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EDITOR'S NOTE

The second volume of Lonergan Workshop is made up of papers from the days of the summer workshop at Boston College prior to those collected in Volume 1. The papers tend to be expressions of periods of transition or consolidation in the scholarly lives of their authors, but are seminal enough to merit publication. Professor Komonchak's paper is perhaps the best piece relating Lonergan's work to the field of ecclesiology yet available. Professor Quesnell's comes from a larger work-in-progress; and it gives us a taste of what dialectic and foundations in Lonergan's sense is about. Professor Tracy's piece presages elements we have since come to know in his well-known Blessed Rage for Order; but it has a more than historical interest as an attempt to do dialectics. Keeping in the vein of dialectics-foundations, Professor Flanagan's paper concretizes the issue of the control of meaning in a discussion of the transcultural foundations of law and morality. Professor Doran raises the issue of a conversion of self as psychic that would complement the conversions already thematized by Lonergan. There follows Professor Tyrrell's application of his well-received Christotherapy to the social context. My own paper relates the debate between hermeneutic philosophy and critical theory to Lonergan's work in asking the question of the title. Finally, Matthew Lamb has supplied us with a solid demonstration of the relevance of method to the wide range of issues central to the concerns of contemporary philosophy and theology.

Fred Lawrence
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The twentieth century has been called "the century of the Church" (Dibelius). The characterization refers not to any expected or verified triumph of Christianity, but to the remarkable way in which ecclesiology has become a central subject of theological reflection. Trutz Rendtorff has described this development in Protestant theology, especially among the dialectical theologians. Roman Catholics have the opportunity to observe a parallel development, most simply by comparing the documents on the Church of the two Vatican Councils, more fully by tracing the development from one Council to the other in Leo XIII's opening of the Church to the modern world and his restatement of the relation between Church and State, in the biblical, patristic, Thomist revivals, in the liturgical and ecumenical movements, in the recovery of such themes as the Mystical Body and the People of God, in John XXIII's call for aggiornamento (Jaki; Congar, 1970:459-477). These several developments bore their fruit in the Second Vatican Council, of which Karl Rahner felt able to remark "that in all of its sixteen constitutions, decrees and explanations it has been concerned with the Church" (3).

The Second Vatican Council, if it lies at the end of one development, itself precipitated another, whose strength is more easily experienced than its direction is charted. Obviously, there are few areas in theology in which theory and practice more directly intersect than in ecclesiology. The pre-conciliar developments in the theology of the Church resulted in a series of reforms which in 1962 the most optimistic did not anticipate, and to evaluate which the
historian must certainly review centuries of previous church history and perhaps must await decades more of development. The practical reforms have in turn brought about a new experience of existence in the Church, which itself receives a variety of evaluative interpretations in a spate of books on the general question: What in God's name is going on in the Catholic Church? And with few exceptions most of the recent work in Roman Catholic ecclesiology has been a mixture of more or less theoretical reflections and practical suggestions (Küng, 1967, 1971, 1972; McBrien, 1970, 1973).

This paper will be largely devoted to theoretical considerations, which I at least like to think are faithful to my own Church-experience and not without practical implications. I propose to review briefly the twentieth-century "recovery of the Church" in Roman Catholic theology, suggest what I believe has been its principal defect, and then to outline ways in which Bernard Lonergan's thought can help to supply for it. I cannot resist noting the appropriateness of studying Lonergan if Patrick Burns is correct in describing American Catholic theologians as "drifting somewhere off Nova Scotia on their voyage toward an American ecclesiology" (323).

New and Old Models of the Church

In 1961, James Gustafson published a very useful little study on "The Church as a Human Community". The book is a sustained criticism of what Gustafson calls "theological reductionism," that is, "the exclusive use of Biblical and doctrinal language in the interpretation of the Church," "the explicit or tacit assumption that the Church is so absolutely unique in character that it can be understood only in its own private language" (100). To supplement a theological interpretation of the Church, Gustafson draws upon the work of Durkheim, Malinowski, Troeltsch, Mead, Royce and others to elaborate a "social interpretation"
which shows the Church to be a human, natural, political
community of language, interpretation, memory and under-
standing, belief and action.

Gustafson's critique may be usefully applied to the
development of Roman Catholic ecclesiology in this century. Avery Dulles has suggested that this development has seen four models challenge the near-monopoly enjoyed for cen-
turies by the "institutional" model. The new models see
the Church primarily as "mystical communion," "sacrament," "herald," and "servant." The first model, "mystical com-
munion," includes the ideas of the Church as "Mystical
Body" and as "People of God." While Dulles does point out
the parallels between these ideas and sociologists' dis-
cussions of Gemeinschaft and of "primary groups," still
the ideas are essentially biblical, and on the first Dulles
writes, "The image of the Body of Christ is organic, rather
than sociological" (46).

The model of the Church as "sacrament" attempts to
unify the distinctive emphases of the institutional and
mystical models, especially by exploring the Christologi-
cal parallel. While some exploration of the "sacramental"
or symbolic character of human living usually accompanies
the exposition, still it is of some significance that this
model's analogue is itself a theological category.

The third model, the Church as "herald," is kerygma-
tic, emphasizing the Church as "event," the actual congre-
gation gathered together by the preached Word. Dulles notes
that the model tends to underplay the institutional aspect
of the Church and that some of its advocates fall into an
ecclesiological occasionalism (72-82).

Finally, the model of the Church as "servant" can
build upon Gaudium et Spee and the social encyclicals. It
is turned out towards the world, which it tends to inter-
pret positively; and emphasizes the brotherhood of those
who, in imitation of the suffering Servant, serve the
world's progress. Dulles notes a danger that the
distinctiveness of the Church's service may be overlooked (93-96).

Now none of these models draws very seriously upon social theory. Their underlying analogues (or, in the case of the servant-model, the paradigm of service) are either biblical or liturgical (sacramental). As I will argue more fully later, their distinctive emphases provide needed correction or supplements to the institutional model. But it is the experience of many today that, while the models have their theological attractiveness, they do not often reflect the common experience of members of the Church. One reason for this, of course, may be the failure to realize the practical implications of the newer models for the life of the Church /3/. But the more fundamental reason may also be the failure of the exponents of the newer models to work through the fundamental social terms and relations necessary for an integral and concrete ecclesiology /4/.

From that standpoint at least, the institutional model more clearly escapes the criticism of "theological reductionism." It draws, after all, on a social or political theory, devised in the course of centuries of struggle for effective institutional freedom and eventually elaborated in a form which was, for its time, of considerable sophistication. Since the development of recent ecclesiology--at least on the level of theory--has been largely a departure from the institutional model, it might be of some interest briefly to review its history and then to attempt some explanation of its fall from grace.

Nearly everyone today rejects Rudolph Sohm's fantasy of a primitive, "charismatic" Church to which the very notion of law was foreign (Congar, 1973). Several New Testament traditions reveal at least the outline of the "Catholic" understanding of the Church and of church order /5/; and Sohm himself admitted that his ideal stage of the Church had come to an end by the time of I Clement. By the
time of Nicaea, the Church had developed certain "structures" of its own, modelled often on those of the late Empire; and, in rejecting Montanism, it had already, to use Troeltsch's ideal-types, chosen the church-model over that of the sect (Evans; Bouyer: 37-40). The "institutionalization" of the Church was carried out more as a sociological necessity than as a reflexively conscious decision, and later distinctions between "visible" and "invisible" Church were largely unknown (Kelly: 191) /6/.

"Institutional" self-consciousness was accelerated by the struggles in the Eastern Empire over final doctrinal and disciplinary authority, and the development of papal authority in the Church as a counterweight to the Emperor's ecumenical authority can be seen as an effort to maintain the independence and transcendence of the Church (Jalland). Juristic categories and procedures are already common during the Carolingian era in the West, where they function both in the disputes between regnum and sacerdotium and in the controversies between papal monism and conciliarism (Morrison). But an "institutional model still did not predominate. In liturgy, homily, even in conciliar debate, the Church was still described mainly in biblical and liturgical images and symbols and understood principally as the congregatio fidelium, never more the Church than when gathered for the Eucharist (Congar, 1966; de Lubac, 1949).

A turning-point seems to have been reached with the Gregorian Reform, in which the libertas Ecclesiae was argued on the basis of an explicitly juridical ecclesiology, clerical and papal in character, and defended in practice by a series of administrative reforms which generally favored a centralization of power in Rome. In defense of both theory and practice, Hildebrand himself encouraged collections of canons, for one of which he seems to have composed his own Dictatus Papae. The reform-collections drew rather heavily upon the False Decretals, and Congar has pointed out that their inclusion hid from the Middle
Ages the fact of historical development in church order and especially in papal administration (Congar, 1964:226-232). The liberation of the Church from lay dominance was purchased at the cost of a considerable clericalization and juridicization of the notion of the Church, which Congar, again, illustrates by the clerical monopolizing of such texts as 1 Cor 2:15: "The spiritual man judges all things, but is himself to be judged by no one" (DS 873).

Around 1140, Gratian published his Concordia discordantium canonum which, it has recently been argued, should be read as a juridical theory of the Church meant to buttress the threatened reform-movement, now championed mainly by monastic theologians such as Bernard, themselves operating with a "pre-Gregorian" ecclesiology (Chodorow) /7/. However that may be, Gratian's work led to the formation of the great schools of canon law and to the development of the science of jurisprudence which would provide the series of lawyer-popes of the next two centuries with the fundamental categories in which to state their notion of the Church and their defense of their growing power.

It would be a mistake, however, to think the interest in law and juridical considerations to be a clerical or papal intrigue. Behind the gradual growth of the conciliarist movement lies a juridical or canonistic statement of a theology of the Church in terms of corporation-theory (Tierney, 1955). And the great Church-State controversies of the thirteenth and fourteenth centuries were argued out, on both sides, in political and juristic categories. Law was the social theory available at the time (Congar, 1970: 269-295).

The whole history of this "institutional" model of the Church is an exciting and creative moment in the history of ideas. Throughout the period, from the eleventh to the fifteenth centuries, there is a dialectical relationship between ecclesiology and political thought. Brian Tierney has argued that the development of constitutional
theory in the West was greatly influenced by conciliarist theory; and Antony Black has more recently traced the influence of the fifteenth-century triumph of papal monism on the ideology of monarchy (Tierney, 1966; Black). And perhaps the best indirect indication of the mutual influence of ecclesiology and social theory may be seen in the impossibility of writing a history of the ecclesiology of the Middle Ages without considerable acquaintance with the political thought of the period, with corporation-theory, with the rise of new forms of association, urban and communal, in the twelfth and thirteenth centuries, etc. (Con- gar, 1964, 1970; Chenu). It is not clear that a similarly broad knowledge would be necessary to write the history of ecclesiology from Trent to the twentieth century.

At the beginning of the movement briefly described here, ecclesiology was not confined to institutional considerations; but, after a time in which juristic and more "spiritual" ways of thought co-existed, the "institutional" came to dominate, and ecclesiology became "hierarchology," a treatise in public law. That development may be said to have been completed by the time of Trent, certainly in a figure such as Bellarmine, who deliberately worked with minimalistic definitions in order to maintain the political visibility of the Church alongside the Kingdom of France or the Republic of Venice (Bellarmine). The centralization of the Tridentine Reform in Rome only reinforced the dominance of the model, and soon in a series of retreats, the Church would feel itself obliged to preserve its own unique and privileged social order before the threats of the Enlightenment, the political revolutions of the eighteenth and nineteenth centuries, and the general secularization of modern European life.

During this period, the Church ceased to be in creative contact with the forces shaping the modern world and sought to preserve its identity by insisting upon its uniqueness and by making the transcendence of its origin,
center and goal apply to nearly every feature. What contact there was between ecclesiology and wider political thought tended to follow defensive or even reactionary lines as, for example, in Mohler's dependence on Romanticism or de Maistre's *apologia* for infallibility (Congar, 1960) /8/.

As ecclesiology thus lost contact with contemporary social theory and especially with the development of modern, empirical sociology, the articulation of the institutional model took on more and more of the features of what Lonergan calls "classicism." Society was defined normatively, and the Church was shown to possess that definition's characteristics, and this by the express will of Christ. Historical development in church order was either ignored or denied, and in few other treatises were the marks of anachronistic historical interpretation more visible. Something of an "ontology" of social structures came to dominate, and even if the celestial hierarchies were denied their relevance to secular society, they could still appear in the vindication of the "monarchical" or "aristocratic" structure of the Church.

In the end, the institutional model became totalitarian in its claims. Bellarmine reduced the Church to its minimal components. Pius XII attempted the Procrustean task of identifying the Mystical Body of Christ with the Roman Catholic Church. Parallels drawn between structures and offices in the Church and those in other social relationships were looked upon with suspicion. The function of "teaching" in the Church, for example, was a *magisterium authenticum* (having force, not because of the reasons advanced, but because of the "authority" of the one teaching) in distinction from the *magisterium mere scientificum* of the rest of the world's experience, in which a teacher's "authority" rests on his ability to offer reasons for what he teaches /9/. Roman Catholic ecclesiology, as exemplified by the manuals, was marked by what Gustafson calls "social
reductionism," only the social theory was a sort of "supernatural sociology." The emphasis fell, not on the reality being mediated, but on the structures of mediation /10/.

The indifference to social theory in recent ecclesiology is perhaps more understandable in the light of this history. Most twentieth century ecclesiologists seem to have presumed that there was little danger that the institutional elements of the Church would pass unnoticed and so devoted their energies to proposing the distinctive features of the Church, its special union in Christ, its concrete centering around the Word and the Eucharist, its sacramental nature and function, its service of the Kingdom. But, while the newer models of the Church certainly permit a more adequate exploration of its reality than the institutional model alone, I do not believe that the plurality of models today should be assigned anything like the status of a scientific ideal. Ecclesiology will not move out of this pre-scientific stage until some serious effort is made to think out basic social and historical categories. Until these are elaborated, I do not see how the theology of the Church will escape the positivism I see to be present in Hans Künng's *The Church* and also, though to a lesser degree, in those ecclesiologies which use the splendid biblical, patristic and liturgical images of the Church without inquiring whether, to what degree and how they tie in with the faithful's experience of the Church. I do not believe that this experience always reduces the Church to merely another social group among many. But without reference to it, the Church is transposed off into a realm of mystery or, rather, of mystique, a move which only reinforces the sectarian tendencies of post-Tridentine Catholicism /11/. When the Church is considered only in specifically theological terms, its relevance to the wider world of human experience is lost to view, and the privatizing tendencies of post-Enlightenment religion are encouraged.
Lonergan and the Redoing of Ecclesiology

The criticisms advanced in the first section suggest that we have not advanced far beyond the situation which Lonergan regretted in the "Epilogue" to Insight. Since the rest of this paper will outline his attempts to supply for the defect noted, I will quote his remarks in full.

It may be asked in what department of theology the historical aspect of development might be treated, and I would like to suggest that it may possess peculiar relevance to a treatise on the Mystical Body of Christ. For in any theological treatise a distinction may be drawn between a material and a formal element: the material element is supplied by Scriptural and patristic texts and by dogmatic pronouncements; the formal element, that makes a treatise a treatise, consists in the pattern of terms and relations through which the materials may be embraced in a single, coherent view. Thus, the formal element in the treatise on grace consists in theorems on the supernatural, and the formal element in the treatise on the Blessed Trinity consists in theorems on the notions of procession, relation, and person. Now while the Scriptural, patristic, and dogmatic materials for a treatise on the Mystical Body have been assembled, I would incline to the opinion that its formal element remains incomplete as long as it fails to draw upon a theory of history. It was at the fullness of time that there came into the world the Light of the world. It was the advent not only of the light that directs but also of the grace that gives good will and good performance. It was the advent of a light and a grace to be propagated, not only through the inner mystery of individual conversion, but also through the outer channels of human communication. If its principal function was to carry the seeds of eternal life, still it could not bear its fruits without effecting a transfiguration of human living and, in turn, that transfiguration contains the solution not only to man's individual but also to his social problem of evil. So it is that the Pauline thesis of the moral impotence of Jew and Gentile alike was due to be complemented by the Augustinian analysis of history in terms of the city of God and the city of this world. So it is that the profound and penetrating influence of liberal, Hegelian, Marxist, and romantic theories of history have been met by a firmer affirmation of the organic structure and
functions of the Church, by a long series of social encyclicals, by calls to Catholic action, by a fuller advertence to collective responsibility, and by a deep and widespread interest in the doctrine of the Mystical Body. So too it may be that the contemporary crisis of human living and human values demands of the theologian, in addition to treatises on the unique and to treatises on the universal common to many instances, a treatise on the concrete universal that is mankind in the concrete and cumulative consequences of the acceptance or rejection of the message of the Gospel. And as the remote possibility of thought on the concrete universal lies in the insight that grasps the intelligible in the sensible, so its proximate possibility resides in a theory of development that can envisage not only natural and intelligent progress but also sinful decline, and not only progress and decline but also supernatural recovery. (742-743)

Before indicating how, in *Insight* itself, Lonergan attempted to meet the need he here describes, certain comments are perhaps in order. First of all, the "Epilogue" was presumably written as part of "the process of rounding things off" necessitated by Lonergan's appointment to teach in Rome (1973:12). While its outline of the relevance of the book to theology is frequently provocative, it reflects more the notion of theology still maintained in his treatises on the Trinity than the breakthrough to the ideas now elaborated in *Method in Theology*. Thus, for example, there is no indication he had yet seen the possibility or need for "the transition from theoretical to methodical theology" which he often illustrates by the theology of grace and which, presumably, could also be effected with regard to the theology of the Trinity (1972: 288-289) /12/. Perhaps it was the nature of the object of ecclesiology that permitted the more "existential" character of his suggestions for that treatise.

Secondly, with regard to the "material element" of an ecclesiology, Lonergan was perhaps too confident that they had already been assembled. The history of ecclesiology has been considerably broadened and deepened since *Insight* was completed, and the theological evaluation of the material is still in process.
Thirdly, Lonergan's remarks in the "Epilogue" raise a question to which ecclesiologists have not yet seriously addressed themselves, namely, the relation between the Church as an historical reality and the Church as an explicit theological theme. It has appeared in certain comments on the difficulty of writing a history of ecclesiology before ecclesiology became a separate treatise /13/; but the relation between ecclesiology and the concrete life of the Church, including the doing of theology, is only now being investigated (Rendtorff) /14/. It may be suggested that it took the rise of historical consciousness to raise the question directly and that its solution will bear some resemblance to the relation between the sociology of knowledge (at least as described by Peter Berger) and the everyday "social construction of reality."

Fourthly, Lonergan's description of the "formal element" in a theological treatise provides a link with the different approach of Method and suggests an interpretation of the purpose of Insight. The formal element is described as "the pattern of terms and relations through which the materials may be embraced in a single, coherent view." This description evokes immediately the section in Method on "categories," in which Lonergan spells out the claim that "theology in its new context" must draw upon reflection on conversion for its foundations (282-293).

Categories are there described as either "general," regarding objects common to many subjects, or "special," regarding objects proper to theology. To be useful to a religion meant for all men, they must be transcultural; and a base for such categories is provided by the founding religious experience of God's love and by the transcendental method employed in Insight and further expanded in Method. The desired transcultural categories become valid when they form "interlocking sets of terms and relations" or models (ideal-types), which will always have heuristic value and will have descriptive value when a theologian
is able to affirm that the reality they heuristically intend actually exists.

In those terms, Insight can be read as at least partially an attempt to derive general theological categories /15/. Their base is the operating subject, his operations, the structure within which the operations occur, the objects they intend, and the society and history they constitute. The description Lonergan gives on pages 286-288 of Method of the differentiation, expansion and development of the basic terms and relations is essentially a summary of Insight, filled out with the developments of thought and vocabulary between the two works.

As for special theological categories, these have their base in the authentic Christian. Their use involves a shift from a theoretical to a methodical theology. The inner determinant of the founding reality of conversion is God's grace; outer determinants are also provided by the store of Christian tradition. Successive sets of these categories are developed by moving (1) from the basic religious experience to (2) the community and the history which converted subjects constitute, to (3) the principle of their loving, which is God's love for them, to (4) the dialectic of inauthentic Christianity, to (5) the persistent facts of progress, decline and redemption.

Both the general and the special categories are derived by self-appropriation and by employing the resultant "heightened consciousness" both as a methodical control on oneself and as providing an a priori for understanding others. In terms of the functional specialties described in Method, the categories are purified by dialectics and the foundational conversion; and they are used, first as models, in foundations, and then, perhaps, as hypotheses or descriptions, in doctrines, systematics and communications. Their use here, however, occurs in interaction with data, by which they may be further specified, clarified, corrected and developed. The resultant theology will be
both a priori and a posteriori, "the fruit of an ongoing process that has one foot in a transcultural base and the other in increasingly organized data" (293).

Method's discussion of theological categories, then, provides a context in which to understand Lonergan's call in Insight for a theory of history from which to derive the "formal element" of an ecclesiology. Since it is often overlooked to what an extent Lonergan undertook to outline the required theory of history in Insight itself, it might be well to review the work rather closely for its contribution to ecclesiology.

Insight

At first sight, Insight seems to be an uncomfortably private work, not only as the remarkable personal achievement it is, but also for the essentially private self-appropriation to which it invites the reader. The impression is perhaps supported by Lonergan's decision to postpone extensive consideration of interpersonal relations to his work on method in theology. The impression, I believe, is mistaken, however; and I have never been inclined to agree with the criticism that Insight neglects the political dimension of human living. In the first place, there is the insistence upon the collaborative nature of scientific inquiry and progress, which later, in the analysis of belief, is shown to be no special characteristic of scientists, but an inevitable condition of human living in society.

But the social context of individual existence is clearly maintained elsewhere, too. Common sense, after all, is common: "the communal development of intelligence in the family, the tribe, the nation, the race. Not only are men born with a native drive to inquire and understand, they are born into a community that possesses a common fund of tested answers, and from that fund each may draw his variable share, measured by his capacity, his interests,
and his energy" (175) /16/. If the discussion of "the subjective field of common sense" concentrates on the individual bias of the dramatic subject (181-206), still this is not described without reference to social relationships; and in the next chapter Lonergan maintains that in the relationship between the dialectic of community and the dialectic of the dramatic subject, "the dialectic of community holds the dominant position, for it gives rise to the situations that stimulate neural demands and it moulds the orientation of intelligence that preconsciously exercises the censorship," and the qualification quickly appended leads itself to the socially pertinent observation that "what happens in isolated individuals tends to bring them together and so to provide a focal point from which aberrant social attitudes originate" (218).

It is in this chapter, "Common Sense as Object," however, that the social order comes directly under study. Here common sense is presented as originating a technology, economy, polity and culture; and these are studied less as affecting nature than as adding "a series of new levels or dimensions in the network of human relationships" (207). The chapter outlines what Lonergan calls "the social structure of the human good." The structure rests upon the recurrent intervention of intelligence producing the mechanical arts and, today, technology. With these as "initial instances of capital formation," there develops an economy, which in turn evokes "the political differentiation of common sense" (208-209). None of this takes place, of course, apart from culture, man's "capacity to ask, to reflect, to reach an answer" to the question "what he himself is all about" (236). Where all the elements work harmoniously, there functions the good of order, a scheme of recurrence that assures that the diverse particular goods of the social order are regularly achieved (209-210). This good of order is dynamic: "It possesses its own normative line of development, inasmuch as elements of the idea of
order are grasped by insight into concrete situations, are formulated in proposals, are accepted by explicit or tacit agreements, and are put into execution only to change the situation and give rise to still further insights" (596-597; xiv). And because of this dynamism, Lonergan can even insist that "the thesis of progress needs to be affirmed again" (688).

Still, the actual social order is seldom ideal, and just as the individual develops only over time and his development is subject to dramatic bias, so also there is a tension and dialectic of human community. The tension arises from the dual source of human social relationships, the spontaneous intersubjectivity of primitive community and the "new creation" that is a social order or civic community devised by practical intelligence and developed to the point of becoming "an indispensable constituent of human living" (211-214). This duality of origin becomes a tension when the self-transcendent nature of practical intelligence is related to "the more spontaneous viewpoint of the individual," himself conceived, not as a monad, but as affected from the beginning by "the bonds of intersubjectivity" (215). The tension is inevitable, for the intersubjectivity is spontaneous and the practical direction of human living not a matter of choice; and because such intersubjectivity and practical common sense are the linked but opposed and mutually related principles of social living, there exists a "dialectic of community" (215-218).

Consequently, besides the bias arising from the psychological depths of the individual, there are other biases to which common sense is subject, which are directly related to the social order. The individual bias of the egoist refuses to raise the further questions that would relate his clever solution to his own problem of living to a larger social order, even that of his own intersubjective community. Secondly, group bias builds upon the powerful
bonds of one's intersubjective group to deflect the group-transcending dynamism of intelligence to the defense of the group's well-being and usefulness. The wheel of progress can no longer turn smoothly, for now insights are operative or inoperative, not solely in terms of whether they meet the given situation, but also in terms of whether they are supported or opposed by powerful enough social groups. In the end, the social order develops in distorted and twisted fashion: the social order becomes stratified, classes are distinguished by their success and, lacking any coherent order, the society heads towards the alternatives of reform or revolution (218-225).

Finally, there is the general bias to which common sense is congenitally subject, the assumption that intelligence is irrelevant to human affairs. This bias becomes critical in an age in which man discovers that he is himself "the executor of the emergent probability of human affairs" (227). For, once the meaning of this responsibility becomes clear, there arises the necessity of common sense's "being subordinated to a human science that is concerned...not only with knowing history but also with directing it" (227). This means, of course, that common sense must acknowledge its own incompetence, and such good sense is uncommon indeed. The result is the repudiation of theory, a growing confusion of intelligence with "practicality" (itself leagued with force), the cumulative deterioration of the social situation, the emergence of the social surd, and finally, "the surrender of detached and disinterested intelligence," most fatally on the level of the human sciences which thereby become radically uncritical (228-232).

In the end, the decline threatens man's very freedom. For his effective freedom is not only restricted by time and circumstance, but also by his "incomplete intellectual and volitional development" (627). The fourfold bias produces a moral impotence within individual, group, and
general society, the gap between their actual effective freedom and the hypothetical effective freedom they might enjoy were the circle of progress not subject to the biases. The general bias especially disables man and society by producing a social situation which is "a compound of the rational and irrational" (628); and this, because it constitutes the materials, conditions and reality to be dealt with, lends support to the series of mistaken philosophies that repudiate critical intelligence. At last, the civilization drifts into "the sterility of the objectively unintelligible situation and...the coercion of economic pressures, political force, and psychological conditioning" (629).

At first view, the problem can be met "only by the attainment of a higher viewpoint in man's understanding and making of man" (233), "the discovery, the logical expansion and the recognition of the principle that intelligence contains its own immanent norms and that these norms are equipped with sanctions which man does not have to invent or impose" (234). This higher viewpoint will distinguish clearly between progress and its principle, liberty, and decline and its principle, bias; and it will result in a critical and normative human science. Lonergan calls this higher viewpoint "cosmopolis," "a representative of detached intelligence that both appreciates and criticizes, that identifies the good neither with the new nor with the old, that, above all else, neither will be forced into an ivory tower of ineffectualness by the social surd nor, on the other hand, will capitulate to its absurdity" (237). This cosmopolis is not a group, nor super-state, nor organization, nor academy, nor court. "It is a withdrawal from practicality to save practicality. It is a dimension of consciousness, a heightened grasp of historical origins, a discovery of historical possibilities" (241).

But, for all its high goals, cosmopolis is not the answer. For cosmopolis is a higher viewpoint arising out
of a critical human science, itself "conditioned by the possibility of a correct and accepted philosophy" (690). But so long as there is a priority of man's living to his learning how to live, man will suffer from "an incapacity for sustained development" (630). And so long as the living suffers from incomplete development, the correct philosophy and critical science will be achieved only after long struggle and will be unacceptable to disorientated minds and to wills rendered ineffective by the failure of intellect to develop, biased in the ways outlined, and in effete flight from self-responsibility into self-forgetfulness, rationalization or renunciation. In the world of God's creation, such "bad will is not merely the inconsistency of rational self-consciousness; it is also sin against God. The hopeless tangle of the social surd, of the impotence of common sense, of the endlessly multiplied philosophies, is not merely a cul-de-sac for human progress; it also is a reign of sin, a despotism of darkness; and men are its slaves" (692). This reign of sin is "the expectation of sin," which, if it finds its material component in "the priority of living to learning how to live," derives its proper evil from "man's awareness of his plight and his self-surrender to it" (693).

A mere higher viewpoint, then, is not enough. "The solution has to be a still higher viewpoint" (632). From it, indeed, the higher viewpoint may proceed; but the solution itself is not on the level of theory, but on the level of man's living, where the priority of living to learning and being persuaded to live rightly must be overcome.

The argument has so far outlined the first two of what Lonergan, in lectures on the Philosophy of Education, given in 1959, called "the differentials of the human good" /17/. In a recent article, Lonergan has provided a helpful indication of his method and purpose in Insight.

It was about 1937-38 that I became interested in a theoretical analysis of history. I worked out an analysis on the model of a threefold approximation.
Newton's planetary theory had a first approximation in the first law of motion: bodies move in a straight line with constant velocity unless some force intervenes. There was a second approximation when the addition of the law of gravity between the sun and the planet yielded an elliptical orbit for the planet. A third approximation was reached when the influence of the gravity of the planets on one another is taken into account to reveal the perturbed ellipses in which the planets actually move. The point to this model is, of course, that in the intellectual construction of reality it is not any of the earlier stages of the construction but only the final product that actually exists. Planets do not move in straight lines nor in properly elliptical orbits; but these conceptions are needed to arrive at the perturbed ellipses in which they actually do move.

In my rather theological analysis of human history my first approximation was the assumption that men always do what is intelligent and reasonable, and its implication was an ever increasing progress. The second approximation was the radical inverse insight that men can be biased and so unintelligent and unreasonable in their choices and decisions. The third approximation was the redemptive process resulting from God's gift of his grace to individuals and from the manifestation of his love in Christ Jesus. The whole idea was presented in chapter twenty of Insight. The sundry forms of bias were presented in chapters six and seven on common sense. The notion of moral impotence, which I had studied in some detail when working on Aquinas' notion of gratia operans, was worked out in chapter eighteen on the possibility of ethics. (1974c:271-272)

An alert reading of Insight itself could pick up the clues to his intention. On pages 596-597, Lonergan outlines the first two approximations and compares them with the first two steps in an understanding of planetary orbits. And later, as he begins his description of the solution to the problem of evil, he is at pains to indicate that it is already operative in the actual universe.

...since a solution exists, our account of man's moral impotence and of the limitations of his effective freedom cannot be the whole story. There is a further component in the actual universe that, as yet, has not been mentioned. Because it has not
been mentioned, our statements on man's plight are true as far as they go, but they are not the whole truth. They are true hypothetically inasmuch as they tell what would be, did the further component not exist; but they are not true absolutely, for they prescind from a further component that both exists and is relevant to the issue. (694) /18/

It is this "further component," third "differential" which Lonergan outlines under the title, "The Heuristic Structure of the Solution." This heuristic anticipation of the redemptive solution begins where the description of the problem had left off. Essentially the solution will consist "in the introduction of new conjugate forms in man's intellect, will, and sensitivity," providing man with habits that, as operative throughout living, reverse the priority of living to learning and being persuaded (696-697). These new forms constitute the desired "higher integration of human activity" and "solve the problem by controlling elements that otherwise are non-systematic or irrational" (697), the chief of these being, of course, sin.

But, if this description seems rather individualistic, Lonergan goes on to insist that, to leave intact the original nature and laws of man's living, the solution "will come to men through their apprehension and with their consent" (697). And, in accord with the enduring significance of emergent probability, the solution will first appear as "an emergent trend in which the full solution becomes effectively probable" and then as "the realization of the full solution" itself (698) /19/. Both of these will meet man as both sensitive and intersubjective, and will do so in such fashion as to "command his attention, nourish his imagination, stimulate his intelligence and will release his affectivity, control his aggressivity and, as central features of the world of sense, intimate its finality, its yearning for God" (724). In other words, the solution will appear, not as myth, but as mystery, not as fiction, but as history.
But, if the solution is to meet men as they are, it cannot build upon the probability of man's coming to acknowledge its need and its existence by his immanently generated knowledge; for it is the unlikelihood of such knowledge that constitutes the problem (702-703). The solution, therefore, must build upon "the general context of belief," namely, "the collaboration of mankind in the advancement and dissemination of knowledge" and will itself be "some species of faith" (703), by which man will collaborate "with God in solving man's problem of evil" (719) first by assenting to the truths he reveals and secondly by himself communicating and transmitting the solution to successive generations and different classes and cultures of men.

Since, however, one cannot expect the solution to eliminate deficiencies and failures from man's collaboration in it, the solution will be threatened by heresy. "But the one human means of keeping a collaboration true to its purpose and united in its efforts is to set up an organization that possesses institutions capable of making necessary judgments and decisions that are binding on all. Accordingly, it will follow that God will secure the preservation of faith against heresy through some appropriate institutional organization of the new and higher collaboration" (723).

The solution will be concretely effective, "not by suppressing the consequences of man's waywardness but by introducing a new higher integration that enables man, if he will, to rise above the consequences, to halt and reverse the sequence of ever less comprehensive syntheses in which theory keeps surrendering to practice, to provide a new and more solid base on which man's intellectual and social development can rise to heights undreamed of, and perpetually to overcome the objective surd of social situations by meeting abundant evil with a more generous good" (724).
That "more generous good" will be charity or love, a being-in-love with God, with his creation, and with all persons within his creation, which contributes to the solution that "dialectical attitude of will" which returns good for evil. "For it is only inasmuch as men are willing to meet evil with good, to love their enemies, to pray for those that persecute and calumniate them, that the social surd is a potential good. It follows that love of God above all and in all so embraces the order of the universe as to love all men with a self-sacrificing love" (699).

Finally, such love will inform man's intellect with a hope that repudiates man's despair, especially "the deep hopelessness that allows man's spirit to surrender the legitimate aspirations of the unrestricted desire" (701)

Such is an outline of Lonergan's "rather theological analysis of human history," and it may serve to illumine the suggestion that Insight be read as a first attempt to derive general theological categories. In our case, the categories are desired for the doing of ecclesiology, and before going on to Method, it may be well to indicate briefly what this first work has to contribute to a theology of the Church.

First, there is its insistence on the social context of individual existence. A man's consciousness is embodied and it needs symbols and intersubjectivity to become effectively active. He develops within the common sense of his native community, and that community provides the concrete conditions of his own self-knowledge.

Secondly, there is Lonergan's description of the social and historical embodiments of sin. The threat to genuine human development is not outlined only in terms of individual psychological and selfish bias, but also in terms of distorted social process and cultural aberration.

Thirdly, the first two elements provide a context within which to understand the Church. Itself the fruit of
God's intervention through a history and mystery that transform intersubjectivity /21/, the Church, as a community of faith, hope and love, is the bearer of the concrete possibility of a new self-understanding, of a reconciled social order, and of a cultural reintegration.

Fourthly, these elements can combine to describe a concrete Church existing and active in the actual universe. The description is of the polar opposite of a ghetto-community, of a Church whose "catholicity" has the breadth and depth of the biblical, patristic and early medieval images and symbols of the Church, whose origin transcends creation, but whose purpose includes the integration of the one world that exists, so that Lonergan did not think it too much to claim that it had a role "in the unfolding of all human history and in the order of the universe" (724).

Though this summary is brief, it may perhaps show that there is more for ecclesiology to draw from Insight than an argument for an authoritative magisterium. And here and there in his earlier writings, one may find statements of the notion of the Church heuristically described in Insight, as for example, the following, written in 1941.

