Lonergan Workshop
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Fred Lawrence

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Regrettably, the pages of this letter, from Fred and Sue Lawrence, were to be the opening pages of the Rome volume. It was inadvertently left out in the long production process, and I insert it here with many apologies.

Regina G. Knox

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Dear Friends:

In spring 1997 I was a McCarthy lecturer at the Gregorian University. We were living on Via del Seminario next door to the Bellarmino (the original Greg Lonergan attended), near the Pantheon, the Tazza d'Oro, Sant'Ignazio, Piazza Navona, and walking past the Trevi Fountain to classes and the Cafè Bar at the Greg. Sue and I imagined a Lonergan Workshop in Rome. We thought of Workshop participants staying in the heart of Rome, visiting the significant places in Lonergan's life as a Jesuit student and teacher, and sharing the variety of their expertise and interests with the international student body of the Gregorian.

When we came home, trusting the idea was providential, we announced a Lonergan Workshop in Rome in 2001 (not a little scary, but thinking you have to jump in). Encouraged by our friend Paul McNellis, SJ, the first step was to ask permission to use a large hall at the Gregorian. The rector, Fr Imoda, responded with an offer that confirmed for us the rightness of the venture. He asked if the Workshop might be part of a series of events honoring the 450th anniversary of the Greg's predecessor, the Collegio Romano. Another gift was further confirmation. We were invited to spend last Easter in Rome with the Community of Sant'Egidio. Paolo
Mancinelli (of that Community) shepherded us and we stayed with Fr Bob Maloney, CM, at the Vincentian Generalate. This gave us the opportunity to talk about the Workshop with them and with Jesuit fathers at the Greg, Louis Caruana (Fr Imoda’s representative and coordinator with us), Salvino Biolo, John Navone, and Kevin Flannery.

**We agreed on the week of 7-12 May, 2001.**

The Workshop will commemorate the Gregorian ministry of Fr Lonergan, with speakers mostly from his students (or their students) at the Greg. The title of the Workshop will be “Lonergan and Loyola: ‘I will be propitious to you in Rome’.” It will be in honor of Maureen McCarthy, who with Gene conceived and established the Joseph Visiting Lectureships at Boston College and the Gregorian. Her warm and lively presence epitomized the generosity and vision of this memorial to their son.

Adapting the Workshop to the Gregorian schedule (they will still be having classes) and to Italian life, speakers will be in the afternoon and early evening, leaving time for those who wish to meet for 8:30 evening prayer at San Bartolomeo on Tiber Island or Santa Maria in Trastevere with the Community of Sant’Egidio, and for late Roman suppers. We will have the two surrounding weekends for day-trips led by John Navone, SJ, to beautiful hill towns and other explorations.

Andrea Riccardi (History Dept, Univ. of Rome), the founder of Sant’Egidio and past president, who is active in international peacemaking and helped organized the Assisi Prayers for Peace (October 1986), will speak on Interreligious Dialogue. The other speakers now invited are: Salvino Biolo, SJ, David Burrell, CSC, Patrick H. Byrne, Ivo Coelho, SDB, Frederick E. Crowe, SJ, Robert M. Doran, SJ, Mary Ann Glendon, Ulf Jonsson, SJ, Archbishop Anthony Kelly, Arthur L. Kennedy, Joseph A. Komonchok, Matthew L. Lamb, Richard Liddy, Thomas McGrath, SJ, Muhigirwa Rusembekas Ferdinand, SJ, Robert Maloney, CM, Sebastian Moore, OSB, William E. Murnion, Saturnino Muratore, SJ, Bishop William Murphy, Hermann Josef Pottmeyer, Francisco Quijano, OP,
Francesco Rossi de Gasperis, SJ, Giovanni Rota, Giovanni Sala, SJ, Natalino Spaccapelo, SJ, and David W. Tracy.

Many of the rest of us will offer small discussion groups on as many topics and in as many languages as we represent (papers related to the small groups will be made available and collected in a supplementary volume of the Lonergan Workshop). It’s an adventure, and the possibilities are up to all of us.

We think of travel plans and housing mostly organized by regions. Joe and Eileen Fitzpatrick and Fr Phil Egan are investigating housing (maybe the Venerable English College, the Irish College) and transportation for the British Isles contingent. ... Paco and Genny Galán, Martin and Gabi Lopez-Calva with Armando and Linda Rugarcia are doing this for Mexico and South America. Greg classmate Tom Halloran and Fr Tony Kelly, CSsR, will work with the Australians. Sr Maria Fe told us that Sonny and Armi Garcia are thinking about the Philippines, and she will investigate Convent guest housing in Rome. Our friends from the Community of Sant’Egidio and from the Vincentian Generalate will also help us.

Examples of the sort of help we will need from you are ideas of possible housing and reasonable travel, topics you would be able to offer for discussion groups, and any suggestions you think of that might enhance and encourage.

We have high hopes, and want to think of it in the words of a hymn: “Thou art coming to a King. / Great petitions with thee bring. / For his power and glory are such / None can ever ask too much.”

Love,

Fred & Sue Lawrence

*Note.* Lonergan Workshop 28 at Boston College will be held 18-23 June 2001. The tentative theme is “Radical Openness: The Relationship between Philosophy, Religion, and Theology in Lonergan.
PREFATORY NOTE:

In lieu of the customary Editor’s Introduction to the Lonergan Workshop Journal, there follows my account of the Workshop as it occurred back in 2001. I apologize for the length of time that has intervened between the event and the publication of the papers. For one reason or another, we are not able to publish certain papers delivered in Rome. Hence, in what follows an asterisk appears after the names of the persons whose papers are not in this volume. A version of missing papers may appear in a later volume of Lonergan Workshop. Patristics scholar, Hilary Mooney’s paper, and that of Michael McLaughlin (whose Gregorian doctoral dissertation was on Sri Aurobindo), were the basis for their Rome workshop/discussion groups, and appear in this volume. Finally, a special note of thanks to our manuscript editor, Regina Gilmartin Knox, who has patiently shepherded this volume into existence, with the assistance of Kerry Cronin.

Fred Lawrence
Boston College

I WILL BE PROPITIOUS
TO YOU IN ROME:
THE LONERGAN WORKSHOP
AT THE GREGORIAN
UNIVERSITY

[Letter from Cardinal Carlo Maria Martini]

I learned to appreciate Lonergan above all in the 1970s, when, having dedicated much time to the analytic study of the Scriptures, I felt more greatly the need for elements of synthesis and for reflections on language and its diverse types and aims of comprehending reality. I then found in Lonergan a sure guide for integrating the different analytic discoveries within an organic framework of human knowledge and of being. When I became Archbishop of Milan, I continued to read and reread many pages of Lonergan, always finding help. Although I regret not being able to be present for the Rome Workshop, I will follow the results of its labors attentively. In fact the thought of Lonergan permits one to reconstruct ever new syntheses arising from new experiences of life and of thought.
It is a matter of syntheses that permit a contemplative view of reality, even more that help us to apprehend both the mystery of the transcendence of God and that of the transcendence of man and of his paths of knowing and loving. I maintain that Lonergan suggests interpretative keys capable of always doing justice to the new horizons of reality. - Cardinal Carlo Maria Martini

From May 7-11 the First International Lonergan Workshop took place in the Aula Magna of Rome’s venerable Pontifical Gregorian University on the occasion of the 450th anniversary of the Collegio Romano – the first educational institution founded by St Ignatius Loyola.

The theme of the Workshop, “I will be propitious to you in Rome” is rooted in the life-stories of both Ignatius and the Jesuit philosopher and theologian, Bernard Lonergan who was a Visiting Distinguished Professor at Boston College from 1978 to 1983. Lonergan spent almost two decades at the Gregorian University as a theology student (1933-37), a doctoral candidate (1938-40), and a professor of theology (1953-65). But his early years as a Jesuit did not presage such a career. In a letter written a year after beginning his Roman studies, he said that before being sent to Rome he regarded himself as “one condemned to sacrifice his real interests and, in general, to be suspected and to get into trouble for things I could not help and could not explain.” Unexpectedly, three vacancies at the Gregorian precipitated his Canadian provincial’s decision to send him to study theology in Rome. Lonergan’s reaction was unequivocal: “Here was a magnificent vote of confidence ... and with the words over the high altar in the church of St Ignatius here I will be propitious to you in Rome was consolation indeed.” These words come from a vision Ignatius had on his journey from Spain to Rome in the little town of La Storta on the outskirts of the city when the Lord said to him, “I will be good to you in Rome.” Perhaps this motto Lonergan took to be addressed so personally and consolingly to him would also hold true for all the Workshop participants.

At the Gregorian’s own special celebration of this anniversary April 2-4, Jesuit General Hans-Peter Kolvenbach explained why, in the 16th century, St Ignatius moved from his original vision of the Society as a band of wandering knights of the faith to establishing a stable institution of education.

He sensed intuitively and apostolically that anyone who could not have recourse to letters and the sciences does not have much possibility of playing an active part in the dynamisms in his time that were available
for changing the world and healing the Lord’s church. Instead of regarding them as an obstacle to his mission, Ignatius discovers in the knowledge of letters and the sciences a concretization of his vision that humane letters and the sciences are means that one who believes in the Creator of all things ought to be happy to put into practice, treating them as “things which, practiced in the love of God, without doubt cooperate for good, and in no small measure.”

This attitude used to be associated with what was known as the “intellectual apostolate.” The late, saintly Father General Pedro Arrupe and the 32nd General Congregation of the Society wanted to correct a narrowly academic and “ivory-tower” construal of that apostolate with a resolution to strive for social justice. The catholic faith’s evangelical exigence for Christians to play leadership roles in bringing about justice and peace in the world is acknowledged as a legitimate goal of Catholic and Jesuit education. Now, in a postmodern and globalized culture, the deepening realization is abroad that a vital intellectual vocation is integral to establishing justice.

It was perhaps emblematic of the integral vocation of today’s university that the rector of the Gregorian University, Franco Imoda, SJ, invited Boston College’s Lonergan Workshop (now in its 28th year) to be the final part of the Gregorian’s observance of this notable anniversary of its foundation.

The Workshop adapted to the Gregorian’s schedule, where classes and seminars were still in session and the more advanced students were finishing their tesinas. Workshop events occurred in the afternoons and early evening: discussion groups from 1 to 2:45 pm, and then lectures from 3 to 5 pm, and a longer evening lecture from 6 to 7:30 pm. Most of the speakers from Italy spoke in Italian.

Day One The Gregorian’s Rettore Magnifico, Franco Imoda, SJ, inaugurated the Workshop with the following welcome.

**RECTOR’S WELCOME TO LONERGAN WORKSHOP**
**GREGORIAN UNIVERSITY, 7 MAY 2001**

It is a pleasure to welcome here today the Workshop “Lonergan and Loyola: I will be propitious to you in Rome” in honor of Maureen McCarthy and on the occasion of the 450th Anniversary of the Foundation of the Roman College.
Fr Lonergan is a glory of this University as he studied here, taught from 1953 to 1965, and here he matured and produced some of his most important works.

Just a few days ago there was in this very room a presentation of a Festschrift for Cardinal Walter Kasper, Divinarum rerum notitia. Teologia fra filosofia e storia. One of the speakers started from some traits of so-called postmodern culture, singling out a keen attention to diversity and to subjectivity. He then proceeded to reconcile diversity and unity, subjectivity and truth. The work of the author being honored was taken as an example of a stimulating and rich response to these challenges. Theology between philosophy and history—a challenge that started many years ago, but continues today—and I thought of the life of Lonergan, a major figure in our times, whose work was to face but also to guide generations through this challenge.

Not an expert in Lonergan, but a modest reader, I recalled some passages which seem to outline one of his major contributions:

I have been contrasting two different apprehensions of man. One can apprehend man abstractly through a definition that applies omni et soli and through properties verifiable in every man. In this fashion one knows man as such; and man as such, precisely because he is an abstraction, also is unchanging. It follows in the first place, that on this view one is never going to arrive at any exigence for changing forms, structures, methods, for all change occurs in the concrete, and on this view the concrete is always omitted. But also it follows in the second place, that this exclusion of changing forms, structures, methods, is not theological; it is grounded simply upon a certain conception of scientific or philosophic method; that conception is no longer the only conception or the commonly received conception; and I think our Scripture scholars would agree that its abstractness, and the omissions due to the abstraction, have no foundation in the revealed word of God. On the other hand, one can apprehend mankind as a concrete aggregate developing over time, where the locus of development and, so to speak, the synthetic bond is the emergence, expansion, differentiation, dialectic of meaning and of meaningful performance. On this view intentionality, meaning, is a constitutive component of human living; moreover, this component is not fixed, static, immutable, but shifting, developing, going astray, capable of redemption; on this view there is in the historicity, which results from human nature, an exigence for changing forms, structures, methods; and it is on this level and through this medium of changing meaning that divine revelation has entered the world and the Church's witness is given
to it. ["The Transition from a Classicist World-View to Historical-Mindedness," A Second Collection, 5-6]

Though in different ways and from much better positions, we are still facing some of the challenges that modernity brought about. As Lonergan said:

The Modernist crisis was twofold: The Modernists didn’t know much about philosophy and theology and the Catholics didn’t know much about history, and didn’t have enlightened views on what history is. [Caring about Meaning, 123]

His work can be a wonderful guide through these challenges. His concern for the concrete, the historical, which was shown in so many ways in his attention to educational, economic, and cultural issues was well indicated in the words, “De Guibert said about giving spiritual advice: ‘The problem is not to teach the major premises, it is to find the minor premises that will enable the persons to say, That means me’” [Caring about Meaning, 172]. Though an innovator himself, he knew that change comes about slowly, and we need patience: “Centuries are required to change mentalities, centuries. You don’t get a change of mentality by introducing a few fads” [Caring about Meaning, 173].

We are grateful to Prof. Fred Lawrence and those who, with him, have organized and made this workshop possible. We are all confident that the contributions of this symposium will add constructively, through its character, to the task of the Church to continue to find ways to announce a Word which, being Eternal and Final, is however in time and in the contingent.

After the Rector’s speech, Kevin Flannery, SJ (a classics professor trained at Oxford), the Dean of the Philosophy Faculty, gave us a warm welcome, referring with approval to Patrick Byrne’s book interpreting Aristotle in light of Lonergan’s thought. Fr Flannery took time from a busy schedule to attend many Workshop sessions; he also arranged a reception for us on Friday evening in connection with the McCarthy lecture by Oliver O’Donovan.

The leaders of discussion groups then gave brief accounts of what they would be discussing Tuesday through Friday. Among the groups during the week were “Lonergan, Mysticism and Negative Theology” with Hilary Mooney of the University of Freiburg, “On Interreligious
Dialogue” with Michael McLaughlin of Siena College, “The Stages of Education” with David Fleischacker, Dunstan Robidoux, OSB, and Phyllis Wallbank, “Illuminating the Spiritual Exercises” with William Walsh, SJ, and “Lonergan and Hartshorne” with Tom McPartland and George Shields. Thanks to the good offices of Fr Joe Tetlow, SJ, (head of the Center for Ignatian Spirituality) Fr Willie Walsh was joined by Fr Dick Liddy to lead sessions on Lonergan and Ignatian Spirituality of Tuesday and Wednesday mornings at the Jesuit Generalate on the Borgo Santo Spirito near St Peter’s.

Salvino Biolo, SJ, who had Lonergan as a teacher and as the director of his doctoral dissertation, gave the first lecture. His speech—sprinkled with imitations of Lonergan—was really a keynote because he had been a pioneer among Lonergan’s Italian students in realizing why Lonergan disagreed with the Thomistic school’s standard metaphysical approach to Aquinas. Lonergan discovered that Aquinas could transform Aristotle’s thought because he had appropriated Augustine’s breakthrough to interiority—our own spontaneous self-awareness and internal experience of our conscious knowing, feeling, and loving. For Biolo Lonergan’s retrieval and transposition of Thomas Aquinas is “formally postmodern and fundamentally classical.”

What is central for Lonergan and hence postmodern is the understanding of consciousness not as perception but as a strictly internal experience of itself and its own acts. This notion of the subject as subject displaces the postmodernists’ bête noire, the subject as the primary object of philosophic reflection. The subject as subject (not object) is the primal, unformed, awareness that is open to self-transcendence, to the other, and finally, to God. As an immanent source of transcendence, the subject as subject only receives form through the conscious and intentional acts of understanding, knowing, evaluating, and loving.

The rest of Monday’s talks were on education. Rosanna Finamore, professor of pedagogy and philosophy of education at the Gregorian and author of a book on the aesthetic philosophies of Luigi Pareyson and Jacques Maritain, spoke on “University and Meaning.” She placed Lonergan’s idea of the university as a “reproductive organ of cultural community,” in its right context. Lonergan distinguished among the dimensions of community as intersubjective, civil, and cultural. Finamore explained that the “university has nothing to do with all that is stereotyped, mechanical, repetitive, and standardized: it is a vital organ and not a merely instrumental one, with a continuous function of” generating community as cultural. In “the intellectual life of its professors,” the university is “called upon constantly to raise questions about its received wealth, to press toward a
renewed expression of its contents by a revision of them by the subjects who constitute the community.” Finamore related understanding to developing meaning as technical and scientific, and as linguistic and artistic. She closed by outlining the specifically dialectical tasks of the University.

In his lecture, the director of Seton Hall’s Center for Catholic Studies, Richard Liddy, focused on what Lonergan called “Newman’s theorem” about the role of theology in the university. Using the essay “The Role of the Catholic University in the Modern World,” Liddy portrayed Lonergan’s approach to Catholic university education as rooted both in the tendency toward self-transcendence built into the dynamisms of the human mind and heart and in the redemptive gift of conversion. The resulting orientation of the university as Catholic is a conversational and interdisciplinary quest for academic integrity both in its comprehensiveness and in its quality.

Phyllis Wallbank (“I’m old but I’m keen,” she said when we first met her) was one of the last assistants and companions of the world-famous educationist Maria Montessori. She founded the Gatehouse School in London. Combining insights from Montessori, Lonergan, and Newman, she spoke in down-to-earth and original ways about the stages in educating the young between the ages of 4 and 24. Her vast experience and research was evident throughout her talk. She asked, for instance, why not have learning centers for people at different stages of development, where experts can make available just the media and contents to which people will be able to go freely as soon as they themselves realize they are interested in these matters?

Monday evening Lonergan’s intellectual biographer, William Mathews, SJ, from Milltown Park in Dublin, recounted the events surrounding Lonergan’s first coming to Rome until his abrupt departure on the eve of the outbreak of World War II in 1940. Quite affecting was his account of Lonergan’s futile efforts to get back to Canada before his mother’s death. Mathews underlined the providential character of the accidents that shaped Lonergan’s Roman sojourn. He wondered whether the interplay of fate and fidelity to his lifelong task in the twofold agenda of Insight and Method in Theology illustrates what classical authors spoke of as “application.” Lonergan often spoke of the turning points in his thinking as a matter of “luck,” notably the books that he happened upon as he worked on certain problems.

Day Two
The lectures on Tuesday, May 8 related Lonergan’s thought to
historicity, history, and religious experience and expression. Giovanni Rota is a young priest who teaches at the seminary in “good Pope John XXIII’s” home, the northern Italian archdiocese of Bergamo. His lecture showed the compatibility of Lonergan’s ideas with the postmodern thought of the French-speaking Rumanian and Jewish philosopher, Emmanuel LŽvinas. Our conscious living is central to our being persons. However, our conscious living encompasses the innumerable things that occur to us and not just the things we do. Most crucially, the “we” is prior to the “I,” and affects us constitutively. If personal responsibility is always a combination of passivity and activity, our vaunted autonomy is always conditioned, especially by our interpersonal relationships.

Arthur Kennedy, theologian from the University of St Thomas and now Auxiliary Bishop in Boston, spoke on one of the earliest important influences on Lonergan, the English cultural and anthropological historian, Christopher Dawson. Lonergan’s statement in 1980 that “all my work has been introducing history into Catholic theology,” suggests how free from ahistorical orthodoxy he was, and shows why there was such an affinity between him and Dawson. Lonergan’s later definition of theology as mediating between a faith and the culture in which it is embedded is clearly indebted to Dawson.

In 1977 Sebastian Moore, OSB, monk of Downside in England, wrote a key book in the theology of spirituality, *The Crucified Jesus is No Stranger*. He revisited that work in light of the work he has been doing during the last several years on the psychology of feelings of Chicago practitioner and theorist Eugene Gendlin and on the literary critic and philosopher RenŽ Girard. Spontaneously, Sebastian always heeds Ezra Pound’s dictate—“Make it new!”—by plunging us affectively and intellectually into the meaning of our religious experience.

Ever since Vatican II’s *Nostra Aetate* and its declaration on non-Christian religions, interreligious dialogue has become an exigence for Catholic Christians. The rector of Divyadaan (the Salesian philosophate) in Nashik, India, Ivo Coelho, SDB, is involved daily in an interreligious situation. With great brevity and clarity he set forth a basic issue at stake in such dialogue—the relationship between religious experience and religious expression. Coelho explained that “the great advantage of Lonergan is that he not only advocates a sane balance between experience and expression, but also invites theology to move into the realm of interiority.” He helped us to see that we may not be able to understand the valid roles of experience and expression unless we are able first to sort out the questions What is
being? What is truth? and What is objectivity? In other words, besides being religiously converted, theologians have also to be intellectually converted.

Natalino Spaccapelò, SJ, who is on the theology faculty in Cagliari and at Rome’s Oriental Institute (because of his expertise in patristics), pointed out in his evening lecture that St Ignatius defined the issues of the spiritual life concretely and operationally, not abstractly. The spiritual operations that constitute his structured exercises leading to and flowing from a fundamental experience of conversion are prayer, examination of consciousness, discernment, and election. Spaccapelò showed the parallel relationships between Ignatius’s method for spiritual experience and Lonergan’s method for reflection on spiritual experience. The piece de resistance of his talk was his interpretation of the famous Ignatian phrase for experiencing God’s gift of love, “consolation without a previous proportionate cause,” in which he clarified the difference between Karl Rahner’s and Lonergan’s ways of construing this experience.

Day Three

On Wednesday, May 9, a Swedish Jesuit from the University of Uppsala’s theology faculty, Ulf Jonnson, SJ, began by specifying several different kinds of “foundationalism”–which has become almost a swear-word in the postmodern philosophical vocabulary. “Foundationalism” has to do with well-defined ways of supporting claims rationally. The point of this exercise was to show that Lonergan’s foundations for knowing God are not foundationalist in any of the senses specified. Jonsson thus illustrated Fr Biolo’s point on Monday that Lonergan is “formally postmodern and fundamentally classical.”

One of the ways of being “foundationalist” in a manner objectionable to postmodern thinkers is conceptualism, which analyzes human knowledge by putting all the stress on static universal concepts and paying little if any attention to the prior act of understanding that concepts are intended to express. Boston College theologian Louis Roy, OP, a Dominican from Quebec, suggested in his engaging, humorous, and gentle lecture that Karl Rahner is a conceptualist. In light of this insight into Rahner’s cognitional theory Roy contrasted both Aquinas’s and Lonergan’s approach to the philosophy and theology of God with Rahner’s. To my knowledge, this has never been done before.

British positivist and analytic philosophers have been in the vanguard of “foundationalism.” Their stock-in-trade, conceptualism and perceptualism (the opinion that we know the real only by “taking a
look” at it), leads to an exaggerated appraisal of the importance of logic in science and philosophy. Joseph Fitzpatrick (a British schools inspector who attended the Scots College and had Lonergan as a teacher at the Greg before going on to the University of Cambridge), gave an erudite and frequently funny talk, showing how Lonergan’s shift from logic to method is partially congruent with the later Wittgenstein’s insight into the limitations of the logic and picture-thinking, which he had championed earlier on in his career in his Tractatus. Wittgenstein’s stress upon “language games” at work in our “forms of life” introduces as a basic tool of philosophy and theology what the continental philosophers and Lonergan call horizon analysis.

In the world of Roman Catholic theology, a classicist mentality dominated post-Tridentine Catholic thought. This was partially a defensive response to modernity’s wholesale rejection of anything that is not “evident to the senses, self-evident, or else derived from such propositions by a process of reasoning.” German theologian Hermann Pottmeyer had Lonergan as a teacher and as the director of his doctoral dissertation about the section of Vatican I’s Constitution “Dei Filius” devoted to the issue of faith and reason. After conveying his relationship with Lonergan as a teacher, Pottmeyer’s paper shared how his doctoral students at Ruhr University’s Theologische Fakultät in Bochum uncovered Lonergan’s unpublished notes for a 1952 course on the analysis of the act of faith. With their help Pottmeyer demonstrated that Lonergan’s analysis fidei was faithful to Vatican I’s insistence on the reasonableness of that act but transposed the entire problematic of the beginning of faith into the postmodern contours of existential gift and conversion.

Having come to Rome from the Theodore Hesburgh Ecumenical Center at Tantur in Jerusalem, Notre Dame University’s David Burrell, CSC, adopted a more informal and conversational style on Wednesday evening. He spoke about the importance of friendship in the quest for truth. He nudged us towards a more adequate understanding of the relationship between faith and concrete human traditions. The discussion that followed was a group meditation on our religious experience “as lived in a development from elementary intersubjectivity ... to intersubjectivity in Christ ... on the sensitive (external church, sacraments, sacrifice, liturgy) and intellectual (faith, hope, charity) levels,” as Lonergan wrote in a 1958 letter. Burrell has lived out interreligious dialogue both in his scholarship and his praxis, and so he could bear authentic witness to the way our experience of interreligious dialogue is grounded in friendly trust without a need either to pretend we understand things fully or to relativize the truths of our faith.
Day Four

On Thursday, May 10 the first speaker was from Kinshasa, the director and coordinator of Jesuit social justice projects in much of Africa. In an English flavored with the overtones of one whose first European language was French, Muhigirwa R. Ferdinand, SJ, explained the two vectors in human development worked out by Lonergan: the way from above downward—a way of gift, tradition, and healing; and the way from below upward—a way of achievement, creativity, innovation. Both ways are united in integral human becoming, yet for most of his life Lonergan was preoccupied chiefly with the way up from experience through inquiry, insight, and formulation and reflection, then indirect understanding of the sufficiency or insufficiency of the evidence, and judgment of fact, to deliberation, practical insights and formulations of possible courses of action, judgments of value, and decisions. Only after Method in Theology in 1972 did he begin articulating a fuller account of the way down.

There followed an abrupt change of pace when Valter Danna, of the theological faculty at the University of Turin, read a paper on the development of the notion of science in Lonergan’s thought. This is a complex and lengthy topic, involving not just the intricacies of the shift from Aristotle’s logical and static ideal of science to the modern empirical and dynamic notion, but also all the nuances of heuristic structures (i.e. different techniques for naming what you want to discover in any investigation) and of classical, statistical, genetic, and dialectical methods. These schemes are then vastly complicated when you shift into the empirical human sciences. Lonergan apprehended a methodical order in this complexity, which he named “functional specialization.” Lonergan was concerned that because of modernity’s anti-clerical, anti-Catholic, and secularizing orientation, the church had taken so long to come to terms with modern science, in particular its stress on comprehensive understanding of all data and its notion of truth not as absolute necessity and certitude but as verified possibility. Danna showed that Lonergan both appreciated modern science and shared the postmodern opposition to the positivist, materialist, or idealist misinterpretations of science that have led to the contemporary dialectic of rationalism (“Prove it!”) and irrationalism (“Nothing can be proved!”) reflected in even Catholic universities today.

A highlight of the entire week was the lecture by the founder of the Community of Sant’Egidio, Andrea Riccardi (who is also a Professor of History at the University of Rome). He made a special effort to fit us
into his crowded schedule just before going to be honored in Barcelona. The Community helped make this Roman Workshop possible by offering hospitality to Sue and me during two Holy Weeks while we explored possibilities and planned.

After Vatican II the Community of Sant’Egidio emerged in 1968 when Andrea started a the Bible study and prayer group with a few Roman liceo (high school) students who wanted to live more groundedly in the Gospel. In its 30-plus years of existence, it organized schools, ongoing meals, and many other programs for the poor and elderly of the poorer sections of Rome; and it eventually spread through the rest of Italy and Europe to span the globe. Its upwards of 40,000 members and 6,000 communities extend as far as Bolivia, the Cameroon, and Indonesia. Its evangelical mission grew naturally into peace-making ventures. Following great successes in Mozambique and Algeria, the Community plays key long-term peace-making roles in such places as the Sudan, Somalia, Kosovo, and most recently, in Burundi. In October 1986, the Community’s dedication to the poor and to peace led to their organizing participation in the Assisi interreligious prayer for peace led by John Paul II, which they have carried on ever since.

Rome, Sant’Egidio, and the World (a book of interviews with Andrea Riccardi) makes unmistakable how Andrea and his Community have spontaneously operated in accord with the vectors of development articulated by Lonergan. The central role of communal prayer, reflection on the Gospel, and friendship in their lives instantiates the way from above downwards, while the flexible and resourceful service for the poor and elderly, work for peace, and interreligious dialogue illustrates the way from below upwards characterized by self-correcting creativity.

After the last evening session each day, some Workshop speakers and participants walked from the Piazza della Pilotta across the Tiber to Santa Maria in Trastevere to share the Evening Prayer with the Community of Sant’Egidio. Some have said it was a highpoint of their week.

Riccardi used an ethnic and religious demographic description of today’s city of Istanbul in Turkey as a springboard for unfolding the contemporary paradox of the 20th century: never have so many diverse people of different religious faiths been brought into such regular proximity and conversation, yet never has there been more bitter and violent strife among them. As a counterpoise to conflict, Riccardi pointed to the post-Vatican II exigence for interreligious dialogue, citing John Paul II’s remarkable correlation: the more you have genuine interreligious dialogue, the more you have real knowledge and appreciation of the Christian faith,
and vice-versa. Riccardi beautifully wove the story of the evolution of the Community of Sant'Egidio into an account of the meaning of the Assisi experience of interreligious prayer for peace. He stressed that interreligious dialogue is not just a matter of encounter among the leaders of various religious faiths, but of day-to-day conversation among people in ordinary life.

Patrick Byrne, who teaches philosophy at Boston College, then spoke about Galileo, whose teachings once caused such a stir at the Collegio Romano. He sketched various “figurations” of Galileo as a context for exposing Lonergan’s analysis of him. This was part of Lonergan’s comprehensive coming-to-terms with the new sciences of nature. Lonergan cultivated careful “attention to (the) ongoing creative dimension to the practice of scientists” in order to articulate a humanistic vision of science. Byrne explained how Lonergan’s account of science reverses Galileo’s counterpositional distinction between primary and secondary qualities that has caused such havoc in modern philosophy, and overcomes his mechanistic determinism with a theory of emergent probability.

In the Thursday evening lecture, William Murnion, who attended Lonergan’s courses on the Trinity and on the Incarnate Word, and worked with him for almost a decade of graduate studies, revisited after forty years all the Latin works Lonergan published to help students in these courses. In hindsight these works and lecture courses can be seen as “experiments in theological method.” Murnion suggests they also be remembered as a great mind’s edifying grappling with the central mysteries of the Christian faith. In his summary of Lonergan’s achievement at the Gregorian, he bore witness to the way Lonergan demonstrated how faith and reason can be reconciled, and the intelligibility of the doctrines can be apprehended through an imperfect (because analogical) yet most fruitful understanding to wave after wave of many of the Church’s most talented seminarians who had been sent to Rome for theological studies from all over the world.

Day Five

Friday, May 11 was the last day of our Workshop. The first speaker was Giovanni Sala, who was also taught by Lonergan at the Greg and went on to a teaching career in Germany where he is recognized as one of the world’s leading Kant scholars. He made it clear that Lonergan’s epistemology, as grounded in a return to interiority and personal appropriation of rational self-consciousness, parts ways with the modern “turn to the subject” undertaken by thinkers such as Descartes, Locke, Hume, and Kant. In this
way he uncovered the key to answering correctly the question about why our acts of knowing attain the truth: our reflective acts of understanding, which discern whether the data warrants claims (or not), grasp not absolute necessity, but the virtually unconditioned. This basis for judgment takes the contingency and historically conditioned character of matters of fact seriously without sacrificing truth.

Neapolitan theologian and editor of the Rassegna di Teologia, Saturnino Muratore, SJ, turned our attention back to the field of science in relation to philosophy and theology. Muratore confronted Lonergan’s theory of generalized emergent probability as the general form of the intelligibility of our empirical universe with recent scientific cosmology’s theories about the origins of the universe. According to Muratore, Lonergan’s “anthropic finality” that allows for the appearance of more developed living beings is based on a metaphysics methodically grounded in the dynamism of intentional consciousness; but it can be transposed into an anthropic principle coordinate with recent scientific theories. For example, Lonergan’s metaphysical idea of finality can be related to a similar notion implicit in the theory of the Big Bang.

The next speaker was the Mexican Dominican, Francisco Quijano, OP. He played a central role in translating Lonergan’s Insight into Spanish. For the past few years he has been an assistant to the Master of the Dominicans, Timothy Radcliffe, with a special mission of oversight for Central and South American countries. His lecture, “Desire in Quest of an Object,” drew on the poetry of e. e. cummings, Octavio Paz, and Czeslaw Milosz to discuss Christian meanings and values in a globalized economy and culture. Aristotle had feared that the transition from traditional barter economy to the admittedly more efficient system of monetary exchange would disorient people’s apprehension of the hierarchy of goods. In order to diagnose the disease known today as “affluenza,” Quijano cited the following phrases of Gabriel Zaid: “The will to explore every possibility, to realize all potentialities: an unlimited appetite for being and for power: a full accomplishment that demands and deserves everything.” Paradoxically, the transition from market economics to the gigantism underlying globalization poses a great threat to human freedom. This threat can be analyzed normatively in terms of Lonergan’s notion of the human good, with its contextualization of particular goods and goods of order in terms of terminal values. Social and political analysis can neither overlook the feelings by which people are oriented to their ultimate ends, nor fail to point out that when people’s de facto ends are less than ultimate, they are no
longer free.

Fittingly, after a week of presentations ranging over such an array of topics, Michael McCarthy (Vassar College, Philosophy, and Fellow of the Woodstock Institute at Georgetown) brought things together in a vision of a “Christian center of integrated studies designed to meet the critical ethical requirement of practical wisdom.” Such a center “would ... respond simultaneously to the modern democratic demand for informed and responsible debate, and the eminent scriptural imperative of justice and neighborly love.” McCarthy’s lecture might be regarded as a contemporary restatement of the need that inspired St Ignatius to found the Collegio Romano.

Our final lecture was given by Joseph Komonchak, ecclesiologist from The Catholic University of America and distinguished co-editor of the multi-volume History of the Second Vatican Council. The burden of his presentation was to articulate the nature of the church in relation to the contingent created outcomes of the twofold sending by God of the Word and the Spirit. He opposes any “reification” or “hypostatization” of the church that would separate the core reality of the church from its concrete membership in the whole Christ throughout time. This theme is controversial because modern Catholic ahistorical orthodoxy, in its effort to resist both Protestantism and secular anti-Catholicism, has at times fallen into that mode of speech. After giving us the interpretative background for Vatican II’s use of the expression “subsists in,” Komonchak laid great stress upon the statement in Lumen Gentium that speaks of the church as constituted of those in union with the Holy Spirit. He also cited Cardinal Ratzinger’s comment on this passage to the effect that this transforms the entire discussion of church membership. On this evening Komonchak had time only to give us “hints and guesses” of what will surely prove to be an exciting and radical conclusion to the theology of the church already set forth in his Foundations of Ecclesiology.

As Fr Imoda mentioned in his words of welcome, this Workshop was dedicated to the honor of the late Maureen McCarthy, who with her husband Gene, has been a benefactor of both the Gregorian University and Boston College. By all accounts it was a fitting tribute. Anyone from Rome and the Gregorian who wished to attend our sessions were free to do so, and as word spread more and more did so. Over 150 people came to the Workshop from outside Italy. Bishop Essien from Ghana was one of four Africans. There were several Filipinos. Four students from Japan attended and four from India. Besides the twenty-two Italians closely involved with the Workshop
there were twenty-four Europeans, including Belgians, Germans, Austrians, French, and a Swedish person attended; there were thirty-nine from the British isles, nineteen from England, ten from (south and North) Ireland. Two came all the way from Australia, and from forty-five to fifty Americans crossed the Atlantic to join us.

For those who had attended the Gregorian and been students of Lonergan, the trip was a kind of homecoming; those new to Rome’s ancient city were overwhelmed by the many strata of Roman history and architecture and by the overall atmosphere of the Eternal City. Significantly, quite a few said that the experience had been “healing.” For all it was an adventure.

The Workshop was graciously assisted by members of the Gregorian University faculty and staff. Fr Franco Imoda, who made us welcome and arranged for the Aula, appointed Fr Louis Caruana, SJ, to be our liaison with the Gregorian. A philosopher of science trained in Cambridge, England, Fr Caruana helped us at every turn, and put us in touch with the kind and solicitous staff persons, Dr. Beatrice Mirelli of Public Relations and Eugenio Birris, a former philosophy student from Romania, who is in charge of the maintenance staff, rooms, and equipment. Prof. Rosanna Finamore literally put herself at our disposal, giving us timely aid with communications in the months preceding the Workshop and with numerous practical details throughout the week. Sr Maria Fe Mendoza, Good Shepherd Sister from the Philippines who is doing her doctoral work on Lonergan in Missiology, aided us with endless patience for many months in advance, gave us the hospitality of her community, and labored to find wonderful places for participants to stay. We also thank Fr Paul McNellis, SJ, (then of the Gregorian’s Philosophy Faculty, and now at Boston College’s), who did all he could to make this dream become a reality. We are grateful to Fr Robert O’Toole, SJ, (Rector of the Biblical Institute) for working with Kerry Cronin, (Director of BC’s Lonergan Center) in arranging and selling works by and about Lonergan and the conference papers throughout the week. Auspiciously, thanks to Fr Spaccapelo’s yeoman work of proofreading during Easter, the first copies of the Italian version of Method in Theology arrived in time for the Workshop.

Finally, we must acknowledge the Lonergan Workshop’s crucial link to the Community of Sant’Egidio, John Turner, to whom we are most grateful. While he was doing his doctoral studies at BC, John became friends with Cynthia Errico, a student in one of my classes he attended, who later joined the Community established in New York City by Andrea Bartoli and Paola Piscitelli. After becoming friends with the Community there, John introduced it to his PULSE students, some of whom became the nucleus of
the still extant BC Community of Sant'Egidio. It was John who arranged our invitation to spend Easter in Rome by the Community.

STATEMENT ON THE ROME LONERGAN WORKSHOP
7-11 MAY 2001

Sebastian Moore, OSB

It is lovely to be again in the Lonergan community, and in Rome! There is an intellectual joy, an opening of intelligence in all its virtuosity, to prayer in all its unknowing. What is the secret of this? Quite simply, it is the consciousness of the mind as undivided. Science and poetry acknowledge the same grounding in the interplay of image and insight. When Louis Roy told us that Rahner has as his starting-point the concept, not the birth of the concept from the light-bearing image, he was showing the brilliant world of Rahner as cut off from joy, doomed to the seriousness of modernity. For to remember how concepts were born, and to see this birth process as not accidental to the concepts as meaning-bearers, is to know why good minding is fun.

To accept revelation in Christ is to know the mind's infinite desire as obscurely fulfilled. But what kind of an account of this fulfillment shall we give if we do not deeply and rationally know mindwork as joyous? We shall build no doubt a cathedral of the mind, but with the well covered over. And the light in our building will be the dead light of modernity. If we do not know that poetry and science are both grounded in a mutual interplay of image and insight, we cannot have a happy science, to borrow the phrase that Nietzsche borrowed from eleventh century Toulouse and the revolution in feeling that C.S. Lewis saw as a ripple in the surface. Of course, the joyous science grounded by Lonergan is not the same. But it is different in going deeper. The gai savoir was self-consciously in contrast with the sedate Aristotelian order. For Lonergan there is no such contrast, Lonergan, who dared to identify a notion (of being) with a desire (to know). When he understood in all its depth Aristotle's point de depart as insight into the image, he saw all true knowing as joyful, and false knowing as giving itself away as joyless. And then, when we look at the great mass of reductionist scripture study and the dogmatised unknowability of the Jesus of history, is
it not the joylessness of it all that stands out?

Joylessness very easily becomes a categorical imperative. I know this very well, as I at last begin to emerge from a lifetime of self-punishment. Every assistance of a psychological kind is offered to religious doubt today. I still treasure the following moment of discovery. In a footnote to Gilson’s book on Scotus, there is a quote from the master, who is asking whence comes the intellectual content in our knowing. One source, one place for the arising of understanding, is dismissed out of hand. This is the image or phantasm. “De phantasmatis nihil. Patet.” Thus does the self-scrutinizing mind turn its back, in all innocence, on its poetry and sheer fun. Thus does our theology condemn itself to an orthodoxy with no bounce in it.

This bounce factor puts us in a relationship with the pronouncements of the Roman authority that is often puzzling to our contemporaries. We can all agree that current pronouncements on homosexuality are at the very best unhelpful, but what of the strictures on R. Haight’s book, *Jesus the Symbol of God*? I haven’t read the book, and it is getting very favourable reviews. But what if it is offering a Unitarian Christology? There’s no fun in that! Not *perichoresis*, not wildly erudite Florensky, who says we are faced with the alternatives of Trinity (if truth exists and proves itself) and insanity (if it doesn’t). And while the CDF shows no signs of being fun-loving, the orthodoxy to which they bear an unpopular witness is full of fun.

That’s the point about Lonergan. And when I hear that he’s “out” at the Gregorian today, I feel like the psalmist in his “How long, O Lord” mood.
THE FIGURE OF GALILEO

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This week to join in the celebration of the 450th anniversary of the founding of the Collegio Romano. As my contribution to this celebration, I would like to speak about a figure whose renown is intertwined with Collegio Romano, Galileo Galilei, and a man who taught at its successor institution at the height of his career, Bernard Lonergan, S.J. In this article I would like to raise the question, what was it about Galileo that made him such an important figure, and in answering that question, I will be featuring the historical role Bernard Lonergan, S.J. assigned to his work.

GALILEO AS “FIGURE”

Everyone has a Galileo, it seems. Because of his historical stature, Galileo, like Socrates, has become a “figure.” Indeed Galileo has become one of the defining figures of modernity.

I am using “figure” here in the sense that Pierre Hadot develops in his essay “The Figure of Socrates.” There Hadot explores how Plato, Kierkegaard, and Nietzsche mimic the ways that Socrates “figured” himself. “It was from him that they got the idea both to mask themselves and to use Socratic irony as a mask.” These portrayals of Socrates are intended to draw their readers into an encounter with themselves. As Hadot puts it, Socrates is figured

2 Hadot, Philosophy as a Way of Life, 149.
as taking on the mask of his interlocutors, and his “erotic irony consisted in pretending to be in love until, thanks to the reversal brought about by irony, the object of his amorous affection fell in love with himself.” This means, of course, that there is a “self” to fall in love with. The authenticity of these figurations of Socrates rest upon the deep insights into human selfhood, and into the perennial need for deception as a means “to bring into the truth one who is in an illusion.” (It is noteworthy that Lonergan likewise claimed that the interpretation ought to “force out into the open” the self of the interpreter, and that methodical interpretation would ultimately demand conversions.) Although Nietzsche himself had such great insights into human selfhood, his deliberate avoidance of any unambiguous account of the self has led lesser thinkers to proclaim that there is no self, only an ever changing random sequence of masks.

By means of “figuration” an author or reader renders an account of the figured person as the source of a profound historical movement, and simultaneously constitutes himself or herself in an intensely personal way in relation to the figure and to the movement. An individual refracts and amplifies and situates himself or herself in history by means of the act of figuration. “Figure” therefore also means mask, with all the complexities of meaning involved when one individual uses an Other both to reveal and to conceal. Galileo has become a figure in this sense many times over in modernity.

First and perhaps most familiar is the figure of Galileo as

3 Hadot, Philosophy as a Way of Life, 159.
4 Hadot, Philosophy as a Way of Life, quoting Kierkegaard, 150.
6 A similar observation was made in characterizing the pioneering biography of Galileo by Pio Paschini, although without the nuances I develop here: “Pachini...will give us not just a life, but a figure of Galileo by situating his work in the historical framework of the knowledge of his time.” Quotation of Agostino Gemelli in Annibale Fantoli, Galileo: For Copernicanism and for the Church: Studi Galileiani, vol. 3, trans. George V. Coyne (Vatican: Vatican Observatory Foundation, 1994), 480.
7 Regarding Galileo’s Dialogue Concerning the Two Chief World Systems, E. J. Dijksterhuis writes, “there are actually several Galileos, and the difficulty of reading the Dialogue is [because] ...they sometimes speak together.” Quoted in Jerome J. Langford, Galileo, Science and the Church (Ann Arbor, MI: University of Michigan Press, 1971), 120.
Byrne

Enlightenment Reason’s Rebel and Martyr: Galileo “come to grief as ‘the scientist’ facing a religious credo,” “a matter of ‘science’ versus ‘prejudice.’”8 As Dava Sobel observes:

There was only one trial of Galileo, and yet it seems there were a thousand – the suppression of science by religion, the defense of individualism against authority, the clash between revolutionary and establishment, the challenge of radical new discoveries to ancient beliefs, the struggle against intolerance for freedom of thought and freedom of speech. No other process in the annals of canon or common law has ricocheted through history with more meanings, more consequences, more conjecture, more regrets.9

In a recent, masterful essay Michael Segre has traced the origin and historical unfolding of this figure of Galileo in relation to several other figurations.10 From the beginning Galileo was figured both as a hero and as a villain. The earliest of Galileo’s supporters cast him in the role of a hero, modeled explicitly upon the “prototype” of Michelangelo.11 After the infamous trial of 1633, on the other hand, church officials cast Galileo in the role of a villain who brought on his own downfall and who in the words of Pope Urban VIII “had given such universal scandal [to the Church] with a doctrine that was condemned.”12 This despite the fact that Galileo claimed he was only trying to protect the Church and Catholics in general from being accused of ignorance.13 Segre narrates how these polar oppositions, hero and anti-hero, evolved and transformed into other figurations over the next three and a half centuries.

The transformation of Galileo as hero into Galileo as martyr was surprisingly gradual. Segre attributes the first public and influential

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12 Quoted in Fantoli, op. cit., 468.
13 See for example Sobel, op. cit., 74, 140.
such portrayal to John Milton's *Areopagitica – Speech for the Liberty of Unlicenc'd Printing* (1644). This figure of Galileo as martyr grew over the next century, fueled by the anticlericalism of the Enlightenment. As Segre notes, the figuration in this period "reflects fashion rather than documentary evidence."\(^{14}\)

Pervasive though the figure of Galileo as scientific martyr is in our own time, it has a curious history, for it seems that Descartes rather than Galileo was originally portrayed in this fashion by the founders of the French Enlightenment. Herbert Butterfield narrates how, in the first wave of French *philosophes*, Fontenelle played an especially critical role in forming this figure. Fontenelle conducted "a kind of propaganda on behalf of the scientific movement."

It is all like the Christians recounting conversions in the early stages of a religious movement, when one man after another sees the light and changes the course of his whole life. And the movement generalises itself in those people who represent a new generation, glad to be emancipated from the burden or routine or prejudice of the old one... a particular agent of the transition is geometry, especially the influence of Descartes.

Once Fontenelle had prepared the way, the second generation of *philosophes* expanded this figuration, especially in what has been called "the manifesto of the French Enlightenment," Jean D'Alembert's *Preliminary Discourse to the Encyclopedia of Diderot*.\(^{16}\) The character of this figuration is capsulated in the recent translator's introduction to D'Alembert's *Discourse*:

As we have seen, [D'Alembert] demanded nothing less than the freedom of scholars to establish most of the intellectual disciplines upon a "natural" and secular foundation, untrammeled by the dictates of Religion and Authority. Clerical control in the intellectual domain was in his opinion the chief enemy. (p. xlv)

D'Alembert himself does refer briefly and indirectly to Galileo (without mentioning him by name: "A tribunal whose name still cannot

\(^{14}\) Segre, op. cit., 393-96. See also Fantoli, 476.


be spoken without fear in France ... condemned a celebrated astronomer for having maintained that the earth moved and declared him a heretic,” 73). Curiously, the *Encyclopedia* itself contained no entry for “Galileo,” although the article on “Copernicus” does cast Galileo in the role of martyr. However, it is Descartes that D’Alembert figures as the persecuted rebel and champion of Reason.

Descartes was the heroic rebel who first dared...to show intelligent minds how to throw off the yoke of scholasticism, of opinion, of authority – in a word, of prejudices and barbarism. (xlvi)

Given the fact that Galileo, rather than Descartes was found guilty of “vehement suspicion of heresy,” this is an odd ranking of the order of the heroic rebels. Perhaps chauvinism was a factor; perhaps the fact that Galileo abjured made him seem a tainted martyr. Be that as it may, this figuration has since been largely transferred to Galileo himself. The earliest source I have found which explicitly casts Galileo himself in this figure is that of Johann Jakob Scheuchzer who wrote in 1721, “Galileo Galilei, who successfully revived the theory of Copernicus with his new telescopes, that same excellent individual who was persecuted by the Roman priesthood.” (More on this allegation later.)

As is the case with all figurations of Galileo, this one has some basis in his writing and work. In his famous *Letter to the Grand Duchess Christina* of 1615, Galileo argues vigorously for independence of science and tradition. He writes, for example:

I shall therefore discourse of the particulars which these men produce to make this [Copernican] opinion detested and to have it condemned not merely as false but as heretical...Contrary to the sense of the Bible and the intention of the holy Fathers, if I am not mistaken, they would extend such authorities until even...purely physical matters...

...Copernicus never discusses purely matters of religion or faith...He always stands upon physical conclusions pertaining to the celestial motions, and deals with them by astronomical and geometrical demonstrations, founded primarily upon sense experiences and very exact observations. 18

18 *Discoveries and Opinions of Galileo*, translated by Stillman Drake with intro-
In remarks such as this Galileo masks himself as Copernicus, and therefore as the founder of the experimental method\(^1\) (or what is sometimes called the "hypothetico-deductive method"). Indeed, there is an intimate connection between the figuration of Galileo as martyr of science and that of him as originator of modern scientific reason. The Enlightenment’s figuration expands when reason itself is figured as exactly equivalent, no more no less, to this simple method. Galileo himself originates the impression that his conclusions were arrived at solely by mathematical reasoning and sense experience, which is not in fact the whole story. As Segre points out, the Enlightenment’s figurations paid little attention to Galileo’s actual scientific works. Galileo’s "scientific reasoning," therefore, became identified with whatever model of reasoning that the Enlightenment authors embraced.

It was the careful historical researches of Alexandre Koyré that began to break with these earlier figurations and bring to light the complex mixtures of experiments, intuitions, arguments, and rhetorical devices that Galileo actually used. Koyré began a line of modern critical historical research that has been extended by such scholars as I. Bernard Cohen, Stillman Drake, Thomas Settle, William Shea, and William Wallace.\(^2\) Even so, as Segre notes, the tendencies to cast Galileo in the figure of hero or anti-hero persist, in dialectically modulated form, among these twentieth-century scholars.

For these and other reasons, almost no professional scholar accepts the figuration of Galileo as Reason’s Hero and Martyr, although it persists firmly in the cultural imagination of the modern and postmodern West. Among the difficulties is the fact that Galileo did not really have solid,
scientific support for the Copernican hypothesis. In fact, the theory that best explained the data available at the time was neither that of Ptolemy nor Copernicus. It was the theory of Johannes Kepler. But it is unlikely that Galileo actually read Kepler’s work, *Astronomia Nova* (although Kepler did send him a copy). But he did know of another theory that also fit the data better than either the Ptolemaic or the Copernican: that of Tycho Brahe, the so-called Geo-Heliocentric theory. Brahe knew that if the earth really did revolve around the sun, then there should be a shift in the angular position of the stars between the spring and the fall—a “parallax shift.” He also made the most painstakingly accurate astronomical measurements of his day, but found no observable change in the parallax angles. (It was not until 1838 that astronomical instruments were able to accurately measure these minute angles).21 His conclusion: the earth is at rest; the sun revolves around the earth, and all else revolves around the sun. This did a better job of “saving the phenomena” than did the Copernican hypothesis. So Galileo’s support of the Copernican hypothesis was not purely and solely a matter of scientific reason and evidence.22

Among those who contributed to a reaction against the Enlightenment figuration of Galileo is Grigorio de Santillana. He debunks the idea of Galileo as the rebel against tradition, characterizing him, instead, in the following terms: “the actual conflict reveals Galileo, like all free thinking men, seeking a support in established custom, credit and tradition” (ix). Had he not done so, claims de Santillana, “he would have escaped all trouble” (vii). But “Both his friends and his enemies saw in him a unique type of creative personality, whose essential achievement might very well be conceived to stand or fall with him” (vii). Contrary to the Enlightenment’s rationalist figuration of Galileo, de Santillana claims that Galileo’s downfall came, not from

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21 Somewhat earlier, in 1728, empirical evidence for the motion of the earth relative to the stars was obtained in the measurement of aberration of starlight by James Bradley. This finding, however, depended upon the subsequent developments in the theory of light. Neither the theory nor the instrumentation were available to either Brahe or Galileo.

22 For further details regarding additional scientific flaws in Galileo’s support of the Copernican hypothesis, see Langford, 41-49, 68-69, 87, 123-28. For an immoderate denunciation of Galileo in reaction to his elevation by this figuration, see Arthur Koestler, *The Sleepwalkers* (New York: Gosset & Dunlap, 1975), 353; Koestler classifies Galileo as a “moral dwarf.”
real opposition between the new science or traditional Catholic religion, but from "third parties," Galileo’s actual enemies who orchestrated a case against him, including a crucial forged document, that led to the guilty verdict. Had Galileo not ambitioned an integration, such attempts would have led nowhere. Jerome Langford, in turn, surveyed documentary and historical investigations to argue against the credibility of de Santillana’s forgery hypothesis. Langford thereby paints a figure of tragic mutual incomprehension combined with lack of temperance, humility, and critical self-understanding on both sides.23

In addition, developments in twentieth-century philosophy of science, especially problems regarding the language of reports on perceptual experience, have further problematized Galileo’s simple account of scientific method as “geometrical demonstrations, founded primarily upon sense experiences and very exact observations.” If one adds to Galileo’s overly simple account the pathos of the subsequent actions of the Holy Office, one has the makings of Galileo, Enlightenment Reason’s Rebel and Martyr.

This does not mean, of course, that the Sacred Congregation of the Holy Office did not transgress its legitimate authority.24 In condemning the Copernican propositions that the earth moved and the sun stood still as “formally heretical,” the Holy Office moved out of the realm of faith and morality proper and into the arena of physical, scientific explanatory structures. In The Assayer Galileo cited no lesser an authority than St. Augustine himself in support of his contention that interpretation of Scripture must be cautious in relation to the science of nature:

It often falls out that a Christian may not fully understand some point about the earth, the sky, or the other elements of this world – the motion, the rotation, the magnitude and distance of the stars … Now it is too absurd, yea, pernicious and to be avoided at all costs, for an infidel to find a Christian so stupid as to argue these matters as if they were matters of Christian faith.25

The failure of the Holy Office on this score was certainly tragic. Yet this was not a simple matter of religious prejudice suppressing the

23 Langford, 92-97.
24 Langford points out that the Consultors were clearly influenced by an earlier "faulty exegetical opinion" on this matter by Robert Cardinal Bellarmine, 90.
25 Quoted by Galileo in Discoveries and Opinions, 207-208. Drake attributes the remark to Augustine’s De Genesi ad Literam.
truth of scientific reason. Galileo’s reasoning was brilliant in many ways but also flawed in many ways. Moreover, in Galileo, reasoning was only beginning to become scientific in the precisely modern sense. Galileo’s arguments in support of the Copernican system were still an admixture of rhetoric, *ad hominem* arguments, appeals to authority, imaginative examples, reports of observations and experiments, and mathematical illustrations (more often than actual mathematical demonstrations). To figure Galileo as a champion of scientific reason, defeated by religious prejudice, was an exercise in creating rather than reporting history.

On the other hand, reversal of the Church’s position on this matter has been long and agonizing.²⁶ Important steps were taken already in 1741 under the leadership of Pope Benedict XIV. In 1757 the decree against Copernican propositions was deleted from the Index of forbidden books, although remarkably Galileo’s *Dialogue Concerning the Two Chief World Systems* was not removed until 1835. Of course the Church’s position has reached a definitive reevaluation in the current Pontiff’s address to the Papal Commission on the Galileo Case. John Paul II explains how the complexity of newly emerging sciences required of both Galileo and Church theologians philosophical distinctions and methods not yet available.

The birth of a new way of approaching the study of natural phenomena demands a clarification on the part of all disciplines of knowledge...The majority of theologians did not recognize the formal distinction between Sacred Scripture and its interpretation, and this led them to transfer into the realm of the doctrine of the faith a question that in fact pertained to scientific investigation.

In *The Letter to the Grand Duchess Christina*, Galileo is in fact arguing for a distinction between the method of natural science and the method of theology. It is a distinction not easily made, and Galileo’s simple statement obscures the difficulties.²⁸ It is a distinction that even

²⁶ Drawing upon the significant scholarship of the recent decades, Fantoli, meticulously narrates and sternly rebukes the slow process by which Church has come to terms with this error. See op. cit., 463-48, and especially his footnote comments, 488-510.

²⁷ John Paul II, op. cit., 372.

²⁸ The difficulties involved in clearly distinguishing properly natural scientific from properly theological and dogmatic issues were intensified in the historical context of Galileo’s times. See Richard J. Blackwell, *Galileo, Bellarmine, and the Bible* (Notre
Galileo himself did not always observe consistently. John Paul II draws attention to the complexity of this distinction in his “Lessons of the Galileo Case.” It is a distinction Bernard Lonergan dedicated his entire life to sorting out.

More recently, the Modern Enlightenment has begun to lose its grip on Western culture with the onslaught of postmodern criticism. Most influential in this regard was Thomas Kuhn’s seminal *The Structure of Scientific Revolutions*. Kuhn’s thought was influenced by the studies of historians such as Alexandre Koyré and I. Bernard Cohen, as well as the later philosophy of Ludwig Wittgenstein and W. V. O. Quine. The result was a devastating attack on the hypothetico-deductive account of scientific method. According to the hypothetico-deductive account, modern science begins with formulation of general hypotheses (axioms, premises) which must include “observation terms,” followed by rigorous deduction of empirically verifiable conclusions. Kuhn argued that the actual historical practices of natural scientists did not substantiate the hypothetico-deductive view of science. In particular, following the work of N. R. Hanson, Kuhn argued that unmediated observation is an illusion. All empirical observation is determined by a “paradigm” which itself is impervious to refutation by empirical observations. In the hands of authors such as Richard Rorty and Jean-Francois Lyotard, Kuhn’s criticism became a tributary to the postmodern critiques of modernity. Nor is it difficult to discern the reason for this confluence. At the heart of the hypothetico-deductive account of modern science lie “foundations”: the privileged access to objective reality provided by immediate sense data, and the model of rigorous reason given compelling expression by modern symbolic logic. These foundations constituted the early

29 See Langford, 58-78, especially 64 and 73. Langford explains how Galileo himself provoked an unnecessary confrontation, raising the ante for evidence to a level that he could not fulfill.
twenty-first century’s reformulation of the Enlightenment displacement of tradition via scientific reasoning. The deconstruction of such foundations is a mark of postmodern figurations.

Kuhn’s work set the stage for a series of movements studying the “social construction” and the cultural determinants of what is granted the status of scientific knowledge. Feminist, Marxist, psychoanalytic, post-Nietzschean studies focus upon power as the determinant of what counts as science. In this genre, we have the example of Mario Biagioli’s *Galileo Courtier: The Practice of Science in a Culture of Absolutism*. Biagioli probes behind Galileo’s scientific observations and writings for the factors that made his work “socially important,” and especially what happened socially to win acceptance of his innovative extensions of mathematical practices. Biagioli claims that “Galileo’s courtly role was integral to his science” (1). Explicitly acknowledging his indebtedness to the work of Michel Foucault, he explores the network of social and power relations in Italian courts. These relations, he writes, “played a crucial role in...the cognitive legitimation of the new science by providing venues for the social legitimation of its practitioners.” This social legitimation, in turn “boosted the epistemological status” of the new science (2). In his account, Biagioli criticizes yet another figuration, that of Bertolt Brecht and others that stressed Galileo’s role in the revolution of the artisan class over the aristocracy.

Another contemporary refuguration of Galileo is that of Dava Sobel’s *Galileo’s Daughter: A Historical Memoir of Science, Faith, and Love*. Sobel’s figuration is markedly different from that represented by Biagioli. Sobel’s book took its inspiration from her reading of the thirty odd letters to Galileo from his daughter Virginia who became Suor Maria Celeste of the Order of the Poor Clares. It is clear that Sobel was deeply moved in reading these letters, brought to her attention by Silvio Bedini. The letters constitute almost the entirety of the documentary sources we have about Maria Celeste herself. The book is entitled *Galileo’s Daughter*, and it is indeed, overwhelmingly, a portrait of Suor Maria Celeste. Yet the text of the letters make up only fifty of the book’s almost four hundred pages. For the most part, Sobel’s writing is devoted to narrating the facts of her father’s life as well as the cultural, political, 

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ecclesiastical, and even medical history of the period. Yet the figure of Maria Celeste emerges powerfully out of the way Sobel has composed the book, and hers is a figure of unconditional love. She was the eldest of Galileo’s three illegitimate children, born of the same mother whom Galileo never married. While Galileo did assume responsibility for the rearing of his three children, the two girls were unmarriageable because of their illegitimacy. In order to provide for their security into adulthood, Galileo arranged for them to be taken at ages twelve and thirteen into the Convent of San Matteo in Arcetri. The letters and Sobel’s narrative reveal how the Order’s Constitutions, laid down by St. Clare, meant that the inhabitants of the convent lived precariously at the edge of physical survival. They were often cold, undernourished, and consigned to live with many women who were ill-suited for religious life, some bordering on insanity. Yet these many sufferings are transformed in the words and life of Maria Celeste into a spirit of unconditional love, especially for her father, Galileo, who was responsible for putting her into such a situation. Suor Maria Celeste writes, for example, as Galileo undergoes his trial before the Holy Office:

Dearest lord father, I wanted to write to you now, to tell you I partake in your torments, so as to make them lighter for you to bear. (243)

Sobel herself remarks that “These letters... recast Galileo’s story” (11). Indeed they do. While it is true that Maria Celeste emerges as the compelling figure of Sobel’s book, it is also true that she presents us with a new figuration of Galileo as well: Galileo as forgiven and loved unconditionally, not for his scientific achievements, not for his rebellion against authority, but for himself in spite of his real failings.

The great interest and response these recent publications have enjoyed are significant of something stirring in our present era. Both Sobel’s study and the postmodernist figurations (so-called science studies) offer the enriched figurations of Galileo and his scientific legacy. They seem to fill a need for a figuration of Galileo and his project in terms of a fuller humanity – as a culturally and politically situated being on the one hand, and as a sexual being, the tender and perhaps guilt-ridden father of an illegitimate daughter who incarnated God’s unconditional love for him, on the other. The appeal of these figurations is that they displace the emasculated, “view from nowhere”
Galileo rising above his inherited traditions to view the cosmos and the earth objectively. These figurations respond to a desire for a science more richly human than the Enlightenment’s modernist science. The responses to them and their appeal remain, even if it should prove true that studies like Biagioli’s are ultimately motivated by new forms of reductionism – to reduce Galileo and his science, and every form of objectivity, to nothing more that the play of power relations constituting Galileo’s role in a cultural matrix and its replacement by a new regime.

HUSSELL’S GALILEO: DISCOVERING AND CONCEALING GENIUS

In some ways more interesting still is the figure of Galileo drawn by Edmund Husserl in his Crisis of the European Sciences.36 Husserl places Galileo in relief against a background of perilous loss: the loss of “what the science in general, had meant and could mean for human existence,” and indeed the loss of human meaning generally in European culture (5-6). According to Husserl, Renaissance European humanity sought to “shape itself anew in freedom.” In order to do so, it looked back to ancient Greece and found in its philosophy a model of what humanity could be, a model it strove to reproduce. In ancient Greece, Renaissance humanity found the ideal of a theoretical system in which both merely empirical questions and the “ultimate and highest” questions are brought into a “meaningful order” – a “theory [that] frees” by means of a unifying (8-9). To this ancient ideal, Renaissance philosophy added its own innovation, namely “the true, universal method through which” such a unity could be brought about (9-10). The “energy” of this method manifested the true and admirable “spirit” or “telos” (15-17) of Renaissance (and Enlightenment) European humanity.

Husserl laments the loss of this meaningful, unifying scientific when the narrow, merely positivistic notion of science became dominant. Yet, he contends, “the genuine ideal of universal philosophy [is]...a meaning which [the positive sciences] continued to bear within themselves”

even though their practitioners had become “unphilosophical experts” (12, 11). Husserl’s *Krisis* is a work of phenomenological retrieval that endeavors to discover how this integral vision was lost, and from what sources in the present day it might be restored.

The first step in this phenomenological recovery is his meditation on the figure of Galileo. Husserl regards Galileo in terms of his role as the originator of the most decisive transformation of European civilization, namely the “mathematization of nature” (24). Galileo himself did not bring to completion the movement that he set in motion, but he gave it its distinctive character. The “process of method-transformation, carried out instinctively, unreflectively in the praxis of theorizing, begins in the Galilean age” (45).

A phenomenological investigation is needed to uncover the meaning of this transformation, because according to Husserl, Galileo himself and his progeny lacked full reflective awareness of all the dimensions of this transformation through a “fateful omission” (49). In Husserl’s view, Galileo relied upon a tacit dimension in his “guiding model of mathematics, [but] because of the direction of his interest, it was kept hidden from his view.” In fact Galileo was actually drawing upon an old, richly constituted inherited tradition – an “ideal praxis” of “pure geometry” – but he lacked reflective awareness of this tacit dimension. For him it was merely “pre-given,” “obvious,” and “taken for granted” (24-25). This pure geometry was a science of “pure idealities,” namely ideal shapes. Husserl offers his account of the origins of this pure geometry and its subsequent role in the transformative mathematization of nature.

(1) The most primordial stage is that of appearance to human consciousness all sorts of “shapes that are sensibly experienceable and sensibly-intuitively conceivable” (27). Husserl remarks that in this prescientific stage “in every-day sense experience, the world is given in a subjectively relative way. Each of us has our own appearances” (23). However, in our dealings with one another, we become aware of the discrepancies between our various perceptions, and this awareness offsets the presumption that there are many worlds. Instead, we come to construct, or to “believe in the world whose things only appear to us differently but are the same.” Husserl uses the term *Umwelt* or “surrounding world” to refer to this intersubjective horizon of things which comes to be given along with and constitutive of these
subjective appearances.\(^{37}\) To Husserl’s way of thinking, this primordial, prescientific, intersubjective, *Umwelt* background provides a deeply sedimented meaning element in what ultimately becomes Galileo’s innovative transformation of the mathematization of nature.

(2) Eventually people developed the art of surveying and measuring. The concern of this art is the sensibly given “body shapes of rivers, mountains, buildings, etc. which as a rule lack strictly determining concepts and names” (28). The irregularities in the sensible appearances of the shapes of these bodies pose real practical challenges for intersubjectivity. In order to meet these challenges, the art of measuring and surveying “discovers practically the possibility of picking out as [standard] measures certain basic shapes.” The determination of the irregular shapes is then provided by means of these standard shapes and the relations between them. For example, one measures the height of a building with a standard length, or the relative location of a bend in the river by means of standard lengths and standard surveying angles. Husserl’s analysis thus reveals that at the root of these developments in the practical realm lay the need to determine shapes “intersubjectively and in practice univocally” (28).

But even with regard to these basic, measuring shapes, “their identity with themselves, their self-sameness and their temporally enduring sameness, are merely approximate, as is their likeness with other things” (25). The exact likeness of two sensibly appearing shapes, therefore, is of greater or lesser perfection according to whether it “satisfies special practical interests. But when interests change [and technology progresses], what was fully and exactly satisfactory” likewise changes. The determination of the degree of likeness becomes ever more refined, and there is established an infinite “open horizon of conceivable improvement” (25). So the spirit of intersubjective determination leads to technologies that become ever more exact, yet always only approximately so. This open horizon of approximation toward exactness is, therefore, rooted in the intersubjective *Umwelt*.

(3) Next, according to Husserl, this “praxis of perfecting” gives rise to a new *noematic* appearance, namely that of the “limit-shape” or “ideal shape” (26). For example, an ideal straight line, ideal point, ideal circle, or ideal triangle is the limit of an increasingly refined series of

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37 Later in his reflections on Galileo, Husserl will introduce the famous term, *Lebenswelt*, which is close to but not precisely the same in meaning as *Umwelt*. 
rough, bumpy, imperfect lines, dots, closed curves, or three-sided shapes as they are actually given in a series of acts of sensation or imagination. But, as Husserl notes, no matter how we "transform these [empirically given] bodies in fantasy [i.e., imagination], the...‘ideal’ possibilities we thus obtain are anything but geometrical-ideal possibilities." The limit-shape as such never actually appears to the sense intuiting consciousness immersed in the technological "praxis of perfecting" approximations toward exactness in measuring and surveying. The ideal limit-shapes remain always beyond that which does appear to consciousness in this practical praxis.

However, this practical praxis of approximating to limits itself gives rise to a dramatically new and pure "mathematical praxis." When consciousness is engaged in this mathematical praxis, it constitutes the ideal limit-shapes as such. Exactness is genuinely possible only in this pure mathematical realm of ideal, limit-shapes. This means, of course, that when certain ideal limit-shapes are selected as basic (e.g., ideal lines, triangles, circles) these, too, are exact. When these basic ideal shapes are employed in pure geometry, this opens up the possibility of producing "constructively and univocally, through an a priori, all-encompassing systematic method, all possibly conceivable ideal-shapes" (27). This possibility can never be fully realized in practical measuring or surveying because of the irregularities, both in the standard shapes and the measured shapes. But it is possible in the systematic method of a pure mathematical unification of all conceivable ideal shapes. This systematic method of unifying idealities provides the paradigm that, according to Husserl, Renaissance humanity so admired in ancient Greek thought.

(4) Because of their origin in the practical praxis of measuring and surveying, these ideal-shapes and their science always are given as possibilities capable of being "practically applied to the world of sense experience" (24). But despite this intimate connection of practical application, Husserl insists upon the radical distinctness of this ideal world from the Umwelt of lived experience. This systematic mathematical realm is a purely ideal realm, radically distinct from the sensible realm. No amount of imaginative variation grades over into the ideal. The neither the world of experience alone nor the ideal world alone is as yet the amalgam of the mathematization of nature.

(5) After making explicit what Galileo unreflectively took for
granted, Husserl identifies what he regards as Galileo’s great and portentous innovation. This “pre-given” possibility of applying ideal mathematics to the world of sensible shapes, suggested “to Galileo the idea of a nature which is constructively determinable in the same manner in all its other aspects” (32). The spirit of geometry, idealizing and thereby making possible systematic unifying, is taken over and transformed into “a rational infinite totality of being with a rational science systematically mastering it.” This mathematical praxis soon “overtakes natural science and creates for it the completely new idea of mathematical natural science – Galilean science” (22-23) “Through Galileo’s mathematization of nature, nature itself is idealized under the guidance of the new mathematics.”

This Galilean innovation is possible only if the methods of measuring under the guidance of pure geometry can be applied to “all real properties” (33). This especially includes what Husserl calls “specific sense qualities” (or sinnliche Fülle) such as color, sound, smell, and so forth (30). These sense qualities “concretely fill out the spatio-temporal shape-aspects of the world of bodies.” However, these qualities “cannot be directly treated as are the shapes themselves” (33). Hence, the mathematization of the natural world becomes attainable only when those qualities are abstracted away and treated as indirectly mathematizable (34). This is accomplished when, for example, “what is experienced in pre-scientific life, as colors, tones, warmth” are now regarded as derivative from... “tone-vibrations, warmth-vibrations, i.e., pure events in the world of shapes” (36; Husserl says that the sense qualities come to appear as “indicating” events in the world of pure or ideal shapes).

(6) According to Husserl, this move toward an indirect mathematization of “intuitively given nature” (38) entails the presupposition that “universal causality” obtains in the world of experience.³⁸ That is to say, not only all shapes but also “all specifically qualitative events” are systematically related to (i.e., “function as indices for”) “precisely corresponding constellations and occurrences

³⁸ Husserl prefers the phrase, “the peculiar universal inductivity” over “universal causality” (39). He also claims that Galileo was unaware of the merely hypothetical (and I might add, a priori, heuristic) character of this presupposition which “precedes and guides all induction of particular causalities” (39). Galileo, rather, took this “hypothesis” as a kind of given, which subsequently served to deepen the hiddenness of what Galileo set in motion.
of shape” (38). Galileo was aware that the mathematical methods that he inherited, even as supplemented by his own innovations, were not yet up to the task of this comprehensive systematic relating of all qualitative contents to occurrences of shapes. But this defect did not deter Galileo’s confidence in his presupposition of the total mathematization of nature. In effect, Husserl contends, by his anticipation that the whole of qualitative experiences could be indirectly mathematized, Galileo set in motion an historical succession of “farther reaching and ever more perfectible” mathematical developments such as analytic geometry (and the calculus). As Husserl puts it, Galileo’s contribution was not merely to determine “the free fall of this body.” It was, rather, to inaugurate an infinite historical process of “a method for improving method.” This method of method gives rise to an endless series of “laws of nature” in the form of “general numerical formulae” which tend toward “better and better ‘representation’ [Vorstellung]” (41-42). As Husserl puts it, it is “the peculiar essence of [modern] natural science...a priori its way of being, to be unendingly hypothetical and unendingly verified” (42). Hence, the interest of the natural scientist who stands in the line of Galileo is concentrated on acquiring these formulae, and upon “grounding them logically and compellingly for all” (43). Fatefully, however, this concentration misled natural scientists into mistaking the formulae “for the true being of nature itself.” This oversight “unavoidably accompanies the technical development and practice of method” (44).

(7) The mistaken identification of formulae with nature itself is due to the fact that as measurement becomes more exact, attention is focused upon the numbers arrived at by measuring. However, this increasing focus upon numbers, like the attention to shapes, regards natural appearances not in themselves, but rather in a universal and infinite context of “numbers in general, stated in general propositions which express laws of functional dependencies” (44). With the subsequent rise of algebraic methods, this “arithmetization of geometry” brings about an immense transforming effect upon the thinking that was handed down from antiquity.39 It greatly expands and enriches the range of practices in service of the goal of attaining ever greater exactness. “It

39 For a detailed and in many ways more positive evaluation of this development, see Carl Boyer, The History of the Calculus and Its Conceptual Development (New York: Dover Publications, 1959), especially 194-216, 267-98.
becomes free, systematic, a priori thinking, completely liberated from intuited actuality, about numbers, numerical relations, numerical laws” (44). But at the same time this arithmetization of geometry leads “to the emptying of [the] meaning” (44) of geometry. By transforming the pure intuitions of ideal shapes into “pure numerical configurations” and “algebraic structures,” the connection between the mathematics of ideal shapes and the qualitatively experienced shapes is radically torn asunder. Husserl acknowledges that this movement of the arithmetization of geometry was not directly the work of Galileo himself. But it is clear that he regards Galileo’s a priori presupposition as having made this development itself inevitable (45). There is, then a transformation of the “experiencing, discovering way of thinking...into a way of thinking with transformed concepts, ‘symbolic’ concepts” which “depletes” the meaning of geometrical thinking (48).

For Husserl, then, the figure of Galileo is the figure “at once of a discovering and a concealing genius” (52). He is the discovering genius who set in motion a vast, powerful, culturally transformative trend that “continually achieves undoubted results” (52) in an infinite open horizon of conceivable improvement. It is the impressive, successful “method of method” of endless mathematical and symbolic innovation in quest of ever greater exactitude of measurement. Galileo stands “at the top of the list of the greatest discoverers of modern times” (53). But Galileo is at the same time a concealing genius who unleashed a trend which inevitably and almost of necessity abolishes reflective consciousness of the meaningful origin of this science. As a result, it leads to “the surreptitious substitution of the mathematically substructed world of idealities for the only real world, the one that is actually given through perception, that is ever experienced and experienceable – our everyday life-world [Lebenswelt]” (48-49). This unreflective substitution produces the illusion that geometry possesses a “self-sufficient, absolute truth” (49). In fact, argues Husserl, the “truth” of geometry (and of Galileo’s

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40 Husserl acknowledges that Francois Vieta, who preceded Galileo, was already a source of this way of thinking. He also sketches out successive stages, beginning with Leibniz’s notion of a mathesis universalis and leading through the highly abstract theories of manifolds (sets). Here he claims that immersion in the techniques of operating with the symbols, and indeed its very successes in reflecting back upon themselves, make retrieval of the “original bestowal of meaning” (47) upon which Galileo himself depended nigh impossible. Husserl’s remarks on these topics, however, raise questions regarding historical complexities that are beyond the scope of this present paper.
subsequent mathematization of nature as well) is not self-sufficient at all. Its truth is founded in sensible intuitions and in intentions as embedded in the life-world. Galileo, then, is also the concealer of the dependence of science upon the Lebenswelt of intersubjective concern and of the real world of perception. Husserl regards his phenomenological mission as the retrieval of the connection between contemporary scientific practice and this original, meaning-bestowing source.  

GALILEO AND THE DISTINCTION BETWEEN PRIMARY AND SECONDARY QUALITIES

As with other figurations of Galileo, there is indeed a basis in Galileo’s work and writings for Husserl’s account of the bequest to European civilization. The relevant remarks appear toward the end of what has been called Galileo’s scientific manifesto, *The Assayer*. Here the connection with the Gregorian University and its predecessor comes to the fore. Galileo composed *The Assayer* as his definitive statement in a series of exchanges with a Jesuit priest of the *Collegio Romano*, Fr. Horatio Grassi. The Italian title of Galileo’s work, *Il Saggiatore*, is a pun. It refers, on the one hand, to the stellar constellation, Libra (“The Balance”), where three new comets appeared in 1618. (Grassi erroneously thought the comets originated there.) But simultaneously it refers to a more accurate assayer’s (il saggiatore) balance on which Galileo will weigh Grassi’s arguments and find them wanting. Grassi and other Jesuits of the *Collegio Romano* considered that the comets provided the bases for the best arguments against the Copernican hypothesis. Two years earlier Galileo had been forbidden to “defend or hold” the Copernican hypothesis. Hence, his response to Grassi needed to be subtle. It was, however, a quite polemical and sarcastic response, and it certainly alienated other Jesuits at the *Collegio* who might have been sympathetic to Galileo’s views.

In *The Assayer* Galileo attempts to argue the quite erroneous

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41 Husserl later goes so far as to assert that even “ancient [Euclid’s?]” geometry was, in its way, τεχνη, removed from the sources of truly immediate intuition...[from which it] at first derived its meaning (49).

42 Langford, op. cit., 103. For the question of the mysterious document containing a stronger injunction, see 93-97.
idea that comets arise from terrestrial vapors. Toward the end of the essay, Galileo takes up the question of heat, since it is relevant to his account of the origins of comets. He writes, "It remains for me to tell...some thoughts of mine about the proposition, 'motion is the cause of heat.'" Galileo attempts to disprove this proposition, which nevertheless eventually gained almost unanimous scientific acceptance in the nineteenth century. In place of the idea that motion is the cause of heat, he argues that heat is caused by fire particles. In doing so, he offers perhaps the first modern articulation (later developed more systematically by John Locke) of the distinction between primary and secondary qualities.

[W]henever I conceive any material or corporeal substance, I immediately feel the need to think of it as bounded, and as having this or that shape, a being large or small in relation to other things, and as being in some specific place at any given time; as being in motion or at rest...and as being one in number or few, or many. From these I cannot separate such a substance by any stretch of my imagination. But that it must be white or red, bitter or sweet, noisy or silent, and of sweet or foul odor, my mind does not feel compelled to bring in as necessary accompaniments.

That is to say shape, size, place, time, motion or rest are primary qualities, intrinsic to every body ("corporeal substance"). On the other hand, Galileo believes that it is possible for a corporeal substance to exist without possessing the secondary qualities of color, taste, sound, smell (or, as he will later argue, touch). Here we find an unmistakable elevation of the status of shape, but Galileo has not yet articulated the position that Husserl will claim is the origin of the mathematization of nature. In fact at one point Galileo speaks in a way that could have come straight from Husserl himself: "I think that tastes, odors, colors, and so on are no more than mere names so far as the object in which we place them is concerned, and that they reside only in the consciousness." (Husserl, likewise, regards tastes, odors, colors, etc. as "specific sense qualities" (or sinnliche Fülle) given in acts of consciousness.)

43 Discoveries and Opinions, 273.
45 Discoveries and Opinions, 274, emphasis added.
46 Discoveries and Opinions, 274, emphasis added.
Yet Galileo is not content to leave stand the simple affirmation of "secondary qualities" as appearing to consciousness. Rather, he takes the further step, as Husserl claims, of attributing the cause of these qualities to changes in the shapes (the primary qualities) that are "really already out there now."47

To excite in us tastes, odors, and sounds I believe that nothing is required in external bodies except shapes, numbers, and slow or rapid movements.48

From his statement of this general doctrine, Galileo gives very brief suggestions (rather than full-blown arguments) that the secondary qualities of most of the senses are attributable to changes in the shapes of particles of earth, water, and air. He then returns to the specific issue of heat, arguing that heat is caused in us by a multitude of minute fire particles "having certain shapes and moving with certain velocities."49 From this assertion, it seems, it would be a short step to the mathematization of nature – to systematic demonstrations of correspondences between changes in the basic ideal shapes and the shapes of the earth, water, air, and fire particles. Once the demonstrations of these basic correspondences are established, the road would be paved toward a total, infinite systematically constructable horizon of causality (or inductivity as Husserl prefers).

Oddly, however, Galileo’s claim that secondary qualities are derivable from the motions of shapes (primary qualities) plays little or no role in the argumentation of the Assayer itself. This is so, despite Galileo’s strong claim in that work that

The book [of the universe] cannot be understood unless one first learns to comprehend the language and read the letters in which it is composed. It is written in the language of mathematics, and its characters are triangles, circles, and other geometric figures.50

While Galileo does briefly dispute with Grassi as to whether the paths of the comets are "irregular lines" (where he infers that Grassi is ignorant of the geometry of the "regularity" of spirals and ellipses), this

47 "When Galileo pronounced secondary qualities to be merely subjective, he meant that they were not ‘already out there now real.’" (Insight, 277)
48 Discoveries and Opinions, 276.
49 Discoveries and Opinions, 277.
50 Discoveries and Opinions, 278.
is about as close as Galileo comes in *The Assayer* to any employment of the mathematical language in which the book of the universe is written. In fact, geometrical demonstrations play virtually no role in any of Galileo’s major astronomical writings, from his *Starry Messenger* to his *Letters on Sunspots*, to his *Letter to the Grand Duchess Christina*. Among his writings on astronomical matters, only in the *Dialogues Concerning the Two Chief World Systems* does systematic mathematics enter, and even there only sporadically. Moreover, in the relatively few passages where properly geometrical arguments enter in, Galileo’s employment of mathematical reasoning in the *Two Chief World Systems* is much more a matter, as Husserl put it, of being “practically applied to the world of sense experience” (24) than of the “idea of a nature which is constructively determinable in the same manner in all its other aspects” (32). Hence, we are left to ponder just how central was Galileo’s ideal of the mathematization of nature to his actual science of astronomy.

*The Assayer* itself, however, enjoyed immense popular success. It was dedicated to Galileo’s friend, the recently elevated Pope Urban VIII, who was delighted with it. Ironically, both the popular success and the Pontiff’s reaction may well have led Galileo to abandon caution in the composition of his fateful *Dialogue Concerning the Two Chief World Systems* published nine years later.

**LONERGAN’S GALILEO:**

**DIALECTICAL FIGURE OF POSITION AND COUNTER-POSITION**

Finally, we turn to Lonergan’s figuration of Galileo. Lonergan also paid considerable attention to the importance of the primary/secondary qualities distinction in Galileo’s bequest to history. Like Husserl, Lonergan also found something deeply problematic in Galileo’s distinction as the source of a concealment (or “cover story” as I would call it). Lonergan paraphrases Galileo’s articulation of the distinction in the following terms:

Galileo distinguished between secondary and primary qualities. Secondary qualities were merely subjective appearances that arise in an animal’s senses as a result of the action of otherprimary
qualities; such appearances were illustrated by color as seen, sounds as heard, heat as felt, tickling as experienced, and the like. Primary qualities, on the other hand, were the mathematical dimensions of the real and objective, of matter in motion.51

However, Lonergan detects in Galileo’s distinction a cover story that operates so as to subtly conceal something of great importance. According to Lonergan, the so-called mathematical primary qualities are not genuinely mathematical at all. They are “impoverished replica” shapes (Insight, 111), and as such, they are to be classified as “specific sense qualities” (sinnliche Fülle in Husserl’s terms) just as much as are color, sound, odor, taste, heat, and texture:

For us, on the other hand, there is to be drawn the same distinction between extension and duration...as there is to be drawn between...colors or sound or heat...As experiential conjugates, extensions and durations are defined as correlatives to certain familiar elements within our experience (108).

Shapes as such are simply components of the objects of visual, sense-consciousness. Galileo’s shapes are the outline of what things “look like.” To proclaim them as “primary” is, in Lonergan’s view, merely an arbitrary privileging of one type of “secondary quality” over all the others.52

If some data are to be understood, then all are to be understood;...it follows that no exception is to be made for experienced extensions [shapes] or for experienced durations; and this conclusion implies a shift from a Galilean...viewpoint.53

Lonergan is able to detect this arbitrary privileging and

51 Insight, page references hereafter cited as Insight in parentheses. Lonergan’s inclusion of tickling in this account demonstrates that either he was reading directly from The Assayer, or else that he was relying upon an exceptionally exact paraphrase. See Discoveries and Opinions, 275.

52 While Lonergan’s discernment of the subtle difference between sensible shape and intelligible content enabled him to recognize that Galileo had arbitrarily privileged extension, shape, etc., in order to explain why, one needs to refer to Lonergan’s dialectic of body and thing. See Insight, 270-79.

53 Insight, 127. See also 108: “The explanation of data consists in a process from experiential conjugates towards pure conjugates. Therefore, from extensions and durations as experienced, there must be a process to extensions and durations as implicitly defined by empirically established laws.”
concealment because of his breakthrough discovery of the distinctive act of consciousness that he called "insight." In brief, Galileo was guilty of an "oversight of insight." While this concealment was given a fateful twist by Galileo, it neither originated nor ended with him: perennially the act of insight "seems to merit the little attention that commonly it receives" (Insight, 3). In his own phenomenological investigation of the structure of consciousness (or "intentionality analysis" as he later called it), Lonergan explored the subtle but pervasive role insights play in the whole of human consciousness, their pattern of relationships with a wide variety of other distinctive acts of consciousness, and especially the unique character of the noematic contents of insights. First and foremost, neither the act of insight nor its noematic content is reducible any act of sensation or imagination ("fantasy" in Husserl's terms). Rather, insight is a "supervening act" (Insight, 3), which is to say that it operates with a quality of consciousness discontinuous with the type of consciousness characteristic of sensation or imagination. (Lonergan repeatedly invokes the metaphor of "levels" and characterize insights as occurring on the "second level" of consciousness; acts of sensation and imagination occurring on the "first level." See for example Insight, 299.)

Because the noetic act of insight is discontinuous with acts of sensation and imagination, so also is its noematic content. The content (or "object") of an insight is radically non-sensible, non-imaginable, non-representational; the object of insight is "reached only by severing the umbilical cord that tied them to the maternal imagination" of humankind (Insight, 15). In order to maintain this radical distinction between the noematic contents of insights and the contents of other acts of consciousness, Lonergan uses the terms "intelligibility" or "the intelligible."

Lonergan applied his intentionality analysis and these findings to the fields of mathematics. Among his results: what is properly and centrally mathematical, is a non-sensible, non-imaginable intelligibility. Mathematics is overwhelmingly concerned with the investigation of intelligible relations. In particular, geometry is not a study of shapes.

Shapes are intrinsically sensible or at least imaginable; but “points and lines cannot be imagined” (Insight, 32, emphasis added). On the other hand, points, lines, and other geometrical magnitudes are intrinsically intelligible, and as such they can be understood and conceived. From Lonergan’s perspective, Galileo’s great failure is his failure of differentiation. He is like the succeeding generations of mathematicians and “physicists [who] move easily and unconsciously back and forth between the use of experiential and [purely intelligible] conjugates” (Insight, 104). As a result, Galileo overlooks the numerous imaginative residues, for example, in the geometry of Euclid’s Elements that, as Husserl points out, formed the inherited background of Galileo’s thought, and he privileges these imaginative residues as the “really real.”

These imaginative residues had to be weeded out in the unfolding of the history of mathematics. Lonergan regarded David Hilbert’s method of implicit definition as the culmination in the twentieth century of this process of severing the illegitimate and concealing dependence upon the non-intelligible to characterize the intelligible (Insight, 37). The philosophical significance of Hilbert’s achievement was to reveal that mathematics is overwhelmingly a matter of the investigation of intelligible relations; it is not primarily or foundationally a study of ideal-shapes from which relations are then derived. As Lonergan puts it,

[No insight can be expressed by a single term…for every basic insight there is a circle of terms and relations, such that the terms fix the relations, the relations fix the terms, and the insight fixes both (Insight, 36).]

In this refined investigation of intelligible relations, the “terms” so defined are what Lonergan calls “explanatory conjugates.” “Pure (or explanatory) conjugates …are correlatives defined implicitly by empirically established correlations, functions, laws, theories, systems” (Insight, 103). Set against the background of Lonergan’s analysis, it

55 See, for example the notes on Euclid’s demonstration of Proposition 1.1 in Thomas Heath, ed., Euclid’s Elements, vol. 1 (New York.: Dover Publications, 1956), 234-43. More telling still is the difficulty in defining “straight line” in strictly intelligible terms. Heath remarks still is the difficulty in defining “straight line” in strictly intelligible terms. Heath remarks that Euclid’s own definition appears to be a new departure from an earlier definition that “implicitly appeals to the sense of sight,” although I would claim that Euclid had not yet successfully executed a complete break with sense and imagination (see 165-66).
is clear that Galileo went too far in surreptitiously assimilating shapes (primary qualities) to the exalted "mathematical language of the universe."

This is not to say that, for Lonergan, the intelligible is limited to the realm of mathematics while "our everyday life-world [Lebenswelt]" is merely, as Husserl puts it, "the one that is actually given through perception, that is ever experienced and experienceable" (Krisis, 48-49). For Lonergan the life-world of common sense and description itself is also permeated by insights and intelligibility. The life-world cannot dispense with insights nor with non-experienceable intelligibility, because intersubjective communication relies upon intelligibility. Communication of descriptive or experiential language depends not only upon contents of acts of sensation, but also upon insights that grasp the "relations of things to our senses" and interests.⁵⁶ As Husserl implies, the sensible content of my act of sensation is not as such necessarily given to the consciousness of another human. Therefore our intersubjective communication requires something that rises above merely individual sense consciousness, namely consciousness of intelligibility in insight. Yet in commonsense descriptive and experiential language, the sensible and the intelligible remain fused and undifferentiated.

Experiential conjugates are correlatives whose meaning is expressed, at least in the last analysis, by appealing to the content of some human experience.

Thus 'colors' will be experiential conjugates when defined by appealing to visual experience...For the experiential conjugate is either a content of experience, such as seen red or touching extension, or else a correlative to such a content, for instance red as seen or extension as touched, or finally ...the red that could be seen or the extension that could be touched (Insight, 102-103).

What Lonergan says elsewhere regarding the distinction between nominal and explanatory definitions (35) can also be applied to that between experiential and explanatory conjugates: it is not that explanatory conjugates suppose insight and intelligible content while experiential conjugates do not. Both are conjugates; as such, both are constituted by conjoint, intelligible relations with their partner. What is different

⁵⁶ See Insight, 536, 201, emphasis added. Lonergan uses the phrase "experiential conjugates" to refer to this dimension of language.
is the kind of intelligible relation and the paired term. Commonsense, descriptive, and experiential conjugates rest upon insights that grasp things as intelligibly related to our senses and the concerns of our everyday life-world. Hence it is easy to notice the experiential elements and overlook the intelligible elements in the Lebenswelt. (To anticipate, this constitutes a major difference between Lonergan and Husserl and, hence, in their figurations of Galileo.) Explanatory conjugates, on the other hand, rest upon insights that grasp things as intelligibly related to one another. Explanatory relations include but go beyond relatedness to direct sense experiences and practical interests of the life world (Insight, 419, 536-37).

Lonergan nevertheless held Galileo in the highest esteem for a quite distinct achievement, one that was fatefuly hidden by Galileo's primary/secondary qualities distinction.

Where we distinguished between experiential and pure conjugates, Galileo distinguished between secondary and primary qualities...Hence, while we would place scientific progress in the movement from experiential to pure conjugates, Galileo placed it in the reduction of the merely secondary qualities to their real and objective source in primary qualities (Insight, 107).

This comment on Galileo also points to a subtle difference between Husserl and Lonergan. For Husserl the advance of modern science consists in the approximation toward exactness of the measurement or re-construction of the sensible by the ideal. But complete exactness is only obtainable in the realm of ideal shapes. Ideal shapes are “limit-shapes” to which sensible and imaginative (fantasy) shapes approximate but never attain. For Lonergan, on the other hand, exact measurement and re-construction of sensible shapes is not the objective of scientific method. Rather, measurements are steps along the way toward the genuine objective of classical science, namely the discovery of explanatory correlations among data (including the data of extensions, i.e., shapes themselves) (Insight, 68).

It is perhaps surprising to learn, therefore, that Lonergan regards none other than Galileo himself as the originator of the quest for explanatory relations. “Galileo’s law of falling bodies...is a model of scientific procedure...Galileo supposed that some correlation was to be found between the measurable aspects of falling bodies” (Insight,
57-58, emphasis added). Moreover, Lonergan regards Galileo as bequeathing not only some vague quest for explanatory relations, but just as importantly Galileo inaugurated a methodical, heuristically structured way of seeking insights into explanatory relations. Lonergan calls this heuristic "classical." It begins with and takes its direction from the heuristic suppositions and anticipations of an undetermined correlation to be found. From its inception in the work of Galileo, this heuristic develops into a long and rich heritage.

Such in brief are the anticipations constitutive of classical heuristic structure. The structure is named classical because it is restricted to insights of a type most easily identified by mentioning the names of Galileo, Newton, Clerk-Maxwell, and Einstein (Insight, 69).

In his own investigations, including but extending beyond his investigation of the classical correlations constitutive of natural free-fall, Galileo himself drew upon the theory of proportions to structure his heuristic anticipations and methodical his search. The theory of proportions permeates his greatest contribution to modern science, his Discourses and Mathematical Demonstrations Concerning the Two New Sciences.57 This is already evident in his first rigorous demonstration of the proposition that:

If a movable equably carried with the same speed passes through two spaces, the times of motion will be to [are proportional to] one another as the spaces passed through (Insight, 192).

Today we would express this theorem in algebraic symbolism by saying, "\( t_1 : t_2 :: s_1 : s_2 \) for a body moving with constant velocity, \( v \)." Galileo, however, did not yet have modern algebraic methods at his disposal. He relied, instead, upon the geometrical correlations

57 Galileo Galilei, Two New Sciences, trans. Stillman Drake with introduction and notes (Madison: University of Wisconsin Press, 1974). The two new sciences are his investigations "mechanics and local motion." Later Newton would redefine "mechanics" to be precisely the study of motion. See Isaac Newton, The Principia: Mathematical Principles of Natural Philosophy, I, trans. Bernard Cohen and Anne Whitman (Berkeley: University of California Press, 1999), 381-82. (It should be noted that the preoccupation with "exactness" that Husserl traces to Galileo is given perhaps its first explicit articulation in these pages of Newton's text.) However, for Galileo himself, the science of mechanics is the study of structural features of matter, especially their capacities to support weight.
found in Euclid’s *Elements* and Apollonius’s *Conic Sections*, as well as certain innovations of his own (in some cases adapted or borrowed from his contemporaries). His reliance on the *Elements* is apparent in his demonstration of the foregoing proposition. He begins by saying

Let the moveable equably carried with the same speed pass through two spaces AB and BC; and let the time of motion through AB be DE, while the time of motion through BC be EF. I say that space AB is to Space BC as time DE is to time EF [i.e., AB : BC :: DE : EF].

Galileo’s manner of stating what is to be demonstrated and his manner of proceeding conforms precisely to the six components in the stereotyped format of an Euclidean demonstration. More to the point, in his demonstration of this theorem, Galileo invokes exactly the definition of proportions found in Definition 5, Book V of the *Elements*. As Stillman Drake observes, Galileo’s use of this generalized definition of proportion permits Galileo a considerable advance over Aristotle’s analysis. Originally developed by Eudoxus and preserved in Euclid’s *Elements*, this definition correlates and compares given magnitudes within a wider horizon of magnitudes constituted by “any equimultiples whatever.” (Note that “magnitude” here corresponds to what Lonergan calls an “explanatory conjugate,” and not at all to the “experiential conjugate” or primary quality of “shape.”)

Following this theorem, Galileo proceeds in a *tour de force* to demonstrate a vast array of propositions, including: that the time to traverse a distance by uniform acceleration from rest is equal to that by uniform speed at half the final velocity; that the distance traveled in

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58 Two New Sciences, 192. To be precise, this is the converse of what he said was to be demonstrated. However, since proportions convert validly, the demonstration is valid if not rigorous. For the difficulties and possible resolution of treating time as a measurable magnitude, see Patrick H. Byrne, “What Is Science? A Contribution to Dialogue” in *The Dialogue Between Science and Religion: What We Have Learned from One Another* (Scranton, PA: Scranton University Press, 2005), 120-123.


60 Two New Sciences, 148.

natural free fall (i.e., uniform acceleration) are in the same proportion as the squares of the times; the proportions between times and distances for a complex series of ramp arrangements; and that the natural motion of a projectile is parabolic. Indeed, Galileo's deployment of the theory of proportions in the Two New Sciences, unlike any of his earlier writings including The Assayer, displays the "free, systematic, a priori thinking" that Husserl sees as so valuable in the Renaissance spirit.

Galileo's mathematical science underwent extensive subsequent refinements, first by the transformation from a geometrical conception of the theory of proportions into an algebraic, analytical geometry by Descartes, Wallis, and Newton, and then later into far more general theories of functions and differential relations. But the establishment of a heuristic anticipation (or "classical heuristic structure") of an unknown correlation from within some field of systematically related explanatorily correlations was Galileo's lasting achievement according to Lonergan.

What is to be known inasmuch as data are understood is some correlation or function that states universally the relations of things not to our senses but to one another. Hence the [classical] scientific anticipation is of some unspecified correlation to be specified, some indeterminate function to be determined; and now the task of specifying or determining is carried out by measuring, by tabulating measurements, by reaching an insight into the tabulated measurements, and by expressing that insight through some general correlation or function that, if verified, will define a limit on which converge the relations between all subsequent appropriate measurements (Insight, 68).

Regrettably, this great "positional" achievement was concealed and distorted by Galileo's "counter-positional" distinction between primary and secondary qualities.

Galileo discovered our law of falling...Correctly he grasped that explanation lies beyond description, that the relations of things to our senses must be transcended, that the relations of things to one another must be grasped, and that a geometrization of nature

62 Two New Sciences, 165-224.
64 On the meaning of "position" and "counter-position" for Lonergan, see Insight, 413..
is the key tool in performing this task. Still, Galileo did not cast his methodological discoveries in the foregoing terms. Instead of speaking of the relations of things to our senses, he spoke of the merely apparent, secondary qualities of things. Instead of speaking of the relations of things to one another, he spoke of their real and objective primary qualities, and these he conceived as the mathematical dimensions of matter in motion.

Thus Galilean methodology is penetrated with philosophic assumptions about reality and objectivity and, unfortunately, those assumptions are none too happy (Insight, 153).

(I would go beyond Lonergan’s own words and say that Galilean methodology was infected with counter-positional philosophic assumptions.)

Most fearfully, in Lonergan’s view, is that this counter-position gave rise to the ideology of mechanist determinism. “Mechanist determinism had its scientific basis in the Galilean concept of explanation as the reduction of secondary to primary qualities” (Insight, 138; see also 128). The reason for this, according to Lonergan, is that “Galilean laws of nature are not conceived in abstraction from sensible or, at least, imaginable elements and, consequently that the Galilean law stands in the field... in which abstract laws and imaginable elements can [unconsciously] combine” (Insight, 153). This leads to the illusion, the “extra-scientific opinion,” (Insight, 109, 424) that the laws of physics, the classical correlations alone, adequately and comprehensively explain and govern the entirety of all natural phenomena.

From this concreteness of the conception of natural laws...there results a mechanistic view of the universe. For, in the abstract, classical laws possess universality and necessity. The Galilean acknowledges this universality and necessity but cannot recognize its abstractness. For him, it is attached immediately to imaginable particles...For him it is already concrete, and so it is not in need of further determinations to reach concreteness...

A machine is a set of imaginable parts, each of which stands in determinate systematic relations to all the others. In like manner, the universe, implicit in Galilean methodology, is an aggregate of imaginable parts and each is related systematically to all the others...apart from the universe of imaginable elements, what imaginable interventions can arise? Mechanism accordingly becomes a determinism (Insight, 153-54).
By referring to the “abstractness of classical laws” Lonergan intends to contrast the difficulty of coming to understand classical correlations with the far greater difficulty involved in reaching correct, complex understandings of the data delivered to our senses by the natural processes of the universe. It is not that the classical laws constitute “impoverished replicas” of the richly detailed intuitive contents of our sense experiences (Insight, 111). To the contrary, the insights into classical correlations enrich the field of sensible data by going beyond and adding intelligibility to what is known in sense perception alone (Insight, 112). Yet it remains that even the enriching of sense data by the intelligibility of classical correlations is still only abstract. This is because additional insights and intelligibilities are needed to achieve adequate understandings of concrete natural occurrences.

[II]t will be well to ask just how far the full realization of classical anticipations would bring the scientist towards an adequate understanding of data...discussions of this topic seem to have suffered from an oversight of insight....[for insight] is needed in the reverse process that applies known laws to concrete situations (Insight, 70).

Lonergan’s keen intentionality analysis discerns the presence of additional insights in scientific thought, over and above insights into classical correlations. These additional insights are needed to determine which laws should be selected and applied to concrete data, how those laws are to be combined, and what measurements need to be preformed to particularize the selected and combined laws (Insight, 70). It is commonly assumed that the explanation of every natural process is already “implicit” in such laws. All that remains to be done is “working out logical consequences.” This assumption is quite flawed and misleading. No one would accord either Galileo or Newton the high esteem they enjoy if they had done no more than announce their basic laws of motion, and then stop with the remark “the explanation of the universe follows logically.” The mere enunciation of their laws would occupy no more than a single page. It is the hard work of working out of detailed implications that earned the great reputations. Yet “implications” can be a misleading word because it suggests results that come from these laws (classical correlations) solely by means of the deductive procedures of formal logic. In fact when scientists work out implications, both the laws and the strict procedures of formal logic
must be supplemented, sometimes extensively, by insights into concrete situations. These further insights are required to understand how the laws have to be combined. In most cases of concrete application, the very same law has to be reiterated many times in ever varying combinations; it is these further concrete insights that guide such assemblies. When Galileo demonstrates that the motion of terrestrial projectiles follows a parabolic path, for example, his success depends upon the concrete way in which he combines his law of uniform motion with his law of uniformly accelerated motion (as well as with several less obvious correlations). If classical correlations enrich mere sense data, insights that combine and apply classical correlations enrich both. These additions are needed because even simple projectile motion or simple orbital motions are already intelligibly complex, and natural reality, in all its intelligible concreteness, is still more complex.

Lonergan’s attention to this ongoing creative dimension of the practice of scientists – ever adding concrete insights – humanizes the figure of the scientist as subject. In this fuller figuration, the scientist is not merely bound by the iron laws of logic, nor does he or she arise above his or her concrete subjectivity to a “view from nowhere.” In this figuration of the scientist, he or she ever creatively and hopefully seeks understanding she or he does not yet know. In this way, something like what Husserl called the Lebenswelt is recognized, not only as the forgotten origin and meaning of scientific practice, but as actually alive and operative in and through scientific practice itself – but unnoticed.

The counter-positional primary/secondary qualities distinction and its mechanist determinism conceal the ways in which actual scientific practice is constituted by these insights into the concrete. The counter-position leads to “oversight of insight.” As a result, both the concreteness “attached immediately to imaginable particles” and also the additional concrete intelligibilities are regarded as “implicit” in the classical correlations themselves. But intentionality analysis grasps the classical correlations for what they are in themselves, as distinguishable from the additions of imagination and concrete insights. This distinctness, their own proper contribution to the enrichment of knowledge, is what Lonergan has in mind in referring to classical laws as “abstract.”

The counter-position of mechanist determinism propagates oversight of the proper nature and quality of classical correlations. This overvaluation of classical correlations, in turn, led to the assumption
that all nature can be explained as “systematic process.” Lonergan’s separation of classical laws from the accompanying elements from imagination and concrete insights, however, frees thought for the realization that “a quite different [non-systematic] type of process not only can be constructed” from classical correlations “but also probably can be verified” (Insight, 71).

As with Husserl, Lonergan’s Galileo is also concealer. His account of the primary qualities grounds a broad, ideology of a totalizing, self-sufficient “mechanist determinism” that is largely responsible for the “oversight of the insight.” This also means that Galileo is at least implicitly responsible for concealing the need for, and even the possibility of, a second scientific heuristic, namely statistical heuristic method. Worse still, once that method did arise, the legacy of Galileo obscured its true scientific character, and suppressed the way it would call for humility on the part of scientists by minimizing and limiting classical method. The ideological counter-position of mechanist determinism was responsible for a delay and a devaluation of statistical heuristic method. As a result, mechanist determinism repressed the non-systematic dimensions of that Lonergan called the “womb of novelty” so intrinsic to nature (Insight, 75). One way of critiquing modernity is to say that it consisted in the assumption that classical method was the only method needed. But classical method makes no provision for the non-systematic negativity of the statistical, or for the creative dimensions of emergence and development, or for the deeper negative absurdities of the dialectical human condition. Modernity led to a great deformation of Western culture by its unintelligent endeavors to force these non-systematizable aspects of natural and human existence into too narrow a mold. Postmodernity, with its harbingers in Romanticism and Expressivism, is the cultural attempt to break out of this iron cage of modernity. But we may be justified in worrying about the ways that postmodernity’s ways of critiquing modern science are unintelligently sweeping away the normative, positional achievement of the classical research tradition that is also part of Galileo’s legacy.

Once intentionality analysis had freed it from the counter-positional elements, Lonergan could take Galileo’s classical heuristic method to be the first of the four great heuristic methods of modern thought that pertain to “any field of data” (Insight, 509-510). But Lonergan was well aware that these four heuristics alone would not be sufficient to offset
the counter-positional dangers set in motion by the primary/secondary qualities distinction.

If the sciences of nature can be led astray by the blunder that the objective is, not the verified, but the ‘out there’, so also can the human sciences; but while this blunder in physics leads to no more than the ineptitude of Galileo’s primary qualities and Newton’s true motion, it leads to zealous practitioners of scientific method in the human field to rule out of court a major portion of the data (Insight, 260).

It is for this reason that Lonergan added to the four methods an “integral heuristic structure” grounded in a self-critical intentionality analysis (or “self-appropriation”) that is needed to meet the contemporary challenge of history (Insight, 509, 416-17). Moreover, for Lonergan, what is most fundamental and common to both the practices of these scientific methods and to the Lebenswelt itself is the pure, unrestricted desire for being and the good that is manifested in human questions (Insight, 372). For Lonergan, therefore, the figure of Galileo stands as the head not only of the classical heuristic method itself, but even as a tributary to Lonergan’s own project to provide a method to mediate the finality of the universe and human history, in Insight and beyond to Method in Theology. Where Newton, Langrange, D’Alembert, Euler, Clerk-Maxwell, and Einstein successively transformed classical heuristic method itself, Lonergan transformed the entire tradition into a method adequate to the mediations of the human sciences, philosophy, and theology.

