, most people do not want to face the moral consequences suggested by evolutionary biology: our lives have no intrinsic meaning, and human flourishing is not the purpose of the universe. Moreover, they distrust accounts that effectively read out the self-sacrificial love of a parent for a child from any valid description of reality, as scientistic accounts do. Modern individuals want to find profound meaning in the depths of their souls, or in nature; the religiously inclined want to connect this meaning with the divine. Romanticism exclusive of rationality and modern science, however, seems too much like the leap of faith that religion requires. So it can happen that secular worldviews swirl about without ever arriving at a satisfactory synthesis. It contains an internal contradiction.

Taylor's account of modern secularism is in many ways compatible with Buckley's thesis about the emergence of modern atheism. In describing modern, secular humanism, Taylor writes:

Secular humanism also has its roots in Judaeo-Christian faith; it arises from a mutation out of a form of that faith. The question can be put, whether this is more than a matter of historical origin, whether it doesn't also reflect a continuing dependence....My belief, baldly stated here, is that it does.  

As Taylor describes it, the Christian West made possible a horizon within which secularity was imagined. Although he does not make the case that Christianity "causes" modernity, he does regard it as inconceivable without Christianity – hence the language of mutation.  

As the transcendence of God emphasized in Western Axial religion created a greater distance between earth and heaven, the terrestrial could be imagined as autonomous and self-sufficient. Rather than regarding secularism, as do Milbank and Hart in the examples above, as a reversal of an upward trajectory, Taylor sees it as a third great stage in religious development, after the pre-Axial and the Axial. In

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62 Taylor, *Sources of the Self*, 319, emphasis mine.

63 It should be noted that Taylor's take on modernity is more pejorative in the final, twentieth chapter of *A Secular Age*, "Conversions." It is not clear whether Taylor speaks in his own voice or for Ivan Illich, when he declares, "Corrupted Christianity gives rise to the modern" (740; see also 741).
addition, Taylor’s genealogy places ideas in a historical setting, as
generated not from pure mental ether, but rather through the grit
and dirt of an intermingling with social and psychological factors that
profoundly complicate any true telling of modernity. Secularity cannot
be the opposite of Christendom; instead it is an iteration of it, however
unfortunate, wrong-headed, and un-self-conscious that iteration might
have been.

Taylor’s contextualization points to a more tepid assessment of
modernity than the boosters and knockers mentioned above. At the
1996 lecture accompanying the Marianist Award at Dayton University,
Taylor addressed this point head-on: “In modern, secularist culture
there are mingled together both authentic developments of the gospel,
of an incarnational mode of life, and also a closing off to God that
negates the gospel.” His argument strongly expresses the genetic
account hinted at above: “In relation to the earlier forms of Christian
culture, we have to face the humbling realization that the breakout
[modern secularism] was a necessary condition of the development.”
Although lacking Buckley’s language of “internal dialectic,” Taylor’s
rendering of modernity, despite its seeming opposition to Christianity,
gives an example of this dialectic by showing how Christianity created
the environment in which modernity was allowed to come into being.

Girard’s description and explanation of modernity is in many
ways more insightful than Taylor’s – this despite the fact that Girard
concedes a lack of interest in elaborating a theory of modernity.
To conclude this section, we will examine three characteristics of
modernity identified by Girard: the modern concern for victims, the
tendency to self-scrutiny, and the modern belief in the superiority of
scientific method. Each of these, according to Girard, is unthinkable
without Christianity.

Like Taylor, Girard points to the particular Western concern for

condition” is meant in the same way as Buckley’s “necessary” evolving pattern (see note
24 above).

65 This concession comes in response to a point raised by Gianni Vattimo about Girard.
See Girard, Evolution and Conversion, 234, 262n1.
Our society is the most preoccupied with victims of any that ever was. Even if it is insincere, a big show, the phenomenon has no precedent. No historical period, no society we know, has ever spoken of victims as we do.

Examine ancient sources, inquire everywhere...and you will not find anything anywhere that even remotely resembles our modern concern for victims. The China of the Mandarins, the Japan of the samurai, the Hindus, the pre-Columbian societies, Athens, republicans of imperial Rome – none of these were worried in the least little bit about victims, whom they sacrificed without number to their gods, to the honor of the homeland.66

The modern concern for victims arises out of Christianity, which identifies God with the victim. Modern anti-Christian objections to Christian atrocities such as the Crusades and the witch hunts are ironic, for such arguments apply a thoroughly Christian moral grammar to the matter. Girard does not deny that modernity produces victims; the horrors of the twentieth century would make such a view untenable. He notes, however, that the modern world “also saves more victims than any previous historical moment ever did.”67 Before Christianity, it would have been unthinkable to use a rhetorical strategy wherein one attempted to identify with the victim. In mythology, the scapegoat is always guilty. In Judaism and Christianity, she is innocent. Siding with the victim or the outsider is so central both to Christianity and to modernity that Girard is able to say that the world is becoming, paradoxically, more and more Christian. Here modernity and Christianity overlap: “We can say [that] we are all believers in the innocence of victims, which is at the core of Christianity.”68

67 Girard, Evolution and Conversion, 246.
68 Girard, Evolution and Conversion, 258; see also Girard and Gianni Vattimo, Christianity, Truth, and Weakening Faith. A Dialogue, ed. Pierpaolo Antonello and trans. William McCuaig (New York: Columbia University Press, 2010): “Christianity deprives us of the mechanism that formed the basis of the archaic social and religious order, ushering in a new phase in the history of mankind that we may legitimately call ‘modern.’ All the conquests of modernity begin there, as far as I am concerned, from the acquisition of awareness within Christianity” (26).
The proclamation of the gospel, which is the proclamation of the victim's innocence, forces us to look inward in order to understand society's fallenness as represented in the stained or sinful scapegoat. This level of self-scrutiny corresponds with Taylor's buffered self. No society has ever been more self-critical than modern, Western society, despite its frequent failings. Both the secular concern for victims, and the desire not to be shaped entirely by one's culture, comes out of and shares this characteristic with Christianity. As Girard puts it, "He [the Christian] is the one who can resist the crowd." Indeed, the very ground of the debate upon which secularity determines the moral legitimacy of Christianity is a Christian one. The new atheists miss this point. Here again, this is an internet dialect in modernity, which Girard attempts to unravel. Girard responds to this new wave of atheism by highlighting how Christian their anti-Christianity is:

Today's anti-religion combines so much error and nonsense about religion that it can barely be satirized. It serves the cause that it would undermine, and secretly defends the mistakes that it believes it is correcting. ... By seeking to demystify sacrifice, current demystification does a much worse job than the Christianity that it thinks it is attacking because it still confuses Christianity with archaic religion.

Like many of the new atheists, Girard also contends that modern science rests at the center of modernity and secularism. He offers, however, an entirely different etiology, which untangles the alleged conflict between science and religion. Girard argues that the zeal for science arises from the Christian attitude about victims. Since victims

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69 Girard, Evolution and Conversion, 239.
70 Rene Girard, Battling to the End: Conversations with Benoit Chantre, trans. Mary Baker. (East Lansing, MI: Michigan State University, 2010), 198.
71 Similar to Girard, Buckley shows how modern science and Christianity are intertwined. Buckley writes, "How ironic it is to read in popular histories of the 'antagonisms of religion and the rising science' that was precisely what the problem was not! These sciences did not oppose religious convictions, they supported them. Indeed, they subsumed theology, and theologians accepted with relief and gratitude this assumption of religious foundations by Cartesian first philosophy and Newtonian mechanics" (At the Origins, 347).
are chosen arbitrarily and are usually innocent, the gospel teaches the people to look for different causes. Girard explains:

The scientific spirit cannot come first. It presupposes the renunciation of a former preference for the magical causality of persecution so well defined by the ethnologists. Instead of natural, distant, and inaccessible causes, humanity has always preferred causes that are significant from a social perspective and permit of corrective intervention – victims.  

Christianity’s proclamation of the forgiving victim’s resurrection, in the words of Flannery O’Connor’s misfit, “changes everything.” Just as we are no longer comfortable with simple theodicies to explain natural disasters, so we are no longer sated by the victimology of old. Girard explains, “The invention of science is not the reason that there are no longer witch-hunts, but the fact that there are no longer witch-hunts is the reason that science has been invented.”

It is no surprise that the most popular television dramas are now the most scientific. I am referring to the explosion of CSI (Crime Scene Investigation) series. Christianity has made us vigilant about the culpability of the accused. Hearsay and verbal testimony no longer convince us: we want scientific evidence and DNA. Despite the persuasive force of Girard’s etiology, it must be conceded that Christians have lost their mettle in this discussion. Voices ignorant of Christian theology and the Christian tradition have too often and too loudly opposed Christianity to modern science and aligned it with modern pseudo-science. But it is Christianity that bred the love of science, the critique of religion, and the suspicion against magic that are the proclaimed virtues of today’s secularists.

D. Christian Responses to Modernity

It is never easy to understand the nature and depth of phenomena like secularism, modernity, or the loss of belief: Are they exceptional, passing fads, entirely circumstantial? Or do they signal something bigger, more seismic, more permanent? It may still be premature to declare a permanent decrease in belief, but one can nonetheless

72 Girard, The Scapegoat, 204.
73 Girard, The Scapegoat, 204.
Widening the Dialectic

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determine that a sizeable majority among educated classes in the West has adopted a secular worldview. Moreover, the old ways that people came to believe may no longer be as effective as they used to.

Michael Buckley addresses the possibility of a post-secular response to atheism in the final two chapters of *Denying and Disclosing God*. If atheism itself results from an “internal contradiction,” then can one persuasively negate the negation of God? Buckley offers a foretaste in the preface, when he promises to use John of the Cross to sublate the projectionists’ critique of religion: “The negation of these projections comprises the classical night of the soul, moving beyond the negation of God as projection to the further negation of the negation itself in the affirmation of God.”

Buckley reads the nineteenth-century critique of belief in God by Feuerbach and Freud as a critique of a “too-easy” theism. For these thinkers, the God projected by believers was all too human. Buckley points out that their critique runs parallel to a similar critique by “a movement equally aware of the proclivity of religion to become projection” (109). This movement is the apophatic tradition of pseudo-Dionysius, Gregory of Nyssa, and John of the Cross, among others. Buckley centers his retrieval on John of the Cross, the great Carmelite mystic most known for his articulation of the “dark night of the soul.” Like Freud and Feuerbach, John admits that our ordinary experience of God is deeply flawed and problematic – according to the Scholastic maxim, *quidquid recipitur secundum modum recipientis recipitur* (160 n.46) – our experience, even the inbreaking of divine that can come through prayer, is necessarily conditioned by our own limitations. According to John, true religious consciousness does not, however, stop at identifying the fraught nature of ordinary religiosity. Buckley explains:

> What we grasp and what we long for is very much shaped and determined by our own preconceptions, appetites, concepts, and personality-set. If these are not disclosed and gradually transformed by grace and by its progressive affirmation within religious faith, working its way into the everyday of human

74 Buckley, *Denying and Disclosing God*, xv. Subsequent parenthetical pagination refers to this text.
history and choices, then there is no possibility of contemplation of anything but our own projections. (114)

John’s crucible of religious reflection forces the student of his method to recognize and disavow the idolatry that often masquerades as worship and to reject the projection that substitutes for the true God.

Buckley’s retrieval of apophatic theology as a response to a strand in atheism implies that atheist critiques have something true and valuable to say. Rather than a more traditional apologetic tactic aimed at prohibiting any entrance to atheism, Buckley suggests that the proper aim “should be less to refute Feuerbachian and Freudian analysis than to learn from them what they have to teach about the relentless remolding of the image of God by religious consciousness” (119). Of course, by the time that most people matriculate out of secondary education they come to realize that something can be learned from one’s opponents. Buckley’s account, however, transcends epistemic platitude. Beneath the façade of anti-Christianity, one finds a visage with all the markings of Christianity. Buckley’s dialectic does not conceive of theism and atheism as static, binary terms. The very contradiction upon which modern atheism rests means that the process of understanding this negation will allow the generation of “its own further negation, the negation of the negation” (121). This process is what Buckley intends to accomplish in his appeal to apophaticism and to the mystical theology of John of the Cross.

Buckley ends Denying and Disclosing God by using data neglected in previous centuries of apologetics: religious experience, examples of holiness, and the critical reflection upon encounters with and by such people. In a similar vein, Taylor’s massive investigation of the cause and nature of modern secularism concludes by examining how Christianity might best respond to this situation. Taylor uses the impasse at which late-modern secularity stands in order to carve out a space for Christianity to flourish. In the final chapter of A Secular Age, “Conversions,” he also shows how previously unbelieving moderns have found a way to believe within the immanent frame.75 Beyond

75 Taylor defines the immanent frame as a set of preconditions or unchallenged framework, a “sensed context in which we develop our beliefs.” In the case of modernity, it is an immanent order made possible by such factors as disenchantment (A Secular Age,
reference to important conversions of influential individuals – Walker Percy, T. S. Eliot, Christopher Dawson, Charles Péguy – Taylor points to the Christian attempt to imagine how a Christian civilization persists without a return to Christendom. Jacques Maritain earns a privileged place in Taylor’s rendering. After his unfortunate association with Action Française – the monarchist movement founded by Charles Maurras, which sought to restore Catholicism as the state religion – Maritain realized that a recovery could not mean a return. As Taylor explains:

[Maritain] sought a unity of Christian culture on a global scale, but in a dispersed network of Christian lay institutions and centres of intellectual and spiritual life... The central feature of this new culture will be “l’avènement spirituel non pas de l’ego centré sur lui-même, mais de la subjectivité créatrice.”

Taylor distinguishes between converts who condemn the modern order and those who form a loyal opposition (745). As much as the latter converts acknowledge this gain, their Christianity enables them to identify what is lost in a world without Christ. The more authentic navigation of the intersection of modernity and Christianity does not settle for trying to identify a better, earlier order. Rather, “it invites us to a conversation which can reach beyond any one such order. ... Inevitably and rightly, Christian life today will look for and discover new ways of moving beyond the present orders to God” (755). Precisely as an instance in which we come to see our previous vision as limited, conversion provides a helpful vehicle for Taylor to move out of the immanent frame.

The examination of different stories of conversion also allows Taylor to introduce the possibility of hope. [This hope consists in the discovery that God’s self-sacrificial love in Christ can manifest the authenticity so dearly sought by moderns.] Moreover, Christianity, especially its Catholic branch, urges its followers to imagine the journey of a wayfaring pilgrim as communal and shared with others: “The Church was rather meant to be the place in which human beings, in all their difference and disparate itineraries, come together” (772).

539-93, esp. 549).

76 Taylor, A Secular Age, 744.
Taylor's final chapter contains perhaps his most impassioned writing and reveals his concern to articulate the abiding truth of orthodox Christianity.

In turning to Girard, let us to suggest that his interpretation of modernity is in many ways deeper than Taylor's. Girard better understands the essence of that from which modernity arises. The qualities in Christianity that form modernity seem in Taylor's rendering like arbitrary offshoots of Christianity. Taylor's hopeful conclusion to A Secular Age seems to follow the general arc of why not? For Girard, the essence of modernity arises from the essence of Christianity. The essence of Christianity for Girard, as we have seen, is the revelation of the scapegoat mechanism and of the victim's innocence.

Girard makes two important historical points about the implications of the scapegoat mechanism. The first is that Christianity undoes its power, thus paving the way for modernity's unique and singular concern with victims; or, in Taylor's terms, Christianity ushers in an inclusivist view of humanity. The second is the historical failure of Christianity for so much of its history. The examples of anti-Judaism, witch hunts, and the Crusades suffice. Despite these failures, Girard affirms Nietzsche's insight about the absurdity of secularism's anti-Christianity: Christianity has initiated a revolt in morality. Nietzsche was also wrong: "He doesn't see that the Gospel stance towards victims does not come from prejudice in favor of the weak against the strong [the "slave revolt"] but is heroic resistance to violent contagion. Indeed the Gospels embody the discernment of a small minority that dares to oppose the monstrous mimetic contagion of a Dionysian lynching."

Nietzsche correctly pinpointed the antithesis – Dionysius versus the Crucified, but he sided with the lie of the former rather than the truth of the latter.

With his evangelical hermeneutic, Girard interprets such modern measures as humanitarian aid, the abolition of slavery and serfdom, and different forms of egalitarianism as evidence for Christian progress. He notes: "We are not Christian enough. The paradox can be put in a different way: Christianity is the only religion that has foreseen its own failure." Girard then offers us his hitherto dormant

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77 Girard, I See Satan Fall Like Lightning, 173.
78 Girard, Battling to the End, x.
eschatology. Although he had made a similar comment in the earlier *I See Satan Fall Like Lightning*, he did so without the apocalyptic conclusions put forth in *Battling to the End* (2009), where he states, “Christian truth has been making an unrelenting historical advance in our world. Paradoxically, it goes hand in hand with the apparent decline of Christianity.” Later he states,

The fact that our world has become solidly anti-Christian, at least among elites, does not prevent the concern for victims from flourishing – just the opposite.

The majestic inauguration of the “post-Christian era” is a joke. We are living through a caricatural “ultra Christianity” that tries to escape from the Judeo-Christian orbit by “radicalizing” the concern for victims in an anti-Christian manner.79

Whereas Taylor points to the authenticity of Christian converts, who chart a better way to be good moderns, Girard points to an incongruence of modern seculars. This incongruence indicates the kind of dissatisfaction with modernity articulated by our “knockers” in the opening section. Despite many indications that Girard would qualify as one of Taylor’s “knockers,” this is an untenable conclusion. Girard reads modernity as far too Christian to read it as a mistake or as a simple reversal of a better Christian past.

This evangelical hermeneutic licenses Girard to understand both modernity and atheism as fundamentally Christian. As Christianity slowly works to dismantle sacrificial religion, it saws off the branch on which historical Christianity rests in so far as it is unable to practice religion free of scapegoating. Secularism and atheism are not simply unfortunate side effects but rather inevitable results. Girard declares:

Christianity is not only one of the destroyed religions but it is the destroyer of all religions. The death of God is a Christian phenomenon. In its modern sense, atheism is a Christian invention....The disappearance of religion is a Christian phenomenon par excellence.80

79 Girard, *I See Satan Fall Like Lightning*, 178, 179.
In a word, Christianity teaches us how to be secular.

It is hard to accept Girard’s analysis without feeling subsequently that Christianity has the upper hand. Indeed, I would like to conclude pointing out that all three of our authors end their writings on an apologetic note. Although Taylor is the only one of the three who acknowledges familiarity with the other two, Girard, it seems, is the more true to the spirit of Buckley, even if less indebted to him. For Buckley, when one understands modern atheism as a negation, then the steps to negate the negation are clear. For Girard, once it is clear that the skepticism of the anti-Christians “itself is a by-product of Christian religion,” then it is a short and swift step to outwit them. Good Christian theology continually engages in a kind of brinksmanship, and the bad theology described by Buckley balks at this.

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81 In private conversations around 2008, Buckley told me that he was reading Taylor and that he had never spent any time with Girard, although he was familiar with but unsympathetic to his theory.

82 Girard, Battling to the End, xvi.
COSMOPOLIS AND COSMOPOLITANISM

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In May 2010, the state of Hawaii passed a law allowing state officials to ignore “repeated requests” for information from people who have had the same request fulfilled within the past year. This law was intended to relieve beleaguered Health Department employees responsible for answering requests for a copy of the birth certificate of President Obama. Prior to passing the law, the Hawaii State Health Department had a stack of requests 13 inches high, received from people who professed doubt that Obama is constitutionally eligible to be president, either because they believe he was born in Kenya or in Indonesia or because he possessed dual citizenship at birth. Despite its reputation as a fringe group, and despite repeated proofs that Obama was born in Hawaii, the movement known as the “birthers” has at this writing fielded at least one apparently viable Republican candidate for state office in California.

For those with an interest in the history of philosophy, the birthers are just one recent example of the irrational extremes to which a narrowly focused and divisive patriotism can lead someone. This kind of example makes it easy to appreciate the attraction of cosmopolitanism (literally, citizenship in the cosmos), which promotes the belief in a “single community” of all human beings. Cosmopolitanism has a long and varied history, ranging from the Cynic Diogenes, through the Stoics and early Christians, through to Enlightenment figures,

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famously including Immanuel Kant in his 1795 essay on perpetual peace. In recent years, liberal moral philosophers have taken up anew the questions of what it means to be a cosmopolitan and whether cosmopolitanism rather than patriotism should be taught to the young. For those familiar with Lonergan’s work, contemporary debates over cosmopolitanism recall his discussions of “cosmopolis” (literally, a universal city), a term Lonergan used in the 1951 article translated as “The Role of a Catholic University in the Modern World,” and which also played a pivotal role in Insight. I will argue here that, despite the appearance that Lonergan’s notion of cosmopolis is far removed from the concerns of the contemporary debate over moral cosmopolitanism, Lonergan’s account of cosmopolis in fact serves to illuminate important questions that moral cosmopolitanism, in particular that of Martha Nussbaum, should bear in mind.

COSMOPOLIS IN “THE ROLE OF THE CATHOLIC UNIVERSITY IN THE MODERN WORLD”

In “The Role of the Catholic University in the Modern World,” Lonergan, as always, was not content to address his trite-sounding topic in a pedestrian manner. Instead, in a few short pages he situates the topic within cognitional theory, the theory of the human good, progress and decline, the problem of evil (moral impotence) and its solution, and the dialectic of history. Along the way he laces the argument with slyly cutting comments about the current state of Catholic intellectual life.


7 “...nor can anyone suppose that a second rate Catholic university is any more acceptable to God in the new law than was in the old law the sacrifice of maimed or diseased beasts.” And “the misadventures of Catholic intellectuals could be taken as a counsel to wrap one’s talent in a napkin and bury it safely in the ground, were not that
To set the context, Lonergan notes the three levels of human knowing (experiential, intellectual, and reflective), the corresponding goods (objects of desire, goods of order, and “judgments of value”), and the levels of community (intersubjective, civil, and cultural). Lonergan here identifies cultural community with “cosmopolis,” not, he writes, “as an unrealized political ideal but as a long-standing, nonpolitical, cultural fact.” He identifies cosmopolis as well with “the field of communication and influence of artists, scientists, and philosophers,” “the bar of enlightened public opinion to which naked power can be driven to submit,” and “the tribunal of history that may expose successful charlatans and may restore to honor the prophets stoned by their contemporaries.” Universities, he claims, are charged with reproducing cultural community/cosmopolis, which for Lonergan means that they must do more than simply pass on accepted cultural knowledge. Rather, the task of the university is “the communication of intellectual development.”

Conclusion clean contrary to the gospel which demands, beyond capitalist expectations, one hundred percent profit” (Collection, 118). See also William Mathews’s discussion of the significance of this essay as a precursor to Insight (William A. Mathews, Lonergan’s Quest: A Study of Desire in the Authoring of Insight [Toronto: University of Toronto Press, 2005], 281-83).

8 Collection, 114-15.
9 Collection, 117.
of faith are not shifted about with every wind of doctrine." In order to accomplish the task of the university, Catholic intellectuals must "purify" the "real achievements" of the human intellect by exercising humility and detachment "without personal or corporate or national complacence..." and by identifying the aspects of current culture that are the result of moral impotence. Because moral impotence (sin) is addressed through "divine grace," "the integration of sciences that deal with man concretely has to be sought not in philosophy but in theology."11

Cosmopolis in this essay, then, is cultural community that is able to effectively critique the status quo. It is identified not with a political state but with the critical judgments of artists, philosophers, scientists, historians, and the educated public. Universities are charged with producing new generations of people who will be part of this critical cultural force, and their task is only possible with the help of the grace without which we cannot overcome our own weakness and corruption and the accumulated errors we have inherited.

In Insight, Lonergan preserves and explains this earlier account of cosmopolis and places it within the context of his rich philosophical system.12 The discussion of cosmopolis in Insight appears at the conclusion to Lonergan's discussion of common sense, in which he argues that the practicality rightly prized by common sense can become its fatal flaw, for the "peculiar danger" of common sense "is to extend its legitimate concern for the concrete and the immediately practical into disregard of larger issues and indifference to long-term results".13 This disregard of larger issues and long-term results is what Lonergan calls "general bias," and along with the biases of individuals and groups, it excludes good ideas from consideration, and over time it creates what Lonergan calls the "social surd."14 General bias contributes to the "longer cycle of decline" in which the acceptance

10 Collection, 119.
11 Collection, 120.
13 Insight, 251.
14 Insight, 255.
of irrational aspects of human practice becomes commonplace, progress turns to "stagnation," and disinterested inquiry is viewed as irrelevant. Lonergan proposes "cosmopolis" as the "higher viewpoint" by which the cycle of decline could be reversed.\(^\text{15}\) Informed by the understanding that free and detached inquiry should be promoted and that bias should be critiqued, and by a critical cognitional theory, cosmopolis functions as a corrective of a declining culture.\(^\text{16}\) "What is necessary," Lonergan writes, "is a cosmopolis that is neither class nor state, that stands above all their claims, that cuts them down to size, that is founded on the native detachment and disinterestedness of every intelligence, that commands man's first allegiance, ... that is too universal to be bribed, too impalpable to be forced, too effective to be ignored."\(^\text{17}\) Lonergan distinguishes cosmopolis from a police force, a court, a "super-state," an organization, or an academy.\(^\text{18}\) Rather than being one of these identifiable institutions, cosmopolis is "a withdrawal from practicality" and "a dimension of consciousness...a discovery of historical responsibilities."\(^\text{19}\) As Thomas McPartland succinctly puts it, the task of cosmopolis is "to promote self-transcendence."\(^\text{20}\)

As in his earlier article, Lonergan here is not content to frame cosmopolis only within a discussion of human history or of social progress. For Lonergan, the central issue facing humankind is "moral impotence."\(^\text{21}\) He argues that the reversal of decline that is the task of cosmopolis faces a "radical" and "permanent" problem in the human

\(^{15}\) Insight, 259.

\(^{16}\) Insight, 262.

\(^{17}\) Insight, 263.

\(^{18}\) Insight, 266.

\(^{19}\) For a discussion of the importance of a critical analysis of history to Lonergan's account of cosmopolis, see Kenneth R. Melchin, History, Ethics, and Emergent Probability: Ethics, Society, and History in the Work of Bernard Lonergan, 2nd ed. The Lonergan Website, 1999, 239-42.

\(^{20}\) McPartland's full statement of the positive task of cosmopolis: "It seeks to promote through persuasion and example the free conversion to the norms of basic horizon, to appeal to the latent openness of individuals and groups, to support the struggle for authenticity, to tap the psychic energy of awe and wonder – in a word, to promote self-transcendence." (Thomas J. McPartland, Lonergan and the Philosophy of Historical Existence. Columbia, MO: University of Missouri Press, 2001, 132). See also McPartland 2001, 125-40.

\(^{21}\) Insight, 650.
“incapacity for sustained development” brought about by human biases. The success of cosmopolis is possible only if a “needed higher integration has emerged.” In his chapter on “Special Transcendent Knowledge, Lonergan identifies moral impotence and the social surd with “a reign of sin” and specifies that the solution to the problem of evil must respect human freedom, that it will be a mystery that appeals not only to human intelligence but to our imagination and sensitivity, both as individuals and as groups, that it will be a supernatural solution that brings about faith, hope, and charity in a collaboration of the human with the divine, and that it will be accompanied by “some appropriate institutional organization of the new and higher collaboration.”

In the Epilogue to *Insight*, Lonergan makes it explicit that this solution to the problem of evil is the birth of Christ, the “Light of the world,” which in transfiguring human living “contains the solution not only to man’s individual but also to his social problem of evil.” In the Epilogue, Lonergan implicitly connects cosmopolis to the mystical body of Christ when he suggests that the study of “the historical aspect of development” has a “peculiar relevance to a treatise on the mystical body of Christ,” and that a formal theological understanding of the mystical body requires a theory of history. Lonergan cites important moments in the unfolding of the history of the idea of the mystical body, including “the Pauline thesis of the moral impotence of Jew and Gentile alike,” the Augustinian distinction between the city of God and the “city of this world,” and the publication of the social encyclicals of the Catholic church in response to the theories of history of liberals, Marxists, *et alia*. Implicit here seems to be the claim that “cosmopolis” has historically been known by other names (mystical body, city of God, the community of followers of the One in whom there is neither Jew nor Greek, and so on), but that it has always functioned as a

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22 *Insight*, 654.
23 *Insight*, 656.
24 *Insight*, 743.
25 *Insight*, 744.
26 *Insight*, 764.
27 *Insight*, 762.
28 *Insight*, 764.
community that draws on God's grace to bear witness to the ongoing transformation of the human world.

MARTHA NUSSBAUM'S DEFENSE OF COSMOPOLITANISM

In her 1994 essay, "Patriotism and Cosmopolitanism," Martha Nussbaum called into question recent calls for a renewed sense of American national identity.29 In opposition to the claim that American children should be educated to view themselves first as citizens of the United States (with the proviso that they must respect the human rights of people in other nations), Nussbaum defends "cosmopolitan education," the view that American children should be taught "that they are, above all, citizens of a world of human beings, and that, while they happen to be situated in the United States, they have to share this world with the citizens of other countries."30 In defense of this view, Nussbaum draws on the Stoic view that our first allegiance is not to the accidents of our birth but to the "reason and moral capacity" that bind us to all human beings.31 For the Stoics, Nussbaum argues, being a citizen of the world does not mean giving up local attachments. Rather, the cosmopolitan sees him or herself as belonging to a series of concentric circles, with the narrowest containing the self and the widest containing all human beings, and with the family, nation, and so on occupying the circles in between. A cosmopolitan education teaches children to imagine vividly and compassionately the lives of those in countries other than their own, thus bridging the gap between the smaller circles of home and community and the larger circle of the world community.

Nussbaum defends cosmopolitan education on the grounds that 1) one learns more about one's own cultural preferences by learning about conceptions (e.g., of gender, family, work) held by those in other countries, 2) solving global problems requires international collaboration and mutual understanding, 3) cosmopolitan education makes people aware of the moral obligations they have to people in

29 Nussbaum, 4. Nussbaum's essay, along with twenty-nine responses from various authors, originally appeared in the Boston Review, October/November, 1994.)
31 Nussbaum, "Patriotism and Cosmopolitanism," 7. Nussbaum points out that this Stoic conception of cosmopolitanism is an ancestor to Kant's "kingdom of ends."
other nations, and 4) the same values of mutual respect and human dignity that are central to democracy also lead one to respect human beings across national boundaries.\footnote{Nussbaum, "Patriotism and Cosmopolitanism," 11-15.}

In the essay collection, \textit{For Love of Country?}, a number of authors respond critically to Nussbaum's essay. Nussbaum concedes to her critics that cosmopolitanism allows us "to give special attention to our own families and to our own ties of religious and national belonging," but that the reason for this preference is that it is "the only sensible way to do good" rather than that the people closer to us have greater moral worth than those farther away.\footnote{Nussbaum, "For Love of Country?" 136.} To the critics' claim that cosmopolitanism is meaningless without a world state, Nussbaum argues that there are many ways to recognize cross-national moral obligations that do not depend on the existence of such a state. She agrees with Kwame Anthony Appiah that it is essential for cosmopolitans not only to celebrate the universal but to appreciate the concrete diversity of local cultures and religions, but argues that "the challenge of world citizenship ... is to work toward a state of things in which all of the differences will be nonhierarchically understood [like the difference between basketball fans and lovers of jazz]."\footnote{Nussbaum, "For Love of Country?" 138.} Against the critics who claim that cosmopolitanism is overly abstract and boring compared to imaginative and artistic celebrations of the local and national, she responds that narrowly patriotic art tends to be kitsch, and that "it would be difficult to find a powerful work of art that is not, at some level, concerned with the claim of the common and our tragic and comic refusals of that claim."\footnote{Nussbaum, "For Love of Country?" 139.}

\section*{COMMON CONCERNS IN COSMOPOLIS AND COSMOPOLITANISM}

Nussbaum's defense of cosmopolitanism has much in common with Lonergan's account of cosmopolis. Both hold that a person's first allegiance should be to something that transcends the boundaries of the family or the nation. Neither Lonergan nor Nussbaum promotes a world state (though neither pronounces it impossible). Indeed, instead
of focusing on politics, both highlight the importance of education and the way the arts, whether tragic or comic, play a critical role in awakening people to this higher allegiance. Both draw (implicitly or explicitly) on the Stoic view that our first allegiance is to that rational capacity that allows us to critique the biases of our narrower local and national loyalties.

INTERNATIONAL COLLABORATION VERSUS OVERCOMING GENERAL BIAS

In several interesting respects, however, Lonergan's notion of cosmopolis and Nussbaum's cosmopolitanism seem to diverge. Let us focus on two of these. The first is that, unlike Nussbaum, Lonergan does not explicitly focus on cross-cultural or international understanding as a central aspect of cosmopolis. Rather, his fundamental way of characterizing cosmopolis is as a force counter to the general bias of common sense. It is true that Lonergan's cosmopolis is in part also addressed to correcting the limitations of group bias, and in that sense it parallels Nussbaum's critique of the narrow patriotism that excludes concern for outsiders. It is also true that for Nussbaum, one of the main drawbacks of narrow patriotism is that it forecloses fruitful questions and lines of inquiry, which can be opened up if one considers ideas from people of other cultures and if international collaboration is encouraged. In that sense, Nussbaum's praise of cosmopolitanism contains a germ of Lonergan's notion that cosmopolis functions to allow questions and insights to occur when they have been previously blocked because of the limitations of common sense, whose concerns are narrowly focused on what is practical within a given horizon. Nussbaum's promotion of the cosmopolitan moral inclusiveness toward all human beings, too, finds a partial parallel in Lonergan's rejection of the narrow practicality of common sense that can easily become ruthlessness toward outsiders.

Where Lonergan and Nussbaum most clearly part ways is in Lonergan's account of general bias as explicitly the opponent of theory. While, again, there is a parallel in Nussbaum's claim that an advantage of cosmopolitanism is that it allows us to embrace a consistent moral

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36 See, for example, Lonergan's inclusion of cosmopolis in his essay on the Catholic university, discussed above.
theory that is inclusive of all persons, Lonergan’s claim goes far beyond moral theory to embrace an openness to theory in general. In identifying the human tendency to cling to what appears practical and thereby to overlook theoretical questions that can turn out to be of immense practical value (or indeed to revolutionize our ideas about what practicality means), Lonergan is pointing to a phenomenon of much wider scope than the one that Nussbaum is concerned with when she praises cosmopolitanism. And yet the problem of general bias and the social surd, which Lonergan has analyzed, is of great relevance if one is to address the problems of international inequality that fuel Nussbaum’s advocacy of cosmopolitanism. Kwame Anthony Appiah, in his book on cosmopolitanism, makes this clear when he argues that the best way to fulfill one’s moral obligation to a starving child in another country may not be to send money to UNICEF instead of spending it on opera tickets, if the result is that “tomorrow [the child] will eat the same poor food, drink the same infected water, and live in a country with the same incompetent government; if the government’s economic policies continue to block real development for her family and her community; if her country is still trapped in poverty in part because our government has imposed tariffs on some of their exports to protect American manufacturers with a well-organized lobbying group in Washington, while the European Union saves jobs for its people by placing quotas on the importation of others.”37 “A genuinely cosmopolitan response,” Appiah writes, “begins with caring to try to understand why that child is dying. Cosmopolitanism is about intelligence and curiosity as well as engagement. It requires knowing that policies that I might have supported because they protect jobs in my state or region are part of the answer.”38

Appiah’s argument points to the fact that Lonergan’s concern to promote an openness to theory has a fundamental role to play in the cosmopolitan project.39 It is easy to come up with other examples of this connection between international cooperation and understanding (advocated by Nussbaum) and the openness to theory advocated by

38 Appiah, Cosmopolitanism, 168.
39 See Oduke’s discussion of the need to overcome short-sightedness in international development (245).
Lonergan. In addition to the problems of the global economy, the threat of climate change is another case in which common sense is often tempted to insist that its own narrow horizon defines what is relevant to the argument. While Nussbaum's cosmopolitanism is not centrally focused on overcoming the commonsense opposition to theory, then, and while Lonergan's cosmopolis is not centrally concerned with international understanding, it is clear that international cooperation has the potential to challenge a parochial common sense and that theory is essential to addressing the international challenges that face our world.

THEOLOGICAL DIMENSIONS OF COSMOPOLIS

A second and even greater point of tension between Lonergan's and Nussbaum's accounts of cosmopolis and cosmopolitanism is the fundamental role that transcendence plays in Lonergan's account. As we have seen, for Lonergan, cosmopolis is ultimately dependent on the grace that allows the reversal of social decline through the supernatural virtues of faith, hope, and charity. Thus for Lonergan, cosmopolis cannot be understood except in a theological context that acknowledges the problem of moral impotence. In contrast, despite Nussbaum's personal commitment to Judaism, for Nussbaum as a political philosopher to frame her work within a theological context is impossible both because of the presuppositions of the contemporary liberal milieu in which she writes, in which religious neutrality is considered an essential part of political tolerance and philosophical objectivity, and because Nussbaum's own work has so consistently faulted philosophers who sacrificed the finite and fragile attachments of human life on the altar of an abstract otherworldly good.

40 See Oduke for a list of related issues that are especially important in Africa (243).
42 Martha Nussbaum, The Fragility of Goodness, updated ed. (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2001). Hilary Putnam hints at the tension between Nussbaum's cosmopolitanism and her previous criticisms of philosophers who over-emphasized transcendence when he writes, "Let me say, first of all, that it is strange that this idea [of universal reason] comes from [Nussbaum's] pen. Indeed, it is so out of keeping with what she has written about the moral life in her many wonderful books that I am puzzled
Michael McConnell points to the tension between Nussbaum's cosmopolitanism and her general avoidance of theology when he comments that a "problem with Nussbaum's position is her dismissal of one of the most powerful resources available for combating selfishness and narrow national self-interest: religion. Religion, like cosmopolitanism, cuts across national boundaries and enjoins us to care for the alien and the stranger." In subordinating religious belief to "cosmopolitan allegiance," he writes, Nussbaum "does not know her allies." Moreover, "There is something peculiar about invoking the ancient teachings of the Stoics and the Cynics in support of ideas that are taught every week in Sunday school."

In the intervening years since Nussbaum published her essay on patriotism, these or other objections led her to reconsider her view. In 2008, she published "Toward a Globally Sensitive Patriotism," in which she revisited her earlier writings, saying that she had earlier "tentatively" claimed that 1) "our duties to humanity should always take precedence over other duties," and 2) "particular obligations are correctly understood to be derivative from universal obligations." Nussbaum wrote that her ideas had changed "in two ways." The first change is that Nussbaum has adopted Rawls's political liberalism, which holds that "the political principles of a decent society not include comprehensive ethical or metaphysical doctrines that could not be endorsed by reasonable citizens holding a wide range of comprehensive doctrines." Because many of the comprehensive views held by reasonable people do hold that particular attachments, including patriotism, are worthwhile, and that one's duties to people who are close by are not just derived from one's universal duties, Nussbaum as a political liberal would no longer advocate for cosmopolitanism even if she still believed in it. However, Nussbaum states further that she

as to whether she can really mean what she wrote; perhaps she was overreacting to Rorty." Hilary Putnam, "Must We Choose between Patriotism and Universal Reason?" In Nussbaum 1996, 93.

43 Michael W. McConnell, "Don't Neglect the Little Platoons," in Nussbaum, "For Love of Country?", 83.

44 Martha Nussbaum, "Toward a Globally Sensitive Patriotism." Dædalus 137, no. 3 (Summer 2008): 78-93.

also “no longer endorse[s] cosmopolitanism as a correct comprehensive doctrine.”46 Further thought about Stoicism, she adds, led her to realize that “the denial of particular attachments leaves life empty of meaning for most of us.”47 Rather than always subordinating one’s particular attachments to one’s universal obligations, Nussbaum writes, we ought to experience an “oscillation” between these two sources of duty. Nussbaum accepts that patriotism, in addition to its potentially narrowing effects on the moral life, “is also a way of making the mind bigger, calling it away from its immersion in greed and egoism.”48 She argues that liberal democratic nation-states are a good and that they require emotional attachments by their people in order to be stable.

Nussbaum goes on to say that nation-states, in order to be able to ask sacrifices of their people (including the sacrifice of redistributing wealth internationally for the sake of justice), need to draw on the emotions stirred by “symbols, memories, poetry, narrative,” but that “we just need to be sure that citizens develop a kind of ‘purified’ patriotism that is reliably linked to the deeper principles of the political conception, that does not exalt the United States (for example) above other nations, and that focuses on suffering humanity wherever it occurs.”49 Such a “globally sensitive patriotism” will use rhetoric and symbol, drawing on the history of the nation (including, to a degree, religion and ethnicity) to underscore its moral ideals, while avoiding the use of symbols that are not inclusive of all. To be encouraged are compassion and respect for others, along with emotions of reasonable anger and hope; to be discouraged are emotions of shame and disgust, which often lead to violence.50

A “purified patriotism,” Nussbaum argues, requires that five elements be in place: 1) constitutional rights and an independent judiciary, 2) a separation of powers “that makes going to war more difficult,” 3) “protections for the rights of immigrants,” 4) “education about foreign cultures and domestic minorities,” and 5) “a vigorous

critical culture."

Nussbaum concludes the essay by examining the use of rhetoric to call forth patriotic emotions in times of great national sacrifice: Lincoln’s Gettysburg Address and Second Inaugural Address, Martin Luther King, Jr.’s “I Have a Dream” speech, and Gandhi’s practice of making his body “a living symbol of the (purified conception of the) nation.” Nussbaum argues that the religious right in both the United States and India promote patriotism in an exclusionary way, and that this practice should be countered by a patriotism that celebrates inclusiveness and justice across religious and ethnic lines.

In recanting her previous support for cosmopolitanism, Nussbaum sought, I believe, a synthesis of, on the one hand, her own lifelong recognition of the importance of our love of the particular and fragile, and, on the other, her dedication to universal principles of justice. While she retained the cosmopolitan’s belief that justice and compassion know no national boundaries, she rejected the cosmopolitan’s sense of not truly belonging to his or her native land. Instead of a forced choice between narrow patriotism and rootless cosmopolitanism, Nussbaum calls for a patriotism that celebrates precisely the most inclusive and self-sacrificing moral ideas of a nation.

Given Nussbaum’s reconsideration of cosmopolitanism, does her revised position maintain its distance from the theological framework of Lonergan’s account of cosmopolis? On the surface, the answer is yes. For one thing, Nussbaum’s reconsideration of cosmopolitanism, which she undertakes in part to protect religious believers from the encroaching implications of her former “comprehensive” cosmopolitan views, has the added advantage of protecting Nussbaum the political philosopher from continuing to espouse a comprehensive cosmopolitan view that is, as Michael McConnell pointed out, uncomfortably close to the ideas taught in Sunday school. In that sense, Nussbaum’s distanciation from cosmopolitanism is also a distanciation from cosmopolitanism’s roots in religion.

51 Nussbaum, “Toward a Globally Sensitive Patriotism,” 86.
52 Nussbaum, “Toward a Globally Sensitive Patriotism,” 91. For example, Nussbaum points out that Gandhi used traditional Hindu fasting as a political symbol, while also breaking with Hindu tradition (and breaking his fast) by asking a Muslim compatriot for food.
53 Appiah, Cosmopolitanism, xvi.
On the other hand, it is worth recalling that as part of her reconsideration of cosmopolitanism, Nussbaum gives a sympathetic and illuminating analysis of the political rhetoric of Lincoln, King, and Gandhi and of their successful invocation and creation of inclusive and idealistic national symbolisms, and that both Lincoln's Second Inaugural Address and King's "I Have a Dream" speech rely heavily on Biblical imagery and quotations for much, though certainly not all, of their rhetorical power. Nussbaum herself, when describing the emotions that a purified patriotism should encourage in its citizens, notably includes the emotions of compassion and hope - virtues not so far from their supernatural counterparts of hope and charity.

One might conclude from the presence of these strong religious influences in her work that Nussbaum, along with Lincoln and King, has simply not yet succeeded in uncoupling patriotism from its theological history, but that eventually this project can be successfully completed. One might conclude further that Nussbaum, along with the liberal political milieu in which she writes, participates in an ongoing eclipse of reality, in which the transcendent mystery that supports human strivings goes unacknowledged while in its place we elevate other, immanent dimensions of life to godlike status, with predictably unfortunate results.

If it is true that Nussbaum is helping to eclipse our understanding of the reality that includes transcendent mystery and divine grace, it is also not difficult to see why she, along with the rest of the liberal intellectual establishment, has headed in this direction, given the kind of intellectually narrow and exclusionary views that represent theology in much of public life. Not wanting to identify themselves with the religious right, mainstream liberal thinkers identify themselves with no religion at all, at least in their intellectual lives. The impulse away from theology is analogous to the one that drove Nussbaum away

54 See especially paragraph 3 of the Second Inaugural Address, and the following passage from the "I Have a Dream" Speech: "I have a dream that one day every valley shall be exalted, and every hill and mountain shall be made low, the rough places will be made plain, and the crooked places will be made straight; and the glory of the Lord shall be revealed and all flesh shall see it together."

55 For a discussion of the importance of transcendent mystery as related to cosmopolis, see Glenn Hughes, Transcendence and History: The Search for Ultimacy from Ancient Societies to Modernity (Columbia, MO: University of Missouri Press, 2003), 106-26.
initially from patriotism and toward cosmopolitanism. Nussbaum’s way back to patriotism, as we saw, was to change what patriotism meant—to distinguish a purified and “modern” patriotism that celebrates one’s country’s best ideals, from a patriotism motivated by shame and celebratory of violence.

Can the same be done for religion? Lonergan gives us clues in his 1975 essay, “Healing and Creating in History,” in which he returns to the questions of development, decline, bias, and faith that informed his earlier treatments of cosmopolis but in which the word “cosmopolis” does not appear. Lonergan begins by citing a disagreement between Bertrand Russell, who believes that the intellectual abilities of human beings (e.g., our development of thermonuclear bombs) has outrun our moral development (e.g., our ability to develop a world state), and Karl Popper, who believes that it is our moral development (e.g., our enthusiasm for making the world better) that lags behind our intellectual ability to solve the complex problems of our world.

Lonergan offers “healing” and “creating” as positive ways to address the problems identified by Russell and Popper. He begins by describing the way multinational corporations, by following the accepted principles of maximizing profit and avoiding inefficiency and bankruptcy, have made the underdeveloped countries “hopelessly worse off than otherwise they would be” and promise to do the same for the developed countries. The multinational “is built on the very principles that slowly but surely have been molding our technology and our economics, our society and our culture, our ideals and our practice for centuries.”

“It remains,” he continues, “that the long-accepted principles are inadequate. They suffer from radical oversights. Their rigorous application on a global scale...heads us for disaster.” What can reverse this disaster is “creative process,” the accumulation of insights whose “nemesis” is individual, group, and general bias.

Global progress can only be made if, in addition to “creating” (characterized as a movement from below upward), a process of “healing” (or a development “from above downward”) occurs. “Where

57 “Healing and Creating in History,” 568.
58 “Healing and Creating in History,” 570.
hatred reinforces bias, love dissolves it, whether it be the bias of unconscious motivation, the bias of individual or group egoism, or the bias of omnicompetent, shortsighted common sense. Lonergan writes, “breaks the bonds of psychological and social determinisms with the conviction of faith and the power of hope.” This power of love, he continues, “must be denied to any ambiguous mixture of love and hatred. If in no other way at least from experience we have learnt that professions of zeal for the eternal salvation of souls do not make the persecution of heretics a means for the reconciliation of heretics. On the contrary, persecution leads to ongoing enmity... In like manner wars of religion...have given color to a secularism that in the English-speaking world regards revealed religion as a merely private affair and in continental Europe thinks it an evil.

Lonergan goes on to say that, just as healing “can have no truck with hatred, so it can have no truck with materialism.” He singles out for criticism Marxism and behaviorists, who believe, respectively, that a “stick-and-carrot treatment” or an immersion in proletarian living conditions have the power to transform consciousness, a power that Lonergan believes properly belongs to God’s grace. He points out, however, that the power of healing by itself is insufficient, as in the case when Christians in the Roman Empire had the spiritual power to heal but lacked the creative force to prevent the empire from disintegrating. Lonergan’s own “proposed utopia” would rely on both economists and moral theorists to take note of one another’s insights (perhaps to combine a morally oriented economics with an economically astute ethics).

In these few pages, Lonergan has revisited the problems he earlier named bias, decline, the social surd, and moral impotence, but in discussing their solution he has avoided using the noun “cosmopolis,” replacing it with two verbs, “creating” and “healing.” While Lonergan never meant by “cosmopolis” a static or universalist system or organization, the terms “healing” and “creating” better convey his original meaning to the extent that they point to something complex and dynamic, to a process that moves, figuratively, from “below” as well as from “above.”

59 “Healing and Creating in History,” 573.
60 “Healing and Creating in History,” 574.
61 “Healing and Creating in History,” 575.
What I earlier identified as the two unique features of cosmopolis—that it is a force against general bias and that it finds its ground in transcendence—are here expressed as the two processes of creating and healing and are both identified by Lonergan as crucial to addressing the problems of what we have now come to call globalization. By showing how “creating” operates in history as a critical accumulation of insights and as a process of transcending bias, Lonergan prefigures Appiah’s later comment to the effect that a true cosmopolitan would try to find out why a child is starving and be willing to question his or her own (commonsense) beliefs in order to find the answer.

Lonergan points, also, to a solution to the dilemma of anyone who would affirm religious belief without engendering the hostility of those who see in religion only the seeds of persecution and conflict. He affirms the faith, hope, and charity that grant us unexplained gifts of healing and cautions us to avoid, on the one hand, attributing those gifts to something less mysterious than their divine origin, and on the other, using our awareness of those gifts as a pretext for hatred against those who do not share our beliefs. Lonergan thus points us toward a religious belief that, like Nussbaum’s “globally sensitive” patriotism, remains pluralist and inclusive. Yet, unlike Nussbaum’s secularized patriotism (and like the patriotism of Lincoln and King), Lonergan’s would acknowledge not only the need for compassion and hope, but also the faith in a transcendent source of grace that allows us to overcome the darkness in our minds and hearts.62

To conclude, I return to the example with which I began: the “birthers” movement that denies, contrary to reason, that Barack Obama is eligible to be president. A narrow patriotism here masquerades as a rational concern for the law, and appeals to reason are only partially effective against it. More effective, perhaps, will be “cosmopolitical” humor, songs, and stories that can help to call us to our better selves. Among the most powerful of such healing symbols is that of a child whose own humble birth brought together poor shepherds and foreign kings, and of whom it was later said that in him “there is neither Jew nor Greek, slave nor free, male nor female, for you are all one...” in him.63

62 For a detailed exploration of the relationship between cosmopolis and theology, see Robert M. Doran, Theology and the Dialectics of History (Toronto: University of Toronto Press, 1990), 355-86.

THE HUMAN PERSON IN
WOJTYLA AND LONERGAN

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INTRODUCTION

THOUGH THERE IS NO EVIDENCE that they knew each other's work, Bernard Lonergan and Karol Wojtyla, later to be Pope John Paul II, shared a number of philosophical concerns. Primary amongst these was their desire to do philosophy at the level of their times – to bring into dialogue the best of the philosophical tradition with the best of contemporary movements in philosophy. Wojtyla worked out his program largely within the Lublin school of philosophy in Poland, drawing together Thomism, personalism, and aspects of phenomenology.¹ The highlight of his philosophical work was his book, *The Acting Person.*² Lonergan worked out his philosophical program through an initial disenchantment with the bare scholastic fare of his Jesuit philosophy studies, through his apprenticeship to Thomas himself, and on to his own account of human knowing and the way in which an accurate account of such knowing can enlighten and ground theology.

In this paper, I shall explore some connections between the thought of these two major twentieth-century figures. There are doubtless numerous other parallels that could be noted, but I will touch on five that have occurred to me. Given the audience of this paper, I


shall presume greater knowledge of Lonergan and lesser knowledge of Wojtyla as I discuss these points.

EXPERIENCE AND CONSCIOUSNESS

My first parallel relates to understandings of experience and of consciousness. Here I shall summarize conclusions I drew in a previous paper in which I point to two parallels between the ways Wojtyla and Lonergan deal with consciousness.3

Firstly, what Wojtyla calls “the inner experience” of the human person parallels Lonergan’s understanding of consciousness as my experience of myself and my acts as subject. For Wojtyla, an experience of myself is necessarily associated with my experience of anything outside of myself (The Acting Person, 3). This experience of myself is unique: “no external relation to any other human being can take the place of the experiential relation that the subject has to himself” (6). This experience, like consciousness, is usually continuous, except that it is interrupted by sleep (3).4 Moreover, Wojtyla refers to philosophies which focus on this inner form of experience as philosophies of consciousness (19).

Secondly, even though Wojtyla does not directly connect his account of consciousness with his discussion of inner experience, what he calls “reflexive consciousness” approaches what Lonergan means by consciousness tout court – awareness or experience of myself as subject. For Wojtyla, the reflexive aspect of consciousness allows one “to experience in a special way [one’s] own subjectiveness” (42); to experience oneself “as the subject of one’s own acts and experiences” (44).

Besides these parallels, I also noted some limitations in Wojtyla’s account of consciousness and knowing. In particular, I pointed to the ways he gets trapped in the visual metaphor for knowing, in descriptive categories of inner and outer experience, and in a belief

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4 Lonergan differentiates dreamless sleep from dream states in which a “fragmentary and incoherent” form of consciousness is present (Bernard J. F. Lonergan, Method in Theology [London: Darton, Longman & Todd, 1972], 9).
that consciousness needs to be consciousness of something. I go on to show how Lonergan’s precisely delineated account of consciousness as experience avoids these traps.

**SUBJECTIVITY AND METAPHYSICS**

The second parallel between the work of these thinkers lies in their shared insistence that philosophy take human subjectivity seriously without getting lost in the black hole of subjectivism. Wojtyla does this by holding together the person experiencing himself or herself as a subject, a concrete self, and the person understood metaphysically as *suppositum humanum*.

Seeing the human being as *suppositum* prevents the slide into “pure consciousness” or the “pure subject” (*Person and Community*, 222). Wojtyla realizes, though, that discussing the *suppositum* leads only to generic statements about and definitions of the human person; it cannot take us into the irreducible uniqueness of each person which is so important to him. For this, we need not metaphysics but an examination of human subjectivity. The *suppositum* is about being a subject; subjectivity is about experiencing oneself as a subject (227). On this point, Aguas notes the difference between Wojtyla’s usage of the term “subject” and existentialism’s usual usage:

Subjectivity as it is understood in existentialism connotes an inwardness, and interiority, so does the notion of subject, so that subjectivity and subject are used interchangeably. However, for Wojtyla, subject as *suppositum per se* and understood in the Scholastic sense, does not manifest this interiority or subjectivity, although it is “virtually” contained in the *human suppositum*.

While Wojtyla is ever careful not to reduce the human person to consciousness, he recognises that it is “because of consciousness” that “the human *suppositum* becomes a human self and appears as one to itself” (227). This is because “human beings are subjects... only

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when they experience themselves as subjects. And this presupposes consciousness" (227).

Thus Wojtyla sometimes uses the term “subject” to denote the human person understood in metaphysical terms as suppositum humanum and sometimes to denote the human person as experiencing his or her subjectivity. Lonergan consistently holds subject and subjectivity together, following the same usage as the existential tradition noted by Aguas. At the same time, he makes a distinction similar to Wojtyla’s distinction between suppositum and subjectivity. Lonergan’s distinction is between the human person as substance and the human person as subject, understood as the person experiencing his or her subjectivity. While admitting the validity of both approaches, he insists that an understanding of the human person at the level of our times requires taking the person as subject into consideration. As a human substance, I am ever the same, whether I am “awake or asleep, young or old, sane or crazy, sober or drunk, a genius or a moron, a saint or a sinner.” The differences between these states, from the point of view of substance, are merely accidental – they do not reach to the essence of myself as substance. From the point of view of the subject, though, they are not accidental. For the subject is not an abstraction, but a concrete reality, “a being in the luminousness of being.” In dreamless sleep or when unconscious, one is a substance but only potentially a subject. My subjectivity begins as I dream, and unfolds through the various levels of consciousness so well articulated by Lonergan. As I become, in turn, empirically conscious, intellectually conscious, rationally conscious, and existentially conscious, I become more and more of a subject. In terms of substance, being is simply being; in terms of subject, being is becoming, and as I develop, I have “more and more to do with [my] own becoming.”

8 “Existenz and Aggiornamento,” 223.
9 “Existenz and Aggiornamento,” 223.
10 “Existenz and Aggiornamento,” 222.
11 “Existenz and Aggiornamento,” 223.
The third parallel may be found in the insistence of both Wojtyla and Lonergan that decision and action are crucial for authentic human living. This point represents the whole import of Wojtyla's *The Acting Person*, the fundamental approach of which involves investigating the person in action to see how the person is revealed by their decisions and actions. Within this account, Wojtyla looks at a variety of aspects of the acting person — self-determination, self-possession, self-governance; our experience of efficacy and of being agent of our actions; the way we transcend ourselves in our actions; how what merely happens in us is related to our deliberate action; and how bodily, psychic, and subconscious dynamisms are integrated within our acting. Throughout this analysis, he emphasises and reiterates one key point — that, in acting, while I certainly may make my mark on the world, I also, and more importantly, form myself. I shape myself by my acting. Wojtyla turns to human action because of his desire to engage seriously with human subjectivity, seeing in action that form of human operation which has "the most basic and essential significance for grasping the subjectivity of the human being" (*Person and Community*, 224).

In clarifying what he means by action, Wojtyla makes a fundamental distinction between what merely happens in the human person and the deliberate action of the human person (*The Acting Person*, 61-63). Acting is correlated, at various points, with activeness (62), action (48), and doing (61). In my acting, I experience myself as the agent (66), as the actor (66), as the subject of my action (71), and the cause of the action (67). Elsewhere, Wojtyla will say that I am the conscious cause of my own causation (66). Action is an actualization in which the self is the agent (68-69). In action, the ego experiences its own efficacy (66). Action in this sense is a human act — an act proper to the human person (66). It is marked by efficient causation, that causation which is proper to the person (67).

Wojtyla distinguishes this deliberate human action from what simply happens in the human person. This is what takes place in me or goes on in me in which I have no active part. Wojtyla correlates it with passiveness (62), passivity (62), *passio* (48). Here, there is no efficacy. I am the passive subject of an experience (8); my ego is not the agent or the cause (67). In this experience, I truly experience my human
dynamism, but I do so passively (68). My potentiality is actualized, but it is not myself actualizing it as the agent (68). Wojtyla distinguishes this deliberate human action from what simply happens in the human person; but it is not a human act in the full sense of that term, since a human person is not the cause (66).

Wojtyla locates two particular elements of the human person under this rubric of what happens in me. Much of what occurs at the somato-vegetative level is located here. Many of our bodily functions are unconscious, and we have no awareness of them at all unless something goes wrong and pain or irritation bring them to consciousness.

"The somato-vegetative dynamism and its corresponding potentiality in the man-subject are connected with the human body so far as it constitutes an organism. ... But the human being has no direct and detailed consciousness of his organism; he is not conscious of the particular dynamic instances of acts which compose the whole of the vegetative dynamism. These ... remain inaccessible to consciousness. (The Acting Person, 89-90)"

Likewise, Wojtyla situates the psycho-emotive part of the human structure in the realm of what happens in me. Emotions and feelings arise within us, happening to us rather than being brought about by our deliberate action. These are accessible to consciousness and are "vividly experienced" (91) but precisely as part of the larger experience of "something happens in me."

In some places, Wojtyla seems to suggest that these two factors, the somato-vegetative and the psycho-emotive, comprise the whole of "what happens in me": "Man who is the actor, who performs actions, is also the dynamic subject of everything that happens in him, whether the occurrences are at the emotive or the vegetative level" (90). This "whether" clause would suggest that we here have a complete delineation of the "something happens in me" aspect of the person. But this is not entirely certain, especially as Wojtyla's phenomenological approach continues to circle around a reality, unfolding more and more levels of its structure with every revolution.

One such revolution brings the subconscious to the fore. While one might imagine that subconscious events would fit into the category
of "something happening in me," since they are, by definition, not within the realm of consciousness, Wojtyla prefers to situate them in a transitional state between "something happens in me" and "I act." In subconsciousness, we have more than simply an inaccessibility to consciousness, as we have seen we have at the somato-vegetative level. Rather, the subconscious "designates a different source of the content of human experience than the source that feeds consciousness" (92).

Those objects which are expelled to subconsciousness or withheld from "reaching the threshold of consciousness" need to pass this threshold "before they can reach consciousness and enter into the process of experience." But while they are in subconsciousness, they are not so much beyond the flux of experience, as is the case with the somato-vegetative dimension, as "they remain in a state of subexperience" (93). Moreover, the subconscious represents a transition point between the two poles of Wojtyla's distinction: "subconsciousness...brings into view the transitions between, on the one hand, what only happens in man owing to the natural vegetative, and possibly also emotive activations, and, on the other, what man consciously experiences and what he considers to be his actions" (95) – that is, between the experience of "something happening in me" and "I act."

What of the various operations involved in human knowing? Here Wojtyla situates some operations on the side of what happens in me and others on the side of human action. On the side of action, he speaks of doings as including cognitive doings (31). Further, he refers to thinking in modalities which are active; of judgment as differentiating passive thinking from active; of judgement itself as active, as we saw earlier; of an active moment in intuition; and of cognition as essentially in the form of acting (143-48). On the passive side, he speaks of thinking ("observing, interpreting, speculating, or reasoning") as distinct from enacting our existence through decisions (vii-viii). Moreover, Wojtyla understands at least some thinking processes to be passive: he speaks of thinking in its passive mode; of intuition as happening in man; and of thinking, in the sense of thoughts just passing though the mind, as a function of the passive subject, not the active agent (143-48).