...just as there is a human solidarity in sin with a dialectical descent deforming knowledge and perverting will, so also there is a divine solidarity in grace which is the mystical body of Christ; as evil performance confirms us in evil, so good edifies us in our building unto eternal life; and as private rationalization finds support in fact, in common teaching, in public approval, so also the ascent of the soul towards God is not a merely private affair but rather a personal function of an objective common movement in that body of Christ which takes over, transforms, and elevates every aspect of human life. (1967:26)

It remains that Insight is not Method in Theology, and before considering the latter in more detail, it might be well to point out some of the more important differences, especially as these relate to ecclesiology.
A first manifest difference is the degree to which the mediating and constitutive roles of meaning are an explicit and central theme of Method. Lonergan has himself described how the experience of teaching in Rome, with the plurality of backgrounds and interests of his students, required him to come to terms with the European philosophical tradition. "The new challenge came from the Geisteswissenschaften, from the problems of hermeneutics and critical history, from the need of integrating nineteenth century achievement in this field with the teachings of Catholic religion and Catholic theology" (1974c: 277). Those who sat in on his seminars on method in the 1960s will recall how these concerns entered more directly in successive years. The later development was implicit in Insight, as for example in the remarks on the human sciences, but in Method the role of meaning is addressed directly and early.

Secondly, in Lonergan's analysis of human consciousness in Method, the fourth level, the level of value and decision, enters much more forcefully than it did in Insight. Evidence may be cited in the repudiation of faculty-psychology, in the dismissal of "speculative intellect," in the controlling role assigned to existential horizon, in the insistence upon conversion.

Thirdly, the primacy of grace is differently stated in the two works. The prevenience of grace is described in Insight as God's reversal of the priority of living to learning and being persuaded, but the higher integration is described in rather "classical" terms as the "habits" of faith, hope, and charity. The central importance of Rom 5:5 is not anticipated, nor the occurrence within consciousness of the enabling "sanctifying" grace. Faith is not distinguished from beliefs. The consideration of redemption appears limited to Israel and the Catholic Church, and the ecumenical significance of God's intervention is not explored.
On all these points, *Method* represents an advance. Religion is not introduced by a consideration of man's individual and social moral impotence, but rather as a God-given fulfillment of the native thrust of consciousness towards self-transcendence. Nor is this early and constant reference to religion explained merely by the fact that *Method* is more explicitly a work on theology than *Insight*. It derives from a fundamental shift in Lonergan's approach, which has startled and even disoriented more than one reader who has come to *Method* from *Insight* and which Lonergan has himself tried to explain at least twice (1972:337-340; 1973:11-13). In *Method* itself, he describes a position on the existence of God which in the latter book he admits was his own when writing the final chapters of *Insight*; and to it he contrasts his developed view.

As long as it is assumed that philosophy goes forward with such sublime objectivity that it is totally independent of the human mind that thinks it then, no doubt, there is something to be said for issuing a claim to such objectivity for preliminary matters of concern to the faith. But the fact of the matter is that proof becomes rigorous only within a systematically formulated horizon, that the formulation of horizons varies with the presence and absence of intellectual, moral, religious conversion, and that conversion is never the logical consequence of one's previous position but, on the contrary, a radical revision of that position.

Basically the issue is a transition from the abstract logic of classicism to the concreteness of method. On the former view what is basic is proof. On the latter view what is basic is conversion. Proof appeals to an abstraction named right reason. Conversion transforms the concrete individual to make him capable of grasping not merely conclusions but principles as well. (1972: 338)

The issue, obviously, is basic and requires more extensive treatment than can be given here; but one or two remarks may be made here. Lonergan's shift seems to rest
on two basic considerations, the controlling role of fourth-level operations and the primacy of grace. The first excludes a proof or attempted "critical grounding" that would ignore that arguments are only expressed and understood within horizons, that horizons are correlatives of existential stances, and that the differences between converted and unconverted stances ground incompatible horizons. The second consideration is a hoary theological principle, whose truth seems to have struck Lonergan with new force with regard to the teaching of the First Vatican Council on the possibility of proving the existence of God. Interiority-analysis permits that ancient truth to be considered in terms of consciousness, and such consideration turns the discussion of the existence of God from a matter of "speculative" intellect to the question of existential self-understanding and self-realization. And it may be that the position on God then filtered down to transform Lonergan's consideration of intellectual and moral conversion as well /22/.

However that may be, the differences between Lonergan's two major works are profound and are likely to provoke debate for some time. My purpose in the next section will be simply to indicate how the advances briefly indicated above have filled out and altered the possibility of deriving categories for ecclesiology which I have outlined in my review of Insight.

Method in Theology

The grounds for an ecclesiology might begin to be laid with reflection on the constitutive role of meaning. Human consciousness unfolds itself in the dynamic structure of questions for understanding, for reflection and for decision. The process intends self-transcendence through correct knowledge and genuine choice; but by intending reality and value, the subject is also constituting himself as the person he is. Especially is this so in "the existential moment" in which "we discover for ourselves that
our choosing affects ourselves no less than the chosen or rejected objects, and that it is up to each of us to decide for himself what he is to make of himself" (240). The existential subject then knows himself as the creature of his past, can perhaps write his autobiography as a sequence of horizons, and can take a new responsibility for his future. In such self-appropriation, a man can know that meaning is "a constitutive element in the conscious flow that is the normally controlling side of human action" (178), constituting namely "his horizon, his assimilative powers, his knowledge, his values, his character" (356) /23/.

But communities as well as individuals are constituted by meaning. In Method, Lonergan fills out his earlier sketch of community, locating its "formal constituent" in common meaning: "a common field of experience," "common or complementary ways of understanding," "common judgments," and "common values, goals, policies" (356-357). To be a member of the community is to share its meaning, and the community ceases to exist when no meaning is shared by a group of individuals. And, as among different individuals, the noteworthy differences between communities will be differences in meaning and value.

From this central meaning of community, the reflection can be extended to a consideration of "the social structure of the human good" and of the constitutive function of meaning in social institutions and in cultures (47-52). And, again, as the question arises about the authenticity of the existential subject, so also questions will arise about the authenticity of the meaning and value which inform the social order and the culture /24/.

This reflection on the constitutive role of meaning parallels the first step in the dialectic of social existence as this has been described by Berger and Luckman: "Society is a human product" (61). And their second step, "Society is an objective reality," considers the elements which Lonergan discusses under the rubric, "the world mediated by meaning."
To indicate the meaning of this notion, Lonergan usually appeals to the way in which the infant and child move out of "the world of immediacy," in which objects are immediately present as sensed, feared, enjoyed, into the "real world," mediated to them by language and by the other carriers of meaning. It is a world beyond immediacy, for it includes the absent, the past, the future, the possible, the ideal, the normative, the fantastic. It is "the far larger world revealed through the memories of other men, through the common sense of community, through the pages of literature, through the labors of scholars, through the investigations of scientists, through the experience of saints, through the meditations of philosophers and theologians" (28).

Now, for reality to be mediated by meaning is for it to be socially mediated, for, in the first place, language has a social origin. "It is the work of the community that has common insights into common needs and common tasks, and, of course, already is in communication through intersubjective, mimetic, and analogical expressions" (87). Different groups have their different languages, distinguished by their different specializations, different horizons, different differentiations of consciousness (72, 236, 304).

But, secondly, the real world is not known to the individual principally by his own experience and his own immanently generated knowledge.

His immediate experience is filled out by an enormous context constituted by reports of the experience of other men at other places and times. His understanding rests not only on his own but also on the experience of others, and its development owes little indeed to his personal originality, much to his repeating in himself the acts of understanding first made by others, and most of all to presuppositions that he has taken for granted because they commonly are assumed and, in any case, he has neither the time nor the inclination nor, perhaps, the ability to investigate for himself. Finally, the judgments, by which he
assents to truths of fact and of value, only rarely depend exclusively on his immanently generated knowledge, for such knowledge stands not by itself in some separate compartment, but in symbiotic fusion with a far larger context of beliefs. (41-42)

Human knowledge of the world, then, is a common, public fund, which has developed over the ages and in which one first shares by sharing the common sense of one's own community (43-44).

Thirdly, "the real world," then, is not the world of the individual's immediate experience--no one's world is that small--nor the sum-total "of all worlds of immediate experience." For meaning goes beyond experience to understanding and judgment.

This addition of understanding and judgment is what makes possible the world mediated by meaning, what gives it its structure and unity, what arranges it in an orderly whole of almost endless differences partly known and familiar, partly in a surrounding penumbra of things we know about but have never examined or explored, partly an unmeasured region of what we do not know at all. (77)

Fourthly, that the real world is mediated by meaning and, therefore, socially, is commonly overlooked. Lonergan traces the oversight to the myth that knowing is a matter of taking a look.

For the world mediated by meaning is a world known not by the sense experience of an individual but by the external and internal experience of a cultural community, and by the continuously checked and re-checked judgments of the community. Knowing, accordingly, is not just seeing; it is experiencing, understanding, judging, and believing. The criteria of objectivity are not just the criteria of ocular vision; they are the compounded criteria of experiencing, of understanding, of judging, and of believing. The reality known is not just looked at; it is given in experience, organized and extrapolated by understanding, posited by judgment and belief. (238; also 1974b)
Fifth, in the mediation of the world by meaning, belief has a fundamental role. But, while in Insight the analysis of belief seemed to have a secondary, ad hoc role in the argument, in Method the concrete role assigned to belief is central: "To appropriate one's social, cultural, religious heritage is largely a matter of belief" (41). Lonergan suggests its importance when he notes, "The same facts are treated by sociologists under the heading of the sociology of knowledge" (41, note), where by "sociology of knowledge" he means that study as understood, for example, by Peter Berger /25/.

The third step in the social dialectic describes the social conditions of individual existence, which Berger and Luckman state as the fact that, "Man is a social product." The social origin of meaning does not merely concern the individual's knowledge of the "real world"; it also basically influences the development of his own consciousness. Language, we have said, is a community-product; but the individual's "conscious intentionality develops in and is moulded by its mother tongue" (71). It names things and by naming them draws them to his attention and permits him to speak about them, and it accentuates certain of their aspects, relations, movements and changes. "Not only does language mould developing consciousness but also it structures the world about the subject" spatially, temporally and existentially (71) /26/.

Ordinary language is the expression of the common sense of a group, and there can be as many brands of common sense "as there are differing places and times" (303). And the communities in which the individual is reared and in which he lives out his life shape the possibilities of his individual existence.

As it is only within communities that men are conceived and born and reared, so too it is only with respect to the available common meanings of community that the individual becomes himself. The choice of roles between which he may choose in
electing what to make of himself is no larger than the accepted meanings of the community admit; his capacities for effective initiative are limited to the potentialities of the community for rejuvenation, renewal, reform, development. At any time in any place what a given self can make of himself is some function of the heritage or sediment of common meanings that comes to him from the authentic or unauthentic living of his predecessors and his contemporaries. (1967:246) /27/

These initial considerations have outlined the social conditions of individual existence: man makes himself by meaning, both as an individual and in community; but, as an individual, he knows the "real world" largely through the common sense of the community, and that social definition of reality, in turn, directs and limits his self-constitution by meaning. The notions of the mediating and constitutive roles of meaning are Lonergan's own; but I have tried to indicate where they may be illustrated and supported by the work of Peter Berger.

The next step may consider the fragility of the worlds constituted and mediated by meaning. Individual and communal authenticity are precarious achievements, seldom reached without struggle and never achieved once and for all. The fragility of the self and community constituted by meaning is matched by that of the world mediated by meaning. "Because it is mediated by meaning, because meaning can go astray, because there is myth as well as science, fiction as well as fact, deceit as well as honesty, error as well as truth, that larger world is insecure" (77). Insight had analyzed the threat to meaning in terms of psychological bias, the individual bias of egoism, group bias, and the general bias of common sense. Method draws upon that analysis at several points (most neatly in pages 52-55) and relates them to the disregard of the transcendental precepts and to the absence of intellectual, moral and religious conversion. "As self-transcendence promotes progress, so the refusal of self-transcendence turns progress into cumulative decline" (55).
Besides progress and decline, there also is the possibility of redemptive recovery, and concretely that possibility is given in religious conversion, which then founds moral and intellectual conversion (242-243, 267-268). Religious conversion is the experienced fulfillment of the very transcendental notions which propel man into the work of individual and communal self-constitution (101-107). Since Lonergan's analysis of religious conversion is by now familiar, I will concentrate only on its communal dimensions, which are of most interest for ecclesiology.

The root of religious conversion is God's gift of his love, and it is important to note that this gift is not itself mediated. If Lonergan does speak of it as an "inner word," still he insists that it "pertains, not to the world mediated by meaning, but to the world of immediacy, to the unmediated experience of the mystery of love and awe" (112). The insistence is not superfluous, as even a slight acquaintance with the history of ecclesiology can reveal; and Lonergan does not hesitate to point out some of its ecclesiological implications (28).

The founding religious experience, however, is not solitary. In the first place, it finds spontaneous expression "in that harvest of the Spirit that is love, joy, peace, kindness, goodness, fidelity, gentleness, and self-control" (108). The intersubjective significance of these transformed attitudes can hardly be ignored.

Even such transformed intersubjectivity as "incarnate meaning" is called a "word" by Lonergan (112). But alongside this spontaneous embodiment of religion and such other expressions of it as art and symbol, special attention is given to the spoken and written word. For "by its word, religion enters the world mediated by meaning and regulated by value" (112).

It endows that world with its deepest meaning and highest value. It sets itself in a context of other meanings and other values. Within that context it comes to understand itself, to relate itself to the
object of ultimate concern, to draw on the power of ultimate concern to pursue the objectives of proximate concern all the more fairly and all the more efficaciously. (112)

This religious word is not secondary, but constitutive of the full reality of the love between God and man, giving the object of man's transformed self a name, enabling the individual to draw on the word of tradition for its wisdom, on the word of fellowship for the experience of religious community, on the word of revelation, it may be, for God's own interpretation of his love (113). The outer religious word, then, interprets man's new self to himself, unites him with others similarly graced, and provides him with a language through which to relate his unmediated experience to the world mediated by inner-worldly meaning.

A communal dimension attends the religious experience itself, then, and not merely in the context of a positive revelation.

Conversion is existential, intensely personal, utterly intimate. But it is not so private as to be solitary. It can happen to many, and they can form a community to sustain one another in their self-transformation and to help one another in working out the implications and fulfilling the promise of their new life. Finally, what can become communal, can become historical. It can pass from generation to generation. It can spread from one cultural milieu to another. It can adapt to changing circumstances, confront new situations, survive into a different age, flourish in another period or epoch. (130-131)

But besides that perdurance over generations by which its expression becomes traditional and its community historical, religion can be historical in the far deeper sense that "there is a personal entrance of God himself into history, a communication of God to his people, the advent of God's word into the world of religious expression" (118-119). And should this occur, then "the word of religious expression is not just the objectification of the gift of God's love; in a privileged area it also is specific meaning, the word of God himself" (119).
History and Social Theory

This is as far as the methodologist will go; whether there has been a revelation, what are its sources and the means of its transmission, what fidelity to it and deviance from it are, are questions, Lonergan argues, for the theologian, prepared by Dialectics and Foundations, to decide in the sixth functional specialty, Doctrines (see 269). It is not clear that Lonergan respects his own limitation on the methodologist, however (or, better, his own claim to be doing method and not theology), for in his discussion of "Communications," he presupposes Christian revelation when he speaks of the Church as "the community that results from the outer communication of Christ's message and from the inner gift of God's love" (361). Still, what he has to say about the Church here presupposes nothing but a revelation in Christ, and does not draw upon that revelation for specific features of the Church. Whether from the methodologist or from the theologian, the following outline of the Church emerges.

First, the Church is an achievement in the world mediated and constituted by meaning and value. Its substance is the inner gift of God's love, embodied and interpreted by Christ's message. The inner gift has its own communal dimension, for the love of God re-evaluates the world and expresses itself spontaneously in transformed living. Community in the experience of God's love constitutes the new fellowship in the Spirit, an intersubjectivity of grace /29/. But besides the outer word of tradition and of fellowship, which objectify the inner gift commonly experienced, there is also the outer word of God's revelation in Christ. This word is "congruent with the gift of love that God works within us"; it "announces that God has loved us first and, in the fulness of time, has revealed that love in Christ crucified, dead, and risen" (113). It is "God's own entry into man's world mediated by meaning" (1974b:260).
The revealed word has a cognitive, constitutive, and effective function, issuing in beliefs, overt Christian fellowship, and Christian service (362). The new Christian fellowship centers around the common experience of God's love in the Spirit and in Christ, in the beliefs or doctrines that interpret that experience, and in the common life of service it inspires. This is the substance of the Church, the common meaning that makes it a community.

The Church, then, is constituted by redemptive meaning, and as such, it is (in part) the effect of the mediation of that meaning from its originating moment in Christ's revelation by the history and tradition that revelation has produced. "Tradition" here does not refer to any special doctrine of tradition, and "history" does not mean critical history; they are rather the tradition and history implied in the assertion that man is a historical being: "an existential history--the living tradition which formed us and thereby brought us to the point where we began forming ourselves. This tradition includes at least individual and group memories of the past, stories of exploits and legends about heroes, in brief, enough of history for the group to have an identity as a group and for individuals to make their several contributions towards maintaining and promoting the common good of order" (182). It is pre-critical history, having as one of its functions "the highly important educational task of communicating to ...fellow churchmen a proper appreciation of their heritage and a proper devotion to its preservation, development, dissemination" (185). It is tradition in the sense in which it is said that "the classics ground a tradition. They create the milieu in which they are studied and interpreted. They produce in the reader through the cultural tradition, the mentality, the Vorverstándnis, from which they will be read, studied, interpreted" (162).

For a community constituted by meaning, doctrines will have a central role /30/. Above all, in a religion that is
shared by many, that enters into and transforms cultures, that extends down the ages, God will be named, questions about him will be asked, answers will be forthcoming" (342). And, since there has been a revelation, "Church doctrines are the content of the church's witness to Christ; they express the set of meanings and values that inform individual and collective Christian living" (311). For that reason, "doctrines are not just doctrines. They are constitutive both of the individual Christian and of the Christian community" (319).

The Church today, then, is the effect of the communication of the Christian message through doctrines but especially through the existential history and tradition of earlier generations of Christians who sought to bring others to share the cognitive, constitutive and effective meaning that informed their lives. The contemporary Church is, in turn, about the same business of communication. Constituted the Church by the communication of its central meaning, it perfects itself as the Church by communicating it to others. "Accordingly, the Christian church is a process of self-constitution, a Selbstvollzug" (363) /31/. It remains to relate the Church to society. Lonergan makes the important point that in modern sociology, the word "society" can refer to any concrete instance of social relationships and that, since the world is becoming increasingly interconnected and interdependent, it is not inappropriate to speak of a worldwide "society" (359). Classically, of course, Church and State were considered "perfect" (autonomous) societies, each an instance of an "organized collaboration of individuals for the pursuit of a common aim or aims" (359). On the modern view, however, the State is merely a territorial division within human society and the Church should be spoken of "as a process of self-constitution occurring within worldwide human society" (363).
Within that universal society, Lonergan understands the Church as part of the effort to realize, support, or recover "the ideal basis of society," which is "community" (360-361). In a large and complex society, responsible freedom demands long and difficult training; but besides the "ignorance and incompetence" thus likely, alienation and ideology add the distorting factors of egoist, group and general bias. "There are needed, then, individuals and groups and, in the modern world, organizations that labor to persuade people to intellectual, moral, and religious conversion and that work systematically to undo the mischief brought about by alienation and ideology. Among such bodies should be the Christian church" (361). It is such reflection on progress and decline that reveals the Church's "redemptive role in human society" (55).

The church is a redemptive process. The Christian message, incarnate in Christ scourged and crucified, dead and risen, tells not only of God's love but also of man's sin. Sin is alienation from man's authentic being, which is self-transcendence, and sin justifies itself by ideology. As alienation and ideology are destructive of community, so the self-sacrificing love that is Christian charity reconciles alienated man to his true being, and undoes the mischief initiated by alienation and consolidated by ideology. (364)

To achieve its redemptive purpose, the Church must become "a fully conscious process of self-constitution," and this will require it "to recognize that theology is not the full science of man, that theology illuminates only certain aspects of human reality, that the church can become a fully conscious process of self-constitution only when theology unites itself with all other relevant branches of human studies" (364). And for this integration, Lonergan argues the method he has outlined has special pertinence (364-367). Finally, something should be said about the distinctive features of the Church. Classically, two aspects of the Church are usually distinguished in such familiar
dichotomies as Spirit and law, divine and human, spiritual and corporal, invisible and visible, community and society. Efforts to relate them systematically have not generally been any more successful than the parallel effort to relate supernatural and natural. The consequences are predictable: either the Church is so identified with the human and so intent upon "relevance" that it becomes unclear it is a distinct community of meaning (Paul: 198-199), or it retreats from the world of ordinary human intercourse to a private world of "spiritual" concern, language and rite. So, for example, the enthusiasm for secular relevance has in recent years been succeeded by a revival of "spirituality," some of whose proponents, it seems, have to be prodded into regarding the real world.

I would suggest that Lonergan's notion of the "sublation" of intellectual and moral conversion by religious conversion may provide a helpful way out of the dilemma. Moral conversion "sublates" intellectual by providing it with a more secure base in a self who is himself an originating value, by arming it against bias, and by integrating the pursuit of truth into "the far richer context of the pursuit of all values" (242). Similarly, moral conversion is sublated when religious conversion transforms the existential subject into a subject in love, a subject held, grasped, possessed, owned through a total and so an other-worldly love. Then there is a new basis for all valuing and all doing good. In no way are the fruits of intellectual or moral conversion negated or diminished. On the contrary, all human pursuit of the true and good is included within and furthered by a cosmic context and purpose and, as well, there now accrues to man the power of love to enable him to accept the suffering involved in undoing the effects of decline. (242)

But as moral conversion goes beyond intellectual, so there are dimensions of religious conversion that surpass its reference to intellectual and moral conversion. It is
Kornonchak

an experience of the transcendent, of the otherworldly. "Holiness abounds in truth and moral goodness, but it has a distinct dimension of its own. It is other-worldly fulfillment, joy, peace, bliss" (242). And it is this experience which, in the normal case, comes first, and has as its implication first moral and, then, intellectual conversion. *Non in dialectica complacuit Deo salvum facere populum suum* /33/.

Now, in somewhat the same fashion, religious community sublates communities whose principle is moral responsibility, and Christian community sublates religious community (360). The sublation leaves intact the normally operative constituents of community, so that it is not necessary to construct a "supernatural sociology" /34/. On the other hand, religious conversion transforms the conditions of community.

So the human good becomes absorbed in an all-encompassing good. Where before an account of the human good related men to one another and to nature, now human concern reaches beyond man's world to God and to God's world. Men meet not only to be together and to settle human affairs, but also to worship. Human development is not only in skills and virtues but also in holiness. The power of God's love brings forth a new energy and efficacy in all goodness, and the limit of human expectation ceases to be the grave. (116)

And, in turn, Christian conversion gives God a name, the Father of the Lord Jesus Christ, receives his own revelation of his love in Christ, and enjoys the overt Christian fellowship of the Spirit.

It seems to me that the only way to integrate the diverse aspects and purposes of the Church is through some such notion. The distinctiveness of the Church is preserved by relating it to the sublating experience of religious and Christian conversion; and the social relevance of the Church is made to rest on two grounds: first, the fact that the higher does not mutilate the lower; and second, that there is only one world, in which man's choosing
is inefficacious without transcendent fulfillment and his knowing is mutilated and his self alienated apart from God (244). The contemporary crisis of meaning and value illustrates the result when proximate concerns are investigated and pursued on the systematic presupposition that ultimate concern is at best irrelevant and at worst illusory.

It may be also that Lonergan's approach permits one to integrate the various ecclesiological models with which I began. The "institutional" model needs to be up-dated by a goodly dose of sociology and then it needs to learn modesty, content to mediate participation in what transcends all mediations. The model of "organic, mystical communion" can enter as the attempt to consider the new dimensions of community, which are in Christ and the Spirit. The "sacramental" model might be taken out of the number of "special" theological categories and be grounded in general considerations on the embodied and social origins of human meaning. The model of the Church as "herald" can be widened and deepened to stress the constitutive role of Christian meaning and value and its redemptive implications. Finally, the Church can be seen as "servant" by understanding it in the light of the principles of historical process, progress and decline.

Conclusion

The concrete locus of the Church is the social construction and definition of reality. The central source of its vitality is the unmediated experience of God which is, thank God, beyond the tampering of man. But, unless the revelation of God, the ministry, death and resurrection of Christ, and embodied fellowship in the Spirit are to be regarded as incidental aspects of the Christian religious experience, the mediated and mediating community that is the Church has also a central role. Americans today have surely ample experience of the fragility of the world
mediated by meaning, an experience from which the distinctively Roman Catholic religious history has certainly not been immune. To some degree what has been going on is a reconstitution and redefinition of the world or, minimally, the relocation of its manifold aspects. Many, perhaps most, churchmen do not seem to know what is happening and consequently seem to prefer procrastination, equivocation or unnuanced and selective outrage to intelligent and critical inquiry and policy. An ecclesiology of the sort outlined here would, it seems, have a contribution to make in this situation; for the terms and relations on which it would found an understanding of the Church are the terms and relations within which the development of the modern world and its distinctive problems are most clearly understood and appreciated.
NOTES

/1/ Garry Wills's metaphor is attractive: for many, Catholics and non-Catholics, the Roman Catholic Church was "the extreme taken as a type, the least changeable part of our religious landscape, theological North Star." Only, such was the post-conciliar development, "The North Star has not only dimmed, but wandered" (1).

/2/ Gustafson's essay is located in recent American Protestant ecclesiology by Robert S. Paul (165-225). Paul links Gustafson's book with Claude Welch's The Reality of the Church and Langdon Gilkey's How the Church can Minister to the World without Losing Itself as examples of serious attempts to explore theologically the human and sociological aspects of the Church. They stand, then, somewhere between an exclusively theological treatment of the Church and the surrender of American Protestant ecclesiology to "relevance" in the late 1960s.

/3/ For example, it has recently been argued that the revival of interest in the term koinonia to describe the Church is a sign of the failure to realize effective community (Bori: 76-77).

/4/ Gregory Baum has proposed "movement" as a new sociological model of the Church (193-210). I find the model attractive, but it needs more extensive development.

/5/ Ernst Käsemann has done as much as any Protestant to show the frühlkatholische elements in the New Testament; in fact, in some ways their presence appears in almost all of his work. Briefly, "early Catholic" notions admit that the Church has a mediatorial role.

/6/ Various of the symbols and images used of the Church are studied in Elert and Hugo Rahner.

/7/ Reviews of this work are mixed.

/8/ Consider two examples of de Maistre's logic: "There can be no human society without government, no government without sovereignty, no sovereignty without infallibility." "Without the pope, there is no Church, without the Church, no Christianity, without Christianity, no society; so that the life of the nations of Europe has ...its source, its only source, in the power of the pope."

/9/ Perhaps the most straightforward statement of the position is Thomas Stapleton's: "In doctrina fidei non quid dicatur, sed quis loquetur a fidelis populo attendendum est" (quoted by Congar, 1970:371; Komonchak).
For illustrations, one might consider the loss of recta ratio as the principle of a law's obligation in favor of mere promulgation by a legitimate authority (Touneau); or the reduction of tradition to magisterium (the latter itself having changed its reference-point from content to form) (Congar, 1966); or the restriction of apostolic succession to a matter of ritual (Congar, 1971). One could also refer to Lonergan's description of "the shabby shell of Catholicism" (1972:326-327).

"Supernatural sociology" is one example of sectarianism; but I am not sure that a sociologist would be able to make much sense out of the terms in which, for example, the relation between episcopacy and primacy is usually discussed even by proponents of the newer "models." One longs for the sober good sense displayed even by so uncompromising a papalist as John of Turrecremata in his interpretation of a gloss on the Decretum asserting the superiority of council to pope: "...videtur quod hoc non sit verum de maioritate potestatis iurisdictionis, existente vero et indubitato Papa, cum semper caput praestansius sit autboritate regimini toto residuo corpore, et concilia robur accipiant ab Apostolica sede....Sed bene regulariter verum est de maioritate authoritatis discretionis iudicii secundum quod diciimus, quod qui magis ratione utitur, eo maioris authoritatis eius verba esse videntur, ...quae praesumitur maior est in toto concilio quam in uno homine" (quoted by Congar, 1972:401).

The extension to the theology of the Trinity is suggested on page 291 and was also alluded to in a remark at a Toronto seminar in 1969, when Lonergan described his analysis of the Trinity as "existential," deriving from another context than that in which questions about "necessity" and "contingency" in God are relevant (1972).

"For the historian to limit himself to treatises which bear exclusively or ex professo on the Church, would be for him to condemn himself to a fragmentary and unilateral view of the ecclesiology of the ancients. They speak of the Church à propos of everything. They do not consider it as a particular object, but rather as the factor which conditions the whole movement of return to God and as a manifestation of the glory of God in Jesus Christ" (Lamirande: 211*).

Karl Rahner has recently offered the following analogy: "...ecclesiology is related to the other departments of dogmatic theology as grammar, the techniques of poetry and semantics are related to poetry itself" (27).

The criticism of the newer models in ecclesiology might thus be expressed as the exclusive use of "special" theological categories, or else as drawing them exclusively from revelation and tradition.
"Man knows himself in the intersubjective community of which he is just a part, in the support and opposition the community finds in its enveloping world of sense, in the tools of its making, in the rites and ceremonies that at once occupy its leisure, vent its psychic awareness of cosmic significance, express its incipient grasp of universal order and its standards of praise and blame" (536).

In these lectures, Lonergan was outlining his "notion of the human good," which, he said, was "interconvertible with a notion of the structure of history." This began with "the general notion of the human good," went on to consider "the invariant structure of the human good" and the parallel threat of evil, and then introduced as "differentials" accounting for the diverse realizations of the invariant structure, the three principles of intellectual development, sin, and redemption. The presentation has obvious similarities to Insight, but decline is here called "sin," and the three biases give the notions of "sin as crime," "sin as a component in social process," and "sin as aberration." I quote from my own transcription of the tapes of the lectures.

It is worth noting that this insistence that only the "third approximation" describes the actual universe has its significance for the notion of the supernatural. The word has lost much, perhaps all, of its usefulness today, but properly understood, "supernatural" and not the word "natural" has concrete reference to the actual universe.

Some indication of what Lonergan meant by the emergence of the effective probability of the full solution may be given by his including among the illustrations of "vertical finality" the fact that "only when and where the higher rational culture emerged did God acknowledge the fullness of time permitting the Word to become flesh and the mystical body to begin its intussusception of human personalities and its leavening of human history" (1967:21).

Lonergan has himself provided a summary of the argument of Insight: "If human historical process is such a compound of progress and decline, then its redemption would be effected by faith, hope and charity. For the evils of the situation and the enmities they engender would only be perpetuated by an even-handed justice: only charity can wipe the slate clean. The determinism and pressures of every kind, resulting from the cumulative surd of unintelligent policies and actions, can be withstood only through a hope that is transcendent and so does not depend on any human prop. Finally, only within the context of higher truths accepted on faith can human
intelligence and reasonableness be liberated from the charge of irrelevance to the realities produced by human waywardness (Insight, Chap. XX)" (1974a:8).

/21/ ...a mystery that is at once symbol of the uncomprehended and sign of what is grasped and psychic force that sweeps living human bodies, linked in charity, to the joyful, courageous, whole-hearted, yet intelligently controlled performance of the tasks set by a world order in which the problem of evil is not suppressed but transcended" (1957:723-724).

/22/ Lonergan notes that "what gives plausibility to the notion of pure intellect or pure reason is the fact that cognitional self-transcendence is much easier than moral self-transcendence." Intellectual conversion can even seem to be accomplished through proof, say by "the dialectic of performance and concept" (1972:122). But even in Insight he had remarked "the startling strangeness" of that event, and the work was intended as an essay "in aid of" (not in proof of) self-appropriation (xxviii). The book is an invitation to intellectual conversion; the difficult illustrations are intended to lead the reader to experience his own consciousness in act and from within that experience, to take conscious control of it.

/23/ The appropriation of one's own past can be a very useful introduction to the sociology of knowledge (Berger, 1963; Berger and Berger, 1972).

/24/ A help in locating Lonergan's approach to community and society within the history and present diversity of sociology is Berger (1963).

/25/ The Social Construction of Reality is essentially a study of a statement by Berger and Luckman that parallels Lonergan's programmatic statement about belief: "Reality is socially defined" (116). Both remarks evoke something of the "startling strangeness" which Lonergan associates with intellectual self-appropriation, and this in turn explains Berger's frequent mention of the "debunking" role of sociology. Pedagogically, the experience may be communicated by taking students through the "Exercises in Alternation" Berger concocted in his early work (1961:23-47).

/26/ Compare Jürgen Habermas: "The grammar of language games links symbols, actions, and expressions. It establishes schemata of world interpretation and interaction. Grammatical rules establish the ground of an open intersubjectivity among socialized individuals. And we can only tread this ground to the extent that we internalize these rules—as socialized participants and not as impartial observers. Reality is constituted in a framework that is the
form of life of communicating groups and is organized through ordinary language. What is real is that which can be experienced according to the interpretations of a prevailing symbolic system" (192).

The same argument is presented less compactly and, perhaps, with less force in Method (79-81), for example: "So it is that man stands outside the rest of nature, that he is a historical being, that each man shapes his own life but does so only in interaction with the traditions of the communities in which he happens to have been born and, in turn, these traditions themselves are but the deposit left him by the lives of his predecessors" (81).

See, for example, 123, on the role of the apologist; 327, on the "real root and ground of unity" of faith and 352, on the continuity of systematics. As for the history of ecclesiology, aspects at least of the Protestant Reformation can be seen as a protest against the claim of the Church to mediate all dimensions of the religious experience.

This fellowship transcends denominational or religious boundaries and founds a fully ecumenical dialogue. This dimension of the Church is represented in the tradition by the theme of the ecclesia ab Abel, as also by such interpretations of the corpus mysticum theme as that of St. Thomas, Summa theologica (IIIa, q. 8).

Discussing the conciliar formula, "If anyone says..., let him be anathema," Lonergan remarks: "What is said is all-important to a group whose reality, in part, is mediated by meaning" (1974b:250).

A link with the tradition may perhaps be found in the alternate translations of ekklesia as congregatio and convocatio or in the theme of the ecclesia congregans et congregata (see de Lubac, 1956:69-75; but de Lubac's synthesis of the two aspects is not adequate).

Two parallels may be pointed out. Paul Ricoeur maintains that "the irreplaceable function of a confessing community in a type of society such as ours, a society of planning ahead, of rational decision, as well as a society in which technique intrudes into consumption, into leisure, and on all levels of daily life" is "to pose continually the question of ends, of perspective in a society which is rather prospective, to pose the questions of well-being and of 'What for!'" (243).

And in Octagesima adveniens (25), Pope Paul VI speaks of the necessity for the social body to have within it "cultural and religious groupings" concerned with
developing "ultimate convictions on the nature, origin and end of man and society."

/33/ A remark of St. Ambrose which Newman quoted as the epigraph for the Grammar of Assent and which might be fairly said to sum up his approach to faith and his view of the Church.