CONCLUSION

It is perhaps surprising that both Lonergan and Husserl pass over in silence the conflict between Galileo and the Roman Catholic authorities. It may be that each, in his own way, recognized the ideological dimensions of the Enlightenment’s figuration of Galileo as concealing the deeper and more ominous dialectics. The closest Lonergan comes to commenting on this controversy is in his suggestions that regarding either the earth or the sun as “the true center” of the cosmos misses the point. It is the rise of a de-centering explanatory exigence that poses
the deeper challenge. Like Lonergan, Husserl regards the unresolved cultural consequences of an illegitimate privileging of primary qualities ("shapes") as among the most serious challenge and source of decline for contemporary humanity.

While there are striking parallels between Lonergan’s and Husserl’s figurations of Galileo, there are also important differences. For one thing, Husserl’s account of the figure of Galileo forms an unbroken, continuous whole through some forty pages, while Lonergan’s account is discontinuous, parceled out into various parts of *Insight*, and must be reconstructed. Once that reconstruction is completed, one finds that for Husserl what makes the objects of mathematics be ideal is their impossibility of exact construction from sense perceivable shapes, and in addition, the “open infinite horizon” of their own properly ideal realm. What makes the intelligible be intelligible for Lonergan, on the other hand, is the disproportion between the level of experiencing and that of intelligence. Thus, with Husserl by comparison, one is always left with the sense that the ideal-shape is just like the sensible shape in the sense of being a shape, but only highly refined – merely a highly “impoverished replica” in Lonergan’s terms (*Insight*, 111). For Husserl a “perfect” circle or triangle which (a) cannot be constructed out of actual (real) uneven sensible shapes and (b) no finite combination of ideal shapes could exactly reproduce or reconstruct the irregularities of sensible shapes.

From this, it seems, follows a crucial divergence between Lonergan and Husserl about the status of mathematical sciences and their relationships to human life. For Husserl the only real world is “the one that is actually given through perception, that is ever experienced and experienceable – our everyday life-world [*Lebenswelt*]” (48-49). For Lonergan, on the other hand, the real world is “what is to be known” in the totality of correct understandings and true, unconditioned affirmations. The real world is itself intrinsically and completely intelligible (if not “ideal” in Husserl’s exact sense). Experienceability is a factor, but not the decisive one in what counts as real. Objective reality of the natural world is whatever is the actual intelligibility of the experienceable data, known in any and all unconditional affirmations of insights into sense experiences. This means, first of all, that the everyday life-world (Lonergan’s “common sense as object”) itself

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65 *Insight*, 319-24, 498.
The Figure of Galileo

has intrinsically intelligible ("ideal") components. It also means that the intelligibilities of mathematical physics, to the extent that they come to be unconditionally verified, are also constituents of the "only real world" that is. Where Lonergan converges with Husserl is in the recognition that the concreteness of the real world differs in profound ways from the abstractness of Galileo's merely classical and systematic intelligibility. His is in solidarity with Husserl's lament over the reduction and concealment of the intersubjective, complex, non-systematic, unpredictable, and tragic dimensions of the Lebenswelt.

It is well, then, that we reflect upon the figure of Galileo. In many ways he is the figure of the modern subject, a subject we ourselves embody. The figure of Galileo shows us who we are, discoverers and concealers, selves living out a dialectical mixture of position and counter-position in a culture irreversibly permeated by the achievement as well as the cover story of modern science, hoping to live authentically in a scientific culture and simultaneously alienated from the sources that would enable us to do so. Such reflections, especially as guided by Lonergan's life's work, ground a hope for living authentically in a scientific or any other culture that searches not for a human figure such as Galileo, but for the Transfigured One.
RELIGIOUS EXPERIENCE AND EXPRESSION IN LONERGAN

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I. THE PRIVILEGING OF RELIGIOUS EXPERIENCE

My intention in this article is to study the topic of religious experience and its relationship to expression in the thinking of Bernard Lonergan. Let me begin, however, by drawing attention to a clear privileging of religious experience over expression over a wide spectrum of thought: Protestant liberalism, Catholic modernism, Indian religions, contemporary Christian thinking in India.

The problem of experience and its relationship to expression is right at the center of Protestant liberalism and Catholic modernism. Kant had reduced faith to an exercise of practical reason. Against such rationalism, Schleiermacher re-established the value of sentiment and religious experience. It would seem, however, that he ended up reducing the Bible and the Church to mere symbols of the interior religious experience. In the context of the liberal theology that followed, there arose biblical criticism and history of dogma. Critics rapidly came to the conclusion that the Bible was a purely human work, crystallization of the religious experience of the primitive Christian community. Historians began claiming that the dogmas and institutions of the Church were a product of a purely human evolution, and even an adulteration of the original

gospel message. In this context, Catholics like George Tyrrell began suggesting the need to clarify whether revelation consists “in certain divine statements, or in certain spiritual experiences about which man makes statements that may be inspired by those divine experiences, yet are not divine but human statements.”

Liberalism and modernism find surprising echoes among Indian religions. Thus, for example, Advaita Vedanta is largely understood as teaching that when one attains the Supreme Experience, one must drop the sphere of expression – creeds, codes, cults, community structures, even the scriptures themselves. Radhakrishnan notes that religion is the direct experience of the divine, and that it cannot be expressed logically or verbally. Every expression of truth is therefore relative. “However perfect and final the revelation may be, when once it enters the realm of human apprehension, it is subject to all the imperfections of the human mind.” One who has had the experience no longer belongs to a particular religion, but transcends it. He belongs to an “open community,” an “invisible church.” In a more extreme way, Vipassana, the ancient Buddhist technique of meditation, teaches that the mind is a liar: get rid of images, concepts, words, propositions; stay at the level of pure experience, stay with your breathing, stay with your sensations; the awareness of your breath and the awareness of your sensations cannot be wrong.

The emphasis on experience in the Indian religions and the recovery of the term “experience” in Vatican II have come together to create a

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4 Cited in Maggiolini 230; ibid., 231: Tyrrell conceives of revelation as an interior and personal experience to which every exterior factor, whether historical or theological, is subordinate.
5 The French monk Dom Henri Le Saux, who took the name Abhishiktananda, underwent a severe crisis, when after years of practising Advaita he was told by a Hindu friend that he was on the threshold of the final experience: all he had to do was to let go of his Bible, his mass, his rituals.
9 Urumpackal, Organized Religion, 169.
great emphasis on "God-experience" in the Indian church. Peter Lourdes, an Indian priest-psychologist, expresses the common (theological) mind when he notes that the four C's – Creeds, Codes, Cults, Community – are not the essence of religion, but merely a human necessity. "A religion of four C's is the outer, more superficial core of religion. The inner and more essential core of religion is the religious experience." 10 "The four C's have a purpose. I do not think they are unnecessary: I think they are expendable. Once the purpose is served they can be handled lightly, not with care. Beginners may need the whole gamut of four C's, but only as a starting point not as a destination. Once they reach their destination, they will use the four C's as tools not as lifeboats." 11

The perfect symbol of this emphasis on experience is New Age, with its interesting combination of Western rationalism and Eastern mysticism. Experience and intensity of feeling are all important for New Age. 12 Revelation and authority are out: New Age co-opts within itself all religions and all movements that have no place for revelation and for authority. John Paul II himself has noted that New Age is really a new gnosticism, "that attitude of the spirit that, in the name of a profound knowledge of God, results in distorting His Word and replacing it with purely human words." 13

What I am trying to say is summarized very well by Charles Hefling Jr., who draws a line from Schleiermacher to contemporary theology, Protestant and Catholic, and then goes on to point out that an emphasis on experience fits well with the Zeitgeist of modernity, and also with current ecumenical and interreligious sensibilities:

That all religion is founded on an experience, or a dimension of every experience, with which virtually everyone has some acquaintance and which has come to be expressed in a variety of rites and symbols, stories and doctrines – that, or something like it, is a theme which harmonizes nicely with the privatism that is modernity’s leitmotif. It allows Christian denominations, not

12 Joseph Ratzinger, “Current Situation of Faith and Theology,” L'Osservatore Romano, Weekly English edition (6 November 1996), 5: "The Absolute is not to be believed, but to be experienced. God is not a person to be distinguished from the world, but a spiritual energy present in the universe."
Religious Experience and Expression in Lonergan

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to mention different non-Western traditions, to be regarded as so many brands of the same generic product...Not surprisingly, then, variations on this theme make up the standard repertoire of religious professionals, clergy and academics alike. It is, after all, what the audience likes to hear.\textsuperscript{14}

The question of the relationship between religious experience and expression then is complex and momentous. It is complex, for experience, expression, and religion are primitive terms which are widely controverted. It is momentous, for it has to do with the encounter of cultures and religions, which Joseph Ratzinger has called the intellectual critical point in the new millennium.\textsuperscript{15} If, further, this question and this encounter are linked to questions about the limits and possibilities of reason,\textsuperscript{16} then we can expect an exploration of Lonergan’s thinking on these issues to be both rewarding and illuminating.

II. LONERGAN ON RELIGIOUS EXPERIENCE

2.1 The Early Writings: Grace as Conscious

Lonergan’s early Latin course \textit{De ente supernaturali} (1946) contains a discussion about whether or not grace is conscious and seems to conclude that it is. Quesnell observes:

Lonergan...uses the theorem of the supernatural to account for divine love in human experience and to explain the relation of that love to other conscious, deliberately chosen, morally good actions. He rejects the traditional, almost universal, extension of it to a world of unknowable (unconscious) human spiritual realities. ‘It is hard to admit some quality within our own acts of knowing and willing which is unknowable to us except by divine revelation. Knowing and willing by their nature are knowable and known to the one who is knowing and willing.’


\textsuperscript{16} Ratzinger, “Current Situation of Faith and Theology,” 4-5.
That grace is conscious is of course not surprising for anyone familiar with Method in Theology. However, a peculiar problem is presented by some of Lonergan’s writings of 1963. The substance and subject passage is rather well known: from the being of “substance,” says Lonergan, we can move through prayer to being subjects in Christ Jesus. But what is this being of substance? “The Mediation of Christ in Prayer” says clearly that grace or the life of faith is basically something nonconscious, a “vegetative” life.

2.2 Insight and After: Religious Experience as Experiential Conjugate

Lonergan’s later thinking on religious experience needs to be read in the light of the distinction made in Insight between experiential and explanatory conjugates. Religious experience is an experiential conjugate, where the correlatives are persons or subjects. It should not be surprising then that Lonergan repeatedly speaks about religious experience in terms of intersubjectivity. In a 1954 letter to Crowe, he distinguishes between the viewpoint of theology and the viewpoint of religious experience:

From the viewpoint of theology, it [the order of the universe] is a manifold of unities developing in relation to one another and in relation to God, i.e., metaphysics as I conceive it but plus transcendent knowledge. From the viewpoint of religious experience, it is the same relations as lived in a development


from elementary intersubjectivity (cf. Sullivan’s basic concept of interpersonal relations) to intersubjectivity in Christ...on the sensitive (external Church, sacraments, sacrifice, liturgy) and intellectual levels (faith, hope, charity).

Echoing this, “Theology and Understanding” (1954) contrasts the objective categories of scholastic thought with the more spontaneous intersubjective categories of ordinary human and ordinary religious experience. “Openness and Religious Experience” (1960) describes openness as gift as “the self entering into personal relationship with God.” “Natural Knowledge of God” (1968) speaks of complete being-in-love, the gift of God’s grace, as a religious experience by which we enter into a subject-to-subject relationship with God.

2.3 Method in Theology: Religious Experience as Conscious Though Not Necessarily Known

The 1968 course Transcendental Philosophy and the Study of Religion speaks about being-in-love as unrestricted, as the ultimate in self-transcendence, as other-worldly, but does not mention religious experience. By the 1969 course, however, Lonergan clearly speaks of being in love with God as an experience, as a conscious dynamic state of love, joy, peace. The important thing here is the use of the distinction between consciousness and knowing: religious experience is conscious but not necessarily known.

25 Bernard Lonergan, Method in Theology (Institute at Regis College, Toronto, 7-18 July 1969) Graham transcript 176. The 1968 course contains a chapter on religion, with a section on religious values and another on religious expression. In the 1969 course, the section on religious value is replaced by two sections on self-transcendence and religious experience. With this, the structure and contents of the chapter match those of chapter 4 of Method in Theology.
26 Bernard Lonergan, Method in Theology (Toronto: University of Toronto Press, 1972), 106. My references will be to Method in Theology, since the 1969 text is identi-
How does this compare with a position such as that of Jean Mouroux? In the conclusion to his famous book, Mouroux makes a distinction between Christian life and Christian experience: Christian life is being in relation to God, whereas the Christian experience is grasping of oneself in relation to God. Lonergan instead holds that the state of sanctifying grace is already conscious, that it is precisely an experience, and that with sustained prayerfulness and guidance one might move from this state to a recognition of this state, and to a reaffirmation of one’s commitments. Does Mouroux’s position echo at least Lonergan’s 1963 distinction between the being of substance and the being of subject in Christ Jesus? Not really, because Lonergan’s distinction here is between what is not conscious and what is conscious, where consciousness is understood as infrastructure, whereas Mouroux’s distinction is between what is not conscious and what is known only through faith and hope. Mouroux does in some way admit that an experience is implied in the life of faith and charity, but he adds immediately that faith and charity are not in the first place an experience, rather they are a mysterious divine life inserted into our souls to lead us to God.

Both Mouroux and Lonergan make a distinction between ordinary Christian experience and the mystical experience. The penalty for not doing so, says Mouroux, is either that mystical experience is sidelined, as among Catholics, or that it is made too cheap, with the danger of all

cal to that of *Method in Theology*.

27 Jean Mouroux, *The Christian Experience: An Introduction to a Theology* (London and New York: Sheed and Ward, 1955). It is generally accepted that it was Mouroux’s book that was responsible for having broken the silence that had descended on the concept of experience in Catholic circles after the condemnation of modernism: cf. Maggiolini, 226.


sorts of illusions and pretensions, as among Protestants. Both Mouroux and Lonergan also insist on a continuity between the mystical and the Christian experience. In fact, Mouroux even goes on to insist that there is a sense in which we can speak of knowledge and consciousness even in ordinary Christian experience. I tend to think however that Mouroux’s concerns are better met by Lonergan’s position, chiefly by the distinction between consciousness and knowledge. This distinction allows Lonergan to affirm that the gift of God’s love is something conscious but not necessarily known. It allows him to assert that the gift, though conscious, remains nonetheless shrouded in mystery. It allows him to maintain, perhaps more harmoniously than Mouroux, that there is both a continuity and a distinction between the mystical and the ordinary religious experience.

Von Balthasar on his part insists on the importance of the concept of experience in theology. He makes approving reference to Mouroux’s “penetrating work,” and along with Mouroux he seems to hold that grace, while it can become conscious, need not always be conscious. Thus he can say: “Because this grace is promised and given, the praying person ought indeed to trust even in aridity and in absence of experience.” It seems to me – but I stand open to correction – that von Balthasar does not have Lonergan’s distinction between consciousness and knowledge.

Lonergan’s careful analysis of *experientia-conscientia* as opposed to *experientia-perceptio* also sets him apart from theologians who hold

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32 Mouroux, *The Christian Experience*, 45: the mystical experience is “a supreme experience that deepens and purifies, clarifies, transcends, and crowns a fundamental experience of a more humble nature manifesting itself in a diversity of ways.”
33 H. U. von Balthasar, *The Glory of the Lord: A Theological Aesthetics. I: Seeing the Form* (San Francisco: Ignatius Press, 1985), 219. Regardless how problematic the concept of experience has become in theology, von Balthasar says, it nevertheless remains indispensable when faith is understood as the encounter of the whole person with God. God wants for his Word the response of the whole man. *Fides ex auditu* is not the exclusive model of faith. He maintains that experience is not a state but an event. It is not man’s entry into himself (Einfahren) that can become an experience (Erfahrung), but rather his act of entering into the Son of God, which becomes the experience that alone can claim his undivided obedience.
34 Von Balthasar, 222.
35 Von Balthasar, 418, emphasis mine.
that the immediacy of experience is a question of the subject being in
direct contact with the object.

Lonergan’s distinction between consciousness and knowledge is
perhaps his key contribution to the contemporary discussion of religious
experience. It is this position that allows him to regard grace or the gift
of God’s love as conscious, and yet shrouded in mystery. It is this that
allows him to admit the possibility of a genuine religious experience in
all people, even when not recognized or properly named.

III. LONERGAN ON THE STATUS OF
RELIGIOUS EXPRESSION

If it is true that Lonergan spent all his life introducing history into Catholic
theology, then following him in his thinking about the status of religious
expression will be a rather complex affair. I take the artifice therefore of
following his comments on rationalism, liberalism, and modernism. This
dialectical exercise will lead to a consideration of genetic factors and to
the synthesis achieved in Method in Theology.

3.1 Counterpositions

3.1.1 Rationalism

Lonergan’s thinking on the question of rationalism is simple. He
maintains that there is an analogy of truth: truth includes not only what
human beings can naturally know, but also what exceeds the natural
capacity of human intellect.37 Further, we naturally desire more than
what we can naturally attain: there is a disparity between the proper and
the formal objects of human intellect, and this creates an openness for
accepting a properly supernatural divine revelation.38 Rationalism instead
affirms that only that is true which arises from human understanding and

37 Cf. Bernard Lonergan, De intellectu et methodo (Student notes from the course
given at the Gregorian University, Rome, Spring 1959), 66.
38 The Method of Theology (Summer Institute at Regis College, Toronto, 9-20 July
reflection and from them alone. It therefore excludes the possibility of a divine revelation, in the sense of truths which exceed the capacity of human or created intellect." The Catholic therefore cannot admit the exclusive rationalism of the Enlightenment.

Already in *Insight* Lonergan notes that a supernatural solution to the problem of evil involves a transcendence of humanism, that the hitherto bipolar dialectic becomes tripolar, and that the humanist viewpoint loses its primacy by submitting to its own immanent necessities. Since however not everyone will accept the solution, he projects that there will be a humanism in revolt against the proffered supernatural solution. Such humanism, which rests “on man’s proud content to be just a man,” is obliged to forsake the openness of the pure desire and take refuge in the counterpositions.

### 3.1.2 Liberalism and Modernism

Lonergan’s earlier writings are punctuated by comments on liberalism, modernism and rationalism. *Insight*, for example, declares clearly that modernism, pietism, etc. are rooted in the counterpositions. “[A]s the philosophic counterpositions appeal to experience generally against the yes of rational consciousness, so they appeal to religious experience against the yes of articulate faith.” They fail to grasp that the real is being, and that being is known by the rationally uttered yes of judgment. They insist that we contact reality only on the level of the experience that is prior to all questions and answers.

39 *De intellectu et method*, 66.

40 The Method of Theology (Regis, 1962), 245: “For the rationalist it cannot be a good for the human intellect to hold as true something that no man can possibly know to be true…The mysteries are not to be believed; God is not to be believed when he reveals to us something that lies simply outside the field of possible knowledge.” Cf. also Bernard Lonergan, *Topics in Education*, vol. 10 of Collected Works of Bernard Lonergan (Toronto: University of Toronto Press, 1993), 242-43: People are rationalists “insofar as they refuse to submit their judgments to the wisdom of God and the enlightenment that God can give us by revelation.”


42 *Insight*, 748.

43 *Insight*, 749-50.

44 *Insight*, 756.

45 “Truth, well, it has a certain symbolic value, and the propositions – such as the
In *De methodo theologiae* (1962) Lonergan takes issue with “people like Marcel” who insist on some deeper reality of inner experience which is expressed in the articles of faith, and also with “professors of theology” who think that theology needs to be purged of hellenistic and medieval ontology. Such people exemplify what Lonergan calls a new form of immanentism, which strenuously opposes idealism, not because it has reached the unconditioned, truth, and being, but because it identifies the real with what is experienced.\(^{46}\) However, and this is important to note, Lonergan accuses these “new immanentists” not of theological error but of a lack of development, of intellectual conversion. For error consists in denying what the [First] Vatican Council teaches, but “lack of development or of intellectual conversion consists in the fact that people think it extraordinary, indeed incredible, that they really know the really real” simply by true judgments. This defect is quite rarely and only with considerable difficult amenable to correction. By some ineradicable instinct, we consider to be absolutely sound and solid that sense of reality that we formed as little children before attaining the use of reason. After all, both animality and rationality enter into the definition of man.”\(^{47}\) Liberalism, modernism, and the “new immanence” seem to inbuilt tendencies in human beings.

What is at stake here is the distinction between metaphysics and myth.\(^{48}\) two natures in one person in Christ – no doubt helped the Greeks of the fifth and sixth centuries in their religious experience, but they aren’t very helpful today, and so we can forget about them. Truth is not the decisive thing in the modernist, it is religious experience – intense religious life – and you adapt these propositional symbols to the exigencies of the age.” (Bernard Lonergan, *Understanding and Being*, vol. 5 of Collected Works of Bernard Lonergan [Toronto: University of Toronto Press, 1990], 279. “Take such a view of religion as developed in the nineteenth century, under the influence of Schleiermacher: the religion of the heart. If your heart is all right, your religion is all right; that is the only thing you need bother your head about.” (Bernard Lonergan, *Philosophical and Theological Papers 1958-1964*, vol. 6 of Collected Works of Bernard Lonergan [Toronto: University of Toronto Press, 1996], 119.)

\(^{46}\) Bernard Lonergan, *De methodo theologiae* (autograph typescript of notes for the course given at the Gregorian University, Spring semester 1962, LRI Archives Batch V.1.c.), 45. Lonergan goes on: these people identify reality with what is experienced, and they are of the opinion that they know God, not because they apprehend being by a true judgment, nor because they know God through an intellectual assent of faith to dogmas, but because for them their religious life is as real as all the other aspects of their life.

\(^{47}\) *De methodo theologiae* (autograph 1962), 45.

\(^{48}\) Cf. Bernard Lonergan, *De Deo trino: I. Pars dogmatica* (Rome: Gregorian Uni-
Mythic consciousness experiences and imagines, understands and judges, but it does not distinguish between these activities, and so it is incapable of guiding itself by the rule that the impalpable act of rational assent is the necessary and sufficient condition for knowledge of reality. For it the real is the object of a sufficiently integrated and a sufficiently intense flow of sensitive representations, feelings, words, and actions. 49

If the real is an object of feeling, the truths of faith can be regarded only as mere words or mere symbols, and the Church has to be denied any validity and competence.50 De Deo trino: I discusses the question whether the Church at Nicea went beyond the categories of religious experience to embrace a hellenistic ontology. Such a question, Lonergan points out, has its own presuppositions: "leaving out of account the word of God, it makes a disjunction between religious experience on the one hand and hellenistic ontology on the other." 51 Such presuppositions are proper to rationalists and liberal theologians who regard the word of God as an archaic and perhaps mythical mode of speech; they cannot be

49 Insight 561: Cf. Lonergan's remarks about Dewart: "Dewart does not want propositional truth and so he does not want 'being' or 'existing' or 'that-which-is' or assent to propositions or judgments issuing in propositions. He does very much want the reassuring sense of present reality that can be savored in the earlier phases of cognitional process and, I have no doubt, is to be savored all the more fully if the unpleasant and tiring business of questions, investigations, and possible doubts is quietly forgotten." (Bernard Lonergan, "The Dehellenization of Dogma," in Second Collection, 28-29.) "But it is also obvious that one can have the feeling that someone is present when no one is there. Especially in a world come of age such feelings should be examined, scrutinized, investigated. The investigation may result in the judgment that someone really is there. It may result in the judgment that really no one is there. It may result only in an unresolved state of doubt. But in any case, what is decisive is not the felt presence but the rational judgment that follows upon an investigation of the felt presence." (Ibid., 28)

50 Insight, 743-44. Understanding and Being notes that modernism makes religious experience the ultimate in religion, while it regards the truths, the dogmas of the church, as only symbols. "So long as these symbols serve the experience which is the ultimate criterion, well and good; but when they are out of date, they are simply to be forgotten; the emphasis is on experience (220)."

51 De Deo trino: I 106 = Lonergan, Way to Nicea, 129. Cf. "The Dehellenization of Dogma," in Second Collection, 22: "It is...quite unhistorical to suppose that the development of Catholic dogma was an effort of Christian consciousness to elaborate, not the Christian message, but Christian consciousness."
admitted by anyone who accepts the word of God in faith; neither can they be accepted by an honest historian who seeks to understand the mentality of another age.52

For what Isaiah felt compelled to announce, and Paul to preach, and Athanasius to defend, was not just a personal religious experience, but the word of God, and the categories of religious experience are not the same as those contained implicitly in the word of God. For there is no doubt that the categories derived from religious experience will contain a reference to the subject who has the experience, but ‘the word of God is not tied’, restricted to speaking of things as related to us and unable to speak of things as they are in themselves. For one cannot exclude, a priori, from the range of God’s word anything that can be affirmed or denied through human words, on the ground that a particular kind of affirmation or denial does not fit into the categories of what we call religious experience.53

Lonergan comes back again and again in his writings to the point about judgment. In “Theology as a Christian Phenomenon” (1964), he points out that the revelation given us through Jesus Christ is a revelation given us through statements, and that one can accept those statements only if one is thinking, not on the level of experience or on the level of understanding, but on the level of judgment.54 In the “Dehellenization of Dogma” (1967) he notes that Dewart does not want propositional truth, but very much wants the reassuring sense of present reality that can be savored in the earlier phases of cognitional process.55 But Dewart’s views on truth are not defensible, for “what is decisive is not the felt presence but the rational judgment that follows upon an investigation of the felt presence.”56 In “Unity and Plurality” (1982) Lonergan observes that absence of intellectual conversion leads to misapprehensions not only of the world mediated by meaning but also of the word God has spoken within that world.57

52 De Deo trino: I, 106 = Way to Nicea, 129.
53 Deo Deo trino: I, 107 = Way to Nicea 130. Compare “The Dehellenization of Dogma,” in Second Collection, 22: “It is... quite unhistorical to suppose that the development of Catholic dogma was an effort of Christian consciousness to elaborate, not the Christian message, but Christian consciousness.”
56 Ibid., 28.
57 Bernard Lonergan, “Unity and Plurality,” in A Third Collection: Papers by Ber-
In “Philosophy and the Religious Phenomenon” (1977/78), Lonergan recalls that the problem of the relationship between scriptures and dogmas surfaced both in liberal Protestantism and in modernism and adds that it is surfacing for a third time in the wake of the Second Vatican Council, “when even Catholic theologians find the definition of Chalcedon questionable and wish to change both our traditional understanding of Christ and our profession of faith in Christ.” But where earlier he had accused liberalism and modernism of mythic consciousness, of being rooted in the counterpositions, or as suffering from a lack of intellectual conversion, now he takes up another of his favourite themes, that the problem or crisis is one of understanding, and that problems of understanding are problems of method. He goes on to indicate briefly the ancient roots of the problem: the shortcomings of scholasticism, the sixteenth-century incomprehension of doctrinal development, Catholic opposition to advanced scholarly methods, and the uncritical transposition of scholasticism into the milieu of modern thought. He concludes by noting that what is needed is a methodical way of handling value judgments, as well as an ordering of differences due to development.

Lonergan’s complaints against rationalism, liberalism, modernism, and contemporary theology can be summed up in two main points: they lack intellectual conversion, and they lack an adequate understanding of development. They manifest an inability, in other words, to handle genetic and dialectical factors. Philosophy of God, and Theology makes the point very sharply:

People generally no longer accept or even consider a scholastic metaphysics. The consequence has been that they water down or reject the truths of their faith. This they excuse on the ground that the early church at Jerusalem, Antioch, Corinth, Rome had no interest in metaphysics. This they further excuse on the ground that they have no idea how there could be any development of


revealed truth. But a lack of understanding proves nothing but one’s own incompetence. Before one can judge whether or not a development of revealed truth is possible and legitimate, one had best understand how it could be conceived to be possible and legitimate....This possibility of a development in doctrine arises whenever there occurs a new differentiation of consciousness, for with every differentiation of consciousness the same object becomes apprehended in a different and a more adequate fashion.60

3.2 Differentiations of Consciousness

The consequences of a lack of intellectual conversion have already been handled in Lonergan’s discussions of rationalism, liberalism, and modernism. The implications of an adequate understanding of development may be handled under the rubric of differentiations of consciousness.

“Theology and Understanding,” the review of 1954, distinguishes two patterns of human experience, an experiential mode and a theoretical mode, exemplified in the contrast between feeling compunction and defining it. These two modes set the methodological problem, which consists in determining “the precise nature of each, the advantages and limitations of each, and above all the principles and rules that govern transpositions from one to the other.”61

1. Such transpositions are relevant to positive theology, “to a study of Catholic tradition, for a great part of the evidence for the truths of faith, as they are formulated learnedly today, is to be found in documents not only written in a popular style but also springing from a mind that conceived and judged not in the objective categories of scholastic thought but in the more spontaneous intersubjective categories of ordinary human experience and ordinary religious experience.”62 De intellectu et methodo (1959) notes that the problem of the investigation of the prescientific stages of theology is the biggest problem facing theology today, the fundamental methodological problem.63

2. A study of the transpositions is also relevant to speculative theology:

60 Philosophy of God, and Theology, 57-58.
61 “Theology and Understanding,” in Collection, 127.
62 “Theology and Understanding,” in Collection, 127.
63 De intellectu et method, 65.
it helps us understand that, while experiential modes of thinking have their place not only in religion but also in theology, they cannot be allowed to take over the whole of theology. It is not the task, for example, of speculative theology to stimulate religious feeling; but nonetheless it has the irreplaceable function of knowing God and all things in relation to God, and for this, the human mind “must effect the difficult shift from the familiar categories of intersubjective living to the objective categories in which the notion of being is potentially both completely universal and completely concrete.”

The question about the usefulness and value of scientific theology is taken up again in De methodo theologiae (1962). Lonergan notes that if theology renounces its speculative aspirations, three “rather awkward” consequences follow: its position coincides (1) with Protestant liberal theology such as that of Troeltsch; (2) with the rationalism of Duméry, who declared dogmatics a practical science, and wanted to inaugurate a strictly philosophical critique of religion, especially of Catholicism; (3) with modernism.

3. A study of the transpositions between modes is relevant to the relations between speculative and positive theology. For a personal grasp of the shift from the prescientific to the scientific, from the experiential to the theoretic, will help solve the fundamental problem of the relation between theology and its sources.

Where earlier he has been speaking of two modes, in the courses of 1962 Lonergan makes a distinction between the worlds of common

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64 “Theology and Understanding,” in Collectan. 128.
65 De methodo theologiae (autograph 1962), 10.
66 De methodo theologiae (autograph 1962), 20-21. Referring to a quotation he has given earlier from Marcel, Lonergan asks: “What is the difference, for example, between the above quotation from G. Marcel and Modernism? Both positions insist on some deeper reality of inner experience which is expressed in the articles of faith. Modernism recognizes this inner experience to be the sole origin and cause of religion, Catholic and others. Marcel certainly does not draw this conclusion: that besides what he himself is, there exist those things that he has; as to what he is, there is that deeper reality by way of which he apprehends God as a person and converses with Him; as to what he has, he recites the formulas of faith. Briefly, if one ignores being, if one ignores that true assent of the intellect in which one says ‘It is,’ then there is no apprehending the divinity of Christ – that is, the truth of the assertion, ‘Jesus of Nazareth is God.’” (De methodo theologiae [autograph 1962], 21)
67 De intellectu et method, 59, 57.
sense, theory, and interiority. My hypothesis is that the symbolic or intersubjective or commonsense mode of *De intellectu et methodo* is now differentiated into the world of interiority and the world of common sense. This is a differentiation between the world of immediacy and the world mediated by meaning.

### 3.3 Theological Method as Differentiation and Integration

*De methodo theologiae* (1962) suggests that the solution to the problem of antithetical worlds lies in the direction not of suppression but of integration of worlds. Practically half this course is dedicated to working out the differentiation and integration.

The solution of *Method in Theology* runs basically along the same lines: acknowledgement of the differentiation of consciousness, and integration from the world of interiority. Such integration is a question of constructing the common basis of theory and of common sense that is to be found in interiority, and using that basis to link the experience of the transcendent with the world mediated by meaning.

*Method* provides hints about the differentiation. The shift from a commonsense mode of religious expression to a theoretical mode is necessitated by the tendencies to myth and magic to which common sense is prone. The world of theory however brings in problems of its own, and these necessitate a shift to the realm of interiority. A first problem is lack of intellectual conversion. “When the realm of theory becomes explicit, religion may take advantage of it to bring about a clearer and firmer

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69 *De intellectu et methodo* (1959) also speaks of two modes, the symbolic and the theoretic, plus a “mixed mode,” which Lonergan does not name, but which seems to be common sense. This mixed mode is born of the dialectic between the two principal modes. In another sense, it may also be seen as an extension of the symbolic mode, which is temporally prior. (Lonergan, *De intellectu et methodo* [31-35]) After having made these distinctions, Lonergan tends to refer to the first mode indifferently as the symbolic or the intersubjective or even the commonsense mode. (*De intellectu et methodo*, 56, 57, 59)

70 *Method in Theology*, 114.

71 *Method in Theology*, 258: “If man’s practical bent is to be liberated from magic, if his critical bent is to be liberated from myth, if his religious concern is to renounce aberrations and accept purification, then all three will be served by a differentiation of consciousness, a recognition of a world of theory.”
delineation of itself, its objectives, and its aims. But in so far as intellectual conversion is lacking, there arise controversies.\textsuperscript{72} A second problem is the defects of scholasticism. Aquinas had adopted and adapted Aristotle in his effort to systematize theology. Aristotelianism was integrated but incomplete, especially in its concept of science. Again, scholasticism could not know the importance of history in theology.\textsuperscript{73} A third problem is developments in science and scholarship. Cultural changes in the notion of science, in the notion of scholarship, in philosophy, have made scholasticism no longer relevant. These changes were accompanied by a lack of intellectual conversion and so were commonly accompanied by a hostility to Christianity.\textsuperscript{74} As Lonergan remarked already in 1960, the philosophies stemming from the Enlightenment are not open to revealed truths because they lack an adequate concept of truth.

All these impel philosophy to migrate from the world of theory to the world of interiority. "In this situation philosophy is left with the problems of truth and relativism, of what is meant by reality, of the grounds of theory and of common sense and of the relations between the two, of the grounds of specifically human sciences..."\textsuperscript{75} They call for the development of a new theological method and style, continuous with the old, yet meeting all the genuine exigences of Christian religion and of up-to-date philosophy, science, and scholarship.\textsuperscript{76} Until that need is met, undifferentiated consciousness will always want a commonsense theology. Scientifically differentiated consciousness will drift towards a secularist rejection of religious experience and of religion. Religiously differentiated consciousness will wobble between an exclusive stress on experience and an immanantism or a rationalism. "But the worthy successor to thirteenth-century achievement will be the fruit of a fivefold differentiated consciousness, in which the workings of common sense, science, scholarship, intentionality analysis, and the life of prayer have been integrated."\textsuperscript{77}

As Lonergan says in his remarks on Dewart, maturity is comprehensive: "As it does not deny propositional truth, so it does not disregard or

\textsuperscript{72} Method in Theology, 114.
\textsuperscript{73} "Unity and Plurality," in Third Collection, 246-47. Cf. De methodo theologiae (autograph 1962), 18.
\textsuperscript{74} Method in Theology, 317.
\textsuperscript{75} Method in Theology, 259.
\textsuperscript{76} "Unity and Plurality," in Third Collection, 246-47.
\textsuperscript{77} "Unity and Plurality," in Third Collection, 246-47.
belittle religious experience.” It is ready to claim with Rahner that a mystagogy will play a greater role in the spirituality of the future. It is aware that spiritual advance brings about the diminution and at times the disappearance of symbols and concepts of God. Still, this differentiation and specialization of consciousness does not abolish other, complementary differentiations, and multiplicity is not opposed to integration. The world of immediacy and the world mediated by meaning are both essential to Christianity. Words are vehicles of meaning; revelation is God’s entry into the world mediated and constituted by meaning. Thus religious experience belongs to the world of interiority, the scriptures belong to the realm of common sense, and dogmas and theology belong to the realm of theory. Integration is a question of constructing the common basis of theory and of common sense that is to be found in interiority, and using that basis to link the experience of the transcendent with the world mediated by meaning.

3.4 Religious Experience and Expression

From within the realm of interiority, then, Lonergan proceeds to construct an account of religious experience and expression. He distinguishes between the religious experience that is the “inner word” of God’s love poured gratuitously into our hearts, and the outer word of religious expression that moves through the different realms of common sense, theory, interiority. He repeatedly acknowledges that religious experience can become so overwhelming as to lead to withdrawal from the world mediated by meaning. Images and symbols, thoughts and words lose their relevance and even disappear.

Still, Lonergan insists that words, expressions, language are not something merely marginal to religion. Experience is only an infrastructure within knowing, so while experiences named religious commonly occur, without an adequate interpretative context, they may not even be recognized as religious. Even when one is born into

78 “The Dehellenization of Dogma,” in Second Collection, 29.
82 Method in Theology, 114.
83 Method in Theology, 112.
a religious tradition and community, religious experience is not usually objectified. "Perhaps after years of sustained prayerfulness and self-denial...experience of the mystery [may] become clear and distinct enough to awaken attention, wonder, inquiry." Here the importance of the word becomes clear: existing religious expression is a help towards identification of what is happening, celebration of the gift, and a renewed response to it. Like human love, religious love also grows and enters a new phase when given expression.

For many religions, the outer word is a human objectification, a human attempt to give expression to the inner word of God's love. But for Christians the outer word has an additional importance. Christians believe that not only the inner word, but also a specific outer word comes from God. "What distinguishes the Christian, then, is not God's grace, which he shares with others, but the mediation of God's grace through Jesus Christ our Lord." For Christians then, God not only gives his love in the heart, but also expresses that love outwardly in a concrete historical person. If a man and a woman are not fully in love until they express that love to each other, then Christianity believes that God brings us to the fullness of love by expressing his love to us in Jesus Christ.

There is therefore an intimate interaction between religious experience and expression. In the general case, the experience engenders the expression, and the expression in turn plays a crucial role in the identification, celebration, cultivation, and integration of the experience into the rest of human living.

In the particular case of Christianity, however, the interaction between experience and expression takes a different turn. While all that

84 Method in Theology, 113.
86 Method in Theology, 119.
is true in the general case remains true also in the case of Christianity. Christianity, as we have said, also claims that some part of the outer word is God’s own word spoken to us. Divine revelation, as Lonergan puts it, is God’s entry into man’s making of man, into the world mediated and constituted by meaning and motivated by value. The responsibility for the objectification of the religious experience is God’s, though the objectification itself will bear marks also of its human origin, and the “ontological status of the symbols is both human and divine,” in the words of Voegelin quoted by Lonergan.¹⁰

But there is yet another factor to be taken into consideration in the particular case of Christianity: the two-way interaction between the formulation of a “sound philosophy” and divine revelation. Intellectual conversion, or the formulation of a sound philosophy, is conditioned by moral and ultimately by religious conversion. For the formulation of a sound philosophy is a question of successive enlargements of one’s actual horizon; “[b]ut such successive enlargements only too clearly lie under some law of decreasing returns,” for human beings are fallen, and there is need of grace that heals, gratia sanans.¹¹ On the other hand, intellectual conversion also conditions the acceptance, understanding, and reexpression of revelation. For a supernatural revelation cannot be accepted unless the pure desire is given complete freedom; but for this desire to function fully, there are needed not only precepts, methods, criticism, but also a formulated view of our knowledge and of the reality our knowledge can attain. Thus, for example, Lonergan remarks acutely that “the crop of philosophies produced since the Enlightenment are [sic] not open to revealed truths because they possess no adequate account of truth.”¹² Again, intellectual conversion and a sound philosophy condition the understanding of revelation, for in the absence of intellectual conversion, the word of God is misunderstood and distorted. A less than adequate view of knowledge can impose restrictions on the way the gift finds expression.¹³ Finally, a sound philosophy and an adequate method

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¹¹ Bernard Lonergan, “Openness and Religious Experience,” in Collection, 186-87. Lonergan also defends the thesis that historically, Christian revelation has given rise to a critical realism.


¹³ Richard De Smet, SJ, an eminent Indologist, used to point out that Indians are closed to revelation because of certain philosophical positions. Rather than trying to
condition the subsequent expressions of revelation: as we have seen, the
shift from description to explanation is essential if we are to overcome
the tendency to mythic consciousness, and intellectual conversion is
essential if we are to overcome the problems that arise in the wake of the
emergence of theory.

IV. LEARNING FROM LONERGAN

As far as Christian life is concerned, Lonergan's teaching on religious
experience helps in avoiding the two extremes mentioned by Mouroux:
total neglect of experience in Christian life as has been a tendency in
Catholicism, and the temptation to experience-on-the-cheap as in
Protestant fringes. We are invited to stop hankering after the powerful
experiences of God: they will come when they will, when God wills, if
God wills. We are invited instead to discover the religious experience that
we already have, the gift of God's love that we have already received,
and to allow this love to carry out its transformation of ourselves and of
the world.

As far as theology is concerned, the great advantage of Lonergan
is that he not only advocates a sane balance between experience and
expression but also invites theology to move into the realm of interiority,
which is the realm of experience. We have in Lonergan a call to a truly
experience-based theology, where experience is taken in the totality of
its aspects, emotional, intellectual, moral, and religious. What is even
better is that Lonergan does not presuppose a nonexistent Cartesian
direct access to experience. The only access we have to experience is
a hermeneutical one. It is in and through appropriation of a tradition that
we move towards appropriation of the self and of selves-in-communion.
In Fred Lawrence's words, the coming to light of the concrete self is
at once the coming to light of the tradition. And the fact that all such
appropriation is the work of a community militates against the privatism

fish, change the water, he would say. The task of Christian philosophy is to change the
water. In some such way, though less ecumenical, Lonergan was fond of narrating the
story about how a Japanese village converted when they became convinced of the prin-
ciple of noncontradiction. – My point is that if the view of knowledge is not adequate,
there will be no place for meaning in its cognitive function, no place for true proposi-
tions, no place for revealed truths.
that is the Leitmotif of modernity. So it is perhaps not without reason that Lawrence refers to Lonergan as the integral postmodern.94

As far as Christian theology in India is concerned, we must recall the surprising echoes that we noted in our introduction between the Enlightenment and the religiosity of the Indian subcontinent. Given the great emphasis on “God-experience,” we need to ask: is there perhaps a corresponding watering down of dogmas, and perhaps also of revelation? What is the notion of truth, of being, of objectivity that is operative in any given instance? Is there perhaps lack of intellectual conversion? Is there need of a far closer collaboration between philosophy and theology?

From another angle, we might ask about the crisis of the Enlightenment that goes by the name of postmodernity,95 and the challenge that this poses to any theology that shares the presuppositions of the Enlightenment. At least in India, the exact nature of the crisis has not yet become evident. But perhaps we can indulge in guesswork. (1) If all access is to experience is through the mediation of a tradition, there is a very intimate interrelationship between experience and expression.96 (2) If the history of effects is the only way we can get to the meaning of a text, it follows that there is no direct access to the past. But if that is true, then there is a point to what John Paul II is trying to say in Fides et ratio, that there is no way a new inculturation of the faith can bypass or otherwise wish away the earlier inculturations.97 (3) The liberal, modernist, and contemporary tendency to highlight experience at the expense of expression is therefore questionable. (4) The recovery/discovery of the constitutive role of meaning and of history is not of course enough. One has to explicitly exclude rationalism and immanentism, and affirm the possibility of a supernatural revelation. Postmodernity is itself under the sign of rationalism, immanentism, agnosticism, and relativism,

95 Fred Lawrence has pointed out that Nietzsche and Overbeck, followed by Heidegger, registered the Grundlagenkrise of the Enlightenment. (Fred Lawrence, “Critical Realism and the Hermeneutical Revolution,” paper at the Lonergan Workshop, Boston College, 1990, 6).
and so, as Lonergan himself has pointed out, one cannot indulge here in half-measures. At any rate, theology in India must engage in a post-Enlightenment, postmodern reflection on the limits and possibilities of reason: what are its Selbstverständlichkeiten? What does it take for granted? What basic assumptions must be questioned? What is needed, in other words, is something like dialectic and foundations.

V. POSTSCRIPT

I would like to end by gathering together a few stray thoughts on the theology of religions in the light of our exploration of the theme of religious experience and expression in Lonergan.

The problem of the relationship of Christianity to other religions is not going to be solved by throwing out of Christianity all that seems to be problematic. Firstly, that would be unfair to Christianity. Secondly, it would amount to an elimination rather than to a solution of the problem.

I propose that the theology of religions be based on a careful phenomenology. This will avoid the dangers of mental laziness, the a priori tendency to level down all religions, speaking glibly of many saviors, and so forth. It is simply too inexact and too crude to speak of all religions as having saviors or savior-figures. They do not. The claims made by Hinduism, Buddhism, Christianity, and Islam for Rama and Krishna, for Gautama the Buddha, for Muhammad, and for Jesus, are simply too different to be classified under one category. As Lonergan has said in a slightly different context, “to me it seems a mistaken method to seek generalization before one has tried to understand the particular.”

Lonergan assumes that the inner word of God’s love is given to all. “[T]his gift as infrastructure can be the Christian account of religious experience in any and all men.” “From this basis one may proceed to a general account of emerging religious consciousness, whether universalist, or ecumenist, or ‘bottled effervescence,’ or alienated by secular or ecclesiastical bureaucracy, or seeking the integration of religious awakening with a fuller development of the second enlightenment, or

Coelho

distorted by human obtuseness, frailty, wickedness."{100}

It seems to follow that differences in religions are differences in the outer word.

A key difference is between outer words which claim to be human formulations of the inner word, and outer words which claim to be divine formulations of the inner word. I use the word "claim," because this is still a question of phenomenology, of research, interpretation, history if you please. We need to ask: What does each religion claim about its outer word? What does each religion have to say about the inevitable component of expression?

I anticipate that certain religions will be willing to relativize religious expression, whereas certain others will not.

Within the latter group, a further question becomes relevant: Does this religion contain truths that exceed the capacity of human reason? Is there anything in them that really challenges human reason? Do these religions fit into a "natural theology"? The issue here then is the same as in rationalism: are we willing to allow God to be God? Or will we a priori block off the possibility of truths which exceed the capacity of human intellect? The real problem then seems to be intellectual conversion: What is being? What is truth? and What is objectivity?

The former group is not without its difficulties, however, for besides considering its own expressions as relative, it would go further to consider all religious expression as relative. But can we a priori exclude the possibility of the Absolute entering into human history? Is this not where Indian religions tie in with Western tendencies rooted in the Enlightenment? Advaita rightly relativizes all its conceptions of God, to remain content with the "dissolution into Brahman." But I would take seriously the possibility of the Absolute beyond name and form intervening in the vyavaharika. That is the possibility witnessed to by Christianity, and it is merely abandoning this radical claim when we want to water it down to make it more acceptable.

A theology of religions will probably have a Trinitarian structure. As Crowe has suggested, we must appeal to the two divine missions, and we must also learn to work out the relevance and the implications for theology of the constitutive function of meaning.

All this is of course a very a priori way of proceeding. Lonergan

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100 "Prolegomena to the Study of the Emerging Religious Consciousness of Our Time," in Third Collection, 71.
would probably advocate beginning with the phenomenology: research, interpretation, history. He would maintain that the problems – which are to be expected, which should not be denied, avoided, neglected, but rather faced squarely – will surface at the level of dialectic. He would presume that dialectic would, in an irenic atmosphere, transform itself into dialogue. At the level of dialogue, of course, all the questions about intellectual, moral, and religious conversion would have to be faced. What I have been doing is perhaps anticipating, quite unilaterally, some of the thinking that might emerge. Is this illegitimate? Perhaps not. There is always a dialogue going on within us – the conversation that we are, the ongoing dialectic of question and answer. I have been trying to lay bare, first of all for myself, but also for others, some strands in this dialectic.
THE DEVELOPMENT OF BERNARD LONERGAN’S NOTION OF SCIENCE

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1. INTRODUCTION: THE EMERGENCE OF THE “NEW KNOWLEDGE” IN THE MODERN EPOCH

Lonergan’s interest in the notion of science pervades his entire intellectual life in his double role as student and teacher of theology and as admirer and autodidact in various fields of knowledge: besides philosophy in general and epistemology and methodology in particular, there are youthful engagements with the exact natural science of nature and the later interests in the human and social sciences (especially Piaget). Already from the doctoral thesis\(^2\) (1938-40), Lonergan – in search of a method for leading the mind toward a renewed theology – discovered a point of convergence and of analogy in the natural sciences that get their objectivity from the general a priori schemes of mathematical knowledge, a fundamental premise for the extraordinary progress in the natural sciences, as if the demonstrable pattern of the nature of the human “mind” will be the underpinning for a contemporary theology at the level of its times.\(^3\) To this investigation Lonergan will devote more than thirty years of his life (1938-72). Moreover, in the articles on the Verbum in St.

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1 Contribution made by the author on the occasion of the First International Lonergan Workshop in Rome at the Pontifical Gregorian University, 7-11 May 2001.
Thomas, Lonergan studies at length the Aristotelian notion of science expounded in the Posterior Analytics and prepares the ground for the transition to the heuristic methods proper to the modern sciences, whose structure, as we shall see, contains elements of similarity (the analogy of proportionality) with Thomist philosophy.

It is a well-known fact that with the modern epoch (from the sixteenth to the seventeenth centuries) the so-called new knowledge has arisen: the modern kinds of mathematics, the natural sciences, and the new human sciences. The expression "new knowledge" is intended to indicate not simple additions to already existing disciplines, but a transformation of the ancient conception of the scientific system itself, such that there is constituted a new structure in which the basic concepts of knowledge have undergone a total transformation. Such a transformation, which precisely justifies the use of the term, new knowledge, brings about a change in the very mode of understanding science and in the manner of operating and that is conducive to considering the operations of the modern sciences, in the wake of modern mathematical group theory, as isomorphic groups of operations.

Lonergan assembled and developed this kind of idea in his epistemology, which furnishes an interesting complementary proposal to that of Popper. In his chief philosophic work, *Insight*, the examination of strategic examples drawn from the new knowledge really permits Lonergan to evince the centrality of understanding in human consciousness and of the nature of its activity as irreducible to that of perception and as prior to rational judgment. In particular, mathematics is an expression of human intelligence developed in so far as the review of the various types of mathematics does not touch on their essential aspects but enlarges a viewpoint; in this sense, the mathematical gains are definitive, and one can speak of mathematical systems. In contrast, empirical scientific knowledge is rather an expression of intelligence in its evolution through an empirical method that is intrinsically dynamic by means of the twofold "scissors" procedure that is used in it (i.e., from observable data to laws, and from theoretical hypotheses expressed, e.g., in differential equations to empirical verifications), and hence its results are provisional and continually subject to revision.

In *Insight* Lonergan offers an epistemological framework to a

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great extent articulated from such knowledge, because his interlocutors typically are, on the one hand, Kant and his critical philosophy elaborated in the context of the first modern scientific revolution, and, on the other, the new knowledge that has emerged from the second scientific revolution due both to Einstein (the theory of special and general relativity) and to the discoveries in physics of quantum mechanics.

The epistemological analysis of the new knowledge, however, is repositioned within a broader philosophical finality: the self-appropriation of one’s own rational self-consciousness, that is, the recognition and the possession of those operative structures that characterize subjects as cognitional and existential, which is to say, recognizing and taking possession of our conscious and intentional dynamisms. This goal, as Lonergan expressed it in the original preface to Insight, is like “a peak rising above the clouds,” a new beginning for an authentic development of the human subject.

In this article we gather together Lonergan’s principal conclusions about the structure of modern scientific systems, although we do not want to miss the opportunity to show the connection of all these conclusions to the philosophical goal of self-appropriation.

LONERGAN’S NOTION OF “SCIENCE”

The term “science” is associated by Lonergan with the idea of a logically structured “system,” that is, with a basic group of terms and relations that are defined implicitly by each other (expressed in a different modality: closed circuit, progress in development, open analogy) and from which it is possible to derive other secondary terms and relations that are linked with the data of experience. Basic terms and relations make way for a series of analytic propositions (true by definition); derived terms and relations make way for analytic principles (subject to empirical verification).

A definition so general, applicable in different cultural contexts, leads to identify “scientific systems” characterized by a diverse level in the differentiation of consciousness. Based on the resources of his own

6 Lonergan speaks in different writings about “differentiations of consciousness”
personal itinerary of self-appropriation and of the progressive filling-out of his own cultural horizon, Lonergan at first assumed, and labored in accord with, the general characteristics of the Aristotelian (metaphysical) system; gradually he reflected upon and thematized the modern system of empirical sciences and concomitantly with this he elaborated his own systematic viewpoint based on the analysis of intentionality.

As is well known, the Aristotelian system of science was the basis for the traditional science of theology that Lonergan taught for many years: he became steeped in its characteristics on the occasion of his doctoral thesis and above all in the articles on Verbum in St. Thomas.\(^7\) The system of the sciences that arose in the modern epoch became the

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**Connecting the Cultural and Scientific Acquisitions of a Period in Various Manners to a Different Level of Differentiation of Consciousness.** For instance, in *Topics in Education: The Cincinnati Lectures of 1959 on the Philosophy of Education*, vol. 10 of Collected Works of Bernard Lonergan (Toronto: University of Toronto Press, 1993), 73 ff., speaks about four levels of integration in the historical/cultural development of humanity (undifferentiated common sense, differentiated common sense, classicism, and the differentiation of historical consciousness). In *Method in Theology* (London and New York: Darton Longman & Todd- Herder & Herder, 1972), “Meaning”) there is talk of “stages of meaning”: primitive language, the Greek discovery of mind, second and third stages. We refer in particular to *Philosophy of God and Theology: The Relationship between Philosophy of God and the Functional Specialty, Systematics* (London: Darton Longman & Todd, 1973): in this last writing Lonergan deals with transition from ordinary and literary language to a systematic one and presents the general characteristics of a logical system in three different contexts: the Aristotelian (metaphysical) context, the modern context (empirical science), and the transcendental context (analysis of intentionality). For a comment on this, cf. the already cited book of Crowe, *The Lonergan Enterprise*.

\(^7\) The Aristotelian notion of science is taken up again in the still classical Latin expression: "scientia est certa rerum cognitio per causas." Indeed, Aristotle affirms: “We think of knowing a single object absolutely – not in the already Sophistic accidental way – when we retain the knowledge of the cause, in virtue of which the object exists, knowing that it is the cause of that object, and we believe that with regard to the object it cannot occur to behave differently... we call knowledge knowing by means of demonstration. On the other hand by demonstration I mean the scientific syllogism, and I call scientific then the syllogism in virtue of which, by the fact of its possession, we know.” “It will also be necessary for demonstrative science to be constituted on the basis of true, prime, immediate premises, more known than the conclusion, anterior to it, and that they be the cause of it *(Analytici Posteriores*, II, 2, 71b 8-25; italics ours). For an analysis of these aspects see *Verbum: Word and Idea in Aquinas*, op. cit.
object of study that pervades all the works of Lonergan, but especially in *Insight* he presents a rather fully articulated framework. The elaboration of "generalized empirical method" or of a transcendental method can in the end be considered as the point of arrival for a new scientific system adequate to the contemporary context: by means of the intentional analysis of interiority the generalized empirical method offers an invariant base for an ambitious project of a "general philosophy" capable of overcoming the current fragmentation of knowledge and of giving a new scientific guise even to theology.

In any case Lonergan himself worked out this schematization. We do not intend to penalize the wide scope of Lonergan’s horizon, nor to rigidify his rich flexibility in passing over to new viewpoints that integrate past ones. Still, as Crowe so well highlighted in recalling the debate that emerged at the Lonergan Congress of 1970, Lonergan’s contribution on the level of methodology and theology is certainly a path of intellectual liberation that places the subject at the center of any elaboration of a scientific kind, but it also offers an open, coherent, and above all verifiable system.  

**THE ARISTOTELIAN “SYSTEM”**

The first type of system that Lonergan studied at length is then the Aristotelian one, in which the basic terms and relations are metaphysical (potency and act, substance and accidents, matter and form, the four kinds of causes, etc.). Metaphysics is the basic and total science of principles and necessary conclusions regarding being inasmuch as it is being, while the other sciences (physics, biology, psychology) depend on metaphysics for their terms and their relations (which handle the proximate causes of changes of certain kinds of "things" and study the genesis of various accidents in the substances, etc.).

Greek science studies realities (all that enters into the ten categories) through their causes (the principles of things: matter, form, agency, and

8 See in particular *Philosophy of God and Theology*, op. cit.
9 Cf. *The Lonergan Enterprise*, op. cit., 60 ff.: Crowe’s interlocutor is David Burrell, according to whom Lonergan’s speculation would not offer a system, but only a way. Crowe has an opinion that integrates Burrell’s: the Lonerganian *organon* is simultaneously a "way" and a system.
end) by means of the two procedures of analysis (from things to their causes) and synthesis (from causes to things). Aristotle constructs his science by adding to ordinary language an appendage of the type, "as such," thus transforming the explicit common meaning into a systematic meaning. It is a matter of a descriptive system.

Deductive logic is the basic instrument (organon) because science for Aristotle is "knowledge by means of demonstration," and this is none other than the scientific syllogism "in virtue of which, by the very fact of its possession, we know." To such an instrument is added in the medieval epoch the technique of the quaestio, which is the examination of a problem through all the arguments pro and contra in order to reach a solution: according to Gilbert de la Porreé, a quaestio exists if, and only if, there are two good reasons to affirm or to deny the same proposition.

The Aristotelian system thus constituted is rigorous, coherent, and clear, although it is also static, because all that is rigorously logical and abstract is immobile and static, and hence immutable.

Moreover, this system offers certain, true, and absolute items of knowledge that have to do with causal necessity (i.e., only knowledge of that which is necessary and of the universal and not of what is contingent). From the logical point of view, Aristotelian science is an absolute system of the categorical-deductive type constituted by deductions that start from demonstrably known premises with other premises in order to attain first principles that are no longer demonstrable. Here objectivity is guaranteed by the immediate experience of the first principles and by the validity of the syllogism. In particular, this science becomes wisdom when it reaches first principles and knows the ultimate causes of being and can also become a habitus (habitual disposition) in the mind of a single individual.

The truth and the certainty constitute the Aristotelian system of knowledge a permanent acquisition because such truth refers to the immutable and eternal structure of things, and nothing is possible except a material development of knowledge, that is, an enlargement of a purely material horizon to include new objects that ought to be integrated into the complex system already attained. These characteristics remain even

10 Cf. n. 5.
beyond the classical and medieval epoch to such an extent that in its more complete formulation, which we find in Kant, classical science, fundamentally based on the Euclidean/Newtonian system, is a coherent and systematic (architectonic) collection of knowledge, such that they can be deduced in an equally evident way from immediately evident principles.

Such a Greek ideal of knowledge brings with it enormous consequences for the elaboration of the notion of *culture*. Logic is the chief instrument for bringing about a precise systematization of knowledge according to a hierarchical scheme from lowest to highest end: the productive sciences or arts (whose end is productive), the practical sciences (ethics and politics whose end is human action), the theoretical sciences (whose end is purely contemplative, or cognitive). Within the theoretical science is established a further hierarchy based on the degree of abstraction and so based on the degree of universality (formal object): (i) physics or the philosophy of nature, (ii) mathematics or the philosophy of quantity, (iii) first philosophy or the science of being inasmuch as it is being (metaphysics). This hierarchy of the sciences will be maintained and deepened in the medieval period and taken up again with some adjustment by Neo-scholasticism (one thinks, for instance, of Jacques Maritain).

In this cultural scheme no demand to change forms, structures, and methods is felt, because any change would arise in the concrete, which is overlooked by this mentality. All this was at work in the origin of the ideal of "classical culture." This is a quite determinate vision of reality, of man (a metaphysics of the soul and of the meaning of the humanity via the idea of nature), and also of society. At the basis of this ideal, everything essential is already given by the wisdom of the ancient thinkers, and one tries to find the appropriate modality for communicating such a study of man already established in its essential lines today.

**THE "SYSTEM" OF THE MODERN EMPIRICAL SCIENCES**

Modernity has worked out a second type of system, one constituted first

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12 Cf. for example, Aristotle, *Metaphysica*, VI, 1, 1025b-1026a; XI, 3-4, 1060b31-1061b33.
by the empirical sciences of nature and then by the human sciences. Each science has its own terms and relations that are fixed by laws established empirically, and all of these are in turn independent and autonomous from any metaphysical superstructure: for example, mass is fixed by the Newtonian law of universal gravitation, the electromagnetic field is defined through Maxwell’s equations, Mendeleev’s periodic table defines all the fundamental chemical elements.

Each science, then, is autonomous in the definition of its proper terms and fundamental and derived relations. In “Aquinas Today”13 Lonergan, recalling the argument, affirms that science is autonomous because it overcomes the ancient division of knowledge based on the material objects and formal objects of the sciences (connected to certain kinds of essences), in order to conceive each science as a closed circle of basic terms and relations that are fixed by laws verified empirically.

The result of classical science is the transition from a descriptive knowledge of phenomena (still present in the Aristotelian categorization) that based its categories in relation to the sensible experience of the observer (empirical conjugates: sounds, colors, geometric forms...) to an explanatory knowledge based on the relations of things to each other (pure conjugates: mass, charge, electric field...) expressed in abstract laws, states, and probability: an explanation of the world quite different from commonsense description or from Greek science, with a technical language gradually worked out and recognized by the entire scientific community (i.e., something that does not occur in the sphere of philosophy where problems are related to the polymorphism of human consciousness).

However, the instrument that modern science uses to obtain its successes is not mainly logic, but a quite precise operative empirical method of recurrent operations guided by canons that agree to assume a dynamic viewpoint: “For in science a single method operates towards a variety of different goals, but in philosophy a single all-inclusive goal is sought by as many different methods as arise from different orientations of the historically developing but polymorphic consciousness of man.”14


The goal of scientific research is ambitious: the knowledge of the laws of nature in the most precise manner possible and the complete explanation of all the data, or the investigation into the total intelligibility of the empirical universe as at least an ideal limit: Lonergan speaks of the canon of complete explanation of all the available data as well as of those that can gradually emerge.

In the sciences of nature such intelligibility is formulated through mathematics, which supplies science with the system of equations and functions by which the laws of nature and the relations between laws are expressed in the most precise manner possible, and furnishes the statistical procedures and the calculus of probabilities that permit the understanding and explanation of concrete and particular cases.

The totality of empirical methods is studied amply in *Insight*. Lonergan shows how the heuristic structures of the classical and statistical type are not isolated processes, but are correlative and complementary not only in the cognitional process (with its heuristic anticipations, its procedures and formulations, with its modes of abstraction, of verifying and mastering the data) but also in the results attained, that is, in the known: the two manners of inquiry are constituted in a precise worldview according to the concept of "emergent probability." It is of interest to explicate the dynamic process of scientific knowledge.

The scientific process is a "scissors" process: it is a movement from below upwards (from the data, to the measurements and cataloguing, to discrete and continuous graphs until the attainment of a better formula); and an inverse movement from above downwards, which is the more important process for grasping, for instance, what is proper to contemporary physics. In this second movement one works out one's differential equations whose mathematical solution furnish a series of functions utilizable for the law being sought. Another aspect of this second scissors movement is the postulate of the invariance of physical laws over particular places and times: such a postulate is shown forth in all its generality by Einstein's theory of general relativity. For this reason physics often solves problems in a manner adequate for its goals without arriving at a determination of the function one had been seeking. Science can advance without knowing certain laws explicitly, simply by making use of these differential equations.\(^\text{15}\) Hence, we can take up again the fundamental assumption of the empirical method of the sciences of

\[^{15}\text{Cf. Topics in Education, 138-39.}\]
nature.

First, the goal of science is the investigation in a mathematical manner of an intelligibility (about which knowledge is needed); but mathematics is not the science of quantity (as it was for Aristotle and the Greek world), but in the modern view it is the science of groups and of intelligible relations among quantities.

Second, mathematics supplies science with a rich range of equations and possible functions, which furnish the system that allows the scientist not only to extract the correct expression for the case under examination (namely, a particular explanatory law of a phenomenon), but it also puts the scientist in the position of being able to use many laws simultaneously, or to know the relations among the laws, and so of having a system at one's disposal.

In the third place, just as with the first procedure from below upwards, scientists put measurements in relation one to another, so too when they seek some indeterminate function, it also puts things in relation to each other. This procedure differs from that of common sense that understands things in their relations with us (common sense is egocentric). It follows that there are two approaches to the real, which should not be in conflict, in principle, because they are speaking about the same thing but from different viewpoints. Lonergan often speaks about the two worlds of Whitehead or about Eddington's two tables (the one of common sense is solid, colored, and large, while the other one is constituted mostly by a vacuum in which the electrons and atomic nuclei of physics move about).

In the fourth place, the quantitative theory adds an important novelty: the system of laws, in fact, constructs ideal cases (on the supposition that the structure of the real is simply the realization of these ideal cases, and so is connected with a determinist view), but not everything conforms to these ideal cases, and so it is necessary to adopt the procedures of statistics.

If the canon of complete explanation manifests the ambition of science, still, empirical verification leads to knowledge that has the truth-status of probability alone, as opposed to the vulgar opinion that whatever is scientific is absolutely true by definition. Indeed, scientific intelligibility regards that which is as a matter of fact, or happens to be the case: modern science, that is to say, is not about what is necessary

16 Cf. *Insight*, 318 f.
but about verified possibility; and it sets out to know and control the concrete ever more proximately. In modern sciences the scientific hypothesis is simply an object of thought, and so it goes on to verify facts that are of interest to science alone, and in this fashion the hypothesis become a scientific law. Science is rightly quite rigorous in this, because an unverified or unverifiable hypothesis must be discarded as extrascientific: as Lonergan repeats, that is what makes the difference between chemistry and alchemy, astronomy and astrology, medicine and magic, history and legend. Constant critical control (there is also a canon of parsimony!) demands that to data are added only those correlations and probabilities that have been verified or that have not yet been falsified, as Popper has shown.

Scientific objectivity is always the fruit of empirical verification of that which has been grasped in significant empirical data: "(objectivity) is experiential, normative and tending towards an absolute." Hence, the cognitive attainments of the sciences are always on the way to the truth: it is a matter of a process of development toward a cognitional ideal which is always pushed forward while it is being actuated through a series of provisional systems that ever better satisfy the need for verification in their data. This asymptotic approximation to truth does not keep scientific systems from functioning! Modern scientific systems are continually evolving (prescinding here from the ethical problems that are ever more dramatically affecting the human horizon). A scientific horizon expands when there is a crisis of existing methods, procedures, theories, assumptions that become inadequate. From the conflict arising from such a crisis is derived a radical revision of concepts, postulates, and method; and there is thus formed a new mathematical or scientific structure. Think for example of the revolutions of Copernicus, Darwin, Freud, of the revolutions of Galileo, Newton, Einstein; of quantum mechanics; of the revolutions in mathematics (analytic geometry, differential and integral calculus, non-Euclidean geometries, Galois’s developments in algebra). Naturally, there are resistances because the human subject is afraid of change: Max Planck said that a new scientific theory comes to be affirmed when the older generation of professors retires. Still, after a relatively brief delay, the resistance is overcome, whether universally, in the sense that an enlargement of the scientific horizon comes to be accepted by all scientists, or permanently in the sense that all the earlier positions

17 Cf. Insight, 449 f.
do not return (there is no regression, but an integration into a higher viewpoint). It is this property of scientific development that merits the high regard in which science is held. The scientists can be in disaccord, they can fight each other; the period of crisis and of reformulation can manifest insecurities; but within a relatively short time, the problems are overcome, and definitive attainments are added.

If the Aristotelian system of knowledge was of the categorico-deductive type, the modern scientific system turns out instead to be a conditional hypothetico-deductive type: in its structure the scientific system still satisfies the logical principle of deduction, but the basis of the system is founded upon intersubjective experience capable of being checked, and in this sense science is a system hypothetically conditioned by empirical verification, or, better, by falsifiability. Scientific verification is founded on probable judgments, because it moves from the affirmation of verified implications (consequent) to the affirmation of the hypothesis/theory (antecedent), and not vice-versa. The scientist reasons in the following manner: (1) if my theory is true, then it conforms to the data; (2) but such a theory is in conformity with the data (the affirmation of the consequent), even if it cannot exclude the possibility that it is possible to discover another theory in the future that could grasp these data better, and explain other matters that at the moment we do not have; (3) hence, it can only state that for now this theory is a sufficiently good explanation (it is probably true). From the logical standpoint, the argumentation, which is an approximation to the complete demonstration of the theory, is a conditional syllogism of the second figure, the *modus ponens*, which notoriously does not reach a conclusion.\(^{18}\)

This is all entirely in line with the epistemology of Popper for whom, however, science belongs to the so-called World 3 of everything independent of the knowing subject. Lonergan is rather removed from this view, because for him the fundamental term of his epistemology is the typically human fact of *understanding*, as well as verification: there is no epistemology without a conscious subject! The great importance accorded to scientific knowing, the study of mathematical, scientific procedures, and of the knowledge of common sense is assessed in view of the self-appropriation of oneself, in which direct and reflective

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understanding have a central role. What is particularly decisive for philosophy is the *sphere of interiority* that confers on it its cognitional specificity and refers the pluriformity of the kinds of knowing and the multiplicity of methods to the conscious intentionality of the subject.

In its epistemological elements, the scientific framework articulated by Lonergan in *Insight* responds on the one hand to the Kantian critical turn performed in the context of the Euclidean/Newtonian scientific system, and on the other hand to the second scientific revolution that, departing from the classical physics of Galileo, Newton, Laplace, and Maxwell, is fully realized with Einstein’s theory of relativity and with the quantum mechanics that arose in the first quarter of the twentieth century through the work of physicists such as Planck, Bohr, Heisenberg, de Broglie, Dirac, Born, and Schrödinger. With these kinds of instruments, science understood that “the objects of its inquiry need not be imaginable entities moving through imaginable processes in an imaginable space-time.” The old eighteenth-century mechanism and determinism (with its ingenuous imaginable model of the world) has yielded to relativist models about the space-time continuum and to quantum mechanical models about the basic processes of matter, which can no longer be illustrated by the imagination.

This evolution has given notice that “to know the real does not mean simply representing it by an imaginative synthesis.” In it Lonergan finds a confirmation of the correctness of his heuristic definition of reality: not that which one can see or imagine (the object of “picture thinking”) but “what which is,” that which one can know by means of intelligent understanding and reasonable affirmation. This is Lonergan’s answer to Kant: through the physical and mathematical science of his time, he aspired to knowledge of the real in itself that his transcendental critique rendered completely unattainable for the human mind. Lonergan makes evident instead that modern science with its methodical procedures attempts to pursue and arrive at the real, even if with only probable judgments, clarifying also the question about a duality in human knowing: there is a simple, extroverted knowing as “taking a look” at the world “already out there now”; and there is knowing in the full sense, which is only given when one completes all the operations that ground rational judgment. But there remains the fact “that the empirical methods in particular sciences are not capable of resolving the ultimate questions in

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19 *Insight*, 15.
cognitional theory, in ethics, in religion.’’ There is a need to go further, but not before having briefly recalled some of Lonergan’s observations.

The complex operative/methodical structure of modern science constitutes the a priori of empirical science, that is to say, the precise modality with which the scientist as such must operate. But such an a priori, which anticipates the general characteristics of scientific knowing and of the object progressively known on the explanatory level, is of a categorical kind, that is, it depends on the conceptual and cultural instruments worked out in a determinate period, that is, on the level of differentiation of consciousness achieved in that historical epoch. In that way Lonergan could confront the various worldviews of Aristotle, Galileo, Darwin, and of the contemporary indeterminists and could give elements for evaluation for a balanced view of the world. Just as the Aristotelian notions of science lead to a hierarchical cosmological vision (the incorruptible and eternal heaven, the corruptible and mutable sublunary world), just as the Galilean reduction of secondary qualities (the proper sensibles) to primary qualities (the common quantitative sensibles) leads to mechanistic determinism, in the same manner the complementarity of classical and statistical investigations lead to a global vision that can be named emergent probability, which, overcoming the unsalvageable counterposition between determinism and indeterminism, is better adapted to the complex evolution of the universe from the viewpoint of cosmology, chemistry, and biology.

Finally, it remains to note that in the modern system of the sciences, complete knowledge of a discipline is never the sole possession of an individual any longer, but is the total resource for an entire scientific community. Lonergan agrees with Kuhn on the role, not only of the individual but also of the scientific community, in scientific development.21 Historically, in the transition from the medieval to the modern epoch, the community of the learned, at first closed in upon itself, recognized the importance of the public character of scientific research; and the ancient

20 Bernard Lonergan, “Questionnaire on Philosophy,” 4.3. We are dealing with one of the last of Lonergan’s writings: it is the response to a questionnaire sent to twenty-three Jesuits, professors of philosophy and theology, preparatory to a Symposium de Philosophie, which took place near Rome from 8-18 September 1977. It is now published in Method: Journal of Lonergan Studies 2 (1984):1-35.

wise man has therefore been transformed into a researcher, and each research group or scientific community has its own meetings and its own specialized journals. Moreover, this complex transition to the modern era has brought about the complete transformation not only of the Greek ideal of science but also of the notion of classical culture. Beyond the quantitative fact of the enormous comprehensiveness attained by modern science regarding the universe of observable being, there are totally novel qualitative aspects that have determined a radically new conception of science and of culture. The modern world has gradually and irreversibly abandoned the notion of a unique and permanent “culture” derived from the classicism that immutably founds a conception of the human world of meanings and explicit values on the basis of the Greek conception of reality. In *Topics in Education*, as we have seen, Lonergan speaks expressly of the “new knowledge” as of new structures in which the ancient conceptions have undergone a complete transformation on the part of basic concepts, while the relevant aspect for Lonergan (and for good reason), is that such a transformation brings with it a change in the very manner of understanding science and its ways of operating: a change in the character of the habitual mental operations of the human being, and of the way of intending both the physical universe and the life of the human being itself. Such a scientific revolution, along with the modern advertence to the historical dimension, is the most basic cultural novelty of the modern epoch.22

**KNOWLEDGE AS ISOMORPHIC GROUPS OF OPERATIONS**

Modern science with its methods offers Lonergan (as he affirms in the preface to *Insight*) the most exact, accessible, and definite example of human consciousness that allows a clear and distinct apprehension of the fundamental cognitional facts, especially giving evidence of the centrality of *understanding* as well as of verification (which last was already underlined by the Neo-positivist school). This familiarity with scientific understanding and its method is an important stage in the

22 Lonergan often cites the historian, Herbert Butterfield: *The Origins of Modern Science 1300-1800* (New York: Macmillan, 1960). Cf. also, “Questionnaire on Philosophy,” 2.2. According to Butterfield, the modern scientific revolution would be the true origin of the modern world and of our mentality to the point that even the importance of the Renaissance and of the Reformation is overshadowed.
project of self-appropriation. He will repeat many years later: “in the contemporary context method is the norm and measure of science, and so it is from an understanding of methods, in their similarities and their differences, that one attains the basic and total science [of human living].” But the centrality of understanding leads Lonergan to consider science in terms of a group of operations, directly inspired by Piaget and his genetic epistemology (elaborated precisely from the perspective of the modern mathematical group theory).

“The principal characteristic of the group of operations is that every operation in the group is matched by an opposite operation and every combination of operations is matched by an opposite combination. Hence, inasmuch as operations are grouped, the operator can always return to his starting-point.” The notion of group offers Lonergan the opportunity to notice interesting performative analogies among the different scientific as well as philosophic disciplines, precisely insofar as the collection of the methodical operations of the various modern sciences constitute isomorphic groups.

In any system that enters into the mathematical definition of a group, the pertinent characteristic operations are what are important, not the terms of the given system. In fact, there are direct operations, inverse operations, and null operations that constitute a group; the

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23 Cf. “Questionnaire on Philosophy,” 3.121.
25 Cf. Method in Theology, op. cit., 27 ff.; and Topics in Education, 127 f.: Operations form a group when their relations with one another are such that you can go anywhere and come back again.... The terms are not important; it is the group of operations form a group. The terms are whatever is presupposed or generated by the operations... You think of the identity operation, the operation that leaves things as they were. You define ‘zero’ as what you add or subtract to get what you already had; with this you have already defined one basic term. Similarly, you define ‘one’ as what you multiply or divide by to get what you already had. And with the zero and one you can go on to construct all the numbers. But what comes first are not the numbers, but the operations. A number is whatever you can derive from the operations.

Note Lonergan’s extraordinary capacity for knowing how to express complicated mathematical concepts in a clear way and not too technically.
null operations define the basic terms (like zero for addition and one for multiplication), from these then all the other terms are then derived by means of the operations (for which a term is something generated by the very same operations). This absolute generality of group theory explains Lonergan’s attention to this notion and allows him to speak of an isomorphism among the various systems, because the same basic form is in play in them, and therefore the same basic insight.

Different mathematical systems characterized by operations that are more or less concrete or abstract (such as operations on pure symbols) are isomorphic groups. Pure mathematics does not assign some interpretation to the symbols because they can be interpreted in a geometric sense, or in terms of space/time, or in a physical sense, and so forth. The different scientific systems are also isomorphic groups if the group of operations on its adopted symbols is the same, although the symbols may be differently interpreted in a physical sense, a geometric sense, or a numerical sense. There is also an isomorphism between scientific thought and Thomist philosophy, as Lonergan already asserted in a 1955 article,26 in which there is no talk of any group theory whatsoever, but of isomorphism in accord with the classic analogy of proportion: there is the same structural similarity that abstracts totally from the materials that enter into the structure. It is worth recalling those considerations here fully at this turning for its pertinence to our theme.

In that article Lonergan examines the similarity in operations between the various levels of scientific procedure and that of Thomist philosophy. There is an isomorphism between the relations hypothesis/verification of science and the relations definition/judgment in Thomism, because in both cases one passes from an object of thought to an object of knowledge; between the empirical verification of the scientific hypothesis and the judgment given by the Thomist on a definition, because for both what counts are the things as they de facto are, or as God made them to be; between the process that originates the formulation of a scientific hypothesis and that which originates a Thomist definition (both start from an examination of sensible data along with acts that can be placed in a parallel order.)

Still more, there is an isomorphism between the abstraction from

the material conditions of space and time (Thomism) and the \textit{invariance}
of physical laws with respect to (inertial and continuous) transformations
of the reference systems of space and time (science); between the modesty
of the scientist who by heuristic anticipations arrives at knowing only
ever more precise approximations of the laws of nature and the modesty
of the Thomist who does not pretend to possess the essential definitions
of anything (which he also knows does exist) because we do not know
many things and many properties of things; between the heuristic
anticipations of science (functions and differential equations) and the
Thomist real distinction between essence and contingent existence as
regards the thing, and between matter and form as regards the essence,
for which the scientific ideal of the "knowledge of theories verified in an
indeterminate number of cases" corresponds to the contingent existence
(verification) of essences and forms (theory) in some matter (reference
to concrete cases).

Finally, the isomorphism subsists between the indispensable use
of the imagination and the senses by the scientist, who has passed from
imaginable theories of the world (determinism, mechanism) to new
conceptions that completely transcend the imagination (relativity and
quantum mechanics) and the Aristotelian-Thomist conviction regarding
the immanence of intelligibility in the sensible ("our intelligence abstracts
intelligible forms from the images..." \textit{Summa theologiae}, I, 85, 1, \textit{ad 5m}) and of the fact that our intelligence has a moving object (inasmuch
as it is a passive potency) and a terminal object or end (inasmuch as it is
an active potency). To the scientist's question about what he knows with
his ever more abstract theories when he joins his symbols with the data
of measurements, the Thomist can reply that he knows being (terminal
object of the intellect), because mathematical symbols are also external
words that mean internal words, and these are the medium in which
reality is known.

All the preceding analogies are based on a still more basic analogy,
which is a precise aspect of our minds, the act of understanding. For St.
Thomas the human soul understands itself (in its nature and capacity)
by means of his understanding of the activity of insight:\textsuperscript{27} \textit{for a scientist
it is a matter to understand and explain all the phenomena of nature
completely}; all the rest of his activity is preordered, come to term, or
subsequent to this unsubstitutable pivot and moment of knowledge (it

\textsuperscript{27} Cf. Thomas Aquinas, \textit{Summa Theologiae}, I, 88, 2, \textit{ad 3m}.}
could be said that understanding or comprehension is the basic term of the entire group of operations of scientific knowledge. And so Lonergan concludes to a fundamental agreement between the constant methodical structure of science and the constant Thomist metaphysics of potency, form, and act, hence "contemporary science finds itself compelled to relinquish its traditional naïve realism and to come to grips with philosophical issues,"\(^{28}\) for the goal intended by understanding (beyond the quiddity/\textit{species/eidos} that emerges from objects as sensed or imagined which is its moving object) is being in all its fullness.

The material differences that exist between Thomism and science are explainable from the different ways in which each is founded on understanding and utilizes it: while the Thomist reflects upon understanding by means of a rational psychology coherent with metaphysics, the scientist performs a great number of acts of understanding and offers in practice the possibility of providing evidence of an invariant method within in the process of knowing.

The operative structure of knowing and the ontological structure of the known are also isomorphic groups. \textit{Insight} itself is considered by Lonergan as a study of operations, in which the basic operation is \textit{insight} and "everything else is defined in terms of one's experience of insight."\(^{29}\) After all, then, in \textit{Insight} Lonergan implicitly uses group theory to work out a philosophy based on his discovery that the structure of human knowing is a well-defined group of operations.

Among other things, considering science from the perspective of a group of operations, one can come to grip with the problem of the division and integration of knowledge in a new away as the division/integration of groups, and also in a manner alternative to the traditional approach. For this last point our discourse will become clear and concrete only in comparison with \textit{Method}, in which Lonergan recalls three possible ways of classifying and correlating specializations in theology.\(^{30}\) There are \textit{field specializations}, attained by the successive subdividing of the data such that each specialist is concerned with his or her own part (e.g., the studies on Scripture, the Fathers, the Middle

\(^{28}\) "The Isomorphism of Thomist and Scientific Thought," 140.

\(^{29}\) Cf. \textit{Topics in Education}, 131: "I may note, finally, that my book \textit{Insight} is a study of operations. The fundamental operation examined there is the act of understanding, insight. Everything else is defined in terms of one's experience of insight....You can see from this how group theory can be used as a presentation of a philosophy."

\(^{30}\) Cf. \textit{Method in Theology}, 125 f.
Ages, the Reformation become divided into species and subspecies; Old Testament is subdivided into the Law, the Prophets, and the Writings. Then there are specializations of department or subject (of teaching), which is obtained by dividing up the results of inquiries in different subjects in such a manner that it is possible to hold different courses on different subjects (e.g., Semitic languages, Hebrew history, Christian theology...). Finally – and this is Lonergan’s methodological novelty – there are the functional specializations obtained through the distinctions and the separation of the successive stages of the process that moves from data to results (e.g., textual criticism that determines what has been written, interpretation that searches for meaning, history that places interpreted texts together and gives them a unique vision...).

THE “SYSTEM” OF TRANSCENDENTAL METHOD

All these accomplishments that Lonergan knew how to thematize in an original and profound manner are but the premise for the elaboration of a further system that rigorously thematizes the basic group of those operations of the subject that constitute one’s own personal interiority.

We can then inquire how the methodology of science is connected with this exquisitely philosophic/introspective objective of arriving at one’s own conscious interiority. Lonergan has shown that self-appropriation is gained in three successive steps:31 (1) making explicit the methodical performances of mathematics and of physical science, of common sense, and of other kinds of knowing; (2) the understanding of the structure (on three distinct levels of consciousness) that governs all the various cognitional operations of scientific method; (3) the recognition of such structures by self-affirmation of ourselves as knowers.

From the observations of the preceding paragraphs the clear result is that Lonergan’s strategy explains the importance of the changes in the science of the modern epoch. If this is true, then to attain familiarity with scientific understanding and with its method is an important stage in the personal project of self-appropriation. This will be repeated later in the responses given to a questionnaire on the teaching of philosophy that was distributed to various Jesuits teaching in universities: “in the

31 Insight, 12 f.
contemporary context method is the norm and measure of science, and so it is from an understanding of methods in their similarities and differences that one attains the basic and total science [of human living].”32

Above all, the examples of mathematical and scientific knowing allow a clear and distinct apprehension of basic cognitional facts that occur in anyone’s consciousness: inquiry about empirical presentations, insight, the accumulation and development of insights, formulations, and definitions, the transition to higher viewpoints, inverse insights, abstraction from the empirical residue. Their apprehension takes place in three transitions: (1) the awareness of such acts, (2) the understanding of their notion, (3) the identification of these acts and notions within one’s own personal intellectual experience. In this effort of “introspection,” especially in the first five chapters of Insight, Lonergan attains his own self-appropriation in order to explain why modern scientific methods work, why they refer to objective reality, why they follow the rules they themselves construct, and what the implications of such procedures are. All of this makes Lonergan one of the few thinkers to truly articulate the foundations of modern science in an authentic and innovative “phenomenology” of natural science.33

In the second place, empirical science is the most exact, accessible, and definite example of human knowing, because it proceeds methodically, and scientists have faith in the validity of method beyond their actual (and indeed always provisional) explanations of the world. The steps of such a method are recurrent: (1) attending to the data, (2) asking how they are explained and formulating the explanation, (3) asking whether the explanation (= the conditioned) is correct and finding the motives for responding affirmatively (the transformation of the conditioned into a virtually unconditioned). Science manifests that method is a precise group of operations that are structured among themselves, recurrent and rich with progressive results. The empirical scientific method in its clarity brings to light the operations that are none other than the specialization of the natural operations of human intelligence. For Lonergan, one identical theory of knowledge lies at the basis of science and of common sense, because it is the same basic dynamism of consciousness in both cases. Nevertheless, to begin with an analysis of commonsense knowing

32 “Questionnaire on Philosophy,” n. 2, 3.121.
would mean taking on a multitude of complications deriving from the complexity of everyday knowing that is tied to practical living and to all the cultures springing forth in space and time. As paradoxical as this can appear to anyone having trouble coming to grips with examples from algebra or the physics of motion or of quanta, science with its operative method furnishes precious starting points for understanding the functioning of understanding and of consciousness; concrete examples drawn from science favor the self-appropriation of one’s own conscious dynamism; and finally, the role of science provides the basis of the analogical formulation of a new method (the generalized empirical method) that alone is able to go to the roots of ultimate questions in cognitional theory, ethics, and religion.

A third important motive for referring to the empirical sciences is the fact that only in the twentieth century have we grasped that the reality of the known universe of being cannot be adequately formulated in imaginative terms. Science is therefore helpful for resolving the problem of the nature of our knowing and of the correct notion of reality, thus overcoming the Kantian difficulty with the conditions for attaining the real object. As is well known, Lonergan answers with his original theory of the judgment of existence that allows us to attain reality in itself.

The notion of science is thus expanded, already in *Insight*, into a generalized empirical method that permits the construction of a general philosophy capable of dialoguing with contemporary knowledge and theology, and of integrating them in a complex vision, and so avoiding the risks associated with excessive specialization and fragmentation. The third type of system, also called transcendental method, lies at the basis of “the total and basic science of human living.” In it the basic terms are the conscious and intentional operations of human knowledge, and the relations among them are fixed by the conscious dynamism that gives rise to, guides, and assembles the various operations among themselves. The derived terms and relations are the pertinent procedures of common sense, mathematics, the empirical sciences, interpretation, history, philosophy, and theology. Here, in contrast to the Aristotelian system, basic terms and relations are cognitional (the data of consciousness) and not metaphysical, so the transition from the conceptual/linguistic level to

34 “Questionnaire on Philosophy,” 4.3.
35 *Insight*, chaps. 9 and 10, but also *Topics in Education*, 133-57.
36 “Questionnaire on Philosophy,” 3.121.
the preconceptual/prelinguistic level of the same performative interiority of the subject is very important.37 This kind of learning does not occur by means of memory, but it is achieved by means of a lengthy study of oneself (with whom the teacher can collaborate only by opportune means and strategic invitations).

In brief, the tasks of “the total and basic method,” that is, of generalized empirical method, are the following:38 (1) the execution of the operations in particular disciplines (mathematics, the natural sciences, common sense, human studies); (2) attention to the same operations; (3) attention to the dynamic assembling of such operations; (4) thematization of these same operations; (5) thematization of the dynamism that assembles these operations; (6) attainment of a normative pattern for each of the particular methods; (7) attainment of the common nucleus for all the methods, that is, of the dynamic structure of human consciousness that lies at the basis of all knowing and deciding. The immense labor accomplished in Insight is the synthesis of this scale of tasks. Such labor constitutes a new method inasmuch as there is a group of structured operations; such a method is empirical in the measure that the operations are immediately accessible through our own consciousness (they are the internal data or data of consciousness), and in the end this method is a generalized empirical method in relation to the empirical method of the natural sciences (that start from the external data of the senses), but also because it is a matter of the operations that are constitutive of the human being (experience, understanding, judgment, and free choice).

It is then starting from understanding of the methods of the sciences in their similarities and differences that the transcendental method is acquired and this explains the importance Lonergan assigns to the empirical sciences. The complicated and fascinating exercise of self-appropriation of one’s own conscious intentionality allows one to highlight a “transcendental a priori,” that is, to individuate the condition of the possibility of any particular cognitional method in any cultural and historical epoch and to identify it within our conscious intentionality.

37 Understanding and Being, 14 f.: “The trick in self-appropriation is to move one step backwards, to move into the subject as intelligent – asking questions; as having insights – being able to form concepts; as weighing the evidence – being able to judge. We want to move in there where the ideal is functionally operative prior to its being made explicit in judgments, concepts and words.”

38 This scale of tasks is expressed in this manner in “Questionnaire on Philosophy,” 4.22.
Nevertheless, the attainment of the conscious structure is achieved *empirically* in virtue of the analysis of the data of consciousness to which each one can have immediate access as soon as one follows the normativity of the so-called transcendental precepts (which is none other than the self-transcendent dynamism of our experience, our intelligence, our reasonableness, and our liberty).

Moreover, in the measure that it is scientific, the transcendental method has for its object a *verified possibility*: the fact that I am one who is conscious in the precise sense that intentionality analysis reveals, not as a matter of necessity, but *de facto.* Still, it is a matter of an empirical verification that is complete in itself. As a matter of fact, while scientific verification only issues in the acquisition of a probable judgment, in generalized empirical method both the antecedent (the intentional operations and processes) and the consequent (the operative methods of particular disciplines) are data of internal experience (the data of consciousness) and so are both verifiable, namely, the operations of experience, understanding, judgment, and decision exist and are verified in accord with the pattern indicated in *Insight* and then in *Method.*

One problem is to establish with certainty whether the cognitional system at work in oneself is present in the interiority of others in the same manner. Crowe responds affirmatively, setting the operations of common sense and those used in the system in relation to each other: as we discuss this theme, each of us “knows” (common sense) that when the others put questions and objections, weigh our answers, they are performing experience, and are having insights and making judgments. We know all this through commonsense judgments without any need of having access to the other person’s interiority. Such a complete verification allows the attainment of a normative and invariant structure (the transcendental a priori). This does not mean that one’s linguistic/conceptual formulations cannot ultimately be perfected on the basis of deeper self-appropriation, also in relation to the level of the differentiation of consciousness attained by one’s culture and civilization. It is a matter of distinguishing between “the normative pattern immanent in our conscious and intentional operations and... objectifications of that pattern in concepts, propositions, words”: the revision will regard only

39 *Method in Theology*, 16s.
41 *Method in Theology*, 18 f.
the objectification of the pattern, but not the dynamic structure of human consciousness, otherwise one would have to have arrived at a new kind of consciousness.

**CONCLUSIONS: A NEW ORGANON FOR KNOWLEDGE**

The normativity of generalized empirical method and the historical variability in the categorical methods of the sciences enable Lonergan to define the notion of *culture* in a dynamic and pluralist manner: it grows and develops in accord with a dialectic parallel to that which is initiated in the polymorphous consciousness of the human being.

Naturally, generalized empirical method is merely the beginning of a development of the man as a philosopher, because “philosophy is the flourishing of the rational consciousness of the individual in one’s arriving at taking possession of oneself.” What is important about this proposal is the focus for a new instrument by which it pursues concretely and realizes today the ideal of a truly scientific knowledge, and which is therefore an instrument on the level of our times.

In this sense, Frederick Crowe speaks of Lonergan’s works as an *Organon* for a new epoch of history. Aristotle worked out an instrument for the mind and for the exercise of thought contained in the *Logical Works* (that only came to be called *Organon* in the sixth century), such that they do not enter into the subdivisions of the sciences (theoretical, practical, and productive) but constitute the necessary premise (for the scientific demonstration based on the syllogism). Analogously, Francis Bacon speaks of a *Novum Organum* in polemical contrast to Aristotle, that is, of instruments adapted (for the mind) with which to reconstruct all the sciences, arts, and human knowledge from top to bottom: instruments that posit its new and better foundations, namely, upon induction as the effectual means of analyzing experience. So too, Lonergan’s methodological investigation is an *Organon* because it is like these attempts at organizing knowledge and of renewing intellectual life, but also it is similar in its goal and in its undertaking, but not in the manner of conceiving the mind (at least in respect of Bacon).

The transition to this new plan does not eliminate the achievements of the history of thought, but integrates them in surpassing them: for example, the supremacy of method does not exclude having recourse
to logic just as human historicity does not keep us from speaking about “nature” as a heuristic notion; and a philosophy of self-appropriation of the subject leads to a heuristic metaphysics able to integrate current knowledge. Lonergan’s proposal is concretized in a “basic and total science”: no longer a metaphysics (as in Aristotle), but a combination of cognitional theory, epistemology, metaphysics of proportionate being, and existential ethics. The dependence of metaphysics (or “general philosophy” as affirmed in the “Questionnaire on Philosophy”) on the other forms of knowledge is not the dependence of a conclusion on its premises, but rather the dependence of a generative, transformative, and unifying principle upon “materials” that it generates, transforms, and unifies. This kind of “general philosophy” is capable of performing a threefold function.

Above all, it can exercise a critical function vis-à-vis the various kinds of knowledge. Philosophy determines the scope of competence and the limits of common sense and of the sciences, assessing their respective methodologies. Again, it helps to overcome the possible counterpositions/competitions due to misunderstandings, closures, and uncritical positions. It therefore verifies the coherence of results of science and of common sense with a cognitional theory and self-appropriation, eventually revealing latent counterpositions due to a misunderstanding of human cognitional structure and of the correlative notion of reality. In particular, it scrutinizes such “science” to reveal the evidence for their heuristic structures yielding knowledge, that is, the acquired a priori that indicates the direction of research: we recall the elaboration in Insight of the four classical, statistical, genetic, and dialectical heuristic methods. They are the methods carrying empirical investigation, based on some basic heuristic anticipations, and allow the further enrichment of discourse about the whole. The philosopher therefore ought to be current with the verified scientific theories or at least more “corroborative.” For example, on the basis of the results what we today have at our disposal regarding cosmological evolution (the theory of the “big bang” and of cosmogenesis with certain characteristics), the philosopher also cannot ignore that the “stationary state” cosmological theory of the 1950s (also used by Lonergan) is totally surpassed today.

There is then the function of integration in the current context of specializations of knowledge (that run the risk of dangerous

42 Insight, 418.
fragmentation). Exercising this task of integration, "general philosophy" does not omit the legitimate autonomy and the correct methodological controls of the sciences, but accepts and utilizes the competencies of the other experts without substituting for them, but assuming their results. Still, it is the role of the philosopher to elaborate scientific results into a unity, clearing away the reductionisms, and bringing to light within the positive results of the sciences the concrete prolongations of the integral heuristic structure of proportionate being.

There is finally the function of mediation philosophy has to perform between theology and the other sciences, between cultures and human society, because it is not simply a methodology of the sciences. General philosophy as an originating and total way of asking questions will not be the definitive system of knowledge, because knowledge is always evolving; rather it has a heuristic character (it anticipates something not yet known). Its role consists instead in leading the particular sciences back to the human subject, introducing them in this way into the realm of being that the cognitional intentionality of the subject itself individuates and toward which it constitutively tends.

Lonergan’s proposal as an analysis of one’s own interiority is nothing other than a replay of the Socratic “Know thyself”: it is fundamentally an invitation to return to ourselves to regain the basic human dynamisms of intelligence, reasonableness, liberty, and love as ultimate and intrinsic existential norms for our own personal self-transcending self-development. This is the foundational basis, a method of methods (Organon, precisely) what can open the path for a true anthropological revolution. Any time, indeed, can also be judged on the basis of what it says about the human being and we can also read our own time according to what it says and understands about the human being.

The invitation that emerges from Lonergan’s work is that of appropriating of that oneself which we are, with all the richness of one’s interior dynamism, for the sake of a life of collaboration and creativity. Lonergan had the courage to work out not only a theory but a concrete itinerary (or "method" that, in Greek, contains the word "way") to pursue by means of a new “Know thyself” and in order to live in accord with this self-knowledge. This Organon of Lonergan is not the content of his works (while being, to be sure, his own extremely rich, open, and dynamic thought), but it is a precise way of self-appropriation. This is not

43 Cf. "Questionnaire on Philosophy," 5.
conceived at the writing desk or in an abstract mode but is the innovative and creative discovery of the resources of one’s own conscious and intentional interiority. Hence, the invitation is to be creative and personal even in one’s acceptance of Lonergan’s proposal, with a view to one’s own personal realization of this method. For teachers, in particular, it is a matter of formulating an adequate educational proposal that helps students to think and to be themselves in finding their own way of human learning and maturation.
UNIVERSITY AND MEANING

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From the time of its origins the university has been affirmed as the eminent locale for the elaboration of knowledge and formation, and it has carried out its mission in relation to the historical and cultural contexts in which it arose and evolved. At the start of the third millennium the dignity of its historic heritage is no less present than the expectations called forth by the current changes in the culture, in the university the institutions, in the disciplines taught, and in the communications of the teachers. New attention has again been drawn to who is called to learn; changes in the students, in their courses of study, in the levels of access to knowledge have been noted. Changes in relation to the faculty and the institutes have repercussions on the activity of formation, questions about the evaluation of university performances, and about the profile of the university teacher. Investigations about formation, its systems of relations and values, about the fragmentation of knowledge, about the need for the integration of the areas of knowledge, about the culture and its models multiply. Particularly on the philosophical level, there come to the surface, among other things, fundamental problematic nodes surrounding subjectivity and objectivity, freedom and responsibility; to make room for them does not mean escaping what is contingent and variable, but rather to rediscover interpretative keys for confronting the current needs in light of the cumulative patrimony of humanity, to discover and to activate dynamisms that, by heightening the reflective and operative powers of persons, lead to fruitful changes.

Challenged by the just mentioned expectations that require philosophic reflection about the worth of ascribing to knowing and to the subject’s possibility of arriving at the meaning of reality and of his or her personal development within it, we confront the thought of Bernard Lonergan.
University and meaning are two distinct and relevant themes that do not seem to converge arbitrarily, and they are the objects of Lonergan’s reflections on different occasions: for the first there was the publication of an article and for the second three lectures separated in time.¹ These texts reveal some fundamental nuclei of the Canadian maestro’s thought, the depth of which goes beyond the circumstances by which they were confronted, and they attest to the broad engagement in academic teaching, at the service of knowledge and of general human formation. I shall recall the texts from this article and from those lectures; besides being evoked by the event of this Lonergan Workshop and by the theme on which it is based, I shall also recur to a course that Lonergan held at the Gregorian University, *De intellectu et methodo*, which amounts to a pointed explication of a decline in meaning within this University.

1. REALISM OF THE GOOD

The brief essay, “The Role of the University in the Modern World,” written at the beginning of the 1950s offers a clear orientation: in the measure that one can understand the role of the university to that extent one will keep abreast of the present world, in the situation in which it currently finds itself; in any case this demand reduces to a primary instance, which at the same time constitutes the basic goal toward which the forces of human community tend – the good – notwithstanding the blows of resistance or the contradictions of history. The notion of the good comes to sight as the generative nucleus of his entire reflection and reveals a trajectory of Lonergan’s thought in the 1950s that he presents in *In* *sight* and in his seminar on education at Xavier University in Cincinnati and that he will reappropriate in what follows.

It is with the notion of the good that the multiple human resonances, along with its original implications, borne by the very same university

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¹ “The Role of a Catholic University in the Modern World” was a 1951 article published in French for *Relations*, a monthly review of the Montreal Jesuits, in view of a special 1952 meeting on the theme. “Time and Meaning” was a lecture given initially in 1962 at the Thomas More Institute, then represented elsewhere; it was part of the course, “To be a philosopher.” The next year, 1963, again at Thomas More Institute the lecture, “The Analogy of Meaning” was held. “Dimensions of Meaning” was a discourse of 1965 held at a Marquette University course.
can be grasped. In its internal articulation, this notion of the human good corresponds to the structure of knowing. Just as knowing is distinguished by the experiential (the data of sense and of consciousness), intelligence (insights, postulates, systems, definitions), and reflective-rational (judgments) levels, so too on the empirical level the good is the object of desire; on the intelligent level there is the good of order that is pursued technologically, economically, politically; on the level of deliberation there is the judgment of value that puts one in the condition for appreciating and being critical, for fulfilling the consequent choices, consenting to being a “radically free” subject and acting consistently with that.

To consider the university in relation to the human situation clears the field of emphatic or the opposed minimalist considerations precisely because it views it in terms of its lofty formative task departing from the notion of the human good without avoiding the difficulty that can be involved. This viewpoint is not therefore dictated by the preferences of one who today is the prisoner of his or her needs, detached from the received cultural patrimony and from responsibility for future generations, in a sort of “present-ism,” whose outcome will be limiting or avant garde as do the “archaist” and “futurist” opposites that tend to flee the present by polarizing attention either on the traditional heritage or upon utopian projects. Such a task cannot prescind from historical attention for the world, which for Lonergan is “the cumulative product of centuries of ambiguous development and change. It is the threatening precipitate of civic and cultural progress and decline solidified in hypotheses, mentalities, interpretations, philosophies, inclinations, habits, hopes, fears,” by which therefore the crisis in which it verges due to the incomprehension and the inadequate actions of human beings is constantly evaluated. At the same time this is to be confronted in order to be resolved.

Human beings can be helped to overcome the vacuum of their incomprehensions, to replace blind evaluations others assessed by critical


knowledge, to take action to overcome carelessness and lack of curiosity. From the negativity of the crisis, from the risk of aggravating it, one can move on to the positivity of a situation that has found within itself the possibility of bringing about a transformation: instead of a "major crisis" there is "a commensurate task." The task is directly aimed at the difficulty, and it can be addressed thanks to the investment of human forces, such as "available power and resources;" the engagement lavished upon us is such that it is able to transform in proportion to the "decline," to generate a new way of knowing, evaluating, acting.

2. COMMUNITY AND VALUES

The above mentioned task is addressed within the cultural community, but the affirmation of Lonergan needs to be located in its context: "The university is a reproductive organ of the cultural community." The university has nothing to do with whatever is stereotypical, mechanical, and repetitive, standardized: it is a vital organ, and not merely instrumental, whose functions are continually generative of the cultural community itself, which is constantly called upon in turn to raise questions for reflection about whatever presents itself as novel and about the received patrimony, to give rise to a renewed expression of the cultural contents because of their having been reworking by the subjects who comprise the community.

It is not so much a matter of cultural objects' having to be reproduced in multiple transmission codes as that the plural and complex subjectivity be promoted so that it be dynamically affirmed as cultural; this needs to be rediscovered above all "in the intellectual lives of the professors" capable of nourishing a formative communication with the students. Among the various functions that can be attributed to the university, a central one is: "the communication of intellectual development," or the communication about whatever distinguishes the human subject in its intellectual attainments, through the differentiations of consciousness in the various periods of history, rigorously linked to the achievements of the operations that progressively characterize it. But the "intellectual

4 "Role of the Catholic University," 111.
life” of the professors, nourished indeed by the personal research that each one cultivates, is not reducible to an individual labor exhausted in a private sphere; it both springs forth from and is at the same time destined for the “cultural community.”

The cultural community, inserted in the broader context of the human community that responds to the exigence of leading a life in solidarity, is preceded by the intersubjective community and by the civil community. Nourished by experience and by the desire for the particular good is the intersubjective community; sustained by insights, by the act and the result of understanding, by the search for and the realization of the good of order is the civil community; supported by value judgments is the cultural community. This last, of course characterized qualitatively — each cultural community has its peculiar traits and constitutive differences — is animated by instances of transcendence, and does not remain a prisoner of geographical confines and historical periods; this is cosmopolis.

With this term, Lonergan does not mean to express “a political ideal” of the good that is difficult to attain (bonum arduum) or something impossible to achieve, but a “cultural fact” that is already configured by time: “It is the field of communication and influence of artists, scientists, and philosophers. It is the bar of enlightened public opinion to which naked power can be driven to submit. It is the tribunal of history that may expose successful charlatans and can restore to honor the prophets stoned by their contemporaries.” Cosmopolis then is inscribed by certain intellectual and moral values: the communication between those learned in different fields of knowledge capable of generating a field of interaction in which the single competences are deepened to teach transversality and not the narrowness of single epistemologies. Cosmopolis stands for the critical and formative repercussions that cultural elements have upon public life to the point where they become a reformative and orientating

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5 “Role of the Catholic University,” 109.

6 “Transversality” is the more recent category recurring in the European context, but it is also more amply international for indicating the degree to which something can be considered common (values, objectives, methods) within the differentiated disciplines and which constitutes their principle of integration, attesting to the unity of knowledge, although to varying extent. In the last thirty years of the nineteenth century, there was no particular advertence given to the need to meet the problems on the multidisciplinary, interdisciplinary, or transdisciplinary level, and transversality can be properly considered in line with this last level.
force; it is honorable, not factious, conduct evaluating words and deeds equally.

3. THE DIALECTIC OF HISTORY AND THE PROMOTION OF HIGHER SYNTHESSES

Even the above-mentioned instances, shared or diffused at the individual or social level, are at the root of changes that have a double valence: they can lead to the "development" or "decline" – what has arrived and still arrives in history and converges with the characterization of its own "dialectic" within it. In their practicality human beings make way for manifold and ambiguous changes, that provide the data one can inquire about, seek their intelligibility, or also wonder about the good that could be brought about. One encounters this ambiguous change inasmuch as it involves a cumulative attainment in the speculative order that has brought about the mastery of science, or a cumulative practical achievement that has brought forth the civil community. Both offspring can become an object of verification, in which the first is verified experimentally, the second historically. The diverse stages of the human community (its origins, development, achievement of power, dissolution, decadence), the plurality of its components (parties and factions, privileged and oppressed classes), its motivations (Realpolitik and revolution), testify to discordances, and counter-positions within human experience, that is, "a common origin in commonly indecipherable ambiguity."

Yet it is not to be thought that such an affirmation is a species of surrender to the ineluctable, since there is a need to pass from theories to facts, to formulate a different kind of question that agrees to reflect, weigh the evidence, and to be critical, and this is the good that properly occurs in the cultural community. Still, this too is not exempt from ambiguity. It does not pertain to "another universe;" "in the universe that exists man suffers from moral impotence;" reason itself is abdicated, "higher

7 In this essay Lonergan does not express himself explicitly in this way (the title of the third paragraph is actually redactional); he prefers to speak of "ambiguous change," "ambiguity," which denote the preference for an ethico-philosophical reading of deeds and of historical events.
8 "The Role of the Catholic University," 110.
9 "The Role of the Catholic University," 111.
syntheses” are replaced by “lower syntheses,” which are further from intellectual and moral progress and determine the course of “decline” in society and culture.

But, through the university, the cultural community can have the organism capable of immunizing it against intellectual and moral decadence due to the “communication of intellectual development” that will lead the professors by their teaching to hold ambiguity in check, and to favor the intus legere in the students that is the hallmark of intelligence in act.

It is an intelligence that does not expect to passively assimilate from others prefabricated syntheses, but that strives to comprehend the multiple aspects of the truth or truths, and to construct syntheses that arise from understanding them.

It is an intelligence that knows how to work out classifications, to construct series of concepts, safeguarding their internal unity, and demonstrating the intelligibility of their relations.

It is an intelligence that is not set on a particular aspect, on a unique unity of meaning, but moves agilely within various unities of meaning, even those that are counterposed or syntagmatic (abstract/concrete, universal/particular, speculative/practical).