Now this awareness of more active and more passive or receptive elements in our cognitional life is not problematic in itself and certainly concurs with Lonergan's account. Coming to know involves a lot of
very active, deliberate activity, such as attending to data, striving to understand, formulating one's understandings, and checking against further evidence. At the same time, there are experiences of receiving—for example, the unexpected insight which comes when we take time away from our study and go for a walk. The point I would make in relation to Wojtyla, though, is that, given the central importance of his distinction between my action and what just happens in me, his placement of particular cognitional operations within this framework remains far from clear. Perhaps the deeper issue is the lack of precision about what he means by the range of terms he uses for cognitional operations—for example, thinking, understanding, judging, intuition, reduction, induction, speculating, ideation. These are not clearly defined and seem, at times, to stand in fluctuating relationships to one another.

Lonergan's account of intentional human consciousness also gives action an essential role. Deliberation and decision represent key elements of his fourth level, the existential level. Here, as already noted, I am most fully revealed as a subject and most involved with my own becoming. For authentic and mature operation at this level is possible only when one has "found out for oneself that one has to decide for oneself what one is to make of oneself." This statement emphasizes human responsibility: deliberation and decision (deciding for oneself), and action (the making of oneself). Lonergan contrasts the person embracing his or her existential existence with the drifter, going along with the crowd, failing to embrace the full challenge of personhood. Furthermore, his treatment of meaning highlights human action in a number of ways. Acts of meaning include active meanings, which involve "judgements of value, decisions, actions." Such active meanings are allied to two important functions of meaning. The efficient function of meaning points to the way that any human work or creativity involves acts of meaning from the beginning to the end of the process. The constitutive function of meaning points not only to one's constitution of one's own life, as mentioned above, but also to society's constitution of its institutions and culture which "have meanings as intrinsic

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12 Method in Theology, 121.
13 "Existenz and Aggiornamento," 224.
14 Method in Theology, 74.
components." Cultural achievements such as religion, literature, science, philosophy, and history, are all involved in acts of meaning. So too are social institutions, such as the state, the family, the law, and the economy. These are shaped by acts of meaning, and any change in them involves a change in meaning. Finally, Lonergan notes in an interview that attention to the level of human action helps us avoid abstract philosophies of pure reason: "[T]he so-called priority ... of speculative intellect, or pure reason, ... doesn't exist. It is always under the guidance of deliberation, evaluation, decision... [I]t is that element that is opposed to a philosophy of pure reason." In fact, the existential level controls all the other levels of intentional consciousness.

TRANSCENDENCE OF THE PERSON

The fourth parallel lies in the ways Wojtyla and Lonergan address the transcendence of the human person. Once again, Wojtyla’s focus is on action, so that the transcendence with which he is concerned is what he calls “the transcendence of the person in the action” (111). He clarifies what he means by this transcendence by differentiating it from three other aspects of the human person. Firstly, he distinguishes my transcendence in action from my immanence in my action. As agent of an action, I remain above my acting; I am transcendent relative to my acting. I have the experience of efficacy, a key concept for Wojtyla. However, this “transcendence proper to the experience had in being the agent of acting passes into the immanence of the experience of acting itself: when I act, I am wholly engaged in my acting, in that dynamization of the ego to which my own efficacy has contributed” (68). Wojtyla expresses this distinction in terms of two aspects of the ego: the efficacious ego (the transcendent pole) and the acting ego (the immanent pole) (68).

15 Method in Theology, 78.
16 Method in Theology, 121.
18 See also Wojtyla’s discussion in “The Degrees of Being from the Point of View of the Phenomenology of Action,” in The Great Chain of Being and Italian Phenomenology,
The second distinction Wojtyla makes is between two different sorts of transcendence of the human subject – horizontal and vertical. Horizontal transcendence is the less significant form – the transcendence of the subject when she or he reaches beyond self in the direction of the object (119). This transcendence is a feature of the whole variety of intentional operations, and is in fact identified with the intentional character of those acts, whether they involve perception, cognition, or the will’s volition of objects (119). In judgment, too, the person engages in horizontal transcendence, attaining a transcendence over the object of cognition and over reality (158). Vertical transcendence, on the other hand, is the transcendence which, in the previous point, is distinguished from immanence. This is the fully human, existential transcendence of the person engaged in free self-determination. Thus, it applies to acts of the will alone, and to the will not as appetite, tending to a value as its object or to the good as an end – this is horizontal transcendence – but to the will as determining the subject. Hence in vertical transcendence I shape and form myself, and so transcend my structural boundaries (119); I “turn toward myself as an end” (Person and Community, 230). I gain a certain domination over my action, my choosing and my willing; I take a position above them. I do this because I am free and to the extent that I am free (The Acting Person, 138). In vertical transcendence, I exhibit my ‘superiority’ over my being, and grow in self-governance and self-possession (131, 180). It is vertical transcendence which is proper to the person (124).

The third distinction Wojtyla makes is between transcendence and integration. In transcendence, I experience myself as agent of action; in integration, I experience myself as the subject of action (191). These experiences are concomitant: I possess myself and am possessed by myself; govern myself and am governed by myself; transcend...
myself and am transcended by myself (190). The two aspects are complementary, forming together a “person-action whole” (190). This integration involves introducing the person’s somatic and psychical dynamisms into the unity of the action (225), where they “surrender to the direction and control of the will” (220). When this is done, the body becomes the means of expression of the person’s transcendence (205), while this transcendence, by which the person reaches for truth, goodness, and beauty, “stimulates a very deep emotive resonance” (227). This reaching for truth, beauty, and goodness shows how the person’s transcendence in action reveals the spiritual nature of the human person (181, 155). “Transcendence is the spirituality of the human being revealing itself” (Person and Community, 233).

This statement of Wojtyla’s about our transcendence revealing our spiritual nature is a good place to introduce Lonergan’s understanding of the transcendence of the person since for him, too, transcendence – self-transcendence, as he calls it – concerns the unfolding of the human spirit. He speaks of various phases in that unfolding and refers to the “eros for self-transcendence that goes beyond itself.”22 Through self-transcendence, we achieve authenticity, the “genuine realization of human potentiality.”23

While he does not confine self-transcendence to the fourth level, moral self-transcendence at that level is a major component of transcendence for Lonergan, as it is for Wojtyla. Here we come to know and to do what is truly good, beyond satisfactions or interests which are merely personal, moving beyond facts to values. Such self-transcendence is qualitatively different from self-transcendence at the other levels. In moral self-transcendence, we go beyond the order of knowing and move into the order of doing,24 shaping ourselves as “principles of benevolence and beneficence.”25 Moral self-transcendence is “real self-transcendence,” to be distinguished from that which is merely cognitive.26 It represents a step toward authentic human


24 Method in Theology, 104.

25 Method in Theology, 35.

26 Bernard J. F. Lonergan, “Theology and Man’s Future,” in A Second Collection, 144.
existence which is realized when we decide and act to do what is truly good.27 We become a human person in society.28

Also in accord with Wojtyla, Lonergan connects self-transcendence with the body. He speaks of the unity of consciousness reaching down into the unconscious, and of the way in which the whole of our bodily reality can be “fine-tuned to the beck and call of symbolic constellations” of our unconscious.29 He points to our skills, by which we have trained and shaped our bodily responses – our agility, endurance, speaking, reading, empathy, recall of evidence, formation of images – and notes:

[All of these] bear convincing evidence that self-transcendence is the eagerly sought goal not only of our sensitivity, not only of our intelligent and rational knowing, not only of our freedom and responsibility, but first of all of our flesh and blood that through nerves and brain have come spontaneously to live out symbolic meanings and to carry out symbolic demands.30

Beyond these parallels, I would suggest two particular strengths of Lonergan’s account in relation to Wojtyla’s. Firstly, Wojtyla focuses solely on transcendence in the action – how I transcend myself by what I deliberately choose and do. While Lonergan concurs that this level of existential self-transcendence is important, in the ways we have noted earlier, he sets it in the context of other stages “in a single achievement, the achievement of self-transcendence.”31 This single achievement unfolds from the unconsciousness of dreamless sleep, through the dream, to sensation, memory, and experience at the empirical level, to intellectual self-transcendence at the level of understanding, rational self-transcendence at the level of judgement, and on to the existential self-transcendence of the level of deliberation. Thus Lonergan situates more precisely how transcendence in the action, to use Wojtyla’s terminology, is situated within the unfolding self-transcendence of the person.

See also Method in Theology, 104.

28 Method in Theology, 104.
30 “Religious Knowledge,” 133.
31 “Natural Knowledge,” 128.
The second strength of Lonergan's account is evident in the way he speaks of the ultimate fulfilment of self-transcendence. Existential self-transcendence is not the fullness of self-transcendence if it remains simply a series of acts, even a series of acts of loving. There is also the crucial movement downward which comes about when we fall in love:

The love into which we fall is not some single act of loving, not some series of acts, but a dynamic state that prompts and molds all our thoughts and feelings, all our judgments and decisions. That dynamic state has its antecedent causes and conditions and occasions, but, once it occurs and as long as it lasts, it is a first principle in our living, the origin and source of the lovingness that colors our every thought, word, deed, and omission.32

This love may be of different kinds, and Lonergan regularly mentions two of these at the human level – the love within the family, between husband and wife, parents and children; and the love of nation or humankind for which one may work ceaselessly and even give one’s life. Both these kinds of love are underpinned by another – the love of God. The key scriptural passage to which Lonergan returns in this regard is Romans 5:5: “God’s love is poured into our hearts through the Holy Spirit given to us.” Here and here alone do we find “the crowning point of our self-transcendence.”33 God’s love draws us, not simply to a particular act of loving, but to “a radical being-in-love” which becomes the first principle of all we think and do and say.34 This being in love with God is “being in love in an unrestricted manner... without limits or qualifications or conditions or reservations.” For Lonergan, being in love with God in this unrestricted manner represents the “proper fulfilment” of our capacity for self-transcendence.35

THE ROLE OF JUDGMENT

The fifth parallel is in relation to the act of judgment. For Lonergan, judgment is a crucial moment in human knowing, the moment when

33 "Future of Christianity," 153.
34 "Natural Knowledge," 129.
35 Method in Theology, 105-106.
“the content of our acts of understanding is regarded as, of itself, a mere bright idea and we endeavor to settle what really is so.”36 When I am able to do this, I transcend myself, get beyond myself in “some absolute fashion.”37 “To know what is so is to get beyond the subject, to transcend the subject, to reach what would be even if this particular subject happened not to exist.”38 Because of the degree of self-involvement in judgment, it calls for responsibility on the part of the subject. Lonergan’s fifth precept in De Intellectu et Methodo is: Accept responsibility for judging.39 He points to the personal aspect of every judgment: Judgment “is totally within one’s power. Every judgement is either true or it is not; no excuses are allowed; the personality of a man enters into every one of his judgements.”40 In this light, Lonergan examines various philosophical movements to see how they understand truth to be attained. Rationalism, for example, considers truth to be necessary; empiricism believes truth to be attained already in intuiting and experiencing; idealism claims to arrive at truth already in understanding; relativism admits only of probable judgments. None of them notes the importance of judgment in coming to know the truth; all involve, in Lonergan’s words, “a flight from the responsibility of judging.”41

For Wojtyla, also, judgment is an operation which does not simply happen but which requires properly human action.

[O]n the one hand, we may consider that in certain of its processes thinking “happens” in man, but, on the other hand, in its other modalities it is ... active par excellence... The passive mode of thinking seems to be radically differentiated from the active ... on account of the role of judgment. ...The action of judging seems to constitute the crucial and decisive factor of human cognitive activity (The Acting Person, 145).

36 Method in Theology, 9.
38 “Natural Knowledge,” 128.
40 De Intellectu et Methodo, 23 (108).
41 De Intellectu et Methodo, 24 (109).
As for Lonergan, judgement for Wojtyla is concerned with the grasping of truth. Without such grasping of the truth, there is no human knowledge. But with this grasp of truth in judgement, “the person attains his proper cognitive transcendence with respect to objects” (146).

Wojtyla also situates judgment in relation to other human operations. He points out that while we often associate the mind simply with thinking and comprehending, with the “shaping of means and projecting their relations,” we need to note also the mind’s role of judgment, “the evaluating and distinguishing of what is true and what is not” (158). It is only by this function, judgment, that we attain an ascendancy over reality, over the objects which we cognize (158). Furthermore, though judgments of truth are essential to human decision, the two are distinct: “the essence of judging is cognitive and thus belongs to the sphere of knowing while the essence of decision is strictly connected with willing” (146-47). Still, there is a correlation between judgement and deliberation: “the correspondence of the already known to what becomes the object of willing.” What mediates between the judgment of truth and deliberation is “a type of judgement in which the value is attributed to the subject,” a judgment concerned with “axiological’ or ‘moral truth’. The “person [who] chooses or decides... has had first to make a judgment of values” (146).

CONCLUSION

This paper has examined five areas addressed by both Lonergan and Wojtyla in their analyses of the human person – consciousness, subjectivity, action, transcendence, and judgment. At points, I have noted how Lonergan offers a fuller context for examining human action, situating it more clearly than Wojtyla does in the context of the whole person engaged in the action, and especially in the context of the person engaged in the operations comprising human knowing. I would suggest that a reason for the strength and harmony of Lonergan’s account is that he has freed himself more successfully from faculty psychology and has grounded his work in an analysis of the conscious operations of the concrete person. Still, in all five areas, we have found a commonality in the insights Wojtyla and Lonergan are reaching
toward, a commonality which we hope might contribute to a dialogue between scholars of these two major twentieth-century figures.
INTRODUCTION

As is well attested, the documents of the Second Vatican Council signaled an opening of the Church to what is good and holy in other religious traditions, all the while maintaining the necessity and uniqueness of Christ and the Church for the salvation of souls and for proclaiming the truth about God and God’s relationship to the universe. They marked what Robert Caspar has called a veritable “turning of the page” in the history of the Church’s relationship to non-Christian religions,¹ such that what Arthur Kennedy discerns in Nostra Aetate (1965) could be said of the Council in general: “The theological motivation of the Church in its outreach and care for other religions is thus grounded in her awareness of the fullness of life and love in Christ alone.”² Post-conciliar documents such as Pope John Paul II’s Redemptoris Missio (1990) or Dialogue and Proclamation (1991), released by the Pontifical Institute for Interreligious Dialogue, address the tension between the Church’s missionary mandate and her newly emphasized openness to and positive regard for other religious traditions. For example, in Redemptoris Missio the late pope argues that the Church’s openness to dialogue must not detract “in any way


from the fact that salvation comes from Christ and that dialogue does not dispense from evangelization." Dialogue and Proclamation, building upon John Paul II’s statements regarding the presence of the Holy Spirit outside the visible Church, nonetheless reminds one that “interreligious dialogue is an integral element of the Church’s evangelizing mission.” Dominus Iesus (2000), released by the Congregation for the Doctrine of the Faith with the ratification and confirmation of Pope John Paul II – presumably in response to the development of what have come to be called “pluralist” theologies of religion – sought “not to treat in a systematic manner the question of the unicity and salvific universality of the mystery of Jesus Christ and the Church, nor to propose solutions to questions that are matters of free theological debate, but rather to set forth again the doctrine of the Catholic faith in these areas, pointing out some fundamental questions that remain open to further development and refuting specific positions that are erroneous or ambiguous.”

The refutations mainly concerned erroneously introducing separations among key Catholic doctrines. For example, the divine Word cannot be separated from the historical Jesus (DI 10); the mission of the Spirit may not be separated from the mission of the Son (DI 12); the Kingdom of God may not be separated from the historical Catholic Church (DI 19), and so on. The open questions concern the precise ways in which, as section twenty-one notes, “the salvific grace of God – which is always given by means of Christ in the Spirit and has a mysterious relationship to the Church – comes to individual non-Christians, [for] the Second Vatican Council limited itself to the statement that God bestows it ‘in ways known to himself.’” The text continues: “Theologians are seeking to understand this question more fully. Their work is to be encouraged, since it is certainly useful for understanding better God’s salvific plan and the ways in which it is accomplished.” Finally, the reader is admonished: “However, from what has been stated above about the mediation of Jesus Christ and the ‘unique and special relationship’ which the Church has with the kingdom of God among men – which

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4 Dialogue and Proclamation, 38, Interreligious Dialogue, 621.
in substance is the universal kingdom of Christ the Savior – it is clear that it would be contrary to the faith to consider the Church as one way of salvation alongside those constituted by the other religions, seen as complementary to the Church or substantially equivalent to her, even if these are said to be converging with the Church toward the eschatological kingdom of God." Both the encouragement and the admonition echo section fourteen of the document: "Bearing in mind this article of faith [namely that salvation is accomplished once for all in the incarnation, death, and resurrection of Jesus, the Son of God], theology today, in its reflection on the existence of other religious experiences and on their meaning in God's salvific plan, is invited to explore if and in what way the historical figures and positive elements of these religions may fall within the divine plan of salvation." Still, *Dominus Iesus* emphasizes that even though elements of other religious traditions may mediate grace, the religions in and of themselves cannot be thought of as salvific. I will return to this concern at the end of the paper.

Among the theologians who have accepted the invitation of *Dominus Iesus* to reflect further on the particular ways in which salvation might be extended to non-Christians is Gavin D'Costa whose most recent book argues for a shift from the typical threefold typology – exclusivism, inclusivism, pluralism – in the theology of religions to a more nuanced categorization of positions based upon the extent to which orthodox doctrinal commitments are observed. D'Costa retrieves, in the last chapters of the book, two doctrines, one from a consensus of Church Fathers, namely the existence of the limbo of the just, and the other from the Apostle's Creed, namely Christ's descent into hell, and he integrates them with traditional Roman Catholic teachings on purgatory in order to articulate a postmortem solution to the question of the possibility of salvation for non-Christians.

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6 D'Costa correlates categorization to the means by which theologians who hold a given position understand the possibility of salvation outside Christianity: "The seven means/goals would be: through the trinity (trinity-centered), through Christ (Christ-centered), through the Spirit (Spirit-centered), through the church (church-centered), through God not conceived of in a Trinitarian fashion, but in a theistic fashion (theocentric), through the Real that is beyond all classification (reality-centered), through good works (ethics-centered)." Gavin D'Costa, *Christianity and World Religions: Disputed Questions in the Theology of Religions* (Oxford: Wiley-Blackwell, 2009), 35.
that intentionally respects the concerns listed in *Dominus Iesus* and elsewhere. It is a rich study, but I do not analyze it in depth here. Instead, as a jumping-off point, I focus on a distinction that D’Costa makes. He argues that salvation, even of the non-Christian, depends upon conformity to Christ both “ontologically,” by which he means “through conscience, through noble and good elements within a person’s religion, through the activity of grace and the Holy Spirit in both these modes,” and “epistemologically,” by which he means answering “how such people become explicitly aware of the Blessed Trinity when they die unaware of the Blessed Trinity.” Both aspects, from a Catholic point of view, are necessary for enjoyment of the Beatific Vision, which is contemplation of the Blessed Trinity. Whether the terms “ontological” and “epistemological” are accurate and/or helpful I leave for others to judge, but the distinction is a good one. In the book, D’Costa works on the “epistemological” side. That is, his postmortem solution is an answer to the question, *How is it that non-Christians who have not encountered the Gospel might nevertheless come to the explicit and necessary saving knowledge of God as the Trinity of Father, Son, and Spirit?* D’Costa says less about the “ontological” piece. However, in another publication, he offers an encouraging suggestion: “If Christians are confronted by the normative shape of grace in history through the contours of Christ, the doctrine of the Holy Spirit ensures the recognition that this grace is not visibly limited to Christ and his Church. But the discernment of this extra ecclesial grace requires a Trinitarian criterion, which thereby implicitly relates it to the Church, the body of Christ. This is the underlying logic of the venerable axiom *extra ecclesiam nulla salus.*” D’Costa’s work on the “epistemological” question “keeps open the question regarding the truth, goodness, and beauty to be found in non-Christians and their religions. This is precisely the type of task that a historically oriented comparative theology might address, without stepping back from difficult and informed judgments that both affirm and challenge various teachings and practices in other religions.” In the remainder of this paper I begin to do just that by turning to the

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7 D’Costa, *Christianity and World Religions*, 177, 163.


9 D’Costa, *Christianity and World Religions*, 187.
work of Louis Massignon (1883-1962) and Bernard Lonergan (1904-1984), to the former for his careful study of Islam in the light of Catholic faith and to the latter for his thesis regarding the Law of the Cross as a means to understanding the mystery of redemption.

MASSIGNON AND THE SECRET OF HISTORY

In his earliest attempts at understanding Islam in the light of Christian faith, best represented by his apologetic treatise Examen du “Présent de l'homme lettré” par Abdallah ibn al-Torjoman – written partly to reassure a friend whose faith was shaken after having read a convincing Islamic anti-Christian polemic – Massignon emphasized stark contrasts between Christian and Muslim apologetics. He writes: “One [the traditional Muslim apologetic] proposes to man only that he adhere via reason to the evidence of the natural religion and that he wage holy war against the partisans of error; the other invites man to humble himself in order to understand the mystery of God, in order to love, with God, sinful souls even if that love brings the Cross and martyrdom to the lover.”

The difference between the two apologetics, for Massignon, is a hermeneutical difference. The traditional Muslim apologetic reduces the reading of the Qur'an to an intellectual assent to its divine origins, perfect transmission, and inscrutability. It reduces the cosmos to a set of dichotomies, for example, creator/creature, believer/unbeliever, elect/damned, and it reduces the person to an intellectual assent or denial of the divine unity. It even reduces the Islamic cult to a simple manifestation of the intellect's subordination to God. By contrast, Massignon emphasizes the hierarchical, multi-layered, multi-valent, but ultimately integrated nature of the Bible, the universe, and the person in the Catholic vision of reality.

The contrast is especially evident in the respective treatments of suffering, sorrow, and pain. The “traditional Islamic apologetic” emphasizes the inscrutability of God's ways, for attempting to reconcile the fact of suffering, sin, and evil with the goodness of God could mean “exposing oneself to the heresy of badâ (supposing that God contradicts

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10 Louis Massignon, Examen du “Présent de l'homme lettré” par Abdallah ibn Al-Torjoman (Rome: Pontificio Istituto di Studi Arabi e d'Islamistica (P.I.S.A.I.), 1992), 38. Except where otherwise noted, all translations from Massignon's French into English are my own.
oneself), or to shirk (associating the creature with the simplicity and glory of God).” In the extreme view, “the divine will has predetermined with equal force monotheism and atheism, the negation of God as well as his affirmation (naţf wa ithbât in the shahâda), the commandment and the transgression.” One resolves the question of evil by attributing all acts directly and immediately to God. The believer’s role is to be patient (sabr) with the divine activity, to enjoin the good and to avoid evil but not to speculate about the meaning or purpose of good and evil. Despite the fact that human responsibility is safeguarded by the doctrine that all have been apprised of the divine law “in advance, before the creation of their bodies” and that they have “sworn an oath of obedience to God and to his law which never changes,” and despite the fact that in Islam God sends prophets precisely to remind humans of this “pre-eternal” covenant, Massignon remains dissatisfied. Such account not only eliminates the dialectic of sin and grace so central to the Christian view, but also it inhibits our desire to understand the human condition. He observed that we rightly want to understand why suffering, sorrow, and pain, “and our hope is not in vain, for it is acceptable neither to adore sorrow/pain like a masochist nor to deny it like a morphine addict.” He was convinced that, regarding suffering, “reason, if it seeks, can find the Law.”

What Law? Massignon never directly defines the term. Instead he turns by way of description to the Eucharist and to the Cross. He notes that “each priest” at “each Mass” renews the holy sacrifice before God, and that this sacrifice “gives to human reason the key to the enigma of pain and sorrow.” In other words, the passion of Jesus and the mass as sacrifice together unlock the mystery of suffering. Further, the “sign [of the cross] is very mysterious. It explains to us the entirety of the law; it reveals to us ‘the image of God,’ for it breaks open the mystery of divine mercy. This Charity, which is God Himself, discovers us naked and

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11 Massignon, Examen, 52.
12 Massignon, Examen, 52.
13 Massignon, Examen, 52. This refers to the mithâq, the covenant God struck with all human souls before their embodiment. At that moment all humans bowed down in worship and swore fidelity to God and to God’s commands.
14 Massignon, Examen, 71.
15 Massignon, Examen, 71.
16 Massignon, Examen, 72.
invites us to imitate Him – we who are so poor and impotent – by giving our very life, with the blood of our heart, in an ecstasy of compassion.”

Put simply, the cross explains the law. With these tantalizing few words, Massignon concludes his explanation, but notice his emphasis on the invitation to participate in the cross, and therefore, the law. What sets the Christian apart from the “traditional Muslim apologetic” is both the call to seek meaning in suffering and the invitation to give oneself in an “ecstasy of compassion.” Even the physical act of participation at Eucharist which involves absorption of the host – the body of Christ – by the communicant is an intentional participation in the Christ event and thus a self-offering as well as an offering of Christ.

It is worth observing that Massignon was fascinated by the stigmatics of the Christian tradition, from St. Francis of Assisi to St. Thérèse Neumann to Blessed Anne Catherine Emmerich, because they so fully identified with, participated in, and imitated Jesus’ suffering and compassion for others that they manifested his wounds physically. If the crusaders wore the “bloody cross” as an insignia on their chests, the stigmatics “were really wounded in their limbs and in their hearts out of compassion for the wounds of Christ.” Taking the stigmatics as its expression and the Eucharist and cross as its primary symbols, one might say that according to the law suffering, and even death, when accepted out of faithful obedience to God, out of desire for union with God, compassion for the sufferings of others, contrition for one’s sins, sorrow at the sins of one’s neighbor, and desire for reconciliation of one’s neighbor with God, is mysteriously transformed into an occasion for announcing God’s glory and for healing a broken world.

Thus far I have dealt with Massignon’s reservations concerning the “traditional Muslim apologetic,” which he associated with the name of al-Ashári and the doctrine of occasionalism, for that was the position of his interlocutor in the text on which I have focused. However, one should understand that the “traditional Islamic apologetic” is a very narrow interpretation of Islam, one that is suspicious of unchecked

17 Massignon, Examen, 73 (my emphasis).
18 Massignon, Examen, 66n1.
19 Massignon, Examen, 72-73.
20 That is, all events are directly caused by the will of God. There is no secondary causality. Not surprisingly, Massignon compares al-Ashári to Malebranche in the Christian tradition.
reason, one that sees God's hand immediately behind every act and every creature, and one that, in an unflattering interpretation, approximates fideism. 21 Some would associate this interpretation with the Wahhabi school, or at least with a particularly Arab version of Islam. Massignon was of course aware of other currents in Islamic thought; he contrasts the "traditional Muslim" apologetic with two others, namely an approach that interprets Qur'anic data through a philosophical lens — and this approach is associated primarily with the name Averroes — and an approach that Massignon calls the "poetic proof," by which he means an approach that emphasizes an analogical reading of the Qur'an and the world in general. It involves something like a sacramental worldview wherein all created forms are ways to the Divine though none is itself a manifestation of the divine per se. This is the way of spirituality, the way of the Muslim mystics, the Sufis. This is also the way of love by which the whole of the person, not just his mind, is drawn through the inescapable harmony and beauty of the created world to the Creator Himself. In other words, some of the elements central to the Christian apologetic, namely, the use of philosophy in scriptural interpretation, a hierarchically structured universe, and love are present in Muslim traditions alternative to the "traditional Islamic apologetic." The problem, at least in Massignon's reading during this early period, is that the philosophical approach "has never been fully accepted by Islamic theology because it is not completely reducible to the Qur'anic logic which sees itself as pure reason," 22 and "there could be no integral [intégral] mysticism in Islam," which led one commentator to note that Massignon "attributed true mysticism to Islam only exceptionally." 23

Nevertheless it was Islamic mysticism that primarily drew Massignon's attention. His magnum opus was a four-volume comprehensive study of the life, teachings, and subsequent influence of the tenth-century Persian-Arab mystic al-Hallaj entitled The Passion of al-Hallaj: Mystic and Martyr of Islam. 24 For Massignon,

21 Massignon, Examen, 53.
22 Massignon, Examen, 53.
Hallâj was more than a subject of research; he was, in some sense, a friend. Massignon counted Hallâj among the intercessors (along with his mother, Blessed Charles de Foucauld, and J. K. Huysmans) spiritually present at a moment of crisis that he would later recognize as his “conversion,” his return to God and to his Catholic faith.\textsuperscript{25} In the opening lines of the Passion, Massignon makes this most unlikely confession of a scholar: “Such a soul [one who “realizes” the divine plan of holiness and thus “shuttles” history along] was that of Hallâj. Not that the study of his life, which was full and strong, upright and whole, rising and given, yielded to me the secret of his heart. Rather it is he who fathomed mine and who probes it still.”\textsuperscript{26} Hallâj represented to Massignon the pinnacle and perfection of Islamic mysticism:

His originality is in the superior cohesion of the definitions he brings together; and in the firmness of the guiding intention that led him to affirm in public, at the cost of his own life, a doctrine his teachers had not dared make accessible to all. Just as the rationalist movement in Greece ended in Socrates with the affirmation of a religious philosophy valid for all, so the ascetic movement in Islam ended with the proclamation of an experimental mysticism, providing aid to all. Hallâj, far from being an aberration within the Islamic Community of his time, represents the final completion of the mystical vocations that had sprung up throughout the first centuries of Islam through meditated reading of the Qur’an and the “interiorization” of a fervent, humble ritual life.\textsuperscript{27}

For Massignon, Hallâj successfully attained the goal of Sufism, namely the unity of heart and tongue – in other words full human authenticity – which really meant union with God. When heart and tongue unite, God speaks or conceives – in the manner of the conception of Jesus in the womb of Mary – a word in the heart and can express Himself, intermittently, in and through the purified and willing human being. Hallâj preached this

\textsuperscript{26}Massignon, \textit{Passion} 1, lxv.
possibility, suffering abuse, scorn, and eventually execution at the hands of those who insisted that such a notion was formally outlawed by Islamic law. He was formally convicted of blasphemy, having uttered “ana al-haqq!” or “I am the Truth,” truth/haqq being one of the divine names in the Qur’an. However, as Massignon painstakingly details, there were political motivations that led to Hallâj’s arrest and trial as well. Hallâj protested against the crushing of a slave rebellion, argued that the required duties of pilgrimage and fasting could be spiritually rather than literally and legally interpreted, and exposed the corruption of the ruling class that was hoarding the mandatory charity tax (zakat). After his conviction, Hallâj was beaten, mutilated, and finally crucified. He died on the cross, but not before begging God to forgive those responsible for his death. It was largely such resemblances to the life of Jesus – in the Qur’an and in the Bible – that attracted Massignon to the life of Hallâj. Regarding the former Massignon wrote:

[The Qur’anic Jesus] gave life to birds of clay, cured the man born blind and the leper, brought the dead back to life, revealed to men the food with which they nourished themselves, and the food that they hid in their houses; he confirmed the Mosaic Law and modified the observance of it with several exemptions. All of these characteristics are also found in Hallâj, with too many unexpected details and based on too many independent sources for this model configuration to be explained as a later transfer by an ingenious forger. Attended by angels who bring to him, as to Mary in the Temple, “summer fruits in winter,” Hallâj extinguishes the sacred fire of the Mazdeans, a mission reserved for the Messiah; and arriving in Jerusalem, he lights up for a moment the lamps of the Holy Sepulcher, “which are lighted only at the following dawn,” Holy Saturday.  

The parallels with exterior aspects of Jesus’ life are impressive, but Hallâj’s understanding of his own suffering as being on behalf “of all” is most striking. He revealed the secret of Sufism, namely that union with God was possible, in order to manifest the universal availability of God’s love, and he accepted the judgment of the law because he was convinced that God would use his death both to reconcile competing

factions in the community through their unified condemnation of him and eventually to reveal the truth of his position. Halláj even identified himself with the sacrificial victim offered at ‘Arafat during the pilgrimage to Mecca (hajj), for “it is there...that God pardons everyone, present and absent...,” while taking into account the spiritual declaration by certain individuals, pure and predestined Witnesses (shuhud) of a vow made in humble and repentant adoration of the God of Abraham, Who, in order to accept the figurative victims of the next day, is content with the ardent and sacrificial contrition of these Witnesses: and rejoices in it (yubahi) with his Angels.” Halláj is like the Qur’anic Jesus, “who is always associated in the Qur’an with the divine fiat, Kun! in Arabic, Be! in English” which signifies his perfect obedience to the will of God and thus renders him the model mystic, but he is also like the Jesus of the Gospels, for he manifests self-sacrificial love of others out of love and fidelity to God.

In his early works Massignon was convinced that Halláj and other Sufis who emphasized this unifying and perhaps even redemptive suffering as either the means or the consequence of union with God were what he called “points of insertion” for the Church, “whereby the spiritual grafts of the apostles will be able to include the wild child of Islam so that it might bear fruit for the Church.” In what sense could Massignon mean that Halláj was incorporated to the Church? He does not say exactly, but the context suggests that it is Halláj’s demonstrated authentic self-sacrificing love of God and neighbor, precisely what was missing from the “traditional Islamic apologetic,” that made of Halláj a “point of insertion” for the Church. Although Massignon does not return specifically to the language of the law in his in-depth treatment of Halláj, the title of his book, The Passion, Halláj’s self-offering as ritual sacrifice, the Christ-like life of Halláj, and the fact that Halláj himself declared “it is in the religion of the cross that I will die,” which Massignon interprets not as a desire to enter the visible Church but as a judgment that his path to God would involve

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29 Massignon, Passion 1, 220.
30 Massignon, Passion 3, 44.
suffering and death, all point in the direction of his description of the law as articulated above.\(^{32}\)

In the later stages of his career, having masterfully studied the entirety of early Sufism, and having also studied widely in Islamic theology, philosophy, and law, Massignon rejected his early separations of traditional Islam from philosophical and mystical Islam in favor of a more integrated view. In addition, having spent some time studying non-Muslim, non-Christian figures, Massignon returned to his notion of the law, but now he expanded its scope and called it the secret of history. In an article entitled “The Transfer of Suffering through Compassion,” Massignon expressed frustration with psychoanalysts who also acknowledge “cases of the transfer of the suffering and moral evil of other people” and sociologists who acknowledge cases of persons who voluntarily assume the debt, whether financial or punitive, of other members in their communities without any expectation of remuneration. The psychoanalysts and sociologists tend to see in those cases only problematic hyper-compassion to be isolated and cured, whereas Massignon sees in them examples of heroic virtue. He writes: “The impact of ‘heroic compassion’ on most of our human, traditional, and legendary records (and legend is an immediate projection of the event in the world of symbols), shows that there is the secret of history, and that this secret is disclosed only to an elite, tested only by men of sorrow and compassion, born to assume the blind anguish of living multitudes and to understand and announce its transcendental glory.”\(^{33}\)

It is in the act of exhibiting genuine sorrow and compassion and of assuming the anguish, or the debt, of others that the “transcendental glory” of the secret of history is revealed. In an article written in 1959 (which, coincidentally, was originally published in the same collection of essays as the Friedrich Heiler article that Lonergan uses in the chapter on “Religion” in *Method in Theology*), namely “The Notion of the ‘Real Elite’ in Sociology and in History,” Massignon explains what he means by the elite to whom the secret is revealed, and he does so by setting up a contrast:

\(^{32}\) Massignon, *Passion* 3, 221.

There is an inequality among men; a minority exists in every epoch and in every group...Posterity is grateful to them, to these superior men, these animators, pace-setters, inventors, and discoverers. They are the "great men" inscribed on Auguste Comte's universal calendar of positivism and, more recently, celebrated on the international calendar of UNESCO. But the cult of such men dies with the earthly cities which they have made flourish through some accidental invention (vanishing like the epidemic that it has wiped out) without much regard for their true personality.34

Such are the heroes of secular society, but they are not the real elite, who often go unnoticed during their own lifetimes. Rather than eliminating suffering, as the "great men" often hope to accomplish, the real elite identify with, assume, and transform suffering. In the process, the real elite, once discovered, are remembered precisely for the personalities they formed under the extraordinary trials they voluntarily accepted.35 Further, the real elite exhibit an "apotropaic character [and]...[t]hey are not isolated in time but become part of a homogenous series, bearing witness to the same certitude about the efficacy of spiritual means in improving corrupted social and political situations with their sense of compassion for the universal."36 There is something transhistorical and transsocial about the achievements of the real elite. The real elite share in a kind of communion of saints that transcends cultural and temporal boundaries. That they are apotropaic, that is, healing/protective elements, is key evidence for Massignon of the divine hand at work. They are chosen servants and constitute the means by which God mediates healing and redemption to a largely unaware population of sinners. The archetypal representative of the real elite is Abraham, especially in his conversation with God before Sodom in which God granted that for the sake of ten righteous persons, a largely sinful and undeserving community would be spared.37

34 Louis Massignon, "The Notion of the 'Real Elite' in Sociology and in History" (1959), in Testimonies and Reflections: Essays of Louis Massignon, 57-58.
35 Massignon, "The Notion of the 'Real Elite'," 58.
36 Massignon, "The Notion of the 'Real Elite'," 58.
37 Genesis 18:16-33. Of course, ultimately even Abraham, whom Massignon describes as a "Marian" figure, participates in the work of Christ. See "Le Signe Marial, la position
In Massignon’s later works, even Muhammad might be seen to participate in the *secret of history*. In response to a question about Muhammad’s prophetic status, Massignon answered:

To be a “false” Prophet, it is necessary to prophesy positively something false. A positive prophecy is generally shocking to one’s comprehension, being a reversal of expected human values. But Muhammad...can only be a negative prophet, which he is, quite authentically. He never pretended to be either an intercessor or a saint. Rather he affirmed that he was a Witness, the Voice who cries out in the desert, [who announces] the final separation of the good from the bad, the Witness of the separation, for as an Arab, son of Ishmael, he is the son of the tears of Hagar, the tears of Eve (at ‘Arafât), for “they who cry are they who know” the transcendent secret of the glory of the just God.38

Widening the pool of participants in the *secret of history* confuses the standard missionary logic:

Contrary to the missiological theories of expanding proselytism, recent investigations of religious statistics have established certain *constants*, approximately the same for all environments and periods: a fixed percentage of ritual practices within the confessional group, of good acts and of sins, of fervent vocations and of unbridled outlaws; with the added note that a small, avowedly sinning, minority is set over against the immense array of its “respectable” contemporaries, secret sinners, as eventual *abdÂl*, the always possible ransom of penitents for a mass in a state of evil. This recognition of the inanity of every official propagandistic apostolate underlines rather clearly the fact that the religious life of believer groups is protected against rotting from hypocrisy by an intermittent treatment, in infinitesimal homeopathic doses, of “substitute” sanctity. Hallâj used to teach that with one saint God purifies every minute 70,000 just men.39

38 “Le Signe,” 214.
39 Massignon, *Passion* 1, lxiii
Just as there is a minority of "great men," leaders, inventors, scholars, et cetera, set over against the masses of ordinary citizens, so too there exists a minority of holy individuals over against the rank and file of religious people, and holiness is not the province of this or that religion, not even the Church, where too a minority of "fervent vocations" is set over against the majority of "respectable contemporaries." The goal therefore is not simply to swell the numbers of the visible Church's members, no matter the believers' dispositions. Rather, in Massignon's perspective, and he was criticized for this, the goal is to increase within each religion - at least in Judaism, Christianity, and Islam - that fervent minority such that more adherents become explicitly aware of the call to participation in redemptive compassion. The difference between the few and the many, the real elite and the ordinary, is that the few knowingly and willingly participate in the redemptive secret of history. As one interpreter of Massignon writes: "These witnesses are the compatriots who observe the how of the drama (the suffering) and who also know the why. [Therefore] one can speak of a science of compassion [as Massignon often did], an explanation of the why of the drama of history." The many suffer at the hand of a whole "gamut of mercenary virtues, calculated actions, mediocre desires, sins, and crimes," but they do so without fully appropriating the invitation to become knowing and willing participants in the secret of history, and thus in a sense, they suffer less freely than do the real elite. Wherever "those who know" appear, as the long quotation above suggests, the suffering of the many is sublated, properly oriented, and transformed in the life of the suffering saints, or as Massignon often called them, the "substitute" saints.

Whereas Christians may participate in the law and are in fact invited to do so in an explicit manner, non-Christians may also willingly

40 Massignon identified the real elite in the following manner: "Hindus call them mahatmas, Arabs abd al, and Christians saints." In other words, their ranks now include even non-Abrahamic traditions. Gandhi, who, in his knowing and willing commitment to non-violent suffering on behalf of his people, and who "revealed to the world the secret of India," also counts among the real elite. See Louis Massignon, "L'exemplarité singulière de la vie de Gandhi," in Écrits Memorables, vol. 2, ed. Christian Jambet, Francois Angelier, Francois L'Yvonne, and Souâd Ayada (Paris: Éditions Robert Laffont, 2009), 806-15.

41 Guy Harpigny, Islam et Christianisme selon Louis Massignon (Louvain-la-Neuve: Centre d'histoire des religions de l'Université Catholique de Louvain-la-Neuve, 1981), 168.
participate in the secret of history, although they remain largely ignorant of its Christological dimension.\textsuperscript{42} That determines the sense of Massignon's directives for the Badaliya (which means "the substitutes" in Arabic), the prayer sodality he founded for Arab Christians and interested Europeans dedicated to living among Muslims and to prayer for peace, justice, and fraternity between Muslims and Christians. Massignon explains the name and the vocation of the group as follows:

"Badaliya," in Arabic, means "replacement, exchange with the soldier whose lot was drawn [tiré au sort]"; it also means to become one of the "\textit{abdāl}" [same Arabic root as badaliya, \textit{bdl}], one of the humble, hidden, and rejected corner stones of the Community of true Believers in the God of Abraham, who, imitating Abraham in his intercession, share with him, according to the immemorial legend of Islam, from age to age, the overwhelming (and obscure) honor of participating in the reconciliation of the sinful world with its judge. For that is our vocation, to rediscover the primordial word of divine love to which our hearts were predestined, to recognize it in the call of those whom we go to help, and to respond to it by witnessing to the \textit{Tawhīd} [i.e., divine unity] among them, rendering "a purer meaning to the words of the Arab tribe." [We do this] in order that the saving mission of this language, the last evoked in the Pentecost story, is brought to perfection in Arabia where St. Paul commenced the \textit{Bishāra} [i.e., Good News] that responds to the \textit{Sayḥa bil-Ḥaqq} [i.e., the outcry for justice in witness to the God of Truth] of the oppressed and the excluded, to their clamor for justice.\textsuperscript{43}

Although the Badaliya would not refuse a Muslim request for baptism — as Massignon writes, "for we desire to become One in Christ forever and at any price" — it was not the normal way of proceeding.\textsuperscript{44} In one of his annual letters, Massignon titles a section "\textit{Zuhūr 'Issā-ibn-Meryem}"

\textsuperscript{42} Hallāj, who was so devoted to Jesus, although to the Qur'anic Jesus, perhaps complicates matters. Gandhi too read the Gospels and Dostoyevsky.


\textsuperscript{44} "Lettre Annuelle No. 4," \textit{Badaliya}, 74-75. \textit{B.A.L.} 4 (1950): 3.
fi 'l-Islām” [the blossoming or flowering of Jesus son of Mary in Islam]. There he instructs Badaliya members to encourage Muslims – but also Christians – to meditate on the examples of Sufi saints, the “friends of God,” who strove toward and in some cases perhaps even achieved union with God. He hoped that by meditating on the reality of union with God and by experimenting with the practices and dispositions that led the saints toward union, Muslims may attain an insight into Christian teachings about Jesus. That is, Muslims would engage a kind of Christology from below. The Badaliya members likewise should meditate on the ḥaḍ to and see there an echo of the passion; they should tend to the biblical fragments present in the Qur’an and facilitate the blossoming of their full significance. For according to Massignon, Christ “wants, bit by bit, to gain everyone.” In other words, the truth about Christ, namely his crucifixion, resurrection, and divinity, for Massignon, is already available to Muslims and to Islam implicitly, but it was the job of the Badaliya members, especially and most importantly by living Christ-like lives, to serve as a mirror in which Muslims might recognize and make explicit, from within Islam, the truth about Christ. Again, he would encourage Muslims to “convert” in the sense of becoming part of the “fervent minority” within Islam that knowingly and willingly participates in the secret of history. However, unless Muslims could see Christ in the holiness of Christians, Massignon was convinced none would entertain the question of the truth of Church teaching.

Massignon cannot escape the accusation that his approach to Islam was colored by his Christian convictions. The fact of the matter is that he believed in the reality of redemption and that redemption pertains not just to Christians but to the entire universe. But this is precisely why, in response to the invitation of Dominus Iesus, Massignon’s work might help the Church in its attempt to understand the concrete workings of grace in non-Christian contexts. Whether the

45 The possibility of union, for Massignon, was grounded in the fact of the Incarnation, specifically at the Third Council of Constantinople (681), where the Church affirmed the doctrine of Jesus’ two wills, human and divine, and the union between them. See Louis Massignon, Les trois prières d’Abraham (1935; 1949). (Paris: Cerf, 1997), 65.

46 Massignon, “Lettie Annuelle No. 4,” Badaliya, 74-75.

grace of Christ is at work beyond the walls of the visible Church is a settled matter. Where and how the work of Christ operates outside the Church and how to discern that work remain open questions. I believe Massignon's faith-informed empirical investigations point us in the right direction, but his findings lack grounding in a solid Christology. Perhaps the work of Bernard Lonergan on the Law of the Cross might help.

BERNARD LONERGAN AND THE LAW OF THE CROSS

In his book The Incarnate Word (De Verbo Incarnato) part five is entitled "Redemption," and there Bernard Lonergan states: "This is why the Son of God became man, suffered, died, and was raised again: because divine wisdom has ordained and divine goodness has willed, not to do away with the evils of the human race through power, but to convert those evils into a supreme good according to the just and mysterious Law of the Cross." In thesis fifteen, Lonergan detailed the various New Testament texts relating directly to God's redemption of sinners in the Incarnation of Christ. In thesis sixteen he explained the dogma of Christ's satisfaction, and he examined Anselm's Cur Deus Homo? In thesis seventeen he demonstrates that while the Law of the Cross is certainly a fitting means for bringing about redemption, it is not, as Anselm suggests, a necessary means for doing so. He also shows that the Law of the Cross is not only Christ's but is ours as well: "What has happened in Christ, however, lays down a general law for his members." Again: "We find this fittingness in the Law of the Cross, which in itself is a sequence or series of three steps, encountered in our Lord both as an individual man and as Head of his Body the church. In keeping with the will of God the Father and with the precept and example of Christ, Christ's members too ought to have this fitting law

48 Bernard Lonergan, S.J., The Incarnate Word, trans. Charles C. Hefling, Jr. from De Verbo Incarnato, 3rd ed. (Rome: Gregorian University Press ad usum auditorium, 1964), 445-593. The unpublished translation with which I am working was revised in 1991 and presumably remains subject to (or has subsequently undergone) further revisions, however I quote from the version at hand with permission of the Bernard Lonergan Estate.

Louis Massignon’s Secret of History

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in themselves, and by Christ’s grace and operation they in fact have.”

Charles Hefling, in a recent article, puts the matter this way:

What the complete generality of the Law of the Cross implies for Christology – and what Lonergan says more or less explicitly in the textbook on *The Incarnate Word* – is that Jesus Christ did not invent it. The Law of the Cross has always pertained to the existing world order. Christ knew the Law of the Cross. Moreover, he knew what it presupposes and what it implies; he knew that it is by divine wisdom that this law has been ordained, and by divine goodness that it has been willed, and, knowing all this, Christ chose it, made his own the essence of redemption, and did so freely. Why did he do this? Not, according to Lonergan, so as to cancel or abrogate the Law of the Cross, so that we would no longer have to choose it ourselves. On the contrary, he chose it so that we might choose it too.

In other words, the three-step sequence to which Lonergan referred – which William Loewe succinctly summarizes: “First, sin incurs the penalty of death. Second, this dying, if accepted out of love, is transformed. Third, this transformed dying receives the blessing of new life” – is a law, albeit a spiritual law, inherent in the universe and available to those who knowingly, willingly, and freely choose to appropriate it but presumably is also operative in the lives of those who may not recognize the law as such. Can one say that members of non-Christian religions participate in the Law of the Cross, as Lonergan understands it?

Massignon’s studies and choice of terminology would certainly suggest that is the case. His observation that the law is a key precept of the Christian apologetic, his identification of the law with the Cross and with the Eucharist, both sites of sacrifice, his insistence that the law invites and even demands participation – self-sacrificial love or “an

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ecstasy of compassion" – from those who would understand it, and his emphasis on confession, conversion, repentance, the love of God, and the glory of God as the context in which the law operates, collectively indicate that one is in the same realm as Lonergan’s Law of the Cross. In both cases one is dealing with the means, the how and the why, of redemption. In Massignon’s investigations one finds that law operative also in the life of Hallâj, whereas there is no indication that Lonergan was thinking about discerning the Law of the Cross outside the Church. Hallâj suffered death primarily as a consequence of the sins, that is, the injustice, of his community. He accepted his death out of obedience to God, whom Hallâj was convinced had purified and prepared Him to Hallâj in love and friendship, and whom Hallâj was convinced would use his death both for God’s own glory and for the healing of the Muslim community. Finally, in Massignon’s account, Hallâj was rewarded by the intimacy with God he so desired as well as his posthumous influence on a line of “Hallâjians” right up to and including Massignon himself. Is the remarkable correspondence between Hallaj’s experience and Loewe’s summary of the Law of the Cross mere coincidence? In Massignon’s later works he recognizes that not only extraordinary examples like Hallâj but Muslims in general can participate in what he now calls the secret of history. As with members of the Church, Muslims knowingly and willingly participate in the secret of history to varying degrees. However, the Church alone knows that the secret is fundamentally a Christological reality, that participation in the law is always participation in Christ. Massignon was aware of that fact, for he understood that the cross “offends Muslims,” that their modesty forces them to “turn away from so undeserved an abjection,” and that only “the supernatural faith of the Church can understand, accept, and desire it.”53 Thus, as observed above, the mission of the Badaliya was to encourage Muslims to detect the secret of history at work in the lives of Muslim saints and then hopefully to ask of the Church how and why it understands this law to be constitutive of and dependent upon the redemption of sinners through the life, death, and resurrection of Christ. I noted the question of explicit baptisms above. It is interesting to note that Lonergan articulates four ways of participating in the work of Christ, namely sacramentally, morally,

ascetically, and physically. Could one say that Massignon found moral, ascetical, and physical, but not sacramental, participation in the work of Christ among Muslims, albeit unknowingly? If so, the Church might begin to articulate more precisely than she has thus far how and to what extent the benefits of redemption are available to non-Christians. On a case by case basis the Church might discern whether Christ has already been appropriated by a particular culture in any one of the four possible ways, or in some combination of several ways. To do so, it seems, would help the Church to clarify and to focus her mission.

I add one final note before making some concluding remarks. In the article cited above, one of Hefling’s main points is that in an unpublished work by Lonergan, which Hefling calls his Redemption book, Lonergan’s understanding of redemption evolved beyond his position in The Incarnate Word. According to Hefling, and in his estimation according to Lonergan himself, the earlier work did not adequately deal with the relationship between Christ’s “person” and Christ’s “work.” That is, it did not adequately answer Anselm’s question, namely why the God-man? In the Redemption book, Lonergan provides a more thorough answer: “The Son of God became a human so that divine friendship might be communicated in an orderly fashion to the unfriendly.” I will not repeat the entirety of Hefling’s argument. I only want to mention a few points. First, suppose “it is God’s intention to diffuse or extend to finite friends the friendship that characterizes the Trinity.” Suppose too that God normally acts through secondary causes and that he preserves natural laws, which Hefling/Lonergan has previously established. In that case “in order to mediate divine friendship, such a secondary cause would have to be a friend of God in his or her own right; otherwise, this friendship would have to be mediated to him or her, and so on ad infinitum. The alternative, that is, to an infinite regress, which explains nothing, is an intermediate friend. But the right to be God’s friend belongs to no created being, no finite person, because commitment to infinite good is by definition...

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54 John Dadosky has suggested something like this sort of clarification in order to fulfill the Church’s mission more efficiently; his ideas demand fuller attention and elaboration. See John Dadosky, “The Church and the Other: Mediation and Friendship in Post-Vatican II Roman Catholic Ecclesiology,” Pacifica 18 (Oct. 2005): 302-22.


supernatural. Humans have no claim to it, no exigence for it. It is natural only to divine persons." Friends enjoy a common good. The friends of God enjoy God the absolute Good. But only God has the right to enjoy God. Therefore God becomes man in order that the Son, the second divine person of the Trinity, through His created and assumed humanity, might call forth, as God, from the unfriendly, unmediated love for God. The unfriendly remain naturally incapable of such love; for that they depend on the work of the Holy Spirit, "the love of God flooding our hearts," but no finite creature, not even the humanity of Jesus, can call forth an infinite response. Only God can call forth God.

CONCLUDING REMARKS

If Lonergan's earlier treatment of the Law of the Cross might theologically explain better than Massignon did exactly how and why one discovers Christ-like activity in the lives of Muslims or other non-Christians and how participation in the Law of the Cross is in some sense an incorporation to the Church, then Lonergan's later emphasis on God's desire to mediate friendship to the unfriendly might better satisfy D'Costa's call for not only Christological and ecclesiological but also Trinitarian criteria in discerning the presence of the work of God outside the Church. Perhaps not coincidentally, Muslims refer to saints as "friends of God." How exciting it would be to affirm that yes, in fact Muslims can be - and surely some are - friends of God and to examine the lives of these holy men and women in order to contemplate the work of God. And how exciting to ask the question, hopefully with Muslim friends, about how God mediates his infinite friendship to finite creatures. To do so would not answer D'Costa's "epistemological" concerns. That is, it would not answer the question of how or, in D'Costa's formulation, when Muslims would come to know explicitly that God is Trinity, as required for enjoyment of the Beatific Vision. It might, however, begin to answer his "ontological" concern, that is, his concern to understand how Muslims might be conformed to the life of Christ here and now. The integration of Lonergan's framework with Massignon's observations might also complicate a trend among Catholic theologians that suggests the mediation of Christ to non-

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Christians may take place “in the religions” but never “through the religions” of which they are members.\(^5^8\) Take Massignon’s insistence that “Hallâj was specifically a Muslim. Not just the original terms of his lexicon and the framework of his system, but the whole thrust of his thought derives from a solitary, exclusive, slow, profound, fervent, and practical meditation on the Qur’an. He began by hearing the words of God resound in his heart, as Muhammad himself must have done; by repeating the mental experience of the Prophet.”\(^5^9\) The documents of Vatican II that speak positively of Muslims make no mention either of the Qur’an or of the Prophet Muhammad, but *Dominus Iesus* invites theologians to investigate the “way the historical figures and positive elements of these religions may fall within the divine plan of salvation.”\(^6^0\) Might it be possible at some future date, perhaps after centuries of study, reflection, and prayer, for the Church to say something about the key elements and structures that make up Islam and that were the vehicle by which Hallâj came to such extraordinary self-sacrificial love and even came to bring a twentieth-century French scholar back to Christ and to the Church?

My treatment in this paper is obviously incomplete and inadequate. I intend it only as a start, but I am convinced that Lonergan’s account of the Law of the Cross sheds much needed light on Massignon’s discovery of what seems to be redemption working in and through Muslims. Further study is needed, and other aspects of Lonergan’s work might be brought to bear upon Massignon. For instance, Massignon’s understanding of the real elite, or the substitute saints, particularly his conviction that the elite of society, the “great men,” are not actually the real elite, and that the real elite have a concrete healing and redemptive effect for those on whose behalf they offer themselves to God, might

\(^5^8\) Regarding “through the religions,” one theologian writes: “This cannot be; for the religions and their teachings and rites are not means of grace and salvation, since only Christ can institute these means, and we have no reports of him having done any such thing. God may bestow grace on individuals; God may bestow special insights on the founders or on individuals. All of these persons live in a religion. But God does not bestow grace and salvation through these religions, since he imparts these only through Jesus Christ,” See Karl Becker, S.J. “Theology of the Christian Economy of Salvation,” in *Catholic Engagement with World Religions: A Comprehensive Study*, ed. Karl J. Becker and Ilaria Morali (Maryknoll, NY: Orbis Books, 2010), 376.

\(^5^9\) Massignon, *Passion* 3, 3.

\(^6^0\) *Dominus Iesus*, 14.
be congruent with Lonergan’s observation that neither propaganda nor argument but only religious faith and hope enable people to resist social decay, and that what is needed to reverse decline is “the charity of the suffering servant,” “self-sacrificing love,” and a constant reminder of our sinfulness. In Lonergan’s terminology, Massignon’s saints are religiously converted individuals who are “foundational reality,” standards of authentic humanity. By their example, and by the contagion of holiness, they increase the probability that redemption will be successfully mediated to the wider community. These and other topics must be addressed elsewhere, but if my hunch is correct, then the Lonergan-Massignon conversation will be a fruitful one.

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AN ETHICS OF AUTHENTICITY: PERSONAL AND COMMUNAL

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PROLOGUE

This paper is drawn from a much longer essay on Lonergan entitled: “The Chill Winds of Modernity: The Profound Challenge of Catholic Renewal.” It is taken directly from the fourth section of that essay: An Ethics of Authenticity: Personal and Communal. In that section I contrast the moral traditions of medieval and Tridentine Christianity with the very complex moral traditions of modernity. Despite the moral complexity of the modern era, it differs fundamentally from the older Catholic tradition on four central background assumptions: the priority of equality to hierarchy; of autonomy to authority; of power to virtue; of the individual to community.

The concluding section of the paper explores Lonergan’s critical response to this grand dialectic of the vetera and the nova, and appraises the merits and limitations of his response.

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“Man’s deepest need and most prized achievement is authenticity.” (Method in Theology, 254)

BACKGROUND

The Catholic moral tradition is highly complex. It is rooted in the law of Moses, especially the Decalogue, the prophetic emphasis on fidelity
to the covenant, and the gospel of Jesus of Nazareth. In his public ministry Jesus insisted that the gospel completed the law and the prophets, bringing them to fulfillment not abrogation (Matthew 5: 17-18). Over many centuries the followers of Christ gradually articulated the ways of being and living that the gospel required. In this way a Christian moral tradition developed, with St. Paul, St. Augustine, St. Benedict, and St. Francis of Assisi as its leading teachers and examples.

Thomas Aquinas's theological synthesis is based on the complementarity of Athens and Jerusalem. In Aquinas's work, "Athens" refers to the metaphysical philosophy of Aristotle, which Thomas adopted and critically refined. And "Jerusalem" refers to the complex mixture of Hebrew and Christian scripture and tradition, especially the theology of Augustine, which Thomas also embraced. The synthesis Aquinas proposed was highly controversial, for Aristotle was a pagan philosopher whose substantive beliefs were often at variance with Christian doctrine. Aquinas, therefore, had to modify Aristotle's theology and cosmology in order to reconcile his teaching with the core Christian mysteries.

Aquinas's moral ontology is a subtle blend of Hebrew, Greek, and Christian insights. From Genesis, he adopts the scriptural view that God's creation is indeed very good. He also acknowledges the importance of sin, both the original sin of Adam and the subsequent sinfulness of Adam's descendants. He tends to treat sin as a form of violence or injury to the created goodness of nature. In the case of humans, sin does not destroy their native capacities, but it darkens their minds, making knowledge more difficult, and weakens their wills, making love more disordered. Grace is an exercise of God's divine art. Grace perfects and completes the powers of nature and heals the harmful effects of sin on created order.

Within Aquinas's scriptural perspective, Aristotle's hierarchical order of nature becomes the order of creation; sin does violence to nature's orderly development; and divine grace both perfects creation and reverses the consequences of sin. Though nature and grace are distinct ontological principles, Aquinas does not separate them, any more than he separates reason and faith, philosophy, and theology, the natural and supernatural virtues.

Violence and sin, though important, are subordinate concepts.
They arrest or impede natural and supernatural development; they can be healed by the redemptive power of grace. Aquinas's moral focus is on the goodness and wisdom of God, the integrity of creation, the rationality of law, the centrality of the virtues, the dual teleology of temporal and eternal felicity.

**THE MORAL CHALLENGE OF MODERNITY**

The moral culture of modernity is not monolithic. Its formative movements, the Renaissance, the Reformation, the Enlightenment, Romanticism, and Existentialism often pull in opposing directions. Despite these important internal differences, and the unresolved moral tensions they create, on five relevant axes of comparison modernity differs markedly from Latin Christendom.

1. **Equality and Hierarchy**

The leading thinkers of modernity systematically dismantled the hierarchical orders they inherited from classical antiquity and medieval Christianity.

*Cosmological:* Galileo rejected the Aristotelian separation of celestial and terrestrial physics. Descartes mathematicized and leveled the *res extensa*. Newton's universal laws of motion embraced the whole of space and time. The decline of the classical cosmos corresponds to the rise of the disenchanted universe, the lawful, purposeless realm of inanimate matter in motion. The scientific judgment of enlightened modernity is clear - the ancient hierarchical cosmos is dead!\(^1\)

*Social and political:* The Protestant Reformers attacked the hierarchical structures of Catholic governance. The radical critics of aristocracy and monarchy undermined the social and political orders of feudalism. The advocates of democracy argued for the created equality of all human beings. The sovereignty of kings was gradually replaced by popular sovereignty, the unprecedented vision of a democratic people governing themselves for their mutual benefit.\(^2\) Slavery was eventually

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\(^2\) The efforts of Bartolomeo Las Casas and the school of Salamanca on behalf of the
repudiated; individual rights extended, in principle, to all human kind. And perhaps most significantly, the patriarchal assumptions of family, society and faith were globally challenged by principled demands for the equality of women. In the North Atlantic world by the late nineteenth century, the Ancien Regime was dead!

