LONERGAN WORKSHOP

Volume 23
EDITOR'S INTRODUCTION

The theme of the 36th Annual Lonergan Workshop, “Ongoing Collaboration in the Year of St Paul,” was inspired by Pope Benedict XVI’s dedication of the year 2009 to the Apostle of the Gentiles. The great theologian and missionary at the beginnings of the Christian faith is a fitting patron for a conference devoted to examining one of the concerns and goals of Bernard Lonergan’s work in theology: ongoing collaboration. In a brainstorming conversation over the phone, Gerry Walmsley, speaking from South Africa, expressed ideas about the theme that he later wrote down, and they became the description of the theme for the Workshop flyer.

There are many issues in interdisciplinary and intercultural and interfaith dialogue....Who are the main dialogue partners, or who should be dialogue partners? What are the key issues in philosophy/theology/science/world politics/globalization and economics/business ethics/the nature of the university....On a slightly different line, is there any possibility of research programs that invite collaboration between Lonergan scholars? There are many relatively undeveloped themes such as emergent probability...The notion of universal viewpoint was clarified by Ivo Coelho, S.D.B., but doesn’t it need to be filled in, in a way that shows its relevance to intercultural dialogue?

This description of our theme generated a rich variety of philosophical and theological papers.

David Burrell’s paper, “When Faith and Reason Meet: The Legacy of John Zahm, C.S.C.,” is the title of a book he wrote as a labor of love.1 Burrell had been teaching at the Ugandan Martyrs University for the Congregation of the Holy Cross. He belongs to the generation bridging the twentieth and twenty-first centuries; and he wants to rescue from obscurity the work of a priest-scholar and confrere in the Congregation who bridged the nineteenth and twentieth centuries. John Zahm strove “to make Notre Dame a full-fledged university rather than a trade school.” For those of us who desire to ensure that full-fledged universities

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founded under religious auspices remain integrally Catholic, Burrell highlights Fr. Zahm’s achievement in tackling the issues of faith and reason that perennially confront Catholic institutions of higher learning. Zahm anticipated similar ideas of Bernard Lonergan in his early article, “The Role of a Catholic University in the Modern World.”

2009, the Year of St Paul, also happened to be the 100th anniversary of Charles Darwin’s birth year. That one of the chapters of Burrell’s When Faith and Reason Meet is entitled, “Evolution and Dogma,” is emblematic of the issue announced in its title. The Lonergan Workshops are fortunate indeed that Patrick H. Byrne frequently unfolds some aspect of Lonergan’s contribution to the philosophy of science. In an age when the Catholics are still in the throes of the Darwinian scandal for which Pope John Paul II apologized, it was then doubly appropriate that Pat speak on the topic, “What Is an Evolutionary Explanation? Darwin and Lonergan.” The controversies surrounding Darwinism, Evolution, Creationism, and Intelligent Design are re-contextualized and illuminated in Pat’s account of evolutionary explanation that uses virtualities in Lonergan’s thought to ‘make the best of’ Darwin.

Jennifer Clark did her doctorate on the thought of Gregory of Nyssa at Boston College under Professor Matthew Lamb. In the meantime, she has married and started her family. Clark’s first paper for the Lonergan Workshop is entitled, “Two Lungs or Two Diverging Roads? Methodological Challenges to Union.” It is an expression of her deep interest in and appreciation of the Eastern Orthodox Church that arose during her doctoral studies, which involved learning Greek and spending time in Greece. At the same time it sets forth her account of the differences related to the unresolved tautness between Orthodox and the Roman Catholic theological traditions, exercising a methodological sensitivity regarding their respective strengths and weaknesses.


3 When Faith and Reason Meet, 15-35.
Ivo Coelho, a Salesian priest who teaches in Nashik, India, spoke at our Lonergan Workshop celebrating the 450th Jesuit Jubilee on the issues surrounding St Francis Xavier's missionary achievement in India. His presentation for this Workshop, "From Person to Subject: Lonergan's Methodical Transposition as Upper Blade for Reading Sankara," was occasioned by a labor of love, namely, Ivo's edition of a collection of writings by his former teacher in Indology, Richard de Smet (1916-97) on the notion of "the person" in Indian thought. In the future we will see many more instances of the use of the terms and relations of Lonergan's cognitional theory, epistemology, and metaphysics as an upper blade to "make the best of" writings from other cultures and historical periods. Ivo's paper discussed Belgian Jesuit Fr. de Smet's use of terms from the Christian theological tradition as an upper blade for interpreting significant Hindus such as Sankara. Coelho told us that de Smet was so profoundly immersed in Hindu philosophy, theology, and spiritual disciplines that esteemed Hindu sages addressed him as "guru." In his paper Coelho explains that (in the essays he edited) de Smet, the great pioneer in inter-religious dialogue, showed how the nirguna Brahman, or the Brahman without qualities, which most Indologists and Hindus tend to interpret as impersonal, is really personal – provided that by "personal" one understands "person" in the classical sense of the Christian conciliar tradition developed to speak about the mysteries of the Trinity and the Incarnation – as Lonergan put it, "what there are three of in God," and "what there is one of in the Incarnation."

The paper "Aristotle, M. A.K. Halliday, and B. F. J. Lonergan: Toward a General Theory of Language for Language Teachers" is the first of English private scholar Peter Corbishley for the Lonergan Workshop. Corbishley is one of the remaining scholars taught by Lonergan as a student in Rome. Many years later, after learning Korean in Seoul, Peter returned to England, where he became a teacher of the English language to those—especially Asians, I believe – for whom English would be a second

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language. It became clear that the interplay between languages is not simply a matter of linguistic meanings but of languages’ cultural embeddedness. Thus, as a student of Lonergan, Corbishley was inclined to move from performance to reflection on performance in the mode of generalized empirical method. In this fascinating study, Peter explains how Aristotle, Halliday, and Lonergan provided him with the technical equipment for making the complex shift from the descriptive viewpoint as enacted by language teachers and learners to the explanatory viewpoint of a general theory.

In “Sanctifying Grace, Charity, and Divine Indwelling: A Key to the Nexus Mysteriorum Fidei,” Robert M. Doran returns to explore the favorite theme of the “four-fold hypothesis” in which Lonergan correlates the four contingently created terms (or graces) by which humans may share in the life of the Triune God through the four Trinitarian relations of paternity, filiation, active spiration, and passive spiration. Using the archival resource of Lonergan’s grace notes from courses in the 1950s and collaborating with his doctoral student, Jeremy Blackwood, Bob’s paper enriches his earlier reflections on this topic with what might be termed “supernatural analogies” made possible by Lonergan’s psychological hypothesis of intelligible emanations as the soundest natural analogy for processions in the Trinity.

Since his days as a graduate student at the University of Chicago Divinity School, Christian ethicist William P. George has dedicated himself to studying aspects of international law. His dissertation was on the law of the seas. In this, his initial paper for a Lonergan Workshop, “International Law as Horizon: An Invitation to Collaboration,” Bill has used the archival resource of the human good to present an integrated view which not only analyzes aspects of international law but also offers a wonderful example of how Lonergan’s conception of method as a “framework for collaboration” might be realized in the field of international law.

Richard M. Liddy presented his paper on “A Catholic Core Curriculum” just after having organized a conference on Lonergan’s Economics
sponsored by his Center for Catholic Studies at Seton Hall University. His talk grew out of participation in discussions about the Core Curriculum at Seton Hall, which often used such terms as "critical thinking" and "proficiencies" as organizing principles. Beyond informing us about these discussions, Liddy brings to bear the clarity and wisdom with which we have become familiar in his several articles on the Catholic Intellectual Tradition in light of the thought of both Lonergan and Newman to formulate a status quaestionis on liberal education and the liberal arts curriculum at the present time.

Along with wife Jude and daughter Blaise, Robert Luby has been a long-time participant and occasional afternoon workshop leader. In his paper, "Method in Medicine for the Age of Syndromes and Genomes," he uses generalized empirical method and considerations drawn from classical, statistical, genetic, and dialectical methods to initiate a re-figuring of the standard American paradigm for medical practice. Whereas a medical orientation toward diagnosis and treatment largely driven by the pharmaceutical industry has tended to focus on the treatment and care of acute medical crises, Luby argues that medical knowledge and techniques have reached a threshold at which medical care and guidance may be increasingly refocused on longer term wellness throughout the human lifespan.

Those of us who have been studying Lonergan for a long time know that the clarity of what in Insight he named the "intellectual pattern of experience" (and later on, "intellectual conversion") was evinced chiefly in relation to the fields of mathematics and the natural sciences. For the most part, Lonergan left it to persons who have undergone the process of self-appropriation to bring something like the same clarity to the sphere of moral conversion and the human sciences. Argentine scholar Alfredo Mac Laughlin has ventured this in his philosophy dissertation at Chicago's Loyola University. His paper, "A Typology of Moral Conversion," provides an overview of what he discovered in his research.

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In afternoon workshops and in papers at Lonergan Workshops through the years, the Irish Jesuit William Mathews has unfolded the many facets of what it means concretely that (what Insight named) the "dramatic pattern of experience" frames the unfolding of the other patterns of experience in a person's life. Once he completed Lonergan's Quest: A Study of Desire in the Authoring of Insight, Mathews turned to the careful study of how his hunch about these matters played itself out in the work of creative scientists such as Francis Crick. Aside from his massive study of Lonergan's quest, Mathews has long understood that similar qualities emerge in the lives of creative persons in other fields of endeavor, especially in artists like the great cellist, Jacqueline Du Pré. He shares the results of these further studies and the enrichments they have yielded in "On Memoir, Biography and the Dynamism of Consciousness."

Brian McDonough's first contribution at a Lonergan Workshop used a powerful videotape presentation to recount the concrete dynamics of mutual self-discovery and reconciliation on the part of perpetrators of violent crimes and victims of such crimes who held conversations with each other in a prison setting. As the director of the Social Action Office in the Montreal archdiocese, McDonough's second paper for the Workshop sets what he has learned through experience and study about the Catholic teachings on social justice in the context of aspects of Lonergan's thought in "Revisiting Catholic Social Doctrine."

Thomas McPartland is a person whose broad and profound erudition without any doubt embodies the spirit of Gerry Walmsley's blurb for the 2009 Workshop. For as long as we have known him from the days when Tim Fallon was still leading Methods Institutes at Santa Clara, Tom has been a fixture among the West Coast students of Lonergan. Many of them, like Tom, became committed to the intellectual life under the influence of such friends of Lonergan and Eric Voegelin at the University of Washington as Rodney Kilcup and Eugene Webb. Like Tom, they are polymaths and deeply engrossed in intellectual history or the history of ideas. His talk for this LW will give you an idea of what you'll encounter in his two monographs (published by the University of Missouri Press, Lonergan and the Philosophy of Historical Existence
Kenneth Melchin's work in the theory and practice of Christian social ethics is offering two papers to this volume are by now well known. They embody the spirit suggested by Lonergan when he said that an interdisciplinary university would be the ideal Sitz im Leben for contemporary theology. The two papers also model the dialogical wisdom that is so typical of Ken: on the one hand, they envisage the tasks and challenges to contemporary Christian ethics in the mode of C. Wright Mills's advice to his grad students: THINK BIG!; on the other, they begin to concretize what Lonergan meant when he wrote in Insight that theology is not the complete human science (so that theology and ethics must be in vital contact with the human sciences), and also that theology plays a systematic role in the theory and praxis of human sciences because, as such, the empirical human sciences do not have the complete solution to the problem of human evil and moral impotence.

During the semester before this Workshop, when Mark D. Morelli was a Lonergan Fellow at BC, the Lonergan Fellows' weekly study and discussion group read sections of a remarkable manuscript, which is an introduction to self-appropriation that avoids jargon and is replete with concrete exercises that for the past several years he has required undergraduate and MA students taking his course on self-appropriation to perform at Loyola Marymount University. Morelli's talent for communicating finer points of Lonergan's thought is again evident in this paper, "Consciousness Is Not Another Operation," which corrects a not uncommon mistake among readers of Insight and Method of Theology. I believe understanding consciousness correctly is the core issue, which, if correctly understood, would render Lonergan's thought impervious to postmodern critiques; by the same token, typical postmodernists seem to have been unable to account for consciousness accurately.

In several recent Lonergan Workshops, Gordon A. Rixon has explored the vistas opened up in Ignatian spirituality and theology
by recent scholarship – especially by studies of medieval and early modern rhetoric. In this year’s paper, “The Ignatian Presupposition as a Methodological Ground for Collaboration,” Rixon relates the genuine recovery of Ignatius’s spiritual theology to the heart of the Lonergan movement: ongoing collaboration on the level of its religious foundations. This treatment of the relationship between Ignatius’s insights and conversion helps us further understand Lonergan’s writing on religious conversion.

It was fortuitous – or better, perhaps, providential – that Richard Liddy’s Seton Hall conference on Lonergan’s economics took place in the wake of the near meltdown of the largest U.S. financial institutions in late 2007 and 2008. This terrible circumstance motivated the paper by Paul St. Amour, “Situating Lonergan’s Economics in a Context of Collaboration.” It attempts to figure out “what went wrong” via Lonergan’s morality-based approach to the good of order as economic. While carefully avoiding the all too prevalent moralism that is void of moral insight based on economic intelligibility, St Amour uses his intelligence, reasonableness, and responsibility to raise further pertinent questions in relation to the research he – in collaboration with others – had already been pursuing in the field of economics.

Charles T. Tackney presented his paper at the 2009 Lonergan Workshop before spending a semester at BC as a Lonergan Fellow. As a person with a background in both philosophy (he had the good fortune to be introduced to Lonergan at Fordham by the late Vincent J. Potter, SJ) and business and organizational theory, Tackney was given the opportunity to work and do research in Japan. We are all very familiar with the fact that in the wake of the world financial crisis, most of the many relevant ideas for reform are at best merely discussed in the U.S. and in Europe, while relatively few of them are implemented in legal and institutional reforms. In his paper, “Asian Anticipations of Cosmopolis: Participation and Distribution Decisions in Japan’s Industrial Relations System after World War II – Evidence of Conversion and Workplace Evangelization,” Tackney points out that many of the best ideas discussed but never adopted in the days of our own New Deal were actually enacted and implemented in Japan (without any clichés about “best practices”). He
describes remarkable recurrence schemes in which workers, managers, and owners cooperate regarding such issues as how profits are to be equitably shared. Tackney’s paper would have done Frances Perkins (FDR’s Christian idea-person for the reform of labor relations) proud.

Gerard Walmsley’s paper, “Becoming Creative Collaborators: Polymorphism/Mutual Mediation of Functional Specialities,” is an application of findings in the book that grew out of his doctoral dissertation in philosophy at Boston College, Lonergan on Philosophic Pluralism: The Polymorphism of Consciousness as the Key to Philosophy. As the person who built up the finest library to be found in any seminary in South Africa (if not in all of Africa), and also as the co-founder and second President of South Africa’s first Catholic University, St Augustine’s, where he again built up a university library from scratch, Walmsley is a relentless explorer of the world’s bookstores and book catalogues. This extraordinary penchant characterizes this paper, which I take to be a concrete testimony to the truth of Lonergan’s at first blush outrageous claim in the Introduction to Insight: “Thoroughly understand what it is to understand, and not only will you understand the broad lines of all there is to be understood, but also you will possess a fixed base, an invariant pattern, opening upon all further developments of understanding.”

Not long before presenting “Lonergan’s Thought May Mediate Thought about Gender Bias” (her first paper for the Lonergan Workshop), Lauren E. Weis had recently defended her doctoral dissertation in philosophy at Boston College and started her teaching career at American University. While it is true that neither Lonergan nor the vast majority of Lonergan scholars have done much in the way of demonstrating the specific relevance of his “essay in aid of the self-appropriation of rational self-consciousness” and his conversion-based study of method in theology to the issue of gender bias, Weis’s paper, together with the expected publication of her dissertation, are an example of a growing group who have both appreciated that relevance and initiated an entry into fruitful dialectic and dialogue with important thinkers on the topic of gender bias such as Judith Butler. This paper gives us a taste of this novel line of development in Lonergan studies.
Following many years' service as president of Yarra Theological Union in Melbourne, Kathleen M. Williams, was finally free to accept a Lonergan Post-Doctoral Fellowship at BC. Her paper, “Objectified Conversion as Foundational in Theology. A Conversation between Rosemary Haughton and Bernard Lonergan, SJ,” grew out of a brief presentation about a book she is in the process of writing. The paper relates a narrative of conversion in the Transformation of Man by Rosemary Haughton to Lonergan’s ideas about conversion. It is well known that Bernard Lonergan held Rosemary Haughton’s works—especially The Transformation of Man and The Passionate God—in high esteem; and the Lonergan Archives possess abundant notes he took from those books. Williams’s manages to convey the intelligence, delicacy, precision, and concreteness of Haughton’s writing, and, in so doing, offers both a marvelous entree to Lonergan’s thought for newcomers, and a deepening of insight into foundations for veteran Lonergan scholars.

Thanks again to all who helped to make the 36th Lonergan Workshop a success: Sue Lawrence, Kerry Cronin, and Susan Legere at the Lonergan Center, Joe Mudd and all the BC and Marquette graduate student helpers with food and refreshments at every event and venu, and of course to our manuscript editor, Regina Gilmartin Knox, without whom this volume would not have appeared.

Fred Lawrence
Editor, Lonergan Workshop
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WHEN THE LIBRARY of Congress, which serves as a national library and repository of books published in the United States, began planning its millennial symposium in 1999, librarian James Billington consulted the agenda for the previous centenary celebration only to find that there was no representative of religion or the arts. The mind-set prevailing in 1899 apparently trusted that “science” would suffice to lead humankind along the march of progress so evident since reason had displaced obscurantism. And if romanticism’s widespread reaction to reason’s incapacity to respond to the yearnings of the human soul had failed to move these representatives of the Enlightenment to include the arts, the complementary stirrings of the Great Awakening would doubtless have elicited yet more formidable fears of the specter of religion. As Billington invited people to reflect on a century in which it is calculated that more people have lost their lives to pseudo-scientific ideologies than the rest of human history, he moved to correct both lacunae. The person whom he chose for religion – the current archbishop of Chicago, Francis George, O.M.I. – would allow himself but one prognosis for the upcoming twenty-first century, one that highlights the relevance of our subject even more decisively, but let us first focus on the climate in 1899, when Notre Dame’s John Zahm had found a persuasive voice for articulating the integrity of rational inquiry in scientific investigation.

while expounding the complementary guidance of faith as well. In retrospect, while his presence could have proved illuminating to that august gathering, Notre Dame was then far from the university which he would prod it to become, and of course a Catholic priest could only have spoiled the party. Yet already in 1887, Zahm’s presentation on “the Catholic church and modern science” to Indiana University, at the invitation of president Louis Jordan, had so impressed the local press reviewer as to inspire a dig at the religion he encountered in southern Indiana, while praising Zahm’s scholarship as well as the excellent training provided for Catholic priests: “unlike many a Protestant minister, Father Zahm knew what he believed, where he got his belief, and how to sustain himself in the same.” But not only was Indiana far from Washington; one also suspects such trenchant criticism of the de facto religious establishment would have been even less tolerated in the center of American power, so omission proved a more suitable strategy for the representatives of the intellectual elite at the Library of Congress in 1899.

Yet much as Vatican Council II provided Catholics a needed corrective for Vatican Council I a century earlier, the inclusion of religion and the arts in the 1999 Library of Congress symposium offers us a way to articulate the decided relevance of John Zahm to our time, even more than to his own. For if his work had failed to catch the attention of the Librarian of Congress in 1899, his writings on evolution and Catholic doctrine (translated into Italian) had negatively captured that of the Vatican, just as he was given the opportunity to initiate a sustained campaign to upgrade the educational valence of his fledgling Catholic university in northern Indiana. Yet those efforts would prove no less unwelcome to influential contemporaries of his own religious community than his writings on evolution to Vatican defenders of the faith. A century later, however, his views reconciling Catholic faith with

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When Faith and Reason Meet

When evolution have received confirmation from Pope John Paul II, while the university for which he expended his life has vigorously pursued the trajectory he limned. The manner in which his educational dream for Notre Dame became realized will prove instructive in exploring the politics peculiar to those Catholic universities animated by religious congregations, yet the way his intellectual and moral stamina continued to sustain and direct him, once his aspirations for both church and university had been blocked, may offer a story even more illuminating than the institutional one.

For as Jung remarked, conscious individuals live out their times as well as their lives, and John Zahm's reflections during his travels subsequent to Rome's rejection of his theoretical reconciliations regarding religion and science, as well as his own community's resistance to practical proposals for Notre Dame's achieving university status, reveal just that. In penetrating the inner reaches of South America, he managed to combine his talents as a naturalist with his zeal as a Catholic priest to come to a critical appraisal of the way that the Catholic faith had been transplanted there (with a keen ear for the plaintive voice of Bartolome de las Casas), as well as a stunning appreciation of the rich natural beauty of that vast continent. But even these three groundbreaking works of reflective exploration pale before the prescient account he offers Westerners on the eve of his anticipated journey form Berlin to Baghdad, posthumously published in 1922. These reflections display a mind trained in Greek and Latin classics in an 1870s Notre Dame, desirous now of sharing with us the amplitude to which life had tempered both his mind and his heart to accept and learn from cultural and religious "others." The most telling chapter in this regard - "Islam Past and Present" - will return us to the 1999 Library of Congress symposium, where Cardinal George permitted himself but one prognosis for the century into which we have entered: that nothing would prove to be more salient religiously than the dialogue between Christianity and Islam. For in this chapter Zahm


employs one example after another, framed as personal encounters via train and raft from Istanbul to Baghdad, to studiously correct Western misapprehensions and fears of Islam. Depressingly enough for contemporary readers, those misapprehensions not only continue to prevail, but have succeeded in reinforcing a Western hubris that has become as destructive as it is oblivious to the dignity of difference.\footnote{Jonathan Sacks, \textit{Dignity of Difference} (New York: Continuum, 2002).} How the contours of his initial education and his subsequent life could have shaped a Catholic priest born in Indiana in 1851 to so prescient an appreciation of Islam is a story worth telling.

Yet the larger story is one limned by the work of Bernard Lonergan, S.J., whose seminal work, \textit{Insight} (1958), celebrates the “unrestricted desire to know,” reminding us of the saving eros of intelligence. For that is what John Zahm’s life – his ambitions, reversals, and sustained recovery – teaches us in an inescapable manner. Lonergan’s astute appropriation of Catholic tradition (inspired by John Henry Newman), together with his experience of teaching theology in Rome in the 1950s and 1960s, led him to divide those who “search for understanding” from those “who need certitude.” John Zahm clearly exemplified the first, as his inquiring mind led him to explore the interface between faith and scientific inquiry, between new and old worlds, between a Catholic subculture and a wider academic world. Temperamentally, he was an adventurer, a Grenzgänger [boundary crosser], who undertook exploratory travel when his proposals for exploring the frontiers between science and faith were thwarted by ecclesiastical authorities, and his ambition for advancing his nascent university, Notre Dame, into full-fledged university status was blocked by members of his own religious community who were administering it.

Yet we shall see how his presence in and to that same community (of Holy Cross) would bear the fruit he desired nearly a quarter-century after his death in 1921. That community dynamic will form the subtext emerging from our assessment of his own intellectual and spiritual journey, undertaken in the wake of severe reversals. And for some, notably men and women whose lives are shaped by and who themselves help to shape such religious communities, the subtext may even prove more instructive than the testimony of Zahm’s own life as an intellectual and a person of faith. Yet perhaps the most
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illuminating fact is that all of us are who and what we are in virtue of the nourishing contexts of family and sustaining communities, so again, it is the interface which counts. In fact, I have been moved to attempt this appreciation of John Zahm as a younger member of the family of Holy Cross, realizing after fifty years of religious profession how much this family (with my original family) has contributed to what I have become. We are all so beholden to the legacies that sustain us that appreciations like this offer us a way to extend that legacy, enriched, to those who come after us.

My indebtedness to Ralph Weber’s Notre Dame’s John Zahm (Notre Dame, IN: University of Notre Dame Press, 1961) – to be referred to as “Weber” – will be evident throughout, as it is here displayed in his masterful historical delineation of our subject, John Zahm (should be a note. Cited earlier.). Composed as only a skilled historian knows how to do, his brief account brings his earlier study to a fine point, making up for my deficiencies in archival research. In that way it renders possible an appreciation of this sort, one that can reliably depend on his earlier scrutiny of extensive sources. So we can extend his inaugural work (a half-century later), as his title gives the focus of that work: “John Zahm and Notre Dame,” to allow us to marvel at all this talented young Holy Cross priest was able to contribute to that fledgling institution from his ordination in 1875, coincident with being appointed professor of chemistry and physics, co-chair of the science department, and director of the library and curator of the museum, as well as a member of the board of trustees, until his departure from Notre Dame in 1906. Handpicked by the founder of the University, Edward Sorin, C.S.C., to be “vice-president” of Notre Dame in 1885 (at the age of 34), John Zahm became Sorin’s traveling companion as well, as they visited the Holy Land together in 1887.

In the spirit of a young religious congregation (Holy Cross dates its origination from 1841 in LeMans in France), a few of whom were transplanted a year later into a pioneer country, Zahm found himself involved in a burgeoning set of initiatives, centering on the foundation at Notre Dame du Lac in northern Indiana. Early on, he traveled the American southwest, in search of Catholic heritage in the New World, attracting students to the new university via chartered railroad cars. His talent for science and technology, coupled with his penchant for
travel, led him on an inspection tour of European science facilities in 1878 and (in a more practical vein) to electrify the campus in the early 1880s. Throughout this period, he was intent on communicating the extensive discoveries of scientific inquiry to students and yet wider publics. By 1883 he had begun his public probe into evolution from the perspective of faith. Beginning in 1893, Zahm began his association with the Catholic Summer School, a Chautauqua-like movement for adult education, with five lectures in Plattsburg, New York, on “Science and Revealed Religion” (Weber, 55). It is that spirit of inquiry which this appreciation will highlight, tempered and interiorized in response to criticism from ecclesiastical authorities and confreres resistant to his visionary call. We shall review the stages of his personal intellectual inquiry as they are punctuated by his major published works, recalling that he had anticipated an extensive study of Dante in his later years – a project cut short by influenza, but continued, as so many of his initiatives, in the Notre Dame of today in the Devers Program of Dante Studies. So we are treated with a rich panoply of accomplishments, punctuated by reversals that might have paralyzed a person of lesser faith.

Who was John Zahm, and why explore his life and work? What moved me to undertake this study, and presumably will move readers to engage it, is this man’s abiding need and ability to imagine “the other,” yet do so in an American climate rather preoccupied with itself. From his earliest days on an Ohio farm in the mid-nineteenth century, we can say he lusted to learn, and that yearning was soon directed into arenas often neglected by others. When empirical science was burgeoning he immersed himself in that subject, with its technological appurtenances. At the same time, a remarkably competent philosophical and theological education equipped him to focus on the interface between science and his religious faith, where he proved unwilling to court either simple opposition or facile juxtapositions. He had to probe apparent contradictions to determine what deeper conciliances might be hidden there. That is why his works on religion and science, published at the turn of the century – from 1890 to 1905 – have received the abiding attention of historians of science. Yet when Vatican suspicions closed off further inquiry in that direction, his ceaselessly inquiring mind moved into cultural and historical domains,
seeking to delineate the multiple dimensions of the Latin American continent to his North American colleagues. These forays into Latin American topography, culture, and politics piqued the attention of the adventuresome naturalist and former president, Theodore Roosevelt, who enlisted his services for what was to be Zahm’s third and last South American exploration. These physical forays were followed by landmark historical inquiries into “women in science,” complemented by two vignettes on women in history who were “great inspirers.” So if gender difference is the most pervasive “difference” we all know, Zahm probed that as well. Finally, in a veritable coup de grace, his final work, whose editing was cut short by the flu epidemic in Munich in 1921, re-created the world of biblical “near east,” with prescient reflections on the Islam of his day – composed in its entirely before undertaking the actually voyage, inhibited as he was from sailing for the duration of the Great War.

He carried out these groundbreaking inquiries in the context of a religious congregation recently moved from France to northern Indiana, whose leader, Edward Sorin, C.S.C., boldly inaugurated a “university” on their arrival in northern Indiana in 1841, calling it “Notre Dame.” Born soon after, in 1851, on an Ohio farm, John Zahm brought both German and English to the education he sought at this fledgling university, where he soon imbibed Greek, Latin, and French. Though his interests turned quickly to science, this classical training left an abiding taste for Homer, which he read in the original for recreation, as well as prepared him to revel in the poetry of Dante’s Divina Comedy, which was to give him lifelong inspiration. The Congregation of Holy Cross was intended by its founder to be a religious “family,” a microcosm of the community of faith and the human family, with priests, brothers, and sisters working side by side. Zahm joined this family soon after enrolling in Notre Dame and was then afforded a fitting philosophical and theological education, after undergoing a period of testing, or novitiate. He was immediately given multiple responsibilities, befitting his talents as well as the pressing needs of the new institution. Yet none of these would stand in the way of that

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probing habit of inquiry that had become second nature to him. Eager to attract Hispanic students to Notre Dame in the 1890s, he travelled to the American southwest, engaging railroad cars to the students to Indiana, as well as devoting himself to the Chautauqua-like Catholic Summer School, where his brief would be "science and religion." Utterly engaged as teacher and publicist, he turned the summer lectures into copiously annotated books which lost none of their spontaneous flavor. The most controversial was his 1896 *Evolution and Dogma*, in which he contended (much the same as Pope John Paul II would in 1996) that the biblical creator, understood via the rich developments of Christian philosophical theology, was certainly "big enough" to employ chance as a secondary cause in sustaining the universe which the creator originates and sustains.

Yet the fallout of that work, once translated into Italian and French by well-meaning European friends, would presage a momentous shift in Zahm’s relation to Notre Dame and to his religious congregation of Holy Cross. His manner of negotiating that crisis, however, will show that the same uncanny capacity to imagine "the other," drawn as he ever was by difference, leads him to be an adventurous "border-croosser," whether that be literally in his South American ventures; intellectually, in his study of women in science and in literary life; or culturally, in exploring the lands of the bible in the ancient and the contemporary "Near East," yet finally, in his own person, as he came to inspire future leaders of Notre Dame to carry it over the threshold into a genuine university. The plot of this appreciation will follow the sinuous interlacing of these intellectual voyages, to the point at which a decidedly cotemporary person emerges, attuned to "the other" with no need or desire to colonize what is different, but always to explicate the difference in such as way as to nourish his compatriots. A real teacher! And one whose adventuresome spirit at the outset of the twentieth century should inspire a cognate sense of adventure in those who face the incipient century following.

**A COMPARATIVE CONCLUSION**

Writing on a person inevitably invites identifications between author and subject, nor can this appreciation be an exception to that rule. Yet I would rather deflect that inveterate tendency by comparing Zahm with
two near contemporaries, both French and each a Grenzgänger: Marie-Joseph Lagrange, O.P., and Louis Massignon, in a way that only a later appreciation could even attempt, considering these distinct persons in a stereoscopic view suggested by their cognate concerns and their shared Catholic faith. Zahm and Lagrange were both participants in the fourth Catholic Scientific Congress in Fribourg in 1897, and shared as well cognate concerns relating the study of the bible to scientific inquiry, though in opposite directions: Lagrange, to incorporate historical-critical methods into the study of the biblical texts; Zahm, to illustrate the compatibility of the disparate genres – biblical and scientific – in expounding cosmological and anthropological issues. Given the climate of the times, that the work of each elicited concern on the part of Roman authorities was doubtless inevitable as well, yet neither allowed that to deter his commitment to faith or to scientific inquiry. Moreover, their relative remove from the epicenter (Rome), as well as their adherence to their respective religious communities, did give each of them a relatively protected space to continue their inquiries, though Zahm was constrained to alter his original field of inquiry.

The second figure, Louis Massignon, relates to Zahm’s final opus maximum, incorporating “more than a quarter of a century” of intermittent work, two-fifths of which is devoted to a sustained effort to enlighten his Western, largely American, audience about Islam. Yet this passion to supplant stereotypes fixed in the Western psyche about Islam had also animated, in another key, his intensive studies of Latin America, though in that case the corrective impulse was directed to a Protestant North American psyche. A similar passion can be found in the life of Louis Massignon (1883-1957), a French Islamicist whose life and work, like Zahm’s, was devoted to crossing boundaries, and whose dedication to the Muslim mystic and martyr, al-Hallaj, led him to “revert to faith in the God of Abraham” in such a way as always to think the revelations of Bible and Qur’an together. We owe the prescient phrase, “Abrahamic faiths” to Massignon, and there is little

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doubt that his longtime friendship with Pope Paul VI expedited the reconciling lines in the Vatican II document on the relation of the Catholic Church with other religions: Nostra Aetate. But what drew me to this comparison was the way their respective Catholic faiths impelled them to direct their co-religionists to ways of appreciating the Muslim “other” without in any way diluting their own faith commitment. To be sure, Massignon was far more instructed in Islam than Zahm, blessed with a bevy of Muslim friends plus fluency in Arabic, as well as enjoying a rich family background and intellectual formation at the Sorbonne; yet their instincts converge in an instructive way. Catholic faith cannot be “exclusive” in the sense of our having nothing to learn from others; in fact, quite the opposite, it is encounter with persons of other faith – in their case, Islam-- which opens us to the reaches of our own. What Massignon’s mysterious encounter with the subject of his study, Husayn ibn Mansur “al-Hallaj” (857-922) allowed him to overcome were nineteenth-century French intellectual prejudices against anything related to Catholic faith, whereas Zahm’s inherent desire to understand, together with an education in the classics and a subsequent sojourn in Rome, carried him beyond his virtual frontier origins in western Ohio in the mid-nineteenth century.

Yet in Zahm’s case, his openness to Islam is nearly as baffling as the composition of the account of the Middle East, without having taken the journey itself, for nothing in his background can plausibly account for that. So we must look to a more generic principle of explanation, already exhibited in his documented travel through South America: an inveterate recoil from narrow or provincial ways of seeing anything, perhaps in gratitude for the liberation which his early education and the opportunities for travel and friendship as a Holy Cross priest had afforded him, first in service of the fledgling University which had become his home, and then of a far larger public: “the glory of God, His church and Holy Cross.” Others had received the same education, however, and were content simply to pass it on, much as Massignon belonged to a burgeoning group of “Orientalists” in the early twentieth century, responding to the opportunities afforded them by European colonization. Yet Edward Said will identify countless ways in which his work eludes the distorted construction of “Orientalist” he finds
so offensive. So it must be said that “something else” influenced intellectuals like John Zahm and Louis Massignon, something which cannot be identified unilaterally with their Catholic faith, since many who profess that faith have responded to “others” in disdainful ways. Indeed, it is that “something else” which attracted me to attempting an appreciation of John Zahm’s life through his works, as well as suggested this prima facie far-fetched comparison with Louis Massignon. Can we suspect that there is “something else” in each person which, were we able to identify it and reach to express it, would give us the individual image of the creator in each human being? Yet that unique person is born, reared, and educated in a family and a community, and as our shared experience of family life tells us, may be unable to express their uniqueness within that otherwise nourishing context. For the flavor of his mature foray into the Middle East, let this aside on Paul suffice as a valedictory in this “year of Paul”:

On leaving Konya Zahm reminds us that we are “on the route of the Crusades led by Godfrey de Bouillon and Frederic Barbarossa” (183) across the Taurus mountains, in the footsteps of Alexander through the “Cilician Gates, from time immemorial...The gateway between Syria and Asia Minor, between southwestern Asia and southeastern Europe” (188). Zahm concludes with a paean to the “weary and footsore Crusaders,” only to arrive at Tarsus, the birthplace of St. Paul the Apostle” (190). Tarsus, the city of Saint Paul, was once “ranked as a center of Greek thought and knowledge with the world-famed cities, Athens and Alexandria” (201), so Zahm can speculate that “the future apostle came into close contact with the greatest teachers and scholars of his time, and was thus prepared to enter the intellectual arena with the keenest minds of Greece and Rome” (202).

Eastern Anatolia provides the location for Zahm to make “a special effort to ascertain the truth regarding the Armenian massacre that so stirred Europe and America to horror in 1909” (205). His Ottoman and Turkish predilections had already made him suspect that reports of “atrocities so frequently ascribed to the Turks were ex parte accounts of what had actually occurred and that most, if not all, of them were greatly exaggerated” (205-206). He cites “an English traveler who had exceptional opportunities for studying the question

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and who is well disposed towards the Armenians” to describe “the sudden period of liberty which followed the downfall of Abdul-Hamid, [leading] Armenians to give unrestrained vent to their aspirations [to establish] an Armenian kingdom of Cilicia [or] Lesser Armenia,” which Zahm himself confirms and intensifies: “what is said here of the hot-brained revolutionaries of Lesser Armenia can with even greater truth be affirmed of their seditious compatriots of Greater Armenia” to the north (206-207).10

The phrase “seditious compatriots” will set up Zahm’s defense of the Turks, but whatever we think of it, his inherently scientific nose for sifting evidence, together with his voracious reading and passion for understanding, particularly of the Middle East, led him to see deeply enough into the events of his day to be able to speak prophetically of scenarios unfolding nearly a hundred years after this study appeared.

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10 Excerpted from Burrell, When Faith and Reason Meet, while page references in text are to Zahm, From Berlin to Baghdad and Babylon.
WHAT IS AN EVOLUTIONARY EXPLANATION? DARWIN AND LONERGAN

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In a word, natural selection means survival in accord with the probabilities. Bernard Lonergan

This year we celebrate the 150th anniversary of the publication of Charles Darwin’s *The Origin of Species*. About that famous work, Bernard Lonergan once wrote: “There are those that date the dawn of human intelligence from the publication of Darwin’s *Origin of Species* in 1859.” While Lonergan himself did not indulge in such hyperbolic praise, it is clear that he held Darwin’s scientific achievement in very high regard, and for good reason. The impact of Darwin’s intellectual achievement has been monumental. Very few other intellectual achievements have given rise to a comparable torrent of books, articles, and debates. Even prescinding from the ongoing debates about religion and Darwinian evolution, the number and range of scientific papers, philosophical discussions, and historical studies are vast. Of course some have taken a much darker view of Darwin’s work, regarding it as the work of the devil himself.


2 All references to the first edition of 1859 are from Charles Darwin, *The Origin of Species by Means of Natural Selection or the Preservation of Favoured Races in the Struggle for Life* (New York: Penguin Books, 1968). Darwin’s works were also referenced at http://darwin-online.org.uk/.

3 *Insight*, 154.
Behind the enthusiastic endorsements of Darwin, as well as the scathing condemnations, there stands a very complex philosophical question – what exactly does it mean to give an *evolutionary* scientific explanation? I deliberately use the phrase “evolutionary scientific explanation” in contrast to “scientific explanation of evolution” for two reasons. First, “scientific explanation of evolution” does take evolution as a given which must then be explained scientifically. Rather, what scientists face as given is a vast array of data of all sorts – morphological differences and similarities, fossils, geographical, geological, and climatological distributions, genetic and biochemical specificities, for example. These are the data that invite scientific explanation. Evolution as such is not given to sense perception. Evolution is not a sense-datum to be explained. None of us sits and watches evolution unfold before our eyes. Instead, evolution is a reality (or realities) to be known not merely through sense observation but through the addition of understanding and judgment as well. The question of evolutionary scientific explanation, then, is the question of what kinds of understanding and judgment are demanded by the data.

Second, the phrase “evolutionary scientific explanation” suggests that these data are not to be explained by the same sorts of approaches used, say, in physics or chemistry. A contrary attitude is manifest when various authors claim that Darwin or neo-Darwinism provide a “mechanistic” or “naturalistic” explanations. However, a century and a half of scientific work has revealed that a very distinct type of explanation and a distinct methodological approach is called for in order to do justice to the relevant data. In my opinion, some sort of evolutionary approach will provide the best scientific explanation of the vast range of data. The question at hand, then is, what is the best kind of evolutionary explanation? 

While the answer may seem obvious at first sight, scientists and

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4 For an especially careful and nuanced study of the difficult and complex historical path toward the proper methods of evolutionary scientific explanation, see David J. Depew and Bruce H. Weber, *Darwinism Evolving: Systems Dynamics and the Genealogy of Natural Selection* (Cambridge, MA: MIT Press, 1995). In his complementary philosophical approach, Lonergan argues that the proper explanation and method for evolutionary science requires a particular manner of combining classical and statistical methods, focused on a conditioned series of schemes of recurrence and their emerging “schedules of probabilities.” Details follow in Part II of this article.
philosophers who have considered the issue more closely have for some time recognized that the answer is not so simple after all. In this article I trace some of the complexities involved in attaining an evolutionary scientific explanation, and its length is due to those in complexities. In Part I, I explore the problems that have arisen regarding "survival of the fittest" as the core of evolutionary explanation. I will explain how the rise of "population thinking" in biology after Darwin provided a partial solution to these problems. In Part II, I will then explore how Lonergan's notion of generalized emergent probability is related to the scientific advances in population thinking. In particular, I endeavor to show both how these advances add important clarifications to Lonergan's ideas, and also how his thought challenges the evolutionary studies of populations to become more fully explanatory and scientific.

PART I: THE DEVELOPMENT OF DARWINIAN SCIENTIFIC EXPLANATIONS

A. Darwin and "Survival of the Fittest"

What comes to most people's minds when they hear Darwin's name is the phrase "survival of the fittest." This is unfortunate for many reasons. Among other things, the phrase has played a much greater role in political ideologies than it has in scientific explanations. "Survival of the fittest" has been the banner of social Darwinism – the political and ethical position that neither governments nor individuals should intervene to assist physically and mentally inferior human beings. According to social Darwinism, it is better to let nature take its course, which is to say, better to let people perish if they are unable to compete successfully with other human beings who are more fit.

The hay day of social Darwinism in the United States came in the last third of the nineteenth century, although its basic ideas constantly resurface in social and political debates, now into the twenty-first century. Its chief spokesperson was William Graham Sumner, who

used evolution to support unrestrained and even ruthless economic competition. In his classic study of social Darwinism, Richard Hofstadter argues that it was the thought of Herbert Spencer, rather than that of Charles Darwin, that laid the foundations for the rise of social Darwinism both in the writings of Sumner and for its wider reception in intellectual and popular circles in the United States. "Social Spencerism" might be the more accurate description of the movement, albeit "now fortified with the tremendous prestige of Darwinism."6

Again, while social Darwinism seemed content to remove barriers to competition and to let nature take its course, eugenics movements (such as the followers of Darwin's second-cousin, Francis Galton) took a more active approach. They argued that it is appropriate to lend nature a helping hand and to accelerate the process by promoting the breeding of superior humans and preventing the breeding of inferior stocks.7 It was in fact the eugenicists who began the tradition of "biometrics," that is, the application of statistical methods to the study of biological populations.8 But like the social Darwinists, their view of the "fittest" traits were class biased in the extreme.

It is no surprise, then, that the phrase "survival of the fittest" has been used in these ways by political and ethical movements. The phrase actually originated in a social-political context. In fact, Darwin himself did not actually use the phrase "survival of the fittest" at all in the first editions of The Origin of Species. He incorporated it only in the fifth edition of 1866, only after encountering the phrase in Spencer's writings. Spencer, not Darwin, originally coined the phrase. Spencer used the phrase to bring biological evolutionary phenomena within the sweep of his own uniformitarian and progressive evolutionary system – a system whose primary objectives were social and political.9 Even before Darwin published Origin, Spencer endeavored to show that all of nature is governed by a single, universal progressive law of "the persistence of force," which inexorably leads to improvement in

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6 Social Darwinism, 65.
7 British eugenicists were concerned to increase the prevalence of "preferred traits" (i.e., traits found in the British upper classes), while American eugenicists focused on "eliminating the unfit." For details and the chilling account of the attitudes and wide acceptance of such views, see Darwinism Evolving, 197-202.
8 Darwinism Evolving, 199, 211-15.
9 Social Darwinism, 30-50. See also Darwinism Evolving, 172.
the material, biological, and human realms. (In the hands of others, especially social Darwinists, the alleged existence of such a law became the justification for letting that law operate without interference, or for the eugenicists, the legitimation for accelerating its progress.) In fact, Spencer's idea of evolution had much more in common with the evolutionary thought of Jean-Baptiste Lamarck than with Darwin. Be that as it may, the phrase originated from Spencer, a philosopher who was very influential in his day because of his ideas of social progress, among other things. It is very understandable, therefore, that when Darwin attached the phrase to his persuasive account of biological evolution, that this would add considerable prestige to its uses in the realm of social politics.

Although the phrase "survival of the fittest" attracted and continues to excite strong political passions, its scientific value is far more questionable. For example, if we take the phrase at face value as the statement of a scientific hypothesis, then it should be submitted to scientific testing. In other words, scientists ought to identify the species that fall under the category of "fittest" and determine whether or not it is true that these are the species that survive. However, all three terms - fittest, survival, and species - require clarification. In the next section I will explore the developments that arose in response to problems associated with "fittest." Subsequent sections take up difficulties and developments regarding survival and species.

B. "Fittest" and the So-called Tautology Problem

It has been alleged that the phrase "survival of the fittest" entails a tautology problem. "Fittest" is a problematic concept once one leaves the familiar realm of commonsense description and enters the realm of scientific explanation in biology. Descriptively, animals and plants appear to be perfectly adapted to their environments, and this notion governed biological thinking for centuries. But what exactly is meant by the concept of a most fit species - or, more generally, of biological fitness at all? For some time now, scientists and philosophers have questioned the scientific status of the law of the "survival of the fittest." Perhaps the first to raise this challenge was Nobel prize recipient Thomas Hunt Morgan, the great geneticist whose work provided important background to what became the neo-Darwinian synthesis. He wrote:
it may appear little more than a truism to state that the individuals that are best adapted to survive have a better chance of surviving than those not so well adapted to survive.\textsuperscript{10}

That is to say, it seems that "fittest" (i.e., "best adapted") is in fact just equivalent to "survivor." Or, in other words, when translated into scientifically operational terms,\textsuperscript{11} "survival of the fittest" appears to be nothing more than the tautology, "survival of the survivors."

In a frequently referenced Harper's article, Tom Bethell quoted Morgan's words in support of exactly this point: "Any way of identifying the fittest other than the survivors?...If not, then Darwin's theory is reduced from the status of a scientific theory to that of a tautology."\textsuperscript{12} If this is the case – if survival of the fittest is indeed the core of evolutionary science – then Darwinism simply would be logically true by definition. It would require no empirical investigation or support. And this could hardly be regarded as a scientific theory that explains empirical facts.

In a response, paleontologist Stephen Jay Gould admitted that Bethell's criticisms apply to "much of what passes for evolutionary theory," but not to Darwin himself or to the core of Darwinian science. Gould claimed that fitness can indeed be defined independently of survival as superior "designs for living in new environments." This would mean that superior designs do explain survival after all. Furthermore, he disagreed with Bethell on the most fundamental issue – "the pearl of great price at the center" of Darwinism – namely natural selection. According to Gould "the essence of Darwinism [is] the \textit{creativity} of natural selection."\textsuperscript{13} However, both of Gould's claims


\textsuperscript{11} "Operationalism" is a philosophical doctrine associated with Percy Bridgman and others. It holds that a term is scientifically meaningful only if the concept can be translated without residue into a set of operations for testing. So, for example, the concept of "temperature" would be translated into the operation, "place a thermometer into the body and read the number on its scale." In the present case, the question would be how to define "fittest" operationally – and thus would reduce to a determination of the survivors.


\textsuperscript{13} Stephen Jay Gould, "Darwin's Untimely Burial," Ruse op. cit., 96-97, emphasis added.
themselves call for scrutiny.

In support of one line of Gould’s criticisms I would add that Bethell quoted Morgan out of context. That is to say, Morgan was not really attempting to show that Darwin was wrong or that his whole theory amounted to nothing but an empty tautology. And Morgan was certainly not doubting the fact that life has evolved. Morgan did not dispute the fact of evolution as such — although others have used Bethell’s article in support of such attacks. Rather, Morgan was arguing that natural selection could not be the whole, or even the most fundamental, explanatory concept in a theory of evolution. It is best to quote him at length:

In what sense, then, have the catchwords “competition” and “the survival of the fittest” come to be generally regarded as the essential features of natural selection? Do these terms mean, for instance, that natural selection is an active agent in evolution, which in itself brings about progressive changes; or do they mean only that it acts as a sieve for the materials that present themselves as variations? If we think of evolution as an active process, is natural selection an agency capable of bringing about progressive changes, or does it not rather direct attention away from the real phenomenon, and offer at most only an explanation of the presence of certain types and the absence of others at any one period of geological history? The origin of these types — the real creative steps — not the preservation of certain of them after they have appeared, might rather be regarded as the essential phenomenon of evolution. If so, “the struggle for existence” and “the survival of the fittest” may express only a sort of truism or metaphor, and have nothing to do with the origination of new types out of antecedent ones.14

Morgan himself was a “mutationist” and was arguing that natural selection cannot be the fundamental principle that provides a truly scientific explanation for the origin of novel species. By itself, he argued, natural selection is not “capable of bringing about progressive

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changes." Along with other pioneers in Mendelian genetics, such as Hugo de Vries, Morgan held that some mechanism of genetic mutation is needed as the fundamental explanatory principle in order to account for the emergence of new species. This would reduce the role of natural selection to second rank as an explanatory principle, for it would only act "as a sieve for the materials that present themselves as variations." Interestingly, at one point in the Origin, Darwin himself anticipates Morgan's point almost exactly. He wrote: "natural selection can do nothing until favourable variations chance to occur."¹⁵

This would mean that Gould is wrong in a very important way. Natural selection could not be the "creative force," as he claims. But to give Gould the benefit of the doubt, perhaps he had in mind the eventual destiny of the mutationist position held by Morgan and others, as discussed in the next section.

C. The Path to the Modern, Neo-Darwinian Synthesis

Darwin's own theory of evolution raised significant scientific and intellectual problems (apart from the religious and political difficulties it raised). Chief among these were the problems of variation and the mechanisms of inheritance. It has become commonplace today to say that the rediscovery of Gregor Mendel's pioneering work in genetics solidified Darwin's theory of evolution. However, the actual path was neither so simple nor so straightforward.¹⁶ The integration of Darwinian evolutionary theory with the modern science of genetics eventually culminated in the formation of what has come to be called "the modern evolutionary synthesis" (or "neo-Darwinian synthesis") — a synthesis in which scientific study of populations came to prominence in biology.¹⁷ It took almost fifty years for this synthesis to reach maturity, and it may be said to have done so in three stages.¹⁸

¹⁶ Depew and Weber give an especially careful and nuanced account of the complexities of this development. For a summary, see Darwinism Evolving, 1-30.
¹⁷ Depew and Weber give an astute summary of four variant construals of the term "modern synthesis," Darwinism Evolving, 299-301.
(1) During the first stage (1900-18), Mendel’s now classic paper was rediscovered and inspired laboratory research in experimental genetics (as well as numerous more speculative arguments) by Morgan, Hugo de Vries, Carl Correns, William Bateson, and somewhat later, Barbara McClintock, among others. They applied Mendel’s work on peas to other species (e.g., chickens, fruit flies, and maize). That is to say, they charted the probabilities of various phenotypic (or descriptive) characters, using the principles and methods developed by Mendel. They also developed sophisticated observational techniques using microscopes to demonstrate direct correlations among recessive/dominant phenotypes and minute structures found on chromosomes (genotypes). However, their work seemed incompatible with the gradualism so central to Darwin’s original version of evolution. In fact, their work initially appeared to be a serious refutation of Darwin’s theory.

To understand this, consider for a moment the actual experiments of Mendel. The phenotypes (visible appearances) of peas that he studied were dramatically different from one another—smooth or wrinkled peas, green or yellow albumins, green or gray seed coats, and so forth. Likewise, the phenotypic characters that Morgan studied in his experiments with fruit flies (Drosophila amelopohila) were dramatically distinct—normal versus vestigial wings, normal eyes versus “bar eyes,” and so forth. Morgan also mentions the genetic basis of the radically discontinuous phenotypic difference between male and female members of the same species. So it seemed that different


20 After a considerable period of confusion, William Johannsen is credited with finally clarifying the distinction precisely, and with introducing the phenotype/genotype terminology; Darwinism Evolving, 228.

21 See Darwinism Evolving, 226.

genotypes led to dramatically different phenotypes.

Such findings were initially difficult to reconcile with Darwin’s theory of descent with modification through natural selection. It was thought that evolution by natural selection had to rely upon extreme gradualism in variation. To Darwin’s way of thinking, existing species were highly adapted to their current environments. If offspring differed greatly from their parents (Darwin called such variations “monstrosities”), they would compete poorly with ordinary, well-adapted members. Hence they would soon perish without issue. Therefore, in order for evolution to occur through natural selection, the variations would have to occur and accumulate very gradually (i.e., with almost infinitesimally continuous variations), and not with the great discontinuities that Mendel, Morgan, and the others observed in their studies. In addition, Morgan argued that natural selection alone could do no more than shift the frequencies (probabilities) of genes in a given population. Therefore, the changes in a population affected solely by natural selection would soon reach an insurmountable limit. Natural selection could at best shift the frequencies of genes and their phenotypic expressions in populations, but it could not cause evolution of new species. For that, discontinuous mutations would be needed. Hence, Morgan and most of the other early Mendelians adopted a “mutationist” position. In other words, they argued that inheritance and speciation must occur in discontinuous mutations or jumps (saltations), and that this was incompatible with the gradualism required by Darwinian natural selection.

Dov Ospovat shows that Darwin initially subscribed to the concept of “perfect adaptation” of natural theologians, and that this posed a significant obstacle for his theory. As Ospovat shows, Darwin eventually, abandoned perfect adaptationism, and in conjunction with gradual and unlimited variation, thought that natural selection could then account for the origin of all species. Dov Ospovat, The Development of Darwin’s Theory: Natural History, Natural Theology, and Natural Selection, 1838-1859 (New York: Cambridge University Press, 1981), 33-38.


Critique, 154.

Darwin did ascribe to a certain kind of “particulate” view of genetic materials,
(2) The rise of theoretical population genetics constituted the second stage (1918-32) along the path to the modern synthesis. Among its key architects were George Udny Yule, R. A. Fischer, J. B. S. Haldane, and Sewall Wright. They developed complex statistical models and theoretical arguments to analyze how complex distributions of genotypes would change over time under different kinds of conditions.27 Among other things, they were able to show that certain phenotypic traits could result from combinations of multiple genetic factors, not from just a single such factor. In this way they were able to establish that gradual (not only saltational) phenotypic variation could be correlated with discrete genetic differences obeying Mendelian genetic laws. Fischer developed a complex statistical model that showed how natural selection would push large populations toward adaptive (or fitness) peaks. Haldane in particular applied his sophisticated statistical studies of genetics to actual natural populations. On the basis of their studies, they made convincing arguments that, contrary to the thinking of the early geneticists, Mendelian genetics is completely consistent with the idea of gradual evolution by natural selection.

However, the work of Sewall Wright in particular raised serious questions about the close link between population genetics and fitness. Wright showed that in relatively small, isolated populations, it was possible that pure randomness could lead to "genetic drift" away from adaptive peaks. Wright believed that this model more accurately reflected how actual dynamics of biological populations than did Fischer's model. In other words, what Lonergan would call non-systematic processes can occasionally eliminate highly advantageous genes entirely from small populations. Thus the remnant population and its progeny would not be "the fittest" after all. It would just be the community of survivors. Wright went on to show that natural selection would still operate after drift eliminated certain genes or even whole species and shift the frequencies (probabilities) of genes which he called "gemmules." However, the gemmules were thought capable of blending in ways that could produce almost continuous variations, in stark contradiction to Mendelian principles. See Darwinism Evolving, 131.

27 Darwinism Evolving, 232-38, 243-73. These researchers continued a tradition of "biometrics" that began with the application of statistical methods to populations by eugenicists such as Galton, but because their scientific concerns were quite different from the early eugenicists, they profoundly transformed biometrics.
in the resulting populations (without the previously adaptive genes) toward new adaptive peaks.

(3) The chief architects of the third and last stage (1936-47) leading to the modern synthesis were Sergei Chetverikov, Theodosius Dobzhansky, Edmund Brisco Ford, Ernst Mayr, and George Gaylord Simpson. They applied the mathematical models of the population geneticists much more broadly to biological populations that actually exist in nature— as well as to populations preserved in the fossil records. Their studies established that the gene pools in biological populations were even more diverse than had been anticipated by the theoretical geneticists. In fact, they argued, natural selection would structure populations so as to amplify and preserve seemingly non-adaptive recessive genes in populations. These reservoirs of non-adaptive genes would enable populations to adapt more effectively to dramatic environmental changes. Their combined work ultimately convinced the scientific community that natural selection was indeed operative in the natural world and that it was also compatible with the early laboratory work by Mendelian geneticists after all.

(4) In his response to Bethell, therefore, Gould therefore may have had in mind this fifty-year period of scientific development, which seems to have reasserted the preeminence of natural selection in evolutionary explanation. As I will show later, these developments only seem to remove the objections of the mutationists. Their point—that the explanation of the emergence of new species demands an account of the emergence of new genetic elements—remains valid, although less obviously so. Their point is one that must be taken seriously by the project of evolutionary scientific explanation.

This prolonged period of scientific development did in fact result in a major shift in the focus of evolutionary explanation. That focus shifted away from an attempt to explain “the fittest.” In place of a focus on descriptive fitness of phenotypic features, there arose a science dedicated to explaining biological populations in terms of frequencies of genetic and phenotypic distributions (“a schedule [i.e., list] of probabilities attached to a schedule of classes of events,” in Lonergan’s terms). As Ernst Mayr put it, this shift to “population thinking” required a dramatic shift in “a viewpoint, an attitude, a

28 Insight, 86.
general philosophy.”

This means that “survival of the fittest” is not essential to Darwinian evolutionary explanation, whatever role it has played in political ideology. Even if “survival of the fittest” really were nothing more than a tautology — if it really meant nothing more than “survival of the survivors” — this would not be ultimately damaging to Darwinian evolutionary science. In my opinion at least, Darwinian explanations can completely dispense with the Spencerian phrase. This would still leave intact Darwin’s own original understanding of evolutionary explanation as “the theory of descent with modification through natural selection” fleshed out by statistical methods.

Therefore, Darwinism has indeed become overwhelmingly a theory concerned to offer a scientific explanation of the survivors. This means offering scientific explanations of actually existing populations. We will look more closely at what is involved in scientific explanations of populations in later sections. First, however, we will consider difficulties with the other two terms connected with the phrase “survival of the fittest” — species and survival. As we will see, those terms also require a turn to population thinking.

D. The Species Problem

“Survival of the fittest” was not meant, of course, to apply to individual organisms. Sooner or later, every individual organism fails the test of survival. Neither Darwin (nor Spencer) was concerned with survival of individuals. What Darwin was concerned with was the origin, survival, and ascendancy of species.

The concept of species also has been notoriously problematic in the history of biology. Ernstat Mayr, who has studied the history of the problem of defining biological species extensively, observes: “There is probably no other concept in biology that has remained so consistently


30 While fittest can be dispensed with, this does not mean, of course that fitness (or adaptation) are to be ignored by scientific evolutionary explanations. Still, there was a shift in focus from fitness toward probability distributions in populations.

31 Origin, 342, 435.
controversial as the species concept."32 Darwin himself devoted an extended section of the *Origin* to the problem. In his view, observable variations (phenotypes) fall along a spectrum, and it is very difficult to determine where along that spectrum to draw the line that determines whether a particular variety falls within one species, or within its adjacent neighboring species. In the end, Darwin adopted a merely nominalist position, stating:

> From these remarks it will be seen that I look at the term species, as one arbitrarily given for the sake of convenience to a set of individuals closely resembling each other, and that it does not essentially differ from the term variety, which is given to less distinct and more fluctuating forms.33

This nominalist dodge is understandable, since Darwin was primarily concerned with demonstrating the limitless variability of the progeny of biological organisms. He was far less concerned with providing an adequate definition of species. He regarded essentialists as his major foes – that is, those who believed in a limited number of fixed and unvarying species or who held that the variation of individuals within species was extremely circumscribed. He marshaled a great deal of evidence (including some from his own breeding experiments) to argue against such positions. What mattered most to him was establishing that there is a virtually limitless capacity for variation, "for this will generally lead to the most different or divergent variations...being preserved and accumulated by natural selection."34

That is to say, Darwin needed to establish that there could be an extensive pool of variations for natural selection to work upon and thereby yield the great diversity of life forms that we do observe. If the fact of extensive and gradual variations implies that the differences among individuals, varieties, species, genera, families, orders, classes, and phyla are no more than arbitrary conveniences, so be it. He did not think that this would alter the great explanatory power of his theory. This is, however, a very odd position for Darwin to take, given his great excitement and pride in proclaiming that he had "shed some light

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32 *Growth*, 251.
33 *Origin*, 108.
34 *Origin*, 162.
on the origin of species – that mystery of mysteries.”35 Why didn’t he simply claim that he was offering a scientific explanation for varieties instead of species?

Mayr offers an explanation, saying that Darwin sought to demonstrate that species lack the constancy and distinctiveness claimed for them by the creationists. For how could they be the result of gradual change through natural selection if it were true, as Darwin’s opponents continued to claim for the next hundred years, that species are sharply delimited and separated by “bridgeless gaps”? Hence, it was a good strategy to deny the distinctness of species.36

Although Darwin may have been “very pleased with himself for having ‘solved’ the species problem,” Mayr shows how his “solution” created a “formidable dilemma” for succeeding generations of naturalists.37 Their field observations of species convinced them that there were indeed “bridgeless gaps” among species actually existing in nature and that these natural, sharp distinctions demanded genuine explanation. Mayr traces the history of the efforts that eventually led to a new definition of species – “the biological species concept” – which finally provided a satisfactory solution. According to Mayr a proper definition of the biological species concept was “not achieved until the 1940’s and 1950’s” – a development in which Mayr himself played a leading role.38

The biological concept of species is perhaps best understood by way of contrast with the essentialist concept. Essentialists viewed species as “a general prototype” on which individuals are “moulded” in variations, depending on circumstances.39 As such, essentialism is compatible with certain versions of Platonism and Christian natural


36 Growth, 269.

37 Growth, 269-70. For an expanded discussion of Darwin’s ambivalence regarding the concept of species, see Darwinism Evolving, 303-304.

38 Growth, 272. See also Darwinism Evolving, 309-16.

39 Growth, 261.
theology. However, the practical difficulties of squaring sometimes widely divergent variations with this descriptive (prototype) notion of species led naturalists to gradually shift focus to reproductive origin as the basis for defining species. That is to say, if widely variant individuals are all offspring of one and the same parent couple, then they must all be members of the same species. This criterion can be pushed back many generations so as to cover a very diverse range of descendants of a given pair as falling within a single species.

This, however, was an intermediary approach to defining species and was not yet the truly modern biological species concept. Those who employed reproductive origin as the defining feature of species still tended to think of a fixed set of prototypic couples that came into being at the moment of creation. This notion gradually became untenable because of various difficulties. One was the difficulty posed by the rapidly expanding number of species that were being discovered. These discoveries would imply millions of original prototypes. In addition, naturalists gradually realized that there were numerous instances of virtually indistinguishable individuals living in the same habitat, which nevertheless belonged to distinct species. Such difficulties gradually led to a shift from thinking of species in terms of common parentage toward thinking of species in terms of distinct reproductive populations. Interestingly, Morgan himself played an important role in this transition. de Vries had proposed that speciation follows directly from mutations. However, Morgan identified mutations (e.g., bar eyes) in his work with *Drosophila* and realized that even such dramatic mutations did not constitute a new species. The bar-eyed mutants were still able to mate with normal *Drosophila* and produce fertile offspring. So something more than mutation was needed in order to generate new species.

As a player in the third stage of the emergence of the neo-Darwinian Synthesis, Mayr's own efforts at defining a modern, biological concept of species passed through several stages. He finally arrived at the following: "A species is a reproductive community of populations (reproductively isolated from others) that occupies a specific niche in nature."40

In addition to replacing essentialist conceptions of species, the

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40 *Growth*, 273.
modern biological species concept also overcame the difficulty that most vexed nominalist conceptions of species (such as Darwin's). Defining species in terms of reproductively isolated populations overcomes the difficulties in applying "the criterion of 'degree of difference'."\(^41\) It does so because it shifts from a predominately descriptive effort (i.e., drawing a line somewhere in a spectrum of gradually varying sensible similarities or dissimilarities) toward an explanatory effort (how organisms relate to one another reproductively, which inevitably calls for statistical analyses). If the defining features of species are their reproductive relations (or non-reproductive relations that inhibit reproduction), then almost \textit{any} degree of variation in their sensible properties can fall within a species definition. Likewise, almost no degree of descriptive, sensible similarity can demonstrate sameness of species membership. Even if two individuals are almost identical morphologically, they will not be members of the same species if they cannot breed to produce fertile offspring.

The biological concept of species also tends to shift the status of the question regarding speciation. In the \textit{Origin}, Darwin argued that as the progeny of a given species diverge sufficiently (i.e., their descriptive morphological features diverge), they tend toward formation of new species. The population concept of species, by way of contrast, completely reverses the approach to speciation. Speciation occurs when reproductive isolation occurs and morphological divergence eventually follows. Initially it was thought that something like geographical barriers (such as are found among the Galapagos islands) were the keys to reproductive isolation. But Mayr argued that physiological differences were the real bases of reproductive isolation.\(^42\) Suppose, for example, that a novel genetic difference might make it impossible for members of one group of offspring to fertilize members of the other group (or that the ensuing offspring are infertile, such as mules). Or it might be that the genetic novelty gives rise to phenotypic characters in some offspring that pose barriers to mating behaviors (e.g., changes in relative fertility periods or loss of morphological features that used to stimulate mating behaviors, etc.) In such cases speciation (i.e., reproductive isolation) comes first in dramatic and discontinuous

\(^{41}\textit{Growth}, 271.\)

\(^{42}\textit{Growth}, 274.\)
fashion, and morphological (taxonomic) divergence will follow as a secondary phenomenon, so to speak.\textsuperscript{43} Mayr adds, however, that scientists eventually realized that the process of speciation requires more than reproductive isolation. A newly isolated species would also need to compete successfully with the older species in the niche, and this would require additional shifts in the probabilities of the elements in their gene pools.\textsuperscript{44}

According to Mayr, the almost exclusive focus on reproductive isolation led to neglect of another feature of the species definition—that is, "occupies a specific niche in nature." In a later section of this article, I will return to consider this and other features of Mayr's definition of the biological species concept in relation to Lonergan's definition of species. For the present, I call attention to just two very significant developments that led to the biological concept of species.

First, as was the case with the problematic concept of "fittest," thinking about species also shifted toward making populations the focus of biological and evolutionary scientific explanation. Indeed, Mayr concludes his historical analysis by claiming emphatically: "The species, therefore, is the basic unit of evolutionary biology," where species is understood precisely as this special kind of population.\textsuperscript{45}

Second, the rise of the biological species concept reveals a movement in biological science from methods that depended heavily upon descriptive prototypes of appearances related to us by means of sensible similarity, toward methods seeking to understand things in relationship to one another. This leads to specifying of a population in terms of the probability of genes distributed among both its individual members and non-members. That is to say, species are understood not only via reproductive relations among constitutive members, but also in terms of reproductive isolation from other species. In addition, species populations occupy specific niches, which likewise serve to define a given species in terms of its relations to the other species that constitute those niches. Hence species are implicitly defined by their relations with one another.

\textsuperscript{43} It should be noted that there is disagreement with Mayr's claims regarding speciation.
\textsuperscript{44} Growth, 274-75.
\textsuperscript{45} Growth, 296. See also Darwinism Evolving, 302.
E. The Problem with Survival

Finally, although the term "survival" may seem obvious in this context, it also requires clarification. Although the difficulties with survival are not as substantial as those confronted by the terms "fittest" and "species," there are difficulties nonetheless.

First, although the work of Sewall Wright has been contested, it seems certain that at least some small percentage of species exist not because they are "the fittest," but because of genetic drift or pure accidents of a catastrophic nature. That is to say, if survival is to be explained scientifically, "the fittest" – or even fitness – cannot be regarded as the sole explanatory principle.

Again, the scientific understanding of the survival is complicated by the fact that most species do not survive. Mayr estimates that there are at present 10 million living species of plants and animals, with probably another billion extinct species. Or, in other words, 99.9 percent of all species that ever existed are now extinct. In addition, the emergence of almost all species now in existence is relatively recent. So if unqualified survival is the relevant scientific explanatory category, it is one that has almost no observable instances. At the very least, it would seem that extinction as well as survival demands explanation. Of course Darwin does discuss extinction phenomena at great length. But the importance of extinction phenomena is hardly reflected in the slogan "survival of the fittest."

This means that unqualified survival is not actually the explanatory concept employed by evolutionary biologists (including Darwin himself) after all. What is meant, instead of survival, is something like the duration of species as populations. In other words, evolutionary explanation is actually concerned with the emergence of new and distinct species populations, and their extinctions, and especially how their emergences and extinctions are related to other species populations. This can be gleaned from the Origin, but it is certainly not explicitly stated in so many terms. At the very least,

46 Of course a strict Spencerian could argue that species that become extinct through catastrophic events such as meteor impacts or violent volcanic obliterations were just not the "fittest" for such environments, but this would be an excessive stretching of the idea merely for the sake of saving it.

47 Growth, 139.
the phrase "survival of the fittest" tends to distract attention from focusing on this richer and more accurate set of phenomena that call for genuinely scientific evolutionary explanation.

As a result, biologists replaced the concept of unqualified survival with the concept of "differential survival" (and its associated concept of differential reproduction). But in popular presentations, differential survival also is frequently stated in descriptive rather than explanatory terms. So, for example, one website puts it this way:

an animal with white fur will have a definite survival advantage over an animal with dark fur if they both live in Alaska. The white-furred animal is much less likely to be seen and eaten by predators (or noticed and escaped by prey). The differential survival of white-furred animals in this situation is called survival of the fittest...

Differential reproduction is the idea that those organisms best adapted to a given environment will be most likely to survive to reproductive age and have offspring of their own. Organisms that are successful in their environments will be more likely to be successful in reproduction, and therefore the better-adapted organisms will reproduce at a greater rate than the less well-adapted organisms.\footnote{http://library.thinkquest.org/C004367/be2.shtml}

Thus "survival of the fittest" is redefined in terms of "differential survival," but in this case it does so in merely descriptive terms. Phrases such as "most likely" and "best" and "tend to outlive" make sense in commonsense descriptive contexts but not in the context of the modern biological concept of species population. Even Darwin himself uses the phrase "a greater chance" of survival. Such phrases are fine as far as they go, but they ultimately rely upon someone's descriptive sense what seems "most likely" or "a greater chance."

Differential survival needs first to be recast in terms of genotypes, their phenotypic expressions, and especially their associated actual and ideal frequencies in given populations in specific territories during specific time periods. The changes in these probabilities through time ought then to be determined. It is the changes in these probabilities that define differential survival. Likewise, the descriptive idea of differential reproduction (e.g., "the better-adapted organisms will reproduce at a
greater rate than the less well-adapted organisms”) must also be recast in terms of the actual and ideal frequencies of offspring in populations over many generations of the offspring of competing species. Once these transformations are effected, biologists are finally in a position to explain differential survival and differential reproduction in a truly scientific evolutionary fashion.

Once a species has been defined in terms of the tables of probabilities of genotypes and phenotypic expressions, along with the ways their probabilities shift under different environmental conditions, evolutionary scientists can relate that reproductive community to a variety of settings. When new genes emerge in individual members of the species population, the propagation of this new character is charted in terms of the way it changes the species’ lists of probabilities. If the new gene causes reproductive isolation of the new individuals possessing it, then the differential probabilities of survival and reproduction chart the evolution of the new species. Notice that even Wright’s ideas about processes of genetic drift (i.e., that highly adapted genes and even populations can be eliminated) are compatible with these concepts of differential survival and reproduction. The whole question of “fitness” is now thoroughly recast in terms of trends of probabilities of populations and the endeavor to explain these trends in one population by relating them to factors in other populations.

F. Darwin Himself as a Population Thinker

To summarize the preceding sections, if one places great emphasis on “survival of the fittest” as the key to Darwinian scientific explanation, numerous problems arise. These problems have been recognized not only by philosophers and religiously motivated thinkers but also by biological scientists themselves. Gradually and on several fronts, survival of the fittest has been replaced by the notion that populations are the proper objects of evolutionary explanation.

Even though the phrase “survival of the fittest” has caused unnecessary distractions, Darwin’s commitment to explaining populational phenomena is in fact quite evident throughout the Origin. The very structure of the Origin reveals this as one of his

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49 Mayr claimed that Darwin’s greatness lay in his innovations as a population thinker, *Darwinism Evolving*, 302.
primary goals. In the early chapters Darwin lays the groundwork for his theory with his discussions of variation, the struggle for existence, and natural selection. He then takes up special difficulties such as instinct, hybridism, and the discontinuities and gaps among contemporary species and in the fossil record. In the concluding chapters of the book, however, Darwin turns his attention to the spatial distribution of species across different environments, their temporal distribution through geological succession (in the fossil records), the morphological similarities among related species, as well as the similarities among early stages of embryological developments across very diverse species. In other words, it was not just the fitness of morphological features that Darwin was seeking to explain. Rather, he was seeking to explain concrete past and present populations of individuals in their spatial distributions and their propagations through time. As historian of Darwin’s thought, Dov Ospovat has put it,

The principal task he set himself, one that he early recognized as essential to the success of his enterprise, was to bring his theory into harmony with the best-established facts of natural history: to show that it could explain all the most important phenomena studied by his contemporaries. His speculative activity, in consequence, was largely devoted to questions of geographical distribution, embryology, morphology, paleontology, and classification.

It is therefore regrettable that “survival of the fittest” has diverted attention from this much more substantial scientific achievement.

PART II: LONERGAN ON DARWINISM AND EVOLUTIONARY SCIENTIFIC EXPLANATION

G. Lonergan on Evolutionary Explanation and Populations

With this background in mind, we now consider Lonergan’s discussion of Darwinism and its contributions toward a genuinely scientific form of evolutionary explanation. Lonergan did of course esteem the

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50 See Origin, chaps. X to XIII.
51 Dov Ospovat, op. cit., 86.
considerable intellectual achievement of Darwin and his legacy. This is clearly reflected in his comment:

For in the first place, Darwinism proposes to explain. It offers to tell why species differ, why they are found in their observable spatiotemporal distributions, why the numbers in each species increase, or remain constant, or diminish even to the point of extinction. In the second place, the explanation presents an intelligibility immanent in the data, grounded in similarities and differences, in numbers and their rates of change, in distributions over the surface of the earth and through the epochs of geology.52

The correspondence between Lonergan’s assessment in Insight and Ospovat’s independent assessment thirty years later is striking. Equally striking is the parallel between the achievement of Darwinism and the claims Lonergan made for his own notion of emergent probability. He wrote:

Such is the general notion of emergent probability. It results from the combination of the conditioned series of schemes with their respective probabilities of emergence and survival. While by itself it is extremely jejune, it possesses rather remarkable potentialities of explanation...of spatial distribution, absolute numbers, long intervals of time, selection, stability, and development.53

More could be said regarding parallels between the approaches of Darwinism and Lonergan, but this will have to suffice for the present.

Before considering the significant points of departure between Lonergan and Darwinism, however, let us reflect for a moment on the sorts of questions that should be answered by an evolutionary scientific explanation, insofar as its major concern is explanation of populations.

In addition to being genuinely explanatory, an evolutionary scientific explanation of populations will also need to contend with questions such as: What kinds of populations are there? What kinds

52 Insight, 155.
53 Insight, 145.
of members compose the populations? How many members are in the population? Why are there this many, rather than more or less? Why are the populations where they are but not elsewhere? Why are they there at these times but not at other times? How do they emerge? How do members of the populations interact? How do the populations function? When they function as they do, what are the effects? Does evolution move toward greater complexity, and if so, why? What in fact is the proper explanatory definition of "greater complexity"?

Twentieth-century neo-Darwinian research has made impressive progress toward answering many of these questions, more than this article can even begin to summarize. In particular, the neo-Darwinian synthesis has made extensive use of statistical methods in answering many of these questions. For statistical methods characterize populations in terms of the actual and ideal frequencies (probabilities) of the kinds of members they comprise. Additionally, statistical methods calculate the probabilities of certain kinds of interactions under varying conditions, and they characterize the changes in the probabilities that will result from these various kinds of interactions.

Now Lonergan does go too far in praising Darwin's Origin as "the outstanding instance of the employment of probability as a principle of explanation."54 Darwin himself never invokes probabilities, and his attitude toward chance in evolutionary explanations was ambivalent at best.55 Perhaps Lonergan is referring to Darwin's repeated invocation of qualitative (descriptive) phrases like "greater chance" in the Origin. In the end, however, even this limited and qualitative use of chance in his explanatory account lost Darwin the approval of the philosopher of science whose judgment he most esteemed, John Herschel. According to Herschel, any true science must be able to predict deterministically, and he recognized that Darwin's theory of evolution could not meet that high standard. Nevertheless Darwin and many later Darwinian scientists remained committed to that misleading deterministic ideal of scientific explanation.56

While Darwin tentatively introduced the idea of chance into evolutionary scientific explanation, credit for explicitly and rigorously

54 Insight, 155.
55 See, for example, Origin, 1859, 173. See also Origin (6th ed. of 1872), 116-17.
56 Darwinism Evolving, 148-50.
employing *probabilities* in evolutionary explanations belongs rather to those who carried on the Darwinian legacy in the first half of the twentieth century, such as the Mendelians and the theoretical biometricians. Their work directly addressed the aforementioned questions. Questions about the kinds of species and their memberships are answered in part by means of probabilities. Statistical studies endeavor to establish the schedules of probabilities of their gene pools – that is to say, tables of genotypes along with their associated probabilities. Changes in species populations are reckoned in terms of changes in those tables of probabilities, as inferred from empirical studies of actual frequencies. The geographical and geological distributions of species populations are similarly established by means of statistical methods. While statistical methods do not exhaust the scope of evolutionary explanations, they do form essential parts of such explanations. In addition, by way of complementarity, statistical determinations sharpen the kinds of answers that must be found in response to "why species differ, why they are found in their observable spatiotemporal distributions, why the numbers in each species increase, or remain constant, or diminish even to the point of extinction."57

It is noteworthy that populations are characterized more by probabilities (ideal frequencies) than by exact numbers (actual frequencies). Biological populations are always in flux. Populations fluctuate as individuals with varying genetic structures are born and die, and they do so non-systematically rather than with precisely predictable rhythms. Similarly, individual organisms also enter and leave territories non-systematically. To demand exact predictions of exact numbers of individuals is not only practically impossible but without ultimate scientific importance. If actual frequencies were the defining features of populations and species, we would have a new species every time an individual organism was born, died, or migrated. Evolutionary science is concerned with the emergence, endurance, propagation, and extinction of species populations – which is to say, with the ideal frequencies around which concrete numbers of individual members fluctuate non-systematically. It is the shifts in ideal frequencies, not the non-systematically varying individual memberships, that are the objective of evolutionary scientific explanation.

57 *Insight*, 155.
Finally, but most importantly, genuinely scientific evolutionary explanations should be explanatory and not merely descriptive. We have already seen how biological science manifested significant shifts away from reliance on descriptive principles toward explanatory principles during the 150 years since the publication of the *Origin*. This is especially true of the movement toward defining species as populations in their explanatory relations to one another, and away from defining species via that form of essentialism which was no more than descriptive. Lonergan actually raises the bar still further, as to what is to be expected of genuinely explanatory evolutionary explanations, and this will be discussed in the following sections. The concluding section will take up Lonergan’s criticisms of Darwinism for its residual reliance on descriptive notions and its consequent vulnerability to counter-positional tensions.

**H. Lonergan on Evolutionary Explanation and Populations**

Beyond the compatibility of the theory of emergent probability with many aspects of Darwinism, Lonergan does offer important ideas that, as far as I can determine, stretch beyond the current horizons of neo-Darwinian evolutionary science. In particular, I believe that Lonergan’s most important contributions to this discussion are his account of emergence and the significance that he attaches to schemes of recurrence as the basic units of evolutionary explanation. The two, of course, are intrinsically related.

Emergence has been and remains a crucial issue in evolution. Morgan argued that natural selection in and of itself does not produce “anything new, but only more [or less] of certain kinds of individuals.”58 That is to say, natural selection shifts in frequencies within populations but does not produce any new genotypes or phenotypes. Without these novel genotypes, evolution in the sense of *origin* of species cannot happen. Although the work of the later founders of the neo-Darwinian synthesis eclipsed the arguments of Morgan and the Mendelian mutationists, in fact, these researches only removed the more obvious examples in support of the mutationists’ arguments. As Depew and Weber put it, Mayr’s population thinking and definition of species “ruled out the

58 *Critique*, 154.
macromutationist Mendelism of Bateson and de Vries” and Morgan.\textsuperscript{59} They showed that much more gradual gradation in phenotypes could be correlated with numerous combinations of punctual genotypes. They did not however refute a more “micromutationsist” version of Morgan’s point, namely: that without the emergence of something new, natural selection can only explain the rearrangement of probabilities in the gene pool. It cannot explain the emergence of new elements in the gene pool or the new patterns of individual and species interactions that result in reproductive isolation.

There remains, therefore, the problem of giving a scientific explanation for emergence. This was exactly the point of the Mendelian mutationists in their dispute with the biometricians. The demonstration that genetic changes can be small did not completely settle the issue in the gradualist biometricians’ favor after all.

Here Lonergan has something significant to offer. For him, the fundamental unit of emergence is the scheme of recurrence. Schemes are the primary instances of what emerge. In fact, he defines the emergence of both genera and species in terms of the emergence of schemes.\textsuperscript{60}

The emergence of schemes is to be explained by two interrelated factors: the combinations of classical correlations that constitute the intelligibility of the recurrence of the schemes and the non-systematic coincidence of the conditions requisite for the actual functioning of the recurrent pattern. For Lonergan, then, this particular manner of combining classical and statistical intelligibilities is what is demanded of evolutionary scientific explanations.\textsuperscript{61} This is his answer to the question posed by the title of this article.

First, then, schemes of recurrence are intelligibly recurring patterns of events. The pattern itself is constituted by some combination of the intelligible correlations found through classical methods. The events recur because each event in the pattern is connected with its predecessors and its successors by the classical correlations. For example, if A occurs, then B occurs because of correlation $R_{AB}$; if B

\textsuperscript{59} Darwinism Evolving, 300-301.
\textsuperscript{60} See Insight, 280-91. See also section J of this essay.
\textsuperscript{61} Strictly speaking, genetic methods and developmental intelligibilities must also be incorporated; see section J of this article.
occurs then C occurs because of correlation $R_{BC}$; if C occurs, then...A recurs because of correlation $R_{XA}$.$^{62}$ Hence, the regularity that we recognize as ubiquitous throughout the biological realm is constituted by the intelligibility of these rich and diverse combinations of classical correlations.

But in the second place, one of Lonergan's most acute observations is that classical correlations are intrinsically indeterminate: "classical laws hold in concrete instances only inasmuch as conditions are fulfilled."$^{63}$ Neither individual sequences (such as $A \rightarrow B$) nor the entirety of recurring schemes will happen of necessity: "Just as classical laws are subject to the proviso 'other things being equal,' so are the schemes constituted by combinations of classical laws; and whether or not other things will continue to be equal is a question that admits an answer only in terms of statistical laws."$^{64}$ Sequences of events, including schemes of recurrence, only take place insofar as their requisite conditions are fulfilled. In schemes of recurrence, the constituent recurring events themselves do constitute part of the conditions for each other: A is a condition for B, B for C, and so forth. But these recurring events comprise only a small portion of all the conditions requisite for the entire scheme. The vast majority of conditions for any recurring scheme are given by means wholly external to the scheme itself.

For example, the Calvin-Benson cycle is a scheme of recurrence involved in photosynthesis in plant cells. The cycle comprises six events, each of which is the condition for its successor. However, the cycle can only function when a host of many other conditions are also fulfilled, including complex structures and other cycles in the interiors of plant cells and sufficient quantities of both chlorophyll and sunlight. Once all the requisite conditions for the Calvin-Benson cycle are fulfilled, the cycle as a whole begins to function, and this is what is meant by the emergence of this cycle.

Thus, for Lonergan, emergence means primarily the emergence of schemes of recurrence. Schemes emerge whenever (a) classical correlations can be combined to make for the intelligible possibility of recurrence, (b) all the other conditions are previously fulfilled,

$^{62}$ *Insight*, 141.

$^{63}$ *Insight*, 117.

$^{64}$ *Insight*, 144.
and (c) any one of the events in the scheme actually does occur and thereby actually initiates the recurring pattern of events. However, ultimately both the prior conditions for the cycle, and the occurrence of the initiating event in the cycle, are fulfilled only non-systematically, although in accordance with probabilities. As Lonergan puts it, "classical laws determine what would happen if conditions were fulfilled, while statistical laws determine how often one may expect conditions to be fulfilled." Hence to give a scientific explanation of the emergence of schemes means to identify the classical correlations that make regular its pattern of events and to identify the probabilities of the assembly of conditions and the occurrence of the initiating events.

Still, scientific explanations concern only the probability of emergences. Science does not and cannot predict with certainty when and where each particular instance of a scheme will emerge. This is why evolutionary explanations are of populations, not of individuals.

While much more could be said about the emergence of particular schemes of recurrence, evolution as such has more to do with sequences of emergences rather than with individual instances of emergence. This is evident in Darwin's original remarks (prior to the misleading Spencerian influence) that his is a theory of "descent with modification through natural selection." Modification and descent alternate to produce sequences of ever more novel life forms that account for major divergences among species.

Lonergan also thinks about evolution as a long-term sequence of emergences, but he rounds out the Darwinian heuristic of evolutionary explanation by means of his focus on schemes of recurrence. He insists, "we are concerned, not with single schemes, but with a conditioned series of schemes." In his view, evolutionary explanation concerns the intelligible relationships among earlier and later schemes of recurrence that are markedly distinct from one another. Not only are schemes the basic units of emergence; newly emergent schemes themselves can and do fulfill conditions for the emergence of still later schemes. As he puts it:

there now comes to light the notion of an emergent probability.

For the actual functioning of earlier schemes in the series

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65 Insight, 134.
66 Insight, 142.
fulfills the conditions for the possibility of the functioning of later schemes. As such conditions are fulfilled, the probability of the combination of the component events in a scheme jumps.  

I. Lonergan on Survival and Natural Selection

Still, there is more to Lonergan’s heuristic notion of emergent probability than the probability of emergence. He continues:

When [the scheme] occurs, a probability of emergence is replaced by a probability of survival; and as long as the scheme survives, it is in its turn fulfilling conditions for the possibility of still later schemes in the series.

Once such schemes have emerged, evolutionary scientific explanations shift to a preoccupation with the probabilities of their survival and of the probabilities of the emergence of new schemes now made possible. Schemes continue to recur as long as those requisite conditions continue to be fulfilled and as long as non-destructive conditions do not occur. Or, as Lonergan puts it: “There also exists a probability for the survival of schemes that have begun to function... Accordingly, the probability of the survival of a scheme of recurrence is the probability of the nonoccurrence of any of the events that would disrupt the scheme.” In light of these remarks, Lonergan gives a more precise formulation of natural selection, a formulation that is far more explanatory than “survival of the fittest,” namely: “In a word, natural selection means survival in accord with the probabilities.”

It is not enough to tell “Just-So Stories” as Stephen Jay Gould called them. That is to say, it is not enough to make up likely scenarios about how certain especially curious anatomical features may have given one species advantages in the struggle to survive and produce fertile progeny. More than this is required of a genuinely scientific

67 Insight, 145.
68 Insight, 145.
69 Insight, 144.
70 Insight, 155.
explanation of the survival of the survivors. That something extra is an account of schemes of recurrence in terms of the classical correlations that constitute them, the conditions for their continued functioning, and statistical studies of the probabilities for the occurrences of supporting as well as disruptive conditions.

Thus for Lonergan, to give a scientific explanation of evolutionary phenomena means (a) to identify the classical correlations that make regular the pattern of events in various schemes of recurrence, (b) to identify the conditions for the emergences of those schemes, (c) to concentrate especially upon how certain earlier schemes and networks of schemes set the conditions for the emergence of later schemes, and (d) to use statistical methods in order to determine shifting the probabilities of emergence and survival of these schemes.

**J. Lonergan on Species and Populations**

So far we have seen how the neo-Darwinian synthesis came to approach evolutionary explanations in terms of populations, while Lonergan came to focus instead upon schemes of recurrence. But it is not at all obvious that an evolutionary science concerned with sequential transformations of populations is compatible with scientific explanation of a conditioned series of scheme of recurrence. How, then, is Lonergan’s account of the emergence of schemes of recurrence related to the neo-Darwinian focus on populations – if indeed it is related in any way at all?

Lonergan provides a clue in his perceptive remark:

Within such schemes the plant or animal is only a component. The whole schematic circle of events does not occur within the living thing, but goes beyond it into the environment, from which sustenance is won and into which offspring are born. No doubt, the higher the type, the greater the complexity and the greater the proportion of significant events that occur within the animal. But this greater complexity only means that the larger circle connects a series of lesser and incomplete circles. The vascular circulation occurs within the animal, but it depends upon the digestive system, which depends upon the animal's capacity to deal with its environment, and in turn
that capacity depends on the growth and nourishment secured by the vascular system.\textsuperscript{72}

In other words, individual organisms and indeed populations are not isolated entities. Properly they are to be understood as "only components" within grander schemes of recurrence. This means that organisms and biological populations are to be understood more concretely in terms of complex schemes of recurrence. Organisms are constantly interacting with one another – both intra-species and inter-species – and they do so overwhelmingly in recurrent schemes. These recurrent schemes function in accord with probabilities of emergence and survival.

Indeed, for Lonergan, not only individual organisms but also species (and genera) are also to be understood scientifically from the viewpoint of schemes of recurrence. Although his discussions of what it means to give an explanatory account of species are among the most difficult passages in all of \textit{Insight}, a few key points will help situate his approach in relation to that of the Darwinian tradition. Lonergan writes that an explanatory account of species recognizes that

The fundamental element in emergent probability is the conditioned series of things and schemes...[and that species] is an intelligible solution to a problem of living in a given environment, where the living is a higher systematization of a controlled aggregation of aggregates of aggregates, and the environment tends to be constituted more and more by other living things.\textsuperscript{73}

A "systematization" is a complex of mutually conditioning schemes of recurrence. The interior of any living cell comprises just such a complex of schemes. It is a higher systematization because it organizes chemical reactions into complex, recurring, biologically intelligible patterns. But the complex of schemes of recurrence does not end at the cell's membranes. In multi-cellular organisms, the schemes of recurrence internal to any given cell are also interrelated with external schemes in other component cells. The holistic schemes of the vascular,

\textsuperscript{72} \textit{Insight}, 156.

\textsuperscript{73} \textit{Insight}, 290; see also 479 and 463-67.
endocrinal, nervous, and other organic systems serve to communicate and interrelate the separate, internal cellular functionings to one another throughout the whole multi-cellular organism. The schemes internal to any given cell depend upon the schemes in other cells, through the mediation of the larger holistic systems. Furthermore, each particular organism is "only a component" in the still larger schemes that go "beyond it into the environment." This means that an explanatory species (= the higher systematization) is grander than the schemes of individual organisms. Species systematizations include but are not limited to the schemes of recurrence internal to individual organisms – even if "the greater the proportion of significant events occur within" the organisms. These more complex internal schemes still depend upon a "larger circle connects a series of lesser and incomplete circles." A species, therefore, is an intelligibly distinct life form, which is characterized by an intelligibly distinctive "higher systematization [species] of a controlled aggregation [particular organisms] of aggregates [cells] of aggregates [internal schemes of recurrence] of aggregates [biochemical reactions]."  

In short, for Lonergan a species is a complex of mutually conditioning schemes of recurrence. A species is not merely some abstract concept or set into which individuals are collected, like marbles into a bag. A species is decidedly not "a general prototype onto which individuals are 'moulded' in variations," as Mayr has characterized the pre-Darwinian concept of species. Lonergan would characterize this as a merely descriptive, "impoverished replica" concept of species, arrived at by abstracting from descriptive variations. A species as a "general prototype" is the residue of sensible, descriptive characteristics that are left over after all the variant descriptive characteristics have been abstracted. Mayr labels this approach to species definition with the pejorative, "essentialism." But it is more accurate to call it descriptive essentialism, for there may well be a more sophisticated explanatory essentialism akin to Lonergan's approach.

Be that as it may, for Lonergan, an explanatory species is not to be reached by abstracting descriptive qualities. An explanatory species is a concrete though very complex scheme of schemes of recurrence, which

74 *Insight*, 156.
75 *Insight*, 111.
incorporates and interrelates a vast number of individual organisms and their internal schemes of recurrence.

This also means that a species so defined is a population. This may not be obvious because we tend to think of populations as mere collections of individuals in a spatial territory during some period of time. Statistical methods are devoted to analyzing populations conceived of in this way. But while Lonergan's explanatory account of species does include statistical analyses, it also goes beyond a merely statistical conception of populations. Lonergan's conception of species adds the concrete and complex schemes of recurrence that constitute the interactions among the members of the species (as well as among the "other living things" which constitute the species' environments). Because his definition is intended to be concrete, it also includes specific environmental territories and periods of time. As Lonergan remarks, a species is "an intelligible solution to a problem of living in a given environment," and given environments always exist at particular places and times.

Defining species in terms of complexes of schemes of recurrence, therefore, is certainly compatible with Mayr's modern biological concept of species. But Lonergan fills out with greater specificity Mayr's very general heuristic definition.

Among other things, Lonergan's insistence on defining species by means of schemes of recurrence includes the fact that plants and animals are always concretely situated within reproductive cycles. Species reproduction is a complex, interrelated set of schemes of recurrence among members of the species. Concretely, organisms emerge as individuals out of those cycles. They participate in those cycles, even when they are unsuccessful in their attempts to reproduce. Less obviously, species reproduction also involves schemes in relation to other organisms with whom they avoid mating. However, this emphasis on reproductive schemes is only implicit in Lonergan's account, just as the emphasis on schemes of recurrence is only implicit in Mayr's definition of species. The two approaches therefore complement each other in important ways.

Mayr's definition of species also adds, "occupies a niche in nature." This is at best a sketchy heuristic on his part, for he devotes little attention to it. Lonergan fills out that heuristic in terms of the
conditions for emergence and survival of schemes of recurrence. The schemes that constitute the living of individual plants, animals, or of whole species do not occur in isolation. The schemes internal to any given species function within an external environment of complex, dynamic relations of conditioning and being conditioned by other individual organisms and indeed whole species, as well as pre-biotic cycles that constitute the ecosystem. It is the ecosystem that Lonergan has in mind when he speaks of "the larger circle [that] connects a series of lesser and incomplete circles." Lonergan is implying that the reproductive schemes that Mayr uses to define a species population are made possible by the schemes of other organisms (as food sources, as competitors, and as predators) as well as non-organic schemes (such as water cycles). These cycles also happen in accord with probabilities. As Alasdair Maclntyre has pointed out, we are all dependent animals — dependent upon the circle of schemes that constitute our environment.

Thus, Lonergan's account of explanatory species is compatible with and complementary to the modern biological definition of species. That definition adds greater specificity to Lonergan's heuristic by focusing attention on the centrality of reproductive schemes of recurrence. In turn, Lonergan adds greater specificity by focusing attention on schemes of recurrence. But he also raises the ante for scientific explanations by speaking of a species as a higher systematization that is a solution to a concrete problem of living. In doing so, he extends the explanatory domain of biological evolution into the vast realm of the underlying biochemical reactions that form its materials. Of course, the biochemical pathways of molecular synthesis, RNA, DNA, and their evolutionary transformations are far from strangers to neo-Darwinian scientists. But Lonergan's way of defining species runs counter to the reductionistic tendencies in neo-Darwinism that would eliminate the generically distinct level of biological functioning in favor of chemical functioning alone. Lonergan points to chemical reactions as posing problems for living, because of his account of explanatory genera. As Lonergan understands the hierarchy of explanatory science, each one comprises a logically distinct set of classical laws (correlations). These correlations make intelligible the regularities that cannot be accounted

76 Alasdair Maclntyre, Dependent Rational Animals (Chicago: Open Court, 1999).
77 Insight, 290.
for solely by the laws of the lower genera. Thus biological solutions bring about regular patterns of recurrence that the laws of chemistry alone cannot make regular. In that sense, sets of chemical reactions provide the potentialities and the problems that biological integrations can exploit and solve.

When he characterizes biological species in this fashion, Lonergan is explicitly relying upon an isomorphism with human intelligence: "later species are solutions to concrete problems in concrete circumstances [and] a solution is the sort of thing that insight hits upon." In other words, theoretical systematists in biology should seek insights into the possible ways that biological correlations can be combined into life forms, under the conditions determined by various chemical materials. Then, according to the isomorphism, just as the insights of the taxonomists arise out of the chemical data, so also the real, biological integrations emerge to systematize the real chemical events. Species then are the various but distinctive kinds of emergent systematizations in accord with biological correlations.

There are profound implications from all this when we consider the phenomenon of genetic mutations. If a new gene arises within an organism, it is the A'that occurs to inaugurate a new scheme within the individual animal. The occurrence of that new gene happens within a vast set of prior conditions provided by the complex, mutually interdependent schemes that make up the internal functioning of the organism. The occurrence of the new gene could prove lethal, neutral, or innovative, depending upon the context of prior schemes. If it is innovative, the occurrence of the new gene inaugurates new schemes of recurrence. These new schemes in turn set the conditions for accommodations by other new or readjusted schemes, first within

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78 *Insight*, 280-83.
79 *Insight*, 290.
80 Clearly, systematics in biology is quite different from what Lonergan means by the functional specialty of systematics in theological method. What Lonergan seems to have in mind is the ways that mathematicians explore the various solutions to highly generic differential equations. They labor to discover highly specific solutions that correspond to very specific sets of conditions. For a detailed discussion of the history of systematics in biology, see *Growth*, 147-297.
81 A critical discussion of Lonergan's "theorem" of the isomorphism between human knowing and proportionate being, and its application to the species problem in biology, is beyond the limits of this article.
and then outside of the individual organism, whether in small ways or in large. Eventually a new ecosystem (larger circle) will emerge, even if only minutely different from it predecessor.

But the evolutionarily significant shifts take place when the new gene leads to reproductive isolation. Then the series of emergent schemes dramatically shift the probabilities of emergence and survival not only of the new species but also of the conditioning and competitive species. In the older, somewhat descriptive language of Darwinism, “selective pressures” of competition for resources “force” divergence of the new species from its parental species. In Lonergan’s more explanatory terminology, the new schemes in the new organism shift probabilities of emergence and survival for other environmental schemes. The larger ecosystem gradually shifts in more dramatic ways. Thus, for Lonergan, the basic unit of evolution is neither the gene nor the individual organism, nor even the species population as Mayr holds. Rather, the basic unit of evolution is the ecosystem – the larger circle that connects a series of lesser and incomplete circles.

Hence to give a scientific explanation of the emergence of schemes means to identify the classical correlations that make regular the pattern of events, and to identify the shifting and emerging sequences of probabilities for the assembly of conditions and the occurrence of the initiating events. Therefore scientific explanations speak only of the probability of emergences and survival of schemes. Science does not and cannot predict with certainty when and where each particular instance of a scheme will emerge. This once again is why evolutionary explanations are of populations, not of individuals.

When Lonergan illustrates what he means by the conditioned series of schemes, he only briefly alludes to the ways that chemical schemes condition the emergence of cycles of plant life, which condition the cycles of herbivorous animal life, which in turn condition the cycles of carnivores. This makes it sound as though the conditioning schemes are exclusively external to organisms – when the proper environmental conditioning schemes are functioning, then new species will emerge. But in fact, the process is more complex. While the environmental schemes are crucial and indispensable, the mechanisms for the emergence of series of new species depend overwhelmingly upon the schemes internal to already functioning organisms. It is the prior schemes internal to
the organism that set the conditions for the emergence of new internal schemes that arise through the instigation of a new gene.

Moreover, new genes give rise to not one but a cascade of new schemes as zygotes develop and differentiate into blastulae, embryos, and eventually mature organisms. Although Lonergan does not go into the details, it is for this reason that he speaks of the further complexification of emergent probability that comes through adding genetic method and its analyses of developments. With this addition, evolutionary explanation becomes concerned not only with the emergence of new kinds of schemes, but with new kinds of developments (e.g., new embryological pathways resulting from new genes) and how these are conditioned, and in turn, set the conditions for the emergence of further new developments. These considerations transform emergent probability into generalized emergent probability. It would require a much longer paper to incorporate these aspects. However, since Darwin explicitly saw his theory as explaining relations among embryological stages of different species, these aspects will eventually have to be addressed as well.

Last but far from least, Lonergan's definition of species is intrinsically evolutionary. He situates species within the conditioned series of schemes of recurrence. As he puts it, “later species are solutions to concrete problems in concrete circumstances, though they are solutions that take into account and, as it were, rise upon previous solutions.”

The complexes of schemes of recurrence that constitute later species emerge when the prior conditions are given. The given environments are overwhelmingly composed of other species of living organisms, themselves “solutions” in the line of evolutionary process constituted by emergent probability. Hence, to fully comprehend a species in an explanatory scientific fashion means to understand it as (a) a complex of schemes of recurrence in which reproductive schemes are central, (b) which is related to its current environment by probabilities of survival, and (c) related to earlier the species by the intelligibility of emergent probability. Explanatory species are, therefore, intrinsically evolutionary.

82 *Insight*, 487.

83 *Insight*, 290.
K. Lonergan on the Counter-Position in Darwinism

The foregoing sections have endeavored to show how Lonergan’s account of evolutionary scientific explanations is in many ways compatible with Darwinism. If anything, Lonergan could be thought of as exhorting the tradition of Darwinism to become even more explanatory than it succeeded in doing during the twentieth century. It is against this background that we can understand the one major criticism that Lonergan does level against Darwin himself.

After a lengthy and largely sympathetic comparison of his notion of emergent probability with Darwinism, Lonergan says almost surprisingly, "Just as mechanist determinism has involved an extrascientific worldview, so also has Darwinism." Lonergan traces this extrascientific assumption to the divergence between his own concentration on schemes of recurrence versus the Darwinian concentration on "things" as "potential components" in schemes of descent and the struggle for existence. Lonergan’s point in this remark is that Darwinism has not cleanly distinguished between "body" and "thing." Lonergan regards the failure to become clear about this distinction as the root of a stubborn dialectic in all human thought, including in philosophy and science. In the particular case of evolution, this dialectic plays itself out in the "quite different implications" that result "from the gradual accumulation of small variations that is associated with the name of Darwin," as opposed to the implications that follow from Lonergan’s own version of evolution – namely emergent probability.

Lonergan keenly recognizes that Darwin’s commitment to gradualism is rooted in his concern with small, descriptive, sensible variations. Just as Mayr identified the problem of applying "the criterion of "degree of difference," Lonergan also recognized this problem of characterizing species in a predominantly descriptive fashion. Yet Darwin’s commitment to descriptive characterizations was far from incidental. Because organisms were assumed to be highly if not perfectly adapted to their present environments, Darwin thought

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84 *Insight*, 157.
85 See, for example, *Insight*, 293, 396.
86 *Insight*, 290. The importance of gradualism to Darwin’s theory was discussed in section C of this article.
87 *Growth*, 271.
that evolution of new species had to proceed in an extremely minute and gradual fashion. In support of this part of his argument, Darwin provided his famous diagram, which depicts species arrayed along a horizontal axis.88 In the diagram, variations of certain species are displayed as gradual movements right and left as species propagate along the vertical time axis: "thus the diagram illustrates the steps by which the small differences distinguishing varieties are increased into the larger differences distinguishing species."89 As these variations spread out horizontally, they encroach upon the places in the diagram representing the progeny of other species. Darwin's diagram is meant to represent the ways in which variant species encroach upon and eventually take over the niches of the other species.

Implicitly Darwin's diagram characterizes the distinct species in terms of some set of characteristics that can be arranged along a horizontal spectrum. As Darwin's text makes clear, characteristics such as gradations of color or size of body parts are the principal illustrations. In Lonergan's view, these are merely descriptive characteristics. He refers to these descriptive characteristics as "some aggregation of sensible qualities" and as "accumulated observable differences."90 He criticizes them for their lack of explanatory relevance. In their place he calls for "the intelligibility of species" – that is, for intelligible schemes of recurrence that are higher systematizations providing solutions to the problem of living in concrete situations.

Lonergan's explicit criticism ends there. He does not continue his discussion to demonstrate how this residual reliance upon sensible, descriptive characteristics leads Darwinism into extra-scientific assumptions. Nor does he explicitly show how his crucial clarification of the distinction between "body" and "thing" "necessitates a still more significant departure from the unconscious philosophic assumptions

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89 *Origin*, 164. Darwin's diagram and his meticulous discussions of it (159-69) form the heart and the persuasive power of his argument regarding the origin of species. However, the diagram and discussion implicitly rely upon the possibility of arraying species along some spectrum of descriptive observable properties. This is the point of vulnerability, not only to the criticisms of Mayr and others, but those of Lonergan as well. See below.

90 *Insight*, 209, emphasis added.
of nineteenth-century science” that are found in Darwinism. But it is not too difficult to make explicit what Lonergan left implicit.

Crucial to the distinction between body and thing is an attitude, orientation, and disposition regarding what is to be taken as real. To a body-oriented mind-set, the criterion of reality is observability, because the observable is already-out-there-now. By way of contrast, for the mind-set of intellectual conversion the criterion of reality is the verified intelligibility of correct understanding. While a “body” is an object of perception for biologically extroverted animals, a “thing” (in Lonergan’s technical sense) is an intelligible unity. For the body-oriented mind-set, intelligibilities are nowhere to be seen and certainly not “already out there now.” This is even more emphatically the case for the abstruse intelligibilities of explanatory understanding. As Lonergan puts it, “a thing itself, stands within a pattern of intelligible relations and offers no foothold for imagination.” Again, by way of contrast, intellectual conversion regards observable data not as the prime analogate of reality in itself, but merely as mediators and auxiliaries along the way in arriving at knowledge of intelligible realities. Observables as such simply present challenges for intelligence and reasonableness. Data simply set problems for understanding and judging. Data provide no direct or immediate access to reality. Only with the addition of explanatory understanding and unconditional judgment to observable data does one attain scientific knowledge of realities.

What Lonergan leaves implicit is that Darwinism must break completely from Darwin’s original reliance on descriptive residues in offering evolutionary explanations. The greater that reliance, the more unreal (and therefore the less scientific) will seem the pure intelligibilities of schemes of recurrence, of emergence, and of probabilities (as “merely” ideal frequencies).

It seems that Lonergan intended to extend his criticism of nineteenth-century mechanist determinism to cover the uncritical extra-scientific opinions of Darwinians as well:

91 Insight, 157.
92 Insight, 278-79.
93 Insight, 275.
Mechanist determinism is bound to conceive all things as of a single kind. For mechanism posits things as instances of the "already out there now real"; determinism makes every event completely determined by laws of the classical type; and the combination of the two views leaves no room for a succession of ever higher systems, for mechanism would require the higher component to be a 'body,' and determinism would exclude the possibility of the higher component modifying lower activities.  

Depew and Weber carefully document how Darwin, despite himself, modeled his work on the Newtonian ideal of science then current in his day (especially as articulated by Hershel), replete with its extrascientific commitments to uniformitarianism and determinism. Many of Darwin's avid followers have enthusiastically embraced natural selection precisely because they regard it as a totalizing principle that is capable of completely explaining everything about everything - the "the materialistic penumbra that surrounded this idea" of evolution. Certainly for many Darwinians it is this illusion of total explanation that has been the most alluring feature of natural selection. Again, although Lonergan leaves the connection implicit, we might say that natural selection was regarded as the "law" that completely determines everything, while small, descriptive, sensible variations are the equivalents in evolution to the "bodies" of mechanism. They are the objects upon which the law of natural selection acts in a completely deterministic way. Just as in mechanist determinism, fixation on small, sensible variations results in an "oversight of insight." That is to say, Darwin introduces a host of assumptions (overlooked insights) in the ways that he handles these sensible variations in his exposition, and those assumptions bestow upon natural selection greater explanatory promise than it truly merits.

No doubt this totalizing tendency has been responsible for much of the antagonism between Darwinism and theistic religion and its notions of creation. But for Lonergan the basic tension is not between

95 Insight, 280.
96 Darwinism Evolving, 113-39, 147-56. Depew and Weber themselves further argue that this ideal is a poor fit for a proper evolutionary science.
97 Darwinism Evolving, 222.
98 Insight, 70.
religion and evolutionary scientific explanations. The basic tension is between extra-scientific and extra-religious assumptions grounded in a "metaphysics of presence"—that is, the illusory reality of the descriptive, observable "already out there now." In such a worldview, already-out-there-now bodies are all there is to reality, and the "laws" of science tell us about the forces that dictate all of the movements and changes of such bodies. This is the essence of nineteenth-century totalization, whether such bodies are determined by physical or chemical forces, or by natural selection.

In such a totalizing worldview, realities will be bodies made up entirely of their observable, descriptive characteristics. Schemes of recurrence and the normativity of probabilities will be regarded as mere add-ons or idealistic projections that contribute nothing essential to those real bodies. These real "out there" bodies will be subject to real forces of impact. The natural, biological, really real forces will be the harsh struggles for survival. As Richard Dawkins put it, "I think 'nature red in tooth and claw' sums up our modern understanding of natural selection admirably." Force, struggle and violence will be regarded as the realities that govern bodies completely characterized by their descriptive, observable characteristics.

This extra-scientific counter-position gives the illusion of a completely self-contained, self-explanatory world. Taken to its extremes, not only is the ineliminable connectedness with transcendent mystery severed, but even the non-material reality of life is regarded as unreal, and any claims about its distinctness are regarded as naive. In the end, only force-governed recombinations of atomic or subatomic particles (i.e., imaginable "bodies") are real. The vital reality of life, and the ultimate mystery of the origin of the natural universe, evaporate. Taken to its extremes, the counter-position "penumbra" surrounding the actual achievement leaves us in a cold and lonely world, as Dawkins among others see it. Best to abandon the childishness of religious faith (for there is no notion of a distinction between childish vs. mature, self-appropriated religious faith). One must be heroic and face the cold, harsh, brutal facts.