/34/ The problem of church order is neglected in my treatment, at least as a special topic. It enters, of course, as an implication of the "social structure of the human good," which simply insists that some church order is necessary. Whether a normative church order has been bequeathed to the Church is, of course, one of the more pressing questions today. It seems to me that the question of a ius divinum could stand dialectical analysis, especially in the light of Lonergan's discussion of "classicism" and of differentiations of consciousness.
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I. The Methodical Approach to the Foundations of Theology

The methodical approach to theology focuses on the actions of the performing theologian, in order to give control of the process by which theological conclusions are reached. The methodical approach to theology's foundations puts emphasis on the presence or absence of conversion in the person who is going to reach the conclusions. The way in which it does so is outlined in "Theology in its New Context" (Lonergan, 1974), in "Bernard Lonergan Responds" (Lonergan, 1970), and in Method in Theology, especially in chapter five, "Functional Specialties," and in chapters ten and eleven, "Dialectics" and "Foundations" (1972: 125-145, 235-294).

As is made clear in those places, this approach puts the ultimate determining factor in theology in a decision, a choice, a determination of the inquiring theologian /1/. Many advantages follow. They are listed in the places just referred to and will not be repeated here. But certain inconveniences follow as well.

A. Inconveniences of the Methodical Approach

1. On the methodical approach, the truth of the doctrines is not a direct result of evidence seen or of intellectual assent to what is proposed by authorities established by God /2/. The truth of doctrines is rather affirmed on the basis of a decision, a choice /3/. The fact that the choice itself is attributed to divine
influence /4/ and so may be supposed to carry some divine
guarantee of the truth of the resulting doctrines really
begs the question. For the attribution of the choice to
divine (rather than, say, to diabolic or psychological or
magical) influence is of course itself a doctrine.

2. The accompanying elaborate structures of method,
apparently analogous to those of other mature sciences,
seem just so much window dressing to disguise what is pure
subjectivity. A long and careful process from data to
conclusions is painstakingly spelled out, but in fact at
the most crucial point of the central step, all becomes a
matter of personal taste and disposition. About tastes
there can be no rational disputing.

To affirm that the choice is self-authenticating /5/
seems only another way of saying that there can be no dis-
puting it. But where no disputing is possible and self-
authentication the only criterion, there seems to be no
room left for collaboration in the attainment of truth.
But if there is no collaboration, then there are no cumu-
lative and progressive results—hence, properly speaking,
no science and no method (Lonergan, 1972:4ff.).

3. As a consequence, there will be no way of deter-
mining which theologian is right. The ultimate norm of
truth is in the individual's experience (subjective) and
in God's freely given grace and love (beyond human control
or possibility of verification).

4. The structure of coming to a true doctrine will
be exactly the same as the structure of coming to a false
one. Orthodoxy and heresy will be arrived at by the same
method. No longer can others refute a theologian's errors
by showing him he has overlooked a scripture text here,
ignored a clear warning of the magisterium there. They
can only exhort him to more and more perfect intellectual,
moral and religious conversion. The erring or heretical
theologian will undoubtedly reciprocate with his own exhor-
tations to them to practice what they preach.
5. "If the trumpet gives an uncertain sound, who shall prepare for battle?" (1 Cor 14:8).

As chapter twelve of *Method* discusses at length, the infallible dogmas of the Roman Catholic Church are ir-reformable. The formulations of those dogmas, as they were finally settled upon by the various Church councils and defining pontiffs, include a word for anyone who would henceforth deny them. The word is *Anathema sit* or its equivalent.

This is not accidental. The conviction, at least in the West since Aristotle, has been that where a proposition is certainly true, its contradictory is certainly false. The classicist system drew strength from this conviction and did not hesitate to reject out of hand any Christian theological doctrines which were incompatible with those already defined. The defined were true--irreformably, infallibly true. Those which contradicted them were therefore equally infallibly, irreformably false. Opposed to *de fide definita* stood the theological note, "heresy."

The methodical approach cuts into this well-established system in two ways. (a) It takes attention from the doctrines themselves to focus on the subject who affirms the doctrines in his judgment that they are true. It is, however, not only the orthodox affirmer of defined dogmas who judges that his doctrines are true. The theologian who challenges those dogmas also judges that his challenges are true. If he is at the same time a religious reformer, he may feel a divine compulsion to attack the dogmas publicly and draw as many others as possible to accept the truth he sees.

Nor can a plausible case be made that a typical preacher of orthodoxy (classicist sense) is more likely to be intellectually, morally and religiously converted than a preacher of (classicist) heresy. As a matter of fact, since the reforming preacher of heresy is more likely to
have reached his doctrines by personal thought, prayer and argument in the face of typical religious pressures to conformity and submission, the probability is rather in the other direction.

(b) It removes the legitimacy of direct appeals to decrees of Councils, to texts of Scripture, to proclama-
tions of Popes as safe foundations for personal assurance of the truth or error of doctrines. The truth or falsity of doctrines cannot be methodically distinguished on those bases, for the reliability of Scripture, and the reliability of Councils and Popes are themselves doctrines /6/. Consequently, neither can the orthodoxy or heresy of doctrines be distinguished on such bases. The foundations of both orthodoxy and heresy, truth and falsehood are the conversion or lack of it of the functioning theologian. But again that leaves the ultimate important criterion inside the individual, inaccessible to the critical judgment of the rest of the world.

No one, consequently, can definitely say that another's doctrines are heretical. They may simply be the expression of one and the same truth in terms adapted to another culture, another time or place, another differentiation of consciousness which one has not yet personally attained (Lonergan, 1972:326-330). One cannot even say with assurance that someone else lacks authentic conversion, for to the unauthentic person unauthenticity seems authentic and vice versa (291). On which side is one to place oneself? "One is on one's own" (344).

So the inability to say who is wrong connotes an insecurity about who is right. If there is no heresy, there would seem to be no sureness to orthodoxy. But then what happens to "the Word" as constitutive of revealed religion? (112-113). And what is left to be passed on in "communications"? And why is engaging in theology a worthwhile way to spend one's life? If reflection on religion cannot lead to progressive and cumulative results in knowledge, why bother with it?
Are these to be the results of the longed-for reform in theological method?

B. The Same Inconveniences in the Classical Approach

The major deficiencies of the classicist approach to theology and to the foundations of doctrines have been catalogued in many of Lonergan's writings, and most fully in Method in Theology (1972:326-327; 363). They will not be reviewed here. Here we refer to the classicist approach only in order to put the inconveniences of the methodical approach (listed under I.A.) into proper, reasonable perspective.

At first glance, the inconveniences of the methodical approach seem to constitute a strong argument in favor of not abandoning the classical. After all, classically the evidence for truth and against error was simply in the thing itself, in the objective nature of reality. One could, as the various criteria of the Fathers put it, examine the words of Scripture, or the regula fidei, or the teaching of all the apostolic churches, or what was held semper, ubique, ab omnibus.

One could, according to Melchior Cano's sixteenth-century systematization of that approach, specify ten principal sources or loci theologicici from which theological arguments could be drawn (Lib. I, Cap. 3) /7/. Cano's detailed discussions of these did indeed show that various subtleties of balance and counterbalance among them was necessary, so that theological operations were perhaps as much a skill and an art as they were a science /8/. Still, practicing this skill remained a thoroughly objective matter, so that its conclusions could be publicly discussed, disputed, and in crucial instances, definitively settled publicly by the definitions of a Council.

Moreover, in weighing and weighting the force to be attributed to the various loci, Cano again and again found logic pushing him to maintain that obscurities and
perplexities, questions of fact and questions of interpretation, could be finally settled by judgments from Rome. This objective criterion, public and available to all, came to be given an ever larger role in the classicist theology of the Church after Trent. This trend climaxed in the 1870 definition of papal infallibility and in the common teaching that the practical proximate norm of theological certitude was the teaching of the currently reigning Pontiff /9/.

Nevertheless, a closer examination of the classicist analysis shows that in spite of reassuring appearances the system was never as free as it seemed of the inconveniences listed under I.A. above.

1. The move from evidence seen or from authorities certified by God to a theologian's personal certitude of the truth of doctrines was never so rapid and easy as suggested. It was not enough to say: Follow the clear words of Scripture. Even in classicism there were prior questions: Which books of Scripture were to be admitted? Which preserved text of those books? Which interpretation of those texts?

Similarly for the Fathers, tradition, reason. Which Fathers? What traditions? Whose reason? And for each of these, in what preserved versions? Interpreted by whom?

It was not sufficient to lay down the principle: Follow the Councils or even, Follow the Pope. One had to ask: What texts of what Councils and which Popes? Must everyone master all? Whose interpretations of their words? With what commitment to each part? When they speak at contrary purposes?

Canon 1323 #3 stated that only that was to be taken as dogmatic which manifeste constiterit to be such. Who would determine whether a given conciliar or papal pronouncement manifeste constat to be a dogmatic pronouncement? And should that be settled, what then was the meaning of each word in the pronouncement? To whom was it
directed? For what purpose? Only highly trained theologians knew the rules for interpretation, and only highly skilled ones could apply the rules with any assurance. In most matters, most theologians followed the general consent of the theologians they favored.

Ultimately, even in the classical system: (a) believers could rely even on the sure oracle of Rome only if it were given, as in most matters it never was, in the irrefromable manner around which the assurances clustered; (b) theologians had to make choices as to which authorities to follow—which in practice meant which Roman texts they would most rely on; (c) Catholics who were not professional theologians had to get their contacts with Rome through a still larger number of mediators—either the theologians or, more commonly, their bishops, diocesan newspapers, parents, religion teachers, parish priests; (d) and all these mediators remained open to error, even according to the classical analysis, according to Cano's norms as well as those of Vatican I. Thus the evidence necessary to pursue any given doctrinal instance through to a personal judgment of certitude was passed on through a long line of mediations, in every instance of which, as well as in the person finally judging, it was received seocndum modum recipientis.

2. An elaborate structure of scientific method was a part of the classical approach. It may be seen in any standard seminary manual of the last century. But the substance that underlay this form did not match it in exactness and precision.

The Scripture "proofs" were verbal and without context. The proofs from the Fathers were without any sense of history. The demonstrations from reason were expressed in syllogisms which were more a pleasingly balanced arrangement of phrases on a page than a compelling progression from three defined terms to a logically inescapable conclusion.
Only the prefatory material on *Doctrina Ecclesiae* played a truly decisive role within the typical thesis. But even that was so mediated as to make certitude impossible. For instance, the "theological notes," which, according to the system, were supposed to specify the exact degree of certitude properly attributed to a given proposition proportionately to official Church teaching, were not issued by the Pope, but assigned by practicing theologians, specifically by the theologians writing the manuals. The notes assigned to the same proposition were different in different manuals; and they varied still more widely over a period of years.

Exact definition with many sub-distinctions on each term was one of many techniques frequently used to water down a proposition. The proposition might have an apparent and obvious meaning for common sense; but in the course of developing a thesis, the sense of the common sense words could be so highly refined as to mean sometimes nothing at all, sometimes the exact opposite of what the words seemed to say.

The comments which gradually worked the most significant modifications tended to appear in footnotes, fine print and scholia (according to a pattern of theological exposition signalled by Albert Schweitzer at the turn of the century). They were in the nature of concessions to the reality of facts impinging from the outside world and were not strictly speaking demonstrated or integrated into the method until, at a later stage, they could be cited from those earlier footnotes and scholia as bearing the authority of approved authors.

At any rate, as Tierney puts it, no matter how infallibly a doctrine might seem to have been proposed, theologians could always find ways to modify it later if necessary (4).
3. Because of the above points, theologians functioning within the classical system with its facade of absolute security, actually could not affirm with certitude in any given disputed instance which of them was right. The individual theologian had to do his best before self and before God. Commitment to "the Church" and to "the Pope" expressed an ideal of allegiance to the pure Word of God, but it never ruled out considerable uncertainty in understanding, interpreting, judging what exactly the Church or the Pope was teaching as God's Word at any given moment. Nor did the classical analysis ever succeed in working out the practical consequences of the traditional doctrine that an individual Pope could fall into heresy. Nor could its rules, no matter how carefully worked out, so shorten the hand of the Lord as to exclude the possibility of new prophets or new public revelations.

The thinking theologian, even while remaining committed to the classicist analysis, came to realize that he personally could not reach theological certitude without his own personal decisions playing a part. He could be certain of possessing orthodox truth only to the extent that he was certain of having examined all the pertinent material and of having kept himself attentive, industrious in attempting to understand fully; of having judged cautiously, always ready to be corrected by those he felt shared his commitment to God's truth; of having always remained concerned. The individual theologian ultimately had to take the responsibility for coming to the judgments he had made. And if he absolutely refused to admit that he was doing anything of the sort, if he insisted that others might decide, but he would simply follow authority, that was the most momentous decision of all.

The classical analysis recognized this in regard to faith. There the need of a personal decision under grace, transcending all assimilation of evidence, was dogmatically stipulated. But the same applied proportionately to all
theological positions. The classical analysis recognized this in practice in its call for scholarly lives of obedient submission from theologians. It recognized it above all by distinguishing between "objective heresy" and "subjective heresy," admitting thereby that a man committed the sin of heresy only by pertinacious clinging to his own opinion against the mind of the Church insofar as he knew that mind /10/.

4. The classical analysis of the structures of orthodoxy and of heresy had the one supposedly derive from following the teaching of the Church and the other from departing from that teaching. The classical analysis admitted that this was only the "objective" picture; "subjectively" the heretic might not realize that his teachings departed from those of the Church, so that he was merely a "material," not a "formal" heretic.

But historically, even within the classical analysis, it had to be conceded that those labeled as heretics never admitted that they were departing from the teaching of the true Church. Their claim was precisely that they and their doctrines represented the true Church. In fact, it was precisely that claim which made them "heretics" as opposed to "apostates" or atheists. "The heretic is one who, retaining the name of christian..." (Canon 1325).

Besides, nemo gratis hereticus. Even in the classical analysis as presented in the New Catholic Encyclopedia by G. A. Buckley, the conclusion is:

Formal heresy in the full sense, implying the rejection of a doctrine known certainly to be of faith by one who sees himself as willing to accept the authority of God revealing in other matters, appears somewhat unrealistic and psychologically improbable. (1069)

In other words, even in classical terms, a person in fact (if not in virtue of the reciprocal vituperation of rhetoric) became a heretic by the same structure of
theological reflection by which one became consciously (reflexively) orthodox theologically. The foundational structures leading to orthodoxy and heresy were indistinguishable in practice. Even if the analysis tried to avoid this by identifying orthodoxy with staying with one's own community, it could not be missed that the terms "orthodoxy" and "heresy" changed place according to the religious community in which one stood.

But what is the objective value of holding objective criteria to which each of mutually contradictory parties can appeal, finding in them simultaneously their own orthodoxy and their opponents' heresy? If only those who hold position A can see in the objective sources that A is orthodox and B is heretical; while only those who in fact hold position B can see in the same sources that B is orthodox while A is heretical; how does such an analysis promote the cause of objectivity? How is this situation in fact any better than that of the methodical analysis which says that each judges the same evidence in proportion to the authenticity of his own intellectual, moral and religious conversion?

5. Only on the fifth of the points listed above (under I.A.) is there a certain advantage to the classical analysis over the methodical. The methodical analysis could not in the end confidently proclaim its positions to be eternal truth, their contradictories miserable error. The classical analysis on the other hand did not hesitate to make ringing affirmations of objective, infallible, irrefromable truth. The advantage in this is not that such proclamations could increase the scientific certitude of believers or of theologians. That was impossible, as explained under 1. But such proclamations gave a feeling of certitude and security, which is not without religious value. After all, religious people are expected to risk temporal and eternal life on the doctrines they support.
Secondly and more importantly, such proclamations, though in most concrete instances unjustifiable, met two perennial human needs: (a) They lifted men's eyes to the supremely important truth that truth exists; encouraged them in the spontaneous conviction that men can attain truth and that doing so was worth the effort; (b) they encouraged men in their spontaneous conviction that truth was one; that all men should ultimately be able to agree and therefore should work toward that agreement (Lonergan, 1957:702, 719-721).

Still, the classical method met these needs in a very imperfect way and only at great cost. As to (a): specifying that certain concrete doctrines were the truth already attained often tended to discourage the search for the fullness of truth and to slow the progress toward it. As to (b): instead of tending to make all men cooperate to attain and live in the truth, in practice it often meant passing judgment that most of the human race was simply cut off from the truth; and so tended to close believers' minds to what men of other faiths might have to offer.

C. The Convenience of Methodically Facing Inconveniences

The inconveniences (listed in I.A.) apply with relatively equal force to both the classicist and the methodical approaches. The classicist approach possesses psychological advantage not insignificant in the realm of religion, but not proper to the pursuit of truth, to science as such. This psychological superiority, such as it is, is purchased at a great price, as we saw under 5 above. The religious side of theology is allowed precedence over the truth-function to the detriment of the latter, and to the ultimate corruption of the religious side as well.

The principal advantage of the methodical analysis on the other hand is that it clearly promotes the truth-function of theology, while it does not harm but promotes at a higher level the true religious function in at least four ways.
1. Facing the weaknesses of human knowing openly and dealing with them explicitly, consciously, honestly, is itself the greater allegiance to truth. The cause of truth cannot be promoted by hiding from some questions and refusing to face any evidence. The fullest commitment to truth is commitment to the God whom theology and religion would serve.

2. Recognizing the limitations in any attained judgment of truth (doctrine) tends to open more widely and exploit more fully the possibilities of the human mind and the invitations of God's grace. It encourages the facing of questions, and fosters originality of thought, self-reliance, creativity. It allows possible stimulation through serious attention to others and listening to their contributions to a possibly fuller knowledge of God.

3. The methodical approach makes rationally intelligible what has been widely sensed among religious people in recent times and expressed in the ecumenical movement, the World Council of Churches, the announced aims of Vatican II, etc.: that agreements among the world's religions are more substantial and more important than the speculative controversies which divide them. One Christian formulation of this closes Method in Theology: "...division resides mainly in the cognitive meaning of the Christian message. The constitutive meaning and the effective meaning are matters on which most Christians very largely agree. Such agreement, however, needs expression and, while we await common cognitive agreement, the possible expression is collaboration in fulfilling the redemptive and constructive roles of the Christian Church in human society" (368).

4. It promotes the hope of religious living among all men and calls attention to the indispensable need for it even among professional theologians.
II. A Methodical Analysis of Heresy

We cannot here retrace the long history of development of the notion of heresy and the varying emphases it has received through the centuries. Let us simply take as our starting point the definition proposed in Canon Law and the standard textbooks. It is generally still operative at least as a point of comparison in other modern Catholic studies. Then heresy is the crime of anyone who "after receiving baptism, keeping the name of Christian, pertinaciously denies or doubts about any of the truths to be believed by divine and catholic faith" (Canon 1325 #2).

Even from this starting point, a methodical, subject-oriented analysis of heresy leads to new insights and inexorably to a revision of the notion itself.

A. The Classicist Analysis

The doctrine-centered approach of classicism left the phenomenon of heresy in fact unexplained and unexplainable. On that analysis, as we have shown in I.B.4., no one ever chose heresy or admitted he himself was heretical. Moreover, on that analysis doctrines labeled heretical had to be envisioned as having no truly theological foundations. They led away from God, from his revelation and his Church, so they did not result from the promptings of God's grace; and they did not conform to objective truth, so they were not founded in the evidence of the object. Therefore, on the objective side, their content had to be attributed to human invention, philosophical invasions, pagan relics, and (occasionally) misunderstandings or (more often) corruptions of the Scriptures. On the subjective side, their proponents had to be moved by gluttony, lust, pride, demonic possession, blindness and/or madness, ambition, hard-heartedness, etc.

But the content of all doctrine, even the most orthodox, can be traced to similar origins. Divine causality
never eliminates human causality. Human needs, philosophical stimulation, pagan foreshadowings (anima naturaliter christianae) and distinctive interpretations based on critical selection of the texts are factors in any doctrines anywhere.

The suggested subjective motivations moreover are implausible on any consideration. Any close examination of living heresies (e.g., Lutheranism for Catholics, Catholicism for Lutherans) provides enough testimony of devout persons living Christian lives within each "heresy" to contradict the suggestions. So does most shared ecumenical experience.

If one tests the suggested subjective motivations in the case of long-dead heretics who stood at the origins of some presently flourishing Christian church, then historical investigation, the witness of the heretic's own writings, letters, memoirs, the testimony of contemporaries, especially intimates, the religious life and vigor of the branch of Christianity which looks back to him as leader and founder, all tend to refute the classicist accusations.

If one examines some heresies which no longer flourish (Marcionites, Arians) evidence is harder to come by, but the tendency of historical research and of dispassionate good sense is to refute and reject the classical versions of how such widespread movements came to be so popular among so large a percentage of Christians. How could this have happened without a truly religious foundation?

B. The Perspectives of a Methodical Approach

The subject-oriented, methodical approach begins from the realization that conversion is the important thing. But every conversion is to something from something. Conversion may not always necessarily involve an open break with the religious group to which one previously belonged. But it very well may. And it will always involve an internal break /11/.
Not everyone who experiences conversion is bound to externalize and express it. But all will tend to. A thinking, practicing, writing, preaching theologian is more likely to do so than most. Depending on the level and degree at which the conversion is operative, the person who moves into the new horizon to which God calls him and gives that newness expression in his life, will also find himself more and more at odds with what he previously accepted as orthodoxy. Thus his conversion will make him more and more a heretic to the group out of which his conversion calls him /12/.

That is, if he maintains the name of the group, he ceases to be what the name implies unauthentically and begins to be it authentically. But those who continue to live under that name unauthentically see him as violating their most precious traditions. Every newly generated reform is some traditional community's corruption. Every new-found orthodoxy is, to the old traditional and unresponsive community left behind, some species of heresy. Paul could not become a Christian apostle without making himself a Jewish heretic.

The doctrine-centered classicist analysis missed this point because in it terms were defined from the point of view of the one defining them, without any allowance for the limitations of this point of view. Since the Church was the kingdom of God on earth according to that viewpoint, any departure from it was a sell-out to Satan, a defection, loss, error, which had to be explained in the same way as sin in general—as a surd, as irrational, as without religious motivation or theological foundation.

The subject-oriented methodical approach recognizes in the world of religious people a general movement of human striving to respond to the loving touch of God. On this analysis, the certainty of judgments is the certainty of having made a positive contribution to a long-term process which, if continued, cannot fail of its object.
The Foundations of Heresy

This certainty is the certainty of success through fidelity to the truth, where fidelity to truth consists in judging according to the evidence one has encountered and understood, in an effort to respond to God's unceasing call beyond (see Lonergan, 1957: chaps. 9-13; Higgins). This approach recognizes that the move to the kingdom of heaven takes place on a broad front; all are called to play their parts; and each responds in his own way.

On a subject-oriented analysis, it is recognized that one man's heresy is always somebody else's orthodoxy. If you accuse Luther of heresy for his belief in justification by faith alone, he must accuse you of heresy for rejecting that notion as heretical. He need not have made any judgment in regard to you, had you not yourself made an issue of the matter. He could simply have gone on explaining his own insights into the faith while you went on explaining yours. But once one group declares another heretical, the other has only three choices: (1) submit and change; (2) win a retraction; or (3) deny that its doctrine is heretical. This third choice, if made, means implying that the challenging group are heretics in their turn. Why? Because, when side 1 called side 2 heretics, they insisted thereby that the truth of side 2 contradicted some essential, indispensable part of orthodoxy. But those who insist on something false as being essential and indispensable orthodoxy are heretics. When, then, side 2 denies that their own doctrine is heretical (as they must), they imply that side 1 is teaching something as essential and indispensable orthodoxy which really is nothing of the sort. But this is to imply that they are heretics.

C. The Methodical Analysis

The subject-centered analysis then has as its background the realization that heresy, in the classical, doctrine-centered definition, is always and necessarily
mutual. Each side maintains its own orthodoxy and therefore necessarily considers heretical anyone who calls them heretics. But this is fruitless name-calling. A subject-centered analysis would itself begin by pointing out that the persons involved in every heresy-orthodoxy confrontation through the centuries have gone through at least these stages:

1. teaching a certain interpretation of Christianity, with popular acceptance;
2. being confronted by a different interpretation;
3. being challenged by the proponents of the different interpretation as corrupters of the faith (in contradiction to one's own understanding of the norms of faith and to popular resonance);
4. facing the question:
   4.1 whether to submit to the challenge and change; or
   4.2 to face the challenge and try to overcome it in discussion, negotiation; or
   4.3 neither to submit nor to wrestle with the challenge, but to cut oneself off from the challengers (or the challengers off from oneself).

The next step would be to note that, even by the classical definition, heresy strictly so called made its appearance only in stage 4, and even then only when decision 4.3 was made. In 4.1 there is no heresy but only submission, whether through conviction, conformity, obedience or love of peace. In 4.2 there are only disputing theologians. But in 4.3 there is adherence to one's own doctrinal position, even at the price of giving up communion with those believers who do not share it. But this is "pertinacious," and since by supposition the doctrinal position in question conflicts with that of some other group, it can be described by those within that other group as "pertinaciously denies or doubts about some one of the truths to be believed by divine and catholic faith" (Canon 1325 #2).

In the next step, a classicist, doctrine-centered analysis would spontaneously fix on the fact that after 4.3
there exist two groups of nominal Christians, one of which is right and one of which is wrong. Classicist analysts naturally see themselves within the group which is right, and so to it they give the name "the orthodox," and to the group which contradicts them they affix the pejorative title of "heretics."

But a subject-centered methodical analysis focusses instead on the fact that where there had previously been one body of Christians trying to understand, live by and preach the doctrine of Christ, there now are two groups, each of whom is condemning the other as betrayers of Christ's cause, and each of whom is refusing to live and work in communion with the other for the advancement of that cause.

If the term "heresy" is to be preserved, it would have to mean either neutrally: "parties, sects, separate groups" as it does in Hellenistic Greek and in the six occurrences in the Acts of the Apostles; or, with a stronger negative emphasis, "divisions, factions" as it does in the remaining New Testament occurrences (1 Cor 11:19, Gal 5:20, 2 Pet 2:1).

The evil has been done when the unity of Christian believers has been broken. The collaborative movement for the salvation of the human race begins to fragment like other human societies instead of solving men's problems by pulling them together (Lonergan, 1957:696ff.).

The real sin of heresy is the sin which would produce this evil effect. The sin does not consist simply in having differences in understanding, living and teaching the Christian message. Differences for different groups in different times, places, circumstances can be perfectly healthy. The sin is in the disposition of soul ready to split the collaborative community over doctrinal issues. It is a readiness to give up working together for the good we can do in order to preserve one precise way of formulating that which we are doing together. Heresy as the sin
that destroys is the readiness to admit *haireseis*, "factions," as these are deplored in the New Testament.

This sin occurs on both sides of every actual division in Christianity. It is perhaps more often found in the excommunicating parent community than in the smaller reform groups which end up being cut off and driven out under the name of "heresy." Thus, paradoxically, the true sin of heresy (methodically understood as the readiness to split Christianity) is more properly the sin of the orthodox (classically understood as those who ended up the larger number).

III. A Methodical Analysis of the Foundations of Heresy

Looking for the foundations of heresy, as of orthodoxy, is a matter of seeing how heresy is an expression of conversion or lack of conversion on three levels: intellectual, moral and religious; and seeing how adequately it relates to the general and specific categories in which convertedness may find model expression (Lonergan, 1972: 267-293.

Defining heresy then as "the disposition or readiness to split the community over doctrinal issues," four failures become apparent.

1. Heresy is a failure in intellectual conversion. It implies not realizing the imperfect, tentative nature of one's own human grasp of truth. It confuses knowing with looking, as if the facts are simply there "in the evidence" and are "evidently" as this one thinker sees them from within his own narrow little horizon.

Because readiness to split the group has its roots in lack of intellectual conversion, the parent group often tends to take up inappropriate means to call back their erring brethren: not to debate with heretics, but to imprison, rack and burn them. The small, expelled group, for the same reason, may use the same means to the extent
to which it is able. Or it may rest content with emotional threats of temporal woes and eternal damnation, again without any attempt to argue or convince their opponents.

The conscious motivation which both groups offer for their conduct reveals the same failure to appreciate what human knowing is, for they most often appeal to the need to protect at any costs the simple faithful and the children. Simple faithful and children do of course need protection from error and training in the truth; but they must get these in the only human way there is: by being given opportunity and encouragement to inquire, reflect and choose.

2. Heresy implies a failure in moral conversion. It implies not being ready to do what is right at all costs. The suggestion of Gamaliel seems to demand too much of the group representing the establishment. They cannot face loss of power, prestige, influence, self-esteem as God's specially chosen and assured spokesmen on earth. They cannot bear the possibility that their own lifetime opponents may have been right all along, and that they may themselves have a lifetime of study to re-do. They prefer to keep their life going on as it always has, even if it means splitting the community.

The other group may lack patience with human ignorance and tolerance for human sin. Thus their high human moral living would wish to exclude or ignore what is most human. The "charity is patient, kind..." (1 Cor 13:4ff.). Forcing our own ideals on others is more self-aggrandizing than self-transcending.

3. Heresy is a failure in religious conversion. It implies not yielding oneself into God's hands absolutely and unreservedly. It means not trusting that he can and will create and preserve the Church he wants; that our part is to live as fully as we can in accordance with his Word as we have come to know and understand it. It means not
accepting him as the unum necessarium in one's life, intent on serving him in love; where one's prayer is more important than one's conquests, and where he is to be met anywhere, especially in other men, even in one's enemies (even when these are spontaneously identified as his enemies).

4. Heresy implies a failure to work out one's general and special theological categories adequately as a preparation for the reception and affirmation of appropriate doctrines. For those categories, specifying heuristically or as a model (Lonergan, 1972:292; 1957: chap. 20) the general outlines of the hoped-for salvation, necessarily include the unity of that salvation as a sign and an effective means to a longed-for unity of mankind (Lonergan, 1957:696f.) /13/. Heresy, on the other hand, implies attending excessively to the truth-aspect of conversion—conversion as coming into possession of supposedly correct information about God; and it misses the fact that conversion is first and foremost to the God who can save us and is only the first step on a long road toward him, a road which all men must go.
NOTES

/1/ "Foundations...consists in a decision that selects one horizon and rejects others" (Lonergan, 1974: 230). "...foundations occurs on the fourth level of human consciousness, on the level of deliberation, evaluation, decision. It is a decision about what you are for and, again, who and what you are against. It is a decision illuminated by the manifold possibilities exhibited in dialectic. It is a fully conscious decision about one's horizon, one's outlook, one's world-view. It deliberately selects the frame-work, in which doctrines have their meaning..." (1972:268). "The foundational reality is conversion" (267).

/2/ "...manifestly the foundations do not consist in some of the doctrines. But the existence of a divine revelation, the inspiration of Scripture, the authority of the Church, the significance of the patristic and theological teaching are all doctrines. Therefore, none of them pertain to foundations" (1974:229).

/3/ "...the functional specialty, foundations, discriminates between truth and error by appealing to the foundational reality of intellectual, moral and religious conversion" (1972:299). "...[the] foundation needed to move from the indirect discourse that sets forth the convictions and opinions of others to the direct discourse that states what is so" (267). "Basically the issue is a transition from the abstract logic of classicism to the concreteness of method. On the former view what is basic is proof. On the latter view what is basic is conversion" (1972:338).

/4/ "...in religious matters, love precedes knowledge and, as that love is God's gift, the very beginning of faith is due to God's grace" (123). "...in acknowledging a faith that grounds belief we are acknowledging what would have been termed Lumen gratiae or Lumen fidei or infused wisdom" (123; 240-241).

/5/ "It is the religious conversion that grounds both moral and intellectual conversion; it provides the real criterion by which all else is judged; and consequently one has only to experience it in oneself or witness it in others, to find in it its own justification" (1972:283). "It is finding out for oneself and in oneself what it is to be intelligent, to be reasonable, to be responsible, to love" (253). "...each theologian will judge the authenticity of the authors of views, and he will do so by the touchstone of his own authenticity" (331). "...the elimination of the unauthentic...is effected in the measure that theologians attain authenticity through religious, moral and
intellectual conversion. Nor may one expect the discovery of some 'objective' criterion or test or control. For that meaning of the 'objective' is mere delusion. Genuine objectivity is the fruit of authentic subjectivity. It is to be attained only by attaining authentic subjectivity" (292). "Each considers repudiation of its opposites as the one and only intelligent, reasonable, and responsible stand..." (1972:247, 251).

/6/ Note /2/ above. "...if one desires foundations to be conceived in the simple manner, then the only sufficient foundations will be some variation or other of the following style. One must believe and accept whatever the bible or the true church or both believe and accept. But X is the bible or the true church or both. Therefore, one must believe and accept whatever X believes and accepts. Moreover X believes and accepts a,b,c,d...Therefore, one must believe and accept a,b,c,d....On the contrary if one desires foundations for an ongoing developing process, one has to move out of the static deductivist style...and into the methodical style..." (1972:270).

"...fundamental theology was a set of doctrines, de verae religione, de legato divino, de ecclesia, de inspiratione scripturae, de locis theologiciis. In contrast, foundations present, not doctrines, but the horizon within which the meaning of doctrines can be apprehended" (131, 323).

/7/ Earlier editions of De Locis Theologiciis are Salamanca 1563; Venice 1567; Louvain 1569; Cologne 1574/1585/1603; Lyons 1704; Padua 1727.

/8/ See, e.g., II,6-8; III,5-6; IV,4; V,5; VI,2, etc. Note especially Lib. XIII,5, 8, and 10.

/9/ "...hoc sacrum Magisterium, in rebus fidei et morum, cuilibet theoloxy proxima et universalis veritatis norma esse debet, utpote cui Christus Dominus totum depositum fidei--Sacras nempe litteras ac divinam traditionem--et custodiendum et tuendum et interpretandum concredit..." (Encyclical: 567).

/10/ "Post receptum baptismum si quis, nomen retinens christianum, pertinaciter aliquam ex veritatibus fidei divina et catholica credendis denegat aut de ea dubitat, haereticus [est]" (Canon 1325 #2; see Noldin: 29; and Cano: Lib. XII, Cap. 7).

/11/ "It is as if one's eyes were opened and one's former world faded and fell away" (Lonergan, 1972:130). "Our advance in understanding is also the elimination of oversights and misunderstandings. Our advance in truth is also the correction of mistakes and errors. Our moral development is through repentance for our sins. Genuine
religion is discovered and realized by redemption from the many traps of religious aberration" (110). "Errors, rationalizations, ideologies fall and shatter to leave one open to things as they are..." (52).

"Conversion involves more than a change of horizon. It can mean that one begins to belong to a different social group, or if one's group remains the same, that one begins to belong to it in a new way" (Lonergan, 1972:269). "...conversion is never the logical consequence of one's previous position, but, on the contrary, a radical revision of that position" (338). "It involves an about-face; it comes out of the old by repudiating characteristic features..." (237). "...come to acknowledge all that was misinformed, misunderstood, mistaken, evil even in those with whom he is allied..." (252). "The chair was still the chair of Moses, but it was occupied by the scribes and Pharisees....The religious order still read out the rules, but one wonders whether the home fires were still burning..." (80). "...in that case a genuine interpretation will be met with incredulity and ridicule, as was St. Paul when he preached in Rome and was led to quote Isaiah: 'Go to this people and say: you will hear and hear but never understand; you will look and look, but never see' (Acts 28,26)" (162).

"...veluti sacramentum et instrumentum intimae cum Deo unionis totiusque generis humani unitatis..." (Vatican II).
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I. Introduction: Some Elements of Lonergan's Notion of Dialectics

As it becomes increasingly apparent that Bernard Lonergan's *Method in Theology* is a major document from which all theologians in the present pluralist situation may learn not only what the "mysterious" and "awesome" thought of Father Lonergan may be in a fresh, clear and systematic focus, but also what they themselves as theologians are doing when they are doing theology, a new phenomenon seems to be emerging. That phenomenon seems paradoxical but in fact is not: many theologians, of various traditions, find Lonergan's formulation of the distinction between an acceptance of his method for all theologians as not necessarily involving an acceptance of his own theological positions (his "content") both heartening and, on his own expressly formulated transcendental terms, entirely defensible. With that presupposition in mind, the following essay will attempt to "sort out" or dialectically determine five basic models for a foundational theology presently operative in the contemporary pluralist theological context (see Tracy, 1975: chap. 2).