**Ethical:** In the moral realm, modernity preserves the pluralism but quarrels with the traditional hierarchies of the ancients. The reformers celebrate the goodness of ordinary life, of marriage and the family, of disciplinary work and craftsmanship, of practical involvement in commerce and agriculture. They tend to affirm the priesthood of all believers, skeptically challenging the spiritual value of celibate monks and clergy. Bacon and Descartes reject the supremacy traditionally accorded the contemplative life. For Bacon, knowledge proves its worth in “fruits and works”; for Descartes, in the sovereign “mastery of nature” the new science promises.

The goods the moderns tend to prize are palpable and common: longer life, greater material abundance, increased security and comfort, the heightening of pleasure, the reduction of suffering and pain. Individuals and societies innocently differ in the pleasures and satisfactions they prefer and pursue. There is no objective hierarchy of goods or forms of life, no clear priority assigned to eternal truths or ends. Earthly life, earthly happiness, earthly peace and prosperity, these are the common goods that free and equal citizens jointly strive to promote. In a secular, democratic age, the Vita Contemplativa is dead or dying!

**Metaphysical:** The early moderns did not reject the Christian God. But the radical Enlightenment censured Catholic Christianity and its central role within the Ancien Regime. The new science of nature appeared to banish God from the modern cosmos. Historical criticism raised difficult questions about the authority of scripture and the credibility of Biblical narratives. The “masters of suspicion,” Marx, Nietzsche, and Freud, fiercely criticized the political, cultural, and psychological functions of religion. Over time, their subversive

Native Americans are noteworthy and important. Unfortunately, the remedial effects of their efforts to respect the liberty of the indigenous peoples and to curtail the African slave trade were limited. See Taylor, *Modern Social Imaginaries*, chap. 8, “The Sovereign People.” (Durham, NC: Duke University Press, 2004).

influence established postulated atheism as the first principle of many
critical minds. In the judgment of their loyal followers, the last and
greatest hierarchical division had been obliterated. The dignity of man
allegedly required “the death of God.”

2. Autonomy and Authority

The modern concept of liberty is based on the experience of liberation:
the liberation of the believer from a corrupt and oppressive church; of the
original thinker from a stifling intellectual tradition; of the democratic
citizen from a despotic monarchy; of the creative individual from
established patterns of cultural authority. What medieval Christians
had accepted as legitimate and enabling, the leading moderns viewed
as coercive and constrictive. But human freedom has two distinct but
inter-related moments: the act of liberation that abolishes tyranny, the
act of constitution that establishes a viable replacement for what has
been rejected and cast off. These successive dimensions of freedom are
bound together in the distinctively modern ideal of human autonomy.

Epistemic autonomy: In his Rules for the Direction of the Human
Mind and his Discourse on Method, Descartes emphasized the sharp
separation between belief and knowledge. Belief is often untrue,
invariably doubtful, and generally useless. Knowledge, by contrast,
has all the virtues opinion lacks. The epistemic weakness of belief
derives from its customary sources: religion, tradition, authority, and
common sense. The countervailing virtues of knowledge are based on
its intuitive clarity and distinctness, together with its demonstrative
rigor. The dual purpose of Cartesian method is to discredit the sources
of belief and to coordinate the mental operations that culminate in
certainty.

Descartes’s hyperbolic doubt undermines all truth-claims that

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4 This is the crux of the argument between Lonergan and “exclusive humanism.” For
Lonergan, an authentic and comprehensive humanism must be religious. See Insight,
vol. 3 of the Collected Works of Bernard Lonergan, 747-51 and Second Collection, 144.

5 For the complementarity of liberation and the “foundation of freedom,” see Hannah

6 For an insightful account of the “Roman trinity” of religion, tradition, and authority,
see Hannah Arendt, Between Past and Future (New York: Penguin, 1968), 120-41. “...the famous “decline of the West” consists primarily in the decline of the Roman trinity of
religion, tradition and authority...” (140).
cannot meet the test of indubitability. It is a canon of intellectual liberation, freeing the individual mind from all external sources of belief. The emancipated mind is then free to discover certain knowledge within itself. The rules of intuitive analysis, logical synthesis and deductive rigor are explicitly designed to erect the modern structure of science on firm and unshakable foundations. As Descartes eventually makes clear, his quest for certainty is ultimately a quest for comprehensive autonomy, as advancing knowledge is steadily transformed into world-controlling power. Only the mind that can govern itself will be able to govern the impersonal forces of nature.

**Moral autonomy:** In the *Discourse on Method*, Descartes devises two sets of rules, one for thinking and one for living while we think. The epistemic rules are radical and driven by the quest for certainty. The moral rules are conservative, at least provisionally, and designed to secure the independent thinker's security and peace. While the epistemic rules eschew external sources of belief, the moral rules recommend compliance with conventional practices and norms. The epistemic demand for intellectual autonomy is counter-balanced by Descartes's willingness to live quietly and unobtrusively among his peers.

At the climax of the European Enlightenment, Kant criticized both portions of the Cartesian project. While Kant accepted modern science and mathematics, he strictly limited the scope of theoretical reason. No method, however scrupulously observed, could yield the metaphysical knowledge Descartes promised. At the same time, Kant embraced a radical vision of moral autonomy. Though human reason is limited in its epistemic aspirations, it is autonomous, self-legislating, in the moral realm. For Kant, the supreme principle of morality is the autonomy of pure practical reason.

What is the practical relevance of this striking philosophical claim? The rational will is only obliged to obey moral imperatives, categorical imperatives that it issues to itself while drawing exclusively ("purely") on its own resources. All other sources of practical command or counsel,

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7 The provisional stoicism of the third moral rule in the *Discourse* will eventually be supplanted by the Cartesian project of mastering the natural world in deed as well as in thought.

God, revealed religion, public authority, cultural tradition, natural fear and desire, carry no moral weight. These are heteronomous principles of morality, at best amoral, and often immoral in their normative implications. Kant has constructed his moral theory so that the sources, maxims, motives, and ends of practical reason are completely self-contained and self-legitimating.

Although the noumenal dimension of Kant's moral philosophy was later rejected by his naturalistic successors, his revolutionary vision of moral autonomy profoundly influenced the entire post-Kantian tradition.9

Historical autonomy: Both Descartes and Kant emphasized the autonomy of the individual, the disembodied Cartesian ego, Kant's noumenal moral agent. In the second phase of the Enlightenment, this atomistic conception of human existence was openly rejected. The human subject was resituated in society and culture, in the social institutions and cultural practices of modern Europe. Hegel and Marx displaced Descartes and Kant as the leading modern anthropologists. The disembodied, disembedded, solitary ego was reconceived as a socially and culturally conditioned creature immersed in the processes of history and nature.

Despite these critical conceptual changes, the ideal of autonomy retained its power. Hegel celebrated the autonomy of Absolute Spirit, Marx the autonomy of the human species as a whole. Marx's Promethean humanism defiantly excluded any role for the divine in human affairs. The French Revolutionary dreams of universal liberty, equality, and fraternity would only be actualized through the abolition of capitalism and the emergence of a classless society. The industrial proletariat would play the leading role in this decisive liberation. With the advent of communism, the enmities and struggles that have plagued human history will cease. The utopian vision of the prophets will be fulfilled, not through the providence of God but through human cooperation with history's teleological laws.10

Paradoxically, Marx and Hegel conceive freedom, autonomy, as

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the outcome of dialectical necessity. They both assign causal primacy to the dialectical laws of history. The specifically human contribution to freedom is to discern those laws and to act in alignment with them. The Cartesian overtones of Marx's revolutionary project are unmistakable. Humans gain mastery over nature and history by discovering their invariant laws and then turning this knowledge into world-transforming power. Descartes achieved this practical end by segregating the knowing and transforming agent from the valueless natural order. But this “solution” is unavailable to Marx who paradoxically combines necessity and freedom in his promethean vision of naturalized humanism and humanized naturalism.

Exclusive humanism: Belief in God remains important to the vast majority of our contemporaries. But they coexist with other persons equally convinced that God is dead. Although the latter group is comparatively small, it exercises immense intellectual and cultural influence, especially in the sciences, both natural and human. For these exclusive humanists, because there is no God, there is also no creation, no sin, no grace, no divine law, no revealed mysteries, no providential redemption, no hope for life beyond the grave. Some embrace these views defiantly; for others, living without God has become a matter of course.

There are profound internal differences within the secularist camp, and many of its members explicitly reject the inflated visions of autonomy articulated in this section. What unites exclusive humanists, despite their opposing moral visions, is a shared belief in what Charles Taylor calls the closure of “the immanent frame”: the ontological conviction that nature and history are self-contained causal realms requiring no further explanatory inquiry, that human existence is a fortunate biological accident, and that we mortals must struggle and die in a world that exists without God.

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11 See Arendt, On Revolution, 54, for the murderous “dialectic of freedom and necessity.”
12 See Taylor, A Secular Age, for the branching expressions of “exclusive humanism.”
13 For the moral ontology of “the immanent frame,” see Taylor, A Secular Age, chap. 15, “The Immanent Frame.”
3. Virtue, Power, and Happiness

For both Aristotle and Aquinas, the middle term linking knowledge and eudaimonia (beatitudo) was arete (virtus), human excellence. Although not all the virtues are reducible to knowledge, they all have an epistemic component. Aristotle refused to separate virtuous activity from the virtuous agent, a mature person guided by phronesis (practical wisdom), a constitutive feature of every true moral virtue (Second Collection, 82). The phronimos not only understands the hierarchical teleology of human flourishing but also knows how to actualize it wisely in the contingent circumstances of practical life. Aquinas augmented Aristotle's ethical vision with the supernatural virtues infused by divine grace and the teleology of eternal beatitude with God and the saints.

The virtues themselves are intrinsic goods perfecting and completing the created capacities of human nature. But they are also internal requirements of human flourishing itself.14 Neither terrestrial eudaimonia nor eternal blessedness can be actualized apart from virtuous activity, the best and most complete. The intellectual virtues require a grasp of normative order: in the soul, in society, in the cosmos, in the internal nature of God. The purpose of virtuous activity guided by theoretical and practical wisdom is to actualize that normative order in the psychological, political, and cultural realms. For Aristotle, eudaimonia is achieved when human beings consistently live in accord with the normative teleology of nature, for Aquinas, when they faithfully live in accord with God's eternal law.

The moderns partly retained and largely reversed the ancient and medieval conceptions of eudaimonia (beatitudo). The knowledge prized by the moderns is based upon science, the apprehension of nature's universal and invariant laws. For Bacon, natural science proved its utility through the tangible fruits and works it helped to produce. For Descartes, the fruit bearing branches on the tree of modern knowledge are medicine, mechanics, and morals.15 Medicine was prized because it extended the duration of life and diminished human suffering; mechanics because it augmented human power over the forces of

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14 For the important concept of "internal teleology," see MacIntyre, After Virtue (Notre Dame: University of Notre Dame Press, 1981), 187-89.

15 Descartes, Principles of Philosophy, author's letter that serves as a preface.
the natural world; morals because it offered an effective recipe for increasing terrestrial happiness.

From the Cartesian and Baconian perspective, the key to happiness is not virtue, the right ordering of fear, desire, and belief, but continually increasing human power and control over reality. Only when the power we command exceeds our desires are we positioned for happiness, both individually and collectively. According to the modern critique, it was because the ancients lacked technical power over nature that they focused their ethics on the disciplining of fear and desire. The new alliance of science and technology by radically augmenting human power made the education of the passions unnecessary.

The Cartesian and Baconian project is no less teleological than that of the ancients. But the telos they advocate is divorced from virtuous activity and the ideal of normative order. The vast majority of people can enjoy the palpable fruits of modern science and technology without knowing how they are produced. As Kant later realized, this "enlightened" conception of happiness has been radically democratized. Because each individual conceives the substance of happiness differently, even in ways that violate the moral law, modern counsels of prudence lack normative import. Like the hypothetical imperatives of skill, they carry no obligatory moral force.16

Kant, therefore, openly challenged the moral project of his enlightened contemporaries. For Kant, the genuine goal of morality is not to maximize utility, the greatest happiness of the greatest number of people. It is rather to determine how human beings must act in order to be worthy of happiness. The purpose of Kant's categorical imperatives is not to increase the sum of terrestrial felicity but to confirm the primacy of duty over desire in a world that lacks poetic justice. Given Kant's conceptions of moral excellence (good will) and happiness (the satisfaction of untutored desire), the internal teleology of virtue affirmed by the ancients no longer obtains. The surface similarities of ancient and modern ethics conceal a much greater conceptual and substantive divide.

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16 Immanuel Kant, Foundations, 82-84. Categorical imperatives are carefully distinguished from both technical imperatives of skill and counsels of prudence. Only categorical imperatives are morally binding.
4. The Varieties of Modern Individualism

Charles Taylor draws an important distinction between moral ontology and moral advocacy.\(^{17}\) Moral ontology refers to the way we conceive of the moral life, the basic structural features that frame the context for our moral reflection and choice. Moral advocacy refers to the specific evaluative judgments and policies we actually affirm and pursue. Although distinct, these two dimensions of morality are interconnected, for we regularly employ our moral ontology to clarify, justify, or critique the moral positions we support or oppose.

Taylor's distinction is particularly useful in appraising the constitutive role of "individualism" in modern moral culture, for modern individualism makes both ontological and advocacy claims. It offers contested ontological accounts of the moral activity of human agents and contested substantive accounts of the moral ends it is good to pursue and the moral obligations human beings are required to fulfill.

When we speak of "modern individualism" to what exactly are we referring? The artistic individualism of the Renaissance painters and craftsmen; the religious individualism of the Protestant reformers; the epistemic individualism of Descartes's disembodied res cogitans; the moral individualism of Kant's noumenal subject; the political individualism of the English utilitarians; the democratic individualism articulated and critiqued by de Tocqueville? The Renaissance artists were actively seeking public recognition and patronage; the Protestant reformers, an immediate relation to God; Descartes, a certain path to indubitable truth; Kant, the autonomous source of moral obligation; the utilitarians, a credible teleology of public happiness; Tocqueville's democratic individualists, a practical way of belonging to the new American society. The common thread uniting these disparate forms of individualism was the deep desire to be liberated from inherited forms of mediation: cultural, religious, academic, ethical, and political. If inherited mediation is seen as a barrier to individual liberty, equality, and happiness, then it must be discredited and overcome.

Thus, in the first phase of the Enlightenment (1600-1800), human beings were reconceived as disembodied, disembedded subjects operating in a disenchanted universe. This Cartesian picture of the

self was designed to establish the individual’s epistemic, moral, and political autonomy. The unmediated intuitions of the ego guaranteed epistemic certainty; the autonomous legislation of the noumenal subject gave universal authority to the moral law; the voluntary consent of the solitary individual legitimated political obligations; the satisfaction of untutored natural desires provided the ontological basis of public utility. Despite their profound internal disagreements, Descartes, Kant, Hobbes, and Bentham shared an atomistic view of the self, a conception of human beings having merely external or instrumental relations to one another. From the atomistic perspective, we are most truly ourselves, most free and self-directed, when liberated from all external influences, especially the social, political, and cultural institutions of the Ancien Regime.

In the second phase of the Enlightenment (1815-present), the moral ontology of atomistic individualism was largely rejected. Human beings were resituated in nature, society, and history. Both their biological and cultural genealogies were assigned new importance. According to this revised ontological account, humans are fundamentally linguistic or symbolic animals who acquire and exercise language within an enduring matrix of social institutions and practices. This constitutive communal dependence on language and symbolism, in their various forms, undercuts the inflated aspirations to autonomy of the early moderns.

The renewed stress on human embodiment by both naturalistic and romantic thinkers sharply illuminated the polymorphic nature of human subjectivity (Insight, 410-12, 451-52). Humans are not just rational and volitional egos but embodied subjects with complex affective, sexual, and unconscious dimensions to their existence. They are also economic agents who earn their living and shape their lives in a rapidly changing political economy. They not only belong to families, states, and religious communities but also to economic classes and ethnic and national groups whose demands on their loyalty are intense and conflicting. In late modernity, there gradually emerges a richer, more complex and more fragmented picture of the self as a symbolic animal shaped and divided by natural, cultural, and historically shifting moral determinants.

To what extent did the moral aspirations of early modernity survive the rejection of its moral ontology? The liberty, dignity and responsibility of the individual person continue to be affirmed. Though liberty is no longer equated with radical autonomy, the existential responsibility of the person remains a bulwark of moral and political evaluation. The dignity of the individual is legally translated into a new set of rights, both negative and positive. The negative rights guarantee freedom from interference in matters of conscience, worship, association, expression, economic initiative and ownership. The positive rights, which are more deeply contested, include guarantees of minimum security in the areas of education, health, housing, income and the welfare of children and the elderly.\textsuperscript{19}

Even within this unstable public consensus, important moral differences have emerged. Expressive individualists celebrate the individual’s right to unfettered self-expression as a way of actualizing personal uniqueness. Utilitarian individualists insist on the modern individual’s right to define happiness in subjective terms. The leading existentialist thinkers are less interested in self-expression and personal happiness than in the exigent demands of authenticity: the moral imperative requiring the authentic individual to confront death, suffering, injustice, and oppression in a profoundly disordered world. Though liberty is now defined in diverse, even contradictory, ways, it remains the supreme value in the moral culture of modernity.

What sort of equality does human liberty require and permit? What sort of equality does democratic justice demand? The political struggles of late modernity tend to center on the relative importance and practical implementation of the value of equality. In the North Atlantic world, political conservatives and libertarians tend to argue that the demands of negative liberty, of non-interference with private initiative, trump those of equality. Their rivals on the political left, stressing the positive rights associated with modern liberty, tend to support public policies designed to reduce inequalities of every kind.

Ethnic and sexual minorities, women, indigenous peoples, the disabled, the unborn among others. What concrete forms of equality does substantive justice require: equality of opportunity, equality of result, equality in the underlying socioeconomic conditions enabling self-actualization?20

Ontological differences continue to play an important role here, with the libertarian right espousing a more atomistic conception of the self, and their critics on the left focusing on the socioeconomic conditions in which beleaguered individuals and families are historically situated. Another critical source of difference is the normative priority accorded to *capitalism and the market* by economic conservatives and to *democracy and the people* by the liberal and socialist left. Even carefully regulated capitalism tends to generate significant economic, social, and political inequalities. The story of modern democracy, by contrast, is largely a struggle for extending human equality: equality of rights, of political representation, of due process, of the opportunity to compete economically and politically on a "level playing field."21

Tocqueville memorably argued that modern democracies faced a continuing tension between the values of equality and liberty.22 While Tocqueville's original thesis is sound, the profound tensions within contemporary democracy are more ramified than he realized. For these tensions exist among rival conceptions of liberty and equality, and among rival, even hostile, accounts of what these core values permit and require.

5. *Eros and Exigence*

Eros and exigence, desire and duty, are important factors in any credible account of morality. Is the moral life primarily an erotic quest for the *sumnum bonum*, the highest attainable good, or is it primarily a practical commitment to fulfill our obligations, even when they conflict with our deepest desires?

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Classical morality, without shirking the importance of obligation, tended to emphasize the erotic quest, suitably purified by the relevant virtues. Utilitarian moralists significantly reduced the importance of the virtues, while promoting the greatest happiness of the greatest number of discrete individuals. Kant explicitly challenged both classical eudaimonism and modern utilitarianism, basing his ethics on categorical imperatives that clearly subordinated personal desire to moral obligation. These meta-ethical differences have been recently highlighted by John Rawls's argument that the right (the obligatory demands of justice) is prior to the good (the individual or collective pursuit of happiness). Iris Murdoch, without privileging either eros (Plato) or exigence (Kant), believed that a credible account of morality must do justice to both the human quest for perfection and the inescapable demand that we do our duty in the concrete circumstances of ordinary life.

These important and unresolved meta-ethical debates are conducted at a very high level of generality. While they provide genuine guidance to ethical reflection, they leave ordinary mortals to decide for themselves the different paths to the highest goods and the concrete obligations moral integrity requires them to fulfill.

LONERGAN'S CRITICAL RESPONSE

"Are we to seek an integration of the human good on the level of historical consciousness with full acknowledgement of man's responsibility for the human situation? If we are, how are we to go about it" (Topics in Education, 78).

Lonergan insisted that Catholic thinkers must critically appropriate the vetera in order to respond authentically to the nova. His nuanced response to the moral challenges of modernity clearly follows this dialectical pattern.

25 If moral ontology corresponds to the "upper blade of ethics," then moral advocacy corresponds to the substantive policies concrete individuals and communities choose to pursue. Effectively mediating the important transition from ontology to advocacy are the "lower blade" of ethics and practical wisdom. See Appraisal at the end of section D.
1. Hierarchy and Equality

*Metaphysical.* Lonergan explicitly rejects exclusive humanism, the denial of divine transcendence, the metaphysical confinement of reality to proportionate being alone. He explicitly affirms the Trinitarian God of Christianity as the transcendent *arche* and *telos* of the created universe. For Lonergan, God is the creative *ground* of all proportionate being and the ultimate *end* of cosmic finality and human aspiration (*Insight*, chap. 19).

The ontological gulf between creator and creation does not preclude God’s participation in the created order. Just as God’s wisdom and goodness sustain the created universe in being, so God’s compassion and mercy are revealed through divine initiatives in history: the covenant with Abraham, the gift of the law to Moses, the prophetic challenge to Hebraic fidelity, the incarnation of Jesus (the divine word made flesh), the redemption and sanctification of the world.

The ontological transcendence of God is also the basis of radical human equality. All humans without exception are created in God’s image and likeness, are subject to bias and sin, are redeemed by Christ’s death and resurrection, are blessed with unmerited grace, are called to conversion, authenticity, and self-transcendence. In Lonergan’s redemptive theology, the ineffable mystery of God is balanced by God’s radical generosity in sending his son to dwell in our midst, becoming like us in all things but sin (Philippians 2:7; Hebrews 4:15).

*Cosmological.* Lonergan’s cosmological beliefs differ markedly from those of both ancients and moderns. He rejects the static, timeless hierarchies of Aristotle’s cosmology, the sharp separation between celestial and terrestrial physics, the classical theory of scientific knowledge (*episteme*). At the same time, he opposes scientific determinism and materialism, reductionist accounts of genetic emergence and evolution, and the conflation of the natural and human sciences.

Lonergan’s dynamic and explanatory cosmology of emergent probability is based on: the canons of empirical method, the complementarity of classical and statistical heuristic structures, the conditioned emergence of explanatory genera and species, irreducible levels of emerging schemes of recurrence, the ontological distinction between matter and spirit, the normative unfolding of intentional
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consciousness, the freedom and responsibility of the human person, the intentional subject's openness to unmerited grace (Insight, 146-57; 290-92). Human beings are symbolic, polymorphic animals whose prolonged and uncertain development has organic, neural, perceptual, affective, intellectual, moral, and religious dimensions. Specifically human existence is invariably mediated by meaning and motivated by value and must be understood and appraised by dialectical methods that respect these constitutive features of spiritual life.

Social and political. Lonergan did not write at length about society and politics. Although he recognized the importance of economic, social, and political institutions, he tended to concentrate on their cultural underpinnings, the beliefs and values that animate and sustain their effective operation. In broad terms, he can be described as a normative realist, equally sensitive to the role of factual knowledge and moral precepts in shaping effective public policy. How did this normative outlook inform his judgments about the practical balance between hierarchy and equality (Second Collection, 189-92)?

Though Lonergan was not a reactionary seeking to reverse the democratic revolutions of modernity and to restore the Ancien Regime, he harbored few illusions about the conduct of modern democracy. He recognized the negative effects of bias on individual and group decisions; he emphasized the importance of specialized knowledge and competence in practical affairs; he criticized the vulgarity and ignorance that pervade popular culture and electoral politics.

He supported a version of “complex equality” based on the principle of functional differentiation. Modern institutions are complex cooperative ventures relying on the collaboration of numerous individuals performing different functions and tasks. While institutional tasks should be assigned on the basis of the requisite skills and knowledge, strong interpersonal relations and prudent practical leadership are also essential if the effective integration of these disparate functions is to occur. Careers, it would seem, should be


open to talent together with demonstrated traits of social cooperation and civic responsibility (*Method in Theology*, 47-52).

Freedom and responsibility are not restricted to individual persons. Modern men and women are collectively responsible for the direction of history, for promoting historical progress and reversing historical decline (*Topics in Education*, 76-78; *Third Collection*, 169). As responsible citizens, however, we must fulfill our historical vocation without the *liberal* illusion of continuous progress, the *Marxist* illusion of Promethean revolt, or the secularist illusion of the divine absence from history. The inauthenticity with which individuals struggle is even more pronounced in communal affairs. The greatest practical danger is the public's attraction to seductive ideologies justifying violence and terror in the service of utopian ends (*Method in Theology*, 55, 357-59). There is no substitute for liberty as a source of human creativity (*Insight*, 259-61). Although bias can distort the exercise of freedom, the suppression of liberty guarantees stagnation and decline. Since all forms of despotism suppress human liberty, they should be actively opposed. Given the scale and complexity of modern institutions, administrative bureaucracies are also to be feared because they prevent or obstruct the creative collaboration on which genuine progress depends.

Power, as such, should not be confused with coercion or force (*Third Collection*, 5-12). Power is generated by human cooperation across the ages, through human beings acting in concert with their contemporaries and predecessors. Authority and power, however, are not coextensive, for power can be employed for both good and ill. Lonergan explicitly defines authority as *legitimate* power, power whose generation and exercise comply with the transcendental precepts. In both Lonergan's existential and social ethics, authenticity is the essence of human legitimacy and inauthenticity the justifying ground for critical dissent and sustained opposition.

Lonergan recognizes, therefore, a legitimate role for authority in the church, the state, the economic, and educational enterprises of civil society and, of course, in family life. His normative position would be

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28 For Lonergan's critical distinction between essential and effective freedom (authenticity) see *Insight*, 643-56. "A consideration of effective freedom is meaningless, unless essential freedom exists." (643).
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considerably clearer, however, if we knew his explicit appraisal of the historical exercise of power in these flawed but important institutions.

Ethical. Judgments of value, both originating and terminal, are either categorical or comparative (Method in Theology, 36-41). In categorical judgments, we distinguish good from evil, right from wrong, benefit from harm, virtue from vice. In comparative judgments, we hierarchically rank the plurality of genuine values and the multiple evils that threaten them. The supreme originating value is God; all other originating values are created expressions of God’s love in the world of creation. God is the transcendent source (arche) of all created goodness and the telos all created things naturally seek.

The transcendence of God does not preclude a hierarchical structure within the order of created value (Insight, 624-26). In order of rank, originating values include authentic subjects, the operative beliefs and commitments of authentic cultures, the institutional cooperation of authentic societies, the natural and social realities that underlie and condition the personal and communal quest for what is good (Philosophical and Theological Papers, 17, 336-77).

In the order of terminal values, the complexity of human development is the critical factor. The successful completion of earlier stages of development is necessary to the later achievement of objective knowledge and authentic existence. Thus vital, social, and cultural values condition the possibility of higher levels of personal distinction. However, the functional complementarity of values entails that what is first in the order of temporal development may be lowest in the order of intrinsic excellence. Thus Lonergan affirms an objective hierarchy of originating and terminal values while recognizing the functional dependence of higher on lower goods.

Authenticity is the highest norm for both individual persons and communities. To be authentic they must respond consistently to the transcendental desires for knowledge and value and faithfully comply with the transcendental precepts. Only in this exigent and arduous manner can human beings achieve self-transcendence, epistemic, moral and religious. Since bias and sin continually threaten authenticity, self-transcendence is rare and exceedingly difficult. The greatest danger to authentic living is the seductive power of ideologies that justify alienated forms of personal and collective existence (Method in Theology,
In a society and culture ensnared by ideologies, redemptive grace and the supernatural virtues of faith, hope, and love, are necessary to break ideology's imprisoning grip on the human spirit. Yet even with the aid of grace, individuals and societies must continually struggle to withdraw from inauthentic patterns of thinking, choosing, and living (Insight, chap. 20; Method in Theology, 116-17).

Though Lonergan continues to distinguish between natural and supernatural values, originating and terminal, he also preserves Aquinas's core Christian insights that grace sublates nature and does not abolish it; that grace heals the violence of sin by restoring the created integrity of nature that sin undermines. While Aquinas's Christian humanism emphasizes the complementarity of the different orders of value, the "law of the cross" inserts a powerful tension into his humanistic outlook. It is not that suffering and death are inherently good; they clearly are not. But as the example of Christ unmistakably shows, they are often inseparable from the Christian's redemptive mission of actually bringing good out of evil. In the concrete drama of Christian humanism, Calvary must come before Easter.

2. Authority and Autonomy

A prolonged crisis of legitimacy in Latin Christendom gave rise to modernity in the West. Sincere Christian reformers lost faith in the Renaissance papacy. The leaders of the Scientific Revolution lost faith in the intellectual authority of Aristotle and the Aristotelian tradition. The spirited proponents of democratic equality and liberty lost faith in the institutions and culture of the Ancien Régime. The critical champions of the French Enlightenment initially lost faith in Catholic Christianity and then in the providential authority of God. Both industrial capitalists and their socialist critics lost faith in the economic models and norms of feudal society. In the second half of the twentieth century, large numbers of women lost faith in the patriarchal assumptions and prejudices of Western religion and culture.

Despite significant differences among these powerful cultural movements, they shared a common response to the crises they faced. The unfolding pattern of that response has four distinguishable moments: increasing alienation from inherited authority and tradition; liberation from what they perceived as the institutional and cultural sources of
their discontent; the constitution of new institutional orders on the basis of individual or collective autonomy; gradual recognition that the autonomous foundations they championed were greatly inflated and that the alternative institutions they envisaged could not be sustained and defended.

Lonergan was both a critic and defender of modern assertions of autonomy. He explicitly rejected the atomistic moral ontology that dominated the first phase of the Enlightenment. He explicitly welcomed the re-conception of human existence as socially and historically embedded subjectivity. The anthropological subject he thematized is situated in nature, society, and culture, a symbolic animal whose concrete existence is mediated by meaning and motivated by value (Method in Theology, 76-81). He recognized two distinct but complementary paths of human development, from above and below. But these essential paths to personal growth are also sources of decline. For bias, sin, and ideology affect both the social and cultural formation of the person as well as the individual judgments and choices each person makes.

Because human beings belong to social institutions, the great majority of their beliefs and convictions are culturally transmitted. This cultural transmission, however, is a two-edged sword, containing both true and false beliefs, authentic as well as inauthentic values and priorities. Because situated belonging is a constitutive feature of human existence, individual autonomy is always limited and partial; because our social and historical inheritance is always a mixture of greatness and wretchedness, we must learn to appropriate critically the shared beliefs and values received from our ancestors.

The moderns were not mistaken in critiquing their medieval inheritance. But they were mistaken in believing they could radically emancipate themselves from its influence. The wholesale liberation they attempted is simply not possible. They were also mistaken in their inflated assertions of autonomy, whether it was the scriptural autonomy claimed by the reformers, the epistemic autonomy of Descartes, the moral autonomy of Kant, the Promethean humanism of Marx, the market fundamentalism of laissez-faire liberals.

If critically appropriating the past is required for critically belonging to any society and culture, then neither obedience to "authority" nor emancipation from its claims nor the autonomous
constitution of the new, are viable strategies for independent thinkers today. What alternative strategy does Lonergan propose in the third stage of cognitive meaning? Because cognitive development occurs through specialization and differentiation, we need to recognize the relative autonomy of common sense, theoretical inquiry, and historical scholarship (Method in Theology, 94-95; Third Collection, 46). Differentiated learning, however, does not eliminate the human need and desire for cognitive integration. Thus we still need philosophy to integrate the specialized forms of modern knowledge and the specialized accounts of reality they collectively offer. Moreover, because the unrestricted desires and norms of the human spirit cannot be satisfied within the realm of proportionate being, we must also recognize the intellectual and moral legitimacy of philosophical and revealed theology.

To achieve credible epistemic and moral integration without imperial reduction, Lonergan stresses the importance of sublation (Second Collection, 81-84; Philosophical and Theological Papers, 358-60). On his nuanced account, theology sublates philosophy as grace sublates nature, faith sublates reason and as divine love sublates the classical virtues of intellect and character. Sublation preserves the integrity and relative autonomy of what it sublates, while transcending the limits and deficiencies of what it effectively surpasses. Sublation is an analogous relationship that operates throughout the whole of reality. In the sphere of human existence, it enables Lonergan to balance the legitimate claims of relative autonomy and functional interdependence, intellectually, morally, and religiously.

A transitional crisis of legitimacy demands neither radical autonomy nor radical liberation. These were the revolutionary modern strategies that Lonergan openly critiqued. His proposed alternative is to insist on personal and communal authenticity. Although these critical forms of authenticity are distinct they cannot be separated (Collection, 227-31; Method in Theology, 80-81). For personal authenticity is always the achievement of historically situated subjects; and communal authenticity, to the extent it exists, is always the fruit of the creative and critical achievements of the community’s authentic members and leaders. At both levels of existence, authenticity requires full and continuous fidelity to the transcendental desires and precepts, a humble
acknowledgment of personal and communal failings, and a critical alertness to the seductive influence of bias and ideology. The human path to authenticity also demands a constant readiness to withdraw from inauthentic existence as it emerges within and around us.

A repeated error of modernity was to treat authority and liberty as incompatible values. But if authority is defined as legitimate power and legitimacy is conceived as self-transcending authenticity, then the alleged incompatibility is false. For if divine authority creates and respects human liberty, and commands an authenticity inseparable from freedom, then legitimate human power must do the same. When institutional authority is corrupted it tends to become despotic, wanting to “have by one means what can only be had in some other way.”29 (Montesquieu was right when he identified the animating spirit (esprit) of despotism as fear of coercive power.)30 But despotism in every form is inauthentic, even when it claims to be serving the highest values. Although social institutions cannot flourish without effective authority, their leaders are constantly tempted by despotism, by the suppression of liberty in the name of established order or progress. In the modern era, despotic practices, whether political, religious, or economic, are nearly always defended by ideology. Although the critique of ideology is necessary to “unmask” these apologias for tyranny, the deeper need of our time is to go beyond warranted critique to intellectual, moral, and religious creativity and healing (Third Collection, 100-109).

3. Eudaimonia, Happiness, and Authenticity

For Lonergan a credible contemporary ethics must be concrete, existential, dynamic and historically responsible. It will require a transposition but not a rejection of Aquinas’s moral theology. Thus Lonergan preserves Thomas’s insights into nature and grace, the violent consequences of sin, the hierarchical pluralism and functional complementarity of human goods, the centrality of the virtues, the vertically structured ends human beings pursue. But where Aquinas made beatitude dependent on the natural and supernatural virtues, and the moderns made individual and collective happiness dependent

29 Pascal, Pensées, #58.

on technological knowledge and power, Lonergan makes personal and communal authenticity dependent on comprehensive and sustained self-transcendence (Philosophical and Theological Papers, 313-31).

By epistemic self-transcendence, Lonergan refers to the personal and communal achievement of objective knowledge about the factual universe, social and cultural history, the lower blade norms and precepts that govern particular fields of human action and conduct. It also refers to the practical wisdom, existential and collective, that discerns the best course of action in the changing thicket of human existence.

Objective knowledge of fact and value is necessary though not sufficient for human authenticity. For while knowledge of the real leads to knowledge of the good, ethical inquiry remains incomplete until its evaluative judgments are practically realized, not just here and now, but over the course of a lifetime or the longer history of a people and culture. Thus moral self-transcendence sublates its epistemic counterpart, preserving the vital importance of cognition while transcending its ethical limits.

Authenticity in ethics, however, is incompatible with blithe moral optimism. As human beings, we live under the reign of bias, ideology, and sin (Insight, 714-16). We regularly ignore or deny experience, truncate the scope of our inquiry, reject unwelcome insights and judgments, fail to do or avoid what our conscience commands, soothe an uneasy conscience with placating rationalizations. These recurrent lapses in authenticity create an objective surd, a tangled knot, for individuals and communities (Insight, 254-57). Our concrete moral existence, therefore, is always a complex mixture of good and evil, of achieved self-transcendence, and the defiant, thoughtless, or careless refusal of its exigent normative demands.

Religious authenticity refuses to consent to the reign of sin, however entrenched it may be. But this heroic unwillingness should not be confused with a moral idealism that wills the good but overlooks or ignores the serious obstacles blocking its attainment (Second Collection, 221; Method in Theology, 38). All forms of authenticity are based upon critical realism. We cannot do what is right or correct what is broken or skewed, without knowing in detail what is real. Lonergan’s comprehensive position, like that of Aquinas, rests on the principle
of sublation. Although religious authenticity sublates epistemic and moral self-transcendence, it continues to rely upon them in striving to bring good out of evil and in accepting the full cost of this ongoing redemptive effort.

4. Subjectivity and Objectivity in Ethics

Does the late modern turn to the situated subject undermine the objectivity of ethics? Are the varieties of modern individualism consistent with a normative conception of human subjectivity? Can we develop a contemporary ethics that respects the erotic and exigent dimensions of the human spirit? Lonergan gives affirmative answers to all three of these questions, thus distinguishing his ethical position from the leading ancient and modern accounts of morality.

Why does the philosophical turn to the ethical subject not end in the loss of objectivity? Kant believed he could avoid this danger by conceiving the moral subject as a noumenal ego, pure practical reason (Second Collection, 70n2). Post-Kantian ethics openly rejected Kant's moral atomism, resituationg the moral agent in nature, society, and culture. For Kant, these were heteronomous moral sources that undermined the strict normativity of the moral law. But for Kant's naturalistic and historicist critics, the loss of objectivity should be taken in stride. The utilitarians believed that untutored natural desires were the ontological basis of ethics. Romantic thinkers believed that the passions of the heart took precedence over conventional moral imperatives. The Marxists believed that the ruthless construction of a classless society was not subject to moral constraint. Nietzsche believed that the codes and ideals of Western morality had their affective source in ressentiment. Moral relativists believed that the limited validity of ethical judgments and norms was historically and culturally conditioned. Emotivists believe that evaluative judgments are disguised expressions of individual or group preferences.31 In the post-Kantian era, it often seems that a belief in moral objectivity is incompatible with the new anthropology.

Lonergan countered this skeptical assumption by deepening the prevailing accounts of the situated subject. Against the utilitarians he argued that the unrestricted desires for knowledge and value are natural

31 See MacIntyre, After Virtue, chaps. 2 and 3.
to intentional subjects. Against romantic apologists, he argued that the intentional responses of the heart both reveal and distort genuine values. Against Marxist revolutionaries, he argued that profound social injustice could only be remedied through sustained moral realism. Against Nietzsche he argued for critically appropriating our moral inheritance rather than radically subverting it. Against the relativists he argued that true evaluative judgments have the same objectivity as reasonable judgments of fact. Against the emotivist tradition, he argued that individual or group satisfaction is an unconverted moral criterion; for the morally converted subject what matters are the goods that are really worthwhile.

By itself, the philosophical turn to the subject is morally ambiguous. For intentional subjects and communities regularly fail to achieve self-transcendence. They violate the transcendental precepts, fail to honor the transcendental desires, repeatedly succumb to bias and sin, resort to justifying ideology, and refuse the authentic demand for repentance and reform. Whenever these failures occur, human subjectivity precludes objectivity and the sceptical hand of the critics is strengthened. For objectivity, correctly understood, is always the intentional fruit of sustained self-transcendence (*Method in Theology*, 37, 338).

In epistemic objectivity, we know what is real by affirming what is true. This principle of critical realism applies to both factual and evaluative judgments. Moral objectivity sublates, goes beyond, epistemic achievement. It emerges from practical inquiry and deliberative choice whenever authentic subjects and communities actualize what is good, correct and reform what is broken and flawed, and do all that they can to bring good out of evil. In both personal and social ethics, Lonergan wisely emphasizes both originating and terminal values (*Method in Theology*, 51-52): the authenticity of moral agents, the concrete goods they are able to achieve, the sound interpersonal relations they create and sustain by their concerted deliberation and action. Rather than separating or opposing subjectivity and objectivity, Lonergan’s critical realism makes all achieved objectivity the intentional fruit of authentic existence. Objectivity is no more or less rare than the personal or communal authenticity on which it depends (*Philosophical and Theological Papers*, 202, 339, 389).
In the rhetoric of enlightened modernity, the authentic individual is set against the restrictive community as a critic or rebel. The underlying fear is that communal belonging breeds social conformity and cowardice; it stifles personal uniqueness and strengthens institutional oppression. In the first case, conventional society represses the individual's creative desires; in the second, it makes him/her complicit in serious social injustice. But if the developing individual is invariably dependent on community membership for education, protection and fellowship, how can the dangers of constitutive belonging be responsibly balanced and checked?

Lonergan achieves this difficult balance by conceiving of the individual holistically: as a symbolic animal, rooted in nature, situated in history, reciprocally dependent on others in an evolving network of human relationships. This dynamic pattern of interdependence is both a boon and a burden; while it is essential to personal growth and development, it also inevitably implicates us in the cultural biases of our time and place. How can the intentional subject achieve critical belonging within the complex web of deeply flawed communities?32

In the first place, the modern web of community is not homogenous. The beliefs and convictions transmitted by parents, friends, teachers, colleagues, artists, statesmen, and persons of faith frequently clash with each other and with the dominant cultural biases. Moreover, modern liberal societies are profoundly self-critical. They regularly submit their own assumptions and achievements to the test of internal consistency, while providing ample cultural resources for external critique as well. In the third stage of meaning, these resources include the empirical sciences, natural and human, critical historiography and hermeneutics, philosophical self-appropriation, the transcendent insights of religion and theology.

In late modernity, the principal cultural challenge is less uniformity than pluralism: competing and confusing accounts of knowledge, reality, goodness, and the divine. And the chief cultural danger is not pluralism per se, but ideology, the persuasive appeal of the relevant counter-positions. Rationalizing ideologies, however, are not immune from effective critique and reversal. To advance that dialectical goal,

Lonergan critically appropriates the old and the new, stresses the importance of conversion, reveals the radical implications of the transcendental desires and precepts, and emphasizes the redemptive power of grace. None of these dialectical strategies can guarantee the authenticity of either the individual or the community. But to demand guarantees is to misunderstand the truth of the human condition and the moral tensions inseparable from human responsibility and freedom.

5. Authenticity and the Problem of Evil

The Christian message and mission have been radically challenged by the critical spirit of modernity. At the heart of this challenge is the problem of evil, physical and moral (Insight, chap. 20). Physical evil seems inconsistent with the comprehensive goodness of divine creation. Moral evil appears to mock the Christian message of divine love and providence. How can an omniscient and omnipotent God permit so much suffering, injustice, and violence? How can a church ostensibly dedicated to Christ remain credible when it authorizes violence, condones injustice, and calmly accepts the suffering of the morally innocent.

Susan Neiman has argued persuasively that Lisbon and Auschwitz are the defining moments in this powerful moral critique. The Lisbon earthquake of 1755, like other grave natural catastrophes, raised profound doubts about God's benevolent presence in the natural order. The extermination camp at Auschwitz became the historical symbol of the Shoah, the systematic slaughter of millions in the name of ideology and racial purity.

Neither religious nor secular institutions and causes fared well in the twentieth century. In the European crisis between the wars, the moral authority of the church was seriously compromised. But the secular rivals of Christianity, on both the right and the left, fared even worse. The systemic terror authorized by Hitler and Stalin made the

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33 Dostoevski captures the essential spirit of this criticism in the unforgettable conversation between Ivan and Alexei Karamazov. Ivan encapsulates his moral critique of Christianity in the legend of "The Grand Inquisitor."


scandalous sins of the church appear modest in comparison. Explicitly utopian movements to create heaven on earth produced the very opposite of what they had promised. But the critique of terror and the false hopes that justified it is clearly not enough to restore the lost credibility of the church. What more needs to be done?

Authenticity requires confronting the problem of evil, particularly the unprecedented evils of the last two centuries. While the Catholic Church often allied itself with the Ancien Regime, its enlightened opponents hoped that abolishing the feudal order would lead to irreversible historical progress. The "progress" that actually resulted, however, was deeply ambiguous. During the historic upheaval in France, the Jacobins resorted to terror and the great revolution ended in despotism. Although industrial capitalism dramatically expanded human wealth, it also intensified social injustice and class hostility. The liberal democracies, driven by racism, greed, and nationalist fervor extended their imperial power and violence into Asia and Africa. Even the remarkable scientific and technological discoveries proved a double-edged sword, accelerating both the preservation and destruction of life. The global depression of the nineteen thirties revealed the profound instability of the world economy. Two world wars devastated the earth, leveled great cities in Europe and Asia, cost innumerable lives, both military and civilian, and demoralized the apostles of progress. After Hiroshima, Nagasaki, Treblinka, and the Gulag, the age of modern innocence was finally over.

How did Lonergan respond to this terrible sequence of events? He continued to affirm the importance of human liberty and historical responsibility (Insight, 710-15). But the gift of created liberty can obviously be used for good and evil; and when it is exercised collectively, the scope of its ambiguous power and influence radically expands. We moderns have far more collective power than our predecessors and consequently much greater responsibility for the state of the world. Illegitimate power, however, is invariably despotic and destructive. And as we have noted, the philosophical boosters of science/technology celebrated the expansion of power, but diminished the importance of virtue while priding themselves on their progressive benevolence. They trusted that liberation from the errors and sins of the past would be sufficient for a glorious future.
This complacent trust, as we now know and as they should have known, was extremely naive. For egoistic, group, and general bias did not disappear with feudalism and Latin Christendom, nor did the human capacity for sin and self-deception. If anything, the ideological movements of modernity are considerably more dangerous than the Ancien Regime because of the vast expansion of technical power they command.

Confronted with this history, Lonergan believed that the only responsible historical strategy was to legitimate the reality of power. But that requires authenticity, self-transcendence, and conversion on the part of the individual, the community, and its institutional and cultural leadership. It also requires distinctively religious virtues: humility, repentance, and self-sacrificing love. Sinful arrogance and pride were pervasive in the Ancien Regime, but they have been equally present in their capitalist, nationalist, Marxist, and liberal replacements. The defensive posture of the church, after Trent, stifled its own willingness to repent, to engage openly and honestly with its critics, to rectify its sinful omissions and conduct, and to join, without pride or illusion, in collectively responding to the reality of evil.

To be effective and credible, Lonergan insists such a collective response will require creativity and healing: the free creation, with the help of God's grace, of the true human good, personal, institutional, and cultural; the belated healing, with the help of God's mercy, of the reign of evil, beginning with our own sins and their destructive consequences and then proceeding, as best we can, to heal the destructive effects of sin in the human communities to which we belong (Third Collection, 100-108). Even with divine assistance and support, this will be a fallible, uneven and uncertain process, fraught with error, failure, and inauthenticity. In stark contrast to the Promethean illusions of modernity, it will require humility not hubris, hope not defiance, forgiveness not righteous indignation. Paradoxically, the greatest need of late modernity is to recover the true Christian message and the redemptive mission Christ gave to his church.

36 Stephen Spender's testimony in The God That Failed is particularly striking: “Power is only saved from corruption if it is humanized with humility. Without humility, power is turned to persecutions, executions and public lies.”
APPRAISAL

1) The upper and lower blade of ethics (Method in Theology, 293): In his philosophy and theology, Lonergan is a “both-and” thinker. He strategically avoids the polarizing “either-or’s” except in his critique of ideology and the counter-positions. In ethics, his normative realism emphasizes the concreteness of the human good at the level of both originating and terminal values. He explicitly refuses, in fact, to appraise ethical actions and consequences apart from the ethical agents who choose and enact them (Second Collection, 82-83). The authenticity of the agent is the explanatory cause of the goodness of the action. But this claim should not be misread, for the moral subject’s objective knowledge of fact and value is a necessary condition of all authenticity.

Lonergan identifies three complementary levels of moral cognition: the upper blade of ethics, the lower blade of ethics, and the practical wisdom that is needed to integrate them. The upper blade corresponds to what we have called “moral ontology and anthropology.” It refers to the transcendental and transcendent dimensions of moral agency: the unrestricted desires for knowledge and value; the unrestricted transcendental precepts and norms; the normative pattern of operations that complies with these precepts and responds to these foundational desires. It can also refer to the gift of God’s love and revelation that frames the religious horizon within which the moral reflection of believers occurs. Though the upper blade of ethics is universal and invariant, it is also concrete. The upper blade is not a set of propositions and abstract principles, but a set of immanent interior realities constitutive of the subject’s being and agency. The universal moral determinants (nature, bias, sin, and grace) shape the existential horizon of the subject’s moral deliberation and choice.

Within that orienting heuristic horizon concrete questions and problems emerge, directing the subject’s attention to the lower rather than the upper blade. The ethical focus properly shifts from the universal and invariant to the particular and variable. What are the concrete goods to be actualized and the concrete evils to be avoided in this place, at this time, in this set of circumstances? And what factual knowledge and commonsense insights are needed to inform and justify our practical answers to these questions?

Depending on the scope and complexity of the moral situation, the
responsible individual and community must draw upon the empirical sciences, natural and human, a deep knowledge of the relevant history and culture, a dialectical analysis of existing social institutions and practices, as well as the commonsense testimony and judgments of actual men and women on the scene.\(^{37}\) Although every moral tradition circumscribes the range of legitimate ethical choices (it is easier to specify in advance what ought not to be done), no set of rules or recipes can determine a priori the best thing to do or say here and now (Second Collection, 83).

That creative determination is the province of practical wisdom (Aristotle's \textit{phronesis}, Aquinas's \textit{prudentia}). The practically wise person or community is responsible for integrating the two blades of ethics. The dynamic normativity of the upper blade combines with the factual specificity of the lower blade in a self-correcting process of inquiry and action. While authentic agents and policies transform concrete situations for the better, their inauthentic rivals have the opposite effect. But human beings can learn from their failures, can acknowledge and remedy their mistakes. To do this, however, they must avoid the ethical traps of ideology, denial, and rationalization, the sources of irreversible decline. While the critique of ideology, by itself, cannot undo the process of decline, it is the necessary first step in dismantling the objective \textit{surd} and creating the conditions for effective reform.

How should we appraise Lonergan's contributions to ethics? His work is extremely important but self-consciously incomplete.\(^{38}\) a.) His insights into the upper blade of ethics are deep and enduring. b.) He effectively grasped the functional complementarity of objective knowing and authentic living. c.) He affirmed the strategic importance of intellectual, moral, and religious conversions for resolving ethical disagreements and conflicts. d.) As a critical methodologist, he recognized the power and limits of transcendental method in ethics. Lonergan's transcendental method is clearly not an imperialist instrument. While creating a heuristic framework for creative collaboration, he stressed


\(^{38}\) This incompleteness, of course, reflects the recognized complementarity between philosophy and the other realms of cognitive meaning. In this respect, Lonergan's ethics closely resembles his metaphysics.
the crucial importance of the specialized and differentiated knowledge provided by the lower blade. e.) Lonergan correctly insists on the need to integrate the upper and lower blades of ethics in generating wise and effective solutions to our personal and public problems. In both metaphysics and ethics, the upper blade provided by philosophy and theology can only take you so far. Without a robust and flexible lower blade, the ethical scissors simply can’t cut.

Thus Lonergan has provided a dialectical and critical framework for confronting the central dilemmas of Christian ethics today:39 These dilemmas include: war and peace in an age of nuclear weapons, asymmetric warfare, and ideologically driven reliance on terror; economic, social, and political justice in an interconnected global community, with special emphasis on the needs of the poor and the vulnerable; the profound implications, especially for the Catholic Church, of fully respecting the equality and dignity of women; developing a credible sexual ethics that draws deeply on the practical experience and insights of women and men at all stages of human development; articulating the power, limits, and moral constraints on technological development, especially in the fields of biology and medicine, ecology, energy, economics, and the environment (developing a framework of normative principles and practical policies for responsibly protecting the natural world).

As Lonergan freely acknowledges, devising authentic responses to these moral dilemmas is beyond the competence of the most gifted methodologist. Our most urgent and persistent ethical need is for creative collaboration in cognition, deliberation, and action by women and men of goodwill (Insight, 7; Method in Theology, 361-66).

VIRTUES AND VALUES

How is Lonergan’s ethics of authenticity related to the important tradition of virtue ethics? In his post-Insight writing, Lonergan clearly shifted from a faculty psychology of the soul to the intentional analysis of the subject. Although he no longer based his philosophy and theology on metaphysical terms and relations, he sought to transpose rather

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than reject the enduring insights of Aristotle, Augustine, and Aquinas (*Philosophical and Theological Papers*, 410, 426-31).

Within the *Thomist* tradition, the virtues are treated as metaphysical habits that perfect the powers and operations of the soul. This metaphysical analysis applies to both natural and supernatural virtues. The natural virtues are acquired by education and training; the supernatural virtues are direct gifts of God to the soul. One of the great merits of *Thomism* is the diversity of virtues it recognizes: the moral virtues, like courage and self-control, that perfect human sensibility; the intellectual virtues, like theoretical and practical wisdom, that perfect the mind; the associative virtues like justice, friendship, marital and familial love, that strengthen and support interpersonal relationships; the divine gifts of faith, hope and *caritas* (*agape*) that enable humans to share in the interior life of God.

When Lonergan turns from the soul to the subject, when he elevates authenticity to the supreme human good, does he flatten the landscape of moral appraisal by reducing all the virtues to one?40 I don't believe that he does, but I recognize that he fails to answer this challenge explicitly. On my reading of Lonergan, authenticity is a transcendental virtue and inauthenticity a transcendental vice. Both are moral attributes of the subject measured by transcendental standards that constitute the upper blade of ethics. It is fidelity to the transcendental principles that constitutes the subject as authentic and infidelity to these principles that does the reverse. In reality, the most genuine subjects struggle to become more authentic by acknowledging and striving to withdraw from their own inauthenticity and that of the communities to which they belong.

While Lonergan's transcendental analysis is sound and important, it is also incomplete. Just as the upper and lower blades of ethics are complementary, so are the transcendental and categorial virtues.41 By the categorial virtues, I refer to the normative dispositions of intentional subjects that enable them to feel, think, judge, deliberate, decide, act, suffer, and interact with others responsibly. These virtues

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41 For Lonergan's distinction between transcendental and categorial sources of meaning see *Method of Theology*, 11, 20, 73-74. I have transferred this important distinction into the sphere of the human virtues.
of the lower blade are directed to the concrete circumstances and situations of ordinary life. They include the virtues of self-restraint, tact, patience, generosity, compassion, impartiality, kindness, courage, flexibility, honesty, forgiveness, fidelity, wit, sensitivity, endurance, fairness, and practical wisdom, among countless others.

These are virtues of the subject rather than the soul that are acquired and exercised in the course of the subject’s protracted development. They complement rather than rival the transcendental virtue of authenticity by revealing what authenticity concretely requires in the plentitude of human existence. By acknowledging these virtues and their correlative vices we profoundly enrich our understanding of the polymorphic subject and substantially increase and refine our evaluative vocabulary. This is a truth the great poets and novelists have always understood, and it helps to explain why the careful study of literature is such an important part of our moral education.

All the human virtues, transcendental, categorical, and supernatural, are both originating and terminal values. As originating values they are concrete sources of the human good. As terminal values they are among the legitimate goods education and culture should seek to promote. Although the supernatural virtues are divine gifts not human achievements, a sustained and effective moral education can create the interior conditions for their fruitful reception.

Lonergan’s comprehensive commitment to objective values includes everything in existence that is really worthwhile. My basic argument in this critical appraisal is that the categorial virtues should be explicitly included among the values Lonergan prizes.

**ILLEGITIMATE POWER**

Lonergan gradually extends the ethics of authenticity from persons to historical communities (*Collection, 227-28; Method in Theology, 80*). Drawing on his intentionality analysis he distinguishes four complementary levels of human association. An intentional community is based on a common field of experience, a common set of ideas and beliefs, a shared commitment to common values and practices. This structural analysis helps to explain why particular communities flourish and decline. Without a common field of experience, their
members become disconnected; without common ideas and beliefs they repeatedly misinterpret the world and each other; without common values, they act at cross-purposes and lose trust in each other's good faith.

Intergenerational cooperation binds a community together. Each community's operative level of power is generated by drawing on both past achievement and existing knowledge, virtue, skill, and leadership (*Third Collection*, 5-7). While collective power is clearly preferable to impotence (since the world's work needs to be done), the creation and exercise of power are always morally ambiguous. Whenever human beings cooperate they generate power; whenever power is actually used it changes the world for good or ill. The moral appraisal of power concerns the reasons why humans cooperate, the ends they pursue in concert, and the effects of their concerted activity on both the historical and natural world and on the bonds of their community itself.

To be specific, both love and fear can be sources of cooperation; both peace and war can be goals of cooperative activity; both prosperity and depression can result from economic planning; both loyalty and bitterness can emerge from concerted action.

For Lonergan, when the power of a community is generated and exercised authentically, it is legitimate, warranting our mutual respect and support. Inauthentic power, by contrast, is illegitimate, warranting critique, public dissent and, when necessary, concerted resistance. All communities exercise power through their social institutions, the differentiated schemes of cooperation in which their members assume different roles, perform different tasks, exercise different skills and virtues, make their distinctive contributions to the terminal values they commonly seek. The North Atlantic world today contains an extraordinary array of such institutional arrangements: governments, corporations, small businesses, political parties, labor unions, colleges and universities, churches, the vast number of voluntary associations constituting civil society. The more comprehensive the aims of an institution, the more it depends on a shared institutional culture for successful performance and outcomes.

Those who exercise leadership within institutions concretely direct their employment of power. They are granted authority, the institutional right to issue commands and directives, which their colleagues are
expected to obey. Just as the creation and exercise of power can be morally appraised so can institutional leadership. Leaders can possess procedural legitimacy, while their substantive decisions and actions are clearly unjust. Conversely, institutions may be structurally flawed, while their leaders try vainly to do what is right.

Most social institutions, like most individuals, are a complex mixture of the authentic and the inauthentic. There are extreme cases, of course, totalitarian regimes, terrorist groups, criminal syndicates, associations united by hatred and violence. They elicit no genuine loyalty; they deserve no voluntary obedience. But because there are no perfect institutions, it is very important that our comparative appraisals of actually existing ones be historically informed, factually nuanced and critically free of utopian illusions. Communities, cultures, institutions, and leaders are invariably compromised by bias, misconduct, ideology, and sin. In morally appraising these complex originating values, we need carefully to distinguish their merits and limitations and rigorously to avoid any leveling moral equivalence. The critique of ideology is especially important in social ethics, for while illegitimate conduct is troubling, its systematic justification is dangerous. For this reason, institutional transparency, the personal accountability of those in authority, secure individual rights and public forums for discussion, critique and dissent are among the distinguishing marks of a free society.

What corrective measures should be taken against illegitimate power? To answer this question, we need to rely on the upper and lower blades of ethics, the transcendental and categorial virtues and the exercise of practical wisdom. We need first to determine the nature, sources, and gravity of what we judge to be wrong. Then we need to articulate our analysis and appraisal persuasively both within and outside the relevant community. Finally we need to decide, after candid and careful discussion, what concrete remedies would be most effective in correcting the wrongs and healing the harms we oppose.

A broad spectrum of prudential remedies exists, stretching from tacit dissent and non-compliance to civil disobedience, armed resistance

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42 In the evaluation of human cultures and institutions, comparative appraisals are particularly important. Since all human societies are flawed in significant ways, it's essential to distinguish the varying gravity of their failings and weaknesses.

43 In this respect, Catholic Christianity lags far behind the best practices of the liberal democracies.
and open rebellion. Like Aquinas, Lonergan does not offer a formula for correcting collective injustice, relying instead on the situation-specific judgments of practical wisdom. While this epistemic sobriety is contextually justified, the responsible citizen (employee, religious believer) remains unclear and uncertain just where Lonergan stands on the categorial norms of legitimacy for democratic governments, economic corporations and businesses, and especially religious communities like the Catholic Church. What their mature members really want to know is not whether these institutions are legitimate or illegitimate, tout court, but precisely when, how, and why they abuse their power, with what harmful consequences, and what concretely should be done to restore their legitimacy and effective authority.44

REDEEMING THE WORLD: SOBRIETY AND HOPE

Lonergan placed the process of conversion at the center of his philosophy and theology: the intellectual conversion from the world of immediacy to the unrestricted universe of being; the moral conversion from individual and group satisfaction to the unrestricted universe of value; religious conversion from love of oneself and one's own to the whole hearted love of God and neighbor. Christian conversion, in particular, reveals the mysterious depth of the law of love: that the triune God who created the universe responded to human bias, violence, and sin by sending the divine word into the world to restore its corrupted integrity. The core Christian mysteries, the Incarnation, the Redemption, and the Descent of the spirit, reveal the power, depth, and scope of God's love. Christ founded the church to proclaim the gospel of agape to every nation and people and to carry forward his work of redemption.

Because the three forms of conversion are complementary, they shape the intentional horizon of Christian moral reflection. They also help Christians to avoid the reduction or narrowing of the church's message and mission. Catholic Christianity, especially, should resist such truncation for catholic (katholou) means comprehensive, inclusive,

44 See Michael McCarthy, "The Loss of Effective Authority: A Crisis Of Trust and Credibility," a lecture delivered at Boston College in May 2005 as part of the series on "The Church in the Twenty-First Century."
all embracing. The virtue of Catholicy is essentially a virtue of wholeness. If the church was founded for the task of comprehensive redemption, then its mission extends to the whole of creation.