Of course, this is a worldview that can give no reasons for being heroic in this way. If one acts heroically, that, too, is of no credit to the hero. Heroic acts are also just the result of force-governed movements of particles. People accepting the brutal facts are not really heroic; they are merely automorons, behaving just as religious people do according to the determinations of the forces of physics, chemistry, and natural selection.

By way of contrast, explanations in terms of intelligible conditioning, schemes of recurrence, emergence, and probabilities will be regarded as unreal, and will be marginalized in evolutionary discussions dominated by the counter-positions about reality. It is perhaps not too great a leap to suggest that "survival of the fittest" finds a more comfortable place within the context of a mind-set concerned with bodies and observable properties, than it does in an intellectually converted context concerned with non-imagineable, intelligible reality of generalized emergent probability. For Lonergan's is a context in which the emergence and wonder of radial novelty is really real. It is a naturalistic worldview that does not succumb to the excesses of self-contained naturalism. It is a context of radical conditionality in which natural selection itself does not hold the ultimate answer to "the mystery of mysteries" as Darwin called the origin of species. For natural selection (properly understood) is itself also conditioned, demanding an intelligent explanation which, for Lonergan, is to be found not within the immanent order of this universe, but in the unrestricted act of understanding that transcends the natural order.\(^{100}\)

Based on Lonergan's approach to evolution, then, we may conclude that first and foremost, evolutionary scientific explanations should be explanatory and not descriptive. In particular genuinely scientific evolutionary explanations should eschew all residual reliance upon extra-scientific cover stories rooted in the already-out-there-now notion of reality. The first part of this article narrated the impressive strides Darwinism took away from reliance on descriptive notions and toward explanatory principles during the 150 years since the publication of the \textit{Origin}. This is especially true of the movement toward defining species as populations in their explanatory relations to one another, and away from defining species via a form of essentialism that was in
fact no more than descriptive. The second part shows how Lonergan's ideas about evolution compare with the advances in Darwinian scientific explanations. It shows how Lonergan's ideas can be adapted to accommodate these advances. It also shows how Lonergan actually raises the bar still further as to what is to be expected of genuinely explanatory evolutionary explanations. In this article I have endeavored to show how Lonergan's reflections on Darwin and his legacy cast important light on the developments in Darwinism. I have also endeavored to show how his reflections also can continue to challenge Darwinism toward even further explanatory advances.

101 Depew and Weber also point to other forms of challenges that Darwinism has confronted and has yet to confront even after the achievement of the neo-Darwinian synthesis. See *Darwinism Evolving*, 393-495. Exploring the relationships among these issues and Lonergan's generalized emergent probability is a still further task.
TWO LUNGS OR
TWO DIVERGING ROADS?
METHODOLOGICAL
CHALLENGES TO UNION
BETWEEN THE
EASTERN ORTHODOX
AND CATHOLIC CHURCHES

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I WOULD LIKE to consider today what I believe to be the greatest challenge to unity between what Pope John Paul II called the "two lungs of the Church": the East and West, or Catholic and Eastern Orthodox Churches. While there has been a standing committee to discuss theological differences between the two churches, and there appeared to be a genuine desire from the Holy See during the last pontificate to address problematic issues such as papal infallibility, it is my opinion that ecumenical relations will continue to end in an impasse until one fundamental question receives serious theological attention. This question concerns theological method, for in my experience dialoging with Orthodox theologians, priests, and lay persons, it is the question to which the Orthodox Church returns again and again with fundamental opposition to the Catholic Church. As one Orthodox monastic said to me in Greece, even if the Pope were to rescind the "new" doctrines such as papal infallibility, the Immaculate Conception or even the filioque,

1 For example, the North American Orthodox-Catholic Theological Consultation, sponsored jointly on the Catholic side by the United States Conference of Catholic Bishops and the Canadian Conference of Catholic Bishops. The Orthodox side is sponsored by the Standing Conference of Canonical Orthodox Bishops of America (SCOBA). They have been meeting semi-annually since 1965. For an example of John Paul II's openness to "rethinking" the question of the role of the papacy, see Ut Unum Sint n. 95-96.
this wouldn’t lead to union. In his opinion, the Orthodox and Catholic churches are estranged on a much deeper level than the doctrinal. He certainly would not agree with John Paul’s analogy of the two lungs. Rather, he felt—and I think it is fair to say that his thought is echoed by many working Orthodox theologians today— that the two churches are existentially different as a result of their different approaches to theology. They aren’t two lungs in the same body; they are inhabiting different bodies altogether. Even one of the more ecumenically open Orthodox theologians, Dmitru Staniloae, characterized the two different theologies as “leading along two different paths.”

Hence, we will first attempt to present as best we can some of the central concerns of Orthodox theology. We will see Orthodoxy’s emphasis upon the role of experience and its self-definition almost solely in terms of the apophatic tradition. The emphasis upon these two points has led to a resistance to the notion of “system” or the “systematic” in theology. Such a resistance is born out of the concern to protect the mystery of God, as well as the effects of the “knowledge of God” upon the human person: the doctrine of theosis or deification. Theology is primarily an exegetical and confessional exercise, born from an experience of the person of Christ and undertaken only to move closer to Him. It must be grounded in the history of the faith and the tradition of the fathers of the Church.

As a result of these concerns, certain models of Catholic theology are seen as deviations from the way in which theology was practiced by the fathers and are therefore considered inauthentic models of theology. In fact, some Orthodox thinkers conclude that all of the deviant ills of philosophical modernity can be traced back continuously to Scholasticism, and the end of the era of the fathers. Orthodox thinkers believe that one of the principal offenders who derailed patristic method was Thomas Aquinas. This reaction to Thomas in Orthodox theology is

2 One of the most vocal and well-known Orthodox theologians who represents this view is Christos Yannaras. He is clear that the differences between the Catholic and Orthodox Churches are not simply differences in doctrine, but in their divergent ways of doing theology. See Christos Yannaras, Elements of Faith: An Introduction to Orthodox Theology, trans. Keith Schram (Edinburgh: T&T Clark, 1991), 154ff.

almost universally accepted: his rationalism and scientific method are quite clearly antithetical to the "mind of the fathers" and therefore to Orthodox theology.

My thesis is that Lonergan's transcendental method can be of help in this "existential impasse." Throughout his work, he addresses many of the central concerns and critiques which Orthodox theology levels against Western rationalism. As we will see, his rejection of Cartesianism and the autonomy of the subject does not also entail a rejection of the systematic or scientific in theological method. Our hope is that if we are able to make some headway on basic questions of method in general, and method in theology in particular, perhaps genuinely theological questions such as those surrounding the *filioque* will become more clear.

**PART I: ORTHODOX THEOLOGY**

1. *The Importance of Experience*

The first tenet we will consider in Orthodox theology's understanding of itself is the importance of experience. Christos Yannaras considers different methods of theology in *Elements of Faith* and concludes that only one has an authentic starting point: the approach which privileges the human relationship to God, instigated in the history of the Hebrew people. He tells us that "the knowledge of God which arose from Abraham's personal encounter with Him has nothing to do with theoretical assumptions, reductive syllogisms and logical proofs. It was an experience of relationship." This experience is not a broad and undefined encounter with an oceanic deity. Instead, it is with a named God, Yahweh, in the context of the community of the Hebrew people. He will insist that the experience of contemporary Christians is always mediated by the particular history of a particular people. The God of Christians is always the God of Abraham, Isaac, and Jacob; the God who became man in Jesus Christ.

This historical experience of the relationship between God and man is in direct contrast to two other methods of theology which Yannaras rejects: one, an anthropocentric religious tendency which

\[4 \text{ Yannaras, Elements of Faith, 8.}\]
could be characterized as myth; the other, a “natural” or “philosophical” theology based on logic and conceiving of God as “first mover.” The preferred method of theology, validated by Holy Scripture, begins with the Israelites and unfolds in the New Covenant through an encounter with Jesus Christ.

The Incarnation makes possible an ecclesial dimension to the Christian encounter. The God who appeared to Moses is the Father of Jesus Christ, the one who sends His Spirit to gather together individuals into one body. Yannaras insists that in this gathering, “we draw near to God by means of a way of life, not by means of a way of thinking.” This way of life is that of the ecclesia and not, as is supposed by modernity, that of the individual. It is a life lived with “brothers – just like brothers who draw their existence from the same womb – they are members of an organic, living body.”

At the heart of this ecclesial life is the sacrament that confirms such an organic unity, and this is how Yannaras understands the Church. For him, the Church is above all a gathering in the Eucharistic meal. The experience of the Christian is always conditioned by liturgy, sacrament, and primarily, Eucharist. This experience of Eucharist has the specific character of transfiguring human nature: “the existential change which is completed by the descent of the Holy Spirit in the Eucharist....transfigures the mode of life; changing the existence both of individuals and of things in the Eucharistic communion with God into a participation in the triadic fullness of life.”

This participation in Divine life is understood by Orthodox theology in terms of the doctrine of deification. It is this reality which Orthodox theologians are concerned to protect and nurture, and it is the possibility of this union which leads Yannaras to conclude that “theological knowledge is not an intellectual discipline but an experiential participation, a communion.”

Such a strong privileging of experience is not without clarification in Yannaras’s thought: “The priority of empirical participation in

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5 Yannaras, Elements of Faith, 14.
6 Yannaras, Elements of Faith, 121.
7 He will even say that “the Church is a meal” (Yannaras, Elements of Faith, 124).
8 Yannaras, Elements of Faith, 129.
relation to the intellectual approach to ecclesial truth means neither a cloudy mysticism and refuge in emotional exaltation, nor to overlook and devalue logical thought." However, he does not specify this "value" of logical thought, nor its place in the ecclesial relationship that he emphasizes. For this reason, the scheme arises in which the theology of the Orthodox Church is an irrational mystagogy of experiential encounter with God, whereas the Catholic Church values philosophical argument and reasoned discourse or propositional truth, at the expense of this encounter.

Not only Yannaras, but also Vladimir Lossky, was concerned to maintain the priority of experience within theology. His critique of Origen as one who attempted to bring "Hellenism" into the church encapsulates what is to be privileged and what is to be rejected in theology. So he will say:

This conception [of philosophy] coming from the outside has its origin in human nature, in modes of thought proper to men — "to the Greeks and to the Jews." This is not the tradition in which God reveals Himself and speaks to the Church. It is for this reason that the Church has had to fight against "origenism" as she has always fought against doctrines which, in striking at the divine incomprehensibility, replaced the experience of the unfathomable depths of God by philosophical concepts.

Lossky has a particular caricature in mind when he takes aim at the "modes of thought proper to men." His concern is to safeguard God's incomprehensibility, which he feels Scholastic thought limits by its definitions and syllogisms.

2. Theology as Confessional and Exegetical

If the experience of the Christian is the basis and starting point of theology, this leads to a radical reorientation of theology as a discipline. As John Behr puts it, theology is not "talking about God" at all but rather "affirming the divinity of the crucified and exalted Lord, Jesus

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One could say that the initial experience of the Christian leads to an affirmation that involves the entire being of the person. This affirmation can take many forms, and in fact, Behr would see no difference in the theology embodied by the act of a martyr's public witness and the theology of a written treatise by Gregory of Nazianzen. Both are “theology” for him:

The discourse of theology is not only exegetical and confessional, but a living and active word. It does not merely report what happened in the past, nor pretend to describe, objectively and in an uninvolved manner, a God who is “out there” and his dealings with creation. It is nothing less than a proclamation of the Word of God to this world, allowing it to be at work through us here and now. Such theology is too important to be left to the “theologians” in the modern sense of that term. It is the calling of everyone who would respond to Christ, who would be a Christian, who would allow the transcendent power of God to be at work in them and through them, transforming them and the world in which they live, by “speaking” this divine discourse.

From this we see Behr's critique of the notion that God is “out there” or that He can be known by “taking a look.” We also see his conflation of any differentiation of tasks in theology. His touchstone is the famous statement of Evagrius: “if you are a theologian you will pray truly and if you pray truly you are a theologian.” Now while it may be true that the faithful in the church pews believe in Christ in a way that doubtless far surpasses the faith of academic theologians, can it be said that the two are both doing theology? Yes, if you understand theology as Behr does, as primarily evangelical or proclamatory.

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12 “What are we doing, talking about God?,” in Thinking Through Faith: New Perspectives from Orthodox Christian Scholars, Aristotle Papanikolaou and Elizabeth H. Prodromou, eds. (Crestwood, NY: St Vladimir’s Seminary Press, 2008), 70.

13 Papanikolaou and Prodromou, Thinking Through Faith, 85-86.

14 The question of the proper starting point, the “first principles” of theology, is one to which those engaged in its discipline must continually return; however, their continual temptation is to do otherwise. Without being firmly grounded on its proper foundation, the vast body of reflection developed in theology risks collapsing into dust. It is not simply that the first principles are elementary stages, to be transcended by higher realms of
3. Apophaticism

The emphasis which Orthodox theologians place upon experience leads them to define apophaticism as the only true theological method. Lossky's use of Gregory of Nyssa leads him to the following conclusions about theology:

the only rational notion of God will be his incomprehensibility. Consequently, theology must be not so much a quest of positive notions about the divine being as an experience which surpasses all understanding. Apophaticism...is, above all, an attitude of mind which refuses to form concepts about God. Such an attitude utterly excludes all abstract and purely intellectual theology which would adapt the mysteries of the wisdom of God to human ways of thought...there is no theology apart from experience; it is necessary to change, to become a new man. To know God, one must draw near to him. No one who does not follow the path of union with God can be a theologian. The way to the knowledge of God is necessarily the way of deification...in this sense, all true theology is fundamentally apophatic.\(^{15}\)

Lossky is correct that any theology which ignores the crucial dimension of human experience is truncated and will certainly devolve in the way he conceives of it; as a sterile and rationalist system which is devoid from the red-blooded life of the Church and its divinizing mission. He quickly equates cataphasis with such rationalism. He is unsatisfied with Aquinas's account of theology, for he feels that the way in which

more elevated reflection, but that they provide the necessary perspective within which the more abstract discussion takes place and is to be understood. The proper order, the taxis, of theology must be maintained if it is to retain its proper coherence...Christian theology developed first and foremost as faith in the lordship and divinity of the crucified and exalted Christ, as proclaimed by the apostles according to the Scriptures. The Passion of Christ stands as the definitive moment in the revelation of God, the eschatological apocalypse which unlocks the Scriptures, and so enables Christians, retrospectively, to view the work of God from the beginning and, prospectively, by the continued contemplation of the exalted Christ who is still the coming one, to participate in this work, embodying or incarnating the presence of God in this world through their own witness or martyria.\(^{7}\) (John Behr, The Nicene Faith, Part One: True God of True God (Crestwood, NY: St Vladimir's Seminary Press, 2004), 1-2.

Thomas sees apophatic and cataphatic theology complementing each other in fact makes the apophatic approach merely a “corrective” to the positive approach to God. This does not give enough weight to the opinion of Dionysius, who he sees as clearly preferencing the apophatic. Lossky wants to make apophaticism synonymous with the Eastern church and also with patristic method.

This sentiment is echoed by Yannaras, who writes that Greek Orthodox theological thought is defined in particular by the apophatic interpretation of truth... so long as you do not “know” what apophaticism is and mistake it for a method. For apophaticism consists primarily of a stance against knowledge and the verification of knowledge. It is the denial of “conceptual idols,” denial of the psychological props of egocentric assurance and the sentimental protection offered by conceptual certainties.

4. Resistance to System, Science, Method

This quote brings to light our next point, which, paired with the themes of experience and apophaticism as characteristic of Orthodox theology, is the corresponding rejection of the notion of the systematic, scientific or methodological in theology.

Hence, Andrew Louth will embrace the modern division between the humanities (to which theology belongs) and the sciences: “theologians conduct their academic work in libraries, not in laboratories; they read books, they do not conduct experiments.” This resistance plays out in other of his works and in his reading of patristic and Orthodox theologians.

However, Louth will grant that there is an “unsystematic system” in the fathers. His discussion of Staniloae’s commentaries on the Philokalia, and Maximos in particular, gives an example of how he

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conceives of system and its uses for theology. He says that Maximos presents his thought in an essentially unsystematic way (in this he is typical of the Fathers, for whom systematic presentations are almost invariably introductory, for example St Gregory of Nyssa's Great Catechetical Oration)....There is a system there [in Maximos' thought], but it is heuristic rather than exhaustive, open not closed.19

Hence, the only “system” which he finds acceptable for theology is “open,” “heuristic,” and “unsystematic.” This is his presentation of the method of the Fathers.

What Louth is concerned to protect is explained further by him in the distinction he employs between an approach to a problem and the approach to a mystery. Science is concerned with solving problems, but theology must have a profoundly different approach. God must not be turned into a “problem” which theology seeks to “answer.”20 Such an approach is more a desecration of mystery than a discerning of it. “Discernment” should be the fundamental and reverent pose of theology.

Kallistos Ware agrees with this characterization and the division between science and theology. Natural science and philosophy, according to him, have to do with “earthly” and “visible” realities, whereas theology is concerned with the invisible creator of these. Hence,

Theology can never be a science in any comparable sense to philology or geology, because the subject matter is radically different. It has its own forms of understanding, by “simple cognition” rather than discursive reasoning; it has its own ways of analysis and verification, and the methods of natural science and secular philosophy cannot here be applied without drastic modification, without a fundamental metanoia or “change of mind.”21

20 Louth, Discerning the Mystery, 68-ff.
21 Ware, “Scholasticism and Orthodoxy,” 27.
While he draws this division between the differing methods, he clarifies that this does not mean that theology must reject the use of human reason. Rather, human logic must be cognizant of its inherent limitations due to the unique subject matter of theology. The mode of knowing which is privileged in theology is a "synthetic perception of reality," an "intuitive and mystical awareness of the divine."  

This position is characteristic of Orthodox theology in general and helps to explain certain distinctions operative in Orthodox thought which Westerners might find puzzling, such as the distinction between the essences and energies of God. To a philosopher, such a doctrine is logically inconsistent with Divine simplicity. However, Orthodox thought finds such an inconsistency necessary to protect the mysterious and incomprehensible nature of God, which is in danger of being idolized by the concepts of rationalizing theologians, as well as the reality of human perfection and transformation which is the end of all contemplation of God.  

Yannaras perhaps states most strongly the importance of the distinction of essence and energies and its implications for theology when he asserts that since the West has rejected the distinction, there is no possibility for man to participate in divine life. His interpretation...

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22 Ware, "Scholasticism and Orthodoxy," 24. Ware acknowledges that the rejection of science and scholastic method was not as unanimous in the history of Eastern thought as Orthodoxy may have painted it; in fact there were many "Byzantine Thomists" who, while not necessarily in favor of union with Rome, admired Aquinas for that use of theological method so deplored by contemporary Orthodox. He concludes that easy classification is too hasty and the historical question of method remains far more complicated than has been thus far presented (25-26).

23 See Papanikolaou's very helpful explanation of this in his essay "Divine Energies or Divine Personhood: Vladimir Lossky and John Zizioulas on Conceiving the Transcendent and Immanent God," Modern Theology 19, no. 3 (July 2003): 357-85: "the logical inconsistency implied in the Orthodox understanding of the essence/energies distinction is not without purpose. It protects the reality of the mystical experience in theological expression, and prevents it from falling into a rationalistic complacency that would preclude an ecstatic union with God" (363).

24 See his article "The Distinction between Essence and Energies and its Importance for Theology," St. Vladimir's Theological Quarterly 19 (1975): 232-45: "If we reject this distinction and if we accept, with the Roman Catholics, the intellectual leap to the essence itself – an active divine essence – then the only possible relation of the world to God is the rational connection between cause and effect, a connection that leaves unexplained the ontological reality of the world, the formation of matter and its essential character" (239); this means "exclusion of catholic-personal experience and priority of the
of the development of theology in the West

centered upon the desacralization of the world by means of Thomistic theology....the austere and consistent process that led from Thomism to Descartes and from Descartes to the contemporary technological rape of physical and historical reality. The transference of the knowledge of God from the realm of direct personal manifestation through the natural energies to the level of intellectual and rational approximation of an “active” divine essence, had as unavoidable results the sharpest antithetical separation between the transcendent and the immanent, the “banishment” of God into the realm of the empirically inaccessible, the schizophrenic divorce of faith from knowledge....

This has eventually led to the decline of religion in the West and prevailing nihilism, and was the current state of Catholic theology in 1973, according to Yannaras.25 He will consistently hold that the distinction between God’s essence and energies is the fundamental origin of apophaticism, and if this distinction is lost, the trajectory he outlines above is inevitable. The choices for theology are either apophaticism or nihilism.26

David Bradshaw takes up this provocative point of Yannaras and develops in it a full-length comparative history exploring the Eastern and Western traditions through the connecting thread of energeia. His conclusion and thesis is that Greek patristic theology is an “attractive alternative to scholasticism.”27 He embodies in a new and younger generation of Orthodox theologians the conviction that the persecution, religious wars, nihilism, and unbelief which have characterized the history of the West are not aberrations of Scholastic and Patristic intellect as the way of knowledge, reducing truth to a coincidence of thought with the object of thought (adaequatio rei et intellectus), an understanding of nature and person as definitions resulting from rational abstraction” (241).

25 Papanikolaou, “The Distinction between Essence and Energies and its Importance for Theology,” 244.


27 As he explains on his website for the University of Kentucky and attempts to illustrate in Aristotle East and West: Metaphysics and the Division of Christendom (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2004).
Western theology, they are natural outcomes of it. His work represents a certain strand of Orthodox thought which depends upon opposition to the West for its self-definition. His basic position could be summarized in the following quote: "Eastern Christendom had from the beginning a fundamentally different way of understanding the whole range of issues pertaining to the relationship of faith and reason. It may be that whatever shipwreck occurred in the West leaves this eastern tradition untouched."

At this point, I would like to sum up several points made thus far about Orthodoxy’s understanding of theology:

• it must privilege experience, especially the liturgical and Eucharistic
• it is primarily exegetical and confessional
• it must be apophatic in its expression
• it must not be scientific, systematic, or methodological, but rather, grounded in the thought and “spirit” of the early Fathers

From here we will turn to the thought of Bernard Lonergan, in the hope that his work will be able to help in approaching the questions and challenges which Orthodoxy has posed to Catholic theology. Many of the objections leveled by Orthodox theologians are concerns of Lonergan’s as well.

PART II: Lonergan’s Thought as Bridge?

1. A Historical Caveat: The Neo-Thomistic and Neo-Patristic Renaissances

A. How We Got Here

I would first like to raise a historical caveat which helps to explain

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28 Aristotle East and West: Metaphysics and the Division of Christendom (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press), introduction, x. I am happy to say that the argument about essence/energies as constitutive of Orthodox thought is beginning to be reevaluated. Michel Barnes (Marquette) and Pavel Gavrilyuk (University of St. Thomas, Minnesota) recently gave papers at the Logos Conference (University of Notre Dame, June 2009) in which, in the words of Gavrilyuk, they “threw cold historical water” on the claim that the essence/energies distinction is as constitutive to patristic Trinitarian theology as has been maintained by those like Yannaras and Bradshaw, and they see the distinction becoming more important in neo-Palamite thought.
both the Orthodox and Catholic context on the questions of method and how Lonergan’s thought clarifies these contexts. The neo-Thomistic renaissance which occurred in the twentieth century, spurred by Leo XIII’s 1879 encyclical, Aeterni Patris, is not irrelevant to the current state of Orthodox theology and the neo-patristic synthesis. During this time period, both Catholic and Orthodox theologians were urged within their own traditions to “return to the fathers,” and the results were more parallel than one might first expect. In the Catholic church, there developed what Lonergan called a “classicist mentality” which sought to uncritically return to Thomas without the necessary appropriation or transposition of his thought which would enable a faithful encounter with the problems modernity posed.\(^29\) Aidan Nichols writes that due to the apologetic and defensive stance of Catholic theology of the time, neo-Thomism tended to emphasize the rational aspects of Aquinas’s thought and ignore the context of contemplative and liturgical praxis.\(^30\)

A simple return to medieval methods and questions was hardly the answer which the Catholic Church required in its approach to the modern world. The same kind of appropriation can be seen in the first stages of the neo-patristic synthesis in the Orthodox Church. The first attempts at a return to the fathers took the form of reaction against Hellenizing influences, an attempt to maintain the purity of patristic method and insight, and a similar knee-jerk reaction to “Western tainting” of Eastern teaching.\(^31\)

And yet, to achieve the “mind of the fathers” as Georges Florovsky

\(^29\) Bernard Lonergan, *Method in Theology* (Toronto: University of Toronto Press, 1971), xi, 326-27; see also *A Second Collection* (Philadelphia: Westminster Press, 1975) 232, where he explains the revolution in Catholic theology which was occurring in the twentieth century, and the demise of the “old style dogmatic theologians.” By a classicist mentality he means conceiving of culture normatively and from a historicist perspective, implying a universal uniformity. He critiques this mentality as being no more than a “shabby shell of Catholicism” (*Method in Theology*, 327).


\(^31\) Lossky is a good example of this tendency, as we saw from his critique of Origen, because of that thinker’s “Hellenism” which attempted to “sneak into” the Church. Though we should note that the charge of Hellenism besmirching a previously pure apostolic teaching has its “Western” version, as well; not only from Harnack, but in the Catholic world, Lonergan evaluates Leslie Dewart’s objection to Hellenism (*The Future of Belief: Theism in a World come of Age* (1966)) in “The Dehellenization of Dogma,” in *A Second Collection*. 

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*Challenges between the Eastern Orthodox and Catholic Churches*
conceived, was not a return to ancient questions in the attempt to make them our own (though it is important to understand their questions); rather, it is an appropriation of the attitude Gregory of Nyssa describes allegorically in his account of the Hebrews fleeing Egypt: we must take the pagans' treasures and use them to adorn the house of God. The question of the relationship between Athens and Jerusalem is one which has not definitively been answered by the fathers for us since they did not have to deal with the Enlightenment and a new definition of "faith" and "reason" (which conceived of them as fundamentally different and even estranged). The history of ideas has changed this debate and its terms for us, and hence an attempt to uncritically return to the sources is doomed to fail. Rather, what the return to the sources can fruitfully accomplish is a provision for how we are to proceed with our own questions.

B. Authentic Renewal

The return to the fathers in the Catholic world gradually underwent a revolution, the effects of which we are still witnessing in theology today. Lonergan would gradually speak of the "collapse" or "passing" of Thomism following the Second Vatican Council and the problems and challenges this posed to contemporary Catholic theology. His hope was that what would arise was a new and creative approach to the questions of modernity which remained faithful to the insights and understandings of previous generations, for "the new can be analogous to the old, that it can preserve all that is valid in the old, that it can achieve the higher synthesis mentioned by Leo XIII in his bull Aeterni Patris: vetera novis agere et perficere, augmenting and perfecting the old by what is new." This revolution in Catholic theology (still


34 Philosophical and Theological Papers, 1965-1980, 298.
going on today) will hopefully herald a new era of understanding with her “Eastern brothers,” as so many of the problems which Orthodox theologians found with scholastic theology in particular have been addressed by contemporary Catholic theologians, especially Lonergan.

One of the most crucial points of this renewal of theology, according to Lonergan, is that the renewal must be continuous with its history and tradition. He explains what he means – and what he does not mean – by this in the following quote taken from his essay, “The Scope of Renewal,” a lecture delivered at Trinity College in 1973:

what is desired will be, I should say, first, an assimilation of what is new, secondly, in continuity with the old, and thirdly dialectical. More concretely, an assimilation of what is new will have to involve, first, an understanding of modern science, secondly, an understanding of modern scholarship, and thirdly, a philosophy that is at home in modern science and modern scholarship. Next, continuity with the old will be a matter of analogy, and indeed, of analogy of proportion; so a theology will be continuous with Thomism, to take one example, if it stands to modern science, modern scholarship and an associated philosophy as Thomism stood to Aristotelianism. Finally, a theology will be dialectical if it distinguishes systematically between the authentic and the unauthentic, between positions and counterpositions, and if it can settle issues by appealing to this distinction.35

While specifically concerned with the tradition of Catholic theology and the particular heritage for which it must account, this formulation of the theological task resounds with Staniloae’s description of his vision of contemporary Orthodox theology:

Because it allows the light of the inexhaustible mystery to appear through any of its formulae in any age, Orthodox theology does not make earlier formulas obsolete when it moves forward to new ones, but remains in continuity with them, the former being in fact a new explanation of the latter, a new step forward in the perception of divine mystery which had also been correctly

35 Philosophical and Theological Papers, 1965-1980, 293.
perceived by the previous formulae....Thus Orthodox theology remains faithful to the dogmatic formulations of the first centuries of the church, while nevertheless making continuous progress in their interpretation and in the revelation of that ineffable mystery which they only suggest.36

Both understandings of theology take seriously tradition and the insights of those who have come before, while being critically aware of the new questions with which the contemporary age is faced. Facing new questions does not mean “moving beyond” the prior ages of theological understanding in a way which implies rejection, as in a Hegelian understanding. This latter understanding of a progressive method is that to which Louth objects, for theology should not model itself after modern science’s perpetual advancement which leaves the previous advances “solved” and in a sense, useless.37 Rather, the transposition which is called for by renewal is more like Louth’s description of a “deepening” of patristic insights.38 The description of this “deepening” is not given by Louth, but what both Staniloae and Lonergan have said above are relevant.

2. Theology Must Avoid Cartesianism

The emphasis upon theology as experiential, exegetical, and confessional is in part a reaction against methods which utilize a Cartesian rationalism. For Yannaras, Descartes represents the perfect “example of the historical western temptation to secure God’s existence in terms of rational demonstration.”39 Not only does Yannaras object to the notion that God’s being is subject to the same guarantee of certainty as truths of mathematics, but even worse, Cartesianism (which he sees

36 Staniloae, Theology and the Church, 214-15.
37 Louth, Discerning the Mystery, 67.
38 “The Orthodox Dogmatic Theology of Dumitru Staniloae,” 65. Louth praises Staniloae for the synthesis the Romanian achieves between the fathers and contemporary thought (though he does have his criticisms of Staniloae), and he characterizes this synthesis as one in which contemporary notions are not “reduced” to something patristic, but rather, “he recognizes in [certain] aspects of modern thought the deepening of a patristic insight.” However, Louth points out that a recognition of patristic dimensions which are absent to contemporary thought must also be utilized for the synthesis to succeed.
as the logical conclusion to scholastic premises) sets up an autonomous “knowing” subject, divorced from any experience of relationship which true knowing implies.40

Louth also objects to the idea that theology can be like modern scientific knowing, which he conceives of primarily as based upon observation and experimentation. The incommensurability between the human mind and the Divine cannot allow for comprehension, which would be the goal of the scientific model and consideration of natural realities. And yet, does the rejection of empiricism need be synonymous with the rejection of scientific method? Does theology in fact have its “own forms of understanding” as it was put by Kallistos Ware, which are drastically distinct from understandings one has of other realities?

Lonergan is just as fervent in his corrective to an empiricist Cartesian method. His approach does not intend “certainty,” but rather, his method seeks what he calls the “virtually unconditioned,” in which conditions are fulfilled but not necessary.

If we briefly look at Thomas Aquinas’s definition of the “divine science,” we will see that comprehension is not the goal of theology as he understands it. God’s mystery is never compromised by human attempts at knowing him, because there are in fact, different ways of knowing. However, there is not a human way of knowing theological realities and a human way of knowing natural realities. There is one kind of human knowing for Aquinas, even if all realities are not known to the same degree. The distinction in types of knowing are based upon an ontological distinction between human and divine beings. Hence:

Accordingly, there are two kinds of science concerning the divine. One follows our way of knowing, which uses the principles of sensible things in order to make the Godhead known. This is the way the philosophers handed down a science of the divine, calling the primary science “divine science.” The other follows the mode of divine realities themselves, so that they are apprehended in themselves. (Q2A2, 41-42)

Some commentators mistakenly identify what Aquinas means by theology as a science with what he describes in the passage above,
the divine science handed down by the philosophers. However, he is clear that theology is being conceived of analogously to this kind of science but is not identified with it: "The truths we hold on faith are, as it were, our principles in this science, and others become, as it were, conclusions. From this it is evident that this science is nobler than the divine science taught by the philosophers, proceeding as it does from more sublime principles." 

Lonergan calls this way of doing theology "understanding in process." In this way of doing theology, it is understood to be a subalternated science, a scientia subalternata. Lonergan gives a helpful and concise summary of what this phrase conveys:

The subject of theology is not a set of propositions or a set of truths but a reality;...theology itself is an understanding for science is a process towards a terminal understanding; that this understanding is not of God himself for then the science would not be subalternated but subalternating; and that an understanding of the revelation cannot be adequate for the revelation is about God and God himself is not understood.

We see that theology as a science is not to be confused with classical science's search for necessity. While classical science searched for certainty or necessity, this is not what Lonergan is undertaking through his theological exercises. Theology as scientific or systematic as Lonergan conceived of it and practiced it, searches for verified intelligibility.

Sadly, this way of thinking about theology as a science has been, and continues to be, misunderstood by Orthodox and Catholic theologians alike. From Orthodoxy, Bradshaw's statement that "to

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41 For example, Bradshaw in Aristotle East and West, 221ff.
42 Q2A2, 42.
44 Collection, 127. Lonergan takes this from Aquinas ST I, 1 in which Aquinas describes theology as a science subalternated to the knowledge of God and the blessed.
45 See his brief assessment of this in "Doctrinal Pluralism," in Philosophical and Theological Papers, 1965-1980, 84ff.
46 For a concise history of neo-Thomist and neo-Scholastic thought which "was not especially close to the original or historical St. Thomas," see Aidan Nichols, The Shape
claim (as Aquinas does, for example) that [theology] is a science in the Aristotelian sense – one that has God as its subject matter – would have struck the Byzantines as strangely pretentious bases itself upon a fundamentally distorted view of Aquinas’s analogical use of Aristotelian science. He is right that Aristotle conceived of science in terms of formal and material objects and also that theology cannot make God an “object” in that sense. However, this was neither Aquinas’s intention nor his understanding of theology as a science. When he states that Deus est subiectum huius scientiae, he is careful to point out that this does not mean that the goal of theology is to know God’s essence. By subject he means “that of which is principally treated” by the science. Hence, the mystery of God’s being is never comprehended


47 Aristotle East and West, 221. Bradshaw’s argument with Aquinas extends beyond the methodological. He finds him to be intellectualist, predestinarian, and extrinsicist, among other offenses: “Aquinas, far from presenting a grand synthesis of the kind alleged by modern Thomists, presents instead a medley of incompatible arguments and intuitions. He is continually reaching toward possibilities that his Augustinian commitments prevent him from realizing” (268). It is perhaps not insignificant to note that one Catholic theologian to whom Bradshaw looked for guidance in his reading of Aquinas, especially on beatitude, is Karl Rahner (257). Rahner’s theological vision, which has been called a species of “transcendental Thomism,” and centers upon the supernatural existential that constitutes every “hearer of the Word,” does not really operate with the distinction of natural/supernatural which is crucial to an understanding of Thomas’s thought and method.

48 ST I Q1A7.

49 ST I Q1A7, ad1.

50 ST I Q1A7. “The relation between a science and its object is the same as that between a habit or faculty and its object. Now properly speaking, the object of a faculty or habit is the thing under the aspect of which all things are referred to that faculty or habit…. in sacred science all things are treated of under the aspect of God; either because they are God Himself or because they refer to God as their beginning and end.” It is clear that Bradshaw is thinking of the object of a science in an ocular manner. However, he can hardly be blamed for this misunderstanding, since even the translator of this work uses language which seems to support a similar position: “According to Aristotle, every science has its own subject, whose attributes and causes are demonstrated in the light of certain
or understood in the theological method espoused by either Aquinas or Lonergan.

Lonergan’s method also avoids empiricism since it takes into account not only data of sense, but also data of consciousness. While it begins in experience, it moves through the other levels of human intentionality to understanding, judgment and deciding before the process of human knowing is said to be achieved.

In addition, while Lonergan’s understanding takes account of the subject’s operations of experiencing, understanding, judging, and deciding, giving them their full cogntional value, he also recognizes that these do not occur in an isolated and autonomous individual, divided from the community which has formed the individual by its meanings and values. The social and communal aspects of knowing are accounted for in a way which acknowledges both the positive and negative elements of this interaction. Hence, while the terms of his account differ from the more phenomenological language of Yannaras, who prefers to speak in terms of relationship and otherness, both are correcting the mistaken Cartesian split between subject and object, as well as the tendency to evaluate the subject as an isolated monad.

3. A New Understanding of “Method” and Systematic Theology

Orthodox theology is correct to reject a rationalist and deductivist drive seeking certainty, what Lonergan called the “classicist mentality” which dominated Catholic thought for centuries. It is equally correct that theology cannot follow the presuppositions of empirical science, basing itself solely upon observation. And yet, from the embrace of such precepts, does it follow that one must reject the notion of method or system as it is applied to theology? I would argue that what is needed is a new understanding of “method” and its uses for theology.

In the first part of our paper, we saw how Orthodox theologians...
objected to the notion of "method" or "system" because it sounds like—
and is commonly conceived of as—a set of rules to be followed that yields
"results." However, Lonergan is clear that this is not what he means
by the term "method." He will say that the idea of blindly following a
set of rules may work in an assembly line, but it is not sufficient for
what he conceives of as necessary in any intellectual discipline. His
definition of method as a "normative pattern of recurrent and related
operations yielding cumulative and progressive results" is dependent
upon the experiencing person and his or her habits, dispositions,
education, and an entire host of factors.

Transcendental method is Lonergan's way of explaining the
operations of the human mind and the way in which questions emerge
and drive toward answers. The fact that some questions emerge in
some people and not in others has to do with the person's education,
habits, friends, and the material and spiritual conditions in which she
lives, and an entire range of contingent factors. But the basic pattern
of operations which occur in questioning human beings is the same for
all. Once the person adverts to these operations, then the question of
human knowing can emerge. From this arises the question of what is
known, and from this point, Lonergan says that the question of God
will naturally follow. This is an important point for our ecumenical
dialogue, for he will say that

however much religious or irreligious answers differ, however
much there differ the questions they explicitly raise, still at
their root there is the same transcendental tendency of the
human spirit that questions, that questions without restriction,
that questions the significance of its own questioning, and so
comes to the question of God.

And while Lonergan will say that this question is "implicit in all

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52 If one follows the method, then ideally one obtains always the same results.
A recipe for lemon pie yields lemon pie, and no one expects it to result in chocolate
cake. But the function of a method in an academic discipline or science is to yield a
cumulative series of different and better results" from "Horizons and Transpositions," in
53 Method in Theology, 6.
54 Method in Theology, 5.
55 Method in Theology, 103.
our questioning, so being in love with God is the basic fulfillment of our conscious intentionality" (my emphasis).56 Lonergan may have highly technical language, he may be inaccessible to readers unfamiliar with this language or his work, but when he writes that the love of God is the “first principle [from which] flow one's desires and fears, one's joys and sorrows, one's discernment of values, one's decisions and deeds;”57 his method is decidedly not rationalist. It sounds even less so when he continues to discuss the different kinds of being in love, from the natural and political to the love of God with one's whole heart, mind and soul (Mark 12:30), and from there to the particular love of God given by the Holy Spirit (Romans 5:5) and in Christ Jesus the Lord (Romans 8:38).58 We see that Lonergan's method in theology is in fact grounded upon the love of God in Christ.

It is from here that we find several points of concurrence with the concerns of Orthodox theology. Lonergan will say that when we allow this being in love with God to be our being, it “dismantles and abolishes the horizon in which our knowing and choosing went on and it sets up a new horizon in which the love of God will transvalue our values and the eyes of that love will transform our knowing” (my emphasis).59 Such a transformation is experienced primarily as mystery that evokes awe and in this way can be read as a specific response to Louth's paradigm of mystery/problem. Lonergan writes that “mystery is not to be confused with problem, but the ongoing contexts within which mystery is adored and adoration is explained are anything but free of problems.”60 This is precisely the setting in which a systematic theology finds its purpose and meaning.

And while “man's response to transcendent mystery is adoration.... adoration does not exclude words.”61 This can be said of both liturgy and sustained academic work. Lonergan writes that in an age in which there exists so much confusion about what to believe, church doctrines are misunderstood, and the faithful do not understand the meaning

56 Method in Theology, 105.
57 Method in Theology, 105.
58 Method in Theology, 105.
59 Method in Theology, 106.
60 Method in Theology, 344-45.
61 Method in Theology, 344-45.
of those doctrines. At this point rises the exigency of a systematic theology. In numerous places, Lonergan traces the history of the development of theological thought in the West, in an effort to explain why it developed in the way that it did. His conclusion is that it did so in order to answer questions which emerged in certain contexts. He is not unaware of the deviations into which a systematic theology can fall; he writes that some of the accusations against systematic theology are that it is "speculative, irreligious, fruitless, elitist, irrelevant." The first two of these accusations, the speculative and irreligious deviations of systematic theology, are those which the proponents of a purely apophatic approach to theology charge. But Lonergan briefly responds by reminding theology of its proper task, without denying that theology can and has fallen into such deviations. First, he clarifies that systematic theology aims at an understanding of the truths of the faith, which can never be separated from those statements of the church which have been accepted as true about Christ's revelation. As such, any speculation divorced from the teachings of the Church are not the concern of a legitimate systematic theology. Second, he writes that theology can become "irreligious" when

its main emphasis is, not conversion, but proof, or when positions are taken and maintained out of individual or corporate pride. But when conversion is the basis of the whole theology, when religious conversion is the event that gives the name, God, its primary and fundamental meaning, when systematic theology does not believe it can exhaust or even do justice to that meaning, not a little has been done to keep systematic theology in harmony with its religious origins and aims."  

Lonergan appreciates and acknowledges the place of apophatic theology within religiously differentiated consciousness. This type of differentiation has achieved that "being in love" which is the necessary basis for any authentic theological reflection. However, "Christian

63 Method in Theology, 350.
64 "Doctrinal Pluralism," 83.
love of God is not just a state of mind and heart: essential to it is the intersubjective, interpersonal component in which God reveals his love and asks for ours in return. It is at this point that there emerges the function of church doctrines and of theological doctrines. For that function is to explain and to defend the authenticity of the church's witness to the revelation in Christ Jesus." For Lonergan, systematic theology is necessary for an authentic witness to Christ.

CONCLUSION

Our concern has been to identify several methodological challenges to Catholic-Orthodox dialogue and to apply Lonergan's thought to them in an attempt to bring clarity. As is clear from this paper, my position is not that the two churches are traveling upon utterly divergent roads, but may be passing each other on the same road, without recognizing each other. Both churches agree that the road must lead to one place, union with God in Christ. Orthodox theology's emphases upon the role of experience, the apophatic tradition, the confessional nature of theology, and the contemporary resistance to the systematic, scientific, or methodological are concerns that the thought of Lonergan is willing and able to address. His work shows an understanding of the historical development of theology as a discipline, acknowledging both the advances and declines; he also seeks for authentic renewal which utilizes the treasures of the tradition. His thought rejects the errors of rationalism and empiricism, and formulates a new understanding of the methodological or systematic in theology that appreciates and respects the mystery of God in the face of the human being's limited capacities. At the same time, he respects these capacities and the way in which they can be utilized as one seeks to draw closer to the Divine. If Lonergan can help us to recognize that all authentic theological inquiry, East and West, shares in a common journey toward the incomprehensible God, then he will also have helped those of us now engaged in such inquiry, whether Orthodox or Catholic, to take an important step forward on that very same "road."
FROM PERSON TO SUBJECT: LONERGAN’S METHODOLOGICAL TRANSPOSITION AS UPPER BLADE FOR READING SANKARA

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In a paper published in the Revista Portuguesa de Filosofia, I had argued that the application of Lonergan’s method to the Christian as well as the Vedantic traditions could arrive at a commonly agreed usage of vexed terms such as creation, pantheism, panentheism, monism, acosmism, nondualism, and person, and that emergence of transculturally equivalent sets of categories would have the added benefit of providing the functional specialties with the type of explanatory upper blade called for toward the end of the chapter on interpretation in Method in Theology, serving to get rid of “occult” or inadequately methodical entities such as “Indian mentality” and “Western mentality.”

In the present paper I would like to walk a little further along that road, or, perhaps, wander around it a bit. My hedging and hawing here has a history. The paper mentioned above was to have a second part consisting of a dialectic of interpretations of Sankara’s understanding of the relationship between Brahman and the world. The attempt did not work out and so had to be aborted. However, in response to a request from Paul Allen, I submitted the attempt to the blog on the Lonergan Website, where it occasioned a couple of responses, including one from Philip McShane that pointed out that dialectic presupposes explanatory interpretation. The other part of the history is that I have been busy

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2 See the Lonergan Website: http://lonerganwebsite.blogspot.com/ as of June 2, 2009,
the last year bringing together some fourteen articles by Fr. Richard De Smet, S.J., missionary in India and Indologist of some renown, on the topic of person in Indian thought. So the thought naturally arose: why not both learn from McShane’s comments and attempt to read De Smet’s data in a methodical key? The idea was to try something less ambitious than a dialectic of interpretations. Perhaps I could study one particular instance in Lonergan of a transposition from metaphysics to method, and then see how such a well-worked out transposition might help in the interpretation and generation of equivalent categories in the Indian context.

In what follows I will first present a reading of Lonergan’s efforts and then give brief indications about results that can be expected by using this as an upper blade with respect to the topic of “subject” in Sankara.

1. DE CONSTITUTIONE CHRISTI...(1956)

While they both use and thematize the method of psychological introspection or generalized empirical method, neither Verbum nor Insight make the term “subject” explicit. Insight’s chapter on self-affirmation, for example, uses the term “self” rather than “subject,” describing it as a concrete and intelligible unity, identity, whole grasped in the data of consciousness, and characterized by occurrences such as sensing, perceiving, imagining, inquiring, understanding, formulating, reflecting, grasping the unconditioned, and affirming. In the same chapter Lonergan also asks: What do I mean by “I”? and replies: “The answer is difficult to formulate, but strangely, in some obscure fashion, I know very well what it means without formulation, and by that obscure yet familiar awareness, I find fault with various formulations of what is meant by ‘I.’ In other words, ‘I’ has a rudimentary meaning from consciousness, and it envisages neither the multiplicity nor the
diversity of contents and conscious acts but rather the unity that goes along with them.\textsuperscript{75}

In keeping with the observation in \textit{Insight} that personal relations can be studied adequately only in the larger and more concrete context that is theology,\textsuperscript{6} Lonergan’s earliest substantial treatment of the person is found in his discussion of the ontological and psychological constitution of Christ (1956). I will concentrate on parts 1 and 2 of \textit{De Constitutione Christi}... which discuss the notion of person and the constitution of a finite person, and on part 5 which discusses human consciousness.

\textbf{1.1 The Notion of Person}

Part 1 of \textit{De Constitutione Christi}... is a highly systematic treatment of the notion of person. It takes as its basis the Thomist definition of person as “a distinct being subsisting in an intellectual nature”\textsuperscript{7} and engages in a clarification of the terms being, \textit{Existenz}, one and subsistent. “Being” and “\textit{Existenz}” seem out of place, till one realizes that both have to do with “intellectual nature”:

Since the person is a distinct being subsisting in an intellectual nature, we must first speak of an intellectual nature both from the side of the object toward which this nature tends ($§ 1$, \textit{Being}) and from the side of the subject who easily falls short of so lofty an aim. ($§ 2$, \textit{Existenz})\textsuperscript{8}

Despite the familiar point made in \textit{Insight} that the pure desire to know tends intelligently and rationally toward being, I found it enlightening to be told that an intellectual nature is one that tends toward being. Intellect is defined, in fact, as \textit{potens omnia facere et fieri}, “that by which it is possible to make and become everything,” where “everything” is another way of speaking about “being.”\textsuperscript{9} A nature is intellectual when by understanding and willing it can operate within

\begin{itemize}
\item[\textsuperscript{5}] \textit{Insight}, 352.
\item[\textsuperscript{6}] \textit{Insight}, 754.
\item[\textsuperscript{8}] \textit{The Ontological and Psychological Constitution of Christ}, 9.
\item[\textsuperscript{9}] \textit{The Ontological and Psychological Constitution of Christ}, 10-13.
\end{itemize}
the whole realm of being.\textsuperscript{10} When persons are defined as subsisting in an intellectual nature, it means that they have a special relationship with being: not only are they beings, but they tend consciously, intelligently, rationally toward being. So God understands everything by understanding the divine essence, and is therefore person. Human beings do not understanding everything, but they have the capacity to understand everything, and so they also are persons.

The fact that human intellect is potential accounts for the discussion of \textit{Existenz}. In characteristic fashion, Lonergan refashions this term: truly ex-sisting means undergoing intellectual conversion, learning that “the real” is what becomes known under the name of being through the mediation of concepts and judgments.\textsuperscript{11}

Lonergan goes on to clarify the notions of “one” and “subsistent.” Distinguishing between predicamental one, natural or formal one, and transcendental one, he notes that person is one or distinct in the third, transcendental sense: it is undivided in itself and divided from everything else. Such unity or distinctness is known not through experience or understanding, but through judgment, the second operation of the intellect.\textsuperscript{12} Now “one” and “being” are related: that which is being in the stricter sense is also one in the stricter, transcendental sense, the reason being that “one” adds nothing but negations to being, and that therefore the whole perfection of unity necessarily has its foundation in the perfection of being. This helps us formulate a systematic notion of the subsistent. The subsistent is that which exists \textit{per se} and in itself, a complete being, a whole in itself, simply divided from and existing separately and apart from everything else. It is, therefore, a being in the strict sense. Thus minerals, plants, animals, human beings, angels are said to subsist, whereas accidents, the intrinsic principles of being, possible beings, and beings of reason are not said to subsist.\textsuperscript{13}

Thomas’s definition of person therefore excludes the intrinsic principles of being on the grounds that these do not subsist, and subsistents such as animals, plants, and minerals on the grounds

\textsuperscript{10} \textit{The Ontological and Psychological Constitution of Christ}, 41.

\textsuperscript{11} \textit{The Ontological and Psychological Constitution of Christ}, 19-23.

\textsuperscript{12} \textit{The Ontological and Psychological Constitution of Christ}, 31-33.

\textsuperscript{13} \textit{The Ontological and Psychological Constitution of Christ}, 33, 35.
that they are not intellectual. Thus Father, Son, Spirit, angels, human beings are persons, and the only persons.14

1.2 Human Consciousness and the Finite Subject

Part 5 of De Constitutione Christi... turns to the question of human consciousness. The discussions of the nature of consciousness and the meaning of the word "I" take up matter from Insight, though we might note that consciousness is now described not merely as an awareness immanent in cognitional acts,15 but as interior experience of oneself and one's acts, where experience is taken in the strict sense of the word, as a preliminary unstructured sort of awareness that is presupposed by intellectual inquiry and completed by it.16 Further, we are told that what is known by consciousness is attained not under the formality of the true and of being, nor under the formality of the intelligible and definable, but under the formality of the experienced.

As for "I," it can be considered in its common usage, or as understood by psychologists, or as understood by philosophers. Even among the last it has various meanings because of the diverse levels of Existenzer achieved: for many, the real as real is not that which is known through true judgments, but rather that which is discerned in some sort of intuition prior to judgment.17 Lonergan insists, however, that the meaning of "I" be derived solely from consciousness. But here also there is diversity of opinion, because of different ways of conceiving the structure of consciousness. Some take it as a type of perception, while others understand it as experience in the strict sense. The former ask whether consciousness perceives only the phenomenal I or also the deep I, and whether the latter is the same as nature, substance, person; the latter dismiss such questions by pointing out that consciousness does not perceive anything, for what is known through consciousness is found not on the side of the object, so as to be referred to as a "percept," but on the side of the subject, and not only on the side of the perceiving

14 The Ontological and Psychological Constitution of Christ, 41-43.
15 Though Insight had of course specified that data include data of consciousness, implying that the first level of human knowing, experience, includes what Lonergan is now calling "interior" experience.
17 The Ontological and Psychological Constitution of Christ, 171-73.
subject but also of a dreaming, or waking, or knowing, or desiring, or sensing, or understanding subject. Moreover, this type of experience is not described but only indicated, for description presupposes intellectual inquiry.\textsuperscript{18}

This experience, then, is (a) what is had without any psychological or philosophical inquiry, (b) the material in which intelligible unities and relationships are grasped whether by psychologists or by philosophers, and (c) the material evidence by reason of which either ordinary or psychological or philosophical concepts can be said to be true.\textsuperscript{19}

We do not intuit ourselves by some distinct and special operation; instead, by the very fact of our sensing, understanding, judging, choosing, we already have a certain preliminary unstructured awareness of ourselves and our acts. As from exterior experience, so from this interior experience we can proceed, by inquiring, understanding, reflecting, judging, to apprehend ourselves under the formality of the intelligible, definable, true, being.\textsuperscript{20}

In the light of all this, Lonergan proposes a theorem regarding the different meanings of the subject or “I”:

- This existing human being, or the \textit{ontological subject};
- This human being existing and operating psychologically, or the \textit{psychological subject};
- This human being existing and operating psychologically, considered as known on the side of the subject and under the formality of the experienced, or the \textit{subject as conscious};
- This human being existing and operating psychologically, known on the side of the object and under the formality of the intelligible, or the \textit{subject as conceived};
- This human being existing and operating psychologically, known on the side of the object and under the formality of the true and of being, or the \textit{subject as affirmed}.\textsuperscript{21}

\textsuperscript{18} The Ontological and Psychological Constitution of Christ, 173-75.
\textsuperscript{19} The Ontological and Psychological Constitution of Christ, 175.
\textsuperscript{20} The Ontological and Psychological Constitution of Christ, 189.
\textsuperscript{21} The Ontological and Psychological Constitution of Christ, 175-77.
Finally, the ontological constitution of finite consciousness. Finite persons are not conscious in and of themselves; if they were, they would be conscious at all times, which is not the case. Again, they are conscious neither through accidental potencies or habits nor through some distinct and special operation by which one looks at oneself on the side of the object. Rather, finite persons become conscious through any and all operations of both the sensitive and the intellectual part of one's being. Thus a finite conscious person is made up of the same causal elements as a finite person sensing, understanding, judging, choosing, for "conscious" adds nothing to being; it simply denotes being of a certain degree of ontological perfection.

2. *DIVINARUM PERSONARUM*...(1957)

If *De Constitutione Christi*... discussed person and subject in the context of Christology, *Divinarum Personarum*... takes up these notions in the context of Trinitarian theology. The main discussion is found in chapter 4, entitled "The Divine Persons Considered in Themselves." In contrast to the systematic approach of *De Constitutione Christi*..., *Divinarum Personarum*... adopts a historical approach. What should be understood by the word person? Historically there have been five ways in which this question has been answered:

1. Some *common word* was needed to speak of Father, Son and Spirit. Thus Augustine asked, Three what? Three who? and suggested the use of the word "substances" or "persons." Unity, he explained, is understood by speaking of one essence, trinity by speaking of three substances or persons.

2. *Definitions* were subsequently formulated. The most notable

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22 *The Ontological and Psychological Constitution of Christ*, 183.

23 "Unconscious" is being at a lower level of perfection, e.g., processes such as the growth of hair, circulation of blood, metabolism. "Conscious" is being at a higher level of ontological perfection. A subject is rendered conscious through its operations in accordance with the perfection of the operations themselves. See *The Ontological and Psychological Constitution of Christ*, 187.

24 Question 10 asks about the meaning of person. Question 15 asks whether a person is predicated analogously of God and creatures. Question 17 asks how a person is related to incommunicability and to interpersonal communication. Questions 11 and 13 ask whether "God" is a person, and so whether there is a fourth divine person besides Father, Son, and Spirit.
were those of Boethius, "individual substance of a rational nature," Richard of St. Victor, "incommunicable existence of the divine nature," and Thomas, "distinct subsistent in an intellectual nature."

3. *Theories that were more or less metaphysical* were proposed by Scotus, Capreolus, Cajetan, Suarez, Tiphanus, and others. 25

4. Since there were so many competing metaphysical theories and no way to arbitrate between them, they were replaced by *gnoseological ones*. It seemed that the person should be said to be consciousness, or conscious individuality, or a distinct center of consciousness, or some other psychological reality.

5. Given the proliferation of gnoseological theories in their turn, the contemporary tendency, Lonergan notes, is to *eschew all theory and concentrate on concrete apprehensions of the person.* (This is a reference to existentialism and personalism. 26) Thus a person is one with whom personal relationships are entered into, or one to whom one can say "Thou," or whatever is simply distinguished from the category of "things," or one who is by nature ordered to communication with other persons, and so on. 27

Now despite the diversity of answers, there is to be recognized here a single heuristic structure: all the above are answers to the same question, what is person. Augustine's particular question, Three what? is not left aside when Boethius, Richard, and Thomas ask about person

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25 "More or less metaphysical" is quite deliberate. Lonergan distinguishes metaphysics from grammatical and logical analysis. It is not even enough to consider being, for metaphysics is resolution into ultimate causes, so a consideration of being that fails to resolve it into ultimate causes is not properly metaphysical. Such would seem to be the case with Scotus and Tiphanus. See *The Ontological and Psychological Constitution of Christ*, 49, 63.


in a general sense. The various definitions of person are not left aside when we explore the metaphysical foundations. Knowledge of things through ultimate causes does not exclude a study of conscious being. A general consideration of conscious being does not prevent investigation of being that is conscious of itself in its concrete relationships.28

However, besides the genetic aspect, the heuristic structure manifests also the dialectical aspect. Thus, while Boethius's definition can be correctly explained, it also leads to difficulties in conceiving the divine persons.29 Richard's definition, according to Lonergan, has only a certain historical importance, and so can be set aside. That leaves us with Thomas's definition, which Lonergan has already discussed at length in De Constitutione Christi. Next, there are disagreements about the constitution of a finite person, though not of an infinite person. But the real problem regards consciousness, which is a question that is “profound, subtle, serious.” Subtlety arises from the nature of consciousness, for it is one thing to be conscious and another to know that one is conscious. Profundity arises from the nature of human knowledge which is achieved in three steps, so that it is one thing to know and another to know our knowing.

In view of this, one who discusses human consciousness will easily fall into error unless he or she has a thorough grasp of virtually all philosophies, discerning what is true from what there is false in them. But if it is so easy to err regarding human consciousness, falsity will even more easily enter in when one proceeds to conceive divine consciousness by analogy with the human.30

With the emergence of personalism and existentialism, the question becomes even more acute, and this passage is worth quoting in full:

For, on the one hand, the deepest meaning of person seems to be more clearly understood: what is said to be proper to

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28 Divinarum Personarum, 133 = The Triune God: Systematics, 312.
29 “Individual” is only the lowest degree of distinction, known in experience, and valid only for material beings. Also, “rational” is only the human type of intellect which is discursive.
30 Divinarum Personarum, 135 = The Triune God: Systematics, 317.
and distinctive of a person is that a person is what one has understood one can be and what one has willed to become. This understanding and becoming of the person is for all practical purposes what is meant by *Existenz*....On the other hand, while this conception of the human person is true, it is not easy to take the next step and conceive analogically a divine person. Indeed, and far more serious, there is such an emphasis on the subject and such disdain for anything that has the formality of object that this doctrine is incompatible with both faith and traditional theology.\(^3\)

So contemporary theories (1) make it difficult to conceive analogically a divine person; (2) are incompatible with faith and traditional theology because of their excessive emphasis on the subject to the neglect of the objective.\(^2\) Lonergan’s solution is to recommend a dialectic or discernment:

Accordingly,...we hold that true contemporary opinions about the person should be separated from those that proceed from philosophic empiricism or immanentism. For a correct understanding concerning the meaning of person is not based on a position that fails to go beyond experience and understanding and to rise to the third step in human knowing. In fact, to the extent that one ignores rational reflection, the grasp of the virtually unconditioned, the autonomous intellectual necessity whereby the uttering of a true word emanates from reflective understanding, and the similarly autonomous intellectual necessity consequent upon it, in which moral obligation and the spurring of volition consist – to that extent one surely ignores those features that are most proper to and distinctive of a person.\(^3\)

So the key issue is the “profound, serious, subtle” question of consciousness:

We have said all this in order that it may be seen more clearly

\(^3\) *Divinarum Personarum, 136 = The Triune God: Systematics*, 319.
\(^2\) See the final section of “Cognitional Structure,” 219-21.
\(^3\) *Divinarum Personarum, 136 = The Triune God: Systematics*, 319.
how we ought to proceed with regard to consciousness. For if consciousness is apprehended and studied under the formality of the true and of being, then at one and the same time there are preserved the meaning and nature of consciousness, the method of traditional theology that treats of truths and beings, and Catholic dogma, which through the true attains God as triune. If, however, one is afraid of what seems to be antiquated thinking, if one rejects the notions of the true and of being so that one can examine the subject more intimately, not only does one involve oneself in immanentism, idealism, relativism, but also joins the liberals and the modernists.34

The point then is to apprehend and study consciousness under the formality of the true and of being. If a proliferation of metaphysical theories leads to gnoseological theories, and a proliferation of gnoseological theories leads to abandonment of theory in existentialism

34 *Divinarum Personarum, 137-38 =* The Triune God: Systematics, 323. Lonergan's early writings are punctuated by comments on liberalism, modernism, rationalism. Already in *Insight* he notes that modernism, pietism, etc. are rooted in the counterpositions. “[A] s the philosophical counterpositions appeal to experience generally against the yes of rational consciousness, so they appeal to religious experience against the yes of articulate faith” (*Insight*, 756). They fail to grasp that the real is being, and that being is known by the rationally uttered yes of judgment. They insist that we contact reality only on the level of the experience that is prior to all questions and answers. (See Bernard Lonergan, *Understanding and Being*, vol. 5 of Collected Works of Bernard Lonergan [Toronto: University of Toronto Press, 1990], 279, and Bernard Lonergan, *Philosophical and Theological Papers, 1965-1980*, vol. 6 of Collected Works of Bernard Lonergan [Toronto: University of Toronto Press, 2004], 119.) In *De methodo theologiae* (1962) Lonergan takes issue with “people like Marcel” who insist on some deeper reality of inner experience which is expressed in the articles of faith, and also with “professors of theology” who think that theology needs to be purged of Hellenistic and medieval ontology. Such people exemplify a new form of immanentism, which strenuously opposes idealism, not because it has reached the unconditioned, truth, and being, but because it identifies the real with what is experienced (*De methodo theologiae* [autograph 1962], LRI Archives Batch V.1.c, 45). However, Lonergan accuses these “new immanentists” not of theological error but of a lack of development or of intellectual conversion. For error consists in denying what the [First] Vatican Council teaches, but “lack of development or of intellectual conversion consists in the fact that people think it extraordinary, indeed incredible, that they really know the ‘really real’ simply by true judgments. This defect is quite rarely and only with considerable difficulty amenable to correction. By some ineradicable instinct, we consider to be absolutely sound and solid that sense of reality that we formed as little children before attaining the use of reason. After all, both animality and rationality enter into the definition of man” (*De methodo theologiae* [autograph 1962], 45).
and personalism, the solution is to incorporate the best insights of these movements into a method built on a proper notion of consciousness and of knowledge.

Thus when Lonergan begins applying the fruits of his considerations to the divine persons, he is able to define a divine person both as a subsistent relation, and as a distinct subject conscious of himself both as subject and as distinct. 35 Again, in Question 21, where he makes a sustained comparison/analogy of temporal and eternal subjects, he notes that he will be dealing with the subject as a person that is conscious, and that hence “subject” is understood “as a distinct subsistent in an intellectual nature; and this subject is considered in relation to his intellectual nature.” 36 Both temporal and eternal subjects are distinct subjects in an intellectual nature but are related to their intellectual natures in different ways: an eternal subject is immutable, a temporal subject is both mutable and material. The temporal subject passes through two phases (distinguished by the explicit and deliberate taking control of life, the existential moment); the transition to the second phase is under the influence of other subjects; there are three ways in which this transition can be made: by understanding, by means of a true word (revelation!), and by love; but there are also obstacles to such achievement of authenticity. On the basis of this consideration, Lonergan goes on to marvelously construct an analogous conception of the eternal subjects as Word spoken in accordance with truth and Love spirated in accordance with goodness, as subjects from eternity “inasmuch as the infinite intellectual nature understands itself and manifests itself to itself by the Word, and by infinite Love loves itself as understood and manifested,” and so on. 37


I think it is in “Christ as Subject: A Reply” that the notion of subject, already emergent in De Constitutione Christi...and Divinarum Personarum..., really comes into focus. Lonergan famously describes this notion as “difficult, recent, primitive.”

36 Divinarum Personarum, 176 = The Triune God: Systematics, 401.
37 Divinarum Personarum, 182, see 176-83 = The Triune God: Systematics, 411, see 399-413.
It is difficult... Everyone knows he is a subject, and so everyone is interested in the consciousness of Christ. Not everyone knows the nature of the subject, and so there is a variety of opinions.

The notion is also recent. If one wishes to find out what a soul is, one has only to read St Thomas. If one wishes to find out what a subject is, it is not enough to read ancient or medieval writers. They did not treat the matter explicitly. They did not work out systematically the notion of the subject. They did not integrate this systematic notion with the rest of their philosophic or psychological doctrine.

In the third place, the notion is primitive. It cannot be reached merely by combining other, better known concepts. It can be reached only by directing one’s attention to the facts and to understanding them correctly. Nor is this enough. A difficult, recent, primitive notion is not theologically useful until it has been transposed into the classical categories of scholastic thought; and obviously such a transposition supposes some research into the exact meaning and latent potentialities of classical writers such as St Thomas.38

How then to make the notion of subject explicit? From the hints given above, it would seem that this is a question of (1) attention to the facts and understanding them correctly; (2) making the notion systematic; and (3) integrating it with philosophy and psychology. Further, the theological usefulness of such a notion, according to Lonergan at this stage, is dependent on its transposition into scholastic categories, and this itself involves mining the potentialities of classical writers.

Lonergan goes on to imply that he had attempted precisely such a transposition historically in Verbum and in a more systematic way in Insight. Verbum, as we have seen, employed the method of psychological introspection in a somewhat spontaneous way; Insight elevated this method into something more explicit, deliberate, and sustained. The “systematization” occurs in Insight in the setting up of a cognitional

theory, while the "integration with philosophy and psychology" is perhaps a reference to "epistemology" – given that every formulation of cognitional theory involves an inevitable philosophic component that is either a position or a counterposition – and also to "methodical metaphysics."

The critical point, as usual, is the nature of consciousness: Is it experience? Is it perception? Lonergan notes that it was in De Constitutione Christi...that he had begun presenting two opposed notions of consciousness, consciousness-experience and consciousness-perception. The latter covers all the opinions with which he disagrees; the former is derived from the Aristotelian-Thomist theorem of the identity in act of subject and object.39 Both De Constitutione Christi...and Divinarum Personarum...contain dialectics of consciousness on the basis of this theorem – a dialectic that is carried out somewhat differently in the "epistemological" and dialectical part of Insight.40

So: "A subject is a conscious person. A person is conscious by being the principium quod of acts of sense or of intellect. Insofar as there is in man a sensibile actu, there is by that very act a sensus actu and a subiectum actu; insofar as there is an intelligibile actu, there is by that very act an intellectus actu and a subiectum actu. Finally, the subiectum actu is the principium quod of the act."41 We may note with Lonergan that the notion of subject arises only on the basis of consciousness-experience: "if consciousness is conceived as experience there is a psychological subject, while if consciousness is conceived as the perception of an object there is no psychological subject."42

4. DE VERBO INCARNATO (1961)

39 "Christ as Subject: A Reply," 179.

40 See mainly chapter 14; see also Ivo Coelho, Hermeneutics and Method: The "Universal Viewpoint" in Bernard Lonergan (Toronto: University of Toronto Press, 2001), 36-44. I think more work needs to be done on the status of this theorem, which is, I guess, a postulate, a fundamental option. That may be the reason why it finds no place in the methodical movement of Insight. The fulcrum of the dialectic of Insight is the performative contradiction or the basic counterpositions on knowing, being, and objectivity – which is itself a transposition of the dialectical function of wisdom. See Coelho, Hermeneutics and Method, 40-44.

41 "Christ as Subject: A Reply," 182.

42 "Christ as Subject: A Reply," 164.
De Verbo Incarnato (thesis sexta ad decimam) deals with "person" (theses 6 to 9) and "subject" (thesis 10), if we are to go by the table of contents at the end of the booklet. The section dealing with person clarifies notions such as potency, form, act, mode, being, essence, act of existence, substance, one, proper and proportionate act of existence. The section dealing with the subject clarifies, among other things, the notions of subject, act, object; presence; consciousness, the psychological subject, introspection, the person and the psychological subject, and the meaning of "I." Essentialism is excluded by appealing to Thomas as well as to cognitional theory. Scholastic essentialism is traced back to Aristotle's concentration on matter and form, and to his theory of judgment as composition or division of concepts rather than the absolute positing of what is true. This discussion is reinforced by the subsequent one about the analogy of form, of substance, and of being: the first type of analogy is Platonic, the second Aristotelian, and the third Thomist. Platonic forms are intelligible but not intelligent; they are posited on the analogy of universal concepts. For Aristotle, instead, form does not correspond to concept. It is, in material things, the intelligible that is grasped in the sensible. Analogously, we can conceive that in immaterial things there is an identity between intelligence and intelligible: in his quae sunt sine materia idem est intelligens et intellectum. But Thomas has an analogy neither of concept nor of substance but of being. In material things, besides matter and form, there is also the act of existence. In separate substances, besides form, there is also the act of existence. And beyond these there is God, who is the subsistent act of existence itself, pure act. Thus Thomas proceeds by asking, not: What, analogically speaking is a separate substance? But: What, analogically speaking, is the act of existence, being, that which is? The Thomist system simply and utterly transcends Aristotelian essentialism.

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44 De Verbo Incarnato, 271-88.
45 De Verbo Incarnato, 222-24.
46 De Verbo Incarnato, 224-30. Lonergan notes that the systematic root of his analogy of being is the assertion that the object of intellect is unrestricted being, or all things. The intellect is in act or potency depending on its relation to universal being. Only God's intellect is purely and simply in act. An angelic intellect is always in act, but only with
This emphasis on overcoming essentialism in favor of proper recognition of the act of existence is, of course, to be read in the light of Christology and the importance of the real distinction between essence and existence. Still, it is certainly not an ad hoc solution. We have come across repeated recommendations on the part of Lonergan that we should rise from considerations of consciousness under the formality of the experienced to considerations of it under the formality of the true and of being. As far as subject and person are concerned, we can put together the following methodical indications.

First, intentionality analysis takes its stand on the data of consciousness. Still, a pure phenomenology of consciousness is not enough to answer, for example, theological questions about the consciousness of Christ:

For our question about the consciousness of Christ cannot be treated without establishing the relationship between the immediate data of consciousness and, on the other hand, philosophical and theological notions about subsistence, about the person, and indeed about a divine person. Certainly no such relationship can be established without setting out in one theory both what is purely psychological and also what is philosophical and theological.

What is needed then is a unified theory (“integration”). An essential step toward such a unified theory “lies in the notion of experience strictly so called, although experience of this kind is not ‘human knowing properly so called’ but a part of it, taking its place within an intentional structuring as the first potency of human knowing properly so called.” This intentional structuring, Lonergan adds, is a philosophical theory that holds that it is the same which through experience is known in first potency, through understanding and conception in first act, and through reflection and judgment in respect to certain intelligibles. Human intellect is merely a potency in the genus of the intelligible; even after it has received a species, without a phantasm it understands nothing in act. Thus the Aristotelian doctrine is included but transformed.

47 De Verbo Incarnato, 215.
48 De Verbo Incarnato, 281-82.
49 De Verbo Incarnato, 282.
second act.\textsuperscript{50} From this theory it follows that the same thing is known in different ways, through immediate consciousness and through concepts and judgments:

Thus, phenomenologically speaking, the "I" is a center of many acts; philosophically speaking, however, the "I" is "this subsistent," where "this" does not mean, as it usually does, what underlies sensible data, but what is immediately given in consciousness. At first sight these two are quite different.... Nevertheless, on closer examination, it is clear that the phenomenological description is no more an immediate datum of consciousness than the philosophical conception is.\textsuperscript{51}

The upshot of all this is that the person is, in a sense, an immediate datum of consciousness:

Although through consciousness the person is not known either in first act or in second act, nevertheless through consciousness the person is known in first potency, if it is indeed the same which is known in first potency by experience, known in first act by understanding and conception, and known in second act by judgment.\textsuperscript{52}

Human consciousness is one naturally. Besides this intelligible and natural unity, which links acts with each other, orders them, unites them, consciousness is also of the one who senses through sense, etc. This one, says Lonergan, is a person:

\begin{quote}
[T]his one is a person, that is, a distinct subsistent in an intellectual nature. It is in an intellectual nature, for it understands, judges, wills, chooses. It is distinct, for all the data of consciousness are individual, whereas this is one. It
\end{quote}

\textsuperscript{50} De Verbo Incarnato, 282. This is not new: see Insight, 412-13, which notes that there are two aspects to the basis of any philosophy: "On the one hand, cognitional theory is determined by an appeal to the data of consciousness and to the historical development of human knowledge. On the other hand, the formulation of cognitional theory cannot be complete unless some stand is taken on basic issues in philosophy." It is this inevitable philosophic component immanent in the formulation of cognitional theory that is either a position or a counterposition.

\textsuperscript{51} De Verbo Incarnato, 282.

\textsuperscript{52} De Verbo Incarnato, 283.
is a subsistent, for it is that which operates...; and that which operates is also that which is; and that which is...is nothing other than a being pure and simple – a subsistent.53

This same one is also a psychological subject:

Moreover, this same one is not only a person but also a psychological subject. For when he is sensing, understanding, judging, willing, choosing, and so on, he is present to himself, and what is present to self is a psychological subject in act. But when he is in a dreamless sleep, then of course the same one is able to dream, to wake up, to sense, to understand, judge, will, and so on; hence he is able to be present to himself, and so he is a psychological subject in potency.54

So the same is both a person and a psychological subject.

Thus person and psychological subject are identified in such a way that it is the same who is both person and psychological subject. Person and psychological subject are distinguished, however, in such a way that a person is always a psychological subject at least in potency and at times is a psychological subject in act.55

By 1964, when he writes “Subject and Soul,” Lonergan is consolidating the method of intentionality analysis and its access to the subject. Thus he is able to say that Thomas “fused together a phenomenology of the subject with a psychology of the soul.”56 “Psychology of the soul” here is to be understood with Aristotle and Thomas as a subset of metaphysics; but “phenomenology of the subject” seems to hark back to the remarks on phenomenology in De Verbo Incarnato reported above. Again, Lonergan distinguishes sharply Aristotle’s metaphysical method from intentionality analysis: the former ignores the difference between causal and intentional objects, but the latter takes its stand on the fact that sensitive and intellectual

53 De Verbo Incarnato, 283-84.
54 De Verbo Incarnato, 284.
55 De Verbo Incarnato, 284.
acts and their objects are given in consciousness. But when conscious acts are studied by introspection, "one discovers not only the acts and their intentional terms but also the intending subject."  

5. METHOD IN THEOLOGY (1972)

From De Verbo Incarnato we jump to Method in Theology. De Deo Trino II is a repetition of the matter found in Divinarum Personarum..., at least as far as person and subject are concerned. In the papers of 1964-65 Lonergan consolidates the emergence of the fourth level of intentionality or the existential subject, while also remarking, as he has already done before, about the limitations of an excessive emphasis on subjectivity to the exclusion of objectivity. "Existenz and Aggiornamento" and "Dimensions of Meaning" give particular attention to what Divinarum Personarum...called the two phases of the temporal subject:

For it is in the field where meaning is constitutive that man's freedom reaches its high point. There too his responsibility is greatest. There there occurs the emergence of the existential subject, finding out for himself that he has to decide for himself what he is to make of himself.

As we have noted already before, Lonergan's generalized method may be seen as an acceleration of the movement of history, incorporating especially the best insights of what Divinarum Personarum...had called the fourth and fifth stages in the history of person, the gnoseological and the existentialist-personalist. Thus method is described as consisting of cognitional theory, epistemology, metaphysics. It is expanded into theology by considerations of meaning, the human good, religion, the functional specialties – and these presuppose the existential subject. Thus Method can say: On the fourth level of intentionality, which is a further dimension of being human, we emerge as persons, meet one another in a common concern for values.... And again: originating

57 Verbum, 4-5.
58 See, for example, "Cognitional Structure," 219-20.
59 "Dimensions of Meaning," Collection, 235.
60 Bernard Lonergan, Method in Theology (Toronto: University of Toronto Press,
values "are authentic persons achieving self-transcendence by their good choices," while moral self-transcendence is "the possibility of benevolence and beneficence, of honest collaboration and of true love, of swinging completely out of the habitat of an animal and of becoming a person in a human society." 

As in *De Constitutione Christ..., Divinarum Personarum..., and De Verbo Incarnato*, then, method begins from intentionality analysis and goes on to take a stand regarding the inevitable philosophic component in cognitional theory. But there is a difference when it comes to metaphysics. In contrast to the Latin notes, metaphysics is no longer a question of importing scholastic categories, and so method is not merely a question of integrating the phenomenology of the subject with a psychology of the soul or with classical metaphysics. *Method* is an invitation, I think, to get back *Insight*'s achievement of a methodical metaphysics. But it is precisely that, an invitation, for a methodical metaphysics is, in many ways, something that is still to be set up, a fruit of collaborative creativity.

I do not think theological method is intended to replace the generalized method of *Insight*, for the generation of categories will continue to take place through intentionality analysis applied to mathematics, science, and common sense. But theological method does bring in the novelty of the generation of categories through the functional analysis of texts (research, interpretation, history), and through dialectic and foundations. The great difference is that functional collaboration presupposes a team, and epistemology will be practiced not individually as in *Insight*, but preferably in a team. And here too we can expect the generation of categories that are not only special (religious) but also general (philosophical and moral).

What then of person and subject? In the Latin notes, Lonergan theorizes about the generation of the category of subject from textual and intentionality analysis (something which he claims to have done in *Verbum* and in *Insight*), and then goes on to relate/integrate this category with the metaphysical one of person. In the light of *Method*, the procedure might be to first retrieve/generate the category of subject

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61 *Method in Theology*, 51.
through both intentionality analysis in general and functionally specialized appropriation of the texts of the tradition, and then to transpose this category into a properly methodical and metaphysical one. The matter is well expressed in “Christology Today”:

If the contemporary challenge to traditional Christology is to be met, then one must go beyond a metaphysical view of the person, a metaphysical account of human perfection, a metaphysical account of the life of grace....

By such “going beyond” I mean not a rejection of metaphysics but its inclusion within the dynamic unity of a foundational methodology.63

“Christology Today” is more program than achievement, and it seems content to transpose the classical metaphysical categories of person and nature into the contemporary methodical category of subject, identity, and subjectivity. Perhaps that is enough; but I am not capable of giving a more complete answer here, and so will not attempt it.

What I want to say is that the methodical categories can already be useful in other areas besides Christology and Christian theology.

6. SUBJECT AS UPPER BLADE: SANKARA VEDANTA

In this final section of my paper, I want to indicate how the subject – and the general categories of which it forms a part – might function as an upper blade in the interpretation of Sankara Vedanta, and the fruits that we might possibly expect from such an exercise.

Before I get down to my heuristic anticipations, let me say something more about my attempted dialectic of interpretations of Sankara and McShane’s comments on it. These comments are trenchant and pungent, as may well be expected, but also instructive, helpful, and enlightening. The main point made by McShane is that dialectic must be properly explanatory: it cannot be carried out on the basis of merely descriptive or commonsense interpretation. Elsewhere he

says the same thing: one does not do dialectic on descriptive positions. Such a requirement "cuts out silly dialogue: physicists do not serious discuss dialectically positions that are mythic or merely descriptive."64 I think the point has to be granted. It is true that chapter 7 of Method in Theology – and the 1962 “Hermeneutics” lecture before it65 – is convinced that understanding a text and passing judgment on the correctness of that understanding are both firmly commonsense affairs. Again it is true that both the 1962 lecture and Method acknowledge the possibility of a commonsense or descriptive statement of the meaning of a text. But it is also true that the 1962 lecture at greater length, and chapter 7 of Method in more compendious fashion, call for a “scientific” or explanatory statement of the commonsense meaning of a text. In fact, I realize, the text of Method is quite unambiguous on this point: “It remains, however, that the basic mode of expression, just described, has to be supplemented”; and again: “What is needed is not mere description but explanation.”66 The reason given is the need to avoid occult entities such as the Hebrew mind, Hellenism, and the spirit of Scholasticism, the need to rid theology of “the occult entities generated by an inadequately methodical type of investigation and thought.”67 But McShane provides an additional reason: it is simply impossible to do dialectic on the basis of merely descriptive interpretation. In my attempted dialectic, for example, I say things like: “Ratlhakrishnan clearly admits, therefore, the relative and dependent reality of the world.” McShane asks: “This statement needs complex reconsideration. How clear is he? He [Radhakrishnan] certainly has not the perspective on relations that Lonergan has (Insight 16 or appendix to The Triune God: Systematics)...Are we trapped here in description? ...yes, the controlling factor is his understanding and expression – and implicit metaphysics – of what is true. I would note that we are here, psychologically, and perhaps communally, at the beginning of section 2 of Insight chapter 17, ‘the real issue, then, is truth...’”68

66 Method in Theology, 172 (emphasis mine).
67 Method in Theology, 173 (emphasis mine).
68 McShane, SURF 2:14.
So this is the enlightening point made by McShane: dialectic just cannot be done on the basis of descriptive interpretations, for in descriptive interpretation the meanings of the terms have not yet been pinned down. This is not, of course, a demand for the jettisoning of descriptive interpretations such as that of Radhakrishnan. The point is that functional interpretation cannot be, should not be, "inadequately methodical" and merely descriptive. Or, if it is, it is the task of dialectic to lift it up into explanation and pin down meanings; only then it becomes possible to identify horizons and take a stand.

But the question now is, how to do explanatory interpretation, etc.? My cursory perusal of McShane's voluminous output indicates that he has some rather sophisticated (and complex) suggestions on this point. These suggestions would include the demand that all interpretation begin from a universal viewpoint, or at least a Tentative Universal Viewpoint (TUV), or a Tentative Evolutionary Theory (TET). There is, further, the whole set of nine or ten metagrams that he has been working out and propagating, taking off from Lonergan's recommendation about the importance of and need for diagrams.69 Again, there is his repeated citing of the Appendix of The Triune God: Systematics, where Lonergan talks of the inappropriateness of descriptive categories even at the beginning of a science.70 Still, I do what I have to do, or perhaps what I can, I stumble along, drawing comfort from Lonergan's little recommendation somewhere: take insights as they come.71

69 W0 deals with intellectual conversion; W2 with the explanatory heuristics of language; W3, according to McShane, is the equivalent of the periodic table in chemistry; W4k and W4d are Lonergan's diagrams on knowing and doing; etc. See, for example, McShane, Method in Theology: Revisions and Implementations, 116.

70 McShane, SURF 2:13, 14, 15.

71 In the Nottingham lecture, the first precept is Understand. Not "make significant acts of understanding," not even "make correct acts of understanding," but simply: Understand. See Bernard Lonergan, "Method in Catholic Theology," METHOD: Journal of Lonergan Studies 10, no. 1 (1992): 4-5. I must acknowledge, however, that the very second rule is: Understand systematically: aim at the ideal goal of complete understanding and make explicit the structure through which understanding naturally moves toward this goal. Still, Lonergan ends somewhat cryptically: "But if you ask in what precisely such a technique consists, I can only say that you will find it illustrated by my present efforts to bracket the unknown that is the advance of science in general and of theology in particular" ("Method in Catholic Theology," 9, see 7-9). I take it that Lonergan is referring here to his effort to work out a method, both general and special. The method, then, is both the envisaging of the ideal goal and the making explicit of the
But let me begin by at least indicating a set of stages of meaning in India.

6.1 Stages of Meaning in India

In passing references to India in his 1959 course De intellectu et methodo, Lonergan (1) admits in India the development of language that made the emergence of logos possible; (2) acknowledges the emergence of a genuine philosophy; (3) observes that the objectification was not complete; and (4) notes that India did not have the development of a methodical scientific intelligence, with its precise and univocal definition of terms, setting up of a system of interrelated meanings, and so forth. Thus he maintains that India did not progress from the mixed mode to the properly theoretical mode, where by “mixed mode” he means the dialectical result of the two pure modes of thought, the symbolic and the theoretic.72

Such incidental and illustrative remarks are, of course, to be treated merely as heuristic indications or models, to be verified against the data. We have to admit that, like Parmenides in the West, both Buddhism and several strains of Vedanta did establish linguistic argument “as an independent power that could dare to challenge the evidence of the senses,”73 and thus opened the way to the distinction between sense and understanding. In this sense, there is certainly in India the emergence of the logos and of a genuine philosophy. Whether or not this led in time to the emergence of a properly theoretic mode is the moot point. Future studies might reveal that it did. But this much can be granted: that the development of consciousness in India displays at least the commonsense or symbolic stage, the artistic and the literary differentiations of consciousness, the transcendent

movement of understanding toward that goal.

72 See Coelho, “Lonergan and Indian Thought,” 1033. In 1972, Lonergan still maintains that the distinction between the worlds of theory and of common sense is capable of several variations (Method in Theology, 95-96; see Insight, 703), and that there are degrees in the achievement of theory (Method in Theology, 84). He regards the distinction between understanding and judgment as an integral and important part of the theoretic differentiation of consciousness, as is evidenced by his repeated reference to the principle of contradiction and his observation that the stage of theory is marked by the emergence of the true as a specific goal (see Method in Theology, 93-94).

73 Method in Theology, 91-92.
differentiation of consciousness, and an at least incipient theoretical differentiation of consciousness.

The implication is that in the absence of a proper theoretic differentiation of consciousness we cannot expect to find systematically worked out notions of knowing, being, objectivity, or of the subject, consciousness, intelligence, freedom, subsistence, and so forth.

6.2 Heuristic Anticipations

In the light of my sketchy stages of meaning, let's get down to business. To begin with, I want to note that Sankara Vedanta, and Indian thought in general, is notoriously marked by a confusion regarding the notion of person. One root of this confusion is the assumption that person is applicable only to human beings and not to the Absolute. Accordingly, the nirguna Brahman, or the Brahman without qualities, is regarded as impersonal, while the saguna Brahman, or the Brahman with qualities (also known as Isvara), is regarded as personal. Against such a background, the Christian God who is creator, who loves, who redeems, is regarded as a lower, anthropomorphic type of god, while the Absolute of Vedanta is regarded as non-anthropomorphic and impersonal, and therefore higher.

Related to this confusion about the personhood of the Absolute Self is the question about the reality of the individual self (jivatman). It is quite common to maintain that this individual self is simply unreal and illusory and that it is simply identical with the Absolute Self or Brahman.

Among those who have addressed the question of person in Indian thought and in Sankara in particular, is Richard De Smet. Over a period of almost forty years, he carried out a veritable campaign on the notion of the person in Indian thought. His strategy was to work out the development of the notion of person in Western thought, and to use that development as an upper blade in his study of Indian thought. He was thus able to point out that the notion of person was adopted and adapted by Christian theologians so as to be applicable primarily to the divine mysteries of the Trinity and the Incarnation; it was then also applied to human beings created in God's image. De Smet showed how Boethius's definition underwent deepening and refinement at the hands of Thomas Aquinas. He also showed how Thomas's holistic and
organic notion of person degenerated into atomic individualism in the modern age of the West. It was in this context of the "loss of the person" that a German philosopher, F. H. Jacobi, decided to restrict the use of person to human beings. This decision affected the great translators of the Sanskrit works, who opted to render saguna and nirguna as personal and impersonal respectively, an option that continues to play havoc in the area of Indology and interreligious dialogue. Once all this is properly understood, however, it becomes clear that the highest Brahman of the Upanisads and the Vedanta is nothing if not personal.74

De Smet also went on to consider the question of human personality: does Indian philosophy have an adequate notion of human personality? After perusing the Vedas, Upanisads, earlier and later Buddhism, Jainism, Saiva Siddhanta, Samkhya, the Bhagavad Gita, and so forth, he came to the conclusion that it is in Sankara Vedanta that there may be found the most adequate conception of person in Indian thought, a conception that respects the spirituality as well as the integrity of the person.

This is not the place to enter into a detailed exposition of De Smet's brilliant reading of Indian thought and his generation of the category of person from within it.75 Suffice it to say that his work was influential enough in Indian circles to have won him an invitation to contribute entries on person, individuality, and so forth to the Marathi Encyclopedia of Philosophy, an invitation that served also to crystallize the use of the term vyakti as the Indian equivalent of person, at least in Marathi and perhaps also in languages deriving from Sanskrit.76

My suggestion is that Lonergan's own discussions of the person, and his transposition of this metaphysical category into the psychological category of the subject, might serve now as an upper blade to both

74 No less a scholar and Vedantin than T. M. P. Mahadevan admitted at a public seminar that the Brahman is nothing if not personal. Interestingly, De Smet calls this an important linguistic change, and I am beginning to realize that it is just that: a linguistic change. For true change, the whole system and context needs to change, because it is only within a system that words and terms acquire their meaning. See R. De Smet, "Toward an Indian View of the Person," Contemporary Indian Philosophy, Brahman and Person, 118. Series II, Muirhead Library of Philosophy, ed. M. Chatterjee (London: Allen and Unwin, 1974), 54.

75 A summary may be found in Coelho, "Introduction," Brahman and Person, 7-24.

76 See Brahman and Person, chap. 10: "Atman and Person: Contributions to the Marathi Tattvajnana Mahakosa," Brahman and Person, 141-60.
retrieve De Smet's work, and to confirm it by a fresh reading of the texts of the Indian tradition, especially those of Sankara Vedanta. This line of approach seems to me to be especially promising, given that Indian thought dwells abundantly on the self and on consciousness, as Lonergan himself has noted. But, as I have said already, I do not claim to offer more than pointers and hints.

**Cognitional Theory**

We could begin by asking about Sankara's cognitional theory. It might be granted that he is no empiricist or positivist. Again, a number of scholars, though not all, agree that he strenuously rejected the subjective idealism of Buddhist vijnanavada. Still, we need to ask, how did he understand understanding and judgment?

In an early article De Smet suggests that, in keeping with Indian schools such as the Vaisesika and the Mimamsa, Sankara tacitly assumed the similarity postulate that like is known by like, which led him to conceive knowledge as the result of a process of reflection in the mirror-like intellect (buddhi). This is indicated by his stance that the experience of pure consciousness, when unprepared by scriptural testimony (sruti), leads no further than the apprehension of the void (sunya). Its positive interpretation as experience of the Self (Atman) requires the help of another means of knowledge, sruti. "If the modes of knowledge and reality coincide, then when the mode of knowledge is

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77 In *De intellectu et methodo* and in *De methodo theologiae* (1962), Lonergan makes passing references to India which reflect the standard prevailing interpretation of the Upanishads. Our point here is that he recognizes the focus on the subject and Atman. "In India there occurred a genuine development of reason, hence a genuine philosophy, but the focus was almost entirely on the subject rather than the object (cf. the Upanisads); as a result there was no objectification of the subject as such, which was identified with Atma" (Bernard Lonergan, *De intellectu et methodo*, notes taken by F. Rossi de Gasperis and P. Joseph Cahill from the course given at the Gregorian University, Rome, Spring 1959 [unpublished], 34 [Shields translation]). "[1]n Brahmanism there are oppositions which are, however, reduced to one: the world of the sacred, interior, intelligible is the absolute subject, Atman; nirvana consists in absorption into Atman. The profane, exterior, visible world is Maya, the field of appearances, of karma, of transmigration" (*De methodo theologiae* [autograph 1962] 16 [Shields translation]).

78 Sengaku Mayeda is among those who regard Sankara as a vijnanavadin or subjective idealist.
purity it mirrors nothing and the mode of reality can only be sunya.\textsuperscript{79}

However, according to De Smet, Sankara did try to overcome the defects of his inherited theory of knowledge in several ways. Thus in the Bhagavad Gita Bhasya 2, 16 De Smet finds a transcendental analysis of judgment. First, Sankara defines being as that object whose knowledge never fails, and non-being as that object whose knowledge fails. Next, he makes an analysis of knowledge, or better, judgment, as in “This is a jar,” “This is a cloth,” “This is an elephant,” in contrast to a simple description such as “blue lotus.” He then goes on to point out that in every judgment there is a double knowledge (buddhi) of the substratum which is being (sat), and of subjects such as jar, cloth, elephant. Of these two buddhis, the latter eventually fails, since jars and so forth pass away, but the former never fails, being present even in judgments about illusory objects. So the various subjects of judgment are non-being (asat), while being (sat), whose knowledge never fails, designates Brahman. In this analysis, says De Smet, we find at least the first point of the Thomist analysis, that is, that the immutable Being is somehow affirmed in every judgment, as the radical object of the existential copula. De Smet concludes that both Sankara and Thomas discovered that judgment is anchored in the Absolute as its one Pole and Goal. Unlike Thomas, however, who explained this anchoring by appealing to the dynamism of the intellect, Sankara explains it only by appealing to scripture: the Atman is the witness (saksin), the immutable Being ever present to the judging intellect.\textsuperscript{80}

In a later article, however, De Smet seems to modify his findings on the static nature of intellect in Sankara and on the absence of intellectual dynamism. Thus he reports that Sankara regarded human intellect as interpretative and dynamic:

Let me finally draw your attention to one feature in Sankara's profile by which he stands out among Indian thinkers. It is his presupposition that human intelligence is dynamic and interpretative rather than static and mirror-like. It is interpretative because “the intellect has the power of considering as a whole” (samasta-pratyavamarsini buddhi):


\textsuperscript{80} De Smet, “Questioning Vedanta,” 102-103.
From Person to Subject

Taitt. Up. Bh. 2, 3) the successive data of the senses which it synthesizes and judges. It is dynamic because it is driven by a constitutive desire to know (jñāṇa) which is not limited to finite realities but reaches beyond them to the supreme Reality.\(^8^1\)

**Notion of Being**

So there do seem to be hints in Sankara of the dynamism of intellect and of the active nature of understanding. What then of the notion of being? Sankara seems to appreciate the difference between the “what” component, which he regards as unreal, and the “is” component, which he regards as real. Such language has given rise to a multitude of interpretations, so much so that the currently dominant interpretation of Sankara tends to be acosmic and monist. Here too a close study is needed, with attention to De Smet’s own extensive work on the matter. We content ourselves with his remarks that Sankara does have an equivalent to Thomas’s esse, since he regards Brahman as the absolute Existent (Sat). It is because Brahman is the absolute Existent that it can emanate a full universe freely and without being affected by it.\(^8^2\) It is only an exigency of Sankara’s Sanskrit language, says De Smet, that forces him to use the participle “sat” rather than the infinite “as.” “As” would have been the perfect equivalent of esse; they even have the same Indo-European root.\(^8^3\)

Does Sankara also suffer, like the Vaisesikas and Mimamsakas, from a tendency to ontologize logical categories and even linguistic and commonsense categories?\(^8^4\) This also would bear proper investigation.


84 The Vaisesikas considered genus and species (samanya and vīśeṣa) as ontological categories (padarthaḥ), thus ranging themselves with extreme Realists (who consider universals as actually existing rather than existing only in the mind). Again, many Mimamsakas imagined a realm of subsistent sphotas, while others ontologized the
If it can be shown that Sankara does manage to avoid this pitfall, it would be an indication of his willingness to overcome the similarity postulate and of his distinction of logical and predicamental analysis from properly metaphysical analysis.  

**Consciousness**

What of the notion of consciousness? The Atman – the Eternal Infinite Subject – is Consciousness itself (*Caitanya, Avagati, Upalabdhi, Prajñana, Samvīt*). 

The *Brahma Sutra Bhasya* even defines Brahman as “that omniscient, omnipotent Cause from which (yataḥ) proceed the origin, subsistence and dissolution of this whole world.”

Clearly, however, Brahman-Atman is not a changing knower; it is immutable (*kutastha*); it is the Witness (*Saksin, Drs*) or Illuminator (*Ceta*) which is self-luminous (*Svayam-Jyoti*).  

Sankara spends time and energy expounding the Upanisadic definitions of the Brahman-Atman as, for example, *Satyam Jnanam Anantam* – Reality, Consciousness, Infinity. *Jnanam* indicates that Brahman is consciousness, but *Anantam* negates finitude, and so forth. 

Still, the Atman encompasses all cognitions as its objects; it is the Witness of all cognitions.

Now the crucial point would be to determine further Sankara’s notion of consciousness: is it consciousness as experience, or consciousness as perception? There is at least one indication that it is the former: when it comes to speaking about the preexistence

*akritis*. Even the term *nama-rupa*, when given a realistic interpretation, is a [illegitimate] transfer from the realm of speech and perception to that of metaphysics. De Smet, “Questioning Vedanta,” 98.

85 See Lonergan’s sharp distinction of these in *The Ontological and Psychological Constitution of Christ*, 49.

86 Richard De Smet, Guidelines in Indian Philosophy, cyclostyled notes for students (Poona: De Nobili College, 1968-75), 307.


88 Sankara, *Upadesasahasri* 18, 26, etc. De Smet, Guidelines in Indian Philosophy, 307.

of effects in *Brahman*, Sankara clearly makes an Aristotelian type of option for knowledge by identity rather than a Platonic type of option for knowledge by confrontation. All names-and-forms (*namarupas*) preexist in *Brahman*, he says, in the manner of something future (*bhavisyena rupena*), that is, virtually, as effects preexist in the actual power of their cause. These *namarupas* are identical with the *Atman* in their unmanifested state. Now both Samkhya and Sankara presuppose that the effects preexist as possible “futures” (*bhavisya*) in their cause (*satkaryavada*), but the two systems understand this differently: “We admit only a previous state [of the world] dependent on the highest Lord, not an independent state.” Again, in *Brahma Sutra Bhasya* 1, 1, 5 Sankara asks, “What was the object of *Brahman*’s thinking before the creation?” His reply is, “The object of thinking is unevolved names and forms (*namarupe auyakre*) which are not definable as ‘that’ or ‘other’ (*tattvanyatvabhyam anirvacaniya*) and which are going to be manifested.” The point is that God knows everything by knowing himself; but this is the Aristotelian-Thomist knowledge by identity – which probably means that Sankara can be seen as a partisan of consciousness as experience rather than consciousness as perception. We may note that Aquinas himself was a partisan of *satkaryavada*: for him too, things can arise only out of the absolute Being; they preexist virtually in the Power of their Cause, and they are eternally known by it independently of their actual production. “And as such,” writes Aquinas, “creatures preexisting in God are the divine Essence itself.”

**The Human Self**

Next we ask about the human self (*jivatman*). In his Introduction to his *Brahma Sutra Bhasya*, Sankara notes that the subject (*visayin*), whose sphere is the notion of “I,” is intelligent by essence (*cid-atmaka*). He also notes that there is an absolute distinction between the sphere

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of the ego (asmad-gocara) or subject and the sphere of the non-ego (yusmad-gocara) or object. The former is of the nature of light [or consciousness], while the latter is of the nature of darkness [being unconscious].

Now the consciousness of the jivatman is a dependent type of consciousness: it is a reflection in the ego-sense (buddhi) of the supreme Consciousness that is the Brahman-Atman.

Further, it is the jivatman that is the ultimate subject of attribution. In contrast to Brahman which is immutable, it is changing, acting, suffering. Where the supreme Atman is never described as knower, enjoyer, and agent, the jivatman is affirmed as knower, enjoyer, and agent. It conceives itself as “I” (aham) and possesses qualities, senses, body, and other possessions which it calls “mine.” This jivatman is what is primarily indicated by “I” or “you,” that is, as the knower and hearer.

It is the jivatman therefore that experiences, understands, judges, that is marked by a desire for knowledge (jijnasa) or intellectual dynamism.

Being naturally pervaded (vyapta) by Vidya (knowledge-wisdom), illumined by pure Consciousness, the jivatman is made cognitive by its light and reflects it in all its partial truths. “The light of Consciousness is the illuminer of the mind (manaso avabhasakam) because it is its controller (niyantrtvat), being the source of its light. The inner Atman being the innermost of all objects, the mind cannot move toward it. Rather the mind itself is able to think only when it is illumined by the light of Consciousness residing inside it. Hence, knowers of Brahman declare that the mind with all its functions is made into thought (matam), made into a cognizing subject (visayikrtam), as pervaded by (vyaptam) this inner Atman.”

The jivatman is also integrator. It has the Brahman-Atman as

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93 De Smet, Guidelines in Indian Philosophy, 303. Note that De Smet translates cit as intelligence.
its "own form" (svarupa), its "fundamental essence" (svabhava), but as reflection within its upadhis (the inner sense comprising of intellect, ego-sense, and mind). It is conditioned and colored by the core of qualities of its upadhis. Thanks to these extrinsic adjuncts the ego appears as an individual thinker, doer, and enjoyer existing in samsara. This superimposition is innate; it is brought about by the permission of the Lord, the highest Self, the witness residing in all beings, the cause of all intelligence. This action of the Lord results in the person as a well-integrated individual:

Just as the milk-testing gem imparts its lustre to milk, so the light of the Atman – which is subtler than the intellect or heart through being within the heart, UNIFIES (eki-karoti) and imparts its lustre to the body and the organs including the heart, etc....The intellect, being diaphanous and next to the Atman, becomes the reflection (abhasa) of the Consciousness-light of the Atman....Then this reflection illumines the mind (manas)...then the senses...and finally the body....It is always through the favour of the light of the Atman that all our activities take place...for every act of man is referred to his ego which results from that illumination.

Thus the existential unity of the human being derives absolutely from the innermost Atman through the mediation of its reflection, the individual atman, which diffuses it unto the buddhi, manas, indriyas, and sarira. Such a conception overcomes Samkhya dualism. “Man is no longer the heterogeneous assemblage of a blind and a lame but an integrated contingent being totally dependent on the Absolute.”

What is the relation between this jivatman and the supreme Atman? This is a metaphysical rather than a gnoseological question, but De Smet shows abundantly how it is not simply identical with the Atman, but is related to it in a relation of total ontological dependence called tadatmya, “having that as one’s inmost self”:

96 Sankara, Brahma Sutra Bhasya 2, 3, 29.32.40.
This appropriator [that says "I" and "mine"] is the ego-sense which always stands (mirror-like) in proximity to that [Atman which is pure Awareness] and acquires a reflection of it (tad abha). Hence, there arises this intrication of Atman and atmiya (that whose Atman it is) which is the sphere of application of the words "I" and "mine"....It is because the ego-sense bears a reflection (abhasa) of the Atman that it is designated by words [such as "I" or "Thou"] pertaining to the Atman....

The reflection (abhasa) of a face is different from the face since it conforms to the mirror; and in turn the face is different from its reflection since it does not conform to the mirror.

The reflection of the Atman in the ego-sense is comparable to the reflection of a face [in a mirror]. As in the case of the face, the Atman is other (anya), says the tradition, and the two [Atman and its reflection] are likewise undiscriminated.

De Smet sums up:

What then is man or any kartr-bhoktr-jnitr (doer-enjoyer-knower)? A Jivatman plus inner senses, outer senses and body conjoined (cf. Katha Up. 3, 3-9). What is the Jivatman and how does it unify (ekikr) Buddhi and the rest? According to Upadesasahasri 18, 27 ssq, it is a reflection (abhasa) (in the mirror-like inner sense) of the supreme Atman which is its Prototype. As such it is not an illusion but an ontologically relative and dependent contingent entity for it is unequal to its Cause and Prototype. Though similar to it in imitated centrality, consciousness, freedom, etc., it also shares in its reflector's finiteness, mobility, passibility, etc. It cannot find its truth in itself but only in its Prototype which is its true vastu. In this sense it is not svartha [independent] but parartha.


[dependent, contingent]. In its experience and activity it is autonomous insofar as it consciously takes its own decisions as befits a jnatr-kartr (knower-doer). Sankara’s tenet is that Brahman “is the Atman of this experience” (Atma sa bhoktur iti: B.S.Bh. 1, 1, 1 and elsewhere: kartur-atma, jnatur atma, the Atman of the agent, of the knower, note the genitive). The Brahman is itself neither bhoktr nor kartr nor jnatur; hence it is not expressed (vacya) by the term “I” (aham) although it belongs to the sphere (gocara) of aham insofar as it is signified indirectly by the jahad-ajahal-laksana [analogous indication] of aham.\(^{102}\)

Between the reals and the Real – and therefore also between jivatman and Atman – there is a relation called tadatmya. In its ordinary sense, tadatmya means “identity,” but here it must be taken in its etymological sense, “having That as one’s Atman.” According to Sankara’s explanations, it has the following properties: non-reciprocality, dependence, non-separateness, non-otherness, distinction, and extrinsic denominativeness. This suffices to suggest that attention to Sankara’s writings can eliminate both misinterpretations, pantheism as well as acosmism. The negativity of many of his statements is a matter both of language and of perspective. As an exegete of Vedanta he is driven to use a threefold language; and as a Vedantin, he has to view everything from the perspective of the transcendent Absolute.\(^{103}\)

We must note here Sankara’s assertion that scripture is not competent in mundane matters. This means that it is not right to seek, either in scripture or in Sankara, for an unlimited philosophy complete with ontology, cosmology, epistemology, psychology, ethics, and so forth, but only for matters related to the transcendent Reality and the transcendental relations to it of the universe of things and of selves. “The Sruti is an authority in transcendental matters, in matters lying beyond the bonds of human knowledge, that is, beyond perception and reasoning, but not in matters lying within the range of perception,


and so forth. A hundred *srtis* may declare that fire is cold or dark; still, they possess no authority in the matter. Thus we should in no way attach to *Sruti* a meaning which is opposed to other *pramanas* or to its own declarations.\(^{104}\) Thus "it is nowhere the purpose of *Sruti* to make statements regarding the *jivatman*, since from ordinary experience the latter is known to everyone as the agent and experiencer."\(^{105}\)

Sankara Vedanta is a transcendental doctrine grounded strictly in the *Sruti*. It exists side by side but without compromise with the non-transcendental sciences. It asserts their limited validity. It completes them by the addition of its own dimension and perspective without substituting for them. However, it corrects them eventually by opposing their pretended metaphysics and substituting for it its own *srti*-founded metaphysics\(^{106}\) – and here lies whatever it has to say about *jivatman*. Also, the *jivatman* is the door to the *Atman*, and to that extent *srti* does have something to say about it. So while, on the one hand, we may not expect to find a detailed cognitional theory, epistemology, and metaphysics in Sankara, we must also not derive from him positions involving the denial of the reality of the mundane world and of the human self.

### 7. CONCLUSION

In the light of Lonergan’s transposition of person into subject, I have tried to read De Smet on Sankara and indicate possible results. The areas considered were cognitional theory, the notion of being, consciousness, and the human self. The conclusion indicated is that there does seem to be a notion of the subject in Sankara. Finite and infinite subjects are characterized in different ways by consciousness, intelligence, freedom, and wholeness. But this remains a hypothesis to be verified by further interpretation and dialectic.

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\(^{106}\) De Smet, "Forward Steps in Sankara Research," 35.
ARISTOTLE, M. A. K. HALLIDAY, AND B. J. F. LONERGAN: TOWARD A GENERAL THEORY OF LANGUAGE FOR LANGUAGE TEACHERS

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CAN LANGUAGE TEACHING AFFORD TO PUT ASIDE ARISTOTLE AS THE FATHER OF GRAMMAR?

Written on the basis of some of Lonergan’s incidental comments on language, this article begins from a dialogue with contemporary British linguists about Aristotle’s contribution to understanding language. The paper comes in three parts. Firstly, a section on the understandings of noun and verb attributed to Aristotle by the contemporary linguistic paradigm and then by one Aristotelian commentator in particular. Secondly, a dialogue between M. A. K Halliday and B. J. F. Lonergan leading to a four-level model of language and meaning in human culture. Then, finally, an outline of a spiral curriculum for teachers of languages, as a solution to the practical problem of how to teach English to non-speakers, which acted as the driver for the research behind the article.

Not uncommonly, on websites and in books on grammar, Aristotle is presented as the father of grammar. Minimally his use of ὄνομα (onoma) is taken to mean the same as the word “noun” in traditional grammar and the ρημα (rhema) as meaning “verb.” Additionally πτωσις (ptosis) is taken as referring to the tenses of a verb and συνδέσμοι (sundesmoi) to conjunctions.¹ In fact, the eightfold categories of

traditional classical grammar, including such terms as conjunctions, were not articulated until Thrax,² several centuries after Aristotle.³ Our interpretation of Aristotle comes from de Rijk.⁴

Professional preparation for language teachers commonly socializes would-be teachers into a series of classroom and teaching techniques for use in conjunction with a textbook.⁵ In contrast, this paper develops a model of language to replace approaches to language teaching based on teaching techniques. Contemporary textbooks, too, often use a curriculum that focuses on the grammar and lexis


² The first extant grammar of Greek, “Art of Grammar” (Τέκχνις γραμματική), is attributed to Thrax but many scholars today doubt that the work really belongs solely to him due to the difference between the technical approach of most of the work and the more literary approach (similar to the second century’s Alexandrian tradition) of the first few sections. The grammar concerns itself primarily with a morphological description of Greek, lacking any treatment of syntax. The work was translated into Armenian and Syriac in the early Christian era. Thrax defines grammar at the beginning of the Τέκχνις as “the practical knowledge of the general usages of poets and prose writers.” Thus, Thrax, like contemporary Alexandrian scholars who edited Attic Greek and Homeric texts, was concerned with facilitating the teaching of classic Greek literature to an audience who spoke Koine Greek (http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Dionysius_Thrax; accessed May 2009). Similarly Pannini, who wrote, around or before the time of Aristotle, a full descriptive Hindi grammar of syntax much appreciated by modern linguists, was also concerned with maintaining access to the correct understanding of the religious texts of an earlier period.