It should be mentioned at the outset, however, that the development of these five models for theology are meant to be an exercise in "dialectic" in the same manner as Prof. Lonergan cites Gibson Winter's *Elements for a Social Ethic* to be such (1972:248-249). In sum, the dialectical exercise is not explicated with all the explicitly Lonerganian technical modalities formulated on pp. 235-237 in *Method* but rather employs certain signal features of that
analysis of the discipline named "dialectics" as the central keys not only to Lonergan's own understanding of "dialectics" but also to a use of that discipline in the wider, pluralist setting.

Those key factors can be summarized as follows (Lonergan, 1972: 235-267, also 34-40 and 128-130).

First, the basic aim of dialectics is to explicate "gross differences," i.e., horizontal, not perspectival, differences.

Second, the basic materials for dialectics emerge from the conflicts in Christian movements as the latter have been interpreted by research, interpretation and critical history.

Third, the basic ideal of dialectics is to promote a comprehensive viewpoint; this latter is best achieved under the general rubric, "develop positions; reverse counterpositions"; the more specific methodical rubrics can be labeled the stages of comparison and criticism.

Fourth, since theological method involves, besides the anthropological component of transcendental method, the religious component, the basic horizontal differences in theological positions can be articulated under the general categories of "value" (religion) and "realms of meaning" (theology) /1/.

Fifth, and finally, the basic need for dialectical analysis is the development of certain models (284-287) which can both articulate basic horizon-differences and attempt to show the successive stages of development to a comprehensive viewpoint /2/.

This last insistence by Lonergan is in fact the factor which most informs this present exercise in dialectics. For our aim in this essay is to suggest how recent and familiar research, interpretation and critical history which interpret the dominant models for a contemporary Christian theology can now be employed in a dialectical analysis. In the latter case, one moves to an evaluative
interpretation which attempts to both explicate and evaluate the basic models present in the contemporary pluralist clash of conflicting Christian theologies. Since the interest here is not in perspectival but horizontal differences (214-224, 235-245) /3/, the discipline which Lonergan brilliantly analyzes as "dialectics" is needed. Since the aim is an evaluative comprehensive viewpoint, the dialectical need, again following Lonergan's own suggestion, is for basic theological models. It bears repetition to recall, however, that the present exercise in dialectics is closer to Lonergan's citation of Gibson Winter's analysis in Elements for a Social Ethic as a dialectical one than it is to a strict application of all of Lonergan's own technical categories and methods for dialectical analysis. This is important to note, insofar as a strict application of all of Lonergan's dialectical categories (especially "religious conversion" [235-245] and "foundational reality" [267-271]) would lead to a different "comprehensive viewpoint" or theological model than the one suggested here /4/. But if it be appropriate to differentiate method and content in Lonergan's own manner (as I believe it is) then it is at least possible to suggest that the present exercise in dialectics is informed by and fundamentally faithful to Lonergan's own understanding of what the dialectician does when he does dialectics even if the model that emerges for "foundations" is different in content from Lonergan's own. Such, at least, is the hypothesis which this present exercise will attempt to explore. The exploration will consist in explicating and evaluating five basic models presently operative in Christian theology.

II. The Need for Models in Contemporary Theology

A widely accepted dictum in contemporary theology is the need to develop certain basic models or types for understanding the specific task of the contemporary theologian.
The re-emergence of interest in types and models is prompted by several factors. The first factor is the de facto existence of different sets of criteria, different uses of evidence and varying employments of the social, historical, hermeneutical and philosophical disciplines within various theologies. In such a situation it becomes imperative for any theologian to set forth his or her own model for theological judgment and to compare that model critically with other existing models.

The second factor encouraging interest in the discussion of models is the continuing clarification of basic theological positions afforded by more recent forms of linguistic analysis. The work of Ian Ramsey, Frederick Ferré and Max Black are illustrative of the linguist's ability to make such basic distinctions as that between "picture (or scale) models" and "disclosure (or analogue) models" /5/. Such a distinction allows one to affirm that theological models do not purport to provide exact pictures of the realities they disclose (picture models); but they serve to disclose or re-present the realities which they interpret (disclosure models). In brief, theological disclosure models like the religious symbols upon which they reflect, in Reinhold Niebuhr's famous phrase, should be taken seriously but not literally. Theologies do not--or should not--claim to provide pictures of the realities they describe: God, humanity, and world. But theologies can be shown to disclose such realities with varying degrees of adequacy to any intelligent inquirer.

This essay will try to take this familiar discussion of models a step further. It will do so by employing Bernard Lonergan's notion of horizon to specify the two realities (viz. the self and the object) /6/ which are referred to in the five major theological models of our present situation. The success of this enterprise will follow upon specifying the exact nature of the self-referent and of the object-referent in the following models for
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theological reflection: the orthodox, liberal, neo-orthodox, radical and revisionist models. The major task of this essay, therefore, is to determine with some exactitude the self-referent and the object-referent of the horizon of each major theological option.

Before proceeding to that task, a few further summary observations on the use of models here may be in order. First, the basic need for the development of models is probably best expressed by Bernard Lonergan himself in his notion of the drive to develop models in dialectics. In a less dialectical but still helpful manner Paul Tillich states that in matters of historical description contemporary theologians cannot be content with the usual alternatives of either trying to say everything or saying nothing at all. If we wish to locate our own enterprise historically we cannot but try to develop certain characteristic ideal types or models for interpreting the basic factors present in concrete historical realities. Such models or types do not pretend to be empirical generalizations from historical realities in the manner of Anders Nygren's "basic motifs." Technically, disclosure models do not provide an exact description of particular historical phenomena. They do, as Lonergan suggests, provide intelligible, interlocking sets of basic terms and relations that aid us to understand the basic point of view expressed in particular historical positions. My own hypothesis is as follows: The most basic of such terms and relations are in fact those references to the self of the theologian and to the objects within that self's horizon which any given model discloses. For if we can legitimately label theological models as "disclosure models" in the manner of Ramsey and Perré then we can also find a way to explicate the realities of self and object which each theological model discloses. Such, at least, is the proposal of this essay. We shall try to test that proposal by employing it to determine the self and the object referents disclosed in five major contemporary theological models.
One further introductory note is needed. We need to know what general characteristics will be shared by all models which we call "contemporary Christian theological" positions. Summarily stated, the following observations seem in order. First, any contemporary Christian theological position will consider itself obliged to interpret two basic phenomena; the Christian tradition and contemporary understandings of human existence. Second, the most helpful way to understand how either of these phenomena is interpreted by any given model is the following: one may specify what role each position gives to the apparent cognitive, ethical and existential clashes of contemporary Christian theology—for example, the clash between the traditional Christian commitment to such values as obedience to the tradition (however understood) over against such typical modern commitments as loyalty to one's own autonomous, critical judgments. Indeed, precisely such clashes (summarized by Lonergan as primarily conflicts of values within Christian movements) provide the most basic context for understanding all modern and contemporary theologies. More exactly, it may prove helpful to try to pinpoint the exact understandings each model has of the theological self and of the object of theological discourse in the context or horizon of that all-pervasive clash of beliefs, values and faiths. Such at least is the major attempt of this essay.

A brief summary of the assumptions of this interpretation may prove helpful here. The analysis assumes that each theological model will, in some way, attempt to interpret the Christian tradition in the context of modernity. It further assumes that a specification of the "disclosure model" employed by each basic theological position will explicate the self-referent and the object-referent of that horizon with some exactitude. Hence the discussion of each model will begin with a brief description of the general attitude towards both modernity and Christianity
which that model presupposes. Each analysis shall then turn to the task of specifying the self- and object-referents disclosed by that model.

But clearly it is now time to test this hypothesis on the five models chosen for investigation: the orthodox, liberal, neo-orthodox, radical and revisionist. Since a fair historical assertion (i.e., an assertion following upon contemporary research, interpretation and critical history) would seem to be that these different types have emerged chronologically in the order cited, the analysis will begin with a study of the "orthodox model" for Christian theology.

III. "Orthodox Theology": Believers and Beliefs

In an "orthodox theological model" a number of contextual factors are present. First, the claims of modernity are not understood to have any inner-theological relevance. Rather the theologian's task as theologian is to express an adequate understanding of the beliefs of his particular church tradition. Orthodox theologians do not seem impressed by the counter-claims of modern scientific, historical or philosophical scholarship to the traditional Christian faith's understanding of reality. Rather such theologians ordinarily hold that a firm commitment to the perennial truths of traditional Christianity is the best bulwark against the onslaughts of modern criticism. As is the case with all five models, the orthodox one admits to a wide spectrum of specific theological options. Indeed, the orthodox spectrum is at least as wide as the correlative spectrum of various church traditions. The spectrum of orthodox theologies can stretch from essentially fundamentalist positions through most theologies labeled "biblical" to various systematic understandings of the several church traditions.

In principle, then, what does this orthodox theological model show about the theologians and about the
object which the theologian investigates? The answer seems reasonably clear: the self-referent of the orthodox theologian is to a believer in a specific church tradition; the object-referent is to a (usually systematic) understanding of those beliefs. Recall, for example, such a classical and sophisticated formulation of the "orthodox model" for theological reflection, as the description of the task of theology provided in the First Vatican Council (see Lonergan, 1959:7-68). As careful interpreters of that document have noted, the position of Vatican I on theology is a highly nuanced one. First, the aim of theology is not "proof" of the mysteries of the Catholic faith but an "understanding" of those mysteries. Second, that understanding is achieved by following the classical medieval model. More exactly, theology attempts a partial, incomplete, analogous but real understanding of the "mysteries" of the Catholic faith. Theology may best perform this task by employing the following specific model: (1) find analogies in nature for these beliefs; (2) use these analogies to provide a systematic understanding of the interconnection of major mysteries of faith (Christ, Grace, Trinity); (3) try to relate that analogous understanding to the final end of man (Beatific Vision).

One must admit that the Vatican I model for theology is both highly sophisticated and one which fits the structure of the general orthodox model described above. For in this instance the self-referent of this model manifests that the theologian precisely qua theologian is a believer in the Roman Catholic tradition. The object-referent in turn manifests an "analogous" understanding of the "beliefs" of that tradition. In short, the orthodox theologian's task is not to prove those beliefs ("rationalism and semi-rationalism"). Nor is that task simply to state those beliefs ("fideism"). Rather his task is to provide an analogous and systematic understanding of the Catholic beliefs (dogmatic theology) and a reasoned defense
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(not proof) of those beliefs (apologetic or fundamental theology) (see, for example, Lonergan, 1974b). In either case, the cognitive claims of other modern disciplines and the value claims of the wider culture do not enter into the inner-theological circle except to suggest analogies for systematic reflection or to aid argumentation for strictly apologetic reflection.

The major strength of the orthodox theologian is precisely his ability to develop sophisticated models for providing systematic understandings of the basic beliefs of his church community. His major weakness, I suggest, lies in his inability to make intrinsic (i.e., inner-theological) use of the other scholarly disciplines. More pointedly perhaps, his weakness lies in his inability to come to terms with the cognitive, ethical and existential counter-claims of modernity. This weakness is directly dependent upon the presence of a relatively narrow self-referent (the explicit believer) and to an object-referent of parallel narrowness (an understanding of the beliefs and values of his own church tradition). To understand how that narrowness might be corrected, one must turn to the second model for theological reflection, the liberal model.

IV. Liberal Theology: The Clash Emerges: Modern & Christian

With the emergence of liberal (Protestant) and modernist (Roman Catholic) Christian theologies we find the explicit commitment of the Christian theologian to the basic cognitive claims and ethical values of the modern secular period. To be sure, this challenge is provoked by the wide application of distinctly new scholarly disciplines to the cognitive and historical claims of Christianity. From the new philosophies, the new natural sciences, and especially from the new historical disciplines, Christian theologians in every church tradition found major and minor theological claims severely challenged. Yet it is not the cognitive challenge alone which occasioned the deepest crisis for the
liberal and modernist Christian theologians. Rather, the liberal theologian's ethical and existential commitment to that secular faith constitutive of the critical drive present in all modern science is at the heart of the liberal enterprise. For the liberal and modernist theologian accepts the distinctively modern commitment to the values of free and open inquiry, autonomous judgment, critical investigation of all claims to scientific, historical, philosophical and religious truth. The liberal theologian finds himself committed not marginally but fundamentally to the values of the modern experiment. He cannot but find himself open to the challenges which those values, once applied by modern cognitive disciplines, pose for the classical claims to truth and to value of traditional Christianity.

The liberal theologian also remains committed to the cognitive claims and the fundamental values of the Christian vision. With such a twofold commitment, his problem becomes clear: how can he responsibly maintain both commitments? In extreme cases—as in Ludwig Feuerbach—one of the commitments will be abandoned. In most cases, however, the enterprise of liberal Christian theology will be the attempt to show how a proper reinterpretation of modern man's most basic value commitments and a proper reinterpretation of Christianity's historic claims to truth and value can be—indeed must be—reconciled. The genius of the liberal and modernist theologians, I believe, was precisely their frank and full admission of this challenge and their willingness to reformulate the very task of Christian theology in accordance with it.

The spectrum of concrete historical options for liberal theologies is almost as wide as the spectrum of specific orthodox theologies. For from the great figures of German and Anglo-American Protestant liberalism through the Catholic modernists, men in every church tradition attempted to rethink and reformulate their tradition in accordance
Theological Models

with the values and cognitive claims of modern thought. From the philosophical interests of a Hegel, a Schleiermacher or a Blondel, through the ethical interests of a Ritschl or a Wieman, to the historical interests of a Harr- nack, a Troeltsch or a Loisy, the same pattern emerges: the need to rethink the fundamental vision and values of traditional Christianity in harmony with the fundamental vision and values of modernity.

In accordance with our project of explicating the referents to self and to object of each theological model, the following brief remarks may seem in order for the liberal model for theology. The liberal's self-referent is principally the theologian's own modern consciousness as committed to the basic values of modernity, especially the value of insisting upon a critical investigation of all claims to meaning and truth, religious or otherwise. The object-referent is principally the Christian tradition (usually the tradition of one's own church) as reformu- lated in accordance with such modern commitments and critiques.

The clearest example—indeed, the still towering paradigm—for this liberal model remains Friedrich Schleiermacher. For Schleiermacher's great achievement—ranging from the Speeches through his systematic theology, The Christian Faith—is largely constituted by his consistent commitment to working out a new model for Christian theology. Such a model would allow—in fact, demand—that the Christian theologian be held responsible to both the community of modern philosophic, scientific and historical discourse and to that community of religious discourse we call the Christian church. In Schleiermacher's mind, the model for a responsible, modern Christian theology could no longer be the orthodox model of "dogmatics." Rather, in his famous phrase, for the modern theologian the theses of faith must now become the hypotheses of the theologian. This dictum, in turn, can be refined to develop a whole new model for theology—the model of the Glaubenslehre.
Such, in brief, is the general model for theology correctly labeled liberal or modernist. By now, it is well-nigh universally admitted that the liberals and modernists were not fully successful in the completion of the task they initiated. Yet their chief strength and their remaining legacy is that they set up the proper post-orthodox model for contemporary theological reflection. How that formal ideal might be maintained without a continuation of the inadequacies of the specific material conclusions of the liberals and modernists remains, I believe, the major task of contemporary post-liberal theology. Yet the fuller dimensions of that task can only be clarified after we have seen the other models which emerged from the two major self-critical moments in the history of liberal theology, viz. neo-orthodox theology and radical theology.

V. Neo-Orthodox Theology: The Dialectic Intensifies: Radical Contemporary Christian Faith and the God of Jesus Christ

In the context of the prior discussion of the liberal task, it seems fair to state that even the neo-orthodox critics of liberalism and modernism fundamentally share the liberal and not the orthodox understanding of the task of theology. In short, there seems every good reason to agree with the judgment of Wilhelm Pauck that neo-orthodoxy is not really a radically new alternative model for theology, but is rather a moment--to be sure, a critical one--in the larger liberal theological tradition. Pauck is, I believe, exactly right when he states: "Orthodox theologies give rise to more orthodoxies; liberal theologies give rise to neo-orthodoxies."

So much is this the case that even the neo-orthodox theologian, Karl Barth (at least the Barth of The Epistle to the Romans), however critical he may be of his liberal predecessors, in a major sense continues the liberal tradition. Indeed, the neo-orthodox theologians can be
interpreted as the theological expression of that same role of both acceptance and negation of liberal modernity which Marx, Freud, and Nietzsche played in the wider secular culture. For no more than their post-modern secular contemporaries were the principal neo-orthodox theologians (Barth, Brunner, Bultmann, Tillich, the Niebuhrs) willing to accept either orthodoxy or liberalism as adequate to contemporary needs. Not a lack of the theological relevance of cultural analysis (as with the orthodox), but a different, post-modern cultural analysis impelled the early Barth to challenge his liberal forebears. The fact is that the neo-orthodox theologians (and here Barth joins Bultmann, Brunner, Tillich, and the Niebuhrs) shared the repugnance of the post-war cultural period for the evolutionary optimism and the now oppressive modernist model of autonomous man's possibilities of the late nineteenth and early twentieth century liberal periods. On this interpretation, the criticism neo-orthodoxy made against liberalism and modernism was not a simple rejection of the liberal enterprise. Rather neo-orthodoxy was a continuation of that enterprise by means of a two-pronged critique. On the first front, the neo-orthodox insisted that the liberal analysis of the human situation was able to account at best for human finitude and possibility but utterly unable to account for those negative elements of tragedy, of terror, indeed of sin in human existence. On a second front, the neo-orthodox insisted that the liberal reinterpretation of Christianity (especially its reinterpretation of the event of Jesus Christ) was a failure. For the central belief of the Christian tradition that justification comes alone from grace through faith in God's manifestation of Himself in the event of Jesus Christ was, in the judgment of the neo-orthodox, nowhere adequately explicated in the liberal analysis of the modern religious consciousness.

The response of the neo-orthodox theologian to these weaknesses of their liberal forebears seems signally clear.
Fundamentally they argued that only an explicit recognition of the unique gift of faith in the Word of God could provide an adequate foundation for a truly Christian theology. Here, it is true, the neo-orthodox theologian joins the orthodox in insisting upon the theologian's own faith as an existential condition of the possibility of theology. Yet it is also noteworthy that the neo-orthodox theologian's faith, unlike the orthodox, is radically experiential and claims, in effect, like the liberal's, to illuminate all human existence. For example, the neo-orthodox—again like his post-modern secular counterpart—demands a deeper recognition of the intrinsically dialectical character of all human experience which the more sanguine liberal tended to discount. Correlatively, the neo-orthodox continues to insist that the experience of Christian faith shows the radically dialectical and experiential relationship now available to every man who, in experiencing our contemporary estrangement, may also be open to experience the justifying, salvific power of this faith in the Christian God.

This understanding of the neo-orthodox model for theology, then, is one which directly relates that theological alternative to its parent, classical liberalism. Such an interpretation may prove not only more faithful to the actual performance of neo-orthodoxy, it may also allow the permanent achievements of that tradition to continue into the more complex present theological moment. Those permanent achievements may be summarized as follows. First, the neo-orthodox, by their profound analyses of the negative elements in man's situation (death, guilt, tragedy, sin), allow a more dialectical, a more contemporary, and most importantly, a more accurate understanding of the actual human condition than did most of their liberal and modernist forebears. Second, the frequent neo-orthodox insistence on both the infinite qualitative distinction between God and man and the irrevocably dialectical character of the relationship of God and world serves to assure a firm grasp of
Theological Models

an element of radical mystery which anyone hoping to understand the Christian God should at some point recognize. Third, the neo-orthodox retrieval of the Christocentric character of New Testament faith has at least one positive effect. For that demand forces any Christian theologian claiming a fundamental continuity between his own theology and the original Christian witness to explicate that Christological claim in a more adequate manner than liberal and modernist discussions of symbol, of history and of religious consciousness were able to manage. Fourth, the neo-orthodox reformulation of the liberal task widens and deepens the understanding of the theological task itself as involving not only criteria of appropriateness to the central meanings of the Christian tradition. In fact, perhaps the most enduring achievement of neo-orthodoxy is its ability to allow for a more adequate formulation of the intrinsically hermeneutical aspect of the contemporary theological task. One need not hold that the neo-orthodox theologies really resolved the liberal dilemma. Yet the neo-orthodox did recognize the need for contemporary "Christian theology" both to come to terms with the post-modern experience and understanding of liberal illusions about our common humanity and to develop more adequate hermeneutical tools to disclose the profoundly transformative meanings of the central Christian symbols. Still the neo-orthodox seemed to have bought these gains at a great price--viz. at the price of not analyzing with critical and deliberate hardmindedness the central revelational, theistic and Christological doctrines of the Christian tradition.

It seemed to suffice that such symbols had a real existential impact upon the contemporary situation of alienation. The rest could be left to "paradox" or "mystery" or "scandal." Yet when the "rest" included the critical questions of whether those symbols, however existentially meaningful, could really stand up to critical
analysis of their coherence and their truth, it became inevitable that the neo-orthodox hegemony must fall; and it did. Eventually, some critics, secular and Christian, had to ask the question which the neo-orthodox theologian seemed unable to answer: however paradoxical Christian faith may be, need its paradox be represented by concepts and symbols which were neither internally coherent nor able to withstand a critical experiential analysis of their truth? The liberals and modernists may not have been able to solve the problem which secular modernity posed for Christian self-understanding. But the neo-orthodox, one fears, were unwilling to some inevitable final moment to follow the task which they themselves initiated to a truly critical conclusion.

In terms of the "disclosure model" approach to this analysis, one may explicate the self-referent and the object-referent of the neo-orthodox model in the following manner. The self-referent of the neo-orthodox theologian is not really the "believer" as it is for the orthodox. The neo-orthodox model of the man of authentic Christian faith is more radical. More exactly, the self-reality for the neo-orthodox is not the traditional believer of some set of beliefs but the basic existential attitudes of Christian faith, trust and agapic love /7/. This self-referent of the neo-orthodox theologian can also be said to include elements of an authentic post-modern contemporary consciousness as distinct from the modern (or Enlightenment) consciousness of the liberal. Negatively, the neo-orthodox theologian is familiar with the collapse of Enlightenment optimism. Positively, he is fully committed to explicating what he ordinarily calls the dialectical character of our human existence. In a word, the neo-orthodox theologian shares the critical attitude towards the illusions of the liberal and secular consciousness present in such paradigmatic figures as Marx, Freud and Nietzsche. For like these secular thinkers, the
neo-orthodox theologian produced penetrating analyses of the illusions and naiveté of the liberal or Enlightenment attitude. As Lionel Trilling might have added, the great neo-orthodox theologians wanted to move away from a subjective base of modern or liberal "sincerity" to a subjective base of a contemporary—and illusionless—"authenticity." Indeed, much of the power and attractiveness of the neo-orthodox position—especially as represented by Reinhold Niebuhr's model of authentic self-transcendence—comes from this highly contemporary and surely more realistic experiential base.

In terms of the object-referent of the neo-orthodox model, the dialectical character of the subject's experience allows the object of that faith-experience to be described in similarly dialectical terms: often as the wholly other God of Jesus Christ. To be sure, in the major Protestant proponents of neo-orthodox theology, this object-referent will be formulated in terms of such neo-Reformation themes as God's Word operative in human existence as unexpected, unmerited, justifying Event. But the use of the model "neo-orthodoxy" should in fact be expanded to include not only the obvious giants of neo-Reformation theology but also those Catholic theologies of contemporary retrieval called neo-Thomism and contemporary Catholic sacramental [or incarnational] theologies. In such Roman Catholic proponents of a fundamentally neo-orthodox position as Karl Rahner, this object-referent (for Rahner, "the radically mysterious God") will be formulated in terms proper to a systematic rearticulation of the major dogmatic and theological moments of the Catholic tradition.

Moreover, it would seem that the liberal vs. neo-orthodox clash continues to dominate much of contemporary Christian theology. When analyzed in the context of the prior analysis, the eschatological theologians (with some exceptions), for example, do not substantially differ from the model of neo-orthodoxy. For Moltmann, Braaten,
Tracy Gutierrez, Alves et al. also employ basically the same self-referents and object-referents as their more existential and sometimes individualist predecessors. Alternatively, several contemporary "theologians of culture" do not significantly differ from the classical liberal or modernist position in their ever more fruitful if not methodologically more adequate search for symbolic expressions of contemporary religious experience. To be sure, both these major positions do represent substantial developments on individual questions over their liberal and neo-orthodox predecessors. But that they represent any substantial development on the basic problematic of a fully adequate model for theology itself remains an open question.

VI. Radical Theology: Secular Affirmation and Theistic Negation

Before proceeding to the model which may prove adequate to the full dimensions of the contemporary theological task, I will first examine the "radical theology" model that has been developed in more recent history. The present interpretation of the model employed by the "radical theologians"—of whom the "death of God" theologians remain the primary instance—is as follows. Fundamentally, the radical theologians are clearly informed by the liberal and neo-orthodox models for theology. Their consciousness is best described as contemporary rather than modern. The crucial step they take seems to be the application of the dialectical method of contemporary and neo-orthodox consciousness to the Christian tradition itself. More exactly, the central difficulty of Christianity for the radical theologian is that the God of the neo-orthodox, the liberal and the orthodox theologians alienates the authentic conscience of the illusionless and liberated contemporary man. For a conscience committed to the struggle for human liberation cannot really affirm both that commitment and a radical faith in and dependence upon the God of orthodox or
liberal or neo-orthodox Christianity. To be sure, the articulation of this contemporary consciousness may differ as radically as does Paul Van Buren's linguistic analysis of radical secularism from William Hamilton's more autobiographical or Thomas J. J. Altizer's neo-Hegelian and neo-Blakean approach. Yet the same rallying cry unites these diverse figures: This Wholly Other God must die in order that the authentically liberated human being may live!

Again in terms of our "disclosure-model" the following referents seem clear. The self referred to by the radical model for theology is a subject committed to post-modern contemporary secular intellectual and moral values. The object-referent of the radical model for Christian theology is now a familiar one: an explicit reformulation of traditional Christianity which negates the central belief of that tradition in God. This negation is usually paired with an equally important affirmation: an affirmation of Jesus either as the paradigm of a life lived for others or of Jesus Christ as the decisive incarnational manifestation of a liberated humanity. The radical's opposition to the God of traditional or liberal or neo-orthodox theologies is a fundamental one. For the radical argues that the Christian God cannot but alienate man from man, from the world, and from his authentic self. The central assertion of traditional Christianity which must be maintained is the Christian affirmation of a life which in its commitment to liberation and to others may serve to humanize the world: a life like that made present—perhaps even "contagious"—in Jesus of Nazareth and in the liberating event of the death of God in the contemporary world.

The strength of the radical theological model, in my view, is its ability to pinpoint the question which any thinking human being committed both to the authentic values of contemporary secularity and to the Christian vision of life's possibilities must face: the question of the
traditional understanding of the Christian God (see Lonergan, 1974a). The corresponding weakness of the radical position is by now apparent: can one really continue the enterprise of Christian theology if there is no meaningful way to affirm the reality of God?

VII. The Revisionist Model: Critical Correlation of the Meanings Present in Common Human Experience and the Christian Tradition

The reasons for the label revisionist are both historical and systematic. Historically, it seems clear that classical liberalisms, classical orthodoxies, various kinds of neo-orthodoxy and various radical alternatives are now legitimately judged as no longer adequate models for the present task of providing theological "foundations." Further, the model called revisionist might be said to be an accurate label for at least some major contemporary theologies /8/. Although some process theologians are the most obvious example of this position, still many other positions—for example, such Roman Catholic thinkers as Johannes Metz, Gregory Baum or Eugene Fontinell or such Protestant thinkers as Langdon Gilkey, Van Harvey, or Frederick Ferre—seem to fit the same general model /9/. The principal reasons for the label "revisionist," however, are systematic ones. For with the relative strengths and limitations of liberalism, orthodoxy, neo-orthodoxy and radical theologies in mind, the revisionist theologian is committed to continue the critical task of the classical liberals and modernists in a post-liberal situation. By that commitment the revisionist will also try to rectify earlier theological limitations both in the light of the new resources made available by further historical, philosophical and social scientific research and reflection and in the light of the legitimate concerns and accomplishments of the later neo-orthodox and radical theological alternatives. In short, the revisionist theologian is
committed to what seems clearly to be the central task of contemporary Christian theology: the dramatic confrontation, the mutual illuminations and corrections, the possible basic reconciliation between the principal values, cognitive claims and existential faiths of both a reinterpreted post-modern consciousness and a reinterpreted Christianity. The revisionist theologian is encouraged in this enterprise by the historical judgment cited above that even neo-orthodoxy is best understood as a self-critical moment in the history of liberalism; and by the judgment of B. M. G. Reardon that various orthodox theologies are properly understood not as the mere self-expressions of a faith community but rather as self-expressions deeply influenced by the orthodox reactions to the challenge of liberalism. He is further encouraged by the recognition of and commitment to both that critique of modern liberalism present in contemporary secular thought and that radical secular affirmation of our common human faith in the worthwhileness of our struggle for liberation. For the revisionist Christian theologian joins his secular colleague in refusing to allow the fact of his own existential disenchantment with the reifying and oppressive results of Enlightenment disenchantment to become the occasion for a return to mystification, Christian or otherwise (see Gay; Horkheimer and Adorno; Harvey). Rather he believes that only a radical continuation of critical theory, symbolic reinterpretation and responsible social and personal praxis can provide the hope for a fundamental revision of both the modern and the traditional Christian self-understandings. Revisionist theology, then, is intrinsically indebted to and derivative from the formulations of the liberal task in theology classically formulated in the nineteenth century. It is post-liberal in the straightforward sense that it recognizes and attempts to articulate not a new ideal for the theological task but new resources for fulfilling that ideal. Included among
such resources would be the development of certain ideal types and models which would be faithful to the research, interpretation and critical history into the historical phenomena of alternative models and would make the authentic achievements of those models more readily available to the contemporary problematic. Hence, the contemporary systematic theologian of this type—precisely because of his understanding of the systematic task—recognizes the ever more urgent need to try to retrieve both the liberal enterprise of the nineteenth century and the neo-orthodox and radical enterprises of this century. As one hopes this essay has made clear, the post-liberal theologian cannot simply return to liberalism and bypass either neo-orthodoxy or radical theology for the most basic of reasons. Those latter positions were not mere "fads" but authentically self-critical moments in the larger enterprise of reconstructing an adequate model for contemporary Christian theology. It is not a surprise, perhaps, that many contemporary theologians are once again finding Schleiermacher, Ritschl, Newman and F. D. Maurice, et al. as important for their present reflection as the latest issue of our best journals. Still what continues to be needed is some method of interpretation that can make their work more readily available for that present revisionist reflection. For one suggestion along that line, this essay has risked a dialectical analysis of the major models for theology and has tried to articulate certain definable self-referents and object-referents which comprise the horizon of each model.

The self-referent of the revisionist model for theology is a subject committed at once to a contemporary revisionist notion of the beliefs, values and faith of an authentic secularity and to a revisionist understanding of the beliefs, values and faith of an authentic Christianity. Such revisionist theologians also believe that precisely such a dual commitment provides every good reason for
challenging both the more usual self-understanding of secularity (viz. a non-theistic and anti-Christian secularism) and the more usual self-understanding of Christianity (viz. as an anti-secular supernaturalism) /10/.

The object-referent of the revisionist model can perhaps be best described as a critical reformulation of both the meanings manifested by our common human experience and the meanings manifested by an interpretation of the central motifs of the Christian tradition. More exactly, the revisionist model for Christian theology ordinarily bears some such formulation as the following: Contemporary Christian theology is best understood as philosophical correlation of the meanings present in common human experience and the meanings present in the Christian tradition. A great deal more evidence, of course, would have to be presented before such a model would be either clarified or rendered acceptable (see Tracy, 1975: esp. chap. 8). For the moment, however, our concern has been to employ some of the principal categories developed by Bernard Lonergan in his extraordinarily fruitful reflections upon the place and character of "dialectics" and "foundations" in the broader spectrum of theological specialties in order to suggest one partial application of those specialties, viz. an attempt to develop an evaluative hermeneutics of certain basic theological models.
NOTES

/1/ I take this as a summary statement of the logic of the structure of Method in Theology. Especially noteworthy, I believe, is Lonergan's remarkable, post-Insight discussion of value (1972:27-57); for the full structure of Method, of course, one would have to add the final "step" of the eight functional specialties and the place of "dialectics" and "foundations" in that structure.

/2/ I am employing here Lonergan's notion of "models" in dialectics, not challenging his more fundamental position on method itself as a model but more than a model (1972:xii).

/3/ In my judgment, Lonergan's distinction between "perspectives" and "horizons" is a remarkable contribution to the discussion of historical knowledge; and a signal and original contribution to the meaning of the discipline called "dialectics."

/4/ I do not claim that the present "revisionist" model either is identical with Lonergan's own model for foundations, or responds directly to that latter model. To attempt to do so here would be too large a task. The difference would occur principally on the question of the character and function of what Lonergan explicates as "religious conversion" for "foundations." I have throughout this essay avoided that complex discussion by not employing, either positively or negatively, that technical category. Insofar as the category is part of the "content" as distinct from the "method" of Lonergan's position, this "sidestepping" of this important issue seems appropriate for this exercise in dialectics.

/5/ It might be noted that here I am only employing the familiar distinction between "picture" and "disclosure" models in these analysts. For the basic notion of "models" and "horizons" I am employing Lonergan's own more fundamental analysis.

/6/ Lonergan's notion of horizon allows for the development of basic models via a horizon-analysis of the self and object poles of any given phenomenon (here a particular theological position).

/7/ Lonergan's own category of "religious conversion" as being-in-love-without-qualification might be said to be a brilliant Catholic formulation of these basic Christian attitudes, formulated by Protestant theologians in alternative (e.g. anti-mystical) terms. Note, also, how Lonergan, like the neo-orthodox theologian, employs the familiar liberal distinction between "faith" and "beliefs" (Lonergan, n.d., 1972:115-124).
Perhaps it would be helpful to note that I earlier employed the label neo-liberal but changed it since the latter does not make sufficiently clear that the model is an attempt at a "comprehensive viewpoint" and not a mere return to the earlier "liberal model." "Revisionist" to all the models therefore is an attempt at a somewhat more satisfactory compromise label (see Tracy, 1974).

Although I believe that Lonergan's own method could be cited as an outstanding example of this model (with his transcendental precepts, "Be attentive, be intelligent, be reasonable, be responsible and, if necessary change," as one of the clearest formulations of the ideal informing this model), I have been reluctant to interpret his own theological "content" as expressive of this model, especially given his own observation: "Though a Roman Catholic with quite conservative views on religious and church doctrines..." (1972:332).

The expression "supernaturalism" is used here in the modern sense of religious studies where it is roughly equivalent to "fundamentalism," not in the refined and restricted medieval theoretical sense analyzed in Lonergan's discussion of the "theorem of the supernatural" (1971:13-19).
WORKS CONSULTED

Black, Max

Ferré, Frederick


Gay, Peter

Harvey, Van Austin

Horkheimer, Max and Theodor W. Adorno

Lonergan, Bernard


I have two purposes in writing this paper. First, I want to examine the relationship between Western classical culture and its dominant moral theory—the doctrine of natural law. Second, I want to analyse the factors that precipitated the end of classical culture and the emergence of the contemporary existential ethic. I will begin by specifying what I mean by culture and by classical culture.