From the beginning, Christians have struggled to understand the full scope of their mission. That struggle continues unabated today. Did Christ come only to “save the souls” of the faithful or to redeem all that God originally created? The Incarnational tradition to which Lonergan belongs views redemption in holistic terms. That explains Lonergan’s dual emphasis on the personal and historical responsibility of Christians. It also explains his affirmation of transcendent and immanent values, his explicit commitment to the goodness of time and eternity. As a critical Christian, Lonergan distinguishes the goodness of nature from the violence of sin and the redemptive power of grace. His moral theology, like that of Aquinas, treats sin as derivative and secondary, as a deviation from created nature and a recurrent occasion for grace.

This ontological stance enables Lonergan to avoid two polarizing counter-positions: the “Christian” rejection of the world as beyond hope of redemption; the secular rejection of divine transcendence as a barrier to worldly allegiance. For Lonergan, these are false and divisive choices, for it is the wholehearted love of God that leads directly to love of neighbor and love of neighbor that generously embraces the work of redeeming the world.

How should the historical responsibility of Christians be understood? First, this is a collaborative responsibility shared with them by God. Theirs is a divine calling in imitation of Christ and supported by the Holy Spirit. Second, they are commanded to use all of their talents, affective, intellectual, moral, and religious to create what is good and to heal what is sinful and broken. Third, they are required to be consistently authentic in their redemptive activity, obeying the transcendental precepts, refusing to do evil in the hope of restoring the good. Finally, they have the memory of Christ’s heroic charity to teach them the high price of redemption in a sinful and broken world.

From the Enlightenment onward, modernity has also embraced

the challenge of historical responsibility. Tragically, this laudable project was undertaken with serious illusions: that radical liberation from the past would ensure prosperity and peace; that a proletarian revolution would lead to a classless society; that the cult of the nation would redress historic injustices; that the power of technology could create a new heaven on earth. After Verdun, Auschwitz, the Gulag, and Hiroshima, it was finally clear that the gods of exclusive humanism had failed, that the era of secular innocence was over.46

But the critique of ideology is only the first step in meeting the challenge of our time. While legitimate critique discredits the utopian illusions of the past, it leaves the systemic injustices of the present in place. To correct these injustices, three things are particularly needed: a comparative dialectical analysis of the merits and failings of contemporary institutions and cultures; authentic discernment, based on integrating the two blades of ethics, of how best to remedy the gravest existing injustices, locally, nationally, and globally; and generous cooperation across religious and sectarian lines in redeeming and transforming the world.47

To be wise and effective, these cooperative ventures will require the virtues of sobriety and hope. Sobriety recognizes that divine creation and grace have not eliminated bias, ideology, and sin. It also recognizes that without moral and religious conversion the demoralizing clash of individual and group egoisms will continue to obstruct every serious effort at reform. Sobriety brings an indispensable realism to the work of redemption. It fosters honesty, humility, frankness, the shedding of moral illusions.

By itself, however, sobriety often leads to pessimism, disillusionment, resignation, the acceptance of systemic injustice as "the way of the world." Christian hope combines the realism of sobriety with the quiet confidence that we are doing God's work, that God joins us in this redemptive effort, and that wisdom, courage, endurance, and patience are needed to bring good out of evil.

46 While communism is "the god that failed" in the famous volume of that title, it is actually only one among the many gods of exclusive humanism.

47 See Method in Theology, chap. 15, "Communications," in which Lonergan proposes a method of "integrated studies" for coordinating theology with historical scholarship and scientific human studies. See also McCarthy, "Practical Wisdom, Social Justice, and the Global Society."
JOHN ROGERS COMMONS: ARE HIS INSIGHTS IMPORTANT IN TEACHING MODERN LABOR ECONOMICS?

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INTRODUCTION

John Rogers Commons (1862-1945) was one of three important early twentieth-century economists identified with what is called American Institutional Economics. The others were Thorstein Bunde Veblen and Wesley Clair Mitchell. Commons was also the most prominent American labor economist prior to World War II. He became a member of the faculty of the University of Wisconsin in Madison in 1904 and remained in Madison until 1934. He was the major figure in what became known as The Wisconsin School. At Wisconsin, Commons worked closely with Governor Robert LaFollette and the Progressive movement, and many of his colleagues and students played major roles in Franklin D. Roosevelt’s New Deal. His influence in American labor economics was eclipsed after World War II by a resurgent neoclassical labor economics that gradually relegated Commons’s institutional orientation to the periphery of economic discourse. A common opinion among contemporary economists is that the work of institutional economists in the Commons tradition was largely descriptive and lacking theoretical content. Commons, however, presented his major text *Institutional Economics*¹ as a work of economic theory. This paper presents a description of the theoretical core of *Institutional Economics* and an evaluation of it from the perspective of its potential usefulness.

in the teaching of modern labor economics. Part I below describes the theoretical perspective of neoclassical economic theory in order to clarify the institutional perspective by contrast. Part II describes Commons's alternative perspective. Part III presents the conclusions derived from this comparison of the two alternative perspectives.

THE NEOCLASSICAL PERSPECTIVE

In neoclassical economics the economy is described as a system of interdependent factor and product markets. Labor economists focus attention on the subsystem of interdependent competitive labor markets embedded in the competitive market system that describes the economic system as a whole. In neoclassical labor market theory both the equilibrium wage or price of a unit of labor service, and the equilibrium level of employment of units of labor service, are determined by the equation of the supply of and demand for labor services under competitive conditions. The behavior of the suppliers and demanders of labor is explained by their desire to maximize their subjective utility or satisfactions. The objective of maximizing profit often used to explain employer behavior is simply a proxy for the utility maximizing objective of employers. The labor supply function or curve relating all possible wage rates and the total quantity of labor supplied at each wage rate in the market is arrived at by summing the supply functions of all individuals who offer labor for hire. In the simplest case each individual's utility is a function of hours of leisure and income. The income is used to gain utility by the consumption of market-supplied goods. In order to maximize utility each individual selects the combination of market goods and leisure that is best for him in the light of restrictions imposed on him by the going market wage or price at which he can sell his time as labor services, and the total number of hours of time available to divide between supplying labor to acquire income, and consuming leisure.

The market labor demand function relating all possible wage rates and the aggregate quantity of labor demanded is the sum of the labor demand functions of all employers that demand labor in the market. In the simplest case the labor demand function for each employer is determined as follows. Each firm has what economists call a production
function. This sums up all the known technological information, that is all the engineering information, about how productive inputs can be converted into output. It is one piece of the total information needed by the firm management in order to choose both the profit maximizing level of production and the profit maximizing method of producing that level of production. The firm owner or manager combines the technological information contained in the production function with pecuniary information about the market prices of all inputs, including labor services. This combination of technological and pecuniary information answers the question of the best way of producing all possible levels of output. The firm manager then obtains information about the going market price for firm output, and in the light of this price selects the level of output that will maximize firm profit. This determines simultaneously the profit maximizing level of employment offered by the firm. At this level of employment the value added to firm output by the last unit of labor services employed will be equal to the wage rate paid per unit of labor service in a competitive labor market. This static abstract idealized picture of competitive labor market equilibrium is obviously highly simplified, and there is a rich literature in economic theory considering all sorts of qualifications and extensions of this basic model. Nevertheless, it is the basic building block in the structure of contemporary microeconomic theory.

The theoretical prism provided by the theory of competitive labor markets embedded in a system of interdependent competitive factor and product markets has well recognized strengths. The most important of these is that it provides a way of understanding those economic phenomena that are the focus of study in labor economics. These are the observed levels and structures of wages and employment and the observed changes in these levels and structures that take place over time. Empirical investigation has revealed repeatedly that observed wages and employment levels and structures resemble in a substantial way what the economist expects to find in the economic world on the basis of the theory of competitive labor markets. Thus the theory is a useful way to understand the world of economic production and distribution, an understanding of which is clearly a primary objective of economic theorizing. Most labor economists believe that the theory of a system of interdependent markets provides more understanding
and insight into phenomena of primary interest to economists than any available alternative body of theory. It thus accomplishes a fundamental task of any body of economic theory.

The theory of competition also has an important normative property. Under certain rigorous assumptions, described in the theory of perfect competition, it can be demonstrated theoretically that a competitive economic system produces an optimal solution to the fundamental economic problem of allocation. Competition allocates an economy's scarce resources most efficiently, and efficient allocation has been a major focus for economists following the path-breaking theoretical work of Stanley Jevons in England, Leon Walras in Switzerland, and Carl Menger in Austria in the third quarter of the nineteenth century. Allocation in a competitive economy is efficient in the sense that, given the initial distribution of ownership of the society's scarce productive resources, no individual economic actor's subjective economic welfare can be improved without a negative impact on the subjective welfare of another economic actor. This leads to the proposition that any imperfection in the system of competition that can be eliminated will likely lead to improved welfare in the aggregate by increasing the subjective utility of some person or persons without decreasing the subjective utility of anyone else. In effect, the removing of a market imperfection will provide some person or persons with a cost-free lunch or cost-free lunches. This conclusion about the normative social desirability of a competitive system provides a powerful a priori argument in favor of free competitive markets.

There are other related practical properties of competitive theory. It provides a method for predicting the likely effects of policy actions that impinge upon the labor market. The theory can be useful, for example, in predicting the likely effects of changes in laws and regulations affecting the labor market. Consider an historical example. In 1973 the United States Congress enacted the Age Discrimination in Employment Act abolishing mandatory retirement at age 65. Competitive theory provides a framework for thinking systematically about the likely effects of such a change in the law on such things as the labor supply, employment, and earnings of older Americans. In a similar vein, if some workers have lower earnings than are regarded as socially desirable the theory of labor demand provides insights
into what might be done to raise their earning levels. The theory also provides insight into what might be done to improve the efficiency of particular economic operations. Such real advantages of the theory of competitive markets should not be lost sight of or minimized.

THE ECONOMICS OF JOHN COMMONS

Commons’s mature theoretical work is contained most completely in his *Institutional Economics*, although his core ideas are also found in *The Legal Foundations of Capitalism*, his autobiography *Myself*, and in *The Economics of Collective Action*. The relevance of his theoretical work to the labor market is the focus of this paper, but it should be kept in mind that his ideas have much wider application. The place to begin is with an explanation of what he meant by institutions and to describe the insight that gave birth to his focus on institutions. He called institutions “collective action exercised in control, liberation, and expansion of individual action.” He had learned the printing trade at thirteen years of age in a shop owned by his father, and later when a student at Oberlin in his early twenties, he took a job as a printer at the *Cleveland Herald* and joined Local 53 of the Typographical Union. It was there he discovered the meaning and significance of collective action. He learned that his “only rights and liberties in typesetting were administered by that little society of printers.” In his economics he extended the concept of an institution to organizations of all types and coined the term “going concern” to describe the form taken by organized collective action, and he used the term “custom” to describe collective action that was unorganized. He described a going concern as any group that controlled individual action and applied the term to families, unions, informal groups, corporations, trade associations, business organizations, the Federal Reserve System, the state, and even the aggregate economy. He observed that as individuals enter

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into the activity of going concerns they alter their habits as they fit themselves into the pattern of group activity.7

Commons claimed that orthodox economics had neglected collective action, and he attributed this to the influence of Adam Smith and John Locke. They had established modern economics on nature's abundance and harmony rather than on scarcity and conflict. He believed that if Smith had considered scarcity and conflict his attention would have been called to the social need to establish harmony through institutional constraints. Commons wrote that Smith had failed to see that the mutuality he observed among men was the historic product of collective action that had created that mutuality out of conflict of interest. Commons had studied the origins of the common law and discovered that it was not Smith's invisible hand that was the source of social harmony but the visible hand of common law courts that had taken over customs and enforced them. Smith had substituted psychological propensities for customs and institutions. He replaced collective action with the propensity to truck and barter, the instinct of sympathy, and the sense of propriety. And his focus on these psychological propensities led him to place economics within a framework of individualism in which conflict of interest among men was absent. Commons found nothing in Smith about the need for negotiations to establish enforceable rights and duties in transactions where conflict is present, and Commons observed that this deficiency was even more pronounced in the work of Jeremy Bentham and the orthodox economists of the late nineteenth century. In David Hume's writings, prior to the publication of Smith's Wealth of Nations, Hume had called attention to the fact of scarcity in the physical world and the consequent need to find ways to resolve the conflicts of interest arising from that scarcity. Commons also learned that following Smith in the early nineteenth century Robert Malthus followed Hume's lead and based his economics on scarcity, but in the subsequent development of English economics the main line of orthodox theoretical development did not follow Malthus. Commons took his cues from Hume and Malthus and turned his attention to the task of finding a place within the economic thought of his era for the collective action necessary to deal with scarcity and conflict.8

7 Commons, "Institutional Economics," 649.
8 Commons, Institutional Economics, chap. 5, esp. 158-62.
In Commons's theoretical framework collective action, exercised within going concerns, or as unorganized custom, is expressed as working rules. These rules govern what the individual can, can not, must, must not, may, or may not do, and thus control, liberate, and expand the actions of individuals engaged in transactions within these going concerns. Commons regarded these transactions as the fundamental units of economic activity and distinguished three distinct types defined as bargaining, managerial, and rationing transactions. The outcomes of all transactions, and bargaining transactions in particular, are influenced by the fact of scarcity, by considerations of efficiency, and by concern about the future. Limiting and complementary factors in each specific environment also influence transactional outcomes, and changes in, and establishment of, working rules can be part of the outcome of transactional processes. Bargaining transactions take place between legal equals and are carried out by means of persuasion and coercion. Managerial transactions take place between leaders and subordinates and are carried out by means of command and obedience. Rationing transactions take place between collective superiors and individuals and are carried out by argument and pleading. In all transactions the control sought by the parties is legal control, and the relations implicit in all of them, are the fact of conflict, the fact of dependence, and the need to establish order.9

Economics, jurisprudence, and ethics intersect in the analysis of working rules and transactions, and correlation among them is an integral part of Commons's institutional economic theory. Thus, Commons's economics is inherently normative. Commons pointed out that Hume also had united economics, jurisprudence, and ethics "in the principle of scarcity" and the "conflict of interests" arising from this scarcity.10 This contrasted sharply with Smith who, because of his assumption of abundance and the consequent absence of conflict, had separated economics from ethics and law. Neoclassical economics followed Smith. Institutional economics followed Hume. Commons summed up this merging of ethics, economics, and jurisprudence as follows:

9 Commons, *Institutional Economics* xxv-xxvii and 52-93.
10 Commons, *Institutional Economics* 71, also 140-44.
“business ethics” deals with the rules of conduct arising from conflict of interests.... enforced by the moral sanctions of collective opinion; but economics deals with the same rules of conduct enforced by the collective economic sanctions of profit or loss...while jurisprudence deals with the same rules enforced by the organized sanctions of violence. Institutional economics is continually dealing with the relative merits of these three types of sanctions.\textsuperscript{11}

Transactions, Commons's fundamental units of economic analysis, involve relationships between and among men. They are not simply a form of individual behavior. For this reason, the essence of what Commons meant by a transaction is not captured by thinking of it as a simple exchange of commodities in a market, which was the characteristic way of thinking about transactions in the orthodox economics of his era. For Commons, the shift from focusing on commodities and individuals to focusing on transactions between persons and the working rules of collective action is what marks the difference between classical and neoclassical hedonic economics on the one hand, and institutional economics on the other. The shift is a change in the ultimate unit of economic investigation. The classical and neoclassical economists founded their theories on the relation of man to nature. Institutional economics focuses on the relation of man to man. The smallest unit of classical economics was a commodity, produced by labor. The smallest unit of neoclassical, or hedonic, economics was a commodity enjoyed by the ultimate consumer. The first was the objective side, and the other the subjective side, of the same relation between the individual and nature. The outcome, in either case, was pictured in mechanical terms as the result of an automatic market equilibrating process. The smallest unit of institutional economics is a unit of activity, a transaction, and the focus is on the participants in the transaction and the way in which the conflicting wills of the participants are resolved.\textsuperscript{12}

Thus, transactions intervene between the “the production of labor, of the classical economists, and the pleasures of consumption, of the hedonic economists.” Transactions are not the exchange of commodities. Since society controls access to the means of production transactions

\textsuperscript{11} Commons, "Institutional Economics," 650.

\textsuperscript{12} Commons, The Legal Foundations of Capitalism, 1-10.
“are the alienation and acquisition, carried out in bargaining and negotiations between and among individuals, of the rights of property and liberty established by society. These rights must be negotiated between the parties to a transaction “before labor can produce, or consumers can consume, or commodities can be physically exchanged.”

Stated in the language of ethics and law... collective acts establish relations of rights, duties.... in the language of individual behavior, what they require is performance, avoidance, forbearance.... in the language of...economic status... what they provide is security, conformity, liberty, and exposure... in language of cause, effect or purpose.... are the principles of scarcity, efficiency, and futurity, the working rules of collective action and the limiting and complementary factors of economic theory. Stated in language of... working rules... they are expressed by the auxiliary verbs... can, cannot, may, may not, must, and must not.

Bargaining transactions may be persuasive or coercive, depending on differences in the economic, political, and moral power of the parties to the transactions. These differences are ruled out when it is assumed that every party is perfectly free, and equal to every other party. In the transactions controlled by collective action wages, profits, interest, rents, employment, unemployment, and the prosperity or poverty of the nation and its citizens are determined.

In his extensive study of the history of economics Commons discovered that in the orthodox economics of his era concepts relating to material goods were not kept sufficiently distinct from concepts relating to ownership and property rights. In classical and hedonic economics property was thought of primarily as physical property. Commons concluded that this obscured differences in the meanings of economic terms such as wealth and assets, output and income, efficiency and scarcity, and use value and scarcity value. For example, wealth was often identified with material output and could be augmented by using inputs with greater efficiency in the engineering sense of increasing physical output per unit of input. But wealth in this material sense

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was not sharply distinguished from income derived from the ownership of wealth. This income was dependent on the ability ownership gave to the holder of wealth to withhold it from others. The use value of wealth considered as the accumulated output of physical goods is not affected by changes in the exchange value of these goods. Income, by contrast, depends on the exchange value received for property in goods sold by the owner. An owner can increase his income by the exercise of the right ownership gives him to withhold his property until others pay his price. Commons believed it was necessary to distinguish clearly the meaning of property in wealth as ownership for one's own use from the ability ownership gave to the owner to withhold the property from others who want it but do not have it. In other words, the proprietary meaning of wealth associated with ownership must be distinguished from the meaning of wealth as material goods. Commons explained how U.S. courts in the 1870s made this distinction in a series of important legal cases. The reasoning in these cases allowed for the explicit recognition of the gradual evolution of the meaning of the institution of property from a purely physical concept to one that included incorporeal property in the form of debt and intangible property in the form of future profits. The study of these cases was the source of Commons's notion of reasonable value, and a theory of the determination of reasonable value became the value question of institutional economics.

Commons regarded the objective of transactional activity as the determination of reasonable values, and reasonable practices, and he was convinced that a theory of reasonable value had to be constructed out of the habits and customs of social life. He fitted the notion of reasonable value to a Malthusian concept of human nature as characteristically passionate, stupid, and ignorant. He believed these characteristics may lead men to act contrary to reason, but he also believed a considerable number of men are able to rise above the level of the least conscientious. The problem confronting institutional economics is the determination of rules of collective action that will bring reluctant individuals up to a reasonable practicable idealism. He was not sanguine about the alternatives for society if this could not be accomplished within a framework of democracy. In the United States of

15 Commons, Institutional Economics, chap. 5.
16 Commons, The Legal Foundations of Capitalism, chap. 2.
the 1930s he identified Communism, Fascism, and banker capitalism as the three alternatives to what he was proposing, and noted that in the experimental laboratories of Russia, Italy, and America all three were on display. He believed reasonable value was an attainable ethical ideal. He looked for a workable consensus, and he did not regard reasonable value as simply an intellectual concept. It was the term he gave to outcomes of collective action that control, expand, and liberate individual action. If action is sensible the result will be an improvement, but improvement was not guaranteed. Starting from the pessimism of Malthus rather than the utopian optimism of Malthus’s adversary William Godwin, Commons believed there is a large amount of stupidity, passion, and error that can get in the way of determining the outcome of collective action. On the other hand, he described and accepted Malthus’s belief that reason and moral character will be the result of a slow evolution out of overpopulation and conflict of interest. Commons believed people needed a government of law and order to regulate their conduct, and it was his hope that out of complexity and uncertainty reasonable practices and reasonable values may emerge.

Institutional economics takes transactions looking to the future as its fundamental units of analysis and regards the man to man rather than man to nature nexus as the key element in these transactions, so it necessarily requires explicit consideration of the wills of the parties to the transactions. The core of economic activity requires a resolution of the conflicting wills of the parties on each side of all transactions. Commons believed recognition of this fact about the conflicting wills was missing from the older classical and hedonic economic analyses because they focused on the relationship between man and nature rather than man and man. Institutional economics also focuses on the purposeful nature of the relationships in which the wills of men looking to the future interact. It incorporates what he called a volitional theory of value, that is, a theory of the will in action. It explains value by final causality, not efficient causality. The underlying psychology is a social psychology of negotiation and the transfer of ownership, with each participant trying to influence and modify the behavior of the other in determining the economic value to be transferred through

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17 Commons, *Institutional Economics*, chap. 11.
the transaction. It is the psychology of business, custom, legislatures, courts, trade associations, and trade unions. It contains elements that will determine the outcome in the immediate and remote future. There are the personalities of the participants with all their differences in powers of persuasion responding to inducements and sanctions. There are the similarities and differences of circumstances in which these personalities are placed. There is the scarcity and abundance of alternatives, and the skills in persuasion of the transacting parties, and there are the working rules and the limiting factors. The will of man acts in adapting to and controlling his environment. It is a will continuously acting. It does not choose to act or not act but chooses between two degrees of power of acting. It chooses between actual alternatives in a world of limited opportunities. It can place a limit on its own performance. It can forbear, and it can be inhibited legally. Every transaction is a double-ended performance of avoidance and forbearance. For Commons the will is not the passive will of Locke's psychology. It is not the hedonist's pleasure or pain separate from the world and forcing it to act. It is will in action, always performing, avoiding, and forbearing with a purpose, looking toward the future and overcoming resistance.

Commons's explicit recognition that transactions involve necessarily a relationship among persons has important implications for the study of labor economics. One of these implications is that labor market exchange cannot be described adequately as a simple exchange of the commodity labor for the money wage or for the real commodities that can be acquired with the money wage. The labor market from the perspective of institutional economics must incorporate explicitly the meeting of the wills of the parties. This is implied by the focus on the transaction relationship among persons. The mechanistic concept of the labor market as equilibrating automatically at a wage level determined by the forces of demand and supply omits explicit consideration of the conflicting human wills of individuals, operating under the collective influence of the going concerns within which they act, upon the resolution of the conflict. The smallest unit of analysis of institutional economics is a unit of activity, a transaction, and the analysis focuses on the conflict between the wills of the participants in the transaction. The transaction involves the alienation and acquisition, between
individuals, of the rights of property and liberty created by society. The transactions must be negotiated between the parties concerned before labor can produce.

Institutional labor economics thus requires an analysis of the behavior of individuals while participating in transactions. Consider the question of the establishment of working rules. Mainstream economics focuses on what will best accomplish efficient resource allocation and economic growth. Institutional economics takes the position that given scarcity and conflict of interest the key question is to understand how the working rules are actually determined. In the classical economics of Smith and Ricardo as well as in the neoclassical economics of Alfred Marshall's Principles value theory offers an explanation of exchange value. But Commons argued that the exchange Smith, Ricardo, and their successors had uppermost in mind was the exchange of physical commodities, and the relationship focused on was between man and nature. Commons believed this focus obscured important features of what takes place when employers and workers meet in the labor market. He remedied for this deficiency in his theory of value by replacing the concept of exchange of commodities that characterized the economics of his era with the concept of the transaction. He directed his theoretical efforts at explaining what he called reasonable value defined as the outcome sought in transactions in which the wills of men meet and are resolved. His emphasis was on the activity in the transactions between men rather than on the exchange of commodities. His value theory was a theory of the joint activity and valuations of individuals in all transactions through which the participants mutually induce each other to reach a consensus of opinion and action. In every labor market transaction explicit consideration must be given to the transfer of ownership of the commodity labor, the determination of the level of the money wage, the enforcement of the obligation to perform, and the payment of the wage. Institutional theory faces several basic questions. Where does the power to enforce the contract reside? How is the efficiency of the producing organization maintained? How are scarce resources and opportunities distributed? How is expected future performance ensured? How are working rules established and administered? These questions must be confronted in achieving a regime of reasonable value and reasonable practices, and Commons
believed they were not considered adequately in the simple model of commodity exchange applied to the labor market. Commons believed a negotiational theory and a negotiational psychology were required. The American economist Ben Seligman described Commons’s fundamental view as a belief that

rational behavior was not necessarily characteristic of the mass of mankind. Stupidity and passion ruled all too often and intense conflict arose over the disposition of scarce goods.... (But, he also believed people) possessed the capacity to alter their environment and relax the normal rigidity of custom but the exercise of this capacity often result(ed) in conflict and...men (needed to) in seek ways of resolving the tensions of conflict. So collective action arose as a means of controlling individual action...(and this) interdependence and conflict of interest culminated in reasonable value... (in which) capitalism (was restructured) along reasonable lines.... Darwinism and natural science were of limited application (in understanding this process) because in economics selection was purposeful and looked to future results... (Commons) was ensnared by the American pragmatic myth that human intelligence if only put on the right track could solve all the pressing issues at hand.19 (brackets)

CONCLUSIONS

Commons produced a theory of the development and operations of economic institutions. It complemented the orthodox theory of his era since that took the institutional structure of the economy for granted. It is not a substitute for the neoclassical economic theory of his era. Nor is it a substitute for contemporary neoclassical theory, which in many respects has moved far beyond the economics of a century ago. Many of Commons’s insights into the nature of transactions are now part of the modern theory of the firm and are integral to modern organizational

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theory. Commons's institutional economics contains no comprehensive theory of the structure and operations of the market system. It contains no theory of labor supply or labor demand and no theory explaining market interdependence. His theory has none of the strengths of neoclassical theory described in the first section of this paper. There is also in Commons no macroeconomic theory of growth and fluctuations. His institutional economics is best thought of as a complement to neoclassical theory. Commons's theory lacks the normative aspect of neoclassical theory that enables economists to make judgments about efficient allocation. In fact, the focus of neoclassical economics on efficient resource allocation was not on Commons's plate. He viewed efficiency as an element that must be confronted in a given situation to produce the best transactional outcome, that is, the most reasonable value. It is primarily an engineering efficiency concept relating to the connection between inputs and outputs in a physical sense, and it is considered from the perspective of the going concerns in each transactional situation, and not from the perspective of the economy in the large. The focus of Commons's work is clearly on problem solving and practice and not on building a general theory. The best solution in each instance depends on the complex set of facts and objectives in that situation. Commons's approach is clearly outside the Walrasian general equilibrium focus of contemporary economic theorizing. His conviction was the practical one that if going concerns in all or most instances of negotiated transactional outcomes can achieve reasonable values, the overall outcome in society will be the socially desirable and ethically correct aggregate outcome.

Commons's work is theoretical but in a different sense from that in which modern economists normally think of economics as theoretical. It is theoretical in the sense that it aims at providing understanding and at developing an analytical framework for theorizing in the investigation of concrete aspects of human behavior. Commons aimed at understanding the genesis of the rules developed by human interaction in the process of resolving conflicts of interest that arise in a context of scarcity. He sought to provide a theoretical understanding of the

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in institutional structure of a market economy. It is a focus on providing a theoretical understanding of certain aspects of human behavior. One purpose of a science of human behavior is to understand why beings like ourselves act as we do. In conventional neoclassical economic theory economists seek answers to questions of what will be produced and how much will be produced, and for whom it will be produced, and what we may expect from interventions in the system of production and distribution, and all these questions are dealt with in a manner similar to questions posed in the physical sciences, but in a science of human behavior we want to go further and ask why we do things as we do. We look for values, motives, emotions, and purposes. We want to understand, as well as to classify, measure, and mechanize. Commons recognized that economics is a science of human activity, and in this sense is different from sciences that study mechanisms and organisms that are external to the investigator. His institutional economics is not scientific in the sense of how and how much, but in the volitional sense of why. Thus, Commons's work is not theoretical in the sense in which economists generally use the term theoretical. For most economists theory is only theory if it yields testable hypotheses that can be validated or falsified by empirical investigation. Commons's theory does not yield testable hypotheses. It is a theoretical framework for understanding why the practices we engage in are as they are. It yields an understanding that is necessary if we seek to evaluate the possibility of improvement in those practices or outcomes that necessarily involve the reconciliation of human wills. From the perspective of the logical positivism that undergirds standard economic theory Commons's work may be regarded at best as a weak or primitive form of theory. It may be thought of as simply a framework that isolates the factors that are important in constructing specific theories to explain what is, but it represents an important theoretical undertaking if we think of the purpose of theory as understanding the why of things.

Commons made two important contributions to modern labor studies. The first concerns his proposition that individual persons act collectively and with purpose as members of a group expressing a group will rather than as isolated individuals. This contrasts sharply with the methodological individualism of neoclassical economics in which all actions are explained in terms of individual utility maximization
with everything affecting motivation subsumed into the individual actor's subjective utility function. The second is his rejection of the proposition that certain economic processes can be studied usefully when separated from other social and cultural influences. He believed ethical, psychological, and legal elements interpenetrate the economic and must be integrated explicitly into any useful social analysis that involves conflicts of human will. The consequence of these two contributions is that his model of the labor market is specific to the situation, for example to the industry or occupation. It is based on the existential pattern of the actual market being studied in contrast with the highly formal model of neoclassical economic theory. His purpose was to provide a model useful in describing specific labor markets in a way that could be useful in resolving conflict in reasonable ways. His aim was not to describe an abstract model that could be easily fitted into a comprehensive abstract highly formalized neoclassical model of the economic system.

What practical gain is realized by incorporating this less abstract, more complex, and more realistically descriptive market model into the study of labor economics? Commons's theory of the labor market meshes well with the focus of industrial relations described by John Dunlop in Industrial Relations Systems. Dunlop was one of four prominent American labor economists who collaborated in the 1950s in the study of the labor problems of newly industrializing areas funded by the Carnegie Foundation. Industrial Relations Systems was one of the many products of this study. A major conclusion of the Carnegie Foundation funded study was that the fundamental labor problem facing all newly industrializing nations was the structuring of the network or web of rules, both substantive and procedural, that are necessary to making the transition to modern industrial societies. The key point was that every industrial society requires a complex structure of occupations and industries, and for this complex system to work, and especially for it to work effectively, a complex

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structure of rules is necessary. Structuring this web of rule was the labor problem these developing nations faced. Dunlop described the industrial relations system as a subsystem of the general social system, analytically similar to, but distinct from, other subsystems, such as the economic and political systems. The rules students of industrial relations focus on are the product of the interaction of human beings. Dunlop's conceptual framework is useful for making sense of the structure of substantive and procedural rules at the levels of the firm, the industry, and the national economy. The rules can be evaluated from the perspective of economic efficiency, but also from many other perspectives. For example, they can be evaluated from the perspective of the contribution they may make to the structuring of democratic political society. The link between Commons's *Institutional Economics* and Dunlop's *Industrial Relations Systems* is obvious. Dunlop's long career as one of the most prominent American labor economists from the mid 1930s to the close of the twentieth century was devoted to resolving labor conflict and striving for consensus.  

In the language of contemporary economics one of Commons's fundamental insights was that labor market transactions are incomplete. This is a central preoccupation of what is called the New Institutional Economics, which examines institutions using tools of contemporary microeconomic theory, in particular, game theory and principal agent theory. Among other things the new institutional economics is concerned with linking the firm to the labor market. It involves a new theory of the firm to understand how firms deal with problems of coordination, incentives, and bargaining. Employment is an intra-firm phenomenon and not simply a relationship understood by market exchange. The point focused on is that labor contracts are incomplete, and transactions costs arise because of the incompleteness of these contracts, and a governance structure is needed to fill contractual gaps. The informational requirements of traditional competitive

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markets may not be met because of informational asymmetries at the time a contract is made (adverse selection) or may arise after a contract is made and begins (moral hazard). There also may be problems that arise over time as employees become specialized to the relationship (asset specificity). From the perspective of standard economic theory there is a gap in the work of the new institutional economics regarding judgments of economic efficiency, that is, about whether the ways in which the issues connected with incomplete contracts are dealt with are Pareto efficient. Commons's institutional economics ignored the question of whether what is worked out in a given instance is Pareto efficient. New institutional economists confronted with the Pareto efficiency question may assume that the employment practices that are developed are efficient, but they really do not know whether this is true. Institutional economists working in the Commons tradition did not think of maximizing the size of the economic pie in the Pareto sense. Their theoretical roots were in Malthus, and they may have simply assumed that men are not rational actors.

Finally, it is important to note that for those in the Commons tradition, work was viewed differently than it was in the orthodox economics of Commons's era. The purpose of economic activity was not simply the maximization of consumer satisfaction. Work was viewed ideally as a means to facilitate each person's quest for self-improvement and self-realization, reminiscent of the encyclical letter of Pope John Paul II on human work, in which he explained that labor had a subjective importance in the life of the worker and was not valued simply for its objective value as a productive input. Work instead of being viewed as something that had only negative utility was viewed as an opportunity for self-development and self-realization. Work was not just a commodity input valued by its output, but an activity of human beings whose welfare as producers is important, and from this perspective competitive market outcomes may not be optimal. In addition the security of one's person and livelihood was important to self-development and to human cooperation and flourishing. In many

26 A contractual outcome is Pareto efficient when one party to a contract cannot be made better off without another party being made worse off. Vilfredo Pareto (1848-1923) was an Italian economist and sociologist.

27 John Paul II, *Laborem Exercens*.
ways laissez-faire might be detrimental to human self-development and self-realization.\textsuperscript{28}

\textsuperscript{28} For an extensive discussion of the content of this paragraph, see Bruce E. Kaufman, "Labor Markets and Employment Regulation: The View of the 'Old' Institutionalists," in Kaufman, Government Regulation of the Employment Relationship, 11-55.
The text behind this presentation is what will become the penultimate chapter of my upcoming book, which will be published by the Pontifical Institute of Medieval Studies Press in Toronto, under the working title "Embracing Wisdom: the Summa Theologiae as a Spiritual Pedagogy." Before getting into the core of my presentation, I would like to make three preliminary remarks to help situate what I will say today.

First, the book itself is a continuation and deepening of my doctoral research, which was focused on a retrieval of Aquinas's theology as an act of cosmopolis. I sought, in that research, to understand Aquinas's theological praxis in its fullness by taking seriously Lonergan's statement that theology mediates between a religion and the cultural matrix within which that religion lives, moves, and has its being. The idea was to study Aquinas's theological performance as a response to the cultural and pastoral crises occasioned by the rapid urbanization of mediaeval society in the twelfth and early thirteenth centuries. In this optic, Aquinas's theology appears as an attempt at cultural and pastoral intervention from cosmopolis, as an injection of soteriological constitutive meaning into a dialectic of culture suffering distortion from the rapid evacuation of the cosmological constitutive meanings that had structured both Church and world in the early twelfth century.

Second, both the book and my work on rhetoric as part of theological method in the Middle Ages seek to be an ongoing verification, within the well-defined experimental space of Western European intellectual...
culture in the High Middle Ages, of the work of Bob Doran on the role of elemental meaning in theology. As I have developed in my essay in the recently published *Meaning and History in Systematic Theology: Essays in Honor of Robert Doran*, the discipline of rhetoric in the ancient and medieval world functioned as the science of elemental meaning. Aquinas’s cosmopolitan project of transforming his culture through an injection of soteriological constitutive meaning takes the form of an ongoing project of persuasion and spiritual formation. The textbook we know as the *Summa Theologiae*, where Aquinas deploys rhetorical techniques to bring about the formation of his Dominican students, is not so much an argument (in the modern sense) as it is an itinerary, a series of intellectual and spiritual exercises to be performed in order to reach a goal. The pedagogical and formative goal of this theological itinerary is the induction of his students into a new form of life that empowers them to hear confessions and preach God’s word with the personal autonomy that comes from being shaped into a greater likeness to divine wisdom. This will make of them agents of the cultural and pastoral change Aquinas desires to promote, even as it draws them closer to the *beatitudo* which is their final end.

In the context of this paper, we will have the opportunity to notice three particular rhetorical strategies: the analepsis, the metonymy, and the appeal to *convenientia*, also known as the argument from fittingness. In the interest of saving some time, I would like to offer brief definitions of all three now. Analepsis is simply the technique of referring back to material previously discussed; in the context of rhetorical practice, however, analepsis is a directive to actively retrieve from one’s trained memory, not just the basic point, but the whole network of intelligibilities within which the point finds a home. It is a way of actively connecting the present station in the itinerary to what has gone before. The metonymy, as we all know, is that literary or artistic structure whereby a part stands for the whole; in the context of ancient and medieval rhetoric, metonymy is again an appeal to memory to actively retrieve the whole. Aquinas’s use of scripture in the *sed contra* of an article is often metonymic in this way; the student is expected to retrieve the entire scripture passage to which his short citation points, so that the larger passage can form the horizon within which his solution can be understood. Finally, the argument
from fittingness, which Lonergan has rightly defined as showing forth the intelligibility of concrete and contingent truth, like that of the Incarnation, is in rhetorical practice a much more complex reality. It is an appeal to the student’s aesthetic sensibility, an attempt to evoke affect and delight and to provoke the moral sense, creating conditions that will dispose the student to receive truth more easily and more readily. The argument from fittingness is thus best understood as a mediation of elemental meaning.

Third and final preliminary remark: this study of the cross in Aquinas’s Christology in the Summa Theologiae fits into a developing project within the functional specialty history. For the last few years, I have been trying to retrieve the elements of a richer and fuller account of the tradition surrounding Lonergan’s presentation of the just and mysterious law of the cross. In 2005, for example, I gave a paper entitled “Retrieving a Lost Tradition: Augustine, Anselm, and Aquinas” at the Lonergan Workshop. This was followed by a fuller study of Augustine on the mystery of the cross, and in January 2007 a paper at the International Lonergan Workshop in Mainz on “Some Convergences between Girard and Lonergan: a Second Look.” I hope to publish soon a follow up to that paper, under the title “The State of Grace and the Law of the Cross: Insights into Lonergan from Girard.” My concern in the paper I am presenting today is to explore in greater detail than I have before the theology of the cross operative in the Summa Theologiae.

So much for preliminary remarks. My presentation will proceed in three steps: first, the question of satisfaction as an explanation of the efficiency of the Cross; second, the larger network of intelligibility for understanding the Cross; third, the cross as God’s wiser (and therefore more cosmopolitan) solution to the problem of evil.

I. THE PASSION AND THE CROSS AS SATISFACTION

Question 48 of the 3a pars inquires into the effects and fruits of the passion, and here Aquinas presents a nexus of terms first encountered in question 46, to which we will turn in Part II: merit, satisfaction, sacrifice, and ransom. Article 48.1 explores the notion of merit: the just and loving man who suffers for justice deserves his salvation. Since we are united as Christ’s body to Christ our Head, the effects of his
suffering for justice come to us as to one man. Note, in this context, that the passion and the cross are presented as the climax of the whole life of Jesus from conception; the Cross is the most intense expression of this life.

Article 48.2 places satisfaction squarely in the context of a relationship rooted in love; satisfaction breaks free of considerations of mere justice. Article 48.3 repeats what Aquinas first proposed in the reply to the third objection in 46.1, namely that the satisfaction offered by Christ takes the form of a sacrifice, an offering of self. Ransom is then understood in article 48.4 as a metaphor for the satisfaction that frees one from the consequences of broken relationship: we pass from servitude to the devil back to our proper Lord, and we are released from the suffering that was a consequence of sin. This is not a literal ransoming; no price is paid to the devil.

So we witness in this question a complex intelligibility that holds together charity, satisfaction, and sacrifice. Now Lonergan has shown that we must understand satisfaction by analogy to the sacrament of reconciliation, and much recent scholarship confirms this insight. But that analogy itself has a complex intelligibility that needs to be explored. Just what is the intelligible nexus which Aquinas grasps among charity, satisfaction, and sacrifice. Question 48 provides only a partial clue: charity governs satisfaction, and the satisfaction which Christ offers takes the form of sacrifice. This is not all there is, however, once we realize that Aquinas's exploration of the passion occurs within the memory structure created rhetorically by the journey through the itinerary, the ductus, of the secunda secundae of the Summa Theologiae.

A student performing the intellectual tasks proposed by question 48 would insert the familiar terms charity, satisfaction, and sacrifice into this existing structure, which would provide a set of intelligible terms and relations ready made to serve as an explanatory framework for the passion and the cross. It is to that memory structure that we must now turn.

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The Intelligible Relations among the Virtues

In order to take a first approximation of the memory structure generated by the secunda secundae, let us examine the fittingness of the Incarnation as presented in 3a 1.2. Aquinas proposes five reasons from our furtherance in the good: a close examination reveals that these five reasons represent the path from faith to hope to charity to imitatio Christi to communion of natures in one person which is the development of the 2a 2ae climaxing in the 3a's Christology. What is singularly absent from this itinerary, if we pause for a moment, is any consideration of the cardinal virtues; why might this be so? If we look at the five reasons from our greater avoidance of evil which Aquinas offers in the second part of his reply, however, we note that each of these reasons is a promotion from disorder to a cardinal virtue. The first reason highlights a return to justice, and particularly to genuine religion. The second reason also highlights justice, this time doing justice to oneself as possessing a certain dignity. Presumption is overturned by magnanimity, which is related to fortitude. Pride is overturned by humility, a virtue related to temperance. The fifth and final reason is that of a satisfaction that is fitting and proportionate to human existence. Thus the cardinal virtues are seen to be very much present, but in the ways in which the incarnation deploys them as correctives to and medicine for sin. This is, of course, very much related to the manner in which the virtues have been deployed in the various explorations of fittingness surrounding the passion and death of Jesus. There is a suggestion here that the cardinal virtues are instruments that serve to specify and express the freedom from sin and the growth in Christ that lead to the imitatio Christi. With this in mind, let us look at the intelligible relation between charity and justice in the 2a 2ae.

Charity: The New Horizon of Human Action

We begin with a review of some basic elements of Aquinas's account of charity. Aquinas makes use of Aristotle's analysis of the love of friendship to arrive at an understanding of the charity that is a theological virtue. The love of friendship is a love that includes three elements: the disposition to desire and work for the good of the other; the mutual reciprocation of this goodwill between the friends; and an
actual *communicatio* and *conversatio*, an exchange of concrete goods that expresses the love of friendship. Even as Aquinas makes use of Aristotle, however, he surpasses him on two fronts: first, charity involves a love of friendship between two unequals (God and the human person); second, on the basis of this primary friendship we can have genuine love of those who are not equal in virtue (sinners) and those who are our enemies.

Questions 25 and 26 examine the object of charity, that is, both what is to be loved and in what intelligible order it is to be loved. We love God as friend, and the neighbour in herself by charity, but the “in herself” of the neighbour is understood as “what she is in her best self,” that is, the friend of God (2a2ae 25.1). Sinners are loved by charity as still capable of beatitude, though they are “hated” qua sinners (25.6). This “hatred” of the sinners is clarified in the reply to the first objection in article 6: to hate their evil and desire their good have the same motivation, namely that they would flourish in beatitude, so that to hate their evil is in fact to love them with the love of charity and to work for their conversion.

Article 25.8, on the love of enemies, also requires careful exegesis. We do not love enemies in their “enemy-nature,” that is, we do not love them because of or by reason of their enmity. This would be perverse, because it would constitute loving the evil of others, or valuing an objective disvalue. We do love them on the basis of their humanity and dignity as loved by God; our enemies are contrary to us as enemies, but not as human and not as capable of communion with God. It is on this basis that we love them. This love of the enemy will take particular forms when it moves to the concrete. On the one hand, charity does not oblige us to love-in-act each and every person in existence, which is impossible; this means that we are under no necessity to actually love each and every enemy. On the other hand, it is a necessary dimension of the disposition which charity is that we be prepared to love a particular enemy if this is necessary for his well-being: ensuring his human survival, for example, is a duty of charity. Outside of necessity in this basic sense, to actually love the particular enemy before me is a function and expression of the perfection or depth of charity in us. Article 25.9 explores this question further: What marks of charity are to be shown to the enemy? Two things are required: to offer those
general concrete goods and marks of love which we must offer to every neighbour, namely to pray for their well-being and preserve and defend their common good. To refuse to do this constitutes vengeance. We must also offer specific help in case of necessity (famine, medical crises, and so on, as we have already seen). Additional marks of friendship are not required but express the perfection of the virtue in us: this is to act so as to get the enemy to love us by doing them good. Love of enemy is in this sense more perfect than love of a friend. The love of enemy is a more perfect act of dilectio, since the movement of the will here demands greater self-transcendence: one loves the enemy as a potential friend, which manifests a deeper and wider ranging charity.

Question 26 explores the proper ordering of our loving. The key thing to note here is that question 26 does not establish a rigid logical grid, but rather an ordered series of questions for discernment to help navigate a particular situation, a kind of heuristic anticipation of what a well-ordered response looks like in the concrete. In effect, if we remember that the goal of the Summa is the formation of confessors, we can grasp that this heuristic structure will guide the questioning and discernment of such a confessor who is faced with a particular penitent. Article 26.4 makes an interesting point in connection with the notion of atonement: the second objection in this article suggests that we ought to love the other more than ourselves, since the book of Proverbs enjoins us to suffer for love of a friend. In the reply to the objection, Aquinas agrees, but specifies that this is a form of higher and more spiritual self-love through a perfection of charity.

It is important here to remember the breadth of meaning covered by the notion of friendship. Aquinas deploys the terms amor, caritas, dilectio, and amicitia with great precision and dexterity. Caritas and dilectio both translate agape: where caritas highlights the “dearness,” the “to be dear to” dimension of agape, dilectio brings to light the voluntary character of this love, the movement of the will as spiritual (rather than sensitive) appetite. Caritas thus suggests the use of friendship as an explanatory category. This friendship, following Aristotle, exists wherever there is community, that is, a grouping of persons around a common good. There is familial friendship, friendship of citizenship, and so on. The character of friendship then, is not merely intersubjective (me and God), but social. What is opposed to friendship,
is not the enemy, not the unloved or not chosen, but the stranger, the one outside the common good which binds us together. Every friendship comes into existence and develops around and through a common working for an authentic good. One realizes here the depth which Aquinas's analysis gives to Saint Paul's statement in the letter to the Ephesians that we are no longer strangers but fellow citizens and members of God's household.

**Justice and Religion within the Horizon of Charity**

We turn now to Aquinas's account of the virtue of justice. Aquinas defines the moral virtue of justice as follows: it is the "habit whereby a person with a lasting and constant will renders to each his due." The object of the moral virtue of justice is the right or the just, understood in the basic and objective sense as what is objectively due according to a relationship of balance or *aequalitas*, determinable by right reason. But there is a subjective meaning, derived from this more basic meaning, according to which to be just is to have the ability to adjust or adapt oneself to the universe and to society by making claims and discharging duties to others. This is a question of discerning and choosing what is proportionately due to the other, a question of being disposed to valuing the other over my own particular pleasure. In this sense, the virtue of justice helps Aquinas articulate the shift from self to other in human moral and spiritual development; in other words, the virtue of justice captures the human reality which Lonergan expresses by the term moral conversion, and the relation between charity and justice could be analogously construed as the relation between religious and moral conversion.

Within the horizon of justice, the virtue of religion is that habit by which we pay a debt of honour to God, and thus establish the proper relationship or order between ourselves and God, as matter of natural justice. Religion reverences God only under the aspect of being the first principle of creation and of the government of all things. Note that fitting worship does not attain God strictly speaking: worship is a natural act; acts such as offering sacrifice reach God only in the sense that they express due reverence for God. The balance in religion is not absolute, because we cannot give God his due, even if we exclude the complication of original sin. The balance is based on our limited ability
and on God's acceptance of our offering.

The essential and principal acts of religion are both interior acts, namely devotion and prayer. Devotion is the willingness to give oneself promptly to those things that pertain to God's service; prayer expresses our subjection to God as the source of all our good. The external acts of justice are various ways of expressing our internal devotion. Sacrifice in particular is a fitting mode of expression of tendering honour and submission, since it uses sensible signs proportionate to us: "the exterior sacrifice signifies an interior sacrifice by which the soul offers itself to God" (2a2ae 85.2). Sacrifice, again, is a matter of natural justice, offered "insofar as God is the principle of its creation and the goal of its happiness." The worth of the sacrifice is not determined by the value of the thing offered, but by the meaning of the more or less total gift of self (85.2 ad 2). The acts of the other virtues can be directed to divine reverence (as, for example, temperance coming to act in fasting): "the act of any virtue assumes the character of sacrifice if it is performed in order to cling to God in spiritual union" (85.3 ad1).

It is within this whole network of intelligible relations that must understand the meaning of satisfaction. The most basic category for understanding satisfaction is that of reparation, the act whereby the equality of persons is restored. Whatever else Aquinas may be doing in his treatment of justice, in this area he shares the concerns of what contemporary scholars call restorative justice: reparation is the act that seeks to restore, repair, and renew the social relations between persons. If reparation for injures involves things, the particular name given to reparation is restitution. If reparation concerns actions and passions, that is, what has been suffered and done (for example, attacking the worth or dignity of a person), then the particular name given to reparation is satisfaction. Satisfaction is a form of making amends, an act of restorative justice that seeks to restore the balance between persons.

**Relating Charity and Justice**

How then are we to relate these two virtues intelligibly? Question 23 of the 2a 2ae outlines two elements of particular interest to us. First, charity is a governing virtue: it has *imperium* over the moral virtues of prudence, justice, temperance, and fortitude. This means that like
the architect who governs the work of stonemasons, sculptors, and carpenters – or like God in his provident government of the cosmos – charity sets a new and wider horizon within which the cardinal virtues are deployed and orders them to each other and to their tasks within that horizon.

But charity is also understood in question 23 as the form of the moral virtues, and it is important that we understand the significance of this choice. For Aquinas, charity makes faith and hope, the other theological virtues, to be living virtues: without charity, faith is present but dead. But charity has a vastly different relationship with the moral virtues. Charity and the moral virtues are related as act to potency, as form to matter. This means that not only are the acts of the moral virtues ordered to a higher final cause in a wider horizon as governed by charity; they are also the matter which give concrete specificity to the acts of charity. We can only discern the love intended by the lover in acts that are shaped by prudence, justice, temperance, and fortitude. Thus, if you will, the complex human act shaped by the moral virtues mediates the supernatural love that is its higher intelligibility, its central form. It is like an outer, sacramental because material, expression of an inner word of love.

Justice, in the wider horizon set by charity, takes on a twofold character. Acts of justice are concrete ways of expressing love for God, that is, they are offerings of myself to God out of love. Acts of justice are also specific ways of expressing love of the other: if the other is a friend, then as part of the goodwill I have for them; if the other is an enemy, then as an act of goodwill that seeks to bring a friendship-in-potency to act.

We see then that a complex set of relations emerges from the path we have traveled. Charity and justice (of which both satisfaction and sacrifice are a part) are related as form and matter. Charity elevates justice into a horizon of higher intelligibility, coordinating justice and the other moral virtues and making of them instruments of a higher reality, namely supernatural love for God and the neighbour. In turn, justice is the matter that individuates love. In the case of the love of enemy that seeks to make the enemy into a friend, the corresponding act of justice is satisfaction, which restores the balance between persons in the realm of action and passion. When this satisfaction concerns the
relation between God and human beings, it takes the form of sacrifice, an offering of self to God that expresses due reverence for God. This offering of self need not take the form of a ritual giving but can take the form of the act of any virtue performed in order to cling to God. For example, as Aquinas points out in 1a2ae 113.4 ad 1, the act of mercy shown to a neighbour satisfies for sin, since being merciful to a brother or sister restores honour to God who created and loves the other.

II. THE LARGER NETWORK OF INTELLIGIBILITY FOR UNDERSTANDING THE CROSS

In question 46, article one, Aquinas explores the necessity of the passion: was Christ’s suffering necessary? The first thing to notice about this article is how much more carefully Aquinas develops the distinctions between kinds of necessity, when compared to the treatment of the necessity of the Incarnation in question 1 of the tertia pars.

There, Aquinas distinguished between absolute necessity and necessity of fittingness (the means are more suitable to achieving the end). Here, he multiplies the distinctions by a factor of three, from two kinds of necessity to six. There is, first, the absolute necessity that flows from the very structure of reality, where Christ’s suffering follows logically and deterministically from the ontological situation. Aquinas states very clearly that Christ’s suffering is not necessary in this way; there is nothing in the order of the universe that mechanistically determines the event of Christ’s passion. He moves on to consider the necessity that follows upon the action of an exterior cause. The first kind of exterior cause he considers is an efficient cause, which would result in a necessity of constraint. Christ’s suffering does not fall under this kind of necessity either: the Father’s will in sending the Son is not constrained by created causes, but is a free choice of love; and because the Son chooses freely to suffer, he is not constrained – since the definition of constraint is precisely the action of a cause that goes against the will of the one suffering – even though his persecutors arrest him, flog him, force him to appear before Roman justice, and condemn him to death.

The exterior cause, however, can be a final cause, creating a necessity from the end. If the end cannot be achieved at all except by
this means, then we have recovered a kind of absolute necessity, this one from the facts of the case. Again, Aquinas points out that Christ’s suffering is not of this kind, since God remains free to save us any way God wants. This leaves necessity of fittingness, where the end is achieved better by the means under consideration. Aquinas argues that the necessity of Christ’s suffering is of this kind, and proposes three kinds of fittingness, each one flagged by a metonymic citation from scripture: with respect to us, with respect to Christ, and with respect to God.

With respect to us, there is the necessity adduced by John 3:14-15: “The Son of man must be lifted up, that whoever believes in Him may not perish, but may have life everlasting.” If we remember – since this is a metonymy – that the whole passage represented is the nighttime conversation between Jesus and Nicodemus, we can notice two things. First, the language of lifting up is part of John’s pattern of vertical descent and ascent, which is a language of conversation and communion between God and his human creatures. Second, the speech by Jesus positively excludes condemnation as part of God’s desires or motives: those who are condemned are condemned by their own refusal to believe. Our contemplation is directed away from the passion as involving God’s desire to condemn and towards God’s desire for communion and friendship.

The second reason of fittingness is with respect to Christ himself, “who merited the glory of being exalted, through the lowliness of His Passion.” Aquinas cites Luke 24:26: “Ought not Christ to have suffered these things, and so to enter into His glory?” This represents the story of the disciples on the way to Emmaus, and the citation introduces Jesus’ explanation of the cross in light of the entire Hebrew Scriptures. Christ’s death expresses a pattern that is reproduced again and again in the Hebrew Scriptures, a pattern of humiliation and exaltation by which Israel turns to God and recovers covenant relationship with God.

Finally, Aquinas offers a reason of fittingness with respect to God, who has arranged the history of salvation so that it might come to this point. This appeal to fittingness is an appeal to God’s wisdom and providence who has brought our salvation about in a way that yields much fruit. Accordingly, Aquinas cites two scriptural sources, Luke 22:22 and Luke 24:44 and 46. Luke 22 is from the Last Supper,
and shows that Judas's betrayal is not outside of God's purview; Luke 24:44-46 is part of Jesus' last instructions to the Twelve, and highlights the surplus that flows from the death and rising of Jesus: repentance is preached to all the nations, and the power from on high (the Holy Spirit) will soon come to the community to empower them to go out.

Aquinas's treatment in this article achieves three key ends: first, he brings us to the contemplation of the passion as showing forth in a better and more fruitful way God's and Christ's love for us; second, as we shall see in a moment, he maps out the points he will explore in the questions on the passion; and third, perhaps most interestingly, he introduces a series of negations and exclusions which will be repeated throughout the treatment of the passion, exclusions that imprint upon us what the passion and cross are not, namely a reality rooted in God's desire for revenge or punishment.

Beginning with article 2, Aquinas explores key aspects of the fittingness mapped out in the first article. Here, Aquinas recalls what he already proposed at the beginning of the tertia pars, that speaking purely and simply in the absolute, the passion (like the Incarnation) is not necessary for our salvation, since God can free us by other means. The reply to objection three is significant. The objection raises the question of God's requiring satisfaction; in his reply, Aquinas states that it is true that objectively speaking, God's honor has been wounded, and this, again objectively speaking, requires objective restoration to remedy the disorder introduced into reality; a third party judge, faced with this situation, would rule that some kind of satisfaction was required. An earthly prince who was harmed, however, could forgive the offence against him without requiring satisfaction. In point of fact, God is in the same situation: he can forgive without receiving satisfaction, and as the supreme governor of the cosmos, his forgiveness would make the relationship whole, simply by his creative word. There must be some reason of fittingness, then, for the passion and cross.

Article 46.3 addresses this issue: a means is all the more fitting when a greater number of advantages accrue from it. The passion of Christ, in addition to freeing us from sin: reveals God's love; shows us an example of the human virtues necessary for salvation; merits right relationship with God and communion in beatitude (our authentic end); elicits or evokes greater participation and effort from us in our own
salvation; and redounds to our greater dignity (here Aquinas repeats the last reason for our being removed from evil from 3a 1.2). The passion as removing sin is placed within a larger nexus of intelligibility.

The cross itself, suggests Aquinas in article 4, has a fittingness of its own: it gives us an example of virtue in the face of death, since Christ dies a most ignominious death while trusting God (an act of the theological virtue of faith); there is also an aesthetic proportion captured in the wood of the cross, which corresponds to the wood of the tree of our condemnation. The two trees serve as an image of the two Adams. Aquinas goes on to list several other reasons of fittingness. But I wanted to highlight these two to highlight a shift that has occurred: Aquinas is now dealing only with the level of human nature, proposing reasons of human virtue and material metaphors that promote our own self-consideration in relation to Christ.

Question 46 inserts the passion and the cross into the context of the saving power of the mysteries of the whole life of Christ from conception to resurrection. The surplus of effects beyond mere liberation from sin serves to complexify the intelligibility of the passion. In addition, the path traveled through these articles includes repeated spiritual exercises to eliminate and exclude mistaken notions that distort the intelligibility of the passion and cross as saving.

We cannot, then, reduce the theological intelligibility of the passion to mere questions of satisfaction. Satisfaction forms part of a complex network of terms and relations. At this point, it should have also become clear that particularly in the use of arguments of fittingness, Aquinas is inviting students to perform meditations both scriptural and patristic that aim to shift their affective disposition and aesthetic sensibility so that it will be easier for them to hold together the surplus of meaning Aquinas discovers in the mystery of the passion and death of Jesus the Christ.

III. A MORE COSMOPOLITAN SALVATION

At the beginning of the Summa Contra Gentiles, Aquinas proposes to perform the office of the wise, which is to show forth the intelligible order of the whole while overturning the errors that prevent people from grasping and delighting in that whole. What Aquinas calls the
office of the wise, Lonergan calls cosmopolis. For Aquinas, God is the one who is supremely wise, and who performs the office of the wise most perfectly. This includes God's ability to take evil and not just overturn it, but order it to a greater good, as Lonergan points out in his account of the just and mysterious law of the cross. At the center of this wise action is the cross understood as a satisfaction that takes the form of an offering of self out of love. But this basic intelligibility must be understood within a network of intelligibly ordered surplus meaning that makes of the passion and death of Jesus God's supremely persuasive appeal to humankind, his artistic rendering, in the concrete human life that is the life of the Word made flesh, of the divine love that reaches out to us. The whole life of Christ, climaxing in the offering of himself on the cross, is for Aquinas the particular shape that divine love takes in a world of sin.

In this sense, we can say with some conviction that Aquinas's concern in his treatment of the cross is to bring to light its genuine beauty, to show forth how the passion and death of Jesus are the splendor of the truth of divine love.
FAITH AND REASON IN AQUINAS

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 THE RECONCILIATION OF FAITH and reason was the leitmotif of Aquinas's entire career as a theologian and has therefore always provided the appropriate framework for the interpretation of his thought. But a new context was created for interpreting Aquinas's view of faith and reason with the 1998 publication of John Paul II's encyclical letter Fides et Ratio (Faith and Reason) and the reactions to it. In the encyclical the pope advocated a return to Aquinas's thought to counteract what he depicted as both a divorce between faith and reason in much of modern theology and a descent into relativism and nihilism in modern and contemporary philosophy. The encyclical evoked a vigorous response – mostly but not entirely favorable – from Catholic philosophers and theologians. And in conjunction with some of John Paul's other writings, particularly Veritatis Splendor, and other Vatican pronouncements, it revived the question, first posed by Leo XIII and still discussed in the pontificate of Benedict XVI, about the pertinence of Aquinas's thought to the modern attempt to reconcile faith and reason.  


It is necessary, therefore, to assess Aquinas's conception of the relationship between faith and reason in light of this new context. I will proceed in three steps. First, I will review John Paul II's recommendation of Aquinas as a model for the reconciliation of faith and reason in terms of his argument for the recommendation in *Fides et Ratio*, the reactions of philosophers and theologians to the encyclical, and the place of the encyclical in the modern papal promotion of Neo-Thomism. Secondly, I will outline, not so much Aquinas's *theory* of the relationship between faith and reason, as the *method* he developed to reconcile faith and reason. And, thirdly, I will suggest how Aquinas's approach to the reconciliation of faith and reason may be helpful in addressing the issue as it is mooted in contemporary philosophy and theology.