To favor intelligence in act with its intus legere is to promote comprehension, that is, to help understanding to develop. Lonergan showed such an interest in the manifestations of understanding in the activity of teaching and learning that in Insight he has set forth the explanation of the dynamics of human understanding as a basic method for making explicit every other method, indispensable for stemming the fragmentation of knowledge, for integrating knowledge from diverse and manifold areas, to appreciate the vitality of the human community, for reading and rewriting history. In different ways, every proposal of the teacher is covered with negative traits inspired by ambiguity: “the explanations,” Lonergan asserts, “are of hypnotic drugs by their virtus dormativa, truths become uncomprehended formulas, moral precepts narrowed down to lists of prohibitions, and human existence settles into a helpless routine without a capacity for vital adaptation and without the power of knowledge that inspires and directs the movement from real possibility to concrete achievement.”

The function of the Catholic universities is not different from

10 “The Role of the Catholic University ...,” 111.
that of every other university, they all ought to face up to "changes," to the "dilemma" involved in reconstructing the maps of learning. The thought of Bernard Lonergan efficaciously meets the need to construct a "map" that guides the recognition of the intertwined currents in the various areas of knowledge and to undertake the "right direction." 

This does not yet touch the fact that Catholic universities can combat social and cultural ambiguity better than others due to the final otherworldly orientation linked with the theological virtues of faith, hope, and charity, whose exercise redounds to the total benefit of the society: faith frees human reason from the narrownesses of worldly ambiguity; hope puts the brakes on practical egotism and battles against economic determinism; charity impedes the continual explosion of tensions provoked by a faithful application of the law, which stops at the level of retributive justice.

In Catholic universities, the care put into teaching and learning, the appreciation of the value of knowledge for its own sake, as we will say later on, is called to express the intellectual and cultural relevance of faith and thus to combat social and cultural "decline." To this relevant task Bernard Lonergan, philosopher, theologian, twentieth-century methodologist, was dedicated, which, while accommodating the exigencies and the attainments of an epoch, passes through it while casting light on the dynamisms of the human subject, and at the same time delineating a method of human knowledge valid for any time, because it is based on the structure of the human subject.

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12 See Richard M. Liddy, "Bernard Lonergan on a Catholic Liberal Arts Education," Catholic Education: A Journal of Inquiry and Practice, III, no. 4, (2000): 521-32. For the author an "integrated vision" of sciences and disciplines is favored, promoted by Lonergan’s thought, read in terms of "liberal education." He affirms at 526: "Such a vision of how the sciences and disciplines are linked in an integrated way to human self-understanding and the progress of human culture is a high goal of human understanding. It does not come easily and without dedicated study of these methods and the basic method of our own spirit. Still, a liberal education is on the way to such achievement."
If the intellectual vitality of teachers will agree to clear the field of the dangers of the *virtus dormitiva*, of the vacuousness of incomprehension, of dealing in precepts for their own sake, it would amount to saying that the university is attentive to its students, to the activity of study and research they undertake. If one could initially direct one's attention to the students, keeping in mind that the goal of university formation is knowledge, one should not think that this is implicit or simply ideal. As John Henry Newman, of whom Lonergan was a careful reader, authoritatively asserted, this goal is "quite concrete, real and adequate;" it is not vague and diffuse, but intensive since "Knowledge is capable of being its own end. Such is the constitution of the human mind, that any kind of knowledge, if it be really such, is its own reward." Newman thus referred to every kind of knowledge and in particular to philosophical knowledge that he recalled consists "in a comprehensive view of truth in all its branches, of the relations of science to science, of their mutual bearings, and their respective values." Hence, knowledge cannot be considered on an instrumental level, it is not a means that should serve something else, a preliminary path for the exercise of a skill into which it dissolves, it has no interest extraneous to itself, it is headed toward the pursuit of its own sake. Undoubtedly there will be advantages that derive from it, but what is primarily considered is that, independently of its external advantages, with knowledge "we are satisfying a direct need of our nature;" this, even if one is not capable of immediately attaining its perfection, is affirmed in gradual objectives, thanks to which we feel knowledge present, operating in us. Knowledge "viewed in relation to learning" focuses subjects, their "cultivation of the intellect" also considered "an end distinct and sufficient in itself" that can be expressed as an "enlargement of mind," and which is "the power of viewing many things at once as a whole, of referring them severally to

17 Newman, *Idea*, 149. This "enlargement of mind" also is presented as "illumination;" elsewhere he speaks of "the expansion of the mind, and of the instrument of attaining to it" (*Idea*, 152), in opposition to a "narrowness of mind" that knows little.
their true place in the universal system, of understanding their respective values, and determining their mutual dependence.\textsuperscript{18}

A renewed attention to the subject committed to knowledge, and at the same time to discovery, reading, reexpressing the meaning present in the various forms of knowledge, is present in Lonergan, who in the first years of the 1960s turned his attention repeatedly\textsuperscript{19} to explaining what the meaning and the significance this assumes in the life of the subject, of the human community, and of the culture, is.

A first consideration regards the possibility of considering meaning as something dynamic, developing; from this viewpoint this has to do with time and with the life of any subject, above all with his capacity to discover relationships. In contrast, aridly conducted study, lacking engagement and motivation, increases the distance from objects and in this way makes room for fragmentation. "The study of literatures, of cultures, of philosophy, of religion can become simply an archipelago of islands with no relations between them"\textsuperscript{20} and – continuing the metaphor – renders them inaccessible or, conversely, impenetrable. Yet before explicating the characteristics of meaning, Lonergan is concerned with individual cultural positions spread about that suffocate it or hinder it, and that are held in check and divided by meaning.

These are provincialism, incapable of enlarging one's own horizon and of accommodating anyone or anything different; classicism, which does not know how to read the importance of change and tends to affirm only what is consolidated; romanticism, which is enthusiastic about the concrete, the individual, the personal, the historical, but falls into fragmentation; the cult of the universal that recurs to the norm, the ideal, and ignores things in their particular reality. The notion of meaning is studied by starting from this "variety" of meanings corresponding to the existential dynamics encountered both in the history of persons and in that of peoples.

The first kind of meaning presented by Lonergan is intersubjective, acknowledging the contribution of Max Scheler on human sympathy; the Canadian maestro considers the phenomenology of the smile\textsuperscript{21} as

\textsuperscript{18} Newman, \textit{Idea}, 158.
\textsuperscript{19} The different lectures thematize meaning in complementary perspectives.
\textsuperscript{21} It is "one incarnate intelligence making itself known to another." "Time and
an "irreducible" and compact form; it is also recalled in the course De intellectu et methodo, as we shall see later on. There follow then symbolic meaning or "the meaning of affect in its most elementary form," by which the subject can orient himself in life, and is able to act in the world; and incarnate meaning, which is the meaning of existence experienced by every person through the choices, the actions of his life.

Finally, there are added artistic and linguistic meaning. In their activity, artists live an experience of the liberation of their own sensibility "from every instrumentalization, all subservience to further ends:" they are committed to transforming their own worlds, even of quotidian activity, and so to transforming themselves. Linguistic meaning provides an existential significance for every subject, as is attested to by the resonance for every person words and names possess, to such a point of even structuring life; it is distinguished from other modes of meaning by the precision, but also by its richness.

The analysis achieved amounts to affirming that meaning is constitutive of human life in all its forms, on individual and social levels; without it we find ourselves confronted by the destruction of personal and communal life, by moral annihilation, by the barbarization of society, by the impoverishment of the institutions of culture. In terms of this proposal, Lonergan affirms: "To eliminate meaning is to eliminate all human institutions. Again, to eliminate meaning would be to eliminate interpersonal relations, symbols, art, language, literature, religion, science, history, philosophy, theology." One of the most frequent errors is to consider meaning as something unreal or opposed to reality, but in that case one ignores what "real being" is and one would need to
reestablish the difference between “natural” and “intentional.” Meaning is real according to the intentional order, and such intentionality is that which characterizes life as properly human.

The subject lives in time, within which it constitutes and maintains its identity; the person he/she is stays the same, even if one’s own presence to oneself is intermittent or undergoes changes. One’s intentional acts in time render one who one is; one cannot be outside of time, but above all, one’s time is the “time of meaning.” “The time of meaning is not a succession of mathematical points, such as is the time of mechanics. There is a now...of a subject that is not confined, in his considerations, to meaning things that are present; he means equally well the things that are past and future.”

Meaning, like the subject, is always considered in development. “Because there is human development there is temporality – the historicity...of human life and because development occurs principally in the field of meaning, the development is principally the development of meaning.”

Lonergan read development in light of the analyses of Jean Piaget, as the interaction among the dynamisms of adaptation (or assimilation, adjustment), of combinations of differentiated operations, of the regrouping of groups of operations; but at the same time he makes good the distinction between some fields that are not able to be regrouped with the others and goes along with the deepening the study of development in general, as well as the development of meaning. Such are the fields of common sense and of theory, the fields of the external world and of the interior world, the fields of mediation and the field of religion. These four sets of worlds, or “types of world,” are not the same for all, and they change according to the differentiation of one’s consciousness.

Meaning cannot prescind from reality, but one needs to attend to the “human reality” and this is “in large part constituted by acts of meaning” that the subject masters during its growth, and this in fact does not correspond to experience or to the sum of experiences which it can have. “It is this addition of understanding and judgment that makes possible the larger world mediated by meaning, that gives it its

28 Topics in Education, 291 ff.
30 “Dimensions of Meaning, Collection, 232.
structure and its unity, that arranges it in an orderly whole of almost endless differences: partly known and familiar, partly in a surrounding penumbra of things we know about but have never examined or explored, partly in an unmeasured region of what we do not know at all."31 The world of meaning is the world mediated by other subjects, by the human community, by the culture, and is much more vast that that of immediate experience, and as different from it, requires understanding and judgment. 32 Such a world, although more vast and nourished by the works of many, is indeed not secure, but it is constitutively 'insecure:' "besides truth there is error, besides fact there is fictions, besides honesty there is deceit, besides science there is myth."33

But the world of meaning is not only that of knowledge, it is also that of action, of projects with choices of ends and means, of the collaboration required by the transformation of nature; it is "the man-made, artificial, world, [that] is the cumulative, now planned, now chaotic product of human acts of meaning." It can happen that one mistakes these transformations as the most important to which the human being can be dedicated, but there is another that has priority, that of the human being who actuates himself through the processes of education, of instruction, of formation that mark the various stages of life and make room for the differences constitutive of the subject.

These are individual goods; they are characterized by the time and place they emerge, "[b]ut the difference produced by the education of single human beings is only the recapitulation of the longer process of the education of mankind, of the evolution of social institutions, and of the development of cultures."34 Not only knowledge in its various religious, artistic, scientific, philosophic, historical forms that has undergone transformations (every form is born, evolve, reaches a culmination, declines, gets reborn), but also institutions change over time, can be the objects of new ideas, the community can reinscribe their meaning.

What would the university be were it not to grasp its profound relationship with the reality of meaning? The change in meaning certainly has its importance, but the control of meaning has still more. An example

31 "Dimensions of Meaning," 233. [Ed. note: In Professor Finamore’s Italian text this essay is cited here and in what follows in the Italian translation by Giovanni B. Sala, in Ragione e fede di fronte a Dio, (Brescia: Queriniana, 1977), 105.]
32 "Dimensions of Meaning," 233; Sala, 105.
33 "Dimensions of Meaning," 233; Sala, 106.
34 "Dimensions of Meaning," 234; Sala, 106.
is noted from the history of philosophy: Socrates put questions to his fellow citizens who responded in a primary, immediate language, without reaching a level of reflection that landed at a definition. Another example is treated in the history of humanity: primitive peoples were intelligent, knew how to solve practical problems but were dominated by myth and magic. People of the first great civilizations notably transformed their living conditions but still were prisoners of myth and magic. It is necessary to acknowledge that the Greek mediation of meaning made way for classical culture and that this has been replaced by modern culture, although the latter culture has not yet reached the level of maturity and so has instead produced forms of blind acquiescence from which situations of varied misery are derived. "The classical mediation of meaning has broken down; the breakdown has been effected by a whole array of new and more effective techniques; but their very multiplicity and complexity leave us bewildered, disoriented, confused, preyed upon by anxiety, dreading lest we fall victim to the up-to-date myth of ideology and the hypnotic, highly effective magic of thought control."35

The breakdown of the classical mediation is confirmed by the field of science, which has not only succeeded it, but radically changed the very conception of science. The new science is no longer expressed in terms of "knowledge" but of "hypothesis, theory, system, the best available scientific opinion;" it no longer speaks of the constitutive elements of science as "truth, certainty, knowledge, necessity, and causality;" the modern ideal has substituted "something less arduous, something more accessible, something dynamic, something effective. Modern science works."36

The new science has brought along with itself a different optic through which to read human life the attention to the essential, the universal, the necessary has been replaced by attending to the accidental, the particular, and the contingent. Lonergan underlines favorably the new scientific interest in man, or better in all human beings – on the level of history and geography – in every human phenomenon, it wants instead to compare the classical and the modern ideal of science because they are both subordinated to judgment, since one can no longer think

35 "Dimensions of Meaning," 238; Sala, 112.
36 "Dimensions of Meaning," 239; Sala, 113. In Lonergan’s original text: "Modern science works," the “works” points to effective results; the modern ideal is that of production, of the multiplication of functions in a context that pays attention to experimental results, not speculation.
of science in terms of imagining the data. This is “an ongoing process that no library, let alone any single mind, is expected to encompass” and precisely for such a processual dynamic cannot be content with grasping the meaning: it has to be verified. The cognitive sphere, on the other hand, is not exhausted in the context of classical science that worked out “a somewhat arbitrary standardization of man;” the literal meaning is neither unique nor primary and Lonergan shows that he is a good connoisseur and appreciator of Giambattista Vico who defended the priority of poetry, and, as well, the vitality of symbols, opening the way for a different definition of man that will eventually emerge: no longer the rational animal but the symbolic animal.

Not only poetry, but also the rediscovery of myth under its various forms, in the twentieth century, has highlighted the power of the incarnate spirit, of the psycho-physical unity of the human subject, of psychic mechanisms, of cultural heritages, and at the same time, of the anteriority of intercultural language: the attention Lonergan pays to Freud, Jung, Ludwig Binswanger, Rollo May, Gilbert Durand, Mircea Eliade is not only of the bibliographical kind, but feeds a profound existential reflection on the human subject, who perceives his body, who grasps the preconceptual dimension of intelligence, is solidified in “vertical liberty” on which his human forces pivot. This liberty is not given, nor can we possess it on the ideal level, since it is that by which “we may emerge out of prevoluntary and prepersonal process to become freely and responsibly, resolutely yet precariously, the persons we choose to be. Still, what are we to choose to be? What are we to choose to make of ourselves? In our lives there still comes the moment of existential crisis when we find out for ourselves that we have to decide for ourselves that we have to decide for ourselves.”

To comprehend the characteristics of the modern mediation of meaning, to compare it with the classical one, is a task entrusted to those dedicated to study, to the cultivators of the different disciplines, to the learned, to as many as avail themselves of their works in the libraries, to university students through the courses they pursue, so as to be able to elaborate in as personal a form as they have made their own, and to

37 “Dimensions of Meaning,” 241; Sala, 116.
38 “Dimensions of Meaning,” 241; Sala, 117.
become capable of reaching judgments and decisions. "There is far too much to be learnt before he could begin to judge. Yet judge he must and decide he must if he is to exist, if he is to be a man."

Lonergan does not tire of insisting that meaning is a "reality" of human life. Already the simple question, "What is meaning?" implies the will to get an answer, but this is not superadded from outside or superimposed to the meaning, because the meaning is self-explicating, "the meaning of meaning is a meaning. The question answers itself." An analytic approach allows one to consider the mind ready to be applied to everything and to be able to give explanations at the level of experience, understanding, judgment. Meanings therefore are related to these three levels, which are not to be thought closed in on themselves, with one separated from the other; by confronting and comparing them, we can grasp "the analogy of meaning."

With a different approach, we can describe diverse types of reality in order to discover meaning in its constitutive elements. They are reality as countersigned constitutively by meaning.

Human communication: everyday language, intersubjective relationships, the incarnate existence of each person, symbols and their affective charge, art, literature, forms of technical language;

Human potentiality: to be men and women, affective and aggressive symbols; tactics and strategies, plans and counterplans, goals, objectives, ideals, intentions; ambitions and achievements; questions, acts and habits of understanding, explorations of possibilities; love, loyalty, faith, deliberations and decisions; all the forms of differentiated consciousness and subjective attitudes;

Human knowing: the complex activity that unites three components – the experiential, the intellectual, the rational; man can humanly say that he experiences, understands what he has experienced, judges as right or mistaken that which he has understood;

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40 "Dimensions of Meaning," 242; Sala, 119.
41 "Dimensions of Meaning," 244; Sala, 121.
Human living: the human potentiality that is actualized, the subject is involved in acts of will, chosen works, actual decisions;

Community: human potentiality is also actualized by communication with which knowledge and modes of living humanly are passed from one person to another; human potentiality is also that of the community, persons are a potential community when they can reciprocally understand each other and understand what means what;

Human sciences: scientific knowledge of man in his personal and communal human reality; such knowing studies not only data, but interprets the human dimensions as such and as historical. Human science is also specified as an interpretive or hermeneutical science and as reflection for education and formation, ultimately to communicate meanings and techniques relevant for them;

Theology: knowledge of the word of God with all its validity and truth is a new datum and a new meaning; the revelation of God enters into human reality as "its most significant and most important level;" the word of God is not just a datum as is given for the human sciences, but has a value and a truth that mounts to God himself.

The techniques, the new forms of myth and of magic cannot be informed by meaning; meaning is disclosed in the specificity of seven realities just mentioned as a generative force and characteristic of the human inasmuch as it is human, as a liberating instance of human development. So we can affirm that meaning is the humanizing factor; it is the process of attaining the human, of the maturation of the human as starting from an activity oriented to uncovering the analogy of meaning, starting from the three levels of knowing to grow in so far as one is human and humanizing one’s own life.

"Meaning is a formal and constitutive element of human living, and to remove meaning is to remove art and symbol, literature and history, natural and human science, families, states, religions, philosophies, and theologies." All the above-mentioned realities concur in humanizing, are the privileged means of humanization; their removal, while it destabilizes the meaning in its objective dimension, threatens the integrity of the

human subject and the human community.

The university, as a place of research and formation, is called to locate itself at the intersection of the objective and subjective dimensions, to be the center of a field in which meaning is studied, that is, reality in its diverse areas, with their dynamisms and their changes, in order to become familiar with them and to re-work them, and to attain self-knowledge and humanization.

In so far as Lonergan has written about the role of the university and on the reality/notion of meaning, his point has been validly embodied and re-expressed in a course from 1958-59, which we will now discuss.

5. THE PROMOTION OF INTELLECTUAL DEVELOPMENT AS AN ACHIEVEMENT OF MEANING

Lonergan’s teaching in the course De intellectu et method could serve to exemplify the contextual and methodological options that turn out to be profoundly consistent with the examples that have emerged until now. The course was held at the Gregorian University in the second semester of the academic year 1958-59; the data has been made available due to various students’ notes that have been assembled and ordered; its title, and Crowe affirms, shows “the two poles of the tension that animates his thought.”

Insight had barely been published (1957), the Halifax seminar on Insight was held in the previous summer (1958). In this course he wanted to throw light on the question of method, and so above all on the irrevocable advantage that theology derives from philosophy. Interest in method had deep roots in Lonergan; we cannot forget that the first course he held at the Gregorian University in 1953-54 had the study of method in its generality as its theme. It was divided into four parts: “1. The

46 The course notes were gathered and put in order by some auditors of the course, and then published by Francesco Rossi de Gasperis and P. Joseph Cahill; in point of fact, Frederick E. Crowe was informed that Rossi de Gasperis revised the text with Lonergan. See Frederick E. Crowe, Bernard J. F. Lonergan. Progresso e tappe del suo pensiero, ed. Natalino Spaccapelato and Saturnino Muratore (Rome: Città Nuova, 1995), 119. The notes cover 72 pages of typescript. [Italian translation of Frederick E. Crowe]

47 Crowe, Lonergan, 118.

48 The Liber annualis attests the title of the course: De methodis universim inquisi-
notion of the question. 2. The notion of science. 3. The twofold mode of human thinking. 4. Method and its precepts." If one went no further than the subtitles of the parts it could seem that a good deal more space was allotted to intelligence than to method, or that the intellectual dimension was more important that the rational-operotive one of method, which seems to be superadded only at the end. In fact, this is not the case: the first three parts are deeply pervaded by epistemological examples in relation to relevant kinds of content, but they are presented in such a mediated manner that a gradual deepening introduction to method itself can be retained.

Here we do not intend to analyze a dense network of contents that emerge in an ordered series; in the economy of the present communication, we limit ourselves to those aspects that allow one to notice both this communication of intellectual development, considered by Lonergan a central function of the university, and the meaning that permeates the cultural quest, but no less, the subject's existential search for its identity and the development of its own human maturity.

5.1 Questions and the Potential of Human Intelligence

After having adduced the premise that every question arose and is fed by reasons adopted to affirm or deny the same proposition, the first part is occupied with a point-by-point historical analysis of authors and texts, aimed a documenting the argument in its manifold aspects.

Each question has a meaning in itself which has to be faced, so too the series of questions that always follows a question once it has been resolved has to be considered; the order of the answers must be logical because it manifests the technique devoted to terms and propositions, and coherent because it contains no contradictions.

Propositions are meant to have a real meaning and one and the same totality can be ordered in different ways, can be named with equivalent systems; series of responses to all questions are composed, they are ordered while they continue to arise. Not only will there be found something novel that is opposed, but the novelty will mark progress if


49 It goes beyond the economy of this study to recall the thick network of texts cited by Lonergan. I must underscore the fact that these citations, while they meet the need of scholarly documentation, assume the pedagogical insistence expressed by Newman of "enlarging" the mind of the students.
some conditions will be taken into account: that the ability to answer a new question depends on an order that is not statically repetitive but evolves or changes into something else; that the above-mentioned evolution of a pervious order is not up to solving the new problems, requires the intervention of schools of method, the new questions will see their solution by changing the way of ordering the answers; all the proposition shall be ordered in accord with a new method, with new techniques, there will be a new principle of development.

It is not to be thought that this will come about without creating new problems; Lonergan indeed offers evidence for a threefold problem: the problem of foundations, related to the transition from one order to another; that of historicity, related to the continuity among orders; and that of the "chasm" or abyss related to the progressive multiplication of ever more organized of orders in time and simultaneously their ever greater distance from the sources. These three problems are nothing

50 Lonergan speaks of the problema chasmatis, recalling the derivation of chasms from chaos, a word used by Luke in the parable of the rich man and the impoverished Lazarus (Luke 16: 19-31) at verse 26: Abraham replies to the groaning of the rich man who discovers himself in hell, saying that it is the "great abyss" of the "voraciousness" which places him at a distance. Problema chasmatis is that of the abysmal differences between words, concepts, notions as reflected in the following note.

51 When first a problem arises within the system that finds no solution within the system itself, the need then arises to pass from an old order to another new one, whether it be in relation to a particular system pertaining to a single author, or whether it be to a general system (e.g., to the teaching of the Vatican in the 1800s); the history of philosophy and of theology is riddled by this problem. The problem of historicity is read in relation to the different order of the causa cognoscedi, which is first in relation to us and in the way of discovery (via inventionis), and in the order of the causa essendi, which instead is first relation to things in themselves and in the way of teaching (via doctrinae); such a problem is noticed especially in the difference between speculative theology and positive theology and does not require an integration between the two, inasmuch in the statement of their foundation with a relative theoretical justification, is a problem concerning the continuity between one order and another. The problema chasmatis, translated in the Italian version with "alienation," mounts to a diverse use of words, notions, technical terms in doctrinal formulations; medieval theologians sought a systematic solution, but they also introduced into theology logical and metaphysical categories that Aristotle had used in the sciences of nature; the controversies between Aristotelian and Augustinians were in quite a rage in the thirteenth century. The Reformers reacted to systematic theology, seeking to return to the gospel, subsequently Balian and Jansenius both claimed to be following Augustine totally. Lonergan recalls the reality of the twentieth century in which the need to make all the faithful enter into theology in is various forms (systematic, positive, moral, ascetic) is felt, and there is
but "three logically distinct aspects of the one real problem of method."

Before coming to delineate the solution, Lonergan directs the students to a journey of gradual and systematic approximation to the same solution. The journey is articulated in three directions, corresponding to the three problems, and of this we indicate here only the structure of the first, the salient traits of his analytic argumentation, in order to concretize the exploratory dynamic set forth by Lonergan in this initial part of the course, and which concludes in the second and third part, grasping "intelligence," and the fourth getting to "method."

The Possibility of Solution of the Problem of Foundations

Individuation of the Genus into which Foundations Is Placed

The possibilities vary according as the kind of foundations; the solution is not total, complete; it is limited by its very conditions, or to the degree that it is marked by difficulty.

The foundation can be extrinsic: if it refers to names, propositions, terms. It is satisfactory inasmuch as its terms and propositions agree at a first level, but no question is asked about why they agree; hence, its limits.

The foundation can be intrinsic: resides in internal concepts and judgments. This is enough when the terms are conceived in the same way, and thus limited.

The foundation can be within the intellect and in intellectual habits: they recur in differentiated forms: in science as a process that leads from principles to a conclusion; in intellectus (nous) which is a habit of intelligence; in wisdom which is: the principle of judgment regarding understanding; the principle of judgment pertaining to its reasoning; the principle of the judgment concerning the ordering of the virtual, multiply orderable totality. It succeeds when the preceding two foundations come into play less, but it equally encounters a twofold difficulty: it would suffice if men were wise, but not everyone is capable of being so: the number of the stupid is infinite.

much discussion of pastoral theology, of the theological meaning of the liturgy, of kerygmatic theology, of existential theology (De intellectu et metodo, 11-15).
We are not born wise, nor do we become wise by natural necessity, otherwise, all or many would be wise, instead of the few, for whom it is silly to move toward wisdom.

Wisdom presupposes science; it is not a principle but fruit, not the foundation, but the roof.

Recourse to authority is of no use if we are not wise to start with; wisdom is not obtained through authority or will.

Recourse to wisdom is useless, even if we tend toward it and love it. Were we already wise, we would have no need of wisdom; if not, we love a false appearance of wisdom.

To invoke wisdom because of the beauty of the name is to fall into relativism. It is preferable to hold on to the insoluble problems and be content with a humble ignorance.

Advancing Toward the Initial Solution of the Problem of Foundations

The solution is not immediate, easy if the abyss would not have given rise to the problem of method. The path to the solution by means of a gradual sifting of objections, arriving at a clarification that solicits a position different from the others.

Knowledge is not increased by addition or external provenance; rather what is little known was first completely unknown. The increase comes about by dividing the whole that already precedes (= ens, being); that is, what becomes progressively known, little by little, resides in being. Intellectual progress is a movement from the amount already known to the amount that has to be known more explicitly.

We make progress toward wisdom through the division of being, the completeness and security of which is based on the principle of non-contradiction. The Tree of Porphyry by the process of setting up dichotomies offers a complete division, validly and permanently schematic and abstract, from which some judgments can arise.

Wisdom grows out of always more numerous divisions and does not reside in the indivisible; nor is it possible to acquire it simply inasmuch as one can increase the number and so it is in relation to wisdom that one already possessed it in some measure. God alone is simpliciter sapiens,
By participating in the divine wisdom, man progresses toward wisdom, but also knows the limits of his wisdom, judges only about what he knows, and not about many other things he does not know; this is the root of his humility. But man can also exaggerate his knowledge and pretend to give judgments about everything. Only the wisdom of God is absolute; the human kind is differentiated into the various kinds of judgments (general, determinate).

The manifold conceptions of being would seem to render the foundations of wisdom instable and from this the many kinds of wisdom are derived. There is however the natural notion of being which is the same in all human beings, distinct from the reflected upon, analytic notion that is formulated in different ways by philosophers and theologians.

The natural notion of being is implicit and identical in every human being; there is not a different kind of foundation in the authors of the Sacred Scripture, in scholastic theology, and in the conciliar definitions.

The notion of science evolves. Today the sciences are many and the examples are far clearer the further they are from the past. There are elements of Aristotelian science (such as necessity and certainty) that are no longer tenable today, but others still recur.

It is not so much the notion of science that evolves as science itself. The question concerning what remains stable and immutable in the evolution of science has been solved.

**Solutions to the Objections**

| In wisdom there are degrees, and man judges according to the degree. | The foundation must precede what it founds, in accord with its modality. If it is placed within wisdom, some initial degree is required. | The recourse to authority, to the authors helps, if one is adducing not points of consensus but the incomprehensible points that push one to investigate, learn, make progress. | The most perfect wisdom is in God alone; the human being can love and desire wisdom and advance toward it. | There is only relativism if human wisdom is not God's; men are not totally foolish, possess wisdom by degrees, make judgments. |
All the solutions, corresponding to the objections, although they have a speculative weight, have a no less formative one for the students. The solution to the third objection has the particularly challenging effect of promoting efficacious learning, as Crowe indeed underlines in commenting on this part of *De intellectu et methodo*: it is not what is familiar that develops learning, but what creates embarrassment, discomfort, difficulty.  

*Unity of the Solution*

| The potentiality of the human intellect |

After having gone through the itineraries in relation to the three problems, Lonergan comes to the point of proposing “the unity of the solution.” He returns to the human intellect that is in potency, without thereby sacrificing whatever is specific or different for the ambit of each problematic.

Inasmuch as the human intellect is in potency, its scientific and sapiential quality can grow; from the progress made by the human intellect springs forth the initial solution to the problem of foundations. In so far as the human intellect is human it is joined profoundly to the sensitive part, and from this union one can look for the solution to “the problem of alienation.” Finally, in the measure that the human intellect progresses to the scientific, intellectual (having the habit of *intellectus*), and sapiential level and is at once profoundly united to the life of the senses, one can form different syntheses at the intellectual and sensitive level. The more the habits of science, intelligence, and wisdom are involved, the more it supervenes on sensitive living, and the mode of conceiving is tied to sensations, provoking crises and transformations that require ever diverse solutions. Precisely in this context is the problem and the notion of method located.

His speculation is concerned with an extremely fertile outcome for reflection on the university, on its differentiated realms of study, on their common exigence for method.

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5.2 The Varieties of Science and of the Notion of Science

The notion of method can be introduced as well by departing from the notion of science that evolves; if Aristotle and Thomas spoke of science, the moderns prefer to speak in terms of method. Such evolution is faster in the practices of science than in the reflection upon them, which feeds conflicts and raises the problem of method. Science can be conceived in a multiplicity of ways, and so can have different notions of science, which are sifted through. We express again such notions starting from some incisive Latin utterances by Lonergan.

"Cognitio essentiae rei, qua cognita cognoscantur rei proprietates." Knowledge of essence brings with it knowledge of the properties of a thing. Lonergan reveals the limits of such a notion. This has a logical foundation, recurring in the divisions of the Tree of Porphyry, but is not applicable to the knowledge that God has of himself (in him there is no distinction between essence, properties, or attributes) or to the knowledge what we can have of God in terrestrial life. If the definition regards the universal, and is applied rigidly, it can lead to the determinism of Spinoza or to the moral optimism of Leibniz. If the knowledge of essence and of properties is considered only an abstract matter, the science of concrete things is limited, as occurs in Scotus, who does not relate science to the concrete world, to this existing world, but to every possible world. If then we inquire whether we really know the essences of things, we have to admit that our knowledge is descriptive, classificatory, explanatory.

"Certa rerum per causas cognitio." Knowledge of things through their causes is certain. That is the Aristotelian notion of science: things are inserted into the ten categories of being (but neither matter nor form are among these), and correspond to the four kinds of cause (final, efficient, material, and formal). Lonergan does not bother much with each of these as with the notion of motion or change that requires the categories that are connected and interrelated and then the same formula in accord with the twofold process of analysis per viam resolutionis (starting from the things until ascending to the causes, which can be logical, physical, or metaphysical, and of synthesis, per viam compositionis (from the known causes until returning to the things). In contrast to this analytic-synthetic structure is chemistry with its periodic table of the elements: the elements arising from scientific investigation are defined by terms and relationships mutually related to each other and the definitions of the compounds arise from the elements.
“De legibus in aliquo systemate adhibentur.” The system is composed by laws that are demonstrated within it. This is the modern notion of science, which proves the laws through some system such as mathematics. The law is a basic element in Galileo and Kepler, while the systematic element was introduced by Newton. But there is no scarcity of oppositions; to the just described notion there is opposed that of the science proportionate to states and to probability; classical laws come to be replaced by the theory of relativity, the deterministic schemes by quantum theory and probability theory.

“Deductio ex principiis analyticis.” Deduction avails itself of analytic principles. The analytic principle has a predicate arriving from the subject’s reason. Lonergan distinguishes between analytic principles and analytic propositions; the first goes beyond the second by not only characterizing the relations among the elements in accord with grammatical and logical rules, but by the concrete existential judgment about concrete realities. The necessity of wisdom that selects principles and terms is the judgment about actual existence.

“De necessariis.” Science regards the necessary. It is the Aristotelian conception according to which the world is eternal, is not created in time; there is determinism in the case of the celestial things, but not in that of terrestrial things, and the causes per accidens do not impinge on the determinism; the whole world is pervaded by contingency. But no science is possible in relation to the per accidens; science regards genera and species. Contrary to Aristotle who did not possess a notion of divine providence, for St. Thomas there is science even of the per accidens, not inasmuch as there are natural agents given, but inasmuch as the one acting by its intellect and its will is God, who eternally knows and wills the links between the effects and is the cause of every object that will occur in the world. For Aristotle, furthermore, there is no science of historical matters that can be explored in poetry. Even Toynbee gets the categories for his study of history from Greek or Shakespearian tragedy. The notion of science is enlarged by distinguishing in the universe what is necessary from what is not; there is no science of redemption or of the Church, as the mystical body. In time, the notion of science has changed, so Aristotle’s notion is not Aquinas’s (absolute and hypothetical necessity), just as the latter differs from those operative in the sixteenth-century controversies concerning the reconciliation between human freedom and divine providence; moreover, we can speak of metaphysical, physical, or
moral necessity. The Aristotelian notion of science is reduced to the field of natural sciences, to scientific laws, to the theory of probability, but it is not able to define every science. With the evolution of science the same notion of science develops; no branch of science is science simply, the science varies in relation to the subject matter.

5.3 The Two Ways of Knowing: Symbolizing and Theorizing

There are two ways of experiencing, conceiving, thinking, judging: the symbolic way, which is natural, universal, and temporally prior, and the theoretical way that comes to be discovered gradually with purpose and will. Each way is limited in itself, they are complementary, but the differences between them make it so that dialectical oppositions arise, giving rise to a third way.

If the symbolic way is absolutized, it falls into the aberrations proper to a mythic, magical, superstitious mentality, which does not prevent one from having to recognize its meaning.

The different expressions on a human face are carriers of symbolic meaning: “they are something intentional, not just combinations of muscular movements; and so there are the various forms: laughter, the smile, derision, the welcoming smile. This intentionality is perceivable beyond the perception of material movements. The perception of movement is recognized according to the light, the color, and varies as they vary. This act of perceiving is an activity that occurs in the field of psychological awareness, where only those things that consciousness itself is able and wants to form. (...) This intentional element contained in these movements is natural and spontaneous. We do not learn to laugh, just as we do not learn to eat.”

53 It is simple, immediate, emotional, does not need words; it is polyvalent in the use of signs and therefore can be ambiguous, does not use abstract signs, nor does it distinguish between that the person knows, wishes, wills, in contrast to the sort of discursive signs that use a unique sign for each concept, distinguishes among moods (indicative, optative, cognitional, voluntary). Discursive meaning is objective, while the symbolic meaning is intersubjective, not only revealing one’s situation, but creating it; thus it occurs in art, and manifests what an abstract concept cannot show.

The use of language represents a second stage that pertains to the

53 De intellectu et methodo, 31. B.
symbolic mode of knowing that evolves and enlarges; it is attached to a symbolism but its operation is intellectual, there emerges an act of intellectual recognition and with a sufficiently developed language a rational operation. In this way the *logos* arose in Greece and in India.

By means of proper and common names the language expresses the act of intellectual recognition and is destined to talk about everything; the Aristotelian and Thomist notion of intellect and the notion of the world as the totality of objects about which one can speak, but also as part of a closed universe, delimited by its own horizon.

Within it the subject develops a common intelligence (*vulgaris*, proper to the people to whom is pertains, popular), but also a conception of time that is one’s own, psychological, the time of which one speaks. Language does not pull apart symbolism, but rather increases it, as happens in poetic art, in which words have an altogether particular force because they resonate within consciousness. Common intelligence also evolves, which occurs only as ordered to general utility and not for the consideration of universal principles, to be deployed in deductions, the evolution in accord with a scientific structure does not necessarily happen. Common intelligence does not join in speaking universal truth, but is expressed in proverbs that teach whatever can be commonly useful and comprehensible by all thanks to common sense. Thus there were the first civilizations of entire peoples (Egypt, Babylonia, India, Maya, Inca) and the first philosophic development (800-200 BCE), in China, India, Persia; a more individual type of thought is encountered in the Hebrew prophets and the Greek philosophers.

With these peoples – Lonergan recalls Husserl’s reflections – arose a new way of thinking and of understanding, which agrees to attribute a new sense to the words that were already in use, such as *sophia, logos, aletheia, episteme*; Socrates inaugurated the change with the *logoi epaktikoi*, inductive discourses what made explicit what had been implicit, that introduced the logical ideal: everything designated by a common name had to be conceived in a way that was capable of bearing the weight of logical deduction. The logical structure in which everything is connected was anticipated, with the fixity of the terms remaining firm. Socrates accepted the value of individual thought; for him no opinion should have been tolerated without having been examined – making explicit what hitherto is known as implicit entails a new actuation of the intellect. In the measure that something is explicated
already always depends on preceding thought, and hence the limit of its value is recognized. Whatever holds true for logic, ethics, metaphysics cannot hold good in the same way for the natural sciences (physics, chemistry, biology) or the human sciences (sociology, history, economy, psychology). The problem of the method of proceeding in the sciences is posed in the Renaissance. In all of modern philosophy the question of method is always more intimately connected with gnoseological and metaphysical questions.\textsuperscript{54}

6. THE EXISTENTIAL NATURE OF METHODOICAL OPERATIONS

Lonergan treats method in general, his notion is practical, and is constituted by five precepts, indicating what has to be done or avoided, accompanied by the relevant reasons handled in the theory of knowledge. The notion of method is inscribed by a manifold and ordered set of operations: the five precepts resemble a series of stages that are going to be followed, the trace a path (in Greek, \textit{meta hodos}) for going through the whole.

These precepts are general because they regard all the sciences and are adapted to the diverse material of each science; one can speak of a unity of method because it attends to the unity of the human mind that grounds it; and on this basis we can understand why the sciences, however diverse, tend toward unity and all of them are involved in confronting meaning.

\textit{The first precept} is "Understand." This is a precise act, the \textit{actus intelligendi}, "the act of understanding," a basic act that is the key to all discoveries. This act precedes any words, sentences, judgments, and any other datum of internal or external experience. It does not belong to a particular species but is the act uniquely sought that has great meaning; each act of understanding contributes to the advancement of understanding, to its progress; its greatness depends alone on the historic moment at which it occurs.

\textsuperscript{54} Lonergan recalled Cassirer in his work, \textit{Das Erkenntnisproblem in der Philosophie und Wissenschaft der neuere Zeit}, 3 volumes (Berlin, 1922-1923); in particular he refers to the positions of Descartes (\textit{Rules for the Direction of Genius}), of Spinoza (\textit{Universal Characteristics of Mathematics}).
There are no true acts of understanding; the truth is able to be found only with the judgment. In an act of understanding, hypotheses, definitions, theories that can be true or false are formulated, but the act of understanding is neither true nor false. It always occurs in situations, and cannot prescind from what we are and so too from our prejudices or from our previous choices; we are not primitive human beings or tabulae rasae; we cannot be nourished on doubts, nor can we doubt everything.

Lonergan recognizes the problematic aspect not just in the partiality in which it can be impeded, or in the closed mentality of which one is aware, but in that which is unconscious, either an aberration or a prejudice, and can be corrected as the intellectual habits grow that promote the acts of understanding preceded by acts of attending, of observation, and of investigating its data. Still, these things are not exaggerated in their importance, for they cannot keep attention to the data from growing or favoring the act of understanding, and if the contrary is true: whoever is under the pressure of interests and of the desire to understand observes and inquires more deeply.

Understanding is not uniquely bound to what is necessary, universal, abstract, even if we use abstract or necessary concepts (reason, cause, point) when we describe the act of understanding.

Understanding regard that which is fundamental in science, which, and St. Thomas affirmed, is the intellectual habit. But to begin with science is not a habit related directly to the subject; this is considered in a mediated way: it is what is in a book, what is studied as an assertion contained in a book; only by progressing in knowledge do we understand that the science is in us and not in the book.

The second precept is, “Understand systematically.” The systematic character is given by the subject’s intention to attain the ideal purpose of intelligence, his or her intentionality will constitute the means for attaining that end, and once the end of a particular science is reached, relations with other sciences can be established. One can speak of the ideal of intelligence inasmuch as this tends toward completeness, seeks the complete explanation of all the phenomena, desires to understand everything; its aim is to single out such a network of relations that the entire universe can be comprehended. Systematic understanding has nothing to do with seeing with systems of abstract propositions from which one thinks to deduce everything; it has to do with understanding the concrete universe, in all its aspects and in all its relationships. At the
same time the ideal is a means that impels one toward a further and more perfect end.

Lonergan characterizes a “heuristic structure that is valid for every science and for every problem.” It is to be found in the structure of our consciousness, constituted by acts of experiencing (experience), understanding (intelligibility), and finally the act of judgment (rationality). What is comprehended in intellection, in the *actus intelligendi* that is “the center of the network of human operations” is expressed with a concept, what is comprehended furthermore in reflection is expressed in a judgment.

The third precept is, “Reverse the counter-positions,” and the fourth is, “Develop the positions.” The two are interconnected. Systematic intelligence arises a bit at a time in the subject, just it does in history. However, not all developments are equal: the objectification of interpersonal symbols what occur in art is different from that of universal concepts; popular intelligence develops with a determinate horizon, in concrete situations, and in its evolution it makes the transition to the universal. Such development happens in subjects, who thereby undergo a conversion: if at first they only care about themselves and their own worlds, now their horizon is the universe; if in the past they followed the popular criterion of utility, now they pursue a scientific criterion.

Lonergan invites us to come to grips with chapters 11, 12, 13, and 14 of *Insight*, in which the notions of knowledge, reality, and objectivity are treated. It is necessary to distinguish the criteria of knowledge: there is the criterion for knowing the truth that is evidence, and there is the criterion for knowing reality that is contact, presence, in accord with a twofold orientation: toward the truth and being (*ens et verum formaliter convertuntur*) and toward the thing and the object. In one and the same subject both can be present, as occurs in Descartes: the *cogito* is orientated toward the truth, the *substantia* and the *res extensa* are orientated toward the thing. All that is the fruit of “true intelligence” of the first or the second orientation is maintained, but there is a need to distinguish that which is coherent with systematic understanding (the positions) from that which is not (the counter-positions). Method demands that one pass from the counter-positions to the positions and that the positions be developed further.

55 *De intellectu et metodo*, 42-43.
56 *De intellectu et metodo*, 43.
The fifth precept is, "Accept the responsibility for judgment." By the first two precepts the subject is challenged to understand and to sustain the commitment to systematic understanding, and if, with the third and the fourth, one advances toward judgment, remaining in the orbit of understanding, with the fifth one is asked to arrive at the truth, something that is more profound than understanding, which it also involves in a major way: it is not only a matter of judging, but of assuming responsibility for judging, and this is supported by the will. The transition from intelligibility to judgment occurs with the differentiation of consciousness, from intelligent consciousness to rational consciousness. It is not possible to have judgment without developed understanding, but certainly there are different kinds of judgment: a judgment about experience differs from a mathematical or scientific judgment.

Personal experience enters in to play a role in each judgment, which pertains completely to the human capacity in such a way that it demands all one's responsibility, which cannot be resolved by the intervention of method; if the latter can aid in making one's own judgment, it is certainly not to be substituted for by any surrogate. Nevertheless in the history of philosophy there are many currents of thought that relieve the human being of his responsibility. 57

To understand the real is to advance in the cognitional itinerary, but this is not complete if one does not arrive at a judgment that requires one to go beyond the simple use of propositions, to be engaged with the satisfaction of the act and in the activity of judgment in view of a critical capacity attentive to the truth of the propositions. 58

57 Such, for Lonergan, are rationalism, empiricism, Kantian criticism, idealism, relativism, the natural sciences. The flight from the responsibility of judgment is not only found in the philosophies and in the modern sciences. It has roots in scholasticism, especially in the Scotist doctrine for which propositions are necessary and absolute, universally valid for every human being, in every part of the world. In Scotism, the rationalist insistence is fused with empiricism, the intuition of what is contingent, rather than the possibility of judging the truth of facts.

58 Frederick Crowe expresses pointed indications that are pertinent: "in the university the focal interest is in the content of judgment; the main concern is with the materials to be judged, and not with the form in which one expresses one’s judgment. (...) A feature of judgment is the exercise of the critical capacity, not in the sense of praise or blame – that belongs to the fourth level – but in the sense of examining propositions for their truth, checking one’s assumptions for their validity, and the like. (...) My suggestion is that, where earlier pupils were taught to critique their own judgment, with the emphasis then on the activity, now at university they will learn to critique what is prof-
Lonergan finds four allies in support of his thesis about the importance of judgment: St. Augustine, for whom the fundamental category is the truth; St. Thomas Aquinas, who works out the category of being in addition to the Aristotelian categories; John Henry Newman, who insists on the unconditional character of the act of assent; and Joseph Marèchal, who defends the absolute character of judgment.

Method has nothing mechanical or necessary about it; its validity is not of a logical kind; it is related strictly to the personality of the subject and remains always and solely a personal act, which does not prejudice the fact that the personality of the subject makes the sciences advance through the judgments of single individuals and pushes toward the unity of method. Husserl’s critique of the multiplication of the sciences, is well motivated in its denunciation, while Lonergan looks to the solution of this problem: just as specializations do not impinge on the unity, on the basis of a cognitional theory, an epistemology, a metaphysics.

The link of university and meaning from which we started has found confirmation and motives for deepening in the nexus of “intellect and method” just analyzed. The appropriation of the dynamisms of consciousness, the investigation of the intellect as “self-affirmation of the knower,” method in terms of the methodological precepts as stages of a personal itinerary, which harmonizes with discovering and reexpressing the meanings that humanize on the personal and communal level are referred as true, with the emphasis on the content of the judgment” [Old Things and New, 115-16]. Judgment, indeed the supreme act of the cognitional process, has within it different levels; it is the act or activity that is perfected along with the maturity of the subject, with the attainment of “an authentic subjectivity.” Crowe himself evinces the progress of critical activity as a return to the critique of one’s own subjective condition even after having arrived at the critique of tradition that cannot prescind from putting the subject in question: “the question of who it is that offers the critique, what the horizon of interests and concerns within which it is offered, how authentically attention, intelligence, reflection and deliberation are exercised in offering it” [116]. Judgment cannot do without wisdom, which is not regarded as most perfect; there pertains to wisdom the recognition of degrees, and Lonergan resolves the first objection following “the initial solution of the problem of foundations” [De intellectu et metodo, 19-21] and recalls “the first degree of wisdom sufficient for making progress” then adds “according to the degree of one’s own wisdom the human being judges that which he knows, and does not judge that which he does not know” [21].

59 Insight, chap. 11. A relevant profound study is available in Joseph Flanagan, Quest for Self-knowledge: An Essay in Lonergan’s Philosophy (Toronto: University of Toronto Press, 1997), especially chap. 5.
the objectives of a university formation that invests in meaning and the subject, and both in development.

Every university teacher, belonging to any disciplinary area can be encouraged and supported in their work by the following words of Lonergan, which can also constitute an omen for the fecundity of this First International Lonergan Workshop:

To know the human potentiality is to know potential meaning. To know human knowledge is to know meanings that are true. To know human living is to know meanings that inform, that are constitutive of modes of human living. To know human communities in their potential in so far as they are communities of knowledge, academic communities or in so far as they are communities of commitment, again is to study meanings as they are effective in groups of human beings. Precisely in the measure that meaning is constitutive of human living and of human commitment, human science is a study of meaning.  

60 "The Analogy of Meaning," 203. The phrase comes from the section, "The Meaning of the Human Sciences," but we think it can be extended to other fields and can contribute in particular to understanding the link between the university and meaning.
INTEGRATING HISTORY INTO CATHOLIC THEOLOGY: CHRISTOPHER DAWSON AND BERNARD LONERGAN, S.J.

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REMEMBERING THE TESTIMONY of St. Ignatius's presence in Rome and the providential character of that time; the gift of a mystical experience of that providence given at La Storta; remembering as well the providential assignment of Fr. Bernard Lonergan by his Jesuit superiors to teach at the Gregorian University in 1954, all of this draws one into the long history of Catholic spiritual, ecclesial, intellectual, and cultural life. The promise "I will be propitious to you in Rome" took many detours in both their lives. Sufferings, as both were to make known in their writings, were part of the way in which what was "propitious" in their lives would be lived "ad maiorem Dei gloriam."

Some papers of this conference are focusing on the specific relationship of Ignatius and Lonergan, but my own task is to move to a different, and more modern, influence on Lonergan's work. In doing so, I wish to turn specifically to that area wherein he spoke of one of his contributions to Catholic theology, namely in bringing history, as its own field and specialty, into conjunction with biblical, foundational, doctrinal, and systematic forms of knowledge. Recognizing this modern influence on his work offers a context for a fuller appreciation of the historical dimension of Lonergan's contribution to Catholic theology and provides a significant approximation and example of what Lonergan proposes in Method in Theology as critical history, or history as it explains the meaning going forward in a tradition.
The particular influence that I wish to examine comes from the work of Christopher Dawson, the British cultural historian and philosopher of history. Dawson was born on 12 October 1889 in Haye-in-the-Wye Valley on the British – Welsh border to an Anglo-Catholic family of decent wealth. He studied at Winchester, was privately tutored in Bletsoe by a retired public school master and parson, read history at Oxford where his tutor was Ernest Barker. His university contemporaries included Edward Watkin a scholar in the history of Christian mysticism, the historian of world civilizations, Arnold Toynbee, and the humanist and theologian, Martin C. D’Arey, S.J. He served briefly as a lecturer in the History of Culture at Exeter University and in 1958, at the age of 68, was appointed to the Chauncy Stillman Chair in Catholic Studies at Harvard Divinity School. He died on the feast of St. Bede, 25 May 1970. As historian of world religions and the Christian sources of the spiritual unity that created Europe, and as an historian of culture, Dawson published twenty books between 1928 and 1972, the last one being published posthumously. His articles number in the hundreds.

The initiation of his lifelong project had its promising start in Rome. During Holy Week, 1909, at the age of 20, when still a student at Oxford, Dawson joined his longtime friend Edward Watkin, a recent convert to Catholicism, for his first visit to Rome. Having attended the Holy week Triduum ceremonies at different basilicas, he was stunned by the synergy of the ambience of Roman pagan antiquity and the living Catholic faith that he found there. He was already familiar, and agreed, with Lord Acton’s hypothesis that “religion is the key to history.” There, in Rome,

1 Ernest Barker, a Balliol scholar, not only encouraged Dawson’s wide reading in historical fields but also encouraged his interest in the philosophy of history. His estimation of Dawson was that he was “a scholar of the same sort of quality as Acton and von Hügel.” Christina Scott, A Historian and His World: A Life of Christopher Dawson (New Brunswick, NJ: Transaction Publishers, 1992), 110. For an early account of Dawson’s work in religion and culture cf. Phillips Temple’s brief essay, “Christopher Dawson, Philosopher of History,” in Sheed and Ward’s Own Trumpet, I, May, 1943, 10-11.

2 Watkin remained a lifelong friend of Dawson’s and is well known for his critical analyses and histories of mysticism.

3 The official invitation from the dean of the Harvard Divinity School identified the chair as the “Guest Professorship of Roman Catholic Studies.”
the immediate sense of the flow of historical existence awakened in him the desire to serve the important recovery of the step-by-step process by which Christianity had transformed the collapsing world of the empire into the new creation of a Christian culture.

Dawson was both familiar and impressed with Edward Gibbons’s *Decline and Fall of the Roman Empire*⁴ and had a keen appreciation of Gibbons’s style and of his wide sense of historical knowledge.⁵ While rejecting Gibbons’s claim that Christianity had been the cause of the collapse of the empire, Dawson had not yet worked out what Lonergan would come to name the “upper blade” of history that was necessary for translating Acton’s vision into practice. On Easter Sunday he climbed the steps to the church of Ara Coeli, situated on the Capitoline hill, where Gibbons had stood when he was inspired to take up his own project of writing the history of the Roman Empire.

Christina Scott, Dawson’s daughter, reports that there is a journal entry sometime late in 1909 recalling “a vow made at Easter at the Ara Coeli” and that Dawson had been thinking of how the vow might be fulfilled, noting that he had in the meantime gotten “great light on the way it may be carried out. However unfit I maybe, I believe it is God’s will I should attempt it.”⁶

It would be four difficult years before Dawson would follow the steps of Newman, and his friend Watkin, and enter the Roman Catholic Church, being baptized on the feast of the Epiphany, 6 January 1914 by Fr. O’Hare, S.J. at St. Aloysius Church, Oxford.⁷

Of his conversion he wrote:

> It was by the study of St. Paul and St. John that I first came to understand the fundamental unity of the Catholic life. I realized that the incarnation, the sacraments, the external order of the Church and the internal working of sanctifying grace, were all parts of one organic unity, a living tree whose roots are in the Divine nature and whose fruit is the perfection of the saints...

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⁵ In his introduction to the Everyman edition of *Decline and Fall*, Dawson applied to Gibbons the words of Gibbons’ss favorite emperor, Julian: “Perfidus ille Deo quamvis nonperfidus Urbi.”


⁷ *A Historian and His World*, 65.
This fundamental doctrine of sanctifying grace, as revealed in the New Testament and explained by Saint Augustine and Saint Thomas in all its connotations, removed all my difficulties and uncertainties and carried complete conviction to my mind.8

Dawson’s image for fulfilling his plan was taking shape as a result of his research and reading as he prepared a study of world civilizations with the intention of writing a five-volume history of culture. While working on this he knew the necessity of publishing a few essays that would introduce his studies to academic audiences. Furthermore, he was also being invited to contribute essays to projects being developed by other new converts to Catholicism in Britain. It was such a request that led to his first major essay, philosophical and anthropological in scope, entitled “The Nature and Destiny of Man,” which was published in 1920 in a collection edited by Fr. Cuthbert, O.F.M.9

By 1922 he had worked out a theory of the cycles of civilizations before having read Oswald Spengler’s work on the same topic, The Decline of the West, with which he was in serious disagreement because of its failure to grasp the dynamic interactions of different cultures. His own theory was based on a schema that would analyze the dynamic interconnection of civilizations from 4000 BC to the twentieth century. His conclusion was that civilizations were the result of parent (often primitive) cultures, which had distinct stages of origin, progress, and maturity, leading, in turn, to the emergence of new cultures. This heuristic had been identified by means of the massive research that he had done for his first major book published in 1928, The Age of the Gods: A Study in the Origins of Culture in Pre-historic Europe and the Ancient East.10 In preparation for almost fifteen years, this work he considered to be the first of a five-volume projected work to be entitled The Life of Civilizations.

The following year his next book, Progress and Religion: An Historical Enquiry into the Causes and Development of Progress and Its Relationship to Religion, was published. This was the methodological analysis of the whole project, and a summation of Dawson’s wider cultural vision.11 It is in the second chapter of that work that he presents

8 Watkin, The Commonweal, 18 (October 27, 1933): 608.
a critique of idealism in the writings of both Oswald Spengler and R. J. Collingwood as limiting their ability to understand the organic flow of cultures and of following Hegel in overestimating the meaning and role of the State in the understanding of human progress.\textsuperscript{12}

Among the key elements in Dawson’s articulation of a history of culture and civilization is the method that accompanied his heuristic synoptical account of the history of the West in \textit{Progress and Religion}. He adopted and adapted some of his insights from the French sociological tradition, particularly from August Comte and Pierre Frederic Le Play, a Catholic thinker who belonged to the Comtean School of social analysis but who nonetheless did not accept Comte’s positivistic ideology. What interested Le Play in Comte was that he had shifted the focus of a theory of progress away from what had been predominant in the various accounts of the early French Encyclopedists, namely that an improvement in material well-being led to an automatic increase in freedom and enlightenment. Comte, as Dawson notes, “...had made the discovery that all social development is the expression of a spiritual consensus and it is that which creates the vital unity of society...In other words, in order to construct a genuine sociology, the study of social institutions must go hand in hand with the study of the intellectual and spiritual forces which give unity to the particular age and society in question.”\textsuperscript{13}

But it was Le Play, in Dawson’s view, who was the first thinker to connect social science with the concrete historical conditions of living. Thus he broke with the social philosophers and engaged the empirical conditions of discrete social worlds in so far as they could be identified. He was dedicated to analysis of the regional geography and environment, to the natural conditions that allowed the emergence of certain kinds of work and economic exchange, to the exact thinking and planning

\textsuperscript{12} \textit{Progress and Religion}, 27-46. The problem regarding Collingwood, he notes, is that “the conception of culture is purely subjective, and owes its existence to the observing mind.” (44)

that led to particular arrangements of governing. His method, Dawson remarks, had been suggested by Fontenelle, and Le Play used it as the motto of his major text: “He enquired with care into the value of soils, and their yield, into the aptitude of the peasants, their common fare and their daily earnings – details which, though they appear contemptible and abject, nevertheless belong to the great art of government.” Thus, for Le Play, progress can only be understood where there is established the interplay of the natural environment and the spiritual sources of intelligence, anthropology, and religion. Furthermore, the underlying unity that holds together the conditions of human living and the natural response ordered by intelligence is more deeply ordered by religion to a spiritual unity both within its own region and in relationship to other regions. This holds true in societies that are ordered by the most primitive as well as the most systematic of religions. Whereas Comte had hoped to create an instrumental rationalistic spiritual unity that would shape social meanings, Le Play recognized that the source was already present within the religion of the social community itself. In addition he had begun a task that Dawson himself continued, namely the effort to find local variant social elements and the sociological categories that would link them with world types. This study could give new terms and relations to the task of history and provide a first step in clarifying the meaning of progress.

From within this context, Dawson identified the ideological threat that came from abstract speculations of progress employed by some of the Enlightenment thinkers. Such theories, on the one hand, were due to the loss of a philosophical grasp of human nature as a result of Descartes’s bifurcation of body and spirit, and on the other hand, to the ideology of the perfectibility of a neutral state of nature that was identified already as good and needed only the help of human engineering. Dawson, saw that a genuine empirical investigation demanded the study of the regional communities and their gradual interaction with other regions as various civilizations emerged. Thus his interest touched the specific

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14 Dynamics of World History, 39.
15 Le Play’s six-volume opus, Les Ouvriers Europeen, published in 1855, was composed of thirty-six monographs on individual families scattered throughout Europe in the first half of the nineteenth century. Each family account is accompanied by detailed information on local economic conditions, historical traditions, associations, ecology, and relations between workers and employers. A second edition was published 1877-79 and included fifty-seven monographs.
local aspects of human living that participated in, and partially created, the movements of historical events and meanings. These realities are constituted by primary social groups in their relations to their geography and to other local groups. This linking of social constituencies offered converging evidence that permitted one to identify the broad cultural unities emerging, and then constituting world history.

Thus, for example, in *The Age of the Gods*, he is concerned with the influences generated by peasant and tribal societies in forming a culture based on the specific place, economy, social interconnections, anthropology, and religion. He points to the fact that the “Archaic civilization of Egypt-Mesopotamia results from the ethos of a unique peasant society” that, in turn, prepares for later great achievements. Or again, he notes that the classical civilization of Greece and Rome cannot be understood without grasping them as forming a unity with the older city civilization of the East with its tribal structures of barbarian warriors who invaded the Mediterranean at the end of the second millennium. Thus there is always an organic connection that underlies not only the constancy of region and place, but also an organic emergence of history and social life.\(^\text{16}\)

In an essay published six years after *The Age of the Gods*, he developed his insight into the fact that history and sociology are complementary spheres of understanding in a single science of social life. Here he notes that sociology offers “a general systematic analysis of the social process” and history provides “a genetic description of the same process in detail.” His analogy is that sociology is related to history as “general biology is related to the study of organic evolution.”\(^\text{17}\)

In fact he warned about two dangers here that present clear concerns for the contemporary setting, the first is that sociology has been “indifferent to the facts of history, and... has tended to invent a history of its own;” the second is “the real danger of the sociologist trespassing on the territory of the other Geisteswissenschaften and attempting to play the part of a theologian or a philosopher.”\(^\text{18}\) Regarding such a relationship of the philosopher and the theologian to the history and culture, it is time to turn.

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\(^{18}\) “Sociology as Science,” 28.
Dawson had begun his analysis of culture with a study of religion as it shaped the foundational reality that ordered all the natural and spiritual elements together. In the introduction to The Age of the Gods, he says:

Every religion embodies an attitude to life and a conception of reality, and any change in these brings with it a change in the whole character of the culture as we see in the case of the transformation of ancient civilization by Christianity, or the transformation of the society of Pagan Arabia by Islam. Thus the prophet and the religious reformer, in whom a new view of life – a new revelation – becomes explicit, is perhaps the greatest of all agents of social change, even though he is himself the product of social causes and the vehicle of an ancient cultural tradition.19

In this matter of religion and its influence on culture, Dawson was most deeply influenced by St. Augustine’s City of God. He notes that Augustine’s work was the counterbalance to Gibbons’s Decline and Fall. In 1930 he had written a critical analysis focusing on this work in an essay entitled, “St. Augustine and His Age.”20 Here he developed a number of the central issues that Augustine had proposed and which were perennially important for relating Christian faith, belief, and life to the formation of culture. Written over the fourteen-year period of 412-426, the work, he remarks “developed from being a controversial pamphlet into a vast synthesis which embraces the history of the whole human race and its destinies in time and eternity. It is the one great work of Christian antiquity which professedly deals with the relation of the state and of human society in general to Christian principles; and consequently it is has had incalculable influence of the development of European thought”21.

Dawson defends the claim against certain German scholars of the time, that Augustine’s work is a philosophy of history but also affirms that The City of God is not a “philosophical theory of history.” This is so because Augustine does not arrive at it through an induction of historical

19 The Age of the Gods, xx
21 “St. Augustine and His Age,” in Enquiries into Religion and Culture (New York: Sheed and Ward, 1937), 223.
facts, “but sees in history the working out of universal principles.” In other words:

What Augustine does give us is a synthesis of universal history in the light of Christian principles. His theory of history is strictly deduced from his theory of human nature, which, in turn, follows necessarily from his theology of creation and grace. In so far as it begins and ends in a revealed dogma, it is not rational theory, but it is rational in the strict logic of its procedure and it involves a definitely rational and philosophic theory of the nature of society and law and of the relation of social life to ethics.22

For Dawson then the originality of Augustine’s understanding of Christian life develops as he integrates the philosophical, theoretical tradition of the Greek world, which while lacking a “theory of history,” had its theory of society and politics, with the Christian tradition that had no philosophy of society or politics, but had a “theory of history.” In fact Christianity knew itself not through theogonic symbols and mythology but through a sacred history. Furthermore this history was not focused simply on the past intervention of God in human living, but rather as a plan that embraced all times and peoples. Indeed the Christian transformation of the Old Testament prophetic “theory of history” meant not only that no division any longer existed between Jew and Gentile, but also that now there was a new human solidarity brought into being by Christ who makes “the fullness of times, reordering humanity into an organic spiritual unity.” Christ restores all things in himself. Thus Dawson recognizes that Augustine’s insight identifies Christian reality as the effecting transforming of the soul, the meaning of history, and the goal of common human nature.

As grace informs the soul, it begins in the individual the reversal of the concupiscence that leads human intelligence and decisions toward sin and thus it enters into individual historical events, and affects the conditions of human solidarity or the community of mankind. For Augustine, Dawson notes, the two Cities "had acquired a philosophic meaning that had been related to a rational theory of sociology... (Augustine) defines a people as a multitude of rational creatures associated in a common agreement as to the thing which it loves."23

Not only do the two loves, that of God and of self, create different

22 Enquiries, 224
23 Enquiries, 240
persons, they also create two types of society based on the loves functioning as the principles of living. From these principles and their making of societies, the historical theory is formed and understood. For these two cities “have been running their course mingling one with the other through all the changes of times from the beginning of the human race, and shall so move on together until the end of the world, when they are destined to be separated at the last judgment.”

The human will, broken and disordered in injustice, creates a history of deformed institutions in which recovery is always ambiguous, and so it requires a redemption to create a new order from the residue of the old debris. Even the virtues of the earthly city must be burned away for they require the proper foundation and motivation that only grace may convey to them.

Dawson recognizes that the crucial issue of how Christian faith and life act in both history and the social world provides the community with the intelligibility that flows from the Christian mission of self-sacrificing love. This intelligibility needs to be available in each new age and thus can allow the Church to be more engaged in self-consciously ordering the means of redemption to the crises and dangers of every age. The relationship of a theory of history and of sociological knowledge advance the understanding of the Church in its past, and just as importantly in understanding its responsibility and the practical emergent probabilities of addressing the world in its own dialectical condition. It was such a translation that Augustine had identified and advanced in the crisis of and for the Church in the Roman Empire. The ability of members of the Church to identify what responses were needed over more than a dozen centuries created what was called Christendom – namely a way for the Christian spiritual actions to give some concrete guidance to the world and so to bring into history a spiritual unity that brought peoples within local regions together and who, in turn, created the bonds with other localities so as to forge a common way of life and a solidarity of hope.

I.3 DAWSON AND DIALECTICS

There are two dialectical fields that are important in Dawson’s work
which relate to further development that will take place in Lonergan's thought. The first is the dialectic within and between cultures. The second is the notion of world history and the dialectic of theories of history.

First, Dawson points in his study of regional peoples, and the meaning of their way of life, to the fact that the development of the intellectual aspect which sets forth the possible emergence of social change needs to be integrated with the vital spirit of the culture if it is to be a principle of progress and not decline. Thus in the organic sense of cultural history, the emergence of a genuine development must arise within the cultural soil and experience, and thus it must grow out of the conditions that already exist. If the change is a revolutionary overthrow of the culture, it may lead to its death. This can be true of a technological invention that disturbs and endangers primitive cultures flooded with advanced Western material technologies, or of intellectual revolutions that shredded the meaning of an ancient culture as occurred with bolshevism in Russia.25 If the culture is stable enough it may be able to wait out the sources of decline. Eric Voegelin claimed that the time needed for that was equivalent to three generations or about seventy-five years.

In the interconnection of cultures, strains of common meaning can antagonize the community into outward acts of aggression or defense. In this dialectic of cultures it can often happen, as it did with the classical Greeks that "their standards of life, their ideals of civic and individual liberty and enjoyment, were too high to stand the strain of political competition and they went down before the ruder and harder peoples like the Macedonians and the Romans, who asked less of life and got more."26

It is possible for a culture to be destroyed and yet have its cultural influence continue. One of the difficult assessments to make is how the traditions and meaning of a vanquished culture may return centuries after their original connection with the new dominant culture. Dawson claims that the classical civilizations in which the world religions appeared were constituted in such a manner. In such cases two peoples were brought into some common meaning and their cultural traditions were gradually united to bring forth a new culture. Thus ancient resources

are transformed so as to open up a wider range of reality as for example what Karl Jaspers sought to identify in what he calls “the Axial Age,” or it means drawing prior social forms into a new situation of meaning as Christianity did in bringing the pagan Celtic tribes into the form of a massive monastic movement.

As cultures have their own pattern of emergence, growth and maturity, eruptions of deformation and frailty, so they can change through both progress and decline. Both progress and decline could be going simultaneously in the same culture as for example when there is advancement in material aspects of culture and a decline in the spiritual resources of culture. Often the times of greatest opportunity and greatest danger are when cultures meet each other like shifting tectonic plates in something of a chaos of meaning, or when they begin the task of making connections in moments of new creativity. Often what will guide the outcome are the spiritual visions that uphold the core reality of common meaning that grounds all the tasks of living. Insightful in Dawson’s studies are the dialectical histories of Islamic-Christian cultures in medieval time in the Iberian Peninsula.

The second dialectic regards the question of world histories and theories of history. First on the possibility of a world history Dawson is doubtful, given the need to know the details of each cultural tradition, its emergence, and history. However, given the possibility of focusing again on sociological types, it may be possible to identify the stages of great ages. Dawson identifies four over against Jaspers’s single “Axial age.” Dawson’s work suggests just such a possibility, and the hints of its structures and movements fill the pages of his writings. In particular, he points to the dialectical character of the major world religions in terms of their dynamic sources that always keep them meeting new situations as is the case of Christianity with its consistent knowledge and action, ordered through creation fall and redemption through the Incarnation and the manner in which the Church strives to live out that mystery faithfully in any age. Because of this eternal dynamic ontology, Dawson finds

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29 Cf., for example, “Christianity in the New Age,” Essays in Order, edited by Jacques Maritain, Christopher Dawson, and Peter Wust (New York: Sheed and Ward,
that the formation of the reality called "Europe" and its Western culture came into being as Christian faith was lived into its local worlds, and not by some explicit cultural design of Christian thinkers and monks. Precisely because of its origin and missionary call it is the only culture that consistently reaches out to other cultures and is the one culture by which other cultures meet each other, save for places where the tectonic plates rub against one another.

Finally there is the dialectic of theories of history. Here he personally enjoyed engaging in serious dialogue with those who were part of the academic study of cultures and civilizations, which were popular in the middle third of the twentieth century. As noted above, he engaged Spengler, and found him lacking in the data of his project in that he treated every culture as if it were a closed system, not understanding the organic complexity and historical transfers which cultures make with one another.

He also found Toynbee's project both deeply fascinating and substantively flawed. Briefly, the differences with Toynbee include notions of culture, wherein Dawson includes the most primitive culture as exhibiting the same type of effort in social formation and response to the environment as do the more systematic civilizations. For Toynbee the primitive cultures are considered to be basically static because he does not grasp how they require and manifest a basic dynamic and developing intelligence in order to keep the culture going with new workers and with some form of education that instructs the young in the order needed for continued existence and meaning. His most serious critique of Toynbee was aimed at his proposal, which has been taken up by large body of Western intellectualist scholarship, namely that the religious forms for the world that is coming into being should be a syncretist world religion.

But for Dawson the source of that type of vision which sought to formulate a secularized religion is tied to eighteenth-century liberalism with its reduction of meaning to material progress and the exercise of techniques to find resolutions of human imperfection. This led to a new creed that employed many of the elements of "the despised religion" that it was going to replace, but in order to do so it had to

1931); Understanding Europe (London: Sheed and Ward, 1952); and Medieval Religion and Other Essays (London: Sheed and Ward, 1934).

have apparently similar features. While imitating certain Christian forms, all of the supernatural sources of Christianity were stripped away and a recapitulation of all things was to be accomplished in this world. Here the private reason of the individual asserted itself against every tradition, and reordered the culture according to new definitions of nature (Rousseau) and of Reason (the Encyclopedists) and history (Lessing). 

Religion would now be a private domain of human opinion and solace and it would have no influence in the public external world of power and technical control of cultural meanings. This dialectic that Dawson found between philosophical liberalism and historical Christian faith, effectively removed that faith from being properly identified as the spiritual unity of the West. For Dawson it would either be recovered, or in the long run, the spiritual vacuum grounding the culture would both create and reveal the decay that would yet again require healing from the only source of redemption.

II.1 LONERGAN AND DAWSON

Fr. Lonergan often acknowledged the liberating influence that Dawson’s work had on him as a young scholar. Obviously he was one among many, but I think that Dawson when connected with Newman provided a major invitation to Lonergan in his struggle to integrate history into the philosophical and theological life of Catholic intelligence. Furthermore I think that Dawson remains an example and one of the best approximations of the kind of academic work that is necessary to meet the standards that Lonergan has called for in advancing this integration between theology and critical history. Lonergan was a philosopher and theologian, not a cultural historian; Dawson was a cultural historian, not a philosopher or theologian. Yet when one engages them together one can grasp the profound order of knowledge and living that underlies Christian revelation and Catholic tradition, with its potential for guiding persons in shaping a history that is worthy of their nature as it is being redeemed in Christ. 

31 Dawson, Progress and Religion, 188-201.
32 While it has been known for sometime that Lonergan was deeply influenced by Dawson’s work, The Age of the Gods, it is only recently with the publication of Lonergan’s economic studies that we learn of his references to Dawson’s essay, “Karl Marx
In his reflection on the history of his own development of the intellectual operations that constitute philosophy, theology, and history, he recalled, “In the summer of 1930 I was assigned to teach at Loyola College, Montreal and despite the variety of my duties was able to do some reading. Christopher Dawson’s The Age of the Gods introduced me to the anthropological notion of culture and so began the correction of my hitherto normative or classicist notion.”

It wasn’t until the publication of the materials found after his death that a fuller clarification was made available as to the kind of work that Lonergan was pursuing in the area of history and sociology from about 1933 to 1938. In a letter to his superior, Fr. Keane, S.J. he had indicated an interest in the philosophy of history but understood that it did not have as yet a significant place in Catholic intellectual life. But he continued, “I wish to ask your approval for maintaining my interest in it, profiting by such opportunities as may crop up, and in general devoting to it such time as I prudently judge can be spared.”

In the 1920s and 1930s the influence of Cardinal Newman’s insights into the historical context and condition for theology was beginning to have significant impact on scholars in the Catholic and Anglican communities. Simultaneously, as noted above, there was renewed interest in St. Augustine’s reflection on the meaning of history.

Lonergan notes that his interest in the concreteness of historical knowledge had deepened and that he had made some headway in comprehending the knowledge reached by historical learning. “It was about 1937-38 that I became interested in a theoretical analysis of history. I worked out an analysis on the model of a three fold approximation.” It seems that the work that he had done in this regard was first employed in his own dissertation on Grace and Freedom in the Theology of St.
Thomas Aquinas. Lonergan mentions this briefly in his 1960 essay, “The Philosophy of History,” where he speaks of the kind of history he was pursuing as “technical history” and goes on to provide the links that allow one to grasp the developing intelligence of Aquinas. “....[T]he movement itself and the interlocking of the data provide an understanding of St. Thomas as thinking, as developing, as changing his opinions that is exceedingly difficult to interpret in different ways.” And again “...you could almost see him think.”

Here already implicit is the subject-as-subject of the later years. Furthermore, a differentiation is made between types of historical knowledge, identified as occasional, technical, and explanatory. The additional use of the sphere of “technical history,” as he calls the history of doctrines, is found in any number of the works that follow his thesis.

It must be noted that this shift to “historical mindedness” was considered from the start as being tied to the basic constitution and mission of the church. It was further tied to the important ongoing grasp of the intelligibility of the mystery of Revelation, Incarnation, Trinity, and particularly, Redemption. In his 1976 responses to questions regarding the role of philosophy in modern Catholic thought, Lonergan presented his own understanding both of the situation of the times and part of his own efforts to respond to them.

It has long been my conviction that if Catholics and in particular Jesuits are to live and operate on the level of the times, they must not only know about theories of history but also work out their own. The precepts of the moral law while rich and detailed in prohibitions (malum et quicumque defectu) are of extreme generality in their positive content (bonum ex integra causa). But what moves men is the good; the good is concrete; but what the concrete good of Christian living is, we shall come to know only in thematizing the dynamic of Christian living in this world in itself and in its relations to liberal progress and

37 Published as Operative Grace in the Thought of St. Thomas Aquinas (New York: Herder and Herder, 1971). This has been published as Volume I in the critical edition of The Collected Works of Bernard Lonergan.


Marxist dialectic. To put it bluntly, until we move onto the level of historical dynamics, we shall face our secularist and atheistic opponents as the Red Indians, armed with bows and arrows, faced European muskets.40

He had sensed and articulated this crucial character of the Church’s mission in the earliest texts that were found in the famous “File 713 – History” some of which have appeared in METHOD: Journal of Lonergan Studies.41 The first document of this file, Παντον Ανεχωραλαϊωσις, written in 1933, Lonergan offers a summary account of the need for developing a philosophy of history. The rationale given in 1933 is strikingly similar to that given in 1976.

Any reflection on modern history and its consequent “crisis in the West” reveals unmistakably the necessity of a Summa Sociologica. A metaphysic of history is not only imperative for the church to meet the attack of Marxian materialist conception of history and its realization in apostolic Bolshevism: it is imperative if man is to solve the modern politico-economic entanglement, if political and cultural values and all the achievement of the past is to be saved both from the onslaughts of purblind statesmen and from the perfidious diplomacy of the merely destructive power of communism.42

The problem that is coming into clarification is the Church’s practical transmission of the grace of redemption and the power of the resurrection. At various times of the Church’s history the individuals who created social and historical actions had effectively transmitted this reality of Christian truth and living that responded to a wide variety of situations in need of healing. But in other periods such responses were not present. Absent from the theological foundations that grounded and mediated the intelligibility of grace and freedom, the incarnation and the Trinity, as realities known through faith, and examined through metaphysical knowledge, was how these mysteries could bring effective intelligibility into concrete and cultural needs.

Dawson had presented evidence and identified the historical fact that religion is the dynamic source that created the underlying spiritual

40 “Questionnaire on Philosophy,” 14-15.
41 Cf. vol. 9, no. 1 (October 1991) and vol. 11, no. 1 (April 1993).
unity of peoples, shaping and sustaining traditions that supported a wide variety of human solidarity and approximations of human dignity. While he could argue for the facticity of such realities, it was Lonergan who realized the depth of the problem and the possibilities that Dawson's work revealed. He understood more fully the need to address the philosophical foundations underlying theology, history, and the social complexity for bringing them into an integral intelligibility and thus overcome the weakened situation for the Church's mission.

In a variety of works, he notes that the centuries during which theologians were laboring from within forms of nominalism, and then later in the conflicts of the reformation, work could and should have been underway addressing the absent mediation between the metaphysical account of Christian truth and the influencing of the structures of daily living in specific human societies. In the Παντόκρατος, Lonergan takes up Dawson's insights into this dilemma, even to the point of including remarks about Le Play, and points to the emergence of the signs of a new attention to this matter arising from theological considerations of the meaning of the Church from within the categories of "the mystical body."

Another issue that Dawson recognized as problematic in the absence of an integral connector between philosophy, theology, and the social sciences was the meaning of "progress." It was, he noted, the dominant idea of the modern age. It was the optimistic faith that was at first not so much of interest to historians and anthropologists but "to political theorists and revolutionaries whose whole attention was concentrated on the immediate future." Following Newman, Dawson referred to the system that entered into the vacuum of an integral intelligence for Christian faith by the name philosophical liberalism. It was this philosophical form that developed and defended the emerging social sciences and it excluded any connection with the metaphysical accounts of human nature and God. In this context, "progress" was defined in a manner that not only could not account for grace, but also denied its existence; it was replaced by a sweeping mechanistic providence. Progress then was considered an advance in external, material, technical goods and in the power and control over their creation and benefits. At the same time the benefits of the widespread humanitarian movements of abolition of slavery and barbarous punishments, the development of

43 Progress and Religion, 5.
universal education and improvements in standards of living were solid realities in history. At the same time these advances were not sufficient of themselves to provide a culture that was fit or sufficient for the totality of the human self or community.

With philosophical liberalism’s reconfigured understanding of human nature through the elimination of the Fall, there was no longer any need for grace, or any other Christian reality. It asserted the individual intellectual as the absolute norm over all communities of knowledge in their historical unfolding through a tradition in time. It knew the fact of religious traditions based on revealed truth and it affirmed them as the enemy of progress; it assigned to religion the room of private opinion and repudiated it as a retrograde influence in the new enterprise of perfecting human existence. It arranged the furniture of the new historical world, requiring that academic historical research and knowledge abide by its arrangement according to the three ages of classical medieval and modern, assigning enlightenment to the first and third ages and deforming ignorance to the second.44

From the essays that we have from “File 713 – History,”45 we know something of how Lonergan began the task that he consistently saw as central for the Church and culture through his entire life. The central issue was how to form an integral structure of human intelligence that could hold together the particular concerns of the social sciences and the universals of philosophy, and as sociologists such as Michael Zöller have argued, how to allow the social sciences to benefit from the kind of universal knowledge that governs terms and relations for the social sciences themselves.46 Zöller’s work provides two critical clarifications. The first is the establishment of sociological terms and relations that permit the move toward the emergence of an explanatory history. The second is that the sociological terms and relations are not derived


from the usual ideological forms of power and domination that control sociological thought, but actual institutions that carry the structure of the good, including the common good and the terminal good.

In Lonergan’s synthesis there is the possibility of keeping the genius of the classical accounts of knowledge, God, and theological knowledge of the Christian reality available to the community, while explaining the transpositions that permit the new knowledge of the social sciences to add their differentiations, however dialectically, to the understanding of how Christian faith both has and continues to inform human cultures.

In the Cincinnati lectures on education in 1959, Lonergan summarized his concerns about the relationship of theology and history.

There is a corollary that follows from what I have said about theology, namely, that the teaching of religion and theology is an enormous problem, and particularly at the present time. It is at the present time that the full impact of the development of the historical sciences during the past century is hitting theology, and theology has not thought its way through the problems yet. So there will be a difficulty finding satisfactory books and satisfactory ways of treating the matter.47

II.2: “THINKING A WAY THROUGH”

In 1935 Lonergan had already indicated that there was a basis in Aquinas for integrating concrete historical events and their emergence, particularly as that tradition could be related to Newman’s account of intelligent acts. One of the earliest efforts that he made was to explain authentic progress by transposing the Aristotelean-Thomistic understanding of physical change by means of causes to the situation of the causes of human action. The causes he looks at are material, formal, and efficient. The material cause is an outer flow of change; the formal is the intelligent form that shapes the outer flow, and the efficient is the control of the will as it is ordained by human reason.

The transposition then follows. An action is constituted by three

47 Topics in Education: The Cincinnati Lectures of 1959 on the Philosophy of Education, 247. Among the works of Dawson’s cited in chapter 10 are The Age of the Gods, 251; The Dynamics of World History, 253; and Understanding Europe, 254.
causes: 1 – the material given as predetermined; 2 – intellectual grasp of the given and its potencies: and 3 – the will as moving to the true good that transforms the given into intelligent and rational good. What leads to failure of such control of the givens is sin – the abandonment of effectively following intellect’s grasp of the truth. In this account, the givens and the two spiritual actions provide a norm for grasping both human nature and the human shaping of historical events and meanings. The causes offer the intelligible grasp of what human nature is and the individual actors are simple matters of fact, and as individuals with the common human nature they possess a common unity that includes their capacity for abandoning norms. Thus there is already a statistical flow of human action that brings the events and meanings into being.

The relation of freedom to the givens is understood in that freedom does not eliminate the predetermined elements of existence, for they are the preconditions for the possibility of freedom to emerge within the conditions. Furthermore because these actions are performed in the context of a common unity, there exists the historical effect of earlier generations as they become the givens for later generations, leading to a unity of human effort.  

48 Cf. Hahlov, 140-46.
49 “Crisis in the West,” in Essays in Order, 101-102.
and the absolute Will of God.

He continues his opening of the historical dialectics:

The truly epoch making occurrence of that sacred history which is wrought in the depths of the human spirit, the action that was to bring this state of tension to an end, took place in the midst of time. It was Christ’s act of redemption. Since, however, we have lost our understanding of the metaphysics of history, this fact of redemption – in reality of central historical importance – will scarcely appear to us as historical. This was not always the case.

For Lonergan that recovery will need to address the differentials of history, which, when they are grasped, allow for a control of the direction of actions forming history either for progression in intelligence, freedom, truth and good, or a decline in the same. It is this that is also linked to “the metaphysical principle of Redemption.”

Progress requires advancement in intelligence as it sets up the conditions for freedom to form the outer action that either continues, transforms, or reverses historical flows. As the process recurs in individuals in communities it is also normative. As opposed to liberalism’s assumption that progress is measured in the minds of certain individuals, “the best and the brightest,” Lonergan notes that advancement or progress is said of the species, for it is constituted by the unity-in-intelligence that guides the freedom of many to common goals and actions.

In “Philosophy of History,” he presents two distinct orders of intelligence which prefigure the realms of common sense and theory as ways that there develop concrete flows of history. The first he names “automatic,” and the second, “philosophic.” The former he connects with Dawson’s account of the existence and development of primitive cultures as they manifest “a series of brilliant flowerings and failures.” The latter phase provides a fundamental reflection that seeks to overcome the failures by guiding historical events through advancement in intelligence. As a result of a double dialectic the first one within philosophy and the second between the “automatic” and the “philosophic” one can identify four historical periods: 1) the automatic; 2) the emergence of the philosophic and its failure; 3) automatic cultural expansion, and 4) the future. As a result of the failure of the dialectic of historical fact on its own to provide a consistent exercise of human intelligence through the actions

50 Παντός, 150.
of freedom, he indicates that history as both automatic and philosophic, must be included within a larger dialectic. Thus there is a third dialectic introduced as a result of sin and the need for redemption. To the dialectic of fact and thought he adds the absolute dialectic that is established by "revelation, prophecy and development of dogma."

This opens both the realm of fact and thought in new directions for the future. Now the dialectic of fact includes 1) mere fact; 2) sin; and 3) revealed fact. The dialectic of thought includes 1) natural reason; 2) rationalism; and 3) faith. Within this expanded view of the causes of human action and their effects, "the hope for the future lies in a philosophic presentation of the supernatural concept of social order."

The theological connection with history is concerned to examine the account of the supernatural agency in history through the intelligibility of the Mystical Body of Christ. This reality reorders the whole dialectic of history as it holds together in its account both the proper and the deformed elements of the dialectics of fact and thought. They do so in the context of a common human nature wherein Christ's action reorients the conditions of human nature, and the action of grace reorders human freedom in its effective making of history.51

II.3 A FURTHER ADVANCE

In the "Analytic Concept of History,"52 Lonergan presents a second schema for considering the structure of history and its dialectical character. Here we find him not eliminating the insights from the Aristotellean-Thomistic account of causes, but transposing them into what looks like the beginning of his work in intentionality analysis. In part I, "Analytic Concepts," there is a move from material causality to concepts of apprehension, or as is indicated by his inclusion of the structure of the definition of the circle, an implicit definition. This is followed by acts of understanding that proceed from many abstract instances and those that proceed from many instances that are particular, the former are named analytical and the latter, synthetic. Examples of the latter he indicates are

51 Cf. Lonergan's account of this development in his thought in "Insight Revisited," 271-72.

in “Christopher Dawson’s historical essay and Newman’s illative sense.” Added is that these acts can be distinguished so as to provide logical and real definitions.

Understanding as it develops is able to grasp change, and so progress or decline; or it may be static as in the logical definitions. Therefore analytic concept of history is ordered by a synthetic understanding that is real and dynamic. The dynamism allows one to engage the dialectic of nature, sin, and grace. It is analytic because it moves from abstract terms of human nature and sociological constructs to the terms of historical events.

A distinction follows between the historian and the theoretician of history. The former is engaged in history that is written; the latter with history that is written about. The work is synthetic as it identifies and unites the data of events and actions. The historian is unable to account for the total meaning of historical aggregates which constitutes history as a science. That kind of history proceeds analytically as it unifies the data on human action and its effects.

In order to comprehend the situation of history in both its forms, Lonergan again turns to the importance of dialectics. He specifies the difference the meaning of dialectics has for him in comparison with Plato, Hegel, and Marx. For him it is “something like a series of experiments, a process of trial and error...rather an inverted experiment, in which objective reality moulds the mind of man into conformity with itself by imposing upon him the penalty of ignorance, error, sin and at the same time offering rewards of knowledge, truth, righteousness.”

As concrete and dynamic it can hold together the material aggregate, intelligence in its unifying action and the social bond of solidarity. It can proceed in a way that will either overcome the consequences of ignorance and deformed freedom or move in the opposite direction. The factual dialectic is established by the choices people have made in creating the actual situation that makes a culture what it is.

The dialectic reveals three types of human action – that which follows humans’ understanding of their nature; that which operates contrary to nature and is unintelligible; and that which is above human nature or is an intelligibility that transcends human nature. The ideal line of history is a state in which humans in all conditions of their knowing and doing would be in attunement with natural law without supernatural assistance. Giving this image of an ideal line of how history would be a continual
growth and progress in human intelligence and resolutions of prior failures and evils, he turns to the facts of history and to the deviations from the natural order of human existence. This he calls decline; its principle is sin, which is systematically turned into principles or rules that lead history and culture into massive forms of disorder. It is the systematic repudiation of human intelligence in act and “Decline realizes this repudiation. The cumulative effects of systematic sin empty out of the world’s philosophy every principle that raises man above the beast.”

Major decline “terminates in the emancipation of man from reason and his enslavement to the accidental causes of history.” Here we have an analytic comprehension of what writers such as Dawson and Wust were presenting in a synthetic understanding of the “Crisis of the West.” Now it is expanded into the general condition of human nature as it corrupts its own structure of intelligence and freedom.

Finally, because human intelligence cannot grasp the unintelligibility of sin, it is not able to provide a solution to the crisis. What is left to it is a supernatural solution that he refers to as “a renaissance.” He distinguishes an “accidental” and “essential renaissance;” the former is a correction that occurs because of the passing of time. The latter is what emerges from the supernatural order that restores the dialectic of progress and decline.

For humans it is both knowable and a mystery. He identifies its seven characteristics that allow it the consistent agency needed to meet the concrete decline.53

The solution originating in the Trinitarian life and made known and given in history through the Incarnation and Redemptive suffering of Christ, is mediated into the ongoing historical condition through the Mystical Body of Christ. Because the natural human order, both on its own terms of limited intelligence and because the decline within it often stands in opposition to the solution. Even, or especially, that resistance Lonergan notes, is met in the solution of the Divine self-sacrificing love where what is found in human vision to be a failure becomes a triumph.

In one sense it is strange to see the implications of what would become his theology of the Law of the Cross presented here so early in his thinking. The new solidarity created in this action by which God is Lord of history, arises for Lonergan through the recognition that religious truth is the intelligibility that grounds the fullest expansion of progress

53 Lonergan’s “Analytic Concept of History,” 25.
and that transforms the living of people in the common meanings of the cultures which they cause to come into being.

Dawson had long written about the necessity of linking faith with the concrete actions that constitute the meaning of life in cultures. He knew of the fact of decline and the conditions that allow it to arise and that maintain it over time. He once wrote of this in terms of the importance of Christian education in mediating the knowledge of these dialectics as existential in the lives of individual Christians and of the Church.

The vital problem of Christian education is a sociological one; how to make students culturally conscious of their religion; otherwise they will be divided personalities – with a Christian faith and a pagan culture which contradict one another continually. We have to ask ourselves are we Christians who happen to live in England or America, or are we English or Americans who happen to attend a church on Sundays? There is no doubt which is the New Testament view; there the Christians are one people in the full sociological sense, but scattered among different cities and peoples. But today we mostly take the opposite view, so that our national cultures are the only culture we have and our religion has to exist on a sectarian sub-culture. Thus the sociological problem of Christian culture is also a psychological problem of integration and spiritual health. This is the key issue... We must make an effort to achieve an open Christian culture which is sufficiently conscious of the value of its own tradition to be able to meet secularist culture on an equal footing.54

IGNATIUS, LONERGAN, AND THE CATHOLIC UNIVERSITY

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Never has adequately differentiated consciousness been more difficult to achieve. Never has the need to speak effectively to undifferentiated consciousness been greater.¹

In recent years, especially since the publication of *Ex corde ecclesiae*, much has been written on the nature of the Catholic university. Some light can be shed on this topic, I believe, by recalling the Ignatian and early Jesuit move from immediate pastoral concerns to the ministry of education in the context of Renaissance humanism. But the humanism within which the early Jesuits established their schools is quite different from the historically conscious, pluralist and pragmatic culture within which Catholic universities labor today. It was to the credit of Bernard Lonergan to have highlighted these differences and to have created a refined philosophical tool for thinking about a Gospel-informed humanistic education today.

In the first part of this article, therefore, we will outline the Ignatian and early Jesuit move to the ministry of education in the context of Renaissance humanism. In the second part we will highlight Bernard Lonergan’s contribution to the integration of contemporary pluralist culture. Finally, in the third part we will draw some concrete conclusions about the possibilities of the Catholic university participating in that transformative role today.

¹ Ibid.
I. IGNATIUS, THE FIRST JESUITS, AND THE MINISTRY OF EDUCATION

Spiritual experience was at the heart of Ignatius of Loyola's own story and at the heart of the life of the first Jesuits. John O'Malley in his work *The First Jesuits* notes that the experience of the early Society was rooted in Ignatius's own story, especially as articulated in his *Autobiography*.

...Ignatius's story was somehow the story of every Jesuit and, hence, revelatory of the deepest meaning of the Society as a whole. The story was basically one of the inner life of the soul. It moved in this sequence: a conversion to God from a previously unsatisfying or disordered life; visitations from God in the form of consolations, clarification of vision, dispositions to give oneself in God’s service that resulted in an “election” to follow these dispositions; a period of probation and trial like that Ignatius experienced at Manresa; and a life thenceforth inspired by the desire “to help souls.” Just as God had guided and aided Ignatius in this course, so God guided and aided every Jesuit.2

Ignatius wrote his *Spiritual Exercises* out of his own personal experience. In them he seeks to bring other persons to a radical openness to God’s plan both for the world and for oneself. The exercises of prayer, imagination, meditation, and contemplation seek to bring a person to the point where they are genuinely open to cooperating with the coming of God’s kingdom – even at the cost of themselves and their own riches, reputation, and health. The Exercises are a handbook for hearing the Gospel message: “Repent! The Kingdom of God is at hand” and for responding to that message effectively. They set the conditions for hearing the Word of God and responding to that Word by conversion of life and by a Spirit-guided “election.” Actual and imaginative exercises in hearing the Word allow one to discern the movement of God’s “consolation” in the soul as opposed to the movements of “desolation” occasioned by “inordinate attachments” and the “enemy of our nature.” The presence of a gifted spiritual director allows God to move in the soul while personally presenting the call of God’s external Word, the call of Christ the King.

From the Exercises flowed a Jesuit “way of proceeding” which the

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early Jesuit, Jerónimo Nadal described as “spíritu, corde, practice” — in the Spirit, from the heart, practically. “In the Spirit” meant that the Jesuits were to be guided by a direct and ongoing sense of God’s presence. “From the heart” indicated how they were to deal with others in their ministries, that is, affectively — bringing their feelings to bear on their ministries. Finally, “practical” was synonymous with “pastoral:” that is, always they were to act to “help souls.”

In all of this it is interesting to note that education was not the first priority for Ignatius and the first Jesuits. Their ministries developed organically as they worked in hospitals, taught catechism, preached, and dispensed the sacraments. Their interest was primarily and immediately “pastoral” — “whatever worked” to communicate the call of Christ to souls. Nevertheless, learning was always part of the Jesuit “style.” Thus, Ignatius in his Autobiography relates that after his return from Palestine in 1524, he felt inclined to study for some time and it was while studying at the University of Paris that he met his first companions. Paris is also where Ignatius was first exposed to Thomas Aquinas’s theology, at that time the major source of theology for the Parisian Dominicans with whom Ignatius studied. In Ignatius’s view, intellectual development was not unconnected to growth in the Spirit.

Gradually, therefore, a few years after the founding of the Society, Jesuit discernment led to the founding of schools.

With the hindsight of over four hundred years, we see more clearly than they did that the Spiritual Exercises and the schools were the two most important institutional factors that, when taken in their full implications, shaped the distinctive character of the Society of Jesus.3

With the establishment of schools came an intensification of learning through teaching. Teaching in turn inserted the Jesuits into the culture of the day, a culture largely influenced by the Renaissance humanists. From the time of Petrarch the humanists had attacked the “scholastic” education of the day as having little relationship to the real lives of people.4 Reacting against a largely decadent and nominalist scholasticism

of the day, the humanists felt that what counted was virtue – and there should be a relationship between good literature and virtue.

Such humanism resonated with the early Jesuits. The humanist pietas or upright character cohered with the Jesuit Christianitas, and they took for granted that learning and literacy were good in and of themselves. This ideal came to be expressed in the Jesuit Ratio Studiorum of 1599 that inculcated a classical model of liberal education, beginning with a “school of languages” and culminating in the higher levels of philosophy and theology. The students studied the Greek and Latin classics so that they might be brought into contact with the noblest minds of antiquity. They focused on the intricacies of language as expressing the subtleties of thought and refinements of taste. Such a formation of mind with its sensibilities and powers of eloquent debate was seen as providing the preparation for the further study of philosophy and theology. The aim was the production of the cultivated person where “cultivated” meant a culturally specific model of human perfection. It was a monumental achievement in its day, frequently bringing order into the chaos of what previously had passed for education. In its original structure, perhaps even more so than its content, the Ratio Studiorum provided an integral vision of the connections among the various aspects of the world and the theological contemplation of God and revelation. Only the introduction of a new historical consciousness in the nineteenth and twentieth centuries eventually sundered the seamless garment of this classical ideal in education.

Furthermore, from the manner of teaching that Ignatius and the first Jesuits experienced in Paris they took not only the idea of a classically ordered curriculum, but also the idea of pedagogy as an active appropriation of the material taught – an “exercitium.”

In an era when the typical schoolmaster was often a feared tyrant or an untrained novice, the Jesuit instructor described in the Ratio was committed to motivating students in positive ways, and appreciating their individual characteristics. He was to be informative, articulate, and flexible, encouraging classroom competition while emphasizing social courtesy. There was even a provision, unheard of in its day, for students to provide “feedback” to their teachers after their lectures!

5 O’Malley, The First Jesuits, 208-12.
Through it all, the theology that informed the Jesuit curriculum, especially at the beginning, was described as "mystical" as contrasted with the "purely speculative" theology of some of their Catholic contemporaries. According to Jerónimo Nadal, this meant not ecstasies and transports but "an inner relish of the truth translated into the way one lived." It was also a theology more directly related to ministry than a purely speculative theology.

According to John O’Malley, the cultivation by the Jesuits of classical rhetoric, the discipline that taught how to touch the human heart, was not simply conforming to the received wisdom of the day but a pursuit that correlated with their deepest pastoral impulses. The Jesuits did not, however, take over the humanist program uncritically. There was much in the new literary interests that might encourage a new paganism, and Erasmus had experienced this tension before them.

Erasmus experienced great tension between his Christian commitment to humility, and the humanist value assigned to pride and praise, between the Christian desire for pure, simple belief and the humanist respect for sophisticated refinement. He thus recognized a central difficulty of Renaissance humanism in the clash between ethical and aesthetic standards, a tension that was particularly pronounced in the ideal of the courtier.

And so the Jesuit program of liberal education involved a pruning of Renaissance excess and a redirection of humanist education in a Gospel direction. As Bernard Lonergan put it, "The renewal of Greek and Latin studies contained a threat of a revival of paganism, and the Jesuits became the schoolmasters of Europe."

In addition, in spite of current humanist criticisms of scholastic philosophy and theology, Jesuit education postulated an ultimate compatibility between an education in “humane letters” and Aristotelian/Thomistic philosophy and theology. This can be seen in Ignatius’s “Rules for Thinking with the Church” in the Exercises. "We should praise both

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7 Referred to in O’Malley, The First Jesuits, 243-44.
9 Kimball, Orators and Philosophers, 89. The notion of the ideal of the courtier as a classical ideal passed into the later English notion of “the gentleman.”
positive theology and that of the scholastics.” For the humanist current in education had always been liable to discounting the importance of “theory.” As Bernard Lonergan put it, while Plato and Aristotle had clearly distinguished the realms of common sense living and theory,

...humanism immediately stepped in and obliterated that difference. Isocrates said: “What differentiates man from the animals is speech.” And the rhetoricians are the people who know how to speak. Subsequent philosophy in general – with rare exceptions – has been the work of people in the humanist tradition who did not want to have any distinction between the world of common sense and the world of theory. It is modern science – with Eddington’s two tables – that has forced that distinction on us again.11

Ignatius’s praise for both positive and scholastic theology, then, is not without significance. For the Jesuits did esteem Thomas’s Summa Theologiae, especially the moral theology of the second part, where “moderation” was extolled. They also resonated with Thomas’s doctrine on the basic goodness of creation celebrated by Ignatius in the Exercises in the “Contemplation on the Love of God.” Finally, a theme later developed in Bernard Lonergan’s doctoral dissertation, the Jesuits believed in the intrinsic compatibility of divine grace and human freedom: an “operative grace” bringing persons to desire what previously they had not wanted; and a “cooperative grace” helping persons actually to do the good they so desired.

The early Jesuit dedication to teaching and learning, then, was rooted in the experience of God fostered by the Exercises. That experience informed everything they did, including their founding of schools. This ministry of education was within their larger pastoral end of “helping souls.” In order to effectively do that, the first Jesuits, while not condemning scholasticism, took on the Renaissance humanist program of speaking to the heart of people through literature. They took the best cultural tools of the times and adapted them to their program of human and spiritual growth. Such education, of course, had social and cultural

11 Second Collection, 226. Cf. also ibid., 234, where the danger comes from “the humanists, the orators, the schoolteachers...the men who simplified and watered down philosophic thought and then peddled it to give the slow-witted an exaggerated opinion of their wisdom and knowledge.”
implications. It was education “for the reform of cities.” Thus, Pedro de Ribadeneira at the urging of Ignatius wrote to Philip II of Spain in 1556 explaining why the Society was so committed to its schools: “All the well-being of Christianity and of the whole world depends on the proper education of youth.”

II. BERNARD LONERGAN: THEOLOGY INFORMING CULTURE

In November of 1537 Ignatius, on his way to Rome with his companions, experienced an illumination in prayer at the little hamlet of La Storta. He was granted a vision of Jesus carrying the cross with God the Father at his side. “I wish you to serve us,” said Jesus to Ignatius, and the Father added “I will be good to you in Rome” – “Romae vobis propitius ero.” Almost four hundred years later, Bernard Lonergan was sent to study in Rome. He had been experiencing difficulty in his life as a Jesuit, and his superiors’ show of confidence was a great “consolation.”

It was a magnificent vote of confidence which, combined with the great encouragement I had had from Fr. Smeaton after years of painful introversion and with the words over the high altar in the church of St. Ignatius here “Romae vobis propitius ero,” was consolation indeed.

And indeed, it would seem, that the Father was very propitious to Bernard Lonergan in Rome. It was in Rome that he followed up on the above “consolation” and dedicated himself to serious study and reflection. It was in Rome that in 1936 he was ordained to the Catholic priesthood in the same church of St. Ignatius. It was in Rome that he experienced what he called his “intellectual conversion.” It was in Rome that he

12 O’Malley, The First Jesuits, 211.
14 O’Malley, The First Jesuits, 34.
15 Letter of January 22, 1935, to Provincial, Fr. Henry Keane, S.J. This letter can be found at the Lonergan Research Institute in Toronto.
16 “I had the intellectual conversion myself when in doing theology I saw that you can’t have one person in two natures in Christ unless there is a real distinction between natures and something else that is one. But that is the long way round.” Presumably “the short way round” would be by reading Insight. (From an unpublished interview
Ignatius, Lonergan, and the Catholic University

wrote his doctoral dissertation on St. Thomas’s notion of divine grace and human freedom. It was back to Rome where he was sent in 1953 to teach for twelve years his courses on the Trinity and on the Incarnate Word. It was while in Rome in 1957 that his classic, *Insight: An Essay on Human Understanding*, was published. And it was in Rome in February of 1965 that he experienced his intellectual breakthrough to the notion of functional specialties in theology, a breakthrough eventually issuing in his 1972 *Method in Theology*.

Lonergan’s own theology was rooted in his spiritual life. Perhaps a hint of that life can be gleaned from his description of the experience of the hidden workings of the Lord in the life of a religious. The religious begins with what he called the “the being of substance in Christ Jesus,” that is, growth in the spiritual life without awareness of what is going on. This “being of substance in Christ Jesus” can, however, grow into “the being of subject in Christ Jesus,” that is, one who is consciously aware of the gentleness and deftness of the Lord’s operation within him or her.

...inasmuch as being in Christ Jesus is the being of subject, the hand of the Lord ceases to be hidden. In ways you have all experienced, in ways some have experienced more frequently or more intensely than others, in ways you still have to experience, and in ways none of us in this life will ever experience, the substance in Christ Jesus becomes the subject in Christ Jesus. For the love of God, being in love with God, can be as full and as dominant, as overwhelming and as lasting an experience as human love.  

In *Method in Theology* Lonergan writes about this experience as “being in love with God.” It is the fulfillment of our human capacity for total self-transcendence and it corresponds to Ignatius’s consolation that has no external cause. The appropriation and ratification of such experience constitutes “religious conversion” and is the principle for the discernment of moral and intellectual conversion as well.

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...from a causal viewpoint, one would say that first there is God’s gift of his love. Next, the eye of this love reveals values in their splendor, while the strength of this love brings about their realization, and that is moral conversion. Finally, among the values discerned by the eye of love is the value of believing the truths taught by the religious tradition, and in such tradition and belief are the seeds of intellectual conversion.18

But the world in which Lonergan followed out his own calling was quite different than the one in which Ignatius followed out his. For one thing, a whole new culture, a whole new way of looking at things, had emerged, and this culture was quite different from Ignatius’s classicist culture of Renaissance humanism. As Lonergan put the issue in 1971:

The Renaissance period was the period of the *uomo universale*, the man who could turn his hand to anything. The command of all that there was to be known at that time was not a fantastic notion. There was one culture, culture with a capital C: a normative notion of culture. That you could acquire it – a career opened to talent, and so on – was fairly well understood in various ways, and either you got it or did not. Communication, fundamentally, occurred *within* that one culture. You made slight adaptations to the people who were uncultured – and they were not expected to understand things.19

Such was the “classicist” culture that Lonergan would describe so frequently in his writings, particularly in the papers gathered together in his 1974 publication, *A Second Collection*. There he described classicism’s ancient lineage stemming from the Greek *paideia* and the Roman *doctrinae studium atque humanitatis*, as well as from “the exuberance of the Renaissance and its pruning in the Counter-reformation schools of the Jesuits.”20

The contemporary notion of culture, however, is something quite different. It is not a normative notion but an empirical one: that is, one that is aware of the diversity of cultures and their histories. It is historically conscious, pluralist, and specialized.

At the present time we don’t have only to speak Latin, write

20 *Second Collection*, 101.
Greek, and read Hebrew. We have all the modern languages with their modern literatures; the modern nations and the different worlds; instantaneous communication, perpetually available entertainment; terrific development in industry, in finance and all this sort of thing. No mathematician knows all mathematics, no physicist knows all physics, no chemist, all chemistry; and, least of all, no theologian knows all theology. With this transformation that has taken place, the world is a world of specialization.21

So it is that modern historically conscious culture is the culture that knows about other cultures. It is also quite aware that each of these cultures is “man-made,” that is, the result of human decisions. In this sense modern culture is “pragmatic;” its focus is on social and cultural change.

...modern culture is culture on the move. It is historicist. Because human cultures are man-made, they can be changed by man. They not only can but also should be changed. Modern man is not concerned simply to perpetuate the wisdom of his ancestors. For him the past is just the springboard to the future and the future, if it is to be good, will improve on all that is good in the past and it will liquidate all that is evil. The classicist was aware that men individually are responsible for the lives they lead. Modern man is aware that men collectively are responsible for the world in which they lead them. So a contemporary humanism is dynamic. It holds forth not an ideal of fixity but a program of change.22

Confronted with the fact of the modern pluralistic and historically conscious culture, the question for the Christian is how to preach the Gospel in this culture. “Far more open than classicist culture, far better informed, far more discerning, it lacks the convictions of its predecessor, its clear-cut norms, its elemental strength.”23 How can the Gospel call for conversion, so emphasized by Ignatius’s Spiritual Exercises, penetrate such modern historical diversity and pluralism? How can we avoid understanding human history as merely a series of unconnected fragments in which knowledge seems to lie “scattered around us, in great, unconnected pieces, like lonely mesas jutting up in a trackless waste.”24

21 Second Collection, 210.
22 Second Collection, 93.
23 Second Collection, 92.
24 James Turner, “The Catholic University in Modern Academe: Challenge and Dilemma,” paper presented at a conference on “The Storm over the University” at the
How can we even think about such fragmentation and apparently incommensurable pluralism? In a word, what “method” can one use in doing theology today?