I

The meaning of the term "culture" has been influenced by two major nineteenth-century developments: the philosophy of Hegel and the emergence of the science of anthropology. In a generic way these two influences stressed the wholeness or unity that permeated all the various parts of a culture such as the art, religion and language of a people. However, besides the same notion of wholeness or unity, I am using Lonergan's distinction between aspects like the language, race, religious and social practices of a culture, over against the way in which people think about these same practices. People have a way of living and a way of reflecting or thinking about that way of life. If the way of life of a people is primarily determined by the way they "mean" their lives, then the term "culture" I am proposing means not so much the meaning that people incorporate into their daily living as the reflective meaning that they give to these "lived meanings." A further refinement must still be added.
This notion of culture refers not only to the way that people think about themselves but to the way they think about thinking itself; and the way they reflect about their reflecting. Hence, (a) people's living is primarily a meaning; (b) people have certain ways of intending their meanings; and (c) there is also a definite way people have of checking and controlling their certain ways of meaning. This third aspect (c) is what this paper intends by "culture."

For example, if an anthropologist like Lévi-Strauss abstracts from a society's language and social customs to deal with the structures by which these people speak and socially act, I am going to focus not on the structures but on the way that thinkers like Lévi-Strauss construct their theories of culture. And so while I will be speaking about the natural law theory, the focus of our discussion will not be on the law but on the way in which the philosophers tended to conceive and determine their natural law theory.

Now I would like to refer to the work of Robin Collingwood in his Idea of History both to indicate Hegel's influence and to concretize the way in which I am going to speak about classical culture. The period that I refer to as classical culture, emerging with the Greek discovery of the soul and ending with thinkers like Hegel and Kierkegaard in the nineteenth century, is the same period treated by Collingwood. Collingwood's preoccupation is the same as mine with this difference: I am concerned with the moral theories that were developed during this period; Collingwood is concerned with the histories that were written within classical culture and, more particularly, with why the study of history was so slow to command the attention of scientists and scholars to achieve the reputation of a respectable science. Not until the nineteenth century did history assume a significant academic role; Collingwood tries to explain this delay by arguing that the period of Western culture from the Greeks to the nineteenth century is dominated by a metaphysical system of thought in which
the category of "substance" plays a fundamental role in determining the types of history that were written (42). Only when this notion of "substance" came under attack in the eighteenth century did people become interested in the importance of history and begin to construct the type of history which merited the label "scientific." Collingwood's point then is that as long as people assumed that the nature of man was substantially the same in various historical periods, they would not be especially interested in trying to discover just what changes in the "accidental" differences took place from one period to the next. But if people did not assume that men always lived and acted in substantially the same way, then they would tend both to pay more attention to what these "historical" differences were, and to ask whether the differences were substantial.

This point parallels the one I am about to make with two exceptions. I am concerned with "substantialism" as it pertains to ethical thinking. Now, Collingwood does not distinguish as precisely as I would between historical or ethical thinking and the same thinking as under the control and direction of a certain method.

In his Natural Right and History, Leo Strauss proposes classical thinkers like Plato, Aristotle, and Cicero fundamentally agreed on the theory of natural right or law. Perhaps this was due to the preeminence of the category of substance according to which all men are substantially the same: laws based on the substantial nature of man would be equally valid in every culture and during every historical period. Strauss, however, does not adopt this line of argument. Not only is it quite difficult to pin down with any precision what is common in the natural law or right theory of Plato, Aristotle and Cicero, but Strauss does not cover over a basic ambiguity in natural law thinking that persisted until the nineteenth century with respect to the question of the immutability of the natural law.
Aristotle, for example, tends to argue that natural laws can be changed while Cicero tends to think of the natural law as unchangeable. I propose to explain this difference in terms of the distinction I have made between a theory and the method embodied in the theory. Collingwood, you will recall, was not primarily interested in the histories written by Greek, Roman and Medieval historians but the "idea of history" that tended to predispose classic historians to write certain types of histories. Now if we consider the ambiguity underlying Collingwood's overemphasis on the notion of substance, it will both clarify my method and lead us into a consideration of the methods that classical thinkers developed to keep their meanings under control.

I think that Collingwood overemphasized the notion of substance and did not put enough stress on the notion of science. Aristotle developed the notion of substance and from his metaphysics the term passed into Stoic philosophy and the classical tradition. But for Aristotle there are at least two other terms that have to be considered in discussing the nature of man, namely, soul and character. The latter term especially contrasts with the notion of substance as Collingwood uses the term. Character is a much more flexible term than either soul or substance and is comparable with Hegel's use of the term "spirit" and Kierkegaard's "existential subject." Aristotle's notion of man was more subtle and complex than what passed into the wider classic tradition because his thought was more comprehensively scientific.

Aristotle's corpus included a science of physics, biology, psychology, treatises on logic, ethics, politics, rhetoric, as well as the crowning science of metaphysics. A major difference between Aristotle's corpus and the contemporary academic curriculum was that Aristotle had no interdisciplinary problem. Aristotle had serious methodological problems, as we shall see, but he had no difficulty in moving from the study of plants to the study of animals
and men. Aristotle interrelated his various subject matters by using the same basic terms (act and potency, form and matter) drawn from metaphysics in each discipline, with appropriate variations of meaning. The terms specific to each discipline were determinations of these basic terms of act and potency, matter and form. Aristotle's system made no pretense at being like Euclid's geometry with basic definitions, postulates, and axioms from which one could deduce a whole series of ethical and biological conclusions. Although Aristotle had system in his thought, it was neither a deductive system like Euclid constructed nor a logical system like Porphyry devised. For Aristotle system meant theory in the sense of a search for causes. The reason why classical theory tended to harden into the narrower (sheerly logical or deductive) meaning of system was that Aristotle never fully had to deal with the problem of devising different methods for different subject matters.

In the contemporary college curriculum the methodological problem has clearly surfaced. A persistent and highly divisive issue is: Can you "do science" in the study of men and women in the same way you "do science" in the study of atoms and molecules? This problem is especially acute in the science of psychology where you have the well-known split between the hard and soft psychologists. Psychologists find the lines between botany, zoology and human psychology ambiguous and difficult to determine. Aristotle's "sciences" of biology and psychology do not clarify the issue because he used the same method to study plants, animals and men. He did not construct his psychology by inviting you to examine the data of your own consciousness as a "soft psychologist" might today. Aristotle was much more object-oriented because for him theory or science was a search for causes. What causes plants to grow? Sunlight and water of course. What causes a man to think? Wonder. But wondering is a conscious act while growing is "done" unconsciously.
Nevertheless, both cause the respective acts of growing and thinking. In a post-Kantian context, an object tends to be taken as a mental object thought by a conscious subject. But when Aristotle talks about sunlight as the object of the act of growing in a plant, it is clear that for him an object means cause and not the intentional term of a cognitive act. The problem however is not terminological, but methodological: the problem of interpreting Aristotle's terms arises because he employed the same method for studying the souls of plants, animals and men.

Aristotle did not confuse the souls of animals and men. Nor did he neglect to practice the introspective approach to psychology of today's "soft psychologist." Aristotle's brilliant, psychological insights could only have been the product of prolonged and careful introspective analysis; but Aristotle never thematized that method as proper for studying souls. Aristotle's goal was theory as a search for causes yielding certain knowledge.

But if we shift to Aristotle's ethics we find that Aristotle is searching for much less clearcut causes or objects than when studying the heavens or souls or substances. The best that one can hope for in the study of ethics is a general knowledge that will be generally but not necessarily true. The motions of the stars may be necessary and known with certitude; not so the motions of the human heart. The reader of Aristotle's ethics will find all the virtues and the corresponding vices neatly arranged in "systematic" fashion but again the "system" is neither deductive nor logical. If method is a set of procedures guiding a process to its goal, what is the method that Aristotle uses in his ethics to guide a person toward his ethical goal? Does Aristotle use the same method as he does in studying souls? To some extent he does since he begins with the "object" that causes a man to act, namely, happiness. Happiness is the general cause of desire. From the general goal Aristotle proceeds to more specific goals or causes—the virtues. What causes a man
to be just? The virtue of justice causes a man to act justly. Still, how does one acquire knowledge of what justice is? By asking the just man. This seems like a very existential way of answering, namely, that justice is only known in one who exists justly. So Aristotle seems to do ethics two ways: by studying the subject matter one comes to theoretic knowledge of souls; and by pointing to the concrete existence of virtuous and vicious persons. Thus Aristotle's term, character, can be compared to Fichte's "absolute ego" or Hegel's "spirit" insofar as they each refer to the capacity of a person to become what one is. But there is an important difference. If we compare the soul as a nature or a potency with the character as a second nature somehow between potency and act, the latter has far more the connotation of "self-making self" than the former.

Here we can draw a helpful distinction. In the classical tradition men were known to be more the causes of their moral situations than of their cognitional situations. Now, a careful comparison of Aristotle's use of the terms "soul" and "character" might clarify this contrast. Let us reconsider the term "substance" from a methodological point of view. If science or theory is a matter of discovering causes, then metaphysics as the first science seeks the first causes. Substance, therefore, is a cause of the being of a thing; moreover, it is the first cause of being, or as Aristotle said, "the study of being is primarily the study of substance." If the substance causes a thing to be what it is, then it is important to distinguish between the acts of substances that are caused by other substances and those acts that are self-caused. This is a complex question since it involves the relation of the method of metaphysics to the method of studying souls and the method of ethics. The problem was not as complex for Aristotle because as we saw he integrated the various disciplines by his theory of causes and he specified his causes through his basic terms of act and potency,
form and matter. All three terms—substance, soul and character—can be defined through variations of the meanings of act and potency, hence, Aristotle had no difficulty in controlling the meaning of his terms. If Aristotle had been faced as had Kant with a system of physics whose basic terms were not derived from a metaphysical context, then the problem of developing a metaphysics that could integrate different disciplines would have become explicit. As it was, Aristotle distinguished the various disciplines without ever determining what the methodological differences were.

With Kant we have the first attempt to discover a method that will provide the norm and method for all the other methods—a transcendental method. Aristotle had transcendental categories that applied to the categories of the various disciplines, but he had no explicit methodical way of integrating the various methods he used in his politics, ethics, physics, logic, rhetoric, etc. Aristotle left to his disciples the problem of discovering a method that would provide the norms and procedures for knowing the difference between the systematic method of doing physics and the systematic method of doing ethics, and how to proceed from one system to the other in a unified, coherent way.

Aristotle's disciples never clearly formulated the problem since Aristotle had already provided them with a way of integrating the various disciplines by using the same terms with different meanings. In the second place there was a basic tension between knowing anticipated in the natural sciences and metaphysics and the quality of knowledge expected in his ethics and politics. In the former case, Aristotle expected certain and unchangeable knowledge because for him the object of theory universe was certain, unchangeable and everlasting; science was causal, and if you knew the first causes, then you had certitude. Ethics and politics, on the other hand, did not have eternal, unchanging, and certain objects of
eternal contemplation. For Aristotle the career of the philosopher seeking science and wisdom was much to be preferred to that of the statesman seeking political and moral goals. Ethics may be systematic, but it was not scientific in the sense of being reducible to first causes. The politician would not attain wisdom; prudence and justice were his goals. With these virtues he could handle the contingencies in a political career.

Shifting now to a few comments about what happened after Aristotle, we find not only that the methodological problem was never solved, but this basic tension in Aristotle was compromised in such a way that the methodological problem never even surfaced.

Recall Collingwood's claim that the study of history was delayed because of the influence of the category of substance in Greek philosophy. According to Marrou, however, philosophy did not play the formative role in ancient classical culture that Collingwood seems to think it did. "Hellenistic culture was above all things a rhetorical culture, and its typical form was the public lecture" (Marrou: 269). Marrou makes this statement in his book, History Education in Antiquity, in a section entitled "Rhetoric--The Queen of the Subjects." He goes on to say:

This fact must be emphasized from the start. On the level of history Plato had been defeated: posterity had not accepted his educational ideas. The victor, generally speaking, was Socrates, and Socrates became the educator first of Greece and then of the whole ancient world. His success had already been evident when the two were alive, and it became more and more marked as the generations wore on. Rhetoric is the specific object of Greek education and the highest Greek culture.

It would seem then that the role of Greek philosophy as conceived by Plato and Aristotle in the formation of the system of classical education which has perdured in the West until the nineteenth century and in some schools even to our own day was rather minimal. In Stoic philosophy, however, we find a different emphasis which had profound consequences, namely, the role that the study of logic
played in philosophy and rhetoric. To quote Marrou again: "Aristotle did not include rhetoric as part of philosophy proper, however, the Stoics did; they claimed it as an integral part of their logic which was the first of the three stages into which they divided philosophy" (289). This change might be mistaken as a simple matter of organizing the curriculum of studies in a different way. But it had the extraordinary effect of distorting the whole Aristotelian corpus and of obfuscating the whole methodological issue. It oriented Western culture in a direction that would last until the nineteenth century. It was not the category of substance, but the tendencies and procedures inherent in the study of logic, that determined the anti-historical course of classical culture. To explain how this occurred we will have to discuss briefly the nature of the study of logic.

Logic is a method of checking the consistency and coherence of an argument. The logician has a number of ways to insure that his arguments are clear and precise. He defines his meanings in such a way that they are consistent throughout his argument. Unlike the rhetorician he does not appeal to emotions; in fact he pays no attention to the level of learning of his audience. In order to be consistent he avoids changing the meanings of his terms so that they be more easily grasped by his listener. The logician is like Euclid when he uses the word "angle" in any of his propositions, always holding to the same meaning set down in the beginning of his system. Thus logic encourages one to seek meanings and combinations of meanings that are changeless over time. The ahistorical orientation of classical culture that preoccupied Collingwood can be explained by logical methods and the sort of attitudes they tend to develop.

Aristotle speaks about substance in many different senses. This multiplicity of meanings offends the logical mind's pursuit of rigid consistency. It would want to
reduce multiplicity to a logical unity. Thus while Aristotle had no difficulty in varying the metaphysical meaning of substance as he shifted from one context to another by using different senses of substance, the logician would want to use the term in each of the disciplines in exactly the same way. For Aristotle the substance of plants and animals are on different levels of being and therefore different levels of meaning; but for the logician differences between these levels would be set aside in favor of the single consistent meaning. The metaphysical differences between the branches of science as Aristotle had conceived them tended to be ironed out and eliminated by treating them in a logical fashion. The differences between the branches of sciences in a logical classification are logical rather than metaphysical or real differences. Similarly, the logician can specify different levels but what he cannot specify is any developmental relations that may occur between these levels.

Note that logic is itself a method. Classical culture dating from the time of Aristotle tended to be dominated by the logical method of reflection; but with Kant a methodological breakthrough occurred and there emerged a transcendental method for unifying the various methods of knowing and reflecting on knowing and reflecting. The problem in classical culture was that logic tended to perform the function of what we have called the transcendental method (the method from which all other methods can be derived).

The main difference that I would underline at this point between the method of logic and the transcendental method is that many of the key steps in knowing are not made explicit by logic: i.e., questioning, inquiring and discovering; and of verifying or of critically probing whether what one apprehends is knowledge of something or someone actually existing. Something may be true and known logically but not exist. Logic "abstracts" from existential questions and deals with the world of the possible.
Second, logic deals with meanings that are always the same and so logic "abstracts" from the problem of becoming or developing.

Third, logic deals with meanings already acquired, and so "abstracts" from the way that meanings or the reality of meaning begin to exist. Such logical realities tend to be considered timeless and necessarily existing in the way they are conceived if only the conceptions satisfy the norms of logic.

Fourth, the logical norms are the principles of identity, contradiction and excluded middle. This means that all knowledge proceeds from the knowledge of these principles, and so logical knowledge can be derived from a few first principles.

Lastly, logic "abstracts" from listeners and speakers alike as it proceeds from principles according to rules that could be programmed in a very impersonal way.

For all five of these reasons, a culture dominated by logical methods of apprehending, reasoning and verifying will be a culture that will not place a high premium on historical studies. Moreover, and more to the point, such a culture will tend to construct a system of ethics characterized by these same logical attitudes.

An ethical system formed in accord with logical method will tend to be based on a few basic principles. It will be a system that will emphasize its own universality, its unchangeability, its applicability to all cultures regardless of their level of development. It will abstract from the concrete particular ethical subject and stress the unchanging substance or soul that is "natural" in all men and women; and thus will tend to be applied to any particular person in a somewhat rigid and formal manner.

I am not proposing that any particular thinkers during the period of classical culture followed the logical method exclusively, but rather that because the study of logic played such a central role in classical education, it was
the ideals and goals of logic that tended to dominate the dominant thinkers of classical culture.

Now there were basic tensions in Aristotle's thought. If one were to assimilate his thought according to the ideals and goals of logic or turn Aristotle's system into a logical system, it would mean artificially covering over those basic tensions. The "system" that held the Aristotelian sciences together was his own mind which, while it respected the ideals of logic, was more concerned with the study of being. Perhaps the most expeditious way to indicate the effects of logic on Aristotle is to briefly consider the assimilation of Aristotle into Stoic ethical thought.

Aristotle had ranked the career of the philosopher above that of the statesman, and he had given speculative intellect priority over the practical intellect. Stoic doctrine reversed these priorities, thereby elevating political and moral investigations above the study of metaphysics. For Aristotle, metaphysics was superior because the metaphysician determined the first causes of everything and the basic pattern that governed the substantial natures of every existing thing. It is important to note that for Aristotle the first principles by which the wise man ordered the known parts into a whole were causes—the real causes of things. Metaphysical principles were not principles existing in a possible mind but actual causes existing in individual things. The general tendency among the Stoics was to transform first causes into first laws and to locate these laws in a mind that knew them naturally. The ultimate source of these natural laws was the divine law that governed every nature individually and collectively by implanting its law in the nature of things. As a result, the tendency among Stoic thinkers was to make ethical, political and physical laws a part of the divine law of Providence. This satisfied the normative ideals imbued in Stoics through the study of logic. Thus the tension between
Aristotle's ethics and the certainties of metaphysics were eliminated.

A good example of this compromise was the Roman Stoic, Cicero. Cicero was neither just a philosopher nor just a rhetorician, but a combination of both. Cicero's philosophy is no longer the "theory" of Plato and Aristotle, with the division between the way of life of the philosopher and that of the politician. In Cicero there is a strong tendency to join these two walks of life into a single career. Accordingly, Cicero tended to blend Aristotle's practical wisdom with the more strictly scientific and speculative wisdom of "first philosophy" or metaphysics. This resulted in Cicero's tendency to conceive the laws of the state as based on immutable principles. While Aristotle himself did not say that ethical and political principles or laws were unchangeable, it would be easy for an interpreter of Aristotle to overlook his clear distinction between laws that can be changed and those that are certain and necessary. With Cicero, the case for immutability is much clearer, although it is still uncertain according to the evidence presented by Leo Strauss. He argues that Cicero is ambiguous as to whether the statesman and lawmaker must work out a fundamental compromise between what is naturally good and what is politically good. The question is whether or not there can be a natural harmony between natural society and civil society. In Stoic doctrine, the question is answered by an appeal to a doctrine of divine providence which governs the entire universe and which implants its laws not only in the physical universe but also in the souls of men. There is no more noble work for Cicero than the building up of a civil society in which the divine reason is made manifest. There is a close union for Cicero between the religious and civil society. This union implies a basic harmony between the divine and human ruler of society; and a cosmic force which makes all men essentially equal to one another, binding them in a universal brotherhood. All men share in a common destiny or providence; and
since all men share this same nature they can be ruled by the same set of laws, or basic law of nature. The harmony that would conjoin political laws with divine laws would thereby make political laws truly universal. Unlike the political justice of the Aristotelian statesmen, which is intrinsically conditioned by the time and conditions of particular situations, Roman political laws pretended universality and complete accord with the whole of nature; nature in turn was (a) controlled by the divine nature permeating the whole cosmos and (b) provided with a providence that governed and guided everything to its natural and necessary destiny.

Summary of Part I

It might be helpful at this point to summarize our arguments. We have been explaining the characteristics of classical culture from the time of Plato and Aristotle up to the period of nineteenth century German Idealism. Collingwood's contention was that the substantialistic view of man as developed by Hellenistic thinkers discouraged the development of historical thinking since it tended to doubt the possibility of developments. With the dynamic notion of the person as Spirit, the seeds for a clear distinction between the natural and human sciences are germinating, thus setting the stage for the rise of historical mindedness. I have argued that it was not the metaphysical notion of substance that held sway over historical thinking but the methodological failure to solve the problem of the specific differences between ethical theory and the sciences of nonhuman reality. The problem was not with the category of substance but with differentiating the first causes of human substances and the first causes of plants and animal substances in a critical fashion. Aristotle did not fail to distinguish between the human and natural sciences, but he failed to develop the critical method by which one could distinguish the two. Aristotle's categories
transcended the division between the sciences but he did not provide us with a critical basis for knowing the various ways that we go about either knowing different categories of things or knowing the same things from different points of view. The key distinction that Aristotle left his followers with was between knowing things as they are related to us and knowing things as they are in themselves; i.e., in their first causes. But this distinction was not articulated critically and it left the door open for subsequent Stoics to reconceive philosophy as a body of knowledge shaped chiefly by the method and goals of logic. The Stoic system of philosophy tended to be more abstract and less concrete than that of Aristotle. This is particularly evident if we compare the basic orientation of Aristotelian and Stoic ethics. In Aristotle's ethics, ethical "causes" are not reducible to a set of norms that are universally applicable in every moral and political situation. Aristotle's wise man may know the first and unchangeable causes of things but the prudent man must determine each case in a much more contingent and less predictable way. This contrast between the virtues of wisdom and prudence can be characterized as a contrast between knowledge that is of the particular, contingent and concrete with knowledge of the universal necessary, and unchangeable. The former mode of knowing characterized Aristotle's ethics, the latter his metaphysics and the other theoretic sciences. Stoic thought tended to replace metaphysics by logic and construct an ethical system that was universally and necessarily applicable to every contingent, concrete, individual person. Because the ethical system was to be based on the principles of nature, and because nature was conceived of as referring to man, universe and God in a way that all three could be bound into a single harmonious and hierarchical system, the Stoics eliminated the Aristotelian tension between prudence and wisdom; between the wise man as philosopher who knew the first and final causes of things and the prudent and
just statesman who had to constantly deliberate well in view of particular and unexpected developments. Again the Stoics obliterated Aristotle's distinction between the theoretic (scientific) intellect and the practical (moral and political) intellect; or if they kept this distinction, they reversed the priority of the theoretic over the practical intellect and endowed practical knowledge with the sort of metaphysical, causal necessity and certitude that had been the goal of Aristotelian theoretic knowing. Thus, the Stoics blended the physical, moral, political and religious universe into one harmonious whole.

My account of the Stoic achievement represents the way Stoics tended to think and reflect on themselves, their political society and the physical universe. This does not mean that the Stoics acted or existed in the way they thought about themselves. No doubt their theory influenced their actual living and day-to-day choosing. But that is not the focus of this paper, which is to examine Western culture not as lived but as thought about and judged. My thesis is that there was a tendency among thinkers from Plato to Hegel to think and judge in a way that was dominated by the ideals of classical logic.

We can now turn to the ending of classical culture and the shift to a new cultural orientation in thinking. The focus in this second part will be on the new conception of the person as a concrete, individual self-developing-self existing in a particular historical context. The key thinkers connected with this new orientation and theory of the self are Kant, Fichte, Hegel and Kierkegaard. In examining these thinkers, I will focus on two factors—the emergence of a transcendental method that governs all other methods, and the effect of this method on the formation of a new notion of the person. Finally, I will describe the implications of these developments for contemporary moral thinking.
II

Recall that Aristotle had developed transcendental categories to integrate the various branches of science into a systematic whole. The break with the Aristotelian system occurred when Newton developed a systematic explanation of the nature of motion using basic terms and formulas that were not derived from Aristotelian metaphysics. Not only did Newton develop a systematic and autonomous explanation, but he strengthened the new methodological orientation articulated and propagandized by Bacon—the empirical or experimental method. Bacon had insisted that this new way of procuring and confirming scientific knowledge was opposed to the traditional scholastic method of explaining the natures of things by their first and final causes discovered in a deductivist and nonexperimental manner. Bacon tended to identify Aristotle as the source of these deductive procedures of knowing even though Aristotle did conduct scientific observations and did not argue deductively from metaphysical or first causes of motion to secondary, natural causes. This type of deductive thinking was derived not from Aristotle's methods of doing science or metaphysics, but from the methods of classical logic. The result of Bacon's and others' failure to find the real source of the error led eventually to the nineteenth century positivist claim that the empirical method of knowing is the only legitimate method, which repeated the Stoic error of allowing only one method to dominate the modes of knowing.

The emergence of the Newtonian science of motion intensified the problem of the legitimacy of ordinary pragmatic modes of knowing in comparison with scientific, systematic modes of knowing. Hume's response to this question converged with other factors to precipitate the Kantian methodological breakthrough. Kant reversed the Aristotelian procedure of arguing from objects (causes) to acts by beginning with the modes of knowing and arguing to the
objects known through the acts. His subversion of the Aristotelian procedure for determining the nature of the human soul made possible the development of a new notion of the human person as a self-causing-self. Though Kant did not himself explicitate this notion, he paved the way for Fichte and Hegel to do so by stressing the creative and constructive role that the human mind assumed in achieving knowledge.

I have already mentioned the phrase "self-causing-self" or "self-constituting-self," in connection with Aristotle's notion of moral character. A person is responsible for the sort of character he makes for himself. But Aristotle had no method either for critically clarifying this moral self-making, or for critically determining to what extent the human person was self-making in acquiring scientific knowledge. Kant's methodological breakthrough is so significant because, by his focusing on the knower and the a priori structures by which we know, Kant made it possible to methodically clarify to what extent the person was both constitutive and responsible not only of his moral person but also of his intellectual self. Kant's method also made possible the distinction between the internal and external fields of consciousness.

Aristotle analyzed the structure of the soul of a plant, animal, and human in the same way; he did not study the operations of the human soul by articulating a unique procedure of reflecting on his own conscious self as Descartes had done. Kant went even further in working out a method for making the conscious self an object of investigation. Though he never capitalized on this methodological possibility himself, Fichte and Hegel did. As we shall see, they both explicitated the self-knowing-self as simultaneously a self-causing-self; and by analysing successive phases of this self-causing-self they articulated the self-developing-self. This novel view of the person coupled with Kierkegaard's notion of the existential subject has
resulted in the break with the controls of meaning that had characterized classical culture.

The generic type of ethical system within classical culture was developed under the control of procedures and attitudes associated with classical logic. We are now focusing on the emergence of a new method of controlling or reflecting upon the way we know and act—a transcendental method. Just as the method of logic tended to produce a theory of the person and a moral theory with certain characteristics, so the development of the transcendental method by Kant, Fichte, Hegel and Kierkegaard produced a new view of the person and a new moral horizon. After Kant, Fichte took a major step in this direction when he shifted the a priori from the categories to the subject who produced the categorical structures—the ego. With the subject as an irreducible point of departure, Fichte characterized in a negative fashion the relation of the subject to the objects including one's own subjectivity as the first of these objects known. It was as though the subject in knowing these objects needed only to "overcome" them and thereby establish its own independence or freedom from them. Yet, Fichte had still added a dialectical procedure to Kant's method by which one could intuit both the structure of the sensible world as the physicist does and the structure of the moral world of human freedom.

For Kant the question of human freedom was not theoretical but practical since the question of human freedom could not be solved theoretically or scientifically. A philosopher could postulate human freedom: if someone had to act virtuously, then, one must be free to so act. If there was an "ought" or a necessity by which people determined their behavior, then, they must in some way be free from the conditions that society and nature impose upon them. Now for Fichte the subject makes himself what he is by overcoming the conditions set up against him by nature and society. In overcoming these oppositions the person
frees himself and realizes his capacity as a self-causing-self. This dialectical movement between self and self, self and nature, self and society provided Hegel and subsequent philosophers with a concrete and dynamic model of the person. Among Hegel's serious reservations about Fichte's absolute ego, the primary one was that it was not absolute; or rather, that Fichte's absolute was not critically grounded.

It remains that with his transcendental model of the person, Fichte was able to review the history of man and detect a new plot—the history of man's own self-making in successive periods. The key to this achievement was Fichte's having overcome the opposition that Kant had left between the realm of nature and the realm of mind. Nature for Kant and Fichte meant the physical universe and man's behavior insofar as it was determined by this physical universe. Nature had the connotation of the so-called "state of nature" as conceived by Hobbes, Locke and Rousseau. While all three had different views on the nature of man in the "state of nature," all three interpreted the course of history as beginning from this "natural state" and reaching the present stage through a series of historical situations. Hobbes and Kant tended to a more pessimistic view; Locke, Rousseau and Fichte were inclined to portray the course of history in which man gradually moved from a state of natural liberty to a state of civil liberty. Fichte divided the course of history into five stages: (1) the natural stage where man was naturally but only instinctually free to do as he pleased; (2) a civil stage in which he subjected himself to an authority; (3) a revolutionary stage in which this authority is rejected; (4) a counter-revolutionary stage of science in which the authority of reason as self-governing is recognized; (5) a reconciliation between nature and reason effected in art where reason, motivated not by duty to a higher authority but by love and sympathy, freely recreates itself. In each of
these stages but the last there is a basic opposition between reason and nature which is gradually transcended as the subject achieves a new and higher stage of freedom. Implicit in dialectical sequence are certain advances made by Fichte over Kant.

Kant had been preoccupied by the traditional distinction between speculative and practical intellect and by the problem of the priority of intellect and will. Fichte transcended these traditional distinctions and moved much further than Kant from the traditional way of conceiving of the person as possessing a soul with two principal potencies—intellect and will. The subject rather than the faculties of intellect and will comes to the foreground in Fichte's thought. Fichte synthesized the major distinction between practical and speculative intellect in a new and broader category of intellectual experience. Kant had held a dichotomy between phenomenal and noumenal experience. But Fichte broadened the possibility of intellectual experience by extending the realm of theory to the moral and practical fields. Its horizon was that of the subject who by passing through these various limitations of the natural, social, and historical environments becomes the absolute subject. For Fichte, man's self-making reaches a final reconciliation within the subject's own activity; Kant's thing-in-itself as a limit of theoretical reason is transcended by the subject's own thinking and willing. Whereas the Romantics transcended Kant's thing-in-itself by absolutizing nature in one form or another, Fichte overcame the same limitation by absolutizing the self employing science and art.

Fichte thought of his philosophy as operating within Kant's transcendentental system. He did not think of his transcendentental ego as in continuity with Kant's transcendentental unity of apperception. But the key aspects of Fichte's self-making-subject such as the notions of freedom and autonomy were only postulates in Kant's system; they
became conscious and objectified in Fichte's thought. Still this line of thought does not draw attention to the heart of the subtle shift that takes place in Fichte's use of the transcendental method. With Fichte, there is much more emphasis on the subject's own performance; to understand the transcendental subject he is referring to, it is necessary to "do" something: his reader must catch himself in the act of thinking and willing. It is the thinking person as actually thinking who becomes the basis of Fichte's philosophy. Kant's postulates not only become conscious in Fichte but they also consciously perform. It is this shift in the meaning of knowing that I wish to emphasize. Once Kant had begun to analyze knowing in terms of the subject's operations on the objects known, it may have been an easy enough step to extend this methodological advance to the wider field of conscious experience as Fichte did. However, it seems to me a much more difficult and subtle development to grasp that knowing is not only cognitive of its object but is also and simultaneously constitutive of that object as known. And when the object known is oneself, then one grasps that knowing of self is also a making of self. Fichte opened the door for Hegel and Kierkegaard to clarify this making of self.

The reason I stress this point is because of the implications it has for a moral theory. A central problem in contemporary moral thinking is to determine critically to what extent a person is responsible for the person he is and to what extent society is responsible for itself and its historical past.

In Hegel we find another important development in the transcendental method and in the notion of the person as a self-making-self. Unlike Fichte, Hegel conceives of his own philosophy in opposition to Kant and makes an explicit break with the classical notion of man as a soul endowed with special cognitive and appetitive faculties. We noted that Fichte had overcome the Kantian division of practical
and pure reason by a dialectical synthesis of the successive oppositions provided by nature and society. At the end of this dialectical and reflective procedure, the Fichtean subject becomes the foundational principle of philosophy itself. Hegel also proceeds dialectically to an absolute goal; but his absolute is not the dialectically conscious human subject but the human and divine subject. For Fichte, the human mind reaches the absolute ego only insofar as the human subject dialectically transforms his experience of nature and history. In Hegel, nature and history are distinguished from yet considered together with a religious and not simply a philosophical viewpoint. Thus Hegel can criticize both Kant and Fichte as "abstracting from" the absolute viewpoint. In their treatment of nature and history, Kant and Fichte are not as concrete as Hegel would wish them to be; their notion of reason is too limited. Reason for Hegel is infinite in power and scope. More important, reason transcends any prior meaning that would place reason or intellect in opposition to will or action.

For Hegel, willing is a mode of reason and reason is a mode of willing. The two faculties are combined into a single structure. The difference between practical and speculative intellect is not that the practical reason involves the use of the will while the other does not, but rather will is involved in both, and the difference is in the attitude of the person's reason in willing. Likewise, the distinction between willing and acting can no longer be conceived as separate from one another. Hegel continues and extends Fichte's emphasis on knowing as a constitutive and performative action.

Fichte conceived the knowing subject and the known object in opposition to one another. Knowing is the dialectical process of overcoming this opposition and eliminating the opposition by transforming what was previously other or not-I into what is ego. Hegel noticed that this
process not only eliminates prior oppositions but also leads to a loss of the objective status of the prior object or other. In wanting to transform and assimilate nature and history within the dialectical process, Hegel also wanted to preserve their objective status. To do this, Hegel reemphasized the cognitive dimension of knowing through a dialectic of concepts that he formulated in his logic. He insisted on a dialectical, conceptual mediation of nature and history that would provide reason with its full and comprehensive scope thereby sublating the Kantian "ought" and the Fichtean endless striving into the infinite power of reason itself. Thus with Hegel, the turn to the subject and its operations begun by Kant and absolutized by Fichte attains a concrete, universal and absolute standpoint in the infinite power of reason to mediate and transform reality into itself. Insofar as the human spirit transforms itself and reality into this absolute, it attains an identity with the divine spirit. Hegel traced the course of this dialectical transformation of the human spirit in a way analogous to Fichte's, identifying the course of history as a series of successive stages in which Spirit sublates the prior stage until it reaches the absolute standpoint that reconciles all differences. Compared with Fichte, Hegel's *Philosophy of History* is much more elaborate, concrete and objective. In art, religion and philosophy, the Absolute manifests itself in a series of dialectical stages culminating in the Prussian state and Hegel's own philosophical system.

By completing his history of philosophy and his philosophy of history, Hegel thought that he had disposed of his major living philosophical adversary, Schelling. But after Hegel's death, Schelling succeeded Hegel at Berlin and lectured against Hegelianism. One of his listeners was the young Danish thinker, Søren Kierkegaard, whose philosophy can be considered as a refutation of Hegel's system. In the present context, this rejection can be seen as an
attack on Hegel's preoccupation with the universal to the neglect of the particular. It is of special significance that Kierkegaard employs the advances made by Kant, Fichte and Hegel to criticize these thinkers, and thereby develop this method in a quite original way.

Fichte and Hegel added to Kant's transcendental method a dialectical and "performative" dimension. The conventional account of the movement between Hegel and Kierkegaard as a turn to the concrete, existential subject and away from the universal, absolute spirit does not do justice to the emphasis that Fichte placed on the performance of the philosopher in doing philosophy. If Fichte conceived of his philosophy as a dialectical task that could only be known in its performance, then he would certainly seem to be speaking about his own existing, performing self. Moreover, there is a case to be made that Hegel's notion of the spirit includes the concrete, existential, performing subject.