**THE NEW CONTEXT FOR INTERPRETING AQUINAS'S APPROACH TO THE RECONCILIATION OF FAITH AND REASON**

*John Paul II's Recommendation of Aquinas in Fides et Ratio*

In *Fides et Ratio* John Paul II presented his recommendation of Aquinas as the model for reconciling faith and reason as the logical conclusion of the combined import of, first, his own conception of philosophy; second, his analysis of the reciprocal demands of faith and reason; third, his history of the dialectic between faith and reason in Western culture; and, finally, his specific reasons for exalting Aquinas.

above any other theologian or philosopher. Basically, he argued that Aquinas’s philosophy of being best exemplified the outcome of the historical dialectic between Christian revelation and Greek philosophy over the proper way to reconcile faith and reason.

First of all, John Paul grounded philosophy in a particular conception of self-knowledge. Taking his cue from the admonition “Know yourself” carved over the portal at the temple of Delphi, he said the journey to wisdom begins “within the particular perspective of the unique self-awareness of man: for in that perspective the more man comes to know the world and its affairs, the more he learns to understand himself in his own uniqueness, and with that there presses upon him the urgent desire to find out about the meaning of reality and of our existence.” From this desire, the pope said, arise the primary questions every human being asks: “Who am I? Where do I come from? Where am I going? Why do evils appear? What remains to us after this life?” These are the very questions that in every culture have generated the philosophical quest for the meaning of truth and goodness (1).

Thus John Paul depicted philosophy as the product of an innate drive in human reason to wonder about the meaning of life and to search for ultimate truth and authentic goodness. Consequently, he regarded the development of the academic discipline of philosophy in Western culture as a refinement of everyone’s informal philosophy of life and a specific codification of the universal philosophy evident, in manifold ways, in the traditions of every culture (1-6). This “spiritual heritage of humanity,” the pope suggested, includes “a sort of nucleus of philosophical ideas,” including the principles of non-contradiction, finality, and causality; the concept of the person as a free and intelligent subject; the capacity to know God, the true and the good; and commonly accepted moral norms (5).

To philosophy as the product of pure reason, however, John Paul contrasted Christian revelation as a matter of faith. In Jesus Christ, the Son of God, he said, ultimate and universal truth was revealed in itself: through the redemption achieved in Jesus’s passion and death God crowned the quest of human reason for truth and goodness with the possibility of immediate union with Himself, confounding at the
same time the pretensions of merely human wisdom (7-15, 23).³ Hence, John Paul saw the function of theology to be the reconciliation of philosophy as the product of human reason with divine revelation as a matter of supernatural faith.

The feasibility of a reconciliation between faith and reason, John Paul argued, arises from the need of each for the other. Reason needs faith to inspire it to search for ultimate truth and goodness: to recognize the traces of God the Creator in the natural world, and to accept the wisdom revealed by God in the death of Jesus upon the cross (16-23). Faith, for its part, depends upon the thirst of reason for truth and goodness to open humankind to the sublime truth of revelation and the love of God revealed in Jesus Christ (24-35).

Yet John Paul thought the dialectic of faith and reason, which had proceeded apace from Early Christianity until the Middle Ages, had broken down, beginning in the modern era and continuing into contemporary society. From the Acts of the Apostles, through the early Apologists, to the Eastern and Western Church Fathers, and on to medieval theologians, a positive if critical relationship had developed, the pope said, between Christian revelation and Greek and Latin philosophy because of a common commitment to the pursuit of wisdom and the demythologization of polytheism (36-42). The crucial product of this fusion was the elevation of the understanding of divine revelation from common sense to theory by the incorporation of metaphysics into the articulation of Christian doctrine (27, 36-42, 77, 84, 105).

Yet beginning in the later Middle Ages and continuing into the nineteenth and the twentieth centuries, John Paul contended, philosophers began to widen the legitimate distinction between theology and philosophy into a tragic separation between the two, inducing many a theologian to opt either for rationalism or ontologism without faith or else for fideism or radical traditionalism without reason. Concomitantly, philosophy underwent in the nineteenth century a crisis of rationalism, vacillating between idealism, atheistic humanism, and positivism, while in the twentieth century it endured a crisis of meaning in the contretemps among modernism, eclecticism,

³ This is a point, elaborated by John Paul II in Salvifici Doloris, that militates against a rationalistic interpretation of the encyclical: see Conley, "Limits of Metaphysical Reason," 119-21.
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historicism, scientism, and pragmatism. There was, in short, an abandonment of metaphysics and a descent into nihilism (45-47, 52-56, 81-82, 86-90).

This is why John Paul appealed to St. Thomas Aquinas as an exemplar of the way to do philosophy and theology. Aquinas ascribed the harmony of faith and reason, the pope said, to the fact that the light of both came from God, ensuring a unity between both in the pursuit of truth. To employ reason for understanding divine revelation, Aquinas—in dialogue with Arab and Jewish scholars—developed Aristotle’s metaphysics of nature into a philosophy of being befitting theology. At the same time, he upheld the primacy of faith through a theology whose wisdom he ascribed to the inspiration of the Holy Spirit. John Paul quoted Paul VI to the effect that “St. Thomas combined in himself the greatest boldness in his search for the truth, freedom of spirit in dealing with novel issues and that mental honesty which belongs to those who, though they do not allow Christian truth to be in any way contaminated by secular philosophy, do not even so reject it out of hand a priori...The key point [is]...he gave to the new encounter of faith and reason...a reconciliation between the secularity of the world and the severest demands of the Gospel” (43). The Magisterium has always depicted St. Thomas as an “authentic exemplar for those who seek the truth,” John Paul II concludes, because “in his reflections the demands of reason and the vigour of faith found the most profound unity that human thought has ever yet attained” (13, 43-44, 58-59, 61, 78, 97).

To be sure, John Paul qualified this endorsement of Aquinas by adding that “the Church does not have a philosophy of her own, nor does she select a particular one to the detriment of others” (49). For philosophy in general has its own proper methodology and autonomy, he said, and no philosophy in particular succeeds in epitomizing the entire discipline, much less in encapsulating the primordial human wonder at the created universe (4, 49). And while he applauded the achievement of the Neo-Thomistic philosophers who had “brought the Thomistic tradition into contact with modern philosophical and theological discussions,” he also commended the Catholic philosophers who “by relying on the reflections of contemporary philosophers and employing their own methodology, [had] produced philosophical works of great authority and lasting importance” (58-59). Therefore, John Paul
II's recommendation of Aquinas as the exemplar for the reconciliation of faith and reason was singular but nuanced.

The Reception of Fides et Ratio by Catholic Philosophers and Theologians

The reception of *Fides et Ratio* by Catholic philosophers and theologians reflected both their respective readings of the encyclical and their own outlooks and practices.

First of all, the consensus among both philosophers and theologians was that John Paul had lauded Aquinas precisely for his philosophy of being. John Knasas, interpreting the encyclical in light of the pope's 1979 Angelicum address, argued that the pope "specifically recommends for the doing of speculative theology a philosophy of being (*philosophia essendi*)...unmistakably...Aquinas’s metaphysics of *esse.*"4 Avery Dulles, interpreting the encyclical in light of the pope’s own intellectual development, concluded that John Paul was a metaphysical realist (as are Thomists of any kind), existentialist as opposed to essentialist (like Gilson), and personalist (integrating modern attention to human experience with the metaphysical bedrock of the dignity of the person).5 And Fergus Kerr would probably agree: despite his reservations about the depth and breadth of John Paul’s personal appropriation of Aquinas’s thought – even though he had earlier completed his theology dissertation at the Angelicum under Reginald Garrigou-Lagrange’s direction – he quotes the pope while still a cardinal writing that Aquinas’s philosophy is “a philosophy of being, of the *actus essendi* whose transcendental value paves the most direct way to rise to the knowledge of subsisting Being and pure Act, namely to God.”6

To this characterization of Aquinas’s thought, Classical Neo-Thomists responded by saying this was exactly the interpretation they

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had always had of Aquinas, just as it was the kind of philosophy they were already doing. And they proceeded to flesh out the speculative Thomistic metaphysics they believed the pope had endorsed in books as well as articles. But analytic Thomists — Anthony Kenny, John Haldane, Fergus Kerr, Nicholas Lash — and postmodern philosophers — Kevin Hart — criticized the encyclical for failing to recognize their alternative interpretations of Aquinas, for promoting a speculative or substantive rather than a transcendental or formal metaphysics, and for ignoring the groundswell of Thomistic studies already under way, many without the benefit of institutional Roman Catholic support (think, for example, of the works of MacIntyre, Haldane, Kenny, Kretzmann, Stump, Finnis).

In *Fides et Ratio*, it seems, therefore, that John Paul II in commending Aquinas for formulating a philosophy of being, represented Aquinas as having a concept of being equivalent to what Bernard Lonergan called the already-out-there-now-real and what Jacques Derrida, following Martin Heidegger, denominated the metaphysics of presence.

**The Place of Fides et Ratio in the Papal Promotion of Neo-Thomism**

John Paul deliberately and explicitly intended *Fides et Ratio* — together with his earlier encyclical *Veritatis Splendor* commending Aquinas for

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9 Hart, “Fides et Ratio et.”

championing a natural law ethic\(^\text{11}\) – to revive or continue the Neo-Thomism initiated by Leo XIII’s 1879 encyclical *Aeterni Patris* and regnant in Roman Catholic seminary and higher education until Vatican II (57-59, 100). This Neo-Thomism was fostered by a series of papal encyclicals and curial regulations, together with Canon 1366 of the 1917 edition of the Code of Canon Law, which mandated that the study of philosophy and theology in Roman Catholic colleges and universities, as well as in seminaries, be guided by Aquinas's “method, doctrine, and principles.”

While Neo-Thomism resulted in a proliferation of historical interpretations and theoretical extrapolations of Aquinas’s thought, it also led among many Catholic philosophers and theologians to a general neglect of medieval philosophers and theologians other than Aquinas, not to speak of a common rejection of modern and contemporary philosophers (with the exception of Blondel and Bergson by some classical Thomists, of Kant by Transcendental Thomists, and of Wittgenstein by Analytic Thomists) and even a disregard for contemporary non-Thomistic Catholic philosophers and theologians.\(^\text{12}\) This exclusive patronization of Aquinas’s thought was mitigated at Vatican II when a ritual approval of Aquinas’s thought was balanced by a sanctioning of the study of other philosophers and theologians, non-Catholic as well as Catholic, in Catholic seminaries and universities.\(^\text{13}\) But John Paul II’s *Fides et Ratio* – together with the subsequent imposition on Catholic institutions of higher learning, in Canon 252 of the new Code of Canon Law, of philosophical and theological


instruction *ad mentem Aquinatis* — entailed a reversion of Roman Catholic patronization of Aquinas to the *status quo ante* Vatican II.

Since the publication of *Aeterni Patris*, the consensus that has emerged among classical Thomists (those who, under the aegis of Reginald Garrigou-Lagrange, O.P., Jacques Maritain, and Etienne Gilson, have interpreted Aquinas’s thought as a philosophy of being) is that Thomas’s philosophy is fundamentally a metaphysics, Aristotelian in origin, accompanied by a conceptualist cognitional theory, an epistemology of direct or immediate realism, and a natural law ethics. Aquinas is also supposed to have separated philosophy and theology into two independent and self-contained disciplines, just as he is taken to have postulated both a natural and a supernatural end for humanity. In effect and often in intent, this Neo-Thomism has amounted to a canonization of the interpretation of Aquinas developed by his Baroque commentators — Cajetan, Suarez, Vitoria, John of St. Thomas (Jean Poinsot), among others. Every point in this consensus is contested by Thomists of other persuasions.¹⁴

From the start Neo-Thomism has been the theoretical linchpin of what some Roman Catholic historians have designated the anti-modern and anti-modernist “Roman Catholicism” of the period from the Council of Vienna (1815) to the Second Vatican Council (1962-65). This movement, led by the papacy, was designed to make the Roman Catholic Church an independent sub-culture in the modern world. It comprised an unprecedented centralization of authority in the person of the pope, now defined to be infallible in questions of faith and morals; the creation of a Vatican bureaucracy rivaling that of any nation state; the promotion of devotions — to the Sacred Heart, Christ the King, and Mary, the Mother of God — antithetical to modern mores; and the formation of Catholic institutions — educational, cultural, social, and political — parallel to their secular counterparts.¹⁵ In one sense, “Roman Catholicism” was simply the manifestation of a Romantic

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nostalgia for an idealized medieval Christendom, blessed with the one true religion, the preeminence of church over state, and a theological foundation of education. In another sense, it was a regime of anti-modernism proclaimed by Pius IX’s condemnation in the Syllabus of Errors of rationalism and secularism (inclusive of their support for “progress, liberalism, and civility”) reinforced in Pius X’s condemnation of modernism in the device Lamentabili and the encyclical Pascendi Domenici Gregis, and implemented in the anti-modernist oath required of all priests and other church officials. John Paul must have been aware of the integral role Neo-Thomism had played in this campaign of “Roman Catholicism” when in Fides et Ratio he presented a Classical Neo-Thomistic interpretation of Aquinas and advocated a revival of this school of Neo-Thomism.

In sum, any interpretation of John Paul II’s endorsement in Fides et Ratio of Aquinas’s mode of reconciling faith and reason must recognize (1) its representation of Aquinas’s theology as founded on a philosophy of being/metaphysics of presence; (2) its ratification of both the program of Neo-Thomism and the Classical Neo-Thomistic interpretation of Aquinas’s philosophy; and (3) its at least implicit acceptance of the integration of Neo-Thomism into the regime of “Roman Catholicism.”

AQUINAS’S METHOD FOR RECONCILING FAITH AND REASON

To understand Aquinas’s position on the relationship between faith and reason, it will not be sufficient to cull the statements he made on the subject over the course of his career, nor to settle, instead, for a putatively definitive statement on the matter from the Summa Theologiae.¹⁶ That would be too simplistic and superficial an approach to such a subtle and complex issue. For Aquinas’s entire career was a quest to reconcile faith and reason by making theology into a science,

one just as legitimate and rigorous in its own way as the natural sciences or mathematics.\footnote{17} The optimal approach for analyzing his conception of the faith-reason relationship is, I believe, to examine three elements in his development as a theologian: (1) his conception of his mission as a theologian; (2) the steps he took to establish a foundation for theology in a philosophy of mind; and (3) his derivation of a philosophy of mind from self-knowledge. This approach aims, therefore, not simply at recollecting Aquinas's \textit{theory} of the relationship between faith and reason but at understanding Aquinas's \textit{method} for reaching a reconciliation of faith and reason.

\textbf{Aquinas's Conception of His Mission as a Theologian}

Aquinas's conception of his mission as a theologian comprises three factors: his Dominican vocation; his opposition to Radical Aristotelianism; and his ambivalence about Aristotelian philosophy.

Aquinas entered the recently founded Dominican order (the Order of Preachers) in 1244 at the age of nineteen or twenty, renouncing his family's noble feudal rank to join in preaching the Gospel to impoverished former serfs huddled around the newly emerging communes in France and northern Italy. At the University of Paris, Thomas pursued studies in the arts and theology, leading in 1256 to a mastership in theology, which gave him the expertise to prepare his Dominican colleagues for their mission. For the rest of his life, Thomas taught theology, splitting his time between two regencies at the University of Paris (1256-59, 1268-72) and two periods in Italy, part of the time as theologian to the papal court, but mostly as master of Dominican houses of study (1259-68, 1272-74). The immediate readership for which he intended his \textit{Summa Theologiae}, in which he incorporated the moral theology of the Second Part into the salvation history of the First and Third

Parts, was his own Dominican students. Aquinas’s characteristically Dominican spirituality, with its commitment to the evangelization of the poor, infused all of his academic work.

The second factor in Aquinas’s mission as a theologian was his goal of making theology a science capable of countering the challenge to Christian doctrine from Radical Aristotelians (or Latin Averroists) in the Paris Arts Faculty who were engaged in making philosophy an independent naturalistic science. Led by Siger of Brabant, they had adopted a reading of Aristotle originating in the commentaries of Muslim scholars, particularly Averroes, who, having translated the entire Aristotelian corpus into Arabic, sought to reconcile Muslim beliefs with Aristotelian philosophy. Not only did they seek to formulate a naturalistic philosophy independent of Christian revelation; they also challenged, if they did not indeed contradict, such Christian doctrines as the Trinity, creation in time, the divinity of Christ, the Real Presence in the Eucharist, and individual human responsibility for knowing and willing. To neutralize this Radical Aristotelianism, Aquinas strove, through both literal interpretation and experiential confirmation, to dislodge Aristotle’s philosophy from the carapace of his Muslim (and Neo-Platonic and Jewish) commentators so that he could employ it


19 M.-D. Chenu, Aquinas and His Role in Theology, trans, Paul J. Philibert OP (1959; Collegeville MN: The Liturgical Press, 2002); Torrell, Aquinas, 75-95.

20 Ralph McInerney, Aquinas against the Averroists: On There Being Only One Intellect (West Lafayette, IN: Purdue University Press, 1993), 4-15, 188-96.

himself as a rational armature for the development of theology into a scientific discipline.\textsuperscript{22}

The third factor in Aquinas's self-conception as a theologian was his ambivalence toward Aristotelian philosophy. Like every other medieval scholar, Aquinas was steeped in Augustine's thought, appropriating Augustine's method of grounding theology in self-knowledge as well as his explications of the doctrines of grace and the Trinity.\textsuperscript{23} Aquinas also welcomed the Neo-Platonic insights he found in the Greek Fathers of the Church, Boethius, Pseudo-Dionysius, and the pseudonymous author of the \textit{Liber de Causis}.\textsuperscript{24} Yet Aquinas was drawn to Aristotle's philosophy, not just because in its profundity and scope it promised to supply the rational infrastructure he needed for a scientific theology,\textsuperscript{25} but also because he had to counter the challenge it posed to the Christian worldview, as well as to particular Christian doctrines, by the Paris Arts faculty's adoption of it as an independent naturalistic philosophy.\textsuperscript{26} To foster a more accurate grasp of Aristotle's thought, Aquinas sponsored William of Moerbecke's translation of the Aristotelian corpus from the original Greek into Latin, and undertook himself the project of writing commentaries on all of Aristotle's

\textsuperscript{22} Jan A. Aertsen, "Aquinas's Philosophy in its Historical Setting," in Kretzmann and Stump, \textit{Cambridge Companion}, 12-37; see also note 18.


works in their new translation. Because of this discriminating appropriation of Aristotle's philosophy Aquinas's career as a theologian may be summarized, positively, as an articulation of an Augustinian philosophy of mind in terms of an Aristotelian metaphysics of being, mediated by a Neo-Platonist conception of participation in the Good; negatively, as an opposition to Aristotelian philosophy — and indeed all of Greek philosophy, both in the original sources and in Muslim and Jewish commentaries — as an independent naturalistic system antithetical to Christian doctrine.

These are, then, the three main factors in Aquinas's self-conception as a theologian: his vocation as a Dominican friar to interpret the import of the Gospel for the poor; his development of theology into a science opposed to the naturalistic philosophy of Radical Aristotelianism; and his adoption of Aristotelian thought as a method for theology but not as an independent philosophy.

**The Phases in Aquinas's Self-Education as a Theologian**

Aquinas had to undertake a long and arduous course of self-education to fulfill his ambition of becoming a scientific theologian while making theology a science. There were five functionally successive phases in his self-education: his commentaries on the literary sources of both Christian doctrine and pagan philosophy; his philosophical and theological monographs; his disputations on controverted philosophical and theological questions; his successive syntheses of the material from his commentaries, monographs, and disputations; and, finally, the spin-offs from these syntheses in polemical essays, in responses to requests for his opinion, and in liturgical works, sermons, and prayers.

In his relatively short but very productive career Aquinas sought to become expert in what today would be virtually the entire spectrum

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The first phase in Aquinas's self-education was his composition of the commentaries in which he deepened his knowledge of both the Bible and important philosophical works. He wrote biblical commentaries on Genesis, Isaiah, Psalms, and Job in the Hebrew Bible and on the four Gospels and certain of Paul's epistles, notably Romans, in the New Testament. He also compiled in the Glossa or Catena Aurea exegetical quotations from the Greek Fathers on each verse of all four Gospels. Legend has it that Aquinas also committed to memory the entire text of the Vulgate. He certainly displayed an intimate knowledge of both the Bible and patristic tradition in the numerous and apposite citations he included in his two summae.30

Both early and late in his career Aquinas also wrote commentaries on philosophical works. In his first Paris teaching assignment he commented on two of Boethius's treatises and on Pseudo-Dionysius's De Divinis Nominibus,31 while in his second Paris period he composed a commentary on the enigmatic Liber de Causis.32 Perhaps the most important of these commentaries for his quest to make of theology a science was his Expositio super Librum de Trinitate. In it he argued that divine science (theology) was just as valid as natural or mathematical science because it followed the same process of abstracting from the individuality and contingency of sensory data, only it took the process one step further by abstracting not only from empirical or imaginative, but also from any literal, representation of its theories.33

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But his most important philosophical commentaries were on the works of Aristotle. While he had become familiar with Aristotle's works right from the early days of his studies at the Universities of Naples and Paris, he did not begin his commentaries on Aristotle until the end of his first teaching assignment in Paris. Thereafter he pursued, in Italy and Paris, his project of writing a commentary on every work of Aristotle – even as he was composing his own original treatises, including his two summae – until, strangely, he lost either the ability or the desire to continue his scholarship. Yet these commentaries not only had the personal benefit of lending philosophical depth and sophistication to his disputations and his magisterial synthesises; they have remained for Aristotelian scholars permanently valuable interpretations of the respective works.

The next component of Aquinas's philosophical self-education was the monographs he wrote on crucial philosophical and theological issues, again both early and late in his career. In his first Paris period he wrote monographs on the principles of physical nature, on being and essence, and on the proper governance of princes. In his second Paris period he wrote monographs on the properties of rational creatures in general – both human and angelic – and on angels in particular. The most important of these monographs was De ente et essentia, in which, while criticizing some aspects of Muslim interpretations of Aristotle's concept of being, he appropriated (and reinterpreted) Avicenna's distinction between essence and existence, a theory he used to explain the difference between God in his identity of essence and existence and creatures with their distinction of essences from existence.

The third phase in Aquinas's campaign to develop theology into a science consisted of the two kinds of disputations he conducted on controversial theological questions, a new option for masters of theology.


35 Chenu, Introduction, 280-83, 286-88; Torrell, Aquinas, 47-50.


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that he exploited to the full. The first kind of disputation was, in effect, a course on a particular topic that a master of theology conducted twice a week over an academic year.38 The topics Aquinas addressed in these disputations show the range of his interests: On Truth, On Power, On the Soul, On Spiritual Creatures, On Evil, On the Virtues, On the Unity of the Incarnate Word. His underlying project was to reconstruct the traditional Augustinian interpretations and explications of Christian doctrine in terms of Aristotelian philosophy, while fending off the contrary interpretations of Aristotle’s Muslim commentators.39

The most important of these disputations was On Truth, which might better have been entitled On the Mind in relation to Being: as Intellect in relation to Being as Truth and as Will in relation to Being as Goodness.40 In the twenty-one questions of this disputation, conducted over three academic years, Aquinas forged the philosophy of mind, inclusive of intellect and will, he would later employ in his two summae. A signal achievement was his analysis of the activity of knowing, operative in self-knowledge as well as in object knowledge, and therefore the medium for formulating his philosophy of mind. Aquinas analyzed direct, objective knowledge as a two-step interaction in our minds between the impact of the data of experience and the demand of our minds for the truth – the first step being an attempt to assimilate the information from sensory imagery into a possible definition of the meaning of the data; the second being a reflection upon the process of assimilation to judge the veridicality of the proposed definition.41 Self-knowledge, he said, had both a categorical and a transcendental dimension: the categorical to be found in our consciousness of understanding in every act of understanding as well as in an appreciation of the nature of our intellectual ability gained

41 Veri. 1.2, 1.3, 1.9; 2.5, 2.6; 10.1, 10.2, 10.4, 10.8, 10.9.
from an analysis of the universality of the objects of its acts; the transcendental to be found in the innate orientation of our intellects to the truth as well as in our habitual ability to understand the significance of sensory experience.\(^2\)

In the other kind of disputation, the *quodlibet*, a master could treat any question he wanted, at a time of his own choosing.\(^3\) In the approximately one hundred articles of the twenty-five quodlibetales Aquinas conducted, he addressed a wide range of both speculative and practical questions—about God, Christ, the angels, and human beings.\(^4\) In these two kinds of disputations Aquinas gradually refined his thought on the multiplicity of topics he would coordinate into a systematic framework in his summae.

The most important phase in Aquinas's campaign to make a science of theology comprised the three syntheses of theology that he wrote at the beginning, the middle, and the end of his career—the *Scriptum super Sententias*, the *Summa contra Gentes*, and the *Summa Theologiae*. In this phase, Aquinas employed as the theoretical armature of his theology the philosophy of mind he was forging in the crucible of personal experience from sources in Augustine, Aristotle, and Dionysius. It provided him with both the format for his syntheses and his solutions to crucial questions of Christian doctrine.

Aquinas's first effort in this regard was the *Scriptum super


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Sententias (1252-1256), a kind of comprehensive written exam that, as a bachelor of theology, he had to pass to become a master of theology. Peter Lombard's Sententiae was a compilation of patristic opinions, particularly from Augustine, on the entire range of Christian doctrines. Initially, candidates for the baccalaureate in theology had simply to write a plausible reconciliation of the divergent patristic opinions on each topic. But by Aquinas's time, the challenge to Christian doctrine from Aristotelian philosophy required the fledgling theologian to moot all of the theoretical issues it raised and create, in effect, an original treatise on the entire body of Christian doctrine.

In his Scriptum Aquinas employed the philosophy of mind he would elaborate in greater detail and with more subtlety in his later syntheses. First of all, the human mind as the image of God provided the pivot for the Pseudo-Dionysian theme of exitus et reditus (departure and return) according to which Aquinas organized his entire commentary as a history of salvation. The departure originated in the processions of the Persons within the Trinity (Book I) and extended to the procession from God of humanity as the apex of creation (Book II). The return began with the Son of God becoming incarnate in human form (Book III), and culminated in humanity's redemption from sin and final union with God (Book IV).

At each stage in this circuit Aquinas posited the human mind as the crux of his explanation. In Book I, Aquinas argued that the theology of the entire work is possible only because the human mind as the image of God is capable of knowing God — now admittedly only through arguments and symbols, but ultimately by identity with God in the beatific vision. In Book II, Aquinas said creation is to be understood through its end, humanity, principally because of the mind being the image of God. In Book III, Aquinas contended that the Word became incarnate as a human being because humanity in its combination of mind and body was the horizon and border unifying spiritual and corporeal nature. And in Book IV, he presented the sacraments and the final resurrection as the remedy for humanity's corruption from


original sin and the means for humanity to be united, through the mind, with God in the beatific vision.47

Just as Aquinas invoked the human mind as the image of God in the framework of his *Scriptum*, so also did he rely upon his conception of the human mind to solve crucial questions in each of its four books: for explaining the categorical and transcendental knowledge of God, both the divine essence and the processions of the Persons of the Trinity; for justifying the designation of humanity as the image of God crowning creation; for interpreting the fittingness (*convenientia*) of the Incarnation and the modes of Christ’s knowledge; and for exploring the kind of knowledge to be enjoyed by the resurrected at the end of the world.48 Drawing upon Augustine, Dionysius, and Aristotle, Aquinas had begun to develop a profound and nuanced philosophy of mind as a medium of theological understanding.

Aquinas's second endeavor at a theological synthesis was the *Summa contra Gentes* (1258/58-1265), an original and comprehensive treatise on the wisdom of Christian doctrine. The purpose, the genre, and the intended audience of this work remain in dispute. Yet a consensus seems to be building that it is basically a protreptic in which Aquinas, for the edification of literate and cosmopolitan Christians, confronted philosophical wisdom, particularly in the works of Aristotle and his commentators, with an exposition of Christian wisdom – originating to be sure in divine revelation but confirmed by either rational arguments or plausible analogies.49 The work is both dialectical and foundational: dialectical, in that Aquinas uses textual exegesis and human experience to refute the theories of his pagan and Muslim adversaries; foundational, 


48 *Sent.* 1.2-7; 2.16-17; 3.2, 10, 14, 16; 4.43, 48-50.

in that he rests his case for the probity and superiority of theological wisdom on a philosophy of mind grounded on self-knowledge.  

Aquinas gives two accounts of the structure of this Summa. At the beginning of Book I, he says it is divided materially between the first three books, in which he uses philosophical arguments to defend the Christian doctrines he regards as demonstrable by natural reason, and a fourth book, in which he uses analogies drawn from the human mind to illustrate the plausibility of the supernatural doctrines of the Trinity and the Incarnation.  

But at the beginning of Book II, he says the more fundamental structure of the work is the same narrative of departure and return – creation and redemption – that he had adopted in the Scriptum super Sententias. Books I and II concern God as efficient cause, in his divine essence and in the act of creation, while Books III and IV concern God as final cause, both in His providence over the created world and in His revelation of the mysteries of redemption.  

Once again, the theoretical pivot for this circuit of efficient and final causality is the linkage Aquinas postulates between God as exemplar and humanity as image arising from the analogy between the divine and the human minds.

Aquinas spells out the basis for this analogy in the philosophy of mind he expounds in the latter half of Book II and the early part of Book III. Not only does Aquinas make this philosophy of mind, inclusive of his conceptions of human nature and human teleology, the hinge of the entire work; he anticipates this philosophy in his analysis of God’s nature and power in Books I and II, applies it in his theory of divine providence in the latter part of Book III, and makes it the basis for an analogy to the Trinity and for the fittingness of the Incarnation in Book IV. So his philosophy of mind is the core of the entire work,

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52 SCG 2.1.

53 SCG 2.46-90; 3.25-63.

54 SCG 1.44-91; 2.15-27; 3.40-63; 4.2, 10-26, 33, 36, 39-44.
underpinning the framework provided by the metaphor of departure and return.

This philosophy of mind has both a theoretical and a practical component. The theoretical component, which Aquinas expounds in Book II, is that we know on the basis of personal experience that humanity is an existential unit of soul and body and yet that the human soul is an incorruptible subsistent spirit. The personal experience grounding this belief is our consciousness of the nature of human action. Because we not only depend upon sensory experience for all of our intelligible information but are individually responsible for all of our activity, physical and mental alike, the soul, from which this activity emanates, must be the form of the body. Yet because our ability to know the truth includes a knowledge of things in their universality and of ourselves as having such knowledge and because our capacity to do good originates from a love of the good in itself and culminates in freedom of choice, the soul must be a subsistent spirit, transcending the body, to which it communicates its own act of existence. Therefore, Aquinas concludes, personal experience shows that our souls are distinct, but not separate, from our bodies.55

The practical component, which Aquinas propounds in Book III, is that we know on the basis of personal experience that humanity has a natural (if implicit) desire for the beatific vision and yet cannot achieve that end without the grace of God. The personal experience grounding this belief is our consciousness of the nature of our final end. On the one hand, we realize we cannot be completely happy without understanding, directly and immediately, the ultimate cause of this universe (which, revelation tells us, can be achieved only in union with God in the beatific vision). Yet we are also aware we are incapable of achieving this goal on our own, given that our understanding is not only finite but also intrinsically dependent upon sensory experience. Therefore, Aquinas concludes, personal experience shows we have a natural appetite for the beatific vision but cannot fulfill that appetite except through the supernatural grace of God.56

56 CG 3.25-63. See also Hibbs, Dialectic and Narrative, 100-15.
Hence Aquinas grounds the superstructure of the entire *Summa contra Gentes* on a philosophy of mind whose evidence is a matter of personal experience. True, he poaches elements of his theory from a multitude of sources, and he directs it against an array of adversaries, but the evidence he alleges in every case is derived from self-knowledge. His argument is, therefore, not abstract but existential. Its truth can be understood and assessed not by conning a theory but only by examining it in light of personal experience.

Aquinas wrote the third of his theological syntheses, the *Summa Theologiae* (1265/1266-1273), as a comprehensive textbook for novice theologians. He organized it according to the *via doctrinae*, proceeding from principles to conclusions, to avoid the disorder and repetition he deplored in other theology textbooks. As opposed to the *Summa contra Gentes*, the *Summa Theologiae* integrates the rationally demonstrable and the analogically intelligible truths of Christian doctrine into a unitary framework. From the outset Aquinas emphasizes the intrinsically theological character of the work, naming God both the subject and the object of theology: the subject, because of His communication of the light of faith and the revealed principles upon which theology depends for an understanding of particular Christian doctrines; the object, because of theology being concerned principally with God and secondarily with everything else insofar it proceeds from God as efficient cause and returns to Him as final cause.

Consequently, the framework for the *Summa Theologiae* is, once again, the salvation history of creation and redemption, pivoting on the analogy between the divine mind as exemplar and the human mind as image. The First Part is devoted to God the exemplar – both in

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His essence, as one substance and three persons; and in His action, as creator and rector of the universe. The Third Part, on the other hand, concerns the perfect image of God in the God-man, Jesus Christ, who redeems humanity through his passion, death, and resurrection and elevates it through the indwelling of the Holy Spirit in the Church as a whole and in each human soul. The pivot between these two parts is the Second Part, which is concerned with humanity: the admittedly imperfect image of God at the culmination of creation and yet the locus of the Incarnation and the beneficiary of redemption.

Once again, the theoretical core of the work is Aquinas's philosophy of mind. In the latter half of the First Part, Aquinas takes up humanity, the composite of both spirit and matter, at the terminus of his exposition of the origination of the universe from God in creation. In analyzing humanity, Aquinas immediately notes that theology considers human nature primarily in terms of the soul and, within the soul, primarily in terms of the mind, inclusive of itsintellective and appetitive operations. The intellective operations he proceeds to analyze in the First Part; the appetitive operations he postpones until the Second Part.

The point of his analysis in the First Part of humanity's intellective operations is to show that the human soul, specifically because of the mind, is truly made to the image of God, and destined, therefore, ultimately to be united with God its exemplar. At the beginning of the Second Part, Aquinas prefaces his analysis of the operations of the will by declaring that humanity is made to the image of God precisely insofar as our powers of intellect and free judgment (liberum arbitrium) enable us to be responsible for all of our actions. On that basis, Aquinas proceeds, in the First Section of the Second Part, to analyze humanity in terms of its pursuit of its final end—beginning with our natural appetite for the beatific vision, working through the

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62 ST 1.44.3; 93.1, 4-8; 1-2 prol.
63 ST 1.75, prol.; 84, prol.
64 ST 1.75-89; 93.
65 ST 1-2, prol.
conditions and impediments for acting responsibly, and culminating in the supernatural conversion by which God, now through grace and later through glory, saves us from our sinfulness and elevates us to union with Himself. He completes this analysis, in the Second Section of the Second Part, with detailed studies of both the virtues necessary for us to move from our initial conversion to our final end and of the various statuses within which we may pursue our destiny. In all, Aquinas takes up about two-thirds of the Summa Theologicae with his philosophy of mind, showing how through intellect and will we are made to the image of God, with a natural desire for union with God and an aptitude for cooperating with the grace of God in our salvation.

What is more, Aquinas employs this philosophy of mind throughout the rest of the Summa Theologicae. He invokes it to explain how, from one perspective, we can know and love God in His essence and as Creator and how, from the opposite perspective, God can be understood to know and love Himself, both in the divine essence and in the processions within the Trinity. He also uses it to interpret both the procession of creatures from God in creation and the return of humanity to God in redemption. And he calls upon it once again to explicate the fittingness, the manner, and the consequences of the Incarnation. Aquinas's philosophy of mind is, therefore, the key to an understanding of the Summa Theologicae, as it is of the earlier syntheses in which he expounded his vision of Christian doctrine.

The final phase of Aquinas's quest to become a scientific theologian by making theology into a science includes the spin-offs from his theological syntheses: his polemics against Averroistic interpretations of Aristotle's concept of mind and against opponents of the mendicant orders; his numerous replies to requests for his expert opinion on questions both theoretical and practical; and his liturgical works, sermons, and prayers - most famously "The Office for the Feast of Corpus Christi" and the hymn "Adoro Te." Not content to stay on the heights of theological theory or to remain within the precincts of academe, Aquinas was ready to apply his theories to current problems,

66 ST 1.2; 12; 14; 20; 26; 27-28; 32; 37; 40-41.
67 ST 1.44-45; 103-104; 1-2.1-5; 109-14.
68 ST 3.1-19; 23-26; 46-49.
just as he was quick to transform theory into prayer. But rather than dwelling on these facets of Aquinas’s theological career, it will be more helpful to summarize the process by which Aquinas developed a philosophy of mind as the foundation for his theology.

Only by a gradual assimilation of both doctrinal and philosophical sources and by a systematic analysis of controversial philosophical and theological issues did Aquinas succeed in mounting to the point where he could confidently “essay” [sic] progressively more adequate syntheses of Christian doctrine. He sought to resolve the relationship between faith and reason, not by concocting a lapidary formula, but by methodically probing all the neuralgia points, until he could coordinate his diagnoses into a coherent and comprehensive prescription. The framework he adopted for his syntheses was, because of its compatibility with Christian salvation history, the Dionysian trope of departure and return; that is, creation and redemption. But the core of his syntheses was his emergent philosophy of mind. It not only provided a theoretical infrastructure for the metaphor of departure and return but supplied both an argument for our knowledge and love of God and an analogy to the mysteries of the Trinity and the Incarnation. Aquinas succeeded, therefore, in making theology a science by combining the framework for the unification of Christian doctrine in the trope of departure and return with the foundation for the explanation or elucidation of Christian doctrine in a philosophy of mind. 70

The Origins of Aquinas's Philosophy of Mind in Self-Knowledge

Aquinas analyzed self-knowledge in a number of his works over the course of his career: his commentary on Aristotle's De Anima; the disputed questions On Truth, On the Soul, and On Spiritual Creatures; the monograph On Separate Substances; all three of his theological syntheses; and the polemic On the Unity of the Intellect against the Averroists. The most original and substantial of these treatments is the disputed question On Truth, in which Aquinas succeeded not only in melding his Augustinian and Aristotelian sources but in expounding the core of his philosophy of mind and exploring in detail both its cognitive and its volitional implications. But for our purposes, perhaps the best source is the tidy summary Aquinas gives of self-knowledge in the Summa Theologiae.

There he says the mind knows itself in three ways: we each experience our own mind in every act of understanding or willing; we can acquire a philosophical knowledge of the nature of the mind by analyzing it in terms of the abilities revealed by the intentional objects of its operations; and we can realize the scope and range of the mind by reflecting upon it in light of divine truth. In each case, the object of understanding is the act of understanding itself, our proper act, perfectly demonstrating the mind's ability and nature.

In the first kind of knowledge, Aquinas says, each of us becomes aware of our own mind in every act of understanding or willing. We each experience ourselves as someone who understands in every complete act of understanding and as someone who wills in every complete act of willing. Thus we become aware of our powers of intellect and will as well as of the mind as the subject of both powers. We also realize that the mind, whether we call it the intellect or the intellective soul, is the principle as well of all of our other activities: locomotion, nutrition, sensation. Aquinas emphasizes how this inherent awareness of our

72 See notes 41 and 42.
73 ST 1.88.2 ad 3; 75.4; 87.3.
74 ST 1.87.1,4; 76.1; 83.1; 1-2.1.1.
75 ST 1.75.4; 84.4; 87.3; 88.2 ad 3.
76 ST 1.76.1.
own intelligence in every operation of knowing or willing functions as both the origin of every theory of understanding or volition and the criterion for evaluating the validity of any such theory.77

The second kind of self-knowledge Aquinas recognizes is the philosophical or categorial knowledge of the nature of the mind or soul. This is the strategy he found in Aristotle, who argued that we could come to understand the soul in terms of the powers revealed by an analysis of the objects of its acts. In the Summa Theologiae Aquinas analyzes the power of the intellect in terms of its understanding of three kinds of object – bodies, the soul itself, and separate substances (including God)78 – and the power of the will in terms of the acts by which it loves the good, intends happiness as its final end, and chooses the means to attain it.79 This kind of self-knowledge, in which the soul becomes, through introspection, the explicit object of understanding, is, of course, the mode that Aquinas employed in the First Part of the Summa to understand the soul in terms of the power of intellect, and in the Second Part, to understand the soul in terms of the power of will. He pushed this analysis for all it was worth, demonstrating that because we were each aware of possessing within ourselves the powers Aristotle ascribed to the agent and the possible intellect, the soul as the seat of those powers must be immaterial, subsistent, and incorruptible.80

The third kind of self-knowledge Aquinas acknowledges is the theological or transcendental knowledge by which we judge the perfection of the mind in light of divine truth. This is the mode for

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78 ST 1.84-88.


80 ST 1.75.1; 77.5-6; 79.1-5.
which he accredits Plato by way of Augustine. Plato, he says, contended that we could discern the perfection of the soul from a recognition of its participation in the subsistent idea(l)s of truth and goodness. But Augustine corrected Plato’s conception of our natural orientation to truth and goodness in two ways. First, he interpreted the ideas, not as subsistent objects, but as exemplars in God’s mind of created beings. Secondly, he interpreted our participation in these exemplars, not as a perception of them as objects (even in the mind of God) but as an inherent awareness of them in the light, natural, or supernatural, by which we know the truth and will the good. This is, therefore, the kind of self-knowledge Aquinas draws upon at a number of crucial junctures in the Summa: in designating theology a sacred and a kind of subaltern science because of deriving the principles for understanding Christian doctrine from God’s own knowledge; in affirming the mind’s knowledge of the true and love of the good; in postulating a natural desire for the beatific vision; and in defining natural law as a participation of the human mind in the eternal law in the mind of God.

On these three forms of self-knowledge - consciousness, introspection, and transcendental reflection - Aquinas based his philosophy of mind and, in turn, his theology. Although his theology is a theoretical structure - a science - it is founded upon an existential commitment. His philosophy of mind is not a formula to be learned, but a method to be followed. Its verification is not logical but factual. In effect, he challenges anyone who is interested in the philosophy of mind to verify his theory for oneself. In our acts of knowing and willing, are we indeed conscious of the intentionality of these acts? From an analysis of their intentionality, can we gain an understanding of the mind as the root of cognition and volition? And through reflection upon the mind’s capacity for knowing and willing, can we come to realize that our desire to know the truth and will the good reveals our fundamental orientation to being itself? In taking this approach,

81 ST 1.84.5; 87.1.3; 88.3 ad 1.
82 ST 1.1.2; 93; 1-2 prol.; 1.1.
83 ST 1.5; 16.
84 ST 1-2.3.8.
85 ST 1-2.93.2, 3, 6; 94.2, 4, 5, 6.
philosophy of mind becomes the fruit neither of linguistic analysis nor of idealist metaphysics but of existential phenomenology.

To summarize this section on Aquinas's take on faith and reason: In his vocation as a Dominican theologian, Aquinas appropriated the core of Aristotle's philosophy as a method for making theology into a science of Christian revelation. Negatively, this meant that Aquinas had to rebut the alternative interpretations of Aristotle's philosophy by his Muslim commentaries and combat the efforts of Radical Aristotelians in the Paris Arts faculty to oppose Aristotle's naturalistic philosophy, as an independent source of true wisdom, to Christian theology. Positively, it meant that Aquinas undertook a course of self-education in which, through commentaries on the sources of Christian doctrine and Greek philosophy and a series of scholarly monographs and disputed questions, he forged the philosophy of mind he employed as the foundation of his theological syntheses. This philosophy of mind he derived from self knowledge: a combination of conscious experience, philosophical analysis, and transcendental reflection. Thus Aquinas sought to reconcile faith and reason by drawing from self-knowledge a philosophy of mind to ground a theology capable of demonstrating the reasonableness of Christian doctrine.

THE IMPORT OF AQUINAS'S EXAMPLE FOR RECONCILING FAITH AND REASON TODAY

The analysis of St. Thomas Aquinas's method for reconciling faith and reason raises several questions about how Catholic philosophers and theologians might respond to John Paul II's recommendation to regard Aquinas as the authentic exemplar for undertaking this perennial task. Does Aquinas indeed have to be followed, perhaps to the exclusion of other philosophers and theologians, in attempting to reconcile faith and reason? If so, is Aquinas's philosophy of being, as a foundation or summation of the "body of knowledge [that is] a kind of spiritual heritage of humanity," what should be adopted as the touchstone for the task? And does Aquinas's philosophy exemplify John Paul's belief that the discipline of philosophy originates from the "primary truth" that every human being who wishes to raise himself up within creation "does so as 'one who knows himself'" (1, see 1-4)?
The first question that John Paul's singling out of Aquinas as an/ the authentic exemplar for the reconciliation of faith and reason raises for Catholic philosophers and theologians is whether he meant for them all to become (or remain) (Neo)-Thomists; that is, to specialize in, if not to confine themselves to, the study of Aquinas. There is no doubt John Paul explicitly called for a continuation or resumption of the Neo-Thomism initiated by Leo XII's 1879 encyclical Aeterni Patris and subsequently reinforced by other papal encyclicals and canon law up to Vatican II. At the same time, he admitted that many of the (Neo)-Thomists who had followed these injunctions had enriched their expositions of Aquinas's thought by incorporating insights from modern philosophers, while non-Thomistic Catholic philosophers had also made important contributions to the ongoing development of philosophy. In addition, he acknowledged that postmodern as well as modern philosophy deserved serious consideration by Catholic scholars (91). He also granted specifically that modern philosophy, despite its propensity for relativism and nihilism, had made significant advances in a number of philosophical specialties, including logic, philosophy of language, epistemology, the philosophy of nature, anthropology, hermeneutics, as well as in studies of perception, the subconscious, irrationality, intersubjectivity, freedom and goodness, time and history, and death itself (48, 91).

Under the circumstances, therefore, contemporary Catholic philosophers and theologians might legitimately claim to be following John Paul's direction by taking an approach to the relationship between Aquinas and contemporary philosophers analogous to Aquinas's approach toward Augustine and Aristotle. Just as Aquinas concurred with Augustine's strategy of basing his theology on a concept of mind derived from self-knowledge, so might contemporary Catholic philosophers and theologians follow Aquinas's example by grounding philosophy and theology on a philosophy of mind drawn from self-knowledge. And just as Aquinas confidently launched out from his philosophy of mind to assimilate Aristotle's philosophy — critically but positively — into his theology, so might contemporary Catholic philosophers and theologians, secure in their philosophy of mind, collaborate — critically but positively — with other philosophers in attempting to reach a mutually satisfactory understanding
of contemporary existence. In taking this approach, no Catholic philosopher or theologian could be expected to master every facet of the prospective interchange between Aquinas and contemporary philosophers. Rather, each might find a congenial niche in the broad range of specializations – from historical interpretation of Aquinas's thought and the development of Thomistic philosophical positions, to comparisons between Aquinas and contemporary philosophers, to independent studies of modern and contemporary philosophers and philosophical schools, to original philosophical theories – that are milestones in the stretch of road between the Thomistic and the non-Thomistic positions in contemporary philosophy.

Secondly, for Catholic philosophers and theologians who wish to follow John Paul's blessing of Aquinas as an/the exemplar for reconciling faith and reason, the question remains whether they are also bound to do this, as John Paul advises, because Aquinas's philosophy of being is the key to such a reconciliation. John Paul apparently based his recommendation on the belief that Aquinas's philosophy of being is a/the foundation for the “nucleus of philosophical ideas, which are regularly present in the history of human reflection...for example, the principles of non-contradiction, of finality and causality, as well as the concept of the person as free and intelligent subject, and of her capacity to know God, the truth and the good...(and) certain moral norms, above all those which are common to everyone” (4). (Neo)-Thomistic philosophers and theologians have rounded this recommendation into the combination of a metaphysics of presence, a conceptualist cognitional theory, an epistemology of direct or immediate realism, and a natural law ethics. This is an approach that – even apart from questions about its philosophical soundness – would adopt Aquinas's thought as a closed, indeed obsolete, system, potentially acceptable only within the cloisters of Catholic seminaries and (some) Catholic universities.

But to follow Aquinas's own method for reconciling faith and reason would require developing a theology (1) based upon research into both the sources of Christian revelation and at least the principal representatives of modern and contemporary philosophy, (2) developed through an empathetic interpretation of seminal texts from either side and unfettered discussion of all crucial and disputed
questions, (3) supported by informed histories of both philosophical and doctrinal developments and synthesized in systematic and comprehensive theories, (4) founded upon the quest for self-knowledge and its methodological implications, and (5) motivated from first to last by a commitment to addressing contemporary problems: scientific, political, social, cultural, and moral. In this approach, the function of theology remains, as always, to grasp and communicate the import of divine revelation for the problems and opportunities presented by contemporary culture. But in order to communicate effectively the import of divine revelation for contemporary culture, it would also require theologians to familiarize themselves with contemporary philosophers (and social scientists as well), both to critically appropriate the notable contributions for which John Paul II lauded them and to assess for themselves the deficiencies he criticized in their work. In addition, they would need to assess and balance the import of both revealed and secular sources before integrating the lessons to be learned from them into an intelligible and appealing synthesis for addressing contemporary problems and opportunities.

Yet in the over seven hundred years separating us from Aquinas the demands of scholarship have increased exponentially with an explosion of specialization in all fields of study, including theology and philosophy. Therefore, although anyone interested in reconciling faith and reason must have a passing familiarity with the specialties in both fields, no one today can pretend to master both fields in their panoply of specializations. To match Aquinas’s polymathic genius in marshaling functionally successive components into a coherent and comprehensive theology, contemporary Catholic theologians and philosophers must learn how to collaborate with one another by finding for themselves a congenial niche in something like one of the set of functional specialties that Bernard Lonergan has designed (or recognized) for accomplishing the complex and collaborative task of theology.\textsuperscript{86} Not simply by repeating or recasting Aquinas’s philosophical theories, but rather by adopting his method of study, can contemporary Catholic philosophers and theologians most effectively emulate his success in reconciling faith and reason.

Finally, the most profound conjunction between John Paul's depiction of philosophy in *Fides et Ratio* and Thomas Aquinas's philosophy is their mutual belief in the foundation of philosophy in self-knowledge. It is not clear, however, that they had precisely the same conception of with self-knowledge as the foundation of philosophy. John Paul seems to have had an informal conception of self-knowledge as a reaction-formation in the human endeavor to understand the world about us, as when he says, “The more man comes to know the world and its affairs, the more he learns to understand himself in his own uniqueness” (1), or “These fundamental conceptions (that is, those universal elements of knowing which give him the ability to understand himself better and which lead to the advancement of his own perfection”) arise from that wonder which the contemplation of created realities excites in him” (4). But Aquinas had a formal theory of self-knowledge as arising in the consciousness of every act of understanding or willing, developing into objective knowledge of the mind through an analysis of the intentional objects of understanding and willing, and confirmed by reflection upon the implicit orientation of the mind to being in the quest of the intellect for truth and the will for goodness.

Yet both Aquinas and John Paul conceived of self-knowledge as not essentially a theoretical construct but an existential quest and a possible achievement. For both of them it originates in our activities of knowing and loving: Aquinas emphasized the consciousness of the intentionality of the acts; John Paul the intentionality of the consciousness of the acts. For both of them this common-sensical and fundamental self-knowledge can be articulated theoretically. For Aquinas, the theory concerns the human subject in its subjectivity: either categorially, in a philosophical analysis of the mind in terms of the intentional objects of its acts, or transcendentally, in a (ultimately theological) reflection upon the implicit orientation of the mind, through knowing the truth and loving the good, to being itself. For John Paul, the theory concerns the human subject in its objectivity: the self-awareness prompted by knowing the world raises “those primary questions by which human life is marked out: Who Am I? Where do I come from? Where am I going? Why do evils appear? What remains to us after this life?” (1). But certainly for Aquinas and presumably
also for John Paul, the basic self-knowledge implicit in every act of understanding or willing remains the gauge for judging the validity of any theory of self-knowledge and indeed the methodological soundness of any comprehensive philosophy. Clearly, the most important value of Aquinas’s philosophy is to remind us that task of philosophy is not primarily the acquisition of historical or theoretical knowledge but the deepening and sharpening of our personal self-knowledge as a medium for engaging in both historical and theoretical knowledge – on the supernatural as well as the natural level. Only to the extent we reconcile faith and reason in our personal lives can we hope to propose a cogent theory for the reconciliation of faith and reason.
BEYOND NEGOTIATION: 
COMBATANTS FOR PEACE AND 
AUTHENTIC SUBJECTIVITY 
IN THE ISRAELI-PALESTINIAN CONFLICT

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But this course of human progress...has taken place through the oscillations of the shorter cycle, in which social groups become factions, in which nations go to war, in which the hegemony passes from one center to another to leave its former holders with proud memories and impotent dreams. No less does it exhibit the successive lower viewpoints of the longer cycle.¹

1. INTRODUCTION

The purpose of this paper is to discuss a research study that I conducted with members of the Israeli-Palestinian group, Combatants for Peace, in light of Lonergan’s heuristic structure of human development. The study itself is a much larger work that includes multiple themes and domains. For the purposes of this paper I will focus on the problems of group and general bias in prolonged conflict and will interpret the study findings within a transformative framework using Lonergan’s metaphysics of human development. I would like to suggest that a lens of political negotiation to violent conflict is insufficient and that a sustainable solution must be grounded in the development of authentic subjectivity.

2. GROUP BIAS AND CONFLICT

Group bias,\(^2\) for Lonergan, is a type of bias in which one group acts for its own advantage while ignoring the questions and insights that would benefit other groups.

New ideas that are not favorable to the group in power are either excluded or damaged through compromise. He describes group bias as influencing shorter cycles of decline in which a succession of groups in power make operative only those insights that are deemed favorable to their own interest. The actualization of group-centric insights are cyclical, with shifts of power from one group to another and a corresponding implementation of different ideas. Lonergan distinguishes shorter cycles of decline related to the transient omissions of group bias from the longer cycle of decline related to the general bias of common sense which renders insights inoperative that are deemed not practical. He argues that general bias, the human tendency to focus on day-to-day problems and avoid long-term considerations, is pervasive to all societies and ultimately, more ominous.

The shorter cycle turns upon ideas that are neglected by dominant groups only to be championed later by depressed groups. The longer cycle is characterized by the neglect of ideas to which all groups are rendered indifferent by the general bias of common sense.\(^3\)

The shorter cycles of decline do not exist in a vacuum. The desire for group advantage can be intensified by competition for scarce resources. Unequal distribution of goods by groups in power can lead to simmering resentment and anger. Deep psychological wounds related to inter-group conflict exacerbate fears of the Other. Latent mistrust and stereotypes can be manipulated by the powerful who provoke inter-group tensions in order to promote their own benefit. Outside national interests may favor one group over another in order to profit themselves. And groups within groups play out their own power struggles leading to complex knots of unauthenticity and diminished intelligibility. All too often these conditions lead to the eruption of violent conflict.

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\(^2\) Insight, 247-50.

\(^3\) Insight, 252.
But I would suggest that while shorter cycles of decline related to group conflict often emerge from group bias and the conditions that exacerbate inter-group tensions, the historical trajectory of such shorter periods of decline as running in *recurring* and often less coherent cycles is a function of not only group but general bias (see Figure 1). These persistent cycles of inter-group tensions emerge from our ongoing failure to authentically address group bias itself and the underlying conditions that influence group bias and violent conflict.

Additionally, the cyclical group conflicts that drive the shorter periods of decline contribute to the destructive tendencies of the longer cycle. Lonergan notes that in the presence of group bias, because what is advantageous to one group is often disadvantageous to another, "some part of the energies of all groups is diverted to the supererogatory activity of devising and implementing offensive and defensive mechanisms." When a portion of the insights and actions of all groups are directed toward offensive and defensive mechanisms, this "practical" diversion of human energy feeds into the longer cycle of decline, by taking energies away from long-term development and towards destruction.

Lastly, through its preoccupation with offensive and defensive mechanisms, the human race constitutes itself with a culture of war. This impedes individual and collective authenticity, furthering both shorter and longer cycles of decline.

Lonergan argues that group bias "tends to generate its own corrective." But the corrective of one group bias that emerges from another group bias is not sustainable. The conclusion that groups will be groups; that group bias will continue to turn the wheels of power, and the acceptance of the human suffering that goes along with those turns is itself a judgment influenced by general bias. And the response to resolve these ongoing shorter oscillations will not be found in championing this group or that group but by the authentic development of a higher viewpoint of human understanding that takes responsibility for stopping these cycles and advancing the historical human good for *all* groups.

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4 *Insight*, 249.
5 *Insight*, 260.
3. THE ISRAELI-PALESTINIAN CONFLICT

This understanding is particularly critical in efforts to resolve the Israeli-Palestinian conflict because of its unique history. The anguish of the Palestinian people, living under decades of military occupation, follows the torment and attempted annihilation of the Jewish people by the Nazi regime. The histories of these two peoples are inextricably linked and viewed through the communal lens of the Holocaust for the Jews and the Nakba, or catastrophe, for the Palestinians. The conflict exists within a context of two millennia of anti-Semitism, so carefully chronicled by author James Carroll, and an eruption of Islamophobia following the events of 9/11 and the so-called war on terror. It is critical that interventions to address this conflict do not provoke further group biases which allow that dangerous cycle to repeat itself. We must find a way to make insights operative that are to the advantage of both groups.

One of the myths surrounding the Israeli-Palestinian conflict is that by advocating for one side we will have abandoned the other. But we do not need to choose between Israelis and Palestinians. Authentic peace building is a choice for both peoples.Repeated political efforts to resolve this conflict have failed, with devastating consequences. Typically these efforts have revolved around international negotiations; some that have reached a stage of formal agreement and others that have not. The word “negotiation” has a variety of definitions and the field of negotiation suggests a range of strategies. Common to these characterizations is the important role of communication, such as in the definition proposed by Moffitt and Bordone, “Back-and-forth communication designed to reach an agreement between two or more parties with some interests that are shared and others that may conflict or simply be different.”

Lonergan discusses the importance of communication as a functional specialty. But as a functional specialty, communication follows the other specialties of research, interpretation, history,

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Beyond Negotiation: Combatants for Peace

dialectic, foundations, doctrines and systematics. Critical to this sequence is that communication is the output of a system that is responding authentically to a contemporary challenge within a historical trajectory. Unless the communication of negotiation has emerged from such a process it will never be equal to the task at hand.

Lonergan notes that, “at each turn of the wheel of insight, proposal, action, new situation, and fresh insight, the tendency of group bias is to exclude some fruitful ideas and to mutilate others by compromise.” Negotiation, when it is not based on authentic subjectivity, but instead reflects the biases of self, group or practical interest, may lead to the compromise of good ideas. Indeed, the underlying biases and conflicting viewpoints of the multiple factions within both sides of the Israeli-Palestinian conflict have effectively prevented a coherent set of authentic decisions, thus impeding the negotiation of a political settlement.

The emergent probability of processes of agreement and decision function as schemes of recurrence in the political structure. But just as such processes can inform the good of order toward progress, they can also lead to decline.

... as crises multiply and remedies have less effect, new schemes are introduced; feverish effort is followed by listlessness; the situation becomes regarded as hopeless...10

If the political process of agreement and decision is not based on an authentic interpretation of history, the contemporary situation and human needs and potential, the wrong schemes may be introduced. In the context of the Israeli-Palestinian conflict, with its devastating cycle of violence, new schemes are urgently needed that are based on a critical analysis of the emergent probability of human relations and the peace that emerges from the human dignity of collective good wills.

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9 *Insight*, 251.
10 *Insight*, 235.
4. COMBATANTS FOR PEACE

Combatants for Peace (CFP) was started in 2005 by Israelis and Palestinians who had been active participants in the cycle of violence. Israeli founders of the group had served in the Israeli Defense Forces (IDF) and Palestinian founders had been involved in violent resistance on behalf of the Palestinian struggle for freedom. These individuals joined together in a commitment to renounce violence and to use joint non-violent activities to advance peace. Their mission statement affirms, "We see dialogue and reconciliation as the only way to act in order to terminate the Israeli occupation, to halt the settlement project and to establish a Palestinian state with its capital in East Jerusalem, alongside the State of Israel."11 Based on their awareness, understanding, and judgments about the conflict, the group has declared, "Therefore we have decided to act together in the following ways."12 Activities that have emerged from this joint decision include reflective dialogue, public education lectures in which members of the group share their personal stories, solidarity activities in the West Bank such as helping shepherds reach their fields safely, and non-violent civil demonstrations.

On its website, CFP describes itself as a “movement.” The choice of this word is significant, especially in light of its goals which are the following:

- To raise the consciousness in both publics regarding the hopes and suffering of the other side, and to create partners in dialogue.
- To educate towards reconciliation and non-violent struggle in both the Israeli and Palestinian societies.
- To create political pressure on both Governments to stop the cycle of violence, end the occupation and resume a constructive dialogue.13

The goals “to raise consciousness,” “to educate,” “to create partners,” and “to create political pressure” are developmental goals.

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11 Combatants for Peace web site (Retrieved 8/2/10) http://cfpeace.org/.
12 Combatants for Peace web site (Retrieved 8/2/10) http://cfpeace.org/.
13 Combatants for Peace web site (Retrieved 8/2/10) http://cfpeace.org/.
In these goals we can appreciate a sense of individual and collective movement from unauthenticity toward authenticity. Faced with an empirical situation of ongoing violence, these individuals reached new understandings, judgments, and decisions about the conflict. And collectively they began to reach out to others to bring about change. As individual “systems on the move,” members of CFP have created an expanding mutually transformative movement, seeking to inspire a new consciousness in those around them.