³ For example, Thrax’s eight categories of noun, verb, participle, article, pronoun, adverb, preposition, and conjunction. Cf. R. H. Robins, *Diversions of Bloomsbury* (Amsterdam: North- Holland Publishing Company, 1969), 199. Or in a modern version from the VISL group of researchers at the Institute of Language and Communication (University of Southern Denmark) (1) noun, proper noun, (2) verb, with subcategories such as v-fin finite verb, v-inf infinitive, v-pcp1 present participle, v-pcp2 past participle, (3) adjective, (4) adverb, (5) pronoun, with numerous subcategories, for example, pronpers personal pronoun, (6) preposition, (7) article, (8) numeral, (9) conjunction, divided into conj-c (coordinating conjunction) and conj-s (subordinating conjunction), (10) interjection http://visl.sdu.dk/cafeteria.html.


of oral language, as exemplified in the British approach to language teaching.\textsuperscript{6} Ironically, a textbook-based context for language teaching in the classroom presupposes models of performance derived from literacy rather than oracy. In contrast, the model of language approach developed in this paper links language to culture so that teaching a language is teaching a culture, whether the focus on the control of meaning within that culture is oral, literate, scholarly, scientific, or methodical.

**PART 1: COLLOCATING NOUNS, VERBS, ADJECTIVES, AND ADVERBS**

In Part 1 we turn now to consider how Aristotle has been made into the father of grammar in a way that trivializes his substantive contribution to an understanding of the different levels at which meaning works in language. Given his nontechnical use of language such ignorance may not be surprising, but below we use de Rijk to work through some of the different meanings Aristotle attributes to his terms, pointing out similarities between some Aristotelian understandings of *onoma* and *rhema* and contemporary approaches to collocation in language.

A contemporary paradigm\textsuperscript{7} in British linguistics nods to Aristotle as the father of grammar, perhaps on the basis that over time his use of the words *onoma*, *rhema*, and *ptosis* became the terms used for noun, verb, and noun declension in the grammar written by Thrax some centuries later. We will shortly outline the basic features of this paradigm using two linguists, Robins and Halliday, who worked or studied at SOAS in London at the same time.\textsuperscript{8} Academics within this paradigm give Aristotle a place as the father of grammar, but they reject his metaphysical and logico-grammatical approach to language and meaning. We shall therefore outline some basic features of this contemporary linguistic paradigm before returning to what Aristotle


\textsuperscript{7} Paradigm in the sense of a set of largely shared assumptions about methods, standards, aims, and here the nature of language and the nature of the processes in it.

might actually have meant when using the terms *onomata*, *rhema*, and *ptosis*.

Robbins wrote on the development of grammar in the West, presenting contemporary descriptive and formal linguistics as the culmination of an evolutionary and progressive development. "A writer's work represents a stage in the history and development of the subject he is concerned with, and Thrax may not be without significance for linguists today, in that his work takes place as a stage in the evolution of linguistic theory and linguistic statement." Halliday, in contrast, makes original and influential contributions to understanding how languages work, yet he shows little curiosity about what Aristotle was trying to do. We will discuss Robins fairly briefly, but Halliday has been influential even within the teaching of English to native speakers in schools, emphasizing the importance of learners recognizing different forms of text and genre if we are to write in English. He is proving increasingly influential in second language teaching through his emphasis on the social context of language use. He also developed Systematic Functional Grammar, a form of grammar somewhat different to the traditional classical-based grammars derived from the Greeks and Romans.

According to Robins, Aristotle divides "the words of the Greek language into nouns (onomata) and verbs (rhemata), on logical grounds similar to Plato's. Only onomata and rhemata were parts of speech in the full sense." Later Robins writes that "Aristotle, like Plato, made onomata and rhemata the main constituents of logos, the sentence. Both onomata and rhemata are semantically indivisible, and rhemata are distinguished from onomata by their function as predicates and their inclusion within themselves of time reference (tense)..." Finally, Robins does not limit *ptosis* to verb tenses, although he credits Aristotle with the development of verb tenses. "The future and imperfect tenses indicate 'surrounding time' and, being less determinate than the present are modifications of the verb" (πωσαίς ρηματος).

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9 Robins (1969) op. cit., 19.
12 Cf. Robins (1951) op. cit., 24. πτωσις is usually taken to mean "a fall" or "falling," as in "a falling away from." Beginning from this metaphorical basis πτωσις comes to refer to
Robins’s progressive view of Aristotle as the father of grammar is further indicated in the following quotations: “under Aristotle grammar made further advance on the lines already laid down,”13 “We find Aristotle...making progress,”14 or “Aristotle anticipates some modern grammatical thought (is) in his definition of ‘word’... (as) the minimal meaningful unit.”15 Robins then goes on to say that “One cannot now defend this doctrine of meaning. It is based on the formal logic that Aristotle codified and, we might say, sterilized, for generations. The notion that words have meaning just by standing for or indicating something, whether in the world at large or in the human mind (both views are stated or suggested by Aristotle), leads to difficulties that have worried philosophers in many ages and seriously distorts linguistic and grammatical studies.”16 In contrast, in the modern paradigm “formal criteria (grammatical behaviour, free substitutability) come to supplement and then to replace criteria based on ‘meaning’ without further precision of the concept.”17

In a further article, Robins outlines the characteristics of the new paradigm, even more clearly raising the question of whether the distinction between verb and noun is found in all languages. In antiquity and medieval scholarship Latin grammar was seen as the counterpart of Greek, and then until the nineteenth century “each language continued to have its grammatical structure analysed and stated within the framework of Latin.”18 This was possible because “The all forms/shapes of the word that derived by modifying the “normal” (initial) form. “Thus Aristotle uses the term not only for what we call cases but for derivatives, inflections of the verb and so on without distinction.” Robins (1951) op. cit., 31. “Aristotle used the word πτωοις to denote any grammatically significant word form variation, considered as a deviation from a basic form, the nominative in nouns and the present tense in verbs.” Robins (1969), 109. But Jean T. Oesterle, trans., Aristotle: On Interpretation: Commentary by St. Thomas and Cajetan (Milwaukee: Marquette University Press, 1969) has a different opinion: “I disagree, however, with Mr. Robin’s position that Aristotle is defining grammatical notions in the Peri Hermeneias.” (http://www.questiaschool.com/read/61450497?title=LessLesson%20IV%3A%20The%20Name; accessed May 2009).

13 Robins (1951) op. cit., 24.
14 Robins (1951) op. cit., 24.
15 Robins (1951) op. cit., 20.
16 Robins (1951) op. cit., 21.
17 Robins (1951) op. cit., 21.
medieval scholastic grammarians based grammar on the supposedly universal metaphysical structure of reality." But metaphysical structures are to be rejected as unverifiable and likewise any "appeal to 'common mentality' or general human psychological characteristics... is unjustified and in great part circular. Besides this, it rests heavily on the inadequate theory of language as the outward manifestation of 'inner' mental operations." In the same vein, "Statements about mental or psychological operations and faculties cannot be based on direct observation, except perhaps in the limited and purely personal field of introspection, and are bound to be constructions out of other data, not least those of linguistic behaviour."

A contemporary grammar, in contrast, is formal, empirical or inductive, descriptive and predisposed to particular interpretations by the specific language "patterns that shape our thinking and analysis." Different languages involve different metaphysics and give different accounts of reality. It is not that the limitations of a given linguistic framework cannot be overcome by a careful and exhaustive analysis, but even so "any descriptive analysis of a language will be to some extent subjective and influenced by the language of the investigator." Further, Robins is aware of the problems of interpretation raised by historical consciousness, so later in the same volume he argues that "Every work of scholarship may be studied in the context of the times in which it was written, and in the context of previous work on kindred topics." However, he seemingly found it more appropriate to give a formal nod to Aristotle rather than raise the question of whether his own reading of Aristotle, too, was anachronistic. This lack of a direct academic interest in Aristotle also forms part of Halliday's horizon.

Halliday was both a linguist and a language teacher, but his distinctive approach to grammar called "systemic functional

grammar" was much influenced by his learning and academic study of Chinese, as well as his experience of teaching Chinese, Russian, and English. Nevertheless, especially given his experience as a teacher of languages, his functional grammar seems to have little relationship to the grammars developed by the Greeks and Romans, grammars that can continue to underpin the approach to language teaching.

A systematic functional approach to language also contrasts with Chomsky's generative grammar which can be said to be largely a set of logical rules for spelling out the structures of noun and verbs within clauses generated by the "Language Acquisition Device."


26 "I think I began with very straight-forward questions about the grammar because there were so many things in Chinese grammar which just simply weren't described at all and we had been told nothing about them because they just weren't within the scope of traditional grammars and existing grammars of Chinese. We just had to discover them for ourselves. Now I felt very well aware of these and wanted some way of studying them. So this was the first attraction to linguistics, before any other kind – the attraction of educational or pedagogical questions which arose in my mind." Interview with M. A. K. Halliday, May 1986, by G. Kress, R. Hasan, and J. R. Martin (http://sfs.scnu.edu.cn/ Halliday/show.aspx?id=67&cid=101; accessed May 2009).

27 Lonergan may have become aware of Chomsky's generative grammar after the completion of Insight: A Study of Human Understanding, vol. 3 of Collected Works of Bernard Lonergan (Toronto: Toronto University Press, 1992/1957), although Insight was published in the same year as Chomsky (1957) Syntactic Structures (The Hague: Mouton. Reprint. Berlin and New York (1985). Lonergan annotated his copy of Insight with the comment "ordinary language [-] generative grammar" (cf note g in the editorial notes on p. 781 of Insight) next to the sentence. "But a nominal definition supposes no more than an insight into the proper use of language. An explanatory definition, on the other hand, supposes a further insight into the objects to which language refers." This suggests that Lonergan thought that Chomsky's account of language was at the nominal level. Later, Lonergan refers to the neural basis for multiple meaning and suggests that Chomsky made a breakthrough to a less deterministic account of language. Cf. 97-98 in P. Lambert, C. Tansey, and C. Going (ed.), Caring About Meaning: Patterns in the Life of Bernard Lonergan (Montreal: Thomas More Institute Papers, 1982/82). However, both Chomsky and probably Halliday hold to a reductionist explanation of language in the
Halliday notes that in the 1960s “Data were said to be irrelevant to the serious study of language; the actual language used by real people, especially spoken language, was dismissed as impoverished and unstructured, a mere matter of performance that could tell us nothing about the true object of description, which was linguistic structure—the rules generating the set of idealized sentences that constituted the ideal speaker’s competence or knowledge of the language.” Like other modern approaches to linguistic analysis, a systemic functional approach to language can be assisted by computer-based analysis of large corpora of linguistic data. So, if traditional grammatics represents language as a set of rules to be learned, systemic functional grammar represents language as a purposeful activity in the real world providing a network of options which structure activity.

In presenting his grammar, Halliday makes a distinction between grammar and grammatics, where grammar is how “wording” takes place within a language, and where grammatics is the second-order account of the grammar of a language. He illustrates this transition from one level to another level with reference to the classical Greek grammarians. “In ancient Greek linguistics, by contrast, the technical terms evolved out of everyday language. The process was a gradual one, extending over three or four centuries; and in the course of this time the original terms has moved some distance from their non-technical meanings, evolving as the theory evolved. Thus, in everyday language, onoma meant ‘a name’, rhema meant ‘saying’; logos meant ‘speech, discourse’ and grammatike meant ‘writing’. As grammatike evolved into ‘grammar’, onoma came to mean ‘a noun’; rhema became first ‘rheme’, in the Prague sense, and then ‘a verb’; while logos came to mean ‘a sentence’. Here it was folk linguistic terms for forms of discourse which became the source of technical nomenclature in grammar.”

In this contrast between the ordinary meaning and the technical meaning of the terms onoma and rhema, Halliday is also illustrating the distinction he makes between the intersubjective and ideational interconnections of the brain.


functions of language, between ordinary everyday language as distinct from the ideational or technical languages used in academia, for example. Halliday is writing his grammatics at the ideational or second-order level of language and meaning, and so he is interested in the functional relations within the clause. \(^{30}\) The categories of his model are theoretical rather than descriptive. "The theoretical categories, and their interrelations, construe an abstract model of language (and other semiotic systems); they are interlocking and mutually defining."\(^{31}\) However, as we shall go on to illustrate, Halliday's understanding of the noun does not reach the level of a fully explanatory account, a failure he could perhaps have avoided with the kind of reading of Aristotle to which we will shortly turn after we have outlined what Halliday understands by the categories "noun" and "verb."

Halliday's understanding of a "noun" goes beyond the single word and includes common nouns, proper names, nominal compounds, nominalizations (whether from a verb or as a whole clause), and nominal groups or noun phrases (nouns plus their determiners and any other modifiers). Given this range of reference he then gives the following definition: "The noun is the class of words (including compounds) that names classes of things; centrally, concrete objects and persons, but also abstractions, processes, relations, states and attributes, whatever can stand for a pronoun."\(^{32}\) He understands that this class is a generalization, but more particularly recognizes that nouns can function in different ways, principally as subject or object but also in other ways, and further that other elements can take on the function of a noun within a clause. "In specifying these roles, therefore, we are making generalizations about the function of nominals in English. In addition to the roles just mentioned, the affected and the causer, I shall briefly refer to some others, including certain roles not defined by transitivity but by another dimension of clause patterning known as 'theme'."\(^{33}\) With this reference to "theme" we are back to the

33 Halliday, *On Language and Linguistics*, op. cit., 61. Theme refers to the focus, or main item of information being presented within the understanding that language is communicative understanding.
topic of the text as a way of communicating information to which we shall turn shortly. But given the generality of this discussion of the noun and the clause, Halliday then goes on to argue that the English clause functions in terms of cause and effect, and not in terms of action and goal. Moreover, he argues that the speaker of English normally structures the message of the clause around the verb, and he uses "the term 'process' as a general term for that which is designated by the verb."  

Halliday uses the ideational language of functions, roles, pattern, internal features in pursuit of "the nature and functioning of the linguistic system." But for all the talk of pattern, function, and system, Halliday adds that his understanding of noun and verb cannot be fully explained. Grammatical categories remain "ineffable." This is so for Halliday because unlike a designed system which to be designed needs principles that can be made explicit, language is an evolved system, "and evolved systems rest on principles that are ineffable - because they do not correspond to any consciously accessible categorization of our experience." So his definition of a noun is in terms of names for classes of things: "a noun will be defined as 'that which names a person, living being or inanimate object (gloss on the name "noun"); which can be participant in an action or event (gloss on the expression "subject or object of a verb"), and may be single or multiple (gloss on "singular or plural in number"). For Halliday, language has intrinsic limitations on its ability to interpret itself, and so a grammar cannot be fully explicit. Indeed to achieve such transparency we would "have to move to some parallel or higher order semiotic which, since it is not itself language, can be represented in language and then reflected to become a metalanguage for representing language....Until we can create a greater distance between the semiotic object and the metasemiotic, grammatical categories are bound to remain ineffable."  

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34 Halliday, On Language and Linguistics, op. cit., 60.  
37 Halliday "On the Ineffability of Grammatical Categories?", 306  
38 Halliday "On the Ineffability of Grammatical Categories?", 307  
39 Halliday and Webster, op. cit., 313. For Halliday a semiotic "is a stratified, or stratal system, in which the output of one coding process becomes the input to another (196)" (1979) So, moving from the higher to the lower level, meaning is encoded downward
might well agree with the desirability of reaching implicit definitions, but clearly thinks they are unattainable when dealing with language.

However, rather than give up on an explicit and explanatory account of nouns and verbs, Halliday’s conundrum can, I believe, be addressed through a return to Aristotle’s understanding of onoma and rhema for, as will be illustrated below, these two terms may not actually signify “noun” and “verb” as currently understood by linguists or grammarians, whether of a traditional or modern variety. Rather, primed by Aristotle and aided by Lonergan, we can reach implicit definitions of nouns and verbs. Once in possession of these definitions we have the basis for a fruitful and enriching abstraction that can have different realizations in individual languages. We can anticipate that the “wordings” that count as noun in one language may act as a verb in another, or that noun-verb functions may operate using the same “wordings,” or that one language culture tends to understand the implicit noun-verb relations in terms of cause and effect rather than action and goal. We can also move away from a vulgar or naïve relativism while fully recognizing the constitutive role of language. We are able to talk of the noun-verb relationship without, as Halliday seems to be doing, restricting the meaning of the terms in the language we are actually using to talk about nouns and verbs.

in wording, and wording downward in sound, or writing. The overall description of Halliday’s general theory of language will follow in Part 2.

40 We can remind ourselves of Lonergan’s understanding of an implicit definition, the equivalent of Halliday’s explicit or “effable” definition. “The significance of implicit definition is its complete generality. The omission of nominal definitions is the omission of a restriction to the object which, in the first instance, one happens to be thinking about. The exclusive use of explanatory or postulational elements concentrate attention upon the set of relationships in which the whole scientific significance is contained.” Insight (1992, 1957), 57.


42 “striving to avoid a sort of vulgarized Whorfiansism... whereby language is held to imprison the whole of one’s thinking, we may nevertheless need to enquire into the relation between language and man’s view of society – not forgetting here his view of language, of words and things, since linguistically as well as culturally man is both the creation and the creator of his environment.” (Halliday and Webster, On Language and Linguistics, 71.)
Aristotle was engaged in a discussion with Plato, and in pursuit of that dialogue he used the emerging technical language of the time. However, perhaps not surprisingly, his vocabulary retains multiple meanings, as is commonly recognized. Moreover his work has been the focus of extensive secondary comment, including by authors with different epistemologies or with concerns not shared by Aristotle and perhaps not even within Aristotle’s own horizon. Frequently De Interpretatione is taken as the focal expression of Aristotle’s views on language and that text has been the subject of a number of recent commentaries. However, despite their positive attitude toward Aristotle, these authors do not address the meaning of all the terms, onoma, rhema, and ptosis in which we are interested, even though, for example, the emphasis Modrak gives to the role of phantasia in Aristotle’s account has implications for how we understand the interplay between knowledge and expression and metaphor. Nor do these authors directly address the problem of the multiple meanings that Aristotle can give to any of his “terms.” In contrast, de Rijk has provided a series of articles and two volumes which set out to outline the different meanings of the same term.43


45 “Phantasia presents sensory individuals, but the rational faculty uses these presentations to think universals. This cognitive ability is what distinguishes language users from other creatures employing species-specific sounds.” Modrak, Aristotle’s Theory of Language and Meaning, 267. “As a sensory content, a phantasmata would be well placed to mediate the relationship between the world and the mental state postulated by the theory. If phantasia is not a type of representation, it is hard to see how it would contribute to the human ability to use vocal utterances as linguistics signs at all (229-230).”

As Aristotle uses the same word with different meanings de Rijk gives four rules for the interpretation of Aristotle’s writings to separate out the different meanings attached to the same word.\(^{47}\) However, the reason for consulting de Rijk’s work at this point is not to set out Aristotle’s theory of language but to discover whether onoma and rhema are for Aristotle equivalent to noun and verb and whether together they make up a sentence. The answer is indirect, onoma and rhema cannot be isolated from the other terms used by Aristotle which provide the context for what onoma and rhema may mean in any given context.

In De Interpretatione, de Rijk argues, Aristotle is discussing two different levels of language use. Aristotle refers to these as the ονομαζεῖν (onomazein) or onomastic and the λέγειν (legein) or apophantic, but the meaning of these distinct levels of thinking is distinct from onoma and rhema. The onomastic level focuses on a composite expression (also referred to as a logos), the apophantic on whether the composite expression is true or false, asserted or denied (a logos aphantihos). Onoma and rhema are elements in composite expressions, potential ingredients of a statement-making expression that adds “is” or “is not” to the composite expression in a συνθέσις (synthesis).\(^{48}\) In contrast to these two levels, however, the onoma and rhema make up a composite expression which is both notional and ontological.

Aristotle is therefore also using the wording “be” εἶναι (einai) in different senses, firstly as tying two things together and secondly for saying that something is or is not the case.\(^{49}\) He operates with two
main syntactical uses of "be," firstly the connative use and secondly the absolute use. Over time the second has probably been the focus of greater comment, but the first is of greater interest here as it involves "the addition of 'be' to a noun or nominal formation, which from the viewpoint of colloquial grammar (or the 'surface structure'), is merely connative or intensional." Onoma and rema are linked connatively and intensionally and really. De Rijk comments, "It should be borne in mind, however, that to Aristotle, this connative (intensional) 'be' is not just a makeweight, but a real (although non-categorical) semantic component." In this account "The two (or more) notions making up this compound are taken from different categories, and are linked up with one another by the connotative (intensional) being they include qua categorical mode of being." Or again "the connative (intensional) 'be' is representative of Aristotle's view that substances (Socrates, man, tree, etc), and accidents (paleness, fatherhood, being in the Lyceum, walking etc.) also are categorical implementations of the semantically empty container value 'be' which by itself does not signify anything definite, and only co-signifies, i.e. constitutes a definite meaning if added to something definite."

As just indicated the onoma and rema together can be thought of as a nominal formation, an attribute, although given Aristotle's realistic use of the verb "be," the "nominal formation" to be taken forward into an assertion deals with heuristic notions or assertibles only by contrast. This "nominal formation" or assertible "is a compound of a substrate and an attributive determination from another category, neatly represents the ontic unity of the two particular forms, manhood and paleness as enmattered e.g. in Socrates." (de Rijk, Semantics and Ontology, 87.)

50 De Rijk, Semantics and Ontology, 35.
51 De Rijk, Semantics and Ontology, 35-36.
52 De Rijk, Semantics and Ontology, 86.
53 De Rijk, Semantics and Ontology, 36-37.
54 "a nominal construct, which equals one of the following in English: gerundial phrase, infinitival phrase, that-clause. (de Rijk, Semantics and Ontology, 86.)
55 Aristotle does allow for a "descriptive" assertible. "Expressions such as 'not-man' give rise to some difficulties. They are not genuine names, nor are they a λόγος or a negative statement. On the other hand, they are significant by themselves, the only difference to ordinary names being that they indicate only a vague, indefinite connotatum, and may denote, consequently, 'a wildly various range of objects'. So they are not entirely denied the label 'name' and are called by Aristotle 'indefinite names.'" (124 B)
e.g. 'a (the) man's being running', or 'a (the) man's being pale'. This onomazein is then open to the second level, or legein, assertion that the running man is, or the pale man is. De Rijk argues that the substrate (υποξειμένον) just referred to is an ontological rather than a logical term. The substrate is what provides something non-subsistent with the possibility of being there. The substrate is whatever something subsists in, so onoma refers to a substrate with rhema a determination of that substratum.

Aristotle is in dialogue with Plato and wants to assert that a form does not exist transcendentally but concretely, and so rhema gives the onoma a time reference, forms are emmattered in temporal substrates. The onoma signifies a subsistent mode of being, and the rhema deals with the normal case in which that subsistence is now and actual. The inflexions of rhema to past or future time, and in negative expressions, are not of the same order, but are rhema in a qualified sense. Given these comments, it is clear that the rhema and its time inflexions are not grammatical forms of the class of verbs. Similarly, ptosis refers to any modification of a word and not just to the declination of verbs, thus weakening the argument that rhema is being used by Aristotle to refer specifically to verbs. The discussion is epistemological and metaphysical, not logical in the contemporary sense, and not primarily grammatical.

We have been using de Rijk to argue that translations of onoma and rhema as the equivalent of the grammatical terms noun and verb respectively have in all probability misunderstood Aristotle. Lonergan read Aristotle in the light of Aquinas and after the development of

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57 C377
58 De Rijk, Semantics and Ontology, 207.
59 ibid. 209.
60 De Rijk, Semantics and Ontology, C212, 212.
61 De Rijk, Semantics and Ontology, C209, 209.
62 De Rijk (2002) op. cit., 513. Thus, according to Aristotle, πέριοις means all forms of the word derived from the "normal" (initial) form and so refers almost to all parts of speech. In addition, note the comments of Oesterle, "I disagree, however, with Mr. Robin's position that Aristotle is defining grammatical notions in the Peri Hermeneias." J. T. Oesterle, Aristotle: On Interpretation, 36. http://www.questiaschool.com/read/6145049?http://www.nplg.gov.ge/caucasia/messenger/Eng/N10/SUMMARY/28.HTM
scientific method. His reading leads to an implicit definition of noun and verb in continuity with Aristotle, as we shall now see.63 Lonergan re-reads Aristotle’s ten categories as descriptive terms. They are not implicit or explanatory terms,64 just as the rhema is a category that adds a description to the substantial form named by the onoma. Then, avoiding the associations generated by Descartes’s separation of body and mind, and criticized most recently by Rorty,65 Lonergan renames the substantial form as central form.66 The phrases “unum per se” and “an individual intelligible unity” define an empirically existing central form, without the additional understanding implied in the rhema.67 The use of the word “central” now refers to a concrete unity at the “center” of a range of mutual, interacting, or conjugate, relations that can also be the focus for our understanding and knowledge, whether descriptive or explanatory. In turn these central and conjugate foci of understanding have associated actions and existences. The terms “central” and “conjugate” forms (cf. onoma) have their counterpart in

63 “...though we are in basic agreement with Aristotle, we differ from him in many positive ways.” Insight, 507. The index to Insight lists some 60 references to Aristotle.

64 Cf. Insight, 420. Also “From a descriptive viewpoint, Aristotle’s ten categories retain their obvious validity, and among them the category of relation maintains its distinct place.” Insight, 521.


66 “The difference between our central form and Aristotle’s substantial form is merely nominal. For the Aristotelian substantial form is what is known by grasping an intelligible unity, an unum per se. However, since the meaning of the English word ‘substance’ has been influenced profoundly by Locke, since the Cartesian confusion of ‘body’ and thing led to an identification of substance and extension and then to the riposte that substance is underneath extension, I have thought it advisable, a least temporarily, to cut myself off from this verbal tangle.” Insight, 462.

67 Re Aristotle: “Primarily, being is what constituted by a substantial form or, on second thoughts, by the combination of substantial form and matter. Secondarily, being is what is constituted by accidental forms; ‘white,’ ‘hear,’ ‘strength’ are not nothing, though they are not simply what is meant by being. Again, being is the collection of existing substances with their properties and incidental modifications; but though being denotes the factually existent, still existing is no more than the reality of substantial forms along with their mainly immanent suppositions and consequences.” Lonergan (1992, 1957) op. cit., 391.
Aristotle, Halliday, and Lonergan

In Lonergan's account the terms "central" and "conjugate" provide implicit definitions for the grammatical terms "nouns" and "verbs." Nouns refer to concrete "unities-identities-wholes"; verbs to the central act of existence, or to the related actions mutual to the specified concrete unity-identity-wholes. Then the grammatical categories of adjectives and adverbs can be defined within an interlocking set of "ideational" terms and relations. Lonergan summarizes his reworking of Aristotle as follows, "There are many words: some are substantival, because they refer to intelligible and concrete unities; some are verbal, because they refer to conjugate acts; some are adjectival or adverbial, because they refer to the regularity or frequency of the occurrence of acts or to potentialities for such regularities or frequencies."68 The argument is that nouns are concrete unities, enriched adjectivally through characteristics which define their individual potentialities actually or by contrast. In addition, we can express the regularity and frequency of the verbal realization of these potentialities in adverbs.

However, although we seemingly have a set of mutually interlocking implicit definitions, we have not reached a metasemiotic that goes beyond linguistic expression as required by Halliday. As proposed and required by Halliday, we have to go beyond the level of verbal meanings and the limitations of linguistic expression and ground these implicit definitions in our own experience. In Insight Lonergan provides us with that opportunity in his invitation to "a personal appropriation of the concrete dynamic structure immanent and recurrently operative in his own cognitional activities."69 Lonergan invites us to start from "the minimal context of the meaning of the name 'insight'"70 and then to move to a personal appropriation and grounding of intelligible unities as existing. The intelligible unities as existing are the nouns, verbs, adjectives, and adverbs found in different languages.

Lonergan's implicit, and so explanatory, definitions of the terms noun, verb, adjective, and adverb leads us onto the metasemiotic sought by Halliday. This appropriation stands in a tradition that stretches back to Aristotle, and that in so doing goes through and beyond the

68 Insight, 578.
69 Insight, 11.
70 Insight, 766.
model of knowing as taking a look, excoriated by Rorty and others, including Lonergan. In using the terms nouns and verbs we can come to recognize what Aristotle also recognized, however inadequate his expression, not through introspection as taking a look inside our consciousness, but as Ryle, another critic of the mind-body problem, noted, through "heeding." Heeding enables us to gain what Lonergan refers to as the self-presence of rational consciousness to itself in the moments of insight and reflective understanding.

The fact that we can define the grammatical terms "noun-verb-adjective-adverb" as mutually interacting terms has practical application. A language teacher now has access to a set of understandings that can be held in mind when encouraging learners to notice how unity-identity-wholes are expressed in the language they are learning. So in learning English, for example, students do not first have to learn a grammatical metalanguage that refers to collective, common, abstract, or gerundial nouns classified by their morphological features. Their focus can remain on what they understand, on what they want to talk about, on what they mean to say, and how this is expressed in the language they are learning. The implicit definitions are invariants differently realized in different languages. As such they are central to a methods-based approach to learning a language. Any language will have nouns, verbs, adjectives, and adverbs, however, because these terms are implicit definitions they are realized differently morphologically, or grammatically, in the expressions of different languages, or even, perhaps, without any simple morphological featuring that distinguishes nouns and verbs, for example. In order to speed up the teaching of a

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71 Rorty believes that Aristotle was involved with the ocular model of the eye of the mind. "The notion of 'contemplation,' of knowledge of universal concepts or truths as *theoria*, makes the Eye of the Mind the inescapable model of the better sort of knowledge. But it is fruitless to ask whether the Greek language, or Greek economic conditions, or the idle fancy of some names Pre-Socratic, is responsible for viewing this sort of knowledge as looking at something..." Rorty op. cit., 38-39. Following on from Aristotle, Lonergan's highly differentiated account of objectivity is inclusive of the 'ocular' or empirical sense of what is real, but principally— as distinct from empirical, normative and absolute— objectivity comes from a patterned context which finds expression in what Halliday would call a 'text'. cf *Insight*, op cit. 399-409.

language, a language teacher has to be able to point out how those implicit definitions are expressed in the words and grammars of the language being taught, but by itself this process does not require the formal teaching of the grammar of that language.

However, although the twin moments of the eureka of insight into the possibility of a unity-intelligible-whole and the passionless calm of the affirmation of a concrete unity-identity-whole are among the most real of our experiences, they are evanescent. In Halliday’s terms they are metasemiotic. The moments have to be captured in words if they are not to be lost.

Lonergan repeatedly points to the interdependence of language and knowledge. He notes that “the development of languages fuses with the development of knowledge,” that knowledge and language are genetically interpenetrated, that they are isomorphic, in solidarity, almost in a fusion. For “It is one thing to understand experience and another to hit upon the happy and effective combination of phrases and sentence. It is one thing to be rich in experience it is another to be fluent with words. Moreover these words are conventional. So the development of knowledge is restricted: firstly, by models of knowing as taking a look at the external world or as a (non-optical) introspection of internal consciousness; secondly, by the public and conventional nature of language as a social institution; and thirdly, by the difficulties of expressing the metasemiotic, but private grasp of an understanding, in a conventional language which fuses existing understanding and knowledge under the constraints of public discourse.

73 “The first observation, then, is that points and lines cannot be imagined. One can imagine an extremely small dot. But no matter how small a dot may be, still it has magnitude. To reach a point, all magnitude must vanish, and with all magnitude there vanishes the dot as well. One can imagine an extremely fine thread. But no matter how fine a thread may be, still it has breadth and depth as well as length. Remove from the image all breadth and depth, and there vanishes all length as well.” Insight, 32. “Now ‘size’ is a descriptive notion that may be defined as an aspect of things standing in certain relations to our senses, and so it vanishes from an explanatory account of reality.” Lonergan (1992, 1957) op. cit., 516.

74 Cf. Halliday’s discussion of Needham who, when discussing the development of technology in premodern China, suggested that with the arrival of a new name it was thought a new kind of clock has been invented even though that clock had been invented six centuries before. Cf. Grammar, Society and the Noun: An Inaugural Lecture Delivered at University College, London, 24 November 1966. Halliday and Webster (2006), 50-73.

75 Insight, 578.

76 Cf. Insight, 578-79.
Language is constitutive of social worlds so that we live out our lives strongly shaped by the language we learn to speak as a child. Halliday, still focusing on nouns, puts it this way: "All the various distinctions that the child learns to associate with nouns, such as common or proper, general or specific, count or mass, concrete or abstract, definite or indefinite, as well as the various roles occupied by nouns in clause structure, provide a part of the conceptual framework for his mental development, and thus for the formation of his ideas about himself and about society." Halliday does not argue for a naive relativism, or for the view that our thinking is imprisoned in language, but a language both expresses and fails to express what we understand and know. Not only is there a close relation between capturing understanding and expression, but that expression itself has metaphorical connotations and denotations that act selectively on the meanings that are carried forward.

So the close link between a "unity-identity-whole" in action and its formulation or linguistic expression is only one part of the equation. The fact that the expression, whether in sound or shape, is sensible means that the expressions themselves have connative links which can be quasi-independent of the central meaning of the noun and verbs in a particular expression. The ordinary expression has a dynamic that goes above, below, before, and after, the central meaning that it carries. Cognitive linguists such as Lakoff would agree with Lonergan and Quintilian that almost all we say is metaphor,?7 and often enough the referents of a metaphor are related to a body image, as in the word *ptosis* where the experience of falling comes to be applied to the declension of nouns. The recognition of such a close relation between forms of expression is latent in Aristotle's postulation of a connative or intentional relationship between the *onoma* and *rhema* as a nominal formation. The *phantasia* of a particular *onoma-rhema* combination

78 "Even within a highly developed culture it remains true that, as Quintilian remarked, paene omne quod dicimus metaphora est. Not only are words themselves sensible but also their initial meaning commonly is sensible. By an unperceived series of transformations this initial meaning gradually is changed until the primary reference to sensible objects and actions is submerged or forgotten, and from that hidden stem there branch out, often in bewildering variety, a set of other meanings that to a greater or less extent transcend the sensible plane." *Insight*, 567.
are also likely to be interconnected. Halliday, similarly, refers to wordings within a lexicogrammar with the implication that the words and grammatical forms of a particular language are likely to occur together in determinate patterns.

These rather abstract comments on word groupings gain empirical support from the statistical analysis of language corpora that bring out how words are used in non-arbitrary patterns. The results of using different statistical techniques are variously called collocations, colligations, or concgrams. But such patterns are not far from the experience of scores of tourists and language students who continue to be fed standard phrases to be learned by heart for use in hotels, airports, or railway stations, for example. These “useful phrases” are but the tip of the large iceberg of how language patterns social context, spoken discourse, and written texts. If language teachers have learned the pedagogical use of the implicit definitions of grammatical terms, they also need to appreciate how lexical meanings are built up alongside the central meanings to which nouns and verbs and so forth refer.

Language teachers, even when promoting the use of vocabulary lists for language students, need to recognize that the meanings carried by a language are more than the definitions of words contained in dictionaries, even with their connotations and denotations, and even when derived from usage in the writings of good authors. The following table gives definitions from the Princeton Wordnet\(^\text{79}\) of lexical meanings for a key word in the writings of Lonergan, namely “insight.” The word “insight” itself suggests that an insight gives “sight” “into” something, and, as we shall shortly note, the preposition “into” is commonly associated with the word “insight.” The metaphorical basis seems to be “looking into” as a kind of sight whether applied to inner or outer circumstances.

\(^{79}\) The word net is a lexical database comprising a network of meaningfully related nouns, verbs, adjectives, and adverbs grouped into sets of cognitive synonyms (synsets), each expressing a distinct concept. http://wordnet.princeton.edu/ (accessed May 2009)
Table 1. Definitions of *Insight*

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th><em>insight</em> penetration</th>
<th>(clear or deep perception of a situation)</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td><em>insight</em> perceptiveness, perceptivity</td>
<td>(a feeling of understanding)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><em>insight</em> brainstorm, brainwave</td>
<td>(the clear [and often sudden] understanding of a complex situation)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><em>insight</em> sixth sense</td>
<td>(grasping the inner nature of things intuitively)</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

However, we can gain a better understanding of the constitutive power of language, as well as the difficulties of learning a language well, if we briefly compare the collocation of the word “insight” with prepositions. We shall take the examples from the British National Corpus\(^{80}\) and from *Insight*\(^{81}\) itself. The results of this simple exercise are given in the following table. They suggest that Lonergan lives in a rather different world from many others users of English. He uses “insight into” far less and “insight as (activity)” far more than speakers of British English. This pattern of collocations indicates, perhaps, something of the difficulty he found in expressing his rejection of the model of knowing as taking a look.

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\(^{80}\) The British National Corpus (BNC) is a 100 million word collection of samples of written and spoken language from a wide range of sources, designed to represent a wide cross-section of current British English, both spoken and written http://www.natcorp.ox.ac.uk/index.xml

\(^{81}\) Insight.
Table 2. Collocations of Insight

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Combinations of “insight” with any preposition</th>
<th>Occurrences in Insight</th>
<th>Occurrences in the BNC 1980-1993</th>
<th>Percent of all occurrences in Insight</th>
<th>Percent of all occurrences in BNC</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>insight into</td>
<td>75</td>
<td>723</td>
<td>61</td>
<td>86</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>insight as</td>
<td>17</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>14</td>
<td>0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>insight to</td>
<td>8</td>
<td>25</td>
<td>7</td>
<td>3</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>insight by</td>
<td>9</td>
<td>3</td>
<td>7</td>
<td>1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>insight in</td>
<td>7</td>
<td>17</td>
<td>6</td>
<td>2</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>insight of</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>32</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>4</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>insight about</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>10</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>insight as to</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>7</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>insight from</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>6</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>insight with</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>4</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Total</td>
<td>123</td>
<td>846</td>
<td>99</td>
<td>100</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>insight into insight</td>
<td>21</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>17</td>
<td>0</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

These collocations suggest something of how Lonergan’s expressions constitute a distinctive approach to the meaning of the word “insight.” The following table shows how collocational patterns, and not single words, configure the worlds we live in. In this small sample of spoken British English, for example, the noun “insight” is very likely to be associated with the verb “give.” This “insight-give,” noun-verb combination, suggests that our understanding of insight is not adequately summarized by the lexis of the Princeton WordNet. Further, the grammatical form of the verb used suggests that the cultural context is that while insights are often gifts, they are not given personally. Such observations show something of the creativity of a language, a cultural resource not readily available in the lexical list available from the Princeton WordNet.
Table 3. Verbal Collocations of *Insight*

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Gwyn Adshead for coming in and giving <em>us</em> this <em>insight</em> into choosing a good therapist.</th>
<th>giving</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>So <em>give</em> <em>us</em> an <em>insight</em> otherwise I'll have to do it</td>
<td>give</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>but also to <em>give</em> them some <em>insight</em> into philosophical problems</td>
<td>give</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>does that one <em>give</em> them an <em>insight</em> into somebody else's culture does it help</td>
<td>give</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>because that <em>would</em> <em>give</em> them that's an <em>insight</em> into what's involved in the care of</td>
<td>give</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>That's fascinating, it <em>just</em> <em>gives</em> an <em>insight</em>.</td>
<td>gives</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>and that <em>gives</em> you an <em>insight</em> to the kind of other things that go on in</td>
<td>gives</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>I don't know. <em>It</em> <em>gives</em> a well a little <em>insight</em> into the workings of</td>
<td>gives</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>which they think <em>gives</em> you an <em>insight</em>. I think it almost does actually</td>
<td>gives</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><em>It</em> <em>gives</em> you an <em>insight</em> Yeah Talking about <em>insights</em> it's</td>
<td>gives</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Now do you think that <em>gives</em> them a bit of an <em>insight</em> into the sort of rights and</td>
<td>gives</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>those with you and it <em>gives</em> you a very <em>good</em> <em>insight</em> into their family background</td>
<td>gives</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><em>may have given</em> you additional <em>insight</em> into further aspects related to health and</td>
<td>given</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>It would have really <em>given</em> me a real <em>insight</em> into what I would have gone through later</td>
<td>given</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><em>may have given</em> you an additional <em>insight</em> into further aspects related to health and</td>
<td>given</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>really important I think crucial <em>So what insight</em> has this <em>given</em> you I think it's</td>
<td>given</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><em>given</em></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>who has to make the decision Now the only <em>insight</em> I can <em>offer</em> you that you don't</td>
<td>offer</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>some help to hospices but also offer an <em>insight</em> into the way the N H S is working</td>
<td>offer</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>so that's one of the <em>insight</em> I think that's the main <em>insight</em> I gained</td>
<td>gained</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>is that <em>you</em> have such a lot of <em>insight</em> into this already, you know what the score</td>
<td>have</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>things like oil pollution they have some <em>insight</em> into the issues from doing that and</td>
<td>have</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>I don't feel I quite have yet. Do <em>you</em> have any <em>insight</em> as to why some people have</td>
<td>have</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>think Okay well I've already got a very clear <em>insight</em> to</td>
<td>have got</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>it's a greater <em>insight</em> into the need of how</td>
<td>is</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>treated in two different settings <em>insight</em> into both is just better I think.</td>
<td>is</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>and I think it's been an <em>insight</em> to us all in how Birmingham art is pushing</td>
<td>is</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><em>It's</em> a great, tremendous <em>insight</em> this.</td>
<td>is</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>in a different setting the <em>insight</em> again is that patients do behave differently</td>
<td>is</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
These tables suggest how insight as an intelligible-unity-whole is differently understood in different contexts, has different metaphorical connotations with different prepositional accompaniers, and works with selected verbs. These illustrate Aristotle’s onomastic combinations of onoma and rhema with associated connative links operating at the level of the onomazein not legein. A good first approach to understanding Aristotle, then, is through the contemporary understanding of collocation underpinned by the metasemiotic shared by Aristotle and Lonergan.

**PART 2: TOWARD A MODEL OF LANGUAGE IN CULTURE**

In Part 1 we argued that the relation of onoma and rhema at the level of onomazein, together with the close connection between knowledge and expression, could be used to understand why words co-occur in corpora. Halliday’s insistence that words are used in lexico-grammatical patterns makes the same point, so in English the noun-verb relation is often that of cause-effect and not agent-goal. Earlier, too, we referred to de Rijk’s recognition that for Aristotle the mere naming of an ontological element is distinct from going on to say whether the onoma and rhema concerned actually exist. As we noted at that point, Lonergan too says that Aristotle’s account works at different levels, even if for Aristotle meaning only exists at the level of synthesising an onomazein.82

Part 2 begins therefore by returning to the previous discussion of Aristotle’s legein as a level “above” the onomazein. For it is this distinction of levels that gives us a parallel with Halliday’s understanding of a text as a linguistically based structuring of the flow of meaning at a level above the lexicogrammar. The parallel is only partial, however, as Halliday treats the sentence as part of the

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82 Lonergan introduces this interpretation as follows: “The second element to be considered is the nature of the correspondence between inner and outer words. Grammarians divide the later into eight, or sometimes ten, parts of speech; of these the Aristotelian Peri hermenias bothered to notice only nouns and verbs, and included both under the same rubric of the element of meaning. (n16: The Aristotelian division is of conventionally significant sounds: if the parts have meaning, not merely per accident as ‘heat’ in ‘cheat’, there is a logos, which is subdivided into indicative, optative, imperative, etc.; if the parts have no meaning, the division is into names and verbs.” See Aristotle, *On Interpretation*, 2-4 [2, 16a, 19-4, 16b 35]; in the *Basic Works of Aristotle*, ed. Richard McKeon (New York: Random House, 1941) 4-42]; *Verbum*, 16.
lexicogrammar not the text, whereas for Aristotle the *legein* is where the *onmazein* is given meaning. For Lonergan, too, the sentence as an affirmative or negative utterance is an expression that corresponds to reflective judgment and that occurs at a distinctive level, for him a third level of knowledge. For the latter two authors, the sentence expressing a proposition has a greater completeness than the clause or phrase. However, if Halliday is not primarily concerned with propositional truth, relegating this perhaps to the ideational function of language, Lonergan also recognizes that meaning is a more inclusive term than truth. And in this recognition there lies the possibility for an agreement that meaning is structured in texts. There is, then, a gap between meaning and truth, for “what you say, though it does not correspond with what is, still it is not meaningless, not necessarily meaningless.” Indeed, “Meaning can be a larger field than being; it can be occupied with everything that isn’t and not just what is!” So just as a proposition is found in a text as a continuous flow of meaning, meanings concerned with “what is not” will have their conventional expression in a text, discourse, or genre. In both cases there is a set of assertions made by one person to another whose meaning lies in the whole as well as the parts. In both cases there are expressions which “in themselves are adequate or inadequate.”

For Halliday the text as a text has structure, coherence, function, development, and character. The structure of a text refers to a fairly standard sequencing of elements from the opening to the closing of the text. The coherence of a text, the way it hangs together, or forms

83 “Again, in utterances there is the obvious distinction between the incomplete meaning of a word and the complete meaning of a sentence.” *Insight* (1992, 1957), 330.

84 P213 The Analogy of Meaning. “because our mind is transcendent, because it proceeds by divisions within the transcendent and can go astray you have the phenomenon of meaning being broader than the field of what actually is (213).” The field of meaning is more inclusive than the field of being (212).

85 *Philosophical and Theological Papers* (1996, 1963), 211.

86 “The meaning of a text is an intentional entity. It is a unity that is unfolded through parts, sections, chapters, paragraphs, sentences, words. We can grasp the unity, the whole, only though the parts. At the same time the parts are determined in their meaning by the whole which each part partially reveals.” *(Method in Theology*, 159)

87 *Insight*, 581.

a unity, has a number of features including cohesive features which chain the text together and establish conjunctive relations between non-adjacent clauses and sentences. A text also has a function, a “purpose” in context, and finally has development or a semantic “flow.” So in addition to Halliday’s intersubjective or interpersonal, and the ideational metafunctions of language mentioned above, there is a third, namely the textual, and this refers to the control of a continuous flow of meaning. The text provides strategies both for the speaker/writer in the presentation of ideational and interpersonal meaning and for the listener/reader in the interpretation of the information as it unfolds in context. The text, that is, occurs at a different level from the clause or the phrase. Hence “The basic unit of language in use is not a word or a sentence but a “text,” and the “textual component in language is the set of options by which a speaker or writer is enabled to create texts – to use language in a way that is relevant to the context.”

Following Halliday’s work on systemic functional grammar, educators in Australian and United Kingdom primary education developed text-focused pedagogic applications. It is now commonplace for children in these school systems to be commended for writing in different formats. The formats include presenting narrative, information, explanation, instruction, or recounts. So stickers can be given out for the “Great use of story language,” “Great effort with your information writing,” “Great instruction writing,” “You have really tried hard with your explanation writing!”; “You have really tried hard with your recount writing!” Or alternatively, they might be asked “Why do we need sub-headings?” or “What are the main features of biographical writing?” or “What are the most important things to do when doing explanation writing?” or “In stories we often talk about beginnings, middles, and ends. What words do we use for the structure of non-fiction writing?” Recount writing, for example, is characterized as having a relevant introduction, the main points in chronological order, the use of the past tense, and a clear ending. Instruction writing, in contrast, begins with a statement of what is to be achieved, a list of items required, a clear sequence of steps, and as a text includes an optional diagram.

89 Halliday and Webster (2002, 1970), 190. Texts are characterized by structure, coherence, function, development, and character. Cf. 219-60.
This emphasis on the flow of meaningful information through a text underlines the fact that Halliday's approach to language is through meaning, not the rules of traditional grammar. Grammar is not a set of rules but a resource for making meanings.\textsuperscript{90} The grammar interprets, experience, the grammar is where the work is done. Language is powered by grammatical energy as the central CPU.\textsuperscript{91} A grammar comprises a syntax and the vocabulary and morphology of a language,\textsuperscript{92} or what Halliday refers to as the wordings of a language.\textsuperscript{93} "By grammar I mean the "lexicogrammatical stratum of a natural language as traditionally understood, comprising its syntax and vocabulary, together with any morphology the language may display... in commonsense terms the wordings in which the meanings of a language are construed."\textsuperscript{94}

In this meaning-based approach to language we can see a

\textsuperscript{90} In this sense a systematic functional approach to language contrasts with Chomsky's generative grammar which can be said to be largely a set of logical rules for spelling out the structures of nouns and verbs within clauses generated by the "Language Acquisition Device." In the 1960s "Data were said to be irrelevant to the serious study of language; the actual language used by real people, especially spoken language, was dismissed as impoverished and unstructured, a mere matter of performance that could tell us nothing about the true object of description, which was linguistic structure — the rules generating the set of idealized sentences that constituted the ideal speaker's competence or knowledge of the language." Halliday and Webster, J (2002). 10. So, if traditional grammatics represents language as a set of rules to be learned, systemic functional grammar represents language as a purposeful activity in the real world providing a network of options which structure activity. However, both Chomsky and probably Halliday hold to a reductionist explanation of language in the interconnections of the brain. Lonergan refers to the neural basis for multiple meaning and suggests that Chomsky made a breakthrough to a less deterministic account of language. Cf. P. Lambert, C. Tansey, and C. Going (ed.), (1982) Caring About Meaning (Montreal: Thomas More Institute Papers 1982/82), 97-98. Lonergan may have become aware of Chomsky's generative grammar after the completion of Insight (cf. note g to p. 35 on p. 781 of Insight), although Insight was published in the same year as Chomsky's (1957) Syntactic Structures (The Hague: Mouton. Reprint. Berlin and New York (1985). Lonergan annotated his copy of Insight with the comment "ordinary language [-] generative grammar" (cf. P7681) next to the sentence. "But a nominal definition supposes no more than an insight into the proper use of language. An explanatory definition, on the other hand, supposes a further insight into the objects to which language refers." This suggests that he thought Chomsky's account of language was at the nominal level.

\textsuperscript{91} Cf. Halliday, On Grammar, 33, 369, 387.

\textsuperscript{92} Halliday, On Grammar, 369.

\textsuperscript{93} Halliday, On Grammar, 369.

\textsuperscript{94} Halliday, On Grammar, 369.
decisive extension of what for Robins was only a footnote, namely the understanding of meaning in a classical as opposed to a modern grammar. Robins, relying on J. R. Firth, argues that “in modern grammatical theory, linguistic meaning can be split up and analyzed to cover the meaning of sentences, the meaning of individual words as lexical units and their “grammatical meaning,” or function as parts of speech – nouns, verbs and so on – in sentences.” Halliday now structures this disparate list with the argument that language is to be modeled through a number of levels, minimally, as mentioned above, the meanings realized through a lexicogrammar, and then the meanings realized through the use of a text in context. Robin, following Firth, simply splits up meaning into parallel elements, but Halliday adds to this mere differentiation a structure of levels. Halliday is almost certainly working within a variant of a basically empiricist account of meaning in which meaning is externally or internally referential. However, even within this account, his understanding of language pushes him to present meaning as operating on more than one level in analogous relationship to each other. Below we turn to construct a four-level model of language and meaning using Lonergan’s critical realist account. The recognition of this four-level account would have been more difficult without Halliday’s appropriation of the text as a distinct level of meaning in language.

Halliday’s account can now be recognized as a general theory of language whose features we can illustrate diagrammatically. In Diagram 1 we begin with a two-level model that separates linguistic content and expression. The relative size and relationship of the two circles indicates how the sounds and shapes, the phonology and graphology, are incorporated within the larger circle of the meaningful contents of a language. By itself the diagram is an unexceptional version of the commonplace dualities used to describe how language works, such as sign and signifier, or Aquinas’s inner and outer words.

95 Robins, Ancient and Medieval Grammatical Theory in Europe, 21-22.

96 Cf. Halliday, On Grammar, 374. “Many grammars (perhaps all) make a rather clear distinction between the two fundamental modes of human experience referred to above: between what we experience as taking place in the world outside of ourselves and what we experience as process of our own consciousness.” The use of the inside-outside metaphor in the model of knowing has, of course, been criticized both by Rorty and by Lonergan.
Halliday then distinguishes, as we have noted, between content as lexicogrammar and content as discourse-semantics, as presented in Diagram 2. Now the lowest level, in a basic three-level model, is made up of the sounds and shapes that occur in spoken and written language. The level of discourse-semantics is the level of the text as discussed above.

Diagram 1

Diagram 2
Aristotle, Halliday, and Lonergan

Texts are delivered in context, so Diagram 3 places language use in a social context. In Halliday these social contexts are extralinguistic, but for Lonergan, social and cultural contexts have an intrinsic linguistic component that triggers different levels of differentiation in social and cultural contexts, as we note below.

![Diagram 3](image)

**Diagram 3**

Then, finally, Diagram 4 outlines a general theory of language, a fully comprehensive account of language using the full range of terms...

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97 Parallel model is available in P. M. Sefton, *Making plans for Nigel* (or defining interfaces between computational representations of linguistic structure and output systems: Adding intonation, punctuation and typography systems to the PENMAN system). Technical report from the Linguistic Department, University of Sydney, Australia, 1990, 5. Figure 1, The Stratal Model of Language This model has a vaselike shape narrower at the bottom and opening up at the top rather than circular rings. This B.A. thesis was written under the supervision of Dr. Christian Matthiessen, a colleague and collaborator of Halliday. The shape of the vase model moving from a narrow base to a wider rim in an open expanding motion provides an image for Lonergan’s suggestion that development is both horizontal and vertical. As, for example, with psychological development on the basis of neural connections. “What may be named the lateral movement is an increasing differentiation of the psychic events in correspondence with particular afferent and efferent nerves. What may be named the vertical movement is an increasing proficiency in integrated perception and in appropriate and coordinated response.” *Insight*, 493. Psychic development is an instance of the open dynamism of the objective universe that is not “at rest, not static, not fixed in the present, but in process, in tension, fluid (470).” The universe is in movement, fluidity, tension, approximateness, incompleteness, but the dynamism is directed (cf. *Insight*, 472) but not determinate, an effectively probable realization of possibilities. Cf. *Insight*, 473.
of the Halliday framework. The diagram aims "to model the linguistic system as a whole," but these terms are not discussed further here.

![Diagram 4](https://example.com/diagram4.png)

**Diagram 4**

Each of the levels is related to the others in a hierarchy. Each level, therefore, has three sets of relations upward, downward, and internally across or within each level. The upward and downward relationships are not in one-to-one correspondence or isomorphic with each other. In addition, priority is to be given to "the view 'from above'." These three sets of relations are also found in Lonergan.

In an analysis of cognition, with parallels to Halliday's three levels of language, Lonergan's major work *Insight* provides exercises in understanding to show how "knowledge rises on the three levels of (1) experience and imagination, (2) understanding and conception, and (3) reflection and judgment." Correspondingly, expression, and so the development of language, takes place at three levels. Firstly, there is

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99 Diagrams from sundry sources on the internet.
the level of experience and imagination for “Words are sensible: they support and heighten the resonance of human intersubjectivity (so that) the addition of speech to presence brings about a specialized, directed modification of intersubjective reaction and response.” Then there are the meanings of words that “belong together in typical patterns” and “significant combinations.” Then, as already discussed above by Aristotle, there is the level of affirmative or negative utterance where “the expression corresponds to reflection and judgment.” We discuss the fourth level below.

Lonergan’s three-level model of knowledge places the sentence at the third level of expression, and not as in Halliday at the second where the text is at a level above the sentence. However, sentences are not simply “expressed” in splendid isolation. Sentences are made to others in the presence of others. Even the diary writer has an audience, even if that audience is only some version of oneself. So, the formulation and expression of sentences takes place within the context of other sentences. Sentences are affirmed or denied within genres and discourses, within texts and conventional understandings of what can be said and how to say that to particular audiences. *Insight* focuses on the structure of human cognition as a three-leveled activity complemented by a fourth element, that of decision. Only later did Lonergan move this whole analysis into a more historical and social context, including an emphasis on language and meaning, but this leaves *Insight* discussing “expression” and so language within a restricted framework.

Lonergan was preoccupied, as the preface to *Insight* shows, with the weaknesses in his own expression. He recognized that there were insights to which he did not have access however voraciously he read, that he was working alone without collaboration with linguists like Halliday, and that perhaps inevitably his “expression” would be at fault. “Only after specialists in different fields had been given the opportunity to discover the existence and significance of their insights
could there arise the hope that some would be found to discern my
intention where my expression was at fault, to correct my errors where
ignorance led me astray, and with the wealth of their knowledge to fill
the dynamic but formal structures I tried to erect. Only in the measure
that this hope is realized will there be initiated the spontaneous
collaboration that commonly must precede the detailed plans of an
organized investigation.\textsuperscript{107}

At this stage, then, Lonergan’s use of the term “expression” seems
to refer primarily to the expression of a proposition, so that the basic
meaning of expression is that found in the grammatical equivalent
of a sentence.\textsuperscript{108} Lonergan’s emphasis, at this point, is on “the mere
fact that a word can occur in a sentence that is affirmed endows it
with a basic reference to the objective of intelligent and rational
consciousness.”\textsuperscript{109} He recognizes that the sentence can, of course, be
built up into paragraphs, chapters, and books. But the overall context
of this section of Insight turns on the difficulties of interpreting a writer
communicating with an anticipated reader and so focuses, though not
exclusively, on written forms of expression whether literary, scientific,
or philosophical.

In Insight therefore, Lonergan generally talks about “expression
as a topic,” using the zero definitive form “expression” which means
“expression in general.” This suggests that the aim is to set up a
general theory of expression as a means of saving the possibility of
interpretation against relativism. In pursuit of this goal a distinction
is made between levels of expressions and sequences or modes of
expression. Levels of expressions are expressions directed at the three
levels of cognition.\textsuperscript{110} Sequences of expression are the development of

\textsuperscript{107} Insight, 7.

\textsuperscript{108} For example, “The point may be illustrated by contrasting the use of the copula
‘is’ in the two expressions ‘John is here’ and ‘Pure water is H20.’ In the first expression,
which stands for a concrete proposition, the copula is relative to the time of utterance;
the grammatical present tense of the verb ‘to be’ has its proper force; and saying that
John is here has no implication that John was or was not here, or that John will or will
not be here. On the other hand, to say that pure water is H20 is to utter an abstract law
of nature; grammatically, the copula occurs in the present tense, but it is not intended to
confine the force of the expression to the present time.” Insight, 164.

\textsuperscript{109} Insight, 578.

\textsuperscript{110} “Now the distinction between different levels of expression rests upon a
consideration of the sources of meaning both in the speaker or writer and in the hearer
specialized modes of expressions across each level, and finally at each level.\textsuperscript{111} The word expression, too, has different, if related meanings, in that expression can be intersubjective, adequate or inadequate to rational truth, morally truthful, as well as an adequate or inadequate expression.

The meanings of the phrases “levels” and “sequences of expression” are clear enough, but Lonergan employs other terms whose range suggests that the account remains incomplete.\textsuperscript{112} This complex of distinctions and concerns takes us some way from our present concerns with language and language teaching. However, it seems likely that Lonergan’s focus on levels and sequences of expression is the counterpart to Halliday’s understanding of text (genre and discourse) at least in terms of the types and modes of expression that result. Lonergan, for example, refers to the “Once upon a time” of the fairy tale, to genera litteraria, to the sequencing of sentence into paragraph, into section, into chapter, and into a book, and also to modes and types of expression. However, unlike Lonergan, Halliday is not interested in putting different genre or patterns of discourse into mutual or even hierarchical relations. As discussed in the literature on contrastive rhetoric, different cultures simply use different patterns of expression.

Halliday’s account of a text, as we have seen, focuses rather on the organizational features of conventional modes of expression, and not on the interpretation of the content of types of expression. There are no doubt philosophical differences on objectivity between Lonergan and Halliday but what Halliday is at pains to point out is that the structure of a genre or discourse as a text has identifiable features which are carried linguistically. This more restricted aim falls within rather than outside of Lonergan’s much larger concern. So Lonergan states that there is “almost a fusion, of the development of knowledge and the development of language.”\textsuperscript{113} Knowledge and language are genetically interpenetrated, and in so far as communication and expression also require practical insights, then patterns of expression are instances

\begin{itemize}
\item \textsuperscript{111} Cf. Insight, 592.
\item \textsuperscript{112} For example, variously types, fields, modes, classify/classification and specialized. Cf. Insight, 569, 592, 594, 595.
\item \textsuperscript{113} Insight, 557.
\end{itemize}
of culturally situated common sense. Lonergan's aim is different from Halliday's as he wants to classify patterns of expression in terms of four sources of meanings and not just by style or language.\textsuperscript{114} So, below we suggest that these four sources ground a four-level model of language in culture that provides a spiral curriculum for the teacher of any language.

Lonergan's four-level model parallels that of Halliday but with the different fields of meaning distinct from the conventional linguistic counterpart of the cohesive features of a text or discourse as identified by Halliday, in what Lonergan calls "specialized modes of expression."\textsuperscript{115} Forms of genre vary from culture to culture but as meaning is something that can both develop or be lost, not all cultures will display or have access to the same fields of meanings. So where Halliday argues for only three fields of meaning, the interpersonal, the ideational, and the textual, Lonergan even in \textit{Insight} separates out common sense, science, and philosophy as areas of meaning with their distinct language and vocabulary. In \textit{Method in Theology} more attention is paid to the range of patterns of meaning, but clearly not all societies, and in complex societies, not all subgroups within a society, produce written literatures or write scientific theories or philosophical monographs.

It is perhaps best to recap the discussion so far. In discussing mathematics, Lonergan refers to "intelligible unities and correlations"\textsuperscript{116} as the second of the three components of knowledge. The phrase "intelligible unities and correlations" parallels the unity-identity-whole and mutual relations which implicitly define the relations of nouns, verbs, adjectives, and adverbs referred to earlier. These relations lead to "significant combinations of words"\textsuperscript{117} as the second of three components of expression. In terms of contemporary linguistics these combinations of words are variously called clauses, phrases, or word groups. As sensible, these combinations also have metaphorical associations. These combinations, too, occur at the level of Aristotle's \textit{onomazein}, the level of the connotation of substantial forms and their \textit{rhema}. This level, then, is the level of Halliday's

\textsuperscript{114} Cf. \textit{Insight}, 592.
\textsuperscript{115} \textit{Insight}, 594.
\textsuperscript{116} \textit{Insight}, 336.
\textsuperscript{117} \textit{Insight}, 576.
Aristotle, Halliday, and Lonergan

lexicogrammar. 118 Then, for Aristotle, Halliday, and Lonergan, there is—despite the epistemological differences already outlined—a third level of conventional expression which we are calling the text, the discourse, the genre.

Lonergan puts the structure of a text in the practical set of insights that govern a writer’s “verbal flow, the shaping of his sentences, their combination into paragraphs, the sequence of paragraphs in chapters and of chapters in books.” 119 Halliday underlines that this practical set of insights is conventional, and so socially and culturally specific. However, given that in Insight the focus is on knowledge and not on culture, Lonergan clearly wants to distinguish between an utterance, a sentence, and a proposition in a way that limits the kind of texts that can be produced at this third level to ones that are dealing with propositional truth. 120 And this, as Lonergan notes, excludes interrogative, optative, and exclamatory sentences as defined by grammarians, 121 types of sentences that appear in written texts, but perhaps more frequently in spoken discourse.

At the beginning of Part 2 we accepted that meaning is a more inclusive term than knowledge; there are (as anyone involved in a public discourse knows) false meanings and well as true ones, but this difference does not mean that knowledge is independent of conventional expression. For while the origins of knowledge may be metasemiotic, the pursuit of knowledge is never merely private, either in its origins or outcomes. Knowledge is pursued in a social context and using conventional expression. So while the moments of insight and of assent are outside or above language or other expression, those moments are not held in focus without an expression, a formulation, however

118 The approach to language which notes that particular words are habitually used in particular grammatical forms. For example, the verb “ban” is almost invariably used in the passive voice as in “Smoking should be banned in restaurants.”

119 Insight, 579; cf. 613.

120 “For present purposes it will suffice to distinguish (1) utterance, (2) sentence, and (3) proposition, in the following summary manner. If you say, “The king is dead,” and I say, “The king is dead,” then there are two utterances but only one sentence. If you say, “Der Konig ist tot,” and I say, “The king is dead,” then there are two utterances and two sentences but only one proposition.” Insight, 296.

121 “Grammarians distinguish declarative, interrogative, optative, and exclamatory sentences, but of these only the declarative corresponds to the proposition” Insight (1992, 1957) op. cit., 296.
inadequate. Further, the movement from an insight to a reflection is not automatic. It involves teasing out the implications of the insight, so that the spelling out of an insight literally involves language, however minimally. In common sense the insight can be captured in a proverb, in mathematics in a diagram with only a few words, and so on. This is to repeat, if in slightly different form, the point made earlier about the tight interrelationship that exists between expression and movement through the cognitional process.

Commonsense knowledge, for example, starts from the wonder and curiosity that drives the questions that have to be formulated if the process is pursued with any efficacy, and the expression will in the first instance take a conventional form. The relation of expression to human action includes modal, conditional, evidential, and exclamatory formats, while the expressions that deal with events, actions, states of affairs, information, or knowledge, both actual and purported, real or imagined, will be variations on the kind of texts Lonergan refers to when discussing the levels of expression mentioned earlier. The patterns of cohesion and coherence of these and similar texts place the intelligible unities and mutual relations of the lexicogrammar of nouns and verbs either in the action space-time shaped and shaping the daily activities and horizons of a particular culture, or in the non-time bound forms of knowledge associated with explanatory accounts.

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122 "I do not believe that mental acts occur without a sustaining flow of expression. The expression may not be linguistic. It may not be adequate. It may not be presented to the attention of others. But it occurs. Indeed, Ernst Cassirer has reported that students of aphasia, agnosia, and apraxia universally have found these disorders of speech, knowledge and action to be interrelated." Lonergan (1971) op. cit., 255.

123 "Such, in outline, is the distinction between the different levels of expression. It envisages the expression as a flow of sensible events that (1) originates in the cognitional and volitional sources of meaning of a speaker or writer, and (2) terminates in a reproduction of sources of meaning in a hearer or reader. It is a distinction that grounds not an actual but a potential classification of expressions, for while the original and terminal sources of meaning are conceived clearly and distinctly, there remains abundant room for the introduction of further differentiations and nuances." Insight, 594.

124 "For if an expression stands for an abstract proposition, it contains no reference to any particular place or time; if it contains no reference to particular places or times, it contains no element that might vary with variations of the place or time of the speaker. Inversely, if an expression stands for a concrete proposition, it will contain a reference to a particular place or time, and so it will include an element that can vary with variations
We have been arguing that texts form a third level of language centered around the presentation of information, whether correct or not. Texts focus, that is, on reflections and judgments about intentions as found in the three levels of expression that Lonergan refers to in *Insight*, namely advertising, scientific studies, or philosophical debates. In practice such reflections are surrounded by text using grammatical patterns for sentences that raise the questions, command the actions, and express the attitudes that are part and parcel of the flow of information and disinformation in social contexts.

We now turn to the topic of a fourth level of linguistic expression and usage. For Halliday, language functions within a social context, although given his understanding of meaning he regards social contexts as extralinguistic. Lonergan with his broader understanding of meaning goes further than Halliday. We can approach what Lonergan is trying to work out when talking of levels and sequences of expression by noting that there is a difference between spoken and written language, in that “the spoken word objectifies transiently” and “the written word objectifies permanently.”

In his later work this distinction underpins the difference between the first of two stages of meaning.

The distinction between spoken and written English is encountered frequently in language teaching, with the transition into literacy, and including within that writing is a second language, providing especially critical and even difficult moments in learning a language. Walter Ong has written extensively on the differences between oracy and literacy. Halliday makes great play of the importance of spoken language arguing that in English at least spoken language shows greater grammatical complexity than the written. Lonergan, too, notes of the speaker’s position and time. The point may be illustrated by contrasting the use of the copula ‘is’ in the two expressions ‘John is here’ and ‘Pure water is H2O.’ In the first expression, which stands for a concrete proposition, the copula is relative to the time of utterance; the grammatical present tense of the verb ‘to be’ has its proper force; and saying that John is here has no implication that John was or was not here, or that John will or will not be here. On the other hand, to say that pure water is H2O is to utter an abstract law of nature; grammatically, the copula occurs in the present tense, but it is not intended to confine the force of the expression to the present time.”

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that "contemporary linguistic study is study not of the written but the spoken word." 127 Further, both authors insist that language is key to a range of social and cultural initiatives and both make distinctions between ordinary and technical languages, for example. 128

Lonergan goes on to conclude that speaking and listening is a "linguistic" phase distinct from the reading and writing of a "literate" phase and suggests further that there are linguistically carried developments in the control of meaning within literate cultures as forms, stages, or platforms of meaning and social activity. 129 Language is used not only to express different types or "levels" of texts, it also carries internal differentiations of the social expression of meaning. Lonergan, working within the Western tradition, highlights the part that classical Greek culture made in creating what he calls a logical control of meaning. An important point of comparison with Halliday arises at this point, for if Halliday regards social contexts as extralinguistic, Lonergan regards social (and cultural) contexts themselves as the products of linguistically carried differentiations of expression. Literacy, for example, provides a different basis for developing and differentiating social and cultural contexts as compared with the differentiations that can be carried by a purely oral culture.

The successive development of platforms of meaning does not mean that the ordering of different stages of meaning is chronological in the sense that one platform succeeds another and obliterates all traces of the earlier. Rather, although literacy, for example, provides a different platform for diversifying social and cultural activities than does oracy, oral communication remains the only way in which certain social transactions can take place. In turn, the development of logic and explanatory forms within literacy leads to a greater differentiation of social and cultural contexts but with the limitation that the systems so developed are thought to have permanent validity. Currently a further basis of differentiation is emerging in which systems are developed

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128 For an example of Lonergan's description of everyday and technical language, see "The analogy of meaning," 185-86.
129 The word "platform" is meant to suggest that developments in the control of meaning underpin social and cultural developments as well as provide a basis for interpersonal, social relations, a different image to that provided by the word "stage."
successively so that no one system is final, but where methods give access to invariants and variables. The leading edge of social and cultural development shifts from an emphasis on content to one on process. In this sequence of changes, speaking and listening as a distinct realm of meaning remains, but is continuously extended and enhanced, and so on. The following extended quotation from Lonergan rephrases his earlier interest in sequences of expression mentioned above. Now there are a clear “four stages diversifying the scope of social and cultural activities.”

“It remains that earlier forms may be found in later periods, so that mere chronology does not provide an even preliminary ordering. On the other hand, differentiation is not independent of language and, in fact, not a little relevance is found when one distinguishes four stages: the linguistic, the literate, the logical, and the methodical. Each of these stages includes those that precede but adds a new factor of its own. In the linguistic stage people speak and listen. In the literate they read and write. In the logical they operate on propositions; they promote clarity, coherence, and rigor of statement; they move toward systems that are thought to be permanently valid. In the methodical stage the construction of systems remains, but the permanently valid system has become an abandoned ideal; any system is presumed to be the precursor of another and better system; and the role of method is the discernment of invariants and variables in the ongoing sequence of systems.”

Lonergan recognizes that meaning has core components that operate at four levels – the level of empirical experience, the level of understanding, the level of reflective judgment, and the level of existential decisions in the context of interpersonal relations. This recognition provides a framework for our four-leveled account of

130 “Philosophy and the Religious Phenomenon,” 140.
131 “Philosophy and the Religious Phenomenon,” 139. Lonergan lists eight examples of social cooperation, and five areas of cultural cooperation which provide explanations, justifications, and goals for the different patterns of social collaboration. Compare with pages 138-140 where Joseph Flanagan compares logic and method as ways of controlling meaning as follows: “Logic, then, is a very limited way of controlling meaning. The much broader method is to control, not the clarity and coherence of the contents that are meant, but the operations that originate and generate the meanings and the orientation that directs those operations.” Quest for Self-Knowledge: An Essay in Lonergan's Philosophy (Toronto: University of Toronto Press, 2002), 263.
expression, and so language. The framework outlines four types of meaning: “on the level of the psyche, as in the smile, on the level of intelligence, as in the definition; on the level of judgment – ‘That’s what really is’; and the meaning that is constitutive of the human community.” But these components and levels of meaning are realized differently in different cultures so that learning another language is not learning word-for-word equivalents with the language/s one already knows. “It is learning to think of everything in a quite different fashion, and if one has not learnt that, one is a helpless victim of one’s own language.”

PART 3: A SPIRAL CURRICULUM FOR A TEACHER OF ENGLISH

We turn now briefly to a basic curriculum for teachers of English. There is much to be done before this curriculum can be more than indicative, but enough has been laid out to suggest that all language teaching can be based on a methodical approach to language as operating within a four-leveled model of meaning. With such a model in hand, the language teacher can operate more flexibly and responsively than when relying on language learning techniques in a classroom context. In this sense the curriculum works spirally as the language is brought back into focus at different levels. So we conclude with a basic curriculum for the promise it contains.

There is much to be done and much to be questioned, so in the above comparison of Halliday and Lonergan we have overlooked epistemological differences in pursuit of a grand theory of language that can underpin a methodology for language teaching. In this dialogue we have reached a mutually enriching model of language as operating at four levels. For Halliday the levels are (1) phonology and graphology, (2) lexicogrammar, (3) text and discourse, and (4) the social context. For Lonergan, with his different epistemology of meaning,

132 “Our intentionality analysis distinguished the four levels of experience, understanding, factual judgment, and existential decision.” “Philosophy and the Religious Phenomenon,” 134.
133 “The Analogy of Meaning,” 211.
there are also four levels to linguistic expression. These begin with (1) the sound and shapes of a psychological experience that begins in the womb of the mother, moving on to focus on (2) the intelligible unities of nouns, their associated verbs and metaphorical meanings, then (3) the conventional patterning of texts generated by the search for assertions about the knowledge of events, facts, opinions, attitudes of others in everyday living, in technical pursuits, or in religious living, and finally (4) the linguistically carried differentiations that move social and cultural development from a reliance only on oral communication into the literary, logical, and methodical approaches to developing social and cultural institutions.

The dialogue does not imply that the two theories are equivalent in either content or practical value. Lonergan’s levels are grounded in a dynamic account of knowing and learning as self-noticing that means that in the absence of blockages, and in the presence of hard work, learning spirals cyclically and cumulatively between levels. Lonergan’s account of the sources of meaning, too, does not restrict meaning to what Halliday refers to as the “content” of language, nor make language the only carrier of meaning. So what Halliday terms the “protolanguage” of a baby’s “first words” are for Lonergan meaningful, as well as part of the learning of the sounds, word stresses, intonations, and discourse interjections of a given language.

In the perspective of an older learner or a teacher, then, the sounds and shapes of a language have meaning at all the four levels we have been discussing, although different languages will utilize them differently. Working from below upward, the sounds of the mother tongue, for example, remain significant throughout life, so that differences in pronunciation mark out the stranger. Moreover, the sounds and shapes of a language are celebrated and extended in the music, poetry, and song that express a shared self-understanding, sometimes beyond rational explanation and accountability. These same sounds gain practical and cultural significance in English when word stress is used to separate out the pronunciation of some nouns and verbs that are written with the same shape. In Chinese, tones separate out the meaning to be taken from a given shape. In one, the function is grammatical, in the other lexical. In English, at the level of a text or discourse, intonation is used to highlight the theme and rheme of the
conversation, or to distinguish old from new information. Finally these same sounds and shapes carry the construction of meaning between self and other. Lower levels are retained, added to, and incorporated or integrated into higher levels.\textsuperscript{135}

Granted, then, that there is much to lay out and display, what does a basic curriculum for language learning look like? What is it that the language teacher has to hold in mind in any single teaching interaction? Firstly, that the process of learning is a self-correcting iterative cumulative and dynamic process of the self-noticing of understandings and misunderstandings by the learner not the teacher.\textsuperscript{136} This is the implication of Lonergan's cognitional theory. The first implication of this observation is that a teacher cannot always recognize what is being learned. In any learning situation what is relevant can be occurring on four different levels, and individual learners may be focusing on now one and now another of each of these levels. However, if the teacher's job is to speed up the learning process then the curriculum provides a way to hold in mind that language learning moves from the top downward but also from below upwards. From above downward the learning situation is interpersonal with the learner (and teacher) situated at, and interested in each other, on at least one of the oral to methodical platforms for meaning at the fourth level of the model. A more or less illiterate woman who is getting by on the streets of a city is differently placed than a student within an academic bureaucracy who has to write a thesis. Similarly, from the bottom-up the process is interpersonal as a learner needs a thorough grounding in the sounds if they are to be able to read fluently, while there is a perennial problem about reading the handwriting of someone brought up in a different educational system, whether or not the writer is using a different script. However, this separation of bottom-up and top-down is analytic, for in the teaching situation the interpersonal is carried by the intersubjective. The colors, furniture, institutional location, equipment, and physical layout of the learning situation are


\textsuperscript{136} Leading to an approach to combining elements from among others, noticing, focus on form, or the Silent Way. Learning is constructed by the learner.
part and parcel of the self-other relationships between learner and teacher. Given these strictures, the following table provides a basic curriculum that works spirally, one that any language teacher could do well to keep in mind.

**Table 4. Spiraling from above and below**

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Metasemiotics constructing meaning</th>
<th>Teaching to DEVELOP AN AWARENESS OF</th>
<th>Learning through DEVELOPING A SPIRALING FOCUS ON</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Interpersonal existential meanings</td>
<td>presenting oral and written frames to maintain and construct communities of meaning in everyday life, in business, the university</td>
<td>reflecting on yourself as a language teacher/learner – learning strategies motivations – cultural personal interests methods of learning teaching the context of learning desired or required sociolinguistic pragmatics and competencies social deixis</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Understanding meanings</td>
<td>the clustering identities and processes in time and space into worlds of meaning</td>
<td>space-time deixis mind maps/lexis word combinations (clause/group/phrase) roots-prefixes-suffixes metaphors – initial/nonvisual word stress/tones</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Intersubjective meanings from below</td>
<td>memorizing shapes and sounds</td>
<td>paralinguistics genres – music, art, architecture, dress, sculpture, folk custom, colors poetry prosody</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
This article sets out Aristotle’s response to Plato, Halliday’s understanding of the distinctive features of language, and Lonergan’s initial presentation of cognitional activity as a multi-leveled activity into a dialogue, a “text,” a mutual search for objectivity focused on method in the formal teaching and learning of language.
SANCTIFYING GRACE, CHARITY, AND DIVINE INDWELLING: A KEY TO THE NEXUS MYSTERIORUM FIDEI

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1. INTRODUCTION

This paper is part of the work of remote preparation for what I hope will be a more or less organized response from the Lonergan community to the call that Lonergan issues for explicit Christian participation in interreligious understanding.¹ We do not yet have a universalist language to express the universal gift of God's love that is given to all participants and that Christian faith identifies with the gift of the Holy Spirit. And so for the present, the best we can do is use the language that our own respective traditions make available to us, purifying it as we do so, ever alert to possible new insights and words.² Here I wish to retrieve from Lonergan, in Lonergan's own language and in the language, both metaphysical and methodical, of his and my tradition some facets of just what the gift is that is offered to all men and women. For Lonergan and for me, that language is irretrievably Trinitarian, and good Trinitarian theology will be at the heart of anything that

¹ See Bernard Lonergan, “Prolegomena to the Study of the Emerging Religious Consciousness of Our Time,” in A Third Collection, ed. Frederick E. Crowe (Mahwah, NJ: Paulist), at 65-71. The annual colloquia sponsored by the Marquette Lonergan Project have adopted this call as a focus for ongoing discussion. The first three colloquia were held in the fall of 2009, 2010, and 2011, and the proceedings are available on the website www.lonerganresource.com.

² See “Prolegomena....,” 70.
Christians bring to the interreligious table.

I will be speaking of matters that touch on religious self-appropriation, and Lonergan has some wise cautions in this regard that it is well to pay attention to. While his acknowledgment of, for example, the work of William Johnston with Zen practitioners in Japan,\(^3\) as well as his insistence that the first set of special categories is grounded in religious experience,\(^4\) indicate that religious self-appropriation is very important methodologically and theologically, he is also very sensitive to the genuine Catholic hesitation regarding certainty in such matters. I begin, then, with two quotations from question-and-answer sessions that will appropriately relativize this discussion of religious experience.

You have people who ask, What is religious experience? But you wouldn’t be here if you didn’t have it in some form. It can be a concealed vector, a component, an undertow in your life; but it is there. Otherwise, you would find something better to do than to listen to a talk about theology. To identify it psychologically is not easy. However, it is not important either: by their fruits you shall know them.\(^5\)

...Religious self-appropriation: One has to remember that one’s consciousness is a polyphony; it is not just one and the same tune from morning to night that has your undivided attention. On the contrary, there are several things going on at once as in a symphony. There is a dominant theme, an intermediate theme, and themes that keep recurring, and themes that are only occasional, and things that barely pop up. And religion can be one of the things that barely pops up...The religious self-appropriation is connecting what is there with the way people talk about religion, and the ability to talk about religion and all the different ways in which it needs to be spoken of; and the

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\(^3\) See “Prolegomena....” 67-68.


\(^5\) Bernard Lonergan, quoted from a discussion session at the Regis College 1969 Institute on Method in Theology. See www.bernardlonergan.com at 542R0A0E060 (audio) and 542R0DTE060 (text).
way people talk about religion can be the big turnoff. Bonhoeffer preferred to talk to people who weren't religious than to those that were religious, and I'm not sure but that what turned him off from those that were religious wasn't the fact that they were religious but rather because they were a bit dumb, and talking about it in the most unsatisfactory fashion and using it as an escape or defense mechanism. So being able to connect what is religious in a person's experience, however occasional, with a language that means something to a person is the fundamental trick in this mediated immediacy. The religious experience is there. God's grace is there and is working...You can presume it is there...I know a person who was saying he wanted to love God, and his director said, You do, and he didn't believe it for ten years yet. Making that connection. Again, this knowing is not the important thing; the important thing is loving God whether you know it or not, whether you are in consolation or in desolation; that is the important thing. Religious self-appropriation in the sense of the mediated immediacy, where you know just what religious experience is and is not: that is dessert; it isn't the meat and potatoes. You can get along fine for years without that, and you need never have any of the dessert in this life. But it helps.

2. THE ISSUE

Even while he was writing the Verbum articles and Insight, Lonergan managed to offer extremely fruitful suggestions regarding some of the most hotly disputed theological questions of the day. These include a highly nuanced systematic statement regarding the issues raised in Henri de Lubac's Surnaturel and a hypothetical position on the relation

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6 Bernard Lonergan, quoted from a discussion session at the 1975 Lonergan Workshop. See www.bernardlonergan.com at 85400AoE070 (audio) and 85400DTE070 (text).

7 Henri de Lubac, Surnaturel: Etudes historiques (Paris: Aubier, 1946). Lonergan addresses the same issues in “De ente supernaturali: Supplementum schematicum,” dated also in 1946; but there is no evidence there that he had yet any knowledge of de Lubac’s work. Perhaps his first explicit mention of de Lubac on the question is in his Latin notes for a course “De gratia et virtutibus,” 1947-48 (on the website www.bernardlonergan.com at 16200DTL040; a translation by Michael Shields has been placed
between created and uncreated grace, that is, between sanctifying grace and charity, on the created side, and the divine indwelling. The record of his contributions lies largely, though not exclusively, in Latin class notes and Latin systematic supplements prepared for his courses to Jesuit seminarians in Montreal and Toronto, and partly at least for this reason his contributions are to this day not given the recognition they deserve, despite the fact that some of his work, particularly on the issues raised by de Lubac, has been studied in first-rate scholarly publications, including Michael Stebbins's The Divine Initiative and more recently in an article by Raymond Moloney in Theological Studies.

I am concerned here with Lonergan's work on the relation of created and uncreated grace. It is interesting that the issue was addressed almost simultaneously by Lonergan and Karl Rahner. It is perhaps even more interesting that, while they identified the same problem, their proposed solutions are markedly different.

There is an interesting story surrounding Lonergan's addressing of the issue. At the beginning of his 1947-48 course on sanctifying grace, Lonergan distributed to the students a list of theses that he would be propounding during the course. But when he came to teaching thesis 22, which dealt with the issue of the relation of sanctifying grace and the indwelling of the Holy Spirit, he told the class that he had come to realize that his formulation was wrong but that he had not

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yet discovered an acceptable alternative. So there was a break in the course until he had figured it out to his satisfaction. He called them back two weeks later. Such was the luxury of teaching in a relatively freestanding seminary!

The formulation that he had come to see was wrong was: "Through this same finite effect [that is, created sanctifying grace] there is constituted not only the indwelling of the Holy Spirit but also the vivification of the justified through the same Spirit." This formulation of the relation between created and uncreated grace contains a difficulty remarkably similar to that which Rahner at almost the same time recognized in the mainline Scholastic tradition. For Rahner, the mainline Scholastic theology of grace had made created grace the basis of the divine self-communication, whereas the scriptures and the Fathers acknowledge created grace as a consequence of this self-communication. 12 Rahner's solution applies to the divine self-communication the Scholastic ontology of the beatific vision, so that "God communicates himself to the [person] to whom grace has been shown in the mode of formal [later in the same paper, quasi-formal] causality," 13 as distinct from efficient causality, which is given short shrift in Rahner's treatment of the issue. Lonergan, on the other hand, reformulated the problematic thesis 22 as follows: "The uncreated gift, as uncreated, is constituted by God alone, and by it God stands to the state of the justified person not only as an efficient principle but also as a constitutive principle; but this constitutive principle is not present in the justified person as an inherent form but is present to the justified person as the term of a relation."

Moreover, by 1951-52, that is, four years later, Lonergan was quite prepared to speak of distinct relations to the three divine persons, and so of the three divine persons as distinct terms of distinct relations. This is a problem that he had acknowledged in 1947-48 but had passed over in that course, perhaps because he had just reformulated his position and was still working out its consequences, and perhaps because he was concerned not to violate Pius XII's strictures regarding the question. Pius had warned, "All things must be held to be common to the Trinity inasmuch as they relate to God as their supreme efficient

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12 Rahner, "Some Implications...," 325.
13 Rahner, "Some Implications...," 334, emphasis Rahner's.
cause. " This statement made many theologians reluctant to speak of distinct relations to the three divine persons in any other way than by appropriation. In 1947-48, Lonergan is on to what will become his response, for he writes, "This statement perhaps leaves a certain latitude when God is not considered as an efficient principle but as a constitutive principle." But he adds, "We shall leave this question to the treatise on the triune God, both on account of its difficulty and also in order not to deal with distinct questions at the same time." By 1951-52, Lonergan was quite prepared in the course on grace to speak of distinct relations to the three divine Persons, and proposes a way to do so. Moreover, he writes that arguments to the contrary do no more than prove that grace not as a term but as an effect is related to the essential divine love common to the three persons. So there is a distinction that already was introduced into the 1947-48 revised thesis 22 between divine love considered as an efficient cause and divine love considered constitutively, and that distinction will by 1951-52 lead to an incredibly rich theology of the divine indwelling. That is what I wish to share with you. I am visiting here the 1951-52 notes with the specific intention of presenting Lonergan's solution to the question of how the divine self-communication, constituted by God alone, allows each of the persons of the Trinity to be present to those to whom the created grace of God's favor (gratia gratum faciens) has been given, and to be present precisely as distinct terms of created relations. I am also asking how we can preserve this solution in a methodical transposition of these issues.

It is in these 1951-52 notes, moreover, that what has come to be called Lonergan's four-point hypothesis was perhaps first expressed, the hypothesis in which Lonergan relates four absolutely supernatural created realities respectively to each of the four real divine relations: the grace of union to paternity, sanctifying grace to active spiration, charity to passive spiration, and the light of glory to filiation. The notes offer a far more extensive and richer presentation of this hypothesis than is found in the 1957/1959 Divinarum personarum and, without revision, in the 1964 De Deo Trino: Pars Systematica, texts with which many are more familiar.  

14 Pius XII, Mystici corporis Christi, in Acta Apostolicae Sedis 35 (1943), 231.
15 For the latter presentation of the hypothesis, see Bernard Lonergan, The Triune
a distinction of sanctifying grace and charity as created participations in and imitations of, respectively, the divine relations of active and passive spiration. It is precisely that distinction that enables him to speak of distinct relations to each of the divine persons, and it is that distinction that I wish to emphasize here, as is obvious from my title. So one implication of my interpretation is that what has come to be called the four-point hypothesis is very important in the development of Lonergan’s theology of grace.

A particular problem has been raised over my continuing appeal to the four-point hypothesis, and the problem has to do precisely with the distinction of sanctifying grace and charity. In effect, the question is being asked whether the distinction survives the transition from a metaphysical to a methodical theology.16 As far as the history of Lonergan’s own position on the issue is concerned, we may say the following. Lonergan made it very clear as early as 1946 that the doctrine of an absolutely supernatural communication of the divine nature can be maintained whether or not one’s systematic understanding of the doctrine includes a distinction between sanctifying grace and charity — a distinction that Aquinas makes and that Lonergan repeats from Aquinas and that Scotus denies.17 The distinction perdures in his theological writings in a Scholastic mode and is very clear in the notes under investigation. However, in the 1974 Lonergan Workshop, in a question-and-answer session, he admits that his later methodical transposition of the category of sanctifying grace into the expression “the dynamic state of being in love with God” represents an “amalgam”

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17 Lonergan says in “De ente supernaturali,” “…the disputed question whether sanctifying grace and the habit of charity are really distinct does not affect the substance of our treatment but only the way in which the matter is presented. It does not affect the substance of the doctrine, for all Catholic schools of thought admit a created communication of the divine nature; but it does influence the manner of presentation, inasmuch as different authors arrange the matter differently in order to expound it in an intelligible way” (*Early Latin Theology*, 73).
of sanctifying grace and charity. I'm asking whether that methodical transposition can be refined so as to preserve the distinction. And I want to preserve the distinction precisely because it provides us with a hypothetical understanding of how it can be true that we do indeed enjoy distinct created relations to each of the three uncreated divine persons.

The 1951-52 notes are divided into historical, biblical, and systematic considerations. In the present paper I wish to indicate how the seeds of the distinction of sanctifying grace and charity are already implied in the biblical part of the 1951-52 notes. I will be developing implications of what is in Lonergan’s biblical notes, in the retrospective light of the four-point hypothesis, which itself is introduced as such only in the systematic portion. I will be asking whether a systematic understanding of the mystery of the divine indwelling is not enriched by maintaining this distinction. If so, I'll be proposing that we would do well to find a way of transposing the distinction into the methodical context, and I will be making some suggestions along those lines. Theological categories as worked out in foundations provide models, not descriptions of reality or hypotheses about reality. But when they are taken over into systematics, they receive hypothetical status. Still, no question of dogma or church doctrine regarding grace is either challenged or strengthened by accepting or rejecting this particular systematic hypothesis. I would like to present an argument for its continuing systematic (and so hypothetical) fruitfulness.

While my review of Lonergan’s notes breaks no new ground but simply revisits ground already well broken but perhaps allowed to lie fallow for too long, I also have some suggestions of my own prompted by this review, suggestions that I think are entirely in keeping with Lonergan’s own thinking but for which I must assume responsibility, for better or for worse. I’m sure you will recognize these when they appear, but let me recall a confession that Fred Crowe makes at the beginning of his groundbreaking essay “Son of God, Holy Spirit, and World Religions”: “I will not...distinguish always between what Lonergan says and what I make him mean.”

18 See below, at footnote 27.
3. THE HISTORICAL NOTES

In the historical notes, Lonergan is concerned with connecting the steps that led to the Lutheran and Reformed positions on justification. He roots these positions, as have many Catholics including Étienne Gilson, in Scotus. For Lonergan that means they are rooted in confrontationalism and conceptualism, and in subsequent nominalist and voluntarist doctrine. His concern in the section seems to be to set up a context that calls for a review of what the scriptures say about justification and salvation, which, he claims, cannot support the Lutheran and Reformed positions. (Whether the far more ecumenical Lonergan of *Method in Theology* would present the same historical analysis is an open question; there are probably not enough data to answer it.)

4. THE BIBLICAL BASIS FOR THE NOTION OF SANCTIFYING GRACE

The synthetic statement of the biblical basis for the notion of habitual or sanctifying grace reads as follows, in translation. The numbers are Lonergan's, not mine.

(1) Those whom God the Father loves as he loves his only begotten Son Jesus (2) he gifts with the uncreated gift of the Holy Spirit, so that, (3) reborn (4) into a new life, (5) they might become living members of Christ. By this gift, they, (6) the justified, (7) the friends of God, (8) the adopted children of God, (9) the heirs in hope of eternal life, (10) enter into participation in divine life.

Every one of these ten points, Lonergan maintains, has a firm biblical basis. He supports this claim with abundant quotations from the New Testament.

Lonergan's principal concern in this biblical section, however, is to establish the point that "sanctifying grace" or "habitual grace" is a synthetic category that unites these ten features of biblical doctrine. The category does not appear as such in scripture. When he comes to the systematic portion of the notes, his specific point will be that each of these ten features of biblical doctrine represents a formal effect of sanctifying grace. The issue of formal effects has to do with the
question, What true judgments can be made once one knows a formal cause – judgments whose truth is founded in that formal cause?

The specific character of habitual or sanctifying grace will be found in unifying these formal effects. As the soul is to the potencies of the soul and the habits rooted in them and the operations that flow from the habits, so sanctifying grace is to the various features synthesized in the statement of biblical doctrine. The analogy holds up because these features name characteristics of new and transformed operations, or of new and transformed habits or states, and so of new and transformed or elevated faculties or potencies of an elevated soul. The systematic part of the notes will show how this is the case, treating each of the features of the biblical synthesis in terms of the metaphysical category of formal effects.

The points in the biblical synthesis that are most relevant to my present concerns are the first two, and so I will concentrate exclusively on those: (1) Those whom God the Father loves as he loves his only-begotten Son Jesus (2) he gifts with the uncreated gift of the Holy Spirit. Even with respect to these two points I will not be able to cover all the details in Lonergan’s notes.

4.1 The Father Loves Us as He Loves the Son

The key texts read: “...I in them and you in me, that they may be perfectly one, so that the world may know that you have sent me and have loved them even as you have loved me” (John 17:23); “…that the love with which you have loved me may be in them, and I in them” (John 17:26).

In commenting on these texts, Lonergan presents a distinction between essential and notional divine love, and a corresponding distinction between divine efficient causality and the entire question of immanent constitution. These distinctions are crucial to his entire position on these issues. The created gift by which God draws us into participation in the divine life, that is, the created grace by which it is true that the Holy Spirit is given to us and dwells in us, is to be conceived as effected by essential divine love, by the love that is common to the three divine persons. But it is also to be conceived as immanently constituted in terms of the notional acts proper to each of the divine persons. The term “notional” refers to the personal properties of the divine persons,
precisely as that by which we know each of them as distinct from the others. In the present instance, the one love common to all three divine persons is exercised in a distinct manner by each of the divine persons. That distinct manner is a function of that person's "notional act."

The "notional acts" are a function of the relations of opposition that are the divine persons. Essential divine love, not finding us good in the special way that a theology of grace is seeking, makes us good by this gift. Thus the gift is called "gratia gratum faciens," the grace that makes us pleasing to God. That grace, as caused by God, is the result or effect of the love common to the three divine persons, but at the same time it establishes in us distinct relations to each of the divine persons and a distinct participation in the divine life of each of them, in keeping with the distinct fashion in which each of them exercises the divine creative love. Thus the Holy Spirit is proceeding Love, Amor procedens (Summa theologiae, 1, q. 37, a. 1 c. and ad 4m), and the Father and the Son love themselves and each other and us (notionaliter diligere) by the Holy Spirit, that is, by proceeding Love (q. 37, a. 2 c. ad fin. and ad 2m). Therein is contained the distinction of active (notionaliter diligere) and passive (Amor procedens) spiration. Sanctifying grace is effected, caused by the essential divine love common to the three persons, but it establishes in us distinct relations to each person, because the gift is immanently constituted in terms of the distinct divine relations and is to be understood as a created imitation of and participation in those relations.

The issue has to do with what can be said of God contingently in the order of sanctifying grace. What can be said of God contingently will be said in terms of transcendent formal effects of sanctifying grace: judgments that can truly be said of God, judgments whose truth is grounded in the created consequent condition called sanctifying grace.

These transcendent formal effects are of two kinds. For sanctifying grace can be considered as an effect of divine love, since it is out of love that God produces grace in a person, and it can also be considered as a term of divine love (for God loves the person made pleasing). The transcendent formal effects of sanctifying grace as an effect of divine

20 "These divine attributes are called 'notional,' not as if they were conceptual beings, but because they cause the divine persons to be known as distinct from one another." Bernard Lonergan, The Triune God: Doctrines, trans. Michael G. Shields, ed. Robert M. Doran and H. Daniel Monsour (Toronto: University of Toronto Press, 2009), 413.
love regard essential divine love. All three persons are equally one effective principle of every creature whatsoever. And so this effective divine love is predicated equally of all three persons. And love that is predicated equally of all three is essential love. But the transcendent formal effects of sanctifying grace as term are related to notional divine love, that is, to the distinct manner in which each person is subject of the one divine loving consciousness. This assertion is proposed as probable with an intrinsic probability; for what scripture and the Fathers say about the various relations of the divine Persons to the just seems to postulate that grace, while an effect of essential divine love, also be immanently constituted as a term of notional divine love.

So for our present purposes, it is sufficient to say that Lonergan uses the first of the biblical elements “God the Father loves us as he loves his only-begotten Son Jesus” to introduce the distinction between the essential divine love common to the three divine persons and the specific manner in which each of the divine persons is subject of that love. Anything further about the dynamics of that specific manner is dependent on the way in which Lonergan elucidates the next point, namely, that the Father gifts those whom he loves in this special way with the uncreated gift of the Holy Spirit.

So to summarize Lonergan’s commentary on the first point, we may say the following. The love that the first of the biblical elements affirms is the love proper to the Father, that is, it is the Father’s proper way of exercising divine love: “God the Father loves us,” with an active loving that corresponds to Aquinas’s “notionaliter diligere” and to the Father’s role in active spiration. That loving is similar to the Father’s love for his only-begotten Son become incarnate, Jesus of Nazareth. This means that as the Father in his love communicates to the eternal Word the divine nature that the Word manifests in becoming incarnate, and to the incarnate Word the gift of the Holy Spirit, so the Father communicates to us some participation in that same divine nature. Sanctifying grace will be that created communication of the divine nature, in the language of the first thesis in “De ente supernaturali.” In commenting on what is affirmed in the first element in the synthetic statement of biblical doctrine, Lonergan introduces the distinction of essential and notional divine love. When he comes to talk about sanctifying grace, it will be essential divine love that effects sanctifying
Sanctifying Grace, Charity, and Divine Indwelling

grace, but that grace itself, as a created communication of the divine nature, will ground a created relation to the uncreated Holy Spirit, and this in turn will establish the possibility of distinct relations to the other two divine persons. This is the next point in the biblical synthesis.

4.2 The Gift of the Holy Spirit

How can a divine person be given? Lonergan quotes Aquinas: The word “gift” conveys the idea of being givable. Something given has a relation both to the donor and to the recipient. The donor would not give unless a gift were his to give; and it is given to the recipient for it to belong to her. A divine person is said to belong to someone (“esse alicuius”) either because of origin, as the Son is the Son of the Father, or because the divine person is possessed by someone. Now, “to possess” means to have something at one’s disposal to use or enjoy as one wishes, and a divine person can be possessed in this sense only by a rational creature joined to God. Other creatures can be acted upon by a divine person, but not in such a way that they have it in their power to enjoy the divine person or to use his effect. In some cases the rational creature, however, does reach that state, wherein she becomes a sharer in the divine Word and in the proceeding Love, so that she has at her disposal a power to know God and to love God rightly. Only a rational creature, then, has the capacity to possess a divine person. She cannot, however, come to this by her own resources; it must be given to her from above; for we say that something is given to us that we have from someone else. This is the way that to be “given” and to be “Gift” are terms applicable to a divine person. (Summa theologiae, 1, q. 38, a. 1, emphasis added)

The fundamental divine gift is the gift of the Holy Spirit, because “Gift” is a personal name proper to the Holy Spirit. As Aquinas writes, “...what we give first to anyone is the love with which we love him. Clearly, then, love has the quality of being our first gift; through love we give all other gratuitous gifts. Since, then..., the Holy Spirit comes forth as Love, the Spirit proceeds as the first Gift.” If the other persons are given or give themselves, it will somehow be a function of the gift
of the Holy Spirit.

4.2.1 Gift and Mission

This gift is also a mission of the Holy Spirit. Again, the scriptural quotations are explained by quoting Aquinas: “A divine person is said to be sent if that person exists in a new way in someone, and is said to be given if that person is possessed by someone. And neither of these occurs except in accord with ("secundum") the grace that makes one pleasing to God” (Summa theologiae, 1, q. 43, a. 3). And “…the very notion of mission means that the one who is sent either begins to be where previously he or she had not been, as happens in creaturely affairs, or begins to be where the one who is sent had previously been, but now in a new way, as is the case when mission is attributed to divine persons. Thus, two things must be considered in the one to whom the mission happens: indwelling by grace and something new brought through grace. There is, then, an invisible mission to all in whom these two features are found” (Summa theologiae, 1, q. 43, a. 6, emphasis added).

How are these two “things” related to one another? That is the key question.

4.2.2 Created and Uncreated Grace

The relation between these “two things” that “must be considered” has been a matter of dispute. We have already seen how Lonergan and Rahner identified the same problem in the mainline Scholastic tradition at roughly the same time, but arrived at different alternatives. As Lonergan drew upon the intricacies of contingent predication about God to explain his revised thesis in 1947-48, so four years later he appeals to the same rules of predication to explain the second element in the synthetic statement of biblical doctrine. Thus, the Holy Spirit is given to us insofar as the Spirit is had by us, and this posits a change, not in the Holy Spirit or in God but in us. For whatever is predicated contingently of God is true through extrinsic denomination and requires a created consequent condition if the predication itself is to be true. In our present instance, the change in us is denoted by the term gratia gratum faciens, and it is understood in terms of something being given to us, created in us, that renders us pleasing to God in
a special, supernatural way, in a way that makes us participants in Trinitarian life. The statement that the Father and the Son send the Holy Spirit could not be true, were it not for this change in us. For anything predicated contingently of God, while constituted by the divine perfection, demands, if it is truly predicated, that there be a created consequent condition of the truth of the statement that makes the predication. In this case, the created consequent condition of the truth of the statement that affirms the gift and mission of the Holy Spirit is *gratia gratum faciens*. And *gratia gratum faciens* makes us pleasing to God in this special way precisely because — and here again we see the difference between Lonergan and Rahner on the issue — it is the created subject of a created relation to the uncreated Holy Spirit as term of the created relation. The Holy Spirit is given to us precisely as the uncreated term of a created relation grounded in a created gift, a gift that elevates the central form of the person to participation in divine life through this created relation to an uncreated divine Person.

Now a created relation to the uncreated Holy Spirit might appropriately be conceived to share in some way in the uncreated relation to the Holy Spirit that is Father and Son, that is, in paternity and filiation breathing the Spirit, in active spiration. And so *gratia gratum faciens*, as grounding such a relation, can with some theological fittingness be thought of as some kind of created participation in and imitation of active spiration, the eternal relation of the Father and the Son together to the Holy Spirit. Here we see the reasoning behind the statement in the four-point hypothesis that sanctifying grace is a created participation in and imitation of active spiration; it is so precisely because it grounds a created relation to the Holy Spirit. What makes us pleasing to God, then, in this special way that we call grace is that we have been given a share in the relation to the Holy Spirit that in God is called active spiration, the Father and the Son "breathing" the Holy Spirit, where the Son is precisely *Verbum spirans Amorem*, a Judgment of Value that breathes eternal Love. That change in us, which may fittingly be conceived as involving a created supernatural judgment of value or set of judgments of value, is simultaneously the created subject of a created relation to the uncreated Holy Spirit, a relation that makes it possible for us to say truly that the Holy Spirit is sent to us by the Father and the Son and dwells in us as the other term,
the uncreated term, of that created relation. It is this created subject of a created relation to the uncreated Holy Spirit that is the habitual grace that unifies or integrates the various elements contained in Lonergan's ten-point statement of biblical doctrine on grace. This created subject of a relation is an elevation of "central form," and the ten elements in the biblical doctrine represent elevations of operations, habits, states, and potencies to the supernatural order.

Moreover, active inspiration is the "notional love" of the Father and the Son from which the Holy Spirit proceeds, and so sanctifying grace, as a share in that "notional love" entailing a created supernatural judgment of value or set of judgments of value, sets up a relation that is precisely a relation of active loving. Furthermore, the Holy Spirit, to whom we are related anew and in this special way, is a proceeding Love in God that is an uncreated relation to the Father and the Son, a passive spiration that in its proper character is nothing but Love, the mutual Love of Father and Son. And so if the Holy Spirit abides in us, is present to us as the uncreated term of a created supernatural relation, it is appropriate to say that there takes place in us some further created change that is the subject of a created relation to the Father and the Son. Our created share in active spiration obviously does not spirate the Holy Spirit, but if it is a share in active spiration, it must spirate something. It spirates charity. The further created change is charity. Charity is our created participation in the Holy Spirit, a change in us that proceeds from sanctifying grace in a manner that is analogous to the procession of the Holy Spirit from the Father and the Son and that grounds a created relation to the uncreated Father and Son.

This created change called charity proceeds from the unification that is gratia gratum faciens and that includes a set of created supernatural judgments of value, in a manner analogous to the way in which the Holy Spirit proceeds from the Father and the Son, where the Son is Verbum spirans Amorem, the Judgment of Value that spirates proceeding Love. So gratia gratum faciens includes a set of judgments of value that, like the eternal Son of the Father, are verbum spirans amor, where in this case the proceeding amor is the charity that grounds a relation of love to the Father and the Son. I would suggest that we might want to explore the possibility that this set of judgments of value constitutes the universalist "faith" that the
later Lonergan distinguishes from the beliefs of particular religious traditions. Sanctifying grace, then, will stand to charity in the created supernatural order as active spiration stands to passive spiration in the uncreated immanent Trinitarian life, and all three persons are present to us precisely as the uncreated terms of distinct but intimately connected created relations of love. They are all our beloved, and the presence of the beloved in the lover is constituted by and identical with love.

4.2.3 The Analogy of Grace

I have suggested in previous writings the possibility of developing a Trinitarian analogy in the order of grace, and reflection on what we have just seen provides me with a sharper formulation than I have been able to come up with previously. The analogy in the order of grace begins with the gift of God’s love, retrospectively interpreted as a gift of being on the receiving end of a love that is without qualification and that has about it something that seems to emanate from the foundation of the universe. I suggest that that retrospective interpretation might be linked to Augustine’s memoria, which was the starting point of the first great psychological analogy. The various modalities that such experience can take are as varied as the individual lives of men and women gifted with this love. This experience is the conscious manifestation of “gratia gratum faciens,” of the grace that makes one pleasing to God in the special way that elevates one into participation in the divine life. It is the gift of God’s love precisely as both received and as retrospectively acknowledged as a fundamental undertow in one’s life and development.

This initial step, though, is composed of two elements: the gift itself recollected and acknowledged in memoria and the inner word of a judgment of value that proceeds from memoria and acknowledges the goodness of the gift. These together are the conscious manifestation of a created participation in active spiration, in divine notionaliter diligere, in the loving of the Father and the Son for each other from which divine Amor procedens, passive spiration, the Holy Spirit, originates.

The gift and its confirming word, as a created participation in

active spiration, ground a created relation to the Holy Spirit, who
dwells in the innermost being of the person thus gifted, precisely as the
uncreated term of this created relation. But the confirming word that is
an element in this created participation in active spiration is a verbum
spirans amorem, a word that breathes love, just as the uncreated reality
of active spiration includes the eternal Verbum spirans Amorem, from
whom and the Father who utters this Word there proceeds the mutual
Love that is the Holy Spirit. The created love that issues from the gift
and its word is the disposition of charity, the antecedent universal
willingness that is a created participation in and imitation of the Holy
Spirit. The relation between the love acknowledged in memoria and
its word, on the one hand, and charity on the other, is analogous to the
relation between active and passive spiration in God. Moreover, the
disposition of charity grounds a reverse created relation of love to the
Father and the Son as its uncreated term. Thus it may be said that
the three divine persons dwell in us and among us, are present to us,
precisely as the uncreated terms of two created supernatural relations:
supernatural, because their subjects are created participations in divine
life, namely, sanctifying grace (gift and word, notionaliter diligere) and
charity (amor procedens). Sanctifying grace and charity, thus conceived,
are the special basic relations that ground the derivation of special
categories in theology.

That is the basic analogy that I want to appropriate and
develop. Many further elements stand in need of clarification,
including the relation of this analogy to the later analogy suggested
by Lonergan, the distinction of faith and beliefs found in Method in
Theology, the universalist faith that Lonergan proposes in the same
book, distinguishing it from the beliefs proper to different religious
communities and traditions, even from beliefs that themselves come
from divine revelation, and Lonergan’s reversal of the adage Nihil
amatum nisi prae cognitum, Nothing is loved unless it has first been
known. I am not prepared as yet to address any of these issues except
the first.

4.2.4 Lonergan’s Later Trinitarian Analogy

Lonergan has given us a very succinct presentation of the analogy
that he suggests in his later work. It appears in “Christology Today:
Methodological Reflections."

The psychological analogy...has its starting point in that higher synthesis of intellectual, rational, and moral consciousness that is the dynamic state of being in love. Such love manifests itself in its judgments of value. And the judgments are carried out in decisions that are acts of loving. Such is the analogy found in the creature.

Now in God the origin is the Father, in the New Testament named ho Theos, who is identified with agapé (1 John 4:8, 16). Such love expresses itself in its Word, its Logos, its verbum spirans amorem, which is a judgment of value. The judgment of value is sincere, and so it grounds the proceeding Love that is identified with the Holy Spirit.

There are then two processions that may be conceived in God; they are not unconscious processes but intellectually, rationally, morally conscious, as are judgments of value based on the evidence perceived by a lover, and the acts of loving grounded on judgments of value. The two processions ground four real relations of which three are really distinct from one another; and these three are not just relations as relations, and so modes of being, but also subsistent, and so not just paternity and filiation [and passive spiration] but also Father and Son [and Holy Spirit]. Finally, Father and Son and Spirit are eternal; their consciousness is not in time but timeless; their subjectivity is not becoming but ever itself; and each in his own distinct manner is subject of the infinite act that God is, the Father as originating love, the Son as judgment of value expressing that love, and the Spirit as originated loving.22

As Lonergan remarks in a question-and-answer session in the 1974 Lonergan Workshop, the only difference between this proposed analogy and the one that he develops in his Trinitarian systematics has to do with the first element in the analogy. "My systematics on

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the Trinity is in terms of Ipsum Intelligere, and then the Word and proceeding love. You can now start off from Agapé. 1 John 4:4-9 and 4:20: God is love, where God is ho theos. Ho theos in the New Testament is God the Father, unless there is contradictory evidence, and there's no contradictory evidence in 1 John. So it is the Father that is Agapé, and the Agapé is being in love, Absolute Being in Love; and the Logos is the Eternal Judgment of Value; and the Spirit is the Gift; and the person gives his loving, the act of loving; the Spirit is proceeding Love from the Judgment of Value. A minor change: the structure remains the same, but we shift from orthodoxy to ortho-praxy.23

I would submit that the difference between the analogy that I am proposing here and Lonergan's later analogy is also a difference that affects only the first element in the analogy. As Lonergan went from Ipsum Intelligere to Agapé as the dynamic state of being in love, so I am suggesting a shift from the dynamic state of being in love, which for me in the supernatural order is charity and not sanctifying grace, to a principle of love understood precisely as lovableness recollected in something like Augustine's memoria.