Lonergan’s solution in *Insight: A Study of Human Understanding* (1957) and *Method in Theology* (1972) was to create a quite refined account of the normative character of human consciousness itself and to use that account as a way of accounting for – and speaking to – the vast diversity of cultures created by human consciousness. Such an account is rooted in self-appropriation, a heightened awareness of the levels of one’s own consciousness normatively and invariably operative in all our human activities. This basic structure is as operative in pleading a case of law as in coaching a baseball game. It is as operative in the creativity of one culture as it in another. It is this dynamic structure that makes it possible for a person of one culture to gradually come to understand a person of another culture. Living attentively, intelligently, reasonably, and responsibly is the source of the human family’s flourishing; and failure to live in such a way results in cultural and social decline.

Lonergan’s account was theoretical but it was rooted in human interiority, the source of both common sense and theory. In *Method in Theology* Lonergan extends this analysis to religion and to history. The core of religion is the experience Ignatius pointed to in the *Exercises* and that Lonergan writes of as “being in love with God.” That experience finds diverse expression in different cultural contexts and is interpreted differently according to various religious traditions. The Christian tradition understands this inner experience as the experience of the Holy Spirit, the “inner Word,” that leads to discerning “the outer Word” of God’s revelation in Christ. The role of Christian theology is to help in discerning that Word of God so that one may be able to speak that Word in one’s world.

Since theology concerns understanding the past as well as taking a stand in the present, Lonergan conceives theology as a set of eight functional specialties, four of which deal with history and four of which concern teaching and preaching the Word of God in the world today. The first four functional specialties – research, interpretation, history, dialectic – concern hearing the Word of God out of the past. The second four – that is, foundations, doctrines, systematics, and communications – concern discerning, affirming, understanding, and communicating that

University of Notre Dame, October 13, 1992.
Word of God to our world today. Central to Lonergan’s understanding is that all these various specializations are “functionally” related to each other according to the dynamic structure of human consciousness. The personal appropriation of one’s own consciousness so stressed in *Insight* is key also to “integrating” all dimensions of theology: historical, dialectical, religious, doctrinal, systematic, and pastoral.

In effect, Lonergan’s method enables Catholic theology to move out of a classicist mode into an historically conscious mode. It provides a way of integrating the new methods of historical scholarship as well as the diverse cultures those methods aim at understanding. It enables one to distinguish differences based on a diversity of culture from differences based on a differentiation of consciousness. Most basically, it enables one to discern those differences based on the presence or absence of conversion. For “the real menace to unity of faith does not lie either in the many brands of common sense or the many differentiations of human consciousness. It lies in the absence of intellectual or moral or religious conversion.”

The key issue then is the one Ignatius focused on in the *Exercises*, that is, the issue of conversion to hearing the call of Christ and discerning what Christ is calling one to. That call comes to persons of diverse backgrounds and cultures. It comes to persons of differing cultural achievements. The call is to a radical personal conversion involving the mission to bring the Word of God to wherever one is “being sent.” Thus, Lonergan’s theological methodology explicitly includes within its sweep the final functional specialty of communications, an area the early Jesuits were well aware of as they founded their schools.

Just as theology has to enter into the context of modern philosophy and science, so religion has to retain its identity yet penetrate into the cultures of mankind, into the manifold fabric of everyday meaning and feeling that directs and propels the lives of men. It has to know the uses of symbol and story, the resources of the arts and literature, the potentialities of the old and the new media of communication, the various motivations on which in any given area it can rely, the themes that in a given culture and class provide a carrying wave for the message.

Thus, just as the early Jesuits found in Renaissance humanism

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26 *Method in Theology*, 141.
the themes providing "a carrying wave for the message," so Catholic preachers and teachers today must seek similar "carrying waves" with which to proclaim the call to conversion. For, "there are the transpositions that theological thought has to develop if religion is to retain its identity and yet at the same time find access into the minds and hearts of men of all cultures and classes." 27 It would seem that the Catholic university is one place where such a union between Catholic theology and effective communications would need to take place.

III. THE CATHOLIC UNIVERSITY

The correlation between the accelerating explosion of knowledge and socio-cultural change confronts the contemporary university with a grave problem. For the university has ceased to be a storehouse whence traditional wisdom and knowledge are dispensed. It is a center in which ever-increasing knowledge is disseminated to bring about ever-increasing social and cultural change. 28

The contemporary university reflects contemporary historical consciousness. On the one hand, it reflects the tremendous specialization of knowledge; and on the other hand it reflects the consciousness that knowledge can and should have practical social and cultural effects. That is why "pragmatism" seems to be the reigning and operative humanism in America today. 29 The university today is not a dispenser of traditional wisdom in a classicist context. It is rather a "center" for various specialties, professions, cultures, all in the business of social and cultural change.

But what if such change is not authentic change? What if it contributes to cultural decline rather than to cultural progress? For in many instances that, in fact, seems to be the case. "Modernity lacks roots. Its values lack

27 Method in Theology, 132-133.
28 Second Collection, 135.
balance and depth. Much of its science is destructive of man."

Since so much is changing and moving – disciplines, professions, historical situations – the Catholic university needs a very refined instrument for linking the basic Gospel message to all of these areas. That is the point of Lonergan’s *Insight and Method in Theology*: to enable the Gospel message to link to all areas studied in the university and to contribute to the purification and integration of those areas for the good of the world – or, as Ignatius would put it, “to help souls.”

To put it more concretely, we go to great expense to have Catholic universities, but if our professors cannot be anything more than specialists in physics, specialists in chemistry, specialists in biology, specialists in history, if they can search and search for philosophic and theological aids to give them the orientation that would be specifically Catholic in their fields, and still not find them, because neither philosophy nor theology is doing its job of integrating, then we have a problem.

The point of Lonergan’s *Insight and Method in Theology* was to facilitate an intellectual conversion that on the one hand promotes radical self-knowledge, and on the other hand promotes the integration of all areas of knowledge: the sciences, the scholarly disciplines, the arts, religion, and the various worlds of common sense – including the various educational ideals, or humanisms.

Intellectual conversion does not hinder you at all dealing with simple people or ordinary people or anything like that; it helps you to understand them better, what their difficulties may be. It isn’t anything narrowing; it is something broadening, simplifying, clarifying.

The point then, is conversion: the religious conversion so emphasized by Ignatius in his *Spiritual Exercises* and the moral and intellectual conversion that flows from that. This is what should distinguish the Christian humanism that inspires and informs Catholic higher education today. To put it in another way, the Catholic university should reflect its religious roots by fostering the purification and integration of knowledge

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30 Second Collection, 99.
31 *Understanding and Being*, vol. 5 of Collected Works of Bernard Lonergan (Toronto: University of Toronto Press, 1992), 98.
for the good of the world. If Catholic theology in its communicative function is not fostering the transformation of the academic disciplines and contemporary culture, then it is "fruitless." Conversely, it is in the Catholic university fulfilling its role as a university that Catholic faith and Catholic theology can find their cultural fulfillment. "As it is only in the university that all aspects of human living are under study, it is only in the Christian university that theology can attain its full development and exercise its full influence."33

But how in fact can a Catholic university, and specifically professors within the Catholic university, connect what they are doing to the religious origins of the university? Besides generalities, does Catholic theology have anything specific to offer the various disciplines in the university, the disciplines as such – history, psychology, sociology, and so forth? In addressing this question Lonergan once pointed to the contemporary validity of Cardinal Newman’s theorem in The Idea of a University that human knowing is a whole with its parts organically related. Newman then asked what would happen if a significant part of knowledge were omitted, overlooked, ignored, not just by the individual but by the cultural community. His response was that there would be three consequences:

First, people in general would be ignorant of that area. Second, the rounded whole of human knowing would be mutilated. Third, the remaining parts would endeavor to round off the whole once more despite the omission of a part and, as a result, they would suffer distortion from their effort to perform a function for which they were not designed.34

Lonergan applies Newman’s theorem by noting that theology has in fact for some time been dropped from most university curricula. Consequently, one may ask whether Newman’s inferences have been confirmed in fact, whether there is a widespread ignorance of specifically

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33 Bernard Lonergan, “Questionnaire on Philosophy,” METHOD: Journal of Lonergan Studies, 2, no. 2 (October 1984), 9. This coheres with what Lonergan says at the beginning of the chapter on communications in Method in Theology, namely, that theology “matures” in the functional specialty of communications. "...It is in this final stage that theological reflection bears fruit. Without the first seven stages, of course, there is no fruit to be borne. But without the last the first seven are in vain, for they fail to mature." Method in Theology, 355.
34 Second Collection, 142.
theological areas, and whether this has resulted in a mutilation and distortion of human knowing generally. In the article we have been quoting, Lonergan leaves this question open for further reflection, but he does indicate one concrete relevance of theology to the specifically human sciences. For the human sciences may be and often are pursued simply on the analogy of the natural sciences.

For the human sciences may be and often are pursued simply on the analogy of the natural sciences. When this is done rigorously, when it is contended that a scientific explanation of human behavior is reached if the same behavior can be had in a robot, then everything specifically human disappears from the science...

On the other hand, when human scientists reject such reductionism, then not only does the exactitude of the natural sciences vanish but also the human sciences risk becoming captives of some philosophy. For what the reductionist omits are the meaning and value that inform human living and acting. But meaning and value are notions that can be clarified only by painstakingly making one's way through the jungle of the philosophies.35

That was one point of Lonergan's *Insight* and *Method in Theology*: to provide the hints and models whereby the human sciences might avoid reductionism without, on the other hand, becoming captives of philosophical fads. Such theoretical issues cannot help but affect the humanities and the question of a contemporary humanistic education. For a humanism is an ideal of human living that can touch the hearts and minds of many people, not only the scientists, scholars and philosophers, but also the intelligent populace who are influenced by these theoreticians.

...what moves men is the good, and good in the concrete...If at one time law was in the forefront of human development...still, at the present time it would seem that the immediate carrier of human aspiration is the more concrete apprehension of the human good effected through such theories of history as the liberal doctrine of progress, the Marxist doctrine of dialectical materialism and, most recently, Teilhard de Chardin's identification of cosmogenesis, anthropogenesis, and christogenesis.36

35 Second Collection, 143.

36 Second Collection, 6-7. Cf. also 93: "So a contemporary humanism is dynamic.
As is evident from the above quotes, some humanisms, some broad visions of the human life, are authentic; some are not. Some are open to self-transcendence and conversion; others consolidate the spirit of bias and unauthenticity. Some are open to theory with its normative implications; some are not. Some are open to God; some are not.

Besides the sciences, there are the humanities, and, as I have no need to insist, much modern humanism is prone to ignore God and to ridicule religion, when it is not militantly atheistic. Whether certain youth movements indicate a significant break in the trend, I cannot say. But I venture to affirm that an authentic humanism is profoundly religious.37

Such an authentic religious humanism is in profound contradiction to any superficial humanism that locks social classes within themselves.

The better educated become a class closed in upon themselves with no task proportionate to their training. They become effete. The less educated and the uneducated find themselves with a tradition that is beyond their means. They cannot maintain it. They lack the genius to transform it into some simpler vital and intelligible whole. It degenerates. The meaning and values of human living are impoverished. The will to achieve both slackens and narrows. Where once there were joys and sorrows, now there are just pleasures and pains. The culture has become a slum.38

Such has been the case with the humanism spawned by modern science.

Just as philosophic theory begot humanism of common sense, so too modern science has its progeny. As a form of knowledge, it pertains to man’s development and grounds a new and fuller humanism. As a rigorous form of knowledge, it calls forth teachers and popularizers and even the fantasy of science fiction.

Such a scientifically influenced humanism has become a principle of social transformation.

It holds forth not an ideal of fixity but a program of change. It was or is the automatic progress of the liberal, the dialectical materialism of the Marxist, the identification of cosmogenesis and christogenesis by Pierre Teilhard de Chardin.37 Second Collection, 144.

38 Method in Theology, 99.
...it also is a principle of action, and so it overflows into applied science, engineering, technology, industrialism. It is an acknowledged source of wealth and power, and the power is not merely material. It is the power of the mass media to write for, speak to, be seen by all men. It is the power of an educational system to fashion the nation’s youth in the image of the wise man or in the image of a fool, in the image of a free man or in the image prescribed for the Peoples’ Democracies.39

One’s educational ideal, then, one’s educational “mission,” then, is extremely important. What is to be the guiding image, the humanism, informing Catholic university education today? Can it be found in John Paul II’s Ex corde ecclesiae? Can that vision be expanded and broadened to include various historical constituencies? How important are these questions about the humanism that will influence contemporary education? “In its third stage, then, meaning not merely differentiates into the realms of common sense, theory, and interiority, but also acquires the universal immediacy of the mass media and the molding power of universal education.”

The point is that this question of the humanism that will inform contemporary Catholic university education is extremely important. “Never has adequately differentiated consciousness been more difficult to achieve. Never has the need to speak effectively to undifferentiated consciousness been greater.”40

It was to the credit of Bernard Lonergan to have outlined the nature of the differentiated consciousness necessary for the contemporary Catholic university. Like Ignatius in his day, Lonergan has provided a very important tool for allowing Gospel values to inform Jesuit and Catholic education today.

39 Method in Theology, 99 My emphases.
40 Method in Theology, 99.
PRACTICAL WISDOM, SOCIAL JUSTICE, AND THE GLOBAL SOCIETY

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Here is my servant whom I uphold, my chosen one in whom my soul delights. I have endowed him with my spirit that he may bring true justice to the nations. (Isaiah 42:1)

The work of St. Thomas, particularly the moral section of the Summa Theologiae, constitutes the convergence of all the great currents of thirteenth century thought meeting in the cultural center represented by the University of Paris in their full theological and philosophical flowering. (Servais-Theodore Pinckaers, O.P.)

INTRODUCTION

We stand at a critical turning point in the history of Christianity. Two thousand years have passed since the birth of Jesus of Nazareth; it has been nearly as long since the descent of the Holy Spirit upon the frightened apostles in the upper room at Jerusalem. The “good news” of salvation has been proclaimed to the ends of the earth, but the evident evils of our common world persist and multiply: intractable poverty, pervasive violence, systemic injustice, the scandalous neglect of the poor and vulnerable. The Christian churches are deeply concerned about these serious violations of God’s law, but their collective response to them
Jesus commanded the apostles to continue his redemptive mission on earth. Christian redemption was intended to heal and renew the whole of the human condition; "the blind see again, the lame walk, lepers are cleansed, the deaf hear, the dead are raised to life and the good news is proclaimed to the poor." (Matthew 11:5) Contemporary Christians continue to give their allegiance to the gospel of Jesus, a gospel that we have learned is ever ancient and ever new. It is ancient because it originated with a Galilean rabbi and prophet in Roman-occupied Palestine; it is continually new because it speaks with exceptional truth and power to the deepest human needs of every time and place in history. As the universal Christian community begins its third millennium of existence, it is still called by God to transform the world through the message and ministry of its founder. The twenty-first century confronts the global community of faith with new questions and challenges, new opportunities and dangers. Will we, the active members of that community, have the courage, the wisdom, and the charity to rise to the level and the demands of our time?

If faithful Christians are really to be “a light unto the nations,” if they are to respond effectively to the gravest problems of our common world, they will need to develop a new form of practical theology that integrates the enduring wisdom of their faith with the emerging insights of contemporary secular inquiry. This integrative theological project will also require the creation of new collaborative institutions. Both the new form of inquiry, theological reflection, and the new institutional framework, Christian centers of integrative studies, have become essential, I believe, to the redemptive mission of the Church in a global society.

### A. THEOLOGICAL REFLECTION

To what does the term “theological reflection” refer? The term itself can signify any form of human inquiry that seeks a deeper understanding of the substance of religious faith. In that broad semantic usage, theological reflection is coextensive with the whole of theology, the study of all things in their relation to God. My use of the term in this essay, which explicitly derives from the pastoral directives of Pedro Arrupe to the
Society of Jesus, is considerably narrower. By “theological reflection” I refer to a distinct form of practical inquiry inspired by and conducted in the light of the Christian faith. This type of practical theology is not without historical precedent. It can be found in the epistles of St. Paul and the episcopal directives of St. Augustine and is continuous with the Church’s social encyclicals during the nineteenth and twentieth centuries. Despite this continuity with Christian tradition, the practice of theological reflection as I conceive it is also importantly new. It is a unique product of several historical factors that have coalesced in the period after World War II. These include: the ongoing process of reform and renewal, *aggiornamento*, initiated by Pope John XXIII, the solidarity with the modern world proclaimed by *Gaudium et Spes*, the pastoral constitution on the Church in the modern world, the post-conciliar emphasis on social justice and international peace, the preferential option for the poor that shaped liberation theology, and a deepening recognition by the universal Church of the need to think and act on the level of history. In the language carefully crafted by the Canadian Jesuit, Bernard Lonergan, theological reflection is a new form of pastoral inquiry that seeks an active integration of the human good with full acknowledgement of our collective responsibility for the course of human affairs. Let us carefully unpack that compressed and concise formulation.

1. The *subject matter* of theological reflection are the most important problems of the contemporary world: economic prosperity and justice, responsible democratic governance, world population growth and global hunger, international peace and security, the sustainable protection of the natural environment, the creation of an equitable and balanced international order, the numerous challenges of biotechnology. The repercussions of these problems are strikingly evident at the regional and national levels of our lives, but their root causes are often transnational in character. Although theological reflection draws heavily on both Hebrew and Christian scripture and on the doctrinal and pastoral traditions of the Church, it derives its practical urgency from the most pressing concerns of the present age.

2. The *method* of theological reflection is typically interdisciplinary and collaborative. To achieve a full and balanced view of such complex practical matters, it is necessary to integrate provisional results from a broad spectrum of specialized knowledge and competence. Such an
integrative process will require the active collaboration of theologians, philosophers, historians, economists, political and social theorists, and responsible democratic citizens engaged in business, government, education, journalism, and the arts.

3. Who should be invited to participate in this practically oriented interdisciplinary project? Theological reflection is a fundamental apostolate not only of religious leaders and theologians but at some level of all genuine Christians. It explicitly continues the work of the apostles, making Christ’s redemptive presence effective in human history and giving visible witness to the Church’s mission as a servant community to all the nations.

4. Sensitivity to institutional bias and the distorting influence of vested interests in particularly important in this collaborative endeavor. This cautionary warning not only applies to the sinful history of the Church, but also to the distorting effects of egoistic, group, and general bias. Biased distortions can occur in the selective appeal to authorities, the exclusion of unwelcome questions and evidence, excessive complacency with the way things are, or unrealistic impatience with the demands of authentic and enduring reform. Theological reflection requires heroic discernment and charity, both personal and communal, and a heightened sensitivity to the social and cultural contexts in which pastoral theology is practiced. The traditional settings of theological inquiry, the library, the study, the classroom, the episcopal office, all have their endemic limitations. Theological reflection also needs to occur in the concrete locations of human action and suffering: in factories, hospitals, prisons, government offices, union halls, and poor neighborhoods, for example. There are clear advantages to creating independent institutional centers of theological reflection for they provide collaborative communities of interdisciplinary reflection and research. But there are important disadvantages as well. Such centers can easily become too comfortable, too closely tied to the interests of the dominant elites, too isolated from regular contact with those directly involved in the struggles of ordinary life.

5. The aims of theological reflection are explicitly practical. The proximate aim is to generate well-informed and continuously revised policies and plans for promoting good and undoing evil in local, regional and national communities throughout the global society. The intermediate aim is to create within the Church an effective and credible voice, a voice
of Christian practical wisdom, in the discussion and conduct of public affairs. The ultimate aim is to fulfill the gospel imperative of promoting and advancing the kingdom of God on this earth.

Given the reality of sin, the fallibility of human intelligence, and the depth of contemporary economic, political, and cultural divisions, what expectations should Christians bring to this collective exercise of historical responsibility? In the practice of theological reflection, how is the proper balance to be maintained between realistic sobriety and prophetic hope?

Christians believe that time is meaningful; it is created by God, redeemed by Christ, and sanctified by the power of the Holy Spirit. They also believe that historical time is essentially unfinished; it awaits completion in Christ’s second coming when the eschatological promises of the New Testament are finally fulfilled. This dual perspective on time and history both engages Christians in the struggles of the world and detaches their hearts from complete absorption in contemporary events.

Human history is a tangled web of greatness and wretchedness, of order and disorder, of achievement and destruction. In its concreteness, it embodies both the goodness of created nature, the moral evil and impotence that are the result of pervasive sin, and the healing power of redemptive grace. The dynamic and unpredictable movement of human history unfolds between the original peace of God’s creation and the ultimate peace that will complete Christ’s final return in glory. During this extended and indefinite temporal interval, Christians are called to follow Christ’s redemptive example, to transform historical time by working to establish the values of God’s eternal kingdom in human affairs: peace, holiness, justice, mercy, and self-transcending love.

In the course of his public ministry, Jesus spoke repeatedly of the kingdom of God. His gospel of the kingdom had two contrasting and complementary aspects: the kingdom is presently at hand in the words and deeds of Jesus himself, and yet it does not finally belong to the temporal world. The kingdom is among you, here and now, yet its full consummation lies in the eschatological future. Christians are obliged to promote and advance God’s kingdom on earth; yet the fulfillment of divine providence awaits the final judgment by God at the end of time. In the light of the gospel, of Jesus’ teaching and practice, a Christian political theology and a Christian theology of history should be neither utopian nor tragic. The followers of Christ simultaneously accept his
call to perfection ("Be perfect as your heavenly father is perfect") while acknowledging the stark reality of evil and sin. Their abiding trust in Christ's promises and in the power of redemptive grace sustains their hope for both the created world and eternal life. Their clear-eyed recognition of sin's destructive effects, both personal and communal, is a concomitant source of sobriety and realism.

The theological mysteries of creation, sin, and redemptive grace profoundly inform the Christian understanding of history. Without creation and grace, the human condition would be tragic, a legitimate cause for unyielding despair. Without the existence of sin, there would be no accounting for the violence, disorder, injustice, and death that are so much a part of human reality. Sin separates human beings from God, divides them within nature and history, and shatters the integrity of their original creation. Bias and sin are the recurrent source of what Lonergan calls the social surd, the absence of intelligibility that permeates human existence. The lived history of humanity is a tangled knot of authenticity and alienation, of objective truth and distorting ideology. Christian realism in responding to this uneven history embraces as its orienting principles the moral ontology of created nature, destructive sin, and redemptive grace. By acknowledging the continuous interplay of these three intersecting forces, Christians can avoid both utopian fantasies about human progress and the pessimistic reduction of human aspirations to the level of existing practice. By combining historical sobriety with prophetic hope, Christians engaged in theological reflection can work for the kingdom of God in this world without naïve illusion or destructive bitterness.

6. The *spirit* of theological reflection is realistic, compassionate, and ecumenical. Committed Christians draw on their active love of God to pursue the temporal concerns that they share with all of humanity. The common human commitment to justice and peace engages believers and those without religious faith in continuous, self-correcting dialogues with the rich and the poor, the learned and the unschooled, the powerful and the weak, the young and the old. As Lonergan repeatedly cautioned, competence, humility, and patience are essential to this demanding work. It is difficult to be genuinely religious; it is very hard to learn, to master new methods and fields of study; it is painful to recognize the limits of our knowledge and understanding and our need to augment them

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2 Insight, 229-32.
with the corrective insights of others. Practical wisdom is rare, and its effective conjunction with heroic charity is truly remarkable. The fruitful collaboration of imperfect and divided human beings in the renewal of the Church and the transformation of the world is an awesome and never-ending task. We can become better at this collaborative effort, but the need for conversion and renewal is permanent.

Authentic Christians have a moral obligation to act justly and to promote justice in the larger world to the best of their ability. This obligation is rooted in the gospel imperative "to love your neighbor as yourself." To proceed from this basic scriptural imperative to concrete action is sometimes simple and direct. A young child runs into the heavily trafficked street and the concerned adult pulls him back. A blind person needs assistance entering a crowded room and the sighted person offers direction and support. An old woman falls on an icy sidewalk and the passing stranger helps her to her feet and takes her home. In these cases, the right course of action is immediately clear. However, in setting national and global budget priorities, raising or lowering interest rates, allocating foreign aid, shaping immigration policy, reforming a massive health care system, distributing political authority among federal, state, and local governments, creating a fair and efficient tax system, appropriately responding to international crises like those in Bosnia, Kosovo, Rwanda, and Iraq, and developing an equitable global economy, it is far less easy to determine what the imperative of justice requires.

Theological reflection, as we have described it, would be unnecessary in this and similar circumstances if "the right thing to do" were immediately evident to persons of goodwill. Since this is manifestly not the case, how are justice-seeking Christians to proceed in a responsible manner from the gospel imperative of neighborly love to developing public policy initiatives that are wise and practically effective? I believe that they need to perform a series of mediating steps, each of which is relevant in connecting their personal religious faith with the actual requirements of social justice on a global scale.

What are these vital mediating steps that constitute the normative practice of theological reflection?

1. Deeply living the Christian faith in our daily existence. True religious conversion demands sustained prayerfulness, asceticism, personal repentance and self-denial, the wholehearted love of God and neighbor. The authentic practice of theological reflection depends on a
personal spirituality that draws us nearer to God and God's vision of the world. This is the common goal of the Ignatian Spiritual Exercises, the Benedictine Rule, and the meditative and contemplative practices of the great religious traditions.

2. Prayerfully reflecting on the central Christian mysteries: the creation of the universe, the fall of Adam and Eve, the enduring covenant with Israel, the reception of the Mosaic law, the promises and warnings of the prophets, the incarnation and redemption of Christ, the descent of the Holy Spirit, the founding of a universal church, the eschatological vision of eternal life in the kingdom of God.

3. Developing a credible theological anthropology centered in the Trinitarian understanding of God: basing human dignity on our original creation in God's mysterious image and likeness; basing human solidarity on our universal immersion in sin and our common need for redemption; basing the value of ordinary practical activities on the conduct of Jesus, the carpenter's son, who chose fishermen and ordinary laborers as his disciples; basing our trust in personal repentance and institutional renewal on the descent of the Holy Spirit and the continuous gift of God's restorative grace; basing our eschatological hopes on the promises of Christ and his miraculous resurrection from the dead. A deep meditative understanding of the Trinitarian mysteries shapes the intellectual and moral horizon within which Christian theological reflection proceeds.

4. Articulating a Christian ethics, both personal and social, in response to two fundamental questions: a) How should I act and live as a mature and responsible Christian today? b) How should we live together in free and self-governing communities of interdependent persons? Because practical Christian inquiry draws on several sources of insight, it is useful to distinguish, but neither to isolate nor to separate (Aquinas's example is deeply relevant here) a theological ethics based on Hebrew and Christian scripture and tradition from a philosophical ethics that proceeds from the data of moral experience, through practical inquiry and reflection, to the articulation of moral principles and the assertion of evaluative judgments. Theological ethics follows the path of intellectual synthesis. It develops from an explicitly religious origin, proceeding from our trust in God's goodness and providence, and our belief in the revelation of Christ, the inspiration of the Holy Spirit, and the cumulative wisdom of the teaching Church, to a set of fundamental moral beliefs (doctrines), to an enlarged understanding of their human implications
(moral systematics), and finally to the practical assessment of their concrete relevance for the here and now (pastoral communications). (See Method in Theology.)

Philosophical ethics, by contrast, follows the path of practical analysis. It develops from below, proceeding from a descriptive phenomenology of moral experience, through a series of deliberative questions, to a set of concrete practical insights, to their articulation in proposed courses of action, to the rational appraisal of the varying merits of these alternative proposals, to informed and responsible decisions on the best course of action for this particular time and place.

Both theological and philosophical ethics are profoundly affected by the cultural transition from classicist assumptions to contemporary historical mindedness. Classicism, as a cultural outlook, conceived of ethics as a permanent human achievement, as a finite set of invariant moral truths with universal and timeless applicability. Historically minded moral agents, by contrast, recognize invariant moral precepts (be attentive, intelligent, reasonable, responsible, open to grace and historicity) and an invariant structure of moral deliberation, evaluation, and choice, but they are acutely aware that the concrete significance of these precepts and the concrete courses of action emerging from that normative structure of reflection have to be determined through the self-correcting process of shared practical inquiry. In theological ethics, basic moral principles expressing how we should live, and what we should do and refrain from doing, are justified by appealing to the theological anthropology rooted in the central Christian mysteries. In the order of theological synthesis we reason, non deductively, from a shared moral ontology and anthropology to prescriptive normative principles, and then from those principles to the advocacy or criticism of concrete courses of action. In philosophical ethics, the order of development is reversed; here we proceed from concrete practical situations through the pattern of deliberative inquiry to particular evaluative judgments, then to an evolving set of moral principles, and finally to an articulated moral ontology that takes full account of our uneven moral responses, both those that exhibit sustained self-transcendence as well as those that are affected by the several types of distorting bias.

Although theological and philosophical ethics are clearly distinct they should not be separated. The two ways of proceeding, from a scripturally based moral ontology and normative principles to concrete
cases, and from practical experience to an explanatory ontology and categorical precepts, are in fact complementary. This practical collaboration is a critical example of the complementarity between faith and reason, between divine revelation and free intellectual discovery, on which Catholic Christianity has historically insisted. In the conduct of theological reflection, authentic ethical and political decisions rely simultaneously on the scriptural and doctrinal heritage of Christianity and on the independent moral reflection of the human community. The ecumenical spirit and collaborative nature of this new form of practical theology depend explicitly on this complex and mutually enriching relationship.

5. By their different paths, theological and philosophical ethics converge on the following concerns: our obligations to God, other human beings, and the natural universe; the range and order of authentic human goods; the ontological bases of human dignity and liberty and their practical implications for political and social justice; ultimate existential questions about the meaning and purpose of life itself. While these ethical questions are humanly unavoidable, the practical answers they receive are deeply contested, not only between Christians and those who do not believe in Christ, but also within the Christian community itself. There are several sources of this striking moral disagreement. These include critical intellectual and moral lapses on the part of the existential subject and the deliberative community: the absence of religious and moral conversion; violations of the basic normative precepts; inadequate factual knowledge; existential and cultural alienation; arrested or distorted emotional development, to name only a few. A primary source of disagreement is the critical mediating role played by institutional and cultural analysis. Christians who share a common theology and moral ontology often disagree at the level of political advocacy, because their understanding of the concrete human situation is strikingly different. In social and political ethics, the structural gap between articulated moral principles and the formation and appraisal of public policies is effectively bridged by institutional and cultural analysis and criticism. But within the human sciences themselves, there is an absence of agreement on the social and political importance of technology, the complex operations of the national and global economy, the power and limits of government, the international balance of forces, and, most tellingly, on the particular strengths and weaknesses of the different cultural and religious traditions
that underpin social practice. Responsible policy-making and planning invariably depend on multiple and potentially conflicting sources of insight: the norms and principles of ethics, the institutional analysis and cultural criticism of the human sciences, the depth dimension of historical research, disinterested dialogue and debate among citizens and their political leaders, and on the particular set of circumstances in which human action really occurs. Egoistic, group, and general bias can distort human inquiry and decision – making at each of these interconnected levels. Discerning the presence of bias and critiquing the numerous ideologies with which bias disguises itself are essential to understanding and correcting practical conflict. Because the operation of bias is inevitable and the resort to justifying ideology recurrent, theological reflection is a fallible, self-correcting, constantly revisable, cooperative blending of theory and praxis.

6. Religious faith and practical action coalesce when situated human beings carry out the personal and public decisions that result from their deliberative inquiry. There is no substitute in ethics for informed and responsible men and women on the scene to enact the plans and to execute the policies that have been jointly agreed upon. As Lonergan constantly emphasized, the human good is always concrete. It is in the lived concreteness of the home, the classroom, the shop floor, the court house, the neighborhood, the subway, the pollution site, the housing project, the welfare agency, the obsolete manufacturing plant, the emergency room, the prison, the homeless shelter, the supermarket, the public park, the thriving or abandoned commercial center that good and evil are directly experienced and made real. In primitive and relatively stable societies, the gap to be mediated between religious faith and effective action is generally narrow. In our highly differentiated and dynamic global society, that practical gap has become steadily broader and deeper.

7. Theological reflection operates like a scissors with an upper and lower blade. The upper blade is relatively invariant and universal; it exhibits a notable continuity through the long course of Christian history. The lower blade is highly variable and particular; it undergoes significant institutional and cultural variation with emerging differences in time and place. The upper blade articulates the moral horizon or background framework within which practical reflection occurs. The lower blade concentrates on the concrete social and political circumstances which
human conduct will ultimately affect.

There are three major components of theological reflection's upper blade: the Trinitarian theology of God; the intentional analysis of human subjectivity; a normative ethics of Christian principles and precepts (based on the gospel and the Ten Commandments). They key component of the lower blade is critical, factual analysis of the institutional, cultural, and historical settings to which the principles and precepts of ethics apply. Traditional Christian ethics has emphasized the normative dimension of the synoptic upper blade, but its descriptive and analytic treatment of human existence was overly metaphysical, and its knowledge of and attention to the specialized and variable lower blade was comparatively weak. The secular social sciences and the commonsense practicality of ordinary men and women are typically attentive to the concrete demands of the lower blade, but they tend to be inarticulate about or indifferent to the normative principles and precepts that properly govern and measure human practice.

The weakness of the upper blade taken in isolation is its lack of effective specificity. It can tell us, as Gaudium et Spes did, what is unjust and unchristian in the way we live as individual persons and historically organized communities. However, it is characteristically unable to identify appropriate and effective remedies to correct what is wrong, or to recommend insightful policies and plans to promote what is right and good. The weakness of the lower blade taken in isolation is its lack of principled normativity. Proponents of the lower blade tend to take the factual status quo for granted and, in the name of supposedly hard-headed realism, characteristically reduce normative measuring principles to the level of existing practice.

Theological reflection, in the spirit of Arrupe and Lonergan, is an exercise of Christian realism fully committed to the effective integration of the upper and lower blades of practical inquiry. Its theological convictions are explicitly Trinitarian: God the Father created the world and saw that it was very good; Christ, the Father's son, redeemed the fallen world from the devastating effects of human sin; the Holy Spirit constantly renews the created and sinful universe through the undeserved gift of amazing grace. The anthropology of Christian realism is also Trinitarian. All human beings are created in the image and likeness of God. God's created image within us is distorted and darkened through our crippling entanglement in sin. We nevertheless remain open to redemptive
healing and creative renewal through the grace of God poured out for us in Christ. With its tri-polar dialectic of created nature, disruptive sin, and redemptive grace, theological reflection takes full account of both the greatness and wretchedness of human existence without losing the disciplined energy and tenacious convictions of Christian hope.

The upper and lower blades of theological reflection concretely intersect in the formation and execution of public policy. It is in shaping policy that principles and precepts are directly applied to the factual universe. It is in enacting policy, in initiating and engaging in cooperative action, that practical inquiry fulfills its normative purpose of healing the effects of sin and of continuing God’s creative work in history. The indispensable virtue required for effective policy-making and planning is practical wisdom. It is practical wisdom that unites the moral vision and normative precepts of the upper blade with the concrete realism and required flexibility of the lower blade. It is practical wisdom that correctly determines the right thing to do, the best thing to do, here and now, in this time and place.

But who are the practically wise? In everyday life, they are the friends whose counsel we seek when we are confronted with important and difficult personal decisions. In public affairs, they are the counselors whom conscientious statesmen consult in the course of governing the political community. In both the personal and public sphere, they are the adults whose practical advice and guidance we trust when the chips are down. In traditional societies that were far more stable than our own and more self-sufficient in meeting the needs of their members, the lower blade of practical inquiry remained relatively constant, and practical wisdom could be ascribed to the wise men and women, the respected elders of the community, who knew from the funded experience of cooperative life the right thing to do. But in contemporary global societies, where the lower blade is in constant flux, and where human knowledge and practice are linked in a mutually transforming symbiosis, practical wisdom is much harder to achieve. The central thesis of this lecture is that practical wisdom in a dynamic global society will require interdisciplinary collaborative teams deliberately organized to integrate the upper and lower blades of theological reflection in a self-correcting process of learning and doing.

As there is no substitute for the reliable common sense of men and women on the scene who depend on their own practical insights for
the implementation of policy, there is also no substitute for the concrete feedback they provide to policymakers and planners on the success or failure of their enacted decisions. Paralleling an empirical canon of operations in science that regularly connects theory and practice, there is a moral canon of operations in human affairs providing constantly new data and evidence on the uneven and unexpected results of cooperative action. This essential feedback procedure keeps theologians and philosophers, cultural analysts and critics, policymakers and planners in regular contact and dialogue with actively engaged citizens and local communities. Reciprocal feedback lessens the dangers of academic remoteness and unbridled idealism, on the theoretical side, while checking the familiar tendency to group and general bias among hardheaded practical "realists."

B. CENTERS OF INTEGRATIVE STUDIES

The distrust of religion and the rejection of theology have steadily narrowed the sources of knowledge and moral energy on which Western culture can draw in its practical reflection. Since the European Enlightenment of the eighteenth century, several important elements in the Christian cultural synthesis articulated by Thomas Aquinas have been abandoned. First, the truth of divine revelation was rejected by critical rationalists like Spinoza; then the directive power of human reason was denied by skeptical critics like Hume. When rational agreement about the common good no longer seemed possible, political liberals insisted on mutual tolerance and forbearance. The toleration of difference was intended to diminish religious and moral conflict, yet, by itself, it lacked the power to remedy systematic economic and political injustice. Democratic tolerance was later ridiculed by totalitarians of the right and left in the name of their allegedly utopian ideals. The upshot of their terrible but limited hegemony in Germany and the Soviet Union was unprecedented barbarism and slaughter. The recent collapse of communism and the evident limitations of unwieldy public bureaucracies have made secular utopianism presently unfashionable. The prevailing mood of political and cultural pessimism coincides with a resurgence of classical liberalism that celebrates the economic efficiency of the commercial marketplace. But global capitalism only deepens existing inequalities
within and among nations; and its anthropological and moral vision of self-seeking individuals and corporations is profoundly dispiriting. It is futile to expect unfettered capitalism to heal the tragic divisions within the modern world.

The profound lesson of the twentieth century, I believe, is that the age of innocence is over. The great secular ideologies, liberalism, Marxism, laissez-faire capitalism, and nationalism, have been forced to confront the intractable problem of evil and moral impotence. In creating and sustaining a just human society, there is no evading the demand for authenticity, personal, institutional, and cultural. But authenticity is incompatible with egoistic, group and general bias, with the refusal of repentance and conversion, with the denial of God. It is also incompatible with the scapegoat “solution” of locating the source of injustice and evil in the other, whether the other is a government official, an entrepreneurial capitalist or an ethnic, racial or religious adversary. Genuine conversion always starts with oneself, with one’s own community, with the prejudices, habits and sins that compromise our created capacity to do good and avoid evil. Ending the terrible injustices of the past, healing the persistent and intractable bitterness they have engendered, reforming our interdependent economic and political institutions, changing underlying cultural attitudes and priorities, learning to cooperate effectively across religious and cultural differences, patiently enduring the struggle to bring credible good out of existing evil, rising to the level and the demands of our time, this profoundly redemptive work will require heroic charity, transcendent hope, and a practical wisdom rooted in and open to religious faith. It will require the effective cooperation of everyone devoted to the cause of global justice and peace.

In the concluding pages of Method in Theology while thematizing the eighth and final functional specialty communications, Lonergan outlined a form of theological praxis that he called “integrated studies.”3 The aim of integrated studies is “to generate well-informed and continuously revised policies and plans for promoting good and undoing evil both in the Church and in human society.”4 These policies and plans are to be based on deliberate interdisciplinary cooperation. They are to emerge from the complementary insights of the functional specialties in theology, the philosophical project of intentional self-appropriation,

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4 Method in Theology, 366.
and contemporary scholarly and scientific inquiry. According to Lonergan, integrated studies would respond to a profound exigence in the modern world, namely “to apply the best available knowledge and the most efficient techniques to coordinated group action.” To meet his contemporary exigence would set the Church on a “course of continual renewal,” as it seeks ways “to meet the needs of both Christians and of all humankind.”

In Lonergan’s conception, integrated studies would draw upon the following intellectual and spiritual resources: Hebrew and Christian scripture; the Christian faith as historically practiced and taught; the several traditions of Christian spirituality, including the Ignatian spiritual exercises; the functional specialties in Christian theology, especially dialectic and foundations; an historically grounded moral ontology and anthropology; normative social ethics; rigorous institutional and cultural analysis; comprehensive historical scholarship; the insights of common sense practicality; public policymaking and planning; the concrete enactment of well-informed policies and plans; continuous practical feedback through the moral canon of operations. To coordinate effectively such an immense range of sources and materials is a formidable undertaking indeed. Clearly, what Lonergan has described in these passages in *Method* is a visionary project rather than an existing apostolic ministry. And yet, Lonergan’s integrative vision explicitly articulates what Father Arrupe’s call for “theological reflection” appears to require, particularly if this new Christian apostolate is to meet the demands of our time at the appropriate level of collaborative excellence. What practical conclusions should we draw then from this striking convergence of Arrupe’s pastoral directive and Lonergan’s theological vision?

In my judgment, a significant number of historical currents and practical challenges are beginning to coalesce. The time is ripe for an innovative global response to the demands of the new century and the new millennium. To meet the gospel imperative of neighborly love, to meet the Johannine summons to Christian reform and renewal, to meet the Jesuit call for a faith that does justice, to meet the historical demand for collective responsibility and global leadership, to satisfy the democratic imperatives of practical wisdom and popular consent, we need to create a new type of institutional structure, a Christian center of “integrative

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5 *Method in Theology*, 367.
studies,” as the appropriate setting for the Church’s ministry in practical theology. We presently have within the Christian community highly specialized experts in the many different fields of theory and practice. What we conspicuously lack are operating centers of integration and coordination to bring the different levels and kinds of human knowledge jointly to bear on the most important contemporary problems. Christian centers of integrative studies would effectively remedy that lack and provide a suitable home for the collaborative enterprise of theological reflection.

What should a center of public discussion and argument created to promote the concreteness of the common good, locally, nationally, and globally, actually be like? The modern West has inherited two opposing models of practical inquiry. One of these models derives from the rhetoric of the ancient Greek sophists. This model has inspired the adversarial procedures embodied in contemporary legal practice. The eristic spirit of lawyers and sophists is competitive and agonial; it presupposes conflicting, often irreconcilable, interests among adversaries. The purpose of argument is to defeat your opponent, to advance your own cause, to maximize individual and collective advantage. This eristic adversarial model now dominates the American political realm. American politics has become an essentially partisan affair where organized interest groups pursue their self-interest through lobbying, the funding of political parties and candidates, and the struggle for favorable public relations. Group bias is taken for granted (that is simply how the political game is played), and the strategic advantage clearly lies with the dominant interests that are better funded and organized. The weak, the poor, the young and vulnerable are clearly threatened by this institutional arrangement, for they have minimal influence at the bargaining table where the major public decisions are made. Those who champion the needs of the poor are driven by this essentially adversarial process to become partisan advocates in their own right for the socially disadvantaged within the political system.

The alternative model of public discourse is based on the practice of Socratic dialogue. In the Platonic dramas, Socrates is the philosophical antagonist of the sophistic rhetoricians. He saw the purpose of public conversation, of shared practical inquiry, as reaching a deeper understanding of and commitment to the human good, rather than gaining partisan advantage or personal victory. Socrates was not
naïve. He clearly knew how the sophists and their political protégés operated, but he was devoted to raising public argument to a higher level of excellence and accountability. Thus, he was open and receptive to his moral interlocutors, willing to begin the argument from their perspective, and prepared to correct his own beliefs and opinions as well as those of his dialogue partners. Most impressively, Socrates was never ideological or doctrinaire. What mattered to him was the truth of the argument, not one’s cherished opinions or convictions. He was constantly alert for bias in every form, egoistic, group, general and philosophical; in fact, Plato repeatedly shows through his dramas how ignorance and bias systematically distort the process of argument, producing inevitable aporia and impasse. Even though Socrates rarely reached full agreement with his interlocutors, he altered the way in which they saw themselves and their world. He forced them to consider alternatives, to confront the full implications of their beliefs, to examine inherited prejudices, to take the long view, to privilege the whole community over its partisan factions, to acknowledge the disparity between what people publicly said and how they actually lived. By his visible public presence in Athens, he served as a detached and effective critic of Athenian culture and conduct. Socrates was a powerful model of situated self-transcendence, of critical belonging, of the thoughtful citizen’s disinterested engagement in public affairs. It is also true that he was silenced by the Athenian demos, that his opponents resented his dialectical inquiry, that they typically refused to embrace the rigorous self-examination he insisted was the mark of the authentically human.

In American public discourse, the sophists and their pupils have clearly triumphed over Socrates; adversarial eristic has supplanted the practice of authentic moral and political dialogue. We take egoistic and group bias for granted, and confine nearly all public discussion to an analysis of short-term costs and benefits. Even the subsidized research centers we have created since the war are usually designed to be weapons in the partisan struggle. Thus, we have right wing and left wing think tanks, but very few public thinkers and leaders to think and speak for the critical center and the enduring common good. In this divisive and often sterile political context, what we urgently need are interdisciplinary collaborative centers that could serve as detached and effective voices, both constructive and critical, on the great concerns of our age. As we no longer have the historical Socrates among us, we must find a way to
create a collective Socratic presence and voice within our culture.

A Christian center of integrative studies would be designed to meet the critical ethical requirement of practical wisdom. It would respond simultaneously to two distinct but related demands, one with its roots in classical Athenian politics, the other with its roots in the prophetic tradition of Judaism: the Athenian root underlies the modern democratic demand for informed and responsible public debate; the prophetic root reinforces the ancient scriptural imperative of justice and neighborly love. With its open, rational discussion of important public concerns, constitutional democracy should be the most educative form of human government. It should create a public learning-community in which adult citizens regularly increase their understanding of and commitment to the commonweal. Does American democracy today fulfill this vital educational function; does it actually enhance the political understanding and civic integrity of its citizens? The familiar examples of political argument we witness on television, whether conducted by politicians, journalists, or talk-show hosts, are deeply demoralizing. There is no shortage of public talk, but so little of it is really instructive, insightful or inspiring. So little of it contributes to shaping the practical wisdom democratic societies urgently need. As citizens, we rarely feel, after listening to these acrimonious debates, that our understanding of the central issues has been deepened, or that we are better prepared to make a responsible civic decision about them. There is a serious danger today that our civic peers, particularly our young citizens, are losing confidence in public speech itself, the political capacity par excellence, because they encounter so few examples of what responsible discourse can do at its best. Distrust of politics, cynicism about our political leaders, hostility to government, the failure of individual citizens to meet their own public obligations – these disturbing cultural trends will continue to erode democratic self-governance until the character of our national conversation is profoundly transformed.

What role can a center of theological reflection play in this process of political conversion? The centers of integrative studies Lonergan envisioned would be spaces of public liberty, where informed and responsible citizens could engage in serious dialogue and debate about our cultural beliefs and values, and about the justice and effectiveness of our economic and political policies. This critical public inquiry would be eminently practical; it would be directed to what we are doing and how
we are living, and the changing character of our connections with other people and the natural universe. But it would be profoundly practical. In the ongoing public discussions within a center of integrative studies, we would be able to draw upon the entire range of cultural resources we have inherited. The depth dimension, so noticeably lacking in contemporary public argument, would come from theology, philosophy, history, economic and political theory, critical social and cultural analysis, the study of international relations, works of art and literature. This public moral conversation directed towards the critical appraisal and reform of contemporary life, would be open to all who love and accept responsibility for the world, and who are prepared to enlist their specialized knowledge, their practical competence, and their moral energy in the service of the commonweal.

How would the exploratory discussion and argument in a theological reflection center differ from contemporary public debate? It would explicitly identify and deliberately challenge the operative prejudices of the dominant interest groups. The striking contrast between partisan advocacy and disinterested critical inquiry would be clearly displayed and group bias would be openly acknowledged and effectively checked. Responsible public argument would consciously avoid the adversarial polemics of existing political controversy where the contending parties are seeking to exploit whatever rhetorical and electoral advantages they can. Although their purpose is practical, to discover, articulate and support appropriate courses of action, these centers would be open and exploratory in spirit. Unlike contemporary think tanks of both the right and the left, they must be neither doctrinaire nor ideological in character.

Prepared to be truly counter-cultural, centers of integrative studies would put into question the moral horizon within which we presently think and live. Like Socrates in ancient Athens and the Hebrew and Christian prophets, they would challenge the legitimacy and importance of the human goods we commonly prize and pursue: economic success, personal prestige, political power, maximal profit, sensual pleasure, individual independence, the liberty to do as we please. In the spirit of the prophets, they would respect the dignity and honor the needs of those presently excluded from the civic forum because of their poverty, their limited education, their inexperience, their lack of organized power. For your legitimate concerns to be taken seriously in these comprehensive public forums, you would not have to be an established political player
representing a powerful interest group or ideology. These centers of liberty would seek to transcend the bias of short-term reasoning, a bias that denies the practical relevance of systematic and historical analysis, or that assumes the futility of bringing theological and philosophical perspectives to bear on the conduct of public affairs. While contemporary public debate is narrowly focused and driven by the shifting winds of opinion research, the sustained political and moral conversation we need is genuinely comprehensive and committed to taking the long view.

Theological reflection concentrates on the whole of the national and global community rather than the part, on the common good rather than on special interests, on the needs of the powerless rather than the ambitions of the already dominant, on the deeper aspects of human interiority, the unrestricted eros and exigence of intentional consciousness, that are presently neglected or excluded from view. It is acutely attentive to bias, systematic prejudice, and rationalizing ideology in their limitless forms, and it strived to counteract their distorting effects on public life through informed and sustained dialectical criticism.

Theological reflection centers, ecumenical forums of public liberty, such as we have described, would provide the setting for the civilized and interdisciplinary practical inquiry the global society urgently needs. They would be respectful of past achievement and yet oriented to creative innovation. They would be attentive to cultural pluralism while acknowledging the transcultural desires and norms that exist within every human being. They would be sympathetic to the constraints of practical politics, to the numerous factors that influence public policy formation, but they would carefully distinguish between factual barriers to political agreement and the normative obligations and principles that govern responsible human choice. Of greatest importance, centers of integrative studies would provide democratic citizens with what they presently require and conspicuously lack in order to reach responsible public decisions: a sense of history, theoretical depth, explanatory context, both long-range and comprehensive perspectives, and the articulate fruits of systematic analysis and normative criticism.

The collaborative practice of theological reflection, the creation of centers of integrative studies, the shaping of a public culture based on personal and historical authenticity, provide a way, when effectively combined, to connect the contemporary need for practical wisdom with the democratic demand for enhanced public liberty and the Christian and
prophetic commitment to the poor and the powerless. Without practical wisdom, the Church cannot effectively integrate faith and justice. Without a radically transformed public discourse, democratic self-government will remain inept and demoralizing. Without the "preferential option for the poor," the least of our brothers and sisters will continue to suffer disproportionately. Institutional Christianity, popular democracy, and the prophetic tradition of social justice have not always been friends, but in the twenty-first century, it is essential that they learn to cooperate for the sake of the world community that now stretches across the entire earth.
INTRODUCTORY REMARKS

This paper is still a work in progress. My thinking is still evolving on these issues. The climate for discussion of these issues today is much more rigorous and contested than when Lonergan was writing.

Today it is more likely that theologians and philosophers be trained in at least one other non-Western religion or philosophical system. Theology and philosophy are becoming global. Philosophy of religion is also taught more frequently in view of religions other than simply Christianity. On the practical level, more and more of our students on metropolitan campuses are coming from backgrounds other than the Christian one. We are seeing this clash of cultures secular, Christian, and "non-Christian" just at the time when Catholic identity is being reasserted in the wake of Ex Corde Ecclesiae.

1 An interesting textbook approach is Gary E. Kessler, Philosophy of Religion: Towards a Global Perspective (Belmont, CA: Wadsworth Publishing Company), which includes selections from Sri Aurobindo, John Hick, Alvin Plantinga, Gavin D'Costa, Purusottama Bilimoria, and others.

2 One of the leaders in the area of comparative theology is Francis Clooney S.J. at Boston College. He, however, most often approaches these issues in light of hermeneutical strategies and of the questions theologians might learn to ask by reading texts in other traditions. He has done some work in philosophy of religion but does not use
LONERGAN AND OTHER RELIGIONS

The discussion of Lonergan’s understanding of world religions and their connection to Christianity moved forward with the recent publication from archival sources of Lonergan’s essay “Philosophy and the Religious Phenomenon” and with the responses to this new text. It clarifies Lonergan’s thinking on several points and gives some further indications of how Lonergan’s method with its functional specialties could also be applied to religious studies. Method in Theology is an exemplification of what Lonergan understood as a generalized empirical method which could also be applied to other fields: psychology, sociology, history, and of course, religious studies.

In this case, Lonergan has done some work in thinking about how his method might be applied to religious studies. The deeper philosophical presuppositions behind this work are constant. The real is to be identified with the intelligible, there is an isomorphism between being and knowing. Economics, history, psychology, and other fields in which knowledge is sought fall under the category of the knowledge of proportionate being. Proportionate being is included within the absolute being of God.

What are some of the points in “Philosophy and the Religious Phenomenon” where the discussion of Method and other writings has been expanded and clarified? First, it becomes clearer that what Lonergan is proposing is a model, a heuristic structure, a paradigm such as could be used in any field. Just as Lonergan was interested in Toynbee’s The Study of History with its use of ideal types as models, here he is interested in models applicable to various world religions and is drawing on a set of characteristics given by Friedrich Heiler. The construction of models is a basic and contested methodological problem as we shall see.

Lonergan’s concept of horizons or the conversions. I do not see that he has dealt with the question of Christian revelation precisely as true and as Trinitarian.


Lonergan fully admits the tentative nature of his project. He is aware that Heiler's work is also tentative and should not be absolutized. He is aware of the problem of privileging religious experience of a transcendent reality – not immediately named as "an experience of God" – since this language is already Christian. Even referring to religious self-transcendence in terms of love can be questioned. It is not clear that Buddhist enlightenment, for example, is simply the equivalent of what Christians would call a mystery of love.5

Lonergan, as we saw, has also brought in other kinds of terminology, for example "ultimate concern" from Paul Tillich. Knowledge born of love seems to include at the level of moral conversion a knowledge of values and disvalues, of good and evil. But this would seem to only push the problem back one step further. Value judgments without being linked to revealed truths of a specific religious tradition are notoriously conflictual. Again, Lonergan wishes to give preference to love over knowledge:

For being in love occurs on the fourth level of waking consciousness and, ordinarily, this fourth level presupposes and complements the previous levels of experiencing, understanding and judging. But what is ordinarily so admits exceptions, and such exception would be what Paul described to the Romans as God's flooding our hearts with his love. Then love would not flow from knowledge but on the contrary knowledge would flow from love. It is this knowledge that results from God's gift of his love that, I suggest, constitutes the universalist faith proposed by Professor Smith.6

The approach of Wilfred Cantwell Smith would hardly go uncontested in the field of religious studies today. As Philip Boo Riley's paper, in the first round of responses to "Philosophy and the Religious

5 Vernon Gregson, 45. An example of Lonergan's reducing all to love is the following: "God in the Gospel is outgoing and forgiving love. Goodness and all-encompassing care make up the characteristic of the Tao of Laotse. The great heart of compassion is the inmost essence of the divine in Mahayana Buddhism" in the article "The Future of Christianity" in William F. J. Ryan and Bernard Tyrrell eds., Second Collection: Papers by Bernard J. F. Lonergan, S.J. (London: Darton, Longman & Todd, 1974), 150.

6 Lonergan, "Faith and Beliefs," unpublished paper section 3. The reference is to a public lecture Jan. 9, 1968 by Professor Wilfred Cantwell Smith at the University of Toronto. For information on this paper, see Fred Crowe, "Lonergan's View of Religion" METHOD: Journal of Lonergan Studies 12 (1994): 147-79 at 151 n. 18.
Phenomenon" indicated, many religion scholars would take a critical
distance from any sort of proposal for a universalist faith.

Scholarly response to Lonergan’s proposal has shown that it is open
to attack from two directions:

From the Catholic side, it is open to the criticism that Christian
religious faith as being in love with God cannot be separated from the
form of revelation itself. This is to say that the God who identifies
himself as Yahweh in the Scriptures and who is finally revealed in Jesus
of Nazareth, the Son of God, presents to us both a particular kind of
religious experience and certain linguistic categories. This would be
a kind of Balthasarian response to Lonergan’s proposal as Bernard
McGinn has seen. It is a rejection of the attempts of Wilfred Cantwell
Smith and Friederich Heiler to say that all religious experiences have the
same characteristics and so are experiences of the same reality which can
be called God.

Lonergan knew that his model would have to be adapted to be
acceptable to Catholics as a model of revelation. My reading of his work
would be that he himself sees the tensions this model is exposed to. In
the still unpublished paper, “Faith and Beliefs,” he says:

It was my hope to sketch a construct, a model, an ideal type
containing a systematic distinction between faith, born of other-
worldly love and possibly common to all genuine religions, and,
on the other hand, the many diverse and often opposed beliefs to
which religious people subscribe.

He continues:

7 See Neil Ormerod’s, Method, Meaning and Revelation: The Meaning and Func-
tion of Revelation in Bernard Lonergan’s Method in Theology (Lanham, MD.: Uni-
versity Press of America, 2000), 236. Ultimately a Christian theology of revelation would
be linked in Lonergan to the procession of the eternal Logos from the Father in terms
of the intelligible emanation of the concept from the act of understanding and to the
procession of the Spirit conceived as the Love which issues from the truth expressed in
the Word. I owe this point to Ormerod, 267-68. I cannot discuss this problem here, but
clearly, as he indicates, this insight takes us way beyond the cultural-linguistic model
of revelation in George Lindbeck, The Nature of Doctrine (Fortress Press, 1984) and
beyond conceptualism and the “method of correlation.” There is much more about in-
carnate meaning in Ormerod than I am able to incorporate here.

8 On this issue see Ormerod, Meaning, Method and Revelation, 205-239, where he
addresses criticisms that Lonergan’s theological method is not Christocentric.

9 “Faith and Beliefs.”
But in concluding I must point out that my model is but a skeleton. To apply it to any particular religion further parts may need to be added. Moreover, because religions can differ in fundamental ways, one must have different sets of parts to add and even one may have to add them in quite different ways.  

Here Lonergan appears to be in difficulty. On a purely formal level he has the part-whole problem. Who is to assure us that different parts added in different ways still form the same whole? How far can this model be adapted before it is not one generic model for all religions but instead a kind of family of related models, one model for each tradition. If each model is different, it is not clear that they are all pointing to the same transcendent reality or indicate the same horizon of religious experience.

Lonergan's uses a two-pronged model. The inner word (the spirit) common to all religions (as love) is balanced and clarified by the outer word (prophecy, sayings of the sages). But this two-directional approach is also liable to attack. Lonergan knows that if he puts too much stress on the "inner word" he will seem to be heading in the unacceptable direction of a modernist position:

My account of religious beliefs does not imply that they are more than objectifications of religious experience. It is a view quite acceptable to a nineteenth century liberal protestant or to the twentieth-century catholic modernist. But it is unacceptable to most of the traditional forms of Christianity, in which religious beliefs are believed to have their origin in charism, prophecy, inspiration, revelation, the word of God, the life, death, and resurrection of Christ.

So Lonergan sees the problem. His skeletal model needs to be fleshed out "in order to be applicable to this traditional type of religious

10 "Faith and Beliefs."

11 Lonergan used this twofold word in "Mission and Spirit" he says Besides fides ex auditu there is fides ex infusione. The former mounts up the successive levels of experiencing, understanding, judging, deliberating. The latter descends from the gift of God's love through religious conversion to moral, and through religious and moral to intellectual conversion. He references Aquinas Sum. Theol., II-II, q.6, a.1. This whole fifth section of the paper should be read to get a balanced picture. See Frederick E. Crowe, ed., A Third Collection: Papers by Bernard J. F. Lonergan, S. J. (New York: Paulist Press, 1985): 31-33.

12 "Faith and Beliefs."
Lonergan then proposes to flesh out the model. The fleshing out will come from the side of an outer word addressing us as love. The love between two people is not complete until it is expressed, even though it may be felt in the hearts of each. “There would not be a steady increase in knowledge of each other.” So also religious love of God needs the same kind of interpersonal element. It must go beyond the gift of God’s love flooding our hearts:

We should not solely believe what results from the objectification of that love. Besides completing our personal self-transcendence in the secrecy of our hearts, God would address his people as his people, announce to them his intentions, send to them his prophets, his Messiah, his apostles (the outer word).

Here it would appear to me that Lonergan is still in danger of slipping into a modernist framework, or at least giving that impression. Is it true, as he says, that the inner word is already completing our personal self-transcendence in the secrecy of our hearts before the outer word comes? If so, the outer word is not really necessary, emphasis will be placed on the invisible universal workings of the Spirit. If it is necessary, then all outer words must be equivalent (Confucian, Buddhist, Hindu). If they are all equivalent then we are back in the modernist camp. Despite Lonergan’s intent, this model seems closer to the kind of position which would ultimately reduce outer words to merely an assortment of phenomenal realities which represent a purportedly common noumenal reality, a kind of Kantian reading.

Secondly, the “inner word” as pure experience is merely sensation or feeling. One can feel a vague attraction to the beauty of the natural world, to the sublime, but does this merit the designation religious experience or religious self-transcendence?

In a way, Lonergan seems to concede that there are problems here, in

13 “Faith and Beliefs.”
14 “Faith and Beliefs.”
15 Fred Crowe’s analysis of Lonergan’s theology of religions places great emphasis on what he says is the neglected role of the spirit really sent in to the world and having “a mission on earth as really distinct as the person of the Spirit is really distinct in the God head.” Thus persons who have never had the opportunity to hear the gospel will be saved and already “belong to God’s family” through the Spirit. Crowe sees the simultaneous presence of many religions, each both faithful and unfaithful to the Spirit, as part of the mystery of the divine economy in history. See Fred Crowe, “Lonergan’s Universalist View of Religion,” METHOD: Journal of Lonergan Studies 12 (1994): 174.
his last paragraph:

To conclude, I suggest, first that there is a construct, model, ideal type grounding a systematic distinction between faith and beliefs but, secondly, to be applied to disparate religious positions, the model had to admit additions and transformations that radically modify perspectives and meaning.  

As I suggested earlier, the model is radically modified the moment that one tries to apply it. So radically, that it would seem to lose its own identity or “wholeness” in the application. Bernard McGinn, while sympathetic to Lonergan’s attempt, has said that “the triumph and the tragedy of foundation methodology” is that “it attains to a universal viewpoint, in the specialty foundations whose persuasiveness is inversely proportional to its concrete applicability.”

Lonergan’s approach to world religions is also open to attack from scholars in religious studies who would disagree with the conclusions drawn by Friedrich Heiler on elements common to all religions. The disagreement is about Heiler’s method, which they would say is not objective or value-free but already implies a series of value judgments. As such, it is open to the charge from the Academy of not being sufficiently “critical.” But the use of the word “critical” itself is problematic. Critical means that in W. C. Smith’s proposal for a universal faith, value judgments are made which run counter to the plausibility structures established by other disciplines, like anthropology, sociology, and psychology. These have their own reigning paradigms which frequently entail a Kantian epistemology as a background theory. As comparative philosophy and comparative theology become more and more prominent in the East-West interchange, the Kantian moment will be relativized as a background theory. Many other ontologies are possible as are other theories of perception, the mind-body relationship and so on.

Another response to the accusation that Heiler’s thinking is not critical enough would be to invoke the resources that some religions use to respond to the anthropologist, the sociologist, or the psychoanalyst. Some religions such as Christianity and Buddhism have the conceptual resources needed to reply to reductionistic attacks. (In Lonergan,

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16 “Faith and Beliefs,” sect. 5.
systematics has this function.\textsuperscript{18}) Religion scholars would then have to decide how to respond to religious traditions characterized by a high degree of reflexivity. A philosopher like Paul Ricoeur can reinterpret Freud’s project, with its various topographies and so find in the dialectic between subject and analyst a way in which God’s fatherhood can be seen not as phantasm but as symbol and so create an opening to transcendence.\textsuperscript{19} Robert Doran challenges the immanentism of Jung the theologian while saving much of Jung the psychologist and holding to the value of dream interpretation as a moment of one’s ongoing search for direction in the movement of life and one’s search for the emotional responsiveness to value which makes that movement energetic.\textsuperscript{20}

A subsidiary question would be, who then, speaks authoritatively for the religion. The ordinary believer, the guru, or the academic? Scholars today are sensitive to any accusation of colonialism or Orientalism. Postmodern thought has made us think of speaking of Hinduisms and Christianities and created a suspicion of meta-categories. I leave the question of authoritative speech for another occasion. Most recently, religion scholars have begun to write not just about but on behalf of religious traditions. They admit to being practitioners of the religions and even of the practices that they write about.\textsuperscript{21} Others however are rigorously skeptical of any advancement of truth claims.

Lastly, in this section, there is the fascinating issue raised by Lonergan about whether a value-neutrality is proper in studying phenomena whose very nature is to lay personal value-laden claims on individuals. If value neutrality is not to be maintained as a methodological stance, then Heiler’s research, which looks for common values in all religions gains legitimacy as does Lonergan’s tentative use of it. If value neutrality must


\textsuperscript{20} Robert Doran, \textit{Theology and Dialectic of History}.

\textsuperscript{21} See the current issue of \textit{JAAR} 68:4 (Dec. 2000) with several articles on the topic “Who speaks for Hinduism?” For example, John J. Thatamanil, “Managing Multiple Religious and Scholarly Identities: An Argument for the Theological Study of Hinduism,” 791-803. One point would be that other religions as religions do not have the same kind of authority structures or institutional mediations as Christianity or certainly Catholicism.
be maintained, then some scholars will indeed describe Heiler’s work as pre-critical; “linked to an earlier period in the history of religious studies where academy and seminary were confused”. These scholars want to separate a belief system as a kind of language from the claim that these beliefs are true, that is from religious faith.

But the question is whether “value-neutrality” is even possible. Putative neutrality may really be a form of enlightenment rationality containing many unstated assumptions about the world. Neutrality then becomes an implied religion of the empirical, one should theorize “as if” there were a God to which these texts refer.

A third position different from both Lonergan and the “critical thinkers” of the Academy would be to hold that each religion has its own axiology and axiological criteria which can be employed only by those who have been converted to that particular world of thought, valuation, and feeling. Outsiders are incapable of correct value judgments because each value system is *sui generis*. Aurobindo’s complex metaphysical system is a response to certain mystical experiences he had which are qualitatively different from the kind of religious experience described in classic Advaita Vedanta which is a competing view. These experiences, together with the explanatory system which organizes them into a whole cosmology, represent a more positive evaluation of the evolving character of the material and biological world than Sankara’s. Aurobindo has a different cosmology and a different axiology. An Indian Buddhist understanding of the meaning of consciousness and religious experience would see both Aurobindo’s supermental consciousness and Sankara’s Advaita Vedanta as filled with mental constructs that have to be broken down to achieve enlightenment. This would represent a third axiological system which is very difficult to relate to the first two.

22 In Kessler, op. cit., both Gavin D’Costa 561-573 and Purusottama Bilimoria 573-592 take positions of this kind on the incommensurability of religious philosophies.

23 See Paul J. Griffiths, “Pure Consciousness in Indian Buddhism,” in Robert K. C. Forman, *The Problem of Pure Consciousness: Mysticism and Philosophy* (New York: Oxford University Press, 1990), 71-97, which contains an extensive bibliography. From Griffith’s Buddhist viewpoint, mental events have both phenomenological attributes and context without having a subject-object structure. Instead they are best described as having an event-attribute-context structure. Thus the sentence “Amy sees the black cat” should be rendered “there occurs in the mental continuum conventionally labeled ‘Amy’ a mental event whose attribute is a visual presentation and whose content is a black cat.” The removal of all constructive operations of the mind is one of the primary
Aurobindo, Sankara, and Buddhist systems have in common is that all of them appeal to some kind of “religious experience” which is different from the empirical consciousness by which one performs the tasks of ordinary living. We can call this a moment of conversion, enlightenment, non-duality, or whatever but it is clear that this is a privileged experience. Often one would seek to repeat this experience later in life or at least recall it from memory.

It appears to me that Lonergan’s Method in Theology when taken as a model for method in religious studies as Lonergan clearly intends ends up being a method in the Christian study of world religions which will not gain the adherence of specialists in other religions because its value judgments still inevitably drift into the Christian categories of sin, grace, redemption, and so on.

In other words, “being authentic,” to use the most general language possible, still seems to mean being authentic or being religiously converted as it is seen from the Christian point of view. Lonergan thinks he has gotten around this by appealing to a wordless experience of the Transcendent common to all religions – a withdrawal from the world mediated by language – but I would argue that this puts him back in the modernist camp. There is a danger of denying traditional Christianity which privileges the uniqueness and finality of the incarnation as it imparts a direction to human history. The danger is that we create an ersatz Religion of Ultimate Reality as mother of all religions, theistic and nontheistic. The work of John Hick has at times gone in this direction.

The inner word without the outer word, is not merely incomplete, it is virtually meaningless, in my view. Calling it an “inner word” risks equivocation. Is one hearing a “word” or merely experiencing a vague feeling of love or attraction of some kind? How is this attraction different from a sensual experience of nature, or of beauty, or of the erotic? Lonergan is aware of this problem but has not resolved it in my estimation. Despite Lonergan’s fascination with the “realization of the Buddha,” can Buddhist enlightenment really be summed up under Lonergan’s category of an authentic experience of religious conversion?

I have chosen as an experiment the theology or religious philosophy goals of Indian Yogacara Buddhism (87) and is understood as a path to salvation.

24 For a critical response to Hick see Jacques Dupuis, Towards a Theology of Religious Pluralism (Maryknoll, NY: Orbis, 1997). Dupuis’s solution, however, has its own problems and has been criticized by the Vatican. I hope to address these in a forthcoming paper.
of Sri Aurobindo as a test case for Lonergan’s proposed philosophy of religion. It is the metaphysical system with which I am most familiar and also one which has an interesting level of philosophical sophistication.

Turning to Aurobindo, the goal of religious conversion is to realize our unity with the Divine, with Brahman. This goal is achieved by an increasing mystical awareness of the oneness of all things including inanimate objects, living beings, and human beings. Achieving an intuition of this unity is possible because of the psychic entity within each person. This psychic entity provides a direct contact with the supermental consciousness which is guiding the universe. It is analogous to the agent intellect in medieval Christian epistemologies.

Ordinary analytical thinking uses only what Aurobindo calls surface mind. Surface mind according to Aurobindo is deficient because by its very nature it cuts reality into pieces which can be analyzed. It cannot grasp the whole only the part. Here Aurobindo was influenced in some of his constructions by the Neo-Hegelianism of F. H. Bradley.

Aurobindo understands ordinary consciousness as a bundle of disorganized ideas and appetites which must be brought into harmony with the Divine reality of Being Consciousness and Bliss. One’s thinking should reflect the oneness of all creatures in the Divine. We are all extensions of the one divine being as it manifests itself in space and time. Each person’s mind and body in put a temporary organization of that Divine reality and in death will dissolve back into it. The only more permanent entity is the psychic entity within a prolongation of the divine bliss-consciousness which has temporarily descended into the manifestation, the earthly plane of existence and will reascend again at our death.

In Aurobindo’s yoga system it is possible to pass through higher and higher levels of intuitive vision of the divine as well as increasing emotional identification with the divine bliss. One’s intellect sees the unity and harmony of all of creation and one’s heart feels the joy of

26 The Life Divine, 126-27.
27 See my Knowledge, Consciousness, and Religious Conversion in Sri Aurobindo and Bernard Lonergan (Gregorian University Press, forthcoming). The point of discussion between Bradley and Lonergan would be over the problem of what Lonergan refers to as “internal relations.”
cooperating with what the divine is doing through oneself and in oneself.28

There are degrees of “illumination”: higher mind, Illumined mind, Intuitive mind, Overmind, and Supermind. At times a personal deity may be chosen as a focus for meditation... but at other times one simply experiences a vision of the insubstantial, fluid nature of all ordinary realities. As an example of this consciousness, we can read one description of what the proficient practitioner of the yoga is experiencing:

The Yogin is able to feel his body one with all bodies, to be aware of and even participate in their affections, he can constantly feel the unity of all matter and be aware of his physical being only as a movement of its movement. Still more is it possible for him to feel constantly the whole sea of infinite life as his true vital existence and his own life as only a wave of that boundless surge. And more easily yet is it possible for him to unite himself in mind and heart with all existences, be aware of their desires, struggles, joys, sorrows, thoughts, impulses, in a sense as if they were his own. At least as occurring in his larger self hardly less intimately or quite as ultimately as the movements of his own heart and mind.... Even our bodies are not separate entities.29

It is difficult for us to think in terms of this kind of philosophical monism. Ordinary we operate from a metaphysics of substance in which we see our own bodies as ontologically separate from those of others and as exclusively material as opposed to spiritual.30 Instead in Aurobindo’s

28 This would seem to imply what Lonergan and Catholic tradition would call ontologism, seeing the divine with human eyes and mind, but this question would need more discussion.

29 Synthesis of the Yoga, 398.

30 We are still very Newtonian in the way in which we separate bodies, matter, and energy. Perhaps the dramatic subject in Lonergan could be thought of as a kind of energy-field since so much of our emotional energy radiates out to others, for good or ill. We are our emotions and nervous energy not merely our minds. Bob Doran’s work on Jung touches on this point frequently. Any one who has ever worked with the mentally ill knows the kind of nonverbal transference of energy one gets caught in. Lonergan’s references to psychic contagion as phenomenon could be explored and deepened. Consider this passage in David Burrell which captures the problem of self as relation and self as spirit. Touching on Kierkegaard’s concept of the self (Sickness unto Death) and on the model of subsistent relations in the Trinity, he says, “For relation remains the most elusive of Aristotle’s categories, not properly and accident for its being is not in but ad; which is to say that it does not exist in another so much as “between” the relata. Medieval to be sure tried to minimize the ontological scandal by focussing on the qualities of the subjects so related, so finding accidental correlates for particular
system, matter, the vital, mind, overmind, supermind, and the Divine are ascending degrees of the same substance and the same energy.\textsuperscript{31}

For Aurobindo, there is a divine consciousness present is all things including matter. This divine consciousness emerges fully only in the human being in which by virtue of a kind of illumination from above and from the psychic entity within, the mind of the individual person is effectively taken up into the divine mind. The individual purusha plunges back into the cosmic purusha. Here Aurobindo draws on some of the language of Samkhya, a classic philosophical system which influenced the yoga.\textsuperscript{32}

At the same time, as one calls down the light of intuition and energy from above one is subject to the impact of the energy of other beings provoking pleasure and pain. Emotional stability comes with relying more and more on intuitions of the divine and resisting the impact of these other forces. Aurobindo hopes that some day there will be a race of gnostic beings who will all share the highest level of supermental consciousness in what amounts to a kind of mystical version of Lonergan’s cosmopolis. But here one sees the oneness of all philosophies and political systems rather than painfully constructing it as an ontology of meaning built on the fragile base of cultural systems. Even here Lonerganians fascinated by the constructive aspects of generalized empirical method realize that without grace no one can respond to the just and mysterious law of the cross and help to undo the effects of decline. And so Lonergan too, in a

\textsuperscript{31} See \textit{The Life Divine}, 262-70.
\textsuperscript{32} For consciousness in the classical Yoga, see Christopher Chapple, “the Unseen Seer and the Field: Consciousness in Samkya and Yoga” in Robert K. C. Forman , op. cit. 53-70. In the literal sense the descriptions of samadhi in the yoga and kaivalyam in the Samkhya ultimately allow for the substantial existence of neither the objective sensorial world nor a locus of self-reference. In this place beyond words, there is no content to speak of, no consciousness that stands apart, no seer to be seen but only pure seeing.
kind of spare Anglo-Saxon way, is also a mystic.

Interestingly, Aurobindo says with most of Hinduism that there are three ways of salvation: the yoga of integral knowledge, the yoga of divine works, and the yoga of divine love. It is not necessary to understand his metaphysics and epistemology to be transformed any more than you have to understand substantial form, the procession of the Logos, subsistent relations in the Trinity, internal relations in metaphysics, or emergent probability in epistemology to be a Christian.

Key doctrines which shape Christianity are hard to reconcile with Aurobindo’s system. Among these are creation *ex nihilo*, eschatology rather than cosmic cycles, the incarnation as unique event, and the immortality and uniqueness of the individual soul. There are also problems with Aurobindo’s account of the freedom of the will, problems he never solved.

Still in his own way, like much of Neo-Vedanta, Aurobindo is open to the person of Christ as a manifestation of the Absolute along with Krishna, and others. He is less open to traditional Christianity which he saw as often anti-mystical and moralizing.

Catholic Christianity has wanted to maintain that non-believers can be saved if they act in accordance with the dictates of their consciences. This generally pertains to those who have not been exposed to the Christian message. The case of those who have been exposed to it, like Aurobindo in his youth, seems different....It may be clearer from the brief synopsis I have presented that Aurobindo’s version of the Absolute or the Divine is very different from the traditional belief in the Christian God.

**ADDENDUM**

The following passage may convey some of the flavor of Aurobindo’s language in the 1000 pages of his principle work *The Life Divine*.

The Divine using its Consciousness-Force creates and maintains forms of itself at all levels of reality. The human mind can only concentrate on one limited field of time and space. Gradually, it can open itself to the higher

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levels of reality. The purpose of the birth of the soul in the human is to struggle towards the joy of discovery of its true nature in the divine. This passage describes the Divine creating, seeing, and maintaining forms of itself on all levels of its being from the Highest to its willed self-oblivion in matter. It is a kind of view from the most divine level downwards.\(^\text{34}\)

In the infinity of being and its infinite awareness concentration of consciousness, Tapas, is always present as an inherent power of Consciousness-Force: it is self-held or self-gathered dwelling of the eternal awareness in itself and on its self or on its object; but the object is always in some way itself, its own being or a manifestation and movement of its being. The concentration may be essential; it may be even a sole indwelling or an entire absorption in the essence of its own being, a luminous or else a self-oblivious self-immersion. Or it may be an integral or else a total-multiple or a part-multiple concentration. Or it may be a single separative regard on one field of its being or movement, a single-pointed concentration in one center or an absorption in one objective form of its self-existence. The first, the essential, is at one end in the superconscient Silence and at the other end the inconscience; the second, the integral, is the total consciousness of Sachchidananda, the supermental concentration; the third, the multiple, is the method of the totalizing or global overmental awareness; the fourth, the separative, is the characteristic nature of the Ignorance. The supreme integrality of the Absolute holds all these states or powers of its consciousness together as a single indivisible being looking at all itself in manifestation with a simultaneous self vision.

\(^{34}\) See the *Life Divine*, 591.
BERNARD LONERGAN HAS argued that the key to philosophy is the process of inquiry, its structure, and its norms. He has developed a worldview of emergent world process. His philosophical theology, relying heavily on his subtle and original interpretation of Aquinas, has inspired David Burrell to argue that Aquinas does not fit neatly into the category of a classical theism that effectively divorces God from presence in the world.¹ Lonergan’s own emphasis on process, then, might naturally raise questions about his relation to such process philosophers as Alfred North Whitehead and Charles Hartshorne. Indeed both Lonergan and process thinkers espouse a metaphysics and adopt a theist standpoint. They both appeal in a fundamental way to subjectivity. They both adopt a critical realist stance. And yet their respective starting points, methods, and conclusions seem to differ in important respects. A dialogue between the two philosophical approaches, if it could get beyond slogans, as Burrell recommends, would seem to be a most fruitful one, as they both offer substantive alternatives to the dominant views of the contemporary climate of opinion.²

This paper originally compared Lonergan with Hartshorne, as one

² Please see endnotes for all following references.
of the key advocates of process philosophy. The investigation, however, discovered some significant affinities between Lonergan and Whitehead on the philosophy of God that were more pronounced than those between Lonergan and Hartshorne.\textsuperscript{3} Hence the general title of this paper concerns the relation between Lonergan and process thinkers, although, in order to keep the scope of the paper within manageable bounds, the focus still remains on Lonergan and Hartshorne. As the subtitle indicates, the paper makes no pretense of a detailed analysis of the subject matter, which would require at least a monograph. It seeks to cover enough terrain to establish that a dialogue between Lonergan and process thinkers is not only a plausible one but a worthy one in the current world of philosophical inquiry.

1. INTRODUCTION

Since the paper will consider primarily the connection between Lonergan and Hartshorne, let us introduce the topic by outlining in broad strokes those points of similarity and divergence between the two thinkers that best suggest the opportunity for further exploration.

1.1 Similarities

Hartshorne and Lonergan are strikingly similar in terms of a typology of intellectual personalities. Both thinkers articulate their views in a comprehensive, careful, and ongoing manner. They demonstrate in their own writings the openness of inquiry. They are both wide-ranging, comprehensive, interdisciplinary thinkers. They are both polymaths, familiar with the major fields of learning. More specifically, they are both exercised by one or more of the exact sciences and are both pointedly concerned with issues of methodology. At the same time, they are seeking an integrated rational theological vision. Hartshorne has extensive publications in theology, metaphysics, epistemology, logic, and psychology, among other disciplines. He has had a special affection for the study of birds. Lonergan, who pursued majors in mathematics and classics in college, while admitting he was not an “expert” in all the fields of inquiry he discussed, nevertheless has dealt extensively with such prominent methods of inquiry as the scientific (including detailed
treatment of relativity and quantum mechanics), the mathematical, the common-sensical, and the artistic.\textsuperscript{4} He has devoted special attention to political economy and macrodynamic economics.\textsuperscript{5}

Both philosophers accept the viability and necessity of metaphysics. Hartshorne agrees with Whitehead that contemporary philosophy must abandon the narrow empiricist interpretation of experience that has liquidated metaphysics and the Kantian approach to objects as merely phenomenal determinants by the categories of the intellect. Hartshorne would posit, as a critical realist, a real relation between the knower and other entities. Lonergan argues that philosophy can thematize the latent metaphysics operative in all genuine human inquiry.\textsuperscript{6} This explicit metaphysics will be isomorphic with the dynamic structure of inquiry. Accepting the viability of metaphysics, both Lonergan and Hartshorne carry on a dialogue with the metaphysical tradition but attempt to purge it of traces of antiquated science, replacing a static worldview with one of emergent world process.

The metaphysics of both thinkers embraces theism. Hartshorne's "neo-classical theism" claims that the theistic position is the only one, in its cumulative case, than can, at once, affirm and make sense of the intelligibility of reality. Lonergan maintains that any sound metaphysics must be theistic, for that is the only position consistent with the intrinsic intelligibility of being and commitment to the process of inquiry always brings with it an implicit affirmation precisely of the intrinsic intelligibility of being.\textsuperscript{7}

Finally, both Hartshorne and Lonergan adopt a "subjectivist principle" as the basis of their philosophizing. Hartshorne would ground philosophy on real experience, which goes much "deeper" than sense experience. Indeed Hartshorne, agreeing with Whitehead, regards the modern epistemological model of a subject confronting an object as an abstraction, in the pejorative sense of the term, from the dynamic process of experiencing. Lonergan posits the "subject as subject"—the conscious subject as performing cognitive and moral operations—as the foundation of epistemology and metaphysics.\textsuperscript{8} The "subject as subject" is not a given, as is, for example, sense data but is the function of the performance of the subject as engaged in the process of cognitive, moral, and spiritual inquiry within an historically constituted horizon.
1.2 Philosophical Significance of a Lonergan-Process Philosophy Dialogue

Both Hartshorne and Lonergan run against the contemporary skeptical tide. Continental philosophy, in the form of existential phenomenology, essentially has worked within the horizon of Kant’s Second Critique and, employing Kantian or Cartesian assumptions about objectivity, which it sees as fundamentally mutilating subjectivity, has looked askance at cosmology, metaphysics, and theology. Insofar as Anglo-American philosophy has been under the sway of empiricism and logical positivism, it has advocated metaphysical skepticism and tended to view theological language as meaningless. At the same time, the analytic philosophy of language has threatened to turn into a subtle version of linguistic historicism. If Continental philosophy has tended towards subjectivism and Anglo-American philosophy towards objectivism, deconstructionism has declared war on both parties by attacking the existence of both subject and object. Philosophy has been left in the wake of this assault begging for an alternative to the modern assumption of a subject-object bifurcation. Hartshorne and Lonergan offer an alternative that can resuscitate the enterprise of metaphysics while still addressing modern concerns.

Although Hartshorne and Lonergan both are critical realists, have a metaphysics, emphasize world process, hold to the centrality of theism, and work from a subjectivist principle, neither their starting points, nor their methods, nor their conclusions are identical.

Hartshorne started out as an expert on Pierce, absorbed Whitehead, broke from classical theism (e.g., that of Aquinas), and employed a great deal of logical analysis. Lonergan, on the other hand, working out of a nominalist starting point reached up to the mind of Aquinas, whom he discovered to be a critical realist (and perhaps not quite the classical theist that he was for Hartshorne). Lonergan then applied this critical realist position to a host of contemporary philosophical issues, addressing problems in epistemology, the import of modern scientific method, the concerns of existentialism, and the historical dimension of human existence.

Hartshorne’s method has been a judicious combination of the metaphysical, logical, and phenomenological. He has formulated arguments about epistemology typically in a metaphysical context.
Lonergan has moved from a phenomenology of cognition (dealing with the subject as subject) to cognitional theory (subject as object) to metaphysics (object as object). His highly systematic approach, his careful definition of terms, and his rigor in arguments belies the fact that he is not presenting a system but rather exercises in "self-appropriation."

Some of the literature comparing Lonergan and Hartshorne has highlighted their different conclusions. Shubert Ogden, writing from the perspective of Whitehead's (and Hartshorne's) subjectivist principle, has criticized Lonergan for his alleged limitation of consciousness to intellectual activity, for treating consciousness as a given, for overemphasizing and overvaluing the intellectual over the affective, for retaining the arcane notion of substance in the face of the dynamism of subjectivity, and for uncritically jumping from his cognitional theory and metaphysics to his apparent classical theism. Michael Vertin, writing from the perspective of Lonergan's subjectivist principle, has criticized Hartshorne for an implicit theory of a truncated subject that confronts reality as already out there now (i.e., in extroverted space and time), for a metaphysics based on that implicit cognitional theory, identifying the real with an essential relation to the spatio-temporal continuum, and for a theology that requires that God conform to the strictures of the aforesaid metaphysics. We need not agree entirely with either Ogden or Vertin to be able to discern that, common ground notwithstanding, Hartshorne and Lonergan are also operating at times in very different territory.

Given the thorough, nuanced, and penetrating manner in which both Hartshorne and Lonergan develop their philosophical alternatives to the anti-metaphysical, anti-theist, skeptical, and relativist trends of the contemporary climate of opinion, their philosophies, we judge, deserve a fair hearing. And given their differences in starting point, method, and conclusions, a dialogue between their philosophical positions would seem to be warranted. Such a dialogue would explore the rich possibilities of critical realism as a philosophy that simultaneously embraces world process, human development, and theism.

1.3 Dialogue over Dialectic

The question remains: What should be the nature of the discussion?
The answer, we think, is clear. To use Lonergan's terms: dialogue over dialectic. That is, we must make the effort, first, to understand the respective thinkers as fairly as possible, overcoming any woodenheaded or text-proof reading that could easily support facile criticism; second, based upon that understanding, to explore how far each thinker might be compatible with the other over a range of crucial topics; and, third, to assess how each thinker would challenge, in a positive fashion, the ideas of the other. Only when we have accomplished this task, we would suggest, would it be most beneficial for us to engage in dialectical criticism. That prior task is our aim in this paper. It has precedence, for example, in John Robertson's attempt to absolve Lonergan of charges by process thinkers of holding too narrow an account of experience and too traditional a concept of substance. Accordingly, we shall focus on the extent to which Hartshorne's (and, to a lesser extent, Whitehead's) and Lonergan's ideas converge regarding world process (including the process of human existence), methodological strategy, and divine reality. We shall, then, be able to consider how a Lonergan-Process Philosophy dialogue will be a mutually enriching challenge of each perspective.

2. WORLD PROCESS

2.1 Hartshorne's Theory of The Natural Universe

Hartshorne, as Whitehead, breaks completely from the Cartesian model of the universe as the res extensa and from the Kantian model of the universe as a mechanism composed of phenomenal objects. He would consign the relevance of the Aristotelian idea of substance and accidents largely to the sphere of common sense. By contrast, bearing some resemblance to Hartshorne's theory of the natural universe is Leibniz's notion of a dynamic universe of developing agents, differentiated along a continuum of apperception. Hartshorne, however, would divorce himself from Leibniz's conceptualism and from the concept of "windowless" monadic agents. In Hartshorne's theory, then, the universe does not consists of static, given substances but rather of subjects along a continuum of increasing organization and awareness. A real entity exhibits creativity and, indeed, historicity, for an entity constitutes itself under the
influence of antecedent events that it “prehends” and in its own synthesis of what it prehends. Creativity, however, has distinct criteria, for as the creative process by its very dynamism breaks from monotony, so it also by its very intelligibility avoids a multiplicity that would head toward chaos, rendering cosmic process a surd. This negotiation of monotony and chaos means, for Hartshorne, that the criteria of creativity reflect the presence of aesthetic value in world process. Actual entities, moreover, form a community, a complex network of relations integral with the historicity and creativity of the individual entities. And the history of the universe witnesses the emergence of more complex entities and more complex communities of entities. Creativity, historicity, aesthetic value, emergence – these are among the watchwords in Hartshorne’s concept of a dynamic world process.

2.2 Lonergan’s Worldview of Emergent Probability

Lonergan’s worldview of emergent probability has striking parallels with Hartshorne’s theory of the natural universe. The most obvious parallel, and one noted by commentators, is with respect to the general structure of world process. If we examine, however, Lonergan’s explanatory notion of a thing and Lonergan’s notion of finality, we shall discover other surprisingly significant correspondences.

The universe, in Lonergan’s view, is a directed dynamism in which the effectively probable realization of its own possibilities means the emergence of new forms and new realities. The directedness of the process is the emergence of more complex realities. This involves a transformation of universal explanatory patterns immanent in the data, or “conjugate forms.” In Lonergan’s universe, one set of conjugate forms can give place to another. The result: the emergence of new forms. This is in complete contrast, for example, to Aristotle’s idea of a fixed order of nature grounded ultimately on the eternal cyclic recurrence of celestial motion.

Lonergan argues for a universe that is not only emergent but emergent according to probability schedules. The intelligible principles of natural processes are most often “schemes of recurrence,” where, in a given series of events, “the fulfilment of the conditions of each would be the occurrence of the others” – as for example, the planetary system, the nitrogen cycle, and the routines of animal life. Lonergan, however, can also find an intelligibility by abstracting from nonsystematic processes
and discerning the ideal frequency from which actual, relative frequencies do not diverge systematically. We can muster the proper scientific apparatus to investigate a universe whose immanent intelligibility is one of emergent probability if we combine the intelligibility of statistical laws to the notion of a conditioned series of schemes of recurrence. When the emergence of an actual order at one level (e.g., the organic) is the precondition, that is, potency, for the emergence of a higher level order (e.g., the psychic) and when the latter is the precondition for a still higher order (e.g., the intellectual), we have a conditioned series of schemes of recurrence. And, given sufficient numbers and time, the higher orders will be likely to emerge. The actualization of one set of potential natural forms can become the potency for the emergence of new, higher natural forms. What on one level is merely a random manifold of events can on another, higher level be an actually functioning formal pattern of events. In other words, an emergent higher integration systematizes what was merely coincidental on a lower order. Moreover, such a dynamic integration systematizes by adding and modifying until the old integration is eliminated and, by the principle of emergence, a new integration is introduced. Emergent probability is thus "the successive realization, in accord with successive schedules of probabilities, of a conditioned series of ever more complex schemes of recurrence."  

2.3 Lonergan’s Notion of Thing

This generic resemblance to Hartshorne’s theory of the natural universe becomes more specific when we consider Lonergan’s notion of a “thing.” We can grasp what Lonergan means by a thing only if we are careful not to commit something like Lonergan’s version of the “fallacy of misplaced concreteness.” Lonergan follows Aristotle in stressing the decisive role images play in getting insights. But there are two uses of images: the heuristic function and the representative function. When we confuse the two functions and misplace the heuristic function – the proper function in the process of understanding – by substituting the representative function, then we demand that the intelligible be the imaginable. We might also be inclined to regard abstractions as always “impoverished replicas” of what must be concretely imaginable reality. In such a case, we are dealing with “bodies,” not things. Bodies are imaginative substances that we confront “already-out-there-now-real” – whether the Cartesian res extensa, the Kantian phenomenal objects, or
the positivist facts.21 By contrast, a “thing” is a “unity, identity, whole, grasped in data as individual.”22 Lonergan refrains from employing the term “substance,” with its Lockean overtones, and instead speaks of a thing in terms of its central form, which is the concrete intelligibility of the unity, identity, whole.23 The concrete intelligibility embraces all the conjugate forms of the thing, all the intelligible relations to other things. As a critical realist, Lonergan argues that conjugate forms are not strictly the relations of things to the knower, particularly through some imaginative projection. This would be a descriptive relation. Rather, conjugate forms are explanatory relations, and thus they are the knower’s grasp of the relations of things to each other.24 The important point here is that, for Lonergan, things in their concrete intelligibility – and reality – are inherently related to other things. He affirms things as both unity, identity, wholes and as intrinsically related to other things. Furthermore, to underscore the intelligible nature of these relations, Lonergan is fully conversant with Einstein’s theory of General Relativity. Things are not billiard ball masses but dynamic processes operating in distinct fields of energy, whose mass is a function of spatio-temporal relations. Energy is a notion reached not by differentiating and abstracting but by integrating. It is a universal principle of limitation ground in prime potency. Mass is a conjugate form implicitly defined by laws that relate masses to one another. Mass, in short, is not the hard stuff of a “body.”25

2.4 Lonergan’s Notion of Finality: The Relatedness of Things

When we turn to Lonergan’s notion of “finality,” we find the strong possibility of another, startling connection to Hartshorne. Finality, for Lonergan, is the upwardly but indeterminately directed dynamism of emergent world process towards ever fuller realization of being. It is the effectively probable achievement of possibilities of ever higher integrations. It may have an ulterior teleological complexion, but in itself it is physis not telos. It is important to note that Lonergan’s notion of finality is not, any more than is Aristotle’s idea of physis, an imaginative and anthropomorphic projection on nature. It is simply the real directed dynamism of the universe in accord with its proper intelligibility of emergent process, classical laws, and statistical laws.26

When Lonergan applies the notion of finality to the relation of different explanatory genera (i.e., kinds of things with distinct levels of integration), he implies that there is a continuous gradation and relatedness
among the things in the emergent universe.\textsuperscript{27} This “continuum” (in the commonsense meaning of the term, not the technical, mathematical sense employed by both Lonergan and Hartshorne) ranges from the subatomic, to the chemical, to the organic, to the psychic, to the intelligent.\textsuperscript{28} Each explanatory genus is a higher organization of what is merely coincidental on a lower manifold of events. The lower manifold conditions but does not determine the higher integration, as potency conditions but does not determine form. Finality, as we have seen, brings to the relation of successive explanatory genera the aspect of directedness. Thus in discussing the relation of organic, psychic, and intelligent levels of integration in human beings, Lonergan can claim that the unconscious neural basis neither means nor wishes in the proper senses of those terms, for both meaning and wishing are conscious activities. But the unconscious neural basis is an upwardly directed dynamism seeking fuller realization, first, on the proximate sensitive level, and, secondly, beyond its limitations, on higher artistic, dramatic, philosophic, cultural, and religious levels. Hence it is that insights into dream symbols and associated images and affects reveals to the psychologist a grasp of the anticipations and virtualities of higher activities immanent in the underlying unconscious manifold.\textsuperscript{29}

While Lonergan clearly wants to avoid projecting such conscious operations as understanding, judging, and deciding onto neural activities, he surely is suggesting a continuity and gradation when he speaks of neural activities as “seeking fuller realization” on the higher sensitive and intelligent levels and when he submits that “immanent in the underlying unconscious manifold” of events are the “anticipations and virtualities of higher activities.” And if there is such a “continuum” among the successive manifolds of a human being – a unity, identity, whole whose concrete intelligibility includes organic, psychic, and intelligent conjugate forms – then would not as thing whose highest level of integration was the psychic level of organization, a cat, for example, have sensitive activities that would be “anticipations and virtualities” of intelligent living? Furthermore, would not a thing whose highest level of integration was the organic level of organization, a plant, for example, have vegetative routines that would be “anticipations and virtualities” of both sensitive living and of intelligent living? Finally, we must ask, if the directed dynamism of finality links the organic, psychic, and intelligent levels of integration, would it not also link the subatomic and chemical
levels to the rest? The import of these remarks of Lonergan together with his overall concept of finality and the general tenor of his concept of emergent probability all point unmistakably to affirmative answers. It is quite true that the nervous system of a cat will not have the same potential as that of a human being for "higher activities" and still less will the cellular structure of a plant have the same potential, precisely because the underlying manifolds of more complex things with more complex levels of integration are organized in more complex ways. The principle of finality, however, would suggest that the "continuum" holds in these cases, even though the potentiality for "higher activities" will be more in the nervous system of a human than in the nervous system of a cat let alone in the cellular structure of a plant. Still, if the potential for "higher activities" is there in a human nervous system, then it is there as well, in some fashion, in the nervous system of a cat and in the cellular structure of a plant. The continuous gradation seems to be illustrated in the increasing freedom that corresponds to increasing immanent intelligibility or constitutive design or organizing complexity. While atoms have their atomic weight explained by underlying subatomic entities, chemicals, as aggregates of aggregates, in their multiplicity have a degree of freedom from subatomic limitations. Multicellular plants have a further degree of freedom since they are not controlled by the manifolds they systematize. Rather, they are aggregates that exert an immanently directed control over aggregates of aggregates of aggregates. A multicellular structure, according to Lonergan, is "dominated by an idea that unfolds in the process of growth." Both plant and animal species systematically systematize aggregates. Plant and animal species are solutions to problems of living, where living is a "higher systematization of a controlled aggregation" of sets of aggregates. With animals, organic growth is subordinated to the still "higher idea of conscious stimulus and conscious response," which grounds a corresponding increase in operational freedom. An explanatory classification of animals thus should be based on psychic differences. Human beings expand the possibilities of freedom by systematizing psychic contents. Human inquiry, insight, reflection, judgment, deliberation, and choice play with images to grasp intelligibility, chart courses of action, and decide. We should keep in mind that the set of aggregates to be systemized by any given level of organization along the spectrum is not a "body" but a functioning scheme of recurrence, and that the higher the level of organization the
more elaborate the conditioned series of schemes of recurrence.

We should not misconstrue Lonergan’s language when he defines “spirit” as pertaining to things that are both intelligible and intelligent and defines “matter” as pertaining to things that are simply intelligible. There is no Cartesian dualism here, for the distinction of spirit and matter does not abrogate the dynamic relation among kinds of things along a “continuum,” including a “continuum” of freedom. If a critic were to rejoinder that the metaphor of a “continuum” (in the commonsense meaning of the term) is inappropriate, at least in a strong sense, because the idea of higher organization itself entails qualitative distinctions, we could point out that the qualitatively distinct organizations form a succession of higher integrations along a spectrum of emergence, where probability schedules work with respect to conditioned series of schemes of recurrence. More importantly, Hartshorne, too, we should recall, talks of the emergence of higher complexity. Hence the extent to which the term “continuum” is applicable to things in Lonergan’s worldview would also seem to be the extent to which the term would be applicable to entities in Hartshorne’s theory of the natural universe.

2.5 Integrators and Operators: A Hint of Cosmic Historicity and Aesthetic Value

Notwithstanding the aforesaid correspondences between Lonergan’s idea of world process and that of Hartshorne, there may be no obvious analogue in Lonergan’s worldview of emergent probability to Hartshorne’s emphasis on the creativity and historicity of entities. Nevertheless, we can find traces of the idea of historicity in Lonergan’s discussion of certain aspects of cosmic process, particularly those relating to emergence. And, although Lonergan never explicitly mentions aesthetic criteria as associated with cosmic process, here, too, we can find elements of what Hartshorne means by aesthetic value in Lonergan’s treatment of the tensions of emergence.

In his discussion of organic development, Lonergan introduces two principles from mathematics that reflect the hallmark of all development, the tension of limitation and transcendence. The tension of limitation and transcendence is inherent in the finality of all cosmic being, for the upwardly directed dynamism of world process is precisely a change in law and schemes of recurrence. To effect such change two principles must come into play: one that organizes sets of lower manifolds and schemes
of recurrence so that they, the parts, function as a whole, the other that moves organization toward a limit where the generic, rudimentary, and undifferentiated become specific, effective, and differentiated and the problems of instability and incompleteness are addressed in a flexible series of advances. Employing terms, by analogy, from mathematics, Lonergan calls these two principles, respectively, the integrator and the operator. These principles are internal principles; they are not forces operating from outside in some mechanistic and determinist fashion. And there is at least a quasi-temporal dimension to these principles. The integrator works with respect to the past since it exploits the possibilities provided by a conditioned series of schemes of recurrence. The operator works with respect to the future insofar as it heads for the emergence of new schemes. Although Lonergan introduces the principles of the integrator and the operator in his discussion of organic developing, they clearly are present in animal development and human development. Indeed, it is because the tension of limitation and transcendence is the hallmark of human development that dread is the existential mood accompanying the possibility of human freedom. Equally, the principles would seem to be at work on the levels of chemical organization and of atomic organization. It is even possible, in light of contemporary physics, that such subatomic particles as electrons and protons integrate and operate with respect to the aggregates of quarks or strings.

But if the scheme of historicity implied in the principles of the integrator and the operator applies to the emergence of new kinds of things, which is the subject matter of Lonergan’s analysis discussed above, do they apply equally to the activities of concrete things, for, after all, things do not usually transform themselves into new things? A notable exception would surely be individual human beings, each one of whom can integrate sensible presentations and images and operate on them to create a world mediated by meaning and values. Still, there are reasons to think that the model of integrator and operator can fit, at least in a limited way, the dynamic process of individual things.

In the first place, explanatory genera and species do not exist by themselves in some noetic heaven. Individual things exist, though neither as “bodies” nor as windowless monads. Individual things, and individual things alone, each participate, no matter how incrementally, in the integration of lower manifolds and operation to new levels of organization. Individual things, then, participate in the history of
cosmic process. Or put another way, if historicity is a real component or dimension of world process, then historicity must be really manifest in the activities of real things.

In the second place, as we have seen above, world process is not a mechanistic process, where external forces determine the activities of things. When, for example, schemes of recurrence take place according to the laws of a conjugate form, the laws function only if certain conditions obtain and other conditions are absent. Each one of the positive conditions, in turn, has positive conditions that must be present for its functioning and negative conditions that must be absent. Each of the negative conditions has a set of positive conditions that must be met and a set of negative conditions that must be in abeyance. And so forth. We are faced here, Lonergan contends, with a concrete series of diverging conditions, which opens the door for the relevance of statistical laws and ideal frequencies. The integrators and operators work in the context of the series of diverging conditions, and, along the “continuum” of freedom, the more complex the thing the more the thing’s activities depend upon the integrators and operators and the less upon simply the antecedent conditions.

In the third place, we can add to this equation the dynamic relevance of Lonergan’s three metaphysical elements of potency, form, and act. The events and occurrences of a thing coupled with the actual relations of the thing to other things and to the real series of diverging conditions affecting it at any given increment of time become in their totality a potency for the further functioning of conjugate forms and further events and occurrences in an ongoing process. Cosmic process, then, exhibits, at the very least, in potentia what, at the human level, is unmistakably the traits of historicity.

Human life, for Lonergan, is a life in creative process, a constant negotiating of the tension of limitation and transcendence impelled by the norms of self-transcendence, which are the norms of cognitive, moral, and spiritual inquiry. The process of inquiry is a self-correcting process of learning structured by horizon, where horizon is the resultant of past achievement and the possibility of future attainment. Creative individual subjects contribute to communal development as individuals are nourished by the communal horizon through acculturation, socialization, and education in an ongoing dialogical relation. The process of inquiry is also constitutive of both individual human subjects and of human
communities whose members share common experiences, understanding, judgments, and commitments.\(^5\) Performance, whether cognitive, moral, or spiritual, becomes data for interpretation, affirmation, and decision. Decision, in turn, leads to further performance, interpretation, affirmation, and decision is a continuous circuit. On the communal level, this circuit of self-constitution is mediated by the externalization of meaning and values in technologies, social institutions, and cultural sedimentations.\(^6\) Herein we witness, according to Lonergan, the historicity of human being.

Lonergan’s emphasis on the centrality of the negotiation of the tension of limitation and transcendence for both emergent world process and for human historicity also suggests an analogue in his thought to Hartshorne’s idea of aesthetic value. The drive toward transcendence, which Lonergan captures in the notion of finality and which is carried on by the operator, indicates a cosmic “dissatisfaction” with the monotony of established schemes of recurrence, while the integrator must respect the principle of limitation and avert the danger of chaos. Furthermore, the operator itself, even as it heads toward emergence of the new, also moves from the generic, rudimentary, and undifferentiated to the specific, effective, and differentiated. On the human level of the spectrum of emergence, the negotiation of limitation and transcendence becomes a responsibility of conscious grasp, rational, affirmation, and deliberative choice. But the negotiation has its pronounced affective — and aesthetic — moments and criteria. The entire process of self-transcendence is underpinned by the affective moods of wonder, doubt, and dread.\(^7\) Symbols, with their base in neural demands, orient the human inquirer to the mysterious “known unknown.”\(^8\) The integration of psyche and intelligence massively involves the human subject in the dramatic pattern of experience, where, in Lonergan’s words, the “fair, the beautiful, the admirable is embodied by man in his own body and actions before it is given a still freer realization in painting and sculpture, in music and poetry. Style is in the man before it appears in the artistic product.”\(^9\) The “freer realization” of the “fair, the beautiful, the admirable” in art reflects the human “straining for being,” shows wonder in its elementary sweep, and symbolizes the object of that wonder. Art, then, acts as an operator, taking human beings out of the routines of ordinary living to dwell in the possibility of a richer world. And yet art also integrates since it grasps patterns and relations that organize the flow of experience and collapses
meaning onto sensible experience. Through art human subjects may also appreciate the presence of aesthetic value in nature. In language that comes the closest to referring to aesthetic value in nature, Lonergan describes human beings as “nature’s priest” and nature as “God’s silent communing with man.”

2.6 Emergence and the Hierarchy of Values

What Hartshorne calls “aesthetic values” is differentiated into a hierarchy of values in the process of human moral inquiry. According to Lonergan, moral values are what are intended in questions for deliberation. Moral inquiry involves an attentiveness and openness to what is worthwhile, in contrast to what is merely pleasurable or merely satisfying. This apprehension of values is experiential, affective, and spontaneous. Still, to work out how to achieve what is worthwhile in the concrete situation, with all of its long-term and short-term complexities, requires insights in a self-correcting process of moral learning and judgments whose criterion is the absence of further, moral questions, as indicated by the good conscience of a morally committed person. To work out how to achieve what is worthwhile, however, is not yet to decide to achieve what is worthwhile. Decision is the terminus of any full increment in the process of moral inquiry, and it is decision that not only issues in a course of action or inaction but also constitutes who the moral subject is to be. Thus, Lonergan maintains, the operations of moral inquiry – with their specific components of experience, understanding, and judging that culminate in decision – occur on the existential level of consciousness. Moral deliberation carries with it an expansion of the moral subject’s horizon and a cognitional self-transcendence. Moral decision carries with it a real self-transcendence. This means that moral decision, as the culmination of the process of moral inquiry, leads to the emergence of a different subject. It is thus a striking instance of the cosmic process of emergence and creativity and a supreme illustration of the principle of finality. Nowhere is this more clear than in the fact of a spontaneous preference scale of values.