From 2007-2009 I conducted a qualitative research study with members of CFP to better understand how these individuals had made the decision to commit to non-violence and join the group. The study was conducted within the framework of transcendent pluralism\(^{14}\) which is described below. To conduct the research I used an explicit application of Lonergan’s transcendental method\(^{15}\) called Transcendental Method for Research with Human Subjects that I had first developed in my dissertation as a method of progressive phenomenology for the human sciences.\(^{16}\) Use of transcendental method in this fashion involves guiding research participants into interiority through reflective questions that focus on eliciting data of consciousness within the operations of experiencing, understanding, judging, and deciding. Data from multiple subjects are then analyzed and related to each other. There were eighteen participants in the study. Eight of these were Israeli and ten were Palestinian. The full results of this study are being analyzed in a separate manuscript.\(^{17}\) In this paper I will consider certain aspects of the study results in relation to Lonergan’s metaphysics of human development.

5. TRANSCENDENT PLURALISM

Transcendent pluralism is an emerging theory that seeks to address


\(^{15}\) *Method in Theology*.

\(^{16}\) Perry, *Transcendent Pluralism and the Evolution of the Human Spirit*.

problems related to human devaluation through the advance of human dignity. The framework has been described in detail elsewhere but a few points will be noted briefly here. In this framework, humanity is viewed as an emerging historical community in which dignity evolves through personal decisions and mutually transformative relationships. Human dignity is defined in transcendent pluralism as, “value in personhood.” And personhood is defined as “the unique wholeness of human identity that has intrinsic value in being and a developmental value that reaches fulfillment in the conscious development of good will.” Human dignity encompasses the value of each person in his or her being and becoming. Critical to this definition is that our own dignity is inextricably linked with that of others and treating others with dignity reflects the manifestation of our own dignity.

Within transcendent pluralism, three types of outcomes of human actions are considered. The first type of outcome is the “empirical effect” in the world. The second outcome, following Lonergan, is the “self-constituting effect” of our decisions on our own authenticity. And the third outcome, a critical component of transcendent pluralism, is the “transformative effect” of our actions on the authenticity of others.

This framework calls for us to consider each decision in both a contemporary and historical context with respect to whether an action is likely to achieve empirical good, to help us advance our own good will, and to help others develop good will.

Group bias in this theory is understood as a failure to universally affirm human dignity for all persons. Group bias proceeds from an incomplete development in intelligence, resulting in a judgment that one group of persons is of lesser value than another. But following the definition above, the devaluation of others is also a devaluation of ourselves and a failure to fulfill our own capacity for human dignity.

Group bias places limitations on the outcomes anticipated in

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19 Perry, Catholic Supporters of Same Gender Marriage, 61.
20 Perry, Catholic Supporters of Same Gender Marriage, 69-72.
21 Method in Theology, 38.
22 Perry, Catholic Supporters of Same Gender Marriage, 65-73.
23 Perry, Catholic Supporters of Same Gender Marriage, 126-31.
transcendent pluralism. It has negative effects on the empirical reality of the social situation, not only through neglect of the possibilities of concrete plurality, but through the institution of unauthentic and unintelligible schemes that result in destruction, bloodshed, and human suffering. It diminishes the authenticity of the members of the group(s) holding the bias by lessening their capacity to act with good will. And it leads to a deformative rather than transformative effect on the victims of group bias, often resulting in resentment, hatred, and revenge.24

One of the central understandings in transcendent pluralism is that our encounters with difference can play a critical role in our personal transcendence. In the paper below I hope to demonstrate that genuine pluralistic human relations can play a critical and collective transcendence. It is through such mutually transformative encounters that a healing transformation based in human dignity can come about.

6. LONERGAN AND HUMAN DEVELOPMENT

Lonergan argues that organic, psychic, and intellectual development of the human person are interwoven processes in which organic development is integrated by psychic development, and psychic development is in turn provided a higher integration through intellectual processes.25 Each level functions through the laws particular to the capacity of that particular level. The processes on the higher psychic and intellectual levels relate to “systems on the move,”26 and Lonergan correlates this movement with existential discovery. Such a view of development, then, is related to the journey and higher purpose of the human person.

Human development is described by Lonergan as a genetic process within a set of five heuristic categories.27 He describes the first category, the individual unity of the person, as a given and the remaining four categories as “laws.” These include the laws of effect, integration, limitation and transcendence, and genuineness.

24 Perry, Catholic Supporters of Same Gender Marriage, 129-32.
25 Insight, 494.
26 Insight, 494.
27 Insight, 494-504.
Lonergan's use of the word "law" is curious given that while he describes finality as a "directed dynamism"\textsuperscript{28} (italics mine), this directed dynamism is not predetermined. But perhaps some clarity around the term "law" can be obtained in light of Pat Byrne's discussion of Lonergan's description of classical law in science.\textsuperscript{29} Even the classical laws of nature are conditioned by other processes and entities. For example, while the process of photosynthesis in plants follows a particular sequence of events, the cycle is dependent upon both light and water. Lonergan's laws of human development can be understood not as guaranteeing fixed outcomes but as emergent probabilities, dependent on the cumulative realization of other possibilities, of which human attentiveness, intelligence, reasonableness, and responsibility are key components.

These five categories provide a useful heuristic structure to understand human growth. In the following sections I will discuss this heuristic structure using illustrations from the data of consciousness that emerged in the study findings. While Lonergan discusses human development in relation to the individual person, these laws can also be understood as operative within the community as a larger unity. In the following sections I will apply the structure to the individual level, then at the level of CFP, and finally at the level of the larger Israeli-Palestinian society.

\textbf{7. HUMAN DEVELOPMENT AND THE INDIVIDUAL}

\textbf{7.1 Unity}

Lonergan describes the human person within the category of things to be understood as a "unity, identity, whole in data."\textsuperscript{30} The person is an individual who is comprised of the totality of his or her dimensions and all the events that have occurred to that individual over time. In the context of development this unity is comprised of various "conjugates":

\textsuperscript{28} \textit{Insight}, 473.
\textsuperscript{29} Patrick Byrne, "Intelligibility and Natural Science: Alienation or Friendship with the Universe?" Paper presented at 37\textsuperscript{th} Annual Lonergan Workshop, Boston College, June 22, 2010.
\textsuperscript{30} \textit{Insight}, 271.
physical, chemical, organic, psychological, and intellectual. These conjugates ground a variety of patterns of human behaviors that occur within what Lonergan calls "flexible circles of ranges of schemes of recurrence."31

Among the CFP research participants, awareness of the conflict can be interpreted as perceived actual or potential threat to the unity of person and community. Experiences of violence, destruction, suffering, and death were interpreted as personal and communal threats. Disruption of unity could relate to the various physical or psychological conjugates of the individual or disruption to the schemes of recurrence anticipated by these conjugates. Communal identity, whether Palestinian or Israeli, was also considered an important part of one's unity. And the Israeli and Palestinian communities were perceived as larger unities in themselves.

Palestinian participants described significant losses: physical, psychological, loved ones, houses, and land. For example, one participant described a physical deprivation after being wounded from a shooting as well as a psychological loss related to missing his brother, who was murdered. Several Palestinian participants described sorrow over the absence of loved ones who were imprisoned for resistance activities. Some Israeli participants also described losses, such as an injury from military training and the bereavement of friends who did not come home after the 1973 war.

For both Israelis and Palestinians, the family, community, home, and land were considered important elements of the person as extended across space and time. Place was viewed as an integral part of one's people, both one's present home and historical memory. The intimate attachment to the land can be appreciated in the Hebrew scriptural verse, "If I forget thee, Jerusalem, let my right hand wither."32 A similar deep connection can be found in the words of Palestinian poet, Mahmoud Darwish. In his poem, "I Am There" Darwish laments:

> I come from there and remember...
> I have traversed the land before swords turned bodies into banquets.
> I come from there, I return the sky to its mother when for its

31 *Insight*, 495.
32 Psalm 137:5.
mother the sky cries, and I weep for a returning cloud to know me.  

One of the Palestinian study participants described the confiscation of family land as a significant loss for him and his family. This occurrence severed the physical connection from the family to the land as well as disrupted the schemes of recurrence related to their use of the land.

I understood the nature of the conflict when I find that a huge parts of our lands in [our village] was confiscated by the settlers and the Israeli military forces. They put a fence around it and they confiscated it completely and forbid us from using it.

–Palestinian member of CFP

Israeli participants in the research study described concerns about potential loss of land. The conflict was viewed as a threat to national existence.

As an Israeli kid... I didn’t understand why the Arabs, don’t like us. And... why they want to take our country.

–Israeli member of CFP

In addition to actual physical privations, the conflict also created disruptions in the schemes of recurrence. For Palestinians, the barriers and checkpoints of the occupation caused significant disruption to the schemes in the good of order such as education, health care, and livelihoods. Israeli participants did not face such restrictions, but there were some alterations in daily routine related to security concerns. For example, one Israeli member of the group described the impact of suicide bombings on travel by bus. In this case, the actual scheme still took place, that is, the bus still ran on schedule, but the perceived potential of a suicide bomber created a psychological constraint in the effective freedom to use the bus.

Ever since I was twelve; every time I go on a bus the first thing I do is look at everyone, just take a look at everyone sitting on the bus and see if there is someone suspicious. And if there

is; I am getting off the bus.... Because that’s what happens in Israel... You could explode in buses.

—IIsraeli member of CFP

Initial response to the conflict described by study participants was generally within formal or informal schemes of recurrence that had already been put into place to protect or restore unity of person, one’s people, and one’s land. Personal involvement in the conflict’s cycle of violence can be viewed as the linking of one’s personal identity with the larger identity of one’s society and efforts toward community preservation or restoration. Israeli participants spoke of being educated from a very young age about the need to defend one’s people – and the inevitable military service that awaited them. For Palestinians, participating in violent resistant activities, was deeply connected with the desire to do good for one’s community, which was strongly linked with personal identity.

I’m started my struggle when I am 13 years old; I go to the jail when I am 15 years old. There is connection between my question about my personal identity and the national identity.

—Palestinian member of CFP

Several of the Israeli participants indicated that the perspective of Palestinian loss was omitted from the narrative they learned from their received tradition. The unity achieved by reclaiming their historical land had a blind spot related to the meaning that the same land held for someone else.

Lonergan describes the relations of one person with another within the dramatic pattern using an analogy of an onion in which one gradually reveals oneself in the manner that successive layers of an onion are peeled back, “so that one is aloof with strangers, courteous with acquaintances, at ease with one’s friends, occasionally unbossoms oneself to intimates, keeps some matters entirely to oneself, and refuses even to face others.”34 A major challenge with the Israeli-Palestinian context is that the relational barriers in the dramatic pattern are not merely between strangers but between enemies. And the “layers” have been sealed not only by the unwillingness of an individual to disclose

34 Insight, 495.
but by an outer rind that is coated in myth. The prevailing stereotypes are fueled by fears related to past damages that have been inflicted by one side on the other. The actual wounds of empirical experience become intertwined with and distorted by the cobwebs of illusion.

There are obstacles to communication at the level of the physical conjugates related to concrete separation of the peoples as well as at the psychological and intellectual levels related to fear and myth. Achieving understanding requires overcoming these barriers so that people from each side can come together to reveal their own meaning and honor the meaning of the sufferings, dreams, and hopes of the Other. This is not simply a matter of one person making a decision around personal disclosure. Peeling back the layers requires mutual decisions on behalf of the one who reveals and the one who perceives.

The founders of CFP had to initiate and work through that process together as a small group of individuals. As the organization grew, schemes of recurrence were designed in such a way that brought people of the two sides together physically and then facilitated the processes of revealing and honoring meaning through mutual reflection, storytelling, and dialogue. Participants in the study indicated that this was transformative in uncovering the layers that advanced self knowledge as well as knowledge of the Other. Together the layers of the onion were peeled back as individuals from one side revealed to the Other the underlying manifolds comprising each unique unity.

7.2 Law of Effect

As the human person develops there are shifts and expansions in the flexible ranges in the schemes of recurrence. Higher integrations on the intellectual level modify the underlying manifolds while the changing underlying manifolds evoke alterations in the higher integration. Lonergan argues that within the law of effect, development occurs along the lines in which it has been successful. Unless one asks further questions and gains new insights one will not advance in knowledge.35 The law of effect can be appreciated in the ongoing cycle of violence in the Israeli-Palestinian conflict. New questions, insights, and creative solutions are desperately needed in order to break out of this pattern.

35 Insight, 495-96.
For the study participants, personal experiences raised new questions and led them to reflect on how to break this cycle.

The human person needn't be merely a passive recipient of occurrences. One can also deliberately seek the experiences that will lead to new insights. "Because one wants to develop, one can frequent the lectures and read the books that put the further questions and help one to learn." Some participants described purposely seeking out experiences that would expand their understanding of the conflict. One Israeli participant described deciding to attend a seminar because he realized that he needed a catalyst to become more active in addressing the conflict. He made a decision to learn – anticipating that it would lead to a decision to act. Meeting Palestinians at a workshop shifted his scale of values such that becoming involved in peace building became a higher priority.

I participated in an Israeli-Palestinian seminar for two weeks. But I can say that I went to the seminar with the feeling that I need a trigger. To become more involved. So I would say I wanted to be involved but it was somehow not important enough... I needed a trigger. And that trigger was the seminar and meeting those people.

—Israeli member of CFP

The development of new insights leading to new actions also requires additional skills and the willingness to undergo a period of awkward functioning until such skills are developed. For example, participants spoke about the need to learn the practice of nonviolence as a new way of responding to the conflict.

7.3 Law of Integration

The law of integration indicates that development may be initiated by one of any number of sources but through the principle of correspondence, an initiated development must be integrated with the other levels of the person for successful completion. The initiation of development may be from one of the internal conjugates of the person on the organic, psychic or intellectual levels or it could emerge through external circumstances such as material situations or the influence of

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36 Insight, 495.
other people. Healthy development of the person as a unified being, however, requires that a new development become integrated in the functional unity of the person.37

For participants in the study, the decision to join CFP was influenced by multiple prior experiences. These included external experiences such as witnessing the consequences of violence, personal encounters with the Other that challenged stereotypes, or the inspirational example of role models. Interior experiences were also described such as feelings of being "bothered" about injustice, worries about repetitive or worsening violence, a desire to fulfill one's dreams that were being inhibited by the situation, or a longing for peace.

Practical and moral insights led to judgments of fact and judgments of value informing the decision to commit to nonviolence. For example, several Palestinian participants described that witnessing the horrific cycle of violence during the second Intifada led them to reflect on the Islamic teaching not to kill innocent people. Several spoke explicitly against the suicide bombings and the loss of innocent life. They realized that they needed to find a nonviolent path so that their resistance to the occupation would be consistent with their Islamic faith. And on a practical level, they realized that their desire for Palestinian freedom could not be achieved through violent struggle. Similarly, Israeli participants described making moral judgments about the injustice and violence of the occupation and the practical judgment that the occupation was exacerbating a cycle of violence. The decisions to adopt nonviolence and join CFP provided a way to integrate practical and moral judgments in a manner that was consistent with values and desires.

Several participants described having reached a state of internal readiness that led them to respond affirmatively when invited by a current member to attend a group event. For most of the participants, the decision to commit to nonviolence and the decision to join CFP were separate, although interrelated. And these decisions did not necessarily come in the same order. The examples of two members of the group illustrate the principle of correspondence initiated through two different pathways. One of the Israeli members of the group described making the decision to refuse to serve in the Occupied territories, some

37 Insight, 496-97.
years before the formation of CFP. His subsequent involvement in the group emerged through a need to extend his sentiments of refusal into productive activity to end the occupation itself and to change the social situation. For another participant, the decision to join CFP came first. While serving in the occupied territories during the second Intifada he was disturbed by the violence he saw perpetuated by the IDF. He described knowing in advance that he would need to make a decision to refuse. Joining the group helped provide the foundation and support which then helped him to take that next step. He knew that to be a member of CFP and to continue to serve in the occupied territories would be morally inconsistent.

7.4 Law of Limitation and Transcendence

The law of limitation and transcendence relates to the tension of the human person as an organism responding to stimuli on the sensory and sensitive levels of biology and psychology while at the same time being an intelligent organism seeking higher understanding of sensory experiences. This tension never fully disappears and part of the work of the intellect is not to eliminate but to integrate the underlying organic and psychic manifolds within a higher understanding. For example, one of the study participants compared violence to an instinctive response, such as eating. To use nonviolence one had to move beyond one’s basic biological instincts of stimuli and response. This did not mean that one ignored the conflict and the experiences of violence and suffering but that one responded to them in a new way. Biological reflexes needed to be transformed into a higher rational response that sought nonviolent solutions.

The most easy solution for your hunger is to eat. And it’s very easy for you to use the violence . . . And the most difficult thing is to find the solutions for this kind of conflict . . . the nonviolence is the most difficult thing.

-Palestinian member of CFP

The law of limitation and transcendence reflects the inherent tension of human development between the subject as he or she is at present and the potential for what one can be. “its point of departure
necessarily is the subject as he happens to be; but its direction is against his remaining as he is."\footnote{Insight, 497.} This tension can be appreciated in some of the challenges that participants described to their work which included both logistical challenges as well as internal and external dialectical challenges.

Lonergan notes that transcendence requires the human person to break away from the inertia and old patterns of his or her prior stage of development. Study participants described the need to overcome deeply held attitudes towards the Other. Palestinian participants described internal challenges related to sitting down with Israeli ex-soldiers, their former enemies. Israeli participants described needing to overcome years of education dominated by the prevailing Israeli narrative about the conflict and deeply held negative cultural stereotypes about Palestinians.

Internal challenges related to overcoming past patterns of behavior were complicated by external events such as violent provocation and societal disapproval. The participants' experiences illustrate that the psychic tension of transcendence can be exacerbated and prolonged by an unaccepting environment, suggesting that successfully navigating the law of limitation and transcendence may require overcoming unauthenticities in one's own culture. For example, participants' spoke of needing to resist the culture of violence around them.

The movement beyond one's current horizon requires a willingness to step beyond one's comfort zone and overcome fears. Lonergan notes, "Present desires and fears have to be transmuted, and the transmutation is not desirable to present desire but fearful to present fear."\footnote{Insight, 497.} Members of CFP needed to overcome the limitations of internalized fears in order to take part in the group. One member of the group discussed her fear of going to the West Bank and the way that she came to understand those fears and weigh the risks involved. Overcoming fear, for this participant was a \textit{decision}.

We need . . . to stop being afraid if we want peace. We need to understand that there are humans from the other side and they are afraid of us as well. I think that fear is the best weapon. . . .
So. You just need to, to (pause) to decide it. That's it. That you're not frightened anymore.

- Israeli member of CFP

7.5 Law of Genuineness

Lastly is the law of genuineness which involves bringing the tension between human limitation and transcendence into consciousness. The success of conscious development, "demands correct apprehensions of its starting point, its process, and its goal." Genuineness involves a critical interior reflection of oneself as one is in relation to one's apprehension of an ideal self.

Responses of the study participants suggested genuineness in the willingness to critically reflect on and respond to inner tension related to one's role in the conflict, the decision to adopt nonviolence, and the associated difficulties inherent in that decision. For example, one participant indicated that he continued to submit his decision to refuse military service to a genuine reflection.

You hear other things that make you think, "Is it right? Is it worthwhile?" And after my refusal, at least at the beginning I was seriously destabilized by the severity of the attacks. So, at that time certainly I was, "Was it right? Was it wrong?" And I kept saying to myself, it's OK. These kind of decisions, if you don't re-think them, then you're lying to yourself . . . . It's good to put these doubts out in the open every once in a while. Reconsider them.

- Israeli member of CFP

Ultimately this participant was able to reaffirm his decision based on interior reflection.

But I kept saying to myself: "Look inside. You know that this is right. They can use all kind of discourses, strategy. In the end of the day this occupation is just not right. And there's no way to make it right." And so I think after the initial storm, it's a little bit, more quiet inside, I was - I don't want to say happy... I was

41 Insight, 500.
content with the fact that I did something I thought was right even though it was extremely difficult, scary.

–Israeli member of CFP

The study findings suggest that the genuineness of critical interior reflection was an important process that helped participants to make their initial decision and then sustain them in meeting the challenges of nonviolence. Their commitment was supported by internal deliberation on the incompatibility of violence with perceived ideals of morality and the vision of an improved future for themselves and their societies. Genuine self reflection about their decision led to the conviction that they had chosen the right path.

8. DEVELOPMENT AND COMBATANTS FOR PEACE

8.1 Combatants for Peace as a New Unity

The heuristic structure of human development can be used to explore development on not only the individual level but on a group or community level as well.42 The emergence of CFP involved development of the group as a new unity of human relations with its own identity. Participants saw the very existence of the group, with its joint Israeli-Palestinian membership, as a concrete achievement. The decision to work together collectively as one organization emerged from a difficult process of reflection and dialogue, culminating in a joint affirmation of unity.

One of the biggest disagreement that we agree after all of that is our goals. We are one part. It's not two parts, Israelis and Palestinians. As a one part. We are Combatants for Peace. . . . That was so hard for beginning.

–Palestinian member of CFP

The relations between members of the group deepened over time, and participants described moving from seeing the other person as an enemy to a human being and beyond that as a partner and, in many cases, a friend. A number of participants in the study spoke of

42 Perry, Catholic Supporters of Same Gender Marriage, 155-57.
the importance of the group as a whole and that ultimately future achievement related to the power of the group.

My personal role must be within the whole group. So the achievement will be in the name of the group, not in the name of the persons. Individual activity and influence is very good and big but within the group it will be bigger.

—Palestinian member of CFP

8.2 Law of Effect – A Network of Encouragement

In the current context, Israelis and Palestinians had very little opportunities to interact with one another. Palestinians were restricted from coming into Israel proper unless they had a permit, which was difficult to get. Most Palestinians’ experiences of meeting Israelis were limited to soldiers and settlers. Israelis could only visit a few areas of the West Bank and very few chose to do so because of their fears. Thus, Israelis had little or no access to Palestinian life and their understanding of Palestinians was largely mediated by the cultural stereotypes in their received tradition. One of the critical functions of CFP was to create new schemes of recurrence in which Palestinians and Israelis could move beyond current comfort zones to share new experiences and reach a new level of joint understanding and functioning.

Additionally, members of the group made operative insights that had previously been deemed inoperative due to individual, group, and general bias. They developed new schemes of recurrence such as regular meetings, through which encounters would recur and reflective relationships could be developed and fostered. They also helped members to develop the skills needed at this new level of functioning by holding activities such as workshops on nonviolent resistance.

Being active in the group required moving beyond one’s comfort level to speak with the “enemy” and overcoming fears based on both myths and actual threats. Participants indicated that the relations and support of members within the group helped individual members to overcome these fears. The transition to a new direction and level of successful functioning was thus accomplished within a network of transformative solidarity. The importance of support from others can be appreciated in Lonergan’s emphasis on being “encouraged out of shyness, timidity,
pretended indifference, to zest and risk and doing...." For example, one of the Palestinian participants spoke of the initial difficulty of sitting with an ex-soldier – his enemy. The commitment of that former Israeli soldier helped him overcome that barrier.

It was not easy for me to work together with an ex-soldier which was considered all the time that he is my enemy, and the enemy of my people. But the commitment of this soldier with me in this kind of activities gave me the [ability] to pass by this challenge and to work together.

—Palestinian member of CFP

8.3 A Window for Integration and Implementation

Through integration, the initiation of development within individuals led to corresponding changes in the person and ultimately these changes were communicated by word and deed as members of the group influenced others toward similar development through the transformative effect described above. This communication is consistent with Lonergan’s depiction of the role that external sources play in the initiation of development through “the discoveries of other minds and the decisions of other wills.”

A development which begins in one’s feelings must be perceived, understood and given expression in concrete tactics. Many of the participants described having already reached a certain level of awareness about the need for a nonviolent approach and in some cases had made the internal decision to take a different path, but there was not any structure in place at that time for them to realize their ideas. CFP provided that structure.

The participants’ responses illustrate the importance having organized networks of human relations and activities for both the initiation of development as well as the integration of that development into one’s daily life. In several cases, an invitation to join the group from an existing member was the initiative for a new member to join.

43 Insight, 496.
44 Perry, Catholic Supporters of Same Gender Marriage.
45 Insight, 496.
46 Insight, 496-97.
CFP also provided an organizational structure in which members could implement their insights and convictions in practical ways.

I used to be always against the violence and Combatants for Peace was the shelter for me to struggle, a shelter for me to realize my beliefs ... Before I joined the group I hadn't any... opportunity to pass my message but through Combatants for Peace I find the window or the gate to pass my message and my idea.

—Palestinian member of CFP

A critical element of group integration related to transmitting beliefs into action. This was important for integrated development on the individual level and also for group relations. For the individual, action was important for personal integrity. For example one Israeli participant said that it was not enough just to refuse to take part in atrocities being committed by his society. He had to "SHOUT."

The translation of personal beliefs into public action was also vital for building trust in the group. While dialogue was an important part of the group's process, Palestinian members of the group took care to emphasize that CFP was not a dialogue group. They explained that in Palestinian society, joint Israeli-Palestinian groups that meet for dialogue or cultural exchange alone are looked down upon as "normalization." CFP was not viewed as normalization because both the Palestinian and the Israeli members of the group were working actively to end the occupation. One Palestinian participant indicated that the presence of refusnik soldiers in the group was the critical factor that prompted him to join. The participant also said that the willingness of the Israeli members of the group to state their positions publicly and to demonstrate against the occupation led him to trust them. On the level of judgments of fact, the demonstration by Israeli members of successfully integrating their inner beliefs with their public action was the condition needed for Palestinian members to verify their trustworthiness.

Interestingly, the words "integrity" and "integrate" come from related Latin roots. "Integrity" comes from "integritās" meaning "soundness," "whole," or "complete" and "integrate" comes from
“integrātus” meaning “to make whole.” Thus the developmental process of integration involves making oneself whole by achieving consistency in one’s knowing and one’s active living. The judgment that one side (Israelis) could be trusted by the other side (Palestinians) was linked to their wholeness, or successful integration.

8.4 Moving Beyond Limitations toward Transcendence

The tension manifested in the law of limitation and transcendence reflects the restriction of one’s present habitual state that stands in opposition to the dynamism inherent in moving to a new level of functioning (Lonergan, 1957/2000). Lonergan notes that the realization of finality in human development is “not according to law...according to acquired habit...; on the contrary, it is a change in the law, the spontaneity, the habit, the scheme...” Navigating the law of limitation and transcendence involves breaking free of one’s old patterns. To end protracted violent conflict, patterns must be transformed on both the individual and community level in order to end the cycles of violence that all too often accompany the shorter cycles of decline. Study participants recognized that individuals on both sides were contributing to the cycle of violence and that to end the bloodshed, they needed to begin with themselves.

With the expanded viewpoint that emerges through intellectual development, Lonergan notes that an individual begins to view themselves as “an object coordinated with other objects and, with them, subordinated to some destiny to be discovered or invented, approved or disdained, accepted or repudiated.” The study participants expressed an understanding that the actions on both sides were contributing to a cycle of violence. This understanding led to a conscious decision to work together reasonably and responsibly to transform that cycle. There was a grasping of a mutual destiny, a rejection of the current trajectory of violence, and the intelligent creation of a joint vision of peace for both people along with the actions needed to bring about that historical change.

48 Insight, 497.
49 Insight, 498.
Although the focus of my research was more on the individual members rather than on the internal functioning of CFP as an organization, some participants did reflect on the challenges the organization faced as a whole. Participants identified a vision for areas of development that they would like to be realized in CFP. The movement toward transcendence was an ongoing process.

8.5 Being Genuine

Genuineness involves admitting the tension of limitation and transcendence into consciousness and honestly addressing the questions that arise in that process.

It does not brush questions aside, smother doubts, push problems down, escape . . . . It confronts issues, inspects them, studies their many aspects, works out their various implications, contemplates their concrete consequences in one's own life and the lives of others.50

One of the participants spoke about the challenges associated with being a member of CFP in that it required the willingness to move beyond the escapism in society to wrestle with very difficult questions. The schemes of recurrence established by the group included critical reflection and dialogue that fostered such genuineness. The deep relationships within the group created a level of trust through which members could support each other in this process. One of the central elements in the group process included members sharing their personal stories with each other and at public forums. The story format itself facilitated genuineness as each member described their personal trajectory from the “starting point” of experiences in the conflict, their initial response to those experiences, the interior “process” by which they came to new affirmations and actions, and a new understanding of their personal and collective “goal” as peacemakers.

50 *Insight*, 502.
9. DEVELOPMENT IN SOCIETY: AN INCOMPLETE INITIATION

Lonergan distinguishes between minor authenticity with regard to the individual and major unauthenticity in which a tradition itself has become unauthentic. In the context of a longstanding violent conflict with a cycle of violence perpetuated by both sides there were clearly major unauthenticities to be overcome in both cultures. Doran writes about the reflexive level of cultural value that arises within philosophy, theology, and science in order to influence the social infrastructure toward greater authenticity. The expression of these values forms a "superstructure." The emergence of the CFP, with its members working to transform the broader Israeli and Palestinian societies, has served the function of a grass roots superstructure. Lonergan's metaphysics of human development provides a helpful heuristic to understand this process, its achievements, and its limitations.

9.1 Israeli-Palestinian Society as Discordant Unity

An understanding of Israelis and Palestinians as part of a larger unity seems paradoxical. How could two societies entrenched in such a bloody conflict be considered a unity? An insight into this paradox can be found in Lonergan's statement that we find ourselves as objects who are but one part of the "universe of being." The whole already exists. What remains is for us to affirm ourselves as part of that whole – and to act accordingly. Unity, then, might be understood as potential, formal, or actual – a unity to be known through the existence of two peoples in a shared geography, a unity that is to be understood and a unity that is to be affirmed. Affirming that unity is integral to building peace. As observed by the Israeli author Amos Oz, "We are not alone in this land, and the Palestinians are not alone in this land.... Until Israelis and Palestinians recognize the logical consequences of this simple fact, we will all live in a permanent state of siege..." Viewing the two peoples as

51 Method in Theology, 80.
53 Insight, 529.
part of a larger unity is important not only for those within the conflict but for those outside because it helps us move beyond taking sides and to look at the conditions needed for peace within a larger whole.

The recognition of the two societies as part of a larger community can be understood as a “higher viewpoint” through which Lonergan says that lower manifolds come together. With a higher viewpoint we can understand that the current social situation can be traced to the historical and contemporary collective experiences, understandings, judgments and decisions of both people. The Israeli-Palestinian region is already a unity, albeit a deeply fragmented unity, bound together by geography, history and mutually destructive processes.

One might then question how a peace proposal for a two state solution could be conceived when viewing the two peoples as a “unity.” But the higher viewpoint of unity simply acknowledges the interrelated existence of the two peoples within a geographic space. The goal of two states existing peacefully envisions political borders based on helping the two people to transcend the dialectical differences that currently exist and to move towards complementary differences. The complementarity of two states does not need to be based on cooperative shared activities such as those within a functional specialization. Complementarity can be found in the respectful relations between two goods of order based on the needs and cultures of two different peoples. Areas of cooperative complementarity might develop with time. But the critical need at hand is to transcend current dialectical differences (dialectic will be discussed further below).

For the purposes of social analysis I suggest that it might be helpful to further distinguish complementary differences into a range from autonomous to collaborative types. These categories reflect the degree of cooperative functionality in interrelations. Differences can be complementary without necessarily being fully collaborative. Even if there is little to no interdependence in the Israeli and Palestinian systems, their smooth functioning, the meeting of needs for their respective peoples, and refraining from harming the schemes of the Other would contribute to a larger peaceful whole.

from web site http://www.nytimes.com/2010/06/02/opinion/02oz.html?ref=opinion&page wanted=print

55 Insight, 465.
9.2 The Law of Effect and the Community

Within the law of effect, if the Israeli and Palestinian societies are not open to new insights and the implementation of new practices, they will continue to function in old patterns of cycles of violence. Here the role of CFP has been to introduce new schemes that go beyond the group itself to the larger public such as house meetings, lectures, and civil demonstrations. Such events challenge the existing assumptions and views of the Other and the conflict.

In human affairs Lonergan notes that, “commonly accessible insights, disseminated by communication and persuasion, modify and adjust mentalities to determine the course of history out of the alternatives offered by emergent probability.”56 The word “persuasion” highlights that it is not enough merely to provide people with data. In order to “adjust mentalities” it is important to make the data compelling. Several participants said that as former fighters they had credibility in their respective societies and that the stories told by members of the group provided a powerful witness. One recounted an experience he had giving a lecture to high school students who were nearing the point of their military service. He heard later that the students described the event as “mind blowing.”

9.3 The Need for Integration

But just as the unity of a person requires new developments to be integrated on all levels of the person, change within one sector of a community calls forth change on other levels. At present, CFP can only be considered an initiated development, working to communicate a new consciousness but as yet without the complementary advances in the broader society.

CFP faces obstacles in their goal of persuading others. One of these is logistical. As a grassroots movement they are not integrated into the official good of order which means they do not have easy access to the schemes of recurrence by which information is regularly disseminated. And personal meetings between Israelis and Palestinians are very difficult due to the physical separation. Barriers to regular channels of communication impede the principle of correspondence. Still, they

56 Insight, 236.
continue to work to communicate their message through as many forums as possible.

9.4 Limitations to Transcendence

The law of limitation and transcendence is manifested in cultural elements of the larger societies that are resistant to change. The tension can be appreciated in the Israeli need for security and the Palestinian need for freedom. The fear sown by violence and the anger provoked by injustice are imbedded in the conflict and constant reminders of the sensory and the sensitive. Palestinian participants pointed out the challenges in persuading their communities to have a different outlook in the midst of violent military occupation. Israeli participants were challenged by prevailing Israeli perceptions that Palestinians were not partners for peace.

Transcending this tension meant helping people to move beyond fear and anger and to understand the underlying community consciousness that gives rise to the cycle of violence. Again, this was not to be achieved by eliminating the neural demands of the people but by trying to increase understanding that it was only through peace that the needs of security and freedom would ultimately be achieved.

Participants described a variety of reactions to their work ranging from anger to skepticism to acceptance. In some cases family and friends were persuaded by their outreach, and some participants reported that they had successfully recruited new members to the group. But their message was one that not all people were ready for.

The responses suggest that group and general bias become intertwined in conflict as the stereotypes of group bias become part of the common sense beliefs of a community. Thus, the group bias of the Other as “not a partner for peace” combines with the practical blind spot of general bias leading to the conclusion that to work for peace with the other side is not practical. One of the Israeli participants told me that he and others who worked for peace were looked upon in Israeli society as “the left wingers who are a little bit crazy.” This view recalls Lonergan’s statement that, “men of practical common sense become warped by the situation in which they live, and regard as starry-eyed idealism and silly unpracticality any proposal that would lay the axe
to the root of the social surd." The stereotypes of group bias and the practical blind spot of general bias have led to a societal inattentiveness and dismissal of creative possibilities to solve the conflict. As Lonergan observes, "in human affairs the decisive factor is what one can expect from the other fellow." And if one expects the other fellow to be a "non-partner" then there is no sense in even talking to him.

9.5 Genuineness Challenged

Lonergan notes that the tension created by the conscious awareness of our concrete self as compared to our ideal self can be an "unwelcome invasion of consciousness." But just as in the individual, the group is also generally adverse to the relentless self scrutiny that brings the tension between limitation and transcendence into consciousness. In some cases members of the group found the questions they raised and the insights they offered to be such an unwelcome invasion. Genuineness was a challenge in the larger society.

In transcendent pluralism I have described the phenomena of "transformative risk," which is the risk encountered when an individual tries to change major unauthenticity in a society through the communication of original meaning. Transformative risk can be particularly problematic when the transformer is part of the society he or she is trying to transform and thus becomes part of the infrastructure and superstructure simultaneously. If members of the infrastructure are resistant to change, the transformer’s position in the infrastructure might be jeopardized. Israeli participants, in particular, discussed facing resistance to their message and some risk to their reputations and relationships in their own society. As "left wingers" they felt themselves to be in a shrinking political minority and sometimes found themselves at odds even with close friends. One participant described a new experience of being "hated." Working for peace was interpreted by some as being "against us."

Some Palestinian participants described having initial concerns about being considered "traitors" in their society because they were

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57 *Insight*, 255.
58 *Insight*, 248.
59 *Insight*, 502.
60 Perry, *Catholic Supporters of Same Gender Marriage*, 147-48.
working with Israelis – and former soldiers at that. However, most of
the participants said that at the present time they did not feel much
risk in the Palestinian community because people came to realize that
their activities were not “normalization.”

Despite challenges, members of the group continued to promote
genuineness in society through their public lectures and demonstrations.
They felt that the Israeli-Palestinian encounters made possible through
CFP have challenged people to reconsider their prior judgments about
the Other. Several participants described encounters in which they
were able to witness new insights and even new relations generated
when individuals from one side of the conflict met CFP members from
the other side. One participant said that observing people as they
wrestled with the dissonance provoked by such encounters offered a
glimmer of hope that inspired them to continue.

10. DIALECTIC AND CONVERSION

Lonergan describes the failure of genuineness as giving rise to dialectic.
Dialectical differences involve actual differences between the authentic
and the unauthentic (as distinguished from complementary differences
or genetic [developmental] differences. The dialectic of community
“gives rise to the situations that stimulate neural demands” providing
“a focal point from which aberrant social attitudes originate.”61 One
can view such a dialectic within the Israeli-Palestinian conflict as an
underlying manifold of human needs, abhorrences, and fears in tension
with the capacities of human intelligence, morality, and love. But just
as the social situation gives rise to fear and anger so too can it give rise
to a longing for peace and the call for a reasonable response that brings
an end to the mutual infliction of suffering.

Lonergan notes that the dialectic of community holds the dominant
position over the dialectic of an individual because the community
brings forth the situations that will stimulate the neural demands of
an individual and also because it molds the attitudes through which
intelligence will be called forth or suppressed. But this dominance is
not absolute. The individual person plays a role in the development of

61 Insight, 243.
the social order, and a manifold of individuals can serve as originators of social attitudes.\textsuperscript{62}

If the genetic laws of human development prevailed unconditionally we would proceed on a steady course toward transcendence. But we do not follow the developmental laws in a logical and predictable trajectory. Therefore, another method is needed to understand and address human transformation. Following his discussion of the genetic method in \textit{Insight}, through which one analyzes development, Lonergan introduces the dialectical method. In \textit{Method in Theology}, Lonergan describes the dialectic as a conflict between “positions” which are compatible with intellectual, moral, and religious conversion and counter-positions which are not compatible with conversion.\textsuperscript{63} Dialectical operations involve advancing positions and reversing counter-positions.

Development is defined by Lonergan as, “a flexible, linked sequence of dynamic and increasingly differentiated higher integrations that meet the tension of successively transformed underlying manifolds through successive applications of the principles of correspondence and emergence.”\textsuperscript{64} Dialectic is “a concrete unfolding of linked but opposed principles of change.”\textsuperscript{65} The commonality in development and dialectic is that that both processes involve “linked” principles; the bringing together of similar or dissimilar materials for a change within the same unity.

Lonergan describes the vertical movement into a new horizon as occurring through two paths. One path is the extension, deepening, and widening of the potentialities of the old horizon. The other path involves an “about-face”\textsuperscript{66} in which certain characteristics of the old horizon are repudiated. Such an about-face is a conversion of either an intellectual, moral, or spiritual nature. So conversion is not \textit{merely} a development in the sense of something added to and integrated with one’s current horizon. But Lonergan does note that, “Human development, in brief, is largely through the resolution of conflicts and, within the realm of intentional consciousness, the basic conflicts are defined by

\textsuperscript{62} \textit{Insight}, 243.  
\textsuperscript{63} \textit{Method in Theology}, 251-54.  
\textsuperscript{64} \textit{Insight}, 479.  
\textsuperscript{65} \textit{Insight}, 242.  
\textsuperscript{66} \textit{Method in Theology}, 237.
the opposition of positions and counter-positions." Perhaps, then, conversion, could be considered a higher aspect of human development.

Given that development, by Lonergan's definition, involves "transformed" manifolds, conversion – as an even more profound change – must too be a transformation. For purposes of clarity in this analysis, transformation will be defined as a new way of being in the world through development, conversion, or both, in the same unity.

Within the Israeli-Palestinian conflict, dialectical tensions are found within each person in the individual struggle for authenticity, within each society or tradition as the achievements and limitations of the body politic, and within the larger unity of the two societies as the tension between fear and hatred and the higher ideals of a genuine peace. We can even appreciate this tension within the international community as a whole as we reflect on the impact of other nations on the conflict and consider how the international community might help achieve a resolution.

Some of the tools to advance positions are found within the group itself, through an authentic interpretation of within-group values. For example, Palestinian participants spoke of the Muslim teaching not to take innocent life. Israeli participants spoke of the values of social justice. Experiences in which these values were not being manifested led to reflection and realization of the need for a new path. Lonergan discusses de Finances's notion of vertical liberty which occurs when commitment to an ideal draws us out of our current horizon to a deeper understanding and practice of that ideal.

Genuine between-group pluralistic encounters can also serve to help each person and society to better understand and respond to dialectical differences by enhancing faithfulness to the transcendentals. The Israeli-Palestinian relations in the group were important in helping to increase attentiveness to the impact of one group's actions on the suffering of the Other, understanding the conditions that led to violence, advancing critically reasoned judgments, and inspiring and supporting responsible action. As Lonergan notes, the challenge

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67 Method in Theology, 252.
68 Method in Theology, 40-41.
of dialectic is to be met through "encounter." Encounters with the Other can stimulate genuineness by admitting the tensions of dialectic into consciousness. The responses of the research participants provide several examples of intellectual and moral conversion and also some examples of spiritual conversion.

Intellectual conversion involves overcoming the myth that knowing is merely looking and acknowledging that data must be subjected to critical reflection and judgment in order to reach understanding and affirmation. Intellectual conversion was critical for participants in order to overcome the myths of the received tradition and the rhetoric of national positivism. A story told by one of the participants provides an example of intellectual conversion in which he realized that blind spots were preventing people from both sides from recognizing the truth, but that the human person had the capacity to discern truth for themselves.

One time I was in Jerusalem with one of my friends and I just invited him to go to eat hummus inside the old city. It was the first time that he go to the old city and he was freak[ed] out. "How could I go inside the old city?" I said, "Very easy. Come on. It's no big thing." And he said ..."That's why we have those ideas about Palestinians."...[It was] one of the Combatants members. He never been there. I couldn't understand why he had these ideas.... That made me more convinced that we in some way cover our minds, or trying to - to fake the truth. That each side want to put a barrier on the other side. Even the barrier on our mind and ideas...most of the people are...they are good people. They are normal. They have the same thing, have the same brain. They could think. They could realize the truth.

-Palestinian member of CFP

Moral conversion involves our apprehension of values and the willingness to overcome personal discomfort, fears, and hardships in order to carry out a course of action when a higher value is perceived.
Several participants described the need to overcome the discomfort associated with talking to the enemy and the fears of stepping into the unknown in order to achieve the higher goal of peace.

There were also some examples of spiritual conversion but to understand these as such involves an abstraction that moves beyond Lonergan's language of "being in love with God." While some participants described their work in the group as having influenced their spirituality in explicit religious terms, several described an evolution of spirituality with regard to relationships.

Many of the Israeli participants had a secular worldview and a few described themselves as not believing in God. But moving beyond a religious declaration, I believe examples of "being in love" can be appreciated in the realm of human relations. For example, one participant who declared that he did not believe in God, when asked if membership in the group had influenced his spiritual development, answered:

I think in terms of imagining living with Palestinians, which has a lot to do with spirituality and faith in my mind, for me, then yes.

—Israeli member of CFP

He also described a very emotional response to making peace with Arabs.

I'm very moved by peacemaking. Very moved by finding Arabs to – to make peace with.

—Israeli member of CFP

Given Lonergan's use of the term "religious conversion" and his explicitly religious focus, it may seem unusual to describe spiritual conversion in atheists who continue to be atheists. But I would suggest that what I learned from meeting with the participants as well as witnessing the group's interactions were expressions of such a...
conversion. I remember one moment vividly in which I had taken part in a tour and nonviolent action in the West Bank. We had taken three separate buses to the meeting place. Two buses were from Israel and one bus brought Palestinians from the West Bank. When we reached the appointed meeting place, a desolate spot by the side of a desert highway, the occupants of each of the buses disembarked eagerly and then drew together with warm and excited chatter. Palestinians and Israelis were clearly thrilled to be together at last and to begin the day's work. I had no doubt that what I was witnessing was a manifestation of the unrestricted desire to love.

11. COMMON SENSE AND THE HIGHER VIEWPOINT

In addition to moral insights that led participants to renounce violent resistance and to oppose the occupation, one of the insights related by study participants was the very practical realization that violence was not working. The decision to work for peace nonviolently within CFP was a development in practical intelligence.

Lonergan describes the dialectic of community as emerging from the tension between spontaneous intersubjectivity of human desires and fears and the practical common sense that intelligently crafts a social order. This tension leads to alternating periods of social tranquility and social crisis which "mark successive stages in the adaptation of human spontaneity and sensibility to the demands of developing intelligence."75 It follows then that moving beyond the shorter cycles of decline related to group bias, will somehow involve the adaptive intelligence of common sense. Indeed, as Lonergan describes group bias involving "an interference with the development of practical common sense,"76 the reversal of group bias must involve a restoration of that development.

Common sense, however, is limited by its own bias. Lonergan argues that the general bias of common sense cannot be corrected by common sense because common sense does not have the tools to analyze itself. He describes the need for a higher viewpoint or heightening of consciousness that takes responsibility for human history in order to

75 Insight, 243.
76 Insight, 247.
overcome general bias. Yet he also identifies common sense and its judgments as one of the two “allies” in reversing the longer cycle of decline, noting that “common sense tends to be profoundly sane.”

How can these statements be reconciled?

Lonergan notes repeatedly that common sense is constantly undergoing adaptive change. And the withdrawal from common sense is not to eliminate practicality but to “save practicality.” Is it possible for a higher viewpoint – the heightened sense of consciousness that grasps historical responsibility – to become part of the common sense of a people? In order to overcome the general bias, a higher viewpoint could not eliminate common sense in favor of an elite intellectual class. That would merely accelerate the retreat into the ivory tower, which is already a problem in the longer cycle of decline. Also higher viewpoints do not eliminate underlying manifolds; they reorder and integrate them into new understandings. Such a viewpoint would then need to be a practical transformation.

Common sense cannot save itself but the higher viewpoint that emerges from a withdrawal could conceivably sublimate the return. It seems feasible – and quite possibly desirable – that the common sense of the human culture could adaptively gain insight into the need for the higher viewpoint in order to ensure its own survival – and betterment. Lonergan does indicate that the destruction wrought through the longer cycle of decline will come about “unless common sense can learn to overcome its bias . . . unless common sense can be taught to resist its perpetual temptation to adopt the easy, obvious, practical compromise.” Common sense can be taught. It can – and indeed does learn.

There are even empirical examples of such a cultural consciousness in native peoples such as the Haudenosaunee (Iroquois) who embrace the notion of the righteous mind and the power of united human action for peace and justice. Their “seventh generation” philosophy, considers the impact of all decisions on the welfare of the seventh generation to
follow. In this ethos, for example, nonsustainable environmental practices are understood not as “practical,” but harmful.

“Ideas,” notes Lonergan, “occur to the man on the spot.” The emergence of CFP as a movement of people who describe themselves as serving “on the ground” in the midst of the violence has occurred through not only moral understanding but a very practical adaptation from those with the insight to recognize the futility of their actions, the courage to say so, and the creativity to plan a new course. And changing that view of practicality required a reflective withdrawal from the common sense of “security” and “resistance” to reemerge with the higher viewpoint of a new practicality.

However, unlike the practical intelligence that develops from common sense as described by Lonergan, nonviolence in this setting was more than an adaptive tool. In contrast to technological adaptations implemented to achieve human desires, the instruments of peace can be desired in themselves, as both a means and an end. While a future political peace settlement might render some of the activities of the group unnecessary, such as nonviolent civil demonstrations, other actions would conceivably continue, such as the dialogue, mutual relations, and deep friendships among the group’s members. And these processes would carry on not only to sustain and deepen the peace but because they were desired as goods in themselves.

12. THE HORIZONTAL EXPANSION OF MUTUAL HUMAN TRANSFORMATION

Figure 2 denotes a general outline of the movement and expansion of horizon that occurred with the process of human transformation in members of CFP as suggested by the research findings. This transformation included both genetic and dialectical processes. This diagram does not provide the level of detail required to analyze each operation within each decision but it suggests a linked sequence of horizontal expansions occurring within the transformational process.

Participants lived within a preexisting horizon of personal history that included foundational knowledge, values, beliefs, and biases. Their

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82 Insight, 259.
understanding of the Other was mediated by the received tradition and through past personal experiences. They were deeply immersed in the cycle of violence, either as close observers or participants. The Other was viewed as a threat. Eventually new experiences raised questions about the Other and about the conflict, leading to new insights in which they began to understand the suffering of the other, the reasons behind the Other's behavior, and the impact of violence on further perpetuating the conflict. This led to both latent and explicit reflection that one participant described as being "bothered."

As new experiences and insights were evaluated, those that were deemed logically consistent with prior values and knowledge were affirmed and integrated. The personhood of the Other became known and affirmed as human, good, trustworthy, a fellow sufferer and as a unique person within a larger culture. Affirmed judgments that invalidated previous beliefs such as myths about the Other, the need for violence, and the occupation led to dialectical processes. With the affirmation of new understandings some previous understandings were repudiated. Group bias against the Other began to be understood and rejected. Personal participation in the cycle of violence was renounced.

As participants began to assimilate new understandings and repudiate old beliefs, a threshold of pre-decision readiness emerged. In some cases the participant was moved to personal action through an internal creative practical insight. But in many cases, the "condition" that led to new action was an external opportunity – new schemes of recurrence that had been put into place by existing members of CFP. A specific invitation to join these schemes from a current member provided the needed catalyst. The organization's schemes of reflection, dialogue, relations, and action provided a structure from which previously undeveloped insights and ideas could be implemented. And the Other became a partner in these new activities.

Integration into these schemes influenced further development on other levels, both for individuals and the group as a whole. However, this new expansion in horizon was challenged with barriers, the internal barriers of deeply held stereotypes, fears and undeveloped skills, as well as external social barriers that created actual physical and psychological risks. New "Others" began to emerge in consciousness and included people in both the Other society as well as one's own
society who continued to live under the horizon of fear, suspicion, and violence.

Ultimately overcoming both personal and communal dialectics was facilitated and sustained by internal and external resources. Intellectual, moral, and spiritual conversion provided the inner conviction and determination to help participants overcome challenges and, in turn, stimulated deeper levels of conversion. External support came through the relations and transformative solidarity within the group. The Other was now not only partner but friend. And as members of the group were themselves transformed they began to reach out to the larger societies to initiate development in the horizon of the Israeli-Palestinian community.

The decision to join CFP can be understood as a horizontal expansion in liberty. The creative processes of essential freedom helped individuals to transcend both internal psychological constraints and external cultural barriers to making peace. The reflective and active schemes of recurrence in the organization itself further facilitated this transcendence of internal constraints while also extending the range of external opportunities for action. With the creation of CFP, the effective freedom of available choices was enlarged for prospective new members. This is reflected in participants who described reaching a state of readiness and finding in the group a new “window” to pass one’s ideas.

13. CONCLUSION: DEVELOPMENT PEACE BUILDING THROUGH AUTHENTIC SUBJECTIVITY

“If I changed...the way that I’m thinking, maybe I could change others. I feel more powerful. Really. Because the power of the human being is in his mind and his ideas....if you could change somebody maybe you give him more power...He could be a better person.”

—Palestinian Member of CFP

Following his description of human development, Lonergan asks “whether we have established the fertility of the heuristic structure....”

83 Insight, 503.
The fertility of the structure lies in the capacity of the human person for change and the human mind as the operator of change. And if we understand conflict resolution as a developmental – indeed a transformative – process, dependent upon conditions actualized through human knowledge and decision, then our own intelligence directs us to creatively seek out and actualize those conditions.

The study results suggest that as a “movement,” CFP can be understood as a development in authentic subjectivity. Such an affirmation is not meant to claim individual or collective perfection in this achievement but merely to point out that in the decision to commit to nonviolence and the associated decision to join CFP, members of the group sought to respond more attentively, intelligently, reasonably, and responsibly to what one member of the group called their “joint historical predicament.”84 The pluralistic reflection, dialogue, and activities within the group advanced authentic subjectivity by facilitating faithfulness to the transcendentals. Members of the group shared dialogue and activities that allowed for new experiences and increased attentiveness to the Other, raised questions for intelligent understanding, generated critical perspectives for reasonableness, and called each other to increased responsibility.

Members of the group supported and sustained each other when carrying out that responsibility was difficult. Evolving relations deepened commitments and through a mutual transformation, individuals influenced and supported one another in transcendence. In this process the dignity of self and other was understood, affirmed, and enriched. Participants indicated that their membership in the group became an important part of self-identity. There emerged a new unity in which belongingness in CFP had become integrated within the self.

In order to overcome the shorter cycles of decline, and their associated violence, we must transcend group bias, which is at the root of these cycles. Of note is that Lonergan calls group bias a “bias of development”85 and indicates that “group bias leads to a bias in the generative principle of a developing social order.”86 It follows then that

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85 Insight, 249.
86 Insight, 248-49.
the repair of the damages wrought by group bias will require restorative developmental processes of human intelligence. The study suggests that the developmental processes of CFP facilitated transcendence of group bias.

It is important to note that while the strategic goals of CFP are consistent with mainstream proposals for a political settlement, the decisions underlying these goals were reached not by negotiation but through the transformation effected by authentic subjectivity. Members of the group have directed their efforts away from offensive and defensive strategies toward making operative the ideas needed at the level of their time. Individually and collectively they are working together to authentically respond to their historical responsibility to reverse the counter-positions of group bias and violence and to advance the positions of nonviolence, mutual respect, and reconciliation. In Lonergan's words the movement has made probable "a sequence of operative insights by which men grasp possible schemes of recurrence and take the initiative in bringing about the material and social conditions that make these schemes concretely possible, probable, and actual."87

The study results suggested that the decision to commit to nonviolence and active membership in CFP had a positive self-constituting effect, leading to personal empowerment and a sense of having done good for oneself and one's society. Participants also described a new sense of hope for the future, while at the same time acknowledging the reality that this hope lay in a long-term historical view. My personal experiences in the region suggest that such a development of hope is significant, because the pervasive cycles of violence in the conflict have led to a profound sense of despair on both sides. Such despair fuels general bias by leading people to believe that efforts to resolve the conflict are futile. They cannot see beyond the next checkpoint or looming rocket. This reinforces the importance of not ignoring shorter cycles with the rationalization that they will self correct. Shorter cycles very quickly become enmeshed in the successive lower viewpoints of the longer cycle. So part of overcoming the shorter cycles of decline is overcoming the despair that fuels the practical blind spot that "nothing can be done about it." The study suggests that

87 *Insight*, 252.
members of CFP were able to transcend despair and sustain a hope for the future.

Within transcendent pluralism three types of outcomes are considered related to human action: the empirical effect, the self constituting effect, and the transformative effect.\textsuperscript{88} I wish to suggest that members of CFP were able to develop and maintain a hope for the future because of their ability to appreciate these outcomes and to maintain a longer historical vision. In the seemingly friendless universe of the “already out there now real” occupation and rockets, Israeli and Palestinian members of CFP had an appreciation for the authentic interior evolution of self and other. Their ability to experience, understand, and affirm change in themselves and their partners gave them a higher viewpoint and a hope that sustained their work towards a new future. This was not a fairy tale hope but a critically real hope.

This paper began with Lonergan’s statement about the cycles of decline “in which the hegemony passes from one center to another to leave its former holders with proud memories and impotent dreams.”\textsuperscript{90} But the quote above from a CFP member speaks of a new kind of power, not the hegemony of one nation over another, but the power of the human mind – used intelligently, morally, and lovingly – to help oneself and others advance in good will. This is consistent with Lonergan’s assertion that the higher viewpoint of cosmopolis will have to witness to making ideas operative without the backing of force. As a grassroots group committed to nonviolence, members of CFP have to break the cycle of myth and violence by relying on their own witness, and calling forth the transcendental norms in the minds of those around them.

A political solution to the Israeli-Palestinian conflict is critically needed in order to create the conditions that foster peace. Negotiation can help set up conditions but unless guided by authenticity, negotiation will be insufficient. To work for a sustained peace that overcomes the shorter cycles of violence that feed the longer cycle of decline will require human transformation through the development of authentic subjectivity.

\textsuperscript{88} Perry, Catholic Supporters of Same Gender Marriage, 65-73.
\textsuperscript{89} Insight, 276.
\textsuperscript{90} Insight, 256.
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Group bias, exacerbating conditions and shorter cycles of decline

- Manipulation by powerful
- Psychological wounds
- Within group factions
- Competition for scarce resources
- Outside national interests
- Violent conflict

Failure to address group bias leading to unimpeded shorter cycles with increased complexity

- Unequal distribution of resources
- Outside national interests revolving in their own cycles
- Proliferation of psychological wounds
- Group bias
- Manipulation by powerful
- Recurrent violent outbreaks
- Increased within-group factions

Figure 1. Perpetual shorter cycles of decline as function of group and general bias
Figure 2. Horizontal expansion in human transformation
IDENTIFYING AND NAMING RELIGIOUS CONSCIOUSNESS IN A FRIENDLY UNIVERSE

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In this paper, I hope to discuss the complexities and challenges of identifying and naming grace as a datum of religious consciousness. The transition from the second to the third stage of meaning requires what Lonergan calls a "transposition" of the scholastic theology of grace. For Lonergan, the task requires that one begin "not from a metaphysical psychology, but from intentionality analysis, and, indeed, from transcendental method."\(^1\) According to Lonergan, difficulties abound because the theologian "may be looking for something with a label on it, when he should simply be heightening his consciousness of the power working within him and advert ing to its long-term effects."\(^2\)

While the theologian should "simply be heightening his consciousness," discovering and identifying grace as a distinct datum of interior experience is, by no means, a simple affair.

I. THE QUESTION OF TRANSPOSITION

It is important that theologians not only engage in the activity of transposing grace from a theoretical to a methodical theology but also reflect on the meaning of transposition. In other words, it is important for theologians to bring to light and reflect on the phenomenological exercise of attending to and naming the data of religious consciousness. In doing so, theologians will be more likely to identify and develop the skills and practices required to accurately notice and name the

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contents of this experience. With these requisite skills and practices at their disposal, such theologians will be able to formulate the normative criteria for verifying the truth of their own descriptive accounts and be able to more effectively adjudicate between competing claims.

II. THE METHODOLOGICAL STARTING POINT

The methodological turn in the history of philosophy can serve as an analogy for thinking about a solution to the problem of transposing "grace" from a theoretical to a methodical theology. In the history of philosophy, the seemingly endless scholastic debates began to raise epistemological questions that were seeking a set of normative criteria that would settle disputes in the area of metaphysics. But modern philosophers answered the criteriological question in diverse ways. In Lonergan's view, the proper means of resolving these polarities in philosophical thought and cutting through the differences requires a turn to performance. The upshot of the methodological turn is that, from Lonergan's perspective, "...a critical metaphysics results...Accordingly, empty or misleading terms and relations can be eliminated while valid ones can be elucidated by the conscious intention from which they are derived."3

By analogy, it is important for theologians operating in the functional specialty "foundations" to raise the methodological question and develop a critical phenomenological perspective that will allow the theologian to eliminate "empty or misleading terms and relations" and support valid ones in the data of religious consciousness. Not unlike the disputes of scholastic metaphysics, the disputes among the theologians operating in the functional specialty "foundations" can be, if not settled, at least benefited by turning to the performance of the theologian and asking: "What am I doing when I am performing a transposition?" What am I doing when I expand my attention and allow the givenness of religious consciousness to enter focal awareness? What I am doing when I am identifying, naming, and expressing the contents of this experience? Secondly, one will raise the criteriological questions: What are the conditions that need to be fulfilled in order to accurately illuminate the contents of religious consciousness – to allow the data

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3 Method in Theology, 343.
of religious consciousness to become focally present? Lonergan assigns this task to the "methodologist."

In his chapter on "foundations," Lonergan distinguishes what he calls the task of the methodologist from the task of the theologian. For Lonergan, "The methodologist's task is the preliminary one of indicating what qualities are desirable in theological categories, what measure of validity is to be demanded of them, and how categories with the desired qualities and validity are to be obtained." He explains further that "The task of the methodologist is to sketch the derivation of such categories, but it is up to the theologian working in the fifth functional specialty to determine in detail what the general and special categories are to be." This essay prescinds from questions about the content of the transposition and raises questions about the requisite skills and practices of an effective transposition in an effort to formulate an heuristic structure or set of performative criteria for noticing accurately and attending carefully to the data of religious consciousness. In other words, the methodologist will sketch the skills and practices that are required to appropriate Lonergan's transcendental and phenomenological precept "be attentive." As one would expect, Lonergan stresses the importance of self-appropriation in these matters.

III. NO LABELS OR TAGS: RELIGIOUS CONSCIOUSNESS AND THE LIMITS OF LANGUAGE

The process of transposition, at least in a restricted sense, involves finding the conscious correlates of scholastic special categories. Turning to the performance of the theologian engaged in the operations of transposition raises questions about the heuristic value of scholastic special categories for discovering and identifying the contents of religious consciousness. In other words, is there a simple, neat, and tidy point-for-point correspondence between the terms and relations of a scholastic theology and contents of religious consciousness? The answer seems to be No. There are terms derived from the method of scholastic theology for which one cannot find conscious correlates in the

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4 Method in Theology, 282.
5 Method in Theology, 291.
data of religious experience. “The habit of charity” may be such a term. Jeremy Wilkins, in his 2010 Lonergan Workshop paper, has suggested that habits as such cannot be found in the data of consciousness but are inferred from operations.