This proposed shift is not without precedent in Lonergan's work. In his 1951-52 class notes on sanctifying grace, Lonergan lists participation in active spiration as one of the primary immanent formal effects of sanctifying grace. Primary immanent formal effects include anything that can truly be said of a subject because of what is intrinsically constitutive of that subject. For example, if one has a human central form, it is truly said of that person that he or she is a human being. What is intrinsically constitutive of the recipient of sanctifying grace is that, because this grace founds a created relation to the Holy Spirit, it can fittingly be conceived to be a created participation in active spiration. But, Lonergan goes on to say, since uncreated active spiration is the principle of the Holy Spirit, it is also the principle of proceeding divine Love itself. And the principle of proceeding Love is lovableness. Love proceeds in God because the Father and the Son acknowledge each other as lovable. And so active spiration is God as lovable. Therefore, because sanctifying grace imitates active spiration,

23 This quotation is taken from the third question-and-answer session at the 1974 Boston College Lonergan Workshop. The recording of this session appears as 81200A0E070 on the website www.bernardlonergan.com, with a corresponding transcription at 81200DTE070.
it imitates God insofar as God is lovable, and so it makes the one who possesses it lovable with a special divine love, prompting in us the judgment of value "This is very good," "It is very good to be loved in this way," which becomes a *verbum spirans amorem*, a word that grounds the created procession of charity.

Perhaps, as I have already suggested, it may be said as well that we are rejoining Augustine at this point, for whom "memoria," understood precisely as the condition under which the mind is present to itself, functions as the analogue for the divine Father.\footnote{This interpretation would seem to be consistent with the view offered by Edmund Hill, who writes in his introduction to his translation of Augustine's *De Trinitate*, "... what he means in this context by self-memory, *memoria sui*, is the mind's sheer presence to itself, which is basically given in the very fact of its being mind; rather as you might say that the Father is the basically divine person, since he is just God, whereas the Son is God from God." Again, in book 14, Augustine rephrases his image as "remembering, understanding, and willing God, rather than remembering, understanding, and willing self." See Augustine, *The Trinity*, trans. Edmund Hill, O.P. (Brooklyn: New City Press, 1991), 52 and 54. I am grateful to Gilles Mongeau for pointing me to Hill's interpretation.} The condition under which the mind is present to itself, of course, can be lovableness or it can be just the opposite, and ultimately it is self-presence that has known "gratia gratum faciens" that is "memoria" as the mind present to itself in a manner that can function as the supernatural analogue for the divine Father. Augustine's "memoria" thus understood, we might say, is at least roughly similar to Heidegger's "*Befindlichkeit*," when the latter is graced in the same way. As "memoria" and "mens" are equiprimordial for Augustine's understanding of self-consciousness, and as "*Befindlichkeit*" and "*Verstehen*" are equiprimordial ways of being "*Dasein*" for Heidegger, so perhaps lovableness recollected in *memoria* and *intelligere* as *dicere*, where what are uttered are supernatural judgments of value, are equiprimordial constituents of the originating element in a psychological analogue for the Trinity in the order of grace. All of this is marked, notice, by a massive "perhaps." Systematic theology is irretrievably hypothetical.

5. THE BASIC SYSTEMATIC POSITION

The systematic statement first "locates" sanctifying grace metaphysically (with Aquinas) as an accident in the genus of quality, reduced to the species of a habit that is radicated in the essence of the soul.
That, of course, was in the thirteenth century an entirely new category creatively forged from philosophical materials familiar at the time, in a manner at least somewhat similar to the way in which “homousion” was reconceived for explicitly theological purposes centuries earlier. But it will be in terms of the formal effects of this gift that the truly systematic question will be answered, How can sanctifying grace unify the various elements mentioned in the synthetic statement of biblical doctrine?

As we have seen, the issue of formal effects has to do with the question, What true judgments can be made once one knows a formal cause – judgments whose truth is founded in that formal cause? So each of the elements mentioned in the biblical synthesis is understood as a formal effect of sanctifying grace, where “formal effect” has precisely this meaning taken from the conditions of true judgment and predication. In this case, then, the formal intelligibility is the entitative habit known as sanctifying grace, and the true judgments that can be made once one posits that intelligibility have to do both with the person gifted with sanctifying grace and with the God who gives the gift. We have considered two of these formal effects: The Father loves us as he loves his Son Jesus, and the Father gifts us with the gift of the Holy Spirit. Certain true judgments can be made about the person gifted and about God, and these true judgments will be found to affirm one or other of the elements contained in the biblical synthesis. The judgments about God concern what is truly said of God both as the one efficient cause of sanctifying grace and as the triune term of the relations that are established as a result of the gift of gratia gratum faciens. In the systematic portion of his notes, Lonergan outlines the way in which the notion of formal effects provides a systematic explanation of each of the ten features of the biblical synthesis. I do not have the time to go into these elements here. I will, however, make a few further comments on these issues.

I have already called attention to the way in which Lonergan speaks of a special kind of lovableness as one of the primary formal effects of the gift of sanctifying grace. This brings to mind what my previous attempts to address these issues have emphasized as a central theme, namely, God’s love for us and our being on the receiving end of divine love. That reception grounds a created relation to the Holy
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Spirit, which releases in us the love for Father and Son in return, the charity that grounds a created relation to the Father and the Son and a created participation in and imitation of the Holy Spirit, who proceeds from their Loving precisely as their mutual Love for each other. In terms of the issue of the first set of special theological categories, which *Method in Theology* says is a set grounded in religious experience, I have already suggested in this paper and elsewhere that the relation between sanctifying grace and charity as a relation between being loved unconditionally in a special way and loving in return in a manner that is without qualification or reservation, with these understood as participations respectively in active and passive spiration, would constitute the *special basic relations* in a methodical systematic theology.

Special basic relations are for some reason not mentioned in the following central methodological passage in *Method in Theology*: “...general basic terms name conscious and intentional operations. General basic relations name elements in the dynamic structure linking operations and generating states. Special basic terms name God’s gift of his love and Christian witness. Derived terms and relations name the objects known in operations and correlative to states.” The passage invites us, almost begs us, to ask, What about special basic relations? I wish to suggest that the special basic relations might be the created participations in the divine relations of active and passive spiration, through being on the receiving end of God’s love in *gratia gratum faciens* and loving God in return in charity.

Now, in a question-and-answer session at the 1974 Lonergan Workshop, Lonergan explicitly stated that his expression “the dynamic state of being in love” is an “amalgam” of what in a metaphysical theology were called sanctifying grace and charity. I have always suspected that that is the case, and I have always had a problem with it, and it was interesting for me to find him saying this. I want to backtrack a bit so as to avoid that amalgam, or rather to differentiate it in terms of interiorly and religiously differentiated consciousness in

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26 *Method in Theology*, 343.
27 This comment occurs in the last of the question-and-answer sessions in the 1974 Workshop. The recording of this session appears as 81500A0E070 on the website www.bernardlonergan.com, with a corresponding transcription at 81500DTE070.
a manner analogous to Aquinas’s metaphysical differentiation between sanctifying grace and charity. If I’m offering anything of my own in this paper, it would be this suggestion; but even here I feel I’m doing nothing more than interpreting and expanding on what is already found in Lonergan’s notes.

I suggested these relations in a somewhat less technical manner in my 1993 article “Consciousness and Grace,” but the response to that article focused so exclusively on the further suggestion of a fifth level of consciousness that some of the major points of the article were missed in the subsequent discussion. Those major points, which I am only retrieving now, are, I think, supported by the notes that I have just summarized.

6. THE QUESTION OF THE FIFTH LEVEL OF CONSCIOUSNESS

Obviously, these notes say nothing about levels of consciousness, let alone a fifth level. The history of the responses to the suggestion of a fifth level that I took from Lonergan and tried to develop has been very accurately summarized by Jeremy Blackwood in a paper that he first wrote for a course at Marquette University and then shortened for presentation at the West Coast Methods Institute at Loyola Marymount University in April 2009. The paper is entitled “Sanctifying Grace, Elevation, and the Fifth Level of Consciousness: Further Developments within Lonergan Scholarship.” It is a major contribution to an ongoing conversation among some of Lonergan’s students. I will conclude the present contribution by summarizing Blackwood’s paper, which I regard as the most complete treatment to date of this issue and by suggesting several other possible connections. Page numbers in Blackwood’s WCMI paper are given in parentheses.

Blackwood indicates that Christiaan Jacobs-Vandegeer’s article in Theological Studies in 2007, “Sanctifying Grace in a Methodical Theology,” correctly suggests that sanctifying grace should be understood in a methodical theology as an intrinsic qualification of the unity of

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consciousness. The moment I saw Jacobs-Vandegeer's statement to this effect, I knew it was correct. However, Blackwood also points out that "further development of his position is required on two points: the precise meaning of 'elevation' needs clarification, and recently-noticed material in the Lonergan archives suggests that the notion of a fifth level needs re-evaluation" (1). The first point is further articulated in two sub-points: "First, just what occurs in this elevation of central form and consequent enlargement of horizon is not fully explained, and a deeper appropriation of Jacobs-Vandegeer's solution requires a fuller articulation of the meaning of 'elevation.' Second, elevation of central form pertains to all the levels of consciousness [a point I also made in "Consciousness and Grace" but that escaped subsequent discussion], and a significant element in the discussion has been the possible relevance of a fifth level. If the whole subject is elevated in virtue of the elevation of central form, a fuller grasp of the number of levels in consciousness is required" (2-3), or (and here I'm speaking in my own voice), if you don't want to talk about levels and numbers of levels, then we might say that a fuller grasp of the full range of sublating and sublated operations and states is required. The basic four levels of intentional consciousness are not enough, and to say that they are is to place on our consciousness a similar kind of straightjacket that for at least some of us was experienced when we tried to bunch our experience of existential decision-making into the confines of chapter 18 of Insight. While that chapter remains a valid account of one mode of making decisions, a mode that St. Ignatius Loyola formulated in his third "time of election," this is not the only mode, and other accounts are required. So too with elements of consciousness that lie beyond the levels of intentional consciousness, on either end.

Blackwood finds an indication of an elevation of cognitional levels of consciousness in Lonergan's papers "The Natural Desire to See God" and "Openness and Religious Experience," while the Latin "Analysis Fidei" offers a detailed account of such elevation. In "The Natural Desire to See God," Lonergan points to philosophy, theology, and the beatific vision as three successive ways in which the human intellect knows the intelligible unity of the existing world order. Blackwood relates these successive ways, respectively, to the three Scholastic epistemological principles of the light of intellect (philosophy), the
light of faith (theology), and the light of glory (the beatific vision). The movement from the lower to the higher involves an elevation of knowing, and so "it is to knowing, and specifically to the horizons of knowing constituted by the light of intellect, the light of faith, and the light of glory, that we ought to attend in order to begin to grasp Lonergan’s notion of elevation in consciousness" (3). "...whether or not a given object is supernatural to a particular knower is not determined by the object itself, but by the light by which that object is attained" (5).

Elevation pertains to judgment, as is emphasized especially in "Analysis Fidei," but it can be extended beyond judgment. It is the addition of absolutely supernatural formal objects of judgment, but that definition too "can be extended to other levels of consciousness, such that at each of the levels of intentional consciousness, an elevated subject has two formal objects – the natural/proportionate and the supernatural/disproportionate" (5-6). In explicit belief, the elevation of central form and the consequent horizon known as the light of faith elevate judgment by allowing the subject to know what one could not know without the elevation of central form and the light of faith. Likewise, on the level of decision, the elevation of central form and the consequent horizon of evaluation allow the subject to evaluate with God’s own values (9), which I am assuming are quintessentially expressed in the Sermon on the Mount. We could speak as well of the elevation of understanding, perhaps most dramatically expressed in mystical insight, at times ineffable, into the meaning of the divine mysteries, but also manifest in much genuine theological understanding at a more pedestrian level. We can speak of the elevation of the level of experience itself, most dramatically expressed in intense physiological participation in divine love, but also abundantly illustrated in less intense fashion in what some theologies have called the spiritual senses. The relation of the natural and supernatural objects of any level is one of obediential potency. And the conscious experience of elevation at each level is related to "an act, the content of which is not fully accounted for by the act itself" (6).

Blackwood then goes on to indicate how records of question-and-answer sessions from Lonergan Workshops, records that had not been appealed to in previous discussion, confirm that Lonergan did maintain a fifth level, but that it is not exclusively connected with
the supernatural but with love in its various forms, including the unrestricted being in love that he identifies with sanctifying grace. This extension is what I missed, let me add, in my appeal to a fifth level in "Consciousness and Grace." The distinguishing characteristic of the fifth level is the interpersonal character of so-called fifth-level experience, the concern with the "other" who is the object, with the beloved whose presence in the lover is constituted precisely by love itself. Fifth-level experience is the conscious relation between the conscious subject in love and the other with whom the subject is in love. One thinks readily of Lonergan's discussion in The Triune God: Systematics of the presence of the beloved in the lover, a presence that is constituted by love.29 In Blackwood's words, "...the fifth level is constituted insofar as the subject operating is also operated on; it is a union of object and intending operation" (8). Lonergan's own notes for one of his responses reads, "love is subjectivity linked to others." Lonergan explicitly relates the fifth level of love and the fourth level of deliberation in a manner parallel to the relation between other higher and lower levels, a relation of sublation. Moreover, the sensitive psyche is related to the levels of intentional consciousness through vertical finality, which is reaching toward being in love. "...the unconscious desire [a phrase that needs some work] to being in love underlies the first through fourth levels, and it reaches beyond and through the horizontal finalities of those levels as a vertical finality fulfilled in the fifth level" (9). Aside from the expression "unconscious desire," which is found in Lonergan, not in Blackwood, and which reflects his own tendency at times not to distinguish between the unconscious and the unobjectified, this is a position that I think is supported by "Mission and the Spirit"30 and "Natural Right and Historical Mindedness."31 Lonergan explicitly subdivides the fifth level into domestic, civil,

31 Bernard Lonergan, "Natural Right and Historical Mindedness," in A Third Collection, 169-83. Here the relevant material speaks of the "tidal movement that begins before consciousness, unfolds through sensitivity, intelligence, rational reflection, responsible deliberation, only to find its rest beyond all of these" in love. "Natural Right and Historical Mindedness," 175.
and religious loves, and characterizes it as "the level of [total] self-transcendence, self-forgetting, the level at which the subject is no longer thinking of him- or herself" (10). Thus, in "Philosophy and the Religious Phenomenon,"32 we find that "beyond the moral operator that promotes us from judgments of fact to judgments of value...there is a further realm of interpersonal relations and total commitment," which in a 1980 question-and-answer session he speaks of as "the sublation of deliberation by self-forgetting love" (10).33


33 Subsequently, I have found distinct confirmation in one of the question-and-answer sessions from the 1975 Lonergan Workshop:

"Question: Recently you have spoken of a fifth level of human intentional consciousness, whereby a plurality of self-transcending individuals achieve a higher integration in a community of love. Please expand on this."

"Lonergan: There is very little to expand on this. Everyone knows what it means. (Emphasis added.) Getting there is another thing. But the constitution of the subject is a matter of self-transcendence. You are unconscious when you are in a coma or a deep sleep, a dreamless sleep. When you start to dream, consciousness emerges, but it is fragmentary; it is symbolic. You wake up, and you are in the real world. But if you are merely gaping and understanding nothing, you are not very far in. And so you have another level of asking questions and coming to understand. There is the understanding that people can have from myth and magic and so on, but arriving at the truth is a further step of being reasonable, liberating oneself from astrology, alchemy, legend, and so on and so forth. And responsible. And this is all a matter of immanent development of the subject. But even before you're born you are not all by yourself, and all during your life. Robinson Crusoe is a real abstraction. And if he really is all alone, his history does not go beyond himself. There is living with others and being with others. The whole development of humanity is in terms of common meaning. Not just my meaning, attention to my experience, development of my understanding, and so on. Common meaning is the fruit of a common field of experience, and if you are not in that common field of experience you get out of touch. There's common understanding, and if you have not got that common understanding, well, you are a stranger, or worse a foreigner, you have a different style of common sense, and so on. Common judgments, what one man thinks is true another man this is false, well, they are not going to be able to do very much about anything, insofar as those judgments are relevant to what they do. Common values, common projects, and you can have a common enterprise, and if you don't [have common values], you will be working at cross-purposes. The highest form of this is love as opposed to hate. It is a hard saying, 'Love your enemies, do good to them that hate you, love them that persecute you,' and so on. There are all kinds of things in the New Testament expanding on this." The links with René Girard are obvious: "...the real human subject can only come out of the rule of the Kingdom; apart from this rule, there is never anything but mimetism and
Blackwood thus characterizes fifth-level operation as constituted by the self-forgetting of love, “the self-possessed handing over of one’s central form to the determination of another” in love. He speaks of a fifth-level question in terms of “What would you have me do?” And the fifth-level object is persons as persons, as subjects. As elevated, the fifth level gains the absolutely supernatural personal object of the three divine persons of the Trinity. The advance made by Jacobs-Vandegeer is not negated by this return to fifth-level talk, since the fifth level is the elevation of central form itself in complete self-transcendence to God.34

I find Blackwood’s discussion convincing. I also find it relevant to John Dadosky’s proposal at the 2008 Lonergan Workshop regarding a fourth stage of meaning – a stage that, as I understand Dadosky, has to do with the communal discernment that would lead to the collective responsibility of a community of persons in love.35 Let me add that we might also correlate such a discussion with Lonergan’s treatment of beauty as a transcendental, as found for example in his response to several questions at the 1971 Dublin Institute on Method. Beauty is a transcendental, he says, but in a different way from the intelligible, the true and the real, and the good, in that it is not the objective of a specific transcendental notion but rather “evokes a response from the whole person.” Perhaps in this way we might link the emphases of Hans Urs von Balthasar’s theological aesthetics to the still unfolding Lonerganian analysis of the unity and levels of consciousness, and we might include the vertical finality of the passionateness of being or tidal movement that begins before consciousness, permeates each level, and comes to its fulfillment in love: an emphasis that I have explicitly linked to the notions of psychic conversion, of the series of dramatic-aesthetic operators that precede, accompany, and reach

the ‘interindividual.’ Until this happens, the only subject is the mimetic structure.” Jean-Michel Oughourlian, in René Girard, Things Hidden Since the Foundation of the World (Stanford, CA: Stanford University Press, 1987), 199, emphasis in the text. Girard’s response: “That is quite right.”

34 Needless to say, many issues of distorted or deviated transcendence to the other will need to be sorted out in future discussions of this level of consciousness. Again, the relevance of Girard to this discussion is clear.

beyond intentional consciousness as attentive, intelligent, reasonable, and responsible, and to the role of those operators in partly constituting the normative source of meaning in history. Perhaps that fulfillment in love is also intimately related to our response to the transcendental “beauty,” a response that satisfies not a particular transcendental notion but the entire person, central form. Perhaps, then, Balthasar’s theological aesthetics are articulating the elevation of that response of the total person to the transcendental “beauty” under the gift of God’s divine love orienting us to the glory of God, precisely as the inner word entailed in this response has been articulated and confirmed in or perhaps awakened by the outer revelatory deeds and words that, while articulating a universal reality, are as articulated (again perhaps) peculiar to Israel and Christianity.

But that is a subject for another and probably far longer paper or papers or book or series of books.
INTERNATIONAL LAW AS HORIZON: AN INVITATION TO COLLABORATION

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Non et Sic:

"Silete theologi in munere alieno" ["When it comes to international law], theologians, keep quiet about things outside their province." Alberico Gentili (1556-1608)

"Method is...a framework for collaborative creativity."
Bernard Lonergan, Method in Theology

THE THEME OF this 36th Annual Workshop is "Ongoing Collaboration in the Year of St. Paul," and Gerald Walmsley, S.J., suggests directions such collaboration might take:

There are many issues in interdisciplinary and intercultural and interfaith dialogue. . . . Who are the main dialogue partners, or who should be dialogue partners? What are the key issues in philosophy/theology/world politics/ globalization and economic/business ethics/the nature of the university. . . . There are many relatively undeveloped themes such as emergent probability. . . . The notion of universal viewpoint was clarified by Ivo Coelho, SDB, but doesn't it need to be filled in, in a way that shows its relevance to intercultural dialogue?1

This paper will be closer to an agenda than an accomplishment, a prolegomena to collaboration if you will. Its aim is not to answer in

1 Workshop Brochure.
full the several questions posed by Wamsley but rather to introduce a topic around which collaboration may occur, namely, international law — a vast, complex, and dynamic field of meaning and value wherein virtually every question Wamsley raises may be pursued.

It may be helpful to offer remarks yet even more preliminary regarding the relationship of the topic to the workshop title, for when one thinks of St. Paul, international law is not the first thing that comes to mind. Still, Paul of Tarsus did take a keen interest in law, in relation, of course, to faith and grace and other matters. Moreover, he had a personal stake in the question of rights on an international, intercultural, and interreligious scale. This Jew from Asia Minor, turned disciple of Christ and apostle to the Gentiles, frequently relied on his Roman citizenship to protect his cause (e.g., Acts 22:22-29) — an example of the reality explored today by international lawyers who discuss such things as *jus gentium* in days of old.2

Reaching back to Paul’s times signals a critical point about the kind of collaboration introduced here. It may occur among Lonergan scholars, certainly, but it will be more than that. The collaboration will be markedly diachronic as figures from across the centuries enter into this conversation.3 And since international law today holds future generations within its purview,4 and since the anticipatory character of Lonergan’s cognitional theory may elucidate a regard for future neighbors,5 it may even be that those yet unborn, in some analogous way, can be collaborators as well.

Furthermore, international law today is necessarily interdisci-


3 For an introduction to many of these conversation partners, see Manfred Lachs, *The Teacher in International Law: Teachings and Teaching* (Boston: Martinus Nijhoff Publishers, 1989).


Climatologists and oceanographers and economists and sociologists and theologians will be partners in the exchange. Added to this is the fact that the range of issues international law engages continues to grow: the commercialization of outer space, human cloning, cybercrime, and the use of drones and other robotics in war were hardly on the international legal agenda even fifty years ago. If, however, the circle of collaboration widens, the need for some unifying and integrating method should be all the more welcome. So Lonergan scholars, especially attuned to questions of method, may have particular contributions to make.

The “horizon” of the title is intended to intimate the still far off, unfinished nature of this collaborative project. But it also suggests that international law, at least in its grounding and aspirations, bears some affinities with the “universal viewpoint” cited by Wamsley, which, in Longeran’s writings, morphs into the notion of horizon – especially the methodical horizon. The bulk of this paper (Part II) reviews several key aspects of that methodical horizon – the upper blade that might cut through the knots of international law without reducing the strength of its many strands. But prior to that, Part I reviews key aspects of the essential lower blade, such as the recognized “sources” of international law. With the daily news filled with issues involving international law, the topic of this paper should not be dull. But the blades themselves,

6 “International law has entered fields of a scientific and theological character, and it cannot be made, interpreted or applied without taking into account almost all the sciences; from physics, chemistry and biology to spheres concerning communications and transport. While all of them need law’s guiding hand, they may play an important part in inspiring and assisting the law-making process” (Manfred Lachs, “The Grotian Heritage, the International Community and Changing Dimensions of International Law,” in *International Law and the Grotian Heritage: A Commemorative Colloquium*, ed. T.M.C. Asser Instituut [The Hague: T.M.C. Asser Instituut, 1985], 204-205).

7 This is one reason why I have argued that international law is a fitting subject for universities – and not just their law schools – and especially Catholic universities. See William P. George, “Why Catholic Universities Should Engage International Law,” *Journal of Catholic Higher Education* 27, no. 1 (Winter 2008): 137-57.

8 “Because of a complex shift that Lonergan makes from ‘faculty psychology’ to ‘intentionality analysis’ and from the primacy of metaphysics to the primacy of method, the functions of the universal viewpoint are taken over by transcendental method” (Ivo Coelho, *Hermeneutics and Method: The ‘Universal Viewpoint’ in Bernard Lonergan*, [Toronto: The University of Toronto Press, 2001], 10. On the “methodical horizon,” see pages 128-31) of this reference.
as described in these pages, need to be honed by considerations and explorations that go beyond one essay.

I. THE LOWER BLADE OF INTERNATIONAL LAW

All analogies limp. The reference to scissors and blades is no exception.\(^9\) International law cannot be discussed as though the upper blade of method were not already operative there. International lawyers, diplomats, and others engaged in international law have been thinking and acting, and, sometimes at least, reflecting on their thinking and acting, for a very long time. Still, it will be helpful briefly to sketch out some of international law's features and contours without attempting to explicate the points of meeting with the upper blade of method.

International law may be viewed as both a normative system of principles and rules and an operating system in and through which those norms are generated, affirmed, applied, and sometimes changed.\(^10\) Both aspects need to be understood dynamically. International law and its institutions grow, sometimes slowly and imperceptibly, sometimes quickly and dramatically. International legal norms and institutions may also break down. When it comes to substantive issues, the range of international law's normative and institutional reach is immense and ever increasing—from torture and piracy (as ancient as they are prominent in today's news), to trade and commerce, to human trafficking and human cloning, to the means of resolving conflict or, when those means fail, to the fighting of wars with computers and drones. So, too, the number of international law's formal "subjects" and informal actors continues to grow.\(^11\) Not only states, but also

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international organizations, governmental and nongovernmental,12 “peoples,” individuals, and corporations participate in international law and law-making in various ways.

Given this expansion, there is no easy way to “define” international law; older definitions are too narrow.13 Still, it is possible at least to give a shorthand account of what counts as international law. Article 38 (1) of the Statute of the International Court of Justice (ICJ) (annexed to the U.N. Charter) states:

The Court, whose function is to decide in accordance with international law such disputes as are submitted to it, shall apply:

a. international conventions, whether general or particular, establishing rules expressly recognized by the contesting states;

b. international custom, as evidence of a general practice accepted as law;

c. the general principles of law recognized by civilized nations;

d. subject to the provisions of Article 59, judicial decisions and the teachings of the most highly qualified publicists of the various nations, as subsidiary means for the determination of rules of law.

This articulation of “sources” pertains in the first instance to the ICJ’s method of resolving cases, but it also stands as a definitive statement about where evidence of international law is to be found: in treaties, custom, principles of law, court decisions, and “teachings.” A few words may be said about each.

12 There are tens of thousands of NGOs worldwide. The Department of Economic and Social Affairs lists 3195 NGOs with consultative status with the UN Economic and Social Council (ECOSOC) alone. See http://esango.un.org/civilsociety/displayConsultativeStatusSearch.do?method=searchEcoSoc&sessionCheck=false&ngoFlag=1.

Treaties

Treaties (which go by various names—charters, covenants, conventions, pacts, protocols—with various shades of meaning) may be bilateral or multilateral. There are thousands of treaties registered with the United Nations. The list of multilateral treaties especially, on such topics as human rights, the environment, transit and trade, criminal justice, nuclear arms, air and outer space, the oceans and other global commons, is considerable and growing. With such range and such numbers, treaty law is, of course, a vast topic. Here, I simply draw attention to some obvious points that anticipate a meeting with the upper blade of method.

First, treaties are ineluctably historical: they come into existence at a certain time, sometimes after years of negotiation; their entry into force may be dated; they expire after a time or may be renewed. Second, treaties are agreements, not simply good or bad ideas. Treaties are signed, ratified, acceded to—or not. They thus entail not only knowing but also acting or declining to act, a fact that brings into focus the fourth level of intentionality. Third, treaties may be broken or breeched, so further questions of agency and action, of responsibility or irresponsibility emerge. Fourth, as can be the case with agreements of other kinds, treaties give rise to questions of interpretation.

Treaties are not always problematic, of course. The treaty-making process is a matter of long-established custom (to which we will turn presently), much of which is codified in a treaty on treaties. It is also “probably the case,” in Louis Henkin’s oft-quoted words, “that almost all nations observe almost all principles of international law and almost all of their obligations almost all of the time.” Instances of treaty breeches may be the exceptions that prove the rule of international treaty law. Still, difficulties on many levels remain. Treaties, we might say at this


16 This may be seen in the obviously important case of the Genocide Treaty, which, unlike some treaties, allows individual states to become parties but also to state their reservations about particular parts of the treaty. Such allowance may increase the probability that more nations will come on board (recall that it took the United States some forty years to become a party), but may also increase the probability that the treaty
point, test the attentiveness, understanding, judgment, and decisions of anyone directly or indirectly involved.

**Custom**

While treaty law may hold a certain primacy in international law today, customary law is also crucial. The identification of what counts as custom turns on two criteria: the actual behavior of states and evidence of *opinio juris*, the state's belief that it is legally bound to act as it does. Again, we may point to a few obvious aspects of this vast topic. First, the behavior of states is an empirical matter, but it is also open to interpretation, especially when it comes to establishing *opinio juris*. Second, customary law expands the legal bonds beyond treaty law. Individual state may be bound, on the basis of customary law, by the provision(s) of a treaty even if that state is not a party to that treaty.

Third, customary law again draws our attention to the historical character of international law. Not only do courts and others examine the past to make judgments about customary law, but new customary laws may emerge. So, for example, a universally accepted peremptory norm (*jus cogens*) against slavery or torture or apartheid may slowly emerge to replace the old way of doing things. Finally, as these examples of emergent custom suggest, the mere existence of a particular customary law does not ensure that law's moral rectitude. Thus we see that customary international law brings with it questions of virtue and vice, of values and disvalues, of progress and decline.

**Principles**

At least in terms of application by judicial bodies, "the general principles of law recognized by civilized nations" often functions as a legal recourse when there is a lacuna in treaty or customary law. But even if principles such as "equity" serve only this role, they enter the

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17 See Damrosch and others, *International Law*, 76, 80-81, 92-100.
18 Damrosch and others, *International Law*, 105-106.
warp and woof of international legal relations and judgments. A few obvious points regarding these principles may advance this paper's aim.

First, the phrase "general principles of law recognized by civilized nations" is contested by legal theorists and historians, and from the time of its insertion into the statute has been a battleground for natural law adherents and legal positivists. Nor is it even clear when and how the court has actually drawn upon this source of law.¹⁹

Second, controversies aside, because international law includes general principles of law recognized by the world's major legal systems, by way of these principles the international legal world expands beyond treaty and custom into the domestic sphere, where law is often perceived (or misperceived) as more stable, more reliable, and more "real." Indeed, the relationship between international and domestic law is so close that some ("monists") will argue that, at root, there is only one legal system. But the relationship is problematic, too, and so questions about international law in domestic law, and domestic law in international law are many. To give but one example, the hotly debated question of the degree to which international norms should impinge on the rulings of the U.S. Supreme Court may be inextricably bound to a conflict of jurisprudential horizons among the various justices.²⁰

The language of the ICJ statute raises a third issue. The reference to "civilized nations" may signal a classicist international legal framework. But the fact that, as noted above, the appeal to these "general principles" has been problematic may also indicate that international law is moving away from any classicist commitments. Obviously, this and other questions related to the general principles require further investigation than can be pursued here. To anticipate remarks below about the "upper blade" of method, like so many other aspects of international law the general principles are an apt locus for dialectical analysis wherein diverse horizons may be explored.


**Judicial Decisions**

In response to international law's detractors, Louis Henkin observes:

> If there is no judiciary as effective as in some developed national systems there is an International Court of Justice whose judgments and opinions, while few, are respected. The inadequacies of the judicial system are in some measure supplied by other bodies: international disputes are resolved and law is developed through a network of arbitrations by continuing or ad hoc tribunals. National courts help importantly to determine, clarify, develop international law.\(^{21}\)

The judicial system is still not without its deficiencies, but it has developed significantly since Louis Henkin wrote these words some forty years ago. The International Criminal Court is now a reality, regional human rights courts (e.g., the Inter-American Court of Human Rights) are active, and the dispute resolution mechanisms to which Henkin refers have advanced significantly, for example, in the areas of sea law and trade. All of this is a testimony to international law as an operating system.

The ICJ does not by statute operate on the basis of *stare decisis*. In practice, however, the ICJ does rely on past decisions and this court's decisions and advisory opinions are important and contribute to international law’s growth or, as dissenting court opinions might suggest, possibly its wayward ways. Perhaps because they are relatively few, ICJ decisions contribute significantly to the developing horizons of international law. If there is doubt about this, consider the extensive attention given these court cases in standard international law casebooks that educate future lawyers.\(^{22}\) There is good reason for this. These cases take up issues of considerable import: the meaning of state responsibility, the relationship of custom and treaty, the legality of the threat or use of nuclear weapons, the bases for deciding territorial disputes – and many other matters. But at least as importantly, these cases not only settle questions. They also open others, as the casebooks

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\(^{22}\) A prime example is Damrosch and others, *International Law*. 
mentioned above make abundantly clear. These cases provide, then, yet another apt locus for testing the horizons of international law.

**Teachings**

As the wording of the statute suggests, "the teachings of the most highly qualified publicists of the various nations" is a limited ("subsidiary") source of international law. Rarely, in fact, does the court cite such authorities. But this does not mean that teachings do not inform the decisions of individual judges or the court. Teachers and teachers have featured explicitly in the decisions of courts other than the ICJ. Such is the case, for instance, in *The Paquette Habana*, a famous case brought before the U.S. Supreme Court in 1900.23 This case is a *locus classicus* both for establishing custom as a basis for international legal judgments and as the occasion for the Supreme Court's oft-quoted statement that "international law is part of our [U.S. Constitutional] law." In keeping with the diachronic nature of collaboration, in *The Paquette Habana* the Court drew upon numerous past "publicists" (e.g., Calvo, De Boeck, Hall, Mackintosh, Wheaton, and Kent) to make its case.

But even aside from citations in court cases, as Manfred Lachs explains, the impact on international law of teachers and teachings over the centuries has been immense.24 The hundreds of treatises and journal articles appearing each year, the collected annual courses given at the Hague, and important organizations such as the International Law Society and the American Society of International Law all give weight to this "subsidiary" source of law. And this is to say nothing of the role of teachings and teachers in the training of future lawyers around the globe. Furthermore, it is for present purposes worth noting the obvious: these various publicists frequently and sometimes passionately disagree with one another or coalesce into schools of thought. Through their questions, sound criticisms, and creative ideas these teachers contribute to international law's progress. Of course, through their biases, they may also contribute to decline.

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23 *The Paquette Habana*, Supreme Court of the United States, 1900, 175 U.S. 677 S. Ct. 290, 44 L. Ed. 320.

24 Lachs, *Teachers and Teachings*. 
II. THE UPPER BLADE OF METHOD

"Method is not a set of rules to be followed meticulously by a dolt. It is a framework for collaborative creativity." There is no hope here of discussing method with the thoroughness required to forge a complete bridge between method and international law. Here, the primary references will be to Method in Theology, both for the obvious reason that method is the main topic there but also because I want to show that collaboration with international law, secular though it may be, need not set aside religion and the theologies that religions spawn. The references to Method must be selective. Relying on the reader’s own knowledge – or, better, self-appropriation – of the background and foreground sections of Method, I will highlight points at which the upper blade of method meets the international legal lower blade.

It may be well to begin this discussion where, in Method, Lonergan begins – with an observation about the distinction between a classist and empirical or historical notion of culture. If this distinction – and problem – is relevant to theology, so, too, I would insist, is it germane to international law. In earlier times, someone as historically attuned and learned as Hugo Grotius could still view international law a matter of abstracting completely from the current political situation or “facts.” And as noted above, as late as the middle of the twentieth century the Charter of the International Court of Justice could refer to the legal systems “of civilized nations,” language that arguably signals a classicist mind-set. Today, by contrast, in a postcolonial age, international lawyers necessarily confront “the future of international law in a multicultural world,” and they are well aware of the dynamic, developmental, unsettled, and possibly revolutionary character of international law, with its shifting paradigms. But awareness, inchoate

26 Method in Theology, xi.
27 In the famous Prolegomena to De Jure Belli ac Pacis, Grotius states: “With all truthfulness I aver that, just as mathematicians treat their figures as abstracted from bodies, so in treating law I have withdrawn my mind from every particular fact” (Hugo Grotius, De Jure Belli ac Pacis Libri Tres, vol. 2, trans. Francis W. Kelsey [London: Oxford, Clarendon Press, 1925], 30.
Method

The “recurrent and related operations” of conscious intentionality ground method, and transcendental method in its full-flowering relies upon self-appropriation of these recurrent and related operations through “applying the operations as intentional to the operations as conscious.”29 This is a difficult achievement. Be that as it may, perhaps I can at least suggest what this achievement might yield when international law is brought into focus.

The exercise of method in the first instance affirms the obvious: international law is an enormously extensive and complex matter of experience, of questioning, of cumulative insights and judgments of fact and value, of deliberation, of decisions. Method will discern in the practice of international law the presence of the transcendental precepts quietly affirmed in the concrete operations of judges, of writers, of diplomats, of those who labor in NGOs as they seek to advance the good in any particular case. Method will also be alert to bias – to the problem of inattentiveness, of oversight, of rash judgments, and of irresponsible decisions.

In short, method as practiced by or incarnate in an authentic converted subject may elucidate, critique, and advance the workings of international law. It might also contribute to a solution to the problem of continuity without the rigidity that besets international law in significant ways. But there is another possibility. International law might enlarge and refine the method: the lower blade might sharpen the upper blade. Lonergan notes that “any theory, description, account of our conscious and intentional operations is bound to be incomplete and to admit further clarifications and extensions. But all such clarifications and extensions are to be derived from the conscious

29 Method in Theology, 14.
and intentional acts and operations themselves." Might the attentive, intelligible, reasonable, and responsible engagement of international law further clarify and extend those operations in new and helpful ways? If, as Aquinas observed, the soul and its powers are known only through acts, could individual human beings and communities become better acquainted even with their own interior lives by engaging this global enterprise? Given the character of international law as praxis, as problem-solving, as deciding and consenting, engagement of international law might especially elucidate the fourth level of conscious intentionality – not only for the individual but also in terms of a consciousness shared by communities of various size and description.

This brings us to another point. When Lonergan writes about method in theology, he has good reason for observing that “the objects of theology do not lie outside the transcendental field. For that field is unrestricted, and so outside it there is nothing at all.” What I wish to emphasize is that neither are the transcendental notions, as transcendental, irrelevant to international law. If the question of God is “the question that questions questioning itself,” if international law gives rise to question upon question (as any good casebook will quickly convince the perplexed student), then the question of God may be operative, if rarely explicit, in the concrete and complex workings of international law. Put otherwise, method in theology and method in international law may converge in a shared transcendent realm of meaning.

Finally – to reiterate a point already implied – if transcendental method “adds no new resource to theology,” then neither does it add any new resource to international law, but rather “simply draws attention to a resource that has always been used. For transcendental method is the concrete and dynamic unfolding of human attentiveness, intelligence, reasonableness, and responsibility. That unfolding occurs

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30 Method in Theology, 19.
31 ST 1, q. 87.
33 Method in Theology, 23.
34 Method in Theology, 103.
whenever anyone uses his mind in an appropriate fashion.” Those engaged over the centuries in international law have, often if not always, used their minds in this way. Anyone who becomes attuned to method in theology primarily by doing theology, and who then turns to international law for the first time, must no doubt negotiate a new horizon. But he or she will not be entering a totally foreign land.

The Human Good

The intersections between Lonergan’s discussion of the human good and international law could easily take up the whole of this paper, and more. Certainly, feelings and skills and judgments of value and beliefs are in no short supply among lawyers and judges and members of NGOs seeking legal change. Assuming these fundamentals of the human good and the need to explore them in relation to international law, perhaps more immediately relevant is the structure of the good, wherein multiple terms “regard (1) individuals in their potentialities and actuations, (2) cooperating groups, and (3) ends.” It is not difficult to see how the good, so described, might be related to international law. Nor is it difficult to anticipate problematic aspects of this relationship. To give but one example, are individual states like “individuals in their potentialities and actuations” who enter into alliances with other individual states only in some form of “contract” or “coalition of the willing” (to recall a recent, highly provocative phrase in geopolitics), or is each state to be regarded as a group disposed by its very nature to cooperate with other states in pursuit of a global common good?

Here, I wish to stress only one aspect of Lonergan’s understanding of the good, namely, its relationship to the notion of emergent probability and the concomitant notions of progress and decline.

35 Method in Theology, 24.
36 Method in Theology, chap. 2.
37 Method in Theology, 47.
38 For a discussion of the tension between cooperation and domination among early state systems in the context of empire, see Bederman, Globalization and International Law, 3-11.
39 In terms of method in theology, see Method in Theology, 49. For a more extensive discussion, see Kenneth Melchin, History, Ethics, and Emergent Probability: Ethics, Society, and History in the Work of Bernard Lonergan (Lanham, MD: University Press of America, 1986).
This is a particularly promising meeting point between method and international law,\textsuperscript{40} one that illuminates any number of events and issues: How did the League of Nations emerge and why did it fail? What conditions of possibility gave rise to the emergent Law of the Sea (LOS), and what were the “defensive circles” that nearly blocked its emergence?\textsuperscript{41} What enabled a small group of citizens (the Neptune Group) to be so effective in advancing the Law of the Sea negotiations?\textsuperscript{42} How was it that a grassroots movement could be largely responsible for the emergence, over a decade ago, of the landmine ban treaty?\textsuperscript{43} How might international law better combat the schemes of recurrence that come under the heading of human trafficking? How might the probabilities be shifted in the direction of appropriate intervention to protect the vulnerable be such that the newly emergent Responsibility to Protect (R2P) doctrine becomes more than a good idea?\textsuperscript{44} More optimistically, perhaps – and we may end this section here – why does international law work as well as it does, day in, day out, and how does it grow? These are just some of the questions that collaborators focusing on the human good in conjunction with emergent probability might seek to answer.

\textbf{Meaning}

That the world of international law and relations is a world mediated by meaning is so apparent as to be almost a truism. But of course it is more than that; international law is a very complex world of multiple and various meanings.

\textsuperscript{40} I have discussed these matters in more detail in William P. George, “International Regimes, Religious Ethics, and Emergent Probability,” \textit{Annual of the Society of Christian Ethics}, 1996: 145-70.

\textsuperscript{41} On “defensive circles,” see Insight, 122-23.


\textsuperscript{43} The International Campaign to Ban Landmines, a coalition of governments, the United Nations, and 1400 NGOs, was awarded the Nobel Peace Prize for its role in bringing into existence the 1997 Convention on the Use, Stockpiling, Production, and Transfer of Anti-Personnel Mines and on their Destruction. See http://www.icbl.org/intro.php.

\textsuperscript{44} For a primer on this doctrine, see the Global Centre for the Responsibility to Protect at http://globalr2p.org/primer.html.
Contact between the lower blade and the upper blade in terms of meaning is multidimensional. I suggest it would be fruitful collaboratively to explore international law in terms of stages of meaning, functions of meaning, and realms of meaning. In terms of stages of meaning, it would be especially worthwhile investigating the historical shift from grand theory in international law (e.g., Grotius and other “classics” of international law) to the highly specialized and problem-solving approach we have today, which leads some to lament theory’s loss. This investigation would have to inquire whether the stages of meaning, discussed by Lonergan, have anything in common with the distinct “epochs” of international law over the course of its long history. In terms of functions, the constitutive and communicative functions appear especially worthy of attention, given the fact that international law, as noted above, is not only a normative but also an operating system, wherein courts and communiqués and conferences and negotiated conventions abound.

In terms of realms of meaning – common sense, theory, interiority, and transcendence – no doubt both common sense and theory are readily apparent. On the other hand, whether or where in international law the realm of interiority might be engaged and developed is, in my view, still an open question – though this paper itself may represent a modest effort to close the gap between affairs of the heart and mind, on the one hand, and international affairs, on the other. What might be said is that, just as an inquiry into the stages of meaning would have to explore the epochs of international law, so an investigation into the shift to the realm of interiority in international law would have to sort out the ongoing tension between natural law or some other urge to systematize and universalize, on the one hand, and the constantly shifting pragmatism, politics, and practice in international affairs that might be aligned with “common sense,” on the other.

46 Higgins, Problems and Process.
47 See, for example, the works of British diplomat and legal scholar Phillip Allott.
50 Method in Theology, 78-79.
51 Method in Theology, 81-85.
Finally, the transcendent realm may seem to have been banished from international law.\textsuperscript{52} As the former vice-president of the ICJ said some years ago, "in the twentieth century, international law... so far distanced itself from religion that the latter receive[d] scarcely a mention in the standard treatises."\textsuperscript{53} But then again, rumors of religion's demise may be premature. In any event, this is a matter to which we now turn.

\textbf{Religion}

Since this sketch of the upper blade of method is drawn from \textit{Method in Theology}, it will be appropriate to recall the international lawyer Alberico Gentili's (1552-1608) complaint from over 400 years ago: "\textit{Silete theologi in munere alieno}" ("When it comes to international law, let the theologians keep quiet about things outside their province").\textsuperscript{54} Against the backdrop of the European religious wars, it is understandable why contributions to international law from theology would be viewed as unwanted intrusions and why international lawyers have sought to banish religion and theology from international law – even if present international lawyers (e.g., textbook writers) tend to read back into history their own secularizing tendencies.\textsuperscript{55} In any event, theologians and other religiously committed individuals and groups have perhaps too often heeded Gentili's warning, so one might ask whether, today, religion – including religious conversion – is pertinent to international law in terms of method. In keeping with the character of this paper as agenda rather than accomplishment, I simply suggest that religion and its theologies are indeed relevant in several ways.

\textsuperscript{52} For an account of the gradual disappearance of religious discourse from international legal texts, see Mark W. Janis, "Religion and the Literature of International Law: Some Standard Texts," in Mark W. Janis and Carolyn Evans, eds., \textit{Religion and International Law} (Boston: Martinus Nijhoff Publishers, 1999), 121-44.

\textsuperscript{53} Christopher G. Weeramantry, preface to Janis and Evans, eds., \textit{Religion and International Law}, xi.


First, international law is rooted in an explicitly religious past, and unless that past is to be totally denied, it will – in some fashion to be determined by the various functional specialities discussed below – be retained. Second, questions about the role of religion and theology not only in international law but also in international relations are receiving considerable attention today, for pragmatic and other reasons. Third, the practice of international law may give rise to the question of God, in one form or another. Not only can one ICJ justice write a book on the Lord’s Prayer and what it might have to say about the state of the world, human rights, and international law, but another ICJ justice and highly respected scholar, but also a self-defined “secularist,” – confronts the problem of evil in his encounter with war criminals and torturers, and turns to the works of Martin Buber and others for “some sense of orientation” in the face of “the age-old question of how it is possible for a human being to behave so inhumanely towards another human being.” The question of God arguably arises through other openings in international law as well, when one asks whether there is any ultimate grounding for human rights and the dignity of persons, or whether the international legal principle of “common heritage of mankind” does not require a theological reference to render it fully intelligible.

Fourth, we ought not underestimate the power and scope of “God’s love flooding our hearts through the Holy Spirit given to us” (Romans 5:5), despite – or perhaps because of – the many questions this raises about “self-interest” or “national interest” as the final arbitrator in international law. In this regard, religious conversion

56 Janis and Evans, *International Law and Religion.*
61 This is a touchstone passage for Lonergan. See *Method in Theology,* 105.
may be relevant to international law through the transformed horizon it brings it its wake. If decline, as well as progress, is a feature of international law — as I believe to be the case — then the method we are exploring will be attentive to the love and the faith that undercuts bias, for instance the group biases of nationalism and state interest, and reverses decline. Even religious belief, as distinct from but grounded in faith, might contribute to international law at the level of method without unwarranted intrusion.

Finally, while international law undoubtedly has its roots sunk deep into the Christian tradition, there is no reason why the reconnection today between international law and theology cannot be ecumenical and interreligious in orientation and scope. Surely, difficulties in this area abound, but method in theology is designed to begin, at least, to meet those challenges.

**Functional Specialties**

Central to any collaborative potential of method are the functional specialties arising from the levels of conscious intentionality. Once again, I am pursuing here an agenda for collaboration, not a full-scale example. And given the complexities — indeed the messiness — of international law, the reader should not expect a neat alignment of the specialties with international law in its mediating and mediated phases. Still, it is possible to suggest some directions the functional specialties might take.

**Research**

If research in theology "makes available the data relevant to theological investigation," then we may assume that this functional

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64 For an attempt to encourage people already engaged in interreligious dialogue to turn their joint attention to international law, see William P. George, "Looking for a Global Ethic? Try International Law," in Janis and Evans, eds., *Religion and International Law*, 191-208. See also in the same volume the various essays on religion and international law that focus on traditions other than Christianity.

65 *Method in Theology*, 127.
specialty can also make available data relevant to questions posed to and by international law. One thinks, for instance of the assembly, starting nearly a century ago, of the "Classics of International Law," under the aegis of the Carnegie Endowment for International Peace – a set of texts that became grist for the mills of scholars working at one, or more likely more, of the other functional specialties.

But even apart from the work of scholars, should we also include here the assemblage of data required by courts which start with "the facts of the case" as well as any relevant texts or artifacts? And will not research require seeking other data that might be overlooked? To give but two examples, feminist scholars will no doubt uncover texts and accounts of legal matters that others have ignored, and even when scholars turn to neglected religious texts relevant to international law the scope of research can be too narrow. Beyond texts and artifacts, however, one may ask whether "human experience," for example, the experience of massive suffering, should become data and starting points for a rethinking of international law. Surely, the widely shared experience of liberation and decolonization around the globe has turned the attention of scholars to new data – or rather old data, long ignored. In other words, this functional specialty cannot, or should not, bypass the role in international law of what educators call "experiential learning." Finally, we must recall a point made at the outset of this paper: international law is in many respects a multidisciplinary enterprise. So findings regarding newly discovered life on the ocean floor, the rate of polar icecap melt, the spread of disease, or the environmental effects of nuclear testing will contribute to the database for developing international law.


67 Thus Harold Berman expresses his regret that, for all the strengths of a collection of twenty-two essays on international law and religion, none of the writers thought to attend to canon law's significant contribution. See Harold Berman, Review of Janis and Evans, eds., International Law and Religion, in American Journal of International Law 94, no. 4 (October 2000): 800–803.


69 For a description of Antonio Cassesse's movement "from contemplation to action," see his "Soliloquy" in Cassese, lxv–lxviii.
International Law as Horizon

Interpretation

Just as the assembled theological texts are, of course, open to interpretation, so, too, do the data of international law give rise to diverse understandings. In the daily practice of international law, this is perhaps most clear in the case of treaties. One case brought before the U.S. Supreme Court turned largely on the interpretation of a single French verb (refouler), and operative theories of interpretation can be decisive: When the question before the U.S. Supreme Court regards a treaty to which the United States is a party, does interpretation turn on the text of the treaty or should the Senate hearings behind the text be reviewed?

Since our dynamic benchmark is method in theology, it may be instructive to highlight a key text in international law’s canon that has been subject to alternative interpretations and misinterpretations. According to standard international law textbook accounts, with one key line in the Prolegomena to his De Jure Belli ac Pacis, Hugo Grotius wrested international law from the clutches of theology. But the standard interpretation of this text is not the only interpretation. Both internal and external evidence indicate that, as an international lawyer, Grotius did not abandon his theological roots. And thus at a pivotal point in its history, international law may be interpreted as more theologically friendly and informed than international lawyers, or at least textbook writers, seem to assume.

History

The question of how to interpret a key text from Grotius gives rise to larger questions about the history of international law, both within its own sphere and in relation to “basic” and “general” history, where questions of what was going forward are raised and possibly settled. Arguably, international law may be hampered here, since international

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73 Method in Theology, 128.
lawyers sometimes give history short shrift. Still, major histories of international law are attempted, as are studies of more limited scope. Sharp dissent from the standard history may occur, and sometimes historians disagree. So, for example, against the one-time standard view that Grotius, writing around the time of the Treaty of Westphalia, was the “father of international law,” James Brown Scott argued that the earlier Salamanca school of theology and philosophy, and especially the writings of Francisco de Vitoria, were the true origins of modern international law. With this claim about the “Catholic” origins of international law, Arthur Nussbaum and others disagreed. Similarly, that most problematic of recent figures, Carl Schmitt, protested against the “mythology” that had grown up around Francisco de Vitoria, defender of indigenous peoples in the New World and founder of modern, enlightened international law. Schmitt argued at some length that Vitoria was quite in the mainstream of those comfortable with the notion and legality of conquest.

But scholarly writers like Scott, Nussbaum, and Schmitt are not the only ones doing history. Collaborators applying method to international law might ask, too, how courts and others exercise this functional specialty. Above it was noted that Paquette Habana is a classic case for showing how courts apply customary international law; indeed, to make its case that fishing boats should not be considered “prize” in war, the court cites evidence reaching back to the late middle ages. But as two international law minimalists (if not “deniers”), Jack L. Goldsmith and Eric A. Posner, argue, the court’s reasoning may be infected by a scant and highly erroneous reading of history. No

77 Schmitt, Nomos of the Earth, 101-25.
doubt the memory of individual courts engaging international law in any number of lesser-known cases may be subject to similar careful review. Whether in any of these cases the precept “Be critical” is in fact affirmed or denied, the point is that history will be a key component of the collaboration encouraged by this essay.

**Dialectics**

It should be clear even from the brief examples scattered throughout the pages above that international law is an arena of inquiry primed for dialectics. Not only are there disagreements at the level of interpretation and historical judgment, but fundamental differences at the level of sophisticated horizons also occur. There is, of course, the long-standing difference between natural lawyers and positivists, but that is not the only fundamental split. There are the cynical realists who view international law as an epiphenomenon of power relations at best, and idealists who overestimate law’s effectiveness and reach. Furthermore, there are discernible among those who contribute to international law through their writings a variety of current methods or approaches: positivism, New Haven School (policy-oriented jurisprudence), international legal process, critical legal studies, feminist jurisprudence, and law and economics, among others.\(^79\) Whether these approaches are radically at odds with or complementary to one another is a question that dialectics will need to pursue.

At this point it may be helpful to recall the various “sources” of international law – treaties, custom, principles, court cases, and teachings. Dialectical opposition at a fundamental level may occur in any of these. As the list of “schools” in the previous paragraph suggests, *teachers and teachings* may be dialectically opposed. Some oppositions are long-standing (e.g., Grotians versus realists), but the present day is not left wanting for spirited debate. So, for instance, Mary Ellen O’Connell, a professor at the University of Notre Dame’s Law School,

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counters Goldsmith and Posner's high-profile text, *The Limits of International Law*, with *The Power and Purpose of International Law: Insights from the Theory and Practice of Enforcement*.\(^{80}\)

*Treaty law* is also contentious ground, and fundamental differences between and among negotiating parties can block the emergence of a treaty. One recent example may suffice: A treaty on human cloning proposed in 2004 never came about in part because disagreements regarding the scope of the treaty as well as the role of scientific findings and criteria could not be resolved. This case would be especially worth subjecting further to the functional specialty "dialectics" because religious perspectives, including those of the Holy See (but apparently couched in non-theological, natural law terms), were integral – though some might say detrimental – to the negotiations.\(^{81}\)

So, too, a review of various *court decisions* will reveal significant and possibly irreconcilable jurisprudential differences. The task of dialectics would be critically to review such landmark and divisive cases as the ICJ's advisory opinion on the legality of the threat and use of nuclear weapons and to ask just how deep is the horizontal split between those who affirmed the decision and those who entered their disagreement.\(^{82}\)

The basis for dialectics is conversion, so here the question to ask is how an intellectually, morally, and religiously converted subject might negotiate and adjudicate between and among the various horizons discernible in the history and concrete workings of international law. While the correct answer might be "Ask a fully converted subject – she will be able to answer," even then certain caveats are in order. Along with the difficulty of homing in on the ever-moving target that is international law, one also runs up against the inconvenient fact that international law is both law and politics. As Aristotle famously observed, in our investigations we cannot expect more exactitude than the subject matter will bear;\(^{83}\) and political realities tend not to


\(^{82}\) *Legality of the Threat or Use of Nuclear Weapons* (Advisory Opinion), 1996 I.C.J. 296.

be pellucid. Add to this the fact that while in some cases dialectics may be dealing with the relatively neat – if still complex – horizons of individual scholars or diplomats or judges, international law also deals with corporate decision-makers (e.g., states), and this opens up the problem of “models” of decision-making discussed by Graham Allison and others.84

Still, lest hope be cast aside, we must assume that dialectics is a possibility. The first order of business – a very tall order – is, of course, conversion. Here there seems no good reason to assume from the outset that the writers, judges, and others (living or dead) whom the dialectician might investigate are any less converted than the dialectician himself or herself. With a degree of humility, then, the dialectician may seek to unravel the various values at stake – or at odds – in international law in general, or in any particular case. He or she may tackle the thorny issue of whether self-interest is indeed the final arbitrator in international law. But the dialectician may also detect a broader commitment to a global common good even when interlocutors are trapped in the language of national interest. Religious, moral, intellectual – and we may add psychic – conversion should leave one attuned to the various biases seemingly endemic in international law and relations. But conversion should also make one alert to international law’s built-in checks against bias and the strivings of international lawyers and others to overcome evil with good and to counter the social surd with intelligence, moral rectitude, and a love of God and neighbor even when these terms are not used.

**Foundations**

This functional specialty would represent an effort to establish foundations for international law grounded in conversion. No attempt to work out those foundations will be made here; again, this paper represents a proposal for collaboration, not its fruition. Nevertheless,


85 Consider, for example, that rules for the makeup of the ICJ are designed to guard against a type of group bias by ensuring that the fifteen judges on the court be as representative as possible of the world community.
a few pertinent questions and directions may be proposed. First, method is concrete. So if one wishes to work out the foundations of international law, grounded in conversion, there is no avoiding the materials of international law from the outset, even though such direct engagement may be more pertinent to the functional specialties doctrines, systematics, and communications. Such "working out" would be a matter of determining the special international legal categories that derive from the general categories of cognitional structure, in some way analogous to the distinction between general and special categories in theology.\textsuperscript{86}

Second, while it may be the proper task of dialectics rather than of foundations, an attempt to articulate foundations ought, it seems, to engage previous attempts at establishing the fundamentals of international law. Such may be found in some of the "classics" of international law. Grotius, for instance, was seeking to articulate a natural law foundation of international law in the Prolegomena to \textit{De Jure Belli ac Pacis}, and Hans Kelsen holds a prominent place in international legal history due to his attempt to root international law in certain \textit{Grundnormen}.\textsuperscript{87} More recently, one might find a dynamic, foundationalist attempt in the writings of Philip Allott, who seeks to construct a solid foundation for international law beginning from the ground up, namely, from words.\textsuperscript{88}

Third, while again it is perhaps better suited to dialectics, this functional specialty must take into account the anti-foundationalist tendencies in international law. So, for instance, Richard Rorty and Michael Ignatieff reject as futile any attempt to ground human rights in a deeper rationality or metaphysics.\textsuperscript{89} This, of course, is an issue the exploration of which far exceeds this paper. But others may be encouraged to take up this challenge. One starting point might be to ask how the transcultural "rock" of cognitional structure, extending

\textsuperscript{86} \textit{Method in Theology}, 281-93.


into moral decision-making, might relate to the natural law to which many (not only Grotius) have looked for international law’s grounding and guiding compass. Interestingly, Lonergan seldom refers to “natural law,” and one reason might be that it too easily gets caught in a classicist web. And yet, even those – or perhaps especially those – who admit of legitimate cultural pluralism also acknowledge the need for some sort of grounding principles. Is it too simple to suggest that the transcendental precepts, affirmed when people of different nations and cultures, but of a shared good will, seek solutions to difficult problems, might fulfill the function of what were earlier called primary principles of natural law? Even Aquinas, recall, is reticent about giving too much detailed content to the natural law. He understood that natural law required “additions,” such as the need for private possession of property (but common use), since reflection on experience teaches that, with such a system in place, things are better cared for and there is more order and peace to be enjoyed by all.

This does not mean that the foundations for international law grounded in conversion will be purely heuristic, with no content whatsoever. Sustained reflection on experience by converted members of the international community, and even the self-correcting process of common sense, can result in substantive conclusions on substantive issues, akin to “virtually conditioned” judgments reached when all the relevant questions dry up. So, for instance, in the long history of customary international law, piracy is outlawed very early on, and, later, slavery and torture and genocide and outright conquest are ruled illegal as well. Violations notwithstanding, on these basic communal judgments there is no turning back, and so they enter into the list of international law’s established doctrines – a matter to which we now turn.

Doctrines

Foundations ground and engender doctrines, and no doubt we might explore any number of these regarding, for example, statehood,

90 See the closing pages of Dupuy, ed., Future of International Law in a Multicultural World.
91 ST I-II 94, 1-4.
92 ST II-II 66, 1-2.
93 Method in Theology, 75-76; compare with Insight, 281 ff.
the environment (e.g., the “protective principle”), air and space, and any other number of issue areas. But it might be instructive to look briefly at a current topic in international law wherein the actual term doctrine sometimes occurs. I refer to the Responsibility to Protect (R2P) doctrine that appears to be emerging in international law.94 This doctrine was developed in response to questions posed in 2001 by then U.N. Secretary General Kofi Annan as to whether states had a responsibility to intervene to stop such practices as genocide and ethnic cleansing, and in 2005 Annan did secure widespread agreement about such a responsibility.

Several observations seem pertinent to our discussion. First, as noted above, the doctrine is emerging; whether it fully takes root is yet to be determined. So it is one more instance in which emergent probability, as an aspect of method, assumes concrete relevance: What might increase the probabilities that this doctrine, assuming it is sound, will take hold? Second, if foundations is aligned with the fourth level of conscious intentionality, and if this is the level of responsibility, then it seems more than a linguistic coincidence that the foundations of international law would give rise to a specific doctrine regarding that responsibility, namely, the responsibility to protect those in need.

Third, this doctrine, to the degree it actually has emerged in international law, has not done so apart from established or emergent institutions – in this case, for instance, the establishment of a “high-level panel on threats, challenges and change,”95 as well as, of course, the resources and authority of the United Nations as a whole. Finally, we may assume that, even if this doctrine truly catches on and lives up to Annan’s expectations, this does not obviate questions about its meaning and application. After all, the meaning of R2P’s precedent, namely, humanitarian intervention, has not always been crystal clear.96 Thus it should be no surprise if a further functional specialty, one that seeks to clarify doctrines at the level of understanding, should be required in the case of R2P as well.

94 For a overview of R2P, see Global Centre for the Responsibility to Protect at http://globalr2p.org/primer.html.
95 See Global Centre for the Responsibility to Protect at http://globalr2p.org/primer.html.
Systematics

The Responsibility to Protect doctrine is, of course, not the only development of international law that gives rise to further questions. The principle of *jus cogens*—or peremptory law—is a part of international law, but how far does it extend? The U.N. Charter puts limits on when individual nations may have recourse to war (let us call it the "self-defense doctrine"), but what exactly does self-defense mean? Does it include anticipatory or preventive self-defense when the threat is great but not immediate? Or does the classic statement on self-defense expressed in *The Caroline* incident remain the relevant standard? The requirements for determining statehood (we will call it the "statehood doctrine") may seem relatively straightforward (territory, stable population, and established government), and yet questions arise in particular cases. Treaties may settle a lot of questions of "doctrine"—about, say, the making and breaking of treaties—and yet the Vienna Convention on the Law of Treaties, meant to settle treaty-related questions, itself may be disputed as to its meaning.

Examples, of course, could be multiplied: All one has to do is to review international law journals to see treatments of the kinds of questions which seemingly clear doctrines of international law persistently provoke. So, just as systematics in theology "is concerned to work out appropriate systems of conceptualizations, to remove apparent inconsistencies, to move towards some grasp of spiritual matters both from their own inner coherence and from the analogies offered by more familiar human experience," so international lawyers working in their own realm "move towards some grasp of" international legal matters. In pursuit of this task they will, of course, turn to the breadth of terms and relations in international law. But human experience, even as mediated by Shakespeare, may come to their aid as well.

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97 "The necessity of that self-defense is instant, overwhelming, and leaving no choice of means, and no moment of deliberation." (*The Caroline*, 2 Moore, *Digest of International Law* 412 [1906]).
Communications

“Communications is concerned with theology in its external relations.”101 Given the public nature of international law, what Lonergan says about this functional specialty would seem to be eminently applicable. For as we noted, international law is now increasingly interdisciplinary, so not only in its “external relations” but also for the sake of its own development international lawyers need to cast a wide communicative net. There are enormous challenges here: convincing skeptics that international law is “real law”; countering other stubborn myths about what international law is and is not; and, like theology, finding “access into the minds and hearts of men of all cultures and classes.”102 International law indeed faces formidable educational tasks. And so, during its centenary in 2006, the American Society of International Law offered interactive web-sites and other means of educating the public not simply about its own history, but also about a hundred ways in which international law is relevant to everyday life. Similarly, the United Nations has it long-standing educational efforts, directed to all ages.103

Despite the importance of this functional specialty, a few brief comments will have to suffice. First, while conversion is most clearly linked by Lonergan to dialectics and foundations, conversion is no less crucial when “external relations” are at stake, since biases may be in play and the likelihood of distorted messages is great. Consider, for instance, the fact that NGOs play a crucial role in communications; but consider, too, that certain NGOs may, in fact, be quasi-governmental organizations, promoting the narrow interests of the sponsoring state. Second, the enormous recent developments in communications, especially the internet, can and do have an immense impact on the development of international law, for instance by furthering the work of the global human rights movement and by posing new legal challenges (who controls the internet?). Third, it would seem crucial that communications not be viewed as simply the last step in an international legal chain beginning with in-house research and ending

101 Method in Theology, 132.
102 Method in Theology, 133.
with communicating results to a waiting public; rather engagement of the wider public and its many institutions as likely supplies new data to which international lawyers must attend, gives rise to new questions, and brings into relief differences to be reconciled. In other words, communication, especially when it involves listening, may be as much a new beginning as it is an end of a process.

Finally, as James Nafziger has argued, religious communities may be crucial to this communicative task since, as much as anyone, they are in touch with people on the ground and they translate the visions and values of international law into language that makes sense and actions that ring true. But as Nafziger also points out, religious folk are likely also to provide the vision – the “foundations,” in the present context – that animates international law to begin with.104 Thus the functional specialty communications is not cut off from the other specialties; not only cognitional structure, but also religious experience and conviction may be a connecting link.

III. CONCLUSION

In his oft-quoted book on international law and foreign relations, Louis Henkin describes the “realist” diplomat and the “idealist” international lawyer:

The diplomat and the international lawyer, the student of law and the student of politics whom I have described, may be caricatures; they are not, I believe, straw men or “sports.” Lawyer and diplomat are engaged in dialogue de sourds. Indeed, they are not even attempting to talk to each other, turning away in silent disregard. Yet both purport to be looking at the same world from the vantage point of important disciplines. It seems unfortunate, indeed destructive, that they should not, at the least, hear each other. ...I wish to attempt to dispel misconceptions, of “too much” as of “too little,” about the place of law in foreign policy.105

105 Henkin, How Nations Behave, 5.
At the end of "Dimensions of meaning," Lonergan writes:

There is bound to be formed a solid right that is determined to live in a world that no longer exists. There is bound to be formed a scattered left, captivated by now this and now that new possibility. But what will count is a possibly not numerous center, big enough to be at home in both the old and the new, painstaking enough to work out one by one the transitions to be made, strong enough to refuse half measures and insist on complete solutions even though it has to wait.106

Is it possible that the kinds of divisions and impasses described by Henkin, on the one hand, and Lonergan, on the other, are not so dissimilar? This prolegomena to collaboration has assumed this might be so. And if it is, then the collaborative enterprise required to move the lower blade of international law to cut against the upper blade of method, and in the process begin to answer some of Gerald Wamsley’s presenting questions, is bound to take time and many steps – many small snips, if you will. The cutting should probably best begin, when it has not already begun, where each collaborator finds himself or herself: historian or scientist, philosopher or theologian, lawyer or diplomat, NGO activist or corporate executive, citizen of a particular country but also citizen of the world. Each may ask: What do the horizons of international law and of method have to do with me and with the good that I seek? How might my personal question in this regard be joined with the questioning of other persons of good will in the “possibly not numerous center”? With questioning of this kind, and serious and collaborative attempts to seek answers, the “universal viewpoint” may even, little by little, be filled in, not only by theory but by practice as well.

A CATHOLIC CORE CURRICULUM

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In military terms history is concerned, not just with the opposing commanders’ plans of the battle, not just with the experiences of the battle had by each soldier and officer, but with the actual course of the battle as the resultant of conflicting plans now successfully and now unsuccessfully executed.¹

History is filled with the unexpected. You plan and plan and you invite others into your planning and you communicate to others and together you execute as well as you can; and what happens? Things turn out differently. Other forces, unforeseen, intervene and events go in another direction, sometimes in an entirely different direction. And why is that? It is because history is not just the result of one person’s plan, or even the result of one group’s plan. History is more like a large battle in which the generals of opposing armies each have their own plans, but the concrete unfolding of the battle is something else again.

I begin with this observation on history because it has definitely been my experience in the creation of our new core curriculum at Seton Hall University. In this article I will describe the origins of our

¹ Bernard Lonergan, Method in Theology (Toronto: University of Toronto Press, 1971), 179. See also 184: “There exists a developing and/or deteriorating unity constituted by cooperations, by institutions, by personal relations, by a functioning and/or malfunctioning good of order, by a communal realization of originating and terminal values and disvalues. Within such processes we live out our lives. About them each of us ordinarily is content to learn enough to attend to his own affairs and perform his public duties. To seek a view of the actual functioning of the whole or of a notable part over a significant period of time is the task of the historian.”
new core and follow this with my experience of new forces at work, forces emanating, it seems, from the educational establishment that in the periodic evaluation of universities uses language about infusing "proficiencies" such as "critical thinking" into the curriculum and insists on processes of "outcomes assessment." In thinking about this new language and these new forces I came across the work of Professor Lance Grigg of the University of Lethbridge in Alberta. Grigg relates the "critical thinking" movement to Lonergan's work on rational consciousness and to the content of the curriculum. I will present some of Grigg's thought and conclude with some reflections on Lonergan and how all this could relate to the "Catholic" dimension of our new core curriculum.

1. THE CORE CURRICULUM AT SETON HALL

I came to Seton Hall University in 1956 and experienced a rather unified classical curriculum, a unity that as Philip Gleason pointed out, emanated from the neo-scholastic philosophy around which Catholic colleges and universities structured their curriculum. Some graduates of Catholic universities from those times have told me that the neo-scholastic philosophy they learned was the most important element in their training.²

But it was not to last. With the Catholic Church's adoption of historical consciousness in the Second Vatican Council, that unifying philosophy disappeared from Catholic colleges and universities. Specialization became the name of the game, and the curriculum easily splintered into a smorgasbord of unrelated fragments. As with universities in general, any previous belief in the unity of knowledge has given way to a contemporary situation in which the specialization of knowledge leaves the human person with scattered bits of knowledge but no integrating framework by which those areas can be linked together. As one commentator put it, "knowledge lies scattered around us, in great, unconnected pieces, like lonely mesas jutting up in a trackless waste." The cultural consequences of this fragmentation of

knowledge are profound.  

Faced with this situation there gradually emerged the felt-need for a unifying vision and a core curriculum that could address issues of wisdom and integration. So in the year 2000 the Center for Catholic Studies at Seton Hall organized a faculty development workshop on the core curriculum. That workshop was the beginning of numerous faculty meetings leading toward the establishment of a new core for eleven hundred incoming freshmen in the fall of 2008.

Of course, since Seton Hall is a Catholic university, sponsored by the Archdiocese of Newark, it was felt – not without some opposition – that the new core had to relate to the Catholic intellectual tradition. At the same time it had to be open to our many students who come from other traditions. Perhaps you can sense the tenor of the discussions when you read the resolution from our university senate meeting in 2004 where it was decided that the new core curriculum would focus on “the questions central to – but not exclusive to – the Catholic intellectual tradition, broadly understood.” (We have spent many hours parsing that sentence.) Perhaps I could do no better than to quote the university’s own present description of its core:

Seton Hall University’s core curriculum is rooted in questions that are central to – though not exclusive to – the Catholic intellectual tradition. Students read and discuss some of the enduring works that address the meaning and purpose of the human journey. Through these courses, students gain self-knowledge, develop habits of intellectual and ethical engagement, and hone the skills of critical thinking and thoughtful communication. They develop the competencies to exercise servant leadership in a diverse and rapidly evolving world. The core curriculum consists of a set of six common courses, and a concerted development of five academic proficiencies through the study of the liberal arts and sciences

**Common Courses:** These courses provide students with an experience unique to Seton Hall University (16 credits)

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ENGLISH 1201 and ENGLISH 1202 provide an introduction to, and development of, academic reading, writing and research skills (6 credits).

CORE 1001 University Life, in which mentors and peer advisors model habits, gives students the tools for success in their academic career (1 credit).

CORE 1101 Journey of Transformation, taken in the first year (3 credits).

CORE 2101 Christianity and Culture in Dialogue in the second year (3 credits).

CORE 3101 Engaging the World, a discipline-specific course in the third year (3 credits).

Proficiencies: The systematic development of proficiencies prepares students with the skills to understand, interpret, and manage the flow of information in an increasingly complex environment. The proficiencies are the following:

- Reading and Writing
- Oral Communication
- Information Fluency
- Numeracy
- Critical Thinking

Literacies are specific to each college or school and provide a diversified experience of the liberal arts and sciences.

For myself, the core of the core has been the creation of what are called "signature courses" for each of the student's first three years at
the university: for first year students, *The Journey of Transformation*; for second year students, *Christianity and Culture in Dialogue*; and for third year students, various courses that are discipline-specific, all under the rubric of *Engaging the World*. These latter courses link the Catholic intellectual tradition with the various disciplines and professions taught in the university.

My personal attitude toward the new core has been content-oriented, that is, toward the classic texts from the Catholic tradition that form a basis for the core. Some of those are indicated in the schema below. It was decided that in order to be true to the mandate to cover questions central but not exclusive to the Catholic intellectual tradition, a text from the Catholic tradition would be paralleled by a text from another tradition. The following diagram indicates where we are now. We are open to changing the selection of texts but only after we have experimented with a text for three years.

<table>
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<tr>
<th>Non-Christian Text</th>
<th>Christian Text</th>
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<tr>
<td><strong>1st Year</strong></td>
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<tr>
<td><em>Plato – Apologia</em></td>
<td><em>Journey of Transformation</em></td>
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<td><em>Bhagavad Gita</em></td>
<td><em>Gospel of St. Luke</em></td>
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<td>Frankl’s <em>Man’s Search for Meaning</em></td>
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<td><em>Dorothy Day’s A Long Loneliness</em></td>
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<td><strong>2nd Year</strong></td>
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<td><em>Ibn Rushd – Ibn Sina – Maimonides</em></td>
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<tr>
<td><em>Nietzsche</em></td>
<td><em>Christianity and Culture in Dialogue</em></td>
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<td><em>Galileo – Darwin</em></td>
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<td><em>Marx</em></td>
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<td><strong>3rd Year</strong></td>
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<td><em>Discipline Specific</em></td>
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In particular, the first two courses had to be primary text oriented, that is, somewhat in the "great books" tradition. The classes have to be in small enough groupings to be discussion-oriented. I must say, that this itself has been a real education for me. For a person who has always been oriented to lecturing, it has been quite a development in one's teaching style to sit in a circle with students and find out what they are actually learning from the texts. I am sure I have been learning as much as the students.

2. A NEW LANGUAGE: "INFUSING CRITICAL THINKING"

The first course of the new core was initiated for all our first year students, about eleven hundred of them, this past year, and this present academic year (2009-2010) all the students in our first two years will be taking the first two courses of the new core. But recently, as we have been initiating the new core, a whole new discourse has entered into the mix, a whole new language – at least to me. As the new courses were being created, I began to hear discourse about "infusing proficiencies" into the courses. Gradually there was less talk about the courses and their content and more talk about something I was initially less interested in, that is, the development of "proficiencies." These proficiencies mostly focused on "critical thinking" but also included reading and writing across the curriculum, information literacy, oral communications, and numeracy. These proficiencies are to be "infused" into various courses in the curriculum: both the new signature courses as well as other courses, and students are expected to take a certain number of proficiency-infused courses. These proficiencies are to be "assessed" according to predetermined "standards" or "rubrics." The basic idea is that in teaching a course, you should have a clear idea of what you are aiming at, how you are going to get there, and how you are going to determine if you have achieved the objectives you had.

All of which is somewhat foreign to "traditional" teachers – among whom I count myself. Our modus operandi has been to come into classroom, lecture, give exams and in that way determine if students

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4 See David Denby, Great Books (New York: Touchstone, 1996); also Richard Liddy, "Reading Well: The Core to the Core," Proceedings of the Summer Seminar, 2000, Center for Catholic Studies, Seton Hall University, 34-39.
have sufficiently mastered the material. Anecdotally at least, in my opinion, these are some of the best teachers in the university – although this perhaps is not universally true.

Obviously, there has arisen a certain resistance to this whole move of infusing proficiencies. I myself found myself saying, “Let’s have some critical thinking about critical thinking!” And, “Are there not other types of thinking besides critical thinking – appreciative thinking? Evaluative thinking? More intuitive types of thinking? How are these related to critical thinking? What in fact is critical thinking?

And now, as language about new “assessment” procedures enters into the discourse, there is a growing resistance to this trend also. I found myself sympathetic to one faculty member who said, “I don’t think you can really assess the effectiveness of a course until some years later – when you can truly assess what really has sunk into a student’s mind and heart.”

All of which has reminded me of several passages from Bernard Lonergan. One from his lectures, *Topics in Education*, in which he reflected on the power of the educational establishment, especially as government uses its greatest of all powers, that of taxation, to influence a nation’s education. But what kind of education do we want? In *Method in Theology*, Lonergan writes about modern humanism harnessing modern science for all kinds of practical ends: engineering, technology, industrialism. Such is an acknowledged source of wealth and power, a power not merely material:

> It is the power of the mass media to write for, speak to, be seen by all people. It is the power of an educational system to fashion the nation’s youth in the image of the wise person or in the image of a fool, in the image of a free person or in the image prescribed for the Peoples’ Democracies.\(^6\)

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3. LANCE GRIGG ON CRITICAL THINKING

In *Topics in Education*, Lonergan seems to carve out a middle ground between the traditionalists who appeal to universal principles as the basis of education and the modernists and pragmatists who see education as primarily employing "the new learning," basically science, to change the world. But Lonergan's is not really a compromise between these two positions but rather a new beginning that takes both the new learning and the traditionalist appeal to "the classics" seriously. My question at Seton Hall has been whether Lonergan could be of help in mediating this tension between "traditional" teachers who emphasize excellence in their various disciplines and those who insist on "infusing critical thinking" into the disciplines.

It is in this context that I was delighted to read a paper by Professor Lance Grigg of the University of Lethbridge in Alberta at the 2009 West Coast Methods Conference in Los Angeles. The paper, entitled "Critical Thinking, Pedagogy, and Lonergan: An Exploratory Sketch" involves a review of the literature on critical thinking, an overview of some of the critiques of the critical thinking literature, and a way of thinking about these issues from Lonergan's point of view. Let me run through some of Grigg's points.

First of all, he highlights various descriptions of critical thinking and its value, noting that between 2005 and 2008 alone, there were an excess of one hundred publications in the area of critical thinking and critical thinking pedagogy. For many, critical thinking is essential for the maintenance of participatory forms of democracy, fundamental to any deep understanding of the curriculum, basic to liberation and critical pedagogy, foundational to effective school leadership, and elemental to research methodology in education.

At the same time there have been problems and criticisms of critical thinking as it is generally presented. Basically, critical thinking as normally portrayed neglects or downplays emotions. It also privileges rational, linear, deductive thought over intuition and is aggressive and confrontational rather than collegial and collaborative. Critical thinking is said to be individualistic and privileges personal

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autonomy over the sense of community and relationship. It also favors
the generic over the subject-specific and fails to attend to the priority
of content – knowledge – in our case, “the questions central to the
Catholic intellectual tradition.” Critical thinking as usually presented
is said to be hostile toward mystery and opposed to faith or religious
forms of belief.

Grigg himself notes that in response to these critiques, the
literature on critical thinking has become more open to the complexity
of the subject and less limited to thinking of critical thinking as the
application of formal or informal logic. It has become more open to a
holistic approach involving attitudes, dispositions, skills, action, and
logic. Finally, Grigg himself asks if there is not another way of looking
at this whole issue of critical thinking:

Is revision of current approaches or death by a thousand
qualifications the best way to proceed? Possibly, an entirely
different model informing critical thinking and critical
thinking pedagogy theory and practice may be a more useful
and economical solution.

Grigg answers his own question by suggesting that critical
thinking can best be understood through Bernard Lonergan’s notion
of “rational self-consciousness.” For Lonergan amply demonstrates
that there are various levels of consciousness structurally related to
each other and to the whole unfolding of personal awareness. There is
the experiential level of seeing, touching, tasting, and so forth that an
artist naturally focuses on; there is the intellectual level of questioning
and understanding that a scientist naturally focuses on; there is the
rational level of reflecting and judging that a philosopher and “critical
thinker” focuses on; there is the level of rational self-consciousness
focused on decision-making that the person of action focuses on; and
finally, there is the level of mystery that the religious person focuses on.
Grigg in his article centers in on the third and fourth levels – rational
and rational self-consciousness to understand the meaning of critical
thinking:

Before the critical thinker makes any reasoned judgment,
therefore, she is rationally conscious. Consequently, she
naturally seeks out relevant explanations of her experiences,
poses questions for reflection to those explanations, remains unsatisfied with incomplete accounts of those experiences, seeks sufficient evidence for a specific explanation, and continually desires to know which explanation is the best one at the time.

Grigg's presentation of Lonergan's analysis of rational self-consciousness is certainly beyond the scope of this paper, but he does assert that Lonergan's notion of reflective insight preceding judgment may address problems in critical thinking in the following way:

- It avoids the reductionism basic to psychological models of learning theory ("rational consciousness is not synaptic firing").
- It is a context-sensitive heuristic that sees the student as a learning subject.
- Pedagogical content-knowledge is the means whereby one arrives at insights into insight – avoiding the pure skills/attitudes approach to critical thinking.
- Authenticity language becomes central to critical thinking.
- Measurement of student achievement becomes authentic to the degree that instruments (tests, projects, papers, etc.) are differentiated – not mirroring a single feature of critical thinking.

Also, according to Grigg, reflective insight's holistic associations avoid forms of reductionism that restrict critical thinking to argument analysis, learning theory, or the scientific method. It sets critical thinking within a broader theory of consciousness, seeing the student as a learning subject and not a learning object to be studied in a detached and disinterested manner. It aims at helping people become aware of the dynamics of their own consciousness: questions, insights, experiences, and so forth and how they all work together to aid us in making judgments:

Such an approach respects pedagogical content-knowledge. Specifically reasoned judgments in critical thinking are understood as reflective insights which operate upon the expressions of direct insights occurring within specific subject-areas, fields or domains. I have insights in history, literature, psychology, science, mathematics, philosophy, etc.
In this sense, reflective insight is a unique type of context-sensitive heuristic. The reflective aha moment in response to a question for reflection occurs when the prospective reasoned judgment is grasped as virtually unconditioned within a particular content-area, field of research, knowledge-domain, chosen by the teacher. One cannot abstract away or factor out context-specific, pedagogical-content knowledge from cognitional process.

Here let me briefly recur to the notion of rational consciousness as it appeared in Lonergan’s 1947 work, *Verbum: Word and Idea in Aquinas*. There Lonergan highlights Aquinas’s analysis of knowledge as consisting, not just in the obvious acts of sensitive experience and imagination, but also in the act of direct understanding that grasps the form or reason in things, as well as the further act of reflective understanding that generates in judgment the expression of consciously possessed truth through which reality is both known and known to be known. According to Thomas and Lonergan, the metaphysical principles of being, of unity, of identity, and non-contradiction – at the core of truly critical thinking – all flow from the conscious nature of our intelligence and reason. When we get an insight, our minds are metaphorically “enlightened.” According to Thomas, such “intellectual light” can be known by intellectual light: we can introspectively know what goes on in us. “There is, then, a manner in which the light of our souls enters within the range of introspective observation.” This was the whole thrust of Lonergan’s 1957 *Insight: A Study of Human Understanding* in which Lonergan uses examples from mathematics and mathematical physics to illustrate what is meant by “understanding” and to aid the reader in an “insight into insight.”

Such insight into insight comes to recognize what Lonergan called “the intelligibility of being.” Our efforts at understanding, our inner fight against bias, our long search into this or that area, are all governed by the intelligibility of being – the fact that we assume that things hang together. It is a subtle point to appreciate this presupposition of all our extended and often conflict-laden thinking – but it is the key to

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9 *Verbum*, 80.
critical thinking. It is also the key to understanding what is meant "by conscience as the normative awareness of the good as well as what is meant by 'God' as the intelligence at the source of all intelligibility and the good at the source of all value." In other words, to truly understand what is meant by critical thinking, it is also important to understand how critical thinking is related to other areas of human concern, including questions of transcendence and questions of the heart.¹⁰

4. CRITICAL THINKING AND A WIDER AUTHENTICITY

Opening up the meaning of critical thinking by means of a theoretical analysis of all that pertains to human interiority sets it in the wider context of human authenticity as such. For "being reasonable" is only one dimension of "being authentically human." Such being authentically human includes such other genuinely human dimensions as being attentive, being intelligent, being responsible, and being loving. Critical thinking is one dimension of being authentically human and such a fuller authenticity finds expression in what Lonergan called "the transcendental precepts," that is, those demands that emerge from the very makeup of our being as humans.¹¹

Be loving!
Re responsible!
Be reasonable! (= think critically!)
Be intelligent!
Be attentive!

Lonergan often adds one other precept, "If necessary, change!" It is cognate to the New Testament message, "Repent! The kingdom of God is at hand."

Let me draw some practical conclusions from this analysis. First of all, it would seem that the list of proficiencies to be "infused" into the curriculum should be lengthened beyond reading/writing, critical

¹⁰ Method in Theology, 20, 55.
thinking, information fluency, and numeracy. Should not proficiencies to be infused include such contemplative practices as meditation and contemplation? After all, getting in touch with all the resources for making reasonable judgments would seem to entail getting in touch with the “intellectual light” which is our selves at our best. For example, exercises in “being silent” can open students up to a whole other side of their being.

The list of proficiencies might also include journaling, a practice of writing that helps a person get in touch with the principles within one for making objective judgments, including objective judgments of value. Students can also in this way be encouraged to get in touch with beauty and with the desire for beauty that is within them. By doing away with religious texts in public schools, schools drastically reduce students’ access to the great and beautiful texts of human literature: *Augustine’s Confessions, The Scriptures, Dante’s Divine Comedy,* and others. With the help of such texts students can be encouraged to get in touch with the springs of beauty, love, creativity, and intelligence that are within them. This is one aim of the new core curriculum at Seton Hall that requires exposure to classic texts of the Christian tradition.

Simultaneously, students also need to seriously get in touch with all that blocks them from the desire for beauty and creativity within them, such as various types of addiction – including addictions to the internet and types of music that keep them restless, frenetic, unable to stop and contemplate the beauty of little things. It is the beauty and wonder of little things that can open them up to the beauty and glory of their own consciousness.

In other words, why is “leisure the basis of culture?” Why do we need vacations? Why do we need solitude? Why retreats? Precisely so that we can get in touch with all that is in us that is related to critical thinking but that comes from other dimensions of our being. Such are levels of feelings that need to be discerned so that feelings related to authenticity can be encouraged and self-centered feelings can be transcended through the authentic emergence of our subjectivity.

5. THE “CATHOLIC” CONTENT OF THE CORE CURRICULUM

Is there a way of thinking about these subjects – critical thinking and
the core curriculum – in such a way that the core curriculum both through its content and through its process can present a vision of the human person adequate to both a committed Catholic and to any genuinely authentic person in today’s world?

Let me begin to address this question by noting that, given the benign interpretation of critical thinking that we have given, I believe we can say that critical thinking is not something that abstracts from content. The content of our knowledge is important. Even though critical thinking is a goal of much education, nevertheless “the outer word” of content is important. It is not incidental. Here is a quote from Bernard Lonergan with regard to the importance of the outer word of tradition in regard to religious experience:

When a man and a woman love each other but do not avow their love, they are not yet in love. Their very silence means that their love has not reached the point of self-surrender and self-donation. It is the love that each freely and fully reveals to the other that brings about the radically new situation of being in love and that begins the unfolding of its life-long implications. What holds for the love of a man and a woman, also holds in its own way for the love of God and man. Ordinarily the experience of the mystery of love and awe is not objectified. It remains within subjectivity as a vector, an undertow, a fateful call to a dreaded holiness.12

Perhaps with time there occur more intense experiences:

But then, as much as ever, one needs the word – the word of tradition that has accumulated religious wisdom, the word of fellowship that unites those that share the gift of God’s love, the word of the gospel that announces that God has loved us first and, in the fullness of time, has revealed that love in Christ crucified, dead, and risen.

It seems to me that this is why the core curriculum at a Catholic university is important. For besides the instances of authenticity outside of Christianity – in a Plato, an Aristotle, the writings of other religious

traditions, the modern sciences – so also in a Catholic university there is need for students to hear the word spoken by the Christian and Catholic tradition itself, the word of the Gospel, the Good News:

The religious leader, the prophet, the Christ, the apostle, the priest, the preacher announces in signs and symbols what is congruent with the gift of love that God works within us.\(^\text{13}\)

This word can and should be spoken clearly: in the context of other words that are spoken in the modern world from all different directions. The students in our classrooms come from all different environments and all different social locations:

The word, too, is social: it brings into a single fold the scattered sheep that belong together because at the depth of their hearts they respond to the same mystery of love and awe. The word, finally, is historical. It is meaning outwardly expressed. It has to find its place in the context of other, non-religious meanings. It has to borrow and adapt a language that more easily speaks of this world than of transcendence. But such languages and contexts vary with time and place to give words changing meanings and statements changing implications.\(^\text{14}\)

Lonergan’s distinctions between the worlds of common sense, theory, transcendence, and interiority are very helpful in separating the pieces amidst the mountainous achievements of modern thought. Catholicism through the ages has been massively influenced by each of these areas of human consciousness:

It follows that religious expression will move through the stages of meaning and speak in its different realms. When the realms of common sense, of theory, of interiority, and of transcendence are distinguished and related, one easily understands the diversity of religious utterance. For its source and core is in the experience of the mystery of love and awe, and that pertains to the realm of transcendence. Its foundations, its basic terms and relationships, its method are derived from the realm of

\(^{13}\) *Method in Theology*, 113.

\(^{14}\) *Method in Theology*, 113-14.
interiority. Its technical unfolding is in the realm of theory. Its preaching and teaching are in the realm of common sense.\footnote{Method in Theology, 114.}

Once these realms are distinguished and their relations are understood, it is easy enough to understand the broad lines of earlier stages and diverse developments:

Eastern religion stressed religious experience. Semitic religion stressed prophetic monotheism. Western religion cultivated the realm of transcendence through its churches and liturgies, its celibate clergy, its religious orders, congregations, confraternities. It moved into the realm of theory by its dogmas, its theology, its juridical structures and enactments. It has to construct the common basis of theory and of common sense that is to be found in interiority and it has to use that basis to link the experience of the transcendent with the world mediated by meaning.\footnote{Method in Theology, 114.}

\section*{6. CONCLUSION}

One example of Bernard Lonergan's relevance to the contemporary world regards the notion of “critical thinking.” Accrediting agencies, principals, university presidents, teachers, and professors all seek to infuse critical thinking into students (can that really be done?) and to assess their performance. But no one else has given an adequate and full account of just what critical thinking is and how it is related to all other kinds of thinking: appreciative thinking, artistic thinking, evaluative thinking, the feminine dimensions of thinking, and so forth. No one else has so completely analyzed the process by which we critique our own insights, ask more questions about them, check out their presuppositions, expose their fallacies and the roots of those fallacies, and so forth until perhaps we might come to grasp the virtually unconditioned from which emerges the judgment: “That is so!”

One comes to this awareness of oneself by coming to know the processes of our own coming to know, our own evaluating and decision making. Such is an inner journey into our own insides: a journey no one
can make for us, but a journey that when guided by masters such as Plato, Aristotle, Augustine, Aquinas, Newman, and Lonergan, can pay rich dividends. It can result in insights into our own selves and into the spiritual processes with which the Almighty has endowed our being. We can be as surprised and shocked as Augustine was in the summer of 386 when someone lent him "a few books of the Platonists" and perspectives opened up on himself that he would never have previously dreamed possible:

...[T]he problems in philosophy at least at the present time are not problems of exploitation. They are problems of getting people to the starting point. The problem is not having people repeat with Augustine that "The real is not a body, it is what you know when you know something true." The problem is to get people to mean as much as Augustine meant when Augustine spoke about truth. And that is a transformation of the subject. It is bringing the subject up to the level of thought of a Plato and an Aristotle and an Augustine and an Aquinas. And that is a terrific development in the subject.17

This is not an easy process, especially if one has no guide at hand to lead one on the journey. Augustine in the Confessions tells us it took him about twelve years from the time he first got interested in philosophy until his discovery of the meaning of veritas – "truth" – in the summer of 386. One could say it took him that long to come to understand the meaning of "critical thinking":

St. Augustine, who was a man of extraordinary intelligence, was for years a materialist. He knew he was a materialist, and he said so. But he changed. And then when he wanted to talk about the real, what is really so, what word did he use? Veritas. Augustine does not talk about realitas, but about veritas, about what is true. And the truth is known not without, non foras, and not just within, non intus, but above us, in a light that he describes as incommutable and eternal. The history of Augustine's thought is the history of the limitations of the

infantile apprehension of reality and the history of the shift to the true.\footnote{Topics in Education, 170.}
METHOD IN MEDICINE FOR THE AGE OF SYNDROMES AND GENOMES

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BACKGROUND AND THESIS

The medical profession has been remarkably effective in meeting many of the challenges of disease in the nineteenth and twentieth centuries, in large part because the methodology of medical inquiry was well suited to meet the demands of the extant patterns of illness. But there are two trends emerging as the twenty-first century advances which threaten to render ineffective what was once a viable methodology.

The first trend involves a change in the observed pattern of illness on a population scale. It can best be described as the predominance of acute "diseases" giving way to chronic "syndromes." The second trend involves the changes necessitated by the accumulating knowledge derived from the human genome project and the developing field of epigenetics.

The methodology of medical inquiry is by now firmly established in medical training and in the clinical setting. But its development predated these sentinel trends. As a result, physicians are frequently frustrated by the chronically ill "syndromic" patient for whom the usual questions fail to narrow the diagnostic spectrum, and the usual diagnostic tests are either poorly suited to the pattern of illness, or erroneously misinterpreted as normal. The syndromic patient encounters physician after physician unable to diagnose their malady, forever reporting that their tests are normal, and unable to offer a therapeutic plan.
The relief of the suffering from chronic syndromes requires a new paradigm, a revised methodology of medical inquiry. The thesis developed herein proposes that two aspects of the medical inquiry will need to fundamentally change as a result of the aforementioned trends: the nature of the questions of the medical history and the interpretation of diagnostic tests. As a first step in developing this thesis, it is necessary to examine the basic methodology of the medical inquiry.

**METHODOLOGY OF MEDICAL INQUIRY:**
THE "QUESTIONS" POSED

Broadly considered, the “questions” employed in the methodology of medical inquiry are of three types: 1) questions of a verbal, or subjective nature: the medical history, 2) questions of a corporeal nature: the physical exam, and 3) questions of a statistical nature: diagnostic tests.

The verbal questions of the medical history are the most subjective of the three, yet they are highly effective for the patterns of illness that predominated in the early years of modern medical practice. Physicians anticipate making the diagnosis or at least significantly narrowing the diagnostic possibilities with no tool other than the responses to the questions of the medical history.

The corporeal data observed in the “questioning process” of the physical exam is more objective in nature, and theoretically more reliable. The “answer” most anticipated during this portion of the medical inquiry is the “pathognomonic” finding; an abnormality specific for a given disease and not found in any other condition.¹

Diagnostic tests represent the third form of question posed in the medical inquiry. They involve the analysis of bodily substances or images derived from the technological analysis of the patient’s anatomy. The answer anticipated by this form of “question” is statistical in nature. That is, the physician anticipates coming to know whether the analyte in question falls inside or outside the population-based statistical range of what is considered normal.

¹ *Stedman’s Medical Dictionary* (Baltimore: Lippincott, Williams & Wilkins, 2000), 1332.
THE HISTORICAL TREND FROM DISEASES TO SYNDROMES

The patterns of illness most demanding of the resources of the medical enterprise for the greater part of the past two centuries were acute diseases and "crisis health conditions." Notable successes were achieved especially in the diagnosis and treatment of many acute infectious diseases. Traumatic injuries are another form of a crisis health condition that modern medicine has been more effective at managing than any other medical paradigm. The other type of crisis health condition involves the sudden worsening of an organ's function superimposed on a chronic disease process. The acute myocardial infarction (heart attack) and the asthma exacerbation are examples of this pattern of acute illness that are often amenable to the practices of modern medicine.

What is notable about these patterns of illness is that they are phenotypically well differentiated at the time of their presentation. That is, at the time they present to the physician, they are already in a "mature" state of expression with little variation in presenting symptoms over the relatively short time course of their observation. Chest pain and shortness of breath occur at the onset, in the middle, and at the end of a heart attack. There is also relatively little variation in symptoms between different patients experiencing these patterns of illness.

This phenomenon is analogous to the birth of a large sea mammal, such as a whale, whose offspring is phenotypically well differentiated from the moment of birth. Moreover, based on its easily recognizable appearance, there is no confusing the baby whale with any other creature. Yet distinguishing the newborn whale of one whale mother from another would represent a significant challenge.

These then, represent the patterns of illness with which modern medicine historically encountered as the methodology of medical inquiry was being developed; those diseases which present to the physician in a phenotypically well-differentiated form, with relatively little variation temporally or among different patients, and often with pathognomonic symptoms, physical exam findings, and/or laboratory test results.

By contrast, the pattern of illness which will demand more of the
resources of the medical enterprise in the twenty-first century is the "syndrome." Syndromes differ temporally and qualitatively from what we have chosen to call diseases. Syndromes present with vague and variable symptoms which wax and wane, or even appear and disappear over a protracted course.

To extend the previous analogy, here we are dealing with the tadpole rather than the baby whale. One cannot well predict from the initial appearance, or even from the appearance of subsequent stages of maturation, the mature frog that is to be when full phenotypic differentiation is achieved. Examples of the syndrome are: irritable bowel syndrome, chronic fatigue syndrome, fibromyalgia syndrome, interstitial cystitis (painful bladder syndrome), posttraumatic stress syndrome, attention deficit disorder, the autism syndromes, and many others. These syndromes are notable for their lack of phenotypic differentiation at onset and their high degree of variability of expression in different patients. By definition these syndromes, unlike diseases, lack pathognomonic symptoms, physical exam findings, or diagnostic test results.

Such then, is the changing trend of illness encountered by the contemporary physician. The assumptions which physicians make and the very nature of the questions of the medical inquiry will now be examined in more detail as a prelude to understanding how "disease-seeking" physicians become trapped by their own methodology when they encounter the patient displaying syndromic illness.

THE ASSUMPTIONS OF THE "DISEASE-SEEKING" MEDICAL HISTORY

For our purposes, the definition of "disease" is: "A morbid entity characterized usually by at least two of these criteria: an identifiable group of signs and symptoms, recognized etiologic agent(s), or consistent anatomic alterations." The manner in which each of these criteria influenced the methodology of medical inquiry is to follow.

Despite the subjective nature of the responses to verbal questions, it remains an adage in medicine that "the diagnosis should be possible most of the time with the medical history alone." This adage is justifiable

\[2\] Stedman's Medical Dictionary, 509.
because the physician who is seeking the identity of an acute illness or crisis health condition assumes that s/he is seeking an entity which is highly reproducible in different patients and distinguishable from other diseases.

In the era when the methodology of medical inquiry was being developed, the doctrine of "specific etiology" was highly influential. This doctrine states that each disease is caused by a specific agent or has a "specific etiology." It is a doctrine which corresponds well to patterns of illness "caused" by infectious agents or malfunctioning organs. At the time there were few compelling reasons to believe that the field, or host, upon which the disease played out its course would have a discernable effect on the observable phenotype of the disease. Thus, in daily practice, physicians make the assumptions that "similars are understood similarly," both with respect to patients and diseases. That is, diseases of the same specific etiology are assumed to be acting on "level playing fields" and can therefore be expected to display reproducibility from patient to patient. Diseases of differing etiologies can be expected to display distinguishable phenotypes when compared one to another. In short order it will become evident that in the era of syndromes and epigenetics this aspect of the methodology suffers a fatal blow because similars cannot, and must not, be understood similarly.

THE NATURE OF THE QUESTIONS OF THE "DISEASE-SEEKING" MEDICAL HISTORY

Assumptions inevitably influence the nature of questions posed, and the interrogatives of the medical inquiry are no exception to this. The assumption of the reproducibility of disease has led to questions which focus on the characteristics of the disease, rather than the patient. The assumption of highly distinguishable disease phenotypes has led to the development of questions which seek pathognomonic symptoms; those symptoms produced uniquely by a specific disease and no other. As pathognomonic symptoms are relatively rare in clinical practice, the next best strategy of physicians is to employ "illness scripts." Illness scripts are mental representations of diseases emphasizing highly

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associated clusters of symptoms which distinguish one disease from another. In practice, the physician attempts to match the symptoms of the patient to a known illness script. In the words of Schmidt and Boshuizen:

...this knowledge transforms into narrative structures called illness scripts. The cognitive mechanisms responsible for this transition are: Encapsulation of elaborated knowledge into high level but simplified causal models or even diagnostic categories and tuning through the inclusion of contextual information.⁴

These illness scripts are conventionally viewed as useful tools which propel the methodology of the seasoned diagnostician. While this may be true with regards to acute disease, it will soon be discussed how the illness script represents a negative type of "inertia" which mentally immobilizes the physician encountering the syndromic patient.

THE ROLES OF THE PHYSICAL EXAM AND DIAGNOSTIC TESTING IN THE "DISEASE-SEEKING" PARADIGM

The medical inquiry is a tripartite process, so our attention turns from the questions of the medical history to the physical exam and diagnostic tests. Recalling the adage that the medical history alone will discover the diagnosis in the great majority of cases, it should come as no surprise that the latter two components of the triad play much less important roles in the diagnosis of acute diseases and crisis health conditions. Instead, they are used more often to confirm the diagnosis developed during the medical history and as the means of grading the initial severity of the condition and monitoring its progress or the success of its treatment.

FROM DISEASES TO SYNDROMES: THE TRAP OF UNIVERSAL FORMS

By way of review, syndromes, unlike diseases, are notable for their lack of phenotypic differentiation at onset and their high degree of variability

of expression in different patients. It becomes immediately apparent in light of the discussion in the previous sections that the paradigm of the “disease-seeking” medical inquiry will not be well suited to this pattern of illness. By definition, relying on pathognomonic features is no longer a tenable strategy of inquiry. More importantly, illness scripts, hailed as effective heuristic devices in the disease-seeking paradigm, are irrelevant at best and detrimental at worst in the syndrome-seeking paradigm.

At this point it is instructive to step back from the situation for a “bird’s eye” view of what has developed as a result of generations of physicians being trained in the disease-seeking paradigm. The role of illness scripts cannot be overemphasized in this analysis. In a twist of irony for a profession otherwise so steeped in materialism, most physicians have come to believe that each disease has something like a “universal form” which is somehow manifest in the patient, and which it is the physician’s task to discover.5 Nowhere is this more evident than in the common parlance and thoughts of the physician: “What does the patient have?” It is further evidenced in and reinforced by the habitual denoting of test results and physical exam findings as negative (when indicating no disease) and positive (when indicating disease).6

A more in-depth analysis of the distinguishing features of syndromes and diseases is in order to understand why syndromes could never even analogously correspond to universal forms, and why the methodology of medical inquiry must be transformed accordingly. To set the stage for this analysis, it is helpful to consider the notion of disease causality as the glue, symptoms as the fulcrum, and illness scripts as the inertia of the medical inquiry.

**DISSOLVING THE GLUE: DECONSTRUCTING CAUSALITY**

Undergirding the disease paradigm is the notion of causality. The doctrine of specific etiology is attractive in its compactness and manages to serve well enough for the disease-seeking paradigm. But it

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6 For more on this, see Luby, "Upstream Medicine."
is hopelessly simplistic and deterministic for the syndrome paradigm.

Consider the most problematic infectious illness of the past century as a prototype for this notion of causality. Fewer than 10 percent of persons who harbor the tuberculosis bacteria will manifest tuberculosis the disease. There is some factor in the patient which determines whether or not the disease in question will occur. What, then, is the “cause” of tuberculosis – the bacteria, or that factor inherent to the patient? The same problem arises for a disease agent as ubiquitous as the common cold virus.

Consider hay fever allergies as another example. It is commonly stated that histamine causes allergies (which is why antihistamines relieve symptoms). But since the pollen (or other allergen) causes the release of histamine, how can histamine be the “cause”? One might alternatively propose that it is the pollen which causes the allergies. But once again we note that only some persons manifest allergies when exposed to this pollen. Some factor further “upstream” in the patient must be more foundational in terms of causality.

What is becoming evident, then, is that the diagnosis rarely provides us with a cause for the disease. Arriving at the destination of medical inquiry does not provide the physician with explanatory knowledge, but only descriptive knowledge. What is also becoming evident is that the doctrine of specific etiology is on very thin ice. For each apparent etiologic agent, there are some factors in the patient which are more influential in determining whether disease will manifest.

Where physicians have erred in the diagnostic process is to confuse “causes” or “etiologies” of disease with “triggers” and “mediators” of disease. In the case of the common cold, the virus is the trigger, the mediators are the fever, the runny nose, the cough, and so forth (which are actually produced by the immune system and serve to eradicate the virus). In the case of hay fever allergies, the pollen is the trigger, the histamine is the mediator. Triggers may be avoided and mediators may be suppressed (and modern pharmacology is most adept at suppressing mediators), but the “cause” of the disease has yet to be discerned.

Attention must now be turned to “some factors in the patient.” With precious few exceptions, there is no disease for which mere exposure to an etiologic agent is sufficient for disease to manifest in all cases. Here
we must introduce the concept of the “antecedent.” The antecedents of illness are those factors of the patient which predispose to the manifestation of disease given the appropriate conditions. Antecedents may be genetic, environmental, nutritional, emotional, psychological, structural, hormonal, and so forth – indeed any factor which contributes to an individual being physiologically unique. Physicians may confuse mediators and triggers, but it is a more consequential error to neglect or underemphasize antecedents.

The fallout from all this is that the doctrine of specific etiology is revealed as too simplistic and deterministic. To even speak of the “cause” of a disease represents a gross misunderstanding. Causality is more appropriately understood as complex, contextual, and conditioned. Far from representing a universal form, a disease (or syndrome) exhibits a probability of emergence based on the interplay and relationships of antecedents, mediators, and triggers.

The tendency to believe that all patients represent “level playing fields” has now been exposed as untenable. The qualities of the individual patient, long ignored in favor of the perceived qualities of the disease and the “illness scripts,” must become the focus of the medical inquiry in the era of syndromes. The glue of causality is thus dissolved.

SYMPTOMS: THE FULCRUM OF MEDICAL INQUIRY IN THE DISEASE PARADIGM

In the disease paradigm, symptoms are perceived as wielding enough “leverage” to allow the physician to distinguish one disease from another. That is, symptoms act as the “fulcrum” around which the diagnostic process of the medical inquiry exercises its potency. By contrast, in phenotypically poorly differentiated syndromes, symptoms overlap so extensively as to be rendered impotent for this purpose. A relevant clinical example of this verity is the extensive overlap of symptoms in hypothyroidism, chronic fatigue syndrome, and the fibromyalgia syndrome.

So pervasive is the phenomenon of overlapping symptoms

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7 For a more complete description of antecedents, mediators, and triggers, see Textbook of Functional Medicine (Gig Harbor, WA: The Institute For Functional Medicine, 2005), 79-91.
that a more instructive image or heuristic concept is that of the "final common pathway." Several examples will serve to illustrate. Clinical depression caused by the loss of a loved one is indistinguishable from depression caused by a medication side effect, chronic pain, or the loss of a job. Research on autism is revealing that in all probability there are multiple potential physiologic insults which all lead to the same phenotypic expression of symptoms we have come to call "autism." It is now justifiably referred to as "autism spectrum disorder" and "the autisms." Attention deficit disorder and anxiety disorder are two other examples of diseases/syndromes which are excellent candidates for the status of "final common pathway phenomena."

To understand why this aspect of symptoms has been so poorly appreciated by the medical profession, one does well to consider that an unstated corollary of the doctrine of specific etiology is that the agent of disease is the symptom-generating entity. A closer analysis of most diseases and syndromes reveals that this is quite misleading. It is the body's reaction to an agent which, in reality, more often generates symptoms. The common stigmata of the common cold previously noted are representative examples of this concept. Every individual symptom is caused not by the common cold virus, but by the immune system's reaction to the virus.

A simplistic analogy is illuminating here. Consider the phenomenon of interpersonal human insults. There are far more types of insults which could be leveled at an individual than there are ways of responding to the insult. One could say that the recipient of the insult has three basic responses: 1) to preclude the insult from "getting under their skin" by letting it "roll off their back," 2) to immediately respond to the insult with an "equal and opposite reaction," and 3) to refrain from immediate reaction, but to harbor the effects of the insult in a manner certain to be manifested in passive aggressive behavior at some time in the future. The latter strategy, it is important to note, is more detrimental to the recipient than to the agent of the original insult.