Lonergan, following Max Scheler, argues that the apprehension of values is spontaneously oriented to a hierarchy. The spontaneity would seem to be rooted in the principle of finality insofar as the moral feelings and images would be emergent from the depths of cosmic process, where neural demands, as we have seen, would be the “anticipations
and virtualities” of higher living. The orientation would be toward a hierarchy insofar as the hierarchy was one of increasing transcendence. The preference scale of values reveals precisely such a hierarchy. At the bottom of the preference scale are vital values, regarding, for example, health and vigor. But going beyond such vital values as health and vigor would be their very preconditions in the network of social relations, which could guarantee the recurrent and effective realizations of the vital values in question. So if nutriment, for instance, were a vital value, then the economic order would be a higher value that would deliver nutriment in a way that an individual could never achieve. At the same time, social interaction is not merely of utilitarian purpose but is also worthwhile in itself as a human possibility transcending solitary existence. But in the concrete situation which social order is most in accord with authentic human possibility? Are not some more worthwhile than others? The very act of raising this question is to go beyond the pure necessity of a good of order and to enter the terrain of cultural values, for culture, as the set of meanings and values that informs a way of life, is the framework for selecting one constellation of economic, political, and social arrangements and rejecting others. Culture, however, is not simply a means to a social end but is a fulfillment of the drive of the human spirit, a reflection of the worth of humans as inquiring, self-transcending beings. Granted that individual development takes place in a social context and with respect to the sedimentations of a cultural tradition, nevertheless, for Lonergan, the standards of creativity and of ultimate authority are the norms of inquiry resident in individual subjects engaged in the self-transcending process of cognitive, moral, and spiritual inquiry. Thus personal values are the conditions of cultural values and go beyond them as their originating value. Furthermore, persons as self-constituting moral agents operating on the existential level of consciousness are values in themselves, ends not means. Persons are also inherently worthwhile as participants in the self-transcending state of being in love, which itself is the ultimate source, inspiration, and condition of authentic social, cultural, and moral activities. This leads us to the ultimate state of self-transcendence, where the operations of self-transcendence reach full operational capacity and fulfillment: the state of unrestrictedly being in love. This state is the sphere of religious values. Here what is worthwhile is that which calls, heals, and sustains on the rode of inquiry. The state of unrestrictedly being in love is a participation in divine reality, an undertow of religious
experience, that while a fulfillment of deepest human yearning, yet raises the ultimate questions that propel inquiry, including the question of God. It is a state of grace that can simultaneously heal a disoriented psyche and sustain the process of inquiry in the face of travail. It embraces vital, social, cultural, and personal values as it moves the process of inquiry to negotiate the tension of limitation and transcendence.

All the values in the hierarchy are, by definition, worthwhile. The preference scale simply reflects the greater attraction to the values that are more inclusive. The choice of a higher value – as we have seen in the case of religious values – embraces all the lower values, respecting human existence as a tension of limitation and transcendence, and the choice of lower values requires recognition of the higher values as their preconditions. The operative criterion for the hierarchy, then, is the criterion of self-transcending activity in relation to transcendence. The choice of what is worthwhile is simultaneously a choice of the subject as self-transcending and a choice of action as participating in transcendent reality. And as it negotiates the tension of limitation and transcendence, avoiding both monotony and chaos, the choice of value, in accord with the preference scale, marks the rich differentiation of aesthetic value in the human process of emergence.

Thus we can glean from Lonergan’s writing on emergent probability the sense that creativity, historicity, emergence, and aesthetic value, all watchwords in Hartshorne’s theory of the natural universe, are all present along a continuous gradation, at least in potentia, in cosmic process, culminating in human self-transcending inquiry.

3. METHODOLOGICAL STRATEGIES

Lonergan considers himself, above all else, a methodologist, and method the key issue in contemporary philosophy. Hartshorne has written on how philosophy employs numerous and complementary methods. Although, as we noted in the introductory remarks, their methods are not identical, we can discern a real convergence between, on the one hand, Hartshorne’s logical mapping of metaphysical alternatives and subsequent appeal to validating experience and, on the other hand, Lonergan’s functional specialties of dialectics and foundations.
3.1 Hartshorne’s Logico-Phenomenological Method

Hartshorne has developed a distinctive method for metaphysical inquiry that might be summed up in his occasional expression “logico-phenomenological methodology.” Employing a suggestion of C. S. Peirce, Hartshorne advocates the development of “position or doctrinal matrices,” which represent the exhaustion of formal possibilities with respect to alternative metaphysical positions. The idea is to use the standard quantifiers (all, no, and some) to generate the formal possibilities. For example, the metaphysics of internal/external relations between entities — following the standard definitions of Bradley, Moore, and Russell, whereby internal and external relations are polar conceptual contrasts — can be seen in terms of the following general propositional triad (which could be ramified into more specific combinatorial possibilities in a complete “Peirce diagram,” but we here state the generalized matrix for sake of simplicity of illustration):

A: “All relations are internal” iff “No relations are external”
B: “No relations are internal” iff “All relations are external”
C: “Some relations are internal and some are not internal” iff “some relations are external and some are not external”

Having a clear notion of the possible alternative positions, one then examines each with respect to their experiential adequacy (the phenomenological component) and their logical implications with an eye toward determining either their coherence, consistency, or logical adequacy. Applied to this particular case, Hartshorne argues that A and B are both experientially inadequate as we can find counterexamples to both (e.g., my experiences are in no way internally related to Dickens novels, i.e., Dickens novels remain what they are no matter if I do or do not read them, but Dickens novels are internally related to my experience upon my having read them, since I cannot be exactly the same person in all psychic details without such novels). Alternative C, however, accommodates the above example. Moreover, the classic debates of Bradley, Moore, and Russell (on relations) seem altogether logically marred by the flawed assumption that A and B are the only choices. To assume they are is to assume that the subalternatives expressed in C are not formally possible, which they are indeed. Thus, the assumption “either A or B” (strong disjunction) is logically fallacious. C, then, is the
correct alternative on both experiential or phenomenological and logical grounds.

For Hartshorne, the standard quantifiers approach of the doctrinal matrix is consistent with his criteriological principle in metaphysics that errors occur when judgments exhibit “monopolarity” or the affirmation of one conceptual polar contrast to the exclusion of its counterpart (as in positions A and B which are mutually exclusive). Metaphysical truths are those which exhibit the highest level of generality or inclusion of ultimate polar contrasts. For Hartshorne, metaphysical truths always exhibit “dipolarity.”

It is an interesting question for investigation as to what extent Lonergan embraces such methodological principles and procedures. The idea of doctrinal matrices is, we note, by no means alien to Lonergan’s notion of the historical dialectic casting up alternative positions for consideration.

3.2 Lonergan’s Functional Specialties of Dialectic and Foundations

If we consider Lonergan’s analyses of the challenge of the historical dialectic, the response to the historical dialectic, and the complexity of the historical dialectic, we can find reasonable approximations in Lonergan’s method to Hartshorne’s mapping of metaphysical statements, his appeal to experience, and his overcoming of “monopolarity.”

The historicity of human being extends to the enterprise of philosophy. Philosophy has a genuine history. Philosophizing requires a critical encounter with the philosophical tradition. Philosophical formulations are framed within horizons, networks of interlocking questions and answers, usually relying upon partially unacknowledged presuppositions. Neither the formulations nor the horizons are final and definitive. The intention of philosophical truth does not rest content within any historically given philosophical horizon.68 Philosophical understanding can advance within established contexts and then move beyond those contexts to effect a genetic sequence of philosophical horizons. Philosophical positions that, on the surface, seem incompatible may, in fact, be revealed as complementary, consonant, or sequences in a line of progress. Still, philosophies have been many, disparate – and contradictory.69 The history of philosophy includes the fact of dialectical opposition among philosophical horizons. The dialectic opposition stems from what Lonergan calls “counterpositions,” which are contradictions
between a given philosophical interpretation and the actual performance of philosophizing, usually rooted in failure to attend to the complexity of cognitional performance. Counterpositions, though, can be profoundly helpful as they ruthlessly hammer out the inevitable implications of dubious assumptions. The reversal of counterpositions can enrich and strength authentic philosophical positions that could not have been so clarified otherwise. Beneath the myriad conflicts of doctrine the history of philosophy displays a startling unity of program, goal, and intention.

Thus the philosophical past hurls its challenge at the philosophical present. The conflicts among philosophies and among historians of philosophy have the salutary effect of further clarifying basic philosophical issues. It is therefore incumbent upon philosophers to analyze the nature of the dialectical oppositions, to assemble materials for classification, to separate the real from the only apparent differences, to classify the crucial differences, and thereby to discern ultimate philosophical assumptions. This effort is the task of Lonergan’s functional specialization of Dialectic, and the use of something like Hartshorne’s logical mapping would surely contribute to its precision.

When we turn to the criterion for selecting from among the dialectically opposed alternatives, we see Lonergan making a radical appeal to experience. Lonergan would have the philosopher attend to his or her experience of knowing, understand the cognitive operations and their structural relationship, and co-affirm that structure as the structure of knowing and themselves as the knowers who perform precisely those structural operations. This personal retrieval of the experience of the “subject as subject” issues in what Lonergan variously calls “self-appropriation” or “intellectual conversion,” and it forms the basis for establishing the epistemological and metaphysical positions consonant with this articulated cognitional theory. In this functional specialty of Foundations Lonergan also appeals to existential factors. If one has a commitment to values over satisfactions, or “moral conversion,” and an entry into the state of unrestricted loving, or “religious conversion,” then one has additional resources for discerning, respectively, ethical and religious positions.

3.3 Lonergan: Counterpositions and “Monopolarity”

While Hartshorne has no such concentrated and systematic focus on cognitional performance, his method of resisting “monopolarity” bears
some affinity with a recurrent theme in Lonergan’s method, namely, the tendency of counterpositions to fail to grasp the complexity of cognitional structure and the structure of reality. Empiricists and rationalists, for example, are correct in what they affirm, incorrect in what they deny. Empiricists correctly affirm the constitutive role of experience in knowing, but ignore or downplay the equally important roles of understanding and judging, while rationalists are correct in affirming the constitutive role of understanding, but ignore or downplay the equally important roles of experiencing and judging. Lonergan finds the disjunction between either empiricism or rationalism a narrow viewpoint that must be transcended by any full account of the performance of knowing. Similarly, Lonergan’s claim that “objectivity is the fruit of authentic subjectivity” – which means that objectivity is a matter of fidelity to the norms ingredient in the process of inquiry – transcends the disjunction of either objectivism or subjectivism. Lonergan’s critical realism, moreover, by its very focus on the norms of the self-transcending process of inquiry avoids oversimplification of the notion of truth. The proximate criterion of truth, for Lonergan, is a rational judgment in which there are “no further relevant questions.” The remote criterion of truth is the proper unfolding of the desire to know. Hence, with respect to truth, Lonergan overcomes the disjunction of either absolutism (as in rationalist deductivism) or relativism. Lonergan would, furthermore, reject the disjunction that would make the locus of truth either the activities of a pure cogito or the function of the sociology of knowledge. Lonergan’s heuristic notion of truth embraces the individual subject’s fidelity to the desire to know and faithful collaboration within a community of belief, where not all knowledge is immanently generated. Here Lonergan’s notion of the development of human knowing toward a convergence on the idea of being or the real has a counterpart in Hartshorne’s occasional expression of the Peircean idea of the striving of the community of inquirers toward a comprehensive knowledge (at least of the contingent truths pertaining to this cosmic epoch and its history and the necessary truths common to possible worlds). Lonergan’s view of emergent probability likewise portrays world process as inherently one of complexity – indeed one of an emergent trend toward greater and greater complexity. Lonergan’s metaphysical reason for this position is based on his concept of potency as harboring a tension of opposites. Potency simultaneously is the ground of universal limitation and the ground of finality and its drive to
transcendence. In addition to internal causes (such as the metaphysical element of potency), there are also external causes (such as final and efficient). On the exceedingly complex level of human reality, the tension of limitation and transcendence is abundantly illustrated. Human history, for Lonergan, is complex: it is as complex as are the various dialectics that must be negotiated or engaged. It can be reduced, for instance, to neither individuals (“great men”) nor the larger collective forces; to neither psychic influence nor intellectual operations; to neither ideas nor material circumstances; to neither aspirations of groups nor cold practical necessities; to neither a purely world-immanent nor a purely otherworldly perspective.82 History has a multiplicity of horizons, each reflecting particular traditions, experiences, and challenges. Clearly, then, in these areas Lonergan would judge “monopolarity” to be utterly counterpositional. While Lonergan would have reservations about Hartshorne’s particular application of dipolar attributes to God (since Lonergan claims that only active potency, and not passive potency, pertains to God), when Lonergan discusses the perspective of religious conversion, he stresses how the horizon of religious experience has a transcendent pole (the “Wholly Other”) and an immanent pole (deep within the human heart).83

**4. PHILOSOPHY OF GOD**

Neither Hartshorne nor Lonergan have “proofs” for the existence of God in any classic deductivist sense. Hartshorne presents a series of arguments that offer a “cumulative case” for the theist position. Lonergan offers a series of strategic inferences from his cognitional theory as part of his moving viewpoint. If we focus on Lonergan’s treatment of the desire to know, the objective of the desire to know, namely, complete intelligibility, and the expansion of the desire to know into the notion of value, then we can grasp strategic implications for theism that find significant parallels in Hartshorne’s analysis. Furthermore, if we consider Lonergan’s discussion of the divine attributes, we find, amid profound differences, striking similarities with some of Hartshorne’s ideas and an even more pronounced kinship with Whitehead’s approach.
4.1 The Intrinsic Intelligibility of Being: Epistemic and Cosmological Arguments

An interesting affinity (so far as we know not commented upon in the literature) concerns certain arguments of natural theology. In *Insight*, Lonergan offers an argument for the existence of God based on the "intelligibility of the real." Just how we are to understand this argument has been the subject of a good deal of commentary. Some have construed it as an ontological type argument (because of its heavy reliance upon definitions) and others have taken it as a variety of cosmological argument (because of the argument's eventual entanglement with the notion of causality). Still others have rejected this traditional typological bifurcation and have construed the argument as a distinctively "critical realist" one. However, as William Wainwright has noted, Lonergan offers an interesting combination of streams of argument that include the "Idealistic." It is here where we see a distinctive connection with specifically Hartshorne's version of the "epistemic argument" for theism.

Like Lonergan, Hartshorne is committed to the idea that there are no "intrinsic surds," entities, or states of affairs which are in principle impossible to know. To use Lonergan's vocabulary, being is completely intelligible. Since there cannot be intrinsic surds, and since, according to Hartshorne, the knowability of the real cannot be adequately accommodated by either finite knowers or merely possible acts of cognition (he provides a number of arguments to support these contentions), he deduces the assertion that an omniscient being must exist. More precisely, he argues that to reject any of the premises upon which his theistic deduction depends is to incur various cognitive costs which he is unwilling to pay. While there are differences between Lonergan and Hartshorne here (what Lonergan means by the "idea of being" is not entirely acceptable to Hartshorne), notwithstanding, there is a striking similarity of argumentation.

We could go at this from another point of view. Hartshorne's version of the cosmological argument also involves him at a crucial step in an affirmation of Lonergan's thesis of the intelligibility of being. Among the nontheistic alternatives to be rationally eliminated in Hartshorne's quadrilemma formulation of the argument is "A1 Nothing exists." Clearly, the affirmation of even a single possible world in which it would be true to say that absolutely nothing exists would undermine the
existence of God on both Hartshorne's and Lonergan's conceptions. For, in that case, God would not be a necessary existent, since God would fail to exist in some possible world if A1 were true (necessity is that which all possible worlds have in common by standard definitions of modal logic). Perhaps Hartshorne's favorite rebuttal of A1 is the argument from the knowability of being, an argument he embraces consciously along with C. S. Pierce. For Hartshorne, nonbeing is not a genuine possibility, because nonbeing could not be known by a conceivable knower. For even, by hypothesis, knowing such a purportedly "possible state of affairs" would falsify "nothing exists," that is, since the verifying experience would thus exist.

Approaching Lonergan's vocabulary, Hartshorne has been criticized by Huston Craighead, as arbitrarily defining the concept of being in terms of knowability: "Hartshorne has won the game by definition. He defines the real in terms of the knowable." But this objection is unwarranted. Hartshorne's definition is not arbitrary. To contradict the notion that "being is knowable" is to claim that a proposition could be meaningful which is clearly falsifiable, but could not be verified even in principle. The most lucid and noncontroversial example we have of the necessarily false are propositions which have the dual characteristics of falsifiability and unverifiability. "Polygamous bachelors exist," "finite transcendental numbers exist," and "circles which are pentagons exist" are falsifiable by existing bachelors, transcendental numbers, and circles and are unverifiable in principle. If one objects that these propositions exhibit internal incoherence or self-contradiction (e.g., being polygamous logically entails being married and thus not being a bachelor) in a direct way not seen in the proposition "nothing exists," it can be countered that "nothing exists" can be reformulated without loss of meaning as "nothing is a state of affairs." Yet "nothing" (in the sense of the nihil absolutum) entails that there are no states of affairs. So, A1 both does and does not constitute a state of affairs.

4.2 The Unrestricted Desire to Know and Theism

Another important connection between the two thinkers is that Lonergan's notion of the "unrestricted desire to know" and the connection he makes between this notion and the theistic idea has a closely similar counterpart in the philosophy of Hartshorne. In Beyond Humanism, Hartshorne argues at length that the search for truth can only have an
implicit theism as its proper motivation.\textsuperscript{91} The fervent quest for truth in humanist figures such as Russell is paradoxically undermined by a nontheistic concept of the future which is devoid of value (assuming the end of the cosmos \textit{somehow}). Commenting on Russell’s criticism of William James’s conception of truth wherein “the valuable is true,” Hartshorne asserts in agreement with Russell that the converse in fact holds wherein “the true is valuable.” Hartshorne adds, however, that theism offers an explanation for how truth can be valuable and of interest whereas Russell’s perspective (where, lacking appeal to omniscience, no value can be retained and all achievement ultimately will be lost) cannot do so by definition.

4.3 The Value of the Universe

We touch here on another area of convergence, for Lonergan claims that only the theistic position can consistently affirm that the universe has value. Lonergan poses the question: “Is this whole process from the nebulae through plants and animals to man, is it a good, a true value, something worthwhile?” He claims that the answer can be affirmative if, and only if, one also affirms the existence, omnipotence, and goodness of God. For, as he argues, “goodness” entails a moral agent. Unless one posits a moral agent responsible for the world’s being and becoming, one cannot apply such terms as goodness, value, and worth to the world. The consequence of a nontheist counterposition would be, then, to adopt a “monopolar” outlook and formulate the following disjunction: either human beings act as moral agents and are alienated from the rest of the universe, or human beings drift into the rhythms of the psyche and nature and are alienated from moral living.\textsuperscript{92}

4.4 The Divine Nature

A complete treatment of Lonergan and process philosophy on the metaphysics of divine attributes is a task well beyond the scope of a single article. There are, however, some interesting points of comparison that can be at least adumbrated here. Below we focus on the central notion of God’s knowledge and its relation to time and causality in both Lonergan and process thinkers. Indeed, we concur with Bernard Tyrrell in his suggestion that no dialogue between Lonergan and process philosophy can take place without a careful consideration of divine knowledge in
relation to “contingent realities.” And here we find some surprises as it turns out that Lonergan’s views are in some ways closer to those of A. N. Whitehead than they are to those of Charles Hartshorne (or C. S. Peirce for that matter).

Consider Tyrell’s explication of Lonergan’s position on God’s knowledge as found in *De Deo Trino* (our italics):

...the primary object of the divine understanding is the divine essence and the secondary objects – the total series of possible and/or actual world orders – are what are understood in virtue of the unrestricted act’s understanding of itself...Lonergan says that the secondary objects viewed *sub ratione possibilis* are known in the manner of “beings of reason” because their total reality as possibles is the divine active power.

The salient point of comparison here is that, for Whitehead, there is a “total reality of possibles” which is within God’s power alone to know. In Whitehead’s mature system in *Process and Reality*, God possesses a “primordial envisagement” of the entire domain of “eternal objects” (Whitehead’s technical term for possibilities). Like Lonergan’s notion of possibles, Whitehead’s eternal objects are complete and are “forms of definiteness.” In a manner of speaking, they have the property of “bookness” (to use Alvin Plantinga’s terminology) as there is no vagueness about their identity and their intrinsic distinctiveness.

This stands in marked contrast to the Hartshorne-Peirce theory of possibles and its implications for divine knowledge. For Hartshorne, there can be no such thing as the eternal, once-and-for-all complete totality of possibles for God to know, even though by virtue of knowing the infinitely actual divine history, God alone at any arbitrary time knows an infinity of possibles (since what is actual is also possible). The essential justification for this view, according to Hartshorne, is to be found in the Peircean doctrine that possibilities are not “forms of definiteness” as such, but are rather “dense continua.” Dense continua, by definition, cannot be exhausted in terms of atomizing all the *qualia* inherent in the continua (just as is the case with mathematical continua, say, a purported exhaustive counting of all the possible well-ordered fractions between the whole number termini of 1 and 2). That is to say, possibles are in their very nature (to some degree) vague. To say otherwise, in Hartshorne’s view, is to imply that there is no difference between the possibility of X and the actuality of X except for the ethereal property of “actuality.”
On Hartshorne’s view, what actualization “adds” is the very definition of what it means for an actual occasion to be the exact occasion it is; that is to say, the becoming of an actuality is a process of making definite that which was partly indefinite. It is a process of creatively synthesizing inherited past occasions which set ontological parameters for the becoming occasion and out of which emerges at least some novel property (of the becoming occasion) within those parameters. Thus, new actualities become, which are, in turn, new possibilities. The domain of possibles grows with the creative advance of actuality.

The domain of possibles is therefore completely protean and can never be exhausted. (For Hartshorne, this is equivalent to saying that God as modally coincident with actuality and possibility is inherently inexhaustible.) Lonergan would ask here whether it is a merely terminological matter to differentiate, as he does, “possibility as something conceptual” from “potency as something real.” On what seems Lonergan’s view, Hartshorne’s discussion of the becoming of an actuality should appropriately employ the term “potency” rather than “possibility” (and, when it come to God, recall that, for Lonergan, the relevant type of potency is active potency).

Lonergan’s theory of God shares another subtle affinity with Whitehead’s theory as contrasted with Hartshorne’s. For Whitehead, like Lonergan, there is an important sense in which God is timeless or nontemporal, and that sense is stronger than the notion of divine timelessness in Hartshorne’s theology. What we have in mind here is the notion that, for the Whitehead of Process and Reality, God is a nontemporal single actual entity and as such is not “in time but with all time.” God is “with” all temporal creation since God knows temporal creation (for Whitehead, by prehending it), yet such knowing does not impute temporality to God. For Whitehead, this is because, as a single actual entity, God’s everlasting concrescence never reaches “satisfaction” or “closure,” and thus God’s relation to time is analogous to that of the nascent occasion during its phases of concrescence, which Whitehead insists (during his discussion of the “genetic analysis” of phases of concrescence) “do not take up time.”

By contrast, Hartshorne attributes timelessness only to the abstract “divine essence.” God’s essential properties – what it is that makes God “God” such as necessary existence, omniscience, omnipotence, et cetera – are immutable and timeless. On this point, Lonergan, Whitehead,
and Hartshorne are in clear agreement (despite the fact that there are, of course, some important differences in their respective constructions of the precise nature of the divine attributes). But Hartshorne (and other neo-Whiteheadians who have followed his “revision” of Whitehead, such as John Cobb, David Griffin, and Schubert Ogden) hold that God is robustly temporal in the sense that

God is not a “single actual entity” but is more strictly analogous to the human person, that is, God is a “personally ordered series of actual occasions.” God knows the creative advance of the cosmos and takes its prehensive data to form a new divine occasion of experience, which in turn becomes the essential prehensive datum for each new creaturely occasion of experience, and so on and on. Thus, for Hartshorne, there is clearly a “temporal dialectic” of prehensions (or cognitions) between deity and creature which is absent from both Lonergan’s and Whitehead’s conception of the divine-creature relation. We note, however, that in the midst of this important difference, there is an odd sort of structural affinity: For both Lonergan and Hartshorne, there is a sense in which God’s creative power is connected to the self-reflexivity of divine cognition. For Lonergan, God’s creative power resides in God’s own unrestricted self-knowledge or understanding. Somewhat similarly, for Hartshorne, God’s knowledge of the creative advance by virtue of God’s universal and positive prehension of the natural universe resulting in a new divine occasion – in effect, the act of God’s knowing God’s own “body” – is the “essential” or “predominant” object of prehension in creaturely processes, which functions literally as a sustaining creative action (in other words, on Hartshorne’s theory, without God to be prehended there is no “divine body” or cosmos to be prehended and thus literally nothing to be prehended, and in turn there is no sustained existence of the creature). Thus, despite the difference on the issue of temporal dialectic, there is a sense for both Lonergan and Hartshorne in which it is true to say that “God’s knowledge is the source of all things.”

This is not to play down the important differences between Lonergan and contemporary process philosophy on the doctrine of God. Despite the above nuanced affinities, a fundamental difference resides in the idea that by knowing the divine essence, God thereby creates or ontologically constitutes the domains of actuality and possibility. Recall that, for Lonergan, creaturely objects, when viewed sub ratione entis, are “nothing other than the divine active power.” Moreover, there is
no clear distinction between God’s unrestricted understanding of the divine essence and the divine active power itself. As Tyrell puts its, “the unrestricted act’s understanding of everything other than itself is because of and in virtue of its understanding of itself.” For Hartshorne, God’s knowledge of the divine essence will render knowledge of the most abstract and necessary truths of metaphysics, logic, and mathematics. However, God’s knowledge of other concrete and contingent realities depends partly on the contingent realities themselves and thus cannot be identified with God’s active power. Put another way, God’s influence on each creaturely process is a necessary but not a sufficient causal condition for that creaturely process. In the process system there is consequently a very clear affirmation of libertarian freedom such that for every occasion and every personally ordered society of occasions some aspect of their constitutive decision-making in which they come to “satisfaction” is really “up to” the occasions. This is an essential part of what it means to be creative. This picture would not hold, according to process thinkers, if God’s influence on occasions was all sufficient. By contrast, Lonergan, as we have seen, clearly seems to affirm something akin to the traditional notion of God’s creation as creation of all past, present, and future events — events known all at once to God in a transcendent, timeless, unrestricted act.

It should be born in mind, however, that Lonergan’s approach to the issue of divine knowledge and human freedom, he would claim, must be differentiated from the traditional rationalist and essentialist metaphysics that starts out from a metaphysics of possible worlds and deduces in some fashion this world. Lonergan, by contrast, starts from the facts of this world, which includes events brought about by rational agents with volition, and deduces the intelligible cause of this world as a deity whose knowledge of the world order, and its subdivision of events freely willed by rational agents, is, by analogy, that of a maker rather than a speculator.

5. LONERGAN AND PROCESS PHILOSOPHY IN DIALOGUE: MUTUAL QUESTIONS

The first requirement for genuine dialogue between two philosophical
perspectives is to understand the respective horizons as precisely as possible, not letting terminological differences spawn superficial criticism. The second is to chart strategically important affinities. We have attempted to follow these requirements as we have outlined above significant parallels between Lonergan and Hartshorne (and Whitehead) and have done so on a scale heretofore unavailable, so far as we know, in the literature comparing the two philosophers. It is precisely the striking similarities between the two thinkers that gives urgency and momentum to the next phase of the dialogue, which we present here in a preliminary fashion: salient questions addressed from the perspective of one thinker to that of the other.

5.1 Questions for Lonergan

Hartshorne’s philosophy is grounded in his subjectivist principle of the experience of dipolar subjects responding in a creative process to aesthetic value. It would be from the standpoint of this subjectivist principle that the most compelling questions would be addressed to Lonergan.

The first set of questions would regard Lonergan’s apparent affirmation of some kind of continuous gradation from humans to subatomic entities, a spectrum in which, at least with some degree of potency, entities exhibit creativity, historicity, and response to aesthetic value. But how far would Lonergan press the continuity? Would he want to ascribe creativity even to subatomic particles? Would the relative emergence of “freedom” at the level of chemical compounds be in any way analogous to the freedom of an agent? Would Lonergan subscribe to the notion that, the relatedness of things to each other notwithstanding, natural entities form communities? Lonergan would need to clarify more the extent to which his “thing” retains the Aristotelian property of permanence.

A second set of questions would concern the failure of Lonergan to apply to divine being the property of dipolarity. Why cannot intrinsic intelligibility include this property? Is Lonergan inconsistent in having a metaphysics of the world, or what he also calls “proportionate being,” that highlights self-transcendence and process, but a metaphysics of transcendence that seems to exclude self-transcendence and process? Indeed Thomas Hosinki has tried to remedy this purported inconsistency by substituting for Lonergan’s “active potency” the self-transcendence
and openness to real future possibilities that is a cardinal feature of emergent world order and associating it with God's dynamic being. Now Lonergan would surely rejoin that the idea of being is the content of an act of unrestricted understanding, where intelligence is the key to being itself. Yet Lonergan's *Insight*, from the perspective of a process thinker, might seem rather hastily to attach traditionalist, or "classical," theist attributes to God in terms of a faculty psychology that does not do justice to the moving viewpoint of *Insight*, which is based primarily on intentionality analysis. It is not until the chapter on ethics and the chapters on transcendence that Lonergan reverts to faculty psychology. In his later works, he revised his approach to ethics and natural theology in light of a fully consistent use of intentionality analysis. It is true that Lonergan claimed in those later works that the argument he propounded in *Insight* for the existence of God was still a sound one (and Hartshorne would basically agree with this claim), though Lonergan placed that argument within the larger, sublating context of religious experience. The question remains, however, whether the argument for the attributes of God would be changed in any way by the explicit recourse to intentionality analysis. In particular, would the transformation from language of "intellect" and "will" to language of the "intention of the good" and the state of "unrestricted love" affect the argument? Although Lonergan's post-*Insight* discussion suggests it would not, nevertheless a more thorough working out of these matters would enormously clarify the issue and provide material for fruitful dialogue, particularly about divine presence in the world. What does it mean for God to be unrestricted love if God cannot be, in a full sense, self-transcending?

It is important to note, then, that Thomas Hosenski has addressed this second set of questions in a systematic fashion. Steering clear of the kind of comparison and contrast we presented above between process thought and Lonergan's *Insight/De Deo Trino* philosophy of God — for he holds that the Lonergan of *Insight* is clearly in strong disagreement with process thinkers on the doctrine of God — Hosenski is rather interested in the startling (if he is correct) metaphysical implications of Lonergan's post-*Insight* philosophy for the philosophy of God, implications which point directly toward a process model of deity. While not going into the technical details of his reasoning, it will suffice for us here to simply point out Hosenski's contention that if we follow through on the structures disclosed by Lonergan's cognitional theory in light of process thinking we
find that “understanding is accomplished through ‘conceptual’ feelings,” but knowing always requires “physical feelings.” To conceive of God, then, solely as the unrestricted act of understanding is insufficient as an account of God because it leaves out the notion of divine knowledge. Accordingly, God must be conceived as infinite subject, as that entity which actually knows and loves by virtue of loving and knowing all actualities. But this in turn means that God must have “physical feelings.” The cognitionally armed structure of subjectivity should thus serve as the guiding analogue for philosophical theology. As perfect subject, God integrates both the conceptual grasp of all possibility and the physical grasp of all actuality. Hence the conception of God as perfect subject is an unmistakably dipolar conception of God. “But this,” Hosenski argues, “is the direction in which we are led when we conceive of God who supremely illustrates the structure of cognitional process and being.”

Our purpose here is not necessarily to endorse what to many may seem to be Hosenski’s controversial interpretation of Lonergan’s cognitional theory. It is rather to encourage the kind of nuanced and extensive effort he has made in taking a Lonergan-process dialogue seriously.

A third set of questions would address the status of the ontological argument, the retrieval of which from Anselm Hartshorne considered one of his greatest achievements. Lonergan and Hartshorne are in clear disagreement about this argument. Lonergan prefaces his “intelligibility” argument with a discussion of the ontological argument in Anselm, Descartes, and Leibniz. Lonergan’s rejection of these arguments and “all other possible forms” is focused on what might be called the “existential import” objection. The proposition that a greatest conceivable being must, by definition of ‘greatest conceivable,’ exist is an analytic proposition, and analytic propositions do not yield existence claims. Hartshorne rejects this on the grounds (among others) that there are pointed exceptions to this general rule about analytic propositions or propositions which provide conceptual descriptions. Sometimes only conceptual descriptions are necessary in order to make existential judgments. An alibi which smuggles in a tacit contradiction is enough to cause detectives to judge that, for example, “you were not in fact with your spouse on a given evening.” No restrictive or special observation of the circumstances is required. How do we know that the concept of God is not among the class of exceptions (other candidates would be conceptual descriptions of units of time and the existence of
time or descriptions of integers and the existence of integers greater than seven, etc.)? God is either necessarily existent or impossible, and thus properly *positivist* arguments to the effect that the concept of God is incoherent or meaningless are relevant to the theistic case, but not issues concerning restrictive or special empirical states. Otherwise, for Hartshorne, God is one contingent being among other contingent beings; God is “ontic” rather than “ontological.” For Hartshorne, the existence of God is a matter of logico-metaphysical *principle* and not a matter of special existential circumstances.

5.2 Questions for Hartshorne and Process Philosophy

Lonergan’s philosophy is grounded in his method of cognitive, moral, and spiritual self-appropriation. Cognitional theory is decisive for Lonergan. Cognitional theory serves as the critical base from which to discern epistemological, metaphysical, and theological (correct) positions and (faulty) counterpositions. Thus it would be from the standpoint of cognitional theory and its expansion in other domains that Lonergan would question Hartshorne.

The first set of questions, then, would pertain to the, at least implicit, cognitional theory of Hartshorne. While Lonergan would agree with Hartshorne that human understanding and reasoning are not all there is to human experience, he would argue that it is crucial that a critical philosophy explicate the operations, structure, levels, dynamic principles, and norms of inquiry. What exactly would Hartshorne’s cognitional theory be. The parallels we have uncovered between Lonergan and Hartshorne might suggest that Michael Vertin’s verdict is too harsh that Hartshorne’s cognitional theory posits a perception of entities “out there” in space and time as the paradigm of knowing. To the extent, however, that Vertin’s judgment would be true to that extent Lonergan would discern a basis for counterpositions in Hartshorne’s metaphysics and theology, including arguments about the dipolar nature of God, the necessity of God to create a world, or worlds, and the necessity of God to be actively involved in the process of that world emergence. Clarification of Hartshorne’s cognitional theory would clarify the grounds for his theology.

To cite one area of possible clarification. Hartshorne, as we have seen above, seems to find exceptions to the fully constitutive role of judgment in cognition, which he then uses to validate at least some version of the ontological argument. Conceptual descriptions simply in
and of themselves can in some cases ground existential judgments. But would the prime example he provides of such an exception—a self-contradicting alibi that would allow a detective to judge a criminal guilty without recourse to direct observations of the crime—require, upon further analysis, a set of existential judgments, such as the judgment of fact in the first place that the criminal is a suspect, the judgment of fact that the self-contradiction resulted from attempted deception rather than stupidity, the judgments of fact contained in the contradiction, and the inductive generalization that a self-contradictory alibi ordinarily imputes guilt? Granted, there is no direct observation of the criminal act. But Lonergan, being a radical empiricist no more than is Hartshorne, would demand no such direct observation of the criminal—or of God. Lonergan's criterion for existential judgment is the absence of further relevant questions. Perhaps, by this criterion, Hartshorne's ontological argument may, in fact, contain implicit judgments of ultimate existential import that would make it bear a closer relation to Lonergan's proof of intrinsic intelligibility (which has itself been mistakenly interpreted as a variation of the ontological argument).

The second set of questions, which would be the other side of the coin from the first set of questions proposed to Lonergan above, would inquire about how far Hartshorne would push the idea of a continuity of consciousness in the natural universe. To what extent can we legitimately talk of feelings with respect to subatomic entities, atoms, chemical compounds, or plants? What do we mean by the "awareness" of entities at these levels? In what sense do such entities constitute communities? Is the language of "feelings," "awareness," and "community" explanatory, analogous, or metaphorical? How do we overcome the danger of projecting human qualities on less complex nature? To be sure, Hartshorne would reject vitalism. But Lonergan would be vigilant about containing the statements of metaphysics within the field of verified explanatory and intelligible relations. Is the idea of a continuous gradation in nature of the sort Hartshorne advocates a "limit-concept" that contains its own inherent restrictions? Would the distinction of potency and act help elucidate those restrictions?

The third set of questions would regard Hartshorne's neo-classical theism. What is the critical foundation for the assertion that limitation and immanence are necessarily parts of the divine nature? How adequate would it be to attribute the properties of beings in the natural universe
to all being? More pointedly, would applying the property of dipolarity to God be an anthropomorphic projection of self-transcendence onto transcendence? Does the idea of intrinsic intelligibility contradict the idea of imperfection and striving? If the perfection of knowing is the identity of knower and known, then would the imputation of learning to God be to deny divine omniscience? Does the idea that for God there can be future contingents presuppose some version of the confrontation theory of truth, alleging that in some sense God confronts the possibility of the future? Does the distinction between divine understanding and divine knowledge, where the latter adds to the former "definiteness," presuppose, from Lonergan's viewpoint, a failure adequately to distinguish essence from existence, a failure perhaps rooted in the tendency to view judgment as in some sense a synthesis (rather than a mere positing of) concepts? And, in general, how much of Hartshorne's rejection of classical theism is a rejection specifically of its rationalist and essentialist version? Does the very way Hartshorne sets up the problem coupled with his own penchant for a metaphysics of possible worlds suggest the adoption of at least some of those rational assumptions, which Lonergan would consider counterpositional?

This last section of the discussion is meant to be not the end of dialogue but its prologue. To use Lonergan's language, genuine philosophical dialogue would be committed both to reversing counterpositions and to developing positions. While mutual questioning can place in sharper focus the possibility of counterpositional elements as a prelude of their reversal, mutual understanding about the remarkable affinities of these two philosophies of critical realism can likewise foster the rich possibility of developing positions. In short, dialogue would be entry into that community of inquirers both Lonergan and Hartshorne commend.

2Burrell, Aquinas, n. 18. David Burrell mentioned to George Shields at the International Lonergan Conference in Rome that Hartshorne had sent him a gracious letter, thanking him for clarifying Aquinas's views in the book just cited. This seems to exemplify a dialogue beyond slogans.

3The basis of the paper was an honors seminar on Lonergan and Hartshorne jointly offered by the authors at Kentucky State University in 1999. A draft version of this paper was discussed at the Rome conference. We wish to thank Patrick Byrne for the many fruitful comments and suggestions about the paper he gave at the conference.


*Insight*, 416, ff.

The brunt of the argument is in *Insight*, chap. 19.


*Insight*, 112-13, 460-61.

*Insight*, 152.

*Insight*, 141.

*Insight*, 78-89, 121-23, 152.


*Insight*, 111-12.


*Insight*, 271.

*Insight*, 460-63.


*Insight*, 470-76.


On Lonergan’s technical use of the term “continuum,” see *Insight*, 50.

*Insight*, 482.

31 Insight, 289-90.
32 Insight, 291-92, 631-42.
33 Insight, 539.
34 Insight, 476, 479, 497.
35 Insight, 489-92.
36 See Insight, 501, 555, 556-57.
38 Ibid., 494; Method in Theology: 76-77.
39 Insight, 276-77, 279, 462, 503.
41 Insight, 70-89, 117-24.
42 On potency, form and act, see Insight, 457-58, 462-63, 467-71, 473-76; on their relation to world process, see Insight, 464, 477-78, 487.
43 On the self-correcting process of learning, see Insight, 197-98; on horizon, see Method in Theology, 235-37.
45 Insight, 268.
46 On technology, economy, polity, and culture, see Insight, 232-37, 261-63.
47 Wonder is an expression of the primordial unrestricted desire to know, or eros of the mind, which is the immanent source of transcendence: Insight, 34, 97, 196-97, 247, 354, 355-56, 482, 498, 659-62, 723-24. Doubt is not Descartes’s universal doubt but, we infer, the affective component of the question for reflection: Insight, chap. 9. On dread, see n. 37 above.
48 Insight, 555-58; Method in Theology, 64-69.
49 Insight, p. 211; on the dramatic pattern, see Insight, 210-12.
51 Topics in Education, 225.
52 On the process of moral inquiry, see Insight, p. 631-39; Method in Theology, 30-41.
Method in Theology, 34.

Method in Theology, 37-38.

Method in Theology, 36-41.

Method in Theology, 9; Second Collection, 9-84.

Method in Theology, 37, 38, 45, 104, 121-22.

Method in Theology, 38; Second Collection, 83-84; Collection, 229-30.

Method in Theology, 31-32.

See Method in Theology, 49.

Method in Theology, 50; Insight, 620-21.

Insight, 62; Method, xi.

Insight, 324; Method in Theology, 51.

Method in Theology, 51.

Method in Theology, 32-33, 122, 289; Third Collection, 10, 175.


Method in Theology, 77, 105-107, 109, 115-16, 241-42, 340-42; Collection, chap. 12; Third Collection, 106; Insight, chap. 20; Grace and Freedom.

Method in Theology, 63-64, 325; Collection, 198-99; Second Collection, 15, 25, 199, 207-208, 233, 259; Third Collection, 186-88, 193-94.

Insight, 386, 411.

Insight, 413.

Insight, 413-14.

Insight, 412-14.

Method, 249-50.

Insight, chap. 11; Method in Theology, 13-20.

Insight, 13, 22; Method in Theology, 238-40, 267-69.

Method in Theology, 240-41.

Insight, 427-33, 437-41.

Method in Theology, 265, 292, 338.

Insight, 366-71, 427-33, 573.

Insight, 324, 352-57, 404-405, 573, 723-39; Method in Theology, 13-20, 41-47.

Insight, 467-76.

See n. 44 above (individual and communal development); Insight, 239-42 (intersubjective spontaneity and intelligently devised social order), 210-31, 499-503 (psyche and intelligence), 749-50 (tripolar tension of psyche, intellect, and spirit)

Method in Theology, 110-11; Third Collection, 217; on “active potency as a divine attribute, see “Bernard Lonergan Responds,” Language, Truth, and Meaning, 311.

Insight, 692-99.


See CSPM 286-288 and PSG 196.

For Lonergan’s thesis, see Insight, 523-26, 575-76, 675-76, 695.

CSPM 281.
"Nonbeing and Hartshorne’s Concept of God,” PS 1, No. 1, 1971.

90 See Insight, 372-83.
91 Beyond Humanism, especially, “Humanism as Disintegration.”
92 See Second Collection, 85-86.
96 Insight, 670-71, 683.
97 Insight, 674-88.
98 See DR, 139.
99 Tyrrell, Lonergan’s Philosophy of God, 141.
100 Insight, pp. 701-702; for a general critique of rationalism, see Insight, 427-33.
101 Method in Theology, chap. 4.
102 Second Collection, 117-133, 277.
103 Thomas Hosinski, “Lonergan and a Process Understanding of God,” in Religion and Culture, chap. 5.
106 Insight, 670.
108 See Insight, 305-12.
109 For apparent similarities of Lonergan’s argument to the ontological argument, see Quesnell, “‘What Kind of Proof is INSIGHT 19?’” 267-68.
110 Insight, pp. 419-20.
111 Insight, 389-90; Verbum, 62, 71.
INFLUENCES OF THE GREGORIAN UNIVERSITY ON LONERGAN: 1933-1940
THE ACCIDENTS OF A LIFE

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PART I
AN INTELLECTUAL DRAMA:
BECOMING A CRITICAL REALIST

Within the canvas of an intellectual biography the occasion when the intellectual desire of its subject first finds its inspiration and path, finds for the first time some of the questions that are going to be the subject's responsibility, is a solemn and even sacred moment. We know that with Lonergan this first occurred when, toward the beginning of his philosophy studies in Heythrop College, his curiosity was awakened by the problem of knowledge. There began there a journey that would occupy him for twenty-eight years, culminating in the book *Insight*.

In Montreal that awakening was enlarged and refigured by his encounter with the Depression and his subsequent attempt to understand the causes of booms and slumps in an economy. Stewart's *Plato's Doctrine of Ideas*, whose significance has been so comprehensively examined by Mark Morelli, also moved him on. It was in the early days of this first journey that he arrived at the Gregorian University in the autumn of 1933. The first part of the paper will trace how in the following

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three years the agenda started in Heythrop would be broadened by an interest in the philosophy of history. At the end of that time, through the inspiration of lectures by Bernard Leeming, crucial elements of his later critical realism began to fall into place. The second part will examine how, later in the decade, the first path found itself becoming a preface to a wider journey concerned with the method of theology.

THE ACCIDENT OF HIS MOVE TO ROME

But how did Lonergan get to Rome as a student of theology at the Gregorian University? The answer must be almost totally by accident. His teaching regency in Loyola Montreal was due to end in 1932 and his theology studies due to start in the autumn that followed. But during that teaching year he had some kind of row with the rector, Thomas MacMahon, a rector disliked by the young Jesuit teachers, but also a province consultor. As a result Lonergan’s passage to theology studies was held back a year. He started, not in the autumn of 1932, but a year later. If he had started his theology studies in 1932 he would have remained in Montreal and would never have come to Rome.

But that delay did not guarantee that he would start in the Gregorian. In fact he started his theology studies in Montreal in the autumn of 1933. Soon after news was received that three Slav students had withdrawn from the Gregorian. Providentially, their places were made available for Canadians. Hingston, the provincial, interviewed Lonergan, putting to him the question, was he orthodox? Lonergan replied that he was but that he thought a lot about things. The outcome of the interview was that he was to go to Rome for his theological studies. He and his companions were the first Canadian scholastics ever to study theology in the Gregorian.

After his difficulties in Montreal he was elated by this development and there began his long involvement with the Gregorian University. He would spend six of the next seven years of his life there as a student and, starting in 1953, twelve more as a professor. It would exert a defining influence on his understanding of theology, culminating in his discovery there, in February 1965, of the functional specialties.

Before moving to Rome he visited his family in Buckingham and asked his mother to play for him her favourite piece, “The Mockingbird.”
Sadly she exclaimed that her fingers were not up to it. Although he could not have know it, it was to be the last time he would see her alive.

THE POLITICAL WORLD

Lonergan took up residence in the Bellarmino where, close by, from the balcony of the Palazzo Venezia, Mussolini would address the crowds. Phil Doherty, one of his friends in Rome, recalled that he and Lonergan used to use code names when they talked about Hitler and Mussolini. According to Paul Shaugnessey, Doherty told him that on one occasion he and Lonergan were just across the street from Hitler during one of his visits to Rome.

In Germany the Weimar Republic was gone by January 1933, the year of Hitler’s appointment as chancellor. The totalitarian wave was rising and Jews, excluded from membership of the German Folk, began to leave the country. In April of 1933 Heidegger was elected rector of the University of Freiburg. During his fateful year as rector he promoted National Socialism and anti-Semitism, events whose mark on the history of twentieth-century philosophy will be permanent.

On May 10th 1933, in the public squares of cities and university towns there was a spectacular ceremony of burning of books. Authors whose works were burnt included Einstein, Freud, the Manns, and Kafka. In the autumn of 1933, just as Lonergan was arriving in Rome, Sauerbruch, Pinder, and Heidegger took a public vow to support Hitler. In a later lecture in Heidelberg Heidegger abused those who did not

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4 The Quirinale, where Hitler would have been received, is at the rear of the Gregorian University. Hitler is mentioned in volume 3 of Collected Works of Bernard Lonergan, Insight, ed. Frederick E. Crowe and Robert Doran (Toronto: University of Toronto Press, 1992), 534. The Nazis are mentioned in volume 21 of Collected Works of Bernard Lonergan, For a New Political Economy, ed. Philip McShane (Toronto: University of Toronto Press, 1998), 4, and on page 61 of Thomas O’D. Hanley’s notes taken at Lonergan’s course on Insight in 1952-53.

A cycle of decline and disintegration had begun.

THE THEOLOGICAL WORLD

In 1929, through the Motu Proprio Quod Maxime, the Biblical and Oriental Institutes became united through association with the Gregorian, an association that has since ceased. In the years that followed the staff expanded to over three hundred. New faculties were added including, significantly, a faculty of Church history in 1932. It was a time of expansion. It should be remembered that most of the teachers at the time would have been shaped by the antimodernist movement in the early years of the century.

In 1931 the Constitution Deus Scientiarum Dominus (God, the Lord of the Sciences), whose drafting commission included Bea and Lanzarini, was issued. The problem which it addressed was that of locating what was then considered the heart of Catholic theology, dogmatic theology, within the context of the growth of positive and human sciences. The various disciplines involved were considered to be constituted by a logical, psychological, and didactic coherence rather than a merely a material conglomeration. At the summit stands the main field of study, the “disciplina praecipua.” In theology it is dogma with the fundamental and the speculative parts of moral theology. In philosophy is the universal scholastic philosophy with all its divisions, logic, ontology, cosmology, and so forth:

Deus Scientiarum Dominus, with its emphasis on dogmatic theology, was a part of a wider paradigm of Manual Theology, largely inspired by Melchior Cano (1509-60). Whereas earlier the terms dogmatic theology were used to differentiate it from moral or historical theology, for Cano they were used to differentiate it from scholastic theology. Dogmatic theology, as Lonergan later put it:

... replaced the inquiry of the quaestio by the pedagogy of

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6 Maurice Friedmann, Martin Buber’s Life and Work: The Middle Years, 1932-1945 (Detroit: Wayne State University Press, 1988), chap. 9, especially 159.

the thesis. It demoted the quest of faith for understanding to a desirable, but secondary, and indeed optional goal. It gave basic and central significance to the certitudes of faith, their presuppositions, and their consequences. It owed its mode of proof to Melchior Cano and, as that theologian was also a bishop and inquisitor, so the new dogmatic theology not only proved its theses, but was also supported by the teaching authority and sanctions of the Church.8

Its sense that there could be no new and surprising insights in theology was in contrast with Aquinas’s intellectualism and the exhortation of Vatican I to understand the revealed mysteries.

**THE STUDENT OF THEOLOGY**

In his first year Lonergan was in a class of just over three hundred clerical religious students. About its content he has remarked:

Fundamental Theology (which was taught by Tromp) was a traditional term in scholastic theology. In the first year of theology you learned “On the true religion” – you settled that – and then “The true church,” and then “The inspiration of the Scripture” V and you were off to the races. It settled the premises from which you were going to deduce the rest of theology: the “basic truths.”9

Arthurus Vermeersch’s *Moral Theology* dealt with the theological virtues of faith and charity, a course he would later teach. The third part of the Church history course, taught by Robert Lieber, addressed modern political questions such as the relation of the Church to revolution, liberalism, nationalism, socialism, and bolshevism. It was a defining experience in his emerging interest in the philosophy of history whose influence can be traced in a text he wrote at the time, “An Essay in Fundamental Sociology.”

The year of study successfully completed, Lonergan spent fifty

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9 *Caring About Meaning*, 73, see also 261f.
days of his summer vacation in 1934 learning German in the villa of the German College in Rome. Despite the strain of being made feel a guest in every sense of the word he felt there were good ideas to be found among the Germans. He would request permission to repeat the experience the following year, assuming his provincial did not mind “my offending the extraordinary susceptibilities of some of the local nationalists.”

Presumably the emergence of National Socialism featured in his conversations.

In his second year the main dogma courses dealt with God as unity and trinity. The text for the former was volume I of the *Summa*, supplemented by Lennerz’s *De Deo Uno* and *De Novissimis*. Topics included the existence, knowability, essence and attributes of God, God’s knowledge and will. Lonergan had a high opinion of Lennerz, a German theologian, and would later use his text in Toronto when he taught a course on providence and predestination.

In his second semester Filograssi introduced him to the classical theology of the Trinity which he himself would teach in his years as a professor in Toronto and later Rome. The course was structured around theses on the processions of a Word and of Love in God, on the Divine relations, persons, and missions. The text was the *Summa*, I, qqs 27-43, complemented by Billot, *De Deo Uno et Trino*. Later he was to remark: “But I mean the tradition like Billot, who said that we get the Trinitarian procession far more clearly in the imagination than in the intellect – missing the whole point of the Trinitarian processions.” The recognition that Billot had lost sight of Aquinas’s position on the matter would in time become the source of a major new intellectual challenge and problem for Lonergan, what precisely did Aquinas mean by processions in God? Just over a decade later his *Verbum* articles will open with a reference to Billot and the question, are the created analogies for the procession of a word in God to be found in the imagination or the intellect?

**FOLLOWING HIS OWN QUESTIONS – THE KEELER ESSAY**

Lonergan was further encouraged in his intellectual vocation by Leo

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10 Letter of January 22nd 1935 to Provincial.
11 *Caring About Meaning*, 103, 104.
Keeler, an American professor of the history of philosophy at the Gregorian. As at the time Lonergan felt his future was in teaching philosophy, they clearly had common ground. He took the unusual step of trying out his ideas on Keeler in the form of a 30,000 word essay on Newman on assent.\textsuperscript{12} This must have made an impression because when Keeler's doctoral thesis, The Problem of Error from Plato to Kant, was published in 1934, he took the unusual step of inviting Lonergan, a student, to review it for the journal, Gregorianum.

The essay is notable in that Crowe finds in it a scorn of Aristotle and a favoring of Plato.\textsuperscript{13} In this Lonergan was influenced by his earlier reading in Montreal, of Stewart’s Plato’s Doctrine of Ideas. Liddy considers that it gives us valuable insights into his statement in Insight that the halfway house between materialism and critical realism is idealism.\textsuperscript{14} The question arises, to what extent is the remark autobiographical and the essay on Stewart a stage in that development?

For Plato, as read by Stewart, the relation between an idea and its related particulars is similar to that between a mathematical equation and instances of the curve of which it is the equation. Give specific numerical values to the coefficients in the equation and you can then trace the curve:

\textit{The Idea of the circle, as defined by its equation in the general form, is not itself properly speaking a curve...Such an equation, like the ideal number, is at once many, as synthesizing an indefinite plurality of positions, and one, as synthesizing them in accord with a definite law...}\textsuperscript{15}

An idea is a unity which synthesizes a multitude of relations. Such was the impact of this that on four different occasions in his later life he referred to it. In 1979 in Boston College he remarked:

Aristotle and Thomas held that you abstracted from phantasm the \textit{eidos}, the \textit{species}, the idea. \textit{And my first clue into the idea}

\textsuperscript{12} Pages 7, 8, 9, 13, 23, 24, 27, 28, 32, 33, 34, 35, and 36 are extant, the archived references running between A14-237. For remarks on Keeler see Caring About Meaning, 268.

\textsuperscript{13} Frederick Crowe, Lonergan (London: Chapman, 1992), 34, n 49. See also page 13 of the fragments.

\textsuperscript{14} Richard Liddy, Transforming Light: Intellectual Conversion in the Early Lonergan (Collegeville, MN: Liturgical Press, 1993), 76-84, especially 84.

\textsuperscript{15} Stewart, Plato’s Doctrine of Ideas (Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1909). 74
was when I was reading a book by an Oxford don by the name of J. A. Stewart who in 1905 had written on Plato’s myths and in 1909 on Plato’s doctrine of ideas. And he explained the doctrine of ideas by contending that for Plato an idea was something like the Cartesian formula for a circle, i.e. \((x^2 + y^2) = r^2\) and that exemplified the act of understanding for me, and the idea was getting what’s in behind the formula for the circle. So you have something in between the concept and the datum or phantasm. And that is the sort of thing that you can’t hold and be a naive realist.  

Stewart, I believe, broke Lonergan out of his naive realism. But it still leaves us with the problem that what Stewart means by an idea is nothing like what Aquinas, Aristotle, and Lonergan, by the time of the *Verbum* articles, meant. I do not find Lonergan’s above position on them in any of his writings before the fourth *Verbum* article in 1949. Where in that movement does the Keeler essay come? The fragments of the essay that remain, open with Hume’s conclusion of his study of perception that causes cannot be seen. This famously stimulated Kant and posed for Lonergan the question: what does understanding apprehend? In this context:

4. Hence, the idea of substance has become the trial case, the experimentum crucis, between the dogmatic and the critical schools. For if understanding is ultimately apprehensive, then “substance,” what lies beneath or stands beneath the appearances, must be had by apprehension; this is the scholastic position. On the critical theory, the substance is known by an immanent activity and so is not apprehended but merely understood to be there; clearly, this corresponds exactly with our knowledge of substance: we do not know what it is – as we would, if we had ever apprehended it; all we know is that it is there.

Lonergan is critical of the scholastics’ spiritual apprehension of substance (which in other contexts he seems to equate with intuition) and sets out to explore the extent to which the critical account can be verified in philosophical inquiry. Is there a suggestion here that understanding

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16 *Caring About Meaning*, 44, italics mine. See also page 4 of the transcript for Lonergan Workshop, Boston College, June 19th, 1979, Toronto Archives.
was for him at this point an immanent activity, a suggestion of idealism? Linguistically, “entendement” in French, “verstand’ in German, the medieval “intus-legere,” and “epistemi” in Greek (but not yet insight) suggest that by understanding we know something not sensibly presented.

Some puzzling remarks follow on page 24 which illuminate his mind-set at the time on a range of topics including the relation between apprehension and facts of existence, the nature of knowledge (both of which I have italicized), and the real distinction between essence and existence:

The law of the object is distinct from the fact that the object exists. This distinctness is due to the nature of our knowledge. *For the fact of existence is known by the apprehension; the law of the object is known by understanding. Knowledge consists of a conjunction of presentation and understanding into one whole:* the pure presentation of experience and the pure intellection (abstract idea) are the entio quibus of knowledge (human). This distinction the scholastic theory objectifies by a real distinction between essence and existence; it puts the composition, not in the mind, but, in some very obscure way, in the object. Whether the critical metaphysician will assert such a real distinction or not, I shall discuss presently. But if he does it will not be due to the distinction in the mind but only on the analogy of this distinction and as a theory to explain definite facts.

On page 34 we find the following:

On the one hand the hypothesis is not a mere guess; the hypothesis has to be a possible explanation and a rather plausible explanation. It is an act of understanding, an idea that has to be evident in the object. Thus there is an intelligible relation between the hypothesis and the facts;...

These remarks help us to some extent to understand the mind-set he was moving from when in 1935 in his intellectual conversion he grasped the nature of the relation between judgment and what exists.

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18 On page 13, after a comment on the exercises of St. Ignatius, he continues: “And while on the point, one may mention how well the theory of intellection as an immanent act fits in with a philosophy of mysticism.”
Critical metaphysics is a science of sciences grounded in induction. In developing its theory of reality it will draw on all human understanding through science of the objective world. Each science discovers its particular empirical laws or relationships, Tycho de Brahe, Kepler, and Newton being mentioned. There follows the visionary punchline: "Critical metaphysics takes the explanations arrived at in every field of science – physics, chemistry, biology, psychology, history, ethics, etc. – and frames a unified view of reality in its totality."\(^{19}\) The approach is in contrast with the straightjacket of Kant’s categories, in whom, Lonergan comments, no one believes. Within this framework Lonergan brings things into a focus with his remarks: "Such then is the “Whole I planned,” the general scheme of human life into which the acts of assent and certitude must be fitted and of which they form parts."\(^{20}\)

Although fragmentary, the Keeler essay on Newman is a major text in the realm of Lonergan studies. Unlike many other texts it shows him in process, struggling toward a destination in his problem solving which is not yet in sight. I believe it gives meaning to the later phrase of the halfway house between materialism and critical realism.

THE AWAKENING OF HIS INTEREST
IN THE PHILOSOPHY OF HISTORY

That Lonergan was actively pursuing his dream of a critical metaphysics which would be a science of sciences, including history, is made clear in the course of the letter of January 1935. In it he stated that he had a draft of an essay on the metaphysics of history “that will throw Marx and Hegel, despite the enormity of their influence on this very account, into the shade.”

It takes the “objective and inevitable laws” of economics, of psychology (environment, tradition) and of progress (material, intellectual: automatic up to a point, then either deliberate and planned or the end of a civilisation) to find the higher synthesis

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19 Ibid., 23.
20 Ibid., 28.
of these laws in the mystical body.

Some insights into that work can be gleaned from the surviving chapter of his "An Essay in Fundamental Sociology" entitled "Philosophy of History." It can be dated as prior to January 1935 but after his first year course on Church history.

The essay is prefaced by a handwritten quotation in Greek of the passage from the Republic on the need for philosophers as kings to rule. The surviving text takes as its theme the question of the human control of history. The successful emergence of liberalism since the middle ages poses again not only the question of who controls the power in history, but also whether that assumption of power is for progress or extinction. It goes on to discuss philosophical foundations with reference to persons, social acts, and the notion of progress. It then explores the phases of history from the viewpoint of a philosophy of society and history whose goal is to master the process. It concludes with the problems of dialectic, of meaning, and of God's presence in history.

The problem about the meaning or purpose of the external flow of history leads us to the question, what is progress? In order to work out a metaphysic of history, a differential calculus of progress, the differentials separating off one epoch from another must be examined. The fluctuations of history will stand to "the differential equation of history" as the aggregate of values of a mathematical curve stand to its differential equation.

But what is progress?

It is a matter of intellect. Intellect is understanding of sensible data. It is the guiding form, statistically effective, of human action transforming the sensible data of life. Finally, it is a fresh intellectual synthesis understanding the new situation created by the old intellectual form and providing a statistically effective form for the next cycle of human action that will bring forth in reality the incompleteness of the later act of intellect setting it

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21 Toronto Archives, File A 713, History. This file also contains drafts of his later thought on the dialectic of history.

22 In Insight, 244, Lonergan talks about dialectic standing to generalized method as the differential equation to classical physics, or the operator equation to more recent physics.
new problems. 

The human intellect is intellect in potency. Its development is gradual and not the achievement of the individual but rather of the race. It can operate in three kinds of situations. Firstly, there is the ordinary action in which a man lives as his ancestors. Secondly there is the change that follows from the emergence of new ideas – scientific or economic that understand the objective world, – ideas vitiated by the existence of sin or elevated by the influence of divine revelation. Thirdly there is the change that follows from the emergence of systems of ideas, philosophies or world views. In short the human intellect is a basic variable of the equation of history.

Finally he comes to consider the needs of the present and the future. Central here is a critique of the modern state which has for him no claim to make final and absolute decisions because of its imperfection. Modern states are not conducted according to any intelligible principles. Social theory cannot justify their pretended rights to making absolute decisions as they are neither economically or politically independent. Their actions are immoral and cannot but be immoral as witnessed in the perversion of the newspaper and school and in armament manufacture and almost everything else. Nationalism is the setting up of a tribal god, and not merely in the case of Germany – at whom the whole world smiles for its self-idolatry – but in every case. Clearly the radical menace of National Socialism had not yet clicked for him.

At the heart of the final analysis is the comparison, based on Pauline teaching, of humankind in the image of Adam and of Christ. It is from these themes, treated in Bernard Leeming’s second year course on creation and redemption, that the fundamental meaning of history is derived. The greatest evil for Lonergan is that concretized in the historic flow, “the capital of injustice that hang like a pall over every brilliant thing.”24 The Christian antidote to this is Christ’s victory over sin and the exercise of charity. Christ’s social form is the koinonia which integrates what has disintegrated.

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24 Ibid., 128, 129. See also 121.
On January 22nd 1935, Lonergan wrote a most revealing letter to his provincial in which he meditated on aspects of his projected future as a teacher of philosophy and the difficulties he had with the prevailing tradition:

...; in a word it is that, what the current Thomists (Suzarezian?) call intellectual knowledge is really sense knowledge: of intellectual knowledge they have nothing to say: intellectual knowledge is for example, the “seeing the nexus” between subject and predicate in the universal judgement: this seeing the nexus is an operation they never explain. From an initial Cartesian “cogito” I can work out a luminous and unmistakable meaning to intellectus agens et possibilis, abstractio, conversion to phantasm, intellect knowing only the universal, illumination of phantasm, etc. etc.

Is there a sense of the immanence of mind in his reference to the Cartesian cogito?

Lonergan also refers to the naive realism of Suarez and the Spaniards for whom:

(substance is “something there”); then, the brilliant Descartes, who was brought up on this stuff; then the antithesis of Spinoza and Hume; then Kant (and do you see any difference between Kant’s need to go back to the causal origins of knowledge to know the thing-in-itself and, on the other hand the Thomistic conversion to phantasm to know the singular.

These points need to be compared with his later remarks about Hoenen’s articles which flag a considerable development in his thought:

Hoenen’s point that intellect abstracted both terms and nexus from the phantasm was regarded as Scotist language, both terms and nexus belong to the conceptual order; what Aquinas held was that intellect abstracted from phantasm a preconceptual form or species of quod quid erat esse, whence both terms and nexus were inwardly spoken.25

Thirdly, he outlined his dream, already mentioned, of developing a metaphysics of history as an exercise in the application of his ideas, his cognitional theory. In January of 1935 this was Lonergan's focal interest. The question of method in theology was not yet on his agenda.

The letter ended by posing to his provincial the question about the unfolding of his life's work. Ought it be left simply to providence, or ought the involvement of superiors as agents of providence be recognized? It was a problem that occupied him throughout the thirties and on which he would seek advice in 1938. Its significance ought not to be underestimated. The letter is indicative of the fact that the 31-year-old Lonergan had a dream and in its pursuit felt the dialectic of hope and anxiety just as much or possibly even more than the rest of us. He sensed that the conditions of possibility of the process itself at the time lay in the hands of others.

**THE REALISM OF THE INCARNATION: LONERGAN'S INTELLECTUAL CONVERSION**

In the autumn semester of 1935 Lonergan took a course on the Incarnate Word by Bernard Leeming, a course he himself would teach in Toronto and Rome. Topics addressed included Christ's knowledge and consciousness about which he would later write. But a central question was about the mode of union of the eternal word of God with a temporal human nature, Jesus of Nazareth. The Christian tradition of the Patristic era teaches that Christ is a divine person in whom through the incarnation there are hypostatically united divine and human natures. By a person, divine or human, is meant not a personality but an ontologically distinct non-fictional existing indivisible unity. This means that in Christ, considered as a divine person, there can be a human nature but not an ontologically distinct human person. The Christian doctrine that Jesus of Nazareth who was born in Bethlehem is not an ontologically distinct existing indivisible human person is a position that, like the reality of the air, brings us up short in our tracks. It challenges us to clarify what kind of a reality are we talking about when we talk about Christ?

26 "Insight Revisited," 266.
27 See *Insight*, 665 for a comment on the metaphysics of proportionate and transcen-
Clearly the doctrine implies a realism, a stance on the ontological reality of the being of persons and their natures:

Can you have one person and two natures? The argument given me by a good Thomist, Father Bernard Leeming, was that if you have a real distinction between \emph{esse} (existence) and essence, the \emph{esse} can be the ground of the person and of the essence too. If the \emph{esse} is relevant to two essences, then you can have one person in two natures. On that basis I solved the problem of Christ's consciousness: one subject and two subjectivities.\textsuperscript{28}

In a letter to Bernard Tyrrell in October 1967 he remembered picking up the notion of the constitutive role of judgment in human knowledge from Stefanu at the time when Leeming was teaching about the \emph{unicum esse}, the single existence of being in Christ. By a providential accident during the academic year in which he took Leeming's course he was also revising for his final examination with Stefanu. Stefanu taught him about Marcehal who seems, as in the case in Rahner, to have rescued Lonergan from naive realism. In \emph{Insight Revisited} he described what happened:

It was through Stefanu ... that I learnt to speak of human knowledge as not intuitive but discursive with the decisive component in judgement. This view was confirmed by my familiarity with Augustine's key notion, \emph{veritas}, and the whole was rounded out by Bernard Leeming's course on the Incarnate Word, which convinced me that there could not be a hypostatic union without a real distinction between essence and existence. This, of course was all the more acceptable, since Aquinas' \emph{esse} corresponded to Augustine's \emph{veritas} and both harmonised with Marechal's view of judgement.\textsuperscript{29}

The one existent is known and affirmed by a judgment. But where does this leave the understanding?

The above questions address distinctions in the object of our knowledge. What happened in 1935 for the 30-year-old Lonergan was that there clicked for him the fact that some of them were related to parallel distinctions in our cognitional powers or operations. Through

\textsuperscript{28} \textit{Caring About Meaning}, 258. The quote continues: "It wasn't the divine subjectivity that was crucified but the human subjectivity; it was the human subjectivity that dies and rose again, not the divine person."

\textsuperscript{29} "\textit{Insight Revisited}," 265.
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Stewart, Stefanu, Marechal, and Leeming Lonergan was beginning to make the break with naive realism and knowledge as intuitive, both of which were strong in the tradition that formed him. Involved in the break was the grasp that existence is known, not by intuition, but by judgment at the term of the discursive process of knowing. One of the pillars of his later philosophy was now falling into place.

Lonergan later described this development in him as an intellectual conversion:

I had the intellectual conversion myself when in doing theology I saw that you can't have one person in two natures in Christ unless there is a real distinction between the natures and something else that is one. But that is the long way around.\textsuperscript{30}

He had broken out of his Suarezian upbringing.

\textbf{PART II}

\textbf{A PERSONAL DRAMA:}

\textbf{FROM PHILOSOPHY TO METHOD IN THEOLOGY}

In the summer of 1937 Lonergan took a holiday, visiting the Pitti Palace in Florence where he enjoyed the Raphaels.\textsuperscript{31} At the beginning of September he went to the Abbaye St-Acheul in Amiens, in the valley of the Somme, for his final year of prayer and formation as a Jesuit, his Tertianship. The French in the locality had been expecting a war since 1932. With the question of Czechoslovakia on the agenda it must have seemed near in 1937. The Tertian instructor, Pere Leontius Aurel, gave the Tertians information about the political developments during his conferences. In May 1940 the town would be invaded, the Cathedral alone escaping the bombs.

As in the novitiate, the thirty-day retreat was the major event. It began two weeks after their arrival and involved three and sometimes four conferences each day. Lonergan must have been impressed by the experience because his notebook survives. The first week was concerned

\textsuperscript{30} The quotation is from a transcript by Nicholas Graham of discussions at the Lonergan Workshop, Boston College, June 13, 1978. For a related discussion see Richard Liddy, op. cit., n 14, 114f.

\textsuperscript{31} Caring About Meaning, 222-23.
with purification through God’s operation on our unfreedoms or sinfulness. The parallels between Christ and the world and the priest and the world were set forth.

The second week focused on our cooperation with God’s initiatives in our lives. It went round and round the fundamental reality of God’s invitation to both the religious life and the priesthood, and our response in faith. In the Old Testament humility, submission and obedience were central; in the New Testament love not of the law but of the invitation – follow me, is central. The three degrees of humility are related to three responses to God’s invitation to vocation – that of the rich young man who goes away sad because of his wealth, of the excuse to first go and bury my father, and finally that of the apostles. As well as invitation, there is also mission. The Church ought not neglect the foreign missions. But what was Lonergan’s mission in the Church to be, his invitation?

The group also had a certain amount of external input including a lecture from De Lubac. After Easter of 1938 Lonergan was sent for a week to Paris to the Ecole Sociale Populaire to listen to four leaders each day speaking about specialized movements in Catholic Action. It was here that he met Pere Desbuquois, a charming man who had time at his disposal for meeting people and whose personal initiatives had resulted in remarkable achievements.

He was a man I felt I must consult, for I had little hope of explaining to my superiors what I wished to do and of persuading them to allow me to do it. So I obtained an appointment, and when the time came, I asked him how one reconciled obedience with initiative in the Society. He looked me over and said: “Go ahead and do it. If superiors do not stop you, that is obedience. If they do stop you, stop and that is obedience.” The advice is hardly very exciting today but at the time it was for me a great relief.

32 Caring About Meaning. 33. "Insight Revisited," 265
What personal initiatives was Lonergan pursuing at the time? In the essay "Insight Revisited" Lonergan refers to work he did during his Tertianship year on the philosophy of history. The extant texts from the time are comprised of three files of typewritten notes of seventeen, eighteen, and nineteen pages, whose titles are slight variations on the theme of analytic concepts of history.\(^{34}\)

Analytic concepts are concerned with the why, the manner in which the compound is made up of elements, the movement of forces and accelerations, the circle of spatial relations. An analytic concept of history will prescind from accidental causes such as plagues and race. It will attend to the why, the essential cause or explanation of history, what makes it what it is rather than something else, the action of human wills in the framework of solidarity.

Human action divides into three categories of acts according to nature, acts contrary to nature, acts above nature. As intelligence is central to man's nature the three metaphysically ultimate categories which will feature in the dialectic can be described as human actions intelligible to man, as unintelligible, and as too intelligible.\(^{35}\) The course of history can be analyzed as the resultant of an ideal line of progress from acts according to nature, of decline from acts contrary to nature, and of renaissance from the exercise of the supernatural virtues. Acts of will and freedom are then central. He concludes that the whole can be viewed as a multiple dialectic, a difficult term to explain. By an analysis of the dialectic Lonergan hopes to arrive at an analytic concept of history.

Economic development liberates man from physical needs only to impose upon him social dependence. In proportion as economic development proceeds, the social unity is of necessity enlarged. As the power of intellect becomes greater, its higher specialization requires a broader basis.\(^{36}\) At all times in every social community there is a body of thought (in his earlier writings *Geist*) that is socially dominant and effective. Though it may change over time at each moment it is the rule, dominant. Other thought is the exception. This dominant thought is subject to a dialectical process:

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34 Archives File 713, History. The different titles will appear in subsequent notes.
36 Ibid., 4.
Taking the matter more largely, we observe that the dominant thought at any time arose from the situation that preceded it; that its tendency is to transform the situation; that the transformed situation will give rise to new thought, and this not merely to suggest it but to impose it.

By the dialectic, then, we mean the succession (within a social channel of mutual influence) of situation, thought, action, new situation, new thought, and so forth.\(^{37}\)

The dialectic is really an inverted experiment in which reality continuously strives to mould the outlook of man into conformity with itself by revealing the evil arising from his errors. Because of the transference of ideas across frontiers and of reaction to them we find in culture a multiple dialectic.

Decline is a deviation from the ideal. It can be minor, major, or compound. Social tension arises because it is not clear that new economic or political ideas are better than the old. But what really brings about decline is sin, the irrational. In this section we find his early thought on the surd, individual, and group bias. Self-interest is not enlightened because it is not objective. It centers the world in the ego of the individual or class and neither is the center:

Second, by reason of their advantages, the favored are able to solve the antitheses that stand against their own progressive well-being. By reason of their ego-centricity, they barely think of solving any others. The bourgeois is full of the milk of human kindness: but this bias in outlook makes him pronounce non-existent or insoluble the antitheses that do not directly affect him.\(^{38}\)

There results a distinction between the privileged and the depressed which gives rise to an objective disorder which contains the irrational. It cannot be understood in the same manner as intelligible progress from one situation to another.

There results, in stark contrast with development, a succession of social syntheses which are actually decreasing in intelligible content. Each of the stages in the succession of lower syntheses calls forth a human mysticism:

\(^{37}\) Ibid., 4-5.

\(^{38}\) Ibid., "Analytic Concepts of History in Blurred Outline," 11, b.
the organized lie of a society defending what it was and, for the moment, preventing it from being worse than it will be. Thus we have the mysticisms of naturalism and progress, of the revolution in Russia, of nationalism and race in Germany; ... as each of these falls short of a whole view of human nature, in that measure it is a lie and its mysticism drug like in its effects.39

Decline sets a problem that has no internal human solution.

ASSIGNED TO TEACH IN THE GREGORIAN UNIVERSITY

In June 1938 the consultors of the Canadian province, this time without MacMahon, advised the provincial, Henry Keane, that Lonergan was a suitable candidate for further studies in Rome. When completed they also agreed that he could teach there for a while, adding the qualification that they should pay for his studies in case they wanted to recall him to Canada at a later date. Around this time the Jesuit General was holding a special congregation in Rome. He invited the assembled provincials to donate men to the Gregorian University. Henry Keane donated Lonergan: "I was informed of this at the end of the Tertianship and told to do a biennium in philosophy."30

On July 20th, Vincent McCormick, the rector of the University, wrote to his provincial, thanking him for the donation that the Canadian Province had made of Lonergan. The letter continued:

Fr. Lonergan has left a splendid record behind him here; and we shall be happy to see him back for further studies. I would suggest – supposing his own preferences are not too strong for one field rather than the other – that he devote himself to Theology. In that Faculty there are hundreds of English-speaking students, who will be needing his help in the future. At present there is only one English-speaking professor in the Faculty.

The provincial would clearly fall in with his request.

Without knowing this after his Tertianship, Lonergan moved to Milltown Park, Dublin, to prepare his notes for the first retreat he would give at the Loreto convent in Wexford. On August 10th he wrote a letter

39 Ibid., "Outline of an Analytic Concept of History," 12.
40 "Insight Revisited," 266
to his provincial which reveals how much he was still engrossed in his reflections on history:

As philosophy of history is as yet not recognized as the essential branch of philosophy that it is, I hardly expect to have it assigned me as my subject during the biennium. I wish to ask your approval for maintaining my interest in it, profiting by such opportunities as may crop up, and in general devoting to it such time as I prudently judge can be spared.

Clearly the work he had done in Amien in his spare time was exciting him. At this time, given his head, he would have written his PhD on the philosophy of history rather than epistemology.

In September Lonergan himself received a letter from Fr. McCormick informing him that he was to do a biennium in theology. Since January 1935 Lonergan had wondered about the providential role of his superiors in his unfolding quest. He was now getting his answer. The shift from a career in philosophy to one in theology effectively took him, at a moment’s notice, off one major road and put him on another. It was a road on which the problem of method in theology lay in waiting.

**HIS DOCTORAL DIRECTOR AND TOPIC**

Lonergan spent the last three weeks of September in Heythrop before returning to Rome just as the Munich conference, with its promise of peace, was taking place. That prospect was devastated on October 5th when Hitler invaded Czechoslovakia. Living in the room next to him at the time was Michael Connelley, an Irish province Jesuit who remembered Lonergan’s typewriter incessantly on the go. Shortly after the invasion they went for a walk up to the gardens. Lonergan was agitated by the event and remarked to him that war was coming and that he wanted to get out of Europe as quickly as possible. It was Connelley’s impression that he was well informed and understood the significance of what was happening. This was the time of Kristallnacht.

Despite these distressing events his main task was to find a thesis director. When in France Boyer had been suggested to him. He was intelligent and had changed his view on the real distinction between

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41 “Insight Revisited,” 266
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essence and existence. About his thesis topic he has said:

I had a good thesis because Charles Boyer said to me:

“There’s this article in the Summa and I don’t think the Molinists interpret it correctly; and I don’t think the Banesians interpret it correctly. Find out what it means. .... Study the *loco parallela* and the historical sources. See what light you can shed on the question.”

As Vincent McCormick and Henry Keane decided he should change to theology, Boyer chose the thesis topic and issued the quite focused directions. None of them could have foreseen the fateful significance of their choices on the direction of his life. The topic was approved on December 6th, 1938, under the title, “A History of St. Thomas’ Thought on Operative Grace.”

The question, Q111, in the I-IIae, is about the divisions of grace into sanctifying (*gratiae gratum faciens*) and actual grace (a term never used by Aquinas who used terms such as *auxilium* or *inclinatio*), operative and cooperative, prevenient and subsequent. The second article of the question, which is the significant one, is on the division of grace into operative and cooperative:

As was said above, grace can be understood in two senses. Firstly, as the divine assistance by which God moves us to will and do good; secondly, as the habitual gift implanted in us by God. In both these senses grace is satisfactorily divided into operative and cooperative grace. (Q111, a2, Resp)

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42 From a conversation with Prof. Fred Lawrence, Dec 7th, 1984, described in note 9 of Frederick Crowe’s “A Note on Lonergan’s Dissertation and Its Introductory Pages,” *Method Journal of Lonergan Studies* (October 1985): 1-9. This has to be related to Leeming’s course on the significance of the real distinction. Later, in a letter to his Provincial on May 5th, 1946, he remarked that Boyer could not answer his questions, so he directed himself.

METHODOLOGICAL QUESTIONS

In discussing the passage Lonergan drew attention to the notorious fact that for several centuries Molinists have uniformly concluded that Aquinas was a Molinist and Banezians that he was a Banezian. Each started from their dogmatic presuppositions and built up their arguments accordingly. This methodological impasse he considers will not be broken: “Unless a writer can assign a method that of itself tends to greater objectivity than those hitherto employed.” And so the first part of his thesis, only recently published, is devoted to the problem of theological method. The method which Lonergan will suggest involves the use of a theory of the history of theological speculation. The question of method in theology was surfacing.

More strategically his approach involved arranging the relevant texts in a chronological sequence and carefully reading and interpreting them. It was in this phantasm of the chronological sequence of the texts of Aquinas that he began to gain access to the problem:

If Thomas treats the same question several times, compare the passages. My dissertation was on operative grace, a topic Thomas treated three times explicitly and each time he changed. Operative grace was only sanctifying grace in the Sentences. It was sanctifying grace and help, auxilium, in the De Veritate. (“Lead us not into temptation, eh?” and “We must pray for perseverance.”) So sanctifying grace was both operans and cooperans – but for perseverance, cooperans. In the Summa he had actual grace (though he never used that expression) but he also had motus divinus or motio divina and both were sanctifying grace, and the motiones divinae were operans and cooperans. To arrive at his final position he was changing his mind on liberty and he was developing his notions of operation. “How could God change the will, pluck out the heart of stone and put in the heart of flesh? That is God operating on the will. Well, what’s that operation?” He was working on things like that.

The same approach could be applied to the question of the relation between sin and freedom. Parallel problems in contemporary experience would have to do with the loss of control of over our will that occurs in addiction or the problem of our freedom to change our will from bad to

44 Grace and Freedom, 153, see also 159-60.
45 Caring About Meaning, 4-5.
good.

For example, Thomas, treating the question “Can a man in the state of sin avoid further sin?” says in his Sentences, “Certainly; otherwise he wouldn’t be free.” In the De Veritate he has twenty-two objections (negative, eleven; positive, eleven) and a solution that runs over about nine columns in the Marietti edition. He answers both the affirmation and the negative, but he has a theory of moral impotence there. To handle that, you have to know about the surd. “Why did Adam sin?” If there were a reason, it wouldn’t have been a sin, eh? 46

The dogmatic datum forced Aquinas to revise his initial position. Out of this confusion there began to emerge the notion of actual grace. The question arose, are there graces that are not habitual but which presumably could change our habitual state?

Aquinas was searching for a theological understanding of the manner in which God operates on the human heart of stone, removes it, cooperates with good will to give it good performance and yet respects human freedom. The theological understanding that was being pursued was closely related to the movement, in the different weeks, of the Ignatian exercises which Lonergan followed each year in his annual retreat and in the previous year had taken in their thirty-day day form. In November 1975 Harvey Egan gave a lecture in St Mary’s, Boston College, on consolation without a cause. Only then did Lonergan link the Ignatian Exercises with his dissertation on Aquinas:

I had been hearing these words (Consolation without a previous cause) since 1922 at the annual retreats made by Jesuits preparing for the priesthood. They occur in St. Ignatius’s “Rules for the Discernment of Spirits in the Second Week of the Exercises.” But now, after fifty-three years, I began for the first time to grasp what they meant. What had intervened was what Rahner describes as the anthropological turn, the turn from metaphysical objects to conscious subjects. What I was learning was that the Ignatian “examen conscientiae” might mean not an examination of conscience but an examination of consciousness: after all in the romance languages the same word is used to denote both conscience and consciousness, both Gewissen and Bewusstsein. I was seeing that “consolation” and “desolation” named opposite answers to the question, how do you feel when you pray? Are you absorbed or are you blocked? I was hearing that my own work on operative grace in St Thomas brought to

46 Caring About Meaning. 5-6.
life a positive expression of what was meant by Ignatius when he spoke of “consolation without a previous cause.” In Aquinas grace is operative when the mind is not a mover but only moved; in Ignatius consolation is from God alone when there is no conscious antecedent to account for consolation.\footnote{Letter to Thomas O’Malley, Dean of Arts and Sciences, Boston College, November 8\textsuperscript{th}, 1978.}

The remark shows the extent of the chasm between the spiritual life and theology at the time.

**OPERATION IN TIME**

A first step in Aquinas’s project was to think out in the most general terms the meaning of operation. Being operated on is a phenomenon that occurs at all levels in our universe, physical, chemical, biological, human, divine. We can ask the questions, what does an agent do and what can be done to it?, and our answers will be in terms of operations. To operate is to enter into a relation with an entity on which one operates. To be operated on is to enter into a relation of dependence on an operator. When an agent operates its operation produces an effect. So the question arises, does the production of an effect result in a change in the agent? It was Aquinas’s position that when the fire heats the meat or the musician makes music or the teacher teaches that all the change was in the object operated on. There does not occur any change in the operator.

Causes act in time. But for a cause to act effectively, that on which it operates must be predisposed to the operation of the cause at that particular point in time. So the wood must be brought to the axe, the hair to the scissors, a disposition to learn to the pedagogy of the teacher. What brings the object into the right relation or disposition with the cause is termed premotion by Aristotle and application by Aquinas.

How then does God pre-move or apply the subject so that his operation can produce a required effect at a given point in time? For Molina God would tailor his operation to the situation so the individual determined God’s providence. For Aquinas the answer was through providence and fate. He acknowledged Aristotle’s assertion of the *per*
accidens and that there could be no science for us of the accidental.\textsuperscript{48} The divine plan has a twofold existence. It exists in the mind of God and there it is termed providence. It exists in the created universe and there it is termed fate. God in his eternal providence understands exactly all the myriad of situations and circumstances which an individual will encounter in the course of his or her life. It is through those circumstances as providentially ordained that God premoves the individual. Later he will divide premotion into external and internal. According to Lonergan, God for Aquinas was a transcendental artisan planning history.\textsuperscript{49}

In the \textit{Summa}, Aquinas affirmed that by fate things are ordained to produce given effects. Fate is a cause in conjunction with natural causes. It is the disposition, arrangement, seriation of the order of secondary causes. It is not a quality and much less a substance but belongs to the category of relation. Together such relations give a single fate for the universe. Taken singly they give the many fates of Virgil’s life: "\textit{Te tua fata trahunt}."\textsuperscript{50} Application is then the causal certitude of providence terminating in the right disposition, relation, proximity between the mover and moved: without it motion cannot take place now; with it motion automatically results. Fate is the dynamic pattern of relations through which the design of the divine artisan unfolds in natural and human history. Without fate things cannot act. With it they do. Thus fate and application and instrumental virtue all reduce to the divine plan.

**REASSIGNED TO TEACHING IN MONTREAL**

On March 2\textsuperscript{nd}, 1939, as the European situation was worsening, the new Pope, Pius XII, took up office for what was to be a long and difficult reign. In April of 1939 in the middle of his work on the thesis, Lonergan communicated to his provincial his desire to return to Canada for the summer. He had been promised a trip to Canada, presumably after his Biennium was finished and before he took up his appointment as a lecturer in the Gregorian. He was now asking that the trip be brought forward. The provincial wrote to the General in Rome communicating his request commenting that he had been away for six years, was somewhat tired

\textsuperscript{48} Grace and Freedom, 79f.
\textsuperscript{49} Grace and Freedom, 86.
\textsuperscript{50} Grace and Freedom, 86.
and unwell, and felt that a trip to his native parts would refresh him. He made it clear that Lonergan was finding his exile hard but no mention was made of the fact that his mother was seriously ill, surely a strange and unusual omission.

The reply came in May turning down the request for the trip. It added that he was now to return to Canada after finishing his thesis and was to teach there for a number of years before taking up his appointment in the Gregorian. On September 1st Hitler invaded Poland. Two days later Britain and France declared war.

By Christmas of 1939 his mother’s cancer began to deteriorate. An operation was attempted in the New Year but was unsuccessful. So far away the one who had made him feel special, loved by God, died. Later he described the impact of the experience on him in a letter to Fred Crowe of December 21st, 1976, at the time of the death of Crowe’s mother:

The death of your mother keeps reminding me of the death of mine. It was in February 1940. I had been in Europe since 1933. Fr Vincent McCormick, rector of the Gregorian broke the news to me. He did it very nicely but I did not speak for three days. I guess I was in a minor state of shock.

Three months later, on May 1st, the thesis was handed in to the secretariat, suggesting that after suddenly being switched from epistemology, in which field he had been reading, to theology, Lonergan wrote the thesis in almost 18 months. On May 10th, just as Churchill came to power in Great Britain, Germany invaded the Netherlands and Belgium. After a flurry of consultations involving the Jesuit curia Lonergan was assigned an early date for his defense. As things turned out two days before that date he was forced to take the last boat leaving Genoa for New York, the Conti di Savoi, his thesis undefended.

EPILOGUE

It is interesting to note how the two agendas, of Insight and Method in Theology, which were taking shape in the two chapters of his years in the Gregorian fared. It is my belief that the outbreak of war, which accidentally moved him back to Montreal, enabled him to engage there
with the first agenda. After getting his thesis published and doing some intense work on economics he made the decision in 1943 to research the *Verbum* articles. This was followed in 1946 by the decision to compose *Insight*. A major factor in seeing that agenda through was his light teaching load. If, as was originally intended, he had stayed on in Rome in 1940 as a teacher of theology it is difficult to see the path to *Insight* following in quite the same way, if at all.

Somewhat to the dismay of the faculty in Toronto at the request of the General, he returned to the Gregorian in the autumn of 1953. He began to teach the tracts on the Incarnation and on the Trinity, courses that he had first taken in his student days in Rome. After *Insight* was published in 1957 and he got some notes in place for his courses he now started to address the question of method in theology, initially opened up for him in 1938-39. In his seminars, “On System and History,” and “On Understanding and Method,” he began to explore the nature of theological understanding.

At the beginning of the sixties Lonergan started to give courses on method in theology. For four years he assembled a huge phantasm but did not have the required insight. It came to him in February 1965 in the Gregorian. So it could be said that the seeds of the project of method in theology were sown and reaped in the Gregorian. The insight into the eight functional specialties in theology, combined with the later insight into the relation between theology and religion, became the basis of the book. In this we see the artistic rhythms of intellectual creativity in his life. He found himself being drawn into the problem of knowledge and as he was engaging with it was opened up to a wider problem. The circumstances of his life directed him back to finish the first problem before moving him to address the second. In the accidents which brought him here in 1933, which moved him from philosophy to theology, opened up the question of method in theology, returned him to Montreal in 1940, and brought him back in 1953 we see, I believe, what Aquinas meant by application clearly at work in Lonergan’s life.
FOllowing the Back of God: A Reflection on Lonergan’s Notion of Mystery

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"You Shall See My Back, But My Face Shall Not Be Seen"

In Exodus chapter 33 we behold an encounter of Moses with the Lord which is said to take place just before the chosen people are to leave Sinai and proceed further on their journey to the promised land. The atmosphere is charged not only with the tension of the proposed migration with all its hazards, but with the dynamic of the approaching and drawing back within the relationship of the man and his God. They stand in front of each other as a demanding (one thinks of the episode with the golden calf) but redeeming God, and a human who is in the process of learning God’s ways. They also stand together as named and named. Moses is known by his name by God and he has been told the name of God. Of central importance in this scene is the exploration of the presence of God, a presence without which the renewal of the journey is unthinkable. Moses is seeking an orientation within this divine presence. He needs not only to savor the intimacy but also to know the limits of the encounter; he needs to learn how much intimacy is being offered, or more correctly, how much he can handle.

His inquiring reaches its climax in the loaded request: "I pray

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1 The thoughts contained in this paper were presented to a discussion group “Lonergan and the traditions of negative theology” at the First International Lonergan Workshop, Rome, May 2001.
The Lord understands where the question is heading, understands its momentousness. The answer which comes is differentiated and measured. Not that it is measured in the sense of being in any way begrudging. Rather it is measured in the sense that it is carefully accommodated to the capacities of Moses to perceive God's glory.

I will make all my goodness pass before you, and will proclaim before you my name "The Lord"; and I will be gracious to whom I will be gracious, and will show mercy on whom I will show mercy. But, he said, you cannot see my face; for man shall not see me and live.3

The terribleness of God's glory emerges: it is impossible to grasp God and live. And yet in the next sentence this terribleness is counterbalanced by the condescending concern of God.

Behold, there is a place by me where you shall stand upon the rock; and while my glory passes by I will put you in a cleft of the rock, and I will cover you with my hand until I have passed by; then I will take away my hand, and you shall see my back; but my face shall not be seen.4

Was the encounter with God ever portrayed in more intriguing terms? Here is Moses sheltering in the cleft of the rock, shielded by the divine hand, cradled by the divine concern that the human might not survive a frontal encounter with the divine glory. And then the concession: you shall see my back, but my face shall not be seen.

THE KNOWN REMAINS UNKNOWN

The transcendence of God has been a matter of reflection for generations of Christian writers.5 The human cannot comprehend the divine essence.

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2 Exodus 33:18 (R.S.V. 1965).
3 Exodus 33:19-20.
4 Exodus 33:21-23.
5 A good introduction to negative theology is given by Deirdre Carabine's book, *The Unknown God: Negative Theology in the Platonic Tradition: Plato to Eriugena*.
This not due to any intrinsic lack of intelligibility in the divine essence, rather it is rooted in the limited capacity of the human spirit to grasp the infinite intelligibility of God. Negative theology considers the limitations of the human grasp of the divine on several levels. We may distinguish the inability to comprehend God, from the inability to conceptualize adequately that measure of knowledge which we have achieved, and further from an inability to speak adequately of this knowledge of God.

Now few “negative theologies” are purely negative. A purely negative theology would be condemned to silence. One way of distinguishing between what we can know, and what we cannot know about God is the affirmation that we can only know that God exists but not what God is. This distinction goes back to the writings of the Jewish first century author, Philo of Alexandria. It also plays an important role in the writings of the fourth century Cappadocian theologian, Gregory Bishop of Nyssa. He repeatedly emphasized that we cannot know what God’s essence is; we can only know that God is. Gregory’s presentation of the transcendence of God is rooted in his understanding of the divine essence as unbounded and infinite. For other authors it was not so much an ontology of the infinite God which concerned them but rather a reflection on the possibility of naming God. The most famous among the Christian negative theologians is the so-called Pseudo Dionysius Areopagita. In his work De mystica theologica he refers to an affirmative theology, and research has agreed that the distinction between affirmative speech about God and negative speech about God is given unique attention in his writings. In our affirmative speech we affirm something analogously of God, and in the negative speech we negate a predication of God. Thus we may engage “towards speech” about God or “away from speech” about

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6 Behind the pseudonym lies most probably a Syrian author of the late fifth and early sixth century. See Andrew Louth, Denys the Areopagite (London: Geoffrey Chapman, 1989; = Outstanding Christian Thinkers).

We may speak of “kataphatic” and “apophatic” theology. Since the divine essence is always more than what can be expressed by any term, negation is the truer form of speech about God. In his third letter, the Pseudo Dionysius considers the case of the enduring transcendence of God in light of the divine revelation to us in Jesus Christ. Here he claims that the mystery remains hidden both after the revelation of God in Jesus Christ and even amid this revelation: (καὶ μετὰ τὴν ἐκφάνσιν ἥ ἑνα τὸ θειοτέρον εἶπο καὶ ἐν τῇ ἐκφάνσει).9

Even after the incarnation, after the revelation of God in Jesus Christ, the Pseudo Dionysius claims that what has been spoken remains unsaid and what has been known unknown (ἀλλὰ καὶ λεγόμενον ἀρρητὸν μένει καὶ νοοῦμενον ἄγνωστον).10

At a first glance Bernard Lonergan might seem an unlikely candidate for inclusion in the train of authors reflecting on the transcendence of God. The calculating tone of his proof for the existence of God in chapter 19 of *Insight* and the detail of his analogy for the divine based on the content of an unrestricted act of understanding in that chapter, linger on in our memory. Yet even within *Insight* Lonergan mentions Aquinas’s position that of God all we have is knowledge that God is and knowledge of what God is not.11 This is a direct attempt to define the legitimacy and limitations of his own metaphysics and his analogy for God. However, it is indeed a fact that chapter 19 is not the most suitable place to witness Lonergan’s homage before the transcendence of God. I suggest that there are individual elements in his treatment of the notion of mystery which are more indicative of his respect for God as transcendent. Within this treatment of mystery even the early Lonergan approaches God in reverent acknowledgement that God will always remain, and must always remain, a “known unknown.” If we ask ourselves whether we are justified in emphasising the hints in this treatment of mystery, we may look to the later Method in *Theology* to see whether it offers confirmation

9 Epistula 3, Ritter, 159, 7.
10 Epistula 3, Ritter, 159, 9-10.
of these hints or adopts a completely different approach to the matter.

**MYSTERY THE "KNOWN UNKNOWN"**

In chapter 17 of *Insight* Lonergan investigates the sense of the unknown. Not any "unknown" is in question but, like the Pseudo Dionysius, Lonergan too speaks of a "known unknown." With his use of this paradoxical expression Lonergan indicates that unknown which, on the basis of what we do know, is intended by our questions for further knowledge. He is indicating a dimension of human experience that takes us beyond the domesticated and the familiar. The sphere of reality to which mystery belongs is attended by an "undefined surplus of significance and momentousness." 12

I suggest that Lonergan’s notion of mystery has applications on several levels. It might be used to investigate the depths of nature and indeed those depths of nature in which the hand of God is to be discerned. We can think of the poet’s discernment of the grandeur of God which charges the whole physical world. 13 Lonergan himself, in a passage treating the many fields in which the image as mystery arises, alludes to a possible discernment of mystery in the words and deeds of Jesus. 14 Let us then apply Lonergan’s notion of mystery to one scene in the Gospel, Jesus calming the storm in the fourth chapter of the Gospel according to Mark. 15

There are few natural phenomena which can rival the ability of a storm to communicate what mystery is. In such a storm scene the transition from the ordinary, from the domesticated to the extraordinary and the unpredictable is highly visible. Fisherfolk know their sea, be it an inland sea or a stretch of ocean, know where to expect a good catch, know how

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12 *Insight*, 556.
14 “To such images, then, let us give the name of mysteries. For if that is an ambiguous name, if to some it recalls Eleusis and Samothrace and to others the centuries in which the sayings and deeds of Jesus were the object of preaching and of reverent contemplation, still that very ambiguity is extremely relevant to our topic” (*Insight*, 571).
15 Mark 4:35-41 quoted from the R. S. V.
one may skilfully chart a course to the other side. And yet they do not know the sea. They too are occasionally shocked by the change which a sudden storm introduces into the landscape previously so familiar.

In the Gospel story, however, it is not the natural mystery which is most striking, but the mystery surrounding the person of Jesus. The scene is evening. At Jesus’ suggestion the disciples set off in a boat in order to reach the other side of the sea. “And a great storm of wind arose, and the waves beat into the boat, so that the boat was already filling.” In stark contrast to the turmoil and threat of nature is the behavior of the man from Nazareth. “But he was in the stern, asleep on the cushion.” His sovereignty in sleeping off shore, moreover in the midst of such immediate danger, irritates his disciples. “Teacher, do you not care if we perish?” He rebukes the wind and says to the sea “Peace! Be still!” And we are told the wind ceased, and there was a great calm. Of the disciples we are told “... they were filled with awe, and said to one another, “Who then is this, that even wind and sea obey him?” Ultimately their question is a “Who” question, the question of an identity deep with significance. It is the intention and partial revelation of the person of Jesus, man and God, Jesus the known unknown which is the climax of this story.

Now in his early account of the notion of mystery in Insight Lonergan gave several indications of the direction in which this notion would develop in his later writings. The first is that he was moving toward an intensified consideration of the concomitance of mystery and affectivity.16 Mystery’s function is not merely cognitive. Already in Insight he could write: “The achievement, then, of full understanding and the attainment even of the totality of correct judgments would not free man from the necessity of dynamic images that partly are symbols partly are signs.”17

The second is the role which the encounter with mystery plays in human authenticity. The finality inherent in the orientation to mystery belongs to the human as human; it is an intrinsic characteristic of each

16 “... it will be well to distinguish between the image as image, the image as symbol, and the image as sign. The image as image is the sensible content as operative on the sensitive level; it is the image inasmuch as it functions within the psychic syndrome of associations, affects, exclamations, and articulated speech and actions. The image as symbol or as sign is the image as standing in correspondence with activities or elements on the intellectual level. But as symbol, the image is linked simply with the paradoxical “known unknown.” As sign, the image is linked with some interpretation that offers to indicate the import of the image” (Insight, 557).

17 Insight, 570/571.
human being.\textsuperscript{18}

Let us now see how these two hints are taken up in \textit{Method in Theology}.

\section*{MYSTERY AND RELIGIOUS EXPERIENCE}

The great scholar of Christian and non-Christian Neoplatonism, Arthur Hilary Armstrong wrote:

"In considering the \textit{via negativa} it is important to distinguish between the apophatic method of intellectual approach to God, or negative theology, and the experience of supreme transcendence (which is also deepest immanence) which impels to and is undergone in the search for... the Divine mystery beyond speech or thought."\textsuperscript{19} In \textit{Method in Theology} Lonergan’s treatment of mystery is firmly linked to the sphere of religious experience.\textsuperscript{20}

Religious experience is according to Lonergan an experience of the love of God flooding our hearts. On the dynamic state of being in love he writes: "Because the dynamic state is conscious without being known, it is an experience of mystery. Because it is being in love, the mystery is not merely attractive but fascinating; to it one belongs; by it one is possessed. Because it is unmeasured love, the mystery evokes awe."\textsuperscript{21} Here the affective side of the fascination of mystery receives the attention that was present in inchoate form in \textit{Insight}.

In \textit{Method in Theology} the proof for God’s existence and the analogy for the divine essence are complemented by an account of the question of God and the human questing for God. It is here that the hint in \textit{Insight} arising from the finality of the orientation to mystery, the link between

\textsuperscript{18} On page 557 of \textit{Insight}, Lonergan speaks of a “directed but, in a sense, indeterminate dynamism.”


\textsuperscript{20} This paper cannot treat Lonergan’s writings on those “mysteries so hidden in God that man could not know them if they had not been revealed by God.” \textit{Method in Theology} (London: Darton, Longman & Todd, 2nd edition, reprint, 1975), 349.

\textsuperscript{21} \textit{Method in Theology}, 106.
A Reflection on Lonergan’s Notion of Mystery

the full human development and the orientation to divine mystery, clearly emerges:

“Man’s transcendental subjectivity is mutilated or abolished, unless he is stretching forth towards the intelligible, the unconditioned, the good of value. The reach, not of his attainment, but of his intending is unrestricted.”

The next sentence shows that this intending is ultimately an intending of the divine: “There lies within his horizon a region for the divine, a shrine for ultimate holiness.”

He speaks of a native orientation to the divine.

SUBLATED CONVERSIONS

In the later writings of Lonergan, intending the divine involves a holistic actualization of the human subject engaging the cognitive, moral, and religious levels of human intentionality. The later Lonergan was interested in the conscious appropriation of the subject of itself operating on each of the four levels of consciousness intentionality. He also came to speak of the phenomenon of conversion. By this term he indicates a vertical exercise of freedom involving a movement into a new horizon significant enough to involve a radical new beginning.

In particular Lonergan speaks of three major conversions, intellectual, moral, and religious. Intellectual conversion involves a rejection of the myth that knowing is like looking. Instead one attains a critical judgement of self-affirmation, “I am a knower,” wherein the three operations of cognitive activity, reaching a climax in the judgement, are affirmed. In moral conversion the shift is from a state of drifting to the dawning realization that one is responsible for one’s own actions. One realizes that one is responsible not only for the actions but consequently for who one is. Religious conversion, Lonergan writes is “being grasped by ultimate concern. It is other-worldly falling in love. It is total and permanent self-surrender without conditions, qualifications, reservations.”

22 Method in Theology, 103.
23 Method in Theology, 103.
24 See Method in Theology, 237/238 and following.
25 Method in Theology, 240. For a critical discussion of Lonergan’s notion of religious conversion, see my The Liberation of Consciousness: Bernard Lonergan’s Theological Foundations in Dialogue with the Theological Aesthetics of Hans Urs von
Now there is a dynamic interaction of the conversions. Lonergan speaks of the interrelations of the conversions in terms of the “sublation” of one conversion by another. The sublating conversion goes beyond the sublated conversion, introduces something new and distinct, yet it doesn’t interfere negatively with the sublated. On the contrary, not only does it need it, but it includes it and carries forward all the proper features of the other conversion to a fuller realization.26. Now one interaction to which Lonergan devotes particular attention is that of religious conversion and moral conversion. When a subject’s heart has been flooded by the love of God that person experiences an intensified discernment of value and their decision making is carried forward to a new realization and the richer context of a love relationship with God. The moral life becomes the life of following, of discipleship. This richer context also becomes the context within which the subject seeks truth in general and the truth about God in particular. Both the religious conversion and the moral conversion “sublate” the intellectual conversion of the subject. Expressing Lonergan’s thought concretely we may say that in the thus converted subject, questing becomes a longing for the loving God, and just who that God is, God’s identity as it were, is hinted at by the very demands the divine love makes on those following as disciples.

PUTTING ON CHRIST

Readers who approach Lonergan through his major works Insight and Method in Theology may be surprised to learn that a strong Christological spirituality is evident in his essays. The essay “The Mediation of Christ in Prayer” is outstanding in its emphasis on the mutual influencing of Christ and the Christian in the life of faith.27 Now by “prayer” Lonergan was not merely indicating the moments which one spends in explicit or exclusive devotion to the divine – in daily prayer or a liturgy or in a meditative reflection. Rather he invokes the “Pray constantly” of I


26 Method in Theology, 241.

Thessalonians 5:17 and explains how the orientation to God extends to all our activities:

In loving our neighbor we are loving Christ. In making ourselves good Christians and better Christians we are loving Christ. In this process, which is universal, which can regard every act, thought, word, or deed, and omission, there is a complete universality, a possibility of the complete growth of every aspect of the person.

All our activities are made holy by the orientation to Christ and in this way we grow in human perfection. What is emphasized in this essay more than in other writings of Lonergan is that it is the object, the person of Christ, who inspires this growth:

And in that growth, not only is there the mediation of the subject by his acts, but the acts have as always an object, and in that object the center, the focal point, is Christ.

The life of prayer is individual in its form. All the polymorphic and individual acts of living may be embraced within a prayerful orientation to Christ. An individual collage of acts centering on Christ may thus emerge. The fruits which the life of prayer bears are also of an individual nature: it fosters authenticity. “The acts of living and the acts within prayer are referred to Christ. By that process we perfect ourselves, we become ourselves, we become autonomous individuals.”

In living toward Christ, in this mediation of Christ in the prayer-filled life, we put on Christ as model and intended object of our love. This experience of following Christ is intensely personal:

It is Christ, not as apprehended by the apostles, by Paul and John, by the church, by Christ himself, by the Spirit; it is our own apprehension of him. It is, as it were, putting on, acquiring, our own view of him. We put on Christ in our own way, in accord with our own capacities and individuality, in response to our own needs and failings.

Now the personal and the traditional are not opposed to each other

28 Thessalonians 5:17.
in this process but are presented by Lonergan as complementary. This putting on Christ "... has its foundation in tradition and revelation, but it arises from what is immediate in the subject. It develops in response to the capacities, the needs, and the growth of the subject."

Lonergan uses not only the biblical metaphor of putting on Christ, which expresses our cooperation with grace, but he also draws on a beautiful image expressing our radical reliance on Christ: that of being carried along:

One is becoming oneself, not just by experiences, insights, judgments, by choices, decisions, conversion, not just freely and deliberately, not just deeply and strongly, but as one who is carried along.

REACHING OUT TO GOD

Over one thousand six hundred years ago, Gregory Bishop of Nyssa reflected not only on the great mysteries of our faith thereby taking part in the trinitarian and pneumatological controversies of the fourth century, but he also reflected on the human journey to God, on spirituality. In particular his Commentary on the Song of Songs is a reflection on the Christian interior life. Now he too drew attention to the dynamic outreach of the human to the infinite God, exhorting his readers “not to stop in your tracks at the grasped but ever to seek more and not to stay put at that which has already been grasped.” Again, commenting on 1 Corinthians 8:2, he points out that in the case of knowledge of God it is always so that the not yet understood is infinitely more than that which has been understood: αὐτῇ... τὸ μήπω κατειλημμένον ἀπειρόπλασιον τοῦ καταληφθέντος εστὶ...
Using the famous image of a spring ever issuing forth out of the ground with fresh water and ever surprising its beholder with an unending supply of water, Gregory writes that the human wonders at the continuing revealing of God and is consumed by the desire to know more than that which has already been grasped. 37

Thus Gregory of Nyssa is one of the tradition’s best exponents of the human questing in the light of the divine mystery.