Additionally, there are terms derived from an intentionality analysis that cannot be supported within the framework of scholastic theology. For example, Lonergan expresses the experience of being-in-love unrestrictedly as a “conscious dynamic state of peace, love, joy”... “an under-tow of existential consciousness...a fateful call to dreaded holiness⁶...as a “direction, a pattern, a thrust, a call, to unworldliness;”⁷ as a “charged field of love and meaning; [that] here and there... reaches a notable intensity; but...ever unobtrusive, hidden, inviting each of us to join.”⁸ Since intentionality analysis explores the religious consciousness of the subject “not in the abstract, not as he would be in some state of pure nature, but as in fact he is here and now in all the concreteness of his living and dying.”⁹ it generates a language that transcends the ambit of scholastic theology.

But even the language derived from an intentionality analysis cannot express comprehensively religious experience as such. In other words, as there is no simple one for one correspondence between the terms and relations of scholastic theology and the elements of religious consciousness, so also the theologian should not expect a neat and tidy point-for-point correspondence between the religious language derived from intentionality analysis and the contents of religious consciousness either. First, no religious language can render religious experience fully explicit, partly because self-consciousness is, in its original sense, a preliminary and unstructured awareness. Since language differentiates and frames our experiences, it cannot express the experience of self that is prior even to the most foundational linguistic distinctions. Second, religious language, even the language derived from intentionality analysis, cannot exhaustively communicate religious consciousness because it is an experience of profound union

⁶ Method in Theology, 240
⁷ Method in Theology, 290
⁸ Method in Theology, 290
with transcendent mystery. It is an experience that defies our efforts to apprehend its meaning in any discursive manner, and one that is only dimly reflected in the phrase 'being-in-love unrestrictedly.'

IV. RELIGIOUS CONSCIOUSNESS AND THE HEURISTIC VALUE OF LANGUAGE

When the theologian operating in the fifth functional specialty 'foundations' explores religious consciousness, the language that he uses to orient his attention and enter into interiority, whether it is the language derived from metaphysical or intentionality analysis, will offer no detailed map of the interior terrain of self-consciousness. Because it is an experience of transcendence, language can only approximate its meaning. Offering no more than intimations, theological language can approach the wordless experience of unity between the self and absolute mystery only asymptotically. But what, then, is the heuristic value of theological language in exploring and identifying the contents of religious consciousness? According to Lonergan,

Data are given to sense or to consciousness. They are the given just as given. They are, of course, hardly noticed unless they fit in with one's understanding and have a name in one's language. At the same time, with an appropriate development of understanding and language, they will be noticed and, if important from some viewpoint, they will be insisted upon.\(^\text{10}\)

Despite the fact that language cannot adequately reflect the experience, theological language, in Lonergan's estimation, can serve a positive and anticipatory function. Language can orient and guide the subject as he explores the domain of interiority; it can expand his field of focal awareness, bring to light unnoticed elements of consciousness, and frame his experience in a way that transforms it into a fertile source of an ongoing discovery and meaning.

\(^{10}\) "Dimensions of Meaning," 347-48.
V. THE PRACTICES AND SKILLS OF THE FOUNDATIONAL THEOLOGIAN

Language serves a positive and anticipatory function in the exploration of religious consciousness, and so it will be important for the foundational theologian to develop a skill that enables her to appropriate a vocabulary and develop a linguistic framework that is rich and sophisticated enough to direct attention to the proper domains of interiority and open up dimensions of meaning within religious consciousness that have gone unnoticed; such a framework needs to be flexible enough to integrate new components introduced by attending to those experiences of transcendent meaning that are beyond language and resist linguistic expression.

But although theological language orients our attention and guides our search, it breaks down in the face of experiences of sacred transcendence. So it is important for the foundational theologian to attend to and notice, to the extent that it is possible, the experiences of transcendence in the immediacy of consciousness that are prior to linguistic formulation, which only subsequently will be named and expressed in a given theological language. By attending to what is pre-linguistic, the data of religious consciousness can become a source of meaning that can verify, invalidate, modify, or develop one's theological language. But attending to the purity of this experience is challenging. Problems arise when theologians think that they are attending to the pure data of religious experience, while, in fact, they are attending to experiences that are already mediated by the interpretations of descriptive or explanatory language. In order to correctly attend to and name the contents of religious experience in the immediacy of self-consciousness, foundational theologians will require a practice or skill that enables them to restrain or place in check that inclination to name and interpret, so that, to the extent that it is possible, what is given in its pure givenness can come to light. The practice or skill that I am referring to can be analogously understood along the lines of what Husserl called the phenomenological *epoche*.

In terms of the theologian operating in the functional specialty "foundations," if language is not to conceal what is given in religious consciousness, the assumptions and interpretations of descriptive and
explanatory language must be, at some point, suspended before self-attention crosses the threshold into the domain of interiority.

VI. APPROPRIATING THE PRACTICES AND LANGUAGES OF OTHER RELIGIOUS TRADITIONS

The theme of the conference is reversing decline in a friendly universe. How to we consider other world religions in the context of a friendly universe? Fred Crowe remarks:

What I am affirming, then, is our religious community with the world religions in some true and basic sense of the word, community, if not in the full sense of a common confession of faith, a common worship, and a common expression of hope in the eschaton. This community is effected by our common religious conversion, which in Lonergan's view, is our common orientation to the mystery of love and awe through the indwelling of the Holy Spirit who is given to us.”

For Crowe and Lonergan, there exists a genuine friendship between Christians and practitioners of other world religions because the same Spirit animates their religious experience as well as the spiritual practices and languages employed to become attuned to that religious experience. This friendship offers a theological ground for Christians to appropriate the language and practices of other traditions as a means of illuminating their own religious experience. For example, there are profound meditative techniques in the Tibetan Buddhist tradition that can help the Christian theologian develop the skill of allowing the pure givenness of religious experience to emerge within the field of attentive awareness.

The Dzogchen practice of “letting be in natural awareness” formulated and expounded by John Makransky seeks to transition the person from a state of controlling to a state of radical surrender. The purpose of the meditation is to cultivate attitudes of profound “allowing” or “letting be” which releases awareness from linguistic or interpretive

frames of reference so that a more expansive, pure, radiant, loving, and transcendent experience can emerge.

Lonergan and Crowe make the claim that the same religious experience, in subsequent reflection, is expressed in different theological languages because the subjects who name their religious experience are operating within different horizons of meaning; but language, even in a more phenomenologically reduced and pure form, remains, to some degree, conditioned by one's founding concerns and questions. If our core religious experience is common, but our descriptions of that experience are limited by our language and its originating horizon, then it may be of tremendous benefit to the theologian, operating in the fifth functional specialty, to appropriate not only the spiritual practices but also the theological language of other religious traditions as a way of bringing to light dimensions of meaning that have not been noticed – as a way of allowing elements within the data of religious consciousness to emerge within the field of attention.

The Tibetan Buddhist practice of "benefactor meditation" articulated by John Makransky offers a language that I think can be beneficial in attending to the data on religious experience or what Lonergan calls the experience of being-in-love unreestrictedly. Makransky explains benefactors as people in your life who you enjoy being around because benefactors communicate through gestures, words, deeds, or just their presence, a simple wish for your deepest happiness and well-being. The meditation involves imagining yourself being surrounded by people from your past and present that have communicated either audibly or tacitly, in actions or in mere presence, a simple and unconditional wish of love. Tibetan Buddhists like Makransky believe that the love that radiates from the benefactors in your life does not originate in them but is, in fact, a transcendent love that flows through the universe. Benefactors are not the originators but the mediators of this love. The purpose of the meditation is to allow one to notice the experience of "being loved unconditionally" that is always present and to create a deeper receptivity not only to the love radiating from one's benefactors but to create a deeper receptivity to the transcendent love that is communicated through them – a love that resides most profoundly in our own hearts.
Makransky’s benefactor meditation is expressed this way:

Sit in a relaxed way with back comfortably straight, on cushion or chair, eyes open, gazing slightly downward. Having identified both kinds of benefactors, ones from ordinary life and spiritual benefactors from near or far, bring one or more of each type to mind and imagine their smiling faces before you. Envision them sending you the wish of love, the wish for your deepest well-being, happiness, and joy.

Sensing these wonderful people before you, gently open to their wish of love. Imagine their wish as a gentle radiance, like a soft shower of healing rays. Bathe your whole body and mind in that radiance, all the way down to your toes and fingertips. Bask in the loving energy of that wish. Trust it. You don't have to trust every aspect of all benefactors, just the wish of love that they radiate, the simple wish for your well-being and happiness.

Receive the gentle, healing energy of that radiance. As other thoughts or feelings arise, let them be enveloped in this loving luminosity. No matter who you think you are, what you think you deserve, all such thoughts are irrelevant now – just accept the benefactors’ wish of love for your deepest happiness. Trusting this wish more than any limiting thoughts of yourself, receiving it into your whole being.

Let yourself rely upon this love, the goodness it comes from, and the goodness it meets in your heart. To rely upon this love more than on your own defensive reactions is to find profound refuge.

Be at ease, open, and accepting, like a puppy lying in the morning sun, passively soaking up its rays. Absorb the soft, healing energy of love into every cell of your body, every corner of your mind. Bathe in this, heal in this, rest in this.

After a while, join your benefactors in their wish of love for you. While receiving the radiance of their love, mentally repeat the wish for yourself, using words like these: “May this one
have deepest well-being, happiness, and joy." Affirm the words repeatedly in your mind. Try to mean them as you say them, just as your benefactors mean them for you. Like everyone else in this world, you most deeply need and deserve happiness and well-being. Repeat the wish for yourself while accepting your benefactors' love even more deeply into body and mind, communing with them through its radiance.

Finally, let go into utter oneness with the radiance, dropping the visualization of benefactors, and releasing any attempt to hold on to any frame of reference. Deeply let be into that gentle, luminous wholeness beyond separation of self and others. Enjoy just being thus for a little while, at ease, at rest, complete.12

Perhaps Christian theologians operating in the functional specialty "foundations" could use this practice to notice elements within their own transcendent experiences of love and being loved that, when named and expressed, could resonate with and complement Lonergan's theological categories. Maybe genuine dialogue with other traditions such as Buddhism does not occur only after we have understood ourselves, but is integral to the activity of self-understanding. What better way is there to discover who we are than through conversation with a friend?

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THE STRUCTURE OF THE HUMAN GOOD: AN EXERCISE IN PERSONAL APPROPRIATION (REACHING UP TO THE MIND OF LONERGAN)

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"Without faith the originating value is man and the terminal value is the human good man brings about. But in the light of faith, originating value is divine light and love, while terminal value is the whole universe. So the human good becomes absorbed in an all-encompassing good" (Method in Theology, 116c).

INTRODUCTION: AN ANECDOTE AND THE CHALLENGE OF PERSONAL APPROPRIATION

Sometime in the early 1980s (I cannot remember the exact year) one of the Workshops featured an afternoon lecture by Father Lonergan. It may very well have been his last public appearance in the Workshop series. My recollection is that he repeated the talk entitled, "Pope John’s Intention" (later published in Third Collection, 224-38) which had to do with the meaning of the Second Vatican Council’s being pastoral. When he had finished the lecture, the floor was opened for a general question and answer session. This gave me the opportunity to ask about something in Method in Theology that had puzzled me right from the time I had first read it. It had to do with the scheme of the structure of the human good to be found on page 48. I had not been able make sense of it. When he acknowledged my raised hand I rose to say as much and asked if he could provide a key to the puzzle.
Although my memory of what followed is somewhat hazy, I do recall having the impression that Lonergan was not charmed by the question, that he was even somewhat dismissive of it, at least of the way it had been framed. Quite likely, my ensuing embarrassment is what prevented me from carrying away from the exchange any clear recollection of what he actually said, but I believe it was to the effect that the effort he had put into discovering and devising the scheme might profitably be duplicated by someone else, given the appropriate tools and a corresponding willingness. For some time afterwards I wondered if his apparent discontent and reluctance to give the question the attention I had thought it deserved might not have been because he perceived in the subject who was raising the question, the desire for a magic formula that would unlock the door to understanding this rather complex matter. Let's say that I was asking for an insight to be handed to me on a platter, free of charge, so to speak, and that the Master's spontaneous resistance was an invitation to pay the normal price for an advance in knowledge. More recently, I have taken some steps in this direction and have kindly been given the chance to share the results by way of witness to an instance of personal appropriation.

**POSITION OF THE HUMAN GOOD IN METHODOLOGICAL DISCOURSE**

How do we find ourselves thinking about the human good at all, much less its structure, when the subject is method in theology as conceived by Lonergan? Well, it is because this particular method has two basic components, one anthropological, the other specifically theological. By his account, the basic anthropological component is transcendental method (*Method in Theology*, 25) or intellectual conversion, that is, the appropriation of the dynamic cognitional structure at work within each one of us. This is no little achievement, of course, but in so far as it is realized, it provides theologians with conscious and normative direction in their journey from one level of human interiority to another, that is, in the sequence of functional specialties (whether from below upward in the first mediated phase, or from above downward in the second mediating phase). The basic theological component then is religious conversion (method in any case is all about the subject!),
which Lonergan will name *foundational reality* (*Method in Theology*, 267d), and it supplies theologians with the light of faith, the eye of love, which promotes their discovering the way from the first to the second phase of theological discourse (for at the very limit the mediated phase does not require faith) and sustains them along the way to the very end, where "theological reflection bears fruit" in communications.

Precisely at the point where this second component of the basic foundation of theological method is to be unveiled, Lonergan observes, "Before we can speak of religion, we first must say something about the human good and about human meaning" (*Method in Theology*, 25). The critical disciple, if not the casual reader, will, of course, ask why this is necessary. Well, I think it is because of the relation of the human good (and human meaning) to the Transcendent Good and Ultimate Meaning for whom we long and toward whom we are striving in all self-transcending activity. And whereas this natural desire for Ultimate Meaning and native orientation toward the Transcendent Good are not self-evident, they can be discovered and verified. Moreover, this discovery and verification have everything to do both with the dynamic structure of the human subject and the building of the human good. And so the notion that this good itself is intrinsically ordered beyond itself constitutes a kind of heuristic as regards its structure.

**THE HUMAN GOOD: WHAT IS IT?**

Let us begin this exercise in appropriating the structure of the human good with an attempt to describe what is structured. As infrastructure, of course, there is the pre-human good, the universe that is given as the stage on which or the environment in which the human good makes its appearance and unfolds. This pre-existent set of dynamic structures has its own finality and continues to develop out of its own resources in accord with emergent probability. But with the arrival or appearance of the human it becomes the universe of our experience. Moreover, we can suppose that human experience is patterned from the outset to the effect that history begins to be made and an artificial world begins to be fashioned (we know these patterns of experience by their fruits!). For eons perhaps the schemes of recurrence that constitute that artificial world remain elementary, and history is relatively stable and
monotonous. Eventually, however, leaps are made, mind is discovered, and humanity is "off to the races."

Such considerations are the ground of our thinking of the human good as the colossal, dynamic indeterminate, and unimaginable (but ever so fragile) project of human progress, still subject to the rule of emergent probability, however in its own way (Insight, 235f/209f [citations from Insight follow the established convention: the first number refers to its location in the Collected Works edition, the second to the manual edition of 1957]). Practical intelligence molds some elements of the pre-existent good that are plastic and perfectible through the manual arts. Tools are produced that are the basis of all further technological development. As this sort of development ramifies it gives rise to various ways of making a living (fishing and hunting, subsistence agriculture, then a mixture of agriculture and trade, etc.), creating the exigence for economic order and eventually the invitation to promote ongoing advances in the standard of living. At a primitive level there even occurs the possibility of developing the art of persuasion to create a social order that carries men and women beyond the exclusive promotion of economic well-being to organize the polis. As Lonergan says:

> We do not have to wait for our environment to create us. Our dramatic living needs only the clues and the opportunities to originate and maintain its own setting. The advance of technology, the formation of capital, the development of the economy, the evolution of the state are not only intelligible but also intelligent. (236/210)

As is so often said, we do not live on bread alone, nor are we satisfied with an efficiently organized society, even one in which by and large everyone gets a square deal. Vital, social, economic, and political values give way to cultural values, as men and women pursue science and wisdom, truth and beauty, and so aspire to and bring about personal integrity and establish an atmosphere where even worship is possible.

By way of descriptive summary let us say that this process is always a combination of the inner and the outer. Human intelligence and human freedom (the inner components) are the source of concrete but dynamic monuments of progress. And this whole complex,
which we call the historical process, constitutes the human good. It is a combination of what our ancestors have made and what we are making; again, of what we are making of ourselves on the strength of our ancestors’ self-discoveries. Not however without enormous errors and failures! But this nature of ours in its striving from below upward remains vulnerable not only to bias and inordinate desire, but also to the intervention of divine love, to a presence that originates another vector of development, that heals and transforms. Moreover, its point of entry is the human heart, a fact that is determined again by the structure of the human subject. All this before, but in view of, the ultimate realization of divine love for us given in the mystery of the Incarnation. I call this a “descriptive summary.” It is obviously made from a viewpoint that is Christian; but that is the sort of subject that I am!

THE BUILDING OF THE HUMAN GOOD

So we speak about the building of the human good (the language of course is metaphorical). And there comes a moment when human thinking becomes historical thinking, that is, when we begin to think about our shared capacity and responsibility for the direction of the process. Marx is somehow the precursor of this way of thinking. The Catholic mind eventually intervenes, perhaps “a little breathless, a little late,” but very effectively, for all that, in the dialogue that brings forth documents such as the *Gaudium et Spes* of the Second Vatican Council.

Now there are the constructing and the construction. A building will have its structure, laid out in the architectural plans, and so also will the activities that bring into being any composite, whether visible and static, or intelligible and dynamic. The notion of cognitional structure is quite familiar, and what Lonergan has to say about it in the introduction to the essay of that name might well be kept in mind:

The parts of a [structured] whole may be things, bricks, timbers, glass, rubber, chrome. But the parts may also be activities, as in a song, a dance, a chorus, a symphony, a drama. Such a whole is dynamic materially. But dynamism may not be restricted to the parts. The whole itself may be self-assembling,
self-constituting; then it is formally dynamic. It is a dynamic structure.” (Collection, 206)

**THE STRUCTURE OF THE HUMAN GOOD**

The desired insight here is the rationale for the way in which the human good is structured, so as to provide an explanatory account of this good. Lonergan himself had already discovered this rationale at the time that he was writing *Insight*. And his thinking is altogether coherent. Just as he conceives metaphysics as the integral heuristic structure of the universe of proportionate being (the universe of experience), so he conceives ethics (writing about its *possibility*) as the heuristic structure for the eventual building of a universe of “proportionate doing,” that is, for *historical* activity in the modern sense.

Thus the three levels of the human good, which in *Method in Theology* are named *ends*, are remotely derived from the isomorphism of the dynamic structure of knowing with the structure of proportionate being (the ground of metaphysics) and proximately from the prolongation of this isomorphism in the existential level. This latter isomorphism is of the dynamic existential structure (where *existence* extends from the everyday satisfying of sensitive desire through to the choosing of authentic values at the highest levels, and everything in between) with the structure of what is getting done, that is, history as it is being played out.

Just as the universe of proportionate being is a compound of potency, form, and act, because it is to be known through experience, understanding, and judgment, so the universe of [the human] proportionate good is a compound of objects of desire, intelligible orders, and values, because the good that [we] do intelligently and rationally is a manifold in the field of experience, ordered by intelligence, and rationally chosen. (*Insight*, 626/602f)

In summary, from an explanatory viewpoint, the “universe of [the human] proportionate good (the human good) is a compound, and the elements of that compound are thus to be identified:
the potentially good: objects of [sensitive] desire, i.e., particular goods to be found in the field of experience (in this connection Lonergan will say that "needs are to be understood in the broadest sense; they are not to be restricted to necessities, but rather to be stretched to include wants of every kind") Method in Theology, 48b.

the formally good: intelligible frameworks, which organize human activity so as to deliver particular goods efficiently on a variety of levels, as human being develops in the world in accord with emergent probability humanly implemented

the actually good: rationally and responsibly chosen values – objects of sensitive desire and intelligible orders that are truly good, by the choice of which men and women are rendered more or less authentic

Once this rationale is grasped it is somehow all over with the structure of the human good! Moreover, the truth of Lonergan’s claim that “our account of the human good is compatible with any stage of technological, economic, political, cultural, religious development” (Method in Theology, 52d) is vindicated, even obvious. For the dynamic structure of human praxis is as little susceptible of revision as is the dynamic structure of human knowing.

To say that it is “all over,” does not imply that the scheme to be found on page 48 is meaningless and not worth pondering, examining, and criticizing. In this respect it is like the account of cognitional structure, quite susceptible of renewed consideration. What I mean simply is that in the scheme everything to the left of the column of ends is generated and determined somehow by these ends, which represent the dynamic structure of human existence. As we say, everything else falls into place! We can see how this is true by a return to the data, as represented by the terms in the scheme.

1. It is obvious the individual and the social have to be taken into account and that society can be intersubjective or civil (not to speak of ecclesial). So we satisfy sensitive desire both on our own and together.
2. It is clear that intelligible frameworks (goods of order) are anticipated in the sometimes intricate organization of intersubjective community (call them institutions if you like), so astoundingly represented in some forms of animal cooperation with roles assumed and tasks assigned (the beehive and the anthill, which, however, in the short run do not seem to develop appreciably— even though they must have gotten there somehow and the period of our observation is relatively miniscule!). In other words the transition from the particular good to intelligible order is somehow gradual in its realization.

3. It is clear that training is required where operators are "plastic and perfectible," to effect operational development of skills, in view of more efficient implementation of the goods of order. This will take place at all times and at all levels of human development, from technology right up into the realm of religion (would that this were better understood and applied in the Catholic Church of the twenty-first century!).

4. Finally it is clear that the attainment of terminal value is also in function of the individual and the social. On occasion we do choose authentic values on our own, but normally it is in concert with others. Here Lonergan's understatement in an earlier context is applicable: "to a notable extent human operating is cooperating" (*Method in Theology*, 48c). Moreover, the ground of this effective concert is personal relations, out of which community emerges as a kind of first fruit. And in this regard Lonergan observes that community is "the ideal basis of society," without a large measure of which society does not survive (*Method in Theology*, 360b).

This consideration provides another occasion for observing that there is a downward vector in the realization of the human good. Wounded (and morally impotent) human freedom is vulnerable to the healing and transforming presence of God's love poured into our hearts by the Holy Spirit. And one might observe, that what is healed and transformed most of all is personal relations.
A footnote is appropriate here (in a text where there are none!), to the effect that this “bottom line” of the scheme has the potential, through a more intense study and extended application, of bearing its own fruit in an explanatory discourse on the mystery of the Church. The clue that points in this direction is that Lonergan himself reproduces nearly in full the scheme of the structure of the human good in reference to the Church later on in Method in Theology (363d). Perhaps significant too is the fact that one of the two principles that generates the Church is included in this line, namely, conversion, which at its deepest level is the inner word of God’s redeeming love. So we might see in the Church the dominion of the downward vector of development, where the human good is implemented in the reverse order, so to speak. The satisfaction of sensitive desire does not come first, as basic, but last, as the fruit of the celebration of the sacraments (You gave them Bread from Heaven!) and the exercise of genuine and outgoing care (we call it pastoral!) in the sort of community so much promoted by Jesus and confirmed in the writings of the apostolic age and beyond. Such a project, however, is way beyond the modest limits of this brief paper.

What is, however, within the limits stated herewith, namely, “to reach up to the mind of Lonergan” in reference to the structure of the human good, is a remark about the material that precedes the scheme of the structure in this chapter of Method in Theology. At the outset the list of topics is apparently quite disparate, if not random: skills, feelings, values, beliefs, cooperation (he seems to have forgotten about that one!), progress, and decline. Against the background, however, of the threefold ends, the rationale for the inclusion of these topics can be discerned.

The paragraph on skills has to do with operational development, and is given to provide background for a fuller understanding of cooperation and various goods of order. Incidentally, in the triad of technology, economy, and polity that appears over and over again, the architectonic skill is the art of persuasion, which in the Church is the proclamation of the Gospel.

The paragraphs having to do with feelings and belief provide background for a better understanding of the “bottom line.” “Values are apprehended in feelings,” says Lonergan; and
believing is very much connected with personal relations in the attainment of terminal values.

No need, however, defensively to affirm that these paragraphs could not be augmented or complemented by others were the chapter to be rewritten.

Finally, the paragraph on progress and decline can be seen as a cautionary, and one is reminded of the remark that Lonergan makes in reference to the ontology of the good, where the human good is included within a more comprehensive view: "As the identification of the good with being in no manner denies or attempts to minimize pain or suffering, so it has not the slightest implication of a denial of unordered manifolds, of disorder, or of false values" (Insight, 630b/607a). Notice the presence in this passage of the three levels: unordered manifolds in the field of experience; disorder on the level of goods of order, which are subject to progress and decline; finally, false values on the level of the terminal, that enter into the various dialectics of history. And notice also that the entire chapter on the Human Good ends with some lines that make implicit reference to the third element of the tri-polar dialectic, which is redemptive, that is, "...a self-sacrificing love...that can undo the mischief of decline and restore the cumulative process of progress." (Method in Theology, 55, in fine)

**APPROPRIATING THE STRUCTURE OF THE HUMAN GOOD: WHAT DIFFERENCE DOES IT MAKE?**

I conclude with a question about the value of this project in its own right. As is always the case, there are the subject and the object. Subjectively the value consists simply in the search for insight and its limited success. In this case, the discovery of the isomorphism of the dynamic structure of human doing (the existential dimension of human interiority) with the structure of what gets done (the human good as construct), has been a worthwhile eye-opener. Better late than never!
Objectively the project does, I warrant, promote one of the purposes of the Workshop, to complete, to fill out, and to make explicit Lonergan’s own passion for clarifying human interiority. Perhaps one might say that the three questions at work here are:

What are we doing when we are making decisions?
Why is that doing?
What do we build when we do that and how is the building structured?

REFERENCES

LONERGAN’S WORKS


OTHER SIGNIFICANT CONTRIBUTIONS


SLOTH TRANSPOSED:
THE FRIENDLESS UNIVERSE

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To be a human is always to face the world with a particular stance and from a particular position. If my stance toward the world is one of eager and passionate interest, I tend to find the world sparkling and captivating. If I am fragmented and scattered, the world will likely appear meaningless or random. This is true of each and every person, and since each of us takes a particular stance at a given time, we will not always inhabit similar worlds even while we may be quite near each other in space and time. Still, despite the particularity, as social and historical beings we might expect certain tendencies to emerge whereby persons in one cultural space tend to share a vision of the world.

Christian tradition provides a fascinating account of a particular vice, acedia, usually translated as sloth, which seems to capture with particular aptness the spiritual conditions of our own age.\(^1\) No longer just a vice afflicting individuals, acedia has become a cultural reality; nestled deep in the roots of our ways of acting and living, sloth seeps into our loves and lives in virtually every domain, before finally transforming itself into boredom and nihilism.

In this paper I use sloth as a diagnostic symbol to describe the “friendless” universe. While in this presentation there is not sufficient time to develop my account of the causes and full range of symptoms of the vice, I will here focus on sloth’s enervation of good work before

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articulating a theory of good work, work which is not slothful or assuming a friendless universe but in keeping with world order. I should note as well two points. First, Lonergan is in the background here rather more than front and center, but I do hope the influence and use is clear. Second, the larger work of which this is part continues, using Lonergan in conversation with evangelical Protestants, particularly those from the Reformed or Calvinistic tradition, and this paper rather explicitly appeals to elements common in that tradition in its second half.

**SLOTH: DISGUST AND IMPOTENCE IN THE FACE OF BEING**

Acedia, the “noon day demon,” so called since it strikes often in the long hours of the afternoon, receives a surprising amount of attention in early monastic literature. Evagrius of Ponticus, a fourth-century Egyptian monk, thinks of it as the most troublesome of the demonic thoughts, and he is followed in this judgment by John Cassian, John Climacus, and others. Evagrius describes the demon as follows:

... he causes the monk continuously to look at the windows and forces him to step out of his cell and to ... look around, here and there ... Moreover, the demon sends him hatred against the place, against life itself, and against the work of his hands...

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He stirs the monk also to long for different places in which he can find easily what is necessary for his life and can carry on a much less toilsome and more expedient profession.4

A wide range of effects follows: sleepiness, sickness, inattentiveness, dissatisfaction, restlessness, wanderlust, hatred for place, frenetic activity, floating from task to task. Sloth is not just laziness, although the term does come to mean mere inactivity in time.5 Rather it reveals a movement of frustration and hate – the monk actively hates, as Evagrius put it, their place and “even life itself.”6 In acedia, the monk longs for a better place because he “abhors what is there and fantasizes about what is not.”7 In sloth we abhor what is there; we abhor what is.

Acedia is developed substantially by Thomas Aquinas who retains something of Evagrius’s understanding of the hatred of place by identifying in sloth both a sadness at the divine good (tristitia de bono divino) and an aversion to acting (taedium operandi).8

The divine good at which sloth feels sorrow is the good of communion with God, at being linked in loving, intimate union with God. Since union with God, according to Aquinas’s theology, is our happiness and joy, sloth not only rejects joy but finds the possibility of joy a deep sorrow. Humans are by nature oriented toward the pursuit of their happiness, and consequently sloth is a rejection of our own loves. If our loves are created to take joy in the good of Divine Communion, and the slothful feel only sadness when presented with such joy, then sloth is a revulsion and sorrow about our own love, joy, and happiness – “sadness at the Divine Good about which charity rejoices (tristari de bono divino, de quo caritas guadet).”9

Why would anyone reject their own fulfillment, or as Aquinas puts it, loath spiritual good as something contrary to himself,” a position of

4 In Siegfried Wenzel, The Sin of Sloth, 5.
8 Summa Theologiae (ST) II-II 35. 1-4. For discussion, see Wenzel, Sloth, 47-60 and Nault, “Acedia,” 241-48.
profound self-contradiction?\textsuperscript{10} In a position reflecting that of Evagrius’s, Aquinas gives a hint when he suggests the cure for acedia: “to repel this [acedia], the wise man advises in Ecclesiasticus (6:26), ‘Bow down thy shoulder, and bear her (wisdom), and be not grieved (\textit{accedieris}) with her bands.’\textsuperscript{11} Just as acedia is repelled by bowing down and bearing the bands or bonds of wisdom, so acedia is welcomed with an inordinate love of freedom – even though the inordinate freedom must be a loathing of the self’s good. Rebecca Konyndyk DeYoung explains Aquinas’s understanding of sloth as follows: sloth is a resistance to friendship with God because of the “burdens of commitment” that such a friendship and its concomitant transformations of self would require.\textsuperscript{12} In the love of freedom, one is saddened at the burdens that friendship with God – our ultimate Good – would cost, and so our ultimate good is thought contrary to our self:

Acedia...is a profound withdrawal into self. Action is no longer perceived as a gift of oneself, as the response to a prior love that calls us, enables our action, and makes it possible. It is seen instead as an uninhibited seeking of personal satisfaction in the fear of “losing” something. The desire to save one's “freedom” at any price reveals, in reality, a deeper enslavement to the “self.”\textsuperscript{13}

This self-contradiction has the further, second result of crippling action, of “immobiliz[ing] the person.”\textsuperscript{14} The slothful have an aversion to acting (\textit{taedium operandi}) – that is, an aversion to work. To perform good work requires a transformation of self possible only in an acceptance of God’s grace and friendship.\textsuperscript{15} To reject God’s friendship and the gift of God's own self which renders such friendship possible is also to reject the grace which makes good action possible.\textsuperscript{16}

\begin{itemize}
  \item \textsuperscript{10} Thomas Aquinas, \textit{On Evil}, trans. Jean Oesterle (Notre Dame, IN: University of Notre Dame Press, 1995), 11. 3.
  \item \textsuperscript{11} Aquinas, \textit{On Evil}, 11. 3.
  \item \textsuperscript{12} “Aquinas on Acedia,” 192, 196-97.
  \item \textsuperscript{13} “Aquinas on Acedia,” 245-46.
  \item \textsuperscript{14} Aquinas, \textit{On Evil}, 11. 4.
  \item \textsuperscript{15} Nault, “Acedia,” 244-45.
\end{itemize}
This is not to say that the slothful are not busy doing things; Evagrius claims, in fact, that the slothful are often in a frenzy of action, now this now that, in their disgust and abhorrence at what God calls them to do. We might actually anticipate the slothful individual and the slothful culture to be very busy. This will not be good work, there will not be the leisure of exultation in the delight of work, but this might be a culture of total work, of the complete victory of grasping, making, producing, developing, buying, and selling – and all for nought.

As Evagrius and Aquinas show, sloth is a vice enervating the meaning of desire. For the slothful accepting God’s grace to love and act as they ought, occasions sorrow and repugnance, even horror. The slothful self considers freedom possible only on the condition that love is limited by nothing more than the will itself. For Michael Hanby, a culture of such reduction of desire is nihilistic:

[such] culture...assumes that our lives are innately and intrinsically meaningless...This nullity on the side of the subject is matched by a similar noughting in the world, for latent in this assumption is a corollary denial of form, objective beauty, or a true order of goods that naturally and of themselves compels our interest....

Acedia thus reveals itself as ontological boredom, for the bored lack adequate desire, they sense that there is nothing worth desiring, precisely why the monk has hatred for his place, work, and life – goodness no longer delights.

FROM THE DIRT, FOR THE DIRT: GOOD WORK

If the monk, or person, or culture afflicted with sloth has hatred for place and for work, the creation account of scripture provides a non-slothful picture and mandate for good work. In fact, as I’ll argue briefly below, rejecting the account of work present in the creation account might very likely create the conditions for cultural sloth.

In the beginning, we are told, the earth lacked structure and content, it was “without form and void” (Genesis 1:2). God’s creative work brings both form and content, as indicated by the ordering of

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creation. The first day overcomes an absence of form with the creation of light, whereas the fourth day overcomes the absence of content for that form with the creation of the lights, the sun, moon, and stars. Waters are separated from waters on the second day, with day five filling these new forms with birds for the heavens and swarms of creatures for the seas. Dry land and its vegetative cover are given on the third day, just in time for the beasts and livestock dependent on them, as well as the humans made from the land, on the sixth day. God, a wise king, both creates and fills.\(^\text{18}\)

Created in the image of God, humans are endowed with reason and skill needed to act as sub-creators and stewards of the earth. In fact, it seems as though God has decided to fill the cosmos partly through the instrumental agency of humans. Rather than act as the direct creator of all that would be, God instead grants to humans the power to contribute to the ongoing filling of the temple of the Lord. Work, then, is the cooperative capacity of humans to do the work of God. The so-called creation mandates of Genesis 1:28 and 2:15 give strong indication of this. God places humans in the garden to *work* and *keep* it, to *govern*, and to *fill* it.\(^\text{19}\)

This divinely sanctioned pattern of working, keeping, governing, and filling presents a fascinating interplay of relationships, especially, for the purposes of my interests here, the relation between keeping and the other mandates. There is very little indication that God's intention was for humans to maintain the garden in its original condition without effecting any change whatsoever, like a hired gardener whose task is to maintain a previously planned and planted garden to ensure that it keeps to the original plan and pattern despite the natural dynamism (or entropy) or time and development. Not only were the humans told to fill the garden, quite clearly a developmental pattern, but their task


of governing and working gives them responsibility for and over the garden. They are not the garden’s hired help but the governors of the garden.

Further, this transformational and developmental responsibility is hardly vitiated but rather intensified by the Fall. Quite obviously sin disrupts and deranges human work, rendering it difficult and often fruitless or even destructive to both the earth and the human workers, but God still, apparently, anticipates a place for the products of human work in His vision of redemption, as evidenced by Isaiah 60 where “many of the people and objects from Isaiah’s own day appear within its walls, but they have assumed different roles, they perform new functions.”20 Rather than escaping the results of human work and culture, God seems to welcome them, now transformed and redeemed, into his vision of final peace and righteousness, even including the works and products of those idolatrous nations outside of the covenantal community, such as the riches of the “ships of Tarshish” (Isaiah 60:9), the camels, sheep, flocks, rams, gold, and frankincense of Midian, Ephaph, Kedar, Nebaioth which “shall come up with acceptance on my altar,” and with which “[God] shall beautify [His] beautiful house” (Isaiah 60:6-7). So too will the trees of Lebanon be used to make the sanctuary beautiful (Isaiah 60:13). Believing that the kingdom of God will not annihilate human works, even those done in sin, but rather transform them “gives human work special significance since it bestows independent value on the results of work as ‘building materials’ of the glorified world.”21

If we grant that God has not abandoned his intention to have human work contribute to and cooperate with the filling of the cosmos, then there seems little reason to deny that human work still maintains its status of cooperating with God in working, keeping, governing, filling, preserving, and transforming the world.22 The garden of Genesis is transformed into the garden-city of Revelation, and much of what fills that city is the redeemed work of our hands.

All this indicates the ongoing task of human work which is not abandoned given sin; however, the history of focusing on the governing

or dominion of the human is full of excess and lack of restraint. What then of this little word keep (shamar)? The other three mandates seem obviously to privilege human capacities to develop and transform the earth, but how does relate to the notion of keeping? Are we to keep the garden the way a curator or librarian keeps a rare text, guarding it to ensure that no one alters it? That doesn’t seem to fit with the other mandates. Instead keeping seems to mean something more like preserving, an activity, for the purposes of developing the capacities of the earth without degrading those capacities or working at cross purposes to them. Take as an example the indication of Genesis 2:5 that while there was vegetation given God’s creative work of the third day, there was as yet no agriculture, no “bush of the field,” or “small plant of the field,” because there was “no man to work the ground.” Clearly the work would change the face of the earth, clearing vegetation, planting and harvesting crops, and eventually breeding and developing new strains and varieties of those crops. This work alters, to be sure, but it is an alteration, if done properly, in keeping with the nature and potentiality of the earth itself. Not destroying the earth and its latent capacities, but through work actualizing those potentialities.

I take this to mean something like what Aristotle says in the Nicomachean Ethics, that “art perfects nature,” that is, that human artifice is able to contribute intelligence and development to the potentialities already present in matter to some desirable end. God does something similar in his own creation when he forms the human from the dirt – consciousness and intelligence emerge from dirt, from carbon, through the work of God, thus adding perfections that dirt can obviously embrace but which are not present in the dirt without the additional perfecting work of God. Something similar happens with grace; for grace does not destroy but rather perfects nature and allows the human a perfection – ultimate beatitude – that human nature on its own natural propensity may desire but not attain. God’s work – creation and grace – brings perfection which expands the integrity and goodness of the thing altered, but without destroying or negating, and human art, done properly, can do the same in a limited and analogous fashion.

If all this is true, then God makes the human (adam) from the dirt (adamah) in order to perfect the dirt; God makes the human from the dirt for the dirt. I will not develop here my account of the history of sloth in the West, instead focusing attention on the tests of good work.
THREE TESTS OF GOOD WORK IN A FRIENDLY UNIVERSE

Good work, labor in keeping with the creation mandates as they apply to both the object and subject of work, must meet the following tests:

1. Respect for the integrity of things
2. Respect for the integrity of systemic emergence
3. Proper direction

Respect for the Integrity of Things

God creates the world in a manner analogous to the artist. He intends and consequently enacts some good. To work, fill, and govern these things in a mode which simultaneously keeps them is what I mean by respecting the integrity of things. When God creates, he does so in a way which grants separate existence to the things created; since anything created cannot, by definition, be God, since God, by definition, is uncreated and non-contingent, created entities must have their own substantiality distinct from God. Obviously created entities are not self-caused or autonomous in their ability to sustain their being, which is an ongoing gift from God, but nonetheless created entities are given their own existence, form, matter (if a material entity), potentialities, operations, tendencies, and actuality. Things are created “after their own kind” and this is good. So while things are not independent of God, they have an integrity of their own, which is a gift of God to them.

Work which keeps the world is work which acts in accordance with this integrity, it is work which does not contravene the nature of the goodness of entities in the world. This is not to say that such respect cannot alter the entities, for alteration or transformation can be an improvement, a development, or a perfection in keeping with the integrity of the entity, just as art and grace perfect nature, or exercise perfects the body, or education perfects intelligence. To act in accordance with the integrity of things is thus to act in attunement with the things, but it is not to maintain the static, pristine origin of the thing.

One way to think of this would be to think of work as attending to the integrity of entities in the world. Attending in an obvious sense is to pay attention, to grasp what is there, to not overlook, ignore, or be without care. Attending is also to at-tend, to tend to, and so attending
is to be aware of the nature of things and to tend to the nature of things. This is what it means to cultivate or to be a husband of in the agricultural senses of cultivation and animal husbandry. Another helpful agricultural term developed in more detail later but which helps clarify my meaning would be the notion of the carrying capacity of a bit of pasture. When cattle are put to pasture, the good husband knows the carrying capacity of the land. Lush, rich grass might be able to handle many head of cattle to a single acre without overgrazing and destruction of the grass whereas poorer land in dryer regions might require many acres for a single cow. If the husband knows (attention) and cares (attends), she can rotate the cattle from plot to plot in a way which provides ample nutrition for the good of the cattle without harm to the grass or the soil, and, given particularly intelligent husbandry, to the benefit of the soil and grass itself:

Aristotle's understanding of the tools of knowledge, the organon, and the function of theory, are good examples of such attention. A method is a seeking after something, in its linguistic origins it has similarity to the hunt, to the attempt to capture of attain some desired end, and this hunt uses particular tools, the organon, of reason and inquiry. A method, then, is a seeking after knowledge using the tools of intelligence. This is not a value-free activity which admits equally of any desired end using any possible tool, but, instead, resembles something like the good farmer who uses tools appropriate to the integrity of the land for the sake of a fruitful harvest which does not itself harm the fecundity of the land or the character and well-being of the farmer: "the concept of method (met'hodos) is not simply a mental exercise but a way of life seeking the human and the universal good."\(^{23}\)

The life of theory, \textit{bios thôretikos}, is not essentially a life of abstraction but rather a life of attunement or attention to the real:

"theory is openness to the things we have not made," the "unmakeable things." It should be said, however, that by extension the theoretical attitude can be brought to all things, including artifacts, since the emphasis of the \textit{Bios thôretikos} is upon fidelity to what is observed, whether made by us or not... the original meaning of theory is openness to the things that

are...the heightened sensibility with which we must dispose ourselves in order to receive what others, including things, have to show to us.\textsuperscript{24}

Theory, then, is fidelity to attending, an attunement to living in the truth of being. Working with respect to the integrity of things is work which attends, or, as we mean it here, theoretical work. One can compare such theoretical work with its opposite, general bias which in its obsessive practicality tends to violate the integrity of things and result in the longer pattern of decline.\textsuperscript{25}

\textbf{Respect for the Integrity of Systemic Emergence}

While things exist and must be \textit{kept}, things do not exist in isolation. All that is, is in relation, part of the community of being as both dependent and contributor. So while things are in themselves good and work should act in accordance with that integrity, one aspect of that integrity is the thing’s relations – which makes matters pretty complicated awfully quickly, perhaps why the life of attentive fidelity is so rarely accomplished.

While complex, these relations are neither unintelligible nor without purpose. The relations originate from the intelligence and goodness of God and for his gracious purposes and thus are knowable and ordered, which does not imply a static fixity or a closed universe but rather one of emergent probability.\textsuperscript{26} This is a world process, a process of world order, and while startlingly complex, we can grasp its order at least heuristically before examining particular schemes and conditions in detail. Our heuristic understanding, moreover, indicates that the system is not static or closed but rather dynamic and open.

\textsuperscript{24} Schmitz, \textit{Recovery of Wonder}, 23.


Part of the world process is the emergence of human beings. God's art allowed for the emergence of responsible moral agents from brute matter – *adam* from *adamah*. (None of this implies a naturalistic reductionism.) And part of the world process is the emergence of human beings who exist as conditions of possibility for new schemes of recurrence through their work – this is what I mean by respect for the integrity of systemic emergence. The world process itself is one of the emergence of new systems; human work can potentially be a condition of emergence, and a test of our work is whether it operates within the integrity of such emergent probability.

Of course, such a test does not mean that work is good whenever it results in new schemes. The point is not to keep the series moving at all costs. Rather, the assumption is that the world, however dynamic and open, is nonetheless governed by God's goodness and intelligence, and an aspect of God's governance is emergent probability; but in order for this to be at all meaningful there has to be a notion of progress. While we've moved far beyond the static nature of classicism to include statistical schemes of recurrence and emergent probability, this remains within a tradition accepting that God has lovingly and wisely ordered the cosmos so that all things seek appropriate perfection and in so doing allow for the emergence of systemic perfection. In other words, and to simplify absurdly, the cosmos exhibits purposive finality. Humans are positioned within this system of purpose uniquely – as members of the system they are governed by the same rules, but as agents they can develop or interfere with the system itself. Good work cooperates with God's good order through intelligent, careful, and attentive labor in keeping with the integrity of things and emergence – and this is progress.27

In a rationally governed cosmos, rational agents need only to follow their intelligent nature to move toward their own fulfillment and the development of the emergent probability – but the great joker in the deck, sin, deranges and damages such progress. Not only is progress not inevitable but sin interferes even with its normal proclivities.

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27 *Insight*, 259.
Proper Direction

Given sin, a third test of work is necessary, although without sin the first two tests would be sufficient and likely met with normal human functioning. But since we are abnormal, under the reign of sin, work requires an eschatological test as well. By direction I mean whether the work would appropriately fill Babylon or the New Jerusalem. Does this work produce things with which God would use in filling and beautifying his beautiful house (Isaiah 60:6-7), or would it be better consigned to fill the markets of Babylon?

If God as a wise king fills his temple, including the New Jerusalem, with good things, and if God has willed to accomplish this filling partly through the sub-creation of human labor, then there is little reason to think that the products of human work will be destroyed or rendered irrelevant in the end. Rather, if the fruits of good labor, both the objective products and the subjective development of the human person, could be presented to God as adornments for his temple, then the implications of work become quite significant. Is this the sort of work I could present to God and God's people as a “house warming” gift which would adorn the halls of the temple forever? That's something of a weighty question, implying that “the expectation of the eschatological transformation invests human work with ultimate significance.” Through it human beings contribute in their modest and broken way to God's new creation.”

This is not to say that humans don't need grace for good work or that the products of our labor would not need some sort of gracious redemption or transformation; I'm not even convinced it implies that all human work will be gathered into the New Jerusalem. It is to say that God can redeem and transform our work, that even swords and spears can be transformed into plowshares and pruning hooks for use in the garden-city (Isaiah 2:4):

Not all of the items of pagan culture will be gathered as is into the Holy City. A pagan ship will be changed into a redeemed ship – but it will still be a ship. But other things will have to have their identities, their basic functions, transformed;

28 Volf, Work in the Spirit, 92.
some of them will be changed almost beyond recognition.... the emphasis here is on transformation, not destruction.²⁹

Now, even if God can redeem work, the test would remain: Does this work have its natural home in Babylon? If so, it is bad work. Given sin, much of our work is bad, but our work is not necessarily bad, certainly it is not irredeemable.

CONCLUSION

We have, then, three tests of good work: Does it respect the integrity of things, including the integrity of the worker; does it contribute to the capacity of the created order, including the human person, for dynamic development and intelligent progress; does the work suit the feasting halls of New Jerusalem or the gluttonous meals of Babylon?

²⁹ Mouw, When the Kings Come Marching In, 40-41.

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The field of management studies is devoted to identification, explanation, and prediction regarding observed variation in management styles. The variations may be observed in case studies, at industry, regional, national, or cultural levels. All too often, scholars report findings that involve inference or creative derivation from what is observed to explanatory constructs that lack any apparent grounding in, reference to, or – indeed – awareness of the legal or quali-legal obligations that are extant in various national cultures.

At a minimum, this oversight could exclude a significant intervening variable in any explanatory causal chain. Taken to extreme, researchers who fail to attend to national legislation and interpretative jurisprudence that condition observed management practice by either judicial obligations of restraint or encouragement of participation run the risk of concluding to constructs of misplaced concreteness. This does little to advance study of management or management history.

In light of this concern, the basis for this paper derives from industrial relations research issues unearthed during field work in Japan, which are curiously connected to U.S. labor legislation. Both aspects lead to compelling implications for management theory in general and, in particular, the future of industrial relations theory and practice in the United States of America. First, it is well enough known that the postwar Japanese economic miracle was grounded in labor law

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directly derived from U.S. New Deal labor legislation. Indeed, this step of legalizing labor unions and ensuring the right of organized workers to collectively bargain over wages and working conditions was initially seen as an important means to ensure reform and the future political democracy of defeated Japan, not only the nature and practice of its industrial democracy. What is less well known is that key Japanese actors in the postwar Japanese industrial relations system adaptively appropriated continental European, and particularly Weimar era German, interpretations of these America-style legislative acts within courtroom struggles spanning decades — and even continuing to this day. From “just cause” obligations to restrict managerial dismissal prerogatives to the localization of German-style works councils within the collective bargaining agreements of Japan’s recovering enterprises, Japan’s postwar industrial relations system enlisted Western — specifically European — legal constructs to the creative transformation of its post-World War II system architecture. Indeed, other measures were also taken to ensure industrial success. Among them would be the labor-inclusive nature of Japan’s Productivity Movement and the role of the Ministry of International Trade and Industry. Nevertheless, from an industrial relations perspective, the two principles of just cause and employee participation appear to be the initial and necessary, if not yet sufficient, conditions to ensure domestic tranquility, the foundations for postwar industrial recovery, and the enterprise organizing principles for Japan’s later international economic prowess.

Remarkably, most Japanese management theory and theorists have completely neglected this crucial legal aspect as an explanatory variable. From Theory Z, to white-collarization, Aoki’s J-firm

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2 C. T. Tackney, Institutionalization of the Lifetime Employment System.


construct, and even the more recent knowledge management literature derived from Nonaka's intensive study of Japanese shopfloor production — all have managed to develop explanatory accounts of Japan's postwar management practice in the absence of any reference to these key legal and quasi-legal conditioning forms of structure and practice. Certainly the validity of the theoretical constructions is weakened thereby. Thus, not only is the validity of each construct at risk, but also reliability and — significantly — external generalizability. In a word, the various precepts of each and every notion — Theory Z, white-collarization, J-firm, or knowledge management — may or may not function if summarily transferred to other, very different labor relations settings of law and jurisprudence.

Now, the reasons for this notable oversight may be many and complex: interdisciplinary studies do not appear to have held much attraction in postwar Japanese higher education or research. Too, a large number of Japanese scholars went off to the United States for graduate studies, thanks in no small part to Fulbright scholarships. The education received was U.S. in New Deal ideological perspective and free market in fundamental orientation. In contrast, the legacy of the immediate post-World War II jurisprudence that shifted the Japanese industrial relations paradigm was European and Weimar-era German in outlook. An additional factor strikes the author as arguably important, if seldom addressed. The Japanese term for industrial relations is "Roshi kankei." This literally translates as "the relation between labor and capital." The role of government, along with its various actors — particularly including the role of law and jurisprudence — is wholly absent from the Chinese character compound that stands for "industrial relations" in the language. In English, it can be argued that the term "industrial relations" itself lacks specificity, but the ideographic nature of Chinese characters communicates by what it specifies — the characters for labor and capital are evident — no

8 D. Kettler, and C. T. Tackney, op cit.
less than what it excludes: any character for government. In contrast, “industrial relations” essentially invites further specification.

Regardless of the cause of oversight in Japanese management theory development, the fact has nevertheless rendered it difficult to adaptively appropriate Japan’s postwar developments in the social relations of the modern enterprise to other national settings. We have no further to look than the U.S. auto industry in general and the recent end of the Saturn experiment of General Motors. The current fiscal crisis and the near-total collapse of the U.S. automobile industry suggest that the United States faces serious economic problems in loss of industrial prowess and that time is of the essence. Thus, to anticipate one set of conclusions to the study we are about to commence, it would appear almost completely self-evident that the two simple steps taken towards industrial and economic democracy in Japan over fifty years ago can now significantly benefit the current U.S. crisis no less than other nations throughout the world.

Given the postwar industrial manufacturing success and economic prowess of both Germany and Japan, there is ample reason to believe these steps would enhance U.S. enterprise function, enterprise competitiveness, and – in a striking example of reciprocal causality - significantly reduce the nation’s singular proclivity towards excessive executive compensation.

What prevents this adaptation in the United States? There is, first of all, a strong national propensity to presume that economic success only derives from a range of managerial prerogative unmatched in the world. This is, basically, an ideological presumption of increasingly questionable validity. The origins for this degree of belief in rugged individual managerial independence go beyond the scope of this paper.

As a student of comparative industrial relations, and aware of the developments taken in post-World War II Japan, the author thought to explore the views held on management right and prerogative in the key texts of the founder of U.S. industrial relations, John R. Commons. Did he share this view of unbridled, unrestrained managerial prerogative? And, if not, how did he construe the nature of the working rules of a going concern? Furthermore, how did his views on these specific notions match the views held by the leading German labor law economist from about his time?
In the following pages we first explore Commons's sense of industrial relations, paying particular attention to the manner in which he saw law and legal practice could influence the working rules of U.S. employment relations. Then, given Japan's Weimar-era influence in key industrial relations issues, we next selectively review the work of the leading solidarist economic thinker of modern Germany, Jesuit labor economist Heinrich Pesch. Finally, insofar as working rules influence economic development and the possible modulation of economic cycles, we explore how the notion of a "going concern" is treated in the circulation economics of Canadian Jesuit Bernard J. F. Lonergan, a more contemporary economist whose work apparently benefitted from both Commons and Pesch.

**METHOD**

This is an extended essay form of research paper designed to selectively review the work of three leading thinkers. The aim is to examine, or reexamine, the historical accuracy of recent scholarship in management theory as well as currently held common sense beliefs that "free enterprise" or unrestricted managerial prerogative are, or have been, firmly held notions by the leading labor economist in American history.

The author was previously familiar with the works of John R. Commons and Bernard J. F. Lonergan. During the course of a Fall 2009 Lonergan Research Fellowship at Boston College, he read more extensively in the works of both, discovering some degree of probable influence upon Lonergan by the works of Commons. Lonergan, in turn, was discovered to have read extensively of the works by Heinrich Pesch, who was influential in Roman Catholic encyclicals concerned with work and its social and spiritual functions.

By index research of their major texts over a range of key terms – management, profit, law, power, free enterprise, among others – then further reading on related themes of interest that emerged, the author was able to craft narratives for each author's point of view concerning those themes. There was surprising convergence around the basic recognition that Adam Smith's classical work was grounded in unrecognized premises involving historical oversight or distortion.
This type of textual study was initially, and simply, exploratory in nature. Pesch was a Roman Catholic Jesuit priest who premised his labor economics on an explicit belief in God, faith in the hierarchical merits of Roman Catholicism, and notions of subsidiarity. Thus, his sense that employers worked for a commonweal was not itself surprising. What was of emerging interest as the research proceeded was the evident consonance between Pesch and Commons, and their very divergent grounds for this consonance.

This combination of consonance and contrast suggested the paper might be of merit for the Boston College Lonergan Workshop and Proceedings. An author may hope these pages will aid the historian, legal scholar, the policymaker, and the management practitioner toward a more nuanced sensibility of the nature of the modern enterprise. They indicate a richer sense of the possible interplay between managerial prerogative and employee participation, this last feature defined over and above merely a collective bargaining voice about wages and working conditions.

We begin with the work of John R. Commons (1862-1945). Then we study Henrich Pesch's (1854-1926) view on similar notions of the working rules of going concerns. Finally, we take up the macrodynamic circulation economics of Bernard J. F. Lonergan (1904-1984) to discover where the industrial relations concepts find an appropriate deployment venue within Lonergan's macro-level economics analysis.

THREE SCHOLARS ON THE WORKING RULES OF GOING CONCERNS: COMMONS, PESCH, AND LONERGAN

The Working Rules of J. R. Commons and the Field of Industrial Relations

Students and scholars of industrial relations are familiar with the defining construct of the discipline: the web of rules governing employment relations.9 We readily envision these rules as extending beyond those of the market, as the field is well-known to have emerged from a critique of simple or simplistic economic analysis, particularly

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in respect to how human beings exist, participate, and impact market transactions. While British and U.S. scholars were involved in the field's development, John R. Commons stands as one of the leading founders of the American industrial relations research tradition.¹⁰

Interdisciplinary in nature, industrial relations researchers consider history, law, culture and other variables relevant to a beneficial and robust account of the working rules of employment relations. That said, the recent fiscal crisis suggests some reflective and reflexive gain may be obtained by a review of how John R. Commons thought about the nature and origin of the central construct he helped to craft. His sense of the legal nature, inherent flexibility, and possible source of creative vitality may serve as both corrective and inspiration.

First published in 1924, Commons noted in Legal Foundations that economic theory had “more recently” come to include “principles of collective control of transactions through associations and governments, placing limits on selfishness.”¹¹ Commons recorded that the “the modern concept of working rules was introduced into economic theory by the great historians and theorists of the British labor unions, Mr. and Mrs. Webb.”¹² He had earlier noted the whole notion of working rules actually predates theoretical development of role of the individual in economic science.

In fact, his work was intended to provide a necessary corrective to Smith and what we now look upon as classic economic theory. Commons asserted that Adam Smith started economic theory with the elimination of all associations, corporations, unions, and almost all of the state itself, with their working rules...and to substitute, in their place, individual units of self-interest, division of labor, liberty, equality, fluidity in the choice of occupation, and that “invisible hand” or divine providence.”¹³ And, what was the nature of this invisible hand or Providence? For Commons, it was “none other than the working rules


¹¹ Commons, Legal Foundations of Capitalism, 6.

¹² Commons, Legal Foundations of Capitalism, 139, from Commons's footnote reference: “Webb, Sydney and Beatrice, Industrial Democracy, 560 (1897, 1920).”

¹³ Commons, Legal Foundations of Capitalism, 137.
of an orderly society as understood by Adam Smith in the middle of the eighteenth century."\(^{14}\)

Commons—working in the North American, U.S. context—stated the fundamental error of modern economics concerned its basic unit of observation—the individual. He wrote, "Starting, as they did, with individuals rather than the working rules of going concerns, both the historical and the causal sequence were reversed."\(^{15}\) Thus, individuals are concerned with protection of personal rights and liberties against impositions from others. This leads the economist to next infer "that the working rules were designed by a rational being for the protection and the preexisting rights and liberties of individuals."\(^{16}\)

The truth, according to Commons, is precisely the opposite: "as a matter of fact, the notion of individual rights is historically many thousands of years subsequent to the full development of working rules."\(^{17}\) And, to be clear, Commons did not perceive this assertion of the newly establishing field of economics for individual liberty to be a gain from American Revolutionary insight; "as a matter of causal sequence the working rules are designed primarily to keep the peace and promote collective action and only secondarily to protect rights and liberties."\(^{18}\) He summarized their historical necessity in these words: "Primarily the rules are necessary and their survival in history is contingent on their fitness to hold together in a continuing concern the overweening and unlimited selfishness of individuals pressed on by the scarcity of resources."\(^{19}\)

If they matter so much, what do they control or address? The basic principles involved in working rules can be understood in terms of the four verbs that capture their domain of activities, clarifying what individuals:

- **Must or must not do (compulsion or duty)**
- **May do (permission or liberty)**

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\(^{14}\) Commons, *Legal Foundations of Capitalism*, 137.

\(^{15}\) Commons, *Legal Foundations of Capitalism*, 137.

\(^{16}\) Commons, *Legal Foundations of Capitalism*, 137.

\(^{17}\) Commons, *Legal Foundations of Capitalism*, 137.

\(^{18}\) Commons, *Legal Foundations of Capitalism*, 137.

\(^{19}\) Commons, *Legal Foundations of Capitalism*, 138.
Can do with the aid of collective power (capacity or right)

Cannot expect the collective power to do in their behalf (incapacity or exposure)

He had earlier summarized their function and role in the text in the following terms: "the working rules of associations and governments, when looked at from the private standpoint of the individual, are the source of his rights, duties and liberties, as well as his exposures to the protected liberties of other individuals."  

While the role and prerogatives of corporations and managers dominate contemporary discourse, the historicity of this status is worth recalling. Commons located the regulation of working rules in what may strike the reader as an unusual place: the U.S. Supreme Court. He noted that transactions are "economic units" and, then, that their "working rules are the principles on which the Supreme Court of the United States has been working over its theories of property, sovereignty and value."  

Commons held an interesting view on the Court's role and function. The Supreme Court occupies, "the unique position of the first authoritative faculty of political economy in the world's history." In this role, he was particularly interested in the Court's historically developed interest in the prohibition of "taking of property, liberty, or value (Commons's italicized emphasis) without due process of law or equal protection of the laws."

The working rules that Commons observed within the U.S. industrial relations context he inferred to be distinctly identifiable constructs; they govern the acts and actions of going concerns. And these have a long history, having been variously ascribed to "gods, ancestors, conquerors, "nature," "will of the people," and so forth, the general idea being to clothe them with a certain sanctity or authority." Following this review of possible human and divine sources, he succinctly resolved the issue of possible transcendent justification with three words; "At

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20 Commons, Legal Foundations of Capitalism, 6.
21 Commons, Legal Foundations of Capitalism, 7.
22 Commons, Legal Foundations of Capitalism, 7.
23 Commons, Legal Foundations of Capitalism, 7.
24 Commons, Legal Foundations of Capitalism, 68.
any rate, they appear, in the history of the race, as the essential and ultimate means by which the members of a going concern are able to work together for a common purpose and to exert their united power against other concerns."