The analogy to symptoms is evident. There are far more antecedents, mediators, and triggers of disease than there are ways for the human body to respond to those physiological "insults." The body has three basic types of response: 1) to eliminate the inciter of
the physiologic insult to preclude it from deeply entering the body (diarrhea, vomiting, runny nose, watery eyes, sweating, or any form of efflux through an anatomic orifice); 2) to react against the physiologic insult in a manner which is protective of the body's integrity (the swelling of a sprained ankle, fever, all forms of acute inflammation, and so forth); and 3) deposition; in cases in which the body cannot eliminate or effectively react against the offending entity, it is relegated to mere sequestration and storage (toxin accumulation in fat tissue, oxidized cholesterol accumulation in atherosclerotic plaque in the walls of coronary arteries, and so forth). 8

There is a further complication of granting symptoms the status of "fulcrum" in the medical inquiry. The belief in diseases as universal forms leads the physician to expect that symptoms will be highly reproducible in different individual patients. There are many examples where this expectation does not hold. The most recent example of note is celiac disease. Long believed to manifest primarily gastrointestinal symptoms, it is now recognized that celiac diseases is more likely to affect the nervous system than the gastrointestinal system, and does so differentially in different patients. Irritable bowel syndrome is another sentinel example, where even the medical nomenclature designates "diarrhea-predominant" and "constipation-predominant" forms. Symptoms have thus been exposed as possessing far less leverage than traditionally believed. As a means of supporting the diagnostic process in the era of medical syndromes, symptoms are a false fulcrum.

REVERSING THE INERTIA OF ILLNESS SCRIPTS: A PROPOSAL FOR REVISED NORMATIVE STANDARDS

The glue of the medical inquiry has been dissolved with the deconstruction of disease causality, and the leverage of symptoms has been negated. Nevertheless, the illness script represents so much "inertia" that the medical inquiry is likely to remain unchanged unless a more robust and potent methodology is available. A consideration of the concept of "normative standards" can provide the force necessary to reverse the inertia of the illness script.

8 For the concept of elimination, reaction, and deposition, the author is indebted to the writings of Hans-Heinrich Reckeweg, a German expert in homotoxicology (1905-1985).
Upon closer examination, it is apparent that the methodology for medical inquiry is based on the foundation of disease as its normative standard for judging. The irony that disease represents what "should or ought to be" has largely escaped notice. Yet it is entirely consistent with the physician's proclivity to consider diseases as universal forms.

An apt and instructive analogy can be made to Lonergan's "Longer cycle of decline." Although this was originally intended in the context of normative standards for judging social conditions, it can be used analogously to provide insight into appropriate normative standards for judging medical conditions. A reference to Flanagan's summative excerpt (with my own parenthetical editions) illustrates this point:

If social scientists (physicians) take the actual data of the social situation (disease) as the norm for critically judging the reality of the situation (a patient's health), they are abandoning the normative guide that is intrinsic to their own desire to know (the status of the patient's condition). In place of this normative desire to know, social scientists (physicians) substitute the concrete data of the social order (the disease), but such data combine ordered and disordered elements without providing any norm by which scientists (physicians) can discern the difference between a social order (health) and social disorders (diseases).  

It is telling that a medical thesis advances this far without once utilizing the word "health." In the process of medical inquiry, physicians are in reality assessing the status of the disease, not the status of the patient's health. Normative standards must represent order, not disorder. The fundamental flaw of the conventional medical paradigm is its use of disease (disorder) as its normative standard.

It is obvious to the lay person that disease represents disorder and should not serve as a basis for a normative standard. To use terminology analogous to Lonergan's "social surd," disease represents

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"the physiological surd."11 But the nature of medical education is such that physicians emerge from their training with the notion that these surds, or diseases, are the nidi of order for the methodology of medical inquiry.12 In the syndrome paradigm, physicians must "lay the axe" to the physiological surd, and use parameters of health, not disease, as normative standards.

In the words of Lonergan:

...a remedy has to be on the level of the disease; but the disease is a succession of lower viewpoints that heads towards an ultimate nihilism; and so the remedy has to be the attainment of a higher viewpoint.13

What, then, are these "higher viewpoints" representing order in the body which are capable of serving as normative standards for the methodology of medical inquiry? They are the optimally functioning physiological processes of the cells and tissues of the body. These foundational physiological processes include the following: intracellular and extracellular communication, detoxification, bioenergetics, biotransformation, digestion, absorption, microbiological, excretion, hormonal, neurological, oxidation-reduction, immune system, structural, inflammation, and psycho-spiritual.14

These new normative standards will have profound implications on the process of medical inquiry. They will require that physicians abandon the conventional goal of making a diagnosis and embrace a methodology which anticipates discovering suboptimal physiological function in order to understand and successfully treat the patient presenting with a syndrome.

Whereas diseases are perceived as being caused by specific agents, syndromes must be perceived as having their origins in the deviation from optimal physiologic function. To state this in a historically relevant manner, it is far less important what agent of disease a patient has than what physiologic function(s) a patient lacks. When, in place of disease, optimal physiological function becomes the normative

11 Insight, 255.
12 Luby, "Upstream Medicine."
13 Insight, 259.
14 Textbook for Functional Medicine.
standard, it will be possible for physicians to reverse the inertia of illness scripts. Having made the conceptual transition from a disease-based to a syndrome-based paradigm, it is now time to adumbrate the impact this will have on the assumptions of the medical history and the nature of the questions utilized therein.

THE ASSUMPTIONS OF THE “SYNDROME-BASED” MEDICAL HISTORY

Whereas, in the disease paradigm, physicians assumed that the symptoms of a disease were reproducible from patient to patient, in the syndrome paradigm physicians will assume that individual differences among patients will result in the same syndrome presenting with variable phenotypes. In short, diseases were understood as deterministic entities. Syndromes will be assumed to manifest as pluripotent opportunistic polymorphs.

Whereas, in the disease paradigm, physicians assumed that individual diseases presented with phenotypes distinguishable from other diseases, in the syndrome paradigm this will be replaced by the assumption that syndromes of differing etiologies will not be distinguishable (because of overlapping symptoms and the phenomenon of the final common pathway). Both of these assumptions will change the methodology of the medical inquiry as follows.

THE NATURE OF THE QUESTIONS OF THE “SYNDROME-BASED” MEDICAL HISTORY

The assumption of reproducibility led to questions focused on the characteristics of the disease rather than the patient. The nature of the questions of the syndrome paradigm will focus on the characteristics of the patient, specifically the antecedents and triggers of illness. These qualities represent the predispositions to and inciters of illness unique to each patient.

The assumption of distinguishability led to questions based on illness scripts. In the syndrome paradigm the questions of the medical history will anticipate discerning which physiologic processes are not functioning optimally. Whereas the disease paradigm concerned
itself with organ-based pathology and exogenous etiologic agents, the questions of the medical history in the syndrome paradigm will be more influenced by the anticipation of discovering endogenous mediators (perpetuators) of illness.

THE ROLE OF THE PHYSICAL EXAM IN THE “DISEASE-SEEKING” PARADIGM

In distinct contrast to the disease syndrome, the medical history alone will not be adequate to make a “diagnosis” in the patient with syndromic symptoms. Yet despite this, it is unlikely that the physical exam will yield more diagnostic fruit for the syndrome-seeking physician. The tendency of syndromes to present in earlier stages of development than acute “diseases” and to exhibit a relative lack of phenotypic differentiation will result in a paucity of helpful physical exam findings, never mind pathognomonic findings.

THE PIVOTAL ROLE OF DIAGNOSTIC TESTING

In the disease paradigm, arriving at the diagnosis of an acute illness immediately allows a physician to employ therapeutic interventions from well-established guidelines based on the perceived etiologic agent or dysfunctioning organ or anatomical structure. Not so in the syndrome paradigm. When the destination of naming a syndrome is reached, the physician is no better equipped to embark on a therapeutic foray. With syndromes, overlapping symptoms and the phenomenon of the final common pathway prevent appropriate therapeutic targets from being discerned at this point of the inquiry. If the physician is to have any chance of therapeutic effectiveness, the information yielded in diagnostic tests must become much more fruitful.

THE CHANGING NATURE OF DIAGNOSTIC TESTING

In the disease paradigm, it was previously stated that diagnostic tests are used less often to make the diagnosis, but more often to confirm the diagnosis developed during the medical history, to grade the severity of the condition, or to monitor its progress or the success of its treatment.
In the syndrome paradigm, as the specificity of the medical history is diminished due to the factors adumbrated above, diagnostic tests will play a much more central role in making the diagnosis (or, more accurately stated, "explaining the condition"). But the type of diagnostic test which will have high utility will be of a different nature than many of the extant conventional diagnostic tests.

In the first place, diagnostic tests will shift from the current focus on detecting damaged organs on the macroscopic level (a "downstream" manifestation of illness). This will be replaced by diagnostic tests which focus on detecting physiologic processes on a cellular or subcellular level which are not functioning optimally. These more fundamental changes precede macroscopic organ pathology and will allow for therapeutic interventions temporally and physiologically closer to the upstream source of illness.

Secondly, with the transition from diseases to syndromes, conventional diagnostic tests which seek to discover exogenous etiologic agents (especially infectious agents) will be less helpful as the pendulum swings away from acute infectious illness. Tests focused on discovering endogenous physiological mediators (perpetuators) of syndromic illness will become more helpful. An example of this type of test will include tests for mediators of chronic inflammation (predisposing a person to diabetes or heart disease).

Thirdly, where there remains a role for diagnostic tests which detect exogenous agents, it will be a different type of exogenous agent which is sought. The thesis of this paper is built upon the observation that the nature of illness is changing from acute diseases to chronic syndromes. Yet this begs the question: What is driving this change? A logical answer to this question would be (at least in part) that there are novel etiologic agents more prominent in the twenty-first century than in the twentieth century, and that they tend to result in chronic syndromes rather than acute diseases. Excellent candidates for this category of agent include mercury, lead, and other heavy metals; industrial, agricultural, household and dietary toxins; toxic personal care and skin care products; xenobiotic chemicals (those which mimic the function of hormones and other endogenous molecules); electromagnetic fields; and stress of various kinds. If syndromes are associated with novel etiologic agents, diagnostic tests must be of a nature to detect these
agents and/or the resulting physiological dysregulation produced by these agents. This novel type of diagnostic testing is rapidly gaining hold. Examples include tests of the levels of various toxins, as well as tests of physiological functions damaged by the toxins.

Fourthly, the information gleaned from the sequencing of the human genome will be of sentinel importance. The practical application of the findings of the human genome project will allow physicians to order diagnostic tests which provide genetic information about their patients. This will have profound effects on the understanding and treatment of syndromes. Recall that exposure to an etiologic agent alone is not sufficient to cause disease. Rather, disease (or a syndrome) exhibits a probability of emergence based on the interplay and relationships of antecedents, mediators, and triggers. The previous paragraphs explain advances in diagnostic testing with regards to mediators and exogenous triggers. The human genome project will provide physicians with a basis to assess antecedents of illness. In short, physicians will increasingly have at their disposal tools which allow for the discernment of the emergent probability of a given syndrome. The implications of this are clear. This will be a key to surmounting the problem of overlapping symptoms and the final common pathway phenomenon which so bedevil the physician faced with a patient with vague and nonspecific syndromic symptoms.

The changing nature of diagnostic testing outlined above will demand radical transformation in the third phase of the methodology of the medical inquiry. As mentioned previously, this component of the medical inquiry is of a statistical nature. As a prelude to understanding what this transformation will entail, the following section will be devoted to understanding how physicians currently apply statistical methods to the interpretation of diagnostic tests.

**CONVENTIONAL INTERPRETATION OF DIAGNOSTIC TEST RESULTS: THE BELL CURVE**

The most common types of diagnostic tests currently employed are intent on measuring the presence of an exogenous agent of disease, some manifestation of the body's reaction to it, a substrate necessary for bodily function, or a substrate which indicates organ damage. The
normal reference ranges of these tests are derived by testing large numbers of persons believed to be free of the disease in question. The statistical definition of an abnormal result is that which has less than a 5 percent probability of being due to chance alone. That is, a given patient's test result is considered abnormal only if it falls outside the range of 95 percent of the population to either side of the mean value of the familiar "bell curve" (see Figure 1). While this provides a convenient "gold standard" for physicians in their medical inquiry, there are problematic assumptions to be addressed.

**Figure 1: The Bell Curve Re-examined**

**ASSUMPTIONS OF THE BELL CURVE: THE POPULATION-BASED REFERENCE RANGE CHALLENGED**

The first erroneous assumption is that subjects in the reference population are actually free of disease. If disease is narrowly considered only as the phenotypic expression of a pattern of symptoms, then there will inevitably be members of the original "normal" reference population who have physiological evidence of the biochemical mediators of disease which precedes phenotypic expression of disease. Yet these subjects
will be considered as part of the population "free of disease" for the purposes of establishing normal reference ranges.

As ever more sensitive biochemical mediators of disease are discovered, subjects in the original normal reference population will, in retrospect, be found to have been in the early stages of the disease in question at the time of the determination of the normal reference range. The end result is that the normal reference range for each disease will become smaller. The classic "bell" shape of the curve will become narrower. An example of this problem has already been well documented with regards to thyroid disease\textsuperscript{15,16,17} (see Figure 2).

**Figure 2: The Bell Curve Re-examined**

The second and third erroneous assumptions of the population-based normal reference ranges are of a technical nature. There is an erroneous assumption that all of the substrate measured in

\textsuperscript{15} National Academy of Clinical Biochemistry Practice Guideline 2002. Laboratory support for the diagnosis and monitoring of thyroid disease.


\textsuperscript{17} Journal of the American Medical Association 291:231(2004).
the laboratory is biologically active in the body. There is a further assumption that the "disease marker" being measured has no cross reactivity with other analytes. Both of these assumptions have been proven to be fallacious.18 The end result of concern to the physician is that individual patients whose results fall within two standard deviations of the mean are erroneously considered to be normal and free of disease.

A fourth erroneous assumption is that the normal range is static at all times and under all conditions. It has now been well demonstrated that there is an expected circadian, seasonal, and lifetime variation in the normal range of many laboratory analytes considered as markers of disease. The seasonal variation of cholesterol levels is now well established, and both seasonal and lifetime variations in thyroid-stimulating hormone levels have been documented and are expected as norms.19,20,21 In the minds of physicians the distribution of the bell curve is permanently fixed. In reality it behaves more like the bell clapper; varying with the time of day, the seasons, and the life cycle (see Figures 3, 4, and 5).

The fifth erroneous assumption of diagnostic tests is that the population-based normal reference range is equivalent to the physiologically optimal range. Physicians entirely neglect the fact that the range of results that falls within two statistical deviations of the statistical mean is just that – a statistical definition. This range may or may not represent levels in the human body which are physiologically optimal.22,23,24 In the era of syndromes, with normative standards based on physiological function rather than disease, this will prove to be a fatal flaw. Many patients will be told that their test results are normal, when in fact they are far enough from optimal to contribute significantly to morbidity and suffering. The bell clapper analogy rings true again here. In the mind of physicians the width of the normal

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Figure 3: The Bell Curve Re-examined

Figure 4: The Bell Curve Re-examined
range is as wide as the base of the bell. In reality the optimal range (relevant to syndromes) is as narrow as the bell clapper (see Figure 6).

The findings of the human genome project are highly relevant to the sixth erroneous assumption; that all individuals share identical normal reference ranges. The revision of this assumption will have profound effects on the methodology of medical inquiry, especially as it pertains to syndromes. Prior to examining these effects, it is necessary to understand the surprising nature of genetic variability revealed by the complete sequencing of the human genome.

THE HUMAN GENOME PROJECT:
EXPECTATIONS AND FINDINGS

When the decision was made to attempt to sequence the entire human genetic material, the expectation was that homo sapiens would possess many more genes than "lower" species. What ensued was an outcome which would have amused Shakespeare and Steinbeck. Humans were found to possess on the order of 30,000 genes, roughly the same as
mice. In terms of quantity, there was precious little difference in the genomes of mice and men.

In terms of the qualitative content, it was expected that the genetic material would be very densely packed along the chromosomes. The reality was altogether different. The regions of the chromosome which actually contain genetic material capable of being transcribed into proteins are interspersed between large regions devoid of such genetic material.

A musical analogy is apt here. In terms of the quantity and quality of the genetic material, we anticipated finding something akin to Bach's Brandenburg Concerti; densely packed, tightly organized, and highly expressive material. What was discovered instead was Beethoven's Fifth; far less densely packed “information,” but with no less expressive potential.

The expressive diversity of the human genome was originally believed to be due to relatively large changes in the sequence of the DNA known as mutations. It turns out that much smaller alterations, single nucleotide polymorphisms (SNPs), account for a great portion of
the genetic differences among individuals of a species. In the human genome, no fewer than 1.42 million such SNPs have been discovered.\textsuperscript{25} It should be noted that SNPs should not automatically be construed as harmful errors deviating from the normal sequence. It is more instructive to consider that the genome is constantly asking questions. “If I make a little change here, will that be beneficial or detrimental?” Single nucleotide polymorphisms are the “questions” the genome asks.

Another surprising finding is that changes in DNA sequence are not the sole, or perhaps even the main, source of changes in gene expression. It turns out that the large “noncoding” regions of the chromosome are regulatory sites. Other molecules attach to these “promoter” regions to activate or deactivate the genes in the adjacent region. This finding has launched the field of “epigenetics,” or “the heritable changes in gene expression caused by mechanisms other than changes in DNA sequence.”\textsuperscript{26}

As the field of epigenetics advances, it is becoming clear that the environment of the individual has a profound effect on the expression of the genetic material. The “environment” includes exogenous factors such as the availability of nutrients, the presence of toxins or infectious agents, and endogenous factors such as the effects of hormones and other biochemical mediators. The narrow determinism of Mendelian genetics, with its emphasis on the slow process of random mutation as the source of genetic diversity, is giving way to the dynamism of epigenetics, with its revolutionary insight that the environment of an individual not only is capable of modifying genetic expression within the lifetime of the individual, but also of passing these changes on to the offspring.\textsuperscript{27}

Thus, the expressive potential of the human genome is of an entirely different nature than was once believed in the era of Mendelian genetics. Here again a musical analogy is illustrative. Mendelian genetics anticipated that we would find the genetic material singing a canon, or a “round,” replicating itself over and over with nary a change. Epigenetics posits that the human genome plays jazz improvisation,

taking its inspiration from the environment of the gig. What we anticipated was "Row Row Row Your Boat." What we found instead was a "Kind of Blue"; the exact hue taking its cue from the mood of the crew, and you.

SINGLE NUCLEOTIDE POLYMORPHISMS AND EPIGENETICS: EFFECTS ON THE METHODOLOGY OF MEDICAL INQUIRY IN THE ERA OF SYNDROMES

At present then, two insights have emerged which have profound effects on the methodology of medical inquiry. First, due to the vast numbers of single nucleotide polymorphisms, the amount of variability in the sequence of the human genome is far greater than previously imagined. Second, even identical sequences of human DNA are capable of differential expression based on cues from the environment. The former will lead to novel types of diagnostic tests, but even more importantly will revolutionize how physicians interpret diagnostic tests. The latter must impact the nature of the questions of the medical history. We will begin with a discussion of the implications of the latter.

EPIGENETICS: THE RISING IMPORTANCE OF ANTECEDENTS IN MEDICAL INQUIRY

Whereas physicians generally have assumed that different patients represent "level playing fields" upon which the agents of disease act, epigenetics establishes the opposite. The ability of an agent of disease to act will be determined by the epigenetic milieu of the patient. This is so because every individual has been exposed to unique environmental influences which modify gene expression. This, in turn, will affect individual susceptibility to diseases and syndromes. Even identical twins will have significant differences in gene expression and therefore will differ in their respective predispositions to various maladies. If physicians assimilate the implications of epigenetics, profound changes in the nature of the questions of the medical inquiry will ensue.

Epigenetics mandates that physicians develop a process of medical history-taking which will focus less on the nature of the disease, organ-based pathology, pathognomonic symptoms, and illness scripts, and more on environmental antecedents and triggers which predispose the
individual to the condition in question. For the many reasons discussed earlier, this transformation will be even more critical for the physician dealing with chronic syndromes than for the physician encountering acute illness.

**SINGLE NUCLEOTIDE POLYMORPHISMS: OPPORTUNITY FOR A NEW TYPE OF DIAGNOSTIC TEST**

Nor will there be any less impact on the methodology of medical inquiry if physicians grasp the implications of the vast numbers of single nucleotide polymorphisms present in the human genome. This will not only lead to the development of new diagnostic tests but will change the way that physicians interpret diagnostic tests. Prior to discussing how and why this will come about, a basic review of genetics and enzymes is in order.

The genetic material, DNA, is composed of a double strand of “base pairs.” There are four different types of bases. When the DNA strand “opens” to be “read,” the base pairs separate. The sequence of every three consecutive base pairs is transcribed into a particular amino acid. These amino acids are strung together consecutively to form proteins. These proteins are then used throughout the body for all of its various functions.

Most pertinent to our discussion are the proteins known as “enzymes.” Enzymes “catalyze” chemical reactions. That is, their presence enables other substances to react and become different substances. For example, in the diagram below, substrate “A” and “B” require the presence of the enzyme “Y” in order to be converted into “C” and “D.”

\[
Y \\
A + B \rightarrow \rightarrow C + D
\]

But that is not the entire story. Most enzymes depend upon a “cofactor” which we will designate “Z.” Cofactor “Z” is most often a micronutrient such as a mineral or a vitamin. It is also worthwhile here to remember that substance “Y” is a product of gene expression. Substances A, B, C, D, and Z most often are not. Now our hypothetical biochemical reaction appears thus:

\[
Y^Z \\
A + B \rightarrow \rightarrow C + D
\]
It is important to note that increasing the concentration of Y (the product of genes) does not increase the rate of the reaction, but altering the concentration of Z (the nutrient cofactor) has the potential to increase or decrease the rate of the reaction. Another critical point is that Y is the only substance whose physical configuration may vary. That is, A, B, C, D, and Z are devoid of structural, or qualitative variation.

The physical configuration of Y (composed of a sequence of amino acids) may change if the sequence of amino acids changes. This may occur as a result of a change in the sequence of DNA base pairs, or a “single nucleotide polymorphism.” Here is the critical point: Although the quantity (the concentration) of Y will not change the rate of the reaction, structural (qualitative) changes may either increase or decrease the rate of reaction.

This is so because when any enzyme catalyzes a chemical reaction, it must bend and twist in a very precise manner. Enzymes dance. A single nucleotide polymorphism in the gene which codes for the enzyme will cause a single amino acid change in the sequence of the enzyme, changing the way the enzyme “dances.” This may have no effect, or may make it bend and twist in a more beneficial or more detrimental manner with regards to the efficiency of the chemical reaction.

Recall that there are at least 1.42 million single nucleotide polymorphisms in the human genome. This should put to rest any notion of a “level playing field.” Single nucleotide polymorphisms affect the efficacy of enzymes, and thereby, the efficiency of biochemical functions in the body. Recall that in the syndrome paradigm, loss of function of physiological processes may determine the predisposition to disease states and syndromes. The Single nucleotide polymorphisms in the genome of any individual determine a good portion of that individual’s susceptibility to disease.

It must be further pointed out that although the concentration of Y does not change the rate of the reaction, the concentration of Z does. The implications are profound. Imagine that an individual possesses a SNP which slows the rate of a critical reaction. This predisposes them to certain diseases/syndromes (#2 below). Increasing the availability (concentration) of nutrient Z has the potential to normalize the rate of the reaction, thereby negating the increased risk of disease (#3 below).
Conversely, if an individual possesses a normal enzyme Y but is in an environment with insufficient nutrient cofactor Z, the risk of disease is increased (#4 below).28

Let us denote the normal enzyme as “Y,” and the enzyme affected by a SNP as “y.” The concentration of nutrient cofactor is denoted by “[Z].” The possible scenarios are as follows:

Normal reaction catalyzed by normal enzyme “Y” and adequate amount of nutrient cofactor [Z]:

\[
Y^{[Z]}
\]

\[
A + B \rightarrow C + D
\]

Diminished rate of reaction catalyzed by enzyme y with a SNP:

\[
y^{[Z]}
\]

\[
A + B \rightarrow C + D
\]

Reaction catalyzed by enzyme y with a SNP normalized by increasing the concentration of the nutrient cofactor “z”:

\[
y^{[Z]}
\]

\[
A + B \rightarrow C + D
\]

Reaction catalyzed by normal enzyme Y decreased by decreasing the concentration of the nutrient cofactor “z”:

\[
Y^{<[Z]}
\]

\[
A + B \rightarrow C + D
\]

From these possibilities it is evident that single nucleotide polymorphisms represent antecedents of disease. As such, diagnostic tests which detect single nucleotide polymorphisms would be very useful tools for the physician attempting to discern such antecedents in the process of medical inquiry. Although these tests are currently available, they remain outside the mainstream of the conventional medical paradigm.

EPIGENETICS AND SINGLE NUCLEOTIDE POLYMORPHISMS: IMPLICATIONS FOR THE INTERPRETATION OF DIAGNOSTIC TESTS

It is one matter to change the diagnostic tests which physicians utilize. History has shown relatively little resistance on the part of the medical profession to adopt promising new diagnostic technologies. It is another matter altogether to alter the interpretation of diagnostic tests. Yet this is exactly what the implications of epigenetics and single nucleotide polymorphisms demand.

Recall the “normal population based reference range” of the bell curve. One of the assumptions of the range is that all individuals share the same normal range. Single nucleotide polymorphisms result in altered function of physiologic processes. It follows that individuals with Single nucleotide polymorphisms will have different optimal ranges for a whole host of diagnostic test analytes (see Figure 7). Epigenetic changes also affect the efficacy of physiological processes,

Figure 7: The effect of SNP’s on the interpretation of diagnostic test
and therefore the optimal range of diagnostic tests. They will serve to magnify these individual variations (see Figure 8). An instructive image is that of a bell with multiple clappers. Individual optimal ranges are narrower than the traditional population-based reference range, have mobility with regards to circadian, seasonal, and life cycles, and differ from other individuals based on Single nucleotide polymorphisms and epigenetic phenomena.

A final deficit in the current interpretation of diagnostic test results is the tendency to correlate single tests with single conditions. This has some utility for certain acute diseases. But recall that syndromes exhibit a probability of emergence based on the interplay and relationships of antecedents, mediators, and triggers. It stands to reason then, that single diagnostic tests interpreted in isolation will have little potency for providing useful information to the syndrome-seeking physician. Rather, multivariate analysis of multiple tests aimed at detecting potential antecedents, mediators, and triggers will provide much more useful information to the physician attempting to discern the probability of the emergence of a given syndrome in a given individual.

**Figure 8: Individual variability in optimal range based on SNPs combined with epigenetic changes**
CONCLUSION

The coming age of syndromes and genomics are like two sets of vibrations shaking the field of medicine. The methodology of medicine which developed during an era of acute disease, while effective, nevertheless produced several "fault lines" in the realm of the medical history. The emergence of genomics and epigenetics exposes and magnifies the existence of preexisting "fault lines" in the realm of diagnostic testing.

With regards to the methodology of the medical history, the assumptions of the reproducibility and distinguishability of diseases with their attendant illness scripts must be replaced by an appreciation of the pleomorphic variability of syndromes. The truncated notion of causality by specific agents must be replaced by an understanding that diseases and syndromes have a probability of emergence based upon the complex, contextual, and conditioned interplay and relationships of antecedents, triggers, and mediators of illness. The disorder of disease as a normative standard must be replaced by the order of optimal physiologic function. With regards to the methodology of the interpretation of diagnostic tests, genomics and epigenetics demand that population-based normal reference ranges be replaced by reference ranges based on optimal physiological function and the expectation of temporal and individual variability.

The vibrations caused by the emergence of syndromes and genomics threaten to produce damaging tremors in the field of medicine. The resulting cataclysm would involve needless patient suffering. However, if these vibrations are correctly understood, the continued development of the methodology of medicine will be one of harmonious resonance.
A TYPOLOGY OF MORAL CONVERSION

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MORAL CONVERSION is a favorite and much desired theme in almost any kind of narrative. Consider the many "change of heart" stories ("change of heart" being another name for moral conversion) that populate the big and the small screen: the cynical pennycounter that becomes a warm-hearted boss and philanthropist, Dickens's Scrooge in his various incarnations; the workaholic father that after a crisis of some sort opts for a less frantic lifestyle; the fast-paced broker becoming a small-league trainer; odd couples becoming lifelong friends; the popular, fashion-focused teen disengaging from her exclusive clique and opening up to systematically excluded potential friendships, the cowardly bystander standing up to support the hero or heroine, and so forth. These and other stories are the bread-and-butter of mainstream and independent drama and comedy alike and are at least an expected subplot in stories that focus on action or suspense. Tragedies too, both classical and contemporary, are constructed around this theme also, though commonly they focus on this process becoming frustrated: Creon, refusing to listen to his son, his people, and the voice of the gods, or Macbeth cowering at the sight of blood and ghosts but continuing on his murderous, self-destructive course.

More importantly, moral conversion is an important element of

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1 This paper is a much shortened version of the fifth chapter in my dissertation Narratives of Hope: A Philosophical Study of Moral Conversion (Loyola University, Chicago, 2008). The wording is in many cases identical, although the corresponding chapter investigates the topic in greater detail and explores many more cases. This paper was discussed during the afternoon workshop on Moral Conversion, at the 36th Annual Lonergan Workshop (Boston College, June 2009).
real moral experience, whether as a process that actually takes place, or in the form of hope for change in oneself or others. The hope for moral conversion is sufficiently common in everyday experience to require little proof of its presence: it is the reason, for good or ill, why people continue to put their trust on those who have disappointed them already, perhaps more than once. Whether moral conversion actually takes place requires, however, some form of demonstration; and this is one of the goals that this paper attempts to achieve.

Since moral conversion is such a frequent element in narratives, and arguably also an important element in moral experience, it is somewhat surprising that it has received so little attention from philosophers, as well as from other disciplines that study moral life. This may be partially explained by the fact that moral conversion is constitutively a surprising event, surprising in many senses. It is surprising, first, in the sense that it often takes place without anyone expecting it, not even the subject of conversion him/herself. It is also surprising in the sense that, even when expected or desired, its outcome is uncertain, and its taking place brings a joyful amount of surprise for those that desire it. It defies, in other words, prediction, whether this be the kind of prediction originated in the methodological observation of patterns of probability, or the everyday prediction of experienced people who have seen it happen many times — and thus moral conversion is not normally discussed, for example, in empirically based analyses of moral development. This quality makes it somewhat of an unwieldy topic.

The difficulty in satisfactorily circumscribing the notion of moral

2 The notion of “moral conversion” appeared very rarely in the literature, until it was discussed in the past century by Bernard Lonergan, in the context of the triad intellectual, moral, and religious conversion. This produced as a result a renewed philosophical and theological interest in conversion, and the resulting scholarship produced most of the literature available now that deals specifically with moral conversion. Even so, such literature is very scarce, since Lonergan scholars have focused mostly on the analysis of intellectual and religious conversion, and only sporadically dedicated more than passing reflections to it. Walter Conn, to whom I am thankful, is probably the scholar that has devoted most time to its study, devoting to it a couple of chapters in Christian Conversion: A Developmental Interpretation of Autonomy and Surrender (New York: Paulist Press, 1986); but the notion of moral conversion he works on is developed from a very specifically Lonerganian context, and as such it is not broad enough to include various classes of moral conversion that need to be considered for a more substantial treatment.
conversion adds to this unwieldiness. The principal objective of this paper is to establish a typology of moral conversion, one that will serve additionally to define what is meant by "moral conversion" in a way that is both specific enough to make it susceptible of philosophical analysis, and inclusive enough to honor the notorious diversity of ways in which human life can be affected by moral conversion.  

THE NOTION OF "CONVERSION"

Conversion has most frequently been studied within the realms of theology and religious studies (or, within the realm of psychology, as a subtopic within the larger topic of psychology of religious phenomena), and as a consequence conversion is frequently understood to mean religious conversion. The meaning of the term, however, is far broader. Intellectual, moral, affective, psychological, aesthetic, social types of conversion have been identified by those having these experiences, and by scholars who have studied them. Possibly the list could be expanded to include further types.

On a first look, the common element among these notions seems to be some form of change in the person. This change is of tremendous importance to the person, in the sense that the relations of the person to the world, to others, to truth, even to the self are fundamentally affected. How the person is affected, and in respect to which aspect of the person's relation to the world, to others, to truth or to self is what identifies the type of conversion involved.

3 This categorization, it is hoped, will help jump-start a discussion that has been lately mostly abandoned. A reason for this abandonment, I believe, is precisely the absence of a proper categorization/definition of moral conversion. Many profound definitions have been put forward; Lonergan's "a move from the criterion of satisfaction to the criterion of value" is a good example (Bernard Lonergan, Method in Theology, 2nd. ed. [New York: Herder and Herder, 1973; reprint, 1994 by University of Toronto Press], 240). But these definitions often operate within complex universes of meaning that need to be grasped before the definition entirely makes sense, and that are not sufficiently inclusive. The present typology operates at a more basic level, categorizing moral conversion in terms that do not require the previous understanding of (nor agreement to) a specific, sophisticated analysis of moral life.

4 The key texts for conversion in Lonergan are in Method in Theology, 237-43. A very detailed analysis of the evolution of the notion of conversion in Lonergan can be found in Michael L. Rende, Lonergan on Conversion: The Development of a Notion (Lanham, MD: University Press of America, 1991).
I propose to use the term "existential" as a key way of characterizing the kind of change that conversion constitutes. The term "existential" is itself difficult to pin down precisely, given how it is used in widely different contexts—and sometimes rather loosely—in contemporary philosophy; but it captures very adequately in its general meaning some essential characters of conversion. It draws attention to the importance of the change (as in expressions such as "she made an existential decision"). It draws attention to something being real and concrete, as opposed to something being "merely academic," detachedly theoretical, and so forth. It has, in third place, the connotation of something being personal—in contrast, for example, to structural changes happening to institutions, to the restructuring of systems of law, to the training of animals, not to mention material changes in physical structures. In fourth place, it can be used to emphasize the contingency of the concrete: the fact that things happen that are not planned, plans fail, accidents occur, and contingency in general cannot be excluded from human existence by any amount of rational planning. This connotation of the term "existential" also applies to conversion, insofar as conversions typically have an element of unexpectedness, even of working against expectations. Lastly, the term "existential" brings forth that emphasis, so dear to the philosophical tradition named precisely "existentialism," on freedom, and specifically on freedom as a harsh blessing. The existentialists' discussions of freedom provide a suitable platform for examining the issue of whether conversion is an event that requires the freedom of the human agent to take place at all.

It can be seen thus why it would be useful to define conversion as an existential change. It is not the intention of this paper, however, to defend this characterization; it is proposed here only as an introductory approach to the meaning of the notion. A proper discussion of the adequacy of this characterization would have to follow a more basic

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5 The idea for this use of the term "existential" is based on a discussion between Walter Conn and John Gibbs regarding whether Kohlberg's postconventional stages of moral reasoning are reached through a "natural/spontaneous" dynamism or an "existential" one, the latter requiring explicit conscious awareness on the part of the agent. See Conn, Christian Conversion, 107-34; John C. Gibbs, "Kohlberg's Stages of Moral Development: A Constructive Critique," Harvard Educational Review 47, no. 1 (1977); Alfredo Mac Laughlin, Narratives of Hope: A Philosophical Study of Moral Conversion (Ph.D. Diss., Loyola University Chicago, 2008; available from http://www.proquest.com, publication number AAT 3332357), 205-27.
circumscription of the term, which is what is attempted below.⁶

**TOWARD A NOTION OF MORAL CONVERSION**

The typology presented in this paper is structured on the basis of two distinctions, that are then cross-related. These are briefly presented here in order to make the subsequent exposition clearer. The first distinction concerns the different focus given to the question about the meaning of moral by classical and by modern/contemporary philosophy. While the modern/contemporary investigations on ethical theory have focused strongly on the question on *right and wrong*, there is a classical understanding of the subject-matter of ethical theory (common to both Plato, Aristotle, and Christian medieval philosophers) that focuses rather on the question for happiness and “the good life” (contemporarily phrased also as “the meaning of life” question). In principle, both provide acceptable – if incomplete – ways of answering the question about what constitutes a matter of moral concern, and consequently, what differentiates moral conversion from other types of conversion. Collapsing both meanings, however, can only be attempted at the cost of much confusion, or by a highly elaborate moral theory that may or may not succeed in bringing both together in satisfactory ways. I will therefore address these two meanings of moral separately.

The second distinction concerns the meaning of conversion itself. A closer look at the phenomenon shows that its manifestations can be enormously varied, rendering a definition aimed at covering all or nearly all instances of conversion extremely general and vague. Thus, rather than attempting to articulate one common but overly general and vague definition of moral conversion, the task of circumscribing the notion for present purposes will be accomplished by differentiating *three general “classes” of conversion*: conversion regarding content, conversion regarding attitude or degree of commitment, and conversion regarding behavioral coherence.

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⁶ For a fuller treatment of the characterization of conversion as “existential,” see Mac Laughlin, *Narratives of Hope*, 193.
THE USE OF NARRATIVE EVIDENCE

Each of these processes entails a change profound enough and existential enough to merit the name of “conversion” as was indicated. For each category in the typology, the fact that moral conversion takes place in such a way needs to be established. There is no shortage of views, both in the spheres of common sense and philosophical reflection, that reject the possibility of human beings changing morally for the better – whether on the grounds of a pessimistic view of human nature that considers human beings just too strongly drawn toward selfish behavior, dishonesty, inauthenticity, the abuse of power, and other forms of behavior generally regarded as morally lacking; or whether on the grounds of deterministic views that consider the change itself to be impossible, either from the belief that moral behavior is, for good or ill, entirely determined by original, inherited tendencies, or from the belief that change becomes impossible once a person’s moral views and moral habits settle in, “crystallize,” so to speak. These views cannot be addressed directly within the scope of this paper, but their presence determines that the fact of moral conversion cannot be simply granted. That moral conversion actually takes place has to be proved, and this in turn demands a specific methodology. The problem will be addressed by providing, at the point in which each category is discussed, what is called here “narrative evidence”: evidence from real-life stories that exemplify and demonstrate the possibility of moral conversion in very diverse areas of life (political commitment, criminal rehabilitation, career shifts, alcoholic recovery, etc). To keep this paper to a reasonable size, I will only include an example or two in the discussion of each category; a more substantial collection of narratives is included in my dissertation.

7 They are discussed in detail in Mac Laughlin, Narratives of Hope, 261-327.
8 Mac Laughlin, Narratives of Hope, 261-37. Because conversion is understood here not merely as a change in externally observable, behavioral patterns, but (as the typology will make it clear) more fundamentally as a change in a person’s ways of thinking, judging, and valuing in moral matters and also because an understanding of the intellectual, emotional, and volitional processes involved is sought, it is necessary that the narrative evidence provided goes beyond an external description of behavioral changes, or a statement of the observable evidence of a person’s moral convictions “before and after” the change takes place, and gain as much insight as possible into such processes. This requirement imposes the methodological need to focus on a small number
1. THE MODERN/CONTEMPORARY NOTION OF MORALITY: MORAL CONVERSION REGARDING RIGHT AND WRONG

The modern/contemporary approach to the meaning of “moral” is not itself devoid of ambiguity. Two approaches are commonly encountered when investigating this meaning. One common approach is to begin the discussion by asking about the meaning of “right” and “wrong,” the polarity most frequently associated with moral judgments. Another very common approach begins with a discussion on the experience of “oughtness,” the peculiarly human experience of regarding oneself as duty-bound with respect to certain courses of action; the problem, in other words, of moral obligation. The two approaches, “right/wrong” and “obligation,” are intrinsically bound to each other; they may or may not eventually be collapsed into one, leading to significant differences in moral theory. To simplify matters, I will consider them in a single category during the course of this article, and will refer to them with the expression “right/wrong.”

This common focus in contemporary discussion provides us with a first meaning for “moral conversion”: a change in the subject (or moral agent) with regard to her/his existential involvement in the task of acting rightly or wrongly, of doing what ought to be done. This change may involve both big, consequential decisions and the small, perhaps half-thought actions of daily life. In relation to this focus, it is possible to identify three distinct processes that can be called “moral conversion.”

A. Moral Conversion Regarding the Content of Right and Wrong

The first class of conversion focuses on significant changes in what is considered to be right/wrong in general.

of narratives that provide sufficiently rich descriptions, rather than to attempt a more extensive but “shallower” survey that could provide statistically significant data but that would serve little purpose for this project. In other words, the methodology employed (and the epistemological challenges it may encounter) is closer to that of the historian than to that of the sociologist. The preferential use of narratives of a biographical and autobiographical kind responds to this specific need.

9 The more classically minded reader will perhaps initiate the discussion by asking about what constitutes “the good life.” This approach will be taken into consideration later in this article.
It should not be difficult for the reader to recall instances of changing one's moral judgment on some specific issue or other: a practice about which one previously had no moral objections comes to be considered objectionable, for example, in the light of such new information as its negative environmental impact or its exploitative background; or because a new argument or point of view is presented that one had not previously considered. Such changes in judgment or opinion – hopefully a normal occurrence in the moral life of an intellectually active person – are not what is referred to here as instances of moral conversion.

But one can also imagine (and perhaps recall) a change in a person's moral judgment about the said practice happening due to a more fundamental shift in that person's basic criteria for judging: in the wake of this shift, a revision of moral conclusions and previously accepted rules takes place. A person, for example, begins to include the potential environmental consequences of his/her acts as an important criterion for decision, when previously there was no consideration of the importance of this factor. This kind of change – even if the example chosen is relatively innocent or uncontroversial – affects the structure of a person's moral judgment. Furthermore, it normally affects quite extensively a person's life. A number of everyday practices and habits need to be changed; life requires restructuring. This restructuring may affect also that person's relations, who may react positively or negatively to such changes, offering encourage or resistance, and overall expressing that the person has changed his/her value in their eyes. This is the kind of change that merits the name of "moral conversion."

Alternatively, the change described may affect not just a criterion or set of criteria, but the entire process by which a person arrives at a moral judgment: the person, for example, might shift from being strictly rule-abiding to an outcome-focused form of compliance, and thus weigh his/her actions accordingly, by examining in each case the potential consequences of acting one way or another.10

10 Sometimes such a change in the criteria for moral reasoning is accompanied by a shift of another sort: the move from a life ruled by uncritically accepted moral principles and/or rules, to a life in which one's criteria for moral action are habitually reflected upon, weighed, and critically considered. This is what Conn calls a "critical moral conversion": a moral conversion that is coupled with some degree of intellectual conversion.
Such is the first class of moral conversion: a change in the person's criteria for moral judgment — or in the process of moral judging itself — so important as to expand into a significant life change.

**Narrative Evidence for this Class of Conversion**

An instance of moral conversion regarding content about right/wrong is found in Donald Gelpi's account of his own conversion from racism. Having been born in New Orleans, Louisiana, Gelpi avows to having grown up "a racial bigot," his racism focusing on black people.

I do not remember ever doing anything to hurt black people, but I did grow up believing in their essential racial inferiority to myself and to other white people.

No one challenged my racial bigotry in a systematic way until I went to high school. The Jesuits who taught me waged ceaseless war on my racism and on the racism of my white classmates. I resisted them for two years, but eventually I conceded that they had the right of it. I recognized the immorality of racism and renounced it in my own heart.

Gelpi's account is devoid of dramatic overtones: he acknowledges in simple terms the fact that he essentially agreed with racist views — despite not having consciously hurt anyone on account of such views — and that in a two-year process eventually came to see such views as immoral and renounce them. There is clearly a significant change in the content of what he regarded as right/wrong, despite his having grown up immersed in such views, and despite the fact that his resistance to change was being supported by his classmates. Gelpi also identifies in this instance of conversion a deeper kind of change:

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11 As anticipated, in order to go beyond a mere description of categories and show that these categories describe something that actually takes place, each section of this paper describing a class of conversion will be accompanied by a subsection providing narrative evidence. The evidence provided is drawn from a survey of biographies, interviews, psychological and sociological investigations, and similar sources.

I look back on that experience as a personal moral conversion. 
I regard it as an initial moral conversion because, for the first time in my life, I took personal responsibility for my disagreeing with the conventional morality taught to me by my society. By disagreeing, I took personal responsibility for my own conscience. 13

This transition – in Gelpi’s words, a transition from “conventional to autonomous morality” 14 – is an instance and an example of a shift in criteria for moral judgment that is accompanied and supported by a cognitive conversion: Gelpi experiences a shift toward a need for reasoned support for his moral views and practices, as opposed to accepting as sufficient evidence for them the fact of their widespread acceptance.

Robert Bellah provides another example in his interview of Wayne Bauer. 15 Raised in an unreflective acceptance of traditional patriotic values, Wayne joined the Marine Corps in the sixties; but during this time, friends who had gone to college began to argue with him about the Vietnam War. These discussions went on for a few months, and Bauer finally concluded that his best arguments “held no weight.” 16 His resolution was strong enough, in practical terms, to lead him to go AWOL, thus being forced to lead an underground life for many years. Eventually he surrendered to the military, was spared a court martial, and became a political activist and an advocate for poor tenants (an instance of a conversion regarding content about happiness and the meaning of life); but this long process began in a moral conversion regarding content about right/wrong: he came to see joining the military and engaging on the military activities of the time as morally objectionable and acted accordingly.

These examples should suffice to indicate the reality of this class of conversion.

16 Bellah and others, Habits of the Heart, 17-20.
B. Moral Conversion Regarding the Degree of Commitment with Respect to Right/Wrong

Another class of moral conversion can be described as a shift from a general lack of concern for the morality of one’s actions to genuine concern for this. An initial way to characterize this class of moral conversion could be as a conversion “from frivolity to seriousness,” or “from amorality to morality.” The rules and principles that previously defined right and wrong for a person, and that were in all probability learnt in that person’s childhood, may have been up to that point regarded as nonbinding; perhaps as rules that, while laid down by society in general, are to be followed only by those obedient enough to abide by them. But when this class of moral conversion takes place, these rules and principles, previously comprehended in this detached manner, become now existentially pressing for the person. No longer are these rules something exclusively “for other people.” Nor are they regarded as rules that one “happens to follow” arbitrarily but are now followed because they are grasped as binding on all moral persons, or essential to the maintenance of one’s moral identity.

On closer analysis, however, the characterization of this class of conversion becomes more complex. To begin with, quite a bit of variety can be found in the shapes that this class of conversion can take, and some ambiguity, even controversy, in their valuation. Simone de Beauvoir for example, in The Ethics of Ambiguity,\(^\text{17}\) has traced a number of moral/existential profiles that range from the “Serious Man,” – a dangerous being, in her account, who takes the world to be the source of absolute, unconditioned values – to the “Free Man” who, aware of the (claimed) absence of such unconditioned values, commits to the existentialist ideal of the exercise of his freedom; and in so doing, by accepting the freedom of others as something like an absolute, regains a “legitimate” kind of seriousness. In her description we find a number of moral profiles – the “sub-men,” the Adventurer, the Nihilist, the Passionate Man – characterized in subtle distinctions by the ways in which they commit to values, including whether they regard them as absolute and unconditional or as something else.\(^\text{18}\)

\(^{17}\) Simone de Beauvoir, The Ethics of Ambiguity (New York: Philosophical Library, 1949).

\(^{18}\) De Beauvoir, The Ethics of Ambiguity, 51. Interestingly, de Beauvoir uses the actual
Secondly, the inverse process is also conceivable. A person who lived by certain rules believing that they should be followed may come to doubt their foundations, or their hold on him/her in terms of right/wrong, and so become more distanced and no longer see him/herself under their rule. Should this process be considered just another form of conversion, or perhaps a “counter-conversion,” with the same characteristics but an inverse moral sign? None of these alternatives seems to be adequate: such a process is rarely the exact inverse, for while the shift toward a higher degree of commitment usually entails a process of “positive” determination on the side of the agent, its opposite usually resembles rather a process of decreasing determination, disintegration, an “entropic” process, so to speak. Such a process fits neither the use of the term “conversion” in its common, everyday usage – so it is rarely called a conversion – nor the technical use of the term as developed in this work. The matter cannot be discussed in further detail here, since this would require a fleshed-out ethical theory addressing the issues of moral progress and decadence. Only the suggestion is made here that the matter may be usefully approached by examining whether the process can be categorized in terms of integration or disintegration.

Narrative Evidence for this Class of Conversion

Often a change in attitude will be accompanied by a change in the way the person perceives moral issues (i.e., content). Thus a conversion will be considered to fit the present class not when there is no change regarding content, but when, even if significant changes regarding content can be identified, the attitudinal change appears to be more significant.

The well-known story of Mohandas Gandhi being forced out of the train may be read in this light.\(^{19}\) While traveling first class through Natal, South Africa, as representative of his Indian law firm, an official told him (because of his “coloured” skin) that he should move to third-class. When he refused, the official called a constable that then took him by the hand and forced him out of the train, together with his

luggage. Gandhi then sat in the waiting room, dark and cold, and considered whether to fight for his rights, to continue on his journey without responding to the insults, or — ultimately his choice — to dedicate himself "to root out the disease and suffer hardships in the process."  

The change that Gandhi describes in his autobiography can be best described as a change in attitude. The injustice and the brutality of racism in general could hardly be something unknown to Gandhi at the time — he had already been involved, for example, in a similar quarrel regarding the use of turbans in court. But, even though the hardship he was subjected to in this episode was somewhat superficial, still the humiliation and shock seem to have acted as a sort of "triggering event," making him reevaluate the morality of ignoring the problem in general, and make a commitment; that is, adopt a new attitude, a "committed" attitude toward its solution. Gandhi does not report a significant revision of his view of the morality of racism itself on his part (i.e., a revision of the content of his moral evaluations). Rather, there is a significant change in the moral weight of the obligation to combat structural racism: it is now perceived as an imperative (a personal imperative, in Gandhi's case) that one cannot just shrug off or set aside for another time.

It is possible to find instances of a more general change in attitude toward morality in stories of people with a criminal career that significantly "reform." A narrative of this kind can be found in the story of CeaseFire activists Antonio Pickett ("Lil' Tony") and Evans Robinson ("Chip"). Childhood friends, both were raised in strict homes "where grace was said at the dinner table and swearing was forbidden." They, however, "quickly grew enamored of the thrill and payoff of petty crime," joining a gang, eventually getting into drug dealing, and beginning their rotation in and out of prison. By 1996, though, Tony found himself facing conviction, and weary of "worrying [that] the next person he saw might try to kill him." While awaiting placement in a

20 Gandhi, An Autobiography, 104.
21 Gandhi, An Autobiography, 100.
23 Huppke, "Four Who Watch over the City."
state prison he let his gang's leadership know he was stepping down. He mentions the prayer and support of his mother, a "loving but stern evangelical minister," as instrumental in his "turning his life around." While he spent time in prison, his friend Chip ran wild, slowed down only by the tragedy of his cousin dying in a shooting.

When Tony was released, his mother connected him then with CeaseFire, an initiative to take on high-risk individuals, help them find jobs and educational opportunities, and counsel them about the pitfalls of street life, and before long Tony became a counselor for CeaseFire. Chip became one of his first clients, taking with his help a factory job; and in 2002 he was also hired by CeaseFire. An article in the Chicago Tribune describes them as having significant street clout due to their criminal past, which makes them very effective in recruiting teenagers out of gangs. They are also described as loving their adrenaline-charged jobs, but also carrying the regret from having hurt people in the past and having influenced others to live a life of crime.24

From the information that can be gathered from this newspaper account, it would seem that Pickett and Robinson were not ignorant of the basic norms required in honest living—they would have learned them in their early years. Rather, they consciously disregarded them. Their conversion involves thus a new or renewed interest in leading an honest life. But while their understanding of what constitutes a honest life has not changed, in this case there seems to have been a change in their way of understanding the good of living a honest life—as, perhaps, free from the hazards and the weariness of a life of crime—and this change in their understanding may have been instrumental in their attitudinal change. Summing up his experience, for example, Robinson says: "The air smells different. The sun seems brighter. Things aren't so bleak all the time."25 His new attitude and his new understanding of

24 The article also quotes a police officer, Sheila McFarland of the Harrison District, attesting that "the once-notorious Chip and Tony have shown they've changed their ways. 'They've done some things in the past that we wouldn't be proud of, but in the same sense they've turned over a new leaf,' she said. 'I believe their experience out on the streets and interacting with gangs at one time has given them the ability to go out and communicate with current gang members. They're taking these people under their wings'" (Huppke, "Four Who Watch over the City"). This testimony provides further evidence to assess the stability of their conversion.

25 Huppke, "Four Who Watch over the City."
life seem to go together.

Cases like this, though not run-of-the-mill, are not isolated cases.26 The opposite process is described by Patrick K., a fast-track operator who gradually got involved in a scheme with corrupt elements of his state's government. Eventually the scheme was discovered; Patrick managed to escape with his family and became an international fugitive; but eventually the stress of this fugitive life became too much and he turned himself in.27 He tells now the story as part of his community service duty. In his account, rationalization was a very important factor in his downfall – he spent a great deal of time devising ways to convince his wife and parents that what he was doing was ethical – and so was a feeling of invulnerability or arrogance fostered by his success. Interestingly enough, his body seemed to be more aware than his conscious mind of the trouble he was getting into: it responded with constant ulcers and hair loss. The dissolution is gradual and does not seem marked by a turning toward anything. Rather, the story illustrates what Lonergan called "the flight from insight," a half-conscious attempt to avoid looking at the issue or understanding it adequately. For these reasons, it seems appropriate to withhold the term "conversion" from this type of change.28

C. Conversion Regarding Behavioral Coherence in Right/Wrong

It is fairly common – perhaps, indeed, a universal element in human moral experience – that even people who take morality seriously, or have an ingrained concern for doing what is moral, do not always act accordingly. "I cannot even understand my own actions," says St. Paul,

26 I provide a few more in the relevant sections of my dissertation. See Mac Laughlin, Narratives of Hope, 92.
27 Patrick K., in a talk given on March 2005 at Loyola University, Chicago.
28 This type of "downfall" – the result of discrete, sometimes half-conscious decisions rather than a conscious, determined "turning" is a favorite topic of fictional narratives too, from crime epics such as Mario Puzo’s The Godfather to fantastical allegories such as Wilde’s The Picture of Dorian Gray or Charles Williams’s Descent into Hell, to the social criticism of Steinbeck’s The Winter of Our Discontent. It is also the stuff classic tragedies are made of, from Creon in Antigone to Macbeth – a progressive loss of control, originated in dubious or bad decisions, that eventually ends in corrupting the character’s originally good (even outstanding) moral character.
for I do not do what I want, but I do what I hate." 29 These occurrences, viewed by the actor as contrary to their best intentions of right behavior can sometimes be explained, when they occur occasionally, as accidents – due to fatigue, to strong emotions provoked by an external situation (fear, anger, anxiety), to distraction, to being in a hurry, and so forth. That is, even though one may know what is the right action, this may still require an energy or concentration not readily available, or perhaps a certain amount of sacrifice that seems, in the situation, more than the agent can muster. Overall, these faults can be and are commonly attributed to "human weakness," by which is meant that we human beings do not operate perfectly according to the ideal, and that in the concrete existential situation we sometimes operate even further from the ideal than what we consider an acceptable standard.

Faults of this kind are commonly distinguished, however, from those that have become a habit, patterns of behavior through which we recurrently diverge from the standard: bad habits, vices, specific weaknesses, what is sometimes called the "dominant defect" by those presenting the Ignatian Spiritual Exercises, et cetera. Such habitual flaws can coexist with an earnest commitment to moral ideals. There is no direct logical correlation between a person's commitment to moral ideals and that person's capacity for self-control: one who experiences a strong desire to be more moral may indeed be very poor at self-control. A change toward greater coherence between moral standards and actual behavior has to be, for this reason, distinguished from a change in one's degree of commitment to moral standards (i.e., the second class of moral conversion). The possibility for this class of conversion is of particular importance for the person that has maintained a high level of commitment for a long while but has not achieved the desired degree of behavioral coherence. For this person, habitual flaws may weigh heavily. She may come to live in a perpetual situation of partial resignation or despair, convinced that these flaws are unconquerable, or, alternatively, may have become nearly blind to them, ignoring them, or living with a certain amount of Sartrean "bad faith." Yet it still may happen that at a certain point in life the person encounters a source of hope, and so engages with the conviction that it is possible to change. Or the person that became used to living with his/her habitual flaws, or

29 Romans 7:15.
is nearly blind to them, is suddenly vividly awakened to them. On the wings of renewed strength and/or awareness, the person may rise to meet the challenge and conquer these flaws, finally beginning to move at a steady, determined pace—sometimes at a very fast pace—toward the much desired, better habits.

What is achieved at the end of this transition is a more complete coherence between one's moral standards and one's patterns of behavior. The key moment seems to be the original moment in which the person's resolve is made (not just when it is formulated, but when it somehow "clicks" and transforms the whole disposition of the person toward his/her habitual flaws). Such is the third class of moral conversion.

**Narrative Evidence for this Class of Conversion**

Examples of this instance of conversion abound in literature regarding alcoholism recovery: cases of alcoholics that have given up hope of ever getting rid of their addiction, that (sometimes quite unexpectedly) find a source of strength, hope or motivation, religious or otherwise, and put themselves in a successful path of recovery. Commonly the subjects do not consider their addiction a good thing, but to varying degrees a destructive one. Many suffer greatly from knowing this; they even feel they have excluded themselves from humanity. But because of the nature of addictions, often the desire to overcome their addiction has been stalled by the subject's sense of inability to do so, the desire turning into something abstract and inoperative, so that its frustration adds an additional element of suffering. It is thus justifiable to classify a determined (and eventually successful) push to reach a higher behavioral coherence as a *moral conversion regarding coherence*.

The story of "Subject G," for example, from James Leuba's classic study of conversion, tells about a man who became an alcoholic at the age of twenty-one, losing his business and two jobs because of this. The subject reports having signed "enough abstinence pledges to cover the wall of the room," which indicates a relatively active desire/attitude toward recovery over the preceding years. But then, finding himself without money, without friends, and without a home, and practically

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wishing to die, "a lady showed him sympathy and invited him to a mission. Her kindness made him look within. For years no one had ever cared about him; this unwonted kindly interest went to his heart."\textsuperscript{31}

Going to this meeting, he was invited to "give himself to the Lord Jesus Christ with the assurance that He would save him." He accepted the offer of a bed and tried to read the material given to him; he was too disturbed, but finally experienced peace after asking God to take him as he was. Three months after this conversion, at age forty, the subject was not only still "sober," but he opened and began managing a mission himself.\textsuperscript{32}

\section*{2. MORAL CONVERSION ACCORDING TO THE CLASSICAL NOTION OF MORALITY: THE QUESTION FOR HAPPINESS, EUDAEMONIA, OR "THE MEANING OF LIFE"}

The three classes mentioned above would be sufficient to circumscribe the notion of moral conversion, if choosing or doing what is right/avoiding what is wrong were the only relevant elements of moral experience. The focus on right/wrong, however, leaves out many aspects of moral life that can be considered essential to it. These are aspects that were regularly taken into account in what may be called, following Servais Pinckaers's use, the "classical" notion of morality. Pinckaers denounces a shift in modern ethical theory toward \textit{obligation} as the central category of ethics (what has been characterized here as the focus on right/wrong).\textsuperscript{33} He contrasts this focus with the focus on \textit{happiness}, which is, according to him, the keystone of ancient and medieval moral thought (as well as of the moral message of the Scriptures): this shift forces many of the classical themes of moral reflection to fit into the obligation framework, in a somewhat Procrustean way, and those that


\textsuperscript{33} Servais Pinckaers, \textit{The Sources of Christian Ethics}, trans. Sr. Mary Thomas Noble from the 3rd ed. (Washington, DC: Catholic University of America Press, 1995). Pinckaers does not specify what he means by "modern"; but it may be inferred that he refers to a tendency that had its roots in some Renaissance thinkers and culminated in the Enlightenment, its paradigmatic expression being Kant's moral treatises. This focus on obligation was carried on, mostly unchallenged, into twentieth-century ethical theories; for this reason it may be better called "modern/contemporary."
do not quite fit are left out, the result being a pauperization of the themes of moral reflection.

Of particular importance for present purposes is not to overlook the concern for happiness or eudaemonia that characterizes classical ethical theory; and, in a more contemporary formulation, the concern for the meaning of life. This concern is not only alive and present in ordinary people’s moral lives but also constitutes a recurrent theme in many stories of moral conversion. Integrating these themes in the present typology will lead us to an alternative, expanded set of scenarios that are also instances of moral conversion.34

A. Conversion Regarding Content about Happiness/Eudaemonia/Meaning

Take as a starting point a common form of the question about eudaemonia, “what would make me truly happy?” Insofar as the question is taken with a certain degree of seriousness, a change in the habitually given answer (or even the suspicion that the answer given habitually may be wrong) can precipitate existential life-changes, that is, moral conversion. Conversion would take place when a person shifts from looking for happiness/eudaemonia/meaning in one “category of goals” to looking for it in a very different category (e.g., moving from career-related achievements to fulfillment in the service of those in need). To be considered moral conversion, however, that which is changed for something else must have been something that habitually constituted a “central focus” in the life of that person, or in other words, it must be in that specific good or category of goals in which the hopes for happiness were placed.35 When this “central focus” shifts one can expect changes deep and overhauling, possibly entailing a substantial

34 In calling this notion of morality “classical,” I subscribe to Pinckaers’s denomination out of convenience; for it may be argued that the expanded notion of “what is a matter of moral concern” is not limited to “classical” (i.e., Western, ancient, and medieval) philosophy; but Pinckaers’s denomination greatly simplifies the exposition.

35 This idea appears in William James’s analysis of religious conversion: “To say that a man is ‘converted’ means, in these terms, that religious ideas, previously peripheral in his consciousness, now take a central place, and that religious aims form the habitual centre of his energy.” William James, The Varieties of Religious Experience; a Study in Human Nature: Being the Gifford Lectures on Natural Religion Delivered at Edinburgh in 1901-1902 (New York: Mentor Books, 1958), 162.
rescheduling of the person's resources, time commitments, and so forth, and more importantly, a restructuring of that person's priorities and values. Career changes usually involve this class of conversion, when a rethinking of one's life's goals is involved. Religious conversion often also involves this class of conversion, both in terms of the life-meaning that a religion can give, and in the more specific terms of the vocational calling that often accompanies a strong religious experience. A person's turning from a life of addiction or crime may also involve it, perhaps because the newly acquired sense of freedom demands of the person an expansive development in the new direction.36

**Narrative Evidence for this Class of Conversion**

Some of the narratives considered previously have sufficient elements of this type of conversion to be revisited here. Gandhi's story, for example: his decision not to shrug off the abuses of institutional racism but to actively combat it would lead him into an extraordinary kind of life, very different from the regular life of a barrister that he had previously envisioned. Gandhi changed his priorities and life goals quite sharply as the result of what he saw as a personal moral imperative. In a similar fashion, some of the converted alcoholics described by Leuba found a meaning-giving function as a result of their conversion regarding right/wrong: "Subject G," founded and managed a mission; John B. Gough became a "temperance orator."37 Similarly, "Chip" and "Lil' Tony" became CeaseFire workers. This pattern is quite significant; it suggests, among other things, a strong link between moral conversion regarding right/wrong, and an openness to finding meaning

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36 There is also the possibility of a change, not in the answer given to the question, but of a change in the question itself. Whatever answer is given for example to the question, "what would make me truly happy?" might never completely dispel the originally individualistic focus of the question, and thus one might consider the possibility that the question is wrongly formulated; that an excessive focus on what makes "me" happy (what Bellah calls, in Habits of the Heart, the "therapeutic attitude") will only yield dissatisfaction or disappointment, and that therefore the only way to find an answer to the question about *eudaemonia* is by abandoning that formulation of the question, and asking something else. Or alternatively the question about happiness may be entirely pushed out of the way by the existential situation: a matter of duty may take priority over questions of personal happiness. When such is the case, the expression "meaning of life" may be better suited to describe this class of conversion.

for life in responding to one's community's needs and ailments.

In a study of individualism in the United States, Robert Bellah has documented a few instances of this class of conversion in quite some detail. The case of Brian Palmer illustrates a shift, in Bellah's terms, from a "utilitarian individualism" to an "expressive individualism." In the interview, Palmer recalls "a considerable devotion to making money" at the root of his "utilitarian individualism."

Whether or not Brian felt his life was satisfying, he was deeply committed to succeeding at his career and family responsibilities. He held two full-time jobs to support his family, accepting apparently without complaint the loss of a youth in which, he himself reports, "the vast majority of my time... was devoted to giving myself pleasure of one sort or another." 38

Palmer put extremely long hours at work, not questioning his commitment, which just "seemed like the thing to do at the time." But he neglected sharing his time with his wife and children. His wife divorcing him came as quite a surprise, and this led Palmer "to reassess his life in fundamental ways and to explore the limits of the kind of success he had been pursuing." In this process of reassessment, he reencountered such pleasures as reading and listening to music. The children chose to stay with him, which also forced him to shift his sense of himself and his priorities. A "compulsive problem solver" by his own definition, Brian reexamined "where the thing broke down" and found that he was operating "as if a certain value was of the utmost importance to me. Perhaps it was success. Perhaps it was fear of failure, but I was extremely success-oriented, to the point where everything would be sacrificed for the job, the career, the company. I said bullshit. That ain't the way it should be." 39

With this new outlook about the content of what should be striven for, Brian married a divorcée age, with four children herself, and discovered by his own account "a new sense of himself" and of "what love can be," "almost a psychologically buoyant feeling of being able to be so much more involved and sharing." 40 He also found out that he

38 Bellah and others, Habits of the Heart, 3.
39 Bellah and others, Habits of the Heart, 5.
40 Bellah and others, Habits of the Heart, 5.
could "get a lot of personal reward from being involved in the lives of my children." As Bellah puts it, "the revolution in Brian’s thinking came from a reexamination of the true sources of joy and satisfaction in his life."

**B. Conversion Regarding Attitude Toward Happiness/Eudaemonia/meaning**

The preceding class of moral conversion commonly entails that the agent is, with some degree of awareness, already involved in some kind of meaning-seeking process. The present section considers a class of moral conversion that can take place when a meaning-seeking process is not actively operative: moral conversion as the process through which a person is “awakened” to meaning and becomes involved in a meaning-seeking process. It considers what changes may take place regarding the attitude with which the effort to achieve happiness/eudaemonia/meaning is (or is not) undertaken.

A person’s attitude in this regard may range from deep involvement (both in the effort to clarify the content of these goals, and to attain them), to utter indifference to the problem, and even to denying that there is a question. As with conversion regarding commitment about right/wrong, there are strong reasons to argue that there is a normative direction for this class of conversion, the ideal being the person who applies his/her conscious faculties explicitly to discerning the content of happiness/eudaemonia/meaning in their own lives. The well-known phrase attributed to Socrates, “the unexamined life is not worth living,” declares this well enough, and often philosophers have interpreted their “gadfly” task as that of denouncing when the social environment makes it too difficult to achieve this discernment. Thus Josef Pieper denounced the creation of a “world of labor,” an existence devoid of the possibility of philosophical leisure, absolutely oriented toward production; Simone de Beauvoir identified a variety of human types according to their relation to meaning (the poorest existence being that of the “sub-man,” whose life is almost bare facticity, the

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poverty of his project making his world insignificant and dull); and Lonergan himself identified the figure of the “drifter,” who does nothing very deliberately and who is so lacking in reflective awareness that one may be tempted to ask whether such a life can be called “moral” (or “immoral”) at all.

Instances of people living “unexamined lives” or “drifting” are rather common. But if it is true that human beings are at their core directed toward happiness, eudaemonia, or meaning, and if such a quality has not been permanently expunged or drowned by habit, then the question for “what is the meaning of it all” may yet be reawakened. When this happens – when a person changes his/her attitude so that the content of happiness/eudaemonia/meaning becomes a pressing question, and its specific achievement is at the center of that person’s efforts and energy, we are in the presence of a moral conversion regarding attitude toward happiness/eudaemonia/meaning.

**Narrative Evidence for this Class of Conversion**

Ira Byock, a hospice doctor who specializes in palliative medicine, and is active in the hospice movement, tells the story of Marie Allen, a middle-aged woman who was dealt many bad hands, including finding out that her sister Kathy had had an affair with her husband, after which Marie divorced him and broke relations with her sister. Marie then remarried her ex-husband after fifteen years of separation; but her husband died briefly after their second marriage. Shortly after this, Marie learned from her doctor that she had colon cancer in its terminal stages and a very short time to live. While this revelation could have

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44 De Beauvoir, *The Ethics of Ambiguity*, 42.


46 As to the possibility of shifting away from an attitude of actively seeking meaning/eudaemonia, this may not, despite philosophers’ concerns, be a bad thing in all cases: some people may enjoy routine, at least if it is not of a dehumanizing kind, and some people, who suffer from actually being too reflective, may benefit from it. But insofar as it involves a mindless, unintentional drifting this process is not properly described by the term “conversion,” which implies some active endeavor on the part of the moral agent, a higher integration of some sort, and not merely the decreasing directedness of “drifting.”

been an occasion for despair, Marie overcame her initial shock quickly and pragmatically; she contacted her sister, and the bad news became an opportunity to heal their relationship. Kathy received Marie in her house and cared for her lovingly during her last year, adapting her life to the needs of Marie's palliative treatment. Marie's relation with Kathy continued to be a little stiff until, finding out from Kathy that her late husband had been actually two-timing both sisters, her resentment dissolved in shared laughter. Marie also recomposed her relationship with her estranged daughter Cindy, and her goal became to endure until Cindy's upcoming wedding. Shortly after a year of being diagnosed, Marie died, without pain, and in the care and company of her family.

There seems to be in Marie, before the diagnosis, a general lack of authentic purpose: she lives in resentment, estranged from her loved ones, and seems to fill these gaps in her life by treating herself to material trinkets (she owned a very large collection of shoes, that she gave away without a second thought after the decision was made to live at Kathy's). There does not seem to be an examined choice here. By contrast, once she finds out that she has little time left, she quickly takes the matter into her hands, gives away those things that are not really important to her, and focuses, with a very practical mind-set, on her goal of making of her last moments a time for healing and cultivating her relations with her loved ones. There is a general and rather swift change, first, in her attitude toward happiness in general: rather than lingering in her resentment and adding to it negative feelings provoked by this last revelation, she puts her energy in cultivating positive, loving relations. And secondly, helped by the hospice staff she examines and articulates her concrete goals (e.g., enduring until her daughter's wedding), a move that implies some degree of examination of what she considers meaningful to her life at that stage. In short, Marie converted from an attitude of acid pessimism and lingering resentment to life in general, to an attitude of cherishing life, letting go of grudges and actively seeking "happiness," which for her meant dying in peace after having reconstructed loving relations with the remaining members of her family.

Brian Palmer's story, considered in the previous section, also reveals
attitudinal changes. Palmer's original "utilitarian individualism" seems to have been espoused, to a great degree, unreflectively. There is something paradoxical perhaps (but not uncommon) in the way in which this energetic, goal-driven "problem solver" lived for a long period of time devoid of authentic purpose. The shock and forlornness that followed his divorce provided the setting and the motivation for a conscious examination of his life goals. Not only did he change his goals, but he also adopted a different attitude toward happiness/eudaemonia/meaning, as something deserving explicit examination.

C. Conversion Regarding Coherence in the Search for Eudaemonia

It was noted above (in Section 1.C), when describing moral conversion regarding behavioral coherence about right/wrong, that the fact that a person holds certain moral criteria and principles does not guarantee that a person's actions will conform to such principles, particularly when they clash with the immediateness of short-term satisfaction. Similarly, even though a person may clearly appreciate that a certain course of action would be beneficial with respect to his/her quest for eudaemonia, or more in tune with what is regarded by this person as meaning-giving, the person may still choose to follow a different course of action; or alternatively, perceive him/herself as powerless to choose or engage in the course of action that is understood as the more appropriate to achieve happiness/eudaemonia/meaning.

Classical sources interpret such failures as the result of an internal division in the person's operative principles. Plato described this internal division with the vivid image of a many-headed beast, in which all heads seek at the same time to be fed by a sometimes strong, sometimes weak, human head, representative of reason. Aristotle gave this phenomenon a detailed treatment in his Nicomachean Ethics, describing "moral weakness" as a disconnection between what the person regards as the rational way to act, and that person's actions. Sometimes this is the effect of a disconnection between different types of knowledge (i.e., we may know the general rule and

48 Bellah and others, Habits of the Heart, 3-8.
49 Republic, book IX, 588b-592.
50 Nicomachean Ethics, VII, 1 (1145b).
not apply it to the concrete situation at hand), and sometimes the effect of the person’s knowledge being rendered ineffective by reason of the person being in the grip of his/her emotions – a condition compared to those of being asleep, mad, or drunk.51 Because of this potential for an internal division/disconnection, sporadic acts of “moral weakness” can be considered a normal part of human life. But it may happen that these inconsistencies become habitual; furthermore, they may become so resistant to change, so recurrent, that overcoming them in a stable and definitive way comes to be perceived by the person as being beyond their capacities and resources, even if there is clarity in the person’s mind regarding the content of happiness/eudaemonia/meaning. The content is perceived as essentially unattainable, not because of external conditions, but because of one’s own weaknesses or insufficiency. The result is loss of hope, despair, defeat.

This is the setting for the third class of moral conversion. Conversion at this point appears as an infusion of new strength, new enthusiasm, new operative hope, on the wings of which the person is able to overcome effectively the obstacles and contrary habits that weighed him/her down, and engage in – and eventually consolidate – patterns of behavior that are consistent with what is regarded as the proper direction toward happiness/eudaemonia/meaning.

**Narrative Evidence for this Class of Conversion**

Here also many stories may be gathered from the context of addiction and recovery. Leuba’s “Subject E,” for example, declares:

...all my pangs were due to some terrible remorse I used to feel after a heavy carousal, the remorse taking the shape of regret after my folly in wasting my life in such a way – a man of superior talents and education. I was not much alarmed about the future world.52

And John B. Gough, also mentioned by Leuba, says of a person in his situation:

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51 *Nicomachean Ethics*, VII, 3 (1146b-1147a).
The sense of his degradation and worthlessness does not involve in his mind responsibility for his sin to others; he is absorbed in his own self. He battles against himself, poor slave and outlaw, to conquer, if possible, the place he has lost in society.53

The theme of happiness/eudaemonia/meaning appears clearly in these two accounts. More recent narratives of a similar sort can be found in the collection of stories that Alcoholics Anonymous publishes in its “Big Book.”54 One of the earliest narratives of this constantly renewed text is that of “Doctor Bob,” one of A.A.’s cofounders.55 Doctor Bob got into drinking during his college years; by the time he took up medicine, he was drinking enough to have morning “jitters.” His addiction compromised already his ability in class, and in the sophomore year he almost quit school. He had to convince the faculty to let him take his exams (he had turned in examination books empty because he could not hold a pencil), passed them, then remained sober during a couple years of residency during which he was too busy to leave the hospital frequently. Soon after he got his own practice he fell into drinking again; he even developed a phobia to running out of liquor.56 He had to manage his addiction carefully – he needed to be sober enough in the morning to practice medicine, in order to have money for liquor in the evening. He developed tremendous cunning for acquiring and keeping alcohol at home, even during the times of prohibition and living with a vigilant wife.

It is significant that, in Bob’s narrative, drinking itself is never specifically censured in terms of right/wrong, whether from a religious or a social point of view. Rather, drinking is mentioned as a continuous obstacle to his fulfilling his aspirations, the cause of many miserable moments, and of living under the constant threat of downfall and shame. This focus places his narrative within the happiness/eudaemonia/meaning theme. Indeed, it is a focus on happiness – here emphasizing the aspect of “living a free life” – that reignites in Doctor Bob a strong

55 Alcoholics Anonymous, 171.
56 Alcoholics Anonymous, 176.
desire to recover: a moral conversion regarding *attitude*, but one that does not become immediately effective, and thus requires a conversion regarding coherence as an additional step. Says Doctor Bob:

About the time of the beer experiment [a catastrophic attempt to replace stronger drinks with beer] I was thrown in with a crowd of people who attracted me because of their seeming poise, health and happiness. They spoke with great freedom from embarrassment, which I could never do, and they seemed very much at ease on all occasions and appeared very healthy. More than these attributes, *they seemed to be happy*. I was self conscious and ill at ease most of the time, my health was at the breaking point, and I was thoroughly miserable. I sensed they had something I did not have, from which I might readily profit. I learned that it was something of a spiritual nature, which did not appeal to me very much, but I thought it could do no harm. I gave the matter much time and study for the next two and a half years, but I still got tight [i.e., drunk] every night nevertheless. I read everything I could find, and talked to everyone who I thought knew anything about it.\(^{57}\)

It was about this time that an unnamed man was recommended to him, and after some long talks managed to get Bob to remain sober for a few weeks. He had a heavy fallback during a conference, but this person again took care of him, and Doctor Bob was able to cease drinking permanently, eventually regaining both his health and self-respect, and the respect of his colleagues. Bob asks himself the question, what did this man do or say that was different from what others had done or said? In his opinion, a key factor seems to be the fact that this man had been an alcoholic too and had had “most of all the drunkard’s experiences known to man, but had been cured by the very means I had been trying to employ, that is to say the spiritual approach.”\(^{58}\)

The current edition of the A.A. book features forty-two selected stories of recovered alcoholics, many similar in essence to the story of Dr. Bob above. The success of the A.A. “12-step method” suggests that the possibility for this type of conversion is not extremely remote

\(^{57}\) *Alcoholics Anonymous*, 178.
\(^{58}\) *Alcoholics Anonymous*, 180.
or rare: a mere four years after the first Alcoholics Anonymous began meeting, they counted over 100 ex-alcoholics who had recovered using their method; and 100,000 worldwide in 1950 – that is, eleven years afterward. Today A.A. claims over 2 million members worldwide, at different stages of recovery.59 For the purposes of providing evidence for this class of conversion, this should be sufficient.

CONCLUSION: A DEFINITION OF "MORAL CONVERSION"

In this paper I have offered a tripartite classification of instances of moral conversion, a classification that applies to moral conversion understood both in terms of right/wrong and in terms of happiness/eudaemonia/meaning of life. For each class of conversion, a few narratives have been presented, with the double purpose of presenting evidence that such a class of conversion actually takes place, and illustrating with examples what is meant by each class of conversion.

On the basis of the foregoing considerations, a general notion of moral conversion can now be offered. Moral conversion is a process in which a person undergoes an existentially significant change regarding their understanding of, attitude toward, and/or their behavioral habits in matters of right/wrong and/or happiness/eudaemonia/meaning of life. The term “existential” is here especially important as denoting the importance of the change, that it is change involving human persons (though by analogy it may also apply to groups), and that it is real, concrete change, involving a great degree of contingency, both because of its concreteness and because of its apparent connection to human freedom.

This categorization, and the tentative definition provided here, are starting points for an in-depth analysis of moral conversion and its implications. How is moral conversion related to a normal process of moral development, to religious conversion, to the goals of psychological therapeutic practice? What philosophical implications follow from characterizing moral conversion as “existential change”? What can be established from the fact of moral conversion with regard to the problem of human freedom? What light does an analysis of the

process of moral conversion throw into the discussion regarding the rationality of moral structures and the problem of moral motivation? These are some of the questions that I have addressed in length in my dissertation and that will hopefully become the subject of future articles.
ON MEMOIR, BIOGRAPHY, AND THE DYNAMISM OF CONSCIOUSNESS

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The present study takes as its point of departure and analysis four presuppositions. The first is that the restless creative desires of the mind for understanding and of the heart for the worthwhile are major elements in the dynamism of consciousness. They are the source in us of all creativity and its communicative expression in literature, science, in the dramatic artistry of the commonsense pattern lived in the presence of others, in our social and political pursuits and the struggles of our history. That dynamism, the personal counterparts in us of the true and the good, cannot be disclosed and understood in individual cognitional or ethical episodes. It has to be understood as constitutive of the entire intelligible unity of conscious and intentional experiences in the life of one and the same agent. Its subject's access to it must be by means of his or her memory and hindsight because it is not given all at once.

Secondly, it will support the claims of Stephen Crites and Hannah Arendt that the form of consciousness in time is basically an emerging

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1 The term, "dynamism of consciousness," is to be read in the present essay as identical with "the transcendental notions": see Bernard Lonergan, Method in Theology (London: Darton, Longman and Todd, 1971), 34. As his earlier book Insight made clear, self awareness or consciousness is not purely intellectual or ethical; it also involves a dynamic biological patternning oriented toward food and drink, self-preservation and sexual reproduction in the "already out there now real" world. A further study is needed to explore this dialectical tension between the nature/culture polarity of consciousness in the realms of memoir, biography, and life. Owen Flanagan in his The Really Hard Problem, Meaning in a Material World (Cambridge, MA: MIT Press, 2007) tries to shrink the intellectual and ethical pole of the dialectic into the biological.
but unread narrative. Thirdly, following Aristotle, narrative will be assumed to be characterized by a plot structure. Central to that structure is the sense of a beginning of the story, a middle phase made up of the subsequent chapters in which the seed potential of the beginning is worked out and expanded, and finally a form of an ending. Fourthly, following Aristotle, Aquinas, and Lonergan, but contra Kant, it will acknowledge that all insights, all human understanding, is partially caused by and requires for its emergence a suitable and appropriate image. Insights are always into the presentations by the senses and imagination of the intelligible elements of the problem in hand. The data of consciousness are a form of unimaginable self-awareness that accompanies and is causally inseparable from our intentional living in our world. Acknowledging that all insights or acts of understanding are into the imaginative presentations of the problem being worked on this will pose the question: what is the appropriate imaginative image in which we can understand the unimaginable dynamism of consciousness as such?

Involved in this narrative turn is the challenge to appropriate, not simply the abstract structure or “what” of one’s knowing, as in Lonergan’s invitation to the judgment of self-affirmation, but rather the “who” of the concrete dynamic unfolding of the conscious intelligible unity that is one’s personal history. Being totally concrete, personal historicity is of the essence of the transcendental notions. The desire of know and the pursuit of values are never abstractions in a human life.

Putting these positions together the paper will suggest that the image necessary for an understanding of the dynamism of consciousness is not the outcome of an MRI scan but a form of personal and meaningful linguistic narrative. From within this perspective the linguistic images of many personal memoirs and biographies that are to hand can be

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3 The force of gravity can be experienced when one falls or drops something and “imagined” as such; the law of gravity cannot become understood apart from such imaginable experiences but cannot itself be imagined. One understands the unimaginable functional relations of the empirical law through an insight into the imaginable presentations of the appropriate measurements of the data of the problem. The same is true for all other laws such as E=mc².
read as tacit presentations of the phenomenologies of the dynamism of consciousness. Their word sequences constitute sensible linguistic images whose sense and reference can from our perspective evoke in us insights into the dynamism of consciousness in the given life. Of particular significance in them will be the event of being awakened to a vocational path in a life and the subsequent roads taken and not taken. In the latter the pattern of major decisions taken in the course of the life illuminates the values pursued by the agent or subject.4

Some imaginative illustrations of relevant elements will be offered from a number of memoirs, and finally, from a reflection on my own Lonergan's Quest. That entire narrative, I now maintain, generates a linguistic image in whose meaning and reference Lonergan's dynamic personal pursuit of value, of the worthwhile in his life can be apprehended. The issues that they raise will then be signalled. The basic thesis is that the narrative perspective of memoirs and biography is needed for such a phenomenology. This will pose questions about how those linguistic narratives are related to Lonergan's two modes of conscious and intentional living, the direct dealing with the data of sense in our world, and the introspective dealing with the causally inseparable data of consciousness, considered throughout an entire lifetime, as well as the meaning of introspection.

I. NARRATIVE BEGINNINGS

It is a thesis of Ira Progoff that the growth of consciousness is seed like in time, each seed giving rise to a distinct species in the human genus. Initially such growth is like that of a plant underground and during this phase its subject has no notion of what the mature plant and its flowers are going to look like. At a certain point in time, unique to each life, there emerges a key and crucial phase of the narrative. The values specific to the life begin to emerge and make themselves felt, begin as Progoff would suggest to manifest to its subject what the life is going to be about.5 This emergence of a primal elemental awareness of one's


5 Ira Progoff, The Dynamics Of Hope (New York: Dialogue House, 1985), 9. Related is Progoff's notion of dynatypes and cognitypes. The dynatypes, which for Lonergan ground our basic lifestyles, are for me rooted in our core desires. The cognitypes are the symbols
self identity gives credence to MacIntyre’s claim that the problem of personal identity, of who rather than what one is to become, is bound up with a narrative perspective. I am going to refer to this emergence as the beginning of the story as contrasted with the beginning of the life itself. The story is a distinctive emergence within the entire life-cycle which it always presupposes.6

Prior to those emergent experiences the subject of the life is engaged with many matters but has no notion yet of what the life is for. R. G. Collingwood in his An Autobiography provides us with a vivid retrospective sense of the transformation in his awareness brought about by such an experience. Normally his father had supplied him with books as a result of which he had become an accomplished reader. One day, taking his own initiative, his curiosity moved him to take down a book from the shelves entitled Kant’s Theory of Ethics. Sitting with his eight year old form wedged between the bookcase and the table he found that it initially evoked in him an intense excitement.

I felt that things of the highest importance were being said about matters of the utmost urgency: things which at all costs I must understand. Then, with a wave of indignation, came the discovery that I could not understand them. Disgraceful to confess, here was a book whose words were in English and whose sentences were grammatical, but whose meaning baffled me. Then, third and last, came the strangest emotion of all. I felt that the contents of this book, although I could not understand it, were somehow my business: a matter personal to myself, or rather to some future self of my own.7


6 Neither Galen Strawson in his “Against Narrativity,” Ratio (New Series) XVII 4 December 2004, 428-52 nor Dan McAdams in his The Stories We Live By (New York: Guildford Press, 1993) seem to grasp this distinction. The life story is not trying to replace or substitute for the stages and seasons of the complex life cycle. It is of the form of a distinctive emergence from within it whose significance it is claimed by some is that in it there is found the highest level of meaning of the life, that which one cannot go beyond in reading the life.

This epiphany was followed by a period in which he sensed that it was to be his future task "to think," which could be interpreted as to wonder, question or explore but with no clue as to the content. No particular questions or tasks formed for him. There was only a "formless and aimless intellectual disturbance, as if I were wrestling with a fog." He continues:

I now know that this is what happens when I am in the early stages of work on a problem. Until a problem has gone a long was towards being solved, I do not know what it is; all I am conscious of is this vague perturbation of mind, this sense of being worried about what I cannot say. I know now that the problems of my life's work were taking, deep down inside me, their first embryonic shape.8

What Collingwood is describing here is a crucial episode in what the present essay means by the emerging dynamism of consciousness. It also makes clear that there are elements in that process that are pre-verbal. It seems that the language in which we come to express our life quests and questions forms from somewhere deep and strange in us that in a peculiar sense is before and beyond language.9

In many cases that transition in self awareness involved is largely effected by events or influences external to the life. This is so for Martin Luther King when he was "called" by the Montgomery bus boycott. It stamped itself like as sort of narrative code on the rest of his life.10 It was true of Mahatma Gandhi when he was exited from a train in South Africa and subsequently politicised. There began the journey that would eventually lead to his becoming the founder of modern India many years later. It was on the voyage of the Beagle that Darwin

8 Collingwood, An Autobiography, 4-5.
9 In True Patriot (Oxford: Mowbrays, 1978), 256-57, Mary Bosanquet describes how in Bonhoeffer’s final imprisonment there formed in him an intellectual freedom from which emerged the verbal articulation of some of the most challenging religious questions of the age. Articulating verbally the real problems in our lives and in our civilization is in itself an achievement of the highest order.
10 I use the terms “narrative code” in opposition to Marshall Frady’s “genetic code” in his Martin Luther King, Jr. (New York: Viking, 2002), 37. Narratives are not reducible to genes. The relation between my position and the neuroscience one of Ken Robinson with Lou Aronica in The Element: How Finding Your Passion Changes Everything (Allen Lane, 2009) has yet to be worked out.
for the first time had a glimpse of what his life was for, was going to be about.\textsuperscript{11} Bernard Lonergan set sail for his philosophy studies in Heythrop suspicious of the discipline; by the end of his first year he confessed that it had become his passion.\textsuperscript{12} For the first time there had emerged for him a sense of what his life was going to be about. Many autobiographies or personal memoirs narrate this personal growth and transition from darkness to light and end there.\textsuperscript{13}

In some memoirs this axial event in the life can come early, in others late. Just before her fifth birthday Jacqueline du Pre heard, for the first time, the sound of the cello. She immediately fell in love with it, declaring to her mother than she wanted to make that sound. In the case of Christine Noble it could be argued that the beginning came in her forties when she saw on the TV a young girl in Vietnam running, naked, along a road away from the flames of the napalm. In Noble's case it could also be argued that without her knowing it her whole life, up to that point, had prepared her for her subsequent departure in fear and trembling to work with the children of Vietnam.\textsuperscript{14} For her the engagement with the calling began very soon after the inspiration. In the case of du Pre it could be argued that all the preparation for her life as a cellist came later. Only much later did she truly begin "to make that sound."

Similar emergences and related personal transformations can be identified in the memoirs of creative scientific researchers. In a chapter entitled The Gossip Test in his 1988 \textit{What Mad Pursuit: A Personal View of Scientific Discovery} Francis Crick describes how when the war was over he was at a loss as to what he wanted to do with his life.\textsuperscript{15} He then narrates the series of experiences by means of which he came


\textsuperscript{12} William Mathews, \textit{Lonergan's Quest: A Study of Desire in the Authoring of Insight} (Toronto: University of Toronto Press, 2005), 33-37, especially the quote from the letter to Smeaton on page 36.

\textsuperscript{13} The paper as it unfolds requires a level of familiarity with the details of these lives which cannot be reproduced here. Ideally that growth in familiarity and the associated questions it poses should be developed and explored in a group.

\textsuperscript{14} Without his having any inclination as to where his life was to lead him, Darwin's time in Edinburgh and Cambridge perfectly prepared him for the voyage of the Beagle.

to understand that, firstly, despite his age he desired to do scientific research, and secondly, he began narrow down the field of research he was fundamentally interested in. By the end of the chapter we see an extraordinary transformation in Crick. He has found a direction. The discoveries he made came with Watson in 1953, and in 1966 on the broader genetic code.

In his Autobiography: The Statue Within, François Jacob also narrates his problems of coming to terms with his life after the war including his transition “through a void which a human being cannot bear.” Was he to become a doctor? The need to have a goal, a purpose, an emerging identity in his life became urgent yet he did not find himself drawn to the vocation of medicine. In time he too found himself exposed to the world of scientific research, stimulated by work on penicillin at the time. Should he launch into research without bothering with a university training or acquire at the university the basic elements so as to be able, later, to go on to the real work? The work being done came to fascinate and the interest in him shown by his boss, Andre Lwoff gave him the needed self-confidence. “If you want to have a university career, then this is surely not the place to come to. Go to the Ecole Normale to take the aggregation instead.” Eventually he was persuaded between the options and his subsequent discovery of the genetic switch was to transform the whole of molecular biology.

In contrast James Watson seems to have had a sense of his quest from quite early on. “My interest in DNA had grown out of a desire, first picked up while a senior in college, to learn what a gene was.” His whole personal identity was to become tied up with that awakened desire. All of his encounters in Europe and England were later directed by it.

Amos Oz, in his memoir, A Tale of Love and Darkness, beautifully describes the emergence of his vocation to be a writer. After a difficult childhood and adolescence he left home and Jerusalem at the age of 15 to live in the kibbutz. Despite himself and his intent to distance himself

from the bookish world of his father he soon found himself, under the influence of his discovery of a “library” in the kibbutz, immersed in reading books:

This is where I went every evening to read my book until nearly midnight, until my eyelids were stuck together. And this is where I took up writing again, when no one was looking, feeling ashamed of myself, feeling base and worthless, full of self loathing: surely I hadn’t left Jerusalem for the kibbutz to write poems and stories but to be reborn, to turn my back on piles of words, to be suntanned to the bone and become an agricultural worker, a tiller of the soil.20

His escape had simply transferred him from the frying pan into the fire. Among the enormous list he gives of books borrowed his discovery of a Hebrew translation by Aharon Amir of Sherwood Anderson’s Winesburg, Ohio stands out like Mount Everest. He had never heard of either Ohio or Winesburg but the impact was enormous:

Then this modest book appeared and excited me to the bone: for nearly a whole summer night until half past three in the morning I walked the paths of the kibbutz like a drunken man, talking to myself, trembling like a love-sick swain, singing and skipping, sobbing with awe-struck joy and ecstasy: eureka!21

Significant here is the reference to the feelings of awe, joy and ecstasy that accompanied his discovery of his vocation. Feelings are the mass and momentum of conscious and intentional living.

The book was a series of stories that took place in a poor Godforsaken provincial town. It featured small-time people, carpenters, hotel owners, servant girls. The stories revolved around the trivial everyday happenings, local gossip or unfulfilled dreams. Each of the stories was connected in that the central characters in one became secondary characters in another. Events, in Winesburg, that Oz would previously have considered beneath the dignity of literature were center stage. His women were not mysterious temptresses and lacked daring. The men were not strong silent types hidden behind a cloud

20 Oz, A Tale of Love and Darkness, 467.
21 Oz, A Tale of Love and Darkness, 471.
of cigarette smoke. The book hit him “like a Copernican revolution in reverse. Whereas Copernicus showed that our world is not the centre of the universe but just one planet among others in the solar system, Sherwood Anderson opened my eyes to write about what was around me.”

The new understanding of himself evoked by Anderson resulted in a felt sense in Oz that his subsequent decision to write was right for him. The same I believe to be true of Jacob and Crick. There was involved a preliminary sense of something worthwhile for them to do for which as it unfolded they would recognize as their own personal responsibility.

Colm Tóibín’s brief reflections in an interview with Michael Ross are to the point re the experience of vocation and the activity of authoring or problem solving. He acknowledged the transformation that was caused in him by his early reading of others, in particular Becket, Banville and McGahern. In contrast with the common attitude that takes the author and authoring “for granted,” he considers his relation with his subsequent career as a writer to be mysterious. When he begins to write, without being able to control the process, he found himself guided towards a particular narrative.

“It will go there on its own,” he says. “And whatever level of self-conscious guidance I have, whatever is going on that causes you to write one thing and not another, no shrink could interfere with it, because its so elemental and basic. It belongs to some part of you that is so hidden that nobody could get to it.”

This sense of a guidance in authoring and problem solving is common.

About the subsequent creative process in life Bergman acknowledges that the location in him of the source of his creativity in movie making was hidden, like background music, difficult to attend to. It mediates between the experience by the artist of their social and cultural world and the articulating of the work of art in a novel or

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22 Oz, A Tale of Love and Darkness, 473.
24 Progoff, The Dynamics of Hope, 208-19, on Bergman’s creativity. Tóibín and Bergman seem here to be pinpointing something missed by Flanagan in his own process of creatively authoring his books.
movie or solution to a major scientific problem in a research paper. His struggle with the absence of God in the world lead him to remark:

But I am also convinced that in every man, you have – there is, there is a part of a man who is – a human being in his mind -- a room that is holy. That is, that is very special. Very high. Very secret room that is – that is a holy part of the human being.\(^{25}\)

It is in the background music in his films that Bergman symbolises this ineffable human reality. Such is the realm of the creative spirit of the human, of what Lonergan refers to as the transcendental notions. Bergman and Tóibín rightly draw our attention to the difficulties involved in owning the phenomena which Owen Flanagan seems to have missed.

From our present perspective all the memoirs and recollections mentioned so far can be read as forms of phenomenologies of Lonergan’s transcendental notions in individual lives. Within that context there arise the following questions:

1. What is the relation between the beginning or axial event and the pursuit or notion of value in a life?

2. What is the relation between memoirs and Lonergan’s two modes of knowing and doing, direct and introspective dealing with the data of sense and the coincident data of consciousness? It seems that memoirs slip almost seamlessly between the two modes yet the account of the awakening in the life to a path is clearly an objectification of the self consciousness involved.

3. What clarifications of the meaning of introspection might be found in memoir writing? Do memoirs need to be read from the perspective of Lonergan’s two modes of operation? There are descriptions by Oz and other of the details of their life world, the kibbutz and its library or the laboratory. There are also descriptions of the inner transformations that went on in him and Crick and Jacob. In this we come face to face in our reading of memoirs with references to both the imaginable data of sense and the unimaginable data of self awareness or consciousness.

4. Are the desires of the mind and heart purely active throughout

\(^{25}\) Progoff, The Dynamics of Hope, 216-17;
the transformation or at times passive, acted upon and being transformed as well as acting and transforming?

5. As memoir involves hindsight and memory, what light does it throw on the time relations between the two modes of knowing and doing? It is only much later in the lives of Crick, Watson, Jacob and Oz that the significance of earlier conscious events can be understood.

6. Of importance is the usually ignored and even anonymous desire of the researcher or author that firstly, solves the problems or writes the books, and subsequently composes the memoir or biography. In the latter Crick and Jacob both clearly describe the puzzlement of the desire of the mind in problem solving but it is also involved in the very authoring of their memoirs. That dynamic desire as experienced has both an intellectual and an ethical dimension. Ethically it affirms that the scientific problem is worth solving, the novel worth writing, and an account of the creative life itself is worth narrating. Intellectually the memoir involves the effort of mind and memory to recall and understand the problem solving and novel authoring. One and the same desire of the mind can be both the mover and the moved in both the direct mode of the life as lived and the introspective modes of reflection on the life, the latter being dependent on the former.

7. Before the mind's desire acted there was simply a blank page in the scientific research, novel writing and the derivative memoirs. Its acting precedes the words of the text and in this sense it is the creative source and author of the subsequent filling of the pages with meaningful scientific symbols, equations and words. For Bergman, the sources of our creativity are always like background music in a movie. They are never on the screen and quite difficult to prise out into our focal attentiveness.

8. That elusive desire and related insights are the source of the linguistic text. Every word, sentence and paragraph of the composition is scrutinized by it. It is the highly elusive preconceptual and preverbal source and cause in us of all language and meaning. It requires unusual self-alertness to
tune into this phenomenon.

9. The same desires are also the highly elusive source in the reader by means of which the meaning and reference of the text is grasped. In many instances for expert readers the awareness involved in assimilating the meaning of the text is extremely evasive.26 Only when, like the young Collingwood, one encounters realms whose meaning are beyond one's current competence does a smooth reading of a text give way to puzzlement and frustration in which the awareness of the learning process or of the need to learn become heightened.

These questions are to be read as also running through the next section of the paper.

II. THE PATTERN OF ROADS TAKEN AND NOT TAKEN IN LONERGAN'S LIFE

The middle, the chapters that grow out of the beginning of a life story, is complex. In many lives the different chapters that follow are defined by the emergence of new themes and with them specific problems to be addressed and solved in those chapters. In the adult life of Martin Luther King a first chapter was concerned with repealing the laws of segregation in the buses. This gave way to general segregation laws and voting rights. Eventually his agenda, to the dismay of some of his followers, enlarged to address the question of poverty in the United States. His final enlargement came in his personal opposition to the war in Vietnam. He became the conscience of America. In the case of an author the chapters could be related to book projects, a research scientist to a succession of problems in the field. Donald Knuth has an interesting spin on how the subsequent problems in a career in computer programme development came to him.

It's not true that necessity is the only mother or father of invention....[A] person has to have the right background for the problem. I don't just go around working on every problem that I see. The ones I solve I say, oh, man, I have a unique

background that might let me solve it—it's my destiny, my responsibility.27

Similar issues arise in the emergent beginning and later chapter structure of the dramatic life of the family and more generally interpersonal relations with, as Progoff's notes, an unfolding dialectic of hope and anxiety.28 In each instance there is involved a spreading out and growth from the original inspiration.

Around 1992 after accumulating a huge amount of information about the life of Lonergan I asked myself, what was the most important thing to try and understand about him? The answer came in the insight that it was the desire that motivated his life. Only recently has the significance of that question and subsequent insights and text for a phenomenology of the dynamism of consciousness become apparent to me. As memoirs illuminate elements of a phenomenology of the transcendental notions so also do biographies, especially those concerned with the intellectual and ethical patterns of living. The next challenge in building up our linguistic image will be to link our previous considerations of the beginning of a story with the broader domain of the roads taken and not taken in the life of Lonergan as a whole. The decisions involved move him towards his original inspiration and from it into the major works in his life. The perspective will be that of retracing the roads taken and not taken by means of which his life story has progressed to and from an emerging beginning to a later stage.29

In Lonergan's life let us recall the significant fourfold awakening of his intellectual desire on the following occasions:

1926- The Kantian problem of the subject and object of knowledge, of the mind-world relation.
1929-30 The economic problem of the causes of the Depression
1934-35 The problem of a philosophy of history
1938-40 The problem of the method of a historically conscious theology.

28 Ira Progoff's The Dynamics of Hope opens with a beautiful passage on their relation.
What this draws to our attention is that, basically, Lonergan is by nature a problem solver. It is the unsolved problems in each instance that move him. Kant’s *Critique*, he remarked posed a perfect question but followed up with a flawed solution. Although he began with some of the unsolved problems in philosophy there was still a wider openness in his intellectual quest to address some of the big problems of the day. His personal experience of the fallout of the Depression in Montreal posed for him the question: what was the cause of this collapse? His original solution came in terms of an understanding of the manner in which money circulates in proper and dysfunctional manners in an economy. There resulted for him the distinction between the trade cycle and a distinct pure cycle or wave in which all movement is positive.

Similarly his experience while in Rome of the collapse of European history in the thirties made real for him Plato’s question in the *Republic* about the control of history. Again, for him, the solution offered was fatally flawed. In chapter 7 of *Insight* and elsewhere he has attempted a partial response to that problem. Finally, in the course of researching his dissertation topic in theology in the Gregorian University in Rome it became obvious to him that the unhistorical theological paradigm at the time was flawed. It needed to be replaced with a method that took a developmental and historical approach to the problem of interpreting texts and religious history. His major insight into the problem would not occur until 1965 and his book, *Method in Theology* until 1972.

The listing below of the pattern of the roads in Lonergan’s life is to be read as providing a life context for the fourfold awakening and subsequent journeying of his intellectual desire. It is written in the first person to emphasize that concretely Lonergan himself was the subject or object of the decisions. The list needs to be read not statically but dynamically, as a series of unpredictable emergences. Each emergent decision was in a sense a preparation for the next but at the time of its emergence there was no awareness or even anticipation of what the next might be. Each was heralded, both in its emergence and being lived out, by the dialectic of hope and anxiety, in some cases perhaps gentle, in others intense. Connecting them was a dynamism at work in Lonergan’s consciousness which, combined with the emerging force of circumstances, would move him towards the next decision. Involved was a process of ethical finality in which, after each decision, some new
schemes of recurrence would come into play in his life and some old ones be discarded.

**Patterns of Roads Taken and Not Taken, Decisions made by and for Lonergan**

I. Decisions Toward the Beginning

1. In 1918, just short of my 14th birthday with my father I decided to go to Loyola Montreal rather than Ottawa University.
2. In 1920-1 on a street car in Montreal I decided to join the Jesuits rather than the Brothers.
3. In the fall of 1926 I was sent to Heythrop College, Oxon for my philosophy studies – encountered Kant’s perfect question etc.

II. Decisions on the Road to Insight

4. In the fall of 1930 I was sent to teach at Loyola, Montreal.
5. At the start of the 30s I began part time research/exploration on the question of the causes of the Depression.
6. In 1933 a decision was made to hold me back for one year from my theology studies.
7. In 1934 I was sent to the Gregorian for theology studies. This option was not available in 1933 so, providentially, the delay made it a possibility.
8. In 1937 I was chosen for postgraduate studies in the Gregorian and shortly after donated as a professor to the Gregorian University upon graduation.
9. In 1938 Charles Boyer chose my dissertation topic. In the course of researching it the question of method of a developmentally and historically conscious theology began to open up.
10. In 1940 because of the war a decision was made in Rome to send me back to Canada to L’Immaculee Montreal in 1940. I had a very light teaching load there for several years. (If I had remained in Rome it is possible that *Insight* would never have been written!)
11. In 1943 I made the decision, inspired by Hoenen’s articles, to research and compose the *Verbum* articles.
12. In 1944, because of the poor response, I decided to discontinue my part time work on economics.

13. In 1945 I was invited to give a course of lectures at the Thomas More Institute. In the light of the positive response towards the end of this course I made the decision to write a book that would turn out to be *Insight*.

14. In 1947 it was decided to move me from Montreal to Toronto to teach theology. There I composed *Insight* between 1949 and 1953.

III. The Road to Method in Theology

15. In 1953 the Gregorian University requested me to return there to teach theology.

16. In 1957 after a conversation with Michael Longman I made the decision to write a book on *Method in Theology*. From now on it became the focus of my energies.

17. In February of 1965 I had the key insight into the Functional Specialties. In July of 1965 I was diagnosed as having lung cancer and operated on. It took me a year to recover my energies as an author and I began to write up *Method in Theology* in 1966. It was published in 1972.

IV. The Return to Economics

18. In 1974 I decided to return to my earlier work and interest in economics. One of my reasons was the emerging interest in justice questions.

All of these decisions are connected with the "beginning." As the decision to send Lonergan to Heythrop resulted in him finding his vocation in philosophy, so the intellectual desires awakened there moved him to the point when in 1946 he decided to write the book *Insight*, and between 1949 and 1953 he brought the work to completion. In all the years in between the dynamism of his consciousness, the personal journey of his transcendental notions was at work, day after day, hour after hour as partially narrated in *Lonergan's Quest* on these issues.
In this sense the decisions are not just a list of isolated episodes but connect through the dynamic and emergent process of selfhood in time.

Related is the notion of transformative writing in the author and transformative reading in the reader. In the initial stages of composing *Lonergan's Quest*, my heuristic notion of "the desire that authored *Insight*" was quite empty. As the process of authoring expanded I began to gain a greater sense of the object of my quest. But only when it was over did I come to the further realization that the dynamism of my own self-consciousness was involved in composing the narrative about the dynamism of the self consciousness of the subject of the work. A similar transformation can take place in the self-consciousness of readers of such works: firstly there is the spontaneous attempt to understand the dynamism of the life of the subject and secondly, the recognition that that same process is involved in one's reading. As reaching that level of understanding did not come easily to me, so also I suspect will it be the case with the reader.

Two selective perspectives of the wider narrative image have been presented, awakenings and roads taken and not taken. At the start of the paper it was stated that the working position was that all understanding, all insights are into imaginative presentations. From this perspective the linguistic account of the "Narrative Beginning" and "The Roads Taken and Not Taken" are elements of the appropriate image. Clearly the insights are not some kind of intuitive look into the unimaginable transcendental notions but access them through the derived linguistic expressions. The insights are not into the words as sensible images or signs but into the sense and reference of those words. The images and questions posed find further focus in the issues listed below.

### III. QUESTIONS ABOUT THE IMAGINATIVE CORRELATES OF OUR UNDERSTANDING OF THE DYNAMISM OF CONSCIOUSNESS

1. What clarifications does the meaning of the linguistic image of the emergent roads taken and not taken in a life provide of the personal values of its subject and related culture?
2. What is the contribution to the image of the intelligible
elements of the problem necessary in order to understand the transcendental notions of the two previous sketches of the beginning and the roads taken and not taken in a life? As what we are trying to understand is the unimaginable dynamism of consciousness the proportionate image must be dynamic. Accordingly it must be read not as a list but as the image of an emerging process. In “reading” that process one must consider each point in time and develop a sense that at that point the future is an open and obscure nothingness. At a certain point the scientific problem is not solved, the next book of the author not written. The future arrives in the form of a series of emergences, some hoped for, and others unpredictable.

3. The question arises: what is moving the process? Desire? Two notions help focus the issue, authoring and problem solving. In both there is the distinction in the process between the activity and the product, the formulated solution in a research paper or the printed text. In this the desire is not just the author of the product, but also of the reality of the agent, the author or problem solver. Is it the source of creativity and solutions to problems and of the narratives that emerge in memoirs? Does that emergent process in time have an intelligibility, form distinct from the form of the product? Does memoir reveal it to be a narrative? Not in the sensible words but in their sense and reference as mediating the emergence of the life story do we understand the transcendental notions of its subject?

4. To grasp some understanding of the transcendental notions one has to grasp how they are the pre-verbal authors of both the direct discovery process in science and in the case of Oz, novel writings and of the subsequent derivative memoir narrative. Before the awakening of the desire to understand or author there are only blank pages. In the process of problem solving the unthinkable and unsayable comes to be thought, spoken and verbally expressed on the pages. This preverbal nature of the transcendental notions, acknowledged in their own way by Tóibín and Bergman, is their strangest and most elusive quality. Equally there is the verifiable change their operation brings about in the agent.
5. The dynamic verbal image is of the process of problem solving or memoir writing in which the original emptiness of the mind of the agent and of the page becomes filled and refilled with emergent meaning. The desire that moves the process is like background music, always somewhat anonymous, never to be found in the written words. The emergent linguistic narrative as image points to it.

IV. ON CONSCIOUSNESS, CREATIVITY, AND THE HUMAN SPIRIT

The previous points suggest that what Lonergan means by the dynamism of consciousness or the transcendental notions could also be interpreted as the creative spirit of the human being. That spirit can be thought of as wonder, the desire to understand and make sense of things, all forms of inquiry. It is the source of our creativity and the origin of our thoughts and language. It underpins the processes of problem solving in science, in the interpersonal and social dramas of our daily lives, and in authoring. It resides like background music in the creative authoring of novels and poems by authors such as Amos Oz and Seamus Heaney. Francis Crick and François Jacob in their memoirs have succeeded in giving it expression without the former realizing its human significance.

That creative spirit is developmental. It grows in the course of a lifetime, and is constantly challenged to overcome the biases or outmoded solutions of our intelligence by achieving ever greater openness to the real world. Involved in it are the dialectical struggles of truth and falsity, of good and evil, of love and selfishness, of authenticity.


31 Jimmy Doherty in the BBC 2 TV Series, Darwin’s Garden, “Of Apes and Man,” 19 March 2009 performs on camera Darwin’s experiment of placing a snake in a chimpanzee compound to see if chimps enjoy a human-like curiosity. He concludes that both are curious, humans simply enjoying a more developed form, that is say a matter of degree rather than of kind. I disagree. There are two kinds of wonder/curiosity, instinctive and intellectual. What the chimps exhibited was the former, instinctive. What distinguishes it is its complete lack of interest in explanation, in answering the what or why questions which we find in the discourses of Socrates – what is virtue? – and the related quest for explanation which dominates the Einstein-like curiosity of modern science.
and inauthenticity, and of hope and anxiety. Such take place within the individual and the community which usually looks askance on whistle blowers and prophets. In time in interaction with the force of circumstances in which the life is lived it comes to forge the narrative identity of the person.