**FOLLOWING THE BACK OF GOD**

Gregory commented explicitly on the verse of Exodus with which I opened this paper. His commentary is not a critical exegesis but rather an interpretation, an interpretation steeped in experience of the spiritual journey. What is this mysterious seeing God’s back he asks? His answer is one of the finest descriptions of the interplay of discipleship and contemplation which the Christian tradition has bequeathed us:

> The one who desires to see God, 
> sees the desired one through ever following 
> and the contemplation of His face 
> is the never ending going-towards-Him realized through closely following the Word.” 38

The expression “the back of God” is understood as an indication that the longing for God is never ending. It is an affirmation of the infinity of our quest for God and the infinity of the divine essence. Those contours of the divine that we are gifted to recognize are given to us in the Word, and in the Word as approached through discipleship. Desire, the thirst for more, is also highlighted and the process of following, the ever-going-towards-Him.

Gregory resolves the riddle of seeing God’s back in terms of the circumincession of following and contemplation. The never ending

37 See In Canticum canticorum homiliae, Langerbeck (ed.), GNO VI, 321.
38 ...δ' ἰδεῖν τὸν θεόν ἐπιθυμῶν ἐν τῷ αἰεὶ αὐτῶ ἀκολουθεῖν ὡρὰ τὸν ποθούμενον καὶ ἣ τοῦ προσώπου αὐτοῦ θεωρία ἐστίν ἢ ἀπαυστος πρὸς αὐτὸν πορεία διὰ τοῦ κατόπιν ἐπεσαθή τῷ λόγῳ κατορθουμένη. In Canticum canticorum homiliae, Langerbeck (ed.), GNO, VI, 356.
In this paper I have traced how Lonergan’s understanding of the encounter with mystery underwent a development. It grew from an account of a “known unknown” into an account of the encounter with the mystery that God is which occurs at the privileged nexus of religious and moral experience which we call the life of discipleship. In the later writings of Lonergan the encounter with mystery is the encounter with the love of God, a love which is approached by seeking His ways and following the Word. Christ is the object of many of our acts but not of all of them. But as Lonergan points out, for the religiously converted Christian all our acts are somehow related to Christ. In our measured moral decisions and in our discerning of value we are putting on Christ. Through moral uprightness we approach Christ through our very following and thus grow in knowledge of ourselves and of God.

Tracing this development is not in itself revolutionary. It is part of the development within Lonergan’s thought which many scholars have traced. I suggest however that less attention has been devoted to Lonergan’s thematization of spirituality and that the task of establishing a dialogue between Lonergan’s position on the Christian life and that of other writers remains a task at hand. Bringing Lonergan’s spirituality into dialogue with the scripturally rooted tradition of spiritual writings is not chiefly concerned with comparing the exegetical methods of the respective authors. Rather the more significant task which is outstanding today is the comparison of their respective accounts of the conscious human outreach to God.

The comparison with Gregory of Nyssa suggested itself because, among the early writers reflecting on God’s transcendence, he in particular thematized the dynamic outreach of the human to the infinite God. Secondly, because the nexus of discipleship and contemplation which is suggested by at least some of Gregory’s texts bears comparison with Lonergan’s position that the ultimate context for mystery is the religiously converted consciousness understood as sublating not only the moral horizon but also the intellectual horizon of the subject. Gregory’s
metaphor for this, the biblical seeing the back of God, was chosen as the theme of this paper. It suggests the circuminsession of religious, moral, and intellectual experience in the Christian experience of following.

Over one thousand six hundred years of academic reflection and shifts in methodology separate the two authors, Bernard Lonergan and Gregory of Nyssa. And yet I would point out that over one thousand six hundred years of lived discipleship, of relentlessly reaching out to God and reflecting on that outreach span that century wide chasm. We may read their (in many ways disparate) texts as thematizations of the one Christian life with its outreach to the mystery of the infinite God.
EMERGENT PROBABILITY
AND THE ANTHROPIC
PRINCIPLE

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In the fourth chapter of *Insight*, after having described the two basic heuristic structures of empirical method (the *classical*, the network of the individuation of systematic correlations in the data of experience, and the *statistical*, turned toward the determination of probability schedules in random groups of events), Lonergan distances himself as much from the traditional determinist views of classical physics, as from the more recent indeterminist views of quantum physics; and he proposes the general intelligibility of our empirical universe in terms of an emergent probability.¹

Starting indeed from the basic notion of *scheme of recurrence* (a circular group of events where the specific conditions for producing each one of these provide for the emergence of all the other events pertaining to the scheme) and, upon further consideration, of a *conditioned series of schemes of recurrence* (which agrees with assessing the intelligibility of the statistical type, inasmuch as it regards the emergence and survival of the schemes), Lonergan constructs an interpretative model, called emergent probability, in relation to the whole universe of experience. Since the model forecasts the modifications in the probability schedules,

based on the progressive realization of the conditions predicted by the conditioned series, it will be the case that a universe governed by emergent probability is capable of guaranteeing the emergence of particularly complex schemes of recurrence, given that adequate spatial and temporal parameters are assured.

At the basis therefore of the effective probability for the emergence in our universe of an exceedingly complex phenomenology, such as that provided by animal and plant biology, Lonergan hypothesized very large spatio-temporal dimensions along lines of the then prevailing cosmological theory, the so-called *stationary state*. This theory availed itself of the authority of Albert Einstein who, having rather arbitrarily introduced a *cosmological constant* into the equations of general relativity, could describe our empirical universe as extended indefinitely in space and time, and as substantially uniform on a grand scale. Only in restricted regions and for limited periods of time is the possibility opened up for complex lines of evolution, but these did not present any real significance for the whole, which always appeared to be in equilibrium.

In following out the exposition, based always on his epistemological analyses, Lonergan had a way of further enriching the interpretative model of emergent probability. Indeed, in chapter 8 of *Insight* he speaks about a generalized emergent probability: the emergent tendencies are not limited to ensuring the appearance of schemes of ever more complex events in accord with progressive probability schedules, but they also assure the emergence of *genera* and *species* of things characterized by growing complexity. Then, in chapter 15, with the account of the notions of finality and development, he could take into consideration the concrete evolutionary sequence, which is conducive from the great variety of biological life-forms to the emergence of the animal psyche and subsequently to the intentional dynamisms characteristic of intelligent life. This *anthropic finalization* no doubt supports this construction of integrated knowledge that Lonergan calls "the metaphysics of proportionate being," but it also opens up an entire series of problems and aporias.

Speaking of the human being in the concreteness of its historical existence, Lonergan highlights the intrinsically dialectical character of human living. History, indeed, attests not only to authentic human development and achievements, but also, and with great frequency, to the striking failures and aberrations; as a result, if the hermeneutic
horizon remains the purely naturalistic one of immanentist closure, it is especially difficult to give this emergence of intelligent life a finished meaning. For Lonergan, indeed, the theoretical solution of the problem posed by the historical development of the human being is attained with the recovery of the metaphysical framework of creation, proper to the Christian philosophic tradition, and with the recognition of the importance and meaningfulness of religious experience.

Consistently with this plan, in writings after *Insight*, Lonergan explicates a general theorem, open to renewal and to an enrichment due to the knowledge proper to faith: the theorem of progress-decline-redemption (whose explanation I obviously pass over2). But the potentiality of this plan can at length also to be grasped in other directions: in the capacity, for example, to interact with the great paradigm-changes that have occurred in the field of science in the decades following *Insight*. I am referring obviously to the new cosmological theories, and more particularly, to the formulation of an *anthropic principle* in the area of cosmology, to which I now would like to turn attention.3

1. THE IMPACT OF THE NEW COSMOLOGICAL THEORIES

Exactly because the decades after the publication of *Insight* have witnessed a radical paradigm-change in the field of cosmology (a transition indeed from the *stationary state* to the evolutionary view associated with the *Big Bang*),4 one has to inquire what are the repercussions all that can imply for the interpretative framework provided by Lonergan in his great work. More particularly: to what extent is the scheme of a *generalized emergent probability* proposed by Lonergan compatible with the formulation of an *anthropic principle* in the area of modern scientific cosmologies?

First of all, one must observe that the cosmological theory of the

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stationary state, although noted by Lonergan, remained somewhat in the background and, as far as discourse about the whole is concerned, could be evaluated only on the level of "secondary minor premises." Lonergan himself makes this clear in chapter 14 *Insight*, when he speaks about the methodological control that it is possible to maintain when confronted by discourse about the whole. Moreover, Lonergan, precisely in virtue of the scheme based on *emergent probability*, was led to rehabilitate the category of *finality*, understood not in the sense of an "extrinsic final cause" (as it was in the Aristotelian paradigm) but, consistently with the canon of relevance employed by modern empirical knowledge, above all as the acknowledgment of a fact: that our universe is not completely static and repetitive, and is open to the emergence of complexity in accord with successive schedules of probability. In other words, even though he had no way of using scientific arguments to overturn the cosmological theory still accepted at the time, Lonergan was not quite ready to take on all the baggage of its tacit presuppositions, not least its rather evident immanentist closedness.

More particularly: whereas in the stationary state framework the emergence of biological complexity and of an anthropic phenomenology came to be calmly interpreted as marginal events, not influencing any "scientific" comprehension of the whole, Lonergan limited himself to noting that this was the prevailing scientific view at the moment⁵; but he was not quite ready to develop a discourse about the whole on this basis alone. This was because the discourse regarding the whole, typical of Lonergan's metaphysics, ultimately found its presuppositions and its criteria not in scientific theories, but in the dynamisms of conscious intentionality, which posits the basic hermeneutic horizon that is thematized by Lonergan as the universe of being. Fully consistent with the foundation of his critical epistemology, therefore, Lonergan distances himself from the immanentist closure of scientistic rationality, which identifies the real *tout court* with the empirical universe studied on the basis of empirical inquiry. No wonder, therefore, that in chapter 14 of *Insight*, Lonergan introduces the category of *finality*⁶ by redefining it, and considers the human mind – above all, the human being precisely

⁵ "[...] there has been suggested a correlation between the expanding universe and the emergence of additional energy. If that happens to become accepted, [...]": *Insight*, 469.

⁶ Cf. *Insight*, 470-76.
as person—a term related to the finality intrinsic to world processes, capable of disclosing new horizons of meaning and achievements.

Just for this reason, confronted with Lonergan’s overall plan, I do not find it so incongruous to speak of an implicit anthropic principle (in line, among other things, with Thomas Aquinas’s anthropocentrism), except that cosmological anthropic principle is not properly treated, but an anthropic principle that is grounded, in the final analysis, only in the context of a metaphysics of creation and of Christian theology (where it becomes a Christological principle).

2. ANTHROPIC FINALIZATION

The entry in the last decades of the nineteenth century of the cosmological theory of evolution (especially the standard Big Bang one) and the new formulation of a cosmological anthropic principle doubtless represent a great novelty, even in the cultural sphere. The new cosmological theory, indeed, furnishes evidence not of a generic evolutionary process, characterized by the emergence of things and schemes of recurrence in accord with successive schedules of probability (as interpreted by Lonergan in the 1950s: in the sense that if determinate prior conditions are realized...then the emergence of a sequence of more complex events acquires a probability schedule such that if negative elements do not intervene...then that which is probable occurs sooner or later...in virtue of which ...and so forth); but it provides evidence for an evolutionary process in which the concrete possibility that especially complex sequences emerge is connected with the presence of very special conditions in the original situation and/or of laws and basic constants, that characterize the basic laws (for which, if the initial conditions and/or laws would have been slightly different, then there would not be able to be produced the further events, which, for the sake of understanding, are indispensable for the emergence of a life based on carbon).

While the interpretative scheme of an “emergent probability” that Lonergan elaborated by way of the most fundamental heuristic structures of empirical science, which is limited to forming hypotheses

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for sufficiently frequent and diffuse elementary processes, such that emergent probability could then progressively select ever more complex lines of evolution, the recent cosmological theories assign great importance to the characteristics of the initial situation and/or laws and basic constants, with the result of providing an ever more compact and unitary description of the cosmic process, conditioned not only by what is produced in the first “three minutes,” but decisively oriented instead toward a series of specific realizations culminating in the emergence of life based on carbon and in the emergence of the observer: intelligent life. All this seems to imply a much more forceful use of the category of finality. In fact the question spontaneously arises: does the cosmic process not realize a precise program? But how may one justify this finalization of cosmic evolution in the direction of the observer without transcending the methodological limitations of scientific knowledge and without recognizing in the mind an ontological character that assures it an undiscussed preeminence?

But another problem also imposes itself by reason of aporetic loose ends. While the emergence of intelligent life in the context of cosmological evolution indeed seems to offer a meaning for the self-same cosmo-biological evolution, still, considered on a cosmic scale, this emergence is presented as fragile, and seemingly ephemeral. Verification of this can lead to the formulation of an entire series of hypotheses, which, however, gain their plausibility from profound presuppositions and general frameworks that often are fully implicit. It is at this point that the critical and constructive contribution of Lonergan’s metaphysics can be evaluated in that it allows us to confront these problems with an effective methodological control, which guarantees a profound integration among different kinds of scientific knowledge, philosophical criticism, and theological perspectives.

3. BEYOND COSMOLOGICAL ANTHROPOCENTRISM

There are those who liked to regard this recent formulation of the anthropic principle in the field of cosmology as a confirmation of the unquestioned supremacy of scientific knowledge which is now capable both of tackling the problems regarding meaning and of offering a
complete and definitive vision of reality. If, in fact, the emergence of intelligent life within cosmic evolution would render the whole process perfectly self-consistent, dispensing one from searching for further metaphysical foundations, especially for those who would credit a transcendental reference, a creator God or an organizing Super-Mind, then the immanentist closure of scientific questioning would be definitively established.

We could say that the stupendous commitment provided by scientific rationality in its attempt to comprehend the empirical universe today has resulted in a strongly unitary vision of the cosmos that is compact, and not yet definitive; but if it is true that now one can already completely recount its past evolutionary history, and if the same aspects of causality can be seen to function for the emergence of order and complexity, it is certainly capable of reinforcing the conviction that the universe that exists is a highly intelligible one – a universe, therefore, whose characteristics definitely orient one toward the expectation of complete intelligibility.

However, – and this is the challenge that emerges today within the scientific commitment itself – intelligent life increasingly appears to be the focal point of cosmological evolution. This is an emergence that can not only give meaning to all previous development, but also open up interesting prospects for the future. If this emergence should suddenly cease, or extinguish itself (by accident, say, the impact of giant meteorites, or, perhaps more probably, some type of inner implosion brought about by human beings), before it can fulfill its real cosmic function, everything would end without providing any meaning at all, thus actually frustrating that spontaneous anticipation of a fulfilled intelligibility. It is at least significant that not a few scientists are pessimistic about such an eventuality.

In brief: the very scientific exercise of Galilean-Laplacean methodology, which was applied to separate the intelligibility of natural processes definitively from problems of meaning and from the anthropological implications, is now leading to its own supersession due to the self-assertion of unavoidable questions concerning the field.


9 See, for example, what S. Weinberg writes almost at the end of his best seller, *I primi tre minuti*, Italian trans. (Milano: Mondadori 1990, 170): “The more the universe seems comprehensible, the more it seems without purpose.”
of nature and the field of subjectivity at the same moment: questions of meaning, of value, of appealing to responsibility.¹⁰

Such radical questioning not only motivates philosophical intelligence (capable of taking on new stimuli and vigor from the problems raised by scientific knowledge today), but also can move theological minds, by overcoming the cultural marginality which assessed the overall development of Western culture negatively. This is all the more the case because while, for example, in the nineteenth century the global attitude of the Catholic church when meeting the cultural challenge of modernity would appear to have been one of clinging to traditional positions, in the second part of the twentieth century this attitude has changed decisively toward dialogue and critical confrontation at every level and in all directions.

But it is not only a question of learning to dialogue in all fields. There are fundamental problems to be confronted and solved, overcoming the closures and absolutisms of the various rational “figures” not only differentiated, but also (and very often) opposed within Western modernity. If, in fact, the scientific view of the cosmos is the only valid one, the only one with an explanatory character, then we would have no means to overcome the immanentist closure and the naturalist interpretation of the human phenomenon: the explanatory principle of the real would be furnished by the situation of the start of the cosmic process and its fundamental rules alone; everything would already be “written in stone” and the freedom and morality of the person would make no sense. In fact, immanentist closure constrains one to map a complete functionalization of the individual onto the history of the species, and a functionalization of the species onto the history of cosmic evolution. But if – as a theological reading of the real (but also a renovated creationist metaphysics) testifies – the explanatory principle transcends world process, then the situation of the start of the cosmic process and its fundamental laws can be limited to providing only the conditions of possibility for the truly important event to be produced: namely, that of an existing being which, despite having been drawn from the dust of the earth, hears the call of the eternal, and incarnates the need

for a total intelligibility and an infinite perfection precisely because it reveals the ontological depth of a mind, and is not totally reducible to the "stuff" and dimensions of the cosmos.

We could talk, at this point, of theological anthropocentrism, of an anthropocentrism that imposes itself necessarily on the viewpoint of creation. If, in fact, all creation is from God, and finds in God its ultimate explanation and its unavoidable reference point, the creation also finds its full meaning in reference to the free creature, to the human being who is called to speak the universe, but who, above all, is called to recognize his/her Creator and reply to the Creator in an interpersonal relationship.

At this point, philosophical and theological reflections can play the role of a higher critical demand to sound the implications and presuppositions of the new anthropic view. Theology can with great satisfaction certainly take note of the connection between cosmological evolution and emergence of the intelligent life, inasmuch as it is not unlike the fundamental biblical doctrine of the creation; and it can maintain that the sharp opposition often assumed to be operative between the anthropic principle and the theistic principle is the result of the diffused immanentist prejudice. At the same time, such a theology remains quite reluctant to consider intelligent life, as it has emerged and developed historically on this planet, a sure guarantee of progress. The strength of the theological intervention regards the fact that human history, in its turn, poses new and disturbing questions. Scientific rationality usually ignores or wrongly judges this point, because it is still too conditioned by the optimism of Enlightenment and positivist views. But, coming from long before, theology has always reflected on the life of human beings. It knows well that the heart of the human being is evil or, at least, that there exists an inevitable propensity toward evil in the heart of human beings. Above all, intelligent life cannot be reduced to a mere superior technique for solving problems (i.e., to "intelligent elaboration of information"), without completely misunderstanding the human being; on the contrary, it opens up an ethical dimension of human existence as well as a religious one, at the same time as it also opens up the abysmal possibilities of evil and of sin, even to the extreme point of the demonic.

Without any doubt, the human world of flesh and blood, of culture and science is a tragic world. This unavoidable tragic dimension of human existence has to be grasped at a profound level, if one wants to put the figure of Christ in the right light. In fact, Jesus of Nazareth is not
just a religious prophet, or just the founder of the Christian religion, or the one who reveals the correct way to behave to be pleasing to God. Jesus Christ is “God-saves,” the redeemer of human beings, the revealer, in an ultimate way, of God’s saving and regenerating love.

Therefore, the anthropic principle is at least revealed to be incomplete: it has an absolute need to be corrected by and integrated into what we could call the “christological principle.” We must not forget that Christ becomes the universal savior and revealer through the event that brings his existence to fulfillment. The cross planted in the world of human beings is not, indeed, a marginal event, just another incident in history. On the contrary, it is the center of all the creation.

4. A POSSIBLE DIALOGUE

Today theology has an opportunity to mediate into the contemporary cultural context the central datum of Christian faith by entering into a fruitful dialogue and positive confrontation with scientific knowledge, reorienting the expectations about the human being and the cosmos toward a future of absolute transcendence, a future that, even in its mysteriousness, maintains the concreteness of flesh and blood because, as the Easter announcement proclaims, “The Lord has risen indeed!” This announcement is the good news delivered to the poor of the world and to all human beings of good will, and it is capable of illuminating every situation of existence, precisely because it opens up the future, the definitive future.

Against every apocalyptic catastrophism and every nihilism, therefore, St. Gregory of Nazianzus’s fundamental anthropology – “All that is assumed is saved” – is of utmost value to theology as well as to believing faith. In an integral vision illuminated and enriched by the datum of faith, the future will therefore not be the washing away of this material universe (hypothesized by recent cosmological theories), against which one could oppose only the “community of pure spirits”; but, rather, the future is the community of the resurrected, the new Jerusalem, which

12 Luke 24:34.
13 Ep. ad Cleodium.
means the definitive form of this unique creation, in which there shines forth the glory of the Resurrected One – the “Pantocrator” Christ – which assures unity, fullness, and beauty to all things.

In some measure, therefore, this theological understanding seems to be capable of taking on the definitive view of the original project and of speaking in a new way about creation and the place of the human being in creation. However, just this critical awareness proper to a mature theology imposes the duty on today’s theologian to discriminate carefully between the datum of faith and its manifold cultural expressions (not excluding those codified in the Scriptures), and to mediate appropriately such a datum with autonomously elaborated scientific and philosophical knowledge.

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LONERGAN'S THE INCARNATE WORD AND THE TRIUNE GOD: EXPERIMENTS IN THEOLOGICAL METHOD

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For twenty-five years, the prime of his working life, Bernard Lonergan was a professor of dogmatic theology, the first thirteen years at Jesuit seminaries in Canada and the last twelve at the Gregorian University in Rome. Not surprisingly, he described his basic viewpoint at the time as that “of a believer, a Catholic, and, it happens, a professor of dogmatic theology.” In this capacity he taught the tracts *De Verbo Incarnato* and *De Deo Trino* at the Gregorian in alternate years, from 1953 to 1965, one tract or the other in the fall semester, following it in the spring semester with a graduate seminar on method in theology. Coming in the pivotal period between *Insight* and *Method in Theology*, this “healthy dialectic between the two types of courses” was, Frederick Crowe has maintained, “an indispensable condition” for Lonergan’s life-project of developing a method for theology. Thus Lonergan utilized the courses as experiments in theology, employing the cognitional theory he had expounded in *Insight* even as he was forging the methodology he was to

2 The only exception was 1964-65, when he taught *De Verbo Incarnato* for a second year in a row.
INTRODUCTION

Although Lonergan utilized his teaching of the tracts on the Incarnate Word and the Triune God to derive a method for theology, he also recognized that this method was itself a means to do theology: an instrument to facilitate collaboration among theologians in their common task of understanding and communicating the significance of the Christian religion for modern culture. Hence, the treatises Lonergan produced for his tracts on the Incarnation and the Trinity deserve to be examined, not just for the use to which Lonergan put them in deriving a method for theology, but in themselves, as testaments to Lonergan’s performance as a theologian, if not also as harbingers of the results to be expected from adopting his methodology.

In evaluating the treatises, though, there is a major caveat to be observed. Lonergan himself conceded, in retrospect, that only “chunks” of the treatises would be “permanently valid.” Why? Because he had produced them under duress and had never completed them to his own satisfaction. They were, he said, a “practical chore,” imposed upon him by the “hopelessly antiquated” requirement at the Gregorian that

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5 Verbum, 223; idem, Method in Theology (New York: Herder and Herder, 1972), xi.
7 Lonergan’s Latin works are now all out of print, with the possible exception of De Constitutione Christi Ontologica et Psychologica, ad usum auditorum (Rome: Gregorian University Press, 1956, 1958, 1962, 1964).
a professor of dogmatic theology provide textbooks for his courses, despite the "totally invalid" expectation that he demonstrate expertise in every field they comprised – from the Old and the New Testament, to the church fathers and medieval scholasticism, to the Renaissance, the Reformation, and contemporary philosophy.8 For about the first half of his tenure in Rome, Lonergan managed to retain the manuals of his predecessor, Charles Boyer, as the official texts for his courses, augmenting them with mimeographed supplements on certain fine points of speculative theology and mimeographed student notes of his lectures.11 In addition, he published, first for De Verbo Incarnato and then for De Deo Trino, monographs on the systematic part of each tract.12 But as Boyer’s manuals went successively out of print, Lonergan had then to publish his own treatises for the entirety of both tracts. For De Verbo Incarnato, the best Lonergan could manage, before illness curtailed his career at the Gregorian, was several editions of a printed typescript of notes for the course.13 But for De Deo Trino he was able to bring his


work on the treatise to approximate completion, first by publishing the analytic part of the treatise,\textsuperscript{14} and then by combining revised versions of both the analytic (now called the dogmatic) part and the systematic part in a two-volume publication of the entire treatise.\textsuperscript{15} So, in the end, Lonergan tended to disparage his treatises as a bit of unfinished business, which, besides, had presented from the start with an impossible task.

But apart from Lonergan’s own reservations about the ultimate worth of his two treatises, there is some reason to regard them with a critical eye. As he was writing them, Catholic theology, and indeed the entire Catholic Church, was undergoing a cultural transformation, only some aspects of which he was able to assimilate at the time. As he was among the first to recognize, this was a transformation from the classicist, post-Tridentine, antimodernist, and Neo-Thomistic \textit{mentalité} espoused and enforced by the papacy since the mid-nineteenth century to a historicist, existential, and ecumenical \textit{aggiornamento} endorsed and promoted by Vatican II (1962-65).\textsuperscript{16} In the field of Scripture, Lonergan opted instead to return to the economics he had set aside since the 1940s: see Crowe, \textit{Lonergan}, 104.


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certainly welcomed Pius XII’s authorization, in Divino Afflante Spiritu (1943), of Catholic exeges to adopt a modern hermeneutic to determine the literal sense of Scripture, arguing on his own part for the necessity of a “positive,” in addition to a “dogmatic,” interpretation of scriptural texts. He also integrated some of the best of contemporary Catholic biblical scholarship into the scriptural theses in his treatises. Yet in his New Testament interpretation, Lonergan failed to exploit the use Catholic exeges were making of source, form, and redaction criticism, just as he neglected to differentiate among the three Sitzen im Leben – of Jesus himself, the apostles, and the sacred authors – that the Pontifical Biblical Commission (in 1964) advised Catholic exeges to take into account in determining the historical truth of the Gospels. Much less did he make use of the work of Protestant exeges. Of the “First Quest for the Historical Jesus” Lonergan took little note, alluding to its participants simply as “more recent adversaries.” And the “New Quest for the Historical Jesus” he simply ignored, even as it was changing the landscape of New Testament interpretation while he was writing his treatises.


17 DDT/D, 5-14.
18 See, for example, his citations of Lagrange, Cerfaux, Lyonnet, Gelin, Benoit, and Stanley in DDT/D, index.
20 DVI, 5-13.
By contrast, Lonergan employed the wealth of historical scholarship precipitated by the 1500th anniversary in 1951 of the Council of Chalcedon to defend the authority of this and other ecumenical councils to define the doctrines of the Incarnation and the Trinity. To enrich the theological understanding of the conciliar definitions, he not only undertook a reconstruction of Aquinas’s medieval analyses of both doctrines in the metaphysical terms of “person” and “nature,” but complemented it with his own modern analyses of the doctrines in the psychological terms of “subject” and “consciousness.” Concomitantly, Lonergan waded into the contemporary controversy over Christ’s consciousness, sparring with a raft of opponents while making a brilliant contribution to the discussion. Yet as Lonergan departed from Rome in 1965, ending his career as a dogmatic theologian, the renaissance of theological scholarship sparked by Vatican II was about to break the mold of the neo-scholastic manual and take both Christology and Trinitology in new directions, in the process outmoding the form and challenging the content of Lonergan’s treatises.

Still, despite Lonergan’s own reservations about his treatises, his De Verbo Incarnato and De Deo Trino remain important works, meriting careful study, not just for their historical significance but for their permanent value – in form as well as content. In form, Lonergan’s contribution was to complement the scholastic and neo-scholastic systematic or (synthetic) format of the treatises with an historical (or analytic) component. Boyer had already begun to move in this

22 DVI, 103-212; DDT/D, 113-248.
23 CC/L, 57-82, 100-48 and DVI, 211-313; DP, 52-91, 165-87 and DDT/SL, 65-114, 186-93.9.
24 DVI, 269-312.
26 Lonergan gave a running commentary on his project to add an analytic counter-
direction, dividing his manual on the Trinity between a demonstration of
the existence of the mystery from New Testament and patristic sources
and an elucidation of the nature of the mystery based on St. Thomas
Aquinas's *Summa Theologiae*. But in his manual on the Incarnation,
Boyer simply adopted Aquinas's systematic (or doctrinal) order, as well
as his theological analysis, for his theses. Lonergan, instead, after
creating for either treatise a sophisticated systematic component based
upon his Thomistic cognitional theory, sought to formulate an historical
counterpart, leading from the New Testament sources for the doctrines
of the Incarnation and the Trinity, to the patristic and conciliar dialectic
generative of both doctrines, to an appreciation of the mysteries inherent
in the doctrines. Only for the treatise on the Trinity, however, was he
able to bring this project to virtual fruition. Yet in *Method in Theology*
he was able to distill the methodological implications of this effort,
particularly in his division of theological scholarship into an analytical
and a synthetic phase and in his accounts of the functional specialties of
history and doctrines. "All my work," Lonergan was later to say, "has
been introducing history into Catholic theology."

In addition to reforming the structure of a theological treatise,
Lonergan made substantial contributions to theology in each section
of both treatises—scriptural interpretation, the development
of doctrine, theological understanding, and philosophical foundations
—each representing a more comprehensive framework. In scriptural
interpretation, Lonergan adopted a modern critical approach, basing
his "dogmatic" interpretation of the sources of Christian doctrine upon
a "positive" interpretation of the authors' intentions, thereby making
exegesis, under the umbrella of positive theology, an integral part of
theology and a complement to dogmatic theology. In the development
part, and, more generally, a historical component, to medieval systematic theology in
contemporary lectures and articles ("Theology and Understanding," in *Collection*, 121;
"Theology and Man's Future," in *A Second Collection*, 135-48), as well as in the introductions to the evolving treatises. See also Crowe, Lonergan, 80-99.

28 Boyer, *De Verbo Incarnato*, 5.
29 For a detailed account of the process, see Boly, *Road to Lonergan's Method in
Theology*, 84-107, 171-75, 197-243.
31 See J. M. O'Hara, ed., *Curiosity at the Center of One's Life: Statements and
See also Crowe, Lonergan, 80-99; Tracy, *Achievement of Bernard Lonergan*, 189-96.
of doctrine, he employed a dialectic to demonstrate, on a first level, the authenticity of the development of Christian doctrine, from its origins in the New Testament to its definitions in church councils and papal decrees, and, on a second level, the simultaneous growth of an implicit acceptance of doctrinal development, from early Christianity to the modern world. In theological understanding, where Lonergan was in his element, he sought to vindicate for theology the function not just of corroborating the truth, but of understanding the meaning, of Christian doctrine, while he also pursued a method for coordinating positive theology (biblical and historical) with dogmatic and systematic theology into a self-validating hermeneutical circle, with reciprocal phases of analysis and synthesis. In philosophical foundations, the cognitional theory he had forged in the _Verbum_ articles and _Insight_ provided him with the matrix for the method he gradually elaborated in producing his treatises—a method he himself applied only to theology, but one he believed was capable of unifying all of the liberal arts.32 The core problematic, the unifying theme of these four contributions, was what Lonergan called the central problem of modern theology: how to introduce historical scholarship into the field while developing a method that would prevent it from falling into modernism.33

**1. CRITICAL INTERPRETATION OF SACRED SCRIPTURE**

In his interpretation of the New Testament, Lonergan employed “a critical understanding of the evidence” as opposed to a “precritical belief in testimony,” while he also sought to vindicate a “dogmatic” interpretation and its complementarity to a “positive” interpretation. In a critical understanding of the evidence, as he later explained, “one is concerned to differentiate stylistic features, discern successive strata, and compose a history of the synoptic tradition.” By contrast, with a precritical belief in testimony, “the greatest emphasis will be placed on the words of Jesus Christ himself, for they are supremely credible.”34

making this distinction, Lonergan was deliberately departing from the approach Charles Boyer, his predecessor, had taken in his manuals on the Incarnation and the Trinity, and allying himself with the approach contemporary Scripture scholars, Catholic as well as Protestant, were taking in their interpretation of the New Testament texts.

At the same time, Lonergan differentiated the dogmatic interpretation, critical though it was, that he thought dogmatic theologians should give of New Testament texts from the positive interpretation, complementary to it, that he recognized to be the proper approach of Scripture scholars. By a dogmatic interpretation he meant the mode by which dogmatic theologians could respect Pius XII’s declaration in *Humani Generis* that “the noblest task of theology is to show how doctrine defined by the church is contained in the sources...in the very same sense in which it has been defined.”35 A positive interpretation, on the other hand, meant, he said, the approach biblical exegetes took in giving a historical interpretation of texts in terms of the author’s own words and intentions. A mutual recognition of the complementarity of these two modes of interpretation, Lonergan contended, could bind biblical exegetes and dogmatic theologians as collaborators in the one discipline of theology as members of the respective subdisciplines of positive and dogmatic theology. In addition, it would enable them to present a united front against modern errors in both biblical interpretation and theological speculation.36

First, let us identify the modern errors in scriptural interpretation that Lonergan sought to oppose. Then we will be in a position to appreciate why he thought a collaboration between biblical exegetes and dogmatic theologians in their respective modes of interpreting the New Testament would be the antidote to these errors. Thirdly, we shall inspect an example of his own use of dogmatic interpretation. With that done, we can assess the success of his endeavor.

There were three sets of modern errors in interpretation that Lonergan opposed, all of them deriving, he said, from a lack of sensitivity to historical context and doctrinal development.37 In increasing


36 DDT/D, 7-14.

degrees of gravity, they were *positivism* and *conceptualism*, *archaism* and *anachronism*, and *historicism* and *rationalism*. *Positivism* and *conceptualism* were the deficiencies Lonergan deplored among modern Catholic theologians for what he believed was their hesitancy about or resistance to a differential but complementary methodology for theology. *Positivism* was the reproach he directed at biblical and patristic exegetes, who, he thought, were directionless, wandering here and there or idly amassing huge heaps of information, useless for establishing the origins of church doctrine in Scripture or tradition. The counterpart, for which he criticized systematic theologians, was the *conceptualism* they displayed in philosophical speculation about and deduction from church doctrines, without either drawing upon the scholarship of biblical exegetes and church historians to establish the authenticity of these doctrines or trying to understand them, as the First Vatican Council recommended, by analogy to natural processes or else by the interconnection of the mysteries among themselves or their connection to humanity's final end. The consequence, Lonergan suggested, was a dichotomy within Catholic theology between two mutually exclusive forms of methodological myopia.\(^38\)

A more basic set of errors, *archaism* and *anachronism*, was what Lonergan thought typically divided Protestant from Catholic theologians. By *archaism* – characteristic, he asserted, of Protestant theologians – he meant an assumption that only the commonsense terminology of the New Testament was apt for expressing revealed truths, together with a condemnation of conciliar definitions and scholastic theology as corruptions – stages in an illegitimate hellenization – of the biblical message. The contrary error of *anachronism* – distinctive, Lonergan believed, of Catholic theologians – was the presumption that the terms of conciliar definitions and papal decrees must and could be found explicitly in the words of the New Testament itself. The ensuing mutual disrespect of Protestant and Catholic theologians derived, Lonergan concluded, from their shared disregard of the historical development – cultural, theological, and doctrinal – from the commonsense language and particular circumstances of biblical revelation to the theoretical articulation in conciliar statements of its universal import.\(^39\)

Beyond the pale of errors Lonergan thought common to Christian

\(^{38}\) *DDT/SL*, 17, 36, 50-51, 58.

\(^{39}\) *DDT/D*, 19-20, 119, 158; *DDT/SL*, 51.
theologians were what he called the modern and secular ideologies of *historicism* and (semi)rationalism. Under the rubric of *historicism* Lonergan excoriated the kind of critical or scientific historiography that on empiricist or relativist grounds discounted a priori the possibility of the Bible being a medium of supernatural revelation. The contrary errors he denounced were *rationalism* and *semirationalism*, the former of which being the presumption that the truths of faith were all discoverable by reason alone, the latter that they were fully intelligible once they were revealed. From neither perspective, Lonergan contended, was it possible to interpret the Bible on its own terms, as a historical artifact, necessary and sufficient for the revelation of the supernatural mysteries of the Christian religion.

The antidote Lonergan prescribed for these modern errors of interpretation was an inclusive conception of theology, comprising both positive and dogmatic functions, apt for reconciling the differences within Catholic theology between biblical exegetes and speculative theologians. Positive theology and dogmatic theology, Lonergan argued, should be seen as subdisciplines — differentiated by end, object, and method — within the single discipline of theology. Whereas the end of positive theology would be to grasp the sense, the intention, and the doctrine of an author — biblical, patristic, conciliar, papal, scholastic, modern, or contemporary — in all their nuances, the end of dogmatic theology would be to establish how a doctrine defined by the church could genuinely be found in the positively interpreted sources of revelation. Likewise, while the object of positive theology would be to obtain a concrete understanding of the individual intentions and actions of particular historical figures in their own cultural contexts, the object of dogmatic theology would be to analyze these intentions and actions as potentially

40 *DV*1, 7-13; *DDT/D*, 115-16; *DDT/S*, 43-44.
42 In a contemporary lecture, Lonergan differentiated these two complementary ideals of exegesis more generally as “romantic” and “classical”: the “romantic” being an effort to plumb the entire psychic richness of the text by feeling “one’s way into the author’s soul, into his imagination, his mind, his emotions, his will, his mode of speech”; the “classical,” aiming at “a meaning that is more intelligible, more accessible, than that of the original text,” because one “transposes the original text to a mode of thought and speech common to all men insofar as they are rational.” See “Exegesis and Dogma (1963),” pp. 142-59 in *Philosophical and Theological Papers 1958-1964*, ed. Robert C. Croken, Frederick E. Crowe, and Robert M. Doran, vol. 6 of Collected Works of Bernard Lonergan (Toronto: University of Toronto Press, 1996).
universal objects of faith, communicable to every culture. Finally, although the methodology of positive theology could not help devolving into a manifold of specializations in particular authors or fields – each to be studied meticulously, on its own terms, in a gradual, self-corrective process of understanding – the method of dogmatic theology would, by contrast, have the single function of culling from the results of positive theology whatever could clearly and certainly be said at a given time to authenticate the derivation of church doctrine from revealed sources. For this collaboration between the positive and the dogmatic functions of theology to succeed, Lonergan warned, the one thing necessary on both sides was sensitivity to historical context and doctrinal development.\(^{43}\)

An example from Lonergan’s treatises will illustrate the benefits he anticipated from a prospective collaboration between biblical exegetes who embraced their role as positive theologians and speculative theologians who, correspondingly, saw themselves as dogmatic theologians. In both *De Verbo Incarnato* and *De Deo Trino* there are theses in which Lonergan gives a dogmatic interpretation of New Testament texts informed by positive interpretations from biblical exegetes. In *De Verbo Incarnato*, the theses concern the hypostatic union, Christ’s personal grace, and the redemption;\(^{44}\) in *De Deo Trino*, they pertain to the consubstantiality of the Son with the Father and to the divinity and the procession of the Holy Spirit.\(^{45}\) The best example is, perhaps, the thesis on the hypostatic union, the first and the fundamental thesis of *De Verbo Incarnato*.

The thesis, as Lonergan states it, is: “From the teaching of the New Testament it is evident that one and the same Jesus of Nazareth is a true man, participates in multiple divine prerogatives, and is true God.” To clarify the intent of the thesis, he cites Pius XII’s pronouncement in *Humani Generis* that the noblest task of theology is to show how a doctrine defined by the church – in this case the dogma of the Council of Chalcedon that one and the same Jesus Christ is true God and true man – is contained in the New Testament “in the very same sense in which it has been defined.” By “man” in the statement of the thesis, Lonergan says he means simply what is, by common consent, truly judged to be a man (that is, a human being) – not some abstruse hylemorphic conception of humanity as a composite of body and soul. By “God” he says he means

\(^{43}\) *DDT/D*, 5-14, 228-30; *DDT/SL*, 22, 28-29, 31-32.

\(^{44}\) *DVII*, Thesis 1 (2-103), Thesis 11 (313-32), and Thesis 15 (443-82).

\(^{45}\) *DDT/D*, Thesis 1 (113-54), Thesis 2 (155-77), and Thesis 4 (216-48).
the God of Abraham, Isaac, and Jacob, as conceived and acknowledged in both the Old and the New Testaments, but with the recognition of the New Testament distinction between the Father and the Son. The thesis itself – that Jesus of Nazareth is a true man (a true human being), participates in multiple divine prerogatives, and is true God – is not, Lonergan admits, expressed in so many words in the New Testament, but is a certain kind of conclusion: not, to be sure, a logical deduction from New Testament truths to another truth, but a correct understanding and explicit statement of a truth implicit in a complex set of New Testament texts.46

This is a thesis, Lonergan cautions, that has to be defended against a host of adversaries – inveterate, ancient, and modern. The inveterate adversaries (pagans, Jews, and Muslims) simply deny the divinity of Jesus of Nazareth. The ancient adversaries (Gnostics, Ebionites, Adoptionists, Arians, Apollonaris, Nestorians, and Monophysites) were those who opposed, for one reason or another, the conciliar definition as an authentic rendition of the New Testament teaching about Jesus. And a vast array of modern adversaries (rationalists, idealists, positivists; historicists, subjectivists [including existentialists], fideists; and modernists) deny that the New Testament can, as a historical document, authenticate the divinity of Jesus Christ.47

The heart of the thesis is, of course, Lonergan’s demonstration of its truth. Before tackling the demonstration itself, Lonergan delineates the factors within the distinctive New Testament mode of conceptualization from which it is to be elicited. The first factor is the parallelism in the New Testament between, on the one hand, a gradual differentiation between God as Father and God as Son within the biblical conception of the God of Abraham, Isaac, and Jacob and, on the other, a progressive recognition of the divinity of Jesus Christ as the Son of God. The second factor is the various literary schemes the New Testament authors chose to depict the progressive revelation of Christ’s divinity: the prospective scheme adopted by the Synoptic gospels for the life of Christ; Paul’s retrospective scheme for anticipating the glory of the risen Christ in the description of his earthly life; the inverse retrospective scheme by which Paul and John assimilated both the historical Jesus and the risen Christ to the preexistent Image or Word of God; and the synthetic scheme into

46 DVl, 2-3, 37.  
47 DVl, 3-16
which Paul integrated all of the other schemes. These schemes confirm
the historicity of the New Testament as the product of a complex process
by which apostles and disciples gradually came to a belief in Christ’s
divinity only as they also came to distinguish between Father and Son
in their conception of God. An appreciation of the function of these
schemes precludes both the anachronism of expecting to find the decree
of Chalcedon expressly stated in the words of the New Testament and the
archaism of clinging to the words of the New Testament to the point of
repudiating the conciliar decree. 48

With the table set, Lonergan then employs the distinctive
conceptualization of the New Testament in a tripartite demonstration of
his thesis. First, Jesus of Nazareth is true man (truly human): see how
the New Testament both depicts Jesus acting as a human being and
explicitly describes him as a human being. Secondly, Jesus participates
in multiple divine prerogatives: see how the New Testament represents
Jesus announcing the kingdom of God, dying and rising from the dead,
destined eventually to return in glory, but meanwhile reigning in heaven
at the right hand of the Father, even as he existed before his earthly life
and indeed at the creation of the world. Thirdly, the same Jesus is true
God: see how the New Testament attributes to Jesus the names, titles, and
honors unique to God and even invokes quasi-theological terminology
– in Paul, the Epistle to the Hebrews, and John – to affirm the unity and
equality of Jesus with the Father, as the Image, the Word, and the Son of
God. 49

How successful was this interpretation? Certainly, Lonergan’s
method of interpretation, exemplified in the cited thesis, represents a
giant step beyond the method to be found, for example, in the parallel
thesis in Charles Boyer’s De Verbo Incarnato. There Boyer, without any
reference to the definition of the Council of Chalcedon, attempted to
demonstrate through a “precritical belief in testimony” – essentially a
fundamentalist interpretation – that the New Testament says explicitly
Jesus Christ was “the natural Son of God and true God.” In a simulation of
oral testimony, he cites the texts in which Jesus is presented as testifying
to being the Son of God and the apostles are presented as testifying to
their belief in his testimony – without any consideration of the layers of
tradition behind the text of the New Testament or any question about

48 DVI, 19-37; see also DVI, 76-77; DDT/D, 98-112, 162-65, 181.
49 DVI, 37-102.
the authentic meaning of the term “Son of God.” Boyer simply takes the word of Jesus and his disciples that Jesus was “the natural Son of God and true God.”

In contrast to this anachronistic interpretation, Lonergan undertook a “critical understanding of evidence” — essentially a hermeneutic interpretation — to show that the New Testament implies that one and the same Jesus of Nazareth was, in the sense intended by the Council of Chalcedon, true God as well as true man (human being). Instead of attempting to approximate direct contact with the oral communication of the ipsissima verba Jesu, he accepted the New Testament as text mediating through the literary conventions of its authors the primitive Christian community’s recollections of the import of Jesus’ words and deeds. His argument proceeded from the texts describing and affirming Jesus’ humanity, to the texts attributing to Jesus a participation in certain divine prerogatives, to the texts containing the literary schemes that New Testament exegetes had discovered in Paul, the Synoptics, and John for declaring their belief in a unity and equality between Jesus and the Father. This is persuasive evidence for the conclusion that the New Testament does indeed imply the same truth, with the same meaning, as the explicit statement of the Council of Chalcedon that one and the same Jesus Christ is true God and true man (human being).

Yet Lonergan’s own interpretation suffers from his failure to have taken advantage of certain contemporary advances in New Testament scholarship that would have enhanced the solidity and sophistication of his thesis. He did not allude to either the First or the New Quest for the Historical Jesus. What makes this oversight especially serious is that the point of the thesis, as even Charles Boyer had recognized in his statement of it, is in part to demonstrate that “the historical man, known by the name Jesus Christ, is the natural son of God, and true God.” Likewise, Lonergan did not incorporate into his demonstration of the progressive revelation of the divinity of Christ the progression (recognized by biblical exegetes and commended by the Pontifical Biblical Commission) from the Sitz im Leben of Jesus himself, to that of the primitive Christian communities, and thence to that of the New Testament.
In ignoring this development, Lonergan failed to base his dogmatic interpretation of the progressive revelation to the early Christian community of Jesus’ divinity upon the best available positive interpretation by biblical exegetes. In this fundamental thesis on the combination in Jesus of both humanity and divinity, Lonergan, although he incorporated some of the positive interpretations of biblical exegetes, did not fully exemplify the rapprochement he advocated between positive and dogmatic theologians in the interpretation of the sources of Christian doctrine in the New Testament.

Yet Lonergan’s brief for collaboration between the prospective and connotative interpretation of the New Testament by biblical scholars and the retrospective and denotative interpretation of it by dogmatic theologians does seem to be the only way to avoid anachronism or archaism in the authentication of Christian doctrine. Biblical scholars can preclude archaism by recognizing that the Christian tradition, particularly in the ecumenical councils, could articulate in technical terms the same truths, with the same sense, as were expressed in the ordinary language of the New Testament. Correspondingly, dogmatic theologians can avert anachronism by recognizing that the truths synthesized in the compact and universalistic formulas of conciliar definitions could be found only implicitly in the multiple and culturally specific schemes of the New Testament authors. Only thus can the development of doctrine in the ecumenical councils be defended against the charge of betraying the message of the New Testament and the message of New Testament be rescued from the criticism of being an outmoded belief of an obsolete culture.

2. THE DIALECTICAL DEVELOPMENT OF DOCTRINE

While Lonergan sought to show in his dogmatic interpretation of the New Testament that conciliar dogmas were contained in the New Testament in the same sense in which they had been defined, in his account of the development of doctrine his intent was, conversely, to show that New Testament teachings had remained the same truths with the same meanings even as they underwent the cultural and theological

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53 See note 19.
adaptations culminating in their conciliar definition as dogmas. His argument was, in effect and probably in intent, a Newman-like via media between the opposed “Catholic” position of Vincent of Lérins (ca. 434) and the “Protestant” position of Adolph von Harnack (1851-1930). Vincent’s contention had been that there was no essential development of doctrine between the New Testament and the councils: the orthodoxy of conciliar dogma was guaranteed by the fact that it was what everyone in the church had always and everywhere taught – in contrast to heresies, which were local and idiosyncratic innovations denominated after their inventors. Harnack argued, on the contrary, that there had been a radical development of dogma from the New Testament to the councils, but the development had been a temporary if perhaps necessary evil, for in defining dogmas to curtail heresy the church had unfortunately Hellenized the New Testament by transforming the simple gospel of Jesus into a set of spurious metaphysical theories. Lonergan split the difference between Vincent’s anachronism and Harnack’s archaism. He argued that there had indeed been a development from New Testament teachings to conciliar dogmas, but that the development had preserved the truth of the teachings, while altering the register of their meaning, from ordinary to technical language.

Lonergan’s argument for a real but authentic development of doctrine comprised four elements: an analysis of the dynamic complex of the components of doctrinal development, a dialectic of the development of the Christological and Trinitarian dogmas, an epitome of the historical stages of doctrinal development, and an incipient theory of its legitimacy.


Lonergan analyzed the dynamic complex of doctrinal development into four components: objective, subjective, estimative, and hermeneutic. The objective component was the transition from the documents of the New Testament – with their multiplicity of literary schemes, couched in a blend of ordinary and literary language, addressed to the whole person – to the conciliar creeds and canons – with their compression of multiple scriptural schemes into single fundamental concepts, couched in technical terms (homoousion, for example), congenial to an intellectual mentality. The concomitant subjective component was the change in horizon from the undifferentiated consciousness of the New Testament authors and their readership to the intellectually differentiated consciousness of theologians and conciliar fathers. The dialectic propelling this change of consciousness was the participants' reciprocal estimation of their respective efforts to transform the ordinary language and Jewish mentality of the New Testament into the technical terminology and Hellenistic mentality of church doctrine. Governing the entire development was the recursive hermeneutic according to which the comparative personal authenticity of the participants governed their estimation of the correctness of one another's interpretations of the New Testament. Hence, Lonergan contended, the underlying unity in doctrinal development – amid cultural shifts, differentiations of consciousness, and reciprocal estimations – was the word of God as true, operating in the minds of the participants to inspire their quest for personal authenticity.

Faced with this dynamic complex, dogmatic theologians could not be satisfied. Lonergan argued, simply to rehearse what the participants knew and intended in their contributions to the development of Christological and Trinitarian dogma. They also had to employ a heuristic structure capable of detecting the underlying dialectic by which the participants unwittingly and implicitly contributed, not just to the development of doctrine, but to the very idea of doctrinal development.

Lonergan therefore employed such a heuristic structure to analyze the dialectic of the development of Christological and Trinitarian...
doctrine from the New Testament to the Third Council of Constantinople (681), and on to the Council of Lyon (1274).60 In a nutshell, the dialectic, as Lonergan traced it, was from the naïve or uncritical realism of the New Testament authors and apostolic fathers (position), through the Stoic materialism and Middle-Platonist idealism of the heretics (counterpositions), to the dogmatic realism of the church fathers and the ecumenical councils (position).61 At issue was the interpretation of the labile, if not ambiguous, Greek terms for nature (phusis), substance (ousia), hypostasis (hypostasis), and person (prosopon) in representing the truth of the New Testament teachings about Jesus Christ and the Trinity. In the nature of the case, this dialectic amounted to a certain Hellenization of New Testament teaching.

Yet within this Hellenization there was a split between the orthodoxy of the conciliar fathers and the heresy of their adversaries.62

60 The model for this approach was the dialectic Lonergan had earlier employed in Insight (chaps. 14 and 17) to contrast the positions and counterpositions in fundamental philosophical conflicts, and that later he was to incorporate it into Method in Theology (chap. 10) as a functional specialty for the resolution of fundamental conflicts of historical interpretation. It consists in opposing two conceptions of knowledge, objectivity, and reality: self-fulfilling positions vs. self-refuting counterpositions. In the positions, knowledge is conceived of as a grasp of the truth in virtually unconditioned judgments; objectivity, as a consequence of intelligent inquiry and critical reflection; and reality, as the concrete universe of being knowable through truthful judgments. In the counterpositions, knowledge is conceived of as a perception of reality; objectivity, as a consequence of extroversion toward external reality; and reality itself, as the already out there now. In De Deo Trino, Lonergan drew upon this heuristic structure to argue that the orthodoxy of the conciliar definitions was the reward of an implicit adherence to the positions, whereas the heresies anathematized in the canons of the councils were the sequels of an implicit emboliment in the counterpositions (DDT/S, 40-112).

61 Here again, Lonergan seems to have mediated between the traditional supposition, associated with Vincent of Lérins, that orthodoxy was original, while heresies were novel deviations, and the recent claim by Walter Bauer (in Orthodoxy and Heresy in Earliest Christianity, trans. and ed. R. A. Kraft and G. Krodel (1934; Philadelphia: Fortress, 1971) that heresies arose first, precipitating the response of orthodoxy. In fact, Lonergan’s position is remarkably similar to the current scholarly consensus rejecting the paradigm of a dichotomy between “orthodoxy” and “heresy” in favor of a paradigm of “internal renewal and dissent,” according to which Christian doctrine eventually crystallized from an initial variety of competing options, some of which won official approval while others were condemned: see Sheila E. McGinn, “Internal Renewal and Dissent in the Early Christian World,” II, 893-906, in Esler.

The Hellenization of New Testament teachings by the conciliar fathers, Lonergan showed, consisted in adapting these teachings to the differentiation of consciousness into the theory and common sense that had occurred in Hellenistic culture because of "the Greek discovery of mind." This adaptation entailed transposing the ordinary language of New Testament teachings into the technical language of conciliar dogmas while keeping the truth and the meaning the same. By contrast, the Hellenization of New Testament teachings by the heretics, Lonergan demonstrated, consisted in an embrace of the false philosophies of Stoicism or Middle Platonism as a medium for interpreting these teachings, to the detriment of their meaning and truth. Consequently, the heresy of the heretics consisted in subordinating the truth of New Testament teachings to the premises of Hellenistic philosophy. In the dialectic of doctrinal development, therefore, the conciliar fathers interpreted the meaning of the Greek terms for nature, substance, hypostasis, and person in fidelity to the truths of the New Testament, whereas the heretics construed the truths of the New Testament to conform to the meaning of these terms in Stoic or Middle Platonist philosophy.

In retrospect, Lonergan demonstrated, the results were predictable. To the question of who was Jesus Christ, the false philosophies of heretics agree with Lonergan that the alleged Hellenization of Christianity implicit in the conciliar definition of dogmas was more like a "dehellenization" because it rebutted the Hellenization explicit in the heretical subordination of New Testament truths to Hellenistic metaphysical theories.


In the conciliar decrees, therefore, *homoousion* and *dyophysitism*, though technical terms, carried no philosophical baggage, so that their use did not entail an adoption of Hellenistic ontology: *DDT/S*, 50.
led them to deduce either that Jesus must be two persons because he had two natures or else that he must have had either a human or a divine nature because he was just one person. In the question of what was the Trinity, they were similarly induced, because of their false philosophies, to conclude either that God was one person because God had a single substance or that God had three substances because God was three persons. By contrast, the church fathers and the ecumenical councils remained orthodox, Lonergan argued, by hewing, despite their precritical realism, to an implicit dogmatic realism: an affirmation in technical terms of the truths expressed in ordinary language in the New Testament, without adducing any extraneous philosophical explanations.

At Nicaea (325), the dogmatic realism of the conciliar fathers led them to define that *homoousion* expressed in a single technical term the same truth about the equality of Jesus’ divinity to that of the Father as the New Testament had expressed in multiple schemes couched in ordinary language. Likewise, at Chalcedon (451) the conciliar fathers defined that *hupostasis, prosopon, and phusis* could express in technical terms the same truth about the one Jesus Christ being both divine and human as the New Testament had also expressed in ordinary language. Hence, Lonergan concluded, the dogmatic realism of the conciliar definitions stated in universal terms the same truths as were expressed in the culturally specific terms of New Testament naïve realism, whereas the heresies condemned in the canons of the councils were the regrettable issue of the empiricism or idealism peculiar to the false philosophies of Late Hellenism.

To illustrate the emergent methodological issue of doctrinal development, Lonergan added to his analysis of the components of doctrinal development and his dialectic of the particular development

66 DVI, 105-212.
67 DDT/D, 17-75.
68 Lonergan argued that the use of the technical terms as heuristic devices (that is, without any precise philosophical meaning) to affirm the truths of the New Testament was an implicit development of Christian realism, while adding that the subsequent discussion about the realism of such use of the terms was the origin of “Christian philosophy”: see Bernard Lonergan, “The Origins of Christian Realism (1961),” pp. 80-95 in *Philosophical and Theological Papers*; idem, “The Origins of Christian Realism (1972),” in *A Second Collection*, 239-262.
69 DDT/D, 75-87, 113-54; see DVI, 105-211.
70 DDT/D, 178-215.
71 DDT/D, 19-22, 87-112; DDT/SL, 50.
of Christological and Trinitarian dogmas a synopsis of the stages of doctrinal development throughout the history of the church.\textsuperscript{72} The theme of his story was that the participants in the process, unable to foresee the outcome, did not realize they were engaged in the development of doctrine, much less in the creation of the idea of doctrinal development, and thus, understanding little about what they were actually doing, had even less to say about it. Now it was time, Lonergan said, to reflect upon and objectify the process.\textsuperscript{73} Lonergan selected four incidents in successive eras to illustrate his point.

The first incident was the Arian controversy, in which the overt substantive issue was whether the Son of God was a creature, but the underlying methodological issue was whether a confession of faith could be made in any but biblical terms. So when the Council of Nicaea adopted the technical term \textit{homoousian} to resolve the dispute, St. Athanasius justified it as an exception to the rule. But the unforeseen consequence was that henceforth there was a tacit acceptance of technical terms, like \textit{homoousian}, for resolving doctrinal disputes insoluble in New Testament terms.\textsuperscript{74}

In a second incident, the official action of the Council of Chalcedon was to condemn Severus of Antioch as a Monophysite for claiming Christ had only one nature while charging the council itself with Nestorianism for declaring Christ had two natures. But in condemning Severus, the council implicitly rejected the legitimacy of his appeal to a certain faction of church fathers for his contention that "\textit{phusis}" signified a complete and concrete being. The Monophysites seem, therefore, to have rejected the council's definition, not so much because of a doctrinal error about the number of natures in Christ, as because of a methodological dispute about the propriety of interpreting scriptural terms according to particular kind of patristic diction.\textsuperscript{75}

Then, in the Middle Ages, Augustinian theologians accused their Aristotelian rivals of jettisoning Augustine's (and other church fathers') theological teachings for pagan philosophical theories. The problem was, though, that the Augustinians failed to recognize the methodological

\textsuperscript{72} Frederick Crowe points to this survey as Lonergan's first extended excursus into the relation between history and theology, an issue that would become paramount for him in \textit{Method in Theology} (Crowe, Lonergan, 88).

\textsuperscript{73} \textit{DDT/SL}, 47-48.

\textsuperscript{74} \textit{DDT/SL}, 48-49.

\textsuperscript{75} \textit{DDT/SL}, 49.
distinctions between optional theological interpretations and the mandatory truths of the faith and, more generally, between understanding the natures of things and judging the truth of such insights. Yet by the end of the thirteenth century even they came, in practice, to realize that the theoretical (read Aristotelian) terminology of systematic theology was a valuable tool for clarifying the meaning of New Testament teaching and patristic tradition. 76

Finally, in the modern era, the methodological issue, latent in all of the previous incidents, became manifest. In the face of Enlightenment rationalism, theologians resisted adopting a method for theology that would enable them to collaborate with one another in tracing the development of the truths of faith from their sources in the Bible, through Christian tradition, to their interpretation in modern terms. This was the blind spot Lonergan believed had precipitated the contrary errors bedeviling theology: positivism and conceptualism, arcaism and anachronism, historicism and rationalism. 77 Only a complete and comprehensive methodology, he contended, could enable theology to both differentiate and integrate the functions of positive, dogmatic, and systematic theology. 78

In the meantime, Lonergan began to identify, within his tracts on the Incarnate Word and the Triune God, elements for a theory of doctrinal development. It was a coaxial theory, with two poles and two interconnecting filaments. Of the two poles, one was a matter of faith, the other a matter of experience. One pole was divine providence, which, Lonergan believed, promoted a fruitful understanding and

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76 DDT/SL, 49-50.
77 See above, notes 37-41.
78 DDT/SL, 50-53. With this epitome of the history of doctrinal development Loner
gen sketched the background to his own predicament as a dogmatic theologian at the Gregorian University in Rome at mid-twentieth century: there he was, attempting to teach the entire tracts on the Incarnate Word and the Triune God – inclusive of scriptural sources, historical development, and theological elaboration – because theology lacked a method for instituting a division of labor among theologians in their common task of interpreting the mysteries of faith in modern terms. Thus, as he dealt with the substantive issues of Christological and Trinitarian theology, he was also envisioning the method he thought theology needed to become a modern scientific discipline. In Method in Theology he would propose a method he believed capable of enabling both the comprehension of the development of doctrine from the New Testament to the modern era and the formulation of an understanding of Christian doctrine appropriate to contemporary culture.
truthful definition of the inexhaustible riches of revealed mysteries. At
the same time, he conceded, it also permitted misbegotten conceptions
and false (that is, heretical) assertions about these mysteries, but only so
that, ultimately, the greater good of a clearer understanding and a firmer
confession of the mysteries might prevail. Thus Lonergan credited the
Holy Spirit for the dialectic that eventuated in the infallible certitude
of conciliar definitions. The matching pole Lonergan adduced was the
manifest pressure of constant cultural change, churning up ever new
challenges to the elucidation and communication of revealed truths. Thus
Lonergan pointed to the shifts in the expression of revealed truths from
Hebrew to Hellenistic thought-forms, from ancient to medieval culture,
and from the Middle Ages to the modern world.

Of the two interconnecting filaments Lonergan instanced, one was
positive and the other negative. The positive filament was the natural,
and supernaturally enhanced, human desire to understand the meaning
and know the truth of revealed mysteries. Thus Lonergan referred
repeatedly to Vatican I’s endorsement of the possibility of a fruitful, albeit
analogous, understanding of revealed truths, just as he also championed
the authority of the magisterium of the church to define infallibly just
what those truths were. The opposing negative filament was the human
liability to error, deriving from the darkness of mind and weakness
of will caused by original sin. Thus Lonergan admitted that had it not
been for heresies there would never have been the need for ecumenical
councils to issue the definitions of dogma and anathemas of error for
which they were convened. The import of Lonergan’s theory is that
doctrinal development is not a begrudging accommodation to cultural
variation and transformation, much less a corruption of the original
Christian kerygma, but a divinely inspired, intelligent, and responsible
effort to unfold and defend the meaning and truth of divine revelation in
culturally appropriate terminology.

Lonergan’s treatment of the development of Christological and
Trinitarian dogma in his two treatises – the analysis of the components

79 *DVII*, 207-10; *DDT/D*, 209-15; *DDT/SL*, 16-17, 22, 26-7, 31-32, 36, 41, 48, 50, 53.
80 *DVII*, 152; *DDT/D*, 152-54, 228-29.
81 *DDT/SL*, 42, 53, 58, 61, 64.
82 *DDT/D*, 228, 271-75; *DDT/SL*, 51.
83 *DDT/D*, 228-29.
of the development, the expansive dialectic of the actual development of
the dogmas from the New Testament to the councils, the subsumption of
this development into a summary history of doctrinal development, and
an incipient theory of doctrinal development—goes beyond historical
description to theological argument. With cogent reasoning and
copious documentation, Lonergan defended the thesis that the conciliar
definitions enunciated in theoretical terms the same truths with the same
meaning that the New Testament had revealed in ordinary language. By
distinguishing between the cultural shift from a Hebraic to a Hellenistic
mentality and the methodological differentiation of consciousness into
common sense and theory, he demonstrated how the Hellenization of
New Testament teachings could result in either orthodoxy or heresy.

Orthodox theologians and the conciliar fathers engaged in the benign
Hellenization of transposing the culturally specific, ordinary language
of the New Testament into theoretical terms of a universal validity,
communicable to any rational person. Heretics, by contrast, pursued the
malign Hellenization of construing New Testament teachings according
to the tenets of the false philosophies of Stoicism and Middle Platonism,
thereby trapping these teachings in a particular and obsolescent culture.
Lonergan compounded the force of this argument by instancing the
development of Christological and Trinitarian dogma as just one stage in
the development of Christian doctrine, however inadvertent it may have
been, from the New Testament to the modern era. And he argued that
the legitimacy of this development derived from an interaction between
the puissant sway of divine providence and the stimulus of cultural
change, mediated by the interaction between the innate (and divinely
enhanced) human desire to understand and the inveterate human liability
to misunderstand—a combination capable of promoting the truthful and
correcting the erroneous interpretation of divine revelation.

Yet certain questions can be raised about Lonergan’s exposition
of the development of Christological and Trinitarian dogma. First, is it
theological enough? Lonergan reduced the dialectic between orthodoxy
and heresy to a philosophical conflict—between the position of realism
(from naïve to dogmatic) and the counterpositions of materialism and
idealism. No doubt this is a persuasive explanation for the truthfulness
of orthodoxy and the falsehood of heresy, as well as an astute recognition
of the genesis of the dialectic in a common effort to devise a technical
account of New Testament teaching congenial to Hellenistic culture.
But the manifest concern of all the participants in the development of Christological and Trinitarian doctrine was to remain faithful to the teachings of the New Testament, whatever may have been their incompatible philosophical allegiances. Therefore the question arises whether there might have been an intrinsically theological difficulty in the church’s quest for an authentic technical definition of both dogmas.

In this regard, Jaroslav Pelikan has contended that it was virtually impossible for the church fathers to encapsulate all of the “innumerable teachings” of the New Testament about the Incarnation in a single lapidary formula. A common stratagem they employed was therefore to choose one among several eligible key texts as a principle of organization, to the consequent disregard of texts outside the ambit of its connotation. Those who selected as their proof-text John 1:14 (along with Philippians 2:5-8 and Hebrews 1:3), for example, interpreted the Incarnation in terms of the hypostatic union, making themselves likely to neglect the evidence in other texts for the genuine humanity of Christ. Those who, on the other hand, chose John 2:19 (along with Colossians 2:9) as their proof-text interpreted the Incarnation as the Indwelling of the Logos, leaving themselves prone to neglect the evidence in other texts for the unity of Christ’s person. A quasi-resolution of the conflict between these two schools, Pelikan added, was reached in a tenuous coalescence around the historical scheme of preexistence-kenosis-exaltation, exemplified in Philippians 2:6-11, as a medium for incorporating the contrary perspectives of hypostatic union and Indwelling of the Logos into a common understanding of the Incarnation. Even at that, the settlement at Chalcedon depended upon imperial intervention and enforcement, while the ambiguity of homoousion fostered irremediable divisions within the church. Pelikan’s account of the development of Christological dogma, therefore, adds a specifically theological (and sociological) dimension to Lonergan’s more philosophical account.

Another question is, how historical is Lonergan’s account? As is customary in the literary genre of theological treatise, Lonergan’s account of the development of Christological and Trinitarian dogma is essentially an intellectual history of theological progress. Orthodoxy prevailed over heresy, he argues, because it represented a sounder set of ideas for rendering the truths of the New Testament in technical terms of a potentially universal validity. But a social history of the quest for

85 Pelikan, 243-66.
orthodoxy would show that it was sought as much for its cultural and political import as for its religious and theological significance.

No doubt, the religious exigency within the church for a rule of faith had already been patent in the baptismal and confessional formulas quoted in the New Testament, just as the theological desire for a genuine if limited understanding of the mysteries of salvation had already become evident in the Pauline epistles and John’s gospel. But the campaign for orthodoxy from Nicaea to Chalcedon, and thence to Constantinople, was initiated and prosecuted by Christian Roman emperors, beginning with Constantine, who desired a common creed to unite the world (oikoumene) of the Roman Empire. Retaining Augustus’s adoption of the title pontifex maximus from the Middle Eastern tradition of divine kingship, they convoked ecumenical councils, presided over them, and enforced their decrees. If Eusebius can be believed, Constantine even proposed the adoption of homoousion as the criterion of orthodoxy at Nicaea. His successors followed his lead by adding a series of doctrinal pronouncements, all designed to impose an ideological unity upon the fissiparous regions of their empire. A comprehensive history of the development of Christological and Trinitarian dogma would therefore have to depict it as a social construct, the product of political pressure as well as theological concern. This need not imply, however, an endorsement of the ‘fall of the church’ thesis—that at Nicaea Constantine initiated the subversion of pristine Christianity—but it would recognize

86 Hart/Esler, I: 636-53.
88 Daniel H. Williams, “Constantine, Nicaea and the ‘Fall’ of the Church,” pp. 117-
that Christian orthodoxy resulted from an interdependence between the theological needs of the church and the political ambitions of the empire.

A final question: how ecumenical is Lonergan’s synopsis of the history of doctrinal development? The trajectory he outlines – from the early Arian and Monophysite controversies, to the medieval conflict between Augustinians and Aristotelians, to the modern impasse among Catholic theologists – is fairly parochial in scope. By contrast, Pelikan’s scheme of the history of doctrinal development includes, besides the Catholic tradition (100-600), Eastern Christendom (600-1700), medieval theology (600-1300), the Reformation (1300-1700), and the impact of modern culture upon all of the Christian churches (1700 to the present). Naturally, Lonergan could not have rivaled Pelikan’s encyclopedic history of doctrinal development in his synopsis, but he would have been more instructive about the ramifications of doctrinal development if he had at least acknowledged the successive turning points where development precipitated major divisions within Christianity. A more comprehensive narrative would also have illustrated how the need for a methodological revolution in theology, toward which Lonergan pointed his survey, is common to all of the Christian churches, not just Roman Catholicism, if they are to account for and exploit the development of doctrine.

3. MODERNIZATION OF THEOLOGY

Introduction

Lonergan’s principal goal in his treatises was to modernize Roman Catholic theology without lapsing into the modern counterpositions – rationalism, liberalism, or modernism; historicism, neo-orthodoxy, or existentialism – that he himself indicted as adversaries to various of his theses. He sought thereby to supplant the Counter-Reformation, anti-Enlightenment, and antimodernist paradigm of theology – what Yves

90 See DVI, Thesis 1, 5-16.
Congar had pejoratively dubbed "dogmatic theology" – according to which a treatise comprised a set of theses, each vindicating the truth of an official Catholic doctrine with proof-texts from Scripture, the Councils, the Fathers, and the ordinary magisterium, but without any concern for an understanding of the doctrine itself.91 Reason, to the extent it was employed, was commandeered to demonstrate a "theological conclusion," a corollary drawn from a doctrine in the major premise, combined with a revealed or a rational minor premise, in a deductive syllogism.92 By contrast, Lonergan, citing Aquinas's distinction between two kinds of disputation, sought to shift the function of theology from recapitulating the proofs from authority for established doctrines into a complex and collaborative scientific understanding of Christian doctrine:93 a science at once religious, ecclesiastical, Thomist, and historical, in both method and theory.

Lonergan, following St. Thomas, defined theology as an intrinsically religious endeavor because of having God as both object and subject. God was the final object of theology, Lonergan argued, because the function of theology was to understand God and everything else in relation to God. In contrast to other sciences, the motive object of theology was not empirical data but the revealed truths about God and the world enunciated in Christian doctrine, dogma in particular.94 Likewise, God was the principal subject of theology, alone capable of comprehending in his omniscience the supernatural mysteries of his own essence and of his actions ad extra. The immediate subject of theology remained, of course, the theologian, who sought, through reason illumined by faith, first to corroborate the derivation of church doctrines from their sources in Scripture and tradition, and then to seek a fruitful albeit limited understanding of these doctrines in arguments

94 DDT/SL, 11, 20, 35, 57, 61; see DS, 3011. This was a position on which Lonergan reversed himself in Method in Theology.
from analogy and appropriateness (ex convenientia). Thus Lonergan concurred with Aquinas in defining theology, in Aristotelian terms, as a subalternate science, one whose self-evident first principles, based in God’s self-knowledge, were taken on faith by the theologian who sought, in light of them, to understand God and everything else in relationship to God.

Theology was likewise an essentially ecclesiastical science, Lonergan maintained. The *magisterium* had the sole authority not just to determine the truth of the doctrines a theologian might aspire to understand, but to adjudicate the truth of any understanding he might achieve of them. Hence, Lonergan took as his authorization for making the understanding of Christian doctrine the function of theology two declarations of Vatican I. One was that understanding, knowledge, and wisdom about Christian doctrine had marvelously grown and progressed over the centuries, in both individuals and the Church as a whole. The other was that reason illumined by faith could, by seeking carefully, piously, and soberly, obtain a fruitful understanding of supernatural mysteries in terms of naturally known analogies and the nexus of the mysteries among themselves and with humanity’s final end. Likewise, he cited as his mandate for investigating the Scriptural and Patristic origins of conciliar definitions Pius XII’s declaration that the noblest task of the theologian was to show that dogmas were contained, in the very sense in which they were defined, in revealed sources. Lonergan, therefore, regarded theology as an ecclesiastical enterprise in which dogmatics and systematics had the respective functions of confirming the truth and elucidating the meaning of Christian doctrine for its effective communication in the church’s pastoral and evangelical mission.

Similarly, the reason he gave for taking Aquinas as his model for transforming theology into a modern science was the church’s commendation of the wisdom, the intelligence, and the scientific rigor St. Thomas Aquinas had displayed in forming theology into a medieval science. Lonergan’s fundamental debt to Aquinas was his appropriation, in the *Verbum* articles, of Aquinas’s derivation of his theory of knowledge.

95 *DDT/D*, 250-51, 276-98; see *DS*, 3008, 3010.
97 *DDT/D*, 5, 120, 250-51, 274-75; *DDT/SL*, 32. See *DS*, 3020, 3016.
98 *DDT/D*, 5 (see 5-14); *DDT/SL*, 22. See *DS*, 3886.
99 *DP*, 27; *DDT/SL*, 18, 33-41, 53, 64, 68.
from self-knowledge. After developing this conception into a full-
fledged philosophy in *Insight*, Lonergan made it the historical and
theoretical foundation of both the form and the content of his treatises.

Aquinas’s two ways of understanding, a *via analytica/resolutionis* versus
a *via synthetica/compositionis* (as Lonergan interpreted them) inspired
the format into which, under the rubrics of *Pars Dogmatica* and *Pars
Systematica*, he gradually divided the treatises. And Aquinas’s theory
of knowledge supplied the metaphysical version of the psychological
analogy Lonergan employed for his theories of Christ’s consciousness
and knowledge and the processions of the Persons in the Trinity.

But Lonergan’s deference to Aquinas changed over the course of his
career. At first, Lonergan regarded Aquinas as his master, characterizing
his own reconstruction of speculative theology as a fulfillment of the
Leonine mandate to augment and perfect the iconic version of it in
Aquinas’s *Summa Theologiae*. But as he became more impressed both by
the historical record of doctrinal development and theological progress
and by the contemporary exigence for theology to comprise positive
and dogmatic as well as systematic components, Lonergan reevaluated
Aquinas’s historical importance and reconsidered the relationship of his
own work to the precedent set by Aquinas. He reduced Aquinas to a
medieval epigone of Aristotle, while he presented his reconstruction of
theology as an original creation, a modern counterpart rather than a latter
day replication of Aquinas’s medieval edifice.

Finally, Lonergan’s embrace of modern historical consciousness
affected his conception of both method and theory in theology. The
stages in Lonergan’s development of a method for theology were marked

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100 *Verbum*, 222-27; see also *Insight*, 769-70.
101 *DDT/D*, 4, note 1; *DDT/S*, 5, notes 1 and 2.
102 *DDT/D*, 180; *DDT/S*, 33 ff. Lonergan was able to complete this program only for
his treatise on the Trinity.
103 *CC*, 57-143; *DVI*, 213-312, 332-416; *DP*, 52-195, 253-71; *DDT/S*, 65-215, 273-
290.
104 Follow the sequence from *Verbum* 24, 59, 87-99, 104-5, 108-10, 152-63, 192-
204, 209-13, 222-24; to *Insight*, 769-70; to “Insight Revisited, Preface to a Discussion,”
*Collection*, 152-55, 159-63; to “Method in Catholic Theology,” *Philosophical
and Theological Papers*, 45-46; to “The Future of Thomism,” in *A Second Collection*,
44-49; to “Aquinas Today: Tradition and Innovation,” in *A Third Collection*, 35-54. See
paper delivered at the Third International Lonergan Workshop, Erbacher Hof, Mainz,
Germany, January 2-7, 2007.
by his progressive assimilation of history into the pursuit of theological understanding: from doing theology as simply speculation; to dividing it into dogmatic and systematic functions; to recognizing positive theology as a prophaedutic to dogmatics; to finally conceiving theology as a complex of functional specialties, leading from historical research, through transcendental method, to contemporary pastoral communication. Likewise, Lonergan's main contributions to theological theory consisted, not just in a modern reconstitution of Aquinas's medieval mode of metaphysical theology, but in reconceiving theology as an intrinsically modern historical science couched in existential terms. It was precisely because theology concerned actual existence, the concrete history of humanity inclusive of sin and grace, that Lonergan claimed that it, rather than philosophy, was the queen of the sciences, capable in its wisdom of establishing its own method and ordering the other sciences. Hence, Lonergan embraced historical consciousness as not just the viewpoint but the substance as well of his theology.

**Development of Method**

Lonergan's development of a viable method for theology was an even greater contribution to the discipline than the theoretical innovations he brought to the treatises on the Incarnation and the Trinity. As early as 1940, in the introduction to his dissertation, *Gratiu Operans*, Lonergan anticipated the method he would eventually formulate: "That middle course [between the a priori scheme of systematic theology and positivism] consists in constructing an a priori scheme that is capable of synthesizing any possible set of historical data irrespective of their place and time." In *Insight* he specified that theological method was the formal element "that makes a treatise a treatise" — "the pattern of terms and relations through which the materials may be embraced in a single coherent view." And in *Method in Theology*, by embedding theological method in transcendental method, he presented it as just one instantiation

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105 DP, 25, 27; DDT/SL, 18, 41. See Method in Theology, 337, and Tracy, Achievement of Bernard Lonergan, 39-44, 206-69; Crowe, Collection, xsv; Boly, Road to Lonergan's Method in Theology, 22, 28, 92, 95.

106 Verbum, 221-22; idem, "Theology and Understanding," 135-41; idem, Insight, 764-68; CC, 43-44; DP, 41; DDT/SL, 54.

107 Bernard Lonergan, Grace and Freedom, 156. See idem, Method in Theology

108 Insight, 763.
of a methodology capable of uniting all workers in all scientific fields through their adoption of "common norms, foundations, systematics, and common critical, dialectical, and heuristic structures."  

In the successive versions of his two treatises on the Incarnation and the Trinity - along with his monographs on their components and presuppositions, the notes of his concurrent seminars on methodology, and the offshoots of this manifold scholarship in his contemporary lectures and articles - Lonergan experimented with the measures necessary to develop his heuristic construct of theological method into an articulated structure of functional specialties. His self-declared strategy for formulating theological method was a "pincer" movement in which he sought to discover how the "upper blade" of transcendental method, descending from the general to the particular, might engage with the "lower blade," ascending from the particular to the general, to generate an effective method for theological scholarship. Three stages can be discerned in his quest: assembling the elements and constructing the framework of theological method, from the writing of his dissertation through his first two years in Rome; the exploratory integration of these elements, along with history, into the successive editions of his treatises; and an approximation to a definitive exemplification of his methodology in the last editions of his treatises.

Stage I: Assembling the Elements and Constructing the Framework for Theological Method (1939/40-1953/55)

At the time Lonergan wrote Gratia Operans, he already knew he wanted to develop a method for theology and had a good idea of what the method would be like. Yet when he began his teaching career in Montreal, he followed the conventional format for a theological treatise - the very format to which he explicitly opposed his own nascent methodology - and continued to do so through the first biennial cycle of his courses in Rome. Meanwhile, though, he was assembling the elements for his

109 Method in Theology, 24.
110 Grace and Freedom, 155-80; see Insight, 87, 114-15, 128-51, 337-38, 486, 546, 554, 600-601, 603, 609.
111 I am much indebted for this approach to Lonergan's development of his methodology to Boly's The Road to Lonergan's Method in Theology, although I give a different chronology and present a different interpretation of the stages in Lonergan's development.
methodology both through a study of Aquinas’s analyses of grace and freedom and knowledge and love and through a series of monographs, capped by *Insight*, on methodology.\(^{112}\)

In this period, while Lonergan regarded Aquinas’s *Summa Theologiae* as the prototype for his project of developing a method for theology, he also admitted natural science was the paradigm for the kind of science he thought theology ought to become. What enabled him to keep both beliefs in tension was the isomorphism he discerned between Thomist and scientific thought because of a common commitment to the goal and the techniques of understanding.\(^{113}\) Only toward the end of this period did Lonergan acknowledge that he also had to incorporate historical method into his methodology if theology was to appreciate the historicity of the mystical body of Christ and vindicate its claim to queenship of the sciences.\(^{114}\)

In various monographs Lonergan explored three elements of method, while in *Insight* he elaborated an integral methodology for inquiry into the meaning of being. The three elements were a conception of theology as fundamentally a process of understanding, a division of scientific understanding into an historical and a theoretical phase, and the adoption of the hypothetical syllogism as framework for demonstrating understanding of a subject. But the signal achievement was *Insight* with its argument that methodology was a function of objectifying the results of self-knowledge.

The first of the elements of method Lonergan adopted was a doubly based definition of theology as a process of understanding, the basis in both cases coming from Aquinas. The basis Lonergan alleged for theology

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being primarily a process of understanding was a distinction Aquinas made between two kinds of disputation. One, a catechesis for younger students, proceeded in a “resolutory” sequence from revealed truths to their intelligible order and was intended to remove any doubt about the truth of dogmas by citing proofs from authority. The other, a magisterial opus for more mature students, descended in a “compository” sequence from the intelligible order of dogmas to the dogmas themselves and aimed at inculcating an understanding of the dogmas by giving reasons for why they were true. To the former kind of disputation Lonergan compared the kind of treatise he sought to supplant – a conventional treatise in (pejoratively speaking) “dogmatic theology,” with its string of theses consisting of proof-texts and theological conclusions. The latter kind he took as the precedent for the kind of treatise he sought to design, one governed by an a priori scheme capable of communicating a perspicuous understanding of the dogmas on a particular topic within a coherent pattern.¹¹⁵

The basis Lonergan cited for claiming theology was essentially a process of understanding was the distinction Aquinas had made between two complementary operations of intellect, simple apprehension and judgment. Whereas the intent in simple apprehension was to understand the essence of something and express its meaning in a definition, the intent in judgment was to assess the truth of a definition and express the verdict in an assent to the affirmation or negation of the definition. On the basis of this distinction Lonergan differentiated between the function of theology and the authority of the magisterium in the development of Christian doctrine. While theology, he said, had the function of understanding the meaning of Christian doctrine – its origins in revelation, its subsequent development, and its analogical significance – the magisterium had the authority to judge the truth, not just of Christian doctrine itself, but of any theological interpretation of it as well.¹¹⁶ On these two bases – for the form of a treatise and the function of theology – Lonergan claimed understanding was the distinctive intention of theology, thereby elevating it above mere catechesis while maintaining its deference to the magisterium.

¹¹⁵ Grace and Freedom, 160; De ente supernaturale, 1. The citation in Aquinas is to Quodl. 4.9.3 (18).
The second, and most important, element of method Lonergan adopted in this period was a distinction between complementary *ways* or *orders* of knowledge. At the beginning of the period Lonergan was satisfied with two ways or orders. But in Aquinas he found a more complex scheme of several sets of ways or orders. Yet by the end of the period he reverted to just two ways or orders, the scheme he eventually incorporated into *Method in Theology* in his distinction between the historical and the theoretical phases of theological method.

In *Gratia Operans* the distinction Lonergan postulated between two ways or orders in knowledge was a complementarity in the history of theological speculation – in this case, about the relationship between grace and freedom. The complementarity consisted in an interaction between understanding the particular in terms of the general and the general in terms of the particular in order to reach a scientific albeit inductive conclusion about the meaning of operative and cooperative grace. This “pincer” movement comprised a dialectic between an a priori scheme about the general form of speculative development based upon the nature of the human mind and the a posteriori collection and synthesis of the empirical data for the history of speculation on supernatural grace. The consequent conclusion would be a “dialectical position,” one asserting the negative coherence of noncontradiction in the dogma while simultaneously denying the positive coherence of a complete understanding of it.\(^\text{117}\)

In *Verbum*, though, Lonergan recognized that Aquinas (with some dependence upon Aristotle) had proposed a more complex scheme of several complementary ways or orders in knowledge: between simple apprehension and judgment, within simple apprehension, and also within judgment.\(^\text{118}\) The most basic distinction Aquinas made within knowledge was between simple apprehension as direct understanding and judgment as reflective understanding.\(^\text{119}\) Within simple apprehension itself, Aquinas postulated three sets of complementary orders: between an order of inquiry or discovery and an inverse order of resolution; between an order of resolution or analysis and a complementary order of composition or synthesis; and between an order of inquiry or discovery.

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\(^\text{117}\) *Gratia Operans*, 153-92.

\(^\text{118}\) See *Phys.* 1.1; *Meta.* 2.1 (278); *Veri.* 12.1c; 15, 3c; *ST* 1.79.8c, 9c, 12c.

\(^\text{119}\) *Verbum*, 12-58 vs. 60-105.
and an inverse order of composition.\textsuperscript{120} And within judgment, Aquinas posited two sets of complementary operations – the first, between an initial order of resolution and a consequent order of composition and division; the second, within composition and division itself, between the coalescence of concepts about an object into a proposition and the assent to a correspondence between the proposition and the object itself.\textsuperscript{121}

Yet in the final chapter of \textit{Verbum}, as well as in his monographs from this period, Lonergan collapsed Aquinas’s three sets of ways or orders into one set: the complementarity Aquinas posited within simple apprehension between resolution and composition in the process of learning a subject. Lonergan argued that invention, analysis, and resolution were all synonyms for the single historical order/way of moving from a holistic grasp of things in their relationship to us as knowers, through a set of dilemmas or experiments, to a grasp (immediate or analogical) of the essence of things in themselves or of intellectual first principles. Likewise, the complementary order/way – a thematic progression from a grasp (immediate or analogical) of the essence of things in themselves or intellectual first principles, through a series of explanatory hypotheses, to a description of how things appear to us in the concrete – could be called indifferently doctrine, synthesis, or composition.\textsuperscript{122} Lonergan made this binary division between the historical and the textbook presentation of a science the basis both for the division of his treatises into dogmatic and systematic parts and for the eventual distinction within theological method between its historical and theoretical phases.

The third element of method Lonergan adopted during this period was the hypothetical syllogism as the medium for reasoning to an understanding of an issue. In “dogmatic theology,” as we have seen, reasoning consisted in the use of a deductive syllogism to demonstrate the possible implications of an established dogma by drawing conclusions from the dogma as the major of the syllogism together with a revealed or a rational minor. By contrast, Lonergan used the hypothetical syllogism, the Aristotelian syllogism “\textit{faciens scire},” to reach and communicate an understanding of a dogma in itself. In doing this he was adopting Aquinas’s position that reasoning was actually understanding in process:

\textsuperscript{120} \textit{Verbum}, 66-71, 73-75.
\textsuperscript{121} \textit{Verbum}, 74-77, 61-62, 62-66 vs. 71-78.
a process originating from an implicit understanding of first principles and terminating in an explicit understanding of an object.\textsuperscript{123} Hence, the hypothetical syllogism could be used to demonstrate either a temporal sequence or a causal influence. It could be used to trace the history of the progress made from an initial recognition of the data for an object to the discovery of its basic elements, but it could just as well be used to frame how a theory led from a formula for the interconnection of the basic elements of the object to a conclusion about the appearance of the object in the concrete.\textsuperscript{124} So in the dogmatic part of a treatise, Lonergan used the hypothetical syllogism to configure the development in the understanding of a doctrine from its discovery in the ordinary language of revealed sources until its definition in the technical language of a conciliar dogma, preservative of both its meaning and its truth.\textsuperscript{125} And in the systematic part, he used the same technique to demonstrate how a particular theorem, articulating in metaphysical or psychological terms the meaning of a conciliar definition, succeeded in providing an analogical understanding of the dogma addressed in the definition.\textsuperscript{126} In the hypothetical syllogism, therefore, Lonergan found the technique for theology to pursue both of the ways or orders he thought it used to understand the meaning of Christian doctrine.

But in \textit{Insight} Lonergan hopscotched over his investigations into the elements of method to broach an integral methodology – comprising statistical, classical, genetic, and dialectical heuristic structures – for the study of being. Lonergan presented this methodology as at once an objectification of the transcendental method implicit in the exercise of the human ability to know and explicit (in principle) in philosophy and the historical product of the categorical methods generated by the sciences, mathematics, and history in their emergence from the matrix of common sense. The effect was to transform metaphysics from its traditional role as a systematic exposition of the meaning of being as known into a method for inquiry into the meaning of being as to be known.\textsuperscript{127}


\textsuperscript{125} See, for example, \textit{DDT/D}, 120-28.

\textsuperscript{126} See, for example, \textit{DDT/S}, 75-102.

\textsuperscript{127} The complete summary of \textit{Insight} will have to wait until the final section of this article, Philosophical Foundations. For my analysis of \textit{Insight}, I am much indebted to
Given that this methodology is supposed to be applicable to entire spectrum of the arts and sciences, Lonergan did not employ every aspect of it in his theological treatises. We have seen how he used genetic and dialectical methods in his analysis of the development of doctrine. Classical method, as applicable to interpretation, while it is certainly apparent in his dogmatic interpretation of the evidence for the doctrines of the Incarnation and the Trinity in the New Testament, is above the guiding methodology for the systematic portions of both treatises. Statistical method would have been applicable to the research underlying the positive interpretations of the New Testament by biblical exegetes. But Lonergan’s conception of positive interpretation would have to await his treatment of it in Method in Theology.

At the end of this stage, therefore, Lonergan had not only assembled the elements, but had also constructed the general framework for formulating a method specific to theology. He had focused upon understanding as the primary and essential function of theology. To describe the process of scientific understanding, Lonergan had borrowed from Aristotle (via Aquinas) a distinction between two complementary ways or orders: the analysis (or invention or resolution) of objects as they appeared to us into their essential elements and the complementary synthesis (or doctrine or composition) of the same objects from their essential elements. And for both phases of understanding he had adopted the hypothetical as opposed to the apodictic syllogism for his medium of argumentation because of its aptitude for reaching an understanding of an object. Moreover, he had elaborated an integral heuristic structure – comprising statistical, classical, genetic, and dialectical methods – for an investigation into the meaning of being. By situating a method for theology within this framework of a methodology for all of the liberal arts, Lonergan had precluded the possibility of its being either an ad hoc or an auxiliary method, peculiar to theology and stigmatizing it as an outlier to modern methods of study.

Joseph Flanagan, Quest for Self-Knowledge: An Essay in Lonergan’s Philosophy (Toronto, Buffalo, London: University of Toronto Press, 1997), 95-119, 149-93, for highlighting how the four heuristic structures in Lonergan’s methodology converge upon a conception of world order and thus constitute a formal metaphysics of history rather than a speculative metaphysics of being in general.

128 See footnote 60.
129 See notes 44, 45, 46.
130 Method in Theology, chap. 7 (pp. 149-173).
Stage II: Integrating the Elements of Method into Theological Treatises (1953-1959)

In Stage II Lonergan began to coordinate the framework and the elements of method he had identified in Stage I into a rough outline of theological method. His efforts can be traced in the four literary genres he employed during this period: theological treatises, supplements to the treatises, monographs on the speculative portion of the treatises, and the notes for his course on theological method. In the mimeographed student notes of his treatises, De Verbo Incarnato and De Deo Trino, Lonergan can be seen shifting from the semi-scholastic model he had inherited in Boyer’s manuals to a historical format – partially recast, in the latter case, into an analysis/synthesis cycle. In the mimeographed supplement to De Verbo Incarnato, he offered an argument from appropriateness for interpreting all of God’s external actions, while in the mimeographed supplement to De Deo Trino, he sketched an argument from analogy applicable to the processions in the Trinity. In each of the two monographs, De Constitutione Christi and Divinarum Personarum – although he was directly concerned with theological theory (about Christ as person and subject, about personhood in the Trinity) – Lonergan interpolated a chapter on theological understanding, focusing in the former monograph upon the role of philosophy and in the latter upon that of history. And in De Intellectu et Methodo he summed up his reflections on theological method in this period by rooting methodological imperatives in a theologian’s habits of mind and, indeed, his personal responsibilities.

During this period, while Boyer’s manuals remained the official textbooks for his courses on the Incarnation and the Trinity, Lonergan began to transform the format of the treatises from Boyer’s semi-scholastic design to a more historical presentation for both tracts and, in addition, into a division within the tract on the Trinity between historical analysis and theoretical synthesis. Boyer had already departed from the strictly scholastic approach of his predecessor, Louis Billot, whose treatises were commentaries on the pertinent tracts of Aquinas’s Summa Theologiae,131 by introducing into his manuals a historical component, comprising theses on the New Testament sources and the conciliar

definitions of both doctrines, before turning to a Thomistic component on the meaning of the doctrines. In fact, Boyer may even be said to have broadly anticipated Lonergan’s project of dividing his treatises into analytic and synthetic parts by the division of his manual on the Trinity into a section on the existence of the mystery and a section on its nature.132

But Lonergan was engaged in a thoroughgoing, if ultimately unfinished, revision of the structure and function of both treatises. He was determined to replace the “dogmatic theology” model designed to corroborate the truth of a set of conciliar definitions in a series of theses, each consisting of proof-texts from the New Testament, the fathers, and medieval theologians, along with a “theological reason.” His replacement was a scientific model aimed at communicating an understanding of a dogma through, at least, a historical analysis in successive theses of the origin of the dogma in the New Testament, its subsequent doctrinal and theological development by the Fathers and in the ecumenical councils, and its speculative reconstruction by medieval and modern theologians. Optimally, the treatise would also include a complementary theoretical synthesis of the meaning of the dogma from the vantage point of a crucial philosophical theorem reached at the term of historical analysis and capable of recapitulating the development of the dogma in reverse order. Lonergan’s primary example was Aquinas’s use of the concept of “procession” to ground an understanding of the Trinity in terms of the relations among the Persons, the Persons themselves, and the missions through which they had revealed themselves in history.133

Lonergan’s progress can be traced in the mimeographed student transcriptions of his notes for both of his courses: the editions of De Verbo Incarnato from the 1953-54 and 1955-56 academic years, and the editions of De Deo Trino from the 1954-55 and 1956-57 academic years.134 In both cases, the later edition, while remaining basically the same as the earlier, improves upon it by modifications of and interpolations between


133 DP, 23-29; DDT, 36-41.

134 In my personal library I retain a composite copy of the earlier and the later editions of both sets of mimeographed notes, which I obtained during the second cycle of each course. I shall refer to De Verbo Incarnato 1953-1954/1955-1956 as DV1/M and to De Deo Trino 1954/1955/1956-1957 as DDT/M.
various theses.

The first point to be noted is the differences between Boyer’s manuals and Lonergan’s notes. Beginning with the first edition of both treatises, Lonergan reduced the number of theses: in *De Verbo Incarnato*, from thirty-eight to fourteen; in *De Deo Trino*, from twenty-seven to twelve (inclusive of six from *Divinarum Personarum*). He accomplished this reduction by consolidating some theses to correspond to their common origin in conciliar definitions and by eliminating others devoted to outmoded scholastic disputes. In addition, Lonergan, instead of distributing the New Testament sources of both doctrines among several theses, made a comprehensive critical compilation of the entire New Testament basis for each doctrine at the beginning of each treatise – for *De Verbo Incarnato* in the first edition; for *De Deo Trino* in the second edition.

Secondly, Lonergan used the second edition of each treatise to revise the first. In the 1955/1956 edition of *De Verbo Incarnato*, he introduced a series of methodological and theoretical refinements: on the direction of the movement in the evolution of the dogma (Thesis 1); on the various terms for and kinds of sanctifying grace (Thesis 7); on the problem of the liberty of Christ in his passion (Thesis 11); on the mode of understanding the cross of Christ and the concept of vicarious satisfaction (Thesis 13); on understanding devotion to the Sacred Heart in light of the evolution of the doctrine of the Redemption (Thesis 14). In addition, he revised Thesis 6, on divine existence as the constitutive cause of the hypostatic union, to incorporate the theory he advanced concurrently in *De Constitutione Christi*.

In the 1956/57 edition of *De Deo Trino*, Lonergan announced at the outset that the notes contained only the more positive aspect of the treatise, the speculative part to be found in the concurrently published *Divinarum Personarum*. He also inserted into the treatise an introduction on the evolution of the doctrine of the Trinity – culturally, transculturally, and dogmatically – in a movement in which the shift from an ordinary to a scientific mode of speaking about God in general and the Trinity in particular eventually precipitated the Arian crisis of the fourth century. And as previously noted, he also added a comprehensive exposition of the New Testament sources for the doctrine of the Trinity.

To elucidate methodological issues too fundamental to be incorporated into the treatises themselves, Lonergan wrote a supplement
to each treatise: on the argument from appropriateness for *De Verbo Incarnato*; on the argument from analogy for *De Deo Trino*. In *De Ratione Convenientia*..., *Incarnationis*, Lonergan argued that in light of divine revelation, the principle of interpretation for the mystery of the Incarnation (as of grace and glory) was, in the context of the actual order of this universe, *appropriateness*: that is, given the fact of the Incarnation, it can only be supposed that God freely chose it, in his infinite wisdom, as the appropriate way to restore the goodness of the universe, defiled as it was by Adam’s sin. In later editions of *De Verbo Incarnato*, appropriateness would become a *leit motiv* in Lonergan’s interpretation of both Incarnation and Redemption.

In *De Sanctissima Trinitate*, Lonergan undertook, primarily, the pedestrian task of transcribing from the *Verbum* articles elements of Aquinas’ theory of the psychological analogy to the Trinity – the metaphysics of intellectual operations, the image of God in man, and the analogy from the temporal image to the eternal exemplar – elements he would also incorporate into appendices of *Divinarum Personarum*. But in an interesting appendix, Lonergan pointed to Aquinas’s theory of the natural desire for the beatific vision as the existential basis for postulating such an analogy between the human mind and the Blessed Trinity. Just as appropriateness became his primary principle of interpretation for the mysteries of the Incarnation and all of God’s external operations, analogy became Lonergan’s primary principle of interpretation for the internal mysteries of the Triune God.

Lonergan’s most important methodological advances during this period, however, occurred in the two monographs he published on the speculative (or synthetic) part of each treatise: *De Constitutione Christi Ontologica et Psychologica* for *De Verbo Incarnato*;*Divinarum

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135 *Supplementum Schematicum de Ratione Convenientiae eiusque Radice; De Excellentia Ordinis, De Signis Rationis Systematice et Universaliter Ordinis; Denique de Convenientia, Contingentia, et Fine Incarnationis* (Rome: Privately Published, 1954).


Although both monographs were primarily devoted to the theories pertinent to each treatise, Lonergan included in each of them a chapter on theological method. In *De Constitutione Christi* he was concerned how understanding, in its nature and ramifications, was constitutive of theology as a science, while in *Divinarum Personarum Conceptio Analogica* for *De Deo Trinum* he analyzed the dimension history introduced to the scientific development of theology.

In “On Theological Understanding,” the methodological chapter of *De Constitutione Christi*, Lonergan explained how the conception of theological understanding he employed in his treatises constituted theology as indeed an authentic, albeit subalternate and analogical, science. By “understanding” he meant “the apprehension of many [aspects of a problem] by means of one [concept],” and by “science,” “the certain knowledge of things through their causes.” His explanation of how, in these terms, theological understanding was truly scientific had three steps: a comparative analysis of the scientific status of philosophy and theology; the fourfold mode of predication about God; and the concrete implications of this fourfold mode.

What all sciences have in common, Lonergan said, is the final object of understanding being, while what is proper to each is the formal object (*quidditas*) in concrete matter moving each to understand. Philosophy and theology have in common, though, not just their final but their formal object since in both cases the formal object is what is by its essence being itself (*ipse ens per essentiam*). Yet they are distinguished by the medium, the method, and the extent of their understanding. Whereas philosophical understanding originates and terminates in a grasp of concrete things in nature through their causes, theology originates and terminates in a grasp of revealed truths through their supernatural reasons. Hence, whereas philosophy proceeds, purely rationally, by a resolution of things into their causes and a complementary composition of things from their causes, theology proceeds, through reason illumined by faith, to the discovery of the supernatural reasons for revealed truths and, through faith illumined by reason, to the explanation of revealed truths in terms of their supernatural reasons. Thus philosophy is a normal and independent science since it describes the causes why things really are through an

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140 *CC*, 45-46, 53-54 and 44, 48-49.
analysis of the causes of our knowing them, whereas theology remains an analogous and sub-alternate science since it is confined to knowing only the causes for knowing things – understanding the more immediate causes of knowledge in terms of the more profound causes of knowledge – without ever knowing the cause (God in himself) for why revealed truths really are the way they are.

In “On the End, Order, and Mode of Speaking [of Theology],” the methodological chapter of Divinarum Personarum, Lonergan demonstrated how the movement of history swept along the oscillation between dogmatic and systematic theology in the progressive understanding of the revealed and defined truths of the faith. The end of theology, he said, was understanding, not proving, the revealed mysteries of the faith. As such, theological understanding – since it was hypothetical, analogical, imperfect, and always developing – was neither true nor false. But it still operated within the ambit of truth since it originated from the revealed and defined truths of the faith and was directed to a judgment about the truthfulness of its grasp of the mysteries of salvation. The object of theology was, of course, God, but the way theology spoke about God varied. Beginning with the ordinary (literary) language by which God was spoken about in relation to us (in Scripture, the Fathers, and partially in the councils), theology shifted to the theoretical language by which it spoke of God in Himself (in systematic theology), before it shifted down again to the ordinary language by which it spoke of God in relation to contemporary cultures (in pastoral theology and missiology). The movement to the end of understanding was motivated by the problem of finding a principle for understanding revealed truth. In part logical, insofar as it consisted in an alternation between dogmatic and systematic theology, this movement was fundamentally historical because the inexhaustible riches of revelation combined with constantly changing cultural conditions required a perennial development of the cycles of dogmatic research and systematic understanding.

In De Intellecto et Methodo, the notes for his course on methodology, Lonergan advanced two major arguments. First, he synthesized the methodological points he had expounded in De Constitutione Christi and

141 DP, 7-51, a section subsequently incorporated into DDT/S, 7-64.
Divinarum Personarum, arguing that theology needed both philosophy and history to accomplish its function of understanding revealed and defined doctrines. Philosophy was necessary to answer the need for a method to unify treatises so that they did not remain just a series of theses offering proofs of church doctrine, but could become, instead, systematic recapitulations of the historical progress in the understanding of church doctrines. History was necessary as well to comprehend that not only had the sciences developed over the course of time, but the meaning of science had developed as well, particularly with the Renaissance discovery of history, thereby rendering the scholastic mode of theology, bereft of history, obsolete. Hence, the task of the theologian had become to understand, rather than just to prove, church doctrines, and also to recapitulate within himself the historical development of modern science, so that he could overcome the contemporary chasm between the theoretical language of theological tracts and the symbolic language of evangelization.

Secondly, Lonergan argued that the exigency for method in theology was not just a need for theologians to get up to speed on philosophy and history but also a requirement for them to assume personal responsibility for the manner in which they sought an understanding of Christian doctrine. The contemporary theologian, he said, had to adapt for theology, as personal habits of mind, the fundamental precepts of method: understand; understand systematically; reverse counterpositions; develop positions; judge responsibly. Understand – the basic act of scientific discovery, by which inquiry becomes insight – becomes for theology faith seeking understanding, as necessary today as in the past. Understand systematically – adopt a heuristic structure for a complete explanation of all of the phenomena in the whole concrete universe – becomes for theology the imperative to make theology a science integrated with all other modern sciences in the pursuit of understanding the whole concrete universe. Reverse counterpositions – convert from the symbolic, interpersonal mode of understanding in common sense to science as a theoretical understanding of the concrete universe of being – becomes for theology, effectively, a rejection of late medieval conceptualism and nominalism for the sake of adapting the Renaissance discovery of history to a recognition of the development of doctrine. Develop positions – realize knowledge is the drive of intelligent inquiry and rational reflection, through truth, to a grasp of
being – becomes for theology the application of historical categories to the history of theology, particularly to the interpretation of the crucial transitions from common sense to science and from one scientific system to another. Judge responsibly – the supreme rule in every science for engaging reality as concrete through virtually unconditioned judgments based on hypothetical syllogisms – becomes for the theologian a personal transformation of the five methodological precepts into a judgment about the truth of his theories, guided by divine faith and subject to ecclesiastical supervision.

In Stage II, therefore, Lonergan did the heavy lifting of beginning to integrate the elements and framework of method that he had identified in Stage I into his treatises on the Incarnate Word and the Triune God. In the treatises themselves, he undertook the tortuous process of converting them from the scholastic mode of a series of doctrinal proofs to a unified historical pursuit of genuine understanding. In supplements to the treatises, he formulated the key strategies of appropriateness, for the understanding of divine operations within the concrete, historical universe, and of analogy, for understanding operations within the godhead itself. In his two speculative monographs, he demonstrated the necessity for the respective contributions of philosophy and history to theology as a scientific understanding of divine revelation and church doctrine. And in the notes for his course on method, he summarized the implications of scientific method for theologians committed to the task of making theology into a modern historical science. All that was left was to reconstruct the two treatises on the basis of these advances.

Stage III: Approximation to a Definitive Edition of the Treatises (1960-1965)

In the third and, as it turned out, final stage in the development of his treatises, Lonergan achieved an approximation to his goal of a definitive format for dogmatic theology in the broad sense in which it is distinguished from moral theology, as the speculative from the practical understanding of revealed and defined truths, and is inclusive of both dogmatic theology in the narrow sense of the corroboration of the definitions of revealed truths and systematic theology as the analogical understanding of the meaning of revealed and defined truths. It was also the stage at which he came to a profound understanding of history, as lived and as written, and was able to integrate it into his conception of the
relations between dogmatic and systematic theology. The approximation to a definitive version of the treatises was, as we shall see, closer for his treatise on the Triune God than for his treatise on the Incarnate Word.

The media in which Lonergan communicated his new appreciation of history were (1) the mimeographed "Notes from the Introductory Lecture in the Philosophy of History"; (2) the mimeographed notes De Methodo Theologiae; and (3) "Metaphysics as Horizon."

In “The Philosophy of History,” after distinguishing within written history between occasional (or narrative), technical (or scientific), and explanatory (or philosophical) history, and defining philosophy of history as a subset of “philosophy of,” Lonergan concentrates on the lived history about which written history is concerned: what he calls historicity. He analyzes historicity as comprising three facets. The first is the existential consciousness of the subject insofar as one’s self-interpretation expands from one’s individual memory to the collective memory of a people, so that “history becomes the objectification of the objectification of the existential memory of the people.” The second stage is the dialectic by which the correspondence or conflict between a people’s – or even humanity’s – self-development and the objectification of this development works itself out: see, for example, the contrast between Hegel’s and Marx’s versions of the dialectic of world history. The third is the stages in the development of consciousness – from the undifferentiated consciousness of primitive peoples, to the differentiation between common sense and theory in Greek civilization, to the modern historicization of consciousness – that are themselves the product of the historical process. Here Lonergan is sketching the historicization of the collective self-consciousness to which he knew modern theology had to adapt if it was to communicate the meaning of Christian doctrine effectively.

The specific challenges of the modern historical context to theology Lonergan addressed in De Methodo Theologiae. Again, there are precise conceptual clarifications – about method in general and about the antitheses facing theology as a science – but the fundamental problem Lonergan sees theology facing is that the notion of science has changed

143 "Notes from the Introductory Lecture on the Philosophy of History" (Montreal: Thomas More Institute, 1960).
144 De Methodo Theologiae (Rome: Gregorian University, 1962).
from the Aristotelian conception of certain knowledge about necessary causes to the modern empirical conception of probable knowledge about states of affairs—along with the concomitant transformation of philosophy from scholastic metaphysics to phenomenology, existentialism, and personalism. But he sees these changes as more an opportunity than a problem for establishing theology’s standing as an authentic science. For theological theories are generally probable rather than certain; they deal with historically developing rather than naturally stable events; they are concerned with the contingent facts of, for example, the Incarnation and Redemption, rather than with necessary conditions for physical and biological evolution. Thus he argues that theology in confronting the challenge of modern science has to avoid the contraries of an extrinsicist deductivism and an immanentist idealism through a critical and methodical realism in which metaphysics serves to unify common sense, the natural sciences, philosophy, faith, theology, positive theology, and systematic theology. In other words, Lonergan saw theology has having to assimilate the methodology he was attempting to forge in the research program that took him from *Insight* to *Method in Theology*.