Yet, the issue of mandate and right persists in the text, particularly in discussion of “absolute rights.”. He observed that such ethical mandates “are mental processes and therefore as divergent as the wishes and fears of individuals.” In action, these are “individualistic and anarchistic.” In consequence, “the only procedure that will correlate (Commons’s emphasis) the wishes and fears of each and prevent anarchy is to resort to a third person of an earthly quality whom each consents to obey, or each is compelled to obey.” He listed the usual sources of earthly authority, beginning with the “social necessity” of judges, chiefs, kings, despots, priests and others. And he noted “that the correlation of right and duty which is the starting point of jurisprudence.”

Commons offered a supple treatment of working rules in respect to the individual of intelligence and reflection. Human will is not lawless, but acts within certain limits of choice and discretion. He noted that we usually refer to these limits as laws. Yet, even these are not fixed borders within which behavior is absolutely delimited. Instead, they are “rather certain conditions or forces having strategic or limiting and complementary relations to each other, which a sufficiently intelligent being can manipulate, and thus, although operating upon something that goes on independently of his will, yet its independent operation comes out with results somewhat in conformity with what he intended.”

In a later discussion of public purpose, Commons noted that working rules have developed over an historical process of adjudication of dispute between members of a going concern – and this whether national, economic, or cultural. The prior forty years had seen the
U.S. courts distinguish between working rule purpose and the process of their creation and enforcement. This unfolding distinction was important at all times, "but especially at times of great economic or social change." He reported that due process of law was to consider "due procedure" (Commons's emphasis) before the Civil War. Since that time it also concerns law's "due purpose of law."

In light of contemporary discussions and debate regarding employment issues and executive compensation in U.S. firms, Commons is particularly interesting in his discussion of the nature of entrepreneurship. He notes the standard economic factor and income parallels:

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<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Labor</td>
<td>wages</td>
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<tr>
<td>Capital</td>
<td>interest</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Entrepreneur</td>
<td>profit</td>
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However, he went on to state these are an "abstract separation," because "both the individual and the concern belong, at one and the same time, to more than one of the factors." This he called the "familiar distinction between functional distribution and personal distribution." Competitive factors are functional, while the combination of these is personal: "It determines the prosperity or poverty of the individual." Significantly, he asserted it is impossible to distinguish where the entrepreneur function begins or ends. The distinction between entrepreneur and manager is equally uncertain. He wrote, "In some concerns...even the wage earners, organized or unorganized, have a compelling voice in determining the direction and extent of management." His treatment of the capitalist function was equally open-minded: "Even the wage-earners and managers are investors in the business, to the extent of their accrued unpaid wages

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33 Commons, *Legal Foundations of Capitalism*, 367
34 Commons, *Legal Foundations of Capitalism*, 367.
36 Commons, *Legal Foundations of Capitalism*, 368.
and salaries and their expectations of continuing jobs...."37 Commons concluded that this analysis supports the view of a going concern rising to a "third principle of classification" because it includes "that authoritative proportioning of factors through inducements to persons, which constitute political, industrial and moral government."38

In *Institutional Economics*, the flexibility and source of authority of these rules was made clear. He wrote, "it is the changeable working rules of a concern, expressed as the opinion of the court or arbitrator in using the sanctions of the concern, which determine, more precisely than is done by custom, what each party to a transaction can, cannot, may, must, or must not do."39

Commons's legal critique of Adam Smith does not rest only with issues of the basic economic unit of appropriate analysis — working rules over the falsely emergent "free" individual. He reviewed U.S. judicial innovation to specify the locus for the historical emergence of Capitalism itself. The New York legislature in 1848, "enacted general corporation laws" to reduce political corruption.40 This granted "business men" a new right — that of association. He continued; "This new right is the beginning of modern capitalism. Capitalism begins not with Adam Smith, but with going concerns."41 And, as we have elsewhere noted, these going concerns are functional entities that are governed by working rules.

These developments were followed by the "discovery, thirty years ago, the holding company, invented by the corporation lawyers to evade the anti-trust laws, and enacted first by the legislature of New Jersey."42 Once these companies obtained functional rights in other states, Commons wrote, "The only restraint upon them now became the Supreme Court of the United States."43 Commons noted that this development of "Judicial Sovereignty" legitimized the materialist interpretation of history offered by Marx. He continued:

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37 Commons, *Legal Foundations of Capitalism*, 368.
38 Commons, *Legal Foundations of Capitalism*, 368.
But instead of bringing in the Communist or Fascist dictatorship through the abolition of the judiciary, Marx's view was validated by the supremacy of the judiciary over all state and federal legislatures and executives. It is the United States Supreme Court that came to define the notion and nature of property, while those who naively read the Constitution literally assume that the definition of property is left to the states.  

Finally, we return to an earlier treatment of working rules to reinforce Commons's notion of their basic explanatory power no less than their historical variability. He explained working rules as "The universal principle, or similarity of cause, effect, or purpose, which we can derive from all observations of collective control, liberation, and expansion of individual action, whether it be a going concern or custom." He negated their transcendent origins or significance, writing, "They are not something prefixed or eternal, or divine, as assumed by John Locke and the natural rights school of jurisprudence." They are, "simply the changeable rules, sometimes named "norms," which, for the time being, in view of changing economic and social conditions, the courts or arbitrators accept in issuing their commands to disputants in a litigation."  

The Solidarism of Heinrich Pesch, S.J.  

While there is no evidence available to the author, to date, that John R. Commons was aware of the work of Heinrich Pesch, he had certainly studied European labor law and practice. Pesch (1854-1926) was a philosopher-economist of tremendous productive output. His work and legacy have influenced German labor law and Roman Catholic social encyclicals. Two encyclicals of Pope John Paul II affirm Pesch's notion of solidarism. "Solidarity" is a Christian virtue of social importance, according to the 1987 Sollicitudo Rei Socialis. In an Introduction to Pesch's work, Rupert J. Ederer wrote that John Paul presented this "in
terms which reflect precisely Pesch’s notion of solidarity as the actual condition of interdependence among human beings in society...”

The influence of Weimar-era German labor jurisprudence upon post-World War II Japanese industrial relations has been detailed elsewhere – with a particular focus upon the German, and Jewish, labor law expert Hugo Sinzheimer. In this paper we are, at this point, interested in exploring parallels between two otherwise very different, yet vigorous, labor law scholars, at a critical time in the development of economic theory, while noting incidental parallels with Roman Catholic social teaching.

Pesch grounded the whole of his economic theory in Catholic theology – proper social order is in accord with God’s will. In this, he predated Commons’s almost dismissive treatment of the transcendent moral sources of social order – the reader will recall that Commons began the very sentence following a review of these sources with the phrase, “At any rate...”

However, what is of interest in this investigation is Persch’s remarkably similar critique of the free enterprise system. Writing in his 1918 text *Ethics and the National Economy* (*Ethik_und Volkswirtschaft*), he stated that the free enterprise system relied on three factors: self-interest, freedom, and competition. Each factor is itself needful of some form of regulation. Self-interest, unfettered, may work to the harm of others, with conflict a likely outcome of competing efforts to satisfy instinctive and even reflectively deliberate interest. He then challenged the reader’s assent, writing, “And that the kind of freedom implied by *laissez faire* all too often ends up being diametrically opposed to order and regulation?” Competition, in turn, serves a possible regulated function “if it is a kind of regulated rivalry which strives to succeed by providing quality, and by offering good and reasonably priced merchandise.” For Pesch, competition is less a principle than a fact, “a kind of conduct which itself needs regulation.” Unfettered free competition, in contrast, is a “hazard” for the national

50 Kettler and Tackney, “Light from a Dead Sun.”
Three Seminal Thinkers

Three Seminal Thinkers

economy. Ultimately, free competition as an economic theory "still does not add up to communal activity."\textsuperscript{54} His concluding observation in the chapter of this 1918 text echoes down to the present fiscal crisis; "A system which proceeds from false premises – as the free enterprise system does – and which is self-contradictory, can only lead to absurd consequences when it goes into operation. And what are these absurd consequences? They may be summed up in two words: capitalism and socialism."\textsuperscript{55}

In his series of texts published between 1923 and 1926, Pesch proposed the previously mentioned construct of solidarism as middle ground between the absolute decentralism associated with abject individualism and the absolute centralization linked to socialism. Solidarism, much like Commons’s notions of "working rules" and the "going concern," was not new. Following a resume of its Catholic sources, he summarized the principle: "The idea of solidarity as it is applied to a social community, in its double role of which are supposed to, or do in fact, bind society together with reference to a morally permissible or morally required common good."\textsuperscript{56}

Community has a particular significance when applied to labor relations, due to the particular nature of the employment contract. Pesch wrote, "Legally speaking we have a wage contract, but ethically there is a social relationship here involving a working community."\textsuperscript{57} He explained that this community involves "reciprocal obligations, reciprocal rights, reciprocal sharing in the results which are the purpose behind any such unity!"\textsuperscript{58}

His principle of solidarity, "casts a new light especially on the relationship between labor and management which has been badly distorted into an adversarial relationship by materialism and selfishness."\textsuperscript{59} Specifically, solidarism takes note of the fact that work in civil society advances culture and the production of wealth. As such, it "has to be regarded as a cooperative effort on the part of all, governed by

\textsuperscript{54} Pesch, \textit{Ethics and the National Economy}, 152.
\textsuperscript{55} Pesch, \textit{Ethics and the National Economy}, 153.
\textsuperscript{57} Pesch, \textit{Heinrich Pesch on Solidarist Economics}, 159.
\textsuperscript{58} Pesch, \textit{Heinrich Pesch on Solidarist Economics}, 160.
\textsuperscript{59} Pesch, \textit{Heinrich Pesch on Solidarist Economics}, 160-61.
social responsibility for the promotion and safeguarding of the common good."\(^{60}\) He went on to note, "If we require, for example, that labor relations ought to take the form of a true working community, that is, after all, stating what is simply a fact."\(^{61}\)

Writing in the period that Pesch did, the words resound to the present day and the current U.S. industrial relations crisis of nature and function. Individualism, he thought, "has split the economy into a mere aggregation of individual economizing individuals."\(^{62}\) What results from this includes the following symptomatic list:

- Brutal conflict
- Service of personal interest
- Absence of individual restraint
- A lack of unifying organization
- Plutocracy enriching itself beyond all measure due to the monopolization of business function to personal and professional ends
- The consequent exploitation of employees and, sequentially, national cultural and society
- Suppression of the middle class
- Profit self-allocation: when this occurs without restraint or proportional relation to actual contributions
- Profit self-allocation: when this powerful mechanism comes to dominate the economic, political, and cultural diversions of a society.

In his time and place, Pesch witnessed the emergence of socialism in response to the depredations of capitalist accumulation. His alternative approach preserved private economic units, and he sustained the sober, realistic view that there ought be no discussion of the abolition or elimination of personal self-interest or personal freedoms. Instead, he looked to the guidance of these toward national welfare: "a genuine communal economy." Solidarism would first of all define and limit economic freedom. Justice and the common good

\(^{60}\) Pesch, *Heinrich Pesch on Solidarist Economics*, 161.
\(^{62}\) Pesch, *Heinrich Pesch on Solidarist Economics*, 164.
are the goals, and regulation would seek their enactment along parameters of mutual support and what he described as “occupational organization.”

Recalling Commons’s respect for the creative role of the judiciary, Pesch looked to the courts to ensure these lofty goals are held up within society and incrementally perfected. Thus, along with individual responsibility, solidarism establishes “juridical, social responsibility on the part of public authorities on the one hand, and juridical social co-responsibility on the part of all citizens and their various associations on the other hand.” Notably, these prerequisites become normative “to make possible economic personal responsibility especially on the part of the weaker members of society.” Functionally, Pesch elsewhere acknowledged, “The accumulation of power in the great economics associations was a basic idea underlying the German movement toward worker councils.”

**Lonergan on the Regulation of Macroeconomic Dynamics**

In the “Editors’ Introduction” to volume 15 of the Collected Works of Bernard Lonergan, “Macroeconomic Dynamics: An Essay in Circulation Analysis,” Fred Lawrence observed that Lonergan’s interest in economics derived from his experience of the Depression. Lonergan’s specific motivation was “to discover how to ground objectively correct moral courses of action in an adequate economic analysis of the relationships between capital formation and the production and distribution of consumer goods.”

In respect to the procedure of his analysis, Lonergan wrote, “What the analysis reveals is a mechanism distinct though not separable from the price mechanism which spontaneously coordinates a vast and ever shifting manifold of otherwise independent choices from demand and of decisions from supply. It is distinct from the price mechanism, for it determines the channels within which the price mechanism works. It is not separable from the price mechanism, for a channel is irrelevant.

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64 Pesch, *Heinrich Pesch on Solidarist Economics*, 165 (Pesch’s emphasis).


when nothing flows through it.”68 Lonergan sought to clarify this notion of a “mechanism.” It is:

- distinct from the price mechanism
- determines the channels within which the price mechanism works
- yet, it is not itself separable from the price mechanism.

Furthermore, regardless of the mathematical rigor of quantitative analysis and projection, Lonergan shared Commons’s nuanced embrace of empirical reality. In a later study of methodological shifts, Lonergan wrote, “the economic issue arises in an ecology in which abstract relationships are complemented by concrete probabilities.”69 In fact, “human society, like an ecology, is an assembly of assemblies of schemes of recurrence.”70

On the theme of multinational corporations, Lonergan observed that these were not new. From of old, maximizing profit was the goal — even from the mercantilist era. Following Commons, he wrote, “The multinational corporation is a going concern.”71 Despite this recognition of continuity, he took the same path that Commons did in recognizing a change in social order had arisen due to certain consequences of multinational corporation function. That is to say; despite continuities in organizational motivation, “It remains that the long-accepted principles are inadequate.”72 And, in light of this conclusion, Lonergan wrote, “When survival requires a system that does not exist, then the need for creating is manifest.”73

In his study of economic process, development, and decline, Lonergan looked back to the end of the Roman empire and the coincident widespread dispersion of Christianity. The latter “possessed the

69 *Macroeconomic Dynamics*, 89.
70 *Macroeconomic Dynamics*, 93.
71 *Macroeconomic Dynamics*, 100.
72 *Macroeconomic Dynamics*, 100.
73 *Macroeconomic Dynamics*, 100.
spiritual power to heal what was unsound in that imperial domain."\textsuperscript{74} Yet, in fact, this creativity did not obtain in the temporal realm. With the cool distance that a retrospective spanning centuries permits, he wrote, "the church indeed lived on. But it lived on, not in a civilized world, but in a dark and barbarous age in which, as a contemporary reported, men devoured one another as fishes in the sea."\textsuperscript{75}

In the present time, Lonergan wrote, two demands must be met lest a similar oversight recur.

From economic theorists we have to demand, along with as many other types of analysis as they please, a new and specific type that reveals how moral precepts have both a basis in economic process and so an effective application to it. From moral theorists we have to demand, along with their other various forms of wisdom and prudence, specifically economic precepts that arise out of economic process itself and promote its proper functioning.\textsuperscript{76}

Here, we may briefly note similarities to Commons's more macro- and middle-level economic analysis. This larger "mechanism" would appear to some degree to be collinear with, or at least impacted by, Commons's working rules. Furthermore, it may permit specification of the interface between Lonergan's macroeconomic analysis and Commons' focus upon middle-level "going concern" legal analysis.

Lonergan's work revealed the various channels and brought to light "an undertow."\textsuperscript{77} This undertow was, however, counterbalanced: "More positively, the channels account for booms and slumps, for inflation and deflation, for changed rates of profit, for the attraction found in a favorable balance of foreign trade, the relief given by deficit spending, and the variant provided by multinational corporations and their opposition to the welfare state."\textsuperscript{78} It may be that the working rules of the going concern represent the substantive norms that generate this observed undertow.

\textsuperscript{74} Macroeconomic Dynamics, 105.
\textsuperscript{75} Macroeconomic Dynamics, 105.
\textsuperscript{76} Macroeconomic Dynamics, 105.
\textsuperscript{77} Macroeconomic Dynamics, 17.
\textsuperscript{78} Macroeconomic Dynamics, 17.
Within the overall analysis, we need not be left wondering what may be creative and meritorious in regard to specific policy possibility. As Lonergan noted, "the good is never an abstraction. Always it is concrete." This gives us means to envision a "a democratic economics that can issue practical imperatives to plain men."

DISCUSSION

In light of the recent global financial crises, the enduring long-term loss of U.S. industrial prowess, and evidence that long-term employment relationships are central to securing the idiosyncratic features essential to global competitive success, it would appear that now is the proper time for the basic structures of economic democracy to be extended to the U.S. workforce. The measures are surprisingly modest: "just cause" employment protections against "no reason" / "bad reason" managerial dismissal prerogative and the enabling of experimentation in employee participation schemes localized within collective bargaining agreements.

Of the two, the latter point can be initiated with little more than an NLRB directive – at least, that is all it took for Japan's postwar working rules in 1946. And while political opposition may be anticipated, the move to experimentation is not itself a commitment to a particular ideology – it is nothing more than a commitment to experimentation. In fact, it is the continued absence of such experimentation that testifies to an ideological rigidity. We have seen such rigidity to be inconsistent with the historical analysis of judicial creativity Commons so eloquently ascribed to the American court and legal practice. Such an invigorating step in the present circumstances would go a long way to alliviate

79 Macroeconomic Dynamics, 101.
the singular disparity apparent in U.S. executive compensation levels. Through these and other measures that would support just cause dismissal protections, the "mechanism" cited by Lonergan that is – to a degree – constituted by the working rules of a going concern would, over time, significantly mollify the extremes of distribution variance and accumulation, while enhancing worker commitment to firms in a manner that would reap their own rewards as productivity gains are consolidated.

Further work should specify the relationship between the working rules of a going concern, as Commons understood them and the "mechanism" circulation that Lonergan observed in his macroeconomic circulation analysis. Perhaps the work of Eric Voeglin (1901-85) holds promise for this, as he was a colleague of both scholars.

The call for reform of American labor law is not new. Serious changes in domestic industrial relations policy and practice were evident decades ago. A former chair of the U.S. National Labor Relations Board has published on the historically innovative developments in Japan – albeit without explicit specification of the continental European adaptive appropriation sources in Japanese industrial relations. As noted in the Introduction, nothing less than a U.S. Presidential Commission has suggested that employee participation should be explored as a nuanced distinction between the extremes of employee "voice" over only wages and working conditions and "exit."

Perhaps the most striking of implications for employee participation in managerial prerogative, such as that practiced in both German and Japanese industrial relations, concerns the incidental tendency of participation to moderate employer compensation excesses. This appears to be due to information transparency no less than the potential threat effect of excessive employer (or managerial)

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appropriation of profit. Fundamentally, it is an advance in industrial democracy and ought to be taken up in the U.S. context with dispatch.

It is ironic that each of the three scholars examined in this paper offered similar, substantive critiques of Smith’s economics. The irony, of course, is that contemporary work in economics and management theory appears to similarly overlook facts of law and jurisprudence that are essential aspects of the research story. With the white-collarization of Kazuo Koike, for example, the steps that led management to generalized skilling were legal in origin: workers simply could no longer be terminated absent just cause. In turn, Aoiki’s J-firm construct is grounded in far more than the mere managerial common sense notion that long-term employment patterns enhance competitive prowess.

Despite this irony, there is ample evidence that academic scholarship, taken as a whole, offers correctives that can enhance accurate policy initiatives, enactment, and oversight. The recent text by Befort and Budd (2009), for example, explores the frequently unnoticed and invisible implications of U.S. public policy. 85 This type of research should be supported and positive steps taken based on the insights obtained. In doing so, the U.S. workplace would then more closely approximate the sustainable economic democracy its political democracy ought inevitably seek.

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GRACE IN THE THIRD STAGE OF MEANING: APROPOS LONERGAN’S “FOUR-POINT HYPOTHESIS”

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In recent years there has been considerable ferment regarding Lonergan’s four-point hypothesis correlating the principal realities of the supernatural order – the secondary esse of the incarnation, sanctifying grace, the habit of charity, and the light of glory – to the four real divine relations.¹ The potential fecundity of this proposal for ordering systematic theology has seized the collective imagination of theologians inspired by Lonergan. Yet, the discussion of its possible

implications for a methodical systematic theology has come up against knotty questions, in part because the hypothesis is formulated in the context of a theoretical theology, in part because it implicates questions to which Lonergan never thematically addressed himself, and in part because Lonergan's "hermeneutics" of development "from above" were not developed with the same rigor and amplitude as his exploration of the issues involved in development "from below."

A methodical theology — a theology, that is, at home in the third stage of meaning, in control of meaning through interiorly and religiously differentiated consciousness — is an ongoing, collaborative enterprise. Successful collaboration has its conditions and probabilities. Lonergan knew better than most how clarity about method can shift the probabilities of fruitful collaboration. His differentiation of the recurrent tasks in theology provides a heuristic structure for specifying the more probably relevant questions for theology in the third stage of meaning. The goal of the present article is to clarify some of the key questions involved in the formulation of a theology of grace on the level of our time. All along the line, what is offered is not a definitive position, not a complete solution, but a series of important questions and some suggestions about potentially fruitful lines of inquiry.

I

In his important 1979 paper "Horizons and Transpositions," Lonergan entered as examples of historical transpositions in theology the transitions from the Hebrew to the classical and from the classical to the medieval scholastic contexts. A more detailed study of the second transition is afforded by Lonergan's Grace and Freedom, where he showed how Thomas Aquinas transposed the Augustinian doctrine of operative grace into a theoretical theology. As Patout Burns has shown,

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2 Similar questions have been raised by others, notably by Doran, "The Starting Point."
Augustine's position (itself largely a transposition of St Paul) developed through successive controversies that forced him to return to the biblical data and think through the implications of his presuppositions. Thomas's transposition, on the other hand, was achieved through the gradual refinement of theoretical instruments of analysis, joined to a careful study of Augustine's anti-Pelagian writings. The theorem of the supernatural, the analogy of divine operation, the theoretical analysis of the freedom of the will (with the distinction of different states of liberty supplying a comparative component), and the concept of habit, all provided a vastly more differentiated context for the doctrine of operative grace.

This scholastic transposition held notable implications for older positions on divine grace and human freedom. First, the theoretical differentiations enriched and sublated, without destroying, the substantial affirmations of the received tradition. Second, however, some of the leading questions and categories of the older tradition became irrelevant; such, for example, was the Augustinian definition of liberty in terms of the disjunction, servitude to God or servitude to sin. Finally, transposition raises problems of continuity. For less differentiated consciousness, transposition is baffling, it must seem like "innovation" and betrayal, but the more differentiated consciousness readily grasps the continuity from compactness to differentiation.

Transposing the achievements of scholastic theory into a methodical systematic theology must begin with a frank acknowledgement of their hypothetical character. The theological theories of Thomas Aquinas

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6 See, for example, Thomas Aquinas's remark that Augustine's "Platonic" way of speaking might conduce the unwary to error, *Summa Theologiae* 2-2 q. 23 a. 2 ad 1. Works of Thomas Aquinas were consulted in the editions supplied by Roberto Busa, www.corpusthomisticum.org. Any translations are my own.
or Lonergan are not truths but hypotheses. Of course, a methodical systematic theology is preceded by methodical doctrines and in that sense presupposes true judgments of fact and of value. But the meaning of those judgments, and of the systematic theology proceeding from them, is controlled by interiorly and religiously differentiated consciousness, and there can be no premature supposition that scholastic theology— including Lonergan’s own scholastic theology, which, in any case, was constantly developing—enjoyed adequate control of meaning on all points.

In various ways Lonergan indicated his opinion that “...in [the third] stage of meaning the gift of God’s love first is described as an experience and only consequently is objectified in theoretical categories,” 7 and the reason is to be found in the fact that only such a procedure provides the desired control of meaning. Not only do the theoretical positions require verification, but also there is no assurance of a simple point to point correspondence between the older theoretical and the emerging methodical systematics. Taking such a correspondence for granted would mean effectively ceding priority—and control of meaning—to metaphysics rather than to the hermeneutics of interiority.

Consider how the metaphysical account of human nature as spiritual is transformed by the shift to intentionality analysis. Lonergan describes how the terms and relations disclosed in his hermeneutics of interiority would transpose into metaphysical terms and relations. Significantly, the metaphysical terms and relations correlative to intentionality analysis are not those of the older scholastic metaphysical anthropology.

Because its account of interiority was basically metaphysical, the older theology distinguished sensitive and intellectual, apprehensive and appetitive potencies. There followed complex questions on their mutual interactions. There were disputes about the priority of intellect over will... In contrast, we describe interiority in terms of intentional and conscious acts on the four levels of experiencing, understanding, judging, and deciding. The lower levels are presupposed and complemented by the higher. The higher sublate the lower. If one wishes to

transpose this analysis into metaphysical terms, then the active potencies are the transcendental notions revealed in questions for intelligence, questions for reflection, questions for deliberation. The passive potencies are the lower levels as presupposed and complemented by the higher.\(^8\)

Not only are the "transposed" metaphysical terms and relations not identical to the old metaphysical terms and relations of faculty psychology, but also the whole set of questions regarding the interaction and priority of intellect and will, practical and speculative intellect are replaced by a different set of questions about the structure and patterns of consciousness, schemes of recurrence, processes of assimilation and adjustment.\(^9\) Perforce, then, the relevance of theoretical questions and hypotheses — about the distinction and relationship between grace and charity, for instance — cannot be taken for granted, but must be established through the ampler "phenomenology" of being in love called for by Robert Doran.\(^10\)

II

Such an investigation immediately comes up against further questions about the relationship between the theoretical categories and the data of consciousness. In *Method in Theology*, Lonergan asserted that "the basic terms and relations of systematic theology will not be metaphysical, as in medieval theology, but psychological."\(^11\) This statement does not necessarily entail that "grace" and "charity" are themselves identifiable as discrete and immediate data of consciousness.

The point to making the metaphysical terms and relations not basic but derived is that a critical metaphysics results. For every term and relation there will exist a corresponding element in intentional consciousness. Accordingly, empty or misleading terms and relations can be eliminated, while valid ones can be elucidated by the conscious intention from which

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8 *Method in Theology*, 120; see 289.
9 *Method in Theology*, 120.
10 Doran, "Starting Point."
11 *Method in Theology*, 343.
they are derived. The importance of such a critical control will be evident to anyone familiar with the vast arid wastes of theological controversy.\textsuperscript{12}

Lonergan had regularly to contend with the denizens of these trackless wastes in his research and teaching, and his works from the Gregorian period furnish numerous illustrations of his meaning. Let a single exhibit suffice to demonstrate the importance of control through interiorly and religiously differentiated consciousness: the Scotist \textit{distinctio formalis a parte rei}, which comes up for treatment in the systematic part of \textit{De Deo Trino}.\textsuperscript{13}

According to Scotus, “God” and “the Father” are distinct, not in reality, not merely in thought, but “formally” on the side of the thing. Now, a distinction is drawn on the basis of a negative comparative judgment: A is, B is, A is not B. The distinction is real, if it means that the reality of A is not the reality of B. The distinction is merely one of reason, if it means only that our concept of A is not our concept of B. But what does a “formal distinction on the side of the thing” mean? Either it means that A is not B in reality, and then it is a real distinction; or it means that A is not B in our thinking, and then it is a distinction of reason. In short, the Scotist \textit{distinctio formalis a parte rei} is empty and groundless, because it does not correspond to any prospective judgment in intentional consciousness.

In other words, what Lonergan means in \textit{Method in Theology} is that a critical metaphysics is to be grounded on a grasp of the isomorphism of knowing and being, the interdependence of the cognitional and ontological orders, mediated through self-appropriation. Statements about ontological causes require cognitional warrants, and conversely, cognitional reasons denote corresponding ontological causes.\textsuperscript{14} What is

\textsuperscript{12} \textit{Method in Theology}, 343.

\textsuperscript{13} \textit{The Triune God: Systematics}, 298-304, esp. 302-304.

\textsuperscript{14} See, for example, Bernard Lonergan, “Insight: Preface to a Discussion,” in \textit{Collection}, vol. 4 of Collected Works of Bernard Lonergan, ed. F. Crowe and R. Doran (Toronto: University of Toronto, 1988), 142-52 at 144 (“...the ontological and the cognitional are not incompatible alternatives but interdependent procedures. If one is assigning ontological causes, one must begin from metaphysics; if one is assigning cognitional reasons, one must begin from knowledge. Nor can one assign ontological causes without having cognitional reasons; nor can there be cognitional reasons without corresponding ontological causes.”).
the term in intentional consciousness that corresponds to an ontological cause? It is a cognitional reason, a warrant. The realities denoted by the assigned ontological causes will not necessarily themselves be immediate data of consciousness; rather, they will correspond to insights and judgments that are elements in intentional consciousness.

The relevance of this point may be appreciated by considering what theoretical theology calls a habit. Subjects, their conscious states, their conscious operations, and the procession of one operation from another are all conscious. A habit, on the other hand, seems to be an integration of a flexible circle of schemes of recurrence in the functioning of the subject. The habit itself is not an immediate datum of consciousness; its existence is inferred from the consistent, prompt, and joyful performance of the pertinent conscious operations and occurrence of the pertinent feelings. The conscious element that corresponds to the existence of the habit is not the habit; it is the affirmative judgment with its borrowed content.

In the third stage of meaning, metaphysics longer supplies the primary context for articulating the new way of being enjoyed by the children of adoption. That context is rather the context of religious experience. Here Lonergan orients us, not to any single datum or quality of consciousness, but to a range of data. "The data... on the dynamic state of otherworldly love are the data on a process of conversion and development."15 These data do not regard only the interior life—the inner experience of a new disposition, and perhaps the sweetness described by St Thomas16—but emphatically also the outer experience of new kinds of friendship.17 “[B]oth the mission of the Son and the mission of the Spirit regard not some particular operation but a whole new series

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15 Method in Theology, 289.
16 Summa Theologiae 1-2 q. 112 a. 5 ("Whoever receives it (grace) knows, by experiencing a certain sweetness, which is not experienced by one who does not receive it."). Here compare Lonergan, Verbum: Word and Idea in Aquinas, vol. 2 of the Collected Works of Bernard Lonergan, ed. F. Crowe and R. Doran (Toronto: University of Toronto, 1997), 103-104, discussing "taste and see how the Lord is sweet" from Thomas's Psalm commentary. The experience of sweetness might not be as universal as St Thomas expected: see, for instance, Mother Teresa's correspondence in Come, Be My Light, ed. Brian Kolodejchuk, M.C. (New York: Image / Doubleday, 2007).
of operations... the Holy Spirit is sent, not for this or that particular operation, but to preside over the whole of Christian living in every one of the just." Given Lonergan's extraordinary attention to the pure and unrestricted desire to know and love in each and every human subject, it might be surprising to recall that he always also insisted that the obediential potency to receive God's self-communication in love resides not in the individual but in the community of subjects.

Though there is an immediacy to the gift of divine love, then, the full range of data on grace have to be known inferentially and understood analogically. The transposition from a theoretical to a methodical systematic theology of grace, therefore, cannot be accomplished by simply correlating each of the terms and relations of theoretical theology with some immediate datum of consciousness. Nor can the explanatory terms and relations of a theoretical systematics—whether those of Thomas Aquinas or those of Lonergan or those of anyone else—be presupposed as if they were truths rather than possibly relevant hypotheses worked out to meet possibly relevant questions. In the present case, this means a methodical systematic theology cannot presuppose the distinction between grace and charity as if it were a truth to be explained rather than itself a hypothesis. Even in its theoretical context, grace was distinguished from charity not on doctrinal grounds but by way of an explanatory hypothesis. Hypotheses are entertained only as long as they cover the relevant data and answer relevant questions; but it remains to be shown that the question about the distinction of grace and charity is any more relevant to a methodical theology than are the questions about practical and speculative intellect that also arise in the context of a metaphysical theology.

18 The Triune God: Systematics, 485.


20 See Bernard J. F. Lonergan, De ente supernaturali: Supplementum schematicum, ed. F. E. Crowe, C. O'Donovan, and G. Sala (Toronto: Regis College, 1973; originally notes for students, College of the Immaculate Conception, Montréal, 1946), section 14. Lombard and Scotus, inter alia, deny a real distinction between grace and charity; Thomas and Suarez, on the other hand, affirm a real distinction.
In the mediated phase of theology (direct discourse), handling all this in a methodical way will require working out heuristic categories and organizing the relevant data. But the questions are not all systematic; they are also exegetical, historical, and dialectical. Hence a methodical systematic theology of grace also presupposes a mediating phase which can yield a more detailed understanding, accurate history, and sound appraisal of the heritage to be transposed.

III

Among the scholastics, Lonergan undoubtedly considered Thomas Aquinas the “master capable of envisaging all the issues and of treating them in their proper order.” Lonergan’s thinking was fundamentally shaped by his apprenticeship to St Thomas. While the writings of Lonergan’s scholastic period do not invariably concur with St Thomas, at least we can safely assume that he had Thomas’s position firmly in mind when he set himself to working out his own synthesis. Particularly on questions where Lonergan judged him to have made a permanent contribution – grace, the Trinity – the work of Aquinas forms part of the relevant context for interpreting Lonergan.

Lonergan’s own exegetical and historical work in *Grace and Freedom*, his schematic presentation of some of the theoretical issues in *De ente supernaturali* and *De scientia atque voluntate Dei*, and other early work provides extraordinary guidance about how he understood the achievements of Thomas Aquinas on questions related to divine grace. Nevertheless, the fourfold hypothesis implicates further questions to which Lonergan never thematically addressed himself, either in his studies of Aquinas or in his own direct discourse. What, for example, is the relationship between grace and charity?

According to Thomas Aquinas, sanctifying grace (gratia gratum faciens, or gratia justificans) is the effect of God’s love in us, an

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22 *Method in Theology*, 345. See, for example, his laudatory remarks in *The Triune God: Systematics*, 72.

23 Thomas Aquinas, *Summa Theologiae* 1-2 q. 110 aa. 1, 2. I treated the issues regarding Thomas Aquinas much more amply in Jeremy D. Wilkins, “Trinitarian Missions and the Order of Grace According to Thomas Aquinas,” in *Philosophy and Theology in the Long*
entitative habit in the essence of the soul, a created participation of the divine nature. The infused virtue of charity is the friendship of human beings for God, a habit in the will, and a created participation in that proceeding love who is the Holy Spirit. Thomas argues that grace means a special love God has for us, by which God draws us above the condition of our nature to a share in the divine life. This love, however, is not a change in God; as God’s love is causal, it entails a change in us. As in the natural order God both confers the principles of natural operation and applies every agent to its operation, so too in the supernatural order God both moves the soul to its act (grace as actual) and infuses supernatural forms as principles of operation (grace as habitual). Our present concern is with the latter. Thomas distinguishes grace from the infused virtues; the former is in the essence of the soul, the latter are in its powers. Grace is a quality in the soul by which it shares in the divine goodness, by which we are in some sense created or constituted in a new being, ex nihilo rather than from merit.

Two related but distinct analogies are introduced to explain why (sanctifying) grace is distinct from an infused virtue. First, grace stands to the infused virtues as esse to operari. Virtues are ordered to nature,
in the sense that they dispose a human being to properly achieve what belongs to human nature. But the infused virtues dispose a human being in a higher way and to a higher end; hence they must be ordered to a higher nature. That higher nature is a created participation in the divine nature, by which we are reborn as children of God. Second, grace stands to the infused virtues as the light of reason stands to the acquired virtues. The light of reason is the operator in the formation of the acquired virtues, which enable consistent performance according to right reason. Similarly, the infused virtues flow from and are ordered to the light of grace.  

These two analogies evince a similar proportion, but there are significant variations. The first analogy — *esse* and *operari* — compares grace to the soul and the virtues to the powers of the soul. The essence and powers are really distinct, because the act of the soul is substantial *esse* while the operations are accidental (only in God are *esse* and *operari* identical); moreover, if the soul were the immediate principle of its operations, whenever it existed it would also be operating.  

By parity of reasoning, grace, because it is ontologically prior to meritorious operation and confers a kind of *esse*, is in the essence of the soul. Because nature is a principle of movement and rest, that is, a remote principle of operation, this analogy raises an important further question: What kind of "nature" is grace?  

It is to address this further question that the second analogy is introduced. Grace is a kind of light; it stands to the infused virtues, as the light of reason to the acquired. It is a principle of movement and rest akin to the foremost moving principle of the intellectual part of the soul. As such it operates the development of the infused virtues which, like the acquired virtues, are subject to the laws of growth; as the seed is proportionate to the mature tree, so grace is proportionate to growth.

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33 Both in *Summa Theologiae* 1-2 q. 110 a. 3.
35 See *Summa Theologiae* 1-2 q. 110 a. 2 ad 8 ("Et secundum hoc etiam gratia dicuntur creari ex eo quod homines secundum ipsam creantur, idest in novo esse constituuntur, ex nihilo, idest non ex meritis..."); *De virtutibus*, q. 1 a. 10 c. ("Infunditur igitur divinitus homini ad peragendas actiones ordinatas in finem vitae aeternae primo quidem gratia, per quam habet anima quoddam spirituale esse...").
36 *Summa Theologiae* 1-2 q. 110 a. 4.
in grace and charity. \[^{37}\] (It is possibly relevant that grace and charity seem to be used interchangeably in this context.) Seemingly, however, this is a secondary analogy, because while intellectual light is a natural property flowing from the essence of the soul, and in that sense derived from nature, grace is conceived as conferring a kind of nature from which accidental powers (the infused virtues) derive.

It goes without saying that the further relevant questions are overwhelming. For instance, agent intellect and the natural inclination of the will both contribute to the formation of the acquired virtues. \[^{38}\] Is there anything analogous in the development of the infused virtues? If grace – or charity – is a kind of light, why does it seem to regard more the will than the intellect? What is the relationship between the light of grace and what Thomas calls the light of faith and the light of glory? And so forth. I could not begin to answer them all, so let me leave them in abeyance and return to a different set of questions about the transition to a methodical theology.

**IV**

Beyond the questions about what St Thomas meant and what Lonergan meant by sanctifying grace and charity, there is a further set of questions that are historical. They regard the development of the theoretical theology of grace and the divine missions up to and including Lonergan. That development is too complex to be fairly sketched here, but let me raise a few issues of undoubted relevance to the fourfold hypothesis.

In correlating the principal realities of the order of grace to the four real divine relations, the fourfold hypothesis extends a general line of thought that goes back at least to Augustine. Augustine identified a divine mission as the revelation of a divine person in his procession, and so made axiomatic the dependence of missions on processions. \[^{39}\] Importantly, Augustine also integrated his search for an adequate spiritual analogy for the Trinity with what might fairly be called a profound concern for the intersubjectivity of the order of grace.

\[^{37}\] *Summa Theologiae* 1-2 q. 114 a. 8.
\[^{38}\] *De virtutibus*, q. 1 a. 8 c.
\[^{39}\] Augustine, *De Trinitate*, 4, 20, 28-29.
The love with which God loves us is the very same love with which the Father loves the Son and the Son loves the Father, and this love is the Holy Spirit. It is out of this gift of love that we in turn love God and our neighbor. Thus in a real sense for Augustine, the gift of the Holy Spirit as the love by which we are loved, and the love with which we in turn love, involves us in the interpersonal communion of the Trinity. It is the Spirit himself, and not only a created gift, who is given. And since to give one’s love is to give oneself, the Father and the Son also come to dwell in the souls of those who receive the Spirit. The charity which is the gift of the Spirit is essentially social and so always involves participation in the communion of the Church, “the companionship by which we are made into one body of the only Son of God.” To refuse communion is tantamount to refusing the gift. Because repentance concretely involves incorporation into the unity of Christ, the Spirit’s mission was symbolized in the gift of tongues by which the curse of Babel is reversed. Augustine refers this symbol to the universal mission of the Church which is to hold the nations in the bond of peace.

The immediate, inner mission of the Spirit and the outer mission of the Word mediated through the Church are ordered to each other. The incarnation of the Word stands to his eternal procession, as the outer word of speech stands to the inner word conceived in the mind. Since Christ himself is the one who confers the sacraments, the sacraments

40 "We ourselves have loved. And where did we get this from? Because he has first loved us. Inquire where a person gets the ability to love God from, and absolutely the only discovery you will make is that it is because God has first loved him. He has given us himself, the one we have loved; he has given us what to love with....The love of God...has been poured into our hearts. Where from? From us, perhaps? No. So where from? Through the Holy Spirit which has been given to us. Having therefore such great assurance, let us love God with God." (Sermo 34, 2-3; trans. Edmund Hill, The Works of Saint Augustine, part III, vol. 2, sermons 20-50 [Brooklyn, NY: New City, 1990], 166-67; Hill thinks this is a late sermon and suggests 420.)

41 De Trin. 15, 31, 32.
42 De Trin. 15, 18, 32; see En in Ps. 149, 9.
44 See Sermo 71, 20, 33 – 21, 34
45 Sermo 71, 17, 28
are not only occasions but actual causes of inner sanctification. This inner sanctification consists essentially in the Spirit’s gift of charity, which is nothing other than a communication of the Holy Spirit himself, the personal communion of Father and Son. Hence it is most fitting that he should also be given to us as the love with which we love God and our neighbor. This mutual ordination of the two missions roots the Church in the history of the incarnate Word. Only Christ can baptize with the Holy Spirit and so bring about the communion of the Church in charity; only the Church which has the presence of the Holy Spirit can effectively mediate Christ’s saving power.

Thomas Aquinas transformed Augustine’s axiom regarding the processions and missions by integrating it with a rigorously conceived psychological analogy for the divine processions, which also allowed him to develop more systematically Augustine’s intimations about the connection between the indwelling of the divine persons and the perfection of the image of the Trinity to which human beings are made.

Thomas quotes De Trinitate to emphasize that is not only created gifts but above all the divine persons themselves who are made present to us in the indwelling of the Holy Spirit. In the same place he invokes Augustine’s distinction between uti and frui to distinguish the use of the created gifts from the enjoyment of the uncreated persons. The Spirit is accompanied by the indwelling of the Father and the Son so that we can freely know God truly and love him rightly. Knowing God truly is a created participation of the divine word; loving God rightly is a created participation of the procession of the Spirit. God is present in all things by essence, presence, and power. But he is present in the

46 “Donum Spiritus sancti nihil est aliud quam Spiritus sanctus…Ita enim datur sicut Donum Dei, ut etiam se ipsum det sicut Deus” (De Trin. 15, 19, 36)
47 De Trin. 15, 19, 37 (“Et si caritas qua Pater diligit Filium, et Patrem diligit Filius, ineffabiler communio demonstrat amborum; quid convenientius quam ut ille dicatur caritas proprie, qui Spiritus est communis ambobus?”)
48 See Burns, Development of Augustine’s Doctrine of Operative Grace, 69.
49 On the trinitarian image and its perfection, see D. Juvenal Merriell, To the Image of the Trinity, A Study in the Development of Aquinas’ Teaching (Toronto: Pontifical Institute of Mediaeval Studies, 1990); also The Triune God: Systematics, Appendix 2B, 626-84.
50 Summa Theologiae 1 q. 38 a. 1 s.c. and c.
51 Summa Theologiae 1 q. 38 a. 1 c.
souls of the just in higher way, as the known is in the knower and the beloved is in the lover. The soul thereby participates the way God is present to himself as intellectum in intelligente in the procession of the Word and as amatum in amante in the procession of the Holy Spirit. The trinitarian image is realized in the immanent operations of knowing and loving, and specifically in knowing and loving God. Finally, sanctifying grace is a created participation in the divine nature, the virtue of faith is a created participation in divine knowledge, and the virtue of charity is a created participation in divine love.

Where Lonergan’s fourfold hypothesis takes its basic coordinates from the four real divine relations, the basic coordinates for Thomas Aquinas are the divine nature, participated by grace, and the divine processions, participated by faith or vision and charity. The general direction of his thought implies that as the order of nature stands to the divine unity, so the order of grace stands to the divine Trinity. We might notice that this scheme of analysis is not totally integrated. The

52 Summa Theologiae 1, 43, 3, c. ("Est enim unus communis modus quo Deus est in omnibus rebus per essentiam, potentialit et praesentiam, sicut causa in effectibus participandibus bonitatem ipsius. Super istum modum autem communem, est unus specialis, qui convenit creaturae rationale, in qua Deus dictus esse sicut cognitum in cognoscenti et amatum in amante. Et quia, cognoscendo et amando, creatura rationalis sua operatione attingit ad ipsum Deum, secundum istum specialem modum Deus non solum dicitur esse in creatura rationali, sed etiam habitare in ea sicut in templo suo.")

53 See Summa Theologiae 1 q. 27. 1 c.; the more elegant and concise statement is Comp. theol. c. 37.

54 See Summa Theologiae 1 q. 27 a. 3 c.; again, more elegantly and concisely in Comp. theol. c. 45.


56 See Summa Theologiae 1-2 q. 110 aa. 3-4; 1 q. 38 a. 1.
analogy between the Trinity and its created image is a matter of acts, not potencies. It is in its acts of conceiving and loving itself and God that the soul is conformed to the Trinitarian image. On the other hand, the Trinitarian analogy of the order of grace is said to obtain in the supernatural virtues of faith and love, rather than supernatural acts.

In his 1946 treatise *De ente supernaturali*, Lonergan basically followed the Thomist analogy. There are two uncreated communications of the divine substance in the processions of Word and Spirit. Corresponding to these are two created communications: principally, the incarnation of the Word; secondly, the communication of sanctifying grace through the gift of the Spirit. Sanctifying grace is "a created communication of the divine nature which is a created, proportionate, and remote principle" of operations attaining to God. As a remote principle of operations, sanctifying grace is formally distinct from, though materially identical to, the created communication of divine nature. It is rooted in the essence of the soul and really distinct from the habit of charity and the light of glory, which are the proximate principles of operations attaining to God. However, as I noted above, Lonergan concedes the distinction between grace and charity is hypothetical and pertains more to the ordering of material than to the substance of the thesis. Because the scope of his tract is limited to explaining the gratuity of grace through the theorem of the supernatural, Lonergan does not develop very amply the symmetry between uncreated and created communications of the divine nature. He does note that the uncreated communications are really identical to the divine relations and the divine essence.

In the major Latin works of his Gregorian period, Lonergan made several important contributions to the development of this tradition. In the well-known passage from *The Triune God*, he relates the principal

57 Although it is difficult to determine from the lapidary formula, in this context Lonergan seems to take the grace of union as the appropriate contingent term for the truth of the incarnation: "**Principale est unio hyppostatica, seu gratia unionis** quo hic homo, D[ominus] N[oster] Iesus C[hristus], vere et realiter est Deus. Non enim vacuum nomen sufficit sed obiectiva realitas requiritur ut hic homo vere dicatur Deus; quae realitas, cum sit contingens, etiam est creatum quid atque finitum." (Thesis one, 4.a.)

58 *De ente supernaturali*, thesis 1 ("**Exsistit creati communicatio divinae naturae, seu principium creatum, proportionatum et remotum quo creaturae insunt operationes quibus attingitur Deus uti in se est.**").
realities of the order of grace to the divine relations rather than to the divine nature and processions, as Thomas Aquinas had. It is asserted that there are four principal realities of the supernatural order: the secondary esse of the incarnation, sanctifying grace, the habit of charity, and the light of glory. The justification offered for these four is that they are absolutely supernatural and never found unformed, which presupposes a good deal of scholastic theological anthropology, all in need of critical evaluation and transposition.

It would be worthwhile to conduct a careful comparison of the *Summa Theologiae*, Lonergan's *De ente supernaturali*, and the four-point hypothesis. For Thomas there seem to be three key points, namely, a created participation in the divine nature through grace in the essence of the soul, and created participations in the two divine processions through faith/vision and charity. In Lonergan's *De ente supernaturali*, the focus is on a twofold divine communication, where the created communications of incarnation and grace are participations in the uncreated processions of Son and Spirit. In the later four-point hypothesis, the four real divine relations come to the fore as structuring the supernatural order.

This shift of emphasis coincides with other ways Lonergan develops the legacy of Thomas Aquinas in *The Triune God*, and there may be positive correlations among the various developments. In his presentation of the fittingness *(convenientia)* of the two divine missions, Lonergan gives much more attention to the historical order constituted by the divine missions than had St Thomas. In this regard he is recovering, in a new and richer context, what had been a major preoccupation of Augustine's. In line with this shift of focus there is the more forceful assertion of the priority of interpersonal relations in the economy of grace, above all in the conception of the state or situation of grace as consisting in an order of friendships among divine and created persons. When these emphases are viewed together with the Law of the Cross formulated in *De Verbo Incarnato*, it seems clear Lonergan aimed at a fuller integration of Augustine's preoccupations with the concrete, historical mediation of Christ and with the wisdom of the

60 See *The Triune God: Systematics*, 490-98.
cross as restoring the proper order of power to justice, with Thomas Aquinas's theoretical account of grace and his appropriation of the theory of Christ's vicarious satisfaction.

As provocative and stimulating as it is, the fourfold hypothesis, with its characteristic use of the relations as analogical coordinates for the order of grace, is not elsewhere (as far as I know) repeated by Lonergan. In his other treatises of the Gregorian period, The Constitution of Christ and De Verbo Incarnato, and in the much later essay "Mission and the Spirit," Lonergan preferred to speak of the threefold self-donation of Father, Son, and Spirit. In these passages the divine persons, rather than the processions or relations, provide the systematic coordinates, while the created terms are the secondary act of the incarnation, sanctifying grace, and the light of glory. The habit of charity is not mentioned.62 In "Mission" it is possible, though doubtful, that he is merely reporting Rahner's opinion, but in De Verbo Incarnato it is clearly direct discourse. In light of the tentative language in The Triune God, its near simultaneity with the material in De Verbo Incarnato, and the additional evidence in "Mission and the Spirit," the fourfold hypothesis cannot be characterized as Lonergan's settled view without further ado.

V

A still further set of questions bears on the relationship between the theoretical theology of grace and the virtues and Lonergan's later program for a methodical theology of self-transcendence. Differences may be complementary, genetic, or dialectical,63 but until the differences are carefully assembled and compared, we will not have a firm grip on their bearing.


What might a methodical theology do with a theoretical distinction between sanctifying grace and the infused virtue of charity, or with the metaphysics of soul and potency it presupposes? More broadly, how might a methodical theology approach the questions about the virtues, human and Christian, that time out of mind have dominated western discourse about that rectitude of the whole person which Thomas Aquinas identifies as the basic meaning of justifying grace, *gratia iustificans*? What exactly are habits, and how are they related to the unrestricted desire to know and the “passionateness of being” that is crowned by otherworldly love?

A methodical theology – a theology, that is, at home in the third stage of meaning – begins with the data on the human self-transcendence, rather than with a metaphysical psychology. In Thomas’s *Summa Theologiae*, the treatment of the human good is dominated by questions about the virtues. Lonergan, by contrast, shifts from abstract discussion of the virtues to the provision of a concrete hermeneutic of self-transcendence. His intentionality analysis discloses how cognitive, moral, and affective self-transcendence finds its supreme fulfillment in that affective self-transcendence wrought by an other-worldly love admitting “no conditions or qualifications or restrictions or reservations.” Lonergan proposes that “this other-worldly love, not as this or that act, not as a series of acts, but as a dynamic state whence proceed the acts,... constitutes in a methodical theology what in a theoretical theology is named sanctifying grace.”

By no means the least pressing question raised by this transition is, If sanctifying grace is the dynamic state of being in love, what becomes of the “habit of charity”? The dynamic state is our love for

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64 Thomas Aquinas, *Summa Theologiae* 1-2 q. 113 a. 1 c.; the expression *gratia iustificans* begins to make its appearance in q. 113, apparently as synonymous with what prior questions called *gratia gratum faciens* and what Lonergan, in line with the later terminology of the scholastic tradition, calls *gratia sanctificans*, sanctifying grace. See, e.g., q. 113 a. 3.

65 See Method in Theology, 289.

66 See, for example, Method in Theology, 41: “...a rounded moral judgment is ever the work of a fully developed self-transcending subject or, as Aristotle would put it, of a virtuous man” (internal citation omitted).

67 Method in Theology, 41.

68 Method in Theology, 41. Sanctifying grace and the dynamic state are really identical but notionally distinct (107).
God, which is exactly how Thomas Aquinas characterizes the habit of charity. Its fruit is deep-set joy and lasting peace, which, according to St Thomas, are among the principal effects of charity.

Lonergan shifts attention from the metaphysics of soul and potencies and habits to the concrete, self-transcending subject, to the role of the desire to understand in the promotion of self-transcendence, and later, increasingly, to feelings and skills. These elements are all important for a transposition of Thomas Aquinas's achievement on grace and virtue. The underlying issue is concrete self-transcendence. The remote operators of this transcendence are the "pure desire" and the "passionateness of being." The proximate operators are questions, skills, and feelings. As these are integrated the zone of effective freedom is enlarged, corresponding to an enlarged capacity for sustained self-transcendence.

The presentation of human development in Insight presents a remarkable parallel to the role of intellectual light in the formation of the acquired virtues asserted by St Thomas:

As we have seen, all development involves a tension between limitation and transcendence. On the one hand, there is the subject as he is functioning more or less successfully in a flexible circle of ranges of schemes of recurrence. On the other hand, there is the subject as a higher system on the move. One and the same reality is both integrator and operator; but the operator is relentless in transforming the integrator. The integrator resides in successive levels of interrelated conjugate forms that are more familiar under the common name of acquired habits. But habits are inertial... Against this solid and salutary conservatism, however, there operate the same principles that gave rise to the acquired habits and now persist in attempting to transform them. Unconsciously operative is the finality that consists in the upwardly but indeterminately directed dynamism of all proportionate being. Consciously

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69 Aquinas, Summa Theologicae 2-2 q. 23 a. 1 c.
71 Aquinas, Summa Theologicae 2-2 qq. 28, 29.
operative is the detached and disinterested desire raising ever further questions.72

The detached, disinterested desire is a kind of remote operator pressing the questions; the more proximate operators of development are the concretely relevant questions and operations themselves.73

Note that “remote” and “proximate” are analogical qualifiers; they denote a proportion to be verified in an order, so that a principle is “remote” with respect to subsequent principles and “proximate” with respect to prior principles. The development of understanding and of skills illustrates what might be meant by calling a habit a proximate principle of operation. Consider how exegetical or historical understanding develops. At the outset it is not clear what the relevant questions are; but gradually, with the formation of habitual understanding, one becomes better able to formulate relevant questions, and the relevance of the questions is a function of their relationship to the data.74 More generally, advanced students can usually formulate a good question, while beginning students are not yet able to do so. In one sense, then, the remote operator of understanding is wonder, curiosity, the desire to know. The proximate operator is the relevant question. But what are the probability schedules for the occurrence of a relevant question? They are a function, not only of native intelligence, but also of habitual understanding, and in that sense habitual understanding is a proximate operator of development. Relative to the question, the habit is remote; relative to the pure desire, it is proximate.

Thus a habit is not only an integrator but also a kind of operative power. As integrator, as settled achievement, there is the inertial tendency to rest content, a reluctance to follow through on inklings that may disrupt settled opinion or routine. But the same achievement also contains the seeds of its own self-transcendence; it changes the probability schedules for the occurrence of relevant questions and for the possibility of handling them satisfactorily, and so confers a higher and accelerating aptitude for further development.

What are we to make of Lonergan’s relative silence about habit and virtue in the discussion of the human good in Method in Theology?

72 Insight, 501. See Verbum, 92.
73 See Insight, 493-94.
74 See Method in Theology, 163, 187-88.
Could it be that the concepts of virtue and habit turn out to be descriptive, not explanatory? A “virtue” seems to be an integration of skills and feelings in a flexible circle of schemes of recurrence, where the feelings support sustained self-transcendence and the skills group the relevant operations for successful performance in various domains. More thorough investigation of these questions is needed before we will be in a position to settle how the relation of grace and charity might transpose into a methodical theology.⁷⁵

VI

“The data...on the dynamic state of otherworldly love are the data on a process of conversion and development.”⁷⁶ Data on conversion and development point us to dialectical and genetic method. For the moment, I will restrict myself to genetic method, with its precept, Specify the operator.

The infused virtues are new and higher integrations. Like the acquired virtues, their development is subject to the dialectic of limitation and transcendence.⁷⁷ In one sense, God is the operator of this development; that seems to be the meaning of operative grace. Yet God operates by conferring the principles of operation and applying creatures to their acts. The analogy of the light of grace, like the dynamic state of otherworldly love, suggests that “grace” is a kind of higher operator of development.

Now consider Thomas’s assertion that while the infused virtues cannot be acquired they can be developed. Lonergan, in fact, makes the same assertion in *Insight*, when he specifies that the supernatural solution to the problem of evil

would be a higher integration; of its very nature it would respect and, indeed, foster the proper unfolding of all human capacities; and just as the organism attains the height of its complexity and versatility under the higher integration of animal consciousness, just as the psyche reaches the wealth

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⁷⁵ I have discussed this whole question at greater length in Jeremy D. Wilkins, “Grace and Growth,” forthcoming.
⁷⁶ *Method in Theology*, 289.
and fullness of its apprehensions and responses under the higher integration of human intelligence, so also would human excellence enjoy a vast expansion of its effective potentialities under the higher integration of the supernatural solution...

[It is constituted through conjugate forms that develop, and...its realization occurs through conjugate forms that develop...through acts of human acknowledgement and consent that accord with probability schedules.]

Plainly, genetic method will be relevant to understanding this development. But genetic method bids us ask, what is the operator?

In “Mission and the Spirit” Lonergan speaks of “the passionateness of being” that underpins, accompanies, and overarches the dynamism of consciousness. It underpins as the “quasi-operator” of the censor, accompanies as feeling, and overarches as “the topmost quasi-operator that by intersubjectivity prepares, by solidarity entices, by falling in love establishes us as members of a community.” Quasi-operator here seems to correspond to the responses to value that in Thomas are the passions and the will, that is, appetitive rather than apprehensive operations. As we saw, for Thomas the inclination of the will is a kind of operator of the formation of virtue, not apart from but in conjunction with agent intellect. Might that be a clue to what Lonergan means by a “quasi-operator”?

On this showing, if the dynamic state of being in love names an antecedent willingness and orientation, perhaps what is called the “habit of charity” is embedded in a flexible circle of schemes of recurrence among judgments of value, decisions, and so forth, and similarly the “habit of faith” is embedded in a circle of schemes of recurrence among judgments of value grounding the decision to accept testimony, etcetera. In both cases the basic condition – the remote operator – for the infusion and the survival of the schemes is being in love. In both cases the integrations move all along the line from the highest intentional operations to the gradual but imperfect transformation of the psyche.

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78 *Insight*, 747.

79 *Insight*, 488-92 (“...understanding is sought methodically through a heuristic structure, and the relevant heuristic structure is, Specify the operator.” [491]).

80 *Third Collection*, 30; compare with *Method in Theology*, 289.
(Thomas already realized that the infused virtues reorder the mind more thoroughly than the lower appetites.)

Perhaps what is meant by the habit of charity is a scheme of recurrence integrating self-donation into the pattern of living. Perhaps the development of that habit consists in the assimilation and adaptation of the skills necessary for sustained self-donation.

If passions are to quiet down, if wrongs are to be not exacerbated, not ignored, not merely palliated, but acknowledged and removed, then human possessiveness and human pride have to be replaced by religious charity, by the charity of the suffering servant, by self-sacrificing love.

Notice also that the schemes are interdependent, not only in the individual but among individuals, which brings us back to Lonergan's insistence that it is not the solitary individual but the group that is open to receiving God's self-communication in love. And I would add that in *Method in Theology* he is pointing us toward a re-conception of theology, not as a habitus in the mind of a single individual, but as a pattern of recurrent and related operations in a group, that is, a collaboration of many different individuals with different and complementary sets of skills.

In a theoretical theology, Thomas Aquinas or Lonergan could distinguish grace from charity by asserting that the former is a remote principle in the essence of the soul and the latter a proximate principle in the will. But if in a methodical theology one seeks to determine whether grace and charity are distinct or identical, one might ask whether there are specific sets of schemes of recurrence, specific integrators, to be discerned in manifold acts of deliberation and choosing. Then one may ask what are the operators of the formation and development of these integrators. The operator, or operators, may be expected to be conscious, but the scheme of recurrence as such will not be a datum of consciousness but an inference from a range of data. Distinction is to be established on the basis of negative comparative judgments. Are the operator and integrator the same, or different? Is the difference real or conceptual? If one remote operator stands behind the formation and

81 *Method in Theology*, 117.
82 See note 19 above.
development of several others really distinct, it follows that the reality of the remote operator is distinct from the reality of the proximote operators.

If grace is a kind of operator, and what is meant by the virtues is the integration of groups of operations, it remains that there is also an integration of the whole person, and this brings us back to the analogy of esse. About ten years ago in this connection, Patrick Byrne drew attention to the fact that Aristotle calls the agent intellect "a kind of habit," that is, a habit in an analogical sense. In fact, as Thomas Aquinas points out, the Philosopher called it both a kind of habit and a kind of light. As light it is operator; as habit, integrator. In a similar way the analogy of grace as esse points to its function as a higher integration of the whole person. What is that higher integration? The unity, identity, whole of a human being is the unity, identity, whole of a personal history. But the unity of one's personal history is not a simple matter of genetic development. The coherence of a personal history is overwhelmed by the absurdity of basic sin. Grace integrates, not primarily some particular group of operations but the total history of a person, precisely because the unity of personal history can be recovered from the teeth of sin only by making one's own the Law of the Cross. Then grace as operative denotes God's authorship of this new and higher integration, disclosed so compellingly in Augustine's Confessions; grace as cooperative, and what St Thomas calls "merit," denotes our own role as co-authors with God.

As a final observation, the formation of Christ's effable knowledge from his ineffable knowledge is the first instance of development from above downward. Lonergan's explication of that process might be relevant to our questions about grace as operator and development "from above."

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83 Byrne, "Consciousness" (see note 1 above), 148.
84 See Q.D. de anima, a. 4 ad 4.