In this light, the question becomes, What can Kierkegaard add that would make the subject more concrete and existential? The conventional response to this question is that Kierkegaard added the notion of existential choice -- the either/or that makes the subject what he or she actually is. But if one goes back to Fichte's philosophy, one can find considerable emphasis on the choosing subject, and it can be argued that "doing" philosophy for Fichte explicitly involved a personal choice. Similarly, if we return to the Aristotelian notion of the person as "character," we can find Aristotle insisting on the same concrete, existential choices made by the person. There is a significant sense, then, in which Aristotle, Fichte and Hegel are speaking about a concrete, existential subject who thinks and chooses to be the sort of person he is. Nevertheless, there is another and more significant sense in which Kierkegaard is referring to the concrete, existential subject in a way they never do. This difference
brings out a further dimension of the transcendental method based on a new transcendental notion of value.

Thus far we have been using the term dialectic to refer primarily to opposition that exists or develops between the subject and object or between the self and others, and to the gradual overcoming of this opposition through a higher synthesis that only brings about a further opposition which yields in turn a new and higher synthesis. This process finally attains reconciliation in the absolute ego by Fichte and in the absolute spirit by Hegel. Kierkegaard uses dialectical method to show that the struggle cannot be reconciled in the Hegelian manner. The Kierkegaardian dialectic uncovers not a tension of opposing forces which can be sublated into a higher synthesis but an impasse. This can be broken not by any higher synthesis but only by a reversal and rejection of the prior way of choosing and living. What must be rejected is my concrete, existential self operating in its present inauthentic modes. For Kierkegaard, it is not part of me that must be rejected because "me" is never a part of my existence but the whole of it. It is not "me" insofar as I am part of a family or a state or a history, but insofar as I exist in the very unique and particular way that I do exist. That way cannot be universalized or generalized because it is uniquely me. Moreover, this unique form of existence which is my own person is not only to be rejected but it is to be rejected absolutely without any way of integrating it into a future synthesis. This is a crucial point. Like Hegel, Kierkegaard discovered the absolute but it was a limited absolute. The existing subject that Kierkegaard proposes to reject is the subject who thinks there really exists for him or her an unlimited form of existence. To communicate this paradox of an utterly unique and concrete, existing person who must choose to reject the person one actually is, Kierkegaard broke with the traditional method of philosophical
expression and employed a literary mode. We can explain this development by using Aristotle's term for the concrete, existing subject—character.

What Kierkegaard did was to present his reader with an actual, existing person having a particular character which he described in concrete detail. Rather than displaying the dialectic as it operated between the subject and the physical universe or between the person and society in the course of successive historical situations, Kierkegaard wished to show it at work in the life of an individual person who had acquired for himself a particular character by the individual choices he had made. One character presented by Kierkegaard in his study of Stages on Life's Way is Don Juan.

Besides presenting the reader with a particular, concrete character, Kierkegaard describes in a very precise fashion the way this person chooses to deceive himself about the way he actually exists. The crucial point here is not that Don Juan chooses incorrectly but rather that all of his choices are part of a single choice that gives the basic direction to his particular life within the wider (universal) social context in which he "performs" his life. Don Juan's basic choice is not to choose. How can a person keep choosing as Don Juan does each day and still be represented as having a character whose principle trait is not to choose? Obviously Don Juan must practice self-deception; and the deception that he carefully weaves for himself is that he has a permanent and consistent standpoint on which to base his life—a commitment to live in the immediate and the present without caring for the past and future. What Don Juan seeks is pleasure in whatever way he chooses and at the time he chooses; he has taken up the search for unlimited and absolute pleasure. What Kierkegaard disagrees with in Hegel's philosophy is not the philosophy but the presupposition that anyone could live a life based on such a philosophy, and that if anyone did
claim, as Hegel seems to of himself, that he "exists" in or by a philosophy, then such a life is comparable to that of Don Juan. This comparison will be made much more explicit in the second stage.

For our present purpose, the important point is Kierkegaard's description of the way Don Juan can shift from the aesthetic way of life to the ethical. Left to his own devices, there is no way for Don Juan to break out of the vicious circle of his choices. It is important to emphasize just how vicious or enslaving is the circle of Don Juan's life. One might argue that a person is by nature free, and so at any point in his life he may decide to turn his life around and begin a new way. However, Don Juan's problem is that he has been refusing to accept the actual consequences of his actions. He insists on choosing as if there were no consequences and hence as if he has no responsibility for what follows from those actions. A person who is living in the "real" world would insist that there are consequences; and so that Don Juan is living in an unreal world.

This shifting of perspectives to another character is a device that Kierkegaard uses to underscore the various nuances of converting from one way of life to another. Don Juan himself is a character that another real person, Johannes, chooses to play. With the interplay of these perspectives, Kierkegaard can describe the consequences of the character's actions as seen from two points of view, thereby contrasting the supposed consequences with the actual ones. He can also describe where the Don Juan or aesthetic way of life is leading. In the letters of Cordelia, we find Johannes's actions tending to those of a madman, a man demoniacally possessed. Since these letters are the literary projections of Don Juan, they suggest his uneasy awareness that his way of life is bringing him to madness. But this is still in the world of fantasy. Don Juan himself lives in the unreal world and his literary
projections are even further removed from the real world. This is Kierkegaard's way of suggesting how desperate the Don Juan way of life has become and how difficult it will be to break out of it.

Don Juan judges himself in complete control of himself; he is free to do as he chooses. A life based on this assumption gradually leads to the situation described above where Don Juan's sense that he is losing control of himself and going mad is not admitted, but only suspected—a projection of the imagination. And so he vacillates between his overt claim of being able to choose without consequences (without choosing) and suspecting that the actual consequences of his life are leading him to insanity.

To break the aesthetic circle of life, Kierkegaard introduces the character, Judge William, who represents a new way of life—the ethical way. The judge attacks the basic assumption of the aesthetic mode of existence—that one can choose without really choosing the consequences. Choices have consequences and these consequences must be accepted. Whether one likes it or not, when someone chooses he or she is choosing the consequences. And the first consequence is the chooser—he or she comes to be what he or she chooses. We are free to choose but we are not free to choose without consequences. If I refuse to accept the consequences, then I refuse to accept the principal effect—the chooser—I refuse to accept myself.

There is another and more paradoxical side to Don Juan's disorientation. If to choose involves responsibility, then the only real choice left to him is to choose what he has already chosen, that is, to accept now the consequences of his prior choices. This means of course that Don Juan must choose despair since that is the "real" consequence of his prior way of life. This, Judge William advises him, is the only way to save himself from despair, the only real way to redeem the aesthetic mode of existence. But Don Juan does not know what Judge William knows he
cannot experience: the ethical values; he cannot feel the joy that Judge William assures him is the reward of virtue. What Don Juan does feel is despair—a dread of losing what little he has left of his existence. Not only must Don Juan choose despair but he must do so without being able to actually experience at the time of his decision those wonderful consequences that Judge William has assured him will be his in the ethical orientation of living. The decision involves a risk—an unknown. Only by an act of faith in the testimony of Judge William can Don Juan transcend or reverse the direction of his present mode of existence. Any hope that Don Juan might feel about escaping from his present situation is coupled not only with the fear of having to accept the consequences of his past life but the risk that the future, ethical direction may not actually exist. What actually exists is Don Juan despairing that he is losing the only real form of existence he personally experiences. What possibly exists is the ethical way of life that can only be made real by the personal choice of Don Juan. The choice is absolute but it is not absolutely absolute; it is absolute as subject to the conditions under which it is made. Does the shift to ethical mode of existence at least offer the hope for a fulfillment of the "naturally" unrestricted desire that drove Don Juan into his basic deception and eventual despair?

Judge William thinks so. In presenting the ethical way of life to Don Juan the Judge insists that Don Juan must take responsibility for his existence, and not just in the present; but he must be ready always to repent his past and look to an indefinite future in which he will render to each man his due. The Judge insists that it is not the nature of man to exist in the immediate, he also exists in the past and future, and he must be responsible for both. To be just is to be repentant about any past injustices and to be dutiful toward future developments.
Freedom and nature may coincide if a person acts accountably and responsibly about his past, present, and future. Don Juan insists on freedom in the present to the neglect of the past and future only to find that his past and future (his nature) are enslaving him in a vicious circle of a destiny of despair. Judge William boasts that in his own life his responsibilities are his freedoms. In his marriage he finds his natural tendencies and his freedom in complete harmony; there is no conflict between what he accepts as his duties and what love demands. Duty and love, nature and freedom are perfectly balanced.

Kierkegaard breaks up the neat harmony ascribed by Judge William to his own life by repeating the same device he employed in describing the actual horizon of Don Juan, namely, the contrast with a new character. This time it is in the light of the character of a Priest that the basic deceit of Judge William becomes evident; at the same time, Judge William discovers an even more radical despair and dread. The Priest presents the case of two lovers in a quarrel to reveal the limits of justice in its ethical pretense to an absolute standpoint. Love and justice are not coextensive. Love can reveal demands to which the just man cannot answer. If the other person places such demands on you that the only possible reconciliation is that you end in the wrong, it is not enough to be just to the other person. If you do not want to end reconciled and in love, justice will save you from such an impasse. Since, however, it would be wrong and unjust for you to give in to a demand that you know is unjust and unreasonable, there is actually no reason that reason itself can provide for transcending such divergent claims. If the other person is unreasonable, then your reasoning will not change that unreasonable claim. The only possible solution is to go beyond reason and find some deeper source of transcendence that encompasses reason itself.
What, then, is the value of reasoning itself? Why do we reason with one another about who is right or wrong? We do so in order to agree and join together in the same reason. Union and communion is the very basis and value of reason. The communion of persons is a value that transcends and grounds the values reason pursues. This line of thought opens up a way beyond the limits of the claims of justice.

The lover cannot reasonably accept himself as being in the wrong. Reason cannot say: I know I am right and you are wrong but I will change places with you and put myself in the wrong. Reason doesn't work that way, and would contradict itself to do so. Love, however, can claim to love not the rightness of a person's reason but the deeper right of the person to reason. The other is lovable because the other has been granted the right to reason, the right to be free to reason. Love reveals reasons that I cannot adequately calculate rationally; indeed these "reasons" are so inexhaustible that I may risk suspending reason for the sake of love. My own reason can transcend itself in virtue of the reason that love discovers, and which takes priority over reason itself.

But if love is going to make claims transcending reason, then the risk of losing my own freedom for the sake of the beloved becomes a real possibility. And if one assumes that the other is infinitely other, then the possibility emerges that the whole ethical way of living may be placed in doubt (or even in the wrong).

It is not necessary to describe all the paradoxes that emerge in this very intimate and personal dialectic of justice and love since our purpose has been to specify the way that Kierkegaard limits the claim of the absolute both in the aesthetic mode of existence of Don Juan and in the ethical orientation of Judge William. In both orientations there is an individual's self-deceiving claim of operating within a supposedly unrestricted and comprehensive horizon of experience. Judge William, for example,
stands outside the horizon within which Don Juan operates and argues against the position taken by Don Juan. He does not accuse Don Juan of having this or that vice, lacking this or that virtue but rather claims that the very foundation of his entire way of living is wrong—the whole orientation is wrong. It is not a question of dropping vices and adding virtues but of transforming one's whole "character" by changing the basic direction of one's life. Similarly, the Priest stands outside Judge William's horizon to suggest that the Judge himself is guilty of the same basic insincerity of which he had accused Don Juan. Both are guilty of the same vice, namely, the failure to admit both that they are living within a horizon and that the direction they have chosen to take is to block out any existential awareness of the radically limited foundation on which they are operating. The crucial term is "existential awareness" since existence here means our making of ourselves by choice. It is by their own choices that Don Juan and Judge William are deliberately unaware of the fact that there is a horizon or a limit to the direction they have taken in their lives. They are living and choosing as if they were absolutely certain. The Priest reveals the real limits of their position and its basic inauthenticity. The Priest's challenge to an unrestricted claim simultaneously reveals their own unreality and strips them of the absolute certitude in terms of which they were operating. The only "absolute" left in the option the Priest proposes is the absolute limitation of one's own reality. With such an option one can know absolutely only that one has no absolute way of existing. Just as Judge William reveals the real limits of Don Juan's unreality so the Priest reveals a similar illusion and unreality in Judge William's direction.

Kierkegaard not only reveals the basic limits of human existence but specifies the way these limits are apprehended in our feelings. The feeling of fear in the form of despair
reveals the unreality of one's way of existing. Dread
discloses the limits of Don Juan's existence. Don Juan has
tried to claim an unlimited horizon, but his feelings of
dread reveal the horizon he has been attempting to conceal.
In feeling this dread, he feels his freedom and existence
really restricted. If he does not feel the dread he will
not "know" the real limits within which he is operating.
This constitutes a basic difference between Hegel's use of
the dialectic and Kierkegaard's.

In summary, then, Kierkegaard uses the dialectic to
demonstrate that reason cannot discover an absolute stand-
point. Only by going beyond reason itself can a person
have any real hope of achieving an absolutely absolute.
But this way is filled with doubt and dread; it can only be
mastered by a faith that is willing, if pressed by the in-
finite other, to suspend even ethical judgments. Again,
the unreality or untruth of the absolute standpoint is dis-
covered in one's own feelings. Our mode of existence is
made and unmade in the context of certain feelings which
form and govern the basic direction of our way of living.
In feeling through the basic dialectic of feelings we dis-
cover the nature of our existence. It is in the basic
limit situations (as exemplified in the life of Don Juan
and Judge William) that we discover what it is to exist
humanly. Especially in the limit situation of Judge
William do we discover that the basic form of human exis-
tence is not so much a choosing as a letting go, an accep-
tance of the fact that the only way of living without limits
is to give oneself over to the claim of a love whose reason
transcends reason itself. The value of this transcendence
becomes the value that grounds all other values including
the value of reason itself. Any choice that ultimately does
not move in this direction is not ultimate and suffers from
a basic inauthenticity that will reveal itself in the limit
situations of anxiety and dread that characterize the choice
(acceptance) of this basic and ultimate norm of human
existence. Every other form of existential choice—personal, social, or historical—falls within the horizon of this basic and ultimate horizon. Any horizon—personal, social, or historical—that claims to be absolute or encompassing can be judged to be absolutely false and absolutely opposed to this authentically ultimate horizon. There is no synthesis, sublation, or final reconciliation possible for this kind of opposition. This either/or is absolutely absolute, and it is ultimately "known" only in unrestricted loving.

From Kierkegaard's point of view the entire Hegelian system abstracts from this final and unreconcilable either/or. In this sense Hegel is neither existential nor concrete in his use of the transcendental method. For Kierkegaard the only resolution can come from a person's choosing to move into a "basically" different horizon. If the person does not so choose the opposition remains, and it remains absolutely. The position can only be eliminated when this concrete person makes a decision not to take the position, to abandon the position; and there is no absolute reason for him or her to abandon the position. The only absolutely absolute is love and love as known within the authentic horizon does not force or compel one. Human decisions are always limited, which is to say they are absolutely limited; but the absolute cannot limit a decision by me to such a degree that it is not mine, that it is not free. There are then personal, existential antitheses that are absolute; and Hegel never explicitated these oppositions in a personal, existential choice of a basic horizon. And so, when Kierkegaard accuses Hegel of dealing with the human person in an abstract, universal way; when he criticizes him for letting existence slip through the fingers of his system, it is this meaning of existence that he has in mind. If Kierkegaard can criticize Hegel for failing to be sufficiently concrete and critical in his dialectical analysis of personal, moral choice and for thereby losing
sight of the self-making moral subject who can be existing in a basically authentic or inauthentic way of life, one may wonder whether Kierkegaard may not be equally vulnerable to the charge that his ethics is not socially concrete in the way that Hegel's *Philosophy of Right* is. However true this may be, there is a yet more serious difficulty that Kierkegaard never encountered and of which he was probably quite unaware.

Kierkegaard broke up the necessity of Hegel's dialectic by showing that the opposition between basic, moral positions could be radical and permanent. He showed that the only way to overcome certain moral oppositions was through a free, existential decision; that there was no way to necessitate such decisions; and so that the dialectical development of the self-making-spirit in history was not as certain and necessary as Hegel had thought. In fact, instead of a growing progress in human freedom and liberty achieved through the evolution of Western Christianity from Catholicism to Protestantism, Kierkegaard found a gradual drifting away from the basic norms of Christianity. Christianity had lost its fundamental orientation, and thereby its liberty as well. For Kierkegaard one became a Christian not by nature or by history but by decision. To be baptized into the Danish Christian church and its nineteenth century traditions was to be born, baptized, and confirmed into an inauthentic Christian tradition. With such a clear articulation of the self-making-subject existing by choice and not by nature or history, one wonders why Kierkegaard's message went unnoticed.

Now while Kierkegaard exorcized the necessity and absoluteness from the Hegelian moral and religious dialectic, he failed to break the Hegelian dialectic of nature or, in other words, he failed to realize that just as moral judgments could only be absolute if they were limited, so scientific judgments had to face up to the same basic problem of fixing the limits of their positions. Kierkegaard
showed that human nature insofar as it was self-making determined its own existential directions. But what if the natures of physical, chemical, and biological processes were absolutely necessary and absolutely determinate in such a way as to render Kierkegaard's self-making-subject proximately free but ultimately and absolutely determined? In other words, while Kierkegaard put into question certain key assumptions of classical culture operative in the "human" sciences, he failed to question these same assumptions as they were at work in the reflective accounts of the procedures of the natural sciences. Kierkegaard explained human "nature" in a very concrete and contingent fashion but he failed to eradicate the absolute, unrestricted necessity of non-human "nature" as a whole.

If we turn to Marx briefly we find an interesting parallel in his relation to Hegel. As Kierkegaard explained the personal dialectic of the self-making-subject in a more concrete and critical fashion than Hegel had done, so Marx explored the social dimension of the same dialectic in a more critical manner. And while contemporary neo-Marxists have brought into critical focus the objectivist and deterministic assumptions of the natural scientist's modes of apprehension and reflection, nevertheless, Marx himself seemed to fall prey to these assumptions. If Marx analysed the social and historical dimension of human existence in a more concrete manner than Hegel, he still left his results within the framework of a deterministic and necessitarian dialectic. Thus neither Marx nor Kierkegaard sufficiently generalized their criticism of the Hegelian dialectic. It was only in the twentieth century with natural scientists like Einstein that the limits of scientific knowledge and nature were displayed. This made it possible to correlate the contingency of "nature" with the contingency of human personal, social and historical "nature" of human existence as explicated by Marx and Kierkegaard.
DRAMATIC ARTISTRY IN THE THIRD STAGE OF MEANING

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To speak or write about the construction of a new Christian vision is in large part to exercise one's mind and heart in methodological reflection. But to contribute directly to a new Christian vision is to engage in theology proper, and obviously in that phase of theology that attempts direct discourse, discourse in oratione recta, where "the theologian, enlightened by the past, confronts the problems of his own day" (Lonergan, 1972:133). At one point, however, the distinction between doing theology and doing method is not sharply disjunctive. That point occurs in the functional specialties of dialectic and foundations, where the theologian is doing method in theology.

Let me explain. Bernard Lonergan asks the readers of Method in Theology "not to be scandalized because I quote scripture, the ecumenical councils, papal encyclicals, other theologians so rarely and sparingly. I am writing," he says, "not theology but method in theology. I am concerned not with the objects that theologians expound but with the operations that theologians perform" (1972:xii). But in dialectic and foundations the operations that theologians perform and the horizon governing their performance become the objects that theologians expound. And so in dialectic and foundations doing theology becomes, in part, doing method. Conversely, in the chapters on dialectic and foundations, Lonergan is doing not only method but, at one point, theology itself. He is urging a horizon within which theological operations are to be performed. He is objectifying that horizon and qualifying it as normative.
To this extent he is doing dialectic and foundations, and not simply writing about what it is to do these two functional specialties. He is actually performing and getting us to perform operations that theologians perform.

Thus, in summary, we might say: (1) When the operations that theologians perform and the horizon within which they perform them become the objects that theologians expound, the theologian becomes a methodologist, and he does so without ceasing to be a theologian. (2) Conversely, when the methodologist recognizes that the process from data to results that constitutes both the whole of theology and each of its functional specialties is qualified by (first phase) or founded in (second phase) the basic horizon of the theologian, and when he offers methodological counsel on the resolution of the resultant difficulties by proposing a normative horizon, he has become a theologian without ceasing to be a methodologist. In brief, normative horizon is both a theological and a methodological issue.

The paper that follows is intended as a contribution, then, both to method and to theology. It would clarify the basic horizon of a contemporary empirical theology. It not only speaks about the construction of a new Christian vision, but offers a contribution to that vision. It is written at that juncture where the operations that theologians perform and the horizon within which they perform them become the objects that theologians expound. Its concern is the normative horizon for theological operations in a methodical Christian theology.

I. Psychic Conversion and the Third Stage of Meaning

The Developing Position on the Human Subject

The foundational theologian is engaged in the task of assembling a patterned set of judgments of cognitional fact and of existential fact cumulatively heading toward the full position on the human subject. Foundations, then, is
in one sense as open-ended as are the other functional specialties. But from Lonergan we have learned at last that open-endedness and relativism are not synonymous, and nowhere does this lesson strike home with greater clarity and persuasiveness than in the work of the foundational theologian. In fact, a case may be made that only by engaging in foundations does the lesson strike home at all. If one's movement out of classicism or rationalism or deductivism or even a far more adequate version of the theoretical stage in the control of meaning does not enter upon a personal appropriation of interiority, if it does not take one into foundations, one seems inevitably to regress, to surrender on the level of one's intelligence and rationality, and even more disastrously on the level of one's responsibility—to surrender to one or many of the current philosophic fads that take their basic stand on a despair over the human mind or the human heart. Then the last word is given, perhaps, to talk of language games and family resemblances, or to normless views of historicity and cultural pluralism, or to confusions of consciousness with knowledge, of truth with concepts, of processive development with formless process, of the notion of being with the idea of being, of the development of knowledge through incremental judgments with an exclusively eschatological notion of truth /1/. If human knowing and human loving are capax Dei, if this capacity is the only satisfactory explanation of an unrestricted intentional quest, then there is indeed reason to maintain that the full position on the human subject is not about to become some secure, well-rounded possession of methodologists and theologians. But the judgments one cumulatively assembles on the human subject in the course of a lifetime and their ever more refined patterning into an ever developing position will be judgments of fact. The fact in question will be either cognitional or existential. The developing of the pattern of judgments will be a progressive integration
of one's judgments of cognitional fact with one's judgments of existential fact. Many of these judgments have already found their way into the pattern that has been weaved by Lonergan and by the students of his writings. The pattern includes the reconciliation of the irreversible self-affirmation of the knower with the primacy of existential fact, the subtle articulation of positions on religious, moral, and intellectual conversion, the developing position on the human good, the recognition of the manners and degrees and cognitive, moral, and affective normativity of self-transcendence, and the privileged position, from the standpoints of both cognitional subjectivity and existential subjectivity, that is to be accorded to the change in one's being that occurs when one surrenders and deepens one's surrender to the love of God.

In my doctoral dissertation (Doran, 1977b), I argued that the transition from the Lonergan of Insight to the Lonergan of Method in Theology may be understood as a development beyond cognitional analysis to an intentionality analysis that includes cognitional analysis but sublates it into a position on the subject that is differentiated from that which emerges in Insight by the addition of a fourth level of consciousness determined by a most significant change in Lonergan's notion of the human good. The evidence for this interpretation seems fairly straightforward, but its implications for a developing position on the human subject are only gradually emerging. One of the implications I have already tried to establish is that the emergence of a new notion of value permits, in a way not explicitly opened by Lonergan's treatments of either depth psychology or myth in Insight, the sublation-by-appropriation of symbolic consciousness into transcendental method. This sublation occurs by reason of a conversion that I call psychic conversion. Psychic conversion is the release of the capacity for internal communication especially through the recognition, understanding, and
responsible negotiation of the elemental symbols that issue from the psychological depths in the form of dreams. These symbols are dramatic indicators of one's existential subjectivity.

In the present paper, I wish to show how psychic conversion enables a higher viewpoint on the duality inherent in the human subject of which Lonergan makes so much in *Insight*, and how it is essential to a reflective overcoming of this duality. The higher viewpoint permits a mediation of the dialectic of spiritual freedom and spiritual unfreedom, a mediation that can function in the third stage of meaning as an adequate cipher of basic alienation and of liberation from basic alienation. Since all other forms of alienation flow from basic alienation (Lonergan, 1972:55), psychic conversion will further the socially, economically, culturally, and politically emancipatory and therapeutic potential of generalized empirical method, as well as its effects on one's personal freedom. The central notion in my position will be the tension of limitation and transcendence that qualifies the genuine person (Lonergan, 1957:469-479). The key to clarifying this tension lies in the meaning of the experiential imperative: be attentive. The criteria for this imperative, with which the upward movement of an authentic and nonalienated consciousness begins (Lonergan, 1975) will be seen to be affective and artistic criteria. These criteria are sublated by the criteria of intelligence, reasonableness, and responsibility but, here as elsewhere, sublation is not negation but means "that what sublates goes beyond what is sublated, introduces something new and distinct, puts everything on a new basis, yet so far from interfering with the sublated or destroying it, on the contrary needs it, includes it, preserves all its proper features and properties, and carries them forward to a fuller realization within a richer context" (Lonergan, 1972:241). Moreover, the gaining of such criteria will be understood, not as the result of a
development from below upwards, but as a gift that proceeds
in a healing fashion from above downwards, from the complex
mediation of transformative love with the dimensions of
human consciousness that are preoccupied with the intention
of value (Lonergan, 1975).

We must discuss, then, the nature and functioning of
these affective and artistic criteria and their mediation
to the empirical subject. I must postpone a discussion of
the effect of my position on what, without some such ex-
planatory framework as I am presenting here, risks becom-
ing yet another regressive emphasis both at the super-
structural level of contemporary theology in the forms of
remythologizing and of the theology of story, and at the
everyday level in the form of an unmediated, fundamentalist
spirituality. But what is at issue is the fact that, "in-
trinsic to the nature of healing, there is the extrinsic
requirement of a concomitant creative process. For just
as the creative process, when unaccompanied by healing, is
distorted and corrupted by bias, so too the healing pro-
cess, when unaccompanied by creating, is a soul without a
body....A single development has two vectors, one from be-
low upwards, creating, the other from above downwards,
healing" (Lonergan, 1975:65). In religious matters the
neglect of the creative vector is fundamentalism. It can
take many forms. In both religion and theology, the neg-
lect of the creative vector will be in the long run sim-
plistic, regressive, ineffectual, nonredemptive. It is
the conjunction of the two vectors that is at stake when I
speak of psychic conversion. Psychic conversion will be
an intrinsic factor in enabling the healing process of
transformative love to be accompanied by a concomitant
creative process.

Our way into the issue I am prepared to handle at
this point will be by way of what happens to what in
Insight is called the dramatic pattern of experience when
the intentional primacy of existential subjectivity is
acknowledged.
Existential Intentionality as Dramatic Artistry

Lonergan has acknowledged that the notion of the good that appears in Method in Theology is different from that proposed in Insight: "In Insight the good was the intelligent and reasonable. In Method the good is a distinct notion. It is intended in questions for deliberation: Is this worthwhile? Is it truly or only apparently good? It is aspired to in the intentional response of feeling to values. It is known in judgments of value made by a virtuous or authentic person with a good conscience. It is brought about by deciding and living up to one's decisions. Just as intelligence sublates sense, just as reasonableness sublates intelligence, so deliberation sublates and thereby unifies knowing and feeling" (1974a:277).

The emergence of a distinct notion of the good has also issued in an acknowledgment of the primacy of existential subjectivity, of the fourth level of intentional consciousness (1974b:79-84). What I wish first to establish is that the primacy of existential intentionality is also the primacy of the dramatic pattern of experience.

Patterns of experience are sequences of sensations, memories, images, conations, emotions, and bodily movements that are subjected to an organizing control by one's interest, attention, purpose, direction, striving, effort, intentionality. As such, patterns of experience are the psychic correlative of intentional operations, where psyche is implicitly defined in terms of "a sequence of increasingly differentiated and integrated sets of capacities for perceptiveness, for aggressive or affective response, for memory, for imaginative projects, and for skilfully and economically executed performance" (Lonergan, 1957:456).

My position is simply this: the concern of existential intentionality--value, the good, real self-transcendence, being an originating value, a principle of benevolence and beneficence--links up with the psychic pattern of the dramatic subject. The success of the dramatic subject is
ascertained in terms of his or her fulfillment of the purpose, direction, concern of the dramatic pattern—to make a work of art out of one's living. It is the authentic existential subject who is concomitantly a dramatic artist, and it is the inauthentic existential subject who is an artiste manqué, a failed artist (Becker: 176-207). Existential authenticity and dramatic art are respectively the intentional and psychic obverse and reverse of the same precious coin.

There is, then, a dramatic pattern of experience, a sequence of sensations, memories, images, conations, emotions, and bodily movements that are organized by one's concern to make a work of art out of his or her living, to stamp life with a style, with grace, with freedom, with dignity. The dramatic pattern is operative in a preconscious manner, through the collaboration of imagination and intelligence in the task of supplying to consciousness the materials one will employ in structuring the contours of one's work of art. These materials emerge into consciousness in the form of images and accompanying affects. The images meet the demands of underlying neural manifolds for conscious representation and integration. From a prepsychological point of view, these underlying manifolds are purely coincidental. They find no systematization at the purely biological level. They are a function of an energy that is properly psychic, i.e. of a surplus energy whose formal intelligibility cannot be understood by laws of physics, chemistry, or biology, but only by irreducibly psychological understanding. The images and affects in which this surplus energy finds its systematization emerge into consciousness at the empirical level, the first level of consciousness, the level whose functioning is governed by one's fidelity or infidelity to the transcendental precept, Be attentive /2/. Nonetheless, there is a prior functioning of intelligence and imagination in the dramatic pattern of experience, reaching into the preconscious and
unobjectified dimension of one's subjectivity for the images one will employ in weaving the pattern and contours of one's work of dramatic art.

It is this preconscious collaboration that concerns us. The intelligence and imagination that cooperate in a preconscious manner to select images for conscious attention, insight, judgment, and decision may or may not themselves be authentic intelligence and imagination. To the extent they are authentic, they have been liberated effectively by religious, moral, and intellectual conversion--liberated from the dramatic bias that would overwhelm the light of consciousness with the darkness of elementary passions; liberated from the individual bias that would grant to the satisfaction of one's ego a privileged and eventually solitary place in the list of motives that govern one's decisions and performance and that would arbitrarily brush aside the questions that challenge such an allegiance to oneself; liberated from the group bias that would identify the human good with what is good for one's intersubjective group or social class or nation; liberated from the general bias that neglects the questions and resists the insights that would arise from an intelligence that takes its stand on the inherent dynamism of its own love of intelligibility, truth, and value /3/. An authentic dramatic artist has been healed by conversion in such a manner that the prior collaboration of intelligence and imagination in the selection for conscious discrimination of the images that are needed for the insightful, truthful, and loving construction of a work of dramatic art can go forward in inner freedom, in an affective detachment from inner states and outer objects and situations that matches the detachment of authentic intentionality. The story of the gaining of this detachment and of one's failures and setbacks in its regard, as well as of one's affective engagement in the world of dramatic and existential meaning is what is unfolded in symbolic form in one's dreams. The
dreams of a developing dramatic artist detail imaginally how one is faring in the progressive integration of body and intentionality, of limitation and transcendence, that constitutes the flourishing of the human person. The psyche is the promoter and the mirror of the progressive dialectic of this integration. An unsuccessful dramatic artist, on the other hand, stands in need of healing from bias, whether the bias be dramatic, egoistic, group, or general bias or some mixture of these. His dreams reflect his need of healing. Effective freedom is intrinsically a function of the unbiased collaboration of intelligence and imagination in the admission to conscious discrimination of images linked with appropriate affects and oriented to the artistic production of the "first and only edition" of oneself (Lonergan, 1974b:83). The basic criteria of the authenticity of the project of one's living, then, as expressed in the transcendental imperatives linked with the four levels of conscious intentionality—be attentive, be intelligent, be reasonable, be responsible—have psychic concomitants that make up the dramatic pattern of one's experience. There are aesthetic, imaginal, affective promoters, ciphers, even criteria of authenticity.

Lonergan's acknowledgment of the primacy of existential intentionality shifts the ultimate burden of his thought from cognitional analysis to an intentionality analysis that sublates the knowledge of knowledge into a more embracing elucidation of the drama of the emergence of the authentic person. The latter is concomitantly a successful dramatic artist. Such a shift entails a sublation of the intellectual pattern of experience by the dramatic pattern, and of the knowing of knowing by the knowing of existential intentionality. The intellectually patterned sequence of sensations, memories, images, conations, emotions that subjects these elements to the organizing control of a concern for explanatory understanding of data can no longer be granted a strict primacy in the relations
among the various patterns of experience, for the subject as existential and dramatic sublates the subject as cogni-
tional or intellectual. The dramatic pattern of experi-
ence, the psychological concomitant of existential inten-
tionality, must integrate at the level of sensation, image, memory, emotion, and conation the interplay of all other patterns of experience, including the intellectual. If one is psychically differentiated to operate in the intel-
lectual pattern, then this pattern too is sublated by the concerns of the dramatic artist/existential subject, in the same way that knowing is sublated by decision. This means that, from the standpoint of self-appropriation, cognitional analysis is sublated by an intentionality an-
alysis that acknowledges not only the existence but even the primacy in all conscious subjects of the fourth level of intentional consciousness. This sublation of the know-
ing of knowing by the knowing of existential intentionality is perhaps the cutting edge at the present time of the develop-
ning position on the subject that is transcendental method. But the knowing of existential intentionality is also the knowing of dramatic artistry, an appropriation of the dramatic pattern of experience, an appropriation that is rendered possible by psychic conversion. Psychic con-
version thus advances the developing position on the sub-
ject. It renders possible the sublation of the knowledge of knowledge by the knowledge of existential intentionality, the sublation of cognitional self-appropriation by moral and religious self-appropriation /4/.

The Dramatic Pattern in the Third Stage of Meaning

The more differentiated one's consciousness, the more complex becomes the task of dramatic artistry. As it is the existential subject who shifts from common sense to theory to interiority to art to scholarship to transcen-
dence by shifting the procedures of intentional conscious-
ness, so the intentional shifts are accompanied by a
concomitant adaptation of the stream of sensations, memories, images, emotions, conations, and bodily movements under the direction of the dramatic artist. It is the task of dramatic artistry to govern the interplay of the various patterns of experience. Thus the psyche of an intentionally more differentiated consciousness must be a more differentiated psyche. Differentiation in the various realms of meaning is joined with differentiation in the patterns of experience organized and controlled by these realms of meaning. Intentional and psychic differentiation, it seems, are mutually complementary.