As the center of such a program Lonergan pointed out, in “Metaphysics as Horizon,” was the concrete subject. This review article of Emerich Coreth’s *Metaphysik* was not about history as such. It was, in fact, a critical comparison of Kant’s, Gilson’s, and Coreth’s conceptions of metaphysics. But the medium Lonergan chose for making the comparison was the concept of horizon as specified by the tension between a subjective pole in the knowing subject and the objective pole in being. And he distinguished himself from all three of the objects of his comparison by holding that the subjective pole was, in the concrete, “the inquirer, but incarnate, liable to mythic consciousness, in need of a critique of counterpositions,...develop[ing] in a development that is social and historical, that stamps the stages of scientific and philosophic progress with dates, that is open to a theology that Karl Rahner has described as an *Aufhebung der Philosophie.*” Lonergan, therefore, saw the metaphysics underpinning his theology as intrinsically personal and historical.

Lonergan incorporated this new appreciation of history into the latest editions of his two treatises. He was ultimately more successful with his treatise on the Triune God. In *De Deo Trino: Pars Analytica* (1961) he broke definitively from the linear format he had inherited
from Boyer. Now he conceived the analytic part, containing the entire historical portion of the treatise as, (implicitly) together with a synthetic theoretical counterpart, forming two complementary parts of the whole treatise. He divided this analytic part almost exactly in two, with the first section devoted to the dialectical development of the doctrine of the Trinity in the first six centuries of the Christian era, and the second section covering the four main developments of the doctrine – the consubstantiality of the Son, the divinity of the Holy Spirit, the Blessed Trinity as a whole, and the procession of the Spirit – and a meditation on the mystery of the Blessed Trinity. In the next edition of the treatise, in 1964, Lonergan issued the two parts together – the Pars Analytica now called the Pars Dogmatica, and Divinarum Personarum (1957) now denominated Pars Systematica. The Pars Systematica went in reverse order from the Pars Dogmatica – starting with the processions within the Trinity, and continuing with the consequent relations, persons, and missions.

In keeping with these changes in the content of both parts of the treatise, Lonergan modified his introductions to them as well. In the Pars Dogmatica he now added a list of the differences between the positive and the dogmatic interpretations of the New Testament, as well as an explanation of the development of doctrine in the Fathers and the Councils that he had earlier included in the Pars Analytica. In the Pars Systematica he now amended the introduction in Divinarum Personarum – about the end, order, and mode of speaking about theology – to say that history was not the process external to the cycles of analysis and synthesis in the development of theology, but was rather the entire process of analysis itself, perpetually providing the systematic function of theology with new developments of doctrine to understand and synthesize. In the introduction to the Pars Dogmatica Lonergan now also enlarged his conception of theology to include moral theology as well as dogmatic theology in the broad sense and refined his conception of the broad sense of dogmatic theology to include positive, dogmatic (historical), and systematic theology, with pastoral theology and missiology also forming integral parts.

Although Lonergan said in De Deo Trino: Pars Systematica that any theologian who did not succeed in dividing a treatise into its dogmatic and systematic parts was bound to keep repeating portions of the treatise in every thesis, he did not succeed in accomplishing this goal.
in *De Verbo Incarnato*. The best that he was able to do, beginning with the 1961 edition, was – instead of giving a list of theses, each of them attempting to prove a conciliar definition with a composite of a dogmatic note, a list of adversaries, some scriptural proof-texts, perhaps a couple of comments from the Fathers, and a theological conclusion – to analyze in historical sequence the New Testament sources of the doctrine of the hypostatic union, the development of the doctrine in the ecumenical councils, the theological analyses of the hypostatic union as it applied to Christ as Person and as Subject, and the consequent implications for Christ’s grace, knowledge, impeccability, and liberty. In the 1964 edition he gave a much more sophisticated analysis, in Thesis 12, of Christ’s knowledge.

In neither edition, however, did Lonergan integrate his analysis of the Redemption with the Incarnation. He started over again, beginning with the evidence for the Redemption in the New Testament, followed by critical reconstruction of St. Anselm’s theory of satisfaction, and concluding with his understanding of the mystery in terms of the law of the cross. The entire treatment is sensitive, profound, and brilliant, but even though it interprets Redemption as the motive for the Incarnation, it fails to integrate the theses on the logic of the hypostatic union into the overall plan of Redemption.

**Construction of Theory**

While Bernard Lonergan’s most important contribution to theology was his development of a method for organizing theological treatises – both internally and in relation to positive theology, on the one hand, and pastoral theology, on the other – he also made major substantive contributions to theology in the content of his treatises. In the sections on Scripture and doctrine, we have already examined his substantive contributions to dogmatic theology, but his most significant substantive contributions in the treatises were to systematic theology. *De Constitutione Christi* and *Divinarum Personarum*, the systematic supplements he subsequently incorporated into the treatises, were *tours de force*, just as astounding in their creativity and ingenuity today as when they were first published. Yet Lonergan’s most brilliant contributions to systematic theology were, not so much any individual theses in either treatise, as the set of theorems he used in both treatises to elucidate the meaning
and dispel the obscurity of the revealed mysteries of the Incarnate Word and the Triune God. These theorems include the psychological analogy, divine transcendence, and the law of the cross.

Lonergan employed these theorems under the aegis of the dogmatic constitution Dei Filius from Vatican I. In chapter 4, On Faith and Reason, it states that reason, illumined by faith, could, by seeking carefully, piously, and seriously, obtain a most fruitful, God-given understanding of the mysteries of faith, both in terms of analogies to what is naturally known and in terms of the relationship of the mysteries to one another and to humanity’s final end.146 But in following these guidelines, Lonergan added, it was going to be necessary to augment and perfect traditional modes of understanding by modern ones – specifically, by reconceiving St. Thomas Aquinas’s metaphysical terminology for the analogy between God and humanity in psychological terms.147 Only in this way could there be an increase in understanding the mysteries commensurate to the historical progress and the development of doctrine that had occurred in the meantime.148

In deference to Vatican I, Lonergan did seek an understanding of the mysteries of faith in terms of their connection to one another and to humanity’s final end. He explored the relation of the mystery of the Trinity to all of the other mysteries of the faith;149 of the Trinity to grace, charity, faith, and glory;150 and of the missions of the Son and the Spirit to each other.151 In perhaps his most penetrating and original analysis, he interpreted the mystery of Incarnation and Redemption in terms of what he called the “law of the cross”: God’s decision, in His infinite wisdom and goodness, to save the human race, not by forestalling the possibility of every evil, but by converting the evil of sin into the supreme good of salvation.152

But Lonergan’s most important theoretical contributions to systematic theology were the analogies between divinity and humanity

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148 DVI, 412-16.
149 DDT/D, Thesis 5 (pp. 249-98).
151 DP, 57 ff., 165-72; DDT/S, 221 and DVI, Theses 15-17: DVI, 292-93, 393, 414, 421, 425, 430-31; see also DVI, 315-16, 517.
152 DVI, Thesis 17 (pp. 502-43).
that he employed to generate an understanding of each treatise as well as to coordinate them with each other. First in importance is, of course, the psychological analogy, based upon transcendental method, which Lonergan adopted to illustrate both the consciousness and knowledge of Christ and what he called the intelligible emanations implicit in the processions of the Blessed Trinity.\(^{153}\) Although Lonergan gave the analogy a distinctively modern spin by reconstruing St. Thomas’s metaphysical interpretation of it in psychological terms, its provenience goes back through St. Thomas to St. Augustine.\(^{154}\)

In regard to Christ, he exploited the analogy to show that just as Christ can be thought of ontologically to be one substance and person with two natures, so also can he be thought of psychologically as one conscious subject with two consciousnesses, human and divine, through which he was respectively conscious of himself as human and as divine.\(^{155}\) Correlatively, while the Trinity can be thought of ontologically as three persons with one nature in a single substance, it can also be thought of psychologically as three conscious subjects with one consciousness, by which they are each differentially conscious of themselves and one another, of their processions and their respective relationships, and of their essential unity.\(^{156}\) Not only does the psychological analogy promote an understanding of each mystery on its own; it has the systematic advantage of assimilating the understanding of both mysteries into a single perspective correlative to the integral mystery of the Triune God as Father, Incarnate Word, and Spirit.

While Lonergan acknowledged that the psychological analogy provided no more than a hypothetical understanding of either Christ’s person or operations or of the processions within the Trinity, he nevertheless maintained that it was the only legitimate analogy for understanding either mystery.\(^{157}\) Formally and explicitly, it is grounded in the self-consciousness of the theologian (teacher or student), reflecting

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157 DDT/S, 252.
upon the exercise of one’s own rationality and morality.\textsuperscript{158} But materially and implicitly, it is also to be found in the New Testament itself, for the authors, conscious of their own rational and moral natures as mature adults, spontaneously wrote about the rationality and morality of human behavior in ordinary language and adapted the same language to speak symbolically of both Jesus Christ’s rational and moral consciousness and the processions of Word and Spirit within the Blessed Trinity.\textsuperscript{159} With that double warrant for the psychological analogy, Lonergan contended that the legitimacy of any other analogy to the Trinity was (virtually?) inconceivable.

A second theorem Lonergan employed in both treatises was that of divine transcendence. In its simplest form, divine transcendence means that whatever can truly be said contingently about God’s operations \textit{ad extra} is so constituted by the infinite perfection of God himself that it requires nothing for the truth of the proposition but a convenient extrinsic term as a consequent condition. This is a theorem Lonergan appropriated from Aquinas when he wrote his dissertation on Aquinas’s conception of operative grace.\textsuperscript{160} The argument behind it is that the infinity of God’s perfection suffices to explain anything contingently predicated of God, without supposing either that God must be changed, much less perfected, in the process, or that there must be a necessary or antecedent condition for his action. The only requirement, besides God’s infinite perfection, for the contingent predication of anything about God is simply that there must actually be, as a consequent condition, the extrinsic term corresponding to the effect of God’s action.\textsuperscript{161}

For creation, for example, to be predicated of God, there need be only the infinite power of the divine substance itself and, as a convenient and contingent extrinsic term, the actual concrete universe. For the divine missions to be attributed to God, there must be, besides God’s infinite power, the processions within the Trinity and their convenient and contingent extrinsic terms. Thus, in the case of the mission by which the divine Word became incarnate, there must be, besides God’s infinite power, the procession within the Trinity by which the Father generates

\textsuperscript{159} \textit{DDT/D}, 276-98.
\textsuperscript{160} See “Transcendence of God” in the index of Concepts and Names.
the Son as his divine Word, and, as a convenient and contingent extrinsic term, Jesus existent human nature with its human consciousness. And in the case of the mission by which the Spirit inhabits the souls of the just, there must be, besides God’s infinite power, the procession within the Trinity by which the Father and the Son spirate the Spirit as their divine Love and, as a convenient and contingent extrinsic term, the habit of sanctifying grace in the souls of the just.162

The benefits of this theorem are many. It preserves a recognition of God’s infinite perfection. It enables a common explanation of God’s actions in the natural and the supernatural orders. It identifies the missions of the Son and the Spirit with their processions within the Trinity. And it requires nothing but the concrete reality of divine effects to correspond to truthful predication about God’s contingent actions.

The third major theorem Lonergan drew upon in both treatises was “the law of the cross”: a development of his thesis in De Ratione Conventiae... Incarnationis that with the eyes of faith, we can believe that the reason for evil in this world is that, given the Incarnation, God decided, in His infinite wisdom, to permit evil so as to bring about, through the Incarnation, the greater good of redemption.163 In De Verbo Incarnato Lonergan expatiated on this theorem to propose an understanding of the role of Jesus Christ’s passion and death within the composite mystery of the Incarnation and Redemption.164 And in De Deo Trino he referred to it to explain how heresy might function as a catalyst for the development of doctrine.165

Once again, a single theorem not only suggests a solution to a particular theological conundrum in each treatise; it also contributes to a synthetic conspectus of the Christian revelation. As Lonergan remarked in De Deo Trino, an understanding of a revealed mystery should enable us, first, to hold the mystery so firmly that we can promptly, easily, and delightfully discuss it; secondly, to reduce what we know about the mystery to an intelligible unity with philosophical conclusions about God and other theological tracts; thirdly, to remove any hesitancy we might have about attempting to understand the mentality of Scripture, the Fathers, or theologians; and, finally, to quickly detect what is false

163 See note 155.
164 DVI, Thesis 17; see also Theses 15 and 16.
165 See note 79.
and easily recognize what is true in judging contemporary intellectual movements.166

In sum, Lonergan made significant methodological and substantive contributions to theology in his two treatises. Admittedly, the extent to which he developed his methodology in the treatises was not yet adequate to the task he had posed for it of unifying the various functions of theology into a dynamic and self-corrective whole. Yet much of what he was to formulate clearly and succinctly in Method in Theology he advanced provisionally and rudimentarily in the treatises. The historical progress that he said united the logical cycles of analysis and synthesis in dogmatic and systematic theology would become in Method a hermeneutical circle, with history as the first phase and theory as the second, in a perpetual development of theology. Positive theology he would divide into research, interpretation, and history, the first three functional specialties of the historical phase of theology, while he would designate dogmatic and systematic theology as the functional specialties of doctrines and systematics in the theoretical phase. The conjunction of dialectic and foundations that he was to make the pivot between the historical and theoretical phases he anticipated, fundamentally in Insight, but also by application in the conditions he stipulated for understanding the mystery of the Trinity and, by extension, every other mystery of the Christian religion.167 And his explicit recognition of the need for the subdisciplines of pastoral theology and missiology to translate into commonsense terms the technical terms of systematic theology presaged his decision to terminate the theoretical phase of theology with the functional specialty of communications.

While Lonergan’s substantive contributions to theology, dogmatic as well as systematic, may have little abetted his project of developing theological method, they manifested his commitment as a dogmatic theologian to defending the truth and plumbing the meaning of the Christian revelation. The psychological analogy, divine transcendence, and the law of the cross are crucial theorems for comprehending and synthesizing revealed mysteries – not just of the Incarnate Word and the Trinity, but of grace and faith, of the church and the sacraments, and of last things as well. It is hard to see how they can be ignored in any definitive synthesis of systematic theology.

166 DDT/S, 260.
167 DDT/D, 276-79.
On at least one substantive point, though, Lonergan was wrong. In the portion of the psychological analogy concerning the comparison of the act of love to the procession of the Spirit within the Trinity, he misinterpreted Aquinas and, arguably, was mistaken as well about the nature of the love appropriate to the analogy. Contrary to what Lonergan contended, Aquinas said that the procession of rational love within the will comes not simply from the intellect, but from the will as well. For rational love proceeds as \textit{dilectio}, commitment or devotion, from the inclination of the will to the good and its intention of happiness, as well as from the intellect making an \textit{electio}, a rational decision based upon an understanding of the truth. And regarding the \textit{delictio} by which the Spirit proceeds as Love, Aquinas said explicitly that it is directly parallel to the \textit{dictio} by which the Son proceeds as Word. He added that just as the saying of the Word presumes the act of understanding identical with the truth of the divine substance, so the commitment of the Spirit in love presumes the love identical with the goodness of the divine substance.\footnote{See especially \textit{ST} I.27.3.3; 4, esp. 4.2, 4.3; 5; 28.4; 36.1-4; 37.1c and 1.1. See also William E. Murnion, "The Three Facets of Aquinas's Theory of Love," An Unpublished Paper for the Twentieth World Congress of Philosophy: Philosophy Educating Humanity, Boston, MA, August 1998.}

What is more, only this analysis of love is warranted on theoretical as well as historical grounds. For only the representation of rational love as an act of commitment emanating from the joint action of intellect and will is an appropriate analogy to the procession of the Spirit. First, only this conception allows for a differentiation of the deliberate act of commitment in rational love from the spontaneity of love as simply a natural inclination or a vital instinct. Secondly, only this conception meets the proviso, which Lonergan maintained with Aquinas, that only a procession by way of product (\textit{per modum operati}), such as occurs in the speaking of a word or the making of a commitment, can be predicated, albeit analogously, of the all-perfect God. Why? Because only a procession by way of product is free of the imperfection inherent in a procession by way of operation (\textit{per modum operationis}), such as occurs in an act of understanding and in the act of love as an inclination or instinct. So on both theoretical and historical grounds it must be admitted that Lonergan erred in his explanation of the application of the psychological analogy to the procession of the Spirit within the Trinity.
Bernard Lonergan's philosophy informed both of his theological treatises. In the preface to every edition of every volume of these treatises, except for *De Verbo Incarnato*, he referred to what he called the historical and the speculative backgrounds to the treatises that were to be found, respectively, in the *Verbum* articles and in *Insight*. So it will be necessary, first, to summarize the philosophy Lonergan formulated in *Insight*, and then to remark upon the pertinent applications of it to the treatises on the Incarnate Word and the Triune God.

*The Metaphysics of Insight*

In *Insight* Lonergan reconceived metaphysics as a method for inquiry into the meaning of being, rather than remaining, as it had been traditionally, a systematic exposition of the meaning of being. He presented this methodology as at once an objectification of the transcendental method implicit in the exercise of the human ability to know and the historical product of the emergence of the sciences, mathematics, and philosophy from the matrix of common sense. Thus he defined metaphysics as the integral heuristic structure of proportionate being and, by extension, of transcendent being as well. The genius of this approach was that it originated in an appeal to the reader to appropriate the dynamics of one's own self-consciousness as the basis of transcendental method, developed as a critical introduction to the set of categorial methods emergent from modern sciences, mathematics, and philosophy, and terminated in a comprehensive worldview of the concrete universe. The importance of this metaphysics for theology was that it provided a methodological framework for including it with all of the other arts and sciences in a collaborative search for the meaning of being.

Lonergan's explication of his definition of metaphysics as the integral heuristic structure of proportionate being and, by extension, of transcendent being included an exposition of the evidence for such a conception of metaphysics – the subjective pole or viewpoint – and the actual erection of the metaphysics thus defined – the objective pole or

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169 CC, 6; DP, 5; DDT/D, 4; DDT/S, 5.

170 *Insight*, 416-17, 507-11; see also chaps. 19 and 20.
horizon. The evidence for it he described with the military metaphor of breakthrough, envelopment, and confinement. The breakthrough consisted in the self-realization of the human subject: self-affirmation as a knower in a factual judgment (specifically of oneself as a knower), rational self-appropriation as a responsible decider in an actual decision (converting essential to effective freedom), and existential self-transcendence in a belief in the possibility of an unlimited act of understanding (what he would later call in *Method in Theology* the three moments of transcendental method: intellectual, moral, and religious conversion).\(^\text{171}\)

The envelopment consisted in the human subject’s recognition of the complementarity between knowing and the protean notion of being – as notion, as concept, and as idea. As notion, being is the object of the detached, disinterested, and unrestricted desire to know. As concept, it is whatever is intellectually grasped, rationally affirmed, responsibly chosen, and faithfully believed. And as idea, it is, generically, an unrestricted act of understanding and, specifically, God, as in fact the unrestricted act of understanding. Hence, the envelopment of the evidence for metaphysics as method progressed from one’s recognition of the isomorphism between knowing – as experience, intelligent inquiry, and rational affirmation – and the known – as conjugate and central potency, form, and act – to one’s affirmation of an identity between the knower and the known in an infinite act of understanding.\(^\text{172}\)

The confinement consisted in a dialectic between positions and counterpositions on knowledge, reality, and objectivity: the positions being conceptions inviting development because they cohere, not only with one another, but also with the activities of inquiring intelligence and rational reflection; the counterpositions, on the contrary, being conceptions inviting reversal because, though coherent with one another, they are incoherent with the activities of grasping them intelligently and affirming them reasonably. For knowledge, the position is to recognize it as intelligent inquiry and rational reflection, whereas the counterposition is to postulate that it is a matter of confrontation and perception. For reality, the position is to identify it with being; the counterposition, to

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171 See especially chap. 11, 18, and 19.1-4 and 20.4; see also chaps. 1, 6-7, 9-10, 15.7 and 17.1-2). I am giving just this cryptic description of the process of self-realization here because I will be giving a more expansive portrayal of it in summarizing Lonergan’s adaptation of it to his treatises.

172 See chaps. 12, 13, 15, and 16.
suppose it is the already out there (or in here, or up there) now. And for objectivity, the position is to make it the consequence of intelligent inquiry and rational reflection, while the counterposition is to presume it derives from animal extroversion.\textsuperscript{173} In the pursuit of truth, through intelligent inquiry and rational reflection, the outcome of adopting the positions is a sense of the mystery of being insofar as it remains unknown, but sticking with the counterpositions traps one in the morass of mythic consciousness.\textsuperscript{174}

Besides supplying the evidence for believing metaphysics to be the integral heuristic structure of being – through his analysis of human self-realization, his exposition of the complementary notion of being, and the dialectic between the positions and counterpositions on knowledge, reality, and objectivity – Lonergan showed how actually to erect the integral heuristic structure that he claimed metaphysics to be. Negatively, his argument consisted in a dialectical critique of common sense, science, and philosophy.\textsuperscript{175} Positively, his argument consisted in demonstrating how the methods of the sciences, mathematics, and history filled out the implications of transcendental method implicit in the detached, disinterested, and unrestricted desire to know.

One way to configure Lonergan’s integration of the four heuristic structures into a composite methodology is as an implementation of the pincers or scissors movement by which he thought knowledge was produced by the interaction between the data of experience and the unrestricted desire to know.\textsuperscript{176} Thus the integral heuristic structure of the four heuristics can be depicted as an interaction between statistical and dialectical methods, mediated by the interaction between classical and genetic methods, in the pursuit of knowledge. In this compound interaction statistical and dialectical methods are both concerned with the concrete sources of intelligibility feeding into and bounding the abstract intelligibility to be gained from the joint use of classical and genetic methods. Together the four heuristics provide a comprehensive methodology for the investigation of proportionate being, inclusive of its possible openness to transcendent being. The result is an anticipation of world order as the outcome of the successive effect of emergent

\begin{footnotes}
\textsuperscript{173} See chaps. 11, 12, and 13.
\textsuperscript{174} See chap. 17.1.
\textsuperscript{175} See chaps. 6 and 7, 2 to 5, and 14.4
\textsuperscript{176} Insight, 114-15, 337-38, 600-609.
\end{footnotes}
probability, development, and vertical freedom.

While statistical method is concerned, at one pole of knowledge, with the intelligibility of empirical data as such, dialectical method is concerned, at the other pole, with determining the parameters of intelligence. Statistics mediates between the practical self-interest of common sense in the concrete and particular and the detached theoretical interest of the sciences in the abstract and universal by establishing ideal frequencies for the instantiation of invariant functions in the concrete. The method of statistical analysis is a modern development of transcendental method precipitated by the inverse insight that scientific laws can serve to express the ideal frequencies of concrete events overlooked in determining the invariant functions of concrete variables. Hence statistical laws state the probabilities for the occurrence of specific kinds of events in certain populations, always allowing for nonsystematic and diminishing deviations from ideal frequencies the larger the number of individuals in the sample and the longer the period of time for their operation.\textsuperscript{177}

At the other extreme, dialectical method, originating in Plato’s dialogues, mediates between the foundation of transcendental method in the dynamism of native intelligence and the conflicting positions about the functions and value of intelligence operative in common sense and theory. Positively, dialectical method elucidates and fosters the process of rational self-appropriation by which one acknowledges and accepts one’s own ability to act rationally and responsibly. Yet dialectical method also reflects the inverse insight that rational self-appropriation is less a simple development from ignorance and naiveté to knowledge and maturity than a complex conversion from error and sin to truthfulness and goodness. So it also has the daunting task of unmasking and removing the obstacles to rational self-appropriation posed by biases, false philosophies, self-indulgence, and inauthenticity. In cases of fundamental intellectual conflict (over objectivity, reality, and truth), dialectical method functions as an existential process of both self-exposure and personal confrontation, as one reveals one’s own viewpoint in contention with alternative viewpoints, in the expectation that a position expressive of the unrestricted desire to know will be self-corrective and beneficent whereas any counterposition will prove to be

\textsuperscript{177} Insight, 76-161.
self-refuting and harmful.\textsuperscript{178}

Thus statistical and dialectical methods function as the outer arms of the "pincer movement" between the data of experience and transcendental method: through inverse insights the former grasps the intelligibility latent even in concrete events and the latter unmasks the obstacles to the quest for rational self-appropriation. But the influence of these two methods must be mediated by the interaction between classical and genetic methods. Classical method, the traditional approach of ancient and medieval philosophy raised to a new sophistication in modern mathematics, is concerned with systematic understanding – with reaching a disinterested and theoretical explanation of things in themselves, as opposed to the self-interested and practical commonsense description of things as they appear to us. Classical method proceeds by abstracting from the incidental and the contingent to grasp, in ancient and classical philosophy, the essential and necessary natures of things or, in modern mathematics, the invariant functions of measurable variables.\textsuperscript{179} In conjunction with statistical method, classical method projects schemes of recurrence for the probable actualization in the concrete of the possibilities inherent in the natures of things or invariant functions.\textsuperscript{180}

Genetic method, by contrast, seeks primarily an understanding of the generation of both higher viewpoints and higher systems from their origins in simpler precedents, but it is equally pertinent to an analysis of the degeneration of enlightened viewpoints and complex systems into their components. In its primary function, genetic method is concerned with the recurrent process by which operators (as Lonergan called them) – random events unintelligible within the confines of a particular viewpoint or system – demonstrate an ability to become integrators of a higher viewpoint or system that both assimilates and enriches the lower viewpoint or system. A dynamic modern version of the static medieval conception of the universe as a chain of being, genetic method is applicable to an understanding of both the intelligibility of nature and the meaning of culture. In nature, it illuminates the successive higher integrations of physical, chemical, biological, psychic, and intellectual forces into progressively more complex and powerful entities. In culture,

\textsuperscript{179} Insight, 109-11, 122-23, 126-38, 157-80, 486, 503-504. The canons of empirical method for research in the natural sciences have their counterpart in the canons for interpretation in the human sciences: see chaps. 3 and 17.3.8
\textsuperscript{180} See chap. 4.
it illuminates the successive higher integrations both of particular aspects of culture—such as the differentiations of common sense into the arts and sciences (as well as developments within each of the arts and sciences)—and of entire cultures—such as the progress from primal culture to civilization, the state, and the modern world. Just as effectively, genetic method in conjunction with dialectical method can detect both the obstacles to progressively higher viewpoints or systems and the causes of the breakdowns by which higher viewpoints or systems disintegrate into their component parts in lower viewpoints or systems. As the method of both natural and human history, genetic method can be employed to chart devolution as well as evolution, decline as well as progress.²⁸¹

The outcome of the interaction between classical and genetic methods, mediating the interaction between statistical and dialectical methods, is a theory of world order as the progressive outcome of emergent probability, development, and finality, inclusive of vertical freedom. Emergent probability, applicable to everything in the universe, is the consequence of the increasing possibility of successively higher viewpoints or systems the greater the number of individuals in a system and the longer they have to operate: as they explore horizontally the range of probable instantiations of the possibilities inherent in the system, the chances increase of a random event capable of precipitating a vertical leap into a higher system.²⁸² Development, itself a higher viewpoint than emergent probability, applies to all living things—both individuals as they mature, some becoming more powerful and independent than others, with a concomitant comparative advantage to propagate their line; and collectives as they institutionalize their internal exchanges and compete or cooperate with other collectives to adapt to, and perhaps triumph over, their environments.²⁸³ Finality is the dynamism emergent in the succession of higher viewpoints toward fuller intelligibility and systematization, as well as the attainment of ever greater but never complete fullness through an effective probability.²⁸⁴ Finality is evident particularly in the vertical freedom specific to human beings, as they transcend their horizontal freedom to assimilate and accommodate to their cultures by raising the claims of not just a more authentic humanism

¹⁸¹ Insight, 250-67, 484-507, 597-98, 630.
¹⁸² Insight, 138-51, 284-87, 290-92.
¹⁸³ Insight, 37-43, 476-507, 594, 596.
but of the infinite value of being itself.\textsuperscript{185}

Given that this methodology is supposed to be applicable to an entire spectrum of the arts and sciences, Lonergan did not employ every aspect of it in his theological treatises. The self-realization of the reader that Lonergan called the breakthrough to the evidence of metaphysics as the integral heuristic structure of being he also made the prerequisite for the student of theology to gain an analogical understanding of the mysteries of faith. As far as the categorial methods go, we have seen how he used genetic and dialectical methods in his analysis of the development of doctrine.\textsuperscript{186} Classical method, as applicable to interpretation, while it is certainly apparent in his dogmatic interpretation of the evidence for the doctrines of the Incarnation and the Trinity in the New Testament,\textsuperscript{187} is, above all, the guiding methodology for the systematic portions of both treatises. Statistical method would have been applicable to the research underlying the positive interpretations of the New Testament by biblical exegetes. But Lonergan’s conception of positive interpretation would have to await his treatment of it in \textit{Method in Theology}.\textsuperscript{188}

\textbf{The Employment of the Metaphysics of Insight in the Treatises}

In employing his philosophy in his treatises, Lonergan imported large chunks of it into appendices in the systematic portions of the treatises, but his most important use of it was to underpin and generate the substance of both treatises.

\textit{De Constitutione Christi}, the first volume of either treatise to go into print, contained as much philosophy as theology – the chapters on the notion of person, the constitution of a finite person, and human consciousness containing the conceptual and theoretical ingredients for the chapters on Christ’s ontological and psychological constitution. \textit{Divinarum Personarum}, the second volume to reach print, included, in addition to the philosophical elements Lonergan incorporated into his introduction on theological method and his opening analysis of intelligible emanation, three lengthy appendices (one-sixth of the book) on the philosophical concepts he employed in his analysis of the

\textsuperscript{186} See footnote 60.
\textsuperscript{187} See notes 44, 45, 46.
\textsuperscript{188} \textit{Method in Theology}, chap. 7 (pp. 149-173).
persons of the Trinity: immanent operation, the act of understanding, and relations.  

But Lonergan's reliance upon his philosophy was not confined to the explicitly philosophical sections of his treatises. He called upon it to underpin the structure and generate the substance of both treatises. The central concept of this philosophy was the subject, the polymorphic subject, a construct Lonergan introduced as the key to philosophy in *Insight* and evidently believed was just as much the key to theology.  

Perhaps the two most important applications he made in his treatises of this construct were in his confrontation of the reader to develop the subjectivity necessary for believing the supernatural mysteries of the Incarnate Word and the Triune God and for appreciating the theological explanations and in his correlative analysis of Christ's subjectivity.  

Lonergan's most direct confrontation of the reader occurred in *De Deo Trino*. Just as in *Insight* Lonergan prompted the reader to appropriate his own rational consciousness in order to have the reader grasp the explanation he was giving of insight and judgment, so at the conclusion of the dogmatic part and at the beginning of the systematic part of *De Deo Trino* he also invited the reader to recognize within his own rational and moral self-consciousness the basis for the psychological analogy he was going to employ for the Trinity. This was the same analogy to the Trinity, he claimed, that the New Testament authors had invoked, except that they had depicted in symbolic language what he was going to represent in theoretical terms.  

At the outset Lonergan asked the reader to examine whether he had ever had the experience of telling the truth on the basis of sufficient evidence or of ever honorably making a decision because of an acknowledged moral obligation. This experiment would be a success, he said, regardless of whether the reader affirmed, or denied, or doubted if he had ever had either experience. For anyone who was not a child or was not asleep or insane, Lonergan contended, must have experienced his own rationality whenever he sincerely affirmed, denied, or doubted anything. He then led the reader along a path in which he was asked, first, to reflect upon whether he had ever violated his rationality or morality; secondly, to recognize the habitual state of consciousness underlying his conscious acts; and, thirdly, to distinguish between any of his previous

189 *DP*, 241-96.  
190 *Insight*, 452; see index for additional references.
experiences of exercising rational and moral consciousness and his present experience of thematically acknowledging it.

Given the presumptive success of this maieutic, Lonergan then asked the reader to follow him as he sought to demonstrate that there was sufficient evidence in the New Testament to believe that the authors, John in particular, had described in symbolic terms the same exercise of rational and moral consciousness he had led the reader to recover within himself. Citing a raft of texts, he argued that the New Testament authors had indeed described this kind of consciousness in the same context in which they wrote about the missions of the Son and the Spirit. The probable implication, Lonergan concluded, was that they too had, at least implicitly, believed that the divine consciousness in the emanation of the processions of the Word and the Spirit was analogous to human consciousness in its rational and moral operations.¹⁹¹

Then, to connect the systematic with the dogmatic part of De Deo Trino, Lonergan again asked the reader to engage in introspection upon his rational and moral consciousness. In this case, his intention was to get the reader to recognize that an appropriation of his own intellectual consciousness, rational and moral, in the act of achieving existential autonomy was the necessary condition for grasping what Lonergan meant by the concept of intelligible emanations he was about to use in analyzing the nature of the processions of the Word and the Spirit within the Trinity.¹⁹²

Intellectual consciousness, Lonergan reminded the reader, originates in the conscious and transcendental desire to know the meaning of being, develops through questioning, and issues in the precepts to inquire, to doubt, and to deliberate. To the extent one adheres to these precepts, intellectual consciousness becomes the conscious determination through which one achieves autonomy, insofar as a word originates from understanding, and a choice from the word. Autonomy, Lonergan clarified, comprises three elements. There is the autonomy of liberty, by which one chooses because one judges and insofar as one judges. There is the autonomy of rationality, by which one judges because one perceives sufficient evidence and judges according to the perceived sufficiency of the evidence. And there is the autonomy of clarity, by which one defines because one perceives the intelligible in the sensible

¹⁹¹ DDT/D, 276-98.
¹⁹² DDT/S, 70-74. 86-92.
and defines it according to its perceived intelligibility.

Now it is true, Lonergan conceded, that the autonomy one thus achieves through intellectual consciousness can be exercised both practically and speculatively: practically, in deciding what to do or make; speculatively, in asking about the universe, understanding it as best one can, judging whence it came and how it exists, and then exulting in a kind of contemplative love for it. But the primary exercise of autonomy, Lonergan contended, is the existential autonomy with which one inquires about oneself, understands how one ought to be, and judges how to make, in the concrete here and now, the existential choices necessary for making oneself actually be what one ought to be.\textsuperscript{193} The degree of one’s success in achieving existential autonomy was, Lonergan argued, the measure of one’s capacity for believing and understanding the mysteries of the Christian faith.

The autonomy to be achieved in intellectual (rational and moral) consciousness that Lonergan celebrated in \textit{De Deo Trino} anticipated the notion of conversion, with its ancillaries of meaning and religion and its functions in dialectic and foundations, that he was to elaborate in \textit{Method in Theology}.\textsuperscript{194} Meanwhile, in the treatises themselves, it provided the perspective from which, as we have seen, he framed the dialectic by which he analyzed the development of doctrine, from the New Testament to Nicaea and Chalcedon, as a movement from naïve or uncritical realism through empiricism and idealism to dogmatic realism. The same perspective is evident in his critique of the adversaries he indicted in various theses: the thesis on the New Testament doctrine of the hypostatic union;\textsuperscript{195} the theses on the consciousness and the knowledge of Christ;\textsuperscript{196} and the theses on the consubstantiality of the Son to the Father, the divinity of the Spirit, the unity of substance and the trinity of persons in God, and the procession of the Spirit from the Father and the Son.\textsuperscript{197} What Lonergan argued the adversaries lacked in each case was a critical realism grounded in what he, in \textit{De Deo Trino}, he called existential autonomy and, in \textit{Method in Theology}, transcendental method.

In writing his treatises, therefore, Lonergan was clearly conscious

\begin{itemize}
\item \textsuperscript{193} \textit{DDT/S}, 86-92.
\item \textsuperscript{194} \textit{Method in Theology}, 237-45; see 57-124, 130-32, 235-71.
\item \textsuperscript{195} \textit{DIV}, 3-16.
\item \textsuperscript{196} \textit{DIV}, 271-73, 354-58.
\item \textsuperscript{197} \textit{DDT/D}, 114-20, 156-58, 182-85, 225-28.
\end{itemize}
of reckoning with polymorphic subjects, people at every level and degree of personal development, whether they were the readers he was addressing or the adversaries he sought to refute. Taking account of polymorphic subjectivity was his modern adaptation of the scholastic aphorism, “Whatever is received is received according to the mode of the recipient (Quidquid recipitur secundum modum recipientis recipitur).” The decision, he realized, whether or not to believe an alleged supernatural mystery, whether or not to appreciate a proposed analogical understanding of it, depended not just upon the credibility of the evidence, or the brilliance of the theory, adduced for it. It depended just as much upon the credulity of the person assessing the evidence, the docility of the person considering the theory, for it. In the case of the divinity of Christ, for example, he said the decision whether to accept the evidence of the New Testament authors was an existential judgment, for which the gift of the Holy Spirit, together with the habit of sanctifying grace, was a necessary precondition. Hence, without explicitly making an accusation of bad faith, Lonergan excoriated the scientific or critical historians who, for all of their professional expertise, simply failed to accept the truth of Christ’s divinity.198

Another important use Lonergan made in his theological treatises of his conception of the polymorphic subject was in his analysis of Christ’s subjectivity. He invoked the construct as well, of course, in his analysis of the processions in the Trinity,199 but his application of it to Christ’s consciousness and knowledge was perhaps more original and certainly more relevant. The joint issue of Christ’s consciousness and knowledge was something Lonergan worked on from the beginning to the end of his tenure in Rome. His initial statement on the consciousness of Christ appeared in De Constitutione Christi (1956), the earliest part of either of his treatises to reach print, and the last statement he made about the knowledge of Christ appeared in his final revision of De Verbo Incarnato (1964). On these topics he made his greatest progress over St. Thomas Aquinas. Whereas Aquinas had analyzed Christ as a person in the metaphysical categories of being, person, and nature, Lonergan analyzed Christ as a subject in the psychological categories of subject, presence, and consciousness. In taking this step, Lonergan consciously and deliberately joined in the shift from medieval to modern culture

198 DVI, 5-16.
199 DP, 52-91; DDT/S, 65-114.
that he was later to describe as a change from classical consciousness to historical mindedness, from theory to interiority, from substance to subject. Fittingly, Lonergan’s analyses of the consciousness and knowledge of Christ were the issues on which he most vigorously entered into contemporary controversy, and they probably remain the points in his treatises of the greatest interest, to theologians and to the general public alike.

The problem about Christ as a subject, Lonergan said, was not, as some other theologians had supposed, how the man Jesus of Nazareth became conscious of himself as a divine person. It was how the divine Word incarnate in the man Jesus of Nazareth, as represented by the authors of the New Testament, became conscious and knew of himself as both divine and human. Lonergan’s answer was to analyze Christ as a subject in terms of the same existential autonomy he enjoined of a reader who expected to believe in the supernatural mystery of the Blessed Trinity or to appreciate the psychological analogy of intelligible emanations to personal processions in the Trinity.

Lonergan began by defining consciousness as presence, as opposed to perception. The kind of presence he had in mind was the experience one has of oneself in being alive and awake, inquiring about the sensible objects in one’s presence, hatching hypotheses about them, judging the hypotheses in terms of the sufficiency of the evidence for them, and deciding what good they are. Consciousness of this kind is the subject’s own awareness of oneself as a subject, without knowing oneself as an object. This was a view of consciousness consonant with the Aristotelian and Thomistic assumption that knowledge originated in an identity of the knower and the known, and developed as an attempt to get to the truth about reality by objectively differentiating between the two: between the intentional consciousness of knowing and the conscious intentionality of the known. This effort entailed, for a knowledge of the world, inquiring into the intelligibility of sensitive data, hatching hypotheses, making sound judgments, and reaching free decisions, just as it required for a knowledge of the mind, inquiring into, hypothesizing, judging, and deciding about the intelligibility of acts of sensing, inquiring,

200 “The Transition from a Classicist World-View to Historical-Mindedness,” in A Second Collection, 1-10.
201 For the remainder of this section, see DVI, Thesis 10 (269-312) and Thesis 12 (332-416).
hypothesizing, judging, and deciding. In either case, the knower had to be present to oneself as knower to appreciate the significance and authority of the operations by which one distinguished between the subjectivity of one’s own intentional operations and the objectivity of knowledge about either the exterior reality of the world or the interior reality of the mind.

By contrast, the conception of consciousness as perception presumed that consciousness was introspection, a knowledge of oneself as an interior object to parallel the knowledge of exterior objects gained through investigation: the perception of an “already in here now real” of the mind to balance the perception of an “already out there now real” of the world. This conception of consciousness presupposed the Platonist conception of knowledge as an operation whose function was to overcome an original duality of subject and object by a perception of the object through intuition (generally of sensibles or singulatrs) or conceptualization (generally of intelligibles or universals). There were two insuperable difficulties with this position. Regarding the grasp of the object, there was no reason to believe perception manifested anything more than a subject’s own sensibility or intelligibility. Regarding the subject, without the presence of consciousness there was no reason to believe the subject could either be aware of the presence of an object to oneself or could become oneself an object knowable through introspection.

Having established consciousness as self-presence, Lonergan argued that Christ as a subject was simply Christ as a person present to himself. The person present to himself was the divine Word incarnate in the man Jesus of Nazareth. He was present to himself as a single psychological subject, but with both a divine and a human consciousness corresponding to his divine and his human nature. Through his divine consciousness Jesus of Nazareth was not only conscious of himself as divine, he also knew himself to be divine, because of the real identity of subject and object in God’s infinite act of understanding. This divine consciousness/knowledge must have been ineffable, Lonergan said, something like the human mystical knowledge of God, because the lack of any sensible data about God prohibited Jesus from formulating concepts or making judgments about his own divinity. But it must still, tacitly but insistently, have governed Jesus’ every action and inspired his entire mission. Much as the light of being (or the agent intellect) inspires in us the wonder by which we desire to know everything about
the meaning of being, but without ever calling attention to itself or being easily recognized, Lonergan suggested, so also must Jesus’ divine consciousness/knowledge have inspired in him the existential autonomy by which he chose to preach the kingdom of God and to redeem humankind.

The Incarnate Word, Jesus of Nazareth, Lonergan continued, must also have been conscious of himself through his human consciousness. Though the subject he must thus have been conscious of was his divine person, he would have been conscious of himself, not as divine, but as human. For through his human consciousness he had to be conscious of himself as doing the same things every human being does: waking and sleeping, walking and talking and eating, and sensing, inquiring, judging, and deciding. Yet, because he was the Word of God, Jesus must have had in his human consciousness an obediential potency for the beatific vision. In the beatific vision he must, immediately, have known himself, in the Word, as God, and, mediately, through the divine essence, he must also have known, albeit globally, everything he needed to know about his mission. For Jesus to accomplish his mission, Lonergan argued, this mediate knowledge must have included everything God actually does, past, present, and future. This knowledge would have been just as ineffable as Jesus’ divine knowledge, and for the same reason: the lack of any sensible data from which Jesus could have formulated concepts or made judgments about it. With these provisos, therefore, Lonergan endorsed the teaching, traditional in the church since the seventh century, that Jesus, even as human, suffered no ignorance because of having been blessed from birth with the beatific vision.

Yet, Lonergan argued, since both the divine knowledge Jesus had through his divine consciousness and the beatific knowledge he had through his human consciousness were ineffable, they did not impede the normal development of his human knowledge. No doubt his divine and beatific knowledge guided and governed all his actions, Lonergan acknowledged, because what Jesus knew as the Incarnate Word was what he revealed to us to take on faith. Unless he knew what he was talking about, we would not have any valid basis for our faith. Still, through his sensitive and intellectual operations Jesus must have performed all of the natural and supernatural acts necessary for him to have led a human and historical life. Only through these acts could he have been true human as well as true God. And only through these acts could he have learned how
Lonergan’s The Incarnate Word and The Triune God

to convert his ineffable knowledge, divine and human, into the effable knowledge he needed to communicate to us the truths of our faith. Hence, Jesus of Nazareth, Lonergan concluded, must have developed, through his human consciousness, the existential autonomy necessary to make himself, through his human actions, into the redeemer he had to become to fulfill his mission as the Incarnate Word of God.

The picture Lonergan drew of Christ as a subject was as traditional in its theology as it was modern in its philosophy. The philosophy was, though, Christian in inspiration. Lonergan developed it to communicate an understanding of the mysteries of the Christian religion. Earlier, the church fathers had to make a distinction between person and nature, for which there was no precedent in Aristotle’s essentialism, to differentiate between what was one and what was two in Christ. And Aquinas had to add that a person was a distinct subsistent in an intellectual nature to distinguish the persons in the Trinity from the substance of God. Likewise, Lonergan had to define a psychological subject as a person present to oneself, rather than simply a conscious center of conscious acts, for the concept of subject to be applicable to a divine as well as a human person. In each case, the struggle to attain an analogous understanding of the mysteries of the Christian faith in terms of human attributes prompted a revision of the ideas about these attributes that refined the original understanding of human existence even as it elicited a new surmise about the meaning of divine existence.

The same must also be said about Lonergan’s concept of the polymorphic subject, capable, at the peak, of existential autonomy. This was the concept he used to prescribe the qualities necessary for anyone to believe in the supernatural mysteries of the Christian religion or to appreciate an analogous understanding of them. It was, correlative, the concept he adopted as an analogy, however obscure and imperfect, for the consciousness and knowledge of Christ in the hypostatic union as well as for the processions of the Persons within the Blessed Trinity.

Yet more remains to be done if the polymorphic subject is to become suitable for evoking a felicitous understanding of the mysteries of the Christian religion in a postmodern and multicultural world. First, consciousness must be explicated in terms of liminality, rather than interiority, if the subject is not to be interpreted as the transcendental ego bedeviling modern philosophy from Descartes to Husserl. Secondly, the subject must be recognized as having intrinsically social as well
as individual dimensions if it is not to be interpreted in terms either of liberal atomism or existential narcissism. Thirdly, the polymorphicity of the subject must allow for a plurality of identities from which to begin the ascent to existential autonomy – black, brown, yellow, and white; Asian, African, and Western; gay and straight; female and male – if its humanity is not to be interpreted according to the reigning paradigm of white, Western, straight masculinity. The construct Lonergan conceived is, I am sure, plastic enough to permit such a refinement and expansion.

Scripture, doctrine, theology, and philosophy: these are components of Bernard Lonergan’s treatises on the Incarnate Word and the Triune God. He forged them from material in the *Verbum* articles and *Insight*, and from them he drew many of the concepts he was to include in *Method in Theology*. But the treatises stand on their own – brilliant, erudite, profound, and pious – testimony to Lonergan’s dedication to the task of becoming a theologian before he could hope to prescribe a method for theology. The classes in which he taught the tracts inspired a cohort of students who have spread his teaching throughout the world. Perhaps the impact he had through his teaching upon their minds and their hearts was as powerful as the influence he has had on his readers through his writing.
BERNARD LONGERGAN’S  
**ANALYSIS FIDEI OF 1952 — THE TRANSITION FROM CLASSICAL TO CONCRETE METHOD**

Hermann J. Pottmeyer

**THE CONSTITUTION “DEI FILIUS” OF VATICAN I AND ITS LIMITS**

When in 1961 I proposed to Bernard Lonergan the project for my dissertation, I aroused great interest in him. My plan was critically to investigate and comment on the First Vatican Council’s Constitution “Dei Filius” on *fides* and *radio*. Besides the published Acta of the Council, the basis was supposed to be the until then unpublished Votum by the most important theologian at the Council, Johann Baptist Franzelin, S.J., available in the Secret Vatican Archive.1 Lonergan had referred repeatedly to the Constitution in his courses, “De intellectu et methodo”2 and “De methodo theologiae.”3 And so Bernard Lonergan became my Doktorvater.

For Lonergan the Constitution “Dei Filius” was the Magna Charta for all of twentieth-century systematic theology, for its foundations and

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for its method. Lonergan however also knew the limits of “Dei Filius.” The Constitution did not pose itself the challenge arising from historical scholarship, whose methods have in the meantime even found entry into theology. It did not deal with the problem of historicity of faith and belief, and of its biblical and dogmatic expression. The later crisis of Modernism was the consequence.

In contradistinction to many theologians, Lonergan was also able to elucidate the causes as to why Vatican I could not accept the historicity both of the Bible and of the dogmas at all. Within the framework of the “abstract logic of classicism” in which the Council remained, the acknowledgment of historicity must have entailed relativism.

The Constitution “Dei Filius” teaches that faith does not contradict reason and that the assensus fidei is a rationally responsible act. This teaching was very important for Lonergan and corresponded with his own preoccupations. But he criticized the classicist form in which this teaching was presented. As he explains in Method in Theology, modern apologetics wanted to ground the rational credibility of faith with the aid of a demonstrative procedure, which pretended to coercive objectivity. The Constitution also moved within the framework of this idea. The recta ratio, to which it appealed – according to Lonergan – is an abstraction. It is abstract because it prescinds from the concrete subject whose ratio it is. But objectivity can never be targeted independently of the concrete subject. Only on the path of self-transcendence of the subject is objectivity attained, and the fundamental form of self-transcendence is comprised of intellectual, moral, and religious conversion. This conversion is not possible without grace. Even so, the knowledge of faith’s credibility or worthiness to be believed, which is unattainable without grace, is thoroughly rational.

This articulation, which Lonergan already proposed in his courses, seemed to contradict that of the Constitution “Dei Filius,” which teaches the possibility of the natural knowledge of God that it reckons among the praeambula fidei. With the available acta of the Council, I was able to show that the Council only intended to pronounce on the fundamental possibility of the natural knowledge of God, but not on the factual

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5 Method in Theology, 337-39
conditions that are necessary for reason to know the existence of God. This outcome of my research corresponded exactly to Lonergan’s conception, which led to the honor of a footnote citing my dissertation in Method in Theology. Usually, the Constitution also made the distinction, to which Lonergan could refer, between the *quaestio juris* and the *quaestio facti* in the concrete order.

For the connection among objectivity, self-transcendence, and conversion, Lonergan at this passage in Method in Theology invokes John Henry Newman’s *Grammar of Assent.* We know today how much Lonergan owes to his early reading of the writings of Cardinal Newman, to which he himself alludes repeatedly. Both, Newman and Lonergan, acknowledge the significance of the decisive characteristic of modernity. Human beings, more than ever before, are aware that they are subjects responsible for their actions and for their history. It was of concern to both of them not only to refer to the Christian roots of the modern consciousness of the subject but also to emphasize the possibility and the necessity of apprehending and integrating this consciousness of the subject theologically. For me personally, I regard Lonergan’s teaching about the necessary self-appropriation of the human person as an intellectual, moral, and religious subject to be one of the most important contributors by a philosopher and theologian, in order to overcome the deficit pertaining to the modern consciousness of the subject and to the awareness of freedom.

Vatican I itself regarded modern humanity’s becoming subjects of their history with ambivalence. On the one hand, the Council rejected it, because the Reformation, the French Revolution, and the natural sciences and philosophy of the early modern period paved the way for it in an anti-ecclesiastical form. In the *prooemium* to the Constitution “Dei Filius,” the Council reduced all the evils of the modern world to Reformation, Revolution, and science, which had betrayed not only the Christian faith but reason as well. On the other hand, the Council insisted that it behooves Christian faith to be based upon a rationality and morally responsible decision. With its stress upon this essential

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6 *Method in Theology*, 339, n. 5.
7 *Method in Theology*, 338, n. 3.
characteristic of Christian faith or belief, the Council linked itself to the modern consciousness of the subject. The fact that this link remained so ineffectual is connected precisely with the fact that it remained caught — as Lonergan writes — in the “abstract logic of classicism.” Hence, in spite of its justified concerns, the Constitution “Dei Filius” was a victim of the same illusionary ideal of an objectivity independent of the subject, which was also pursued by the natural science of that time.

A further object of my conversations with my Doktorvater about “Dei Filius” covered those problems dealt with in the chapters entitled “The Development of Doctrines,” “The Permanence of Dogmas,” and “The Historicity of Dogmas” in Method in Theology. Lonergan saw that in relation to the development of dogma the ideas of the fathers and theologians of the Council remained caught in an abstract logic. They conceived of this development mostly as a logical unfolding from implicit to explicit. However, because the Council distinguishes between the true meaning of the dogmas and their formulation, its statements did not close the way toward taking the historicity of the dogmas seriously. Thus, that which Lonergan proposes as the “concreteness of method” leads beyond the Council without having to contradict it even here.

THE “ANALYSIS FIDEI” OF 1952

I would like, however, to come back to the question addressed as to what degree as assensus fidei is an act both enabled and bestowed by the grace of God and at the same time one that is rationally responsible. In modern theology this problem is termed the analysis fidei. The analysis fidei was considered the most difficult question in systematic theology. Joseph Kleutgen, S.J., the other important theologian of the Vatican I, called it the “torture of the divines.” In his dissertation, “Insight and Conversion: The Starting Point of the Fundamental Theology in Bernard Lonergan,” Grzegorz Dobrocyzynski suspects that the structure of the problematic of the analysis fidei played the role of the godfather in Lonergan’s work, with its “stress of the cognitional structure and its manifold aspects.”

10 Method in Theology, 338.
As a matter of fact, the *analysis fidei* constitutes a central doctrinal component in the Jesuit teaching tradition. In addition, it was a problem with which Newman was also concerned in several of his writings.

Dobroczynski’s suspicion is confirmed by the recently published dissertation of Wilhelm Tolksdorf, completed under my direction. The title of this dissertation reads, “Analysis fidei: John Henry Newman’s Contribution to the Discovery of the Subject in Regard to the Act of Faith in the Context of the History of Theology.”\(^{13}\) The dissertation also contains a chapter on Bernard Lonergan. Tolksdorf obtained (from Stefan Notz, who is working on a dissertation on Bernard Lonergan and David Tracy with me) the unpublished manuscript of a course which Lonergan held at Regis College, Toronto. The title of this course reads, “Analysis fidei.”\(^{14}\)

As we studied this text, we discovered how illuminating it was not only for the evolution of Lonergan’s thought, but also for a Newman-Lonergan comparison. Here, that is to say, precisely in the framework of the traditional treatise of the *analysis fidei*, Lonergan has broken off an entirely new path for specifying the relationship between *fides* and *ration* in the *assensus fidei*. What strikes the eye here is the contrast between the old and the new, the interconnection between the continuity of the state of the question and the innovative solution. New wine in old wineskins – that becomes palpable here, similar to the matter in which Lonergan would have read the tradition tracts in the Gregoriana. The 1952 course is a very dense and precise Latin text. Here we can only sketch in what is most important and some innovations.

The text is divided into twenty points. Lonergan begins with the *processus logicus et psychologicus* that leads to the *assensus fidei*, in which the *assensus fidei* was regarded as if it were the result of a logical process of drawing a conclusion. The point here however – according to Lonergan – is not the grounding of knowledge in the ordinary sense, but the grounding of faith or belief in revelation is communicated in order to be believed first and only then understood. In the cognitional process that leads to the assensus fidei, Lonergan distinguishes three levels: *experiential, intelligentia*, and *reflection* – a scheme that we encounter


in Insight's section called "The Notion of Judgment" as the "level of presentations," the "level of intelligence," and "the level of reflection." As it is stated there, they constitute "a cumulative process" whose final act is judgment which fits into the context of other judgments.

This is exactly what happens in the processus logicus et psychologicus. Lonergan starts with experiential, that is, from the empirically given claims of Christian revelation. The intelligencia which follows, which encompasses the processus logicus, arrives at two insights: it is reasonable to believe the revealing God. And: it is reasonable to assume that the human being is ordered to a supernatural goal.

The level of reflection follows, namely, of the actus intelligendi reflexus. It arrives at the judgment that the preceding logical insights are sufficiently evident, so that the consequent judgments can proceed rationabiliter. The actus intelligendi reflexus is the first step of the processus psychologicus. It is named by Lonergan the cardo, or the key to the entire cumulative process leading to the assensus fidei. Because upon it depends the rationabiltias of the succeeding steps of the processus psychologicus – each single one of which is a judgment that constitutes the human being as a subjectum fidei. These are successively the iudicium practicum credibilitatis, the iudicium practicum credentitiatitatis, the volition finis supernaturalis, the volition medii seu ipse pius credulitatis affectus, and finally, the assensus fidei itself. In contradistinction to the classical analysis fidei, in which these acts appear simply as logical acts, Lonergan presents them as existential acts proper to a personal decision with ethical implications, which have the utmost practical transformations as a consequence. They are nothing else than steps of a conversio, of a conversation.

For these reasons and because these acts are ordered to the finis supernaturalis and to the assensus fidei, they stand under the influence of grace. Grace is as affective as gratia sanas, in order to overcome obstacles, as gratia illuminans upon the intellect, as gratia inspirationis upon the will, and lastly, as gratia elevans, in virtue of which the assensus fidei becomes an assensus liber, supernaturalis, obscurus, infallibilis, firmus super omnia, irrevocabiliis. Even when under the influence of grace, the acts of the processus psychologicus – considered apart from the assensus fidei itself – are quod substantiam actus naturales. They occur

as rationally and morally responsible. As individual and personal acts, they are shaped differently by each person. The *processus psychologicus* is thus a personal path, whether in the case of one initially coming to faith, or of one who, as already believing, is growing in his faith. For this reason, Lonergan calls the *subjectum fidei* a *homo viator*.

The *actus intelligendi reflexus*, with which the *processus psychologicus* begins, Lonergan characterizes as the *initium fidei supernaturale*. In the case of the *infidelis*, he correlates this, like the whole of the process of the *processus psychologicus*, with the *gratia conversionis ad fidem*. In *Method in Theology* Lonergan specifies what occurs here in the *processus psychologicus* as intellectual, moral and religious conversation. 16 But the concept of conversion already emerges here.

The *actus intelligendi reflexus* we already encounter in his book *Insight* as a “reflective act of understanding” and again as a “key act” in the section, “The Analysis of Belief.” 17 Hence, in the “Analysis fidei” of 1952 we can already note the transition from the classical *analysis fidei* to *Insight*.

In his dissertation Wilhelm Tolksdorf compared Lonergan’s “Analysis fidei” with the corresponding utterances of Newman. 18 At issue are especially the writings “Theses de fide,” “On the Certainty,” “The Newman-Perrone paper on Development,” and of course *The Grammar of Assent*. As with Newman, so also with Lonergan, faith or belief is a general principle of knowledge, applicable both in everyday thought and in science. It rests upon the *scientia alterius*, as Lonergan explains in his “Analysis fidei.” Religious faith or belief is a particular case, but no exception when it comes to the acquisition of knowledge, and it is anything but irrational. For Lonergan as well as for Newman, Christian faith or belief is a personal and existential path of the *subjectum fidei* or the *homo viator*. In both, there is a cumulative cognitional process with the three stages of experiential, intellectio, and reflection. For both, faith or belief as an assent on the basis of judgment, in whose genesis the “reflective act of understanding” for Lonergan and the “illative sense” for Newman plays a decisive role in mediating the *sufficienta evidens* for the rational and moral responsibility of the *assensus fidei*.

Newman obviously stimulated Lonergan to give attention to the

18 Tolksdorf, *Analysis fidei*, 563, n. 81; 567f, 576, 587f, 598.
significance of judgment in cognitional process, to distinguish between notional and real assent, as occurs in Lonergan in the distinction of the processus logicus from the processus psychologicus, and to acknowledge that tight connection between assent and certainty. 19

In Lonergan’s “Analysis fidei” of 1952 there is also set down his study of the cognitional teaching of Thomas Aquinas published between 1946 and 1949 under the title “The Concept of Verbum in the Writings of St. Thomas Aquinas.” 20 So he names the judgment that follows upon the level of intelligentia the verbum interius incomplectus, and the judgment that occurs on the level of reflection, the verbum interius complexus.

As an outcome of the investigation of the “Analysis fidei” of 1952 in comparison with Insight and Method in Theology the following may be established: Bernard Lonergan took up the concerns and the propositions of Vatican I’s Constitution “Dei Filius”; just as did the latter, so too he dealt with the rationabilitas and the credibilitas of the assensus fidei. At the same time he pointed the way to overcoming the limits of the classical analysis fidei; he analyzed not only the logical structure of the path toward and in faith, but the concrete steps which the subjectum fidei performs on this path of conversion. What he demonstrated initially in 1952 with respect of the structure of the assensus fidei, in Insight became a general theory of knowledge and in Method in Theology a theological theory of knowledge.

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19 Tolksdorf, Analysis fidei, 568, n. 110 with reference to G. Dobroczyński.
I wish to thank Fred Lawrence for inviting me to participate in this workshop. While I was in Mexico, I wanted to spend some time to Boston College. I couldn’t get then to the mountain; but now the workshop came to Rome and here we are!

I should avow two things. I have been in Rome almost six years, and this is the first time I dare to break through the stronghold of the Gregorian University. But from this stronghold the Jesuits have already broken through my windows in Santa Sabina and succeeded in hitting my shelves with various Lonergan book-bullets!

After some years struggling with the translation of Insight into Spanish, I finally finished it. This doesn’t mean at all that I am a scholar. I have taught philosophy for years while being at the same time on the spot as a troubleshooter in the very heart of commonsense experience, as I do full time now. So, what I can present will be a mere patchwork sewn together on the road or in the skies!

I would like to present some issues about human desire: desire in quest of an object will be the main topic. I take this topic as a tool in order to give a hint (not a full understanding) of what seems to be happening with our desires in the context of modern (or postmodern) culture, that in recent years is marked also by widening globalization.

It is something like what Aquinas treats in Prima Secundae, questions 1 to 5, particularly questions 1, 2, and 5: what is happening, in the context of our modern and globalized culture, with the deepest of all human desires, the appetitus beatitudinis. It is such a desire that at the level of sheer human experience strives for an obscure and undetermined bonum perfectum et completivum (q. 1, a. 5). It is such a drive for happiness that would fulfil all human desire: appetere beatitudinem nihil aliud est quam

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1 Thomas Aquinas, Summa theologiae, I - II, qq. 1 a 5.
I begin with a sonnet by e. e. cummings, who presents this very issue: how are we opened by our desire and by our quest for meaning to an ever wider and transcendent horizon, and how are we to cope with that openness which is at the core of our destiny in this earth and beyond.

so many selves (so many fiends and gods each greedier than every) is a man (so easily one in another hides; yet man can, being all, escape from none)

so huge a tumult is the simplest wish: so pitiless a massacre the hope most innocent (so deep's the mind of flesh and so awake what waking calls asleep)

so never is most lonely man alone (his briefest breathing lives some planet's year, his longest life's a heartbeat of some sun; his least unmotion roams the youngest star)

– how should a fool that calls him "I" presume to comprehend not numerable whom?

MODERNITY AND GLOBALIZATION

Modernity and globalization are different phenomena. At a very descriptive level, this complex net, globalization, seems to deal mainly with the technological and economic infrastructure of progress; and modernity corresponds to the levels of politics and culture (what Lonergan treats in Insight, chap. 7).

While being different, both phenomena seem to go together. Present globalization can be traced back to its beginnings in the later Middle Ages market and monetary economy, then through mercantilism to

the rise of modern capitalism (Braudel); it is linked with conquests, colonizing, intercontinental trade, and the rise of world economies in the sixteenth and seventeenth centuries (Wallerstein) that were dominated by colonizing countries.

As for modernity, or what Lonergan calls the empirical conception of culture, we have different sorts of emancipation occurring over the past four centuries, that opened up new autonomous realms for human thinking, new modes for social and political organization, and new ways for exploring human desires and potentialities.

Both phenomena create a new horizon, rather than new multiple horizons, at least from the side of the human subject. It is as if the old Aristotelian saying, anima est quoddamodo omnia, breaks out now in its sheer potential openness to human destiny.

GLOBALIZATION AND DESIRE

What is the impact of globalization on our desires and on our immediate tasks? This is something that occurs at the level of everyday life: we have in front of us an immense shop-window that exhibits an abundance of consumer goods, of opportunities for pleasure, of means to go beyond what we have already experienced. As Nicholas Boyle puts it crudely, we are involved in a circle of desire and work: "As consumers we need ever wider choice and ever higher quality and so impose on ourselves as producers ever sterner requirements, to which we become ever more resistant, for better work and longer hours."4

Offered in the global marketplace, it seems, is whatever we want. However, our desires are not fulfilled. For us who are already within the net of the global market because we have more or less the means to get what we wish, there seems to be always something more that we could acquire or enjoy, and so our desires are not fulfilled. For those who are excluded (an immense majority of humankind), the marketplace offers just window-shopping, because they have no means to cope even with their very needs for survival.

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This process of ever producing new goods and opportunities, pulled out by our own drives to acquire and to prove, seems to produce a sort of zapping of human desire: *so huge a tumult is the simplest wish.*

Scientific research, technological development, and the burgeoning of communications offer the ground for unknown possibilities to the human quest for happiness. A sort of implicit reasoning takes the lead: what is possible is worthwhile getting or attempting to do; it is possible because we have the means to get it; then let us go ahead and get it. Sheer possibility, supported by technological advance and capital resources, is the ground for exercising our choice. It is something like the old theological dictum: *potuit, voluit, ergo fecit!* There are omnipotent, sovereign, whimsical gods behind that!

This supporting structure (technology, science, production, commerce, communications) is the potential ground for our desires. What about the formal ground?

**MODERNITY AND DESIRE**

This ground seems to be what we call modernity. At the core of it there is the openness of the human mind: *how should a fool that calls him “I” presume / to comprehend not numerable whom?*

Modernity is the scenario and the result of an eager and widespread experiment which tries to comprehend and to express our "not numerable whom", the "whom" of each one of us, and the "whom" of the members of our manifold humankind.

This experiment has gone, and continues to go, through different levels of human experience (pace Lonergan). At the sheer experiential level, it is the enjoyment of, or the longing for, a sort of happening that grants immediate happiness to our nude sensibility, if not complete and for ever at least successively in the present instant. It is the longing for the happiness of human encounters such as those between the beautiful model and the bitter judge in Kislowsky’s *Red*, a part of the *Three Colours* trilogy.

It has gone through an overall exercise of intelligence and reasonableness in search for understanding and grounding in our knowledge of the cosmos, of human beings, of our history.

It has gone through the level of responsibility and freedom in social,
political, and national emancipations and revolutions that have marked our history over the past four centuries.

There are, of course, in this huge human experiment all sorts of biases, deviations, aberrations, blind alleys, fatal errors, crimes, of which the past century gives us a crude nemesis. Octavio Paz touches this nemesis of progress and modernity:

The good, we have sought the good:
to straighten the world.
We didn’t lack resoluteness:
we lacked humility.
What we sought we sought without innocence.
Precepts and concepts,
a theologian’s arrogance:
beating with the cross,
founding in with blood,
building up the house with bricks of crime,
decreeing an obligatory communion...

And what was worst: we were
the public that applauds or yawns in their stalls.
The guilt that ignores that it is guilt,
innocence
was the greater guilt.
Each year was a mountain of bones.5

What is the shape of this quasi form of modernity, what is the modern conception of the human subject behind it? I found in Charles Taylor’s Sources of the Self (also in his Hegel) a suggestive expression for it, what he calls the expressivist turn in our self-experience and self-understanding:

...The expressivist revolution constituted a prodigious development of modern post-Augustinian inwardness, in its self-exploratory branch...We certainly saw the bases for a strong orientation to inwardness in the transpositions wrought on Augustine by Descartes and Montaigne, and in the practices

of disengaged self-remarking, and religious and moral self-exploration, which arise in the early modern period. But only with the expressivist idea of articulating our inner nature do we see the grounds for construing this inner domain as having depth, that is, a domain beyond our furthest point of clear expression.

That examining the soul should involve the exploration of a vast domain is not, of course, a new idea. The Platonic tradition would concur. But this domain is not an “inner” one. To understand the soul, we are led to contemplate the order in which it is set, the public order of things. What is new in the post-expressivist era is that the domain is within, that is, it is only open to a mode of exploration which involves the first-person instance. That is what it means to define the voice or impulse as “inner.”

According to this conception, we tend to make sense, if ever, of our life and we search for happiness and plenitude by permanently exploring our hidden potentialities and through an overreaching realization of those potentialities. Meaning and fulfilment, if ever, are found on the move, they are a sort of happening; they are not something that we accept as given or taken for granted.

This is the main trend nourished by the very nature of our spirit and supported by an expanding material development. Is this fact a fate or is it a prophecy for our freedom?

**ALTERNATIVE WAYS**

Before adding a few simple reflections, I quote another poet, Czeslaw Milosz, *Tidings*:

> Of earthly civilisation, what shall we say?  
> That it was a system of coloured spheres cast in smoked glass,  
> Where a luminescent liquid thread kept winding and unwinding.

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Or that it was an array of sunburst palaces
Shooting up from a dome with massive gates
Behind which walked a monstrosity without a face.

That every day lots were cast, and whoever drew low
Was marched there as sacrifice: old men, children, young boys and young girls.

Or we may say otherwise: that we lived in a golden fleece,
In a rainbow net, in a cloud cocoon
Suspended from the branch of a galactic tree.
And our net was woven from the stuff of sings,
Hieroglyphs for the eye and ear, amorous rings.
A sound reverberated inward, sculpturing our time,
The flicker, flutter, twitter of our language.

For from what could we weave the boundary
Between within and without, light and abyss,
If not from ourselves, our own warm breath,
And lipstick and gauze and muslin,
From the heartbeat whose silence makes the world die?

Or perhaps we’ll say nothing of earthly civilisation.
For nobody really knows what it was.7

This experience of the modern human subject, in the context of globalization that works at different levels (technological, social, political, cultural, communicative), presents various questions.

I would like to note first the predicament of the enormous gap between our moral aspirations and the practical means we have to cope effectively with them. This gap is fulfilled with what Taylor, following Bernard Williams, calls “the attachment to a hypergood of purity,” 8 that is, a restricted notion of the moral as an obligation. This way of feeling and thinking imposes upon us who participate in the play of exploring our potentialities, and upon many people who are set aside, an immense burden that we cannot support.

8 Taylor, Sources of the Self, 85.
And what is worse, we establish through this benevolent feeling of purity the standard that other people should attain in order to consider themselves relatively happy human beings. By the very dynamics of material progress and the openness of our expressivist nature, this standard is ever mounting and ever demanding more means to get to it. A good example of this is given by Paul Krugman: the mounting expenses of health care in the United States that will leave out of it those who will not be able to afford its costs. His comment: a system that explicitly allows that money purchases our own lives, is something that is difficult even to talk about. And he puts the crucial question: how can we create a set of institutions that really could say no? 

The unlimited overgrowing of our aspirations goes beyond any conventional way of approaching moral questions, because it touches the very limit of the human condition: we simply are not gods. It is basically, I would say, a metaphysical issue that requires a renewed understanding of our human condition in terms of radical precariousness, and at the same time of trust in the spark of human freedom that could lead us to real attainable happiness.

In Kantian terms, the whole bulk of our civilization is involved in an ethic of imperatives that impulses us to an ocean of possibilities (years ago, Banco del Atlántico in Mexico used this slogan, utterly Leibnizian, to announce itself), whose practical conditions will never be fulfilled whatever means we manage to have.

A Mexican writer (poet and keen essayist on quite different fields: economics, politics, culture, religion) expresses our moral and practical predicament in these terms:

For over the past centuries, moral imagination has developed projects for a more human life (sincerity, naturalness, freedom, equality, fraternity, autonomy, perpetual peace, free loving choice, creative work, etc.) whose engineering, economy, social organisation, etc., have been realised only partially, symbolically, demagogically...

Unfortunately, the moral demands seem to be more contagious than the capacity to realise them. From the awareness of what is possible for the “advanced” focuses, an epidemic of good

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intentions spreads out over the whole planet...

...The possibility that opens itself beyond any limits can be seen as something terrible, that may be justified only as a divine summon and at the risk of offending the gods, or as an invitation to progress. Still, it’s an invitation we have not to wait for, but that we have to pursue (reversing the pursuit itself) in order to go after all that is possible beyond any limits. As if all imperatives were just one: do (read, travel, produce, earn, accumulate, spend, waste, prove, learn, develop, build, help, save, do) all that is possible.

The will to explore every possibility, to realise all potentialities: an unlimited appetite for being and for power; a full accomplishment that demands and deserves everything.”

This seems to be one of the main issues we confront nowadays: how are we to cope with this fleeting object, a phantasm, of our desire. I will not suggest any particular alternative way to come to grips with this predicament. I will indicate four realms – economic, political, cultural, and purely human – where we can try alternative ways to it. At the core of them there is the finite spark of our freedom. In the background, you will guess Insight chapters 7, 18, and 20: “In the first place, there is such a thing as progress, and its principle is liberty.”

What is at stake in these realms is a dialectical tension between finite and infinite, the boundary we weave between within and without. There is a principle that keeps the poles of the tension together: the heartbeat whose silence makes the world die.

Nicholas Boyle and Gabriel Zaid express this tension of our freedom that is open through our deepest and utmost desire to an infinite good, and at the same time constrained by our finite precarious human condition.

The system, true, is global, but it is also closed – constrained both physically and by our own demands as consumers. Recognising ourselves as self-constraining consumer-producers we recognise not only our own finitude but that of the world we inhabit.

12 Boyle, *Who Are We Now?*, 119.
In the aesthetic stage of life, every one of us wants everything: to live is a finitude with infinite aspirations. It is so until the horizon of death, of time that flies out, of the ethical imperative, makes us perceive that we will do some things and not other, and that freedom does not reside in the infinitude of whatever is possible, but in the concrete accomplishment of this and that, of one thing and not the other.\textsuperscript{13}

It is a crucial issue that is to be faced in terms of self-understanding and of an understanding of our human historical condition. Before even confronting us at a moral level, the global net where we live propitiates a flight from understanding. This flight is hidden by the gigantism of the economic paraphernalia, the ever mounting standard of happiness that our sensibility establishes, the betting game in the marketplace and the pretension of a nonmeasurable outreach of our desires. This apparent infinitude of our net is, in fact, limited. Is it possible to avoid surrendering to trivial infinitude without escaping from the limited net?

\textbf{GIGANTISM AND ECONOMIC FREEDOM}

Is the global market really free? If we consider the movement of capital, the agreements to overcome national frontiers for investments, merchandise, work, and services, maybe yes. If we consider that private initiative has widened and the state’s has diminished, maybe yes, even though protectionism is still played out.

However, the main constraint for a free global market is an almost unconscious one: the fact that the global market is restricted to the three biggest economies of the world (USA, Japan, and the EU) and to the welfare to which they have reached. For the rest of the world, welfare reaches only the upper and middle classes. That is to say, the global market is tied to a limited group of consumers, its production is oriented to those demanding consumers, and for that it requires a huge amount of capital. The whole system seems to turn around that phantasm of our desire: material progress viewed as an infinite offer and an infinite demand.

Where can we find the realm of genuine economic freedom? This

\textsuperscript{13} Gabriel Zaid, “Un teorema sobre el progreso improductivo,” Vuelta magazine, no. 205, 15.
realm could be the authentic human market, as studied by Fernand Braudel. He considers that the capitalist modern economy, grown out of mercantilism, is a by-product of economic life, a parasite. In a recent essay, “Del mercado al gigantismo,” Gabriel Zaid suggests that the whole industrial revolution down to our days has been in fact supported by cheap capital exploited eagerly: the given capital of nature, fossil energy, coal, oil, and gas. He has also in various keen essays penetrated in the mystery of cheap capital: the paradox of a nonproductive progress. That is, progress based on decreasing productivity of capital that requires the concentration of huge amounts of it loaned at surprisingly cheap rates. Gigantism, he concludes, requires to be subsidized.14

The concentration of cheap capital is used by the biggest economies of the world, and leaves the rest of them with poor means to overcome poverty and their purely survival needs. The nonproductivity of capital has various overtones. Some central questions are: where capital really is, how it is used, how it moves, how it is wasted. We need perhaps a detective story to find the answers. Hernando de Soto, a Peruvian economist, wrote a book (that I have not read yet) with the title, The Mystery of Capital. And some of you here have studied the question of capital circulation treated by Lonergan.

PYRAMIDS AND SOCIAL FREEDOM

Economic gigantism calls forth all sorts of bureaucratic pyramids, whether governmental, private, unionist, ecclesiastical, or academic. It is a paradox, as Nicholas Boyle points out, that the supposed reduction of state involvement in the economy in the United Kingdom under Mrs. Thatcher produced more bureaucracy, whose task was to check out how private agents behaved according to its norms. Social pyramids are constraining and produce a ladder-scaling mentality.

It is true that industrial scale production, agricultural and transformation industries oriented to massive consumers of the big modern cities, requires those sort of huge enterprises. But huge enterprises, whoever may be the owners or directors, incorporate massive files of executives, clerks, workers, all of them obliged to servile work even if they are very

well paid.

The whole human economy nonetheless, does not rest on the biggest enterprises. There is an enormous worldwide population that works on their own at a small (and beautiful) local level. There are also what we may call “intermediate societies” of human scale because of the territory they occupy or the loyalties they imply. These lesser human groups are the social and political locus where all of us live, encounter other people, and find our destiny. In the social womb of these groups the spark of our freedom enlightens us, as we become what we are and what we want to be.

Besides the economic organization of worldwide outreach and the political organization at national and international levels, we need communities of human scale, whether religious or cultural, whether for leisure or work, to become fully human persons, for from what could we weave the boundary / between within and without, light and abyss, / if not from ourselves, our own warm breath, / and lipstick and gauze and muslin...15

BETTING AND CULTURAL FREEDOM

In practical terms, the phantasm of our desire is floating between a sort of double bet played in the marketplace: the bet of those who invent, produce, and offer new goods and opportunities to attract our desire; and the bet of those who wish to acquire another new good or to attempt another opportunity to reach a new token of happiness. To keep the play going on requires a good deal of money. We are free to bet. For what are we to bet?

There is no question of us putting aside the marketplace, nor of fancying that modernity is overcome by postmodernity and that this one will be overcome by a new thinking mood. The global market, the communicative exchange, the pluralistic culture of our time, are well settled and will expand.

The modern culture of liberties offers us already institutional carriers for the exercise of our freedom: the whole issue of human rights, democracy, commercial and political agreements. Still, the betting game

of the market tends to hide the real issue: we are free, but free for what? In the center of this for what all of us stand, the whole humankind and our destiny. The market plays its bet: the paradise of the offer. We play ours: to try once again. This play pretends that we may experience a passing happening, one after the other. But these happenings that fulfil momentarily our desires and consecrate the success of the market obscure another more profound and utmost desire. The fascination of the betting game impedes us to discover it.

At the root of our freedom there is the singularity of each of us, there are other persons, there is the life we share with them, the history of each one, and the one we create together, there is our destiny. Who are we? Where do we go?

These questions lead us beyond the bet of the market, beyond the seemingly ineluctable cycles of economy, beyond mere political pressures and war-games. Our utterly human global net is made from another substance, it shields prophecies and signs for our freedom: and our net was woven from the stuff of sings, / hieroglyphs for the eye and ear, amorous rings. / A sound reverberated inward, sculpturing our time, / the flicker, flutter, twitter of our language.16

DESIRE AND HUMAN FREEDOM

Desire is a bio-psychic drive at the roots of pleasure, it is wish, appetite, ambition, greed, voracity; it pulls us beyond any measure. Desire is ambiguous: so huge a tumult is the simplest wish: / so pitiless a massacre the hope / most innocent...17

As the sweetness is delightful to every taste, but for some the most delightful is the sweetness of wine, for others the sweetness of honey, or something like that; however, the sweetness that is the most delightful by itself should be that in which someone who has the best taste delights the most. Similarly, that good that is complete in an uppermost degree should be the one that is desired as ultimate end by someone who has a well disposed feeling (I-II, q. 1, a. 7).18

18 Thomas Aquinas, Summa theologiae, I - II, qq. 1 a 5.
THE "HISTORICITY" OF CONSCIOUSNESS AND THE ONTOLOGY OF THE PERSON

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INTRODUCTION

a) The Topical Relevance of the Category "Person."

"Person" is a term that impressed itself indelibly upon the "world" of Western civilization, forming both thought and conduct. Though arising in a theological and philosophical context, it succeeded over time in penetrating political, juridical, and moral spheres.

The modern world's "turn to the subject" has sought to recuperate the dimensions of consciousness, existence, and history, while freeing itself from "metaphysics." As a result of the neglect of metaphysics, "person" has not attracted much attention in "specialized" literature. Nonetheless public debates about moral, political, and juridical questions frequently appeal to "person" more or less directly: recall the ongoing struggle over...
the defense of human rights, genetic experimentation, and euthanasia. An immediate public consensus is often attained by calling all to "respect" the dignity of the person. But consensus reveals itself as merely verbal as soon as a concrete application is attempted. Even if context and "rules of the game" provide such an apparent unanimity of meaning that in ordinary language "person" can be used without immediately creating the chaos of equivocal predication, explicit reflection changes the situation radically\(^4\). Univocal clarity shatters into an equivocal multiplicity of meanings.

"In the midst of this widespread disorientation" about the identity and task of man in the world, which has assumed "the dimensions of a social crisis"\(^5\), Bernard Lonergan's reflections can indicate a way out. He achieved in a critical manner the transition from metaphysical research to intentionality analysis of the subject and so developed a method to serve as the thread of Adrienne leading us from the labyrinth of meaninglessness attendant upon the unrestricted growth of isolated scientific specialization. This method would offer "a universal viewpoint from which individual temperament can be discounted, personal evaluations can be criticized, and the many and disparate reports on man, emanating from experts in various fields, can be welded into a single view"\(^6\). From this viewpoint the recovery of the category of "person" can

\(^1\) Cf. I. **Kant**, *Fondazione della metafisica dei costumi*, ed. by V. Mathieu (Milano, 1994) 142f.

\(^2\) B. Lonergan suggests that Socrates had a similar experience in Athens at the end of the fifth century b. C.: *Understanding and Being: The Halifax Lectures on Insight*, ed. by E.A. Morelli and M.D. Morelli. Revised and Augmented by F.E. Crowe with the collaboration of E.A. Morelli, M.D. Morelli, R.M. Doran, and T.V. Daly (CWL 5: Toronto, 1990) 39. All texts cited without indication of the author are to be attributed to B. Lonergan.


\(^4\) Ibid., 6.
be attempted.

**b) Lonergan’s Reflections on “Person”**

Lonergan’s interest in the “person,” both word and res, is closely tied to his Trinitarian and Christological reflections, where he rethought its meaning in accord with the Leonine program “vetera novis augere et perficere”. Employing the results of previous studies, *De Deo Trino* and *De Verbo Incarnato* formulated a definition of “person” embracing its ontological and psychological aspects. Although these works are a milestone in Lonergan’s reflection, they do not supply his definitive term. They revealed an unusual mixture of the old with the new. Not only was the originality of his thought poured into the ancient literary genre of a theological treatise designed to support the professor’s lectures and to facilitate private study but also on certain points Lonergan’s thought was still developing. If the methodological and conceptual infrastructure of these treatises depended heavily on the investigations published in *Grace and Freedom*, *Verbum*, and *Insight*, Lonergan did not ignore the challenges arising from the discovery of historical consciousness and the results of historical research as applied to theology.

*Insight* surely had faced the questions raised by modern science and the Kantian critical turn in philosophy. Employing “generalized

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8 *De Deo Trino I: Pars Dogmatica*, 2nd ed. (Romae, 1964) (henceforth: *DT I*); *De Deo Trino II: Pars systematica*, 3rd ed. (Romae, 1964) (henceforth: *DT II*).


11 Cf. ibid., 211f.

12 This becomes obvious in comparing the methodological introductions to the various editions of *De Deo Trino*, in both the dogmatic and the systematic parts: *DT I* (1961) 5-12; (1964), 5-14; *Divinarum Personarum conceptionem analogicam* (Romae, 1957) 7-51; *DT II*, 7-64. On this point cf. F. Crowe, *Lonergan* (London, 1992) 129-130.

empirical method,” i.e., identifying the intrinsic conscious, intelligent, and operational norms in actu exercito of human intentional consciousness (noesis) which underpin every known content (noema), he analyzed the mind’s procedures in mathematics, physics, and common sense to “recover” human cognitional structure in its own terms and fundamental relations. As a result Lonergan critically produced, first, a theory of knowledge, and thereafter an epistemology, and a metaphysics empirically verified in knowing processes.

But his transfer to Rome forced him to take notice of the European cultural milieu with problems not previously considered: those of Geisteswissenschafiten, hermeneutics, and historical criticism, and, consequently, the challenge of the existential, historical subject. He had to deepen his understanding of the structure of intentional consciousness and to bring to maturity that “shift” in his own reflections which we can synthetically describe as “a transition from the analysis of the knowing subject to the analysis of the existential and religious subject.” The resultant method, spelled out in Method in Theology, permitted the integration of the nineteenth century’s achievements in hermeneutics and historical studies “with the teachings of the Catholic religion and Catholic theology.”

17 Caring, 105-106.
18 “Insight Revisited,” in 2C, 276-277.
19 Crowe, Lonergan, 97-99.
23 “Insight Revisited,” in 2C, 277. During the Lonergan Congress (1970) Lonergan made it clear that his method was valid not only for theology but also for every human science that was investigating a cultural past in order to guide its future: “Bernard
Even if Lonergan dedicated his final years to economics, a subject on which he had worked passionately in the '30s and '40s, further considerations, developed in many talks, seminars, and study weeks, significantly deepened the results obtained in *Method*. Although the topic of “person” was not directly treated, nonetheless the importance of the theme supplies the underlying dynamic of his research, insofar the “classic” idea of person is challenged by the results of today’s psychological and sociological inquiries, which deeply emphasize the historicity and relativity involved in our attempts to attain the truth and achieve the good. These final studies also underscore the primacy of the practical and religious dimensions of reality and the need of adequate method capable of responding to the problem of authentic meanings that constitute the person, society, and history.

1. THE “QUADRUPLE TRANSITION”
IN THE UNDERSTANDING OF MAN

As just noted, Lonergan’s encounter with phenomenological and existential philosophies brought about some important transitions in his understanding of man and, as an upshot, in his final elaboration of the “basic and total science.” I think that there were four important transitions after the discovery of the uniqueness of “human nature” persuaded him to surrender the primacy of metaphysics to a psychological analysis that became an analysis of the conscious intentionality of the concrete, social, and historical human subject.

a) The first transition was “from essence to ideal” i.e., from a
consideration of what man is in potency to what he ought to become through his own decision. Whoever begins with the Greek definition of man as an animal rationale must recognize that according to this "logical" essence (grasped by determining its genus and specific difference) man does not evolve. For any individual, "no matter what he does, how intelligent or stupid he is, how wise or silly, how saintly or wicked," is a living being potentially rational, and in this possibility any development is so excluded that differences "are merely accidental," so much so that all development is excluded. But these differences are not accidental to the man who is a rational being in act. Of him a decision about himself is demanded. His own freedom is called into play, and freedom is not given to him once and for all. The challenge of the decision about oneself perpetually recurs, and always under the threat of failure. Consequently, "time enters into the essence of being a man." The self I am today is not numerically different from the self I was as a child or boy. But it is qualitatively different. Hence an analysis of man cannot restrict itself to the "logical" essence: in man's essence decision, freedom, and time must be included.

b) The second transition, following upon the first, was "from substance to subject" (or "from human nature to the existential human subject"). "Who is a man? Who is to be a man? The answer is "I," "We." That use of the first person supposes consciousness. Whoever is awake and conscious is aware of his obligation to be human, of his involvement in his own decision, of his own possible success or failure. In particular modern philosophy effected the transition from substance to subject, which implies that consciousness is constitutive of the subject.

unpublished text prepared by James Quinn and John Quinn (CWL 10; Toronto, 1993) 79 (henceforth: Topics).

27 Topics, 81.


29 Topics, 80.


31 Topics, 81. Cf. also "A New Pastoral Theology" (Nov. 12, 1973), The Larkin-Stuart Lectures at Trinity College in the University of Toronto, 19.


33 Topics, 81.
Indeed “we are always substances, but we are subjects only when we are awake, and we are subjects in different degrees according to what type of activity is going on in us.”

c) The third transition was “from faculty psychology to flow of consciousness.” The study of the subject is different from the study of the soul: “It prescinds from the soul, its essence, its potencies, its habits, for none of these is given in consciousness.” Since “a contemporary philosophy is under the constraint of an empirical principle,” insisting that a basic, total science have fundamental, verifiable terms and relations, the data of consciousness supply the fundamental evidence for such a methodological construction.

d) The fourth transition, resulting from the nineteenth century discovery of history, brought the awareness that man is “constituted in his humanity by historicity, by this historical dimension of his reality.” Hence today “the development, the presentation, of any science or any subject” should be “four-dimensional, and philosophy is no exception.” Surely whoever follows a “classicist, conservative, traditional” position can consider human reality abstracting from every aspect by which one man differs from another and so arrive at “a residue named human nature” and at “the truism that human nature is always the same.” But whoever studies concrete persons must recognize the progress and historicity involved in the constitution of meaning that makes man a subject actually intelligent, rational, and moral. Consequently two different perceptions


35 Topics, 82. Yet Lonergan tacks on immediately, p. 83: “There is nothing wrong with faculty psychology, but it is not enough for our present purposes, because it does not take us near enough to the concrete.”


40 “Philosophy of History,” in Philosophical and Theological Papers, 72.

41 Ibid., 79.

of man are possible:

One can apprehend man abstractly through a definition that applies *omni et soli* and through properties verifiable in every man. In this fashion one knows man as such; and man as such, precisely because he is an abstraction, also is unchanging... On the other hand, one can apprehend mankind as a concrete aggregate developing over time, where the locus of development and, so to speak, the synthetic bond is the emergence, expansion, differentiation, diachronic of meaning and of meaningful performance. On this view intentionality, meaning, is a constitutive component of human living; moreover, this component is not fixed, static, immutable, but shifting, developing, going astray, capable of redemption; on this view there is in the historicity, which results from the human nature, an exigence for changing forms, structures, methods... 43

Hence, “if differentiated consciousness is itself a product of the historic process, it becomes evident in a particularly clear way that there is a dimension of human nature contained in historicity itself”44. Historicity and history constitute human reality: man can only exist as self-determining; he is the being that has to be what he is; hence decision (the fourth level of consciousness) is constitutive of his reality, which is intrinsically individual and social.

2. THE CONUNDRUMS WHICH EMERGE FROM THE RECOGNITION OF MAN’S HISTORICAL NATURE

The recognition of man’s historical nature epochally marks contemporary thought, but the lack of precision about that nature’s specifying characteristics undercuts any possible consensus45. This paper attempts to expand path traced out by Bernard Lonergan. We have to justify

43 Ibid., 5-6.
44 “The Philosophy of History,” in *Philosophical and Theological Papers*, 78.
45 A “culturalist” interpretation seems to run a double risk. One tends either to “historicism,” which sees in cultural enterprises only an infinite process of subjective self-referential interpretations, or to “transcendentalism,” which interprets the differences which emerge in history only as “categorical” (hence “accidental”) manifestations of an immutable, transcendental structure, which *qua* universal constitutes of itself the truth dimension of the categorical reality.
the constitutive role of history in the actualization of consciousness’ formally dynamic structure. This involves showing “how” and “why” pre-reflective experience does not contain in itself a realized meaning but obtains it in that actualization of the subject which it both renders possible and demands. We shall develop this proposal in eight steps.

a) At the center of Lonergan’s speculative journey is to be found the discovery, thematization, and application of the formally dynamic structure of human consciousness, which is experiential, intelligent, rational, and moral. This is his only “a priori”.

b) To establish consciousness in this central position signifies the recognition that the question of truth concerns not only knowledge but also, and more radically, consciousness. Only by considering the subject and his effective constitution can one face in a non-formalistic way the question of truth. Lonergan himself has shown the Scholastic insistence on the objectivity of truth apart from the subject led to the neglect of the subject as the only condition of truth’s emergence and existence. “The fruit of truth must grow and mature on the tree of the subject, before it can be plucked and placed in its absolute realm”.

c) Consciousness bears witness to its own passivity. Lonergan stressed this original dimension of consciousness, especially in the period of his research on St. Thomas. Against the theory of vital acts, he defended the “passion” of the actus perfecti in sentire, intelligere, and velle as a received perfection. This pati does not imply any diminution of the one receiving because it is called most properly a perfcit. The immediate experience of consciousness testifies that it is self-awakened in the original experiences of life, which anticipate the inseparability of the world and the self. Meaning is given to consciousness in these spontaneous experiences of life. These are suffered. Our original


47 “The Subject,” in 2C, 71. Cf. Method, 265, 292. In “The Subject,” 70, Lonergan makes the distinction: “intentionally it [the objectivity of truth] is independent of the subject, but ontologically it resides only in the subject: veritas formaliter est in solo iudicio.” Lonergan always rejected conceptualism for overlooking that the act is the subject’s and happens according to the subject’s own constitution. Cf. Verbum, 39 n. 126, 194-195.

relation to the world is an “affective” experience, a being “affected by.” Hence consciousness is the symbolic locus where a passivity interior to the subject is experienced. This passivity can be specified in three ways: regarding one’s own body, the other, and social and institutional relations. Hence man knows that even before acting he is acted upon (in Scholastic terminology man is actualized). He is already taken up into an experience that has to do with him before he determines himself, an experience ordered to his determination. In this original, constitutive passivity meaning is not created by the subject but is freely assumed by him in its manifestation. Man becomes aware of himself in a desire that responds to the challenge which anticipates himself. Thus consciousness bears witness to an original “debt,” which calls it to freedom and constitutes it as responsible.

d) Consciousness’ passivity reveals itself uniquely in the intersubjective constitution of the person. Even if “person” emerged from the Trinitarian and Christological disputes that inevitably arose between the systematic differentiation of consciousness effected by Aristotle and its transposition to a Christian context by Thomas Aquinas, contemporary research on intersubjectivity has proceeded in “psychological, phenomenological, existential, and personalist channels”\(^49\). In particular “the contemporary view comes out of genetic biology and psychology”\(^50\). These studies show that the community, not the individual, is primordial. For the child’s “I” emerges only within the “we” of the family. Within the community, through intersubjective relations, differentiation of the individual person originates. So “person” denotes always a singular person with all his individual characteristics resulting from the community in which his self lives. Through the community the self is formed and forms itself. “The person is the resultant of the relationships he has had with others and of the capacities that have developed in him to relate to others”\(^51\). In particular the original relation-experiences with their sense of totality manifest this passivity. Paradigmatic are relations between parents and children and between man and woman. The former communicate the comprehensive meaning of life. The latter supply the interpretative figure for the meaning of difference and of every relation to the “other.”


\(^{51}\) Ibid., 59.
The passivity of meaning indicates an anteriority and an otherness which find their most immediate manifestation in the “face” of the other. The event which precedes me is the “proximate” presence of the other. The relation to the other is therefore constitutive of consciousness. The other is neither not outside me nor subsequent to me; the other is in me. The appeal of the other to me constitutes my identity because his concern for me awakens me to my freedom as responsibility and concern for him. Clearly the subject can will only if his identity is anticipated as possible, yet no verification of its possibility exists aside from the effective relation which the “I” establishes with other subjects.

e) The presence of the other manifests the original ethical dimension of consciousness. Human experience emerges as the experience of a freedom called by an absolute meaning. This absolute is revealed to the subject in the “feeling” and desire for the good life as mediated through civilized forms. The absolute meaning experienced anticipatively becomes effective for the subject only in his decision. There man makes himself, for the act does not confirm an already given a priori, but establishes it in an original meaning. In deciding about the anticipated meaning of experience the action turns back upon the subject who irrevocably forms his own existence in the realized choice. Action realizes itself as self-actualization since in deciding what he does man decides who he is.

Choosing not only settles ends and objects; it gives rise to dispositions and habits; it makes me what I am to be; it makes it possible to estimate what I probably would do; it gives me a second nature, an essence that is mine in virtue of my choosing; still it does not give me an immutable essence, achievement is always precarious, radical new beginning possible. In choosing I become myself; what settles the issue is not external constraint nor inner determinism nor knowledge but ut quo my will and ut quod myself; in the last analysis the ultimate reason, for my choice being what it is, is myself.

In deciding man constitutes his true identity as subject, i.e., as one “constrained to be free” and therefore “to decide.” Thus human action

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manifests a triple dimension: while deciding about the meaning offered to him — he accepts or refuses various opportunities — man decides about himself — in deciding what to do he decides who he is. Deciding about himself, i.e., consenting to and entrusting himself to that meaning which anticipates him by authorizing and requiring his decision, he decides about the meaning of the totality. For he must decide about himself as a whole. This basic actualization of the subject is termed ethical insofar as it constitutes the matrix of the moral form of experience.

Contemporary phenomenological and hermeneutical research has been able to demonstrate that consciousness is “set” in the decision, i.e., within its most original ethical dimensions. Consequently the gnoseological structures of intentionality have to be reinterpreted in the context of this original practical mediation of consciousness. Phenomenological investigation does not limit itself to noting that consciousness is open to a meaning which cannot be deduced from willing; it affirms rather that no meaning will be given to man apart from his willing. Man’s free self-orientation occurs only in the act of consenting-entrusting in response to what anticipates the act. This act possesses the depth of self-determination. Truth is simultaneously recognized as a gift insofar as it is accepted as a task, and vice versa: it is “for me” insofar it is “other,” and it is “given” insofar it is “to be accomplished.” Correspondingly freedom awaits its liberation because life’s ambiguous “face,” both promising and threatening, generates suspicion about the goodness of its origin as well as about the meaning of its goal.

f) This quality of the relation of consciousness to truth indicates what I mean by historicity as constitutive of the subject’s existence. If we mean by evidence the form in which truth becomes accessible to man, we have to conclude that the evidence constitutes itself in a synthesis that is originally practical. If self-appropriation really requires understanding the conscious structural normativeness and necessity in the realm of actuation, consciousness’ intentionality ought to be understood as originally practical. Lonergan’s analysis of the conscious, dynamic structure of intentionality arrives at the “transcendental precepts” (be

53 Obviously here one should introduce a consideration of consciousness of guilt and Lonergan’s explanation of sin. For an inchoative presentation cf. G. Rota, “Persona” e “natura,” 148-152.

attentive, be intelligent, be reasonable, be responsible). Their actuation and meaning are bound to the necessity of subjective decision. But does this explanation sufficiently clarify the effective role of decision as self-disposition starting from the understanding of a meaning which renders the decision possible? We must still explain the ontological importance of the hermeneutical act that accomplishes the synthesis between the emergence of meaning and the free decision appropriating it. This connection is radically historical and thereafter its evidence cannot be anticipated.

Lonergan has warned against attributing to method the false certitude of a structuralism, even if it is a structuralism of conscious intentionality:

And in this the one great delusion, to my mind, is the belief that there is an island of safety called “method.” If you follow the method, then you will be all right. In the sense that there is some allegorism, some set of rules, some objective solution, independent of each man’s personal authenticity, honesty, genuineness. And that does not exist. The only solution lies in “the good man”.

No mechanical method, independent of the subject, dispenses him of the responsibility of judging. No human authenticity can be automatic. But how does one justify the “excess” of the act, of “the good man” in relation to the formality of intentional structure?

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56 The fifth methodological precept in De intellectu et methodo (notes taken by F. Rossi de Gasperis and P. Joseph Cahill during a course at the Gregorian University in spring semester, 1959) says on this point: «responsabilitas iudicandi est acceptanda». Lonergan then comments: “Saepe ex methodo expectatur quod tollat responsabilitatem iudicandi, atque methodus fingitur tamquam aliqua institutio publica succurrens indigentes. Hoc methodus facere non potest.” (p. 46). Then he notes that a fundamental objection is usually raised against his fifth precept: “enim tota cognitio pendet a iudicio, et hoc implicat responsabilitatem individui qui illud facit, iudicium erit bonum si homines erunt responsabiles; quod de facto raro accidit. Unde methodus, prout a nobis proponitur, totum opus scientificum opinionibus singulorum relinquit.” Lonergan responds: “scientiae non possunt progredi sine usu iudicii personalis singulorum individuum, et quod iudicium est actus personalis.” (p. 47). Cf. Insight, 297-299; “Method in Catholic Theology,” in Philosophical and Theological Papers, 38-41.

57 “Man is called to authenticity. But man attains authenticity only by unfailing fidelity to the exigences of his intelligence, his reasonableness, his conscience.” (“The Ongoing Genesis of Methods,” in 3C, 152-153) Cf. also “Horizons and Transpositions,” 9.
The answer forces us to expand Lonergan’s analysis of the problem of existence. He attained the solution to the hermeneutic and historical problem of dispersion of meaning by referring to the dynamic and intentional structure of rational consciousness. Yet his analysis indicates the “disparity” existing between the structure of consciousness and the actuation of the same. The truth of the human subject’s personal identity is not attained by merely analyzing the universal normativeness of rational self-consciousness, because the self-conscious subject not only knows himself but also realizes himself as truth specifically in exercise, in the actuation of the subject who ought to recognize, appropriate, and prosecute responsibly the intelligent and responsible dynamic structure of the rational consciousness (cf. the topic of conversion). This “ought” makes two things clear: first, actuation can not be understood only as conformity or objectivization of what is already completely given and determined in its structure; second, freedom is the positive characteristic of spirit insofar as it is different from nature. A freedom, which cannot be reduced to the quality of the human operation inscribed in the contingency of the world (i.e., only virtually unconditioned).

Ultimately the human person decides about the meaning of his permanent, operative structure in practice, more exactly in the decision which, as Insight already stated, is a level of consciousness beyond

58 This topic is explicitly treated in De constitutione Christi ontologica et psychologica supplementum, 4th ed. (Romae, 1964), 14-19, in DT II, 196-204, and more generally in Existentialism. Obviously these presuppose the investigations of Insight. One should be aware that Lonergan attributes two difference meaning to “existence-existential.” The first, which belongs to the vocabulary of general metaphysics, refers to the esse that actuates an ens and is recognized in the act of judgment (Insight, 274). The second appears in De Constitutione Christi e in DT in reference to the human problem of becoming a “subject of later time,” i.e., of understanding, judging, choosing, and want to be what one ought to be, despite the “radical evil” which afflicts man’s individual and social existence even as he awaits a supernatural salvation-revelation that is desired, prayed for, but never demanded as a right. These two meaning are not exactly equivalent, and perhaps they explain the double concept of nature which J. McDermott claims to find in Lonergan as in other transcendental Thomists: “Person and Nature in Lonergan’s De Deo Trino,” in Angelicum 71 (1994), 184 n. 56. As a matter of fact the uniqueness of the “human nature” puts into question the gnoseological, epistemological, and metaphysical model of Aristotelian-Thomistic derivation which is grounded in the certain knowledge of causes; consequently in order to deal with historicity it has to rely upon a double notion in its analyses of general metaphysics (esse) and freedom.
59 DT II, 44; Existentialism, 28.
60 DT II, 42.
intellectual and rational consciousness\textsuperscript{61}. One might say that the truth of man has not yet been "equaled" by knowledge; for as such his truth still has to be "made." Therefore the problem of existence cannot be ascribed only to contingency, potentiality, and the human subject's structural incapacity. It indicates the uniqueness of the spirit whose actualization does not consist in the empirical translation of what is already determined in essence but constitutes its own truth (inseparably theoretical-practical). Hence stopping at the formally dynamic structure of rational consciousness appears rather to dissolve than to resolve the existential problem and the historical problem; as a matter of fact the structure constitutes itself fully in its truth finally only in practice, indeed, in the act of decision. The level of consciousness' actualization cannot be considered external to its truth, as if it were formally predetermined in the permanent order of rational consciousness, which would remain ultimately exterior to the person's history and freedom\textsuperscript{62}.

Thus we have to overcome the temptation of an epistemological model which shapes the knowledge of truth as originally speculative. In such a model the criterion of truth concerns knowing separate from willing, and the evidence of willing is interpreted as an extension, within a practical viewpoint, of the criterion gained in the analysis of the theoretical dimension of consciousness. Instead we must initiate a deeper investigation of the same evidence of the original knowing in which the theoretical and the practical are inseparable\textsuperscript{63}. The will's decision actually does not relate extrinsically to a content, whose evidence is defined independently of consciousness' practical dimension. The act of realizing truth manifests a form that is undeniably theoretical-practical.

The original structure of evidence not only demonstrates the reductive character of the empirical-positive approach but also

\textsuperscript{61} Insight, 631-642.

\textsuperscript{62} "Reality, truth, and freedom are given together not in the sense that one arrives at their connection through a deduction, but because reality's characteristic of truth includes the determination of my freedom. Their interrelation is not deductive because it is mediated by freedom. Praxis is not concerned with the actuation of a truth already established on a reflective level, but it refers to the form of experience which guarantees access to the foundation because it lays the foundation itself." (M. Epis, Ratio Fidei: I modelli della giustificazione della fede nella produzione manualistica cattolica della teologia fondamentale tedesca post-conciliare (Roma - Milano, 1995) 295.

denounces the more subtle ambition of speculative thought to determine the meaning of truth on a conceptual level which effective experience can only verify. Because the truth of experience is only effective in its free actuation, not only can the meaning of the truth be known solely in the decided decision but also this decision contributes to determining the meaning of the truth which renders the decision possible. The truth demonstrates its own transcendence because it grounds the free character of its own appropriation and it integrates the response as a moment of its own truth. Because the human response belongs to the truth, in it is the foundation for what one can and should call the historicity of truth.

A return to Lonergan’s theoretical model allows us to define the theoretical problem in terms of the following questions: Is generalized empirical method adequate for the thematization of the ontology inscribed in action? What is the relation between consciousness’ a priori and freedom’s practical mediation? Does not a method risk misconceiving man’s free, historical act as the correct application of procedural rules and hence falsely assigning to freedom the role of merely “confirming” or “transgressing” a truth already structurally predetermined?

It was not by chance that Lonergan considered the “practical” dimension a subsequent expansion of the transcendental structure recovered through the mediation of the “tripod” of doctrine of knowledge, epistemology, and metaphysics, but never as codetermining the structure itself. For that reason religious experience as the fulfillment of the subject’s self-transcendence was ascribed to the category of love, which apparently “transgresses” or “surpasses” the inventory of rational evidence. For Lonergan repeats Pascal’s aphorism that the heart has reasons which reason does not know. Thereby he underlines the insufficiency of the rational model adopted to grasp the “reasons” of the dynamism of the moral and religious conversion that realizes the

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66 Philosophy of God, 59.

subject's self-constitution. Such is the outcome of modern reason. For this reason excluded from the sphere of "reason" and indeed of "truth" all that cannot be shown, through experimentation or logical deduction, to be "universal," i.e., not only as true but as true for all. Consequently it factually defined as "knowing the truth" that form of consciousness which by decree has to remain indifferent to desires and affections. In the extreme case truth does not need the subject because it has to neutralize the risky subject's possibility of choice, his freedom. As a result proper procedure should not seek to construct a shelter for the heart's reason against the rigorous, impersonal laws of reason, but question the alleged adequacy of this model of "reason" for grasping the truth of consciousness.

g) We have been led in this direction because the notion of person calls attention to the human subject's "excess," his irreducibility to "nature," the dynamisms of transcendental subjectivity, and even the very instruments employed for understanding the person. In this sense "person" possesses a significance primarily critical. For "person" draws attention to the original irreducibility of man's ontological constitution to that of worldly beings, even though conceptualization must inevitably rely on these for understanding man's constitution. On account of this "disparity" man has to appropriate his "rational self-consciousness" in order to "exist" authentically, as Lonergan never wearies of repeating. Thus, on the one hand, man recognizes that his complex nature, inserted into a whole universe governed by the law of generalized emergent probability, is assigned to him as a "given." As the previous condition of his own existence to which he "ought" to respond, his nature is removed from his total, free self-disposition. On the other hand in acting he decides about the meaning of his own nature insofar as he decides ultimately about himself, constituting himself in his own personal differentiation. Therefore the ontological interrogation initiated by the person cannot be resolved by its transcendental moment. The subject's ultimate qualification cannot be metaphysically derived, since it depends on a free self-disposition. This involves not only the power of choice but also the same power of self-realization. This free self-disposition actually renders effective the very transcendental relation to the absolute — a relation, which is the condition for the characteristic of the consciousness'
freedom. Paradoxically the topic of sin, which Lonergan studied in its personal, social, and historical aspects and effects, manifests the operative capacity of a "quasi-transcendental" dimension, fruit of man's historical activity. We have to rethink the relation between truth and history in such a way as not to separate them but so to articulate them as to restore the irreducibly unique and historical character of man's relation to truth and hence truth's character of "event."

h) The starting point for understanding truth as event can be taken from Lonergan's analysis of self-transcendence, which arrives at its final efficacy in "being in love." He roughly classified love in three basic types: love of familial intimacy between husband and wife, parents and children; love toward one's mate, loyalty with regard to the civic community, which motivates us to contribute to human well-being; and finally love of God. This final love is a "radical being-in-love" with God with all one's heart, with all one's soul, with all one's mind, and with all one's strength. Various times Lonergan identifies it with "the love of God poured forth in our hearts by the Holy Spirit that is given to us" (Rom. 5:5). It is "a being-in-love that is without conditions or qualifications or reserves, and so it is other-worldly, a being-in-love that occurs within this world but heads beyond it, for no finite object or person can be the object of unqualified, unconditional loving." Hence it "actuates to the full the dynamic potentiality of the human spirit with its unrestricted reach and, as a full actuation, it is fulfillment..." It is "the crowning point of our self-transcendence." Lonergan connects the person's self-constitution with the religious relation:

The person is the resultant of the relationships he has had with others and of the capacities that have developed in him to relate to others... If persons are the products of community, if the strongest and the best of communities is based on love, then religious experience and the emergence of personality go hand

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70 "The Response of the Jesuit as Priest and Apostle in the Modern World," in 2C, 170, 171; Method, 289. In one passage, Lonergan adds to the usual four transcendental precepts (Be attentive, be intelligent, be rational, be responsible) a fifth precept: "be in love." (Method, 268)
71 "Natural Knowledge of God," in 2C, 129.
72 Loc. cit.
73 Loc. cit.
The relation to the other, which is constitutive for consciousness, manifests an absoluteness irreducible to the two subjects involved. Though neither person can ground absoluteness, it nevertheless occurs in an actual relation. Every reciprocal relation, and pre-eminently the relation achieved in love, demands as the quality of its truth a necessary and free self-sacrifice, which can lead even to the giving of one's life for the beloved. The relation is necessary insofar as a Sollen and not a Müssen is involved, and it is free since the sacrifice can only be awaited, and never claimed as a right. The absoluteness present in this relation is not justified by the subjects taken as individuals because the condition for the relation demands that neither pretend to be the relation's foundation. Thus the relation opens to the question about God, i.e., the question about the real foundation capable of justifying the absoluteness involved in the experience. True reciprocity excludes the subjugation of any one partner to the desires of the other. For the absoluteness, which supplies the norm for reciprocity, is irreducible to the partners involved precisely because no substitute for either can be found and even no relation can "equale" this quality; in reality every interpersonal relation is only a "sign" of the meaning which it bears. Every interpersonal relation is animated by the ultimate ground which calls it into existence even while remaining beyond the control of the people involved.