The human spirit is in the world and the world is in the spirit. There is no Kantian bridge between human inquiry and the worlds of nature and culture. The desire of the mind is awakened by its direct engagement with the perplexities of nature and the waxing and waning of the cultural human situations in which it lives. The source of the problem in the world is not "out there" and spirit as inquiry somewhere "in here." They are related by a direct and intimate causal interaction. The problem situation in the world causes the questions in the agent.

The spirit of the human is also totally embodied. As Aristotle would have it, it is the emerging form of the life of the body. It is awakened by the presentation through our embodied senses of the data in the world to be explained. Every decision to embark on some course of action in the world or on some creative research or to write a book has to be worked out and carried by our body. In this process spirit and matter/body live and interact together as, in the words of the French philosopher, Francis Jeanson, eternal (but intimate) strangers.\(^3\)

Spirit as both intellectual and ethical has inseparable sensory and neural correlates. In order to understand particular problems the imaginative elements of the problem must be assembled. That imaginative process has neural correlates. The exploration of the neural correlates of insights is now a part of the neurosciences.\(^3\) In the process of learning a language or how to play a piano concerto our understanding programs and reprograms the potentials present on the neural level. Such interactive programming of the intellectual with the sensory and neural in some sense involves the emergence of


\(^{33}\) Mark Jung-Beeman and others, "Neural Activity When People Solve Verbal Problems with Insight," *PLos Biol.*, 2004; 2 no. 4, e97, 13 April 2004. See also the reference to John Kounios's work at Drexel University in *Discover*, July/August 2009, 25. The brain scans capture the changing relation with the context of the imaginative presentations of the problem when the insight occurs, but not with the sense and reference of the words involved.
appropriate algorithms which when consciously or habitually activated cause otherwise coincidental aggregates of neural and sensory events to recur in our living in our world. The process can become as complex as learning a language, a piano concerto, one's lines in a play or sequence of steps in a ballet. Each stage of development constitutes the spring board for the next.

The human spirit is also irreducible. Potentially, as the restlessness of scientific research illustrates, it is fitted to an understanding and mastery of the entire problem structure of the universe. As a desire to be loving, to do something worthwhile in one's life and be affirmed as lovable it does not reduce to and cannot be explained in terms of anything less than itself.

Spirit is interpersonal, dialogical and communicative. It is a desire to love and to be loved, appreciated by the other for who one truly is yet at its centre there is an experience of loneliness. Because of limitations the present emphasis has of necessity been on its more academic and literary expression. The larger part of its reality is its incarnation and operation in interpersonal relations and family life. There we live out in dialogue our I-Thou meetings, and in mismeetings our it-it relations; we engage in the discourse in trust about life and of its vicissitudes with some, are mistrustful of others. Truly falling in love and subsequently learning authentically to love the other in our mutual struggles, finitude and flawedness is the central drama of the human spirit. But it is in the very journey of love in our lives that we come to learn about a real and unavoidable inner personal loneliness. That loneliness can never be filled utterly by the companionship of others and is shocked by the grief that we experience on the death someone deeply loved. As Rilke puts it: "Friendship consists in this: That two solitudes bound and guard and greet each other." Genuine love protects us from the unfilled loneliness of spirit that we are but seemingly cannot provide a substitute for whatever it is that we long for.

The human spirit as desire is also startlingly and elusively strange. In the Verbum articles Lonergan remarked that the spirit of inquiry was the closest thing in us to the divine. Later he wrote

an article about a natural desire in us to know God. In the course of authoring Lonergan’s Quest I found my own desire to understand his desire awakened. It was a long and difficult ascent. In the course of it I began to appreciate that the desire in me to understand Lonergan or any other human being was one and the same desire in me that desires to understand and know God, not conceptually or abstractly, but concretely.

Scientific materialism will have no truck with this language of spirit and creativity. There is just the material world “out there” to be understood and mastered. In particular there are “other brains out there” and when they are mastered by the neurosciences and their consciousness studies we will have the key to it all. At the core of their doctrines is a taboo of scientific subjectivity, usually justified on the grounds that the truth claims of that realm cannot be verified by the methods of science are so are to be dismissed. It follows that there can never be an explanation of the creative process of scientific discovery and insight. But this involves a denial of the reality of the first person self consciousness that does science or authors texts. One way of overcoming this blind spot is through the authoring and reading of more memoirs of discovery. This narrative turn, embracing both memoir and biography, has a necessary and essential contribution to make to a phenomenology of the transcendental notions, of the dynamism of the spirit of the human.

REVISITING CATHOLIC SOCIAL DOCTRINE

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INTRODUCTION

I WOULD LIKE to do three interrelated things in the one-hour timeslot that we have before us:

1) First, I would like to lead you through an exercise – an experiment, really – that I've developed for leaders (clergy and lay) of Catholic parishes and organizations. This exercise has been designed to help such leaders discover what they are actually doing when they are engaged in responsible decision-making.

2) The second thing I would like to do is to report on what emerges when such an exercise is carried out with parish leaders – how their horizons are expanded and how obstacles to conversion manifest themselves.

3) The third thing I would like to do is show how such an exercise – and especially having to deal with situations like those which inspired the scenario used in this particular exercise – raises questions as to the normative character of the principles of the Catholic Social Doctrine (CSD) in pluralist, secularized societies. Would such an exercise point to the relevance of presenting CSD, not in the language of classicist culture, but in a language and with categories grounded in interiorly differentiated consciousness? How would a situation, like the one depicted in the scenario, be treated by persons who were religiously,
morally and intellectually converted and who relied on categories grounded in interiorly differentiated consciousness?

I. DISCOVERING WHAT I'M DOING WHEN I'M ENGAGED IN RESPONSIBLE DECISION-MAKING

You should have in your possession three 8½ by 14-inch sheets. (The page with colour is for later.) You will need the two black and white pages to carry out the exercise – which, as I said, is really an experiment.

Let’s look at the SCENARIO in Annex A. (Read through the text of the scenario.)

The principles of Catholic Social Doctrine (identified as such in the Compendium of the Social Doctrine of the Church) are set out in the left column of the document in Annex C: respect for human dignity, the common good, the universal destination of goods (which grounds the preferential option for the poor), subsidiarity, participation, and solidarity. Note how these principles are presented in the normative language of classicist culture. These are the “received meanings” that we will be working with in the course of our experiment. They are, of course, the “received meanings” with which parish leaders are more familiar.

In the right column, you can see that interiorly differentiated consciousness can ground theological categories from which might be derived doctrines that correspond to the CSD principles listed in the left column. We will be returning to this in the third and final part of this presentation.

If you so wish, you may turn to your neighbour and carry out this exercise together. Select one of these principles and see how that principle can act as a lens enabling you to grasp insights into this scenario. You may wish to repeat the exercise using another principle as a lens. (This part of the exercise should enable you to grasp the

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2 In the same way that the Hubble telescope uses different filters to allow specific wavelengths of light to come through and thereby permit the study of invisible as well as visible features of a celestial object, so the principles of CSD constitute filters permitting different kinds of questions and concerns to emerge regarding the same situation.
importance of perspectives\(^3\)

Note that, if we had the whole afternoon (as I usually have when I carry out this exercise with parish leaders), I would be inviting you to work in groups of five or six (the dynamics of small groups are important) and then I would be listing on a blackboard, under each CSD principle, the insights, questions and concerns which would have emerged in your small group when you considered the scenario through the lens of a particular principle.

Now I invite you to decide what would be the best course of action in these particular circumstances. What would you do in this situation? Please take careful note of what is taking place within your own consciousness as you struggle to come to a decision.

When I carry out this exercise with parish leaders, I usually write on a blackboard (or on large sheets that can be stuck to the wall) the decisions which each small group has arrived at. I insist however that I am not as much interested in the conclusions at which they arrived as in the operations that spontaneously occurred within them in the process of arriving at their conclusion. This is by far the most important part of the exercise: the participants become aware of what took place in themselves as they engaged in responsible decision-making.

At this point, I would normally review the operations involved in the decision-making process. Look at Annex “B”. You will surely recognize the operations that occur at the fourth level of intentional consciousness.

When I carry out this exercise with parish leaders, I strive to enable them to grasp how these operations, constituting the existential structure, enable them to become actors shaping not only the world around them but also their very selves.

II. WHAT HAPPENS WHEN PARISH LEADERS ENGAGE IN THIS EXERCISE: PRELIMINARY FINDINGS

Context

The Archdiocese of Montréal, where I have most often carried out this experiment, has over 1.6 million baptized members. It is at

\(^3\) On “perspectivism” and what it is not, see Method in Theology, at 217-18.
the centre of the Québec Church, which, over the past forty years, has gone through repeated breakdowns in respect of common meanings, notably as regards freedom and authority, human sexuality and the role of women.4

As director of the diocesan Social Action Office,5 one of my responsibilities is promoting the social dimension of the Catholic faith experience. Towards that end (and combined with other more experiential approaches), I seek to familiarize parish leaders (both clergy and laity) with the principles of CSD. However, I'm not interested in doing this just to impart general knowledge or to expand Catholics' appreciation of an important cultural legacy. I do this so that leaders of parishes, organizations, and institutions will be better equipped to make decisions in complex situations and contribute to the Church's mission. I like how Robert Doran formulates this mission: "To evoke, through its ministry of transformative praxis, an alternative situation that approximates more closely the rule of God in human affairs."6

The Fourth Level as Entry Point

The particular exercise, which we have just gone through, seeks to familiarize parish leaders not only with the principles of CSD, but more importantly with the operations that occur at the fourth level of intentional consciousness, that of responsible decision-making. My contention is that such exercises help such leaders become more aware of themselves, specifically of their own existential consciousness. Lonergan writes in Method in Theology, at pages 38-39:

[T]he development of knowledge and the development of moral feeling head to the existential discovery, the discovery of oneself

4 Method in Theology, 356: "Community is not just an aggregate of individuals within a frontier, for that overlooks its formal constituent, which is common meaning. Such common meaning calls for a common field of experience and, when that is lacking, people get out of touch. It calls for common or complementary ways of understanding and, when they are lacking, people begin to misunderstand, to distrust, to suspect, to fear, to resort to violence. It calls for common judgments and, when they are lacking, people reside in different worlds. It calls for common values, goals, policies and when they are lacking, people operate at cross-purposes."

5 As such, I am seriously engaged in what Lonergan calls "practical theology," the effective communication of Christ's message. See Method in Theology, 362.

6 Theology and the Dialectics of History, 109.
as a moral being, the realization that one not only chooses between courses of action but also thereby makes oneself an authentic human being or an unauthentic one. With that discovery, there emerges in consciousness the significance of personal value and meaning of personal responsibility. One's judgments of value are revealed as the door to one's fulfilment or to one's loss. Experience, especially repeated experience, of one's frailty or wickedness raises the question of one's salvation and, on a more fundamental level, there arises the question of God.

It seems to me that people find it easier to become aware of the operations which make up the existential structure than to become aware of the operations which make up the cognitional structure. I have thought that, once persons become aware of what they are doing when they are engaged in responsible decision-making, some of them would want to become aware of what they are doing when they are knowing. This has not usually been the case. Why? I will try to answer this question a little later on when I discuss the obstacles to intellectual conversion.

Conversions and Overcoming Obstacles to Conversion

I begin with people where they are at and I operate on the premise that they are doing the best they can at their current stage of personal development. Just as they are summoned to religious, moral and intellectual conversions, so am I called to embrace these conversions in my own life. When I speak about parish leaders, I'm well aware that I am also speaking about myself.

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7 *Method in Theology*, 121: “The fourth level, which presupposes, complements, and sublates the other three, is the level of freedom and responsibility, of moral self-transcendence and in that sense of existence, of self-direction and self-control. Its failure to function properly is the uneasy or the bad conscience. Its success is marked by the satisfying feeling that one's duty has been done.”

8 *Method in Theology*, 240. To help persons achieve such awareness, I have developed another exercise, loosely based on Phil McShane's famous story of finding oneself on the beach. Some of my colleagues have labeled the exercise I have developed to generate such cognitional awareness "Lonergan meets Baywatch!" See Annex E.
Bernard Lonergan’s threefold conversions provide useful criteria for analyzing what takes place in parish leaders when they participate in the above exercise.

i) Religious Conversion

The parish people who participate in this exercise are persons who have been deeply marked by God’s love pouring into their hearts, through the Holy Spirit (Romans 5:5). It is unlikely that they would come out on a frigid Saturday in the middle of winter if they had not experienced God’s love for them and a genuine desire to contribute to the Reign of God through active involvement in the life of the local Church.

Their experience of God’s love, however, can be mediated not only through family and friends, but also through an institution which can become the object, not of a critical love, but of blind obedience. Hence, instead of engaging in responsible decision-making, some parish leaders will base their decision on what they think their parish priest would prefer or on what will make the bishop happy.9

The exercise which we carried out enables parish leaders to become aware of the demands of responsible decision-making. It can also point them towards the significance of the critical function of transcendental method.10

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9 In his discussion of special theological categories at pages 283-84 of Method in Theology, Lonergan draws a distinction between being in love in an unrestricted manner (1) as it is defined, and (2) as it is achieved. “As it is defined, it is the habitual actuation of man’s capacity for self-transcendence; it is the religious conversion that grounds both moral and intellectual conversion; it provides the real criterion by which all else is to be judged; and consequently one has only to experience it in oneself or witness it in others, to find in it its own justification. On the other hand, as it actually is achieved in any human being, the achievement is dialectical. It is authenticity as a withdrawal from unauthenticity, and the withdrawal is never complete and always precarious. The greatest of saints have not only their oddities but also their defects, and it is not some but all of us that pray, not out of humility but in truth, to be forgiven our trespasses as we forgive those that trespass against us. Accordingly, while there is not need to justify critically the charity described by St. Paul in the thirteenth chapter of his first epistle to the Corinthians, there is always great need to eye very critically any religious individual or group and to discern beyond the real charity they may well have been granted the various types of bias that may distort or block their exercise of it” (my emphasis).

10 Method in Theology, 20 ff.
ii) Moral Conversion

People actively engaged in the life of a parish tend to be very generous, out-going persons. They want to do the “right thing.”

The exercise seems to expand their notion of what is of value in a situation like the one described in the scenario (which may very well resemble the kinds of situation they have previously encountered). The exercise certainly invites them to transcend paternalistic attitudes and to ask questions about how they might help the women develop their potentialities. In other words, the exercise may help them grasp some of the elements of the “human good” set out in the famous chart found on page 48 of Method in Theology. For example, while some parish leaders might suggest that the collective kitchen become a “parish project,” others might grasp that to do so might undermine the women’s efforts to exercise liberty, to develop their own matrix of personal relations and to affirm themselves as originating values capable of bringing about terminal values (namely a good of order that is truly good and instances of the particular good that are truly good).  

The exercise also illustrates how, in opting to renew the lease to the women’s group, the parishioners may be called to choose value (and at times, a certain messiness) over the satisfaction of running a parish that conforms to every social and ecclesial norm. “What is good, always is concrete.” The exercise will also very likely uncover and even possibly root out individual, group and common sense biases.

iii) Intellectual Conversion

Intellectual conversion is “a radical clarification and, consequently, the elimination of an exceedingly stubborn and misleading myth concerning reality, objectivity and human knowledge” by which persons spontaneously assume that “knowing is like looking, that objectivity is

11 Method in Theology, 50.
12 Method in Theology, 240.
13 Method in Theology, 27.
14 Method in Theology. “One has to keep developing one’s knowledge of human reality and potentiality as they are in the existing situation. One has to keep distinct its elements of progress and its elements of decline. One has to keep scrutinizing one’s intentional responses to values and their implicit scale of preference. One has to listen to criticism and to protest. One has to remain ready to learn from others.”
seeing what is there to be seen and not seeing what is not there, and that the real is what is out there now to be looked at.”

Intellectual conversion consists in the “discovery of the self-transcendence proper to the human process of coming to know”, in other words, the recognition and appropriation of the radical dynamism and structure of one’s own cognitive capacities and operations.

The exercise above can certainly uncover the presence of these exceedingly stubborn and misleading myths to which Lonergan refers in his discussion of intellectual conversion.

For most parish people, knowing consists in taking a good look. As naïve realists, they do not grasp that knowing results from the interaction of the operations of experiencing, understanding and judging. They are very likely to make decisions about a situation in respect of which they have inaccurate criteria for determining what is true and what is real. And biases regarding minorities, such as the women portrayed in the scenario, can over time lead to distortion, exclusion and ultimately violence.

For many parish people what is real is “what is already out there now,” not that which can be intelligently grasped and critically affirmed. They do not understand the world as mediated by meaning and oriented towards value. In other words, they may have difficulty grasping that, in our scenario, the women’s sense of identity, their understanding of the local church and their participation in society may be mediated by a set of meanings and values that are different from their own. They cannot imagine how different their world is from the world that the women know.

Furthermore, the parish wardens, who are responsible for the financial administration of the parish and who are often empiricists (with a strong tendency towards pragmatism), might only be concerned

15 *Method in Theology*, 238.

16 “The criteria of objectivity are not just the criteria of ocular vision; they are the compounded criteria of experiencing, understanding, judging, and believing.” *Method in Theology*, 238.

17 “For the world mediated by meaning is a world known not by the sense experience of an individual but by the external and internal experience of a cultural community, and by the continuously checked and rechecked judgments of the community. Knowing, accordingly, is not just seeing; it is experiencing, understanding, judging, and believing” (*Method in Theology*, 238).
with the financial repercussions of renewing the lease to the women's group: the loss of a potential increase in revenue, the risk of driving away from the parish potential donors. The wardens might ask what is the point of offering advantageous leasing conditions to women who will not come to the parish liturgies and who will not enrol their children in Sunday School and sacramental preparation. In other words, the wardens' considerations will be focused only on visible factors that can be tabulated and accordingly they will discard entire dimensions of meaning and value. As empiricists, the facts in the situation are reduced to "what is out there" and "what is capable of being looked at."18

For other parish leaders, whom Lonergan might characterize as idealists, the facts are "mental constructions carefully based on data recorded in documents."19 For them, the women are engaged in lifestyles and advocate positions that are clearly contrary to the Church's teaching. This in itself constitutes sufficient evidence for arriving at a judgment as to the truth of the situation. Consequently, the parish should have nothing more to do with these women.

Why is it so difficult to reverse these counter-positions and to embrace Lonergan's positions? What are the obstacles to intellectual conversion?

As I pointed out earlier, the parish people I tend to work with are well intentioned, very generous persons - many with professional or business backgrounds - who basically operate out of common sense. They are very busy. After all, as Lonergan points out, "they have the world's work to do."20 Very few are aware of differentiation of consciousness. Most become quite impatient when I refer to the realm of theory,21 even

18 Method in Theology, 239. I love the famous line from Albert Einstein: "Not everything that can be counted counts, and not everything that counts can be counted."
19 Method in Theology, 239.
20 Insight, 202.
21 Insight, 201-202: "Common sense, on the other hand, has no theoretical inclinations. It remains completely in the familiar world of things for us. The further questions by which it accumulates insights are bounded by the interests and concerns of human living, by successful performance of daily task, by the discovery of immediate solutions that will work. Indeed, the supreme canon of common sense is the restriction of further questions to the realm of the concrete and particular, the immediate and practical. To advance in common sense is to restrain the omnivorous drive of inquiring intelligence and to brush aside as irrelevant, if not silly, any question whose answer would not make an immediate palpable difference. Just as the scientist rises in stern protest against
though in their professional lives (as accountants or technicians) they may in fact be acquainted with theory.22 While they might agree that a particular situation may be grasped not only from the standpoint of common sense, but also from the standpoint of theory, they have difficulty arriving at interiority, that heightening of intentional consciousness, whereby they might attend not merely to the situation as object, but also to themselves as intending subjects engaged in the compound operations of experiencing, understanding and judging. Rare are those who are moving from the outer realms of common sense and of theory, to the appropriation of their own interiority, their own subjectivity, their structure, their norms, their potentialities.23 Only setbacks and failures enable them to grasp the pitfalls resulting from common sense bias and to understand the need for self-appropriation that will lead to interior and religious differentiation of consciousness.

It is my hope that carrying out exercises (like the one we did together) will not merely enable church leaders to be aware of the decisions they make within their current horizon (a horizontal exercise of freedom), but rather become aware how, through their judgments and decisions, they can move from one horizon to another (a vertical exercise of freedom).24 Unless the horizon of its leaders is broadened, deepened and enriched, unless its leaders are willing move into a new horizon requiring an about-face in its ways of judging and deciding, the church will not be able to be (in Robert Doran’s words) a catalytic agent of transition from the prevailing situation to an alternative situation that approximated more closely the rule of God in human affairs.25

the introduction into his field of metaphysical questions that do not satisfy his canon of selection, so the man of common sense (and nothing else) is ever on his guard against all theory, ever blandly asking the proponent of ideas what difference they would make, and if the answer is less vivid and less rapid than an advertisement, then solely concerned with thinking up an excuse for getting rid of the fellow.”

22 Method in Theology, 81 ff.
23 Method in Theology, 83. Such appropriation is facilitated by answering Lonergan’s famous three questions: “What am I doing when I am knowing? Why is doing that knowing? What do I know when I do it?” (83 and 261).
24 Method in Theology, 237.
III. A TRANSCULTURAL CATHOLIC SOCIAL DOCTRINE ROOTED IN INTERIORITY

As we saw in the first part of this presentation (just before we began the exercise), the principles of CSD are usually presented in the classicist language of conciliar and papal documents (see Annex C). We saw how using these principles, even as they reflect a classicist mind-set, enable participants in the exercise to better grasp what they are doing when they are engaged in responsible decision-making.

But CSD could also be presented in a language and with categories grounded in interiorly differentiated consciousness. Bernard Lonergan explains in the chapter *Foundations* that once the basic terms and conditions of intentional consciousness have been clarified, the following general categories can be distinguished and described:

1) the different kinds of conscious operation that occur;
2) the patterns of experience within which these operations occur;
3) the different qualities of consciousness in experiencing, understanding, judging and deciding;
4) the different manners in which these operations proceed towards goals: the manners of common sense, theory, interiority and philosophy, and of the life of prayer and theology;
5) the different realms of meaning and the different worlds that

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26 See "The Transition from a Classicist World-View to Historical Mindedness," *Second Collection*, 5-6. There are, of course, the special categories grounded in religiously differentiated consciousness, but it would be beyond the scope of this paper to discuss them at any length. I will limit myself to listing whence these special categories are derived: 1) religious experience; 2) subjects together in community, serving, witnessing, promoting the reign of God; 3) our implicit intending of God in all our intending and how the source of this intending lies in the Trinity; 4) differentiating between authenticity and unauthenticity (what appears authentic to an unauthentic person is unauthentic); 5) progress, decline and redemption, not only in the world, but also in the church! See *Method in Theology*, 290-91.

27 For every term and relation there will exist a corresponding element in intentional consciousness. See *Method in Theology*, 343.

28 *Method in Theology*, 286-87. "But how does one get from transcendental method to general categories?" This question was posed to Bernard Lonergan by Robert Doran. Complicate the basic structure of the transcendental method was Lonergan’s answer, given at a lecture at Boston College in the summer of 1968. See Doran’s discussion in *What Is Systematic Theology?* 179-80. Functional specialties represent an example of complicating the basic structure.
result: world of immediacy, the world of common sense, the world of the sciences, the world of interiority and philosophy, the world of religion and theology;

6) the diverse heuristic structures within which the operations accumulate: classical, statistical, genetic, dialectical, and embracing them all an integral heuristic structure (which is what Lonergan means by metaphysics);

7) the various differentiations of consciousness;

8) religious, moral, intellectual and psychic conversions;

9) dialectics of contraries and dialectics of contradictories (such as the opposition between positions and counter-positions);

10) development not only “from below upwards,” but also “from above downwards.”

To this list, Robert Doran has added some other general categories, including the integral scale of values, based on Lonergan’s discussion of how feelings respond to values in accord with a scale of preference. The response of feelings to values, as we saw in our exercise, plays an important role in responsible decision-making.

One might well ask how Lonergan derived the ascending scale of values (vital, social, cultural, personal, religious) from the basic structure of intentional consciousness. For Doran, “the scale is based on the increasing degrees of self-transcendence to which one is carried or to which a community is carried in response to values at the different levels.” Doran asserts that the levels of value are isomorphic with the levels of consciousness, so that vital values correspond to experience, social values to understanding, cultural values to reflection and judgment, personal values to deliberation and decision, and religious values to God’s gift of love.

With these categories grounded in interiorly differentiated

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29 I.e. Attentive experience → intelligent understanding → critical judgment → and responsible decision-making. (Elsewhere Lonergan describes this dynamic as the creative vector.)

30 I.e. Affectivity → apprehension of values → belief → growth in understanding → experiential confirmation (which then triggers the creative vector). (The “from above downwards” dynamic is described elsewhere by Lonergan as the healing vector.) See “Natural Right and Historical Mindedness,” in A Third Collection, at 181.

31 Method in Theology, 31.

consciousness, Lonergan asserts that we can come "to a developed account of the human good, values, beliefs, to the carriers, elements, functions, realms, and stages of meaning, to the question of God, of religious experience, its expressions, its dialectical development."33

Having established that CSD can be presented using categories grounded in interiorly differentiated consciousness, what might be the advantages of so doing? For Robert Doran such an effort will enable Christians to affirm what they believe as true and value as good, "not with a relatively stable set of cultural meanings and values, but with an emergent set required to meet the exigencies of the present social order." He goes on to claim that such an effort, which is the urgent task of systematic theology, would catalyze "the emergence of a new set of cultural values, a set that itself is crossculturally generated."

Systematic theology today will be contributing to the emergence of a new cultural matrix, in a fashion that can truly be called axial or epochal. It will be forging some of the very materials of constitutive meaning required for the emergence of a legitimate alternative to the present situation.34

Interiorly differentiated consciousness, it is claimed, would succeed in generating meanings and values that are transcultural35 and thereby enable CSD to recover universal significance.36 This however presupposes widespread intellectual conversion, which, as we've seen, is no small achievement.

33 Method in Theology, 287.
35 Lonergan asserts that the transcendental method outlined in the first chapter of Method in Theology is transcultural. "Clearly it is not transcultural inasmuch as it is explicitly formulated. But it is transcultural in the realities to which the formulation refers, for these realities are not the product of any culture but, on the contrary, the principles that produce cultures, preserve them, develop them. Moreover, since it is to these realities we refer when we speak of homo sapiens, it follows that these realities are transcultural with respect to all truly human cultures." Method in Theology, 282, 283. See also Doran, Theology and the Dialectics of History, 114.
Consider the ongoing debate about the transcultural validity of human rights. According to CSD, human rights are universally binding because they are rooted in the dignity of the human person. According to Lonergan, respect for human rights is implicit in the categories derived from interiorly differentiated consciousness, especially the transcendental precept "Be responsible," which we explored in the first and second parts of this presentation.

How this transcendental precept binds not only the individual but also a collectivity is approached by Lonergan in his discussion of the dialectic of history in his important essay "Natural Right and Historical Mindedness." I would argue that categories grounded in interiorly differentiated consciousness might provide clarifications and correctives to such principles as the common good and the universal destination of goods. Robert Doran, in his recent What Is Systematic Theology?, has argued that a CSD using categories grounded in interiorly differentiated consciousness might enable emerging doctrines, such as the preferential option for the poor, to be better integrated with other doctrines of the Catholic tradition.

Doran, in his monumental Theology and the Dialectics of History, shows how a category derived from interiorly differentiated consciousness – namely, the integral scale of values – not only identifies the elements of society and their interaction, but also situates them within a theology of grace in history. It is beyond the scope of this presentation to review Doran's thesis. However the chart in Annex D is my attempt to illustrate the dialectics explained by Doran. I believe that it can set the stage for an aggiornamento of Catholic Social Doctrine.

Now, how would such a Catholic Social Doctrine, grounded in interiorly differentiated consciousness, enable parishioners to appreciate the dimensions of meaning in the scenario we considered in

37 On this question, I would strongly urge you to read the article by John C. Haughey, entitled "Responsibility for Human Rights: Contributions from Bernard Lonergan", which appeared in the Theological Studies issue of December 2002 and which was presented at this workshop the previous June. Benedict XVI, in his encyclical of June 2009, "Caritas in veritate," at no. 43, expresses a view similar to Lonergan's: "The sharing of reciprocal duties is a more powerful incentive to action than the mere assertion of rights."

38 A Third Collection, 169 ff.


the first part of this presentation? Would such a transposition, from a classicist mindset to one rooted in interiority, lead to a different outcome in the decision-making process? How might the structure of dialectic, which Lonergan sets out in *Method* at pp. 249-50, be implemented effectively in a parish setting?

In closing, I would refer to the final paragraphs of "*Natural Right and Historical Mindedness*" where Lonergan reminds us that beyond dialectic, there is dialogue. Certainly the parish leaders, to which we referred in our experiment, are part of the dialectic of history. Their decision-making process will be marked by the contradictions of intelligence and obtuseness, reasonableness and silliness, responsibility and sin, love and hatred. Lonergan writes that it may be more helpful for persons such as our parish leaders,

to move beyond dialectic to dialogue, to transpose issues from a conflict of statements to an encounter of persons. For every person is an embodiment of natural right. Every person can reveal to any other his natural propensity to seek understanding, to judge reasonably, to evaluate fairly, to be open to friendship. While the dialectic of history coldly relates our conflicts, dialogue adds the principle that prompts us to cure them, the natural right that is the inmost core of our being.\(^{41}\)

Whatever solution is arrived at through the application of a Catholic Social Doctrine grounded in interiority, dialogue with marginalized persons, like the women in our scenario, must be sought and the conditions for a fruitful dialogue must be put in place. This in turn will require a renewed spirit of collaboration.

**ANNEX A**

**APPROPRIATING THE PRINCIPLES OF CATHOLIC SOCIAL DOCTRINE**

You are the person responsible for a parish in a working-class neighbourhood of a medium-size North American city. Because the number of parishioners who contribute financially to the parish is

\(^{41}\) *A Third Collection*, 182.
declining from year to year, you have been forced to call upon the Diocesan Assistance Fund in order to cover your recurring expenses. To generate some income, you have been renting out space in the basement of your church to certain Christian groups.

A little more than a year ago, a space with a kitchen became available. A group of women, single moms on welfare, approached you. They indicated that they were interested in renting the space which had become available in order to set up a "collective kitchen." You were not surprised when they told you that they could only scrape together the equivalent of 50% of the rent you had been hoping to receive. It turned out that they were really hoping that you would let them have the space rent-free.

Following heated debates at meetings of the parish’s Pastoral Council and Finance Council, you refused a request for the space made by a group of relatively well-off seniors, who had hoped to use the space in question to organize social events once a month. Instead, you decided to offer the space to the group of women, rent-free for one year. Now the time for renewing the agreement has come up.

During the year, you and the other parishioners came to realize that several of the women in the group were living together in same-sex relationships. Furthermore, they had been circulating a petition in the neighbourhood calling for the legal recognition of same-sex marriages. You are relieved that the women never sought out signatures for their petition on church premises.

Recently you were surprised to read in the local newspaper that this group of women was about to hold a fundraising activity where the guest speaker was a woman widely known for her "pro-choice" stance in the abortion debate. This fundraising activity however will not be taking place in the space which they currently use in the church’s basement, but in a local community centre.

Several parishioners, outraged that a women’s group using Church property should be publicly advocating such positions, threaten to call upon the United States Conference of Catholic Bishops and even to write to the Vatican, in order to get you to stop providing space to this group. You have tried to explain to them that this is a matter that should really be dealt with at the parish level. Some parishioners are denouncing you for a lack of solidarity with the Magisterium, while
others have congratulated you for your solidarity with a group of women who are really quite marginalized.

It seems to you that principles of Catholic Social Doctrine are at stake in this matter. But which ones? And at the end of the day, which principle should prevail?

You are invited to join with one or more of your neighbours to speak from the perspective of one of the following principles: a) respect for the dignity of the human person; b) the common good; c) the universal destination of goods (which is the basis of the preferential option for the poor); d) subsidiarity; and e) solidarity.

1) What light does your particular principle shed on this scenario? Which principles should prevail in these circumstances?

2) In your view, what is the right decision to take in these circumstances? Why? How did you come to make this decision? At which moment (or moments) did the principles of Catholic Social Doctrine enter your decision-making process?

ANNEX B
“SO WHAT AM I GOING TO DO ABOUT IT?”

(Becoming aware of what you’re actually doing when you’re making a decision)

Presentation of Data

Data relevant to the decision-making process is elicited, organized and presented for moral deliberation. Note the role of CSD principles in eliciting this data, in organizing it according to different categories, and in formulating the issues. Note how you are spontaneously making judgments as to the scope of a particular principle’s application, by distinguishing one situation from another. Feelings play an important role at this stage: feelings of compassion, but also of indignation; feelings of wonder, but also of revulsion.

Moral Deliberation

a) Spontaneously a question emerges: “What is the good (or the right thing) I should do in these particular circumstances?” Note the
important role played by your disciplined imagination in presenting different possibilities. It should be added that this “brainstorming” exercise can occur in a group context. Note also how different biases (dramatic, individual, group, and common sense) can prevent possibilities from emerging into your consciousness or from being considered as a viable option. Note how your feelings direct you towards different values, ordered along a scale of preference (vital values, social values, cultural values, personal values, religious values).

b) After you have been mulling over all this data and letting the above question focus your attention, you come to a deliberative insight. An idea is emerging as to what you should do. This insight can come quite suddenly, from out of the blue. Or it can result from a congealing of different data, leading you to experience a shift: suddenly many of the different strands of the puzzle seem to fit together, perhaps not perfectly, but at least you seem to be getting there. Note that this event has to occur in you personally. No one can grasp the insight for you. Because different people have different insights, conflicts arise.

c) You then attempt to formulate this deliberative insight, using definitions and concepts. You may call upon the members of your group to help you formulate this insight more accurately or more comprehensively. However, since it is you who grasped the insight, you are the only one who can determine whether the formulation "fits" the insight.

Evaluation

You reflect upon your formulation of the insight: "Is this really the good I should do in these circumstances?" You may answer this question with either a "yes" or a "no" or "I need more data". Notice that you may find yourself going back to the previous moments to verify whether you may not have overlooked a relevant factor. The principles of CSD may provide a useful checklist.

Decision

You have finally arrived at the answer "yes" to the question "Is this really the good I should do in these circumstances?" Sometimes this event is signalled by a little phrase such as "This is what I think we should do." or "This is what I feel like doing." Notice how you feel a
release of tension when you have arrived at a decision.

However this is not the end of the process. We are all aware of having come to a decision and then not putting it into action. Here are some of the strategies we all use to avoid moving from decision to action: a) avoiding awareness of yourself, of your words and deeds, and of your mixed motives; b) rationalization, i.e. inventing lies about matters of fact, alleging circumstances that mingle fact with fiction, trumping up excuses; c) moral renunciation, i.e. giving up on making the necessary changes in your life so as to achieve consistency between knowing and doing.
## ANNEX C
### PRINCIPLES OF CATHOLIC SOCIAL DOCTRINE
(\textit{IN FACT, A VERY TENTATIVE AND IMPERFECT CONCORDANCE})

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>CLASSICIST</th>
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<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Dignity of the Human Person</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>&quot;Being in the image of God, the human individual possesses the dignity of a person, who is not just something, but someone. He is capable of self-knowledge, of self-possession and of freely giving himself and entering into communion with other persons.&quot; (\textit{Catechism}, 356, 358)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>&quot;The person represents the ultimate end of society. The social order and its development must invariably work to the benefit of the human person, not the other way around.&quot; (\textit{Gaudium et spes}, 26)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>&quot;The roots of human rights are to be found in the dignity that belongs to each human being.&quot; (\textit{Gaudium et spes}, 27)</td>
</tr>
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</table>

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>INTERIORITY (fragments)</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>(Consider the third level of the structure of the human good – \textit{Method in Theology} at page 49)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Individuals are free and responsible, can opt for self-transcendence or for alienation, enter into relations with other individuals or groups within the society, and, as originating values, can bring about terminal values in themselves and encourage them in others (based on \textit{Method in Theology}, 32).</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>&quot;In the case of human rights, one would see the truth of human dignity both in the abstract and concretely as warranting the assent of judgments of fact and value, thus being open to action on behalf of the one possessing that dignity.&quot; (John C. Haughey, &quot;Responsibility for Human Rights: Contributions from Bernard Lonergan,&quot; \textit{Theological Studies}, December 2002, at 767)</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
The Common Good

Refers to: “the sum total of social conditions which allow people, either as groups or as individuals, to reach their fulfillment more fully and more easily.”

Its requirements:
Food, healthcare, proper housing, transportation, work, education, access to culture, freedom of communication and expression, religious freedom, a sound juridical system, a healthy environment. (*Gaudium et spes*, 26)

Consider the first and second level of the structure of the human good, set out in *Method in Theology*

“The good of order is not a merely sustained succession of recurring instances of types of particular good. Besides that recurrent manifold, there is the order that sustains it. This consists basically in (1) the ordering of operations so that they are cooperations and ensure the recurrence of all effectively desired instances of the particular good, and (2) the interdependence of effective desires or decisions with the appropriate performance of cooperating individuals” (48).
### Universal destination of goods (preferential option for the poor)

"God destined the earth and all it contains for all humans and for all nations so that all created thing would be shared fairly by humans, under the guidance of justice tempered by charity." (Gaudium et spes, 36)

No 182: “The principle of the universal destination of goods requires that the poor and those whose living conditions interfere with their proper growth, should be the focus of particular concern. To this end, the preferential option for the poor should be reaffirmed.” (John Paul II, 1979, cited in the Compendium, 182)

### Overcoming group bias

The social order must be grounded in religious, personal and cultural values, lest it become progressively subordinated to an instrumentalized reason under the dominance of the will to power. (Based on *Theology and the Dialectics of History*, 542)

### Consider the integral scale of values

“The proportions of problems from below in the scale of values set the tasks to be met at the higher levels.” (*Theology and the Dialectics of History*, 100)
**Subsidiarity**

*Thus social entities of a higher order must provide help (i.e. "subsidium") to social entities of a lower order, so that the latter can properly perform the functions that fall to them without being required to unjustly hand these functions over to social entities of a higher order."

Subsidiarity requires that the State "refrain from anything that would de facto restrict the existential space of the smaller essential cells of society. Their initiative, freedom and responsibility must not be supplanted."

The principle of *subsidiarity* "will require that at the local levels problems will be defined and, in so far as possible, solutions worked out. Higher levels will provide exchange centers, where information on successful and unsuccessful solutions is accumulated to be made available to inquiries and so prevent the useless duplication of investigations. They will also work on the larger and more intricate problems that have no solution at the lower levels, and they will organize the lower levels to collaborate in the application of the solutions to which they conclude." (*Method in Theology, 366*)

**Participation**

Participation "is expressed essentially in a series of activities by means of which citizens, either as individuals or in association with others, contributes to the cultural, economic, political and social life of the civil community to which they belong." (*Gaudium et spes, 26*)

Consider the implications of the fourth level of intentional consciousness

Consider the tension between the two poles in the dialectic of community: *spontaneous intersubjectivity* (i.e. the sense of belonging together) and *practical intelligence* in the areas of technological innovation, of economic systems and of political and legal structures.
<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Solidarity</th>
<th>“Be responsible!”</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>As a moral virtue:</td>
<td>“Global injustice... is the result and symptom of a distortion in the dialectic of community, the loss of creative tension between intersubjectivity and instrumentalized practical intelligence. In general, the distortion is in the direction of instrumentalization for the sake of uncritically accepted aims of maximized profit and economic and political domination. The theoretical developments required to institute alternative technologies, economies, polities, and communities are a function of culture, and specifically of the superstructure. Moreover, for there to be generated a global network of alternative communities, there is required the crosscultural generation of a set of cultural values...”</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>It is a firm and persevering determination to commit oneself to the common good; that is to say to the good of all and of each individual, because we are all really responsible for all.”</td>
<td>(Sollicitudo Rei Socialis, 38)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>(Sollicitudo Rei Socialis, 38)</td>
<td>(Compendium, no. 193)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>As a social principle:</td>
<td></td>
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<tr>
<td>Structures of sin must be overcome and transformed into structures of solidarity, “through the creation or appropriate modification of laws, market regulations, and juridical systems”</td>
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<tr>
<td>(Compendium, no. 193)</td>
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ANNEX D
THE INTEGRAL SCALE OF VALUES AND
THE DIALECTICS OF HISTORY
(chart based on the work of the same name by Robert Doran)

Religious values (= Be in love)

Universal antecedent willingness
("that matches the unrestricted desire to know" *Insight*; p. 624)
(really a function of grace)

![Diagram of the Integral Scale of Values and the Dialectics of History](chart)

**Basic Dialectic of the Subject** constitutes

**Personal values (= Be responsible)**

- Neural demands that would Reach a conscious integration in image and affect
- Censorship exercised by dramatically patterned intentional consciousness and imagination

**Derived Dialectic of the Subject**

- Psychic component of censorship which psychic conversion transforms into being constructive rather than repressive
- Intentional component of censorship which is transformed by religious, moral, and intellectual conversions

**Distortion**

- Psychoneurosis
- Return of the repressed
- Dramatic bias (as a result of the distortions of dialectics of culture and of community) damages the psychic component of censorship, leading to psychopathology
- Individual, group and general biases (as a result primarily of personal fault) damages the intentional component of censorship, leading to pneumopathology
Dialectic of Culture constitutes
Cultural values (=Be reasonable)

(SCM) Soteriological
Constitutive meaning

(CCM) Cosmological
Constitutive meaning

(ACM) Anthropological
Constitutive meaning

Distortion
helplessness in the face of history and imperialist forces
Cosmopolitan intellectual collaboration

Distortion
loss of connection with "nature" ignorance of the "divine partner"

systematic theology

general categories
special categories

Dialectic of Community constitutes social values (=Be intelligent)

Practical intelligence:
- technology
- economics
- politics

Spontaneous intersubjectivity

Distortion
group bias

Distortion
general bias

(Vital values) (=Be attentive)
ANNEX E
THE STRUCTURE OF INTENTIONAL CONSCIOUSNESS

Let's begin with an exercise of the imagination:

Imagine that you are down South! It's a warm sunny day and you're lying on the beach, soaking in the rays. You've closed your eyes. Suddenly you hear some sounds – which you can't quite make out. You're trying to avoid being distracted by these sounds (after all, you've come to the beach to relax), but these sounds keep intruding into your awareness. So you begin to focus on them.

"What are these sounds?" you ask yourself. This question is increasingly imposing itself. So you sit up and look around. You notice that there's someone – a woman – out in the water and she seems to be gesturing wildly. "What is she doing? Why is she waving crazily? Whom is she signalling?" These questions are demanding answers, and, even if you would like to lie down and continue to work on your tan, you simply can't.

After observing the woman, a tentative answer to the question "What is she doing?" pops into your mind. She's inviting me to play Beach Frisbee! But you notice that her arms are gesturing wildly and her cries seem increasingly strident. It suddenly comes to you that she seems to be signalling for help. So you get up and you take off your sunglasses to take a better understand what's happening.

"Is she really signalling for help?" That is the question that now spontaneously presents itself to your mind. Notice it's a question that must be answered by either a "yes" or a "no", or by "I don't know yet! I need more evidence!" You tell yourself that, if she keeps gesturing wildly, and if her body seems to be overpowered by the waves, then you are probably right that she is in fact calling for help. At one point, you make a judgment: The woman is probably calling for help. She may be in danger of drowning.

"What am I going to do?" This is the question that now imposes itself upon your consciousness. You have come to the realization that the woman is drowning and needs help. You want to respond to this
call for help. You want to do the right thing. But you remember that you don’t know how to swim. What should I do: Should I wade into the surf and try to reach out to her? Will she just pull me into the waves – causing both of us to drown? Should I call for help? Should I run to the beach house and try to find someone who knows how to swim? Should I call 9-1-1 on my cell? What is the best thing to do in this particular situation?

Because there’s no one in sight, I decide to take my towel and wade into the water. Approaching her, I throw an end of my towel towards her. She desperately grabs at it. I begin to pull the towel and the woman finally gets some footing on a sand bank.

**Notice What Happened:**

1) You were disturbed and so you began to concentrate your attention: you looked and you listened more carefully.

2) You then began to ask questions in order to understand the situation; suddenly you had an insight into what the woman was doing; you were able to say to yourself that the woman seems in trouble and is signalling for help.

3) You then needed to verify whether your insight into this situation was accurate: “Is she really calling for help?” and, after marshalling and weighing the evidence, you arrived at a judgment of fact: “Yes, she is probably calling out for help!”

4) You then asked yourself: “What am I to do?” You deliberated upon different possible courses of action, you decided which one was the best in these particular circumstances, and you acted upon that decision.

This little scenario illustrated the four operations of intentional consciousness that are repeated over and over again in our daily lives:
First, you are attentive to experience,
Second, you seek to understand it,
Third, you arrive at a judgment as to the validity of that understanding,
And fourth, you decide to do something.
The first three operations make up our cognitive structure. The fourth constitutes our existential structure. These operations are normative in all cultures.\textsuperscript{42}

But what makes you move from one operation to the next?
Being attentive to your experience spontaneously generates in you questions of intelligence, such as “What is it?” “Who’s there?” “How often?” From the level of experience, you have moved to the level of understanding. From empirical consciousness, you have entered into intellectual consciousness, which ultimately seeks intelligibility. Your questions for understanding give rise to insights which are then conceptualized and formulated.

When you’ve reached this point, your effort to understand spontaneously generates in you questions of reflection, such as “Is it so?” “Is it true?” From the level of understanding, you have moved to the level of judgment. From intellectual consciousness, you have moved into rational consciousness, which ultimately seeks the real, the truth. Your questions for reflection are satisfied only when your answers to them are “virtually unconditioned”; in other words, all your relevant questions have been answered; now you’ve made a judgment. (Note a judgment that something is probably true is nevertheless a judgment.)

At this stage, your effort at arriving at a judgment of fact spontaneously generates in you questions of deliberation, such as “What am I going to do about it?” lead you to evaluate different courses of action and to choose one, according to values. From the level of judgment, you have moved to the level of deciding. From rational consciousness, you have moved to rational self-consciousness (or existential consciousness), which ultimately seeks the good, or value.

\textsuperscript{42} No web of meanings can claim to be the norm for humanity. Normativity is located in the structure of human intentionality — in the operations of experiencing, understanding, judging and deciding (what we identified above as the categorical source of meaning) — rather than in the results of these operations (i.e. particular examples of acts of meaning). A particular culture’s web of meanings should be considered as a function of the differentiations of consciousness that prevail among its members.
What is important to retain for our purposes is that intentional consciousness at the second level ultimately seeks *intelligibility*, at the third level the *real*, the *truth*; at the fourth level, the *good*, or *value*. The different levels of consciousness ultimately point in those directions. Once you acknowledge the drive towards intelligibility, you have to face the question whether the universe could be intelligible without an intelligent ground. This raises the question of God. Similarly, once you acknowledge that the drive towards the real, you have to face the question whether there is a reality that transcends the reality of this world. Once again the question of God is raised. Finally, once you acknowledge the drive towards the good, you have to face the question whether the primary instance of moral consciousness is constituted by human beings or by the transcendent, intelligent ground of the universe. The drive towards intelligibility, the real, and the good, therefore, raises the question of God.

This presentation of the operations that structure human consciousness not only sets the stage for raising the question of God, but also, as Lonergan demonstrates in chapter 19 of *Insight*, for affirming the existence of God. In other words, the affirmation of the existence of God would result from what might be called a “natural” theology, in other words, from humans’ own efforts to understand the structure of human consciousness. But does such an exercise of human speculative reason suffice to make one actually believe in God? I would maintain that most persons who decide to believe in God do so on the basis of a some form of revelation of (and by) the transcendent Other.

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43 In Catholic theology, this drive towards the truth and the good is attributed to the Holy Spirit. God’s Spirit is thought to create in humans an affinity for the truth and for the good and to draw the human heart towards them. *Doctrinal Note on Some Aspects of Evangelization*, CDF, 14 December 2007, at no 4.

44 If the real is to be completely intelligible, we have to go beyond this world to a completely intelligible being that accounts for the existences and occurrences of this world. That complete intelligible being would be an unrestricted act of understanding. And such an act has the properties traditionally associated with God,” from “The General Character of the Natural Theology of Insight,” in *Philosophical and Theological Papers, 1965-1980*, vol. 17 of Collected Works of Bernard Lonergan, 9.
As I said above, humans seem to be hard-wired to search for the direction in the movements in their lives. Once again, let me invite you to pay close attention to all the movement that is going on in your consciousness at this very moment and notice how spontaneously you find yourself asking questions to understand that movement and where it seems to be heading. (Don't accept this just because I've attested to it. Experiment for yourselves!) You will notice that the direction in the movement of life becomes clearer when you are attentive to this experience, when you seek to understand it, when you arrive at a judgment as to the validity of that understanding, and when you decide to do something. Each of these operations can be said to involve an act of meaning.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Transcendental Imperatives</th>
<th>Categorical Sources of Meaning</th>
<th>Acts of Meaning</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Be attentive</td>
<td>Experiencing</td>
<td>A smile, a work of art, a symbol (These are potential acts because there is not yet the distinction between meaning and meant.)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>(Receiving data from the senses or from consciousness)</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Be intelligent</td>
<td>Understanding</td>
<td>Definitions, formulations. (These are formal acts because what one means is limited to the object of one's thinking.)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>(Questions such as “What is it? Why? How often?” generate insights that are then defined and formulated.)</td>
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*ANNEX F
SCHEMATIC REVIEW OF BERNARD LONERGAN'S ANALYSIS OF THE STRUCTURE OF INTENTIONAL CONSCIOUSNESS*
<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Be reasonable</th>
<th>Judging</th>
<th>Judgments of fact, affirmations</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>(Questions for reflection such as “Is it so? Is it true?” lead to judgments when all relevant questions have been answered.)</td>
<td></td>
<td>(These are full acts because one has settled the status of the object of one’s thinking by affirming whether it is true or not.)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Be responsible</td>
<td>Deciding</td>
<td>Judgments of value, decisions, choices, actions</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>(Questions such as “What am I going to do about it?” lead to deliberation about different courses of action and to the choice of one, according to values.)</td>
<td></td>
<td>(These are active meanings and as such play a key role in constituting both the individual and society as a whole.)</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

**Note the following:**

The acts of meaning of an individual are communicated to others through interactions, works of art, symbols, language and the individual’s example. Thus individual meanings become common meanings. These meanings mediate the real world to the members of a culture. Meanings therefore have a cognitive function.45

45 "A first function of meaning is cognitive. It takes us out of the infant’s world of immediacy, and places us in the adult’s world, which is a world mediated by meaning. The world of the infant is no bigger than the nursery. It is the world of what is felt, touched, grasped, sucked, seen, heard. It is a world of immediate experience, of the given as given, of image and affect without any perceptible intrusion from insight or concept, reflection or judgment, deliberation or choice. It is the world of pleasure and pain, hunger and thirst, food and drink, rage and satisfaction and sleep.

However, as the command and use of language develop, one’s world expands enormously. For words denote not only what is present but also what is absent or past or future, not only what is factual but also the possible, the ideal, the normative. Again words express not merely what we have found out for ourselves but also all we care to learn from the memories of other men, from the common sense of the community, from the pages of literature, from the labors of scholars, from the investigations of scientists,
Common meanings are passed along through cultural achievements (including religion and the arts) and social institutions (including the law and the economy), which must adapt to changing circumstances. Meanings, therefore, are continually in a process of change because humans are continually engaged in acts of meaning. In shaping and re-shaping meanings, humans are constantly constituting and re-constituting both the real world and themselves. In other words, by transforming meanings, humans transform themselves and their world. Revelation can be viewed as God’s entry and participation in the human effort to transform humanity and the world through the transforming of meanings.  

from the experience of saints, from the meditations of philosophers and theologians.

This larger world, mediated by meaning, does not lie within anyone’s immediate experience. It is not even the sum, the integral, of the totality of all worlds of immediate experience. For meaning is an act that does not merely repeat but goes beyond experiencing. For what is meant, is what is intended in questioning and is determined not only by experience but also by understanding and, commonly, by judgment as well. This addition of understanding and judgment is what makes possible the world mediated by meaning, what gives it its structure and unity, what arranges it in an orderly whole of almost endless differences partly known and familiar, partly in a surrounding penumbra of things we know about but have never examined or explored, partly an unmeasured region of what we do not know at all.

In this larger world we live out our lives. To it we refer when we speak of the real world. But because it is mediated by meaning, because meaning can go astray, because there is myth as well as science, fiction as well as fact, deceit as well as honesty, error as well as truth, that larger real world is insecure.” — Bernard Lonergan, Method in Theology, 76-77.

46 “One can apprehend mankind as a concrete aggregate developing over time, where the locus of development and, so to speak, the synthetic bond is the emergence, expansion, differentiation, dialectic of meaning and of meaningful performance. On this view intentionality, meaning, is a constitutive component of human living; moreover, this component is not fixed, static, immutable, but shifting, developing, going astray, capable of redemption; on this view there is in the historicity, which results from human nature, an exigence for changing forms, structures, methods; and it is on this level and through this medium of changing meaning that divine revelation has entered the world and that the Church’s witness is given to it. “Transition from a Classicist World-view to Historical-Mindedness,” in A Second Collection.
THE CRITIQUE OF HISTORY
AND THE PURE LINE OF PROGRESS:
LONERGAN'S LEGACY

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Frankfort, Kentucky

THE THEME FOR THIS Lonergan Workshop is Lonergan's legacy as it is concretely relevant today. It is, of course, appropriate that Lonergan's legacy should be considered under the title of a "workshop," for, whatever concessions must be made to institutional necessities and practices in the academic world, the "workshop" title points to the goal of community in dialogue, where dialogue goes beyond dialectic and nourishes a community of inquirers. To be sure, the legacy of Lonergan is broad because he was a polymath, covering such fields as theology, economics, philosophy, intellectual history, and, in general, methodology. Since my focus is on Lonergan as philosopher, I shall, accordingly, examine his legacy as a philosopher (although that legacy embraces all the other fields).

What is a legacy? The term is derived from the Latin lego, meaning, "to send with a commission or charge." The noun legatus, derived from lego, refers to an embassy or an ambassador, usually to a governor or a general; and by extension, it can mean, "what is brought by the embassy." So the legacy of a philosopher must be related to some commission or imperative, and the philosopher must be acting as an ambassador or deputy. What, then, was Lonergan's commission and what was his role? And what is our commission and what is our role today if we seek to carry on his "legacy"?

1 Charlton T. Lewis and Charles Short, A Latin Dictionary, rev. ed. (London: Oxford University Press, 1879), see under "lego."
2 Lewis and Short, A Latin Dictionary.
1. LONERGAN AS PHILOSOPHICAL LEGATUS

It is not surprising that the commission of the philosopher is to act in accord with the norms and standards ingredient in the love of wisdom. Ever since Heraclitus called the “lover of wisdom” by name, the love of wisdom has been identified as process, captured, for example, in such terms as *logos*, *nous*, and *eros*. Lonergan himself claimed that Plato objectified inquiry as process. At least in a fragment of a lost essay on Assent by Lonergan in the early 1930s, he sees Plato’s *eidos*, following the interpretation of John Alexander Stewart, not as a reified concept (related to the doctrine of *universalia a parte rei*) but as a correlate to the activity of understanding, with the emphasis on the latter. The activity of understanding might be obscured by faculty psychology, or conceptualist metaphysics, or nominalist empiricism, but it periodically becomes at least partially thematic — as in Descartes’s *Mediations*, Kant’s desire of Reason to go beyond the categories, Hegel’s dialectical exploration of the process of *Geist*, or Heidegger’s *Sorge*. By contrast, Lonergan’s unique role as ambassador to philosophy is to identify, objectify, inquiry precisely as structure.

It makes sense, then, that Lonergan would describe himself as a methodologist. In this he may bear some similarities to the Marburg school of neo-Kantianism, as Mark Morelli has shown. After all, John Alexander Stewart, whose impact on Lonergan was profound in terms of “unconscious effects,” was, in turn, influenced by Paul Natrop of the Marburg school. But no matter how much Lonergan might describe his method as transcendental method (with echoes of neo-Kantianism), Lonergan’s approach to method made a decisive break with neo-Kantianism. Lonergan’s notion of structure is different from the a priori structure of neo-Kantianism as it differs from the conceptualist structure of structuralists. Lonergan’s structure is dynamic and self-

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3 Lonergan made the claim in a conversation with me at Boston College around 1980.
assembling.° It is not only dynamic and self-assembling but it is the dynamic, self-assembling activity of a "subject." Still, the "subject" is not the Cartesian pure cogito. It is Descartes's cogito transposed to concrete living. Indeed it is the concrete consciousness of a concrete person, whose horizon is a "concrete synthesis of conscious living." At the same time, the concrete person is not a Leibnitzian monad but rather is an embodied consciousness in a world and in an intersubjective and historical community.  

As we celebrate the 35th anniversary of the Lonergan Workshop, we gain a clue to Lonergan's distinct approach as an ambassador of philosophy in a paper he delivered in the third workshop and published in the first volume of the Lonergan Workshop proceedings. In his paper, "Religious Knowledge," Lonergan emphasizes how the activity of inquiry is consciously present as a normative, recurrent pattern prior to objectification and knowledge in the full sense of the term. The philosopher, in calling philosophy by name and in identifying the structure of inquiry, relies on self-present experience as data. This emphasis, captured in Lonergan's distinct notion of consciousness as self-presence, allows Lonergan to escape any reification of the structure of consciousness and any desire to take at look at or intuit the structure of consciousness.

Behind this escape, I believe, is the fruit of his struggle to reach up to the mind of Aquinas, another ambassador of philosophy. Lonergan shocked the world of Thomism by claiming that Aquinas differentiated intelligere from dicere: the act of understanding was pre-conceptual; insight grounded the formulations of concepts (the inner word); and, remarkably, insight also grounded the inner word of judgment, a

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11 *Insight*, 769-70.
positing of synthesis not itself a synthesis of concepts.\textsuperscript{12} That Aquinas's differentiation of *intelligere* and *dicere* should be obscured for centuries should come as no shock. On the one hand, his differentiation was couched in, if not occluded by, the language of faculty psychology and frequently located in what at least to later philosophers might seem the strange, esoteric territory of Trinitarian speculation with its analogies with the human mind.

On the other hand, this differentiation itself is notoriously hard to discern. As William Mathews has pointed out, Lonergan agrees entirely with Aquinas that insight is into the phantasm, but if we are to have an insight into insight, then where are the relevant phantasms? Insight, as pivot between image and concept is neither image nor concept. Perhaps the heightening of consciousness in a self-reflective mode while engaging in inquiry can offer up "virtual images" much as lower order mathematical sequences of operations can serve as virtual symbols for higher order operations.\textsuperscript{13} This only highlights how delicate and difficult the appropriation of insight is, and how grasping the difference of *intelligere* and *dicere* (as well as insight and image) is so startlingly strange.\textsuperscript{14} No wonder an erudite scholar of medieval theories of cognition while citing Lonergan's *Verbum* articles made no real use of them to clarify what the author considered Aquinas's "confusions" with respect to intellect turning itself to the phantasms.\textsuperscript{15} In much the same vein, Andrew Beards took even Anthony Kenny to task for not fully appreciating the scope and nuance of Lonergan's interpretation of Aquinas by a kind of short-circuiting via the later Wittgenstein.\textsuperscript{16} Michael McCarthy has observed that contemporary philosophers face the ever-present temptation to substitute the analogy of ocular vision for the "murky" operations of cognition as


\textsuperscript{14} *Insight*, 22.

\textsuperscript{15} Robert Pasnow, *Theories of Cognition in the Late Middle Ages* (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1997), 136.

they try to imagine what is in what the behaviorists call the “black box.”\textsuperscript{17} Lonergan, of course, by his own admission, was aided in his task of objectifying inquiry as structure by the tremendous advances of modern science, which provides abundant phenomenological and historical data, and by the intense focus of modern philosophers on the theory of knowledge, where the dialectical unfolding of modern philosophy, through all its mistaken conceptions and blind allies, was a “sequence of contributions to a single but complex goal.”\textsuperscript{18} He was the beneficiary of his predecessors. Indeed Lonergan could place the struggle of his predecessors in a higher viewpoint precisely because his differentiation of \textit{intelligere} and \textit{dicere} allowed him to comprehend the real meaning of Aristotle’s theory of identity of knower and known in the act of knowing and thereby to contrast it with the primal counter position – viz., the confrontation theory of truth, or the ocular view of truth, or the representational doctrine of truth.

\section*{2. THE TURN TO HISTORY}

As we explore the legacy of Lonergan and see the fruits of his differentiation of \textit{intelligere} and \textit{dicere}, we also need to recall his insistence that philosophy addresses contemporary issues at “their deepest level, at the point of maximum consequence for human welfare or human disaster.”\textsuperscript{19} And this means a “concern with history.”\textsuperscript{20} In Lonergan’s view, if philosophy must reach up to the level of the times, philosophy must establish an adequate philosophy of history. This was Lonergan’s goal early in his career. He was dissatisfied with the reigning progressivist and Marxist views and sought, as he later put it in \textit{Insight}, a “higher viewpoint” of those views.\textsuperscript{21} The language of “higher viewpoint” may remind us of Hegel. Lonergan’s legacy indeed involves

\textsuperscript{18} \textit{Insight}, 15, 414.
\textsuperscript{19} \textit{Phenomenology and Logic}, 208, 295.
\textsuperscript{20} \textit{Phenomenology and Logic}, 295
an encounter with Hegel, as Mark Morelli has argued vigorously.\textsuperscript{22} Lonergan admires Hegel's system for its extent: it embraces all of reality, including human history, in dialectical tension. But Hegel's system is restricted in content: it ignores facts. That is, it has a problem with reflective insight and judgment.\textsuperscript{23} It is, says, Lonergan, perhaps echoing Karl Löwith's \textit{From Hegel to Nietzsche}, "a restricted viewpoint that can topple outwards into the factualness of Marx or inwards into the factualness of Kierkegaard."\textsuperscript{24} So Lonergan points us to the concrete. The concrete is the historical.

The philosopher must lead the cultural superstructure to appropriate the structure of inquiry as a manifestation of historicity. The norms of inquire provide the standards to criticize the past: "There is needed, then, a critique of history before there can be any intelligent direction of history. There is needed an exploration of the movements, the changes, the epochs of a civilization's genesis, development, and vicissitudes."\textsuperscript{25} The philosopher is not bound by the past but open to the future. The critique of history can identify the role of counter positions – that is, interpretations at odds with the authentic structure of inquiry – as they shape the current horizon so as to distort it, narrow its possibilities, and challenge its very survival. The philosopher must encourage the reversal of counter positions. That very openness, however, means the philosopher must promote the endeavor of developing "positions" – correct interpretations of the structure of inquiry – to face the future. The critique of history not only exposes the oversights; it can recover the insights that have been lost, buried, only partially grasped; it can discern genetic sequences that could be further expanded. The critique of history passes over into the reconstruction of a pure line of progress that would enlighten and contribute to future development.


\textsuperscript{23} \textit{Insight}, 398, 446-48.


\textsuperscript{25} \textit{Insight}, 265.
3. THE CRITIQUE OF HISTORY

Lonergan perhaps never fully developed the philosophy of history to the extent that he would have liked to do so in his earlier career. He had anticipated he would be a professor of philosophy, where the philosophy of history may have been his main preoccupation, but his career took a turn into the field of theology (with astounding results!). Later in life his health interfered with his work at a time when he was devoting more energy to historical matters. Nevertheless he has profound and substantive things to say on the philosophy of history. We can look for his reflections on the philosophy of history scattered in various books, articles, and lectures – keeping in mind how they flow from his radical foundations. In *Insight*, he discusses progress and decline in history, critical history, and methodical hermeneutics. In *Method in Theology*, he employs technical terms from phenomenologists and historians, deals with the problem of historical objectivity and historical relativism, explores the meaning of historicity, and argues for functional specialization as a reflective appropriation of historicity. To these works we can add numerous papers and articles. Clearly, part of carrying on the legacy of Lonergan is to explore his approach to the philosophy of history and to attempt some comprehensive treatment. But carrying on the legacy also means conducting explicitly historical investigations in all fields of inquiry and investigations at the scholarly and critical level demanded by Lonergan. As we carry out these endeavors there are a number of key themes we can keep in mind. Let us survey salient themes in the critique of history.

First, we must be clear that history is an intellectual discipline that is a pivot between the concrete and the universal. Oddly, it may occupy the territory that Aristotle held was the province of poetry – namely, to embody the universal in the concrete. For the master historian Thucydides created a “work for all time” by depicting universal human tendencies under a range of challenging situations in his narrative. History is a sophisticated extension of commonsense understanding. We must focus on both aspects of this description: the commonsense aspect and the more theoretical aspect. Common sense is concerned with insight into concrete situations for practical purposes. This is its genius – and its liability. To cite a dramatic – and recurrent – example, common sense will react strongly to a massive
experience, such as a war, and draw short-sighted conclusions. Thus the aphorism that generals are always planning to win the last war and diplomats are striving to prevent the last war is almost a law of history. The calamity of World War I led generals to erect the Maginot Line and diplomats to espouse the policy of Appeasement. The failure of Appeasement led American diplomats to refuse to retreat in Vietnam and the generals to conduct World War II operations. After Vietnam, American policymakers were afraid of any situation becoming "another Vietnam." The lesson here is that common sense is good at making insights into concrete situations. But its claims are at best analogies for other concrete situations. What are needed are further reflective insights to ground reasonable judgments in the other situations. Good historians are not so much cynics as advocates of raising the questions for reflection. Historiography can attempt to grasp the long-term trends. Lonergan would raise this enterprise to a methodological level that would embrace the entire cultural superstructure as his functional specialties collaborate in an ongoing fashion in the appropriation of historicity. To implement this vision would surely be the greatest continuation of Lonergan's legacy.

Second, Lonergan's philosophy of history depicts the world of historical existence in as complicated and nuanced a fashion as does Hegel—without Hegel's dynamic conceptualism. In grasping Lonergan's philosophy of history there is no substitute for grasping the intelligible relations of the parts to the whole. The matrix out of which historical existence arises is the emergent probability of pre-human being. Lonergan, of course, is no reductionist. "Nature" is an intelligible order of emerging higher integrations. There is an immanent intelligibility to the process, which Lonergan, following Bergson, calls "finality." The term "finality" is opposed to any determinism, either of the reductionist kind (where the beginning is determinant) or to the older teleological kind (where the end is determinant). Lonergan sees finality as more physis than telos, and the universe of emergent probability exhibits an open-ended dynamism for fuller being. What keeps the process both directed and open-ended is the tension of limitation and transcendence. This tension, too, as we shall see, is the hallmark of human development. Human beings are higher integrations of underlying psychic, biological, chemical, and subatomic levels. Thus human beings are subject to the
laws of the lower integrations but also operate on the higher level of intelligence, moral decision, and the spiritual. Historians therefore must take into account all the physical conditions and determinants of human existence from geography to demography to disease. But these very physical conditions become challenges to which humans can respond through the structure of inquiry. There is a human world added onto the natural world. There is a second nature, a world mediated by meaning and motivated by value—a cultural world sustained by the artifices of technology and by cooperative patterns solidified into social institutions. This created human world with its technological materials, recurrent social patterns, and sedimented cultural meanings becomes an “objective order” with its own dynamic intelligible relations. Lonergan details the mutually conditioned interaction of the orders of the technology, economy, polity, and culture. This emergence, too, is under the sway of emergent probability, where the probabilities are influenced more and more by human insight or human oversight. The objective order of society, which, precarious as it is, can take on the appearance of a natural order, is in dialectical relation to the communal spirit that originally constituted it – and must sustain it – just as the community needs the technology, economy, polity, and cultural heritage. The human situation is further complicated by the fact that neither communities nor societies are metaphysical entities that completely absorb the individuals within the larger whole. For the individuals are persons, capable of operating within the structure of inquiry. It is the common experience, understanding, judging, and commitments of persons that constitutes the nucleus of a genuine community; it is the insights, judgments, and decisions of persons that create and sustain the objective order of society. Still, persons only develop as persons though acculturation, socialization, and education. There is, then, a dialectical relation between subject and society, person and community – and perhaps ideally a dialogical relationship. While we have only touched the surface of Lonergan’s analysis, we have seen enough to conclude that any monocausal explanation of history is ruled out of court. This is not to say that “history” disappears in its complexity. For there are enduring, transcultural norms – the norms of the process of self-transcending inquiry. These norms – with their openness to being – replace the speculative unity of Hegel, Marx, or
the progressivists and the positivists who claim to have penetrated to the *eidos* of history. Of course, the norms can be violated, and then we have another dimension of the human world: a factual situation that lacks intelligibility because it is the product of bias not insight, a manifestation of decline not progress. Lonergan would join Habermas here to espouse a critical history and a critical human science to identify what Lonergan calls the "social surd," the objective order of which is not the product of the spirit of inquiry. The legacy of Lonergan would be to show a keen awareness of how our own contemporary situation is an extremely complex network of dialectical relations, including the almost seamless interweaving of progress and decline.

Third, when we consider the historical world in terms of the creative process of inquiry, we must acknowledge there are inevitable problems that flow from the illusive nature of insight itself. The creative thinker, or community, attends to issues, grasps insights, tests out the expressions of insight by further, reflective insights and by reasonable judgments. The product of this thinking can be passed on as "outer words," as expressions of meaning in material objects, such as texts, or even in oral traditions. But the expression can be divorced from the insight and the originating question. The expression demands interpretation, and there is no guarantee that the interpretation will be correct. So the insight gets lost. The answer persists, but the question disappears. We must be sensitive, then, to the "fragility of insight." In fact, we can observe an historical pattern in the ancient Greco-Roman world, which is repeated at in the Western world. A creative surge is followed by stale dogmatism, and the dogmatism then evokes a skeptical reaction that, outside of more radical philosophical spokesmen, engenders a humanistic tradition devoid of a solid philosophical orientation. The creative insights of Plato and Aristotle were watered down by the Academy and the Peripatetics. The Platonic and Aristotelian schools along with the Hellenistic philosophies of conduct increasingly avoided genuine dialogue about basic philosophical issues. An inevitable response to this dogmatic atmosphere was skepticism, and the sting of skepticism only enhanced the appeal of rhetoric, as in the school of Isocrates, which looked askance at theory. Indeed the school of rhetoric won out over the school of Plato in the battle of these two forms of humanism. According to Werner Jaeger, this battle ran "like
a leitmotiv throughout the history of ancient civilization." Supporting this contention is Lonergan's view that the theology of the Patres of the Church was an educated kind of common sense, often employing theoretical terms only in a metaphorical sense. Even the brilliance of Augustine was expressed primarily in a commonsense mode. The cycle was repeated when the Scholastic movement reintroduced an authentic theoretical impulse. But the acrimonious debates among medieval Schoolmen, starting in the generation after Aquinas, ushered in a new era of dogmatism in the Scotist conceptualist metaphysics and its influence on the Scholastic commentators only to invite another wave of skepticism in the nominalist movement. And in the early modern period a "classicist culture," as Lonergan called it, with its rigid standards and humanistic canons of literature attempted to salvage a frozen residue of the creativity of earlier periods. This dynamic of dogmatism and skepticism cannot be ignored in an analysis of larger historical trends, as Voegelin has made clear in his masterly portrait of the sway of this dynamic in the modern period.

Fourth, differentiations in history pose the challenge of integration. Challenges are met adequately only by engaging the process of inquiry. We must pause to consider the sober implications of this assertion. If the major, epochal differentiations in history take place over centuries, it is not surprising that the adjustments to the challenges may take centuries—if not millennia. Lonergan discerns two great differentiations of consciousness in history, the transition from a culture dominated by myth to a theoretical culture with an emergent superstructure and the shift to interiority brought about by modern science, modern historical scholarship, and the shift to the subject in modern philosophy. We may speak, then, of an Age of Myth, an Age of Theory, and an Age of Interiority. But this is not a positivist three-stage theory. The Age of Interiority has not superseded the Age of Theory any more than the Age of Theory has superseded the Age of Myth. The discovery of the self has not abrogated the discovery of the mind any more than the discovery of the mind has abrogated the efficacy of myth as a representation of mystery. The great accomplishment in the Age of Theory was the differentiation ("discovery") of the mind and the differentiation of transcendence. With this accomplishment came a profound transformation in culture perspective. In the traditional mythic view all the partners in the
community of being – the divine, nature, society, and humans – were participants in the same substance of order along a continuum. There was an integrating principle, reflective of this sense of oneness – the principle of lastingness. So human beings needed to be integrated in the more lasting order of human society to live meaning lives; human society needed to be integrated into the more enduring order of nature through the mediation of a shaman or king; and nature was, in fact, integrated into the order of the divine. The "discovery of the mind" in the Age of Theory meant that the human mind, having attained a reflexive self-identification and confidence, would investigate the essential properties of the partners in the community of being. A new set of relations emerged among the partners in the community of being: the mediator between order in human society and the larger order of nature and the divine was the representative human, either the philosopher or the spiritual person. To generalize, the integrating principle in the West was the mind. The mind was not a mirror of nature, but nature was a mirror of mind. Mind was the key to the dynamics of human nature. The well-ordered mind was the source of order in human society. God was pure mind. Nature was an intelligible, pre-established static hierarchy within which human nature flourished in its proper place within the hierarchy of human society. If we accept the penetrating analysis of Louis Dupré, as early as the fourteenth century we witness the beginnings of modernity. The medieval synthesis was dissolving, and neither the self-assertion of modernity, argued by Hans Blumberg, nor the second wave of modernity, the Enlightenment, nor the postmodern era have fundamentally changed the intellectual situation. According to Dupré: "Modernity is an event that has transformed the relation between the cosmos, its transcendent source, and its human interpreter. To explain this as an outcome of historical precedents is to ignore its most significant quality – namely, its success in rendering all rival views of the real obsolete." Modern science has isolated the causes it investigates and developed an heuristic procedure to carry on those investigations. This specialization of intelligence has been complemented by the development of the hermeneutical and historical

sciences in the past two centuries. The differentiations of consciousness associated with the Scientific Revolution and the "historical revolution" have led to the differentiation of nature from history. As the key to the Age Theory, we might argue, was the "discovery of the mind," so the key to its emerging successor, the Age of Interiority, is the "discovery of the self" (or subject). 27

4. DECLINE AND A PURE LINE OF PROGRESS

A fifth theme, complicating the historical picture, is the mating of progress and decline. Once intellectual culture has emerged there is added to the normal biases that contribute to decline – psychoneurosis, individual egoism, group bias, commonsense shortsightedness – the role of counter positions. At their root, counter positions are explicit or implicit epistemological claims at odds with genuine cognitive practice. The prime counter position is the view that knowing is taking a look. In ancient philosophy Lonergan saw a tension between the Platonic and Aristotelian emphasis on inquiry and the fascination with concepts and logic. This tension continued into the medieval period with the ultimate victory of the counter position in the conceptualism and nominalism of the Late Middle Ages. This would have awesome consequences for modernity with its differentiations of nature, God, and self. So the traditional hierarchical cosmos became an autonomous network of relations created by the arbitrary fiat of a voluntarist deity separate from the world, and human beings began to take on the trappings of the voluntarist deity. The world was no longer a mirror of mind but the product of – perhaps blind – will. The deity was the distant voluntarist creator, or the removed Deist creator, or simply the hypothesis to be discarded. This epistemological confusion only continued with a repetition of the dialectic of dogmatism and skepticism in the antagonism of rationalism and empiricism, their canceling out in the Kantian critique and its retreat from metaphysics, the post-Kantian dialectic of positivism and romanticism as the dominant theme on nineteenth and twentieth century intellectual history, leading to the inexorable exhaustion of postmodernism with

27 Hegel distinguished substance and subject; Kierkegaard I would argue actually discovered the self.
its denial of the self, an objective world, and perhaps transcendence. In contemporary culture, reductionist interpretations continue to depict nature as a machine to be dominated by world alien human observers, or a machine that could crush the independence of human objects, or a merely phenomenal reality that could preserve human autonomy. Also prevalent in popular culture today is neo-atheism, a movement nourished by positivism and certain postmodern efforts. To be sure, the movement is singularly lacking in originality: it regurgitates stock arguments from Victorian anthropology, Feuerbach's projection theory (rooted in naive realism!), Marx's one paragraph critique of religion, Freud's own version of projection theory, based on his so-called reality principle, and, in general, simplistic materialist and reductionist philosophies culminating in claims of neuroscience. At the same time, it dogmatically denies the validity of philosophy in the age of science. But its massive impact cannot be reversed by thinkers — including many contemporary theologians — who contain religious discourse within language games, or subtexts, or opinions. In our post metaphysical age, metaphysics still matters. It must, of course, be a metaphysics at home with a universe of emergent probability and the discovery of the self. But what is the self? The modern discovery of the self has been accompanied by numerous versions of an "ersatz self," cataloged in abundant historical detail by Charles Taylor.28 It is instructive to note that there is a current version of the "self" dominant in Western popular culture and in political discourse. The self, so conceived, is the self-creation of a voluntaristic agent, and the very activity of self-creation, or self-making, is its own end, for the process bestows meaning on human existence.29 This goes beyond even the earlier romantic journey of finding one's unique, true self. The self is not found — but must be created. And this self-creation is the goal to which all culture and politics must be subordinate. In the modern secular utopia the purpose of the polity is to ensure the conditions of self-creation. By definition minority life styles are to be protected; by definition the majority culture is tyrannical. But the "logic" of the


situation heads toward a devolution of selfhood into the "tyrannical self," as the contemporary drug and techno culture would intimate. This view of the self, in fact, is a product of a crude voluntaristic subjective idealism. It is a massive counter position, which must be exposed and rejected without compromise.

Sixth, it is not enough to identify counter positions. Even their reversal points to the existence of positions consonant with the structure of inquiry and its norms. There must be an historical retrieval of the insights lost or obscured or distorted beneath the dogmas and the skeptical reaction. If positions are to be developed, they must first be recovered. This venture of historical anamnesis would lead to a reconstruction of a pure line of progress, itself only an ideal frequency in actual history. But its recovery in the functional specialty of systematics would play a real role in intellectual development. If, for example, Aquinas's differentiation of intelligere and dicere had been operative in the intellectual culture at the transition to modernity, how would the differentiations of nature, God, and self been handled? Surely, modern science would not have given rise to scientism and atheism, historical consciousness to historicism, and interiority to relativism. Conversely, what would modern intellectual culture look like as a trend if the insights of the great modern creative thinkers had been shorn of their faulty philosophical frameworks? Discerning a pure line of progress is not only retrospective but prospective in that it nourishes the attempt to develop systemically ideas on nature, God, and self and pinpoints the integrating principle in the normative process of self-transcending inquiry itself, which arises out of nature and its principle of finality, defines authentic selfhood, and heads toward the excess of

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30 Indeed we could look at the past ten thousand years as one major trend: the Agricultural Revolution and the Urban Revolution, separated from each other by about five thousand years, established the technological a priori for the cultural superstructure; the destruction of Bronze Age civilizations about 1200 BC, with the attendant "times of troubles," challenged, for some, the validity of the myth that tied order in human society to cosmic-divine order; thereby provoking an intellectual crisis to which the Greek theoria responded; the Greek achievement ran through the pre-Socratic discovery of the mind, to the cultural crisis of the Greek Enlightenment during the age of the Sophists, and to the Socratic, Platonic, and Aristotelian climax with its somewhat ambiguous concern for theory and interiority; the theoretical life then underwent the fluctuations alluded to above until the Scientific Revolution and the modern Enlightenment brought it to the threshold of the unambiguous discovery of the subject.
intelligibility, which, from the human perspective, is the divine mystery.

To be an ambassador for philosophy today requires courage as well as vision. It means that, as Lonergan noted thirty years ago, one must participate in a "not numerous center." But this is only a particular way — appropriate to the level of intellectual culture — of being an authentic human being. For, as Lonergan’s philosophy of history insists, the hallmark of authentic existence is always fidelity to inquiry in negotiating the tension of limitation and transcendence.
I want to begin by congratulating Fred Lawrence for this year's topic. I believe we stand at an important moment in the history of the Lonergan enterprise, a moment of opportunity for bringing Lonergan's work into mainstream conversations in the natural and human sciences. Humanity faces enormous challenges that threaten the future of the planet, and we are coming to understand that currently we are ill-equipped to face many of these. This opens the door to new ideas and disposes women and men to confront new ideas in new ways. Yet bringing Lonergan's work into these conversations requires building relationships with others who think differently. I believe this is an important idea we need to keep in mind in our work.

Today I will speak about three challenges in Christian ethics. These are challenges whose import has become clear to me over the past two decades. The three challenges are: doctrinal development, democracy, and the social sciences. I'll take each in turn.

**FIRST, DOCTRINAL DEVELOPMENT**

It is clear that a range of ethical issues is now dividing the churches to the point where we are becoming impotent to speak the good news of God's love to the world. These issues include: contraception, abortion, women in the church, euthanasia, homosexuality, genetic research, moral authority, social justice, conscience, dissent, politics, economics, war, the environment, and the role of family values in human living.

At the center of each issue is the challenge of doctrinal
development. I am speaking here about ethical doctrines that have emerged within religious traditions. On each issue, we know we must draw on ethical traditions that have roots in scripture. Yet we also know that contemporary questions are novel in important ways, and this requires admitting there is something new to be discovered that is ethically significant. The history of each issue reveals both continuity and change. Still we lack tools for judging reliably when continuity must be affirmed and change required. We observe common words being used—words like contraception, usury, or homosexuality. But we do not seem to notice when we have used similar words to mean different things, or conversely, when different words have meant similar things. We are not sure what the unit of moral analysis is, or what makes some feature central to this unity and another admitting of variation.

Linked to this is the problem of cultural diversity. Presently, theologians know that some form of cultural diversity is here to stay and this is a good thing. Yet we are not clear on what must remain similar and what can be allowed to differ when Christians work out culturally appropriate norms for ethical living.

Over the years, Lonergan’s work has alerted me to four important features of development. First, development proceeds along two paths. There is development in things themselves, and there is development in our understanding. When things change, then fidelity and continuity require a change in understanding. Understanding development in the past and present requires both distinguishing and relating these two paths. Second, development involves change, but for change to be development something central must remain the same through this change. In Christian ethics, we have an abundance of scholars documenting change, but I believe we have been less successful in understanding continuity. Third, change must be progress rather than decline. Past and present events have borne witness to countless instances of horrific change, and sorting out the difference between constructive and destructive change is the heart of ethics. Finally, there are special instances of development where continuity with something fundamental requires significant discontinuities: jump-shifts, migrations to higher viewpoints or reference frames where fundamentals are affirmed anew, transposition to broader contexts
understood, and errors reversed. Here, I believe, is where Lonergan’s work can be most helpful.

(1) On the two paths of development, Lonergan provides innovative resources for understanding the first, development in things, in his emergent probability analysis of genetic method in metaphysics in *Insight*¹ and Piaget’s assimilation and adjustment theory of skill development in *Method.*² For the second path, his work on Christology in *The Way to Nicea*³ and essays like “Theology as Christian Phenomenon”⁴ provide rich analyses of developments in understanding through the ages. I’ll say a little more about these as I go.

(2) On continuity amidst change, we have in Lonergan’s insights into schemes of recurrence, systems or series’ of schemes, integrators, operators, and his distinction between central and conjugate form, extraordinary resources for helping ethicists through the issues. To speak of development in persons and history is to affirm something central that remains the same through change.⁵ To speak of doctrinal development is to say that in both earlier and later stages, the doctrine is an answer to a question about the same integrator or operator whose intelligibility is sought.⁶ Ethics is not simply about acts in isolation, it is about the person acting and personal relations with others, the universe, and the Divine. Persons are intelligent organisms with central form whose good is at the center of questions in ethics.⁷ Moreover, ethics is about recurrent types of acts of meaning within recurring ecologies of intelligible social schemes. Contexts differ, but

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⁵ *Insight*, 476-504.
types of contexts are similar. Lonergan can help us understand what is similar and recurrent in these types of contexts, and this provides tools for understanding continuity amidst change and similarity amidst diversity.\(^8\)

(3) On progress and decline, an important feature of progress is cumulative change. For change to be development, the new must build upon the old, not undermine it or sweep it away, and this means incorporating or assimilating something central from the old while adjusting it to function within a wider range of contexts. Lonergan's analysis of Piaget on assimilation and adjustment provides resources for understanding how progress involves building, cumulative change, and the emergence of the new that builds on the old. And his understanding of finality provides a way of thinking of value, not as a static but as a dynamic notion expressing a vector or direction in a sequence of changes. Moreover, the idea that progress consists in adjustment or adaptation to ever-wider circles of contexts could well prove helpful in thinking through some of the thorny issues of cultural diversity.

(4) In my judgement, however, Lonergan's most powerful contribution to the conversation on development is his analysis of discontinuities and transpositions. Materials and operations can be assimilated and adjusted to ever-wider circles of contexts. But there arise limitations to this cumulative process, particularly when earlier stages have involved both truths to be affirmed and errors to be reversed. When these limitations are met, the situation calls for a transposition – a jump-shift, a discontinuity, a move to a reference frame that is radically different from the earlier way of understanding. Oddly enough, however, when we get this new reference frame right, it preserves the required continuities in the face of new challenges, it guides the transposition to diverse contexts and furnishes tools for reversing errors.

I would say that Lonergan's most profound analysis of this form of development is his differentiation between common sense, theory,

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\(^8\) For a preliminary exploration in these directions, see Kenneth Melchin, "The Challenge of World Poverty: Continuity and Change in Theological Ethics from a Canadian Perspective," in *Catholic Theological Ethics in the World Church*, ed. J. Keenan (New York: Continuum, 2007), 152-57.
and interiority. Theory is discontinuous with common sense. Yet only the differentiation between things in relation to us and things in relation to each other can grasp what is continuous in questions about the nature of things when these questions reach the limits of common sense. Moreover, only the shift from field categories to operations of consciousness can overcome the challenges that arise when cultures move from classicism to historical consciousness. Finally, the shifts to theory and interiority and the insights into intellectual, moral, and religious conversion can establish the frameworks and tools for differentiating progress from decline and reversing errors in prior formulations when ethics becomes a composite of common sense and past theory.

I would say there is a great deal of work to do in working our way through these challenges of doctrinal development in ethics. But I also believe that Lonergan has provided a formidable array of tools for the task at hand.

SECOND, DEMOCRACY

I have to say that over the past ten years, I have learned that democracy is a much more complex and misunderstood idea than I’d expected. As I understand things, the two main currents of thinking on democracy focus on participation and liberty respectively. The first was launched by the Greeks and was cast as an alternative to decision-making centralized in the monarch, emperor, or oligarchy. Here democracy means citizens’ participation in the deliberative process. Of course, through the ages, the field of candidates who count as citizens has widened considerably. Eventually the idea was developed that all citizens have a right to participate in this deliberation, and electoral processes were developed to allow citizens to name representatives to bring their concerns into the conversations and deliberate on their behalf. In the twentieth century, deliberative approaches have sought to involve citizens more directly in various theatres of deliberation.

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9 “Time and Meaning.”

The second current of thinking on democracy has its roots in Hobbes and Locke, and democracy here focuses on an arrangement in which the state guarantees the liberty and equality of citizens and provides institutions for intervening when the liberty of some infringes on the liberty of others. Here the focus is not on collective deliberation on public goods but on maximizing the liberty of individuals to live as they please. While the second current has tended to dominate in North America, we are now witnessing voices championing the first as an important corrective to some problems in liberal individualism.

I believe Lonergan’s work can contribute to these conversations by helping focus on the object of these deliberations, the human good and the scale of values. Human societies, particularly complex societies like those that emerge in democracies, are structured as schemes and systems of schemes of meaning. As meaning, their constituent events are acts of meanings of persons. But as schemes and systems, they have a structure that links large numbers of acts of meaning into patterns that are goods of order. These patterns may emerge without anyone planning or understanding them. But, for their functioning to be assured as constructive rather than destructive, at some point they need to be scrutinized, understood, evaluated, and either supported or resisted. This, it seems to me, is the work of governance, whether it be the governance of families, neighborhoods, businesses, municipalities, nations, or transnational bodies.

What makes these structures of governance democratic, I believe, is that, as much as possible, deliberation on these goods of order is de-centered. It is placed in the hands of persons who are close enough to the experiential data to make good judgments. This, I believe, is the heart of the principle of subsidiarity, so much celebrated in Catholic social thought. It is also the heart of innovation in market economies, so much championed by Jane Jacobs. The other thing about democratic deliberation is that this form of governance involves ongoing learning. Authors like Charles Taylor and David Hollenbach have highlighted the importance of this learning in their understanding of public

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11 For a fascinating discussion of “subsidiarity,” which draws on Lonergan, see Joshua Daly, “Subsidiarity and the Human Good,” Major Research Paper (M.A.) Faculty of Theology, Saint Paul University, Ottawa, 2008.

12 For a discussion of links between the works of Jacobs and Lonergan, see Fred Lawrence, ed., Ethics in Making a Living (Atlanta, GA: Scholars Press, 1989).
deliberation.\textsuperscript{13} I believe Lonergan has much to offer in understanding how this learning unfolds.

However, two things tend to be forgotten in discussions of democracy: First, citizens' judgments need to be more than merely expressions of individual interest, or mere agreement. They need to be truly good. This means that the learning process, the structure of the human good, and the scale of values need to be understood widely. Citizens need to be taught how to engage in the learning necessary for making wise decisions. Second, citizens need to recognize that democracies give rise to complexity, and understanding and affirming the truly good amidst complexity requires competencies that will not be shared by the majority. Understanding democracy correctly requires recognizing these distinctive competencies – particularly those rooted in interiority and the conversions. And it requires recognizing the way they must guide the deliberations of wider circles of citizens. Unfortunately, this is not a fashionable thing to say these days.

Democracy cannot be understood simply as participation, liberty, agreement, free elections, equality, or majority rule. It requires the deliberation and learning of citizens on public goods, but it also requires that these deliberations be competent, that they affirm real progress and reverse real decline, and that they admit the relevance of specialists who can navigate the realms of theory and interiority. Neither can democracy be understood simply as critique of ideology. It requires wide scale support for public persons, projects, and institutions that promote public goods. This means that citizens need to know how to understand public goods and systems of public goods. They need the skills and virtues for learning and deliberating wisely within the spheres entrusted to them, and the wisdom and guidance for trusting reliable authorities on matters that are beyond them. They need to know how to live wisely amidst failure and evil. And they need the skills for navigating the conflicts with fellow-citizens that invariably arise in these many theatres of deliberation.

Being a citizen in a democracy is an extremely onerous task. We are not taught this. Instead we are taught about doing our own thing, and the freedom to make up our own minds. Both of these are true, but for democracies to function well, our own thing and our own minds must be truly good. This we are not taught. I believe Lonergan’s work with its focus on the structure of the human good, the scale of values, the operations of learning in the deliberation process, and the virtues related to theory and interiority can contribute significantly to current conversations on democracy.

THIRD, THE SOCIAL SCIENCES

I believe that one of the conditions for Lonergan’s work to gain entry into mainstream scholarly conversations is our ability to begin speaking the language of the social sciences. This means subjecting our claims to the empirical methods of the social sciences. Over the past decades, we have made quite a number of universal claims: about the structure of human cognition, the nature of direct and inverse insight, the heuristic structure of empirical inquiry, the structure of the human good, the realms and stages of meaning, the differentiations of consciousness, the functional specialties that structure a community of inquiry, the list goes on. We have made these claims on behalf of all of humanity. On the face of it, these claims seem rather bold, perhaps even outrageous. In a contemporary world that is ever-more attentive to cultural diversity, these claims require some evidence. Can our claims be verified empirically?

Now, of course the question arises: What do you mean by empirical verification? And Lonergan has had a lot to say on this topic. I suggest, however, that on this topic, his work supports the call for considerably more scholarly investigation of self-appropriation than we have done to date. Self-appropriation is a personal process, but it is not solitary. Investigating self-appropriation requires personal reflection on one’s own operations of cognition, but it does not end there. It requires a community of scholars studying the self-appropriation activities of large numbers of people from diverse cultures and within diverse contexts of life and work. It requires the disciplined procedures of process design, sampling, data gathering, questioning, and statistically correlating
results. It requires the further insights that draw upon earlier iterations to refine and develop new contexts for self-appropriation. It requires developing and adapting novel self-appropriation activities for new contexts. All of this involves us in the empirical methods of the social sciences. I believe that until we begin doing this work and circulating results, scholars will not be inclined to take our claims seriously.

I would say that this could be a good time to begin doing this work. In the past, the empirical social sciences tended to be biased against studies of self-appropriation and tended to discriminate against philosophies that made claims to such experiences. More recently, however, scholars and methods are emerging and gaining acceptance that appear more open.

In social theory, major breakthroughs were made when, through the influence of hermeneutic philosophy, sociologists and anthropologists like Clifford Geertz\(^\text{14}\) and Anthony Giddens\(^\text{15}\) began understanding their discipline as the study of meaning. Within qualitative sociology, authors like Anselm Strauss\(^\text{16}\) opened the door for empirical sociology to help move beyond verification of existing insights within existing theoretical frameworks to include methods and strategies for gaining new insights and developing new theories. More recently, Danish sociologist Bent Flyvbjerg\(^\text{17}\) has drawn upon Aristotle to argue that empirical sociology can and should include the investigation of \textit{phronesis}. Others, like Jane Siltanen, explore the role of reflexivity in social scientific research.\(^\text{18}\) And authors like Russ Hurlburt are exploring how social science can study inner experience.\(^\text{19}\)

To be sure, much remains to be done. And I believe that Lonergan's


work has much to contribute to conversations around method and theory in the social sciences. Yet I believe these contributions can and should begin with our own explorations of self-appropriation.

We have a great deal to learn, and we can certainly benefit from conversations with social scientists pursuing investigations along similar paths. Most important, I believe that subjecting our claims to careful empirical scrutiny and adapting appropriate methods from the social sciences will advance our own learning and enhance the willingness of other scholars to take our claims seriously. This, I believe, will advance our ability to contribute to research on the challenges in Christian ethics that we face today and in the decades to come.
LONERGAN AND THE SOCIAL SCIENCES:
SOME PRELIMINARY REFLECTIONS

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This essay explores a contribution that, I believe, Lonergan's work could make to some current conversations in the social sciences. My interest in the social sciences dates back to my doctoral studies in social ethics. I wanted to follow the lead of Gibson Winter in bringing theological ethics into conversation with sociology. Following Winter, I began reading sociology and phenomenology, and as I moved into studying Lonergan, I discovered how his work could help advance the project envisioned by Winter. Over the years, I have kept an eye on this topic, but, until recently, have not been able to devote serious time to it.

As is well known, Lonergan published an essay in Social Compass, 1970, reprinted in Second Collection, titled "The Example of Gibson Winter." He also wrote another essay in 1974 titled "Moral Theology and the Human Sciences," that includes a discussion of Winter and the social sciences. This second essay did not get published until 1997, when a "Symposium" on the topic was published in Method: Journal of Lonergan Studies. Earlier in his life, in the 1930s, he had written

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4 Bernard Lonergan, "Moral Theology and the Human Sciences," Method: Journal of

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"An Essay in Fundamental Sociology." This essay was not published and only part of it remains in the Lonergan Archives.\(^5\) In addition, Lonergan’s work on economics is well known.\(^6\) Together, these works outline a range of diverse and powerful contributions to the social sciences. In this essay, I do not attempt to overview these contributions. Instead, I offer only a preliminary sketch of an interesting set of insights I have gained recently.\(^7\)

My interest arose as a result of work in conflict studies.\(^8\) I believe Lonergan could gain some serious consideration in the field of conflict, but because the field is dominated by social scientists, it would be helpful if


Lonergan researchers were able to cite social scientific research results in support of claims about the universality of cognitional structure and the merits of self-appropriation. The challenge, here, goes to the heart of the methodology of the Lonergan project. Engaging social scientists in examining self-appropriation as an empirical research method is not easy. In past decades, there has not been a lot of support for the type of self-reflection called for by Lonergan studies.

In recent years, however, some doors have opened that, in my judgment, could provide opportunities for a serious consideration of self-appropriation in the social sciences. Cheryl Picard and I have been involved with a friend and colleague, Janet Siltanen, a sociologist at Carleton University, in a working group focused on researching conflict mediation. From Siltanen, we have learned about an interesting sociologist from Denmark, Bent Flyvbjerg. His book, *Making Social Science Matter,* offers a critique of extant approaches in social science, both theoretical and methodological, and proposes an alternative vision based on Aristotle's *phronesis.* His work has elicited considerable response and seems to lend itself to exploring various contributions from Lonergan.

A second opportunity gets to the heart of the methodological questions around self-appropriation. In recent years, sociologists have been pursuing a fascinating line of research on the role of "reflexivity" in sociology. This work involves a form of self-reflection and self-insight that is undertaken methodically by researchers while they do their work. Siltanen and her co-authors offer an example of a team approach to "reflexivity" explored by a group of sociologists investigating challenges encountered by people negotiating change in their work profiles. The team members found that conversations

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10 See, for example, the edited collection, Sanford F. Schram and Brian Caterino, eds., *Making Political Science Matter: Debating Knowledge, Research, and Method* (New York: New York University Press, 2006).


around their own self-reflection and self-discovery during the research were helpful in understanding both themselves as researchers and the work they were doing. They found it enhanced their ability to work as a team and clarified instances of their own engagement with the persons whose lives they were studying. Their self-reflection does not include an explicit discussion of cognitional operations, but the authors do make reference to “insights and interpretive developments” and provide ample evidence of the importance of these learning moments for their research.  

I believe it would not be difficult to adapt some of the “reflexivity” research methods to self-appropriation.

I have made a preliminary effort to explore possible links between these two opportunities. In our working group, Siltanen introduced the work of Flyvbjerg with some questions of her own about the role of reflexivity within his work. Flyvbjerg makes reference to the self-reflective feature of humans and its role in the research process, but he does not follow up on this. Siltanen wondered about this and about how an explicit attention to self-reflection might shape an understanding of social scientific research. What about doing research self-reflexively? Would it alter Flyvbjerg’s argument? I began reading Flyvbjerg with some of these questions in mind and began exploring how a conversation on self-appropriation might be introduced with respect to Flyvbjerg and reflexivity. In the following pages, I summarize some preliminary insights I have gained from these explorations.

**FLYVBJERG’S BOOK, MAKING SOCIAL SCIENCE MATTER**

I begin with a brief overview of Flyvbjerg’s argument. The principal question running through the book is the relationship between the natural and social sciences, and he frames this in terms of the relationship between context-independent and context-dependent knowledge; that is, universals and particulars. He characterizes the natural sciences as producing knowledge whose key qualities are “explanation and prediction based on context-independent theories.”

He examines social science’s efforts to emulate this ideal and pronounces

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14 Flyvbjerg, Making Social Science Matter, 32-35.
15 Flyvbjerg, Making Social Science Matter, 26.
it a failure. Rather than accepting this ideal and proposing alternative roads toward its achievement, however, Flyvbjerg suggests abandoning the ideal altogether. Social science should stop pursuing the ideal of context-independent knowledge and instead should pursue an ideal of knowledge proper to its own domain, an ideal based on a contemporary interpretation of Aristotle’s *phronesis.* Its proper object, he argues, is not explanatory, predictive, context-independent knowledge. Rather, it is contextual knowledge, the mastery of particulars that is achieved by the virtuoso social and political actor. This knowledge is virtue-based, value-focused, and context-specific. To retrieve this Aristotelian ideal for the contemporary age, Flyvbjerg brings in Michel Foucault, whose analyses of domination and power, he argues, both update the Aristotelian project and lend themselves to this focus on context, particularity, and virtue-based knowledge. Finally, he uses this analysis to make a strong argument for the role of case studies in social science research.

There is a lot going on in this book, and I focus my comments on a particular section that provides a base for a good deal of Flyvbjerg’s analysis in subsequent chapters. After outlining the broad lines of the book’s argument, Flyvbjerg turns to an examination of a model of human learning that was developed by Hubert and Stuart Dreyfus and published in a 1986 volume, *Mind over Machine.* Their research examines the learning path of people as they develop various types of technical, social, and intellectual skills.

The Dreyfus model proposes that in the process of learning skills, people move through five stages: (1) novice, (2) advanced beginner, (3) competent performer, (4) proficient performer, and (5) expert. What marks the most important part of the development process is the transition from stage (3) to stage (4). Here the learner makes a qualitative leap from methodical, analytical reasoning and rational problem-solving to a form of expertise that is rapid and intuitive, holistic, immediate, and experiential. It is this leap that inaugurates a new form of context-specific or situation-based knowing, and Flyvbjerg

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offers a description of this transition. Instead of beginning with generalized knowledge and applying it methodically to contexts, the Dreyfus model's virtuoso intuitively grasps knowledge of contexts, and in a continuous fluid motion, adapts her performance to the demands of the context. This form of knowledge, he argues, provides a better model of knowledge and learning for social scientific research. Flyvbjerg devotes the rest of the book to proposing and adapting this as the basis for a phronetic, case-based, context-focused, virtuoso-centered model of social scientific research. He proposes not only that social scientists study virtuoso actors with the goal of capturing their virtue-based, contextual knowledge, he also holds up this model's virtuoso actor as worth emulating by social scientists, and its virtue-based, contextual knowledge as the proper object of their research.

Flyvbjerg presents a description of the various stages of the Dreyfus model. In the first stage, “Novices act on the basis of context-independent elements and rules.” As they develop through the next two stages, they begin to develop their own experiential base for using situational elements in their learning and decision-making (stage 2), and they begin choosing goals and plans for structuring and prioritizing large bodies of both context-dependent and context-independent information (stage 3). What characterizes his description of all three of these initial stages, however, is the presence of a rather methodical rule-based analytical form of thinking that “applies” context-independent rules to particular contexts. I use quotation marks because it is the meaning of “applies” that I explore in the following section. What distinguishes the highest two stages, in his judgment, is precisely the absence of this methodical or logical-analytic plodding. What interests Flyvbjerg about stages 4 and 5 is the apparent absence of conscious reflection, methodical rule-based thinking, explicit evaluation, and objective choice. Instead, experts act spontaneously, immediately, holistically, fluidly. Most dramatically, they do not use rules. “They recognize thousands of cases directly, holistically, and intuitively on the basis of their experience.”

It is this absence of generalized rules that Flyvbjerg wants to
hold up as the ideal of social scientific knowledge. To be sure, his proposal is not foolish. He admits the relevance of rule-based or context-independent knowledge both in human learning and in the research process. His argument, however, is that this focus on context-independent rules has dominated the social sciences for too long and needs to be complemented by a focus on the intuitive, context-based knowledge achieved holistically by the virtuoso performer.22

DISCUSSION: LONERGAN, REFLEXIVITY, AND POSSIBLE DIRECTIONS FOR SOCIOLOGICAL RESEARCH

There are a lot of points at which Lonergan’s work could be brought into discussion with Flyvbjerg, and I focus on only one of these. I do this in a way that points toward a form of self-reflexive empirical research that would bring self-appropriation and reflexivity into conversation with the Flyvbjerg project. The Dreyfus research involved an application of phenomenology to sociological research that is interesting.23 But this application is not self-reflexive in a methodical way, and neither is Flyvbjerg’s. My interest is in exploring this direction.

I believe that if we examine carefully Flyvbjerg’s descriptions of the early stages of learning, we can observe something that could become the focus of such a reflexivity- or self-appropriation-based research project. I believe such a project would enhance our understanding of learning and its role in the social sciences. My hypothesis is that the earliest learning stages involve an element or operation that Flyvbjerg has not examined carefully, because he did not attend reflexively to his own operations of learning in similar situations. This missing element is insight. Moreover, my hypothesis is that because he has not examined insight, Flyvbjerg’s explanation of the process of methodical plodding in the early stages is not correct. Rather, there is something missing in his explanation and to get at this requires the empirical self-examination of insight.24

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22 Flyvbjerg, Making Social Science Matter, 23-24, 49.
23 See, in particular, Dreyfus and Dreyfus, Mind over Machine, 1-15.
Let me begin with a clue from Flyvbjerg’s account of the novice stage.

As a novice, the individual experiences a given problem and a given situation in a given task area for the first time. During instruction the novice learns what various objective facts and characteristics of the situation are relevant for the performance of the skill. The novice learns to recognize these facts and characteristics when they appear.\(^{25}\)

The key words here are “the novice learns...” in the second sentence and “The novice learns to recognize...” in the third sentence. Flyvbjerg explains the first learning moment as the learning of context-independent rules. He explains the second as the analytic-logical process of applying rules to contexts. I believe he has not been careful in studying what goes on in this second learning moment.

Flyvbjerg uses the example of learning to drive a car with a standard transmission. I recall learning this myself and have had the opportunity of teaching this on a number of occasions.\(^{26}\) You might say it is true that teachers begin by presenting context-independent facts and situational characteristics for applying rules.\(^{27}\) However, it is the term “recognize” in the second learning moment that is of interest here. Understanding this second learning moment is central to understanding what is going on when rules are “applied” to contexts. One of the first things that happens when a novice begins “applying the rules” is the physical experience of what precisely the context

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\(^{26}\) Moreover, I have spent a great deal of time doing self-reflexive studies of insight in various contexts and have brought this learning to bear on understanding the processes of skill development in diverse contexts, including carpentry, music, driving, and sailing. In addition, the self-reflexive study of cognitional operations (self-appropriation) has been undertaken by many other Lonergan scholars, and conversations with them frequently reveal similar observations and insights. Unfortunately, like other Lonergan scholars, I have not developed this reflexive process into a carefully monitored and documented methodology. Thus, my interest in this project.

\(^{27}\) I say “you might say” because the rules selected for the novice driver are tuned to a very narrow range of types of contexts: a novice driver, a standard transmission car, in relatively good weather, on flat ground, with little or no traffic to contend with.
of a moving car really "is": the dramatic lurch of the car that occurs when she lets out the clutch too quickly; the jarring succession of lurches culminating in a "thunk" and then silence when the car stalls; the frightening ineluctability of the car’s forward movement once in motion. These experiences and many more are part of the novice’s learning, and they cannot be explained as the logical-analytic process of applying rules to contexts. Rather, these experiences need to be understood, and this requires the learner to gain insights into what precisely is "the nature of" this "getting-the-car-rolling" context.

When the novice does begin to "get it," what arises are a host of concrete, bodily grounded insights into what exactly is going on at each particular moment of the moving-car-context. For example, to get the car moving from a standstill in first gear, the novice must gain an insight into the correlation between the mechanics of clutches and the inertia of cars. She cannot smoothly and slowly let out a clutch. Rather, she must get a body-insight that differentiates between a first moment of letting out the clutch to the friction point and a second moment of increasing the gas while letting the clutch out fractionally further until the car begins to roll. None of this involves the logical-analytic process of applying rules to contexts. It all involves insight, and I suggest that empirically examining learning in these moments can be advanced through careful self-reflexive research on insight.

This is not to say that the generalized rules and explanations that are offered in the first instance are not helpful, they most certainly are. Understanding how clutches work enhances enormously the learner’s ability to gain the bodily grounded insights. So too do the generalized explanations of engines, drive trains, wheels, and inertia. The point here is simply that the second learning moment cannot be understood adequately as "applying rules to contexts." The learning involves insights that must grasp the intelligibility of contexts. This needs to be

28 I would also say that Flyvbjerg has not correctly explained the form of understanding that is involved in the grasp of generalized rules and explanations. I do not explore this in this essay, however, correcting this will constitute another important part of the conversation between Lonergan and Flyvbjerg, and, in my judgment, will advance Flyvbjerg’s project. I am grateful to Patrick Byrne for his observations on this. Given that Flyvbjerg draws on the work of Aristotle, Patrick Byrne’s text, Analysis and Science in Aristotlee (Albany: State University of New York Press, 1997) will be helpful in this conversation.
investigated reflexively, by attending to one's own acts of insight.

I want to add another point. When the novice gains the relevant, bodily based insight, she grasps a concrete intelligibility that, oddly enough, can be generalized immediately to other similar contexts. Of course, the key word here is "similar," and I will say a few words about this in a moment. For the present, however, I want to suggest examining this link between the insight's concrete context and generalized knowledge. Getting the car moving in first gear involves the actuation of the same insight whether the car is in the parking lot, or on the street in front of her home, or on another street. The novice understands this and is eager to practice again and again. To be sure, the presence of traffic introduces the need for new insights that must be combined with this. However, as long as the context is sufficiently similar, the novice can repeat the process of getting the car moving time and again, in one location then another, in the morning and in the evening, on Tuesdays as well as Fridays.

What is supremely important for the novice driver is the word "similar." In the early stages of learning, the range of similar contexts to which insights can be applied is quite limited. The presence of other cars definitely presents a non-similar situation because then the task of getting the car moving must be coordinated with other tasks like steering, braking, and noticing relevant data on the streets. These involve gaining and combining new bodily grounded insights into new car-motion contexts. Starting on a hill is definitely non-similar and presents new and frightening challenges that must be met by new insights. Shifting from first to second gear is non-similar, as is shifting from second to third.

Of course, the interesting thing about driving is that the progress toward mastery involves not only the new insights individually, but a succession of higher-order insights that yield a unified but flexibly patterned grasp of diverse combinations of insights.29 These are all context-rooted, but each new insight that is integrated has the effect of widening and adjusting the range of contexts to which the acquired flexible scheme of insights can be generalized. Once the novice

29 Lonergan discusses this process of skill development drawing on Piaget's notions of assimilation and adjustment in Method in Theology (Toronto: University of Toronto Press, 1990), chap. 2.
driver has learned to coordinate starting, shifting, braking, steering, and noticing, and once she has learned to judge the timing of these operations and their various patterns of combinations, and as long as she keeps away from ice or snow, heavy traffic, or expressways, she can generalize her insights through an awesome diversity of contexts.

The astounding feature of insight that calls for reflexive investigation is the fact that contextual learning yields generalized or transcontextual knowledge. It is the concrete context-rooted insight that is the very ground of generalized knowledge. I suggest that the only way this can be investigated adequately is by integrating reflexivity and self-appropriation into the research methodology.