Now, Insight is a set of exercises through which one enters on differentiation in the realm of interiority. Such differentiation begins with intellectual self-appropriation. This self-appropriation is a form of conversion, the intellectual conversion of the self-affirming knower. But Insight is an initiation not only to a realm of meaning, but also to a stage of meaning (Lonergan, 1972: 85-99). Such initiation, it seems, is always dramatic /5/. We can, I trust, all testify to the complex emotional impact of Insight. One of the constants of this impact is its psychologically taxing quality, no matter what the extent of the enthusiasm generated by Lonergan's genuinely exciting invitation. The sequence of sensations, memories, images, emotions, conations does not adapt easily to the invitation and challenge of Insight. Not only does any knowledge in the intellectual pattern of experience make a bloody entrance, but the psychic tension is increased when the demand made upon the stream of sensitive consciousness is to adapt itself to an exercise in which the intellectual pattern is brought to bear in explanatory fashion upon itself and upon its relation to other patterns in which the sensitive stream is spontaneously more at home. Moreover, the sensitive stream is confronted with a demand that it subordinate its spontaneous home to a higher specialization of human intelligence than even the most intelligent common
The intentional subordination of common sense to a generalized empirical method that thinks on the level of history is concomitantly a psychic self-surrender of sensitive spontaneity to what it can only perceive at first as a terrifying abyss. The call and demand of Lonergan in *Insight* is or can be psychologically upsetting and even physically unnerving.

With the emergence of an insistence on Lonergan's part of the primacy, indeed the hegemony, of existential subjectivity, the story of sensitive spontaneity in the way of self-appropriation enters a new episode. In some ways, the newness is experienced with relief. For one thing, affectivity now receives a privileged acknowledgment as the home of value. For another, affectivity and symbol no longer find their integration in knowledge, but both cognitional and psychic subjectivity come to rest in good decisions. The suspicion that *Insight*, for all its brilliance, necessity, and truth, was not the last word on self-appropriation is confirmed, and the confirmation is welcomed by the psychological stream of sensitive experience. The constraint imposed upon aesthetic liberation from biological purposiveness by self-appropriation in and of the intellectual pattern seems to be a temporary exigence, a needed constraint until the questions of cognitional theory, epistemology, and metaphysics have been thoroughly answered, but that need not be maintained as primary pattern when the artistry of the dramatic subject becomes what it is time to attend to as one follows Lonergan from cognitional self-appropriation to existential self-appropriation. The relief, moreover, is not apt to be deceptive, for if one has truly followed Lonergan to the intelligent and reasonable position on the subject in *Insight*, one needs no persuasion that "the very wealth of existential reflection can turn out to be a trap" (1974b:85). But the task of dramatic artistry has become a more complicated one. For with intellectual conversion one has entered upon a third stage of
meaning, where meaning is controlled not by practical common sense nor by theory, but by a differentiation of consciousness in the realm of interiority. Existential subjectivity in the way of self-appropriation must sublate a cognitional subjectivity that has been transformed, converted, from counterpositional allegiances to self-affirmation of its own normative intelligence and reasonableness. This means that the knowledge of existential subjectivity must sublate the knowledge of knowledge. So with the entrance into a new stage of meaning, one's dramatic pattern of experience now has to become a sequence of sensations, memories, images, emotions, conations, and bodily movements that includes but does not remain identical with that sequence to which one was introduced in the course of one's intellectual maieutic. An even tauter stretching of sensitive spontaneity is called for, a more demanding discipline, a more profound surrender that is at the same time a more wide-ranging adaptability and flexibility, a greater degree of freedom. The task is monumental. It is an extension to psyche of differentiation in the realm and stage of interiority. Its successful execution would be a high achievement of human artistry, the differentiation of a dramatic pattern of experience that sublates the other patterns subject to the organizing control of the other realms of meaning, and that does so in the third stage of meaning, i.e., not simply in actu exercito, but with a reflexive control. Existential self-appropriation is, in Lonergan's analysis, not itself conversion, as is intellectual self-appropriation, but a reflection on religious and moral conversion that allows them to sublate intellectual conversion. But is the dramatic differentiation that existential self-appropriation is intrinsically linked to, even dependent upon, not itself in need of a conversion if it is to succeed? This is what I have argued in speaking of psychic conversion.
Psychic conversion is the gaining of the capacity on the part of the existential subject for the internal communication that occurs in the conscious and deliberate negotiation of one's own spontaneous symbolic system, i.e., of the images for insight, judgment, and decision that are admitted to consciousness by the subject in the dramatic pattern of experience. The key to psychic conversion, I believe, is the dream, for in the dream symbols are released in a manner unhindered by (yet perhaps reflective of) the dramatic, individual, group, and general bias of waking consciousness' guardianship. The dream is the story of intentionality, a story told by sensitive consciousness. It is a cipher of authenticity and of its immanent sanctions. It performs this function precisely as the operator or quasi-operator of the higher system of sensitive consciousness in its function of integrating what otherwise is a coincidental manifold on the level of neural demand functions (Lonergan, 1957:189-191). Transcendental method or intentionality analysis is the key to understanding the function of the dream. Conversely, the dream is an indication of the drama of one's existential intentionality.

Lonergan has dealt with the dream in *Insight* in the context of his discussion of dramatic bias. The emergence of a distinct level of existential consciousness in his later work calls for a further nuancing of the position of *Insight* on the dream. In *Insight* Lonergan relies on the Freudian notion of the dream's manifest and latent content, according to which there is a deceptiveness to the dream. This is a notion which Jung, who was more open to a non-reductive interpretation of human spirituality, did not accept. I agree with Jung in his rejection of the Freudian distinction, since I find that it is based on an inadequate notion of symbolism. As we shall see, there are problems also with Jung's theory of symbolism, problems perhaps rooted in an implicit epistemological idealism endemic to
the romantic mentality from which Jung never broke free. But before dealing with my own position, I should set the context provided by Insight.

The dramatic pattern is one of four patterns of sensitive consciousness discussed in the first chapter on common sense. The others are the biological, aesthetic, and intellectual patterns. The dramatic pattern is that pattern operative in the subject's concern for the art of living. One's dramatic activities are invested with a style that is a function of human aesthetic liberation from the confines of mere biological purposiveness.

The materials of the dramatic artist are one's own body and actions. They impose a certain constraint upon the style with which one can invest one's work of art; they make certain demands. But these demands can be met by granting to neural processes and patterns the systematization of psychic representation and conscious integration. There are coincidental manifolds on the neural level that can be integrated by sensitive and imaginative consciousness without violating any biological law; and there are coincidental manifolds on the level of the sensitive psyche that can be integrated by a higher level of insight and reflection, deliberation and choice, without violating any law of the sensitive psyche. Through these successive integrations, schemes of recurrence are established which permit the smooth functioning of the one person who is at once body, psyche, and intentionality. These schemes of recurrence transform the biological, confer a certain culturally conditioned dignity on one's dramatic being, invest it with a style, realize aesthetic values in one's living.

There is an intelligent component to this drama of human living. In the case of undifferentiated consciousness, this intelligent component is purely common sense. Common sense has to do, in part, with "the insights that govern the imaginative projects of dramatic living," the
insights through which one discovers and develops the possible roles he might play in the drama of living, and works out his own selection and adaptation of these roles, under the pressure of artistic and affective criteria. Common sense intelligence conspires with imagination in representing at the empirical level of consciousness courses of action that are to be submitted to conscious insight, judgment, and decision. In this prior collaboration of imagination and common sense intelligence, the dramatic pattern of experience is already operative. It outlines how we might behave toward others. The outline represents an artistic transformation of a more elementary aggressivity and affectivity, i.e., of a coincidental manifold at the psychological level. An imaginatively and intelligently transformed set of materials is provided for conscious insight, rational judgment, and deliberate decision to work on in the forging of a dignified life. The materials granted psychic representation and conscious integration in sensitive consciousness are not raw and unpatterned, but already organized by image and insight, and already charged emotionally and conatively. Since the materials are already patterned when they enter consciousness, we may speak of a preconscious functioning of imagination and intelligence, a patterning of basic materials in accord with the interests, concerns, direction, intentionality of the dramatic subject. This preconscious functioning is itself largely formed by the dialectic of spontaneous intersubjectivity and practical common sense, the dialectic of community that "gives rise to the situations that stimulate neural demands and...moulds the orientation of intelligence that preconsciously exercises the censorship" (Lonergan, 1957:218) that arranges materials for insight (190).

The prior collaboration of imagination and intelligence may be biased, however, by an orientation of the dramatic pattern of experience in such a way that one does
not want the conscious insights one needs if one is to make a work of art out of one's living. This preconscious rejection of insight is dramatic bias. Then the materials (first level) for conscious insight (second level), rational criticism (third level), and deliberate decision (fourth level) will not emerge into consciousness. Elementary aggressivity and affectivity, moreover, are conditioned by the dialectic of community in such a way that individual, group, and/or general bias conspires with dramatic bias in its distortion of the prior collaboration of imagination and intelligence so as to prevent the needed materials for conscious insight, reflection, and deliberation from being presented to empirical consciousness. One does not want the insights one needs, and to prevent these insights from occurring the dramatic pattern prevents the materials that would give rise to these insights from emerging into consciousness. From a basic point of view, what one is excluding is insight, but this exclusion means antecedently an exclusion of the materials for insight, and subsequently an exclusion of the further questions that would arise from insight and of the complementary insights that would lead to a rounded and balanced viewpoint.

Now, the rejection of insights is an aberration of human understanding. Antecedently, it is also an aberration of the function of the censorship that in a genuine person is selecting and arranging materials for insight but in an inauthentic person is repressing from consciousness the materials and arrangements that would lead to the insights one does not want. Subsequently, too, the rejection of insight results in an aberration of one's dramatic living, in a failure to make a work of art out of one's living. This failure is the anguish of the neurotic personality, of the failed artist. The failure is described initially in Insight, where it is said that the lack of a rounded and balanced viewpoint for one's dramatic living...
results in behavior that generates misunderstanding both in ourselves and in others. To suffer such incomprehension favours a withdrawal from the outer drama of human living into the inner drama of phantasy. This introversion, which overcomes the extroversion native to the biological pattern of experience, generates a differentiation of the persona that appears before others and the more intimate ego that in the day-dream is at once the main actor and the sole spectator. Finally, the incomprehension, isolation, and duality rob the development of one's common sense of some part, greater or less, of the corrections and the assurance that result from learning accurately the tested insights of others and from submitting one's own insights to the criticism based on others' experience and development. (1957:191)

The anguish of the neurotic is due to the fact that, while the exclusion of materials for insight is fundamentally an unconscious or spontaneous process, it is not wholly so.

The merely spontaneous exclusion of unwanted insights is not equal to the total range of eventualities. Contrary insights do emerge. But they may be accepted as correct, only to suffer the eclipse that the bias brings about by excluding the relevant further questions. Again, they may be rejected as incorrect, as mere bright ideas without a solid foundation in fact; and this rejection tends to be connected with rationalization of the scotosis and with an effort to accumulate evidence in its favour. Again, consideration of the contrary insight may not reach the level of reflective and critical consciousness; it may occur only to be brushed aside in an emotional reaction of distaste, pride, dread, horror, revulsion. Again, there are the inverse phenomena. Insights that expand the scotosis can appear to lack plausibility; they will be subjected to scrutiny; and as the subject shifts to and from his sounder viewpoint, they will oscillate wildly between an appearance of nonsense and an appearance of truth. Thus, in a variety of manners, the scotosis can remain fundamentally unconscious yet suffer the attacks and crises that generate in the mind a mist of obscurity and bewilderment, of suspicion and reassurance, of doubt and rationalization, of insecurity and disquiet. (1957:191-192)
The failure of dramatic artistry and the anguish that accompanies it are further detailed in a discussion of repression, inhibition, and distorted performance (1957:192-196). Aberration of the censorship means that an activity that is primarily positive--selecting and arranging patterned materials for conscious insight, rational criticism, and deliberate decision--has become primarily negative through the collaboration of imagination and intelligence to prevent materials for insight from emerging into consciousness. Not only are perspectives and imaginative schemata that would give rise to unwanted insights not allowed to emerge into consciousness, but any materials in any other arrangement or perspective are permitted into consciousness. But because these materials are not integral with the insights needed for the dramatic artistry of human living, they emerge into consciousness in an incongruous and seemingly unintelligible fashion. Thus what the distorted censorship primarily blocks from consciousness are imaginative complements to neural demand functions, because insight arises from images. But images are associated with feelings or affects, and so a distorted or biased censorship not only prevents images from emerging into consciousness but also detaches from the repressed image its associated affects and associates these detached affects with some other images that are permitted into consciousness precisely because they will not give rise to unwanted insights. An affect has become coupled with an incongruous object--one develops a fetish, for example--and so both the conscious, affective attitudes of the extroverted persona performing before others and the conscious, affective attitudes of the introverted ego performing in his own private theatre are burdened with the associations of feelings with incongruous objects. Moreover, one's dramatic subjectivity is further split when one's incongruous conscious affective attitudes are matched by repressed, nonconscious combinations that are directly
opposite to the combinations of conscious persona and ego. Conflicting complexes develop in one's dramatic subjectivity. Lonergan casts the conflict in the form of a systematication of Jung's terminology: "The conscious ego is matched with an inverse non-conscious shadow, and the conscious persona is matched with an inverse non-conscious anima" (1957:194). The integration of complexes into a unified whole is blocked. One becomes a bundle of contradictions.

Now, a bundle of contradictions cannot offer a smooth performance in the dramatic world of human living. If conscious living is divided into the two patterns of persona and ego, if these are contradictory to one another, if they are burdened with incongruous affective object relations, and if furthermore each of them is matched by repressed, opposite combinations of images and affects, then it is easy to see how one's performance before others on the stage of life is liable to be inconsistent, interfered with by the sentiments of the introverted conscious ego or of the nonconscious anima/anima/animus or shadow. One is a mess. One does not "have one's stuff together," and one's performance in the drama of living is distorted as a consequence. His dramatic artistry has failed.

The same incongruity appears in the dreams of the unintegrated dramatic subject. The basic function of the dream, says Lonergan, is to meet those claims of neural demand functions for psychic representation that have been neglected in the wear and tear of conscious living. These demands are for conscious affects, and the affects in question may be those of the conscious ego or persona, or of the unconscious anima/anima or the shadow. If they are the affects of the latter two, they will emerge, says Lonergan, disassociated from their initial objects and attached to some other incongruous object--i.e., they will emerge disguised, because they are alien to the conscious performer and, were they to emerge into consciousness with
their proper objects, they would not only interfere with sleep but would violate the aesthetic liberation of consciousness. The dream has both a manifest content and a latent content. The latter has purposely been hidden, so that the integrity of the conscious stream of experience is preserved.

Thus far Lonergan. What follows is my own recasting of what Lonergan says on the dream.

Biased understanding and distorted censorship prevent the emergence into consciousness in waking life of the images that would give rise to unwanted but needed insights that would correct and revise one's current viewpoints and behavior. The bias also causes the dissociation of the affects of persona and ego from their proper imaginative schemata and their attachment by association to other and incongruous imaginative schemata. Furthermore, unconscious complexes are formed, consisting of repressed and needed materials. What, then, happens in the dream? Might it be that there the distorted censorship is relaxed enough that neural demand functions can and do find their proper conscious complement in psychic images that, were they to be adverted to by the waking subject, would indeed provide materials for the insights that are needed in the dramatic artistry of life? Basically, I believe this to be the basic principle for the interpretation of dreams. In dreams, the complexes speak as they are. They show what they do or do not want. What preponderates in dreamland is not one's dramatic pattern of experience, but the neural demand functions and their systematizing complexes. In a genuine person successfully making a work of art out of his or her life, neural demand functions are also being granted waking entrance into consciousness in an appropriate manner, but in an inauthentic person fleeing the insights that are needed for dramatic artistry they are being repressed from representation in consciousness. The repressed materials and the repressing dramatic subject
emerge as they are in the dream. The dream is a commentary on the quality of one's dramatic artistry. It manifests whether or not in waking consciousness the dramatic subject is or is not allowing the emergence of the imaginative schemata that would give rise to needed insights. The sentiments of shadow or anima/animus do not emerge in a disguised fashion in the dream, but speak quite plainly of their plight, of what is happening to them, of their distorted object relations. In the dreams of the biased subject, the expressions of anima/animus and shadow are alien to the conscious performer; they do emerge into consciousness with their objects; they do interfere with sleep; they do violate the aesthetic liberation of consciousness. This is the point of Jung's insistence on the compensatory function of the dream (Jung, 1970:153). Dreams will be increasingly an ally, a complement, of the subject open to insight, and increasingly even an enemy of the subject who does not want the insights he needs if he is to make a work of art out of his own living. In their function of meeting neural demands that have been neglected in the wear and tear of conscious living, dreams always provide imaginative schemata that can be negotiated by waking consciousness in such a way that neural demand functions are met in a harmonious, integrated, congruous fashion. But there is no disguise to the content of the dream. It is a natural phenomenon which displays the linkage of image and affect in the persona, the ego, the anima/animus, and the shadow, and displays them as they are. It shows what in fact each of these complexes wants and does not want. If the dramatic subject does not want insight, the dream displays this rejection. If the persona is burdened with incongruous affects, the dream displays the incongruity. If the anima/animus or shadow have been made the victims of the repression of conscious insight, the dream displays their plight, their crippled condition, their anger, their violence, their perversion. The course of one's dream story will
reflect the quality of the ongoing relationship of waking consciousness with neural process in the task of the art of living. For the person fleeing the insights needed for artistic living and thus repressing from consciousness the imaginative schemata that would integrate in a harmonious fashion one's neural demand functions with the conscious orientation of dramatic living, dreams will increasingly reflect, but not in a disguised fashion, the inhibitions that a distorted and biased dramatic pattern of experience has placed on neural demand functions. The dreams of a biased subject will manifest the violence that the flight from understanding has perpetrated upon the neural-physiological materials. The dreams of the subject who wants insight and truth will become continuous with and complementary to the dramatic artistry of living and will reflect the orientation to integration that qualifies such a subject. The dreams of the biased subject will be increasingly discontinuous with and compensatory to the attitude of waking consciousness which, in its flight from understanding, has done violence to the psychoneural base. The discontinuity is in the interests of providing a compensatory corrective to the attitude of waking consciousness. These dreams, if one would attend to them, would let one know that one is indeed biased and would inform one of the sanctions of one's scotosis. But the chances of a biased subject paying attention to such a message are minimal, and the disharmoniousness of dreamland with waking consciousness increases to the point of bizarreness as the neural demand functions are further neglected through one's flight from understanding. The dream is a cipher of the authenticity or inauthenticity of the waking subject. Dreams are liable to be attended to only by the subject who wants needed insights even if they correct and revise his current viewpoints and behavior. The dreams of such a subject will reflect, even if through prolonged struggle and crisis at key points in one's life, an increasing
Dramatic Artistry

harmony and artistic creativity in one's dramatic living. But the dreams of the subject fleeing needed insights will reflect rather the violence done to the underlying materials by the biased waking collaboration of intelligence and imagination in preventing these materials from emerging into consciousness in such a way as to promote artistic living. The dreams of the person who wants the light of truth, no matter how corrective it may be, will be increasingly themselves works of art, as truth takes its effect in his or her life. The dreams of the person who loves the darkness of bias will be increasingly bizarre and incongruous, but not deceptive. There is no opposition between manifest content and latent content in the dreams either of the subject who honors neural demand functions and integrates them imaginatively and intelligently by conscripting them into his desire for insights needed for living, or of the subject fleeing understanding. The content in the latter case is incongruous, and becomes increasingly so the more desperate the appeal expressed in the incongruity, and the more the appeal is resisted by the subject who is fleeing the insights that would lead him to change; the incongruity itself is an appeal for help, an appeal that, were it to be heeded, would itself be the beginning of therapy.

Bias and Conversion

Because the dramatic bias that excludes helpful images by virtue of elementary aggressivity and affectivity is itself conditioned by the dialectic of community that is complicated by individual, group, and general bias, the reorientation of the preconscious collaboration of intelligence and imagination to the exercise of a constructive rather than repressive censorship is a complex task indeed. Fundamentally, it means overcoming bias in all of its forms. Such a precarious victory, we know from Lonergan, is possible only through religious, moral, and intellectual
conversion. As I understand the relations of the conversions to the biases, religious and moral conversion affect principally individual and group bias, while intellectual conversion is needed to overcome general bias. Because dramatic bias is or can be joined to any of the three biases of practical common sense or to any combination of them, it is effectively corrected only by the sustained operations of conscious intentionality in its triply converted state, where a scheme of recurrence is established that sets up a defensive circle to prevent the systematic interference of any form of biased intentionality. In the ideal case, as one develops in the converted life, the interferences of bias are rendered increasingly less probable, increasingly more coincidental.

Psychic conversion is both a function of and an aid to the sustained intentional authenticity of the religiously, morally, and intellectually converted subject. As resulting from the therapeutic movement of the other three conversions from above downwards, psychic conversion is a function of their dominance in one's intentional orientation. But as enabling a recurrent scheme of collaboration between neural demand functions and conscious discrimination, it is an aid to the creative development of subjectivity from below upwards. Psychic conversion is what enables one recurrently to attend to, understand, judge, and evaluate the imaginal deliverances of dramatic sensitivity. It is a function of the other three conversions, for without these one's intentional consciousness is biased against the emergence of materials for insight. But it is a function of the other three conversions, for without these one's intentional consciousness is biased against the emergence of materials for insight. But it is also an aid to growth and development in the other three conversions, for it provides to an antecedently willing intentionality the materials that this intentionality needs if the insights are to occur that will function in offsetting the
shorter and especially longer cycles of decline in human living. It is the defensive circle set up by a triply converted intentionality to prevent the systematic interference of bias in the projects of the dramatic/existential subject. Psychic conversion also facilitates the sublation of intellectual conversion by moral and religious conversion, since it allows the latter two conversions to be transposed into the post-critical context of self-appropriation in the realm of interiority, and thus to be mediated to the subject in a manner demanded by the third stage of meaning, where meaning is controlled by differentiation in the realm of interiority. In its function as an aid to sublation, psychic conversion mediates a dramatic pattern of experience for interiorly self-differentiating consciousness. It mediates dramatic artistry in the third stage of meaning. And, as I have argued at length elsewhere, psychic conversion intimately affects the self-appropriation of the fourth level of intentional consciousness, the level of moral and religious response (1977b).

Psychic Conversion and the Experiential Imperative

It needs to be emphasized that psychic conversion also throws light on the transcendental precept corresponding to the first level of intentional consciousness: Be attentive. Attentiveness is a function of one's willingness for insight, truth, and responsible change: i.e., of religious, moral, and intellectual conversion. Conversion is a therapeutic movement from above downwards, enabling the movement from below upwards in one's conscious performance to be complete and creative. Conversion affects one first at the fourth level of intentional consciousness; thus Lonergan can say that usually religious conversion occurs first, then moral conversion, and thirdly intellectual conversion (1972:243). Psychic conversion would be a further extension downwards into the unconscious neural base of the
therapy of consciousness that begins when one falls in love with God; that continues as this love promotes value over the satisfactions of individual and group egoism; and that extends further when one of the values promoted is truth, and when the subject moves from the general bias of common sense and from the philosophic counterpositions on knowing, the real, and objectivity, to cosmopolis and to the basic philosophic positions that cosmopolis needs, implies, and in a more tutored state explicitly supports /8/. The willingness introduced by religious conversion and extending to moral and intellectual conversion, affects the censorship, the prior collaboration of intelligence and imagination in the admission to consciousness of the images that are needed for a sustained and creative development of one's being in harmony with one's self-transcendent orientation to intelligibility, truth, the real, and the good. The willingness introduced by religious conversion and extending downwards to psychic conversion renders one watchful, vigilant, expectant, contemplative: in a word, attentive. Attentiveness first permits the intelligible emergent probability of world process to become recurrently and not coincidentally intelligent, truthful, responsible emergent probability in and through the mediation of human consciousness. And so we have perhaps the starting point of a contemporary mediation through transcendental method of the biblical insight that the whole of creation groans in expectation, waiting for the liberation of the children of God.

II. Genuineness in the Third Stage of Meaning


Each of the conversions is a beginning of a new way of being. Religious conversion is the beginning of an other-worldly love that, if pursued, moves in the direction of
union with God in the mystical cloud of unknowing. It is vertical self-transcendence. Moral conversion is the beginning of a life based on value, the initial step in becoming a virtuous person. It is horizontal self-transcendence. Intellectual conversion is the first step in the movement toward methodological expertise and finesse. It is self-appropriation of cognitional self-transcendence. It systematizes one's entrance into the third stage of meaning.

Psychic conversion, too, is an initiation. The higher system of intellectual conversion as integrator of development is also the higher system as operator /9/. What is called for now is self-appropriation of moral and religious subjectivity, and consequently the sublation of intellectual conversion by moral and religious subjectivity. Psychic conversion is what enables this further development. It is also a further key to the genuineness that consists not in "the happy fruit of a life in which illusion and pretence have had no place" (1957:475), but in the harmonious cooperation of a self as it is and a self as it is apprehended to be through the mediation of a maieutic of interiority /10/. Such a retrieval, a second immediacy, is, it seems, the goal of the third stage of meaning (Doran, 1977b:114-131). Psychic conversion contributes to the attainment of this goal by promoting a self-possessed detachment in the realm of affectivity that matches, indeed sublates and sustains, the detachment of the pure, disinterested, unrestricted desire to know that one has come to affirm in the self-affirmation of the knower and in the positions on being and objectivity (Lonergan, 1957:chaps. 11, 12, and 13). It is the conflict of sensitive desire with the dynamism of intentionality that prevents genuineness /11/. Psychic conversion promotes a purification of sensitive desire so that the self-affirming desire of intentionality to know and to be an originating source of value can be sustained. Nor is this purification
a form of death. It is rather a higher systematization of human life.

There are three conditions which often look alike yet differ completely, flourish in the same hedgerow:
Attachment to self and to things and to persons, detachment
From self and from things and from persons; and, growing between them, indifference
Which resembles the others as death resembles life, being between two lives--unflowering, between the live and the dead nettle. This is the use of memory:
For liberation--not less of love but expanding of love beyond desire, and so liberation from the future as well as the past.

(Eliot: 55)

There is, then, an affective self-transcendence that matches, accompanies, permeates the detachment of intelligent, reasonable, and responsible intentionality and is the condition of the sustained possibility of authentic consciousness. It is called in Insight "universal willingness" (1957:623-624). Resistance to it is what prevents the harmonious cooperation of the self as it is and the self as it apprehends itself to be that is genuineness. The resistance is not hard to explain /12/, but it must be overcome. Moreover, when the detachment of intentionality has entered upon the stage of self-appropriation, affective self-transcendence must be submitted to a thoroughgoing maieutic of self-mediation. As affective self-transcendence confers on dramatic existential living its aesthetic or artistic character, so psychic conversion is the source of this dramatic artistry for the subject whose development has brought him into the third stage of meaning. This I must explicate.

Consciousness and Genuineness

There is a strange law to human development, according to which the more consciously a development occurs, at least
to a given point, the greater risk it incurs of losing the simplicity and honesty, the perspicacity and sincerity, that we associate with genuineness. Consciousness and genuineness seem to be at odds. For genuineness is a matter of the harmonious cooperation of the self as apprehended and the self as it is, and the very development of the powers of apprehension can mean either correct or mistaken understanding of the starting point of development in the subject as he is, of the term in the subject as he is to be, and of the process from the starting point to the term. If these apprehensions are correct, "the conscious [self as apprehended] and unconscious [self as it is] components of the development are operating from the same base along the same route to the same goal. If they are mistaken, the conscious and unconscious components, to a greater or less extent, are operating at cross-purposes" (Lonergan, 1957:475). Moreover, the apprehensions may be minimal or extensive. "They are minimal when they involve little more than the succession of fragmentary and separate acts needed to carry out the successive steps of the development with advertence, intelligence, and reasonableness. They are more or less extensive when one begins to delve into the background, the context, the premises, the interrelations of the minimal series of conscious acts, and to subsume this understanding of oneself under empirical laws and philosophic theories of development" (1957:476). If other things are equal, the minimal apprehensions are more liable to be free of error than the apprehensions through which one tries to match the self as it is by a self as it is known. Other things may, of course, not be equal, and then "errors have become lodged in the habitual background whence spring our direct and reflective insights," so that, "if we relied upon our virtual and implicit self-knowledge to provide us with concrete guidance through a conscious development, then the minimal series so far from being probably correct would be certainly mistaken" (1957:476).
In the latter case, then, genuineness depends on a more or less extensive self-scrutiny that would bring the self as it is apprehended into harmony with the self as it is. This self-scrutiny reaches its limit in the third stage of meaning, where it takes the twofold form of (1) the introspective method of intentionality analysis, and (2) a depth psychology that has been transformed by and integrated into method /13/. This twin maieutic promotes the harmony between the self as it is and the self as it is known. As the subject's development enters the third stage of meaning, then, the needed self-scrutiny (1) is systematized in intellectual conversion and (2) is carried further by means of psychic conversion. Through intellectual conversion, the generalized or transcendental structure of what Jean Piaget calls the cognitive unconscious (the knowing self as it is) becomes objectified, and through psychic conversion, the energetic compositions and distributions of the affective unconscious (the affective self as it is) become known and are integrated with and promote the intentionality disclosed in transcendental method (Piaget, 1973:31-48). Because it is through the affective self as it is that values are apprehended and responded to, psychic conversion enables or at least initiates a mediation of moral and religious subjectivity (Doran, 1977c; 1977b:17-113). Through these third-stage conversions, what was conscious in a twilight state but not objectified—objectification may even have been resisted—becomes known. Genuineness in the third stage of meaning is, strictly speaking, a matter of the harmonious cooperation of the self as it is and the self as it is objectified, known, apprehended through self-appropriation. It is a second naïveté, a second immediacy, a naïveté that in the limit returns to "speech that has been instructed by the whole process of meaning" (Ricoeur: 496), an informed, post-critical, post-therapeutic naïveté.
Psychic conversion, then, enables the emergence of a post-critical and post-therapeutic dramatic/existential pattern of experience that can sustain and sublate the tension introduced into sensitive consciousness by an affirmation of the philosophic basic positions and by the thorough and effective critique of common sense through which one subordinates the imperiousness of practicality to the sanctions of the transcendental precepts. Just as there is cognitive self-transcendence without the self-appropriation of cognitive process that is intellectual conversion, so there is affective self-transcendence without the self-appropriation of affectivity that occurs through psychic conversion. As the former, so the latter is precritical. A post-critical and post-therapeutic self-transcendence of cognitive structure and of affective energetic compositions and distributions have been mediated by self-appropriation /14/.

The therapeutic character of the methodical maieutic, however, is not adequately explained in terms of mediation alone. More precisely, mediation, if it is effective, is also transformation. The higher system it introduces is not merely integrator but also operator of development. Mediation is conversion, a change in the subject, "a change of direction and, indeed, a change for the better. One frees oneself from the unauthentic. One grows in authenticity. Harmful, dangerous, misleading satisfactions are dropped. Fears of discomfort, pain, privation have less power to deflect one from one's course. Values are apprehended where before they were overlooked. Scales of preference shift. Errors, rationalizations, ideologies fall and shatter to leave one open to things as they are and to man as he should be" (Lonergan, 1972:52). If consciousness is to be open to things as they are and to man as he should be, it must be converted. The extent of the conversion is the extent of the openness, as one might expect from the correspondence of the therapeutic movement from above
downwards and the creative movement from below upwards in human consciousness /15/.

Psychic Energy

The openness of an intellectually and psychically converted consciousness permits the post-critical and post-therapeutic entrance into third-stage consciousness of a basic law of limitation and transcendence (Lonergan, 1957: 472-475). The tension of limitation and transcendence is characteristic of all development in the concrete universe of being proportionate to human experience, human understanding, and human judgment. But in man the tension itself becomes conscious. Wherever it is found in the universe, the tension is rooted in potency, i.e., in the individuality, continuity, coincidental conjunctions and successions, and nonsystematic divergence from intelligible norms, that are to be known by the empirical consciousness of a mind intent on explanatory understanding /16/. Potency is the root of tension because it is the principle both of limitation and of the upwardly but indeterminately directed dynamism of proportionate being that Lonergan calls finality (1957:442-451). Now, the principle of limitation of the lowest genus of proportionate being is prime potency and, since each higher genus is limited by the preceding lower genus, prime potency is the universal principle of limitation for the whole range of proportionate being (1957:442-443).

Prime potency grounds energy which, Lonergan writes, "is relevant to mechanics, thermodynamics, electromagnetics, chemistry, and biology" (1957:443). Thus, he asks, "Might one not say that the quantity of energy is the concrete prime potency that is informed mechanically or thermally or electrically as the case may be?" And he asks for an answer to this and other questions "such that prime potency would be conceived as a ground of quantitative limitation and general heuristic considerations would relate
quantitative limitation to the properties that science verifies in the quantity it names energy" (1957:444).

The notion of energy as also psychic is not without its difficulties, but it has been defended by C. G. Jung (1972b), approved, it would seem, by the physicist Wolfgang Pauli (Jung, 1972c:514), and is defensible in terms of Lonergan's exposition of explanatory genera and species. Nonetheless,

when one mounts to the higher integrations of the organism, the psyche, and intelligence, one finds that measuring loses both in significance and in efficacy. It loses in significance, for the higher integration is, within limits, independent of the exact quantities of the lower manifold it systematizes. Moreover, the higher the integration, the greater the independence of lower quantities....Besides this loss in significance, there is also a loss in efficacy. Classical method can select among the functions that solve differential equations by appealing to measurements and empirically established curves. What the differential equation is to classical method, the general notion of development is to genetic method. But while the differential equation is mathematical, the general notion of development is not. It follows that while measurement is an efficacious technique for finding boundary conditions that restrict differential equations, it possesses no assignable efficacy when it comes to particularizing the general notion of development" (Lonergan, 1957:463).

The loss of significance and efficacy to the quantitative treatment of what remains a quantity is most apparent in man, where "the higher system of intelligence develops not in a material manifold but in the psychic representation of material manifolds. Hence, the higher system of intellectual development is primarily the higher integration, not of the man in whom the development occurs, but of the universe that he inspects" (1957:469) /17/. The human psyche as integrator develops in an underlying manifold of material events, but the same psyche as operator is oriented to the higher integration of the universe in and through human intentional consciousness.
It is this tension between psyche as integrator of physical, chemical, cytological, and neurological events and psyche as operator of the higher integration of the universe in human intelligence, affirmation, and decision that is the sensitive manifestation of the law of limitation and transcendence as this law becomes conscious in human development. In fact, it is through psychic energy as integrator and operator that this law does first become conscious. The genuineness that would accept the law into consciousness and live from it, then, is promoted by a mediated recognition of psychic energy as integrator and operator of one's own development.

III. Psychic Energy and Elemental Symbols

Transformation of and by Symbols

Freud and Jung entertained what eventually were to become dialectically opposed understandings of psychic energy and of its functioning in personal development. For Freud, psychic energy would seem to be reducible to a biological quantum. It is always, in all its manifestations or object relations, explained by moving backwards. Its real object is sexual, and it institutes other object-relations only by being displaced from the sexual object. There is one basic and unsurpassable desire. Dreams, works of art, linguistic expressions and cultural objectifications dissimulate this desire. They do not witness to a polymorphism of human desire, a capacity to be directed in several autonomous patterns of experience, but rather always disguise the unsurpassable biological instinct from which they originate. Displacement can be either neurotic or healthy. It always occurs through the agency of one or more mechanisms: repression, substitution, symbolization, sublimation. In each instance the primary process, governed by the pleasure principle, is superseded by a secondary process whose principle is the harsh Ananke of reality.
The seat of psychic energy, then, i.e. the unconscious, is on this account never related directly to the real world. It must be adapted by the reality principle, and submit in stoic resignation to things as they are. Therapy enables this healthy, adult stoicism, this adaptation to a cruel fate.