In this way the Absolute manifests itself as the Foundation guaranteeing and illuminating the original meaning of the desire constituting the subject. For this reason the "notion of God" can only happen as an event; it arises in consciousness and is nourished by religious symbolism so that the "desire," quickened by the experience of reciprocity, can realize itself. There is a "Third" who stands surety for it. This "Third" is not a thought about God that would be subject to my control. For He remains even when I am not actually thinking about God. Consciousness originally seeks not a thought about God, but the confirmation in reality of the absoluteness that it carries in itself: an Event manifesting its Foundation.

75 Philosophy of God, 59.
3. THE CHRISTOLOGICAL "EVENT"

a) The thematization of the practical intentionality of consciousness implies the recognition of (actual) history's primacy and the subordination of the transcendental to the event. From a theoretical point of view it renders legitimate the transition to the level of theology. The model just elaborated refers internally to truth's realization as a conclusive event of human existence. The event brings definitively to light why God can reveal Himself only within the form of reciprocity: this is not only the place or external form of His revelation; the truth of God is not external to the reciprocity.

In accord with this orientation contemporary theology has stressed the Christian faith's irreplaceable reference to history as its characteristic element. For the biblical God's revelation is historical not only because it unfolds on the stage of history but, more radically, because it causes man's free agreement as its intrinsic moment. Consequently human history becomes the revelation of God in the sense that man's response decides God's very identity. God cannot enter our history without making the history of the man who recognizes Him the form of His own revelation.

The category of event signifies that man's response is intrinsic to God's intended revelation. If God's initiative, both irreversible and unilateral, grounds an authentic reciprocity, to say that revelation occurs in history would be an understatement. History is more than a frame for revelation; revelation occurs as history.¹⁷⁶

b) The history of Jesus bears witness to the realistic foundation of the "desire" animating the relation of reciprocity with its human hope. For in that history the unexpected act of God comes into the open. God is not the projection of man's desire because man is not extrinsic to God but the very one addressed by God. Only for God is it true that His being addresses itself to man. The power of that address constitutes man before God as absolutely individual.

The "history of Jesus" manifests and realizes God's will to inscribe

¹⁷⁶ Therefore the uniqueness of Jesus grounds the absoluteness of His revelation and dictates the conditions for recognizing Him (faith). But because in the phenomenology of action such conditions are shown to coincide with the conditions of the original evidence, in the Christological event everyone can recognize that freedom enjoys access to its foundation, placing itself there as faith.
man’s otherness in the constitutive self-distinguishing of His own being. Christ is the first born of creation and the first born from the dead (Col. 1:15.18); this means that He is the reason for which man exists (creation) and can be fulfilled (salvation). Man is capable of fulfillment and ought to tend toward it, because the truth of his finitude consists in his having been created. The priority of God’s self-distinguishing “guarantees” man’s absoluteness and uniqueness: he is not a moment of the divine self-constitution but is the addressee of God’s free act. Creation is not necessary. For it is “more than necessary.” It belongs to an order transcending necessity, the order of freedom. The meaning of Rahner’s statement that the economic Trinity is the immanent Trinity and vice versa77 intends to protect the convictions of Easter faith that in history God gives Himself and, more radically, that in history the permanent “novelty” that is God realizes itself. The absolute priority of the immanent Trinity allows us to think that the story of salvation constitutes a “novelty” for God Himself; for His truth allows itself to be codetermined by the human story of freedom. Theological ontology is concerned, not with an immutable essence of the spirit which is opposed and foreign to matter and becoming, but with the event of freedom, which makes matter and time the place and form of its communication.

c) In this context “person” can be taken as the cipher for the fundamental problem of theological language; once it is understood not as a concept, which would be applied analogously to God and man, but in such a way that “person” gives the reason why one can only speak of truth in a theological sense within the horizon defined by the reciprocity of God and man78. Significantly in Christological and Trinitarian dogma the same term “hypostasis” defines the personal distinction in God and the hypostatic union of the incarnate Word; it insists on both the absolute priority of God — Trinitarian dogma prevents man from effecting the distinction in God — and the realism of His identification with man for whom such a history can never be transcended and absorbed — Christological dogma protects the truth that the human so belongs to God as to be personally identical with Him. The homoousios of Nicea provides the principle according to which the incarnate Word is not the extrinsic

union of two natures but the reality from which we have to understand both God and man. Theological discussion interpreting the issue raised by the Christological event has to study explicitly God’s becoming man. In this “the humanity of God is not a generic likeness of God to man, which in one way or another would play down the difference, but is God’s positive disposition to make His own man’s existence”79. Hence “anthropology belongs to the very structure of theological truth”80.

As a consequence theological theories about “person” assume the status of “category” or “model”81, i.e., of an entire web of terms and relations expressed in a determined cultural and philosophical context, whose relevance has to be judged by their aptitude to express God’s Christological truth.

4. EPILOGUE

I can now conclude that the notion of person plays a “key” role in the history of thought, especially in the spheres of morality, law, and political practice82, as well as in faith’s understanding because it preserves the fundamental ontological question of truth, despite the risks of its generic use83. Lonergan teaches us that we can and should confront the question of the person’s definition without limiting ourselves to affirming rhetorically the issue involved, a process always exposed to nominalistic abuse. We have to investigate the root of man’s relation to truth.

79 Ibid., 31.
80 Ibid., 4.
81 Method, 284f., and more generally, 281-293.
RAHNER’S EPISTEMOLOGY AND ITS IMPLICATIONS FOR THEOLOGY

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The Canadian Jesuit Bernard Lonergan and the German Jesuit Karl Rahner both lived from 1904 to 1984. Because of their intellectual acumen and their eagerness to face basic issues, their contribution to Catholic theology is considerable. This essay employs Lonerganian tools to assess Rahner’s approach to God. The first part introduces Rahner’s epistemology. The second links that epistemology to his views on God and theology.

RAHNER’S EPISTEMOLOGY

Rahner’s initial interests clearly resided in fundamental theology. His first two books are best interpreted in the wake of his fellow Jesuit, the Belgian Joseph Maréchal (1878-1944). During the 1920s and 1930s, Maréchal carried out a systematic comparison of Thomas Aquinas and Immanuel Kant in the last three of his five “Cahiers” entitled Le point de départ de la métaphysique.1 For him the human mind is essentially dynamic and its basic orientation manifests finality. In Cahier V, he stresses the fact that the human intellect spontaneously operates according to a purposeful ordering of its acts and its grasped objects toward truth. One can observe

in its workings an undeniable orientation toward being in its complete intelligibility. Because of the attention he pays to our acts, in particular to judging as discursive and not intuitive, Maréchal partly escapes the constriction of conceptualism. But, as Michael Vertin has demonstrated, his thematization of the consciousness that accompanies those acts is not so thorough as Lonergan's.

Capitalizing on Maréchal's contribution, Rahner's first book, *Geist in Welt: Zur Metaphysik der endlichen Erkenntnis bei Thomas von Aquin*, published in 1939, is the result of his reading Thomas Aquinas with a sensitivity that is at the same time Kantian, Hegelian, and Heideggerian. From Kant, he borrows the sense of the a priori; from Hegel, the explication of the dynamic spirit; from Heidegger, being as a question.

As the title of the book, *Spirit in the World*, suggests, the human spirit is located in the sensory world. It always operates in conjunction with the finite, and yet it unfolds into the infinite. While being conditioned by a particular phantasm, the mind experiences an intellectual liberation by applying the general form to innumerable instances. A whole field of endless possibilities is thereby opened, the range of which is necessarily affirmed as unlimited, so that the mind finds itself oriented to the infinite in a "pre-apprehension" or "anticipatory grasp" (*Vorgriff*).

Contrary to what several Thomists think, I have no difficulty with Rahner's thesis, based on Maréchal, that every judgment entails a *Vorgriff* of absolute being, even though he may too quickly identify being in general (*esse commune*) with absolute being, also called absolute mystery. After all, did not Thomas write, "All cognitive beings also

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know God implicitly in any object of knowledge." Nor do I hesitate to approve of Rahner's insistence on the *Beisichsein* (Being-Present-to-Self) as concomitant with the knowing process, *pace* Cornelius Ernst. As is well known, self-awareness is a major theme in *Spirit in the World*. Indeed I agree with many of the points made by *Spirit in the World*. Unfortunately, Rahner's cognitional theory remains incomplete. He overlooks the insight and he underrates the judgment. The omission of what Thomas calls *intelligere* is typical of modernity. In the sixteenth century, Cajetan had attempted a response to Scotus; the outcome had been an amalgam of Thomist and Scotist components of knowledge. Independently of Lonergan, the great historian Yves Congar found out that "Scotist vocabulary became the vocabulary of subsequent Scholasticism." In the 1920s, because of the influence of Cajetan and of Suarez, virtually all the scholastics were to a large extent Scotists insofar as epistemology was concerned. The young Rahner was deeply

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8 In the wake of Lonergan, I understand cognitional theory to be the answer to the question, What am I doing when I am knowing? Epistemology is the answer to the question, Why is doing that knowing? This essay is not concerned with metaphysics, which is the answer to a third, basic question. See Bernard J. F. Lonergan, *Method in Theology* (Toronto: University of Toronto Press, 1992), 25.


10 With few exceptions, for instance Pierre Rousselot, who broke away from conceptualism in *L'intellectualisme de saint Thomas* (Paris: Alcan, 1908), English translation: *Intelligence: Sense of Being, Faculty of God*, trans. Andrew Tallon (Milwaukee: Marquette University Press, 1999). In an interview entitled "The Importance of Thomas Aquinas," Rahner mentions the influence of Suarez on the Jesuit School. See *Faith in a Wintry Season: Conversations and Interviews with Karl Rahner in the Last Years of His Life*, ed. Paul Imhof and Hubert Biallowons, trans. and ed. Harvey D. Egan (New York: Crossroad, 1986), 41-58, at 42, 48. Throughout his oeuvre, Rahner does not discuss the epistemology of Scotus or of Suarez. He adopts Scotus's position regarding the reason why the world was created and the necessity of the Incarnation even without original sin. He disagrees with Suarez's interpretation of a text by Ignatius in "The
influenced by the conceptualism not only of the modern scholastics, but also of Kant and Hegel, who shared conceptualism’s overlooking of insight.\(^\text{11}\) Whenever Rahner talks about knowledge in the scientific sense, he centers it around the concept, as Kant and Hegel did. In “Thomas Aquinas on Truth,” a piece written in 1938 which sums up the results of *Spirit in the World*, he writes, “Thomas stands, rather, in the line of the tradition of Aristotle, Thomas, Kant, and Hegel in regarding this principle of truth as consisting in a formal *a priori* of the spontaneous intellect itself.”\(^\text{12}\) Throughout this article, several times he suggests that Thomas’s, Kant’s, and Hegel’s epistemologies are the same, while mentioning but one area of discrepancy between Thomas and Kant.

More specifically, he wrongly reports that Thomas’s *simplex apprehensio* is “the forming of a concept.”\(^\text{13}\) So far as I can observe, I don’t find in Rahner’s writings any reference to the excitement and pleasure of having insights (the *intelligere* of Thomas), an enjoyment that turns to joy in the case of interpersonal knowledge. In later writings also, the act of understanding is not mentioned; the unthematic, transcendental self-presence and the conceptual, categorial objectification are juxtaposed, without any insight to account for the passage from the former to the latter.\(^\text{14}\)

Even where we should expect to find the recognition that the act of

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understanding is much more than entertaining ideas (i.e., in the section entitled “The Light of the Active Understanding,” in the article entitled “Thomas Aquinas on Truth”), the insight is ignored and the concept remains central. There Rahner writes:

The intellect gives conceptual form to this material [sense impression], and so makes it that which is intelligible actu, that which is known at the conceptual level and emerges as a synthesis of the sensory material and the a priori of the intellect.  

In the wake of Maréchal, Rahner stresses the importance of judgment. Nonetheless, he exaggerates the capabilities of perception. He writes, “According to Thomas sensibility as such, to the extent that it apprehends the existing thing at all, apprehends it as it truly is in itself.” There is “a finite act of perception that ‘takes in’ an individual object as such as it presents itself in its own identity.” “According to it [Thomas’s theory of cognition] sensibility is a finite experience in which a finite being reveals itself and is ‘taken in’, a kind of knowledge in which a sensible object is possessed in its manifestation of itself as it is in itself.”

If sensibility or perception already reaches reality, does judgment become redundant? In Rahner’s opinion, no. The limitations of sensibility derive from things’ “obtuse particularity,” from “their lack of reference to anything beyond themselves.” Sensibility cannot “stand back, so to say, from the impression it has received and from its object, and... judge of it as it is in itself.” “What sensibility experiences is always a genuine reality, yet it cannot express any judgement upon it, which means that strictly as such it never rises to a level at which it is capable of being true or false.” Therefore, judgment is needed so as to bring together perception and conception: “every one of our judgements and every one of our concepts contain two elements: a sensible element and an intellectual one (representation and conception).” Notice the non-difference, in Rahner’s sentence, between the judgment and the concept.

Although Rahner never discusses Scotus’s epistemological texts, he adopts a position which resembles the one propounded by the “subtle doctor.” The latter’s account of knowledge can be fleshed out

16 “Thomas Aquinas on Truth,” Theological Investigations, 13: 24; italics are mine.
17 “Thomas Aquinas on Truth,” Theological Investigations, 13: 19; italics are mine.
as follows. Out of the sensible species, the intelligible species emerges, thanks to an abstractive process. The universal concept – or essence – is the intentional content of the intelligible species. It is present in the intelligible species before the intelligere occurs, and it puts the knower in direct relation with the object. Objectivity, or truth, is obtained before the acts of understanding and judging; it is not constituted by these acts. In his eagerness to guarantee objectivity, Scotus places the decisive moment at the beginning of the process, when the extramental and yet universal object sets off the intelligible species that will soon impress the mind. It is a matter of what Lonergan calls the “already out there now real.” No wonder that Scotus diminishes the function of both understanding and judgment in the access to truth; they are reduced to seeing and affirming the nexus between concepts.

For Scotus the concept comes before the act of understanding, whereas for Thomas it makes its entry only after the act of understanding. As the result of an insight (intelligere) followed by a “saying” (dicere), Thomas’s concept is a “word” (verbum) which turns out to be much richer than Scotus’s concept. In line with the latter, Rahner locates truth at an early stage, that is, in the work of the active intellect. The “principle of truth” consists “in a light of the understanding itself which permeates and informs the material of the sense knowledge, and raises it in acts of judgment to the level of objective apprehension and conceptuality.” In this telescoped account, the “understanding” is left unexplained and the “word” is absent.

In Verbum, Lonergan offers an exact reading of Thomas Aquinas’s epistemological texts. The gist of Thomas’s position is as follows. There is already a certain generality (not yet a universality) achieved by the cogitativa, which unifies the particular data of the various senses. This half-sensitive and half-intellectual potency is also named the ratio particularis or the intellectus passivus. In connection with this generalized image or phantasm, the active intellect produces a form

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22 Verbum, 21. Rahner here speaks of “understanding” but not in the Thomas sense of intelligere.
(forma) or likeness (similitudo) called species intelligibilis because it is susceptible of being understood. At this phase the species is about to shine in the phantasm. Insight (intelligere) occurs in the intellect as receptive (intellectus possibilis) when the intellect is actuated, in the very act of understanding, by the species qua intelligitur. Such understanding can be either a simple apprehension (apprehensio) expressed in a definition (definitio, ratio, intentio, which possesses a universality), or a reflective apprehension (compositio or divisio, which grasps the sufficient ground for affirming or negating a specific state of affairs) expressed in an intellectual commitment (iudicium, enuntiatio, propositio affirmativa seu negativa). At each of these two stages, the intellect says to itself what it has grasped, in an inner word (verbum interius, also called conceptio, conceptum, conceptus). Like the preceding apprehension, the inner word is either simple (stating the meaning) or complex (positing the truth of a synthesis between subject and predicate).

The neglect of the twofold apprehension (simple and reflective) and of the corresponding twofold concept (definition and judgment) has deplorable philosophical and theological consequences. I will underline a few theological consequences in the next section. To finish the present section, however, let me call attention to an instance of philosophical consequences. Rahner declares:

Thomas’s teaching is not completely consistent. If, for example, he had really taken seriously his own theory of the anima forma corporis (the soul as the form of the body), then he would not have been able to speak in general of an anima separata (a soul separated from the body).  

While Thomas recognizes that prior to the resurrection of all, the state of anima separata is a very imperfect one, almost against nature, he nonetheless maintains it, because his belief in the spiritual and subsistent character of the soul derives from his account of the acts of insight and judgment.

23 Faith in a Wintry Season, 52.
RAHNER'S VIEWS ON GOD AND THEOLOGY

This second part will disclose the implications of Rahner’s epistemology in four areas: the doctrine of God, the beatific vision, the Trinity, and theological pluralism.

THE DOCTRINE OF GOD

The shortcomings of Rahner’s epistemology become evident when we examine his view of how human beings know/do not know God. Although he thinks that by and large he follows Thomas’s teaching on this topic, he departs considerably from him. As many commentators have observed, the angelic doctor walks a tightrope as he combines affirmations and negations regarding God. He maintains that our analogical knowledge of God is valid. For his part, Rahner downplays kataphatic language and insists on apophatic silence. In his excessive emphasis on negations, he pushes center-stage Thomas’s doctrine that we cannot comprehend God. By incomprehensibility, however, Rahner seems to mean unknowability. For Thomas, the fact that God is incomprehensible entails that we shall never understand him perfectly, whereas for Rahner, it entails that the human intellect will never know God, who will always remain hidden.

In “The Mystery of the Human Person,” Rahner voices disagreement with Thomas and exclaims:

How could Aquinas say that the essence of happiness consists in an act of the intellect, when he knew that God is incomprehensible; when he prayed: “I worship you, O hidden godhead,” and knew that in the beatific vision God’s incomprehensibility does not disappear?

In Thomas’s theology, the incomprehensibility of God is beautifully balanced by his intelligibility. His God is both incomprehensibilis and infinite cognoscibilis, “infinitely knowable.” In Rahner’s theology, this infinite knowability drops out of the picture and God undergoes, as it were, an everlasting eclipse. For him, the believers’ experience of the

26 Aquinas, Summa Theologiae, 1, 12, 7.
mystery is more an experience of darkness than an experience of light. In the phrase “super-luminous darkness” which repeatedly recurs in his writings, “darkness” is the substantive whereas the luminousness is the accompanying adjective.27

Naturally Rahner understands Thomas’s doctrine of incomprehensibility to be primarily an anthropological statement. Yet he goes too far when he concedes, “Only in a highly derivative and tenuous sense should one regard divine incomprehensibility as an ‘attribute’ of God himself.”28 In another piece, he is more precise:

We cannot however understand this incomprehensibility as a special characteristic of God, which he has together with the other attributes different from that, which then yield the fullness of meaning for which we yearn. These other attributes of God, which we declare to be the meaning of our existence, are themselves incomprehensible; this incomprehensibility is not one attribute of God alongside others, but the attribute of his attributes.29

Does Rahner not open the door to an ambiguity which many of his readers may fail to notice? Without saying so explicitly, he frequently crosses the line between a statement about our knowledge and a statement about God. For instance, he concludes an article quoted above with this extraordinary assertion, “the intellect only achieves its own fullness of being when in hope and love, in a freedom which properly belongs to it, it surrenders itself to incomprehensibility as its own beatitude.”30 “Incomprehensibility” has two undistinguished meanings here, both problematic. In the first sense, how could surrendering to our cognitional limits make us happy? Instead, it seems that Rahner has in mind our recognition that God is incomprehensible – the second sense of incomprehensibility. But again, how could this recognition make us happy? He writes, “man can reach final bliss only with a God who is

29 “The Human Question of Meaning in Face of the Absolute Mystery of God,” Theological Investigations, 18: 89-104, at 94. In this text and in other upcoming quotations, italics are the author’s.
incomprehensibly greater than himself and for that very reason the true blessedness of man.” I would agree partly with him if he is saying that to trust freely and fully, with hope and love, in God’s incomprehensible and therefore infinite goodness is what makes us happy.

To contrast Rahner and Thomas on this issue: for the former, happiness consists in trustfully loving the God we do not understand; for the latter, happiness consists in gratefully loving the God whose goodness we understand more and more. Out of a deep sense of mystery, then, two incompatible conclusions may be derived. For Rahner, God and the world are so profoundly unintelligible that what we know and shall know amounts to a mere human construction which fails to actually characterize reality. For Thomas, God and the world are so profoundly intelligible that what we shall know is infinitely vaster than the little we know on earth.

On this issue, the Lutheran theologian Eberhard Jüngel voices a moderate, friendly criticism of Rahner’s position. Having affirmed that God in himself is not darkness but rather light, Jüngel insists that our awareness of God’s hiddenness is a consequence of revealed knowledge.

And this is utterly different both from the non-knowledge of God and from the knowledge that presents itself on the basis of human self-knowledge, namely that God is unknowable. Under no circumstances does revelation allow theological insight into the hiddenness of God to be understood on the model of Immanuel Kant’s famous statements concerning reason which has reached its own limits….The hiddenness of God is something other than his incomprehensibility.

In my opinion, Jüngel rightly disagrees with Rahner because he understands Rahner’s “incomprehensibility” to mean unknowability, in the manner of Kant. Furthermore, Jüngel is ill at ease even with the concept of hiddenness, and he prefers to make mystery the paramount

32 Rahner seems to have abandoned his early Thomistic position that “being is being-able-to-be-known (Sein ist Erkannteinkömmen)” (Spirit in the World, 67) or that “one cannot ask about being in its totality without affirming the fundamental knowability, in fact a certain a priori knowness of being as such” (68), that is, “a thoroughgoing determination of knowing by being” (liii).
I disagree with Rahner’s equation of mystery and hiddenness, which has its parallel in the equation of mystery and incomprehensibility. Though the mysteriousness of God certainly increases with knowledge of him, it is nevertheless not evident that mystery should mean hiddenness, indeed, that being brought to light should simply be ‘an alternative formula’ for being taken back into the darkness of incomprehensibility.34

So Jüngel keeps Rahner’s notion of mystery to indicate the limits of our knowledge of God and tones down hiddenness in order to preserve the fact of our knowing God through revelation.

One would be wise not to let the revelation of the hiddenness of God be the last word, but rather to introduce some differentiations within the concept of the hiddenness of God, to allow one to speak of overcoming the hiddenness of God in a way that does not in any way touch the mystery of God.35

In 1215 the fourth Lateran Council declared:

We firmly believe and confess without reservation that there is only one true God, eternal, infinite (immensus) and unchangeable, incomprehensible (incomprehensibilis), almighty and ineffable, the Father, the Son and the Holy Spirit (DS 800).

That council also stated, “For between Creator and creature no similitude can be expressed without implying a greater dissimilitude” (DS 806).

In Rahner’s piece, “The Hiddenness of God,” the incomprehensibilitas underlined by that council and subsequently reiterated by Thomas is rendered by Unbegreiflichkeit, a German word which is ambiguous.36 On the one hand, it means incomprehensibility, that is, ruling out full grasping or encompassing37; on the other hand, given that Begriff is the concept, Unbegreiflichkeit also suggests

37 I am indebted to Professor Hermann J. Pottmeyer for letting me know that the root metaphor of begreifen is the human hand seizing or capturing something.
unconceptualizability – a semantic shift from the daylight of Thomas’s intellectualism\textsuperscript{38} to the night of conceptualism, in which the antithesis conceptualizable/unconceptualizable is taken for granted. Instead of Thomas’s view, Rahner seems to adopt here Kant’s view that human knowledge (\emph{Erkenntnis}) consists in the concept (\emph{Begriff}) to which a sensible intuition (\emph{Anschauung}) must correspond.\textsuperscript{39} Accordingly, anything that lies beyond the conceptual – and mostly God – is hidden in the sense of being unknowable.

\textbf{THE BEATIFIC VISION}

Throughout “The Hiddenness of God,” Rahner contrasts the unthematic presence of divine truth with a conceptualistic view of knowledge. The inadequate account of knowledge that he rejects is “conceptual mastery” (229, 238, 240), “a model of knowledge in which an object is penetrated and mastered” (231), “theoretical understanding” (231, 239), “seeing through an object” (233).

Rahner’s problem stems from his caricature of rationality. The following text is typical.

Rationality as such is not directed in the first instance to the particular content of a proposition; rather it is ordered, in a constantly new way, to the methods and validity of the connection of propositions to one another. It is aimed, therefore, at least approximately and within distinct areas of human consciousness, at the building of systems.\textsuperscript{40}

Given this distrust of knowledge, wrongly equated with the conceptual, and of rationality as establishing connections between general propositions, Rahner is bound to proclaim that “the ending is the advent of God who is the enduring mystery and is accepted in love”

\textsuperscript{38} May I call attention to Lonergan’s praise of the \textit{Summa}: “the intellectualism of St. Thomas … shines as unmistakably as the sun on a noonday summer hills of Italy.” See \textit{Verbum}, chap. 5, Epilogue, 226.


\textsuperscript{40} “Faith, Rationality and Emotion,” \textit{Theological Investigations}, 16: 60-78, at 61; Rahner’s italics.
(239). He adopts the position that heavenly beatitude consists principally in loving. His dissatisfaction with conceptual knowledge leads him to assert the primacy of love not only on earth (which Thomas accepts) but also in heaven.

Rahner's depreciation of insight and truth depends on his own assumption, which we examined earlier, that knowledge is basically a matter of acquiring and linking concepts in a controlling manner. If knowing amounts to this sort of conceptualization, which, as we saw, is taken to precede understanding, of course it has no place in the vision of God. Hence, Rahner mistakenly characterizes Thomas's intention as follows:

to force man out of the brightness of the dimension which he can comprehend, and into the mystery of God where he no longer grasps but rather is grasped, where he no longer rationalizes but rather adores, where he no longer controls but rather is himself subject to a higher control.41

By contrast, for Thomas the eternal happiness is the result of *videre* (analogically understood as *intelligere*) in interaction with *amare*. In personalist terms: because we love God, we want to know him; constantly receiving insights (freely given by God) into the Trinitarian life, we appreciate and love the divine Persons ever more. Walter Principe notes:

For Aquinas, the integrity or full perfection of beatitude necessarily "requires" an accompanying overflow from vision of God into blissful delight, love, and joy such that nothing other than God's infinite goodness could ever attract the human heart (1-2.4.1, 5.4, 11.3). And if the essential act of beatitude is for him the intellectual vision of God, this act of vision itself is a great good that human persons seek and attain through love: then, on reaching this vision, the object of their affective longing and desire, they experience its perfect completion in affective bliss (1-2.3.4; 1.12.1).42

One should read the articles of the *Summa theologiae* just referred to and compare Principe's understanding with Rahner's version:

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41 "On Recognizing the Importance of Thomas Aquinas," *Theological Investigations*, 13: 3-12, at 8.
Thomas sees the nature of the beatific vision as consisting of intellectual knowledge alone. In doing so, he denies nothing of the reality. But I think that, if Thomas had on this question made radical use of the interchangeability of being as true and being as good (ens verum et ens bonum), he might have formulated otherwise or possibly even seen more clearly the nature of the beatific vision.\(^{43}\)

Incidentally, in his remarkable essay on the spiritual senses in the Middle Ages, Rahner wonderfully details Bonaventure’s position regarding ecstasy. In this life, ecstasy, as the highest mystical state, is intrinsically affective. Rahner does not mention—and in that context does not have to mention—the fact that for this Franciscan doctor, the beatific vision consists of both intellectual beholding and loving.\(^{44}\) However, not having taken note of this fact, he may have remained unaware that his own view of the beatific vision contradicts not only Thomas’s, but also Bonaventure’s. In fact Rahner’s stance is indebted to Scotus, for whom beatitude formally consists in an act of the will.\(^{45}\)

One additional point calls for comment. Two aspects of Rahner’s representation of human knowledge must be criticized. First, it is conceptualistic and second, it is monolithic. Instead of opposing knowledge and a quasi-irrational experience of the mystery (we shall find more about this in my section entitled “Theological pluralism”), he should have differentiated several kinds of knowing. Thinkers such as Thomas, Polanyi, and Lonergan all distinguish between discursive and nondiscursive knowing. However, in Rahner’s oeuvre, I have found one happy exception: he correctly differentiates the Ignatian discernment of divine will from the “cognition of the rationally discursive and conceptually expressible kind.”\(^{46}\) Conceptualistic though the language remains, yet here he points in the right direction, that is, to a differentiation of knowing. Had he pursued this line, he might have avoided his antithesis between two caricatures, namely, of scientific knowledge, and of religious trust apparently dissociated from thinking.

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43 Faith in a Wintry Season, 49.
44 “The Doctrine of the ‘Spiritual Senses’ in the Middle Ages,” Theological Investigations, 16: 104-34, esp. 117-25; Bonaventure, Breviloquium, part 7, chap. 7.
45 Duns Scotus, Opus Oxoniense, IV, dist. 49, q. 3 and q. 4.
46 “The Logic of Concrete Individual Knowledge in Ignatius Loyola,” 94-95, including n. 9.
THE TRINITY

In addition to the beatific vision, the treatise on the Trinity is a subject matter in which Rahner betrays the fact that he does not share Thomas’s understanding of the Word. About the Trinity he writes that “the supreme mystery is also the most obscure.” 47 Construing Augustine’s “speculative concepts” as “essential concepts,” and lamenting that they are not “personal” concepts, he concludes that “they do not work.” 48 Let the readers ponder this assertion by Rahner:

Any attempt today to present the Christian doctrine of the Trinity must involve a “liberation” of the usual traditional propositions from their “splendid isolation”, in which they have been encapsulated in scholastic theology. 49

Elsewhere he indulges in disparaging and indeed caustic remarks on “the Augustinian-psychological speculations.” 50 His skepticism is consistent with his disregard of the insight, which supplies the analogy for the generation of the Son. The Word is indeed the expression of an unrestricted act of understanding and, pace Rahner, not a matter of “conceptual objectivation” (again understood in the Scotist sense). 51

THEOLOGICAL PLURALISM

Rahner’s view of theology in the contemporary world can also be situated in the context of his epistemology. He states:

all the single insights of life (however modest, ambitious, loving, unsentimental, industrious, critical, “positive,” intelligent, and

50 The Trinity, trans. Joseph Donceel (New York: Herder, 1970), 19, 47-48; see also 115-20 (with two footnotes on Lonergan’s De Deo Trino), where he does not reject and yet severely restricts the fruitfulness of the psychological analogy.
51 The Trinity, 48.
so forth they may be) will never form a whole. We do not then imagine that there could be a well-tempered synthesis of all these disparate insights which could cater for them all.  

If he is thinking of an overall Hegelian synthesis, or of a positivistic erudition based on a huge amount of merely juxtaposed data, we cannot but agree. But how about the joy of acquiring, even here on earth, thanks to a succession of related insights, a worldview which becomes more and more coherent? Let us think of Thomas’s *intelligere multa per unum*, interpreted by Lonergan as the “synthetic character of understanding.” I am afraid Rahner replaces such *fides quaerens intellectum* by an act of hope consisting in a transcendental decision in favor of God. In fact, he is rather insistent:

Yet, how simple Christianity is. It is the determination to surrender to God’s incomprehensibility in love.... A Christian is a true and most radical skeptic. If he really believes in God’s incomprehensibility, he is convinced that no individual truth is really true except in the process (which necessarily belongs to its real essence) in which it becomes that question which remains unanswered because it asks about God and his incomprehensibility. The Christian is also the individual who can cope with this otherwise maddening experience in which (to formulate it with poor logic but accurate description) one can accept no opinion as wholly true or wholly false.

At the end of his career, Rahner adopts a somewhat relativistic stance regarding theology. He registers the coexistence, in the mind of many contemporary believers, of faith with “skeptical relativism.” Bravely addressing the widespread epistemic situation of Catholics who dissent from several church doctrines, he does not see such denials as extreme cases, however many, for which remedies must be sought. In an essay where he discusses this issue, he extols the graced transcendental, through which people subjectively receive revelation, without mentioning the importance of the categorial. Usually, he accords a secondary and

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52 *The Content of Faith*, 80.
54 See, for instance, “The Foundation of Belief today,” and “Faith Between Rationality and Emotion, Theological Investigations, 16: 3-23 and 60-78.
55 *The Content of Faith*, 81.
yet real significance to the categorial. But not here. Again, he departs from Thomas, for whom first truth is indissociable from the articles of belief.57 For the angelic doctor, those articles are judgments, not concepts in the Scotist sense, as Rahner construes them.

Rahner accepts the fact of theological pluralism and intelligently endeavors to show that it precludes neither dialogue nor acceptance of church pronouncements.58 Although his form of pluralism is not to be equated with relativism, it is more intractable than the form of pluralism that Lonergan acknowledges. In a dialogue with William Dych, Lonergan respectfully begs to disagree with Rahner’s construal of theological pluralism. It is in method that Lonergan finds the possibility of limiting theological pluralism. In a rebuttal of Rahner’s very words,59 Lonergan says:

I believe one will find ways to control the present uncontrollable pluralism of theologies, one will cease to work alien, alone, isolated, one will become aware of a common site with an edifice to be erected, not in accord with a static blueprint, but under the leadership of an emergent probability that yields results proportionate to human diligence and intelligence.60


58 “Pluralism in Theology and the Unity of the Creed in the Church,” Theological Investigations, 11: 3-23. One of the commentators who are most sympathetic to Rahner is nevertheless ill at ease with this aspect of Rahner’s thinking; see Gerald A. McCool, “Person and Community in Karl Rahner,” in Person and Community: A Philosophical Exploration, ed. Robert J. Roth (New York: Fordham University Press, 1975), 63-86, esp. 79-83.


Despite some overlapping, the discrepancy between Thomas and Rahner as well as between Lonergan and Rahner is more significant than has been acknowledged in transcendentalist circles. It has to do with the fact that Lonergan moved out of the conceptualism of his day and became a Thomist in matters of cognitional theory, whereas Rahner saw conceptualization as the kernel of rationality and unwittingly remained a Scotist. Perhaps this difference between the two thinkers can be explained by the fact that the Lonergan of Verbum paid sustained attention to cognitional theory as the door to Thomas's epistemology and metaphysics, while the Rahner of Geist in Welt concentrated on epistemology and metaphysics, without dwelling long enough on cognitional theory proper.

I readily recognize that Rahner made a significant contribution to the understanding of Catholic faith. Unfortunately, in the last decades of the twentieth century, his moderate antiintellectualism and antidogmatism have become, in the minds of the Rahnerians of the left, a green light for an unbridled creativity accompanied by a more pronounced antidogmatism. Against his best intentions, Rahner’s lack of cognitional theory has fostered disrespect for Christian insights of the past and has legitimized the primacy of the imagination in its free choice of symbols. His continual stress on the mystery and on human


62 On the difference between cognitional theory and epistemology, see my footnote 8.

63 See Elizabeth A. Johnson, She Who Is: The Mystery of God in Feminist Theological Discourse (New York: Crossroad, 1994). Misled by Rahner, she incorrectly thinks Thomas’s position on God amounts to “a theological agnosticism” (109), of which she approves. Having left out Thomas’s key distinction between metaphorical and proper words, she puts forward only pragmatic criteria for discerning the respective validity
transcendentalism has brought about a relativization of the ecumenical councils, of the doctors of the church, and of the magisterium. Evidently Rahner would disapprove of that trend among his disciples. Nevertheless the seeds of that deviation from sound doctrine are found in his deficient epistemology.  


64 I am grateful to Rev. Giovanni Sala, SJ, for offering comments on the first draft of this essay. As this essay was going to the press, I came across a lucid article by a competent philosopher, Andrew Beards, “Rahner’s Philosophy: A Lonerganian Critique,” Gregorianum 87 (2006): 262-83.
THE PHILOSOPHY OF INTERNATIONAL EDUCATION

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We need to look at the plan for learning that God has put within EVERY human being. When this inner need is not recognized and used, it causes tension within young people and also within teachers.

Philosopher Bernard Lonergan’s favorite walk when in Rome was in the Borghese Gardens. A young child was running down a ramp ahead of his mother when he tripped and fell. Lonergan says that he found himself beindng down as if to scoop up the young child, although he was at least twenty feet too far away. He realized that this was an involuntary action that came from a natural link that human beings have with one another. I think that this link should also be recognized within our education system.

Has education changed much since Lonergan’s time?

It is state control that brought to birth the function and the class of educationalists. To obtain money from taxpayers, politicians, the rich, foundations, to plan and construct buildings, their adjuncts and equipment, their libraries and laboratories, to devise curricula, set standards, impose tests, to select, train, organize, direct, inspect, hire and fire teachers and professors – for such tasks there were needed, not mathematicians nor scientists nor linguists nor litterateurs nor historians nor economists nor sociologists nor psychologists nor philosophers nor theologians nor even pedagogues. There had to be created a new caste, a new priesthood of the new philosophy, the men of universal wisdom able to consult and judge specialists in any particular field. To be able to select and judge all the specialists and pass the ultimate pronouncements on all issues, there was needed a universal wisdom; and the universal wisdom that is the justification of the
educationalist is philosophy of education."

Certainly within England it hasn’t changed much except to have even more pressure imposed in the hope of raising standards.

I recently read how Jesus’ great Sermon on the Mount (The Beatitudes) might be met by the students and the hierarchy today. I’m afraid I don’t know the author, but it went something like this:

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Simon Peter:</th>
<th>Will this count?</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Andrew:</td>
<td>Will we have a test on it?</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>James:</td>
<td>When do we have to know it by?</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Philip:</td>
<td>How many words?</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Bartholomew:</td>
<td>Will I have to stand up in front of the others?</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>John:</td>
<td>Does everyone have to learn this?</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Matthew:</td>
<td>How many points do we get for this?</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Judas:</td>
<td>What is it worth?</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Then one of the Pharisees asks to see Jesus’ lesson plan, and asks what are his terminal objectives in the cognitive domain!

It is very amusing and yet it is also desperately sad that unwittingly we go against the way that GOD has programmed us to learn. Montessori, Newman, and Lonergan understood, but have been crying in the wilderness. Here is a suggested scheme based on their understanding.

The stages for certain ways of development are universal. They are, according to Montessori, birth to six, six to twelve, twelve to eighteen, and eighteen to twenty-four.

David Fleischacker, president of The Lonergan Institute for the “Good Under Construction,” Washington, D.C., has linked these to Lonergan’s stages which he calls immediate, mediation, self-mediation, and mutual self-mediation stages.

When then is the problem? We turn to Lonergan: “[W]ith regard to the philosophy of education itself, the fundamental problem is the horizon of the educationalist....So the genuine function of a philosophy of education is to bring the horizon of the educationalist to the point where he is not living in some private world of educationalists, but in the

universe of being.”2 This is for everyone. Lonergan stresses this point of “for everyone” when he says about truth: What once is true is always true. It can be transported to make it accessible to all men, and all places, all natures, and all cultures.

I realize that in all the phases, the way time plays a part is very important, as it is perceived differently at each stage. This is a way of knowing what is important for the fullest development of that age group. Pythagoras (Plutarch’s Morals), when asked what Time was, said that it was the soul of this world.

1. BIRTH TO SIX YEARS

For the first stage (birth to six years), time in the present is what matters to the children. They repeat actions of interest many many times without being conscious of time passing. There is always an urgency in the present activity.

Montessori says of this stage: The child has an intense sensitivity, in consequence the things about him awaken so much interest and so much enthusiasm that they become incorporated into his very existence.3

Lonergan says of time perception: “Now” is not a mathematical point. It is the psychological present. The psychological present is not a mathematical limit.

This first stage of development is so important to understand because it is the basis for all the other stages.

All children need to know love at this stage to be able later to give love. It is the whole of the environment which is taken in like a photograph in its entirety, so that by the end of the third year the child has become a little Indian, or American, or African, or whatever, and has the complete language and all the cultural differences of behavior.

When absorbing the language or languages around him, the frontal lobes are active and absorb all language around him easily. Later when we come to learn a language, these lobes are not available for this purpose, and we have to learn with a different part of the brain and the power of

2 Topics in Education 106.
easy absorption has gone!

The mind is so absorbent at this stage that the adopted child during these first six years absorbs the speech of the adoptive parents and so becomes like them, copying the intonation and also their mannerisms.

As the children at this stage take in all the traditions and reactions around them through this absorbent mind, we can understand how important the later "self-appropriation" of Lonergan is, to weed out from what has been absorbed whatever is inappropriate to real loving action. The will is important for this later stage. Freedom to use the will to explore the environment through the senses is a characteristic of this first stage, forming the basis for future understanding.

Lonergan speaks of the underlying flow, the practical insight, the process of reflection, the decision. This is how the mind works at this stage.

To give a description of this within a young child, here is the story of Christopher. Christopher in a Montessori class, at the age of three, liked to fit a tray of triangles into their right shapes. He loved feeling the shapes and when just four he wanted to know the name of each. He was very interested in the right-angled triangle. Some weeks later he asked me very urgently to go outside, he wanted to show me something. He showed me a ladder against a wall and said with great excitement: "Look! A right-angled triangle!"

Lonergan says: reflection has no internal term, it can expand indefinitely.

I have so much to say for each stage, but here I can only just touch upon the content.

Of course at every stage the great attributes of humanity are important: dancing, singing, music, art, and the joy of movement. Through drama, physical activities, and team sports, children learn to submit their own wishes to the greater good.

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5 *Insight*, 634.
2. SIX TO TWELVE YEARS

The next stage of development in all humans is from six to twelve years. Time in the PAST has now a fascination for this age group as well as the present. They are interested in everything to do with the earth itself; with living creatures and with past ones such as dinosaurs. They enjoy the wonder and awe of the world and show great interest, for instance, in fossils and volcanoes.

This is the green age for interest in facts and definitions, and if they are not made to answer other people’s questions, then their own questions come very fast. We tend to make children think that all they have to do is to put up their hand and answer our questions, whereas the way we acquire knowledge is to ask our own questions based on our own unique experience. Then we enjoy the chase, for our answers when found always lead us on to other questions that form within our consciousness. This is the way advances in understanding are made. They are not made by being programmed to regurgitate other people’s answers by rote.

All subjects really are linked because everything comes from or goes back to the real world. Through this linking, children are conscious of their Creator.

In the first stage they absorbed the religion of home and now during this stage they like to take an active part.

A very important part of education at this time are the History Time Lines with pictures, models, and so forth to put beside the time lines. Through this process of putting down against the right dates, pictures, objects, and data, they get to know and understand the progression of humankind’s understanding and questions for knowledge. For instance, through seeing the inventions throughout the ages, the child realizes how understanding develops from what is already known. When he places cards showing the discoveries he realizes that science is not finished, it is on the way.6

Through these time lines and the placing of information, pictures, objects, writing against them, the child sees the development and attributes of humankind as a whole. All these materials have their special place within the environment and by their groupings within the areas, the child is helped to understand the different types of thought. The child sees the patterns of thought for mathematics and sciences, for literature

6 Topics in Education, 136.
and for poetry.

The surroundings are kept in order by the students themselves, which makes for self-discipline and caring. Children are able to repeat activities and take time so that they really understand. This understanding rather than rote learning is the most valuable gift to our children. In *Topics in Education* Lonergan quotes Einstein saying that there was so much to be prepared for examinations that it was impossible to be intelligent! The thing that saved Einstein was coming across a series of volumes that presented knowledge as a LINKED WHOLE. Newman believed that all knowledge forms an organic whole or unity. We have done education a great disservice by dividing learning up into such tight subject compartments. One piece of knowledge in one science always has connections with the others, and this should be seen and explored.

Children at this stage enjoy writing a great deal, and it is useful to have perhaps a retired person for a few hours just to proofread the writing and to direct the children to exercises for remedying constant mistakes. These should be done before more writing is done. The teachers should still mark the writing for the content.

Our present system encourages children to think of learning as being for self-aggrandizement, the end being examination honors. Although achievement is great, they must be helped to understand that learning is for the development of society, and part of their education should be to give some of their interest and knowledge in return back to the places of learning and, whenever possible, to society in general.

The teaching materials for this age (from six to twelve) should be made during the last two years of the STAGE ABOVE, during the penultimate year before their present senior exams. During their craft work for a short period of time, the older students should choose their favorite subjects and make three-dimensional self-corrective sensory materials and also two-dimension materials with definition booklets for this younger age group. This is like a practical brain map and helps the students with their own basic revision and understanding. They should provide charts and other ways for self-correction for the younger children. They should research to find places of interest to visit and videos and films that show what their materials teach, but within the context of the child's real life.

One of the great ways to stimulate children at this six to twelve age group is to get people at the top of their fields, who are in love with

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7 *Topics in Education*, 17.
their subjects, to come and give a talk about them. I had Buckminster Fuller, the great American scientist and geophysicist, who came and talked about “Space Ship Earth.” We were also privileged to meet the first spacemen who went to the moon. All types of presentations such as videos, films, computer programs, and visits of all kinds should be used to delight the children and arouse their questions.

It is easy to help a child to find the answers to its questions today with modern technology. When I knew that someone was coming to talk, I prepared materials and put within the environment things that I thought would be useful to follow their interested questions.

Children enjoy tests when they understand a piece of work. I envisage Achievement Centers where examinations may be taken at any level at any age and at any time. These should be placed if possible at Leisure Centers. The candidate knows the right time for success. Random questions can be made available at each stage of any subject. People enjoy learning at all ages, and some children may have reached an advanced stage in a subject whilst an adult may be at the first stage. Ages and dates should not be involved in true understanding and testing. They should be free to try at any stage. It is so dangerous when we make someone feel no good and a failure.

The children change physically and also in character at this age. The birth parents’ genes become active within their development and the child now begins to look like the birth parents. The character begins to develop and no longer is the family sufficient but the child now seeks out friends in any spare time. The family still plays a very important part in safeguarding the child but at the same time the need is to be helped toward more independence.

3. TWELVE TO EIGHTEEN YEARS

The young people of this age are very unlike their previous years. They are changing spiritually, physically, mentally, and emotionally. Time for them, like for the very young child, is so very important in the present, and their great need in the present is for friendships and companions. In the West they spend hours on the phone and with their mobile messagers, going in and out of friendships. They enjoy meeting and laughing and exchanging views and during these the time flies for them. Time at other
periods goes slowly!

During this time of great transition the results of surveys show that both sexes do better when separated for a time. I would suggest separation for this first year whilst they get used to their new identity. They have changed so much and now need affirmation of their new self. Every cell in their bodies has altered and they are a mixture of both birth parents and their environment. They need to get to know and to like themselves as being of God’s creation if they are to be able to love their neighbour “as themselves.” This fundamental self-liking is essential for mental health.

In our present society adolescents rebel to make parents and others realize that they are no longer the same person as they were and that they are still altering. They need help now to know themselves and to understand how they form opinions and make choices.

By helping to prepare the nursery equipment before a term beings, they will become interested and begin to understand more the different types of meaning: meaning in symbols, nonlinguistic meaning as in art; literary meaning, technical meaning. They experience communication meaning and that special intersubjective meaning during this special age for friendships and communication. As Newman says in his motto, “Heart speaks to heart.” There is great sensitivity at these ages, and they are very easily hurt. They feel uncertain in their new role, and we have a duty to help them to know themselves.

In many countries of the East, thirteen is a marriageable age. This previous year is important for all of this age, to be sure of their own identity and for learning physically and psychologically about both sexes. Thankfully, we now have more equal opportunities, but it is vital that we begin to appreciate the very real differences of the genders.

Modern brain research identifies differences. Modern brain research has shown that in males, the area in the brain activated for fighting overlaps with that activated in intercourse. Now we know why throughout the ages when wars are fought there is usually rape. To understand is half way to prevention.

The physical power of women is less than that of men, as is seen in the categories of the Olympics. There is so much to be discovered by the children during this year. They need to know their own body and how best to keep it healthy, but most of all they need to realize the need for integration of body mind and spirit for a fulfilled life.
We should at this stage, find out what these young people would like the world to be like, and to think for themselves what values would be needed to bring this about.

In order to help them feel good about their basic character it is helpful to let them find the character that is most like themselves, choosing from the ancient main categories used throughout the ages. When they have chosen the one they think most like themselves then they should think of the talents that go with these character traits. These talents are for their use within society. These are the talents that they are here to use rather than to bury, so that they help their ideal world to come about.

The young person is then affirmed and knows that he has a role to play. He needs to realize that there is actually no other person like them in the world and so no one can take their place.

Here are the main characteristics. They should choose the character that they think is the most like themselves. They may see themselves in more than one but should pick the one that their friends say that they most resemble. No character is better than another! These are the choices:

1. principled and orderly
2. caring and generous
3. self-assured and competitive
4. creative and intuitive
5. perceptive and analytic
6. likable and dutiful
7. accomplished and energetic
8. self-confident and strong
9. peaceful and reassuring

Again, there are certain TALENTS that go with the characters. These are the talents that must not be buried but must be used to help society.

(The numbers are the same as those for the character traits.)

1. Speak out for right values. Encourage order.
2. Look after the materially and spiritually poor.
3. Give confidence and support to those in difficulty.
4. See possibilities and help bring about.
5. Good at spotting the difficulty and solving problems.
6. Popular and dependable
7. Use active nature to help others achieve.
8. Use your leadership for promoting true values.
9. Help to reconcile.
Now that they are able to feel good about themselves, they are ready to make their own interior and fascinating journey as suggested by the philosopher Bernard Lonergan.

Born within each one of us is this potency to be free. They have seen the strength of the Absorbent Mind stage when they were with the nursery age children. They have seen how the children absorb the environment and accept all the tradition and culture from their parents and surroundings. These traditional actions were sometimes suitable for the previous generation, and they often came from even earlier times. These often were not applicable but were actions arising out of inherited habit. Sometimes arising from these are actions not applicable for the present new generation and sometimes actions without positive loving respect for fellow human beings.

They can now see the need to question, and they seek to know the foundations for their present actions. They are now ready to receive the truth through illumination as to the real source of their actions. Now they may begin this exciting journey of self-mediation as described by Lonergan. No one else can make this journey for them, and no one else can play their part within society.

The goal is to know the operating structure of their own way of knowing. They do this by shifting their attention from the content of knowing to the actual activity of knowing itself. As they become aware of the procedure, they will be both subject and object. They can correct their ideas and make judgments after collecting and viewing relevant data, questioning and reviewing before looking and judging the foundations of the action. They will find that they have sudden illumination, not only as to the source of their actions but also as to links with other pieces of knowledge. Suddenly the link will be made by their minds as other synapses of the brain link up to other points of understanding and show even new applications of the knowledge.

Before any action they must learn to review their collected data and make a judgment. They must be taught always to act responsibly as a result of their findings.

They will now get to know the source of their action, where their own will arises from deep within themselves. They will understand the source of their loving actions originating from deep within their own uniqueness.

This experience meets a very deep human need within for the
unbounded intimacy that results from this communication of love, and they themselves will feel part now of the fundamental universal viewpoint.

But first, they should know the common forms of escape that we all tend to use, as noted by Lonergan in *Insight*. (1) To avoid this self-consciousness, we may give the explanation of our avoidance by referring to our environment and our ancestry. (2) We may talk of "extenuating circumstances." (There must never be this inconsistency between knowing and doing. The two must always be in harmony.) (3) We may confess, and yet say within ourselves that there is really no hope of being able to mend our ways! We deceive ourselves by rationalizing.

Knowing all this they are now ready for this extraordinary ongoing journey where the roots of their actions will be illuminated. T. S. Elliot in *Little Gidding* writes:

> We shall not cease from exploration
> And in the end of all our exploring
> Will be to arrive where we started
> And know the place for the first time.

When both genders join together, when they are affirmed in themselves and so feel confident in themselves, then we have to prepare them for the society in which they live.

The age of fourteen is a wonderful one for apprenticeship to learn a skill of their choice. It has been found that at fourteen they are ready to watch before trying whereas at sixteen they think that they know more than they do!

They can now learn useful home skills such as cooking, plumbing, sewing, carpentry, repairs, or other things needed for their society.

Sixteen is the age when they really hate "being bored." This is the stage when they need excitement. We can see this whenever there is trouble in the world, for this is the stone-throwing age. They enjoy the danger. Leisure activities should include thrills such as bike racing and possibly a motor bike track. Virtual reality is useful too. In early humans this was the hunting stage, and this urge for danger and excitement has to be met and be given a legitimate outlet. The work that they now do in all subjects should contain topics that they will need to know about, for them to be able to take a proper place within society. We tend to

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8 *Insight*, 622-23.
leave this too late and many young people miss this help because they leave school without further education. We have to make sure that before leaving school all students understand how their society works so that they will feel part of it. Many aspects of each topic should be explored, bringing the linking together of many subjects.

Here are some suggested topics:

**LAW**

- Rules within families
- Rules within schools
- Traffic law
- Domestic laws
- Civil law
- Age and the law
- Criminal law
- European law
- International law
- Appeal procedures
- Possible changes

**MONEY**

- Earned money
- Inherited money
- Business and profit
- Stock exchange
- Poverty definitions
- Historical poverty
- Budgeting for imaginary incomes
- Personal debt
- Interest rates
- Mortgages
- National debt
- International debt

Practical ways should also be available for earning money. Through the school shop there comes an understanding of bookkeeping, stocktaking, prices, and profit margins. Everyone is expected to earn through helping
with the whole environment. Jobs are priced and chosen, the less popular jobs being priced higher. Money is earned in school currency; this may be used at the school shop or exchanged at the school bank where the exchange rate is fixed and where a charge is made for the exchange.

The university students near the end of their time might give to this age group a glimpse of some of their topics in their chosen discipline by bringing round to the schools a mobile classroom. It could show for instance a study with examples of different types of soil and textures. The aim is to widen the understanding of the world around to get a glimpse of advanced detailed study.

Religion for this age group has developed from the Absorbent Mind stage, through the active and understanding stage, to the personal and mystical relationship stage where relationship is now so important.

Their self-mediation will have strengthened their knowledge of God because when they are in contact with their own uniqueness, true values become clear, and they will develop a oneness of faith and reason. The Holy Father speaking of Cardinal Newman on the bicentenary said: He came to a remarkable synthesis of faith and reason like two wings on which the human spirit rises to the contemplation of the Truth.

Now that the development of their own religion has a personal mystical content, it is time to explore the meaning of life and death. At this age the aim should be to fit the person for their life. One of the topics explored through different ways can be death, as that is an attribute of life.

**DEATH**

Their own faith  
World religions  
Death and customs  
Burial customs of own faith  
Traditions  
Taboos  
Wars and death  
Ethnic cleansing  

Another popular one among the older student is the brain:
THE BRAIN

The human brain
Types of intelligence
Types of personalities
The mystery of the mind
The stages of development in all humans
The characteristics of great people in history
Disorders of the mind
Genetics
Evolution

During this time, outings and communal activities like bonfires and singsongs, poetry and drama, choirs and orchestras are so very valuable because within these the individual has to learn to curb their individuality and relate to others for the sake of the whole.

During their penultimate year they can sum up the linking of all subjects by making Mind Maps. They can make a game by making separate labels to place at the correct places.

4. EIGHTEEN TO TWENTY-FOUR YEARS

As they come to the next age group and many go on to university they come through self-meditation and jettison unwanted absorbed behavior; now they come to MUTUAL self-mediation.

Lonergan gives the example of contingent parts of a watch working together to make for smooth accurate running. Our contacts and our actions resulting from these relationships — our loves, our anger, our worries, all our contacts and actions with others — are now a means of mutual self-mediation and consequent growth. This is a natural progression. Lonergan says in “The Mediation of Christ in Prayer”: “In this process, which is universal, which can regard every act, thought, word, deed, and omission, there is a complete universality, a possibility of the complete growth of every aspect of the person.” It is self-mediation through others, and the others are we and all men." And again: It is NOT

a matter of study of oneself or analysis. It is a living, a developing, a growing in which one element is gradually added to another, and a new whole arises and prayer develops.10

This age group has sensitivity to time in the FUTURE. They have very strong ideals and great vigor and enthusiasm, which they are ready to use in the world. Throughout history many of this age group has been ready to die for what they believe. Ideals, however, without the Holy Spirit inspiring loving actions to gain the ideal, go sadly wrong and profit no one. Many great ideals have gone wrong because action for an end was perpetrated without love being with the will, the willingness, and the willing.

Montessori, Lonergan, and Newman say that for each to play their part in God’s creation, the knowledge of the way of truth and love must be present. This is why it is of utmost importance that the young people at this age undergo mutual self-appropriation as well as self-transcendence, and that they discover within themselves the loving communion with God.

Lonergan linked vocational courses such as law and medicine under one roof. He envisaged exchange of ideas and theories through all the various disciplines. Newman saw this as very important because any advance in any subject, if true, will have an effect on the knowledge within other subjects and will throw light there.

I suggest that after the first year as outlined by Newman, with a unity of exchange of learning, the student should be free for the next year to sit at the feet of an exponent of their subject but in a different country and culture. Those not at university would also gain by an exchange, living and working also in another county. It should not be difficult to arrange this. Where Newman saw the need for unity of learning we now see also the importance of unity with other cultures and nationalities.

There are many wonderful exponents of Newman’s vision for the university. If we follow through much that is suggested, we shall bring through our education, students who realize what Fr. Joseph Flanagan S.J. says in Quest for Self-Knowledge, that “Truly authentic knowers are continuously struggling knowers, always on the alert for further questions that will advance their accumulative knowledge and reverse

their mistaken assumptions.”

As Brian Cronin says on self-appropriation: When practiced it engenders the values of truth, attentiveness, and reasonableness.

And Montessori in *Functions of the University*: “Every contribution able to bring out the latent power of love and to throw light upon love itself, should be welcomed with avidity and considered of paramount importance.”

Following God’s own pattern placed within all humans is this UNIVERSAL WAY FORWARD.

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LONERGAN ON THE VIRTUALLY UNCONDITIONED AS THE GROUND OF JUDGMENT

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1. INTRODUCTION

Lonergan’s teaching on human knowledge is centered on the thesis that our knowledge of reality is mediated by meaning. This is to say that we know reality through acts of meaning – specifically, through acts of conceiving and judging. Our mind posits acts of meaning through its intellectual, rational, and moral dynamism, commonly called intentionality. This conscious dynamism tends toward the knowledge of being and the willing of the good. Because of it man is a subject superior to all worldly reality and is the link between matter and spirit.

Intentionality is an intelligent and rational cognitive dynamism with an unlimited range; it thus is a conscious anticipation of the objective toward which it tends, which is being. In this sense, it is our original way of knowing being, what Lonergan calls the “notion” of being. In the cognitive process by which our mind gradually passes from the anticipation of the whole of being to the knowledge of this or that being, our intentionality is first expressed in the formal act of meaning that is conceiving. It then is realized in the complete act of meaning that is judging. With the first act our mind thinks reality; with the second it knows reality.

But alongside the properly human knowledge that occurs in judgment,
there is also another kind of knowledge. It does not come about through intentionality, but through the dynamism of spatio-temporal extroversion that belongs to both humans and animals.\(^1\) It is to Lonergan's credit that he was able to clarify the nature of these two forms of knowledge and the relation between them. He thus was able to recognize the role of sensibility in the human cognitive process without weakening his claim that it is not sense, but the intelligent and rational meaning produced through our cognitive dynamism, that mediates to us our knowledge of reality.

The nature of human spirit is manifested in the two fundamental kinds of question that we can pose. Spirit is an intelligent dynamism in search of the intelligible through questions for Intelligence (What is it?) posed with regard to the content of (sense) experience. It is also a rational dynamism in search of truth and, by way of truth, in search of being through questions for reflection (Is it really so?) posed with regard to the intelligible object thought at the end of the preceding stage of cognition.\(^2\)

Lonergan reached two important conclusions that correspond to these two questions. The first was that the intelligent meaning that constitutes human knowledge is the meaning that the intellect grasps in the material provided to it by the sensibility. This was Lonergan's discovery in his study of the *verbum* – actually, his rediscovery of what is most valid in the tradition that goes back to Aristotle and St. Thomas.

The second was that the intelligent meaning grasped in this *prima mentis operatio* [first operation of the mind] subsequently acquires a rational component in the reflection prior to judgment, since at that stage of cognitional structure the mind seeks an absolute meaning, in a sense that will be clarified below. Lonergan designates this meaning that grounds the affirmation of judgment by the term “virtually unconditioned.” Though it was already present in the work on the *verbum* in St. Thomas, this second element was the special contribution of *Insight*. Two factors

\(^1\) *Insight*, xvii, xxviii/11f, 22. All quotations from Lonergan's writings will be given without indicating the author's name. Similarly for quotations from St. Thomas, for which I shall indicate both the work with its divisions and also any numerus currens in the Marietti edition. For *Insight* I shall indicate both the pages in the first (1957) edition and those in volume 3 of the "Collected Works of Bernard Lonergan" (1992).

\(^2\) Human spirit is also a moral dynamism in search of the good – the question for decision, "What should I do?" This last stage of the dynamism, which affects the cognitive process itself, will not be examined here.
were decisive for this discovery. The first was the attention that Lonergan gave to modern science, with its clear distinction between the stage of hypothesis and the stage of experimental verification. The other was the attention he paid to the idealist immanentism of Kant, whom Lonergan criticized for not having recognized a constitutive factor of human knowledge in the unconditioned that our mind seeks.

Lonergan sometimes used the common expression “sufficient evidence” to indicate the ground of judgment. But he was not content with this metaphor taken from our sense knowledge by sight. He tried, by introspective analysis, to grasp just what our mind “sees” that justifies it in saying that the object it thinks, as a result of an inquiry following on the first question, is something real or is not.

The transition from speaking of “sufficient evidence” to speaking of the “virtually unconditioned” therefore was, for Lonergan, a decisive moment in his general program of overcoming our spontaneous conception of knowing as a sort of seeing. That conception is harmless in itself, and it is justified by the principle that our knowledge begins with sense experience. This is why, in the case of realities that transcend the sphere of possible experience, we refer to experience and to the insight that arises from experience in order to reach some understanding of transcendent reality. But in the case of the cognitive operations of the intellect, we are dealing with spiritual realities (though connected with sensible representations) that are conscious, so that they are given to us in internal experience or consciousness. Here it is possible to move beyond a conception based on the analogy with sensible knowledge, by attending to the data on our intellectual activity in order to reach an understanding of that activity as it is in itself. Our spontaneous conception of knowing as seeing becomes misleading and leads us into myth when, in philosophical reflection, it becomes the guiding principle that any cognitional activity must be like ocular vision if it is to be objective, that is, if it is to reach being.

In this paper I would like to present Lonergan’s analysis, with particular attention a) to the collaboration of intellect and sensibility, and b) to the role that our sensibility plays in seeking that ground for judgment.

3 *Insight*, 340f / 364f.
4 Among the cognitive operations of sense, the operation of sight is, for us, the most evident and the most “loved,” as Aristotle noted at the beginning of his *Metaphysics*.
that Lonergan appropriately calls the "virtually unconditioned". I shall mainly refer to Chapter X of *Insight*, "Reflective Understanding", in particular to the first two sections (279-283/304-308). There Lonergan took up again what he had learned from St. Thomas in the second chapter of *Verbum* concerning judgment as the positing of a synthesis. The positing of a mental synthesis, or assensus, occurs at the end of a reflective activity in which the intellect returns from the synthesis achieved in the *prima mentis operatio* to the sources of that synthesis in both sense and in intellectual light. With his analysis, Lonergan precisely identified the function of the intellect's return to the sensibility, which originally provided the material for the intelligible synthesis that constitutes the object that the mind thinks. The data of sense as interrogated in reflection enable the intellect to move from thinking an object to affirming it and so to knowing it as a being.

### 2. THE FINITE MATERIAL BEING IS THE PROPER OBJECT OF HUMAN KNOWLEDGE

Human knowledge is a knowledge of being or reality. In this it differs from animal knowledge, which has as its object sensible reality. Not, however, insofar as sensible reality is being, but only insofar as it is relevant for the biological and the psychic (but merely sensitive!) life of the animal. To say that human knowledge is a knowledge of being is to say that it tends toward knowledge of everything that is, and thus toward knowledge of everything.

But within the unlimited sphere of being, only material being is the object that is proportionate to our proper mode of knowing: Our mode of knowing is "made to measure" for material being. It is indeed true that acts of meaning, that is, acts of conceiving and judging, mediate our knowledge of reality, but the meaning that our intentionality is directly capable of is only the meaning grasped in the material reality that is the object of sense.\(^6\) The reason is that our intellect's act of understanding (and without previous acts of understanding and conceiving we cannot

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\(^6\) The only exception is the meaning immanent in the spiritual reality of our very conscious acts at the level of intellect and will. But even these acts are connected with our psychic activity on the level of sense.
move on to judging) is essentially an *intelligere in sensibili* [insight into the sensible]. Our intellect, as a faculty of a soul that is *forma corporis* [the form of the body], is by its nature turned to sense. These limits on meaning are therefore limits on our knowledge of reality.

But this statement must be clarified. Our intentionality inquires beyond the limits of the “world”, that is, beyond the limits of the whole of material reality. But our mind can reply to this inquiring only on the basis of what it knows about proportionate being, that is, on the basis of the proper intelligibility of this world (including man). It does this, first, by forming an analogical concept of transcendent being and, then, by affirming in judgment the transcendent being so conceived, on the basis of the existence of the material world.

In this paper, I intend to limit myself to our knowledge of proportionate being. I will concentrate my analysis on the reflective moment, the third moment of the cognitional structure, which moves from thinking a being to affirming it in judgment and thus to knowing it as a reality.

### 3. FROM EXTERNAL EXPERIENCE TO KNOWLEDGE OF WORLDLY REALITY

The characteristic moment of judgment is affirmation, mentally positing in an absolute way the thought object that is the final product of the second phase of the cognitive process. This second phase starts with the question for understanding and ends with the formation of the concept. To form a concept is to reduce to unity the manifold given in sense experience. The mind is able to perform this synthesis only after it has grasped intelligible relations among the data by an insight. The synthesis may be that expressed in the concept of a “thing,” which results from an insight that grasps a unity in all the data presented by experience, considered in all their aspects. Or it may be a synthesis that further qualifies what has already been grasped as a “thing,” for example, that Peter possesses the character of being prudent.

Just because performing a synthesis is specifically the role of understanding, one must say that the traditional Scholastic terminology that speaks of judgment as a *compositio* (the affirmative judgment) or a

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7 "conversus ad phantasma": Cf. *Summa Theol. I*, q. 84, a. 7.
divisio (the negative judgment) is inadequate and ambiguous. St. Thomas habitually uses this terminology, but he is aware that the characteristic moment of judgment is the assensus, the affirmation or negation of the synthesis performed at the preceding level of understanding. The same inadequacy, though not only terminological, is also widely present in the non-Scholastic philosophical tradition. Not only does Kant define the judgment as the act by which "the relation of a subject to the predicate is thought," but his whole doctrine of the judgment consists in explaining this synthesis – through the twelve a priori syntheses or categories. For just this reason, he assigns to the unconditioned that our reason seeks only the supervisory function of a regulative principle that puts in order the knowledge of objects that we have already reached by combining intuition and concepts.

In fact, only after the intelligible synthesis has been performed does our rational intentionality pose the question for reflection: "Is it (truly) so?" For our intentionality in search of being there is no immediate passage from the content of sense to the affirmation of the judgment "This exists." For what is "this"? Without a specific something, the "is" of judgment makes no sense and would thus enable us to know nothing. Now the intelligibility (the formal meaning) of which our mind is capable is the intelligible grasped in the data of sense and expressed in a concept. Only on the basis of such a specific intelligibility is the mind in a position to ask directly about existence, by asking of a finite being or event: "Is that (truly) the case?" But to put this question is to anticipate a judgment: "This object, presented by sense and thought by the intellect, is." We call this anticipated judgment a prospective judgment.

The question for reflection starts the reflective moment of the cognitive process, which aims at grasping a sufficient reason for answering "it is" or "it is not." Since the "it is" that it seeks is not conditioned by any restrictions, the justification that the intellect must have in order to answer must also be an unconditioned – a virtually unconditioned, as we shall see. Through the unrestricted intentional being of the affirmation that concludes the cognitive process, we come to know the real being of what up to that point was being only in the sense of "thought being."

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8 See in Verbum, chap. 2, the two distinct sections: 1. "Composition or Division" and 2. "Judgment."
9 Kant, Critique of Pure Reason, A 6.
10 Kant, Critique of Pure Reason, B xx f
11 Kant, Critique of Pure Reason, A 50-52.
In the following pages our attention will be fixed on the kind of judgment that serves as an entrance door to our knowledge of reality. This is the concrete judgment of fact, the judgment that concludes a cognitive process that starts from sensible or external experience. The judgments by which we reach a knowledge of transcendent reality will remain outside the present inquiry. Such judgments are justified simply by application of the principle of causality: In order to be explained, contingent being refers us back to transcendent being.

There is another kind of judgment whose justification does not call for a separate examination. These are judgments posited within a restricted horizon of intentionality. In the first place, there are judgments that occur in hypothetical-deductive systems. Through an insight, it is possible to define a set of terms and relations so that the terms fix the relations and the relations fix the terms, while the insight fixes both. Once the primitive terms and relations that delimit the horizon of intentionality have been posited, it is possible to deduce from these premises, by the rules of logic, consequences that will be expressed in as many judgments. These judgments too consist in the absolute positing of an object (the deduced consequence); thus they also have the character of being true or false. But the reason that justifies them is the coherence of the consequence, which at first is hypothetical, with the basic set of terms and relations. The reflection prior to this judgment therefore consists in an insight that grasps this coherence.

In these judgments, the intentional "is" of affirmation has a limited meaning, limited by the premises that are at the basis of the system. The known object consequently is a merely logical, or hypothetical, or mathematical, and so forth, being, corresponding to the character of the

12 Judgments that start from our internal experience or consciousness also lead to knowledge of reality. Consciousness is the experience that the subject has of itself as subject when it operates psychically, that is, consciously, in acts at the empirical, intelligent, rational, or moral level. These judgments make us know the reality that we ourselves are as subjects. For example, the judgment "That conversation disturbed me." For simplicity, I will not examine here the reflection that leads to grasping the virtually unconditioned that grounds such judgments. But it resembles the reflection we will discuss when we examine judgments about the "external" world. The only difference is in the two different kinds of data that reflection may return to. In his study of knowledge Lonergan places the emphasis on concrete judgments of fact, as judgments that mark an increment in our knowledge of reality. This is one of the fundamental points on which he differs from Kant, whose Critique places universal and necessary judgments in the forefront (Cf. Insight, 340 / 363f.).
restricted horizon within which that object is thought. The two following judgments, which are both true, exemplify the difference between the being that is known through a judgment posited within a limited horizon, and the being that is known through a judgment posited within the unlimited horizon, starting from the data of experience. Hence they exemplify the ontological difference between the two affirmed objects: "The square root of -9 is (exists)," "The moon is." 13

The cognitive process that leads to knowledge of real being (a worldly being, in this discussion) starts, not from premises posited by the mind, but from a sense experience, and then it unfolds within an unqualified and therefore unrestricted horizon of intentionality. Only on the basis of sense experience and within the original horizon of intentionality does our cognitive process, passing through the stage of understanding and arriving at a concrete judgment of fact, make us know a real being. The reflections that follow are intended to show how our mind comes to grasp the justification for affirmation in the case of a concrete judgment of fact.

4. THE CHARACTERISTICS OF THE CONCRETE JUDGMENT OF FACT

The judgment that makes us know a finite being, and whose genesis we want to explain, is the concrete judgment of fact. 14 It is concrete in the sense that it concerns a real being that, as existing or occurring, can only be singular. Opposed to the concrete is the abstract, that which abstracts from individuality and singularity and so is universal. There exist universal representations, namely those that refer univocally to an unlimited number of individuals. Such are our concepts. But the concept as an act of our mind is singular. Nothing that is universal exists or occurs. 15

15 In the material being, which is the proper object of our knowledge, the intelligible metaphysical principle or form (whether substantial or accidental) is by its own nature universal. It is universal in the sense that, while remaining the same as an intelligible, it can be actualized in numerically different individuals: "Omnis forma, in..."
Now the concrete judgment of fact, by which we know that something is, has an absolute aspect in the sense that the intentional est is posited by our mind operating within its own unlimited horizon. In asserting that the object, that at first was only thought, "is," we do not mean to say that the object is insofar as it satisfies conditions that we have previously posited ourselves. The "is" of the concrete judgment of fact does not assert that something "is from the point of view of..." or "is provided that..." or "is with respect to..." When I assert that the Wendelstein "is" in Upper Bavaria, I indicate the region where that mountain is found, but I in no way restrict the value of the "is." For just this reason, the intentional "is" of the judgment makes us know the real being by virtue of which a thing exists in itself apart from the causes to which it owes its existence.¹⁶

The concrete judgment of fact also has a contingent aspect. This judgment is the answer to a question for reflection, which asks whether the object thought really exists. This indicates that the subject is aware that it is not absolutely necessary that what he thinks exists. On the contrary, he is aware that definite conditions must be fulfilled before he

quantum huiusmodi, universalis est. [Every form, as such, is universal.]" (De Veritate, q. 8, a. 11). For this reason, the concepts that we form when we express the intelligible that we have grasped in the sensible together with the matter that is relevant for that intelligible (the "materia sensibilis communis [common sensible matter]" Summa Theol. I, q. 85, a. 1) are universal: "man," "temporal," "white," and so forth. But as real, that is, as a metaphysical principle constitutive of the material being that exists or occurs, this intelligible is singular. It is singular owing to the singularity of the individual that is constituted by this intelligible, along with matter and act. "Ipsa natura cui accidit vel intelligi vel abstrahi, vel intentione universalitatis, non est nisi in singularibus; sed hoc ipsum quod est intelligi vel abstrahi, vel intentione universalitatis, est in intellectu. [The nature itself to which it falls to be understood, or to be abstracted, or to bear the intention of universality is only in individuals; but that it is understood, abstracted, or bears the intentionality of universality is in the intellect.] (Ibid., a. 2 ad 2 [English Dominican translation]).

¹⁶ Even a judgment posited within a restricted horizon of intentionality has the character of absoluteness. But in this case the "is" of judgment does not mediate the real being of the object thought, since this object is within a horizon restricted by conditions that have been posited by the one who judges. The one who judges therefore intends to assert the ontological status of the object in just the way he thinks it. In these judgments there is thus a gap between the relative value of the content of the assertion (a merely logical, merely mathematical object, etc.) and the absolute value implied in the performance of the judgment. The one who judges inevitably (!) intends to say that really and truly this reality is merely logical, mathematical, etc. Cf. "Metaphysics as Horizon," in Collection, 192f.
can rationally assert that the object thought exists in itself, independently of his thinking it.

If it is true, then, that the affirmation of the judgment, because of its absolute aspect, requires a corresponding absolute justification, it is equally true that this justification cannot be a formal absolute, an absolute with no conditions at all. It must be a virtual absolute, a conditioned whose conditions in fact are fulfilled so that it is equivalent to an unconditioned. The virtually unconditioned is, on the intentional plane, the counterpart to contingent being on the ontological plane. A contingent being, also, does not exist necessarily by virtue of its essence; it exists because definite conditions have been realized, in the first place the action of an efficient cause.

We must now examine in what sense the question for reflection (the question whether the object thought exists) expresses a conditioned. We must further identify the conditions whose fulfillment makes the prospective judgment, as conditioned, a virtually unconditioned, so that it can be expressed as an absolute affirmation of the object. From what has been said, we see that the mental process that is able to grasp the prospective judgment as virtually unconditioned can be represented schematically as a hypothetical syllogism in *modus ponens*:

If p then q: the judgment q grasped as conditioned, together with its conditions p,

But p: the fulfillment of the conditions,

Therefore q: the judgment grasped as virtually unconditioned and therefore groundedly assertible.

But a syllogism is already made up of three judgments. We want to know how we manage to make judgments in the first place, so that reasoning in accordance with the hypothetical syllogism cannot be the primary and general way in which we arrive at a judgment. Such a formalized deductive inference serves only to illustrate how our mind, in more original and not totally formalizable ways, arrives at the appropriate reflective understanding. In very general terms, we can say that our intellect is in process and discursive, both in having direct insights and in having reflective insights.\(^{17}\)

Grasping an intelligible by a direct insight (into the data of experience) and grasping the virtually unconditioned by a reflective insight are two distinct and complementary moments in cognitional

\(^{17}\) Cf. Verbum, 67f.
structure. In another perspective: A finite intelligible (and the content of every direct insight is finite) indicates only a possibility of being. The same possible is known as actually existing, and thus as real, only if is grasped as virtually unconditioned. The reflective insight does not add any further intelligibility to the intelligibility grasped by direct insight; rather, it reveals the groundedness and absoluteness of a contingent that in fact is.

5. REFLECTIVE INQUIRY COMPARES THE OBJECT OF THOUGHT WITH THE DATA OF EXPERIENCE

Lonergan illustrates the reflection that follows the question “Is it so?” with the story of the worker who comes home in the evening to find his house in a much different state from the way he had left it in the morning. At the sight of it he makes the judgment “Something happened.” By recognizing the same intelligibility of a “thing” (the same unity-identity-whole) in the content of two experiences he had at two different times, he grasps the specific event that is the (accidental) change of that thing.

The data preserved in memory concerning the state of the house in the morning, and the present data of experience in the evening, provide the worker with evidence that his understanding-hypothesis of a sinister event during his absence is well-founded. Hence he cannot help affirming rationally and thus knowing that something has happened. The worker obtained confirmation of his hypothesis that something happened by comparing that explanation with the content of two experiences, what he remembers seeing in the morning and what he sees now.

Such a comparison, and thus the reflective insight it leads to, is possible because both terms of the comparison are objects immanent in the cognitive process. 1) The intelligible, “an event consisting in the change of state of the house,” is the object of an insight into the two different sets of data about the same house at two different times. It thus is immanent in the insight. Now the worker wonders about the ontological status of this intelligible: Is it only a thought event, or did something really happen? 2) The object seen in the morning and the object seen in the evening are immanent in the visual experience.18

18 In saying that the object seen is immanent in the act of seeing I do not intend to
It is important to recognize the immanent character of the object of thought (the intelligible indicated by the term “event”) and of the object of sensibility. This means that the mind’s return to experience, in which it has grasped the intelligible about which it now wonders whether it “is,” is not a return to a thing that is material, external, and existing in itself. The reason is that sense does not know worldly things and events as realities! Rather, it is a return to the data of sense in their pure givenness. But while, at the stage of understanding, the mind was in search of the intelligible that the data bear, now, at the stage of judgment, it is in search of the correctness or groundedness of that intelligible. Hence, in the same content of experience in which the mind discovered an intelligible, it now seeks the fulfillment of the conditions that permit it to know whether the thought intelligible (a thing or event) truly “is.”

Thinking a thing or event is in itself an intellectual (spiritual) act, but its content, the intelligible, refers essentially to something sensible; indeed, it is the intelligible of a sensible object. This reference of the concept to a material element is a reference to what in the Scholastic tradition is called the materia sensibilis communis. In our knowledge of the world (the physis) there is always implied the first of the three degrees of abstraction, physical abstraction. To reach knowledge of material reality in its status as reality, we first of all ask of the data furnished by sense experience the question “What is it?” The road that brings us to knowledge of reality passes through our knowledge of the intelligible. Now the intelligible qua intelligible (the “form” of a material thing) cannot be an object of sense, but as the intelligible of a sensible it is grasped in the material concrete object. It thus is grasped in an object constituted not only by form but also by matter.

The matter that constitutes the object of sense is individual. The Scholastic tradition speaks of a materia signata, a determinate matter,
underlying the dimensions of the object. Now the intelligible grasped in the object of sense as being specifically this intelligible refers to a corresponding matter. The intelligible "thing" refers to a manifold of sensible data that are interconnected and enduring, so that they constitute a unity-identity-whole. The intelligible "house" refers to those materials that are its walls, beams, windows, and so forth, which are arranged so as to constitute a reality suitable for sheltering people. (These in turn are already materials grasped together with their intelligible structure, their "form.") The intelligible in the event "it is thundering" refers to the auditory datum that is the typical sound that occurs during a certain kind of atmospheric disturbance.

But this reference to the sensible matter that is constitutive of the intelligible, and therefore of the concept, is a reference to materia communis, common matter. It is thus a reference to matter as an element in potency to form (which per se is universal). But as individual, matter is not the bearer of any intelligibility. We spontaneously abstract from it when we try to understand something, because we know that individuality, the hic et nunc, does not as such explain anything about the material world. St. Thomas illustrates the reference of the universal concept to matter when he says that the concept of "man" refers to a human body (flesh and bones, which are de ratione speciei [characteristic of the species]), but not to this body (this flesh and these bones, which are partes individui [parts of the individual]).

St. Thomas characterizes our knowledge of the singular as a reality by calling it a knowledge that is had indirecque, et quasi per quandam reflexionem [indirectly, as though by a kind of reflection]. The intellect does not directly know the material singular, even though that is the object proportionate to our mode of knowing. This is because, in order to ask about something as real, it must first answer the question for understanding. It does this by an insight into the content of sense experience, in which it abstracts from individual matter and therefore from the singularity of what is known.

20 Ebd., ad 2; also q. 3, a. 3: "Materia individualis, cum accidentibus omnibus individuantibus ipsam, non cadit in definitione speciei: non enim cadunt in definitione hominis hae carnes et haec ossa, aut albedo vel nigredo, vel aliquid huiusmodi. [The individual matter, with all the accidents that individuate it, does not fall within the definition of the species. For the definition of man does not include this flesh and these bones, or whiteness or blackness, or anything of that kind.]"

21 Ibid., q. 86, a. 1; cf. Verbum, 179-86.
After it has conceived a universal object and asked whether it exists, the intellect returns to the content of sensation to verify the conditions that are able to make the prospective judgment (the conditioned) into an unconditioned that can be affirmed. Judging as affirming consciously and groundedly that "It really is so" (intentional being), is the very means by which the one who judges comes to know the real being of what he has experienced and understood.

Now returning to the content of sensation means returning to the individual matter that up to that moment the intellectual process has left aside. With this return, one recognizes that the universal intelligible thought by the intellect coincides with the singular object presented by sense. This is because the *materia communis* to which the intelligible, as the intelligible of a sensible object, refers coincides with the *materia signata*. The intellect, in fact, first grasped this intelligible (together with its reference to the *materia communis*) in the matter presented by sense, which is the *materia individualis*. The judgment of existence therefore has the following structure: *This* singular object presented by sense, which the understanding has grasped in its intelligible and therefore universal component, *is* that is, is affirmed in the judgment and therefore is known in its real being. For example, "This is a man". The intellect grasps a universal ("man"), but knows that it is real because it knows that it is realized in the singular object presented by sense. It is through this reference to sense that an object conceived in its intelligible component is known as a singular existent.

We can describe the reflective moment in which we come to know the correctness of a direct insight, as follows: The task of the critical-reflective moment is to ascertain whether all the data that would be relevant to the object thought are in fact given in sense experience, and whether in this experience other data are present that the insight has not taken into account, but that might put the correctness of that insight into question.

We can do this because our question for understanding asks about the intelligible present in the content of experience from a particular point of view. We do not ask either about the total intelligibility of the universe (which is not given to us in a single experience!) or about the exhaustive intelligibility of a single object presented by sense. To ask about an exhaustive intelligibility would be to consider an object from innumerable points of view that are not intrinsically interconnected. The
fact that we do not undertake that kind of inquiry does not hinder us from reaching true knowledge. Indeed, true knowledge, knowledge that makes us know reality as it is, is not exhaustive knowledge! Nor does the absolute positing of the judgment (in which alone truth is given) imply the exhaustiveness of the affirmed understanding.  

We therefore grasp the justification necessary for answering yes to the question for reflection by returning to the intelligible that is grasped by the intellect and to the sensible that is presented by the sensibility and thus is known in its pure givenness. This confirms the teaching of St. Thomas according to which our knowledge of the real (which can only be a singular) is the fruit of a collaboration of sense and intellect.

The explanation of the concrete judgment of fact as the fruit of a collaboration of sense and intellect also permits us to understand how we can exercise our intelligence and rationality in a dream, so as to produce concrete judgments of fact by which we know (or, more exactly, think we know) reality. In fact our imagination can reproduce or make up images of singular realities on the basis of which our intellect can grasp an intelligibility and then conceive an object. Then, returning to the image, the intellect can verify the fulfillment of the conditions of the thought object, and thus grasp the judgment as unconditioned. Through the affirmation of the judgment, it can then know the object as real. It is only when we awake that we realize that the fulfillment of the conditions was based only on images of the imagination and not on images that correspond to the content of a true sensation. We thereby realize that we were having a knowledge not of real beings, but only of imagined beings.

22 See in Insight the discussion of the distinction between vulnerable insights and invulnerable insights (284 / 309), as well as the refutation of relativism (342-47 / 366-71, and also 490-97 / 514-20), which holds that the whole universe is a single scheme of intrinsic relations, so that to be correct an understanding would have to be an exhaustive understanding of everything. But in fact it is possible to delimit an experience and fix on one aspect under which to consider its content, without thereby neglecting data that are relevant to the insight sought. Consequently, in the reflective moment we can verify in the individual matter mediated by sense the limited number of conditions for the conditioned expressed by the prospective judgment.

23 During a dream we can only partially control these. This explains the fragmentariness, incoherence, and errors in our knowledge when dreaming. Cf. Summa Theol., I, q. 84, a. 8.; De Veritate, q. 12, a. 3, ad 2; Verbum, 75.
6. TWO ERRONEOUS INTERPRETATIONS OF THE REFLECTIVE MOMENT

Lonergan worked out his theory of knowledge by an introspective analysis directed to identifying the acts that make up our cognitive process. It further identified the norms that are immanent in our intentionality, which successively summon forth the different cognitive acts and combine them into the whole that is human knowledge in its capacity for knowing being. In short, Lonergan’s procedure was to work out a theory of knowledge by taking as his guiding thread the question “What do we do when we know?” What operations do we perform, and in conformity with what norms?

This procedure consists in inquiring into the data of our internal cognitional experience, and so it is parallel to the procedure of the sciences of nature, which inquire into the data of external experience. But as an alternative to this, there is a short cut by which other theories of knowledge have been worked out. This divergent path does not neglect the data entirely, since it is not possible to speak of experience, concepts, judgment, and so forth without some reference to internal experience. But, for the philosophers Lonergan intends to distance himself from his introspective procedure, the criterion for a cognitive act to be considered properly cognitive is the spontaneous, but nonetheless easily misleading, analogy with eyesight. Our intellectual operations are cognitive if, and to the extent that, they resemble seeing, that is, insofar as they implement the extroversion typical of ocular vision: a stretching toward something there in the space that opens before our eyes, and reaching it, but in a way that does not eliminate the extroversion (the duality) between knower and known. Only acts of this kind achieve true and objective knowing, knowing that arrives at knowledge of an ob-iectum (Gegen-stand) that stands before the subject.

When we make a judgment that is not merely a guess but is grounded, we know that our judgment is true, that is, that it conforms to the reality known. But if knowing is essentially seeing, then to know that our knowledge is true will be to see the conformity between the mental representation and the known thing in itself. This “seeing,” prior to and grounding our true knowledge, is the “sufficient evidence” for the judgment.

As I pointed out at the beginning, Lonergan accepts and even uses
this expression to indicate the ground of the rational judgment. The use of metaphorical terms to refer to spiritual realities is quite spontaneous, even inevitable, for us, given that *omnis nostra cognitio a sensu initium habet* [all our knowledge takes its start from sense],\(^{24}\) so that all of our understanding is ultimately an *intelligere in sensibili*. But we have to realize that these are images and metaphorical expressions, and so we need to ask how far the metaphor is useful for grasping and expressing nonsensible realities. With this, I have touched on the general problem of how we can reach an understanding (and then a knowledge), that is the least inadequate possible, of realities that are outside the sphere proportionate to our mode of knowing. This is the problem of analogical knowledge.

Fortunately, this problem does not arise in our inquiry about human knowledge — or rather, it does not arise with the same seriousness as when we are dealing with our knowledge of transcendent realities. We are conscious of our cognitive operations by that internal experience that is our consciousness. Hence we have data on these operations, as we do not in the case of transcendent reality, so that we can have a direct insight into them. This is so even though these are not purely sensible data,\(^ {25}\) so that they do not provide us the kind of phantasm or representative image\(^ {26}\) that our intellect by its nature is turned to.

Introspective analysis of the stage that leads from the question for reflection to the judgment permits us to go beyond metaphor. We discover that the “sufficient evidence” for making a grounded judgment actually consists in grasping a virtually unconditioned. Evidence thus consists in grasping, by a process in which intellect and sense collaborate, that the prospective judgment (“Is the thing the way we think it?”) is an unconditioned insofar as the conditions on which its correctness depends are in fact fulfilled.

This performative-introspective method (the method of attending to our cognitive performance) is at the base of Lonergan’s theory of knowledge. With it, we are in a position to grasp where the error of the intuitionists lies, that is, the error of those who, to investigate the “sufficient evidence,” start out from the general principle that makes

\(^{24}\) Cf. *Summa Theol.* 1, q. 1, a. 9; q. 17, a. 1.

\(^{25}\) They are connected with the sensibility, however, insofar as the intellectual cognitive act is in functional connection with the sensibility.

\(^{26}\) Cf. “A Note on Geometrical Possibility,” in *Collection*, 105 and 275.
seeing the analogatum princeps [standard of comparison] with respect to any other cognitive operation.

1. Lonergan compares the prospective judgment with its sources in the act of sensation and in the act of direct insight, so that he is comparing elements within the cognitive process itself. For the intuitionists, this becomes an intellectual act of comparison turned on the one hand to the mental representation and on the other hand to the thing in itself. It is therefore the act of an intellect that views both terms of the comparison, one immanent in the cognitive process and the other transcending that process. Only in this way, by seeing the truth of the prospective judgment, which is the conformity of the mental representation with the thing itself, do we have the necessary and sufficient evidence that justifies the affirmation of the judgment.

Now if we require this kind of seeing, we are inevitably led to the following dilemma: Either the intellect sees, that is, knows, the thing in itself or it does not. If it sees it, then the comparison is possible, but useless, since it would actually be a comparison between two items of knowledge; the first would be the thing itself, as known through an act of knowledge (of what kind?!) prior to judgment, the second would be the mental representation (which is also an item of knowledge), about which we want to decide whether or not it corresponds to the thing. But if, prior to judgment, we already know the thing as it is, there is no reason to compare the mental representation with this knowledge. It is quite sufficient to stop at this direct (?) knowledge without resorting to the comparison. But if, on the other hand, the thing in itself is not known, it is not possible to institute the comparison.

2. A second erroneous interpretation of the reflective moment is concerned with the function of sense experience in reaching knowledge of reality. We have seen the decisive role that experience plays in human knowledge. Human knowledge is, in its essence, knowledge of being, and therefore it has an unlimited scope. At the same time, it is the activity of a "spirit in matter," so that the scope of the reality that is its proper and proportionate object is limited to material being. This explains why a) the starting point in our search for being is sense experience, why b) the understanding we are capable of is an understanding in sensibili, and finally why c) the concrete judgment of fact, by which we reach knowledge of reality, involves a return to the data of sense.
Clearly, then, our sensibility functions throughout the cognitive process, and in particular in the movement from thinking an object to knowing it as real. But sensist realism (which is both the spontaneous and the most primitive form of intuitionism) interprets, (really misunderstands) this functioning to mean that sense experience as such is the act that mediates our knowledge of the object as being. For the sensist realist there is no need to justify any mental representation that differs from the act of sensation, and so he sees no need to examine the reflective moment of the cognitive process. For him, the true and proper act of knowing the real lies in sensation. If he ever recognizes acts proper to the intellect, these can only be the epiphenomena of a knowledge of reality that is already achieved by sense.

We can already presume that this view is false from the following considerations. At least in the case of the higher animals, we have good grounds for believing that they enjoy a sense knowledge comparable to ours. Nonetheless, they do not know the object seen, touched, or smelled in its ontological status as being. The realism of a dog, for example, is the realism of the extroversion proper to sense, which grasps the “external world” in its spatio-temporal dimensions and in its relevance to the biological and psychic life of the animal. This is so because its conscious dynamism for knowledge is neither intelligent nor rational. The animal is not endowed with the \textit{a priori} anticipation of being that is constitutive of the human spirit. By virtue of this anticipation we pose the question for understanding “What is this?” when confronted with the data of sense, with a view to knowing being. And once that question is answered we further ask, “Is it so?”

Only man is an intelligent in search of the intelligible and a rational in search of the true and of being, and only for him can a sensible object lead to the knowledge of being. Just because man is in search of being, the sense experience to which he returns in reflection provides the fulfillment of conditions, so that the conditioned that is the prospective judgment becomes an unconditioned. And this permits him to answer yes to the question “Is it really so?” The question about being is a question about what is and so about what, insofar as it is, does not depend on any condition that is not already realized. The answer to this question can only have the same meaning as the question itself. But the question is about being without any restrictive qualification. Hence the answer achieves the knowledge intended by the question: knowledge of being,
knowledge of what is and of what, insofar as it is, transcends the knowing subject.

7. THE VIRTUALLY UNCONDITIONED ALLOWS US TO KNOW BEING THROUGH THE JUDGMENT THAT IT GROUNDS, BUT IT DOES NOT EXPLAIN THE EXISTENCE OF THAT WHICH IS THEREBY KNOWN

Being is intrinsically intelligible; it is the objective of an intelligent and rational dynamism that, just because it has an unlimited range, aims at knowing all that is. Outside the realm to which the dynamism of our intentionality is turned, there is only what is not, that is, nothing. But we cannot ask about being except by first passing through the intelligible. Only with regard to what we have first grasped by answering the question for understanding “What is it?” can we ask whether it “is.” With regard to what is not intelligible, what is contradictory (a square circle), we cannot seriously ask whether it is.

We saw above that our mind is able to answer the question whether something is. When we succeed in answering this question affirmatively, we know that the object that at first was only thought is. But this does not mean that in addition to our direct insight we have a grasp of the intelligibility of the existence or occurrence of that object. The mental process that leads to a knowledge of existence is not a second insight that understands existence. Reflective understanding is an act of our rationality that grasps a justification for our affirming that the object thought is. This justification is the virtually unconditioned, which has the same intelligible content as the direct insight.

But the content of the direct insight (e.g., the content of the concept “man”) cannot be known as existent as long as we know it only as universal. Still, it indicates the conditions for its existence: it exists, if matter as pars speciei (part of the intelligible) or materia communis, structured in conformity to the form that it bears and thus thought in the concept, is known, by the intellect returning to sense, as being at the same time the materia individualis presented by sense.²⁸ The individual matter

²⁸ The intellect can recognize this because in the direct insight it grasped the intelligible (the structure of the matter) in the individual matter presented by sense.
is an object of sense (and not simply something imagined in imagining a finite being), and the reflective intellect asks whether this object of sense is, for example, a man. As a result, the intellect recognizes in this sensible object the individual fulfillment of what it thinks universally. Thus, to the question whether the singular object is really a man, it can rationally answer: "Yes. This is a man." The object of sense fulfills with its individual matter the material elements that are implied in the thought intelligible.

From this description of the reflective moment, two decisive things emerge for our question about how we come to know the existence or occurrence of a finite reality: a) the knowledge of being does not occur before the intentional est of the judgment; b) sensation, reconsidered in the light of the question about the existence or occurrence of an intelligible, provides the final element that brings the prospective judgment from conditioned to unconditioned. Sensation does not know anything about the existence of the material object that it makes known to us in its pure givenness. Nonetheless, in the reflective moment it assumes the function of being the fulfillment of the conditions required for judgment about the object that the cognitive process has grasped in its intelligible component. This function can be clarified with the following syllogism: A finite object thought actually exists only if, besides the materia communis that we think in thinking the object, we also know the materia individualis through the same sensation that provided us the material for thinking the object. Indeed, only an existent can strike (affect) our senses. But we do know the materia individualis

29 Sensation knows nothing about existence for the simple reason that it knows nothing about being.

30 "Experience, though it is not as such the source of the concept of being..., still it is the condition of the transition from the affirmation of the possibility to the affirmation of the actuality of being," (Verbum, 57).

31 "Indeed..."But it is necessary to point out that the explanation adopted here can be applied to our problem in two radically different ways. The naïve realist invokes this principle to assert that we therefore know the existent through sensation. The critical realist attends to the intermediate process between sensation and judgment. This process includes a) the moment of direct understanding, without which the est of judgment would not have sense; b) the moment of reflective understanding analyzed above. Finally, we should note that the principle stated here does not mean that the reflective moment consists in an application of the principle of causality. From a specific event known as real we can deduce another specific event as its cause. But here the question is how we come to know the reality of an event or existent in the first place.
in this sensation. Therefore the object exists.

This means that the virtually unconditioned is reached through the collaboration of intellect and sense. What for the sense is only the content of an act of sensation becomes, for the intellect in its reflective stage, the fulfillment of the conditions indicated by the thought intelligible content. In other words, the intellect in its reflective moment does not grasp a new intelligibility in the content of sense. (Matter as materia individualis is not the bearer of any intelligibility.) Rather, it understands, in the light of the content of the direct insight, that this materia individualis is the matter needed to move from the hypothesis that the object of sensation is a man to the affirmation that this object is a man. (Because only a man has as his own a matter that carries in itself the intelligibility of "man," and only in an existent man is the matter that bears this intelligibility at the same time materia individualis.)

From this analysis we see that reflective understanding does lead to knowledge of an existent, but it does not explain why the object that at first is only thought exists. Reflective understanding ascertains in the sensation that the materia individualis that is necessary for a material object to exist is actually given. This indicates that the object in fact exists, but it does not explain the existence itself. The existence is known as a fact, but it is not (yet) explained. It is the fact of a contingent existent, parallel to that fact which is the virtually unconditioned, a conditioned whose conditions have come to be known as fulfilled — which does not imply a knowledge of why they are fulfilled.

But the fact of contingent existence and occurrence can and should be explained. This can already be seen from our spontaneous tendency to ask "Why does this thing exist?" or "Why did this event happen?" just as earlier we posed the question for understanding when confronted with experience. We spontaneously suppose that the existence and occurrence known in the concrete judgment of fact are no less intelligible than the content of sense experience. There is no thing as existing, or event as occurring, that we suppose to be objectively without explanation, whatever may be our effective interest in and our capacity for reaching such an explanation.

The progress of man in his knowledge of nature is the result of an inexhaustible series of questions that have been posed in order to understand what things are and why they are. To renounce in principle the explaining of existences and occurrences in the world would be
an extreme form of obscurantism. Such obscurantism is rejected by our intelligence, which in its insuppressible dynamism for knowledge presupposes that nothing that is absolutely unintelligible can exist or occur.

In particular cases we can know why this thing is and why this event occurred, by referring one contingent being to another. However, this does not provide a true and proper explanation of contingent existence and occurrence but only shows that they in fact exist and occur. What is thereby known is not the explanation of contingent existence and occurrence as such, but only the explanation of this existent and this event. The question always comes back again, as long as an adequate answer has not been given.

It is not possible to limit intelligibility to the form of a material thing that we know when we understand the content of a sense experience. The content of an insight, together with the materia communis to which it refers, constitutes an object thought (an essence) about which we spontaneously ask whether it really exists. This very fact means that the intelligible of itself implies a possible being: “Intelligibility is the ground of possibility.” The possibility that a thing exists is so dependent on its intelligibility that when we grasp something as being entirely without intelligibility, as being contradictory in those very features that define it (a square circle), we do not seriously ask whether it exists. In such a case the very possibility of existing is excluded a priori.

A finite intelligibility does not of itself imply actual being, precisely because it is limited. Because it is intelligible, it intrinsically grounds being, but because it is finite this being implies both being and non-being. The specific determination of an intelligible (such as “tree” or “storm”) is at the same time a negation of infinitely many other limited intelligibilities, and it therefore is a negation of as many possibilities of being. This means that the finite intelligibility, while it is positively oriented to being, is not in its own essence being. Indeed, if it were by identity being, it could not be a negation of being at the same time. Only an infinite intelligible is by identity being itself, but this implies that it is not only a possible being, but an actual being. What is by its essence being must necessarily exist!

Being is therefore intelligible, indeed in itself it is the primary intelligible on which every other intelligible depends. On this point we

32 Cf. Verbum, 57; “A Note on Geometrical Possibility,” in Collection, 102.
can refer to the Aristotelian principle\(^\text{33}\) that the Scholastic tradition has formulated in the aphorism: "\textit{Propere quod unumquodque tale et illud magis} [Whatever causes a certain character in others must have that character, and to a greater degree]". Thus, that by which everything is intelligible and therefore oriented to being must itself be maximally intelligible and so maximally oriented to being, with an orientation that goes beyond mere possibility so as to be actually and necessarily being. The \textit{magis tale} is the \textit{maxime tale} [i.e., "to the greatest degree"] when we are speaking of the \textit{causa per se} of all the beings that share in the same order of determination. Equivalent to this Aristotelian aphorism is another aphorism, with obviously Platonic overtones, that also comes from the Scholastic tradition: "\textit{Primum in unoquodque genere est causa ceterorum} [The first in any kind is the cause of the rest]." St. Thomas quotes it frequently, giving as its source the above passage from Aristotle.\(^\text{34}\)

Because of its finitude, there is a split in finite being between its essence and its existence. A finite being, insofar as it is a being, is a sharing in the first intelligible, so that it too is intelligible. But the extent to which it is a being and thus intelligible, just because it is a finite extent, implies that it is only a possibility of being; hence it does not actually exist by virtue of its own essence. A finite essence does not explain and so does not ground its own actual existence. Thus on the one hand, the essence of a finite being is not existence; on the other hand, the finite being in fact exists; therefore, the finite being receives its existence, ultimately, from that primary being that is the only adequate cause, and so the first cause, of everything that exists. But this does not prevent a finite being from receiving its existence through another finite being operating as a cause secondary to the primary being.

The split between essence and existence is the reason why we are able to arrive at knowledge that a being in fact exists, even though the cognitive process by which we do that does not include an explanation of the existence or occurrence of that being. The process that brings us to know a being that is proportionate to our mode of knowing always involves an experience. Without experience, we would not ask about being and therefore would not come to know anything. That cognitive

\(^{33}\text{Cf. Metaphysics, II, 1: 993b 24f.}\)

\(^{34}\text{Cf. Contra Gentes II, 15: 924; De Potentia, q. 3, a. 5; Summa Theol. I, q. 44; a. 1; I.II. q. 22, a. 2 ad 1.}\)
process also involves an insight. Without that insight, the intentional being of the judgment would have no meaning and therefore would not mediate any knowledge of real being. But our cognitive process does not involve an understanding of the existence of a proportionate being. That is so because contingent existence and occurrence are not intelligible in themselves; they are understood only when they are brought back to a noncontingent extrinsic cause.\(^{35}\) For us to know a contingent, finite being, only an indirect path is open,\(^ {36}\) the path of deducing its existence from the existence of another finite being. This second path also is by way of the concrete judgment of fact and thus does not involve a true and proper explanation of contingent existence or occurrence.

This knowledge that "combines the concreteness of experience, the determinateness of accurate intelligence, and the absoluteness of rational judgment" Lonergan calls factual knowledge.\(^ {37}\) A fact is a virtually unconditioned: "it might not have been; it might have been other than it is; but as things stand, it possesses conditional necessity."\(^ {38}\) This is the only necessity that our mind is able to grasp, given that we cannot grasp formal necessity, namely the necessity of that intelligible that is identically being itself.

The rational facticity of the concrete judgment of fact enables us to know the real, finite existent or event. But that is not to say that this fact is a pure fact. We know the fact as a reality without knowing the explanation of its existence or occurrence; we should not, however, conclude that objectively there is no explanation. For this would mean that the fact is outside the sphere of being and is therefore nothing, since being is precisely the intelligible.\(^ {39}\)

If this is the case with our knowledge of every finite being taken as an individual, there is no reason why it should not be valid for the totality,

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35 The noncontingent extrinsic cause that explains and therefore grounds contingent being is the infinite intelligible, God, who for just this reason is the *ipsam esse subsistens* [subsistent act of being itself]. But in order to know the infinite intelligible and infinite being – with an analogical knowledge that does not include, and cannot include for us, a proper understanding of that intelligible – we must already know that a contingent being (the world) exists.

36 This is the knowledge of the singular "indirecte, et quasi per quandam reflexionem": *Summa Theol.* 1, q. 86, a. 1.


38 *Insight*, 331 / 355.

that is, for the actually existing universe. With regard to the universe in its totality the principle is still valid: *non est procedere in infinitum* [no process can go on to infinity]. St. Thomas employs this principle whenever there is a question of moving from the finite and contingent being to its ultimate explanation in the first transcendent cause, God\(^40\). This is not because of the impossibility of a creation *ab aeterno* or the impossibility of an actually infinite numerical quantity.\(^41\) It is because of the metaphysical principle that there cannot be a sharing in the intelligible and in being without a transcendent *primum* that grounds the created being by sharing its own intelligibility with the creature. In the finite material being, this sharing is realized in the three metaphysical principles that are intrinsic to such a being: the potential intelligible (matter), the formal intelligible (form), and the actual intelligible (being).

The ultimate explanation of contingent existence or occurrence is found by ascending to a transcendent being that is the intelligible itself and that, as such, is capable of explaining both its own existence and that of every contingent being. This intelligible will be an efficient cause that brings about the fulfillment of the conditions of every finite being. It will be an exemplary cause that is able to explain the intelligibility of the entire scheme according to which all the conditions of the conditioned are fulfilled. It will be a final cause that grounds the universe of finite reality by a rational and free choice whose object is the intelligibility and the good of the universe.\(^42\)

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40 Cf. Ibid., q. 2, a. 3.

41 St. Thomas recognizes by faith “*mundum ab aeterno non fuisse* [that the world was not from eternity].” But he leaves open from the point of view of human reason the question “*utrum potuisset semper fuisse* [whether it might always have been],” as long as such an eternal world is recognized as “*causatum a Deo secundum totum quod est* [caused by God in all that is]” (“De aeternitate mundi contra murmurantes” in *Opuscula theologica* (Turin: Marietti, 1973): 295). Similarly, on the second question he writes “*adhuc non est demonstratum, quod Deus non possit facere ut sint infinita actu* [it has not yet been shown that God could not make an actual infinity of things]” (Ibid., 310).