**CONCLUSION**

I offer these reflections, not to dismiss Flyvbjerg, but to advance his project. His insights into the merits of studying concrete contexts, virtue-based knowledge, and the role of case studies in social science offer a refreshing alternative to older approaches in the social sciences. Also, his introduction of Aristotle and *phronesis* offers a compelling alternative to older claims about the "value free" status of social science. I believe, also, that his selection of Foucault as a partner in his work reflects his desire to include a dialectical critique of bias and domination into social science methodology.30

I suggest that these clues provide some direction for developing an empirical research project that integrates reflexivity and self-appropriation into the study of insight. I offer these clues as hypotheses that are rooted in a good deal of research that has been conducted individually by Lonergan scholars over the years but has not been organized methodically into a research strategy or program. Sociologists are beginning to recognize that their own self-understanding is an important part of sociological research, and this needs to become part of the research process. Most important, however, is my interest in developing research methods that lend themselves to the self-reflexive

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30 This recognition of the role of dialectical critique in the social sciences is reflected in Lonergan's essay, "Moral Theology and the Human Sciences." One of his points in praising Winter's project was that Winter recognized the need for a broader theoretical and methodological framework that would locate dialectical critique as one of the methods within social science.
study of insight. I do believe that reflexivity and self-appropriation need to become central components of social scientific research methodology. And I believe that studying insight will advance our ways of thinking about learning and about the relationship between concrete contexts and generalized knowledge.
CONSCIOUSNESS IS NOT ANOTHER OPERATION

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I spoke of the subject experiencing himself operating. But... this experiencing...is not another operation over and above the operation that is experienced. It is that very operation. ...

It is evident that we can shift our attention from the contents of our performance to ourselves as performing. We do this with greater or less frequency both in our ordinary practical and dramatic living and in our intellectual pursuits. In ordinary living, for example, corporate managers make this shift of attention when they gather to reflect upon the way they make their decisions or participate in a seminar on improving their creativity. In scientific practice the shift is made, with a bit more precision and refinement, when scientific investigators stipulate that attention should be restricted to sensible data and that the steps of scientific method should be followed. It seems that when we decide to take what we’re doing seriously in ordinary practical and social living, either because things haven’t been going well or because we wish to make them go still better, we shift our attention to our conscious performance as practical and social subjects. It seems that when we decide, in our scientific practice, to take what we’re doing seriously, we shift our attention to our operations, to our own performance, as scientific subjects. As ordinary subjects or as scientific subjects we can make this shift of attention because we’re conscious, because we’re present to ourselves in our performance.

But, these familiar facts don't prevent theorists of human consciousness from concluding that this shift of attention to ourselves as performing, motivated by practical or social or intellectual seriousness, is impossible and that the project of self-appropriation, of becoming reflective and deliberate subjects in our ordinary living or in our high-cultural pursuits, of taking possession of ourselves as conscious performers, is also impossible. Some philosophers do admit that the self-attentive effort to come to know ourselves as performers may be, in a limited way, self-clarifying, but they also claim that the clarity achieved cannot be regarded as objective self-knowledge. As Lonergan observed in the opening pages of *Understanding and Being*, "...[T]he simple matter of attaining self-appropriation can be complicated by an enormous series of surrounding questions that are all more difficult than the actual feat of attaining self-appropriation." The conclusion that it is impossible to come to know and take possession of ourselves as conscious performers is rooted in a conception of consciousness which is quite different from Lonergan's, one that

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4 For Lonergan on consciousness, see *Insight*, 345: "To affirm consciousness is to affirm that cognitional process is not merely a procession of contents but also a succession of acts." Again: "By the conscious act is not meant an act to which one attends; consciousness can be heightened by shifting attention from the content to the act, but consciousness is not constituted by that shift of attention, for it is a quality immanent in acts of certain kinds...." Again: "By the conscious act is not meant that the act is somehow isolated for inspection, nor that one grasps its function..., nor that one can assign it a name, nor that one can distinguish it from other acts, nor that one is certain of its occurrence." 346: "By consciousness is meant an awareness immanent in.... acts. But such acts different in kind, and so the awareness differs in kind with the acts." 346: "...the awareness immanent in the acts is the mere givenness of the acts." 347: "Intelligent and rational consciousness denote characters of cognitional process, and the characters they denote pertain not the contents but the proceeding." 349: "...different kinds of acts have different kinds of awareness...." *Understanding and Being*, vol. 5 of Collected Works of Bernard Lonergan, ed. Elizabeth A. Morelli and Mark D. Morelli, revised and augmented by Frederick E. Crowe (Toronto: University of Toronto Press, 1990), 20-21: "We are all present to ourselves. And as present to ourselves we are not looking at ourselves, we are not objects, we are subjects." See also *The Ontological and Psychological Constitution of Christ*, vol. 7 of Collected Works of Bernard Lonergan, ed. Michael G. Shields, Frederick E. Crowe, and Robert M. Doran (Toronto: University of Toronto Press, 2002), 215: "What we experience
flies in the face of the facts and involves its adherents in performative self-contradictions by which they should be, but strangely are not always, embarrassed. We should give this conception of consciousness serious attention. It seems to be deeply ingrained in contemporary high culture. It is held by highly educated philosophers who produce complex arguments to draw out its implications. It is also imbedded in the so-called folk-psychological language we use to talk intimately about ourselves, or in what I prefer to call, less pejoratively, the Language of Self-Possession. When we use the word “conscious” and feel the impulse to add “of,” the influence of this conception is quietly, effectively, and maliciously at work. The implication of this conception, inadvertently invited by our casual employment of the existing Language of Self-Possession and fully grasped by its high-cultural adherents, is that we are incapable of coming to know ourselves as conscious performers. Obviously, if we can’t come to know our own conscious performance, we can’t take possession of ourselves as conscious performers, we can’t become reflective and deliberate in our conscious performance. This competing and widely held conception of consciousness has dire implications, and it has to be acknowledged and addressed.

Let’s suppose, then, that consciousness is one operation among the many operations we perform. Suppose that we are present to ourselves or conscious only when we perform this operation. In this usage of the

interiorly, however, is known to us neither by some special act nor as an object.” 227: “To be conscious of oneself and one’s acts, however, is not the same as attending to oneself and one’s acts. If we were not first conscious, it would be futile for us to try to render our consciousness more clear and distinct by concentrating our attention.” See also Method in Theology, 8: “The operations then not only intend objects. There is to them a further psychological dimension. They occur consciously and by them the operating subject is conscious. Just as operations by their intentionality make objects present to the subject, so also by consciousness they make the operating subject present to himself.” “Again, whenever any of the operations are performed, the subject is aware of himself operating, present to himself operating, experiencing himself operating,” “...I spoke of the subject experiencing himself operating. But do not suppose that this experiencing is another operation to be added to the list, for this experiencing is not intending but being conscious. It is not another operation over and above the operation that is experienced. It is that very operation which, besides being intrinsically intentional, also is intrinsically conscious.” 15: “...[O]ne and the same operation not only intends an object but also reveals an intending subject...” (emphases added).

Lonergan is himself guilty of adopting this misleading usage, although he has successfully escaped its malicious influence. See, for example, Insight, 348.
word “conscious,” sometimes I am “conscious of” what I’m doing, and sometimes I’m not “conscious of” what I’m doing. There’s no verb form of consciousness we can use to name this operation that consciousness is supposed to be. The word “consciously” is not part of the standard vocabulary of the Language of Self-Possession. A word that is often used to name the operation that consciousness is thought by many to be is “reflection.”

This mistaken identification of consciousness with reflection is revealed in the way we sometimes use the Language of Self-Possession. We might say, “I wasn’t reflecting upon what I was doing, so I wasn’t conscious that I was doing it,” or “I was doing that unconsciously; I should have been conscious of it; I should have reflected on what I was doing,” or “I wasn’t conscious of that until I reflected on it,” or “I play piano better when I’m unconscious of what I’m doing; when I reflect upon my playing, I start to make mistakes.” We identify consciousness with reflection when we speak of an outstanding athletic performance as “unconscious.” “Did you see Kobe play last night? He couldn’t miss! He was unconscious!”

When we speak in this way, despite our vagueness and imprecision, we know well enough what we mean to be saying and what we don’t mean to be saying, and others understand us well enough. When I say, “I wasn’t reflecting upon what I was doing, so I wasn’t conscious that I was doing it,” I don’t mean I wasn’t present to myself while I was doing it. I mean I wasn’t attending, or paying attention, to what I was doing, describing it, and asking questions about it. When I say, “I was doing that unconsciously,” I don’t mean I had no experience at all of what I was doing. I mean I wasn’t attending to that experience. When I say, “I didn’t become conscious of that until I reflected on it,” I don’t mean I wasn’t having any experience at all until I began to pay attention to it. I mean I wasn’t paying attention to the experience I was actually having. When I say, “I play piano better when I’m unconscious of what I’m doing,” I mean I’m a better pianist when I’m playing the piano without thinking about my playing. When I say, “Did you see Kobe play last night? He was unconscious!” I don’t mean to say that Kobe was playing so well because he was playing while in deep sleep. Imagine his interview with the commentator after the game: “Kobe, forty points, all in the second half! You were unconscious out there! How did you do
that?" And imagine him responding, "I have no idea. Just like you said, I was asleep the whole time." He is more likely to respond, "Sometimes you just get into the zone. I wasn't thinking about it." If consciousness is reflection, how could Kobe have reported this experience of his performance? Like the skilled pianist, he wasn't thinking about his performance while he was playing. But, he certainly was present to himself while he was performing.

The casual, everyday identification of consciousness with reflection invites the creation of amusing imaginary scenarios involving talented and highly accomplished somnambulists, and its impact on ordinary communication is negligible. But, the high-cultural insistence that consciousness is reflection is a different story, and it has a sad ending. It leads to the conclusion that knowledge of ourselves as conscious performers can't be achieved. If knowledge of ourselves as conscious performers can't be achieved, we can't hope to take possession of ourselves as conscious performers. So much, then, for self-knowledge, and so much for sophrosyne.

When consciousness is identified with reflection, it's conceived as an operation or set of operations. Our operations are operations with contents. They relate us to objects. If consciousness is another operation, it is an operation with a content. It relates us to something, just as seeing relates us to something, questioning relates us to something, deciding relates us to something, and so on. If consciousness is an operation with a content, then when I'm conscious I'm performing an operation with regard to something. Now, this is a radically ambiguous statement, and its ambiguity pertains directly to the issue at hand. From one standpoint - Lonergan's - it is true to say that when I'm conscious I'm performing an operation with regard to something; I'm conscious only when I'm operating, because consciousness is a quality of operations. But, this is not the claim being made here. The claim being made here is that consciousness is itself another operation with a content. "Consciousness is consciousness of..." is an oft-repeated dictum of many philosophers nowadays. The point of the statement is to assure us that our conscious operations are intentional, that our conscious operations always have contents, that by our conscious operations we are related to objects, and this is all true. But, the statement also suggests, perhaps inadvertently but nevertheless very
problematically, that consciousness, too, is an operation with a content, that consciousness is an intentional operation, and this isn't true.\(^6\)

If consciousness is an operation with a content, if consciousness is always "consciousness of," then consciousness of my conscious performance must be an operation which has my operations as its content. The only way I can have any experience of my operations at all, then, is by making them objects of consciousness, that is, by performing the operation called "consciousness" on the other operations I perform. Without "consciousness of" my operations, it seems, I may be operating, but I won't have any experience of my operations to talk about. I can only gain access to my own operations, before I even begin to describe them, if I make them objects of the supposed operation called 'consciousness'. In other words, I can't gain access to my operations as my performance but only to them as objects of my performance. But, my operations are "operations with contents," or performances. They can be the contents of other operations, but that is not all they are. Consequently, when I am "conscious of" my operations, my performance is present to me only as other things are present to me, and I am not present to myself in them. They are present to me only as objects of my performance and never as my performance, or as what they actually are.

According to this conception of consciousness, then, when I'm conscious of my operations, I can't avoid misrepresenting them as objects of an operation. I cannot gain access to them as my operations, as what they actually are. My presence to myself is not understood to be my self-presence in my performance. It is conceived as presence to myself of my performance. It is conceived as another operation. My self-presence so-conceived, then, inevitably misrepresents my operations, by which I am related to objects, as themselves objects of an operation, because it is thought to be another operation with a content. The conclusion I must draw is that I simply cannot know my conscious performance as my conscious performance but only as the content of my conscious performance. Knowledge of myself as a conscious performer is impossible. Knowledge of the subject-as-subject is impossible. Only knowledge of the subject-as-object is possible. But,

\(^6\) The usage of "consciousness" in the statement "Consciousness is consciousness of..." is generic and undifferentiated. It refers to conscious performance generally. But, it is inadvertently transposed into a specific usage when the issue of access to our own conscious performance arises.
that's not the knowledge we're after when we undertake to come to know and take possession of ourselves as conscious performers.

There's another vitiating implication of the identification of consciousness with reflection. Even if my performance were not misrepresented when it is made the content of another operation, there would always be one operation I could never make an object of my performance, namely, the operation that "consciousness" is taken to be. The operation I'm supposed to be performing when I'm present to myself in my other operations cannot be the object of itself. I can't be conscious of my operation of being conscious of other operations. Keep in mind that consciousness, according to this view, is not my presence to myself in my operations. It is not my self-presence as the performing subject. It is supposed to be the operation through which my operations are present to me, not as relating me to contents, but as themselves contents of an operation. The conclusion I must draw is that, even if my performance were not misrepresented when it is made into the content of the supposed operation called "consciousness," the operation called "consciousness" could never be attended to, described, or asked about without converting that operation into the content of itself. Reflection on reflection as reflection is simply impossible, and so knowledge of myself as reflecting on my performance is impossible. One aspect of my performance, the operation by which my performance is presented to me, not as my performance but always as an object of my performance, inevitably eludes me in my effort to know myself as a conscious performer. Not only can we say nothing about ourselves as actually performing, but we can say nothing about ourselves as actually performing reflectively with regard to our performance. If we try to say something about ourselves as reflecting on our performance, we initiate an infinite regression of operations of being conscious of ourselves being conscious.

The identification of consciousness with reflection seems to have its source in the confusion of two characteristics or qualities of our conscious operations. In addition to being conscious, our operations always have contents. We're present to ourselves in our operations, and our operations make objects present to us. When consciousness is assumed to be an operation, it becomes yet another way in which we

\[ \text{Method in Theology, 78.} \]
are related to objects. The conclusions that reflection on our conscious performance as performance is impossible and that reflection on our reflection as one type of performance is impossible follow from this fundamental confusion. We are conscious in our operations, and in them we are related to objects. Our operations relate us to objects, and they are conscious. Our presence to ourselves is not another operation by which we relate ourselves to objects. Our relation to objects is conscious, but it is not consciousness. In our operations we are conscious, present to ourselves, and related to objects. As Lonergan states bluntly in the quotation with which I began, the experience of oneself operating is that very operation.

The critical issue here is this: Am I present to myself in my operations? Are my operations conscious? Or, am I conscious, present to myself, only when I make the operations I perform the objects of another operation? If I am present to myself in my operations, if self-presence is a quality of my operations, then when I attend to my performance, describe it, and ask about it, I am coming to know it as my own performance. On the other hand, if I am present to myself only when I make the operations I perform the objects of another operation, then I have no experience of my performance as my performance before I attend to it, describe it, and ask about it. But, if that were the case, what, then, could I be asking about?

According to this confused view, I'm not self-present when I'm performing operations unless I reflect upon them. But, how can I reflect on something I'm not aware of, and what would move me to attempt reflection? If, despite the impossibility on this view, I have any experience at all of myself as a performer, that experience will always be of myself as an object, as the content of my operations, and never as the subject operating, which is what I really am. My experience of myself would seem always to be recollective of what was done by me and never the experience of myself now doing it. I would not be

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8 There is a marked tendency to hypostatize consciousness, to conceive it as the operation of which it is only a quality. The inadvertent transposition from the generic usage of 'consciousness,' inclusive of operations with their qualities, to the specific usage sets the stage for this hypostatization. Conscious performance is the proper object of study; but typically consciousness, a quality of our performance, is made the object of study. When this happens, the inclination is strong to conceive consciousness as an operation.
able to know myself now as a performing subject, because I would be forced by the supposed operation called “consciousness” to apprehend myself then, as an object of an operation instead of as the subject of the operation.9 The operation “objectifies,” but the subject is the self-present operator.10

In the final analysis, if it really were the case that we can’t avoid denaturing “objectification” of ourselves as performing operations and are never present to ourselves as performers in them, we would have no experience of our operations to reflect upon before and until we reflected upon them. We wouldn’t be having any experience at all. There would be no performing subject to reflect upon.11

This identification of consciousness with reflection infects the existing Language of Self-Possession. I’ve suggested that the source of this mistaken identification is the failure to distinguish consciousness from intentionality and to see that both are qualities of operations. But, it should be noted that the infection is worsened by the viral influence of spontaneous extroversion.12 Not only is self-presence confused with intentionality, but intentionality is often imagined to be like ocular vision as popularly conceived. If I want to experience myself I must look into a mirror, and the one I see when I look into a mirror is never myself as seeing myself but only myself as seen and looking back. In the theoretical languages of many philosophers, this spontaneous imaginative construction of self-presence has been smuggled up, so to speak, and covertly frames analyses of consciousness, intentionality, and their relations to operations, with the consequence that the mistaken identification is made still more problematic as it is

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9 Understanding and Being, 16: “What, then, is this business of moving in on oneself, self-appropriation? It is not a matter of looking back into yourself, because it is not what you look at but the looking that counts. But it is not just the looking; it is not being entirely absorbed in the object; rather, it is adverting to the fact that, when you are absorbed in the object, you are also present to yourself.”

10 The use of “objectifies” here is one that supposes an imaginable opposition of subject and object. It is not the Lonerganian usage according to which the subject may be made an object of inquiry or objectified without being denatured.

11 Understanding and Being, 15: “Moreover, there is a third meaning of ‘presence’: you could not be present to me unless I were somehow present to myself... [A] person has to be somehow present to himself for others to be present to him.”

12 Understanding and Being, 106-107, for a concise account of extroversion.
legitimized by high-cultural authorities. One might expect that the vagueness and imprecision of the existing Language of Self-Possession would be challenged and remedied by high-cultural analysis, but that would require the fruitful appeal to our experience in our operating which has been ruled out. Instead of being tethered securely by these analyses to what is given in our presence to ourselves, the Language of Self-Possession is allowed go on holiday and, while it lounges in its lack of lucidity, the dire implications of its vagueness and imprecision are worked out in sophisticated arguments for the futility of trying to take possession of ourselves as conscious performers.

These high-cultural rationalizations of our inattention to our own performance arrest the movement from the second stage of meaning to the third. They reinforce the old procedure of thinking of ourselves as substances among other substances and reduce our presence to ourselves as subjects to just another instance of the presence of objects to us. And, if it is rightly discerned, under the sway of the imaginative model upon which the arguments often rely, that there is no “body-like” subject to be found, the conclusion drawn is not that self-presence isn’t intentionality and that the imaginative model has exacerbated the erroneous identification, but that there is no subject at all. It’s no wonder, then, that adherents of this mistaken conception of consciousness are unembarrassed by performative self-contradiction; for, they deny the possibility of accurate self-description and so do not acknowledge any performance with which their theories about themselves may meaningfully conflict. If this conception of consciousness as another

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13 Jaspers position on self-knowledge, on Lonergan’s view, is crippled by the identification of intentional object with the ‘object’ of elementary extroversion. See Method in Theology, 262 ff.

14 See, on this issue, Bernard Lonergan, The Subject (Milwaukee: Marquette University Press, 1968), 7: “The study of the subject is quite different, for it is the study of oneself inasmuch as one is conscious. It prescinds from the soul, its essence, its potencies, its habits, for none of these are given in consciousness. It attends to operations and to their center and source which is the self.” In the third stage of meaning, “Philosophy finds its proper data in intentional consciousness. Its primary function is to promote the self-appropriation that cuts to the root of philosophic differences and in comprehensions.” See Method in Theology, 95.

15 If the subject-as-subject is not taken seriously, the major integrity that is put in question when the charge of performative self-contradiction is made is reduced to the minor integrity of conceptual consistency. The interlocutor identifies herself with the
Consciousness Is Not Another Operation

operation is not displayed as erroneous and eventually abandoned, the pursuit of knowledge and possession of ourselves as conscious performers, upon which the flowering of the third stage of meaning depends, will continue to be declared futile before it is even tried.

beliefs and values she produces or generates rather than with herself as producing or generating them, and her integrity resides in her consistent maintenance of them and in their consistency with one another. On the high-cultural level, embarrassment is avoided by claiming the minor integrity of persistent conviction or the conceptual or logical consistency of convictions among themselves, because this minor integrity is mistaken for major integrity. Accordingly, the accused interlocutor is not embarrassed but offended by the charge of performative self-contradiction with its implication of a lack of integrity. Lonergan, commenting on the poor state of philosophical argumentation at the Gregorian in 1935, wrote, "...[G]ive me someone I can speak to plainly and bluntly, that I can attack not only by argument but with the important ally of some well-deserved ridicule, and there is little difficulty in making him see the light." (Letter of Bernard Lonergan to Henry Keane, 1935). Argument is impersonal and focuses solely on products of conscious performance and their logical handling; ridicule is personal and involves attention, not merely to the subject's products, but also to the subject's production of them. Argument is conceptual, pertaining to what is said; ridicule is operational, pertaining to a relation of the said to the productive conscious performance leading up to and involved in the act of saying it. The ridiculous is absurd, incongruous, or disharmonious, and ridicule exposes the subject who is, as Plato put it, "in contradiction with herself." For more on exposure of performative self-contradiction, its seeming irrelevance to the issue of personal integrity, and why it may not embarrass, see my article, "Reversing the Counterposition: Argumentum ad Hominem in Philosophical Dialogue," Lonergan Workshop Journal 6, ed. F. Lawrence (Missoula, MT: Scholars Press, 1986): 195-230.
THE IGNATIAN PRESUPPOSITION AS A METHODOLOGICAL GROUND FOR COLLABORATION

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Although encounters with those from other cultures and religions may present many difficult issues, exchange with those with whom we share our most intimate meanings and values may pose equally intractable challenges. In the face of the limitations imposed by difference, we expect to labor in cross-cultural and inter-faith dialogue to achieve some measure of mutual self-transcendence. Yet, over time, our continuing efforts to meet the distant other may retrace previous journeys. We begin to anticipate the mutual deconstruction of perceptions and cognitive categories. We discover some common patterns in our conscious, cognitive operations even as our specific acts of attending, inquiring, judging, and deliberating are mediated by radically different circumstances. While dialogue with strangers may never become a comfortable process, exactly as a process, the initial unknown unknown can become a known unknown, even a welcome venture beyond the activities most familiar within the cultural and religious horizon of our daily living.

Encountering the more intimate other, someone who already ostensibly shares our cultural and religious horizon, may pose the challenge of discovering a greater distance than anticipated. Differences of perception, interpretation, judgment, or commitment emerge that can breed mistrust and even suspicion of the betrayal of a shared meaning or value. The constitutive elements of community – common experience, common understanding, common judgment, and...
common affirmation of value – begin to erode. A painful new dimension intrudes on our friendships and communities of meaning as we confront an increasingly unknown known. But here recurring patterns may also emerge as we venture repeatedly from assumed familiarity through distressing alienation toward more profound friendship. In this essay, I will explore these latter, simpler, more intimate journeys, with a measure of confidence that the insights gained will be of some ultimate service to the complexities of cross-cultural and inter-religious dialogue.

As a ground for intimate dialogue that acknowledges the complexation of advance, decline, and redemption within communities of shared meaning and value, I propose an intentional appropriation of the dynamic, spiritual rhetoric presented in the *Exercitia Spiritualia* of Saint Ignatius of Loyola (1491-1556), especially as exemplified by the presupposition (#22) and the five moments of the general examination of conscience (#43). These two performative texts, I believe, can guide and inspire the active engagement of Ignatian practitioners in the construction of self-transcending meaning, a construction that, as freely bestowed gift and responsibly elicited task, synthesizes a personal participation in the redemptive missions of Word and Spirit with the composition of a transformative, communal narrative. Formed by the Word and guided by the light of the Spirit, we become disposed in freedom and gratitude toward vulnerable attentiveness, compassionate understanding, deliberative evaluation, and discerning response. Although these dispositions will not in themselves change the world of meaning or value, they enhance the likelihood that life-giving patterns of human living will emerge.

I reflect on the presupposition and general examen with the methodological assistance of the Canadian Jesuit philosopher and theologian Bernard Lonergan (1904-1984) and several of his

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2 I thank my colleague Michael Kolarcik for the distinction of gift and task in his reflection on the covenants of the Tannach.
contemporary interpreters, especially the critical contribution made by Gerard Walmsley in his recent text, *Lonergan on Philosophical Pluralism: The Polymorphism of Consciousness as the Key to Philosophy.*³ Lonergan and his interpreters develop an analytic matrix that attends to the intricate interplay among patterns of experience, levels of consciousness, differentiations of consciousness, realms of meaning, stages of meaning, and states of conversion, a matrix that helps us appreciate the diversity found in personal and communal narratives.⁴ If the spiritual formation promoted by Ignatius invites us to participate in the redemptive narrative focused on the Paschal event, Lonergan and his interpreters help us to bring an analytic perspective to differences and tensions that are drawn within the encompassing scope of this account. By integrating critical analysis with spiritual formation, I hope to explore the creative interaction between transformed disposition and progressive understanding.

Gerard Walmsley presents an original synthesis of Lonergan’s intellectual contribution; a synthesis that offers three critical advances that are of particular relevance to our present project. First, he develops a positive appreciation of diverse patterns of experience as the ground of human living, and philosophical reflection upon the meaning and value of human living. Without diminishing the achievement of Lonergan’s rigorous exploration of and within the intellectual pattern – an achievement grounded in a prioritization of the pure, unrestricted desire to know and focused on a philosophical appropriation of positions on objectivity, the real and the self-affirmation of the knower – Walmsley argues that Lonergan’s discussion of the polymorphism of human consciousness in *Insight: A Study of Human Understanding* (1957) is largely negative. Walmsley observes that polymorphism is construed principally as a dialectical encounter between biological extroversion and an intellectualist approach to the universe of inquiry. Employing Lonergan’s method of critical self-appropriation, Walmsley develops a broader, more positive appreciation of alternate patterns of experience. Often

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⁴ Walmsley acknowledges that his analysis does not explore fully the contribution of states of conversion (*Lonergan on Philosophical Pluralism*, 137).
building on Lonergan’s discussion, Walmsley reflects on the aesthetic, artistic, dramatic, practical, mystical, symbolic and ethical patterns of experience. Elaborating and affirming the value of these patterns acknowledges a variety of influences on the flows of human living, streams that feed different traditions of philosophical reflection on the meaning and value of human history, and the ensuing turbulence and confluence found in the dialogues of both life and philosophical reflection.

Second, Walmsley brings this critical insight into the polymorphism of human consciousness, specifically the source, scope, fecundity and significance of the patterns of experience, to his reading of Lonergan’s later text, *Method in Theology* (1972). Here, Walmsley suggests that the diversity of patterns of experience is a dispositive ground for the development of differentiations of consciousness, realms of meaning, and cultural stages of meaning, three key elements of the critical apparatus for the reflexive control of meaning proposed by Lonergan in *Method*. New patterns of experience call for the adaptation of cognitive skills; habituated competencies in attending, inquiring, judging and deliberating (differentiations of consciousness) that intend different aspects of the universe of inquiry (realms of meaning) and, eventually, are socialize through cultural institutions (cultural stages of meaning). By flagging the constructive correlation of the polymorphism of consciousness with the cognitional, metaphysical and historical realms investigated by Lonergan’s analysis, Walmsley brings a positive light to bear on both the ground and prospect of diversity.

Third, most significantly, Walmsley investigates polymorphism as a developmental phenomenon. Beyond a fundamental polymorphism which refers to the spontaneous patterns of experience that ground the differences of attending, understanding, judging and deliberating shaping the content of intentional consciousness, Walmsley observes that there is great diversity in the developmental paths followed by individuals and communities of meaning as they appropriate and develop themselves as intentional shapers of meaning. Not only is there a basic, spontaneous “alternating, blending, interfering, and conflicting of patterns of experience,” there are also many paths through partial differentiations of consciousness, transient realms of meaning, fragile stages of meaning and vulnerable states of conversion, paths upon
which the shapers of meaning may advance, recede, and interact with others on the way. The complexity of the journey and the inevitability of ambiguity in interactions with other individuals and social groups can give rise to misunderstanding and confusion. By distinguishing fundamental and developmental polymorphism, Walmsley advances Lonergan’s analytic framework, an advancement of the intentional resources available to assess the path travelled to date and foster development toward the future.

Although the *Exercitia Spiritualia* assumes an encompassing intentional stance to personal, religious narratives — a stance that has been expanded in contemporary practice to include communal, religious narratives — the intentional approach does not arise from an explicit, critical, framework. Rather, Ignatian discernment stems from the practice of medieval, monastic meditation and contemplation, spiritual disciplines that adapt the goal-oriented principles of classical rhetoric to the tasks of personal formation through the creative, engaged appropriation of sacred scripture and sacred tradition. Four elements of Ciceronian rhetoric name the dynamics of this intentional appropriation: *inventio* is the evaluative gathering of selected elements of the tradition; *dispositio* is the deliberative ordering of reflection through the identification of a starting point (*stasis*), pathway (*ductus*) and goal of reflection (*skopis*); *elocutio* is the cultivation of an evolving matrix of desire that accompanies and interacts with the meaning of movement along the pathway; and, finally, *memoria* is the ensuing profound, personal, moral formation associated with a memorial culture, the spontaneous inhabitation of a set of meanings and values that enables faithful, dynamic, autonomous responses in rapidly changing circumstances. Adapted within the practice of meditation

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and contemplation, these four dimensions of rhetoric chart the way to an intentional goal.

The presupposition and the general examen illustrate the intentional dynamic of dispositio. The presupposition proposes "better cooperation" between the one practicing and the one guiding the spiritual exercises in the common pursuit of truth (skopis). The "presupposition" itself that "every good Christian is more ready to put a good interpretation on another's statement than to condemn it as false" is the starting point of a pathway with further three steps. This stasis and the succeeding steps appear to acknowledge distinctions between the shared object of inquiry, the speaker's understanding, intended meaning and expression, and the interpretation of the listener. The first step points to the active engagement required for inquiry, "if an orthodox construction cannot be put on a proposition, the one who made it should be asked how he understands it." The second step suggests that any required correction should proceed as a collegial pursuit of truth, "if he is in error, he should be corrected with kindness." And finally, further carefully chosen efforts are employed as necessary to justify the proposition, "if this does not suffice, all appropriate means should be used to bring him to a correct interpretation, and so defend the proposition from error." The stasis and each step on the ductus assume the authenticity of both parties in the search for truth, acknowledge the complex interaction of intended object, understanding, expression, and interpretation, and empower the partners in the dialogue as responsible, autonomous agents who are capable of genuine collaboration. Simply, the contours of the pathway reflect and affirm the intentional, communal character of dialogue.

The general examen proposes that practitioners amend their lives with the grace of God, a goal that is effected by creating a transformative narrative shaped by participating in the missions of Word and Spirit, completed by sharing in the Paschal mystery, and enacted through renewed discipleship in the world. The first two moments in the creation of this narrative establish its intentiones, the disposition of gratitude and the desire to understand the events of the period under

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review in the light of the Holy Spirit. By adopting a disposition of
gratitude, practitioners embrace their status as creatures before the
creator, imitate the kenotic action of Christ in the Eucharist, and
recollect the creative and redemptive actions of the Word in history.
By seeking the light of the Holy Spirit, practitioners move toward
an intentional interpretation of the data of their daily living. Beyond
the episodic sequence of events, they search for the self-transcending
meaning and value of their living. In some small way, they anticipate
an eschatological perspective on their own biography and the history
of their community of meaning. The third moment is the actual review
of the events where the movement from *historia* to *theoria* occurs in
union with Word and Spirit. Guided by the disposition of gratitude,
the wisdom of the Word in history, the interior prompting of the Holy
Spirit, and the anticipation of transcendent intelligibility, practitioners
move beyond the mere presentation of their living to contemplate
its more profound meaning. The fourth moment acknowledges and
addresses the aspects of human living that resist being drawn into
this act of contemplation. There are, remarkably, areas of darkness
that turn away gratitude and light. By drawing these moments into
the Passion Narrative, a new *intentiones* is introduced, the darkness
is reversed and meaning is rediscovered. The integrity of the narrative
is restored by an act as simple as resuming the same events under the
tonality of contrition or compassion for the innocent victim condemned
to death on a cross. Finally, proceeding in imperfect union with Word
and Spirit, under the disposition of Eucharistic gratitude and in the
supernatural light of God, and propelled by the momentum of an
integrative narrative brought to greater wholeness by returning good
for evil through the triumph of the Cross, practitioners resolve their
future course.

Re-appropriating the presupposition and the examen in light of
Walmsley’s critical synthesis suggests refinements to these Ignatian
dynamics. We are invited to attend to a broader scope of potentially
relevant data, develop new patterns of possible understanding,
and redefine standards for reasonable judgment and responsible
evaluation. We are presented with an opportunity to explore new fields
of experience and re-contour our reflection about our travel.

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7 For the distinction of *historia* and *theoria*, see Gregory of Nyssa, *The Life of Moses*. 
The data to which we are challenged to attend anticipates the differentiated data presented by fundamental and developmental polymorphism. In addition to attending to the spontaneous data of sense and consciousness with a broader and more positive disposition we are invited to acknowledge the developmental diversity that accompanies the interpretation of these assemblies of data. A structured challenge confronts the collaborative disposition avowed by the presupposition and the intentional task of completing a transforming narrative in Word and Spirit assigned by the Examen. Iconic representations and transitional privileging of particular patterns of experience or developmental paths yields to an eschatological anticipation of a horizon of mystery that holds and appreciated every pattern and all paths through the matrix of differentiations of consciousness, realms of meaning, cultural stages of meaning and states of conversion.

Despite the relatively sophisticated interior awareness found in the *Exercitia Spiritualia*, the prayer instruments proposed by St. Ignatius serve the practical demands of day-to-day spiritual discernment and dwell principally within the realm of common sense. With the assistance of creative adaptations proposed by trained, spiritual guides, prayer instruments such as the presupposition and general examen may transcend the bounds of a particular brand of common sense to assist persons from a broad range of backgrounds, but the instruments are always applied within the specific horizon of a particular individual or the common narrative that shapes a community. Why are such applications not sufficient for the discernment of the advance, decline and redemption of the meanings and values shared by intimates within particular communities? If our focus remains on dialogue between intimates, what value is added by introducing an analytic matrix that invites and enables us to transcend a particular brand of common sense or reflect about the assumptions of a common narrative? The answer to this question, of course, rests in the simple observation that tensions and conflicts arise within shared common sense and common narratives that elude effective resolution with the aid of the available resources. Left to the resources of the horizon within which the challenges appear, the achievements of shared common sense and common narrative seem destined to decline.

By integrating spiritual formation with critical analysis,
especially the critical analysis afforded by Walmsley's reframing of Lonergan's intentionality analysis within the horizon of a positive account of fundamental and developmental polymorphism, we are able to attend more comprehensively to our encounters with the intimate other. We are more likely to have both the self-transcending disposition and the cognitive capacity required to notice, understand and respond constructively to the tensions that arise from encounters with those whom we expect to share and affirm common meanings and values, tensions that arise from either from the "alternating, blending, interfering and conflicting of patterns of experience" or the ensuing multiple, ambiguous, hesitant and instable states of specialized cognitive development. As Walmsley elaborates, the differences in patterns of experience are inevitable, and often enrichments in their diversity. But differences in the interpretation and valuation of that diversity flow not only from the variety of patterns of experience but no less, and likely more, from the alternating, blending, interfering and conflicting influence of multiple, ambiguous, hesitant and instable states of specialized cognitive development. Differences in partial differentiation of consciousness, preferred realms of meaning, the varying impact of the dominant cultural stage of development and state of conversion are all reflected in the advance and decline of achievements in common meaning and value.

The spiritual practices that we have introduced cultivate personal dispositions and a narrative process that advance self-transcending goals. The presupposition enlivens the common pursuit of truth as a collegial process that affirms the autonomy, interdependence and inalienable value of collaborators. The general examen invites the composition of truly transformative narratives that draw creatively upon religious sources, the data of daily living, an integral method and transcendent norms. Both engage practitioners by eliciting personal response mediated through the mnemonic association of images and affect, active inquiry, critical judgment and deliberative commitment. The critical, analytic matrix developed by Lonergan and his interpreters charts significant reference points for personal integrity, communal collaboration and self-transcendent accountability. The intelligent application of these analytic tools generates opportunities to practice the presupposition and generates further, reflective data for the
practice of the general examen. The principal locus of transformation rests in the intentional operations of practitioners, who are renewed in espoused meaning, value and action.
SITUATING LONERGAN'S ECONOMICS IN A CONTEXT OF COLLABORATION

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This year's conference invokes reflection upon the possibility of "ongoing collaboration." In keeping with this theme, I would like to consider how Lonergan's work in economics might be situated into a collaborative context.

We could distinguish between an internal and an external problem of collaboration. The internal collaborative problem is the problem of collaboration as experienced by those who have the benefit of sharing a common method. Although there will exist differences among collaborators regarding determination of priorities, allocation of responsibilities, and adjudication of findings, having a method provides "a framework for collaborative creativity" nevertheless.¹ In the context of the method of functional specialization, dialectics allows collaboration not to break down in the face of differences, but rather anticipates and resolves these, to move forward into foundations. The internal problem of collaboration in economics then, would be the problem of doing economics in the full context of functional specialization.

But I suggest that there is also what might be called an external collaborative problem – one that occurs in contexts in which people who may have similar concerns and goals (and hence motivation to collaborate) have not yet unified under the guidance any common method. In this case the problem of collaboration is experienced initially as a problem of dialogue. How is dialogue possible in the

absence of shared theoretical foundations, of common methodological principles, or even – in the case of dialogue with common sense – of an apprehended need for a theory or a method?

This is the question upon which I intend to focus, and with respect to Lonergan's economics. There seems to be a pressing need for such a focus. Last week at the New Paradigm of Economics Summit, at Seton Hall University, for example, many gave papers expressing the conviction that Lonergan's work in macroeconomics is pertinent to the diagnosis and treatment of contemporary economic problems. And indeed it is. Yet it is also the case that Lonergan's remarkable accomplishment in economics has remained somewhat isolated – something of an island of theory unto itself. And so the New Paradigm conference was an attempt to make connections, to begin to build bridges to and from that island – in part by an effort to invite and include members of the business community, most of whom had little prior familiarity with Lonergan's work. On the supposition that this problem of external collaboration is worthy of consideration, I will attempt to explore ways that Lonergan's work in economics might enter into current dialogue, especially in light of the recent economic turmoil.

A MORAL CRISIS RESOLVED BY WILL?

For Lonergan, normative economic, commercial, and financial practices involve both an intellectual-theoretic and a moral component. (The moral component however, is largely a matter of willingness to act in accord with the exigencies of the pure cycle, which itself must be understood theoretically.) Yet there has been a tendency to regard the recent financial crisis and resulting global economic downturn primarily as a moral failure, and little discussion coming out of Washington or Wall Street advocating the need for deeper diagnostic theorizing. In his inaugural address for example, Barak Obama makes reference to an economy badly weakened due to "greed and irresponsibility." No doubt there was plenty of greed and irresponsibility afoot, on a variety of levels, but one may wonder whether any merely moral analysis gets to the root of the problem. Likewise, in various discussions concerning what needed to be done to end the crisis and reverse the recession there

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seemed to be little or no hesitation on the part of government officials and central bankers regarding theoretical issues. The only concern publically expressed was a practical concern for gathering consent. In March, for example, Secretary of the Treasury Timothy Geithner was interviewed by Charlie Rose. The final question of that interview was a question Socrates could have asked Euthyphro:

Charlie Rose: Final question: Why are you confident that we’re going to come out of this? What is it that makes you, when you see the numbers that you never imagined seeing, when you see a trillion dollar deficit, when you see General Motors tottering close to bankruptcy, when you see General Electric having the kinds of problems – these are icons of American might – when you see people going through what they’ve gone through, when you see unemployment climbing up beyond 8.5 percent, why are you, in the center of this – who knows everything or knows most of the stuff, you hear the bad news and the possibilities – confident?

Timothy Geithner: Because this is not about ability; it’s about will. And it’s about the will of government to do what’s necessary to act to fix this....

Granted, the appearance of a thoroughgoing voluntarism here might simply stem from the fact that, during a crisis, public leaders do need to attain consent quickly and can not afford to publically express indecisiveness. Nevertheless, the impression with which one could be left is: 1) that the problem was caused merely by moral failure, that is, by “greed and irresponsibility on the part of some,” 2) that the solution to the problem is clear theoretically and uncontroversial in its possible risks and side-effects, and 3) that the only real problem is one of mustering the political resolve to implement the obvious solution.

That resolve has certainly been forthcoming. Interest rates have been lowered to near 0%. The Federal Reserve has begun to engage in “quantitative monetary easing,” a somewhat experimental technique

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that runs the risk of inducing very high future inflation. The immense credit and countercyclical spending power of federal government has been tapped in various efforts to “stimulate” or “jumpstart” the economy by fiscal policy, that is, by additional deficit spending. The American Recovery and Reinvestment Act provides for $787 billion in deficit spending for education, health care, infrastructure, aid to state governments, tax breaks, extension of unemployment and welfare benefits, and so forth. To encourage consumer lending, the Term Asset-Backed Securities Loan Facility (TALF) provides up to $1 trillion for government purchase of securities backed by credit card debt, student loans, auto loans, and so forth. Up to $1.45 trillion was allocated for government purchase of housing-related debt and mortgage-backed securities.\(^5\) Aid to struggling automobile companies could reach $100 billion by the end of 2009. In response to the banking crisis, the Federal Reserve has also established a variety of lending, purchasing, and insuring arrangements (with potential total financial commitments in the low trillions of dollars) to sustain and encourage activity in interbank lending, the mortgage market, the money market, and short-term commercial paper markets. The bad assets of Bear Stearns were federally guaranteed (at taxpayer expense) to facilitate the sale of that firm to JP Morgan Chase. It is not yet known what the final cost of the AIG bailout will be, but it could exceed $100 billion. This financial crisis has also been somewhat unusual insofar as certain huge financial institutions such as Citibank and Bank of America were deemed “too big to fail.” They were not placed into FDIC receivership, as were over 30 smaller failed banks, but rather became the beneficiaries of the U.S. Treasury Department’s $700 billion Troubled Assets Relief Program (TARP). The Emergency Economic Stabilization Act of 2008 suspended conservative GAAP “mark to market” accounting standards. Troubled assets, which had widely come to be called “toxic assets,” were renamed “legacy assets” by the Department of Treasury in preparation for its Public-Private Investment Program (PPIP), which is preparing to auction off those “legacy assets” to private investors enticed by nonrecourse FDIC loans that provide very high leverage and very limited downside risk.

THINKERS IN A SPIRIT OF ECONOMIC REALISM

While it is certainly correct to acknowledge that "greed and irresponsibility" were causes precipitating the financial crisis, and while it may possibly be the case (especially given a previous regulatory laxity) that government could be instrumental in facilitating resolution of such a crisis, there nevertheless exists a significant minority of financial journalists, economists, and investment managers who remain skeptical that the economic, commercial, and financial problems that recently surfaced have been adequately understood or resolved at a sufficiently fundamental level. There are those who have argued that the recent financial crisis was merely a symptom of deeper underlying distortions, imbalances, or otherwise unsustainable conditions at a properly economic level. As we are inquiring into the possibility of Lonergan's economics entering into dialogue, acknowledging such thinkers and their concerns may help to stake out possibilities for common ground. Examples include the following:

Among financial journalists Martin Wolf, chief economics commentator at the Financial Times, has routinely attempted to focus attention on issues pertinent to long-term global economic stability – issues that often lie beneath the surface of what gets reported on a daily basis, even in the fairly thorough reporting of the Financial Times. The reporting of Jillian Tett, also with the Financial Times, was critical of the speculative excesses of certain investment banking firms well before this became fashionable; she warned of a possible meltdown in the credit derivatives market more than a year before the actual crisis. Tett holds a doctorate in social anthropology and recently released a book in which she studies the firm of J. P. Morgan from a social anthropological perspective. Kevin Philips, in Bad Money:

6 This list is certainly not intended to be anywhere near exhaustive. These are merely some of the economic thinkers I happened to have come across recently. As the selection of these readings was more serendipitous than directed or methodical, I have no good reason to suppose that these are the best representatives of the positions and priorities advocated.

7 Two representative recent examples include Martin Wolf, "Fixing bankrupt financial systems is just the beginning," Financial Times, April 29, 2009, p. 9. Martin Wolf, "Why G20 leaders will fail to deal with the big challenge," Financial Times, April 1, 2009, p. 11.

Reckless Finance, Failed Politics, and the Global Crisis of American Capitalism, investigates the rise to prominence of the financial services industry since the Reagan era. He raises critical concerns about risks to the vitality of the real economy, and to the integrity of political democracy, imposed by this disproportionate growth.9 James Fallows has written a number of articles for The Atlantic questioning the sustainability of the American trade imbalance with exporting countries such as China.10 A more dated example of sound financial journalism is that of Henry Hazlitt, who sought to understand and evaluate a wide range of economic policies in light of their consistency with his proposal that: "The art of economics consists in looking not merely at the immediate but at the longer effects of any act or policy; it consists in tracing the consequences of that policy not merely for one group but for all groups."11

Among academic economists, Hyman Minsky attempted to understand speculative euphoria and the financial instability it causes by tracing its roots to underlying economic cycles of cash flow and indebtedness.12 Robert J. Shiller, of Yale University, offered warnings (that appear prophetic in retrospect) of asset bubbles and speculative excess in both equity and housing markets.13 Simon Johnson, former chief economist of the IMF, now at MIT, has argued that policies currently being pursued to rescue the failed banks are precisely the kind of policies already known by the IMF not to work.14

Finally, despite media impressions to the contrary, it is simply not the case that all on Wall Street lost their minds and went wild prior to

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the 2008 crisis. Some investment managers and strategists were in fact extremely insightful in their assessments of the economy and prudently wary of underlying risks in financial markets. Here one might examine the writings and/or interviews of Stephen Roach, chairman of Morgan Stanley Asia,\textsuperscript{15} Seth Klarman, manager of the Baupost hedge fund,\textsuperscript{16} financial analyst Richard Duncan,\textsuperscript{17} or James Grant, editor of Grant’s Interest Rate Observer.\textsuperscript{18} Such a list surely could be extended.

While none of these economic thinkers, to my knowledge, are familiar with Lonergan’s macroeconomic analysis, they do nevertheless emphasize certain themes and priorities that resonate with what might vaguely be called the realist spirit of Lonergan’s macroeconomics.\textsuperscript{19} These themes and priorities include a recognition that what is primary is the so-called real economy, rather than the superstructure of finance – or, to put it colloquially, Main Street, rather than Wall Street. The productive process is basic; it is what deserves the unswerving attention of the economist; its strength or weakness is the standard by which economic policies are to be evaluated. Financial institutions and practices, on the other hand, are secondary insofar as they have as their raison d’être the more effective facilitation of the productive process itself.

A corollary of this emphasis upon the productive process and the primacy of the real economy is a suspicion of what some regard the bloated significance of the financial sector. Many of these thinkers have expressed concern that the self-priority of finance and recent developments in “financial innovation” risk undercutting the stability of the economy as a whole. There is also an inclination to suppose that economic problems demand properly economic solutions and to be wary


\textsuperscript{17} Richard Duncan, The Dollar Crisis: Causes, Consequences, Cures, revised and updated ed. (Singapore: John Wiley & Sons, 2005).

\textsuperscript{18} James Grant, Mr Market Miscalculates (Mount Jackson, VA: Axios Press, 2008).

\textsuperscript{19} Lonergan himself makes no reference to a spirit of economic realism. My intention is merely to use this phrase as a rubric to stake out common ground that Lonergan might possibly share with other economic thinkers who seem to have similar motivations and goals.
of proposed solutions that are merely financial in nature.

A distinct but related emphasis in these thinkers is upon the need to think out and promote conditions for long-term global macroeconomic sustainability. There is a concern to think systematically and to understand the potential unintended consequences of persistent trade imbalances, of excessive debt, of deficit spending, and of governmental economic intervention. By definition, a concern for sustainability will be a concern for consequences occurring over the relatively long term. Appreciation for the interconnectedness attending globalization has also encouraged analyses from beyond merely nationalistic perspectives.

Accompanying this concern for global macroeconomic sustainability is a cautionary attitude on the part of these thinkers with respect to persistent “structural imbalances,” and other perceived unfulfilled conditions of sustainability. They have been wary of excessive leverage on the part of financial institutions and of a global economy fueled by credit-driven consumption. They have been critical of financial markets in which speculation drives asset valuations out of reasonable proportion to the real economic potential of underlying enterprises. While sympathetic with some recent findings in behavioral finance, they have generally rejected as overly psychological the surprisingly common notion that economic reality is fundamentally a socially constructed matter of “sentiment” or “animal spirits.” On the other hand, they have generally rejected as insufficiently psychological the efficient market hypothesis, which has been central to much academic finance in recent decades. They partake of a realism that purports to forego “magical thinking,” unfounded optimism, faith in new economic paradigms, and the slogan “this time it’s different.” They have been critical of at least some proposed governmental interventions, fearing these are liable only to postpone and exacerbate inevitable consequences merely for the sake of deflecting pain in the short term.20

My point in adverting to the existence of a variety of economic thinkers who emphasize such themes and priorities is not to make the claim that they somehow approximate Lonergan’s approach – for they

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20 My use of “they” in this passage is intended collectively rather than distributively. Not all of these economic thinkers advocate all of the positions mentioned; but some do, for each.
do not. Nor is it to suggest that those persons in particular might prove suitable dialogue partners for those among us interested in Lonergan’s economics – for few if any would be both interested and accessible. My point rather, is to acknowledge that there do already exist streams of inquiry running through the landscape of current public discourse that might enter into confluence at least with the motivations and goals of Lonergan’s work in economics.

The thinkers I have mentioned (and again surely others could be added) are attempting to be attentive to issues they believe have been overlooked, to be intelligent in raising relevant questions that others have cast aside, to be reasonable in critically questioning possibly mistaken economic assumptions and policies. With respect to the treatment of the financial crisis, they are asking questions that advert to responsibility: Do the policy makers understand the crisis in its full complexity and at its most fundamental levels? Has the crisis been diagnosed properly? Are the policymakers treating the long-term disease or merely the short-term symptoms? Do the policy makers adequately understand the risks and likely long-term consequences of the policies they are implementing? Has government intervention in the financial crisis been consistent with the stated ideals of capitalism and of democracy? Has the process been just and ethical? Has it been fair?

The function of dialectics is not merely to reverse decline but also to advance progress. The financial crisis has certainly highlighted the prevalence of decline – not only obvious patterns of “greed and irresponsibility,” but also, one suspects, deeper oversights pertinent both to the causes of the global recession and to the various governmental interventions. But my point here is that the story of decline is not the whole story; there already do exist elements of progress that are worth advancing. The economic thinkers I mentioned unknowingly share with Lonergan what I have called a spirit of economic realism. This spirit is characterized by a recognition of the primacy of the productive process and an appreciation for the conditionality of global macroeconomic sustainability. On the basis of these shared emphases

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there is some hope that those working on Lonergan’s economics may find collaborative partners, allies in the cause of economic realism.  

LONERGAN’S THEORETIC CONTRIBUTION

What could Lonergan’s macroeconomics writings contribute to current dialogue on economics? I would like to answer this question twice – first generally, by discussing Lonergan’s contribution precisely as a contribution of theory, and then specifically, by outlining how that theory differentiates and relates two distinct macroeconomic circuits.

First, my appreciation for the economic thinkers mentioned above stems mainly from a recognition of what I consider their sound commonsense judgment and prudential long-term concern for sustaining the economy as a conditioned whole. While I have suggested that the motives and goals of these thinkers resonate with those of Lonergan, still Lonergan’s contribution is a different kind of contribution; it is a contribution not of common sense, but of theory.

Whereas commonsense practicality attempts to deal with each particular situation as it arises, theory would understand things systematically, as an integral functioning whole. Whereas commonsense practicality deals with each new situation by drawing upon “experience,” upon a store of insights and judgments that have been gradually acquired through trial and error, theory attempts to both differentiate and relate relevant variables or functions. While commonsense practicality understands things “in relation to us,” in relation to our familiar everyday ways of thinking and imagining, and in the context of an horizon of practical concern, theory would understand things “in relation to each other,” in relation to the variables and functions constitutive of the systematic context.

22 Do the streams of inquiry I have outlined have a future, or do they dry up? I believe these are questions that will persist and re-emerge all the stronger should the economic recovery either not materialize, or prove unsustainable. If we should somehow manage to slip back into another halcyon Greenspanian era of “Great Moderation,” it is possible that attention could be diverted, until the next crisis. Yet even given a vigorous recovery, one would think that the sheer amount of political, social, and economic disruption, not to mention the massive public debt that has been incurred in attempted resolution of this present crisis, would be enough to sustain serious inquiry along these lines.

23 I recognize that the very activity of a selection in some manner presupposes a dialectical principle.
Lonergan’s contribution to economic dialogue, generally considered, is a contribution of theory. That theory attempts to understand how an economy functions as a \textit{systematic} conditioned whole. It attempts to identify variables that are \textit{relevant} to the economic process as it \textit{concretely} occurs, variables that are \textit{fundamental} to adequate understanding, variables that are adequately \textit{differentiated} (i.e., into distinct basic and surplus circuits, to be discussed below). The variables of Lonergan’s theory are actually functions: two demand functions, two supply functions, and a redistributive function. Those functions are \textit{explanatory} rather than descriptive; they include, but do not directly denote, such quotidian realities as firms and households, consumers and producers. These functions are \textit{implicitly defined}: the demand functions function by receiving income from the supply functions and making expenditures to the supply functions in exchange for goods and services. The supply functions operate by making outlays to produce the goods and services that are exchanged for the expenditures coming from the demand functions. The redistributive function allows for savings and loans to be channeled to and from any of the demand or supply functions as required for the optimal functioning of the whole. The theory is not static but \textit{dynamic}; it does not seek to understand merely one particular productive-monetary situation but rather the entire range of possible productive-monetary situations. The theory is not merely dynamic but is also \textit{genetic}; it includes not only ongoing economic change but also economic growth. It is \textit{normative} in offering an account of the monetary conditions that would have to be fulfilled if economies are both to meet the productive potential offered up by new innovation and subsequently have this accelerated production be met by effective demand. Finally, it is \textit{dialectical}; it can account for the failures of economies, for the inefficiency of weak surplus expansions, and the waste of resisted basic expansions. It accounts for the familiar trade cycle with its slumps and critiques a range of misguided and ineffective palliatives.

If Lonergan’s contribution, in general, is a contribution of theory, what \textit{specifically} would that theory contribute to current economic dialogue? In light of the recent financial crisis and the current global economic slump, it may be salutary to consider a central passage concerning the cause of economic slumps. Lonergan argued that
economic slumps are not inevitable; given a properly differentiated understanding of macroeconomic process, and cooperation with that process, in principle slumps could be prevented. The difficulty however, is that insofar as economic theory remains undifferentiated, we lack the understanding to do this.

The difficulty emerges in...the basic expansion. In equity it should be directed to raising the standard of living of the whole society. It does not. And the reason why it does not is not the reason on which simple-minded moralists insist. They blame greed. But the prime cause is ignorance. The dynamics of surplus and basic production, surplus and basic expansions, surplus and basic incomes are not understood, not formulated, not taught.24

The distinction between surplus and basic is thrice repeated here. So perhaps the specific contribution of Lonergan’s theory could be clarified 1) by contrast to economic theory that remains undifferentiated, 2) by adumbrating Lonergan’s distinction of “surplus and basic production, surplus and basic expansions, surplus and basic incomes,” and 3) by explaining how Lonergan’s differentiation and relation of the surplus and basic circuits makes possible a new heuristic, a new way of raising new questions that might broaden the horizon of public discourse in economics.

FROM UNDIFFERENTIATED TO DIFFERENTIATED ANALYSIS

By the terse and seemingly exasperated phrasing, “not understood, not formulated, not taught,” Lonergan clearly wished to underscore the need to move from undifferentiated to differentiated analysis. The following vignette might help clarify what is meant by undifferentiated analysis: A bright and talented student dropped by my office last semester to talk over some ideas for her term paper. I noticed that on the cover of one of the notebooks she carried was a large drawing, in bold marker,

of what appeared to be a house and a factory connected by two large arrows. I asked her what it was. She explained it was her notebook for an economics course. The picture was of the economy. It showed how firms provide goods and services to households (indicated by the arrow from the factory to the house), and how households provided various "factors of production" to firms (indicated by the opposite arrow, from house to factory). She seemed mildly impressed with how it made one big loop and said that her professor had told the class that if there was only one thing they remembered from that course, it should be that diagram. As she went on to talk about how highly she admired that particular professor, and as we still had the term paper to discuss, I never had the heart to break it to my student that her diagram lacked adequate functional differentiation. That was probably fortunate for both of us.

The diagram on the notebook cover is fairly standard in economics textbooks. The problem is not that it is inaccurate, or even that it is too simple (given the usual appending of other progressively more complex flow charts which also include government, banks, etc.). The problem rather, is that the terms of the diagram, households and firms, are descriptive entities, rather than explanatory functions. The other problem is that such diagrams present the economy as one undifferentiated whole, a single loop of exchanges between firms and households. While this seems to present a complete and concrete picture, it acknowledges neither the important functional difference between basic and surplus production in firms, nor the difference between basic and surplus income in households. It also fails to differentiate what Lonergan recognized as two distinct kinds of circuits in the economy. And if these surplus and basic productive and monetary circuits are not differentiated, the relation that obtains between the two circuits – a very important relation of accelerator to accelerated – can not be understood. And if that relation is not understood, neither can the exigencies of distinct surplus and basic expansions. Hence the apparently complete picture of the single undifferentiated circuit actually keeps us in the dark about much that is worth understanding. We proceed to Lonergan's distinction and relation of the basic and surplus macroeconomic circuits.
Basic and Surplus Production

Lonergan's major contribution was to work out how any economy beyond the subsistence stage is constituted not by a single circuit of production, but by two circuits, one producing a flow of "basic" goods and services that leave the productive process to enter directly into a standard of living, and the other producing "surplus" goods and services, which do not enter into a standard of living in this way, but rather are utilized within the productive process itself to accelerate the velocity of goods and services. Hence basic and surplus goods are distinguished by their ends. A sandwich, a sweater, or a ski chalet would be instances of basic goods; these are desirable as directly contributing to a standard of living in some more or less obvious manner. On the other hand, a grain combine, an industrial power loom, or a saw mill, are all surplus goods (even if these are used in the basic circuit for basic production). These do not directly enter into anyone's standard of living, but are desired only instrumentally, as making production more efficient.

The surplus circuit emerges and expands as people come to reflect upon the effectiveness of existing productive processes. To the extent that questions are raised concerning possible improvements, there will tend to occur insights into how production might possibly be rendered more effective. Insofar as those who have such practical ideas are given the time, resources, and financial support to develop and implement their insights, new innovations come to enter into the productive process. Such innovations, when implemented, eventually accelerate the flow of goods and services in the basic circuit. Hence, the relation of the surplus circuit to the basic circuit is one of acceleration to velocity.

Basic and Surplus Incomes

The functional analysis of the productive process is paralleled by an analysis of monetary counterflows. In an attempt to think out conditions for long-term macroeconomic sustainability and growth,

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26 The theoretical and practical importance of this discovery is difficult to overestimate.
Lonergan sought to understand the normative but dynamically changing income requirements of the basic and surplus circuits. He recognized that there was a persistent danger of one circuit "draining" the other and that this resulted in a suboptimal or precarious set of economic conditions. If, on the one hand, there is an unwillingness to save and invest to produce surplus goods and services, an economy cuts short its long-term potential for the sake of present consumption. On the other hand, if such saving and investment do occur, but the resulting surplus expansion is not followed by a willingness to allow growth rates of pure surplus income to decline and rates of basic income to increase, then the basic expansion will be choked off. In this case the prior sacrifices that made possible the surplus expansion will be wasted to some extent, because there will be too little effective basic demand to purchase the increased flow of basic goods and services that the surplus expansion had made possible.

**Basic and Surplus Expansions**

Lonergan sought to determine what the participants in an economy would need to understand in order to intelligently make those decisions which would actually bring about, first, a surplus expansion that implements new innovation capable of accelerating the productive process, and then, a basic expansion that would allow all to enjoy the bounty of the resulting accelerated flow of basic goods and services. The successful negotiation of a complete "pure cycle," in which a surplus expansion is followed up with a basic expansion, would be something very different from the boom-to-bust dynamics of our all-too-familiar "trade cycle." It would avoid both the speculative boom, with its inefficiencies of productive overcapacity and sudden credit contractions, and the waste of the bust, which entails a negative acceleration of production and consumption, and all the nastiness that goes along with this. On the whole, Lonergan’s account of the pure cycle specifies the necessary conditions for the possibility of a sustained maximization of the productive process compatible with equally sustained effective basic demand.
NEW THEORY, NEW QUESTIONS, NEW HORIZON

We have discussed Lonergan's contribution in general as that of providing a theory, and have adumbrated some salient specific features of that theory. I would now like to return to the initial question, "What could Lonergan's macroeconomics writings contribute to current dialogue on economics?" by suggesting that they might greatly broaden the horizon of such dialogue.

In the discussion of the notion of horizon in his 1959 lectures on the philosophy of education, Lonergan introduced a distinction between the known, the known unknown, and the unknown unknown. The known extends to the range of questions one can presently ask and answer. The known unknown extends beyond the known and is bounded not by answers, but by the range of questions one raises. For Lonergan, it is not the limit of the known but rather of the known unknown that demarcates any particular intellectual horizon. The limits of human understanding are marked not by the answers we already have, but by the questions we find meaningful, significant, worth asking. Beyond the known unknown lies the unknown unknown in which resides the answers to the totality of questions one does not even ask. Such answers of themselves are presumably intelligible and disclosive of being, but as their corresponding questions do not get asked, an unsuspected range of being remains in the dark, as it were, and undisclosed.27 Intellectual development broadens the horizon of the known; but the means to this is an initial broadening of the horizon of the known unknown, and that occurs when we come to ask questions which previously we were unable or unwilling to ask.

The significance of Lonergan's theoretic contribution to economics is that by allowing new questions to be asked and answered, it effectively broadens a horizon previously bounded by a narrower known unknown. What formerly remained in the darkness of the unknown unknown now becomes a subject for inquiry; it enters as a known unknown into the horizon of thought and discourse. Lonergan's macroeconomic analysis contributes to contemporary economic dialogue a theory which I have

characterized above as systematic, concrete, functional, differentiated, explanatory, dynamic, genetic, normative, and dialectical. Being able to think about the economy with the aid of such a theory complements tremendously the resources of commonsense understanding, no matter how refined, prudential, and morally informed those may be. It vastly broadens the horizon of discourse by making possible an array of questions which would not likely occur in the absence of the theoretic contribution.

Most especially engendering new questions would be the differentiation and relation of two distinct basic and surplus circuits. The key insight that the surplus circuit functions as accelerator to the basic circuit places what is perhaps the most important relation in economics – that is, the relation of productive capacity to effective demand – into an entirely new light. It holds out the possibility of a quantitatively refined analysis. It allows inquiry into whether there might be promoted some set of conditions under which economic development could be maximized while avoiding any negative acceleration of aggregate production or consumption, that is, inquiry into the conditions of what Lonergan termed a "pure cycle." Insights into the pure cycle, in turn, would give rise to new questions and new insights regarding the causes of the familiar trade cycle, and its attendant slumps.

Differentiating basic and surplus circuits allows new questions to be raised regarding what happens to those circuits when an economy engages in foreign trade. An understanding of the conditions that must be maintained to sustain the vitality of both circuits would give rise to questions regarding the viability of imbalanced trade.

When basic and surplus expansions are differentiated, and the phases and requirements of the "pure cycle" come to be understood, the compact and undifferentiated but seemingly universal desideratum of "promoting economic growth" might come to be understood in a more nuanced manner. Policy-makers would recognize the need to ask: In which circuit ought we now to be aiming to promote growth – basic or surplus? And answering that question would in turn depend upon understanding the further question: Where are we in reference to the normative requirements of the pure cycle? Currently these are questions which are not asked. It is commonly assumed that growth is
something always to be pursued, at some more or less constant steady rate per annum. But if it were understood that long-term economic growth is more like the beating of a heart than the climbing of a hill, this would give rise to a very different set of questions.

As economic growth came to be reinterpreted, so too would the function of savings, credit, and investment – the means by which growth is facilitated. Insights into the exigencies of the pure cycle would also encourage new questions, and new understandings, concerning the legitimate function of finance. If the vast sums of money flowing through the redistributive function (especially during surplus expansions) came to be reinterpreted in a functional manner, they would be understood as something more than merely revenue for the “financial services industry.” If the functional significance of the surplus expansion was understood as a condition for the possibility of an eventual basic expansion, Lonergan’s understanding of the significance of savings as “the social dividend” would concomitantly be understood. An appreciation for the significance of the social dividend would foster a new sense of responsibility for the use of other people’s money. It would also encourage new questions regarding the function of profits. The understanding of profit would likely shift from what it seems currently to be – a somewhat unquestionable criterion for decision-making – to a more adequate understanding which would apprehend profit functionally and as ultimately directed toward the egalitarian good of a basic expansion.

Lastly, Lonergan’s macroeconomic analysis can be appreciated as an attempt to think out the conditions for long-term macroeconomic sustainability. Insofar as it can be affirmed that sustainability is achievable on a properly economic level, this would give rise to critical questions regarding what now seems a prevalent assumption that government involvement is required to promote and sustain economic vitality. These would include a host of questions regarding the perceived need for interest rate manipulation, deficit spending, fiscal stimulus, and public recapitalization of failed financial institutions. Lonergan’s functionally differentiated analysis could also be employed directly in an analysis of the efficaciousness of all such policies.
CONCLUSION

This paper has taken up the problematic of situating Lonergan’s work on economics in a collaborative context. The concern has been with external collaboration, with how to dialogue with those with whom one does not have the benefit of already sharing a method.\(^{28}\) Drawing upon the positive principle of dialectics, that progress is to be advanced, I attempted to identify various streams of economic inquiry that seem to be consistent in principle with Lonergan’s major emphases upon the primacy of the productive process and a concern to promote conditions for long-term macroeconomic sustainability. I then raised the question of what Lonergan had to offer and emphasized that his contribution is primarily one of theory. Drawing upon the salient features of that theory, I made the argument that theories function as heuristics; they generate new questions, and new ways of asking questions. As it is by expanding the range of our questioning that we encroach upon the unknown unknown, Lonergan’s theoretic contribution holds out the possibility of broadening the horizon of discourse in economics in some very enriching ways, many of which were tersely indicated.

The concern in this paper has been not so much with dialogue internal to the realm of theory but rather with dialogue that might occur between the realms of theory and common sense.\(^{29}\) While the remote goal of Lonergan’s economics remains a transformation of common sense by theory, it is not the case that theory could ultimately replace common sense. And although Lonergan recognized that the implementation of differentiated economics would require a massive educational effort, he envisioned the fruit of that effort being implemented by persons of

\(^{28}\) I recognize that there might be ways of situating what I am calling the problem of external collaboration in the context of functional specialization itself, and hence of reducing the entire problem of collaboration merely to what I have called the internal problem. Even if this should be the case however, I believe there are some sound pragmatic reasons for supposing there exists a distinct problem of external collaboration, not least of which is that posing the problematic in this manner circumvents a temptation on our part to assume that we already have the upper hand; it chastens that tendency (thematized by Levinas) to reduce the other to the same.

\(^{29}\) In doing so the paper has prescinded not merely from the internal problem of collaboration in the remotely possible context of functional specialization but also from the proximate context of Lonergan’s relation to already existing economic methodologies and other properly theoretical economists.
common sense at all levels, and in a democratic and locally sensitive manner.30

So the challenge presented by my paper is this: The critical-dialectical side of Lonergan has done a very good job making us mindful of the tremendous resistance of common sense to theory, of the insidious nature of general bias, and of the ongoing devastation wrought by the longer cycle of decline. These problems, as Lonergan himself realized, are no less severe in the economic realm than in the cultural-political. But might there be a need for an equally strong imperative, perhaps lacking in Lonergan’s own emphases, for persons operating in the realm of theory, especially in human sciences such as economics, to seek out ongoing dialogue with persons operating in the realm of common sense? Socrates, after all – the arch-progenitor of the theoretical realm of meaning – seemed to have maintained to the end of his life a genuine admiration for the artisans, precisely because they “did know many things” of which he was ignorant.31 The interpretation of the significance of Socratic dialectic, much emphasized by Lonergan – that by seeking out the conversation of ordinary persons, Socrates was covertly trying to entice them into the realm of theory – may perhaps be only half the story.32

Without denying the either the distinctiveness of theory or the need to implement the negative imperative of dialectics, that is, the imperative to “reverse decline,” might it be possible, especially in the initial stages, to implement the positive principle of dialectic to “advance

30 “Now to change one’s standard of living in any notable fashion is to live in a different fashion. It presupposes a grasp of new ideas. If the ideas are to be above the level of currently successful advertising, serious education must be undertaken. Finally, coming to grasp what serious education really is and, nonetheless, coming to accept that challenge constitutes the greatest challenge to the modern economy” (Macroeconomic Dynamics, 119);

“...there is no intrinsic impossibility to the static phase, but we shall have to do a lot of thinking and a lot of educating before we can hope that our exchange processes will swing easily and gracefully from an expansion into a static phase instead of falling clumsily and painfully into a slump” (Bernard Lonergan, For a New Political Economy, vol. 21 of Collected Works of Bernard Lonergan, 21, ed. Philip J. McShane (Toronto: Toronto University Press, 1998), 100.

31 Plato, Apology, 22d.

32 See, for instance, Lonergan’s use of Socrates as a representative of “the intrusion of the systematic exigence into the realm of common sense” in Method in Theology, 82.
progress," by seeking out and encouraging whatever normativity can be found in current streams of public discourse, however fragmentary and impartial these may presently be?

Might it also be salutary to be mindful that Lonergan's own theory remains incomplete in a number of ways? The redistributive function especially remains something of a black box, and Lonergan's remarks on finance are clearly underdeveloped. The economic landscape has also changed in many striking ways since Lonergan wrote. Globalization presents a degree of economic interdependence that makes Lonergan's discussion of closed economies seem quaint and a bit beside the point – a mere analytic moment, rather than an account of the concrete. We are no longer on the gold standard. Deficit spending has become the rule, rather than the exception. For better or worse, the U.S. economy has transitioned from manufacturing to service, and the financial sector has grown tremendously both in size relative to GDP, and in the complexity of its techniques. Environmental crises and the prospect of climate change have raised deep concerns about resource-availability and even the long-term sustainability of life on the planet. Given the incompleteness of Lonergan's theory, and such changes to the underlying global economic situation, might efforts at dialogue be conducive and indispensible to the completion of his theory? Might dialogue with prudent and morally informed persons of sound economic common sense feed into a process of ongoing theoretical development? Certainly there would be need for vigilance here, especially regarding the tendency of commonsense eclecticism to try to pass itself off for theory. But might the massive educational effort of which Lonergan spoke involve something more than the one-way-street of theory speaking to common sense? Might it in some manner be reciprocal and mutually mediating – open to a common sense that can also speak to theory?
ASIAN ANTICIPATIONS OF COSMOPOLIS: PARTICIPATION AND DISTRIBUTION DECISIONS IN JAPAN'S INDUSTRIAL RELATIONS SYSTEM AFTER WORLD WAR II - EVIDENCE OF CONVERSION AND WORKPLACE EVANGELIZATION

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PREFACE TO THE WORKSHOP

In this paper, and even more in the Workshop presentation, I will be going rather far out on the limb of my training in industrial relations. Such is, perhaps, the intent of the collaborative process envisioned by Lonergan, no less than the theme of this conference. How far out on the limb I think myself to be will be evident from my referencing specializations far from my field, along with the increasingly shaky tone of voice. If Workshop participants or later readers could offer a turning word that will aid this investigation, I would be grateful.

As the section headings suggest, we will venture afield. The distance travelled is necessary due to the topic, the nations, and the cultures involved. My aim is, first, to shed light upon one particular set of decisions taken in Japan, in the immediate aftermath of the Pacific War, and how these effected industrial relations developments thereafter. Second, and on a different level of analysis, I will present evidence that a singular collaborative moment took place in Japanese history, at a specific point in time, that certainly appears to anticipate the notion of cosmopolis as Lonergan describes it. Third, I will end with brief points of possible further interest to Lonergan scholars.
1. THE SIMPLE PROPOSAL

In light of the current economic crisis we are all well aware of, and based on the evidence and effects reported below, the U.S. Central Labor Relation Commission should immediately permit experimentation in the collective-bargaining based use of employee participation arrangements throughout the country.

Employee participation arrangements are well known throughout the industrialized world; these remain functionally illegal and largely unknown in the United States of America. As we will see, "employee participation" does not simply mean incentive compensation, production line-halt authority for quality assurance, or stock options. It is a very important concept in industrial relations and one that appears to reside almost completely outside U.S. economic and human resource management ideological parameters – parameters of American labor unions no less than American management.

I begin with this simple proposal because it comes from the singular decision to do precisely this in Japan, in the immediate aftermath of the Pacific War, and with the same legislative basis. That decision forms the main thesis of this paper, which can be stated here: Japan's postwar "web of rules" governing employment relations represents a remarkable form of workplace evangelization that, in its creation, may offer an anticipatory benchmark in the collaboration expected of cosmopolis in the works of Bernard J. F. Lonergan.

2. INTRODUCTION

Among other things, Lonergan was an economist. He was interested in economic cycles and circulation effects, as anyone who has inspected and struggled over his diagrams on the subject know. In this paper, I am particularly interested in the decisions and the decision makers who impact these circulation effects in one area of economics and legal policy: the role and function of managerial prerogative and its relation to employee participation in enterprise governance. For those familiar with German industrial relations, we are talking about works councils and their variants found throughout the world – with the notable sole exception, among the leading industrialized nations, of the United
States of America. The United Kingdom, once similar in Anglo-Saxon rejection of such employee participation, appears to now face the necessity of hosting EU Works Councils, according to legal obligation.

To date in my readings, I have found Lonergan rather quiet on these specific fine-grained issues: the constraint, encouragement, or definition of managerial prerogative. Perhaps his era required a higher order macroeconomic analysis – addressing the fundamental premises concerned with conflict and competition between liberal market economies, the central planning of Marxism, and the dictatorial absolutism of Fascism. Regardless, Lonergan’s contributions to epistemology and political economy should enable us to think about this question, perhaps a lesser order inquiry, nonetheless made very urgent today: what is management?

I suppose “lesser order” is a poor word choice, because, in fact, it has been the serial and systemic lack of insight into the management function that has, ironically, caused a dreadful failure of circulation effects throughout the world of late. The interdependent scale of this failure is such that even Lonergan, perhaps, could not have imagined the linkage between a relatively constrained lack of insight into the nature of managerial prerogative and its vast global consequences.

However, he certainly imagined something substantial, interdependent, collaborative, and presumably emergent as a necessary counterpoint to such disruptions. There would come a time when those able to make intelligent and reasonable decisions will function properly on behalf of the commonweal: he called this cosmopolis.\(^1\) It has always been curious to me that an individual so painstakingly detailed in epistemology and economic analysis would deliberately point us all forward to a nonspecific “time” when leaders competent to lead actually would lead – and properly do so. Yet, as any reader of the text will know, in *Insight* this pointing is largely by way of negation regarding the concrete aspects of cosmopolis; it recalls the Hindu approach to finding God through specification of what God is not. From *Insight*, we know that cosmopolis is not, among other things, a police force, something that operates by force, nor is it a busybody. It is not a political entity

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in the sense of a world government; a world government would all the more need the function of a cosmopolis.

We can note that one key to collaboration, which cosmopolis presumes, is trust. Trust is a matter of interest in cross-cultural studies involving comparative economic performance. In the critical management studies literature, Adler identified trust as "the key coordinating mechanism in the community form." And, working backward through Adler's text presentation, the community is the constituting outcome of informal organization. He noted three sources of trust: familiarity, interests (and their calculation), and values/norms. Trust is generated via any of three mechanisms: direct interpersonal contact, reputation, or "by our understanding of the way institutions shape the other actor's values and behavior." Throughout the decades of Japan's post-World War II economic miracle, a vast literature reported that Japanese culture, management, and modes of production are all profoundly based on trust. Fukuyama views trust as a key explanatory variable for Japanese success in the comparative political sphere. Masahiko Aoki, Kazuo Koike, and William G. Ouchi see trust to be of critical importance for Japanese management practices. Others see the concept as central for Japanese modes of production, whether domestically - that is, in Japan - or in the successful export of these practices abroad.

5 Fukuyama, Trust, 1995.
What I plan to specify in this paper is how Japanese legal scholars freely adapted foreign, decidedly Western, and specifically Continental European legal constructs, to advance this “Asian culture” of trust as a workplace value. And this story is even more intriguing because trust, which the literature clearly attributes to the Japan case (and not, in contrast, to the U.S. – or, at a minimum, not in remotely the same way), emerged from postwar Japanese circumstances, circumstances that feature essentially identical U.S./Japanese labor legislation.

I intend to go one step further. I wish to bring this industrial relations research under the light of Lonergan’s construct of cosmopolis. This is because of the political and legal decisions made in and around 1946 and the legal grounding that informed these decisions. Japanese policy makers turned to Continental European jurisprudence to craft rules of employment appropriate to their Asian condition. Curiously, Western law was deployed to reinforce and reinvent Japanese culture. There is yet more – these steps, which we will explore below, constituted an explicit Christian evangelization of the Japanese workplace: a self-evangelization, if you will.

The key players may or may not have been Christians in any formal sense. The father of Japanese labor law, Professor Izutaro Suehiro, was not – to my knowledge – a professed Christian. Yet, he explicitly noted the profound gratitude Japanese labor law scholars should feel for the Judeo-Christian tradition that had played such a role in Japanese legal studies and development. In this, the appropriation of Continental European labor jurisprudence was the distinction that has made all the difference.

In subsequent decades, as the Japanese “Economic Miracle” began to be felt abroad in increasingly value-added, excellent quality products, the effects of these decisions were perceived to be – and actually were – threats to the American industrial relations system. As we shall see, the Japanese insights in a particular 1946 moment of possible cosmopolis may be precisely what is called for now to rescue the American set of “working rules” that govern employment relations. If this is a proper judgment, we should ask if the American cosmopolis, in anticipation or fact, is actually up to the task of enactment? And who

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will these individuals be that will ensure good decisions are made in a timely manner?

3. METHOD

This is an extended essay primarily concerned with the field of industrial relations. Industrial relations is an academic discipline that studies the "web of rules" or "working rules" that govern employment relations at the workplace, firm, region, industry, or nation.\(^9\)

To appreciate the significance of the postwar steps taken by Suehiro and others, we begin with a brief resume of industrial relations theory from the perspective of the 1946 postwar settlement. Three analytical models of enterprise employee ecology will be presented and explained. The second step will be to summarily note the nature of the workplace evangelization that obtained and has since carried forth under what is now termed "Japanese management practice," and its consistency with Roman Catholic social teaching. Third, we turn to the issue of cosmopolis, with brief notes about some possible implications for Lonergan studies.

4. THE POSTWAR JAPANESE INDUSTRIAL RELATIONS SETTLEMENT: WORKPLACE EVANGELIZATION BY ADMINISTRATIVE RECOMMENDATION AND CASE LAW INTERPRETATION OF NEW DEAL STYLE LABOR LEGISLATION\(^{10}\)

Three measures differentiate the Japanese employment ecology of the enterprise from that of the United States. First, just cause is the only grounds for dismissal – and fiscal difficulties are presumed by the courts to be the responsibility of management, so economic redundancy dismissals are extremely problematic to enact. Second, Japan localizes

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works councils in the collective bargaining agreement. Third, case law provides an ongoing method to modify practice as history proceeds.

One man, Professor Izutaro Suehiro, was instrumental in all three measures. To grasp the significance of this accomplishment, we begin with the U.S. employment ecology model. After all, that was the same legislative basis Suehiro had to work with in 1946.

4.1. The American Enterprise Employment Ecology Model

While the topic is Japan, we begin with the U.S. model because it is easiest to understand and the Japanese later did such entertaining and interesting things to it. Since the New Deal labor legislation and – significantly – the legal interpretations of the National Labor Relations Commission, American workers may unionize. Unions negotiate over wages and working conditions. The nature of the U.S. employment contract is “at will”; employer and employee are presumed equal parties to the contract. Functionally, “at will” employment permits the U.S. employer to dismiss for a good reason, a bad reason, or no reason.

There are, of course, federal restrictions against discriminatory employment practices (religion, race, party affiliation, gender, and, most recently, age). State legislation may further restrict “at will” dismissal prerogative. Collective bargaining agreements further constrain managerial range of action.

The legal employment ecology of the U.S. enterprise is given in Figure 1. Solid black lines between management and employees depict the fundamental adversarial nature of their relationship. Apart from wages and working conditions – dealt with through unions – there are no formal, institutionalized mechanisms to negotiate or discuss matters relating to authority, power, fiscal transparency, detailed management decisions, strategies, or plans. Insofar as employees are granted additional rights or discretionary power – stock options or other forms of “employee empowerment” – these are strictly at the discretion of the employer. That is shown by the downward arrow to the right.
Figure 1. The Legal Employment Ecology of the U.S. Enterprise

American Management

Labor unions (wages, working conditions)

Employee "Empowerment"

Dismissal/ participation:

Good, bad, or no reason: "at will," with federal, state, and union restrictions.

No (not since the New Deal)

This schematic does not intend to negate the prevalence or role of work teams in the United States. As we shall see, these simply, and factually, lack the institutional stature recognized in other national settings. They do not, for example, have a role or voice in the organization as concerns executive compensation, for example, or inordinate risk-taking by one department, which may lead to the failure of the firm.
4.2. The German Enterprise Employment Ecology Model: Just Cause, Legislated Co-determination, and Works Councils

While the German model parallels that of the United States concerning collective bargaining, stark differences are immediately visible in a simple diagram. It is illegal to dismiss for a bad reason or no reason in Germany and the EU. The German model (and, I note, the European Union works council model since 1994) obliges, by legislation, works councils in firms beyond a certain size. Works councils are generally defined as an institutionalized group that ensures representative communication between a single employer, the management aspect, and employees of a single plant or enterprise. In addition, at the top level of an enterprise governing board, proportional representation by elected representative of employees is also obligatory by legislation. Taken together, works council and board membership participation in the function of a German enterprise are referred to as "co-determination" (die Mitbestimmung). The German co-determination schematic of Figure 2 depicts a degree of transparency and participation in authority, information, and resource control by the dotted lines that separate management and works councils. This is in contrast to the solid lines separating union and management functions.

11 See, for example, Joel Rogers and Wolfgang Streeck, Works Councils: Consultation, Representations, and Cooperation in Industrial Relations (New York: University of Chicago Press, 1995).
Co-determination in Germany has a history that has been traced to the 1848 Frankfurt National Assembly. As we shall soon see, the Japanese postwar legal employment ecology is profoundly influenced by this history. Because of this fact, and to aid understanding as we approach the Japanese model, the German case comes before the Japan case.

Before we look in more detail at the various features of works councils, recent developments oblige us to note that the European Union has adopted employee participation as part of the Union’s political economy. In 2005, the European Trade Union Confederation (ETUC) reported the following on its website:

The claim that co-determination is an alien concept in Europe does not stand up to scrutiny... Even though the German arrangements regarding worker participation are more extensive than in other European countries, Hoffmann points out that this is far from equivalent to saying that other European countries have widespread co-determination free areas. In fact, 18 of the 25 EU Member States have binding rules governing co-determination, and in many cases their arrangements provide for an extensive workforce presence on companies' supervisory boards. In the new Member States company bodies are taking their lead from German law, and in Slovenia – by law – companies employing more than 1,000 staff have to guarantee the workforce 50% participation.13

This development both recalls, and strengthens, a 1995 observation by Wolfgang Streeck. He wrote of the “largely forgotten” process of “the almost universal establishment of works councils after 1945 in otherwise very different national contexts, as an integral part of a worldwide recasting of the political economy of capitalism.”

It will be useful to elaborate on the possible range and role of works councils, precisely because of their varied manifestations in different national settings. Works councils, briefly:

- Represent all the workers at a given workplace, irrespective of their status as union members
- Represent the workforce of a specific plant or enterprise, not an industrial sector or a territorial area
- Are not “company unions”
- Differ from management policies encouraging individual workers to express their views and idea, as well as new forms of work organization introduced to increase the “involvement” of workers


(Enable) representative communication between employers and their workforces, (which) may be of all possible kinds and may originate from either side.

May (the usual case) or may not have legal status.

Are evident in structures that may vary widely across and within countries.

Are not the same as worker representation on company boards of directors.\(^{15}\)

Rogers and Streeck specified three "ideal types" of works councils. First, paternalistic councils are those formed by employers or government. They permit worker representation only to the extent that the independent expression of worker interest is constrained, by prior intent. In this respect, there is a political dimension to their establishment. Second, consultative councils are primarily for economic purposes. Consultative councils seek to enhance communication with the goal of enhanced firm competitiveness and, possibly, the implementation of reward or incentive systems. These councils supplement the firm's functional organization. And third, representative councils "are typically established through collective agreements or legislation giving the entire workforce of a plant or enterprise (again, unionized or not) some form of institutionalized voice in relation to management."\(^{16}\) In contrast to consultative councils, representative councils are "part of a firm's political system."\(^{17}\)

Given this background on the U.S. enterprise legal employment ecology and informed of the German variant, which includes just cause dismissal protections, works councils, and employee representation on corporate boards (co-determination), we are ready to turn our attention to the Japan case. It was in Japan, shortly after the end of World War II, that works councils were adapted from their German origins to creatively resolve a political crisis within a devastated Asian nation.

\(^{15}\) Rogers and Streeck, Work Councils, 6-9.

\(^{16}\) Rogers and Streeck, Work Councils, 10.

\(^{17}\) Rogers and Streeck, Work Councils, 11.
4.3. The Japanese Enterprise Employment Ecology Model: Just Cause, Management Councils, and Case Law Norms

The initial design notion for the comparative legal employment ecologies of U.S., German, and Japanese firms arose from study of the institutionalized practice of lifetime employment in Japan.\(^{18}\) The particular models represent an effort to conceptualize the key variables that engendered “lifetime employment” in a manner appropriate to social science norms of comparability across national industrial relations systems.

Izutaro Suehiro, a civil and labor law specialist, was instrumental in the establishment of three postwar industrial relations practices. The first was study and systemization of the role of case law as a pattern and norm generating legal resource – beginning long before World War II. The second was post-World War II “just cause” case law restrictions on managerial dismissal prerogative – initially appearing, quite ironically, in dismissal efforts by occupation forces against redundant Japanese employees. The third was the localization of employee participation prerogative (modeled on German works councils) within the postwar Japanese collective bargaining agreement.

Suehiro’s various contributions to Japanese legal studies are recognized by a small number of legal scholars in Japan. While his name is widely known among Japanese, his specific contributions are far less well recognized. In the field of law, his approach is known as “Suehiro jurisprudence” (末弘法学). This is a fairly well-known phrase in Japanese, but the precise content of the term remains rather amorphous. Most Japanese will find it difficult to signify what this approach precisely means. For present purposes, it is only necessary to keep in mind that Suehiro’s contributions to Japanese labor law jurisprudence, reviewed above, stand upon distinct, and distinctively Continental European interpretation of employment and contract. These interpretations were made in reference to legislation essentially identical to that which the United States refers to as New Deal legislation.

Following legal interpretations extant in continental Europe,

Suehiro jurisprudence presumes that the labor contract is inherently unequal; the hired worker is comparatively disadvantaged in comparison to the hiring employer. Accordingly, corrective measures should be taken by the government and courts, with appropriate norms becoming "codified" through case law outcomes. As a means to overcome extremely antagonistic confrontations between Japanese employers and unionized workers in the aftermath of World War II, Suehiro was instrumental in the crafting of a July 1946 Central Labor Relations Commission (CLRC) guideline document that advocated creation of "Management Councils" (経営協議会, keiei kyogikai). These were modeled on German works councils, but uniquely based in firm-specific collective bargaining agreements.\textsuperscript{19}

Due to case law restrictions enforcing just cause as a restriction against managerial dismissal prerogative and the single CLRC document issued in July 1946, the legal employment ecology of the Japanese firm is radically different from that of its U.S. counterpart. The difference in degree of the legal interpretations given in respect to similar legislation – by the Japanese courts and the CLRC – resulted in a difference in kind concerning the emergent postwar employment ecology of the Japanese firm\textsuperscript{20}.

The Japanese model is given in Figure 3. As Japan's management councils arise from the collective bargaining agreement, there is an obvious transparency of form and function – also information and power – between the labor union and the management council. This is depicted by the dotted line between them. In turn, the relationship between the management council and management is also variable and varied. This is also depicted by a dotted line.

\textsuperscript{19}This text, with citation information, is given in translation in Appendix 1.

Suehiro and those with whom he worked localized management councils in the collective bargaining agreement because they felt the German approach did not get the nature of the function quite correct. Proximity to the actual market itself seemed best, for flexibility, adaptability, and the sustainability of the enterprise. In addition, the Japanese approach places no theoretical limit on the degree to which employee voice may assert itself in the life of the enterprise.

Apparently, this approach remains a useful and ubiquitous feature of Japanese firms. While German and EU law specify a minimum number of employees in a firm before works councils are mandated, Japan has no such restriction. Data from a 1999 survey indicate that 41 percent of all Japanese firms have some form of management council; 58 percent do not. Yet, 85 percent of unionized firms have them. Furthermore, 78 percent of firms having 5,000 or
more employees report the presence of such councils.\textsuperscript{21} Data from a subsequent survey show the rate of participation for firms with 5,000 or more employees increased to 81 percent, while there was a decline in the overall national rate to 37 percent.\textsuperscript{22}

These practices are the legal foundations for the later emergence of "lifetime employment" as an institutionalized practice which was, itself, first recognized in Japanese case law only in 1961.\textsuperscript{23} The institutionalized practice was most recently reaffirmed in 1997 by the Japanese Supreme Court as "what has come to be taken as the premise of our nation's labor conditions."\textsuperscript{24}

Thus, from all available evidence, it appears that it is primarily from these two principles – just cause and employee participation – and their normative establishment in case law that led to the cultural affirmation of lifetime employment through subsequent Supreme Court decisions. These are the distinctive and defining features of post-World War II Japanese industrial relations. Furthermore, by keeping these principles in mind it becomes possible to trace, extract, export, appropriate, and objectively evaluate "Japanese management theory and practice" in all its research, application, and consulting manifestations.

\textsuperscript{21} Ministry of Labor Policy Secretariat Survey Section, \textit{Japan's current labor-management communications (Nihon no roshi comyunikeshion)}, (Tokyo: Ministry of Finance, 1999).

\textsuperscript{22} Ministry of Labor Policy Secretariat Survey Section, \textit{Japan's current labor-management communications (Nihon no roshi comyunikeshion)}, (Tokyo: Ministry of Finance, 2004).

\textsuperscript{23} Lexis Data Base Case Number 27611297, \textit{The Osaka Regional Court Case of July 19, 1961} (Showa 36), available from www.tkclex.ne.jp. LexDB is an online proprietary legal data base system in Japanese. This case is also published in Hanrei Jiho, no. 270 (1961).

5. LABOR JURISPRUDENCE AND WORKPLACE EVANGELIZATION

So far, we have seen that “Japanese management” and Japan’s “lifetime employment system” are both actual, traceable outcomes of postwar working rules of industrial relations. These rules, evident in the creation of judicial and quasi-judicial institutional norms, arose from adaptive appropriations – to an Asian context – of continental European, primarily German, labor law principles of jurisprudence. These adaptations, when appropriately deployed, are, in fact, much closer to Roman Catholic social teachings on the nature of the firm in modern society than the working rules of employment commonly found in the US industrial relations system.

Quite ironically, it become possible to consider the export to or appropriation of “Japanese management practice” to the United States (or other national systems) as an unexpected, surprising evangelization of American management practice no less than a continental European reevangelization of the American workplace.

Of course, this will be so only if good practice obtains; there is a double-edged sword facet of Japanese management implementation. When appropriately deployed, it may, in fact, reflect a more “integrated” civil society mode that parallels legal constructions more familiar to the European Union – at least when certain criteria are met.

What this specification of “working rules” accomplishes is to clarify the chronological “puzzle” of initial U.S. industrial relations research enthusiasm yielding to later critical re-appraisals of “Japanese management practices” as they were deployed in the U.S. industrial relations system. In other national settings, similar patterns of enthusiastic reception changing to later cautionary positions may be found – it depends largely upon the presence or absence of just cause, participation rights, and other norms in the target nation.

We have seen that the legal inspiration for “just cause” and management council adaptive appropriation in postwar Japanese

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industrial relations derived from Germany and German jurisprudence. There is no question that the Japanese legal scholars of the postwar era were well versed in German legal studies and labor law. No one exemplified this level of scholarship more than Izutaro Suehiro.

However, another aspect of the European appropriation to postwar Japan lies in the Christian and Roman Catholic tradition of teachings on civil society. These were, at a primary level, known to the Weimar political parties and their policymakers. Further, the Japanese legal scholars of the period, including Suehiro, were well aware of Roman Catholic social teaching. Kaufman, describing the global evolution of industrial relations, wrote, “in Japan many of the earliest Japanese labour scholars and union activists had earlier converted to the Christian faith.” It will be of interest, then, to briefly review the key document of the period which informed their knowledge: the Encyclical Rerum Novarum (On Capital and Labor) of 1891 by Pope Leo XIII.

The Encyclical was primarily aimed at legitimizing the right of private ownership, specifically property, against claims by “Socialists.” Socialists:

...by endeavoring to transfer the possessions of individuals to the community at large, strike at the interests of every wage earner, since they would deprive him of the liberty of disposing of his wages, and thereby of all hope and possibility of increasing his resources and of bettering his condition in life.

Having established that “private ownership is in accordance with the law of nature,” Leo XIII asserted that the human obligation to “maintain the balance of the body politic” rendered it a “…great mistake...to take up with the notion that class is naturally hostile to class, and that the wealthy and the working men are intended by

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27 In e-mail correspondence, David Kettler (June 2008) noted that the Catholic parties took up defensive “traditional” positions against the emerging Weimar norms on works councils. Yet, even these struggles took place in a wider context of mutual Christian knowledge. Kettler is the co-author of Kettler and Tackney (1995) and an expert in Weimar labor law history.


Asian Anticipations of Cosmopolis

nature to live in mutual conflict."\textsuperscript{30} The employer should "give everyone what is just."\textsuperscript{31} Leo XIII then offered this description of the nature of human labor:

Hence, a man's labor necessarily bears two notes or characters. First of all, it is personal, inasmuch as the force which acts is bound up with the personality and is the exclusive property of him who acts, and, further, was given to him for his advantage. Secondly, man's labor is necessary; for without the result of labor a man cannot live, and self-preservation is a law of nature, which it is wrong to disobey\textsuperscript{32}

He concluded on this theme by stating, "...these two aspects of his work are separable in thought, but not in reality."\textsuperscript{33}

A few other points in this Encyclical are noteworthy: the prevention and correction of strife that appears grounded in class conflict remains the purview of "Christian institutions," such as the Church.\textsuperscript{34} In addition, the Pope noted that there can be no doubt, "civil society was renovated in every part by Christian institutions."\textsuperscript{35} These, in turn, have an obligation to alleviate conditions of the masses that are inappropriate or exploitative. The interests of the "working man" should be protected by the State.\textsuperscript{36} To this end, public measures are appropriate to overcome issues, such as strikes, which may arise due to excessive working hours or inappropriate conditions.\textsuperscript{37} Associations of employers and workers, separate or together, can be aids that draw the classes together; "The most important of all are workingmen's unions."\textsuperscript{38}

Two aspects of law drew the particular attention of Leo XIII. He wrote, "The law, therefore, should favor ownership, and its policy should

\textsuperscript{30} Leo XII, pr. 9 and pr. 19.
\textsuperscript{31} Leo XIII, pr. 20.
\textsuperscript{32} Leo XIII, pr. 44.
\textsuperscript{33} Leo XIII, pr. 44.
\textsuperscript{34} Leo XIII, pr. 19.
\textsuperscript{35} Leo XIII, pr. 27.
\textsuperscript{36} Leo XIII, pr. 40.
\textsuperscript{37} Leo XIII, pr. 39.
\textsuperscript{38} Leo XIII, pr. 49.
be to induce as many as possible of the people to become owners.”

Furthermore, in light of danger to the public peace occasioned by labor disputes, he wrote, “The laws should forestall and prevent such troubles from arising; they should lend their influence and authority to the removal in good time of the causes which lead to conflicts between employers and employed.”

The exact degree of influence of the Encyclical *Rerum Novarum* upon the efforts of the CLRC’s 1946 Guidelines is difficult to estimate and beyond the intent of the present research effort. We know, however, from Suehiro’s texts, that he had thorough knowledge of the Encyclical. Prima facie, the textual consonance in viewpoint and tone is striking and unmistakable. The CLRC ends its recommendation on management councils by stating:

Accordingly, harmonious solutions to these issues are expected. It is unreasonable to wait for legally binding resolutions: appropriate provisions ought to be previously included in the firm’s articles of incorporation. Without exception, legal issues inherently contain paths to a resolution.

By situating the German works council organizational form within the provisions of firm-specific collective bargaining agreements, Japan’s 1946 CLRC, in one legal stroke, institutionalized a process that eventually overcame the plant takeover disputes of the period. This achieved the point of law envisioned by Leo XIII cited earlier:

The laws should forestall and prevent such troubles from arising; they should lend their influence and authority to the removal in good time of the causes which lead to conflicts between employers and employed.

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39 Leo XIII, pr. 46.
40 Leo XIII, pr. 39.
42 See Appendix
6. PERSONAL INTELLECTUAL CONVERSION?
AN ASIAN MOMENT OF COSMOPOLIS? 43

Under the Allied Occupation, labor legislation reflecting the New Deal labor laws of the United States were passed through the Japanese Diet (the legislative body). The Trade Union Law provided for the creation of a remedy institution to deal with industrial disputes in the form of a CLRC, with its regional Commissions. The CLRC and its regional affiliates are modeled upon the U.S. National Labor Relations Board that was part of New Deal labor legislation enactments. Nine members compose the CLRC. They are appointed by the Ministry of Labor. They represent employers, employees, and the public interest. The CLRC public interest representative, by law, must be approved by those representing employer and employee interests.

The first public sector representative was Izutaro Suehiro, former professor of law and dean of the Imperial University Law School. This was the position he migrated to following, and despite, his 1946 purge from the school in the immediate aftermath of the Occupation. His purge was due to his role as the coach of a martial arts club. This was later deemed to be an excessive act and his purged status was formally rescinded.

Professor Suehiro was one of many Japanese legal scholars who pursued advanced studies overseas. He completed law studies at the German Law Department of the Tokyo Imperial University in 1912. Following a short teaching period, he went abroad for further studies: first to the University of Chicago, then on to Europe where he was drafted into the Japanese delegation for labor issues at the Treaty of Paris, in Versailles, which formally ended World War I.

It was at the University of Chicago Law School that Suehiro underwent some form of profound inner conversion: certainly it was an intellectual conversion, as a committed legal scholar, it may have been

43 On Suehiro's career, see Chuo Rodo Jiho (Central Labor Relations Commission Times), 1951, in Japanese. Much of the details in this section derive from this memorial edition, published shortly after his death. In English, the most detailed account of his life, to my knowledge, is David Kettler and Charles T. Tackney, 1997. His continued employment during the war in such a prestigious position, along with actual social science studies he led in Occupied Manchuria, left a complex legacy. His legacy in postwar Japan somewhat parallels the circumstances of Martin Heidigger, whose postwar career was shadowed by his initial support for the National Socialist Party of Germany.
considerably more. As a graduate student overseas, and unfamiliar with English, he nevertheless decided to attend a class in case law. Watching the students being aggressively queried by the professor about the cases and their underlying legal issues, he reported that he realized, in that classroom experience, that everything he had studied and learned about law in Japan was meaningless. The "top-down" application of legal abstractions to concrete instances missed the facts of life being driven home to the students by that American professor. He left that class a different law student.

He went on to Europe. Suehiro studied for a time under Eugen Ehrlich, who is the father of the sociology of law. After aiding the Versailles Peace conference on the issue of labor law, he returned to Japan.

Once back, Professor Suehiro soon established the first case law research group in order to use social scientific principles in the study of legal norms as they are evidenced in specific judicial decisions. His approach was empirically grounded, seeking, inductively, to derive principles of "living law" from collections of cases. He took up teaching and research at the law school of what is now Tokyo University. He was, as noted, dean of the law school by the end of World War II. Thus, in practice, he was formally responsible for the academic training of an entire generation of Japanese legal scholars. He was, in addition, the leading labor law scholar in the country.

The next significant development in postwar Japanese industrial relations was also largely due to Suehiro's influence. As mentioned, he was the first public sector representative on the first CLRC, assuming the role of CLRC chair after the first chairman resigned. Faced with a series of plant takeovers by workers, the CLRC, at the request of the Ministry of Labor, issued a set of guidelines on July 17, 1946, titled, "Central Labor Relations Commission Guidelines for Management

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44 In a culture such as Japan where individuals do not generally "think about" transcendent concepts of divinity in the way of the West, assessments of religious conversion may be somewhat of a challenge.

45 Japanese law does not follow the stare decisis (precedent) norm-setting characteristic of U.S. law. Each justice has but two obligations that bear on any case: her or his conscience and the Japanese Constitution. Patterns of similar decisions obtain a sort of "crystallized custom" normative standard. Lifetime employment is one example.
Participation Forums." Thereafter, the intransigent relations between management and labor changed. What followed was a quest for national recovery and sustainable operations in the manufacturing sector.

Suehiro was not without uncertainty in the norms he helped devise. It was not clear to him, for example, that workers would be up to the studious task of learning the issues required to participate in discussions of managerial prerogative. Furthermore, he felt some uncertainty that the enterprise union form that emerged in Japan would be an authentic and properly independent labor union structure. He wrote, at one point, that it would take a decade or more to know if their decisions were appropriate.

Suehiro devoted the last years of his life to professional involvement in every major, and many more minor, labor disputes. His granddaughter recalled him leaving after dinner, driven away by a car with a driver, and returning only early in the morning. He was noted for beginning mediation with a favorite phrase, "Ok, so what are the facts?" He coupled a strong grounding in social science – empiricism – with a firm belief that conflict inherently contained the seeds of its own resolution – this is, in terms of a functioning and professional legally grounded epistemology that was thrust into the worst possible disputes of industrial society, a remarkable – arguably breathtaking - balancing act.

As the public sector representative to the CLRC, he preserved a careful nonpartisan stance at a time when Communists were seeking proletarian revolution in the factory, and workers were actively engaged in "production control" assumption of the means of production – locking out the owner who had refused to negotiate over wages and working conditions. The Japanese managers, then, were little better. They had no prior experience of a negotiated managerial prerogative. He mediated between Party members and plant owners. He was known to keep a small metal flask of whiskey in one pocket for the long negotiation sessions.

Shortly before his death, he was part of a tour group of Japanese dispatched by the Supreme Command Allied Powers (SCAP) to the United States so that the defeated enemy could learn about democracy.

46 This is given in Appendix 1.
47 Personal interview in 2001, Tokyo, Japan.
Apparently he said some things about worker rights that upset the local American press. The state department quietly recommended to SCAP that Suehiro be repatriated early on the pretense of a needed meeting. SCAP refused; he was not saying anything back in America he had not already said in newly democratized Japan.

Suehiro passed away in 1951, some years before Japan’s postwar “economic miracle” began to be noticed, either domestically or overseas. In the subsequent decades, Japan’s “web of rules” underwent ongoing specification of employment relations through collective bargaining agreements, the famous “Spring Offensive” (coordinated wage and working condition improvement calls by organized labor), the mediation of disputes through the CLRC and its regional affiliates, and case law decisions that established evolving norms for appropriate behavior on the part of management and labor, given the employment ecology parameters previously specified.

Despite the decades-long media reports and researcher claims that lifetime employment in Japan is inefficient, outdated, or non-existent, this institutionalized practice continues to be regulated by Japan’s courts and case law. The simple fact is that the Western media and most researchers do not read Japanese case law, so misapprehensions abound. The most recent labor legislation reforms show no evidence of a shift to American style at-will employment. To the contrary, workers who are dismissed now have the right to receive a prompt and clear statement of the grounds for dismissal. Such documents can be brought to courts in Japan and a “provisional disposition” sought – the same day. Provisional dispositions are measures invented by Japanese judges to provide immediate remediation to the discharged worker, until the court case is formally resolved (a process notoriously slow – perhaps a decade). If the judge finds in favor of the dismissed, which they do with remarkable frequency, then the “provisional disposition” effectively revokes the dismissal until formal determination. The dismissed is entitled to job access and compensation until the case is formally resolved. Needless to say, Japanese managers are extremely careful in the matter of employee dismissals.
7. DISCUSSION

If we consider the historical ground we have covered in this paper, and reflect on this from the perspective of Lonergan studies, perhaps the first and most interesting question to ask is, "What if the global collaboration that we seek, anticipating cosmopolis, actually emerged over half a century ago in Japan, but we failed to notice?"

This is not an easy question to take up - it has any number of implications. When the author, as a Jesuit scholastic, was preparing to be sent to Japan for Regency in 1980, one spiritual advisor strongly cautioned against any missionary optimism; "If you're going with an expectation of baptizing Japanese, well, I hear that doesn't happen very often." The author was not told that Japan had self-evangelized the worksites of the entire nation according to principles of industrial democracy that easily matched Roman Catholic social teaching - and was busily exporting it around the world under the guise of Japanese management practice. Nor was he told that these employment norms were more in keeping with Roman Catholic social teachings than had yet to obtain then - or to this day - in the nation he was leaving for "missionary" work.

There are a number of other topics of possible interest I will note sequentially, which strike me as being worthy of more work and will benefit from advice from those more familiar with Lonergan. These points will move from industrial relations into other (for me exotic) aspects of the greater Lonergan research community. Given time and, of course, appropriate insight, I will add more at the Workshop presentation itself.

a. Basic (productive) and higher order (finance) cycles require appropriate checks to ensure adequate distribution of gain and to minimize disruptive variance between boom and bust. I have yet to understand Lonergan's thought about this. From an industrial relations perspective, works councils, or their clever Japanese variant, ensure against excessive CEO compensation. The problem Americans face in this regard is wholly their own.

b. Postwar Japan did well with management councils in the productive manufacturing sectors. They were less successful with their deployment in their own financial sector. Thus, the
1990s were a lost decade due to inappropriate management of wealth.

c. The proposal to localize works councils in collective bargaining units is not a panacea. Japanese courts and jails have their share of executives and labor leaders who have broken the law. Badly deployed in any circumstance, Japanese management production line regime pressures can exceed Taylorism in exploitation, in that they also demand the workers' entire consciousness, not just repetitive physical motions.

d. Nevertheless, it appears that the American future for a manufacturing sector that is productive, sustainable, and globally competitive must adopt this "choice of just one thing," invent a functional equivalent, or fail.

e. If we acknowledge Lonergan's insight into the need for a new approach to political economy, and couple that with his obvious—if carefully nuanced—faith in the future of humanity as evidenced in the construct of "cosmopolis," then where shall we go to seek signs of cosmopolis emergence? Is the Japan case one example? Might it be an exemplary case? Are we not obliged to verify philosophical discussions of political economy in the concrete facts of history—in precisely the measure of which Lonergan spoke: "a democratic economics that can issue practical imperatives to plain men"?48

Finally, we end by noting that today, some sixty-three years after the CLRC issued its recommendation, Suehiro's uncertainty over what he sought to achieve in Japan can now be seen as a challenge to the transformation needed in the United States industrial relations system. Is this national system, and its guiding leaders, able and, significantly, willing to learn from his simple, clear, and appropriate insight in crafting a few practical imperatives for plain men and women?

Discussion and debate over this simple proposal should occur. In the context of the Workshop, one member claimed that the simple proposal that began this paper was "ideological" in nature. Certainly it would fall into the category of proposals for the U.S. political economy that are readily labeled as "socialist" by many. However,

this proposal is empirical, not ideological. Only the refusal to permit such experimentation, once a successful precedent case for it has been observed, would be ideological.

In terms of research method, the only ideological component evident is that the research is grounded in industrial relations theory. The only practical way to effectively determine the comparative utility of the Japanese approach in the U.S. system is to permit experimentation and observe what facts appear.

APPENDIX 1: CENTRAL LABOR RELATIONS COMMISSION GUIDELINES FOR MANAGEMENT PARTICIPATION FORUMS
(Issued July 17, 1946)

The establishment of management participation forums is recommended by determining suitable terms in collectively bargained agreements according to the specific characteristics of each enterprise. This is because conformity to a forcibly determined set of one-sided regulations can easily give rise to structures uselessly created which do not adequately demonstrate the original function of such forums. Moreover, if we consider the various bargaining disputes, given the actual circumstances of management participation forums now being established and the different aspects of management participation forum establishment, there are points that specifically need to be considered in establishing management participation forums now. Providing reference material to facilitate reflection on these problems for those generally involved to enable logical commentary will help avoid one-sided, useless argumentation. At the same time, no small contribution will be made by adequately demonstrating the essential function of management participation forums.

This guide is based upon the present condition of management participation forums along with that of current collective labor contracts. It is also aimed at qualitative improvement in the practical utility of future collective agreements and the gradual development of the range of items that should be dealt with through the function of management participation forums. The following commentary is based upon the standard of the ordinary publicly held (stock) firm. However,
adequate attention is also given the respective features of nonprivate, managed enterprises, such as the national railways, as there is a rough resemblance in principles.

1. The essence of management participation forums

Management participation forums are based on the spirit of industrial democracy. As workers actively participate in the management of labor, it is a permanent participation forum established through collective bargaining between the labor union and the employer. Different from a simple round-table conference or an inquiry session, representatives of the employer and labor union meet as equal forum members. Both sides assume the duty of planning for implementation of items that are decision outcomes. However, in establishing management participation forums, there is no change in official duty and competence of enterprise executive for general direction of overall management. Simply that what was hitherto despotically decided and implemented by the executive will instead become the assumption of a duty to implement decisions specifically made by the management participation forums.

Moreover, for publicly held corporations stock may be given to workers so they may attend the general shareholders meeting. An individual recommended by the labor union may become a member of the board of directors. These and other methods of worker participation are conceivable, but they are completely different from management participation forums. Management participation forums premise to the utmost that the management executive and labor union stand together; these forums are institutions that recognize continuing management participation by the worker.

2. The establishment of management participation forums

Management participation forums are established through collective agreements between employers and labor unions. Accordingly, if an employer one-sidedly established a mechanism to permit worker participation in management without relying on a collective agreement, this mechanism would not be a management participation forum.
3. The constitution of management participation forums

Management participation forums are constituted by representatives of management and workers as defined by a collective agreement.

a. The number of members may be determined by option through the collective agreement. It is not necessary that the employer and labor sides always have the same number. When faced with a difficult problem, a one to one opposition will in the end develop. For multiple problems decisions will not be able to be made as stated in the postscript.

b. The executive officials are free in terms of how many will be put forth to represent the employer. However, to further progress in harmony in the forum, it is desirable that the president, managing director, and plant chief attend of their own responsibility. Otherwise, after something has been decided in the management forum, the board may reject it. This would, in turn, easily give rise to friction with the labor union.

c. Forum representatives of labor are to be decided according to independent, formal procedures. Interference in their selection by the employer will not be permitted. The representative(s) of the labor side should have the confidence of the entire labor union. These individuals should necessarily have complete representative competence. If possible, those things that the representatives obtained unanimity about should be, in the same way, followed by the labor union so that all labor union members are so constrained

d. Adding a third party representative is to be determined as an option of the collective agreement. For example, for public transportation enterprise functions, which directly relate to daily life of the public, there are many good occasions where it would be good to include a third party public representative.

4. The authority of management participation forums

The authority of the management participation forum, that is, the degree to which workers are permitted to participate in management, is something suitably specified in collective bargaining according to the characteristics of each enterprise. The nature of the firm and the actual power of the labor union involved logically provide one self-
certain range of limit. Current law provides no legal enforcement to that specified limit. If we consider actual examples:

a. Issues for participation are, most ordinarily, working hours, wages, and the manner of wage payment according to legal standards. In addition, other issues may involve those related to appropriate working conditions, labor welfare, improvement of labor productivity, regulation of the intensity of work, and other issues related to the preservation of labor power. Principally, items for discussion also concern those related to the profit of the actual workers, such as practices of worker health and welfare, issues dealing with materials distribution, productivity measurement documents, and necessary work documents for such activities. There is no legal understanding extant regarding the limitations of management participation forums in respect of their authority arising from their nature.

b. Personnel standards related to worker hiring, dismissal, and other matters, such as work organization, are not infrequently considered to be management participation issues concretely involving participation in actual personnel matters. However, actual participation in personnel matters may, conversely, easily give rise to a variety of negative effects. Thus, to instead obtain labor union understanding, a degree of room for objection would seem good to allow and define in advance within the collective agreement.

c. It is not a legal violation of forum structure to include issues like profit distributions, directors, and other company executive personnel matters in management participation forums. However, to prevent problems from arising in regard to the firm's articles of incorporation, these rules should be included therein. Otherwise, there is a danger that a problem may arise afterward in regard to invalid restraint of the general shareholders' meeting under the law.

d. In the event of a dispute, this should necessarily be discussed within the management participation forum and a solution found. Otherwise, it is desirable to have preventive means in place through clause articles that ensure disputes between both sides do not occur.

In addition to the preceding points, other items for participation forums include detailed manifestation of accounting details of the firm, this in order to obtain worker understanding. This will have no small role in preventing disputes and sustaining labor relations harmony.
5. The character of management participation forums

A management participation forum is not a simply round-table meeting [懇談会, kondankai]. Opinions about participation forum issues should be stated without alienation by both labor and employer sides to facilitate understanding. This is the mission of these forums. Accordingly,

a. Forum resolutions should, by custom, be reached in unanimity. Even if resolution methods are set by agreement that involve rules applied to complex decisions, these are not usually of practical effect. If the opinion of participants on both sides divides over a major issue, it will not matter how many the number of participants are, the result will be a one-to-one opposition and participation forum solutions will naturally not obtain.

b. Accordingly, for such instances of opposition, it will be good to have established clauses in advance for third-party mediation, arbitration, or final arbitration.

c. The effective force of forum resolutions should be understood as being identical to the effect of collective agreements. Participants share a common obligation to work for the actualization of such resolutions. In the event a certain resolution requires shareholder action or approval, there should be no procrastination. In the absence of shareholder action, the firm will only be all the more legally constrained. In practice, the effort of those representing the firm in the management participation forum can generate acceptable proposals based on reflection over actual company circumstances. Accordingly, harmonious solutions to these issues are expected. It is unreasonable to wait for legally binding resolutions: appropriate provisions ought to be previously included in the firm's articles of incorporation. Without exception, legal issues inherently contain paths to a resolution.
BECOMING CREATIVE COLLABORATORS: POLYMORPHISM/MUTUAL MEDIATION OF FUNCTIONAL SPECIALTIES

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1. INTRODUCTION: A CALL FOR COLLABORATION

The following is simply the result of a brainstorm on the theme of collaboration – creative collaboration – on Lonergan studies. By this I mean collaboration on two fronts:

1. Collaboration within Lonergan studies in developing, integrating, implementing the whole range of Lonergan’s key notions from self-appropriation to generalized empirical method to functional specialties and especially notions that are relatively underdeveloped such as universal viewpoint, emergent probability, mutual mediation, humanity as a “concrete universal.”

2. Collaboration between Lonergan studies and other contemporary intellectual traditions such as analytical philosophy or phenomenology or hermeneutics or even other aspects of contemporary Thomism. Here the aim would be to engage effectively in a way that would convince thinkers in other traditions that a dialogue would be mutually beneficial.

My suggestions are divided into two parts: The first part consists of fairly concrete and particular suggestions for engaging other traditions and for developing Lonergan’s legacy. The second part consists of more general suggestions for developing certain notions distinctive
to Lonergan Studies: I comment briefly on the very important notion of functional specialties and then turn to notions such as “humanity as a concrete universal” and “mutual self-mediation,” notions that constitute what I call Lonergan’s philosophy of collaboration.

I hope the development of the second set of suggestions will motivate and guide the implementation of the first set as well as itself providing something to engage other traditions that deal with “social epistemology” and “social metaphysics.”

2. MOTIVATIONS FOR THE INQUIRY

The motivation for this brainstorm is twofold: First of all my habit of visiting the Toronto Research Institute each year – to identify new materials and also renew my appreciation of what has been achieved – often brought conflicting reactions.

I am always impressed by the achievements but also wonder what else might be done. I am often torn in two directions: I think, “It is all here – why don’t people see it?” But also I find overlaps and repetitions or I find different commentators unaware of their complementary contributions.

A similar reaction arises even when I browse in the modest Lonergan Centre we have in South Africa. These materials are filed under topics or themes such as Lonergan on Philosophy of Science or Lonergan on Philosophical Pluralism or on Emergent Probability. This way of filing allows accumulated results in a certain area to be readily visible and possible future developments are more readily suggested. The motivation here is directed towards developing Lonergan’s legacy.

A second motivation arises out of my work in teaching philosophy in South Africa and out of the task of setting up a Catholic University. I may think Lonergan’s position is the most nuanced or the most well grounded. But to teach him in isolation would leave students unable to communicate with students from other universities, many of who are taught according to the dominant analytical tradition or who are formed in a hermeneutical-phenomenological way. This raises the question of communication or collaboration or engagement with other intellectual traditions.
3. COLLABORATION AND THE RECEPTION OF LONERGAN

In this section I want to make a number of suggestions about how we need to engage other traditions and about developing the Lonergan legacy. I base myself on Michael McCarthy and Mark Morelli's reflections on the "First and Second Reception of Bernard Lonergan's Thought." Around fifteen years ago they presented a whole range of issues concerning the need for collaboration within Lonergan studies between Lonergan studies and other intellectual traditions. What is startling about their account is that the same list of issues could be drawn up in almost exactly the same terms today.

3.1 Lonergan and Major Philosophers/Main Philosophical Themes

McCarthy begins by explaining some of the reasons why the first reception of Lonergan was limited and why the academic institution and academic fashion tended to resist Lonergan. However, he went on to argue that fruitful dialogue is still possible, though he points out - what is still the case - that the initiative will have to come from the Lonergan side and from someone equally at home in another tradition. He then makes a number of suggestions as to how real engagement and real cooperation might proceed.

A first suggestion is that major conferences could be held relating Lonergan's thought to important thinkers and important themes: Kuhn and Rationality in Science, Rorty and the End of Philosophy, Charles Taylor and the Merits of and Limits of Modernity. Today these issues remain important but I would add conferences on the Philosophy of Mind and Epistemology and Ethical Naturalism.

I would particularly urge a conference on Lonergan and the Analytical Tradition. There has been good work in this area from McCarthy's The Crisis in Philosophy (1990) to Fitzpatrick's Philosophical Encounters: Lonergan and the Analytical Tradition (2005) and Andrew Beard's excellent Method in Metaphysics: Lonergan and the Future of Analytical Philosophy (2008).²

¹ The suggestions of McCarthy and the comments of Morelli are available in the archives of the Lonergan Institute at Boston College.

² Michael H. McCarthy, The Crisis of Philosophy (New York: State University of
Perhaps the next step would be to invite analytical philosophers of mind or metaphysicians to a seminar with people like Beards who is clearly at home with the thinking of major analytical philosophers as well as with Lonergan. Perhaps such invitations of philosophers from other traditions could become a standard feature of the workshop.

3.2 Producing a Twenty-First Companion to Lonergan

A second suggestion from McCarthy is the publication of a fairly heavy-weight but accessible Companion to Insight. That would offer a definitive and substantial account of the whole range of Lonergan’s achievement. Here I have a definite model in mind: the recently published Edinburgh Companion to Twentieth-Century Philosophers (2008). It focuses on Analytical Philosophy and European Continental Philosophy – leaving out Thomism but including shorter sections on non-western philosophers.

There are some excellent features which could be adapted for a Companion to Insight. For example, there are opening chapters on “How to Recognize European Continental Philosophy.” These are followed by later chapters on “Analytical Themes in Continental Philosophy” and “Continental Themes in Analytical Philosophy.” In addition a wide range of sub-traditions and sub-fields are presented. Essays on philosophy of mind or on ethics or political philosophy are offered from the perspective of the two main traditions. All this allows from the beginnings of a dialogue between two approaches that are often kept apart.

(a) Lonergan and Contemporary Philosophic Pluralism

So why not a Twenty-First Century Companion to Lonergan? An opening section could be entitled “Situating Lonergan as a Philosopher.” Later sections could be “Lonergan and Analytical Philosophy” and on “Lonergan and European Continental Philosophy” and even on


“Lonergan and Contemporary Thomism.” In each case a Lonergan scholar could offer a presentation and then an established scholar from the relevant tradition could be invited to do a companion piece. What would be essential is that all contributions were of a high standard – a standard comparable to the model chosen here.

Another section could deal with key notions from Lonergan, presented in an order that facilitated a gradual entry into his thought. Key notions include: self-appropriation, the nature of consciousness, the dynamism and structure of consciousness, levels of consciousness, patterns of experience and polymorphism of consciousness, insight and higher viewpoint, mutual mediation, emergent probability, humanity as a concrete universal, functional specialties, method. The aim would be an accurate and substantial account of basic notions written with a view to communication.

(b) Lonergan and Main Areas of Philosophy

There could be another section (or we might need another volume) that would focus on different fields in philosophy:

- Lonergan and Contemporary Epistemology: Why Lonergan is not a reliabilist, or a naturalist, or a foundationalist; or an internalist or an externalist or a coherentist!
- Lonergan and Philosophy of Mind
- Lonergan and Philosophy of Science
- Lonergan and Contemporary Ethics/Metaethics

A model here would be The Routledge Companion to Twentieth Century Philosophy. Many thinkers and movements are presented here in a way that is neither “uncritically bland nor inappropriately partisan” (Putnam). It is a marvelous read, both detailed and authoritative, though there is scarcely a mention of Thomism. If Lonerganians cannot produce something of this range and quality they will not earn the right to collaborate or to expect collaboration.

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(c) Lonergan and Major Philosophers

I would also recommend a section (or another volume) on Lonergan and major philosophers. Lonerganians have already written on Lonergan and almost every philosopher from Plato to Hume to Kant to Heidegger to Wittgenstein and to Derrida. These materials could be gathered or rewritten and expanded. Again if this is to be done well we need to ensure a high standard of presentation.

Two models spring to mind: The Classics of Western Philosophy: A Reader’s Guide (2003) and The World’s Great Philosophers (2003). If this were made into a separate volume it could be entitled something like Critical Collaborations: Lonergan in Dialogue.

Lonergan scholars could be commissioned to write chapters in a manner that would demonstrate an expertise in the thought of a major thinker that they are bringing into dialogue with Lonergan. Obviously the thought of these thinkers should be ‘domesticate’: their achievements should be fully appreciated. Yet the illumination that an engagement with Lonergan might bring could be introduced in a sensitive way. Some discussion may be needed to guide contributors so the various treatments could be pitched at the right level and articulated in the right tone.

If the treatment matched the standards of the models just mentioned and went beyond them by means of a sensitive comparison and contrast the effect might be to elicit real dialogue.

3.3. Lonergan-Shaped Textbooks/Anthologies

A further collaboration I would like to see is the writing of new kinds of textbooks or the gathering of new kinds of anthologies or readings shaped by knowledge of Lonergan. This could be a way of introducing beginning to students to Lonergan in a balanced way. It could demonstrate he had a contribution without imposing him on students. Well-developed textbooks of a suitably high standard could be attractive to lecturers also. The value of an anthology that revealed a

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trajectory in philosophical thought, in contrast to eclectic or piecemeal collections, could be brought out.

Again whatever is produced must match the best alternatives available. For example, in Philosophy of Mind there is *Arguing about the Mind* (2007) or *Theories of Mind: An Introductory Reader* (2006). Students would be put in touch with all the standard resources and positions as well as being given some appreciation of the kind of illumination that Lonergan can bring. A particular need is for different kinds of textbooks in Philosophy of Knowledge and in Metaphysics. These are needed to balance the dominance of analytical treatments that often give no hint of alternative approaches.

### 3.4 A Range of Projects: A Research Program

The range of collaborative projects is extensive – even if we consider philosophy alone. Perhaps a brainstorm is needed to consider a different kind of workshop that focused on identifying such projects or devising a research programme. Doran has suggested that some institution or university become a focus point for ongoing research in Lonergan and philosophy – just as Seton Hall takes up economics and Marquette focuses on theology.

(Finally I note that Micheal McCarthy offered an impressive list of areas in which the continuing relevance of Lonergan was clear. He called it a hastily assembled list. I would love to see what a prolonged reflection would include).

### 3.5 The Need for Genuine Dialogue: Avoiding Lonerganian “Group Bias”

Mark Morelli adds some interesting remarks on collaboration with other traditions. He warns of the danger of ‘group bias’ in the Lonergan movement. This can often lead to premature dismissal in sweeping ways of “analysts” or “Heideggerians” without real engagement. Naturally they return the favor.

However, I think there is a self-correcting process going on. The best people in most traditions tend to transcend their traditions – or

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leave openings to dialogue. The volumes mentioned above – such as *The Edinburgh Companion to Contemporary Philosophy* – suggest this is so. Also there are a number of potential dialogue partners who are not narrowly identified with particular schools. If Thomism is often left out this may be simple lack of awareness rather than ideological exclusion. It may also reflect lack of production or of outreach from the Thomistic side.

John Haldane, in *Mind, Metaphysics, and Value in the Thomistic and Analytical Traditions* (2002), has made efforts to set up links between Thomism and Analytical Philosophy. But he insists Thomists need to raise their standards – their analytic standards. Maybe he could be invited to workshop!

Morelli also raised questions about the character of the workshop. He perceived it as having a scattergun approach and wonders if it could be reshaped to a still greater impact – or maybe new elements could be added such as an invited speaker from another tradition.

In addition Morelli makes specific suggestions about *Method: Journal of Lonergan Studies*. He says we need more contributions from professional philosophers and more contributions from professional philosophers and more philosophically-trained theologians. We need a greater philosophic person-power. Maybe we need to commission or invite papers, or suggest themes for collaboration. This fits in with McCarthy’s call for articles good enough to be included in the *Journal of Philosophy* or the *Review of Metaphysics*.

Finally Morelli makes a strong plea for communicating Lonergan to beginning students. Not only are textbooks needed but new programmes need to be devised. Students need to be introduced to Lonergan without excluding anything else they might need to become good students of philosophy who may become professionals.

This is a real challenge. How to combine a philosophy of self-appropriation and cognitional analysis with a high standard of analytical thought and a good grasp of phenomenological and hermeneutical methods!

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4. COLLABORATION AND THE FUNCTIONAL SPECIALTIES

Any discussion of collaboration in Lonergan studies must mention functional specialties and functional collaboration. This in many ways holds the core position in the theory and praxis of collaboration. Philip McShane is very clear on this in his important article on “The Origins and Goals of Functional Specialization” (2005).5

McShane quotes Adam Smith on the need for a division of labor in every art (to increase the productive power!). He points out how even literature or literary studies has identified the need for functional specialization. However, the paradigm application is that provided by Lonergan in theology in which the tradition is retrieved through Research, Interpretation, History and Dialectics whilst theology engages culture in Foundations, Doctrines, Systematics and Communications.

Here I cannot engage the question of functional collaboration in great detail. I would first have to seriously engage McShane’s many web publications and for this I would need considerable time – and undergo a demanding intellectual workout.

My purpose here then is simply to acknowledge the importance of Lonergan’s work here and present it as a key dimension of Lonergan’s overall philosophy of collaboration. I suggest that it would be fruitful to relate it to notions such as “humanity as a concrete universal” and that of “mutual self-mediation.” There is work required within Lonergan studies in collaboration on collaboration: in the building up of a complete account of Lonergan’s thoughts on the collaboration in history of the whole human race, on the collaboration that arises in mutual mediation, and on the collaboration of specialists.

Having said I cannot engage the issue of functional collaboration in great detail I will add a few questions. McShane himself requests that Lonerganians take a “stance” on Global Functional Collaboration even if they are not “connected” to it in the way he is. My probably premature and uniformed questions are as follows:

• What are the conditions of the possibility of functional collaboration: what kind of self-appropriation enables one to participate in it?

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5 Available on McShane’s website: http://www.philipmcshane.ca/.
Does generalized empirical method or the appropriation of polymorphic consciousness have some kind of priority to functional collaboration?

What makes functional collaboration more than a conveyer belt of operations – a flat division of labor? (The answer to this question may be in the famous page 250 of Method in Theology)

What are we to make of McShane’s claim that discoveries in one area or specialty sends “vibes” up and down the whole framework? (This is a very intriguing claim.)

Is functional collaboration the only model of collaboration: Doesn’t the method of collaboration depend on what you are collaborating on and whether you are initiating collaboration or systematizing the process at a later stage?

The project of Global Functional Collaboration that McShane is guiding or fostering is fascinating in its intentions. I do wonder, however, how it may be effectively communicated to those who are working, in their own way, in intercultural or interdisciplinary/transdisciplinary ways or in interfaith dialogue. There are serious people working in these areas and they have their own achievements or accumulated insights and judgments that may not readily be lifted this framework. Perhaps they should be allowed to discover ‘functional specialization’ in their own way and their own time.

I think care should be taken not to too quickly assimilate projects of collaboration to functional collaboration. Otherwise we may end up with a methodological imperialism that results in a higher order version of early Lonerganian claims to methodological superiority. Instead of saying “we are intellectually converted and you are not” we say “we know what functional collaboration is and you do not!” At the very least we need to be aware of other approaches to collaboration in a range of contexts and issues, even if they appear to be methodologically inadequate in some way.

So whilst appreciating the ambitious project of Global Functional Collaboration – which I will continue to keep in view – a residual stubbornness allows me to proceed in my own way. I will continue to explore the relevance of polymorphic self-appropriation to collaboration in philosophy or between cultures, and I will continue to
encourage direct first order engagement with other philosophers and support middle level encounters prior to fully systematic functional collaboration. (Another way of putting this may be that specialists should retain some of the sensitivities and awarenesses of generalists.)

5. COLLABORATION AND THE SOCIAL APPROPRIATION OF REALITY

I turn now to another level or dimension of collaboration, a dimension that may be wider and yet complementary to functional collaboration. I see this additional dimension in terms of the whole matrix of conversations unfolding historically in human life – which may be taken as the ground out of which the collaboration of specialists arises. This is still at the level of a brainstorm but it may link up with other notions of Lonergan such as that of mutual mediation between the members of humanity inasmuch as they constitute a concrete universal. And these different notions together may constitute an area of Lonergan studies that needs further development – an example of where collaboration is called for. To my mind this may be seen as a collaboration on Lonergan’s philosophy of collaboration.

5.1 The Collaborative of Mankind

My point of departure is a paper by William Mathews on “Method and the Social Appropriation of Reality,” found in Creativity and Method (Lamb, 1990).9 This is a single short paper and so cannot have the scope and detail of McShane’s work, but it gives a new twist to our theme of collaboration.

Mathews explicitly responds to Lonergan’s claim that “Method is a framework for collaborative creativity” (M: ix). He is led, like McShane, to a reflection on the need for cooperation between functional specialists. But to my mind he points to a further dimension that moves beyond individual self-appropriation and beyond the collaboration of specialists to a wider collaboration that needs to be appreciated.

Mathews seeks to "build up an image of an historical and social community of inquirers" and lead us to a new appreciation of "Being" as the "objective of wonder of the whole historical-social community of inquires." This is worth dwelling on and developing.

Clearly such a community will generate many systems of searching, will involve wonderings and questionings in many contexts – and will differentiate itself into many communities of inquiry. To that extent pluralism and fragmentation will emerge.

However, because the human mind is common to all there is a probability that communities will generate sets of questions that correspond to the levels of consciousness that structure the human mind. Spontaneously a division of labor may emerge and may be recognized and explicitly formulated by someone like Lonergan. Here McShane's perspective converges with Mathew's outlook.

But I find also a hint of something more in the image offered by Mathews. He says, "Being is the objective of the collaborative wonder of the human community" (1981: 432). Surely there is more included here than the wonder of specialists. There is the wonder of the wider community, the wonder that gives rise to cultures and human history. The wonder of the whole human race includes the pre-theoretic wonder of everyone as well as the wonder of specialists in the realm of theory and science. It includes the wonder of those who have found an entrance into the realm of interiority. There is something attractive and compelling about this image of collaborative wonder. I have not worked out all that could be said about it. But it is suggestive:

It seems to link up with the emerging literature on ongoing collaboration in human life found in *The Wisdom of Crowds: How the Many are Smarter than the Few* (Sunswiecki) or *Wikinomics: How Mass Collaboration Changes Everything* (Tapscott and Williams) or *Utopian Pedagogy: Radical Experiments against Neoliberal Globalization* (by Coté et al) or *Multitude* (Hardt and Negri).

In addition it points to the more explanatory treatment of human
interaction found in what Lonergan says about “humanity as a concrete universal” and about “mutual self-mediation.”

5.2 Humanity as a Concrete Universal

My brainstorming exercise leads next to an article by Mathew Lamb on “The Transcultural in Lonergan” (METHOD: Journal of Lonergan Studies, 1990). He finds communicative process (collaboration) rooted in the creative finality of emergent probability. To explain this he goes back to Lonergan’s early work on human beings as constituting a concrete universal, for example to Lonergan’s “An Essay in Fundamental Sociology.”

Lonergan insists that “humanity is not an abstraction, nor is it simply an aggregate of isolated individuals.” Rather human beings are in solidarity at many levels and humanity is constructed by the entire sequence of interlocking human lives.

From this point of view our “experiences” and our “ideas” are never merely private. Our experiences are embedded in the flow of human action (56): in complex physically, chemical, biological, zoological, neurological, psychological, sociological and cultural schemes of recurrence.

Similarly our ideas emerge in reflection on shared situations and contexts and through personal intellectual collaboration of students and teachers, and by participation in intellectual traditions.

So “universality” is not a mere abstraction but emerges out of a matrix of historical and cultural understanding attained by collaboration. Every person contributes to a culture and every culture contributes to human living in a way that has relevance for the whole of humanity.

The core of all cultures is the resourcefulness of the human spirit in its embodied and historical condition. This core generates layers and layers of understandings and higher viewpoints – or constructs and deconstructs and reconstructs diverse worldviews.

This is an attractive account of the solidarity of humanity. It may be worth revisiting and developing as part of Lonergan’s explanatory philosophy of human collaboration. Not only does it motivate our

openness to a whole range of dialogues but it helps us to avoid the temptations of specialists.

5.3 Mutual Self-Mediation

Moreover the large scale image may be complemented by the account of personal collaboration which Lonergan explains in terms of mutual self-mediation.

Too often we think only in terms of individual self-appropriation – and take this as something prior to collaboration. But all along self-appropriation implicitly or explicitly involves what Lonergan calls mutual self-mediation. This should not be overlooked. Self-appropriation may be such that no one else can do it for me. But neither can I do it without others to invite me to do it. Self-possession always concomitantly involves an engagement with the other. Self-transcendence is towards the other: It is for my sake and for the sake of the other. Human beings are essentially and inescapably conversational (Andrew Beards develops this in his “Metaphysics of the Social” in *Method in Metaphysics*).

Again we have a notion of Lonergan’s that needs developing and that may be extremely fruitful in many areas. I find here a basis for an explanatory account of Dignity. In a course on the Dignity of the Human Person I often ask: What am I looking for in a theory of Dignity. The main aim is to find an explanation of how my dignity is a value for me and also for (any) other person. Dignity is not merely autonomy and self-possession. It is also my self-transcendence. My dignity is linked to the other who mediates my self-possession and elicits my self-transcendence. I appropriate and become myself in the act by which I engage and meet and become the other. Persons meet in their free self-donation and their free receptivity as the movement towards self-transcendence reaches its term in the other person – and partly because of the other.

So to the large scale account of human collaboration – in terms of the concrete universal – we can now add this complementary personal account, in terms of mutual self-mediation (see Appendix: Diagram on

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Creative Collaboration).

It may help to see this process or movement of mutual self-mediation in terms of an enlargement of the familiar diagram that expresses the structure of human consciousness. The enlargement brings out the mutuality of embodied, intelligent, reasonable and responsible spirits – of human persons.

I find this perspective of humanity as a concrete universal, constructed by the entire set of interlocking unfolding human lives, as explained in terms of mutual self-mediation compelling.

Since many of you have just come from a conference on Lonergan’s economics, I’m tempted to compare Lonergan’s vision with that of Paul Krugman – the well known economist whose textbook seems to be replacing Mankiw (of No Thank-you Mankiw fame).

Krugman says that his early inspiration came from the psychohistory of Isaac Asimov’s famous science fiction work: The Foundation Trilogy. The key figures in this work are the psychohistorians who use their mathematical expertise to analyze trends in society, predict the future and nudge civilization to its proper fulfillment. He says:

In my early teens my secret fantasy was to become a psychohistorian. Unfortunately, there’s no such thing (yet). I was and am fascinated by history, but the craft of history is far better at the what and the when than the why, and I eventually wanted more. As for the social sciences other than economics, I am interested in their subjects but cannot get excited by their methods – the power of economic models to show how plausible assumptions yield surprising conclusions, to distil clear insights from seemingly murky issues, has no counterpart yet in political science or sociology. Someday there will exist a unified social science of the kind Asimov imagined but for the time being economics is as lose to psychohistory as you can get. (Quoted in Coyle, 2007: 33-34).

I wonder if Lonergan takes us even closer to psychohistory. If you put together everything he says on emergent probability, on God and secondary causes, on humanity as a concrete universal, on mutual mediation, on grace and freedom and on the universal viewpoint, and on the hierarchy of values and the common good you have a nuanced
basis for grasping the unfolding of human history, for anticipating possible futures, and for directing human action towards a cosmopolis that is based on the common good. You have suggestions on how we can shift the probabilities of achieving this good. I am not sure if Krugman can acknowledge not just interests and needs but actions based on judgments of value.

So again we have aspects of Lonergan’s thought that need to be developed in collaborative Lonergan studies.

Let me end with another science fiction story:

A group of scientists were gathered by government and shown a brief film of an inventor who appeared to levitate for awhile, then fell to the ground. They were told that he had invented anti-gravity but was killed in the fall – when his imperfect creation failed. A few clues were left and they were challenged to recreate anti-gravity – which they did succeed in. However, this is not the end of the story. In fact he had no invented anti-gravity. In fact this was a psychological experiment to see what they could achieve if they thought he had.

Now I sometimes wonder if Lonergan is a bit like this inventor – challenging us to impossible results as we seek to recreate what we think he has done. And extraordinary achievements do emerge – in the collaborative efforts of those who attempt to reach up to his mind (So let us continue in this and maybe one day someone will really work out what is meant by page 250 of *Method in Theology*).

I have aimed at two main things in this brainstorm on collaboration in Lonergan studies.

- At suggesting particular projects of collaboration within Lonergan studies or between Lonergan studies and other intellectual traditions.
- At raising the topic of collaboration conceiving Lonergan’s philosophy of collaboration as an area of research that may feed back towards and motivate and guide particular projects.

I hope this workshop will promote many further projects of collaboration.
APPENDIX: DIAGRAM ON CREATIVE COLLABORATION

THE CONVERSATIONAL/COLLABORATIVE STRUCTURE OF HUMAN CONSCIOUSNESS: MUTUAL SELF-MEDIATION

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Transcendence towards Persons</th>
<th>Divine Persons</th>
<th>Person</th>
<th>Collaboration between Person: Self-Donation and Receptivity</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Deciding</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>Collaboration in Action: Moral and Social Collaboration</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Judging</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>Dialogue involving shared insights and judgments:</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Understanding</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>Intellectual Collaboration</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Experiencing</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>Patterned experience of interdependent animals:</td>
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<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>Embodied Collaboration</td>
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</tbody>
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Embodiment
LONERGAN'S THOUGHT MAY MEDIATE CONCERNS ABOUT GENDER BIAS

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INTRODUCTION

Within twenty-first century popular and academic dialogue, concerns about gender bias are myriad, expressed by thinkers who identify as feminist; as well as those whose work focuses on masculinity; lesbian, gay, or queer-theory; and transsexual or transgender studies, among others. As this multitude of approaches, as well as ever-increasing acronyms used to describe so-called sexual and gender identities demonstrate, concerns about gender bias are polymorphic. In this paper I will focus on critiques of biological sex, gender and gender bias articulated by feminist philosophers. Yet, even the claim that there is a unified field or discipline of "feminist philosophy" or "feminism" is contentious these days. Many feminist thinkers prefer the term "feminisms" as an accurate description of the multiplicity of their points of view. Feminism and other disciplines relating to the study of gender seem to be engaged in a self-correcting process in which univocal discourse is continually amended (rightly or wrongly) in order to attempt to make room for multiplicity.

In order to explicate how Lonergan's thought might be helpful to mediate such concerns about gender bias, I will first define and elaborate a brief history of the emergence of the terms that are central to this conversation. Next, I will present a brief overview of the philosophical work of Luce Irigaray, which has become an influential feminist critique, attacking the Western philosophical tradition as
the root of gender bias within Western culture. In the third and last section I attempt to demonstrate how Lonergan’s approach clarifies the relevance of metaphysical thinking to feminist philosophical analysis.

TALKING ABOUT SEX AND GENDER

In many disciplines, the terms “sex” and “gender” are now used almost interchangeably,¹ so I think it will be helpful to consider how this came to be, as well as why this equivocation is philosophically problematic. Etymologically, “sex” is related to the Latin “sexus” indicating a state of being male and female,² while “gender” relates to the Latin “genus” most closely indicating a kind or class related by birth or origin.³ While there is some evidence that forms of “gender” have been used since the Middle Ages to refer to sex difference⁴ the notion of gender commonly refers to language, specifically the practice of categorizing nouns and pronouns as masculine, feminine, or neuter, a phenomenon not common to all languages. The notion of gender, and particularly the idea of a “gender role” as related to human sexuality emerges in the 1950s.

The term is coined by researchers in pediatric endocrinology at

¹ See, for example, Phillip L. Walker and Della Collins Cook, “Brief Communication: Gender and Sex: Vive la Difference,” American Journal of Physical Anthropology 106 (1998): 255-59. The authors argue that the failure to distinguish clearly between sex and gender is problematic in the field of biological anthropology, as well as in other physical and human sciences.

² See the Oxford English Dictionary (2010): “Middle French, French sexe the genitals (c1200 in Old French as sex), gender, state of being male or female ... and its etymon classical Latin sexus (a-stem) state of being male or female, specific qualities associated with being male or female, males or females collectively, sexual organs, of uncertain origin (perhaps compare sec re to cut (see SECANT adj.), though the semantic connection is unclear). While Lewis and Short, in A Latin Dictionary, argue in favor of a demonstrable etymological connection between sexus and secus: “Sexus , s (1 abl. plur. sexibus, Spart. Hadr. 18, 10 al.; “but sexubus,” Iul. Val. Rer. G.Alex. 1, 36), m., or s cus , indecl. n. root sec-of seco; hence properly, a division, segment.” See Charlton T. Lewis and Charles Short, eds., A Latin Dictionary (Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1879).


⁴ Ibid. The OED cites usage as far back as 1387, but this usage seems to be reserved for language that is literary or humorous, rather than technical or commonplace.
John’s Hopkins University who studied children born with various chromosomal abnormalities and endocrine disorders. In examining the “sexual psychology” of these children, the team concluded that the most reliable indicators of “gender role” and sexual orientation are not biological factors such as physical morphology, chromosomal abnormality, or hormone imbalance. Rather, there are two things that are the strongest predictors of which “gender role” the child will ultimately embrace: the sex assigned to the child resulting from a concern about the child living with ambiguous sexual biology, and how the child is raised.5

During the 1950s and 60s, the disciplines of psychology and psychiatry popularize the use of terms such as gender “roles” or “characteristics” to describe human embodied existence as sexually differentiated. Indeed, this terminology is quickly adopted by feminist theorists in fields including psychology, sociology, history, literature, philosophy, and theology. While “sex” is commonly used to refer to sexual biology,6 “gender” is employed to account for the social, psychological, intellectual, emotional, and volitional distinctions captured in manifestations of femininity and masculinity. In particular, the term “gender” is most often used to indicate those characteristics associated with culturally normative expressions of unambiguous sexual biology — that is, sexual biology which is differentiated according to a binary between “male” and “female.” Feminist theorists, concerned that these normative views of gender are biased, attempt to rethink the relationship between biological sex and gender roles/characteristics – the relationship between “sex” and “gender.”

By the early 1970s, feminist theorists are raising serious challenges to the idea that “gender roles” are determined and fixed by sexual biology, a view which functions as a powerful cultural norm, both at the common sense and theoretical level. Those who advocate such determinism do so for a variety of reasons; we find appeals to

6 Though this is not an unproblematic claim for some feminists and gender theorists. Theorists such as Judith Butler argue that the assumption of a “natural” differentiation between male and female sexual biology ignores the fact that our understanding of sexual biology is socially constructed. See Judith Butler, Gender Trouble: Feminism and the Subversion of Identity (New York and London: Routledge, 1990).
biology, as well as to nature and religion, all attempting to provide either a descriptive or explanatory account of the relationship between biological sex and gender characteristics. In contrast, feminist theorists who advocate the explanatory framework of social constructionism argue that norms of maleness and femaleness (sex), and masculinity and femininity (gender) are not derived through a neutral description of fixed natural facts, but through beliefs that are influenced by deep and abiding group bias. Feminists argue that such bias is derived from an "essentialist" account of the relationship between sex and gender, in which human natures or essences are understood to be fixed or determined on the basis of biological sex. More specifically, this leads to the belief that women (those persons who demonstrate both "normal" female biology and normative feminine traits) are naturally inferior to men (who demonstrate both "normal" male biology and normative masculine traits). While these norms for feminine and masculine traits vary culturally, feminists argue that it is a nearly universal human social phenomenon that meaningful imbalances of power exist between those persons who fit norms of "male masculinity" versus those persons who fit norms of "female femininity." These power imbalances, coupled with group bias, manifest as cross-cultural oppression of women, as well as the oppression of other persons who do not fit within cultural norms of femininity or masculinity, including hemaphrodites or "inter-sexed" persons, persons with male biology who manifest significant feminine traits, etc.

Feminist views of the social construction of sex and gender comprise two main types. The first is a materialist approach, which criticizes the structures of the social world insofar as these structures divide the roles of men and women within a society. This view emphasizes the significance of the fact that many material aspects of social life, including work, the family, and sexuality, are divided and organized on the basis of gender roles which are imposed upon and shape human experience according to categories which are generated by bias. The second type of social constructionism focuses on discourse rather than material existence, by examining the linguistic meanings which express cultural views about normative interpretations of sexual biology and

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7 For an excellent discussion of these approaches, see Rachel Alsop, Annette Fitzsimons, and Kathleen Lennon, theorizing gender (sic). (Cambridge: Polity, 2002), chap 3.
gender roles; for example, the fact that masculine characteristics include strength, rationality, and power, while feminine characteristics include weakness, irrational emotion, and subservience.8

These varying interpretations of the social construction of sex and gender owe a common intellectual debt to theorists who advocate that a strict distinction between sex and gender (sometimes referred to as the sex/gender divide) is important in order to further feminist aims. In particular, sociologist Ann Oakley, in her work Sex, Gender, and Society "argued that gender was distinct from sex, that gender referred to the social characteristics, masculinity and femininity, and [was] variable, whereas sex related to biological sex and was more fixed."9 In addition, feminist anthropologist Gayle Rubin is often credited with forwarding the feminist distinction between sex and gender, particularly in her 1975 essay, "The Traffic in Women,"10 in which she discussed the notion of a universal "sex/gender system." Rubin's writings proved very influential in the later work of feminist and queer theorist Judith Butler. Butler traces the theoretical lineage of the sex/gender divide back even further than 1975, to the 1952 work of Simone de Beauvoir. Beauvoir noted in her weighty 1952 philosophical tome, The Second Sex, that "One is not born, but rather becomes, a woman."11 Butler argues that "Simone de Beauvoir's formulation distinguishes sex from gender" - though de Beauvoir herself does not express the distinction in this way.12

Eventually, feminists begin to challenge the intelligibility of the sex/gender distinction and the strict social constructionism that gave rise to the distinction. The distinction between sex and gender is useful in order to counter biological determinism which, feminists argue, gives rise to limiting and biased norms of masculinity and femininity. The strict social constructionism which embraces the sex/

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8 Alsop and others, theorizing gender, chap. 3.
9 Alsop and others, theorizing gender, 66.
gender distinction demands a stringent separation between biological sex and culturally constructed gender characteristics, and eschews all accounts of sexually-differentiated embodiment as overly essentialist. This strict social constructionism restricts the development of a notion of subjectivity that genuinely addresses the significance of embodiment. Ultimately, the sex/gender distinction it is not sufficiently explanatory to address pressing questions about human embodiment and subjectivity.

Rejecting a strict separation between sex and gender, some feminists argue that we must rethink embodiment as an expression of a complicated matrix of multiple factors. These so called “sexual difference” theorists attempt to consider seriously the relationship between the body and the emergence of gender characteristics, without reducing gender to something essentially determined by sex. This theoretical approach is controversial among feminists whose aim is to achieve meaningful equality between men and women, because it requires an examination of the meaning of sexually differentiated embodiment. As a result, some feminists express a concern that these “sexual difference” theories are biologist or naturalist and essentialist, and therefore undermine the feminist quest for equality by reiterating reductionist accounts of the relation between sex and gender.13

“Sexual difference” theorists, including prominent feminist philosophers Luce Irigaray and Moira Gatens, are not primarily concerned with achieving equality per se for women. These theorists employ postmodern and psychoanalytic analysis to criticize the Western metaphysical tradition and, in their view, its tendency to construct and support hierarchies that bolster patriarchy. In order to elucidate how Lonergan’s thought can address these feminist criticisms of the Western philosophical tradition, in the following section of the paper I will examine some of the arguments developed by Irigaray as she works out a philosophical position that elaborates the philosophical problem of sexual difference.

13 This debate raged particularly over the work of Luce Irigaray. For a discussion of this issue, see Nancy Fraser’s introduction to Revaluing French Feminism: Critical Essays on Difference, Agency, and Culture, ed., Nancy Fraser and Sandra Lee Bartky (Bloomington: Indiana University Press, 1992), 10-11.
IRIGARAY’S ACCOUNT OF THE SIGNIFICANCE OF SEXUAL DIFFERENCE

Luce Irigaray, perhaps the most widely known and influential theorist of sexual difference, critiques the claim that the main focus of feminist theory should be to obtain social equality for women. In her view, this approach assumes masculine male experience to be a universal standard for subjectivity, a subjectivity that women must strive to become “equal to” by overcoming the adversity of their situations. Irigaray is opposed to this notion of universal subjectivity. She claims that the focus on universal subjectivity, accepted by women in their quest for equality, has the effect of an erasure of sexual difference. In Irigaray’s view, this is a dangerous possibility, because human beings (at least for now) are dependent upon sexual reproduction for the survival of our race. Hence to erase sexual difference is flirting with the possible genocide of humanity. Instead she emphasizes difference, while conflating the notion of sex and gender, when she claims that the “human species is divided into two genders which ensure its production and reproduction.”14

Irigaray endeavors to establish the notion of sexual difference as “ontologically fundamental” by insisting that philosophy must consider seriously the sexual specificity of women as different from men.15 Her view is that the meaning of the sexual differentiation of the human race has been obscured because women have been relegated as inferior by an implicitly masculine metaphysical tradition. She argues that this tradition ignores the significance of sexual difference, as well as the problem that women have been categorized as inferior. Her project of developing an “ethic of sexual difference” focuses on social as well as “ontological” considerations as a means to redress the effects of the failure of male Western philosophers to attend to the problem of sexual difference. Irigaray poses the question, “Has a worldwide erosion of...

14 Luce Irigaray, je, tu, nous: Toward a Culture of Difference (New York: Routledge, 1993), 12.

15 While Irigaray rejects traditional stereotypes of femininity and masculinity, in her quest to establish an ethics of sexual difference she maintains that there is a distinction between the experiences of women and men. In doing so she rejects the kind of androgyny that social constructionists sometimes advocate. However, she refuses to accept an unproblematic distinction based on biology or nature, instead focusing on the particular lived experiences of persons whose bodies are differentiated by sexual biology.
the gains won in women's struggles occurred because of the failure to lay foundations different from those on which the world of men is constructed?\(^{16}\) I think that it is important to note here that although Irigaray rejects the validity of metaphysical claims because they are corrupted by male bias, she is comfortable using the language of the "ontological" to describe the phenomenon of sexual difference. She is attempting to assert claims which correspond with the real phenomenon of sexual difference, while divorcing those claims from the tradition of Western metaphysical discourse.\(^{17}\)

In the service of demonstrating that sexual difference is ontologically fundamental Irigaray takes up the project of developing the notion of sexual difference. She uses the tools of deconstruction and psychoanalysis to critically engage philosophy, culture, and interestingly, psychoanalytic theory itself, particularly as it is articulated by Freud and Lacan. She uses the Derridean notion of *différence* to critique the hierarchical binaries\(^{18}\) typical of the "phallogocentric" tradition of Western metaphysics. In her view the tradition is marked by the privileging of *logos* or speech in a way that serves the interests of patriarchal power and results in a metaphysics which privileges unmediated presence as the central form of Being. Irigaray is particularly concerned with the dichotomy in Western philosophy and culture between the privileged poles of "mind, reason, man, truth, vision," valued over "body, appetite, women, falsity, touch." Irigaray asserts that the association of maleness and masculinity with


\(^{17}\) This certainly seems to be a problematic contradiction, perhaps resulting from the neglect of the possibility of an explicit metaphysics which unifies the whole in human experience, understanding, and judgment.

\(^{18}\) For example, Sr. Prudence Allen, RSM, discusses the theme of Aristotelian "contraries." Allen claims "Aristotle thought that male and female were 'contraries' within the same species because they had the same human form. He argued further that in a pair of contraries, one is the privation of the other, cold is the privation of hot, and female is the privation of male." See Sr. Prudence Allen, RSM, "Metaphysics of Form, Matter, and Gender," *Lonergan Workshop* 12 (1996): 4. Irigaray's point is that such "contraries" or dualisms aren't neutral, but are valued in a hierarchical fashion, often in service of patriarchal values and power. For a helpful development of this point, see Moira Gatens, *Feminism and Philosophy: Perspectives on Difference and Equality* (Bloomington: Indiana University Press, 1991), 92-94.
the former, these privileged poles, creates and constantly reinscribes the notion of man as universal subject. Instead of subsuming both sexes under this notion of universality, Irigaray aims to break down dualistic hierarchies by exploring an alternative female symbolic. This female symbolic is contingent, as opposed to universal, in order to free feminist philosophy from masculine concepts that parade as universal. While Irigaray’s embrace of the notion of contingency is significant for rethinking the relationship between sex and gender, it is problematic that she understands the contingent in opposition to the universal, for even within her own framework, this seems to be a reinscription of the kind of binary that she wants to avoid.

According to Irigaray, one area where women have been unable to define themselves with an accurate symbolic language is their experience and description of desire. She argues that philosophers’ understandings of the Western conception of desire have in many ways shaped and been shaped by Western metaphysics. She argues that Western philosophers have produced a conception of desire that is not neutral, but is a male conception, formed out of the lived experience of the masculine male. Irigaray is focusing here not on the fact of male anatomy but on the male body, especially when shaped by cultural norms of masculinity. Elizabeth Grosz, a noted Irigaray scholar, claims that for Irigaray the body is always interpreted as an inherently social “[bearer] of meanings and social values.” This socially situated analysis of the body relates to Irigaray’s interest in the morphology of the body, especially as it gives rise to desire. Irigaray is not referring here to physical anatomy interpreted literally, but to the body as imagined and experienced by a person: imaginatively, intellectually, psychically, and socially. According to Irigaray, the male experience of desire is tellic - it seeks completeness, fulfillment - an ordered universe in which everything is categorized and put into its place. Hence she concludes that this experience of desire is the ground of the masculine Western philosophical tradition, and in particular of the history of

19 It is important to note here that Lonergan’s notion of pure desire is distinct from what Irigaray describes as a typically Western, metaphysical conception of desire.


21 Lonergan’s unique metaphysical approach is also opposed to this static notion of being.
Western metaphysics.

She finds evidence of this formulation of desire in Plato’s theory of the forms (the soul yearning to completeness in a return to the One), Aristotle’s account of place in the *Physics*, and Husserl’s notion of eidetic intuition. In reading these and other texts, Irigaray focuses not on arguments or conceptual logic, but aims to uncover the meaning in what is missing from the text, of its structure and metaphor, and the significance of the voices that are absent. In her readings of Plato and Aristotle, Irigaray draws out some of the morphological differences between the male and female lived experience: the solid, containing, tellic morphology of male experience, versus the fluid, contained, daimonic form of desire expressive of female morphology. She concludes that the female subject has been all but excluded from the discourse of philosophy by this masculine desire for completeness. According to Irigaray this “phallogocentric” exclusion of the female subject invalidates any claim of completeness on the part of Western philosophy, both ancient and contemporary.

While the complexity of Irigaray’s analysis can only be briefly mentioned here, it is important to emphasize that she accurately assesses the eliding of women philosophers and female bodily experience from the history of Western philosophy. She is correct in her criticism of counter-positional accounts of subjectivity, including the rational individualism typical of Cartesian, Kantian, and other modern accounts of the subject, as well as the ideal of pure immediacy which Irigaray accuses Husserl of harboring in his account of eidetic intuition. And yet, while Irigaray insightfully recognizes many of the philosophical counter-positions which arise from bias, there are also significant counter-positional elements of her own analysis. In the final section of the paper I will articulate how Lonergan’s thought can help to create a response to such feminist concerns.

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22 Again, it is important to emphasize here that her claims about the morphology of the body do not refer merely to the physical body, but to a particular body as lived by a particular person within a unique social, historical, cultural context. It is in light of these specificities that the meanings of the sexual differentiation of a body can and do emerge.
Lorcan’s Thought May Mediate Concerns about Gender Bias

HOW LONERGAN’S THOUGHT CAN ADDRESS GENDER BIAS

Lonergan’s metaphysics, grounded in the dynamic notion of being, counts among its basic metaphysical commitments the notion of the intrinsic, dynamic finality of proportionate being. In addition, his metaphysical account of human being entails a complex, integrated, tripartite developmental process. The central and repeated emphasis on dynamism present in Lonergan’s metaphysics, and its possible and likely distortions, requires a different kind of metaphysical method than the counterpositional metaphysics critiqued by Irigaray and other feminist philosophers. Counterpositional metaphysics, rooted in logic, conceptualism, and the privileging of presence (the already-out-there-now), cannot do justice to such dynamic realities as human development. Rather, the method of metaphysics must be heuristic and dialectical.

Lonergan’s method of metaphysics is heuristic. For Lonergan, metaphysics is wide open and dynamic because it is rooted in wonder. It is this wonder about the universe of being that distinguishes human knowers from animals, for animals are limited to the habitual routines of merely sensitive living. Wonder is dynamic because being itself is dynamic. Being, however, is not made manifest to us in any immediate way. Rather, our implicit desire to know and understand the universe of being is the particularly human horizon that makes it possible for wonder to emerge and move us toward the dynamic universe of being. It is this heuristic structure of human knowing, grounded in pure desire to know, that provides the unity for human conscious operations and serves as the unifier for Lonergan’s notion of the human person. This explanatory account of the unity of consciousness can address feminist concerns about Western philosophy’s failure to generate genuine accounts of human subjectivity. Lonergan’s account of human consciousness is grounded in concrete experiences of human embodiment and can thereby account for sexual difference in a meaningful and concrete way.

Lonergan’s notion of pure desire is always manifest in a particular person under particular social, historical, and material conditions. According to Lonergan, what he refers to as ‘pure question’ is the experience of a deep and abiding openness and receptivity, shared by all humans, which is the manifestation of unrestricted desire. While
pure question is associated with pure desire to know, the sort of
desire that arises out of an orientation towards pure question is not
simply focused on knowing. Rather, pure question is manifest as an
originary willingness and longing to become whole, to live in a way
that is integrated rather than fragmented by bias and ignorance. An
attentiveness to sexual difference would be an important facet of living
in such an integrated manner.

Irigaray, however, is very critical of the notion of desire as
manifest within the Western philosophical tradition. She claims that
the notion of desire is biased from a masculine point of view. According
to Irigaray, the male experience of desire is tellic. That is to say, male
desire seeks a telos, completeness, fulfillment – an ordered universe in
which everything is categorized and under our control. Furthermore
she argues that this experience of desire is the ground of masculine
philosophy. She proposes a new economy of desire based on generosity,
which would destroy the notion of desire as tellic.

A Lonerganian response would say that Irigaray's account
critiques the phenomena of bias imposed on experience. According
to Lonergan, pure desire to know is resisted because giving oneself
over to the demands of intelligence can be very uncomfortable.
Resisting the comfortable status quo created by one's own biases is
the challenge of genuineness. This notion of genuineness arises out of
Lonergan's metaphysics, and as such, does not suggest some kind of
static approach to "being who one is." Rather, to be genuine means to
be open and responsive to the demands of pure desire. According
to Lonergan, you could say that genuine, originary desire (male, female,
or otherwise) seeks completeness, but not as Irigaray describes. Rather,
as an ongoing incompleteness in an emergently probable universe in
which things are unstable, the unrestricted desire to know has the
character of fluidity. More specifically, the unrestricted desire to know
is isomorphic with the constantly emerging incompleteness of the
universe. The universe emerges in a probable way, not in a manner
which is certain or determined, and so the universe itself has the
character of fluid and dynamic emergence. Pure desire respects this
dynamism and is in opposition to the kind of tellic desire that Irigaray
so rightly condemns.

For Lonergan, the notion of pure desire relates to the isomorphism
between knowing and being, the relationship between the operations of the human intellect and the nature of the universe itself. Fundamentally, Lonergan understands the human intellect as dynamic, and as engaged with a dynamic universe that is not rigid or fixed, but always in motion. His understanding of the intellect is not abstracted from our embodiment, nor is it reflective of an exclusively male experience of embodiment. Rather, Lonergan invites all of us, manifesting the full horizon of human embodiment, to personally appropriate the structure of our experiencing, understanding, judging, deciding and loving.

By engaging in this exercise, we eventually move from a latent to an explicit metaphysics. The aim of such an explicit metaphysics is an ordered set of heuristic notions that anticipates the whole of proportionate being - everything that could possibly be experienced, understood, and affirmed by human reason. According to Lonergan, the practice of explicit metaphysics requires the implementation of the integral heuristic structure of proportionate being. While “A heuristic structure is an ordered set of heuristic notions ... an integral heuristic structure is the ordered set of all heuristic notions,” or all that could possibly be known by human reason.23

For Lonergan, metaphysics is not about universal abstractions, but the integral heuristic structure of proportionate being, which is both radically contingent, and completely concrete. Irigaray associates metaphysics with universality, and universality with abstraction, and so cannot conceive of a comprehensive concrete metaphysics, the central feature of which is the notion of finality. Lonergan reminds us that finality is not an abstraction, but “means no more than what can be grasped intelligently in the data and reasonably affirmed on the basis of the data.”24

Lonergan characterizes his notion of finality with the remark that proportionate being is “upwardly but indeterminately directed.”25 Such a notion is only possible in a metaphysics in which substance is not a rigid determiner of what is, for if substance were a rigid determiner of being, then being would be determinately directed. This would make

24 *Insight*, 507
25 *Insight*, 477.
impossible any change or flexibility in the universe of being. Indeed, it would mean that emergence was itself impossible, that the universe was static, and that the "nature" or existence of things was wooden and fixed. Rather, in Lonergan's view, the universe is real and the real is dynamic. Perhaps most importantly, this means that we live in a universe that is incomplete.

It would seem that Lonergan's notion of the real as dynamic would be compatible with Irigaray's attempt to escape from the conceptualist mantle of Western metaphysics, and it is insofar as Irigaray critiques counterpositional metaphysics. But the problem remains that Irigaray, and many other feminist thinkers, reject any kind of metaphysical hierarchy. A positional view of metaphysical hierarchy requires a correct understanding of the notion of emergence which, for Lonergan, occurs out of manifolds of things which are initially related only coincidentally, but which become systematized by higher forms and integrations.

The universal phenomenon of the emergence of intelligibility in the universe is treated in Lonergan's analysis of schemes of recurrence. According to his analysis, events and things exist within ever emerging "flexible circles of ranges of schemes" of recurrence. This means that events and things, including human beings, are intrinsically interrelated metaphysically in an ever-developing emergent universe. However, schemes of recurrence will emerge and survive not necessarily, but only probably, and when they do, they make probable still further emergences. Lonergan's account of emergent probability, and related notions of genetic method and intelligibility, as well as his account of human development (in particular his analysis of the relation between the neural and the psychic) offers tremendous resources for gender theorists seeking to explain the emergence of gender roles and characteristics within the human person.

Lonergan's method of metaphysics is dynamic, and also dialectical. Yet he takes pains to distinguish his method from that of Hegel, yet another thinker in the Western philosophical tradition whose work is considered biased and sexist by Irigaray and other feminists. Hegelian dialectic, according to Lonergan, is "conceptualist, closed, necessitarian, and immanent" while in contrast, Lonergan's own

26 Insight, 487.
position is "intellectualist, open, factual and normative. It deals not with determinate conceptual contents but with heuristically defined anticipations."

Lonergan argues that Hegel's deepest error was his failure to recognize the role of judgment in reaching an understanding of the virtually unconditioned. Lonergan notes that while Hegel "effectively acknowledged a pure desire with an unrestricted objective," nevertheless he was following Kant, and neither thinker recognized the constitutive component of judgment that allows the knower to affirm (or deny) the virtually unconditioned. According to Lonergan, Hegel's failure to properly account for the role of judgment in affirming the virtually unconditioned cripples human rational consciousness. Lonergan, however, is post-Hegelian, and indeed post-modernist in his respect for the social surd, which he later calls the problem of evil, a problem that cannot be swept away in the abstract progress of history. It is this notion of the social surd, or the problem of evil and human moral failure, that is at the root of the sexism and gender bias that motivates feminist philosophers to criticize the Western metaphysical tradition.

The social surd arises out of group bias, which is predicated on the manifestation of bias within the individual. Lonergan specifically discusses the phenomenon of bias in his discussion of the dialectic of the dramatic subject. While Lonergan's account of the dramatic subject is too complex to discuss fully here, it is important to note that philosophical dialectic and the dialectic of the individual (or as Lonergan says "the dramatic persona") intersect, and this intersection affects the individual and his or her community. In the group, we find spontaneous subjectivity in tension with intelligent social order, within a community of knowing subjects. According to Lonergan, the dialectic of community "regards the history of human relationships" and "is concerned with the interplay of more or less conscious intelligence and more or less conscious spontaneity in an aggregate of individuals." This dialectic is mainly concerned with an aggregate of social events, arising from the principles of human intersubjectivity and practical common sense. These principles are linked because "the spontaneous, intersubjective

27 *Insight*, 446.
28 *Insight*, 397.
29 *Insight*, 243.
individual strives to understand and wants to behave intelligently; and inversely, intelligence would have nothing to put in order were there not the desires and fears, labors and satisfactions of individuals.\textsuperscript{30} The opposition of these linked principles is responsible for the tension of community. Common sense develops as we learn from the mistakes and successes of those who come before us; intelligence develops and we adapt our living to meet its demands. Yet our adaptations (both on the individual and communal level) are not always successful, and so we attempt to maintain a balance between social tranquility and social crisis.

The reality of dialectic for Lonergan means that humans develop, or fail to do so, both individually and as a community; ideas and understandings change, positions push us forward, counterpositions move us back. For Lonergan, dialectic is a manifestation of interfered with and distorted development. Dialectical process can be described as rational progression in tension with irrational regression and decline. Dialectic then “is a concrete unfolding of linked but opposed principles of change.”\textsuperscript{31}

Lonergan’s attention to the social surd, the unintelligible bias that is immanent within and concretely constitutive of the facts of a given social situation, manifests a concern with what he names the “distorted dialectic of community.”\textsuperscript{32} This distorted dialectic is a demonstration of the decline or reversal of emergent probability within human living. Feminists would certainly contend that the oppression and victimization of women as the result of centuries of pernicious group bias is a vivid example of the social surd. Speaking of Lonergan’s analysis of social bias and decline, in his introduction to the volume “Lonergan and Feminism,” William Loewe notes that

Lonergan identifies one dynamic that he finds especially pernicious. Egoism and the self-interest of groups can pervert praxis, giving rise to a situation that embodies not intelligence and responsibility but their opposite. Such a distorted situation in turn calls for pseudo-theory, theory that draws its plausibility from the facts of the situation to which it corresponds and that,

\textsuperscript{30} Insight, 242-43.
\textsuperscript{31} Insight, 242.
\textsuperscript{32} Insight, 251.
rather than criticizing that situation, accepts its distortions as a given, as simply the way things are. Theory of this sort renders distortion normative.\textsuperscript{33}

While the feminist critique of the Western philosophical tradition must be addressed as a significant attempt to unmask such pseudo-theory, it is neither accurate nor fair for feminist philosophers to blame metaphysics for the emergence of social and cultural schemes that introduce bias, oppression and violence into human living. Ultimately, the central issue for addressing concerns about gender bias is not merely the correction of counterpositional metaphysical claims, but addressing our judgments about value and the biases that prevent us from making such judgments correctly, as well as our moral failure to will our values as concrete goods. This examination of Lonergan’s notion of value is a project that demands attention in order to more fully address concerns about the manifestation of gender bias in our human communities.

\textsuperscript{33} William P. Loewe, foreword to \textit{Lonergan and Feminism}, ed., Cynthia Crysdale (Toronto: University of Toronto Press, 1994), x.
OBJECTIFIED CONVERSION AS FOUNDATIONAL IN THEOLOGY: 
A CONVERSATION BETWEEN 
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THE QUESTION(S)

From the introduction to her book, The Transformation of Man: A Study of Conversion and Community,¹ through to the final chapter, “The Meaning of the Church,” Rosemary Haughton is convinced of three things: first, there is an urgent need for a new theology in the Christian (and specifically the Catholic) Church; secondly, the categories that will make such a theology both valid and indeed possible will “grow directly and verifiably out of actual and common human experiences;”² and thirdly, the relevant experiences occur when the Law by which a person lives, in some sense comes to bits.³ The common human experiences with which she is concerned are precisely those that can be shown to have become occasions of conversion. While Haughton will not be lured into trying to define conversion – it is too easy for an abstract definition to appear to be an attempt to deny that “anything

² Haughton, Transformation, “A Prefatory Note to the New Edition.”
³ Haughton refers to “Law,” a term she uses interchangeably with “formation,” as “an imposed patterning of reality, to make it intelligible and usable (135).” At its best, the Law provides “a formation which is as far as possible according to the needs of loving (126).”
has really happened” – she knows that if the crucial experiences are to be honored, in other words not to lose their meaning for the people called through them to decision or choice, what happened must be described in terms that are recognizably true to their experiences; it is only when this is the case that the transformative character of the events can be both revealed and acknowledged.

So, in this paper I am attempting to clarify what it is that Rosemary Haughton is asking of theology; what that has to do with conversion; and whether or not we can hope that a response to her search is to be found in Bernard Lonergan’s *Method in Theology*. Further, I consider the possibility that Haughton’s work might provide an example, and perhaps even an expansion of the task Lonergan understood to be the foundations of the second phase of this new theology, namely the objectifying of conversion.

**REMEMBERING THE MOMENT: EUCHARISTIC FAITH AND THE REDEMPTIVE INCARNATION OF THE WORD**

The center, the culmination, the transformation that is at the heart of Christian life finds its realization and most intimate expression in authentic celebration of the Eucharist. This is so because, as Haughton recognizes so clearly, what the Christian is invited and enabled to make in the Eucharist is not just any act of faith but the act of faith that accepts simultaneously two realities that reason alone insists are irreconcilable: Jesus as “Lord” and as “crucified.” And as “the pathetic little spark of faith” makes the leap – the naturally impossible leap – between these two poles, the explosion of the power of the Spirit occurs and “the world is consumed in the transforming love of Christ.”

Many Christians probably give at least notional assent to this truth of the Eucharist, but Haughton maintains that not only is mere notional assent shabby: it is harmful. Why? Because giving merely notional assent neglects the mysteries that are at the heart of Christian life.

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4 Haughton, *Transformation*, 86.
6 The task of Foundations as the fifth of eight functional specialties in theological method is set out in chapters 5 and 11 of *Method*.
faith. Performatively, it comes close to being a virtual denial of the fact that salvation comes to us through the missions of the Son and of the Spirit; it glosses over and obscures the magnitude of the meaning in those seemingly insignificant occasions in which the Word takes flesh over and over again in human beings; it fails to recognize that the impossible leap made into the void between two irreconcilables, a leap that happens over and over again in ordinary human situations where a decision for love is made, is the choice for salvation, a choice made possible by the gift of the Spirit. It is little wonder, Haughton believes, that people give only notional rather than real assent\(^8\) to the mystery of redemption celebrated in the Eucharist if they have no opportunity to understand that it is that same mystery that is at work in their experience of conflict and its resolution in their lives, in those messy, disturbing situations that threaten their very understanding of who they are and call them to a new self-understanding and so to a new commitment. Further, the giving of merely notional assent to this central doctrine of Christian faith is unwittingly promoted by the Church through a failure in formation, a failure to honor what faith recognizes: if Christian formation is not to fall into the trap of being hi-jacked by humanism\(^9\) it must be realized that, far from being an end in itself, formation must always be at the service of transformation. The Church can do no more than this but this it must do: form people toward transformation.

Haughton is convinced that the transformation involved in the Eucharistic act of faith is intimately, integrally related to the transformation which occurs in the leap of faith that is taken when

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\(^9\) Haughton is rejecting as inadequate for human perfection (both individually and as a whole) both classical humanism and naturalistic or scientific humanism understood as "a philosophy that rejects supernaturalism, regards man as a natural object and asserts the essential dignity and worth of man and his capacity to achieve self-realisation through the use of reason and scientific method." Webster's Third New International Dictionary (Springfield, MA: Merriam-Webster, 2000), 1100.
(knowingly or not—and mostly not, in the heat and confusion of the moment) a decision for love is made in situations of human conflict. In order to facilitate the possibility of insight into the reality of this potentially salutific leap into the void between the security of the Law of one’s formation, which is never adequate to the new demand for love, and the insecurity of consent to an unknown and uncontrollable future, Haughton takes the reader right into the midst of a number of such human situations, remarkable only for their ordinariness. Yet as she does so, what she means by both formation and transformation, and the difference between them, becomes apparent. However, if we are to consider a possible theological interdependence between Haughton and Lonergan, before following her into some of those imagined situations we need to consider the place Lonergan gives to conversion, initially in itself and later within theological method.

**CONVERSION: THE FOUNDATIONAL REALITY**

Lonergan is not alone in understanding that conversion is basic to authentic Christian living. The precise meaning he ascribes to conversion, as well as extensive clarification of the ways in which it occurs can be seen in the multiple references he makes to it in *Method in Theology* and elsewhere, particularly in his post-*Insight* writings. In this paper I focus on his description of conversion as a foundational reality, a description given in *Method* where he is outlining the eight functional specialties through which theology is done, and specifically in relation to the fifth of them, Foundations.

By conversion is understood a transformation of the subject and his world. Normally it is a prolonged process though its explicit

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10 At the beginning of the introduction to *Transformation*, Haughton confronts the reader with the radical difference between formation and transformation, while insisting on their essential interdependence in the realization of human purpose or perfection. See *Transformation*, 7-8.

acknowledgment may be concentrated in a few momentous judgments and decisions. Still, it is not just a development, or even a series of developments. Rather, it is a resultant change of course and direction. It is as if one's eyes were opened and one's former world faded and fell away. There emerges something new that fructifies in inter-locking, cumulative sequences of developments on all levels and in all departments of human living.

Conversion is existential, intensely personal, utterly intimate. But it is not so private as to be solitary. It can happen to many, and they can form a community to sustain one another in their self-transformation and to help one another in working out the implications and fulfilling the promise of their new life. ...

Conversion, as lived, affects all of a man's conscious and intentional operations. It directs his gaze, pervades his imagination, releases the symbols that penetrate to the depths of his psyche. It enriches his understanding, guides his judgments, reinforces his decisions.12

It is this same foundational reality of conversion as radical transformation that is the subject of Haughton's book. She too conceives of the transformation of conversion as existential and intensely personal, as utterly intimate, as radically changing who one is, how one decides to live, what one values and gives one's life to, and as bearing fruit in and being sustained by community.13 She too is aware that, while the highly desirable effect of good formation is at least "an imaginable ideal," indeed one that inspires human creative capacities, the idea of transformation is "not imaginable at all."14 Yet transformation – conversion – does occur, concretely, verifiably, healing and elevating people right within the turmoil and conflict of human experience.

So what Haughton does, fearlessly and yet with awe, is examine

13 Examples permeate the text of *Transformation*.
the experiences involved in this unimaginable reality as it is happening. Accordingly, she takes a step back from Lonergan’s reflections on what conversion is, and on the effects it has, and instead leads the reader right into the middle of the situations of human conflict as conversion is occurring within them. As Haughton describes what actually happens, she digs out of those events, unrepeatable in their particularity, the elements common to all of them, the elements within actual human situations that both constitute conversion and enable it to occur. The result is that the attentive reader is able to gain some understanding of why it is that this transformation normally occurs only in such recognizably ordinary human experiences of conflict (that become religious because they are revelatory of human orientation to the sacred) rather than, as might be expected, in conventionally understood “religious” experiences.

The consequences of attending to the transformation occurring within common human situations are perhaps not too surprising, even if such attention tends to be somewhat neglected or at least lacking in direction. Like Haughton, Lonergan is aware that even though such experiences are in fact “the data on the dynamic state of other-worldly love,” “the data on a process of conversion and development,”15 they may still be too familiar and seemingly too ordinary to be considered in this way. Yet, coming to recognize, in Haughton’s words, “how much a matter of everyday experience are the tremendous themes of salvation,”16 can enable one, as Lonergan intimates is most desirable, to stop looking for something with a label on it and instead simply to heighten one’s consciousness of the power working within and start adverting to its long-term effects.17 Both Haughton and Lonergan are convinced that the experience of conversion is not rare; it occurs in the everyday.

WHERE HAUGHTON TAKES THE READER: FOUR “COMMON HUMAN EXPERIENCES”

Haughton gives detailed accounts of four imagined and diverse sets of common human experiences, each of which can be understood as a

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15 Method in Theology, 289.
16 Haughton, Transformation, 242.
17 See Method in Theology, 289-90.
model in the sense that it is possible to discover in it all the elements of the wider human situation which has "no existence...except in each unique and unrepeatable event."\textsuperscript{18} Hence her use of particular examples of human behavior is deliberate; keeping the discussion tied to the facts of human experience will ensure that it does not "vaporize into a cloud of abstractions"\textsuperscript{19} taking with it any hope of theological relevance. Because the particularity of human experience is seen as integral to authentic theology, a brief sketch of each account follows.

\textit{“Conflict and Resolution”: My Kingdom – for What?}

The first human situation, a familiar, recognizable, common one, is of two children fighting and the fight being stopped. A boy of twelve who loves to paint and has no idea why it matters so much to him postpones his painting, reluctantly, to go off on an errand for his mother. While he is out his little eight-year-old sister takes his paint brushes and two tubes of paint to decorate her doll's house which suddenly seems to her to be really shabby and needing her immediate attention. Anger, frustration, resentment explode into a big fight, stopped in this case by the mother.

Haughton examines several possible scenarios of the way in which this event might work itself out, depending on the factors actually at play taken from the almost limitless number of possible differences: in temperament, relationship between parents and children, previous events and influences on the children and on the mother, the mother's understanding of her role as a mother and her notion of the meaning of the peace she wants to restore, and so forth. In general however, while the outcome of this fight is going to be influenced both by the formation of those involved and by the mother's understanding (at least performatively) of what formation is \textit{for}, neither of these influences is adequate to bringing about a solution to the human problem which this specific incident explosively exposes - yet again. Haughton

\textsuperscript{18} Haughton, \textit{Transformation}, 20. Haughton aims to show "the elements of the human theological crisis in which our whole culture is involved (11-12)." Accordingly, because human experience can only be particular, she makes particular examples of human behavior rather than general ideas her starting point, in order to try to discover "the elements of the human situation as we are aware of it, now, in our particular culture (12)."

\textsuperscript{19} Haughton, \textit{Transformation}, 12.
describes this human situation, in its particular manifestation and in its universal experience, as

one of ignorance striving for knowledge, of separateness striving for communion, of fear longing for safety. Therefore it is a state of desire, which does not know what it desires, and of anger that does not know what to be angry with. It is subject to futility, and yet subject in hope, and this hope is precisely what makes the futility so painful.20

What is clear is that there is no way out of this painful and potentially destructive situation from within it, even though the explosions, which expose the problem, also have the potential to provide the occasion for its solution. However, because these events so threaten the security of the status quo, no matter how stultifying that may be, they are often “got over” in all kinds of ways which, far from helping people to really resolve the conflict and so genuinely encounter each other, instead allow them just to get on with life, ultimately resulting in something akin to, at best, “kindly indifference to each other,” “a settled and contented and taken-for-granted lack of communication.”21

Fortunately this does not have to be the end of this story – of any story – because while there is no way out from within, “there is a release from without, and this simply means the intervention of some influence that is not totally contained in the situation itself.”22 This intervention is usually spread out over a long period in what Haughton calls a kind of “infiltration” effect: the children learn about living and getting on well from what other people say to them or show them by how they themselves live, or from what the children read or otherwise observe, and most particularly from how those who love them relate to them. The point is that this intervention does occur, and the results can be seen in a gradually modified reaction to similar events in the children’s lives. The intervention that filters through over the years prepares for and to some extent heightens the possibility of transformation occurring through those rarer occasions when both the conflict and the intervention effect are dramatic and immediate.

21 Haughton, Transformation, 23.
22 Haughton, Transformation, 21.
From the multiple possible ways in which such a fight between two children could pan out we will look only at the situation when, according to Haughton, the conditions are fulfilled that enable the elements of a transformation and its inherent effects to be named. Perhaps not so surprisingly, fundamentally there is one main condition: the one intervening, in this case the mother, loves the children in a way that frees them to love. She cannot teach them love, she cannot love for them, but she can make it more likely that they will be able to love. She can do this because she has the (not necessarily articulated) understanding that her role as mother calls her to risk herself in responding to the children in a way that communicates her love of them and her involvement in their (perhaps unknown to them) desires and fears and needs. Experiencing her love, in whatever way she communicates it, the children have the security to risk letting go of their own separateness that they have been struggling so vehemently to hold on to, and so to risk coming to see the needs and desires and gifts of the other and to want to support them. But the risk of leaping from the security of their staunchly defended separateness into the void between that and the threat of the other is no small thing: that leap is the decision to love. In this explosive situation, the intervention of the mother in a way that somehow reassures them of her love frees the children to risk the leap that will enable them to repent, to have a new self-knowledge that is bearable only because they know they are loved, to be reconciled, paradoxically to be both more themselves and more able to give themselves, and to be at peace. Further, when this occurs its effects spill over onto the other people in their lives. An apparently trivial event can have momentous consequences.

This first "story" can be understood as a model in the sense that, in its particularity which has no exact duplicate, it is possible to discover all the elements of the wider human situation. The elements under Haughton's microscope here and in the subsequent stories in her book are those which are to be located in the conversion event.

In this commonplace experience then, transformation/conversion has occurred. None of the people in the situation could have brought it about themselves, even though each of them is involved, and yet it has happened. We are now in a position, with Haughton, to name the elements of transformation, in other words to objectify the religious
and moral conversion when it has occurred, and then to locate these same elements revealed so differently in the stories that follow. There is the breakdown of formation, and therefore conflict to be resolved. Intervention facilitates a resolution of conflict and this occurs when a release of power makes the leap between two irreconcilables possible. In that leap, opposites encounter each other, and through repentance and reconciliation self-discovery occurs and community is formed.

While the particular focus in the story which follows is on encounter, it also contains all the other elements that have been identified in the first story and which make encounter possible.

**“Encounter”: (Sexual) Encounter as Salvific**

While acknowledging that a salvific encounter can occur in any relationship, Haughton chooses to take the reader into the experience of conversion through a sexual relationship, not only because she considers the sexual to be the most intimate and far-reaching of all encounters but also because a sexual and apparently non-religious type of conversion provides her with the necessary de-mythologized vocabulary for a discussion of salvation.23

The two people in this account have immense obstacles to overcome in order to encounter each other, including a rather limited notion of happiness. The young woman, despite her successful career, has no sense of herself as having a right to a life of her own other than that which her “family circumstances” seem to allow her. Following the death of her father she started work and ever since has assumed responsibility for the support of her mother and her two much younger siblings. Her mother has little regard for her daughter, yet takes it for granted that she will support the family without any consideration being given to the possibility that she might want to do anything else; the daughter agrees with this assessment of how things should be. Consequently, she gives no thought to a relationship – or marriage – as a realistic option for herself. The man in the account, a dedicated doctor who sees his fulfilment in his work, is avoiding the commitment of a relationship; he experienced family life as “all-too-cosy, stifling and deadening,” and so he is afraid of domesticity which “secretly revolts

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23 See Haughton, *Transformation*, 244-45.
him” even though, from a safe distance, he “respects and admires it.”

Accordingly, when the doctor is attracted to this young woman who he discovers is intelligent, interested in him, and responsive to ideas which she has had little previous opportunity to appreciate, he responds happily; even though he might not have consciously adverted to the fact, he is aware that because of her family circumstances she considers herself “unmarriageable,” and so he feels safe to indulge his developing feelings for her. The inevitable happens: they fall in love.

The opportunity for real encounter comes about because there is conflict. Firstly, their new-found love threatens the known, the “law” by which each of them has governed their lives to this point: the dutiful, loving daughter, bound to her family and committed to meeting their needs; the dedicated doctor, devoted to his patients and feeling no need or desire for any other commitment. Secondly, this love seems also to threaten them with the unknown, with self-discovery, together with the unsettling realization that this discovery of self is coming about through the other. Ultimately, their refusal to turn away from love forces them to commit themselves to a sexual relationship, one that Haughton describes as a married one, in effect. The conflict nature of their relationship, namely the threatening of the status quo for each of them and also of their very self-understanding, did not force them apart because their desperate need for each other kept them open to each other, an openness that persisted in spite of failure, an openness, Haughton maintains, that is “the assertion, from the depths of human life, of the obscure knowledge that this way lies salvation.” But the dual conflict did break them down enough to release “the power of true passion,” the power of what she calls “the deepest springs of personality.” The power for the children to be transformed was released through the security of love they experienced in their mother’s intervention.

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24 Haughton, *Transformation*, 44.

25 Haughton, *Transformation*, 69. Haughton’s insight is the realization that for both people involved, what is occurring in and through this love affair is redemption, “for to this woman this man is Christ, and she finds life through him as far as she is able to at the moment...What they have announced to each other is the good news of salvation, and their response to the invitation that each proffers is the salvation occurrence, is faith, though it is hampered and incomplete...” The woman does not think of the man – nor he of her – as Christ; the redemption of both that is occurring within the experience happens independently of, and certainly prior to, any possible reflection on it.
In the case of the adults, it comes “in response to an inner, but clear, demand for the gift of love,”26 coupled with the new knowledge for both of them that “each is the other’s gateway”27 to this saving love which will constitute their new world.28

In both accounts, the decisions the people make are a response to something they did not initiate. Both encounters involve self-discovery and other-discovery that is salvific and transformative. In both cases, the preparation was formative: a living of the law that governed their lives, a law that is “the peace which the world can give, and which we need, in order to go on living.”29 In both cases, the self-gift in love was transformative, coming out of a transgression of the law because of the simple fact that “no Law can fully satisfy the need to love, the restless spirit seeking a way to transform.”30 If the people in these accounts are to be faithful to their transformation there is much that remains to be formed in them, but it can be, and to the extent that they don’t backtrack, they will be formed differently, in light of the transformation that has occurred in them. While all of this is true of the people not just in these two accounts but in all four of them, in the next story some attention is given to what happens when backtracking does occur.

26 Haughton, Transformation, 65.
27 Haughton, Transformation, 52.
28 It is worth noting Haughton’s claim that “even a sexual conversion is only accidentally related to the other person as he or she exists ‘in the flesh’, that the person is rather the means of encountering the demand for faith, and so creating community between the two, in their present and limited condition (245).” Charles Heffling makes the same point: “Beatrice herself was the occasion of Dante’s love, and therefore the Comedy portrays her as the guide and the way to abundant life. Yet in the poem as in the experience that inspired it, she in incidental – an image, as Williams puts it, of something that cannot in itself be imagined. Dante was truly in love with Beatrice, but he was even more truly in love through Beatrice (emphasis added).” (Why Doctrines?, 2nd ed. (Chesnut Hill, MA: The Lonergan Institute, Boston College, 2000), 17. Both are right of course, but our being is incarnate so it is perhaps not amiss to note that, just as there must be some imagined data in which we find the intelligibility before we can conceive or define something, so too one must be in love with someone in particular, in order to be in love.
29 Haughton, Transformation, 126.
30 Haughton, Transformation, 126.
“Self-discovery”: Love Differentiates

The conversion related in the next imaginary account is ultimately a Christian one. However, Haughton is at pains not to wrap the experience up and attach religious labels to it prematurely; this is to avoid the very real danger that the experiences which with hindsight can be seen as preparing for and leading up to the final decision for Jesus Christ, can be hollowed out of their meaning, deprived of their integrity, if they are presented in language which is not consonant with how the person experienced the event at the time. Again, Haughton is also careful simply to describe the experiences and allow the categories to emerge rather than try to define the conversion.

She is concerned with the moral crisis of the time, one which contemporary dramatists and writers still keep before us, of a difficulty in recognizing that conversion can happen at all. She maintains that it does, but that the obstacles to it, many of them within ourselves, are formidable and so we need to be aware of them.31

The subject of this account describes himself as an “ordinary sort of chap, [who] didn’t want anything more from life than a decent job and a happy, comfortable home.”32 Accordingly, he virtually merges phlegmatically into work and family, content to stay as he is, making no demands and expecting none to be made of him. His eldest daughter and her friends irritate him and her crazy idealism worries him, but he is really very fond of her and is unhappy that he fights with her so much. Perhaps in an attempt to make amends for his frustration with her, he starts reading the pacifist and communist pamphlets she is always leaving about the place and unwittingly begins to feel a certain

31 Haughton is convinced that the possibility of salvation is always available, grace always on offer. She cites Look back in Anger, where Jimmy Porter hears that an old lady he really cares for is dying and wants to see him. He wants to go to her, but the unaccustomed feeling of compassion makes him vulnerable and he is afraid, so he appeals to his wife Alison to go with him. She almost does, but the fear of losing her security if she lowers the barriers between them is too great – she goes to church instead. Haughton observes: “The excruciating experience of being dramatically involved in the rejection of the possibility of salvation is in itself a kind of offer of salvation. Shall we surrender to the feeling that the situation is hopeless, or shall we – as our angry sense of frustration seems to indicate we deeply want to (emphasis added) – refuse to give in, and go on waiting for Godot? (Transformation, 88).”

32 Haughton, Transformation, 90.
attraction to the idea of an attitude toward life that makes demands and even threatens to disrupt the status quo, but which is in stark contrast to the way of life to which he is accustomed and has never before questioned. The conflict remains an intellectual one, however, so he doesn't feel threatened by it.

One day he asks his daughter about her political opinions. She answers him readily and with sense and as they talk tells him about a club she and others belong to — the members are mostly young and politically minded people — and which welcomes anyone who has nowhere to go in the evenings. The place was purchased for that purpose by a young man who moved from his comfortable family home in the best part of town and into this basement flat in a squalid and over-crowded area of the town. The father is moved by what he hears. His willingness to ask his daughter about her ideas has made him more open to her, and that openness, together with her generous response, sets up a new relationship between them. Because of this he is more aware of himself, aware of a certain smugness in his past, a tendency to be unjust, supercilious in his judgments — and he repents, recognizing this former way of being as inimical to the new relationship he now has with his daughter.

A few weeks later he goes with his daughter to the club. Though somewhat embarrassed he is receptive, probably prepared to some extent both by the ideas he has picked up in his recent reading and by his reflection on his life made possible by the closer relationship he now has with his daughter. In the hours that follow he finds himself deeply disturbed, shaken, by what confronts him, especially by the young man who runs the place. In light of the challenge this place puts to him he sees his life as futile, nothing more than a series of evasions of reality, an avoiding of decision. In the young man who runs the place he experiences a communication of the fact that "Love exists, it works, I know it" and in light of this he is able to face who he is, to repent, and to commit himself to change, even though it is quite unclear what he is to do. But at this stage this doesn't seem to matter much. Rather, he is overwhelmed with joy and though he doesn't understand why, he feels that a huge burden has dropped from him, and so, as Haughton comments:

33 Haughton, Transformation, 95.
He is reconciled to himself, to this newly stripped and worthless and unlovely self, for it is in realizing the complete worthlessness of all that he had thought worthwhile, in the rejection of all this as loathsome and futile, that he discovers his real value. And this value is not something he has, not a possession – great or little – but precisely something that is given, and is only realized in being given.\(^\text{34}\)

For a while he is simply carried along in the newfound freedom to be himself. He does have a vague and yet rather strong feeling that something needs to be changed, but it is difficult for him to know what that might be; given the circumstances of his conversion, he does not have a language that enables him to express what has happened to him, or a community that shares his particular experience, or a liturgy in which he can celebrate it, and as a result he fails to integrate his conversion with the rest of his life. Ultimately he deprives the new self of the power to act by making a single decision against it;\(^\text{35}\) predictably he rationalizes his decision, and by degrees the power to act falls away. He cannot undo the transformation that has happened, but when he fails to live up to it, it simply becomes a deeply resented, ever-present burden, a bad conscience.

In this state he starts doing things to distract himself. Returning home on one of the many nights he has been out drinking, he wanders onto the road, gets knocked over by a car, and lands in hospital with multiple broken bones and other injuries. Vulnerable, with all his normal supports and comforts gone, angry, afraid, he is lying awake one night and to fill in the time agrees to read a fairly crude and conventional account of a conversion, given to him by a young nurse, an enthusiastic evangelical Christian. Reading it evokes the experience of security he felt in his early and lonely childhood from a kind and simple nanny, also a Christian, and as he reads he meets love expressed in Christian words: he “encounters Christ as the one who cares, and who wants him,”\(^\text{36}\) and he responds. The vague yet strong feeling he has had that something needed to be changed now has a direction, a focus. Though he still does not know what is required of him, he knows that whatever

\(^{34}\) Haughton, \textit{Transformation}, 97.

\(^{35}\) See Haughton, \textit{Transformation}, 102-103.

\(^{36}\) Haughton, \textit{Transformation}, 108.
it is it will revolve around the person of Jesus Christ.

In this account, as in the first two, all the elements Haughton identifies as integral to transformation — or conversion — are present. There are several instances of a breakdown in formation, rifts with the Law which has formed him and by which he has lived. There is a series of interventions from both without and within: the literature his daughter leaves around; the new relationship with his daughter following his openness to her and her generous response to him; the meeting with a group whose attitude toward life differs markedly from his own, and especially with the young man who embodies a way of life given to others; disorientation and disappointment with himself on account of his failure to keep faith with what he has experienced; the simple little Christian tract given to him to read. Through these breakdowns and interventions, he not only experiences in himself the conflict between the way of life to which he has been accustomed, and with which he has previously been content, and the life of relational commitment, of love, to which he is being opened up; he also experiences a release of power within him, enabling him to repent of his limited and limiting life, and to make the leap into the void between two irreconcilables: the security of what his life has been, and the radical risk of a future that cannot be imagined, and certainly cannot be controlled.\(^\text{37}\) In each instance, taking the death-dealing and life-revealing leap in the dark meant overcoming two opposing obstacles: a conviction that he had the ability to cope with the situation in virtue of his own abilities; and a consciousness of his (very real) inability to cope, left to himself. In this leap of faith made possible by the release of power, self-discovery and encounter with the other occur. Community consonant with his transformation can result and, along with an appropriate language and ritual, can play a part in encouraging him to be faithful to the gift received and accepted.

\(^{\text{37}}\) Haughton stresses throughout the book that only when formation has broken down can transformation happen: "The release of power occurs only when people have been drawn 'into the wilderness,' into the 'in between' state where the structures of ordinary life are not operative (134-35)." And again: "The life of the flesh – the world of appearances which is after all the only one we can be sure of without faith – is regulated by the Law; or it would come to bits. But it is only when it has, in some sense, come to bits that the power that underlies it and gives it meaning can actually break through....It is in the breaking down of the Law that the Spirit's work becomes apparent, but there has to be a Law to break down (135-36)."
“Creating Community”: Surrender to Something Shared

Community is not just one element in the experience of transformation but rather the focus of all the elements already discovered. Further, just as community is the place where the crises of culture and the division within Church show up, so too the hope is that it will be the means whereby that division “may be healed and from which a new theology may grow.”38 Community is not independent of transformation; it is the completion, the expression, and living out of transformation. If, as Lonergan asserts, “a theology mediates between a culture and the significance and role of a religion within that culture,”39 it is community above all that will welcome such mediation and so make it more likely to be fruitful.

In this next account, Haughton equates creating community with surrendering to something shared, where the surrender is a common achievement and involves all the elements integral to transformation already explored in the previous accounts. She notes that for the most part people live in what she calls an accidental community – born into it in a family, choosing it in being drawn to a particular way of life such as a Religious Order or an educational institution – so that while their being together may not be accidental, the actual make-up of the group is; the “people just are there.”40 Moving beyond this mere “given-ness” to becoming a community of the spirit, a converted community, means moving through the elements of transformation with which we are now familiar: transgression of the Law, conflict, intervention, release of the power of the Spirit, repentance, encounter, self-discovery. In the process, there is a deliberate decision of love for something shared but not yet known, and it is this choice that creates a real community.

As always, Haughton illustrates this through the struggles of particular people, in this case a family of three generations, including in-laws, faced with the decision about where they will live given that before long the big old house that has accommodated all of them will no longer be available to them. The more the formation of the people concerned has been geared toward transformation the greater the

38 Haughton, Transformation, 12.
39 Method in Theology, xi.
40 Haughton, Transformation, 153.
possibility, she claims, that the family will make a transformative decision, a decision for something shared as a commitment to the unknown. It is this commitment that makes it a converting decision, a conversion event.\textsuperscript{41} This and multiple other events actually constitute the family as family.

This common and not very drastic family problem is one of the series of events that make up the history of this family. Yet this event, and the others, are not part of an unfolding process happening to the family but actually are the family, they bring it into being as a community and determine its quality and character as a community.\textsuperscript{42}

And yet a Law cannot be transgressed unless it exists, so there is an interdependence of the structures of formation and the occurrence of transformation,

...this community-creating event could not take place without the continuous history, with recognizably belonging events and traditions, rules, language, customary gestures, of this community as it happens to be.\textsuperscript{43}

In other words, a new understanding of themselves as family presupposes an already existing self-understanding; they already understand themselves as a family because of the traditions and ways of functioning that they share. So, what is the transformation? A converted community consciousness – in this case of a family – is a personal consciousness of the whole; it is an encounter that does not involve any kind of possession of what has been, but rather is known and comes to be only as a shared commitment to the unknown.\textsuperscript{44} And

\textsuperscript{41} Haughton, \textit{Transformation}, 174.

\textsuperscript{42} Haughton, \textit{Transformation}, 175. This notion of the ontology of the family as a self-constituting process is consonant with Lonergan's understanding of the ontology of the church: "Through communication there is constituted community, and, conversely, community constitutes and perfects itself through communication. Accordingly, the Christian church is a process of self-constitution, a Selbstvollzug (\textit{Method in Theology}, 363)."

\textsuperscript{43} Haughton, \textit{Transformation}, 175.

\textsuperscript{44} Because of the "given-ness" of many groups that are only potentially converted communities, Haughton does not ignore the differences that will exist within any group
yet, for the people in this story to be able to make this transformative leap in the dark implies that, in some way in their formation, love had been put first in their scheme of things.\textsuperscript{45}

Theologians and Christians generally tend to use the word grace to talk about what makes possible this leap across the great divide effecting religious and moral conversion. But what Haughton does is yank that notion out of the ethereal sphere where it is often (dis) regarded and impersonalised and take it right into the midst of the experiences where it functions, enfleshing it, not allowing it to seem to have nothing at all to do with the earthy, messy, explosive, uncontrolled and yet ordinary circumstances in which decisions for life and love and relationship are made. She is clear that grace is not something alien poured in from outside – as “jug to mug”; it is a gift, certainly, a divine gift, but it is a gift that takes flesh in people as they make the decision to love in moments when they somehow “know” that that decision puts their very identity at risk, it radically threatens their notion of who they are and of what keeps them securely in place. That decision to love and the consequent decision to choose the value of the other person can be (and often is) made without any knowledge or belief that it is God one is loving and choosing in making these decisions. These events are not small, trivial as the individual incidents might seem; instead both their meaning and the magnitude of their struggle find an echo in the cry of Jesus, the Lord, crucified: “My God, my God, why have you forsaken me? (Mark 15:34)”\textsuperscript{46}

and the need for these to be taken into account: “But it is also necessary, in creating community, to take into account those who are not yet converted, and to provide, in the formative structure, the support and help that they need, as well as the means for working out the converted community-consciousness in those in whom it exists (Transformation, 246).” Lonergan also draws attention to both the need and the complexities of the task of preserving unity while respecting pluralism in his examination of the influence of diverse differentiations of consciousness in the communication and reception of doctrine (Method in Theology, 326-30), that is of the truths by which a community understands itself and according to which it lives.

\textsuperscript{45} See Haughton, Transformation, 246.

\textsuperscript{46} The thought of Jesus the beloved Son experiencing himself as forsaken by God is beyond our imagining, but we can only believe from this cry that he experienced radical loss. Harry Williams comments: “We cannot tell the full significance of that cry. But at least it must mean that Jesus surrendered his role or identity as the teacher who brought to men good news from God, the man certain of his vocation as messiah, the figure in whom God’s truth was ultimately revealed. In that loud and bitter cry such claims and
THE CHURCH AND ITS PROPHETIC TASK

Haughton sees the task of the Church as being to form itself toward transformation. With a self-understanding of being both a repentant and a sinful people\(^47\) "living in relation to salvation, as everybody is, even when they don't know it."\(^48\) the community of the Church has the responsibility of deliberately creating the encounter that is at least potentially transforming. To do this the Church is called out of the reassuring structures of ordinary life and into the wilderness, the place of transformation.\(^49\) Providing for encounter with the sacred is

certainties were cast aside and given up in a death which preceded the moment of this dying physically. . . . It was in the surrender of all he was that he became transparent to the Eternal Word in whom all things in heaven and on earth are to be gathered into one." (H. A. Williams, True Resurrection (Springfield, IL: Templegate Publishers, 1972), 9.

\(^{47}\) A prophet – and so the Church as prophetic – can speak the word of the Lord only from among the people. "It is only from this position of total immersion that the prophet has the right to speak, and the likelihood of being heard. As soon as he begins to think he hasn't got unclean lips then he'd better shut up, because he can no longer say 'thus says the Lord' but only 'I think.' The burning coal that purifies the prophet's speech is the fire of repentance, and the minute he stops repenting he is no longer pure. Only a penitent Church can speak the word of the Lord, and its penitence is real repentance for its real sins, which are the sin of the world, not for some private category of sinfulness which must be purged in order to make it ready to speak to the sinful world (254)."

\(^{48}\) Haughton, Transformation, 253. In Method in Theology, Lonergan expresses this notion as "our implicit intending of God in all our intending (291)." However, in some of his post-Method writings he extends the experience of human orientation toward God to include more explicitly both that which precedes and that which follows the intentional, and so asks whether the intentional aspects of the dynamism of consciousness are "but aspects of a deeper and more comprehensive principle," "a tidal movement that begins before consciousness, unfolds through sensitivity, intelligence, rational reflection, responsible deliberation, only to find its rest beyond all of these"... in "being-in-love." ("Natural Right and Historical Mindedness," in A Third Collection, ed. Frederick E. Crowe (Mahwah, NJ: Paulist Press, 1985), 174-75.) In a further article in the same collection of writings, it refers to that principle or tidal movement as "the passionateness of being" (which) "has a dimension of its own: it underpins and accompanies and reaches beyond the subject as experientially, intelligently, rationally, morally conscious" ("Mission and the Spirit," 29). I think it is this same principle Haughton has in mind when he speaks of the release of power in the process of transformation. She considers release of power to be "not so much another part of the whole process as another way of thinking of the development as a whole. Something is let loose, and this something is in fact the agent of self-discovery, but that is only part of the movement. The movement is continued in the other result of resolving the situation, which is community (Transformation, 39)."

\(^{49}\) Haughton makes the point that, even though Sunday church becomes part of the
the purpose of a formative, structured, and deliberate ritual, as in the setting for Eucharist, and it is in this ritual encounter that the Church can achieve the clarification of its nature and mission that it needs in order to be able to translate that self-awareness into language which is intelligible to others. And as Haughton notes, “this clarification is by repentance and conversion, and that is what makes prophecy possible.”

The whole point of the Church forming itself toward transformation, which Eucharistic encounter effects – in other words of realizing that it does not dispense salvation; it receives it in its people and must be prepared for its careful formation to break down so this can occur – is so that, recognizing salvation at work in people’s experiences in those ambiguous, wilderness, broken times, it will be able to exercise its prophetic task and so point beyond itself to the meaning functioning in those experiences of the sacred and say to the people: “Behold your God.”

To the extent that Eucharist is celebrated in such a way that people can realize that to be Church is to mean what Christ means; that, ambiguity of all ambiguities, fellowship means dying; that a worshipping community is, in Augustine’s words “taken, blessed, broken and given away” – to that extent will it be possible for people to realize that the radical ambiguity of Eucharist is integral to their lives: it is “the challenge that demands faith, and in response to which a man can be saved or condemned, by his own decision and no-one else’s.”

routine of people’s lives, it is really quite different from their everyday life. In church they act and talk in a way that, while taken for granted there, would be seen as quite odd at any other time or in any other place. See Transformation, 270-71. This “wilderness” place, away from the normalcy that is the everyday life of the people in church, parallels the moment in people’s lives when, their formation having broken down, they respond to the invitation to leap into the void between the life they have lived and an as yet unknown commitment. The Eucharist is the possibility for that moment in the life of the Church, the moment of radical ambiguity when those present take the leap of faith that is redolent of those other transformative occasions in their lives.

50 Haughton, Transformation, 263.
51 See Haughton, Transformation, 260.
52 Haughton, Transformation, 278. Haughton gives multiple examples of the fundamental ambiguity at the heart of Christian experience: while repentance is the lead-in to conversion, the converted penitent knows him/herself to be in need of salvation; telling a story of what happened two thousand years ago is somehow related to what is happening now; Jesus is the one whom “nobody has even managed to define satisfactorily, because the whole point is that you can’t. He wasn’t a priest yet offered
This is what gives meaning to those moments when the Law of their life breaks down in ordinary situations of human conflict, and they are invited through the intervention they experience to leap from the security of the familiar and give themselves to a future that is not in their control, while somehow knowing obscurely in the depths of their being that “this way lies salvation.”

Haughton has illustrated in the above accounts that the experiences which the Christian can associate with the idea of the sacred are common to all. The prophetic task the Christian community has is that of communicating their meaning as sacred. It can do this only through living its faith in the light of the ambiguity that is the Eucharist, by being holy in fact, because the only words of the Church that communicate this truth unequivocally are the words of Christian living, “clearly...expressing the fact of Christ in her whole life. Christ poor, Christ serving, Christ healing, Christ suffering, Christ dying, and – but only through death – Christ risen and glorified.” Only such holiness will make it possible for listeners to hear the link between that Eucharistic way of life and the call they hear over and over again in their own lives to leap into the ambiguity that is the void between two irreconcilables, in other words to respond to the call to love by leaving the security of who they are and what they have known, for they know not what.

So, the faith to which the Eucharist calls each person and the whole Church is choosing to embrace the fundamental ambiguity that is the heart of the Christian reality. What Haughton has shown is that this same ambiguity is commonly experienced and embraced when people's formation, the Law by which they live, somehow falls apart; there too, the same choice (for sure death and only hope of life) is theirs to make. In this book she puts flesh on the bones of those redemptive

53 Haughton, Transformation, 69.
54 Haughton, Transformation, 263.
55 While Haughton’s focus in the stories in this book has been on the ways in which
choices; in other words, she objectifies those transformative choices, gifts of grace that are conversion.

THE OBJECTIFICATION OF CONVERSION AND THE FOUNDATIONS OF DIRECT DISCOURSE IN THEOLOGY

While acknowledging the primacy of conversion for authentic living, Lonergan claims that it is the objectification of a threefold conversion that provides the required foundations from which theologians can speak directly and with some personal authority to the people of their own time. From these foundations they speak concerning what they hold to be true as a believing, reflecting community (Doctrines); they say how those truths might be understood and how they could be reconciled with each other and with findings in other areas of human learning (Systematics); they clarify and demonstrate the difference that effective sharing of those doctrines and their possible meanings can make in practice (Communications). Further, as well as guiding the second phase of theology, Foundations can have a “backwards”}

the transformation of individuals and small groups comes out of the transgression or breaking down of the Law of their formation, her thoughts are never far from the application of this same understanding to the Church as a whole. Indeed, the book leads up to this application in the final chapter. The parlous state of the Church resulting from its (even if unwitting) focus for so long on formation as an end in itself cries out for a new theology, a theology adequate to the crisis, a theology which is not content to attempt the impossible task of simply adapting traditional theological structures (see Transformation, 11). If this were true in 1967 when Transformation was written, how much more is it the case now? Still – but much more so – people reject a Catholicism whose focus is predominantly on formation, whose raison d’être is in danger of being seen as itself, a Church more focused on shoring up its own defences than in recognising God’s Spirit breaking through those defences into the lives of its people. As Haughton noted in 1967, “A generation has grown up that is suspicious of a rich tradition, scared by massive continuity, unwilling to acknowledge permanent ethical values, revolted by togetherness and the bland assurance that springs from the feeling of being part of a great whole (9).” In this uprooted state, the Church needs a theology that calls it to an ongoing recognition of the interdependence of formation and transformation; a theology that calls the Church to be true to its task of forming itself and its people not for itself, but for transformation. The result to be expected is not that the Church will become irrelevant, but rather that the formation of the Church will break down (perhaps most especially following a time when its formation has received undue attention) to allow the transformation of the Church to occur, thus allowing its real relevance to become apparent. “Unless a grain of wheat falls into the ground...(John 12:24).”
effect toward the first phase, helping the theologian to elucidate the
cflicts revealed in Dialectic.  
Lonergan claims that while conversion may well be operative
in the first phase of theology, it is not a prerequisite in research,
interpretation, history, and dialectic; it "does not constitute an explicit,
established, universally recognized criterion of proper procedure
in these specialties." By implication, conversion does have this
function in the specialties of the second phase: foundations, doctrines,
systematics, communications.

At the introductory stage of the chapter on Foundations in
Method in Theology, Lonergan seems to use the terms "conversion"
and "foundations" interchangeably – not so when he specifies the
theological task of Foundations later in the chapter – and as he writes
of this "foundational reality" that is conversion, he could well have
been providing the blueprint for the task Haughton set herself. He
writes of foundations/conversion as being "on the level of deliberation,
evaluation, decision;" of being "a decision about whom and what you
are for and, again, about whom and what you are against;" of being "a
fully conscious decision about one's horizon, one's outlook, one's world-
view;" of being a move "from unauthenticity to authenticity;" of being
"total surrender to the demands of the human spirit: be attentive, be
intelligent, be reasonable, be responsible, be in love;" of decision as
being "responsible and free ... the work of a conscience and ...when a
conversion, the work of a good conscience;" of decision about horizon
being high achievement, an exercise of vertical liberty which involves
migrating from a horizon "they have inherited to another they have
discovered to be better;" of conversion, being "intensely personal...not
purely private" and therefore constitutive of community. It is easy to
see multiple examples in the accounts above of the many ways in which

56 Method in Theology, 131-32. Lonergan is proposing that the objectification of
conversion in Foundations can throw light on what theology has done in an earlier
stage. Haughton also frequently refers to a "backwards" or retroactive effect of the
experience of contact with the sacred; it is as if the impending transformation brings
about self-knowledge and repentance in the actual movement toward decision, so that
in transformation love gives assent to that toward which love already tended. See for
example pages 68, 69, 97, 244, 245, and 271.
57 Method in Theology, 268.
58 Method in Theology, 268-69.
Haughton gives flesh to what Lonergan specifies here as the bones of conversion.

Keeping in mind Lonergan's insistence that in Method he is not doing Foundations but rather indicating what the theologian working in this area needs to do, there are several approaches we could take to illustrate how Haughton's work takes up this challenge, even if unwittingly. Our approach will be to look at what is involved in the derivation of some sets of special theological categories. Lonergan lists five areas from which Foundations will derive these sets of categories; we will give brief attention to the first three of these, in order to see how Haughton's work develops categories that can serve as models.

Lonergan observes that "the genesis of the special theological categories occurs seminally in dialectic and with explicit commitment in foundations." The development of the special theological categories is, of course, the task of the theologian working in the functional specialty Foundations, informed by and informing Dialectic. But parallel to and providing the data for this professional responsibility are the experiences which give rise to these categories, and from Haughton's analysis we can see that the experiences which provide the data occur seminally in the conflicts which break the Law of one's formation, and with explicit (even if unwitting) commitment in the subsequent actions and decisions that constitute transformation or conversion.

For Haughton, experience is religious not because of any peripheral circumstances but solely insofar as it reveals human life as directed toward transcendence, toward the sacred. All of the experiences she recounts can be seen to be doing this, so in examining them she is focusing on the religious experience of the people involved, the experience Lonergan suggests is the source of the first set of categories to be developed by the theologian working in Foundations. Lonergan draws attention to the fact that studies are needed of religious interiority in its various manifestations - historical, phenomenological, psychological, and sociological. Haughton's work makes it clear that if these studies of religious interiority are to have the validity required for the development of theological categories, the theologian must begin

59 See Method in Theology, 282.
60 Method in Theology, 268.
61 Method in Theology, 290.
with people's actual experiences, and specifically with those stemming from the breakdown of formation, the kinds of experiences Lonergan also recognizes as conversion experiences that initiate change.62

The experiences recounted by Haughton all concern individuals. Integral to those experiences in every case however is the creation of community, with its concomitant loving, practical commitments over time; and community – or in Lonergan's terms, subjects functioning authentically together – is the source of the second set of categories he names to be developed.

The third set of categories he identifies "moves from our loving to the loving source of our love."63 Again, Haughton provides material for the development of this set of categories by consistently linking the transformation occurring in the conflict-ridden, messy events of people's lives with both the fact and ways in which the mission of the Son and the mission of the Spirit – though she is not using those terms – are operative in those events. The Divine Word became human so that we too might become fully human, and becoming human requires the whole life of the individual and of all humanity – and perhaps then some! Being fully human means being someone whose very being is being-in-love, a possibility realizable only in the gift of the Spirit. On Haughton's account, becoming human occurs only through the encounters coming out of conflict resolved through the release of the power of the spirit that enables people to repent, to discover themselves, and to commit themselves together to an as yet unknown future. It is the divine invitation that is experienced and responded to in those events. Accordingly, the experiences Haughton relates are instances of human

62 Lonergan writes of this – what Haughton would call a breakdown in formation – in the context of discussing the exercise of freedom in relation to horizon, horizon being defined as "the sweep of our interest and of our knowledge (Method in Theology, 237)." He notes that "sometimes the movement into a new horizon involves an about-face; it comes out of the old by repudiating characteristic features; it begins a new sequence that can keep revealing ever greater depth and breadth and wealth. Such an about-face and new beginning is what is meant by a conversion (Method in Theology, 2373-38)." He notes also the place conflict sometimes plays in the development of doctrine. Given that often enough such development is dialectical, occurring "not in some vacuum of pure spirit but under concrete historical conditions and circumstances," the discovery of truth is seldom a smooth evolution, but rather follows the eventual and at times painful recognition of previous error (Method in Theology, 319).

63 Method in Theology, 291.
response to the invitation to share in the very relations that constitute the Trinity, responses made possible by the fact that human beings are always already graced into, already caught up in, those relationships. Thus the experience and naming of the elements that are integral to transformation are an invitation into approaching more closely an understanding of the triune God who transforms. Descriptively and by implication, not systematically, Haughton presents authentic Christian living as an existential parallel to the psychological analogy for the Trinity; flesh on the bones, yet again.

Lonergan observes that once the special theological categories have been developed the commitment to them is "only as models, as interlocking sets of terms and relations."64 In each of the accounts she has given, Haughton has located the elements involved in transformation and the relationships between those elements. By using particular accounts of specific kinds of human experience she has located the elements common to all of them; accordingly the interlocking sets of terms and relations she has surfaced do serve as models.

According to Lonergan, "The use and the acceptance of the categories as hypothesis about reality or description of reality occur in doctrines, systematics, communications."65 Haughton does not intend to develop theological categories as such; her concern rather is to support her claim that if such categories are to be valid for the theology needed for our time, the data for them must come from actual and crucial human experiences. Yet, as a result of paying close attention to such experiences and drawing out their integral relationship to conversion she develops models or theological categories that invite acceptance as descriptions of reality. The task of their acceptance, understanding, and communication remains to be done by other theological professionals.

Lonergan notes again: "It is to be stressed that this use of the special categories occurs in interaction with data. They receive further specifications from the data. At the same time, the data set up an exigence for further clarification of the categories and for their correction and development.

In this fashion there is set up a scissors movement with an upper

64 Method in Theology, 292.
65 Method in Theology, 292.
Haughton continually goes back and forth between the categories she is developing and what actually happens in people as their transformation is occurring. Consistently she subjects the way we talk about conversion to the litmus test of what really happens, of what people actually experience as, with nothing guaranteed for their future, they move into making decisions that are an acceptance of the divine invitation to be people whose being is being-in-love. Only by functioning this way, she insists, will theology be done in a way that gives it meaning for the people doing it, as well as for those others on whose behalf it is being done. Experientially, she sets up a scissors movement between attempting to classify what she understands to be religious events and reporting accurately on what happens in people as the experiences that constitute those events occur. In other words, she is committed to being faithful to the data that makes the classification possible. In doing this, trying to make well-founded judgments of what is true, she is, I think, already edging into the task of those charged with doing this professionally, namely those working in the area of Doctrines. Further, she recognizes in these accounts that what (from the foundation of conversion) we hold to be true in faith needs also to be understood not only as having meaning in itself but also as being able to be reconciled with other things in our lives that ground us; and that people need to hear this. In other words she knows, in her own terms, that once Foundations has clarified "just how much a matter of everyday experience are the tremendous themes of salvation," then Doctrines and Systematics are essential if Communications are to provide real food for the people.

So, in light of the theological crisis in a divided Church, what is the urgent task for the theologian, as Haughton sees it? If, as faith confirms, the Word continues to take flesh throughout time in a people being transformed, theologians would do well to attend to actual, common human experiences, for it is there that conversion occurs; it is there that redemption continues to be revealed. All the elements of conversion, effected by grace, are to be found in human experience. Not just any experiences are appropriately the subject of this attention,

66 Method in Theology, 293.
however, but precisely those experiences in which one’s formation, the Law by which one lives and identifies oneself, somehow falls to bits, and out of this dissolution one is enabled to take a leap – the leap of faith – into an as yet unknown, though radically new way of being oneself. Theology based on the objectification of such conversion experiences provides a sure foundation for speaking truly, meaningfully, and effectively to the Church and culture within which theology has a vital part to play.

68 As noted above, such breakdown of formation with the concomitant potential for conversion applies not only to individuals but may apply also to the Church as a whole. See footnote 54.