For Jung, on the contrary, specifically psychic energy is a surplus energy from the standpoint of biological purposiveness. It is, in Lonergan's terms, a coincidental manifold at the biological level. Its original orientation is neutral, undetermined, undifferentiated. It is not aboriginally sexual, tied to a destiny in reverse (Ricoeur: 452), but can be directed to a host of different objects. Moreover, it can be transformed. The transformation of energy is not displacement, even by sublimation, for psychic energy has no determinate object from which to be displaced. Thus Jung frequently takes issue with the Freudian notion of mechanisms of displacement, and sharply distinguishes his own notion of transformation from even the seemingly least reductive Freudian mechanism, sublimation /18/. Sublimation is a bending of instinctual desire to a suitable form of adaptation to reality. In essence it is a self-deception, "a new and somewhat more subtle form of repression," for "only absolute necessity can effectively inhibit a natural instinct" (Jung, 1972a:365). Transformation, on the other hand, is itself a thoroughly natural process--i.e., a process that occurs of itself when the proper attitude is adopted toward the process of energetic composition and distribution (complex formation) that depth psychologists call the unconscious /19/. This proper attitude initially may be characterized as one of compassionate and attentive listening, of an effort to befriend the neglected dimensions of one's subterranean existence. Attentiveness, therapeutically tutored, puts one in touch with the upwardly but indeterminately directed dynamism that Lonergan calls finality. Healing thus complements
creativity. Jung designates the fuller being (Lonergan, 1957:445) to which finality is directed as wholeness, which he characterizes as the unconscious meaning and purposefulness of the transformation of energy /20/.

The Jungian explanation of symbols provides the most direct access to the transformation of energy in the service of this unconscious meaning and purposefulness. I find it most instructive to compare the early and later Jung on fantasy and dream /21/. More or less in agreement with Freud, the early Jung indicated that fantasy-thinking and dreaming represent a distortion in one's relation to reality, an intrusion--welcome or unwelcome--of the non-realistic unconscious psyche into the domain of the reality principle or ego /22/. Fantasies and dreams are thinly but subtly disguised instances of wishful thinking, symptoms of the primary process, needing only the suspicious hermeneutic of reduction in order to be revealed for what they are /23/. But in Jung's later work, fantasies and dreams are not distorted forms of thinking, or illegitimate relations to reality, but spontaneous products of a layer of the subject that has its own distinct meaning and purpose /24/. Fantasies and dreams, moreover, have a function: they cooperate in the interests of the transformation of energy in the direction of the wholeness of the personality /25/.

The development in Jung's thought is from symptom to symbol. If dreams and fantasies are symptoms of neurotic difficulty, they reveal the formation of substitutes for sexual energy. But if they have a meaning of their own as symbols of the course of occurrences or conjugate acts at the psychic level of finality, then they are to be interpreted as integrators and operators of a process of development, i.e., of the transformation of psychic energy in the direction of the fuller being that Jung calls wholeness. As an integrator and operator of development, the spontaneous or elemental symbol is efficacious. It does not merely
point to the transformation of energy like a sign; it *gives* what it *symbolizes*; it is not just a symbol of transformation, but a transforming symbol. If for the moment I may neutralize a religiously charged word, we might call the symbol as integrator and operator sacramental.

Because we have made reference to Lonergan's notion of finality, it is interesting to note in this context that Jung speaks explicitly of the necessity of adopting a teleological point of view in the science of the psyche. The question to be asked of the elemental symbol is not so much, What caused this distortion in the relation to reality?, as it is, What is the purpose of this symbolic expression? What is it intending? Where is it heading? The intelligibility is to be discovered in the higher system of human living that systematically assembles and organizes the psychic materials (see Lonergan, 1957:264-267). There is not, however, an either/or dichotomy to be entertained between the causal point of view and the teleological approach. Jung understood that these two scientific orientations are complementary to one another. Both are necessary if the symbol, precisely as symbol, is to be correctly understood. The causal point of view displays the system of energy-composition *from which* energy has passed over into a new distribution. The teleological point of view reveals the direction of the new distribution. Where Jung differs from Freud is that the new distribution is not a faulty substitute for the primal system, but a new and autonomous system in its own right, invested with energy that has become properly its own. It takes over something of the character of the old system, but radically transforms this character in the process. To employ explanatory categories from Lonergan, we might say that, just as potency is a principle of limitation for the realm of proportionate being, even as finality urges world process to new genera that are not logically derivative from former genera, so psychic energy is a principle of limitation for that domain of proportionate
being that is human development, even as its finality urges human development to new patterns, capacities, and differentiations that are not logically derivative from former constellations.

The elemental symbol, then, is not for Jung an inferior form of thinking, the symptom of a maladaptation to reality, but is rather "the best possible description or formulation of a relatively unknown fact" (Jung, 1971:474). The relatively unknown fact is the self as it is and the self as it is becoming.

The process of development toward wholeness, when engaged in consciously and deliberately, Jung calls individuation. Psychic energy as the principle of the upwardly but indeterminately directed dynamism of finality, is initially undifferentiated as far as its specific focus or objective is concerned. But it is generically directed to a wholeness that is moved toward by individuation. Its elemental symbolic productions effect its ongoing transformation in this direction. Wholeness is a generic goal that becomes specifically differentiated through the process of individuation /26/.

The complementarity of the causal and the teleological points of view in the interpretation of elemental symbols corresponds to the transformation of an object into an imago. On a purely causal interpretation, the appearance or suggestion of a maternal symbol in a dream or fantasy, for example, signifies some unresolved component of infantile Oedipal sexuality, some disguised or displaced form of the primal Oedipal situation. On a teleological interpretation, the same symbol may point not just back to one's childhood or infancy, but also ahead to further development. It may be, not a symptom of infantile fixation, but a symbol of the life-giving forces of nature. It may have a more than personal meaning, a significance that Jung calls archetypal. One may be regressing to the mother, but precisely for the sake of finding memory-traces that will
enable one to move forward. In this case, "mother" is no longer an object or a cause of a symptom but, in Jung's term, an *imago*, i.e., a cluster of memory associations through whose aid further development may take place /27/. What was once an object of one's reachings may become a symbol of the life that lies ahead. The energy once invested in an object is now concentrated in a symbol which transforms the original investment in such a way as to propel one to an adult future. The cathexis of psychic energy has been transferred--by transformation, not by displacement--from an object to the "relatively unknown fact" that is expressed in the symbol. Psychic energy has been channeled into a symbolic analogue of its natural object, an analogue that imitates the object and thereby gains for a new purpose the energy once invested in the object.

Intentionality and the Transformation of Energy

To say that the transformation of psychic energy is a natural and automatic process does not mean that wholeness is its inevitable result. We have already called attention to the requisite attitude on the part of consciousness if the individuation process is to proceed from generic indetermination to specific and explanatory differentiation. Jung himself insisted on the need for a freely adopted conscious attitude toward the psychological depths and their symbolic manifestations if individuation is to occur (1966). The same may be gathered from Lonergan's discussion of the collaboration of imagination and intelligence in presenting to conscious discrimination the images needed for insight, judgment, and decision (1957:187-196). Earlier I called the proper attitude one of therapeutically tutored attentiveness. Such contemplative listening is a function of the effective introduction into one's operative intentionality of the universal willingness that matches the unrestricted spontaneity of the desire for intelligibility,
the unconditioned, and value. "There is to human inquiry an unrestricted demand for intelligibility. There is to human judgment a demand for the unconditioned. There is to human deliberation a criterion that criticizes every finite good" (Lonergan, 1972:83-84). The transformation of psychic energy may well be a natural and automatic process, but the direction it will assume is dependent on the orientation of the higher system of intentionality in which the psyche itself finds its integration. Thus, too, the science of depth psychology depends on a maieutic of intentionality.

The unrestricted demand of inquiry, judgment, and deliberation constitutes what Lonergan calls the transcendent exigence of human intentionality. "So it is...that man can reach basic fulfilment, peace, joy, only by moving beyond the realms of common sense, theory, and interiority and into the realm in which God is known and loved" (1972:84).

Religious conversion and its development in spirituality is what brings one into this realm of transcendence. As fulfilment of intentionality and simultaneously as participation in the divinely originated solution to the problem of evil, religious conversion is the beginning of the therapeutic movement from above downwards that proceeds through moral and intellectual conversion to the psychic conversion that effects the therapeutically tutored attentiveness that represents the proper attitude to the symbolic deliverances of psychic finality. In this way, the divinely originated solution to the problem of evil penetrates to the sensitive level of human living. In the limit, it is to be expected that what will occur in the unfolding of the story told in one's dreams will be the transformation of one's spontaneous symbolic process so that it matches more and more the exigencies of the divinely originated solution. For the transformation of sensitivity and spontaneous intersubjectivity wrought by development in the realm of transcendence penetrates to the physiological level of human subjectivity (Lonergan, 1957: 741-742). The divinely originated solution to the problem
of evil is a higher integration of human living that will be implemented by a converted intentionality, an intentionality that has been transformed by the supernatural or transcendent conjugate forms of faith and hope and charity (Lonergan, 1957:696-703). But, because the solution is a harmonious continuation of the emergent probability of world process, it must penetrate to and envelop the sensitive level with which the creative movement of intentionality from below upwards begins. Spontaneous psychic images function in human consciousness in a manner analogous to the role of questions for intelligence, reflection, and deliberation. As questions promote the successive sublations of lower levels of consciousness by higher levels, so psychic images, when attended to under the influence of an antecedently willing collaboration of imagination and intelligence, promote the sublation of neural demand functions by waking empirical consciousness (Doran, 1977b:183-217), which in turn is sublated by intelligent, rational, and existential consciousness.

The transformation of energy under the influence of the transcendent conjugate forms introduced into intentionality by religious conversion will enter a dimension or stage that was not adequately differentiated by Jung /28/. As we saw above, Jung was extremely sensitive to the transformation of energic compositions and distributions from personal object-relations to archetypal imago-relations. But beyond the archetypal stage of energic transformation, there is an anagogic stage /29/. It represents the envelopment of sensitivity by the divinely originated solution to the problem of evil. In this stage, transformed and transforming symbols are released that correspond to the unrestricted intentionality of human intelligence, human judgment, and human deliberation. Anagogic symbols simultaneously reflect and give the conversion of human sensitivity itself to participation in the divinely originated solution to the problem of evil. They correspond to what Lonergan calls "the image that symbolizes
man's orientation into the known unknown" (1957:723). Lonergan aptly explains their function: "Since faith gives more truth than understanding comprehends, since hope reinforces the detached, disinterested, unrestricted desire to know, man's sensitivity needs symbols that unlock its transforming dynamism and bring it into harmony with the vast but impalpable pressures of the pure desire, of hope, and of self-sacrificing charity" (1957:723). These symbols make of the divinely originated solution "a mystery that is at once symbol of the uncomprehended and sign of what is grasped and psychic force that sweeps living human bodies, linked in charity, to the joyful, courageous, whole-hearted, yet intelligently controlled performance of the tasks set by a world order in which the problem of evil is not suppressed but transcended" (1957:723-724). Through anagogic symbols, the divine solution becomes living history in a deeper, more personal manner. Through their agency, "the emergent trend and the full realization of the solution [includes] the sensible data that are demanded by man's sensitive nature and that will command his attention, nourish his imagination, stimulate his intelligence and will, release his affectivity, control his aggressivity and, as central features of the world of sense, intimate its finality, its yearning for God" (1957:724). In fact, since the higher system of intentionality is primarily the higher integration, not of the subject in whom development occurs, but of the universe of being that the subject knows and makes (1957:469), it may be said that elemental anagogic symbols not only intimate but also promote the finality of the universe. The participation of sensitivity in the divinely originated solution to the problem of evil that occurs through anagogic symbols, when sustained by the harmonious cooperation of the therapeutic movement from above downwards with the creative development from below upwards would then have to be understood as the fulfilment of the process of conversion in the retrieved genuineness of the subject in the third stage of meaning.
NOTES

/1/ Some of these confusions are obvious in Gregory Baum's Pere Marquette lecture, misnamed Truth beyond Relativism: Karl Mannheim's Sociology of Knowledge (1977).

/2/ On the levels of consciousness and their corresponding sanctions for one's authenticity as a human subject, see inter alia Lonergan (1972:3-25); on the dramatic pattern (1957:187-206).

/3/ On the relationship of the dialectic of community to the inner dialectic of the subject, see Lonergan (1957: 218).

/4/ In contrast with the position of Lonergan, I would want to say that it is not moral and religious conversion as such that sublate intellectual conversion, but moral and religious self-appropriation, i.e., the knowledge of existential intentionality. Psychic conversion is an aid to this knowledge. Thus it is psychic conversion that sublates intellectual conversion.

/5/ See Piaget (1967:60-70) for a description of the drama that accompanies the adolescent's budding familiarity with systematic thinking.

/6/ I have referred to the dream as an operator (1977b:184-189). Lonergan has used the expression "quasi-operator." His refinement is, I believe, accurate and to be preferred.

/7/ It must be kept in mind that the factors that operate in the aberration of the censorship are manifest and complex. Lonergan has recognized this complexity by referring to the dominance of the dialectic of community over the dialectic of the dramatic subject (1957:218). This means, of course, that there are extreme cases of people who never really had a chance themselves, whose failed artistry is a function not so much of inauthenticity as of victimization. As a civilization nears "the catalytic trifle that will reveal to a surprised world the end of a once brilliant day" (1957:210), such cases are liable to become more numerous. The reversal of personal decline in such instances is increasingly more improbable. So too, I believe, the need for and the availability of an extraordinary remedy from the realm of transcendence increases as the longer cycle of social decline moves toward the day of reckoning. Perhaps it is in these terms that such phenomena as the charismatic movement are to be explained. It is to be kept in mind, however, that even extraordinary remedies are subject to the distorting influence of human religious inauthenticity.


Lonergan speaks of genuineness as "the necessary condition of the harmonious co-operation of the conscious and unconscious components of development" (1957:477). The context of this reference indicates to me that his later refinement is more precise, according to which there is a need to avoid a conflict between what one spontaneously is and what one has objectified oneself to be (1972:34).

"One moves to a deeper grasp of the issue when one asks why conflict should arise. For if one does not have to look far to find a reason, the reason is not without its profundity. As we have seen, all development involves a tension between limitation and transcendence. On the one hand, there is the subject as he is functioning more or less successfully in a flexible circle of ranges of schemes of recurrence. On the other hand, there is the subject as a higher system on the move. One and the same reality is both integrator and operator; but the operator is relentless in transforming the integrator. The integrator resides in successive levels of interrelated conjugate forms that are more familiar under the common name of acquired habits. But habits are inertial. The whole tendency of present perceptiveness, of present affectivity and aggressivity, of present ways of understanding and judging, deliberating and choosing, speaking and doing, is for them to remain as they are. Against this solid and salutary conservatism, however, there operate the same principles that gave rise to the acquired habits and now persist in attempting to transform them. Unconsciously operative is the finality that consists in the upwardly but indeterminately directed dynamism of all proportionate being. Consciously operative is the detached and disinterested desire raising ever further questions. Among the topics for questioning are one's own unconscious initiatives, their subsumption under the general order intelligence discovers in the universe of being, their integration in the fabric of one's habitual living. So there emerges into consciousness a concrete apprehension of an obviously practicable and proximate ideal self; but along with it there also emerges the tension between limitation and transcendence; and it is no vague tension between limitation in general and transcendence in general, but an unwelcome invasion of consciousness by opposed apprehensions of oneself as one concretely is and as one concretely is to be" (Lonergan, 1957:476-477). As we shall see, the tension is rooted in the conjugate potency that Jung calls psychic energy, which is simultaneously the integrator of underlying physical, chemical, cytological, and neurological manifolds
and an operator not only of the higher integration of the human subject through universal willingness but of the higher integration of the universe of proportionate being through understanding, judgment, decision, and love.

"Intellectual development rests upon the dominance of a detached and disinterested desire to know. It reveals to a man a universe of being, in which he is but an item, and a universal order, in which his desires and fears, his delight and anguish, are but infinitesimal components in the history of mankind. It invites man to become intelligent and reasonable not only in his knowing but also in his living, to guide his actions by referring them, not as an animal to a habitat, but as an intelligent being to the intelligible context of some universal order that is or is to be. Still, it is difficult for man, even in knowing, to be dominated simply by the pure desire, and it is far more difficult for him to permit that detachment and disinterestedness to dominate his whole way of life. For the self, as perceiving and feeling, as enjoying and suffering, functions as an animal in an environment, as a self-attached and self-interested centre within its own narrow world of stimuli and responses. But the same self, as inquiring and reflecting, as conceiving intelligently and judging reasonably, is carried by its own higher spontaneity to quite a different mode of operation with the opposite attributes of detachment and disinterestedness. It is confronted with a universe of being in which it finds itself, not the centre of reference, but an object coordinated with other objects and, with them, subordinated to some destiny to be discovered or invented, approved or disdained, accepted or repudiated.

"Such then is the height of the tension of human consciousness. On the side of the object, it is the opposition between the world of sense of man the animal and, on the other hand, the universe of being to be known by intelligent grasp and reasonable affirmation. On the side of the subject, it is the opposition between a centre in the world of sense operating self-centredly and, on the other hand, an entry into an intelligibly ordered universe of being to which one can belong and in which one can function only through detachment and disinterestedness. Not only is the opposition complete but also it is ineluctable. As a man cannot divest himself of his animality, so he cannot put off the Eros of his mind" (Lonergan, 1957:473-474). The opposition is even more concretely understood when one brings in Lonergan's insistence on the primacy of a fourth level of consciousness. For then not only is the universe of being to be known by intelligent grasp and reasonable affirmation, but also it is to be promoted in its upwardly directed dynamism by responsible decision.

Ernest Becker (1973) has captured the drama of the opposition of limitation and transcendence.
/13/ For the general structure of this transformation and integration, see Doran (1977b).

/14/ On method as therapy, see Gregson (1975); see also Doran (1977a:202-213).

/15/ On openness as fact, achievement, and gift, see Lonergan (1967).

/16/ On potency, see Lonergan (1957:432-433); on central potency (individuality), conjugate potency (other aspects of the empirical residue) (437); on a coincidental manifold of conjugate acts (occurrences) as potency for a higher integration by an emergent conjugate form (438).

/17/ Again, in the light of the later expansion of the analysis of consciousness to the fourth level, "intellectual development" as used throughout Lonergan's treatment of human development in chapter 15 of Insight must include the existential development of the subject as originating value.

/18/ For a representative critique of the notion of sublimation, see Jung (1972a:365).

/19/ Jung, of course, initially agreed with Freud that psychic energy is displaced from sexual object-relations to other distributions, but he soon abandoned this notion in favor of the natural process of transformation. His early agreement with Freud on the notion of sublimation can be seen in some original 1909 footnotes to a paper Jung revised and expanded in 1949 (1961b:320-321 n. 21 and 22).

/20/ Compare Lonergan (1957:477): "Unconsciously operative is the finality that consists in the upwardly but indeterminately directed dynamism of all proportionate being." Emphasis added. The context is the tension of limitation and transcendence in human development.

/21/ Approximately, the early Jung is the Jung prior to the "confrontation with the unconscious" detailed in chapter six of the autobiographical Memories, Dreams, Reflections (Jung, 1961a).

/22/ "Ego" is here used differently from the way Lonergan employs the term (1957:191), where the ego is a daydreamer or fantasizer, and not in a particularly helpful manner.

/23/ On the hermeneutic of suspicion, see Ricoeur (32-36). Jung's early interpretation of fantasies and dreams is still present in the book that generally is acknowledged as Jung's definitive break with Freud, the 1912
Jungian analyst John Weir Perry (1974:28-30) has argued persuasively that this is the case even—especially—with the fantasies of psychotics. If Perry is correct, he has contributed another facet to the critique of the usual treatment of schizophrenia that has been offered by Thomas Szasz and R. D. Laing.

Compare Lonergan (1957:452-453): "The course of development is marked by an increasing explanatory differentiation. The initial integration in the initial manifold pertains to a determinate genus and species; still, exclusive attention to the data on the initial stage would yield little knowledge and less understanding of the relevant genus and species. What is to be known by understanding, is what is yet to come, what may be present virtually or potentially but, as yet, is not present formally or actually. Accordingly, if one attends simply to the data on each successive stage of a development, one finds that the initial integration can be understood only in a generic fashion, that subsequent integrations are increasingly specific intelligibilities, that the specific intelligible differentiation of the ultimate stage attained is generalized in the process from the initial stage."

Paul Ricoeur's notion of the archeological-teleological unity-in-tension of the concrete symbol helps me understand the complex constitution and function of the dream (Ricoeur: 494-551). The tense unity of regressive and progressive aspects is rooted in what Ricoeur calls the overdetermination of the symbol, a factor which in turn I would root in the coincidental character of psychic energy from a biological standpoint.

I have offered a preliminary critique of Jung on this issue and the related problem of his treatment of evil (Doran, 1976 and 1977d).

My initial exposure to the contrast of archetypal and anagogic symbols was through Frye (1957:95-128). I was introduced to Frye by Joseph Flanagan's paper at the 1976
Lonergan Workshop. For my own purposes, I would articulate the distinction in its most simple form as follows: archetypal symbols are taken from nature and imitate nature (cf. the example of the mother-imago); anagogic symbols are taken from nature but point to its transformation in the light of its transcendent finality. I do not intend, however, to ascribe this precise interpretation to Frye.

Jung's failure to distinguish the archetypal from the anagogic leads, in the last analysis, to a displacement of the tension of limitation and transcendence that is every bit as erroneous as Freud's reductionism. On displacement of the tension as failure in genuineness, see Lonergan (1957:478).
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The book Christotherapy is an initial, heuristic outlining in a pastoral fashion of a Christian psychotherapy. Attention centers on the healing and maturation of individuals rather than of groups or societies. The book does make it clear, however, that the meanings, values, assumptions and beliefs of individuals are in large measure the product of familial, societal, environmental factors. In the present paper a key interest is in the potential role of a Christian psychotherapy and specifically of Christotherapy in effecting a healing through enlightenment on the societal level and, in particular, on the level of the American psyche or consciousness.

The discussion in this paper covers the following elements, some of which are treated in detail, others only briefly and suggestively: (1) a consideration of the basic meaning of a Christian psychotherapy and specifically of Christotherapy; (2) a phenomenological exposition of some hypotheses of psychotherapists regarding the possible role of society in the generation and/or development of emotional disorders or "mental illness" in individuals; (3) the views of Bernard Lonergan on the relationship between the individual and society and the possible role of society in the causation of emotional illness; (4) the view of Christotherapy on society's causation of emotional illness; (5) the relationship of Christotherapy, Noo- and Christogenesis and cosmopolis; (6) Christotherapy, liberation theology and conscientisation; (7) some brief suggestions.
regarding the possible role of Christotherapy in the healing of the American consciousness.

The Issue of a Christian Psychotherapy

A first step is to establish certain parameters within which a Christian psychotherapy can be seen to make any sense by testing the notion of a Christian psychotherapy in the light of the biophysical, the intrapsychic, and the rational-emotive and existential psychotherapeutic approaches.

Diverse Psychological Approaches

The Biophysical Approach. If mental illness finds its sole and adequate explanation on a biophysical level, then the notion of a Christian psychotherapy is meaningless. Either drugs or surgery but not psychotherapy would constitute the proper healing means to be employed. Good Christian counseling might prove to be helpful in the recovery process but it would be a factor extrinsic to the curing of the neurosis or psychosis as such.

The Intrapsychic Approach. If mental illness is at least at times explicable along the intrapsychic lines of a Freud or a Jung with the emphasis on instinctual conflicts, need deprivation or traumas, especially in early childhood, then there is a certain room for such a phenomenon as a Christian psychotherapy. Thus, for example, Agnes Sanford, Francis MacNutt, Michael Scanlan and others describe a certain Christian form of "healing of the memories." In this process of inner healing the Christian counselor or charismatic healer enters into a prayerful dialogue with the troubled individual. In this dialogue the suffering person journeys into his past and allows painful and at times repressed traumas and memories to surface in consciousness and to be prayerfully evaluated and responded to in the light of Christ's forgiveness and healing love. The result
of this process is a certain healing of the memories and traumas of the past in which the individual experiences a liberation and transformation at the very roots of his psyche and spirit. Here there is an instance of a genuinely psychotherapeutic approach along intrapsychic lines since various natural techniques are employed to raise to consciousness traumas and repressed memories and experiences of the past. At the same time the process is constitutively Christian since it is at its core prayerful and since healing in the process above all comes about through the transforming presence of the light and grace of Christ.

The Rational-Emotive and Existential Approaches. If, as Dr. Albert Ellis, founder of rational-emotive psychotherapy, contends, mental illness has its roots in deeply held, constantly reiterated irrational ideas and beliefs, and if healing comes through the unmasking of those ideas and beliefs as irrational and replacing them with rational ideas and beliefs, then there is room for an explicitly Christian psychotherapy. In fact, the Sermon of the Beatitudes might serve as a paradigm for a Christian rational-emotive psychotherapy. Again, if O. Hobart Mowrer is correct that refusal to acknowledge real, authentic guilt is the key factor in many emotional illnesses, then most certainly there is room for and indeed need of a Christian psychotherapeutic approach. Finally, if Dr. Thomas Hora is correct that inauthentic modes of thinking and desiring lie at the roots of mental illness then both the possibility and desirability of a Christian psychotherapy which puts central stress on the healing power of the Christ-meaning and the Christ-value is clearly established. The idea of Christotherapy finds its key inspiration in the writings of Hora and other psychotherapists who hold that meaning and value play constitutive roles in the psychotherapeutic healing process.
Tyrrell

Lonergan's Notion of a Christian Philosophy and the Issue of a Christian Psychotherapy

Certain reflections of Bernard Lonergan on the issue of a Christian philosophy help to elucidate the meaning and scope of a Christian psychotherapy. Lonergan argues that "there is a philosophy that is open to the acceptance of Christian doctrine, that stands in harmony with it, and that, if rejected, leads to a rejection of Christian doctrine" (1972b:309). Now it might be argued by analogy that at the very least there is a psychology and psychotherapy that is open to the acceptance of Christian doctrine, that stands in harmony with it, and that, if rejected, leads to a rejection of Christian doctrine. If, for example, Carl Jung is correct in his observation that the philosophy of life of the therapist shapes the spirit of his therapy (79), then the psychotherapy of the determinist or the materialist or radical anti-religionist will not be open to Christianity or in harmony with it. This presupposes, of course, that the philosophy of the therapist in question is, in fact, carried over into his psychotherapeutic theoría and praxis. On the other hand, if a psychotherapist envisages the human person as endowed with intelligence and freedom and as open to a religious dimension then to the extent that his view of man enters into his psychotherapeutic theoría and praxis it is open in principle to Christian revelation and in harmony with it. This, of course, is a minimalist approach to the issue of a Christian psychotherapy.

In other writings Lonergan argues that there is a philosophy implicit in Christian revelation (1964:154). Lonergan speaks, for example, of a Christian realism which acknowledges that the true and the real are known through correct judgments and not properly in any prior stage of cognitional process (1974). I believe that it might be argued analogously that there is a psychotherapeutic dimension at least implicit in Christian revelation. This is
clearly the case if healing of the wounded psyche can come through the discovery of authentic meaning and value since Christ himself is the very revelation of the healing Meaning and Value that is God himself.

Natural Healing Laws and Christian Intentionality

The possibility and desirability both of a Christian philosophy and a Christian psychotherapy are rooted in the distinction which the Catholic Christian tradition has drawn between nature and grace. Nature refers to man as he is according to his essence, that is, as a rational animal or symbol-using animal or incarnate spirit endowed with the capacities to sense, to know and to love. Grace refers to the transformation that takes place in man when he receives the gift of adoption as son or daughter of God and is filled with the Spirit. Lonergan expresses this distinction between nature and grace in the psychological terms of "openness as fact" and "openness as gift" (1967a). Man is by nature open to the fullness of being and of value. He possesses a pure, unrestricted desire for knowledge and for value. But man's natural openness to everything that is, his natural desire to know even the essence of God can only be fully satisfied through God's free gift of his love, his gift of adoption in Christ. In my book Christotherapy I express this distinction by speaking of the natural self and the Christ-self.

In the light of the distinction between nature and grace or between "openness as fact" and "openness as gift" or between the natural self and the Christ-self, it is possible and necessary to distinguish between healing processes operative in the natural self and according to its laws and inner dynamics, and healing processes directly attributable to the workings of healing and transforming grace and the gift of God's love. A psychotherapy, then, is to be called "natural" to the extent that it embodies and employs natural healing laws. It is to be called
Christian, however, to the extent that it embodies healing laws which are in accord with the psychology and anthropology implicit in revelation but above all when it partakes in the healing through enlightenment which flows directly from the saving power of Christ himself.

Now Christotherapy, as I have developed it to date, invokes certain natural healing laws and in this sense it may be spoken of as involving a natural psychotherapy. Christotherapy, however, sublates the natural healing laws it employs within the higher healing context of Christian intentionality. Christotherapy, then, is a natural psychotherapy insofar as it is in principle open to the employment of any natural healing techniques which are authentically human and not in opposition to the psychology and anthropology at least implicit in Christian revelation. Christotherapy, however, is above all a Christian psychotherapy because it places all natural psychotherapeutic theories and techniques under the final judgment of revelation and most of all because it envisages Christ and the healing meanings and values he incarnates as the principal therapeutic agent for the healing and integrating of the wounded psyche and spirit of man.

Some observations of Karl Rahner on the relationship between the revealed word of God and the natural signs or symbols present in the sacraments may help at least indirectly to illuminate the relationship between natural healing laws and the healing dimension of Christian intentionality or of the Christ-meaning and the Christ-value. Rahner indicates that natural signs or symbols are not able of themselves to communicate the meaning of the healing mysteries of faith, e.g. of the Trinity, the Incarnation, the Indwelling of the Spirit (1966:281-286). He affirms that if God is to reveal to us the healing mysteries of his inner life, a revelation of the Word in the word must be added to the natural revelation of himself God makes in nature and the cosmos. Thus, in the context of
the sacraments Rahner writes: "In the manifestation of grace which is called the sacrament, the word is necessarily and inevitably the decisive element: an objective element in the nature of a thing only enters this manifestation insofar as it is absorbed into this utterance in the word" (267-268). For example, washing by itself is a natural symbol of purification. But it is only through the revelation words of the baptismal formula that the natural symbol is sublated into a faith-context and is able to effect truly what it symbolizes and signify what it effects. Analogously, there is, for example, a natural law of psychological healing which is effective whenever an individual who has offended another acknowledges his wrong-doing and sincerely asks for forgiveness. But when in a prayerful or sacramental context an individual confesses his sin against his neighbor to God and asks for and receives forgiveness in Christ the natural law of healing is subsumed into an entirely new realm of healing efficacy and forgiveness. This latter is the gift-realm of the healing Christ, of the Christ-meaning and the Christ-value, of Christian intentionality.

But what, more precisely, is the meaning of Christian intentionality? The expression "Christian intentionality" I derive from Josef Fuchs who raises the question: "If Christian conduct is substantially identical with human conduct as such, in what sense can we speak of a specifically Christian morality?" (123). Fuchs answers that the "distinctive element of Christian morality is that specific Christian intentionality which transcends and fulfills all human moral values" (123). He develops this point in noting that in all his moral activities the Christian relates himself to Christ as his brother and savior and to the Father as the source of all salvation. The dynamic presence of the risen Christ in the consciousness of the Christian who lives by faith transforms all that the Christian thinks, desires, feels and does. And this is what is meant by Christian intentionality.
It follows that in a Christian psychotherapy the healing light and power of the Christ-meaning and the Christ-value—manifested in the Christ-Event—irradiate and transfigure all natural psychotherapeutic laws of healing and sublate them into an incomparably richer and more vital and efficacious healing realm. If for example, a natural healing of the wounded psyche can come through the discovery of meaning and value, how much greater and more transforming a healing can come through the gift of participation in the saving Value and Meaning brought near to suffering humanity in the event of Jesus the Christ. Of course, the healing that comes through Christ does not obliterate or render useless and inoperative the natural psychotherapeutic healing laws. Rather these natural healing processes are enhanced, strengthened and enriched beyond measure through their sublation into the gift-realm of the healing and enlightening grace of Christ the Healer.

Some Hypotheses on the Role of Society in the Causation of Emotional Disorders

Perhaps it will be best to offer a phenomenological exposition of some theories of psychotherapists regarding the possible role of society in the genesis of emotional illnesses.

Major Hypotheses

**The Biophysical Hypothesis.** Clearly, for the strict biophysical psychotherapist societal causation of emotional disorders is a matter of genetics and strictly physical causation and, if improvements are to come, they will probably be along some eugenic line.

**Intrapsychic Hypotheses.** Within the intrapsychic tradition of psychotherapy Karen Horney's views on neuroses and their development in society are especially interesting. Horney stresses the critical importance of cultural factors
in the causation of psychic disturbances. Horney does not depart entirely from Freud in his stress on the role of childhood experiences in the development of neuroses but she does see cultural factors as playing an important and sometimes decisive role. She points out, for example, that there are certain difficulties inherent in American culture which appear as conflicts in each individual's life and when intensified and accumulated may lead to neuroses. As an example of these difficulties and conflicts, Horney notes the contradiction which exists between the stress in society on the need to be competitive and to succeed and, on the other hand, the need to be an exemplar of brotherly love and humility (288-289). As another example of cultural conflicts Horney points to the stimulation of our need for "conspicuous consumption" especially through advertisements and, on the other hand, our constant factual frustration in satisfying our so-called "needs" (288-289).

Horney concludes her work with this telling comment:

It seems that the person who is likely to become neurotic is one who has experienced the culturally determined difficulties in an accentuated form, most through the medium of childhood experiences, and who has consequently been unable to solve them, or has solved them only at great cost to his personality. We might call him a stepchild of our culture. (290)

Viktor Frankl distinguishes between what he calls "psychogenic neuroses" and "neogenic neuroses." The latter type of neurosis is, according to Frankl, "sociogenic" in nature. It is brought about by a sense of meaningless in life which he sums up under the rubric of the "existential vacuum." Frankl sees drug addiction, a rising suicide rate and the increase of crime, violence and aggressiveness as indications of this collective neurosis. He sees logotherapy, with its emphasis on meaning, value and self-transcendence, as providing a powerful antidote to the existential frustration, loneliness and despair which are
generated within the collective psyche and are constantly on the increase both in America and elsewhere.

*The Rational-Emotive Hypothesis.* Dr. Albert Ellis holds that it is the various irrational ideas, which are ubiquitous in America and elsewhere, that are the prime source of emotional disturbances and widespread neurosis. Ellis appeals to Horney, Erich Fromm, Wilhelm Reich and others for added support of his view that societally-inculcated superstitions and prejudices are a prime cause of pathological disturbances (60). He notes the danger of an uncritical acceptance of the so-called American values and he cites La Barre who comments that in our society "a child perforce becomes a Right Thinker before he learns to think at all" (60). Ellis lists eleven principle culturally derived irrational ideas which both cause and sustain emotional disorders. I myself would dispute some of the notions Ellis considers irrational but here I simply cite his view that society is indeed to a large extent the cause and sustainer of pathological diseases in individuals.

*The Existential Hypotheses of Waldman and Hora.* Dr. Roy Waldman takes issue with the basic tendency of Freud to confine his theory of personality to an individual framework. Waldman, showing the influence of Alfred Adler, Jean-Paul Sartre and Ronald Laing, emphasizes the role of socio-historical elements in the individual's development of neurosis. He envisages man as basically a "being-in-the-world" who can only act in a situation. Neurosis, for Waldman, is not the product of instinctual conflicts or biophysical inadequacies but a purposeful tactic or life strategy, either consciously or unknowingly employed, in a self-defeating effort to deal with the at times oppressive alienating forces of society. If I might cite a comment from the final chapter of Waldman's provocative book:

The task of contemporary psychiatry calls for far more than the ceaseless familiar, time-worn efforts of laboratory studies inclined to investigate the
physical insides of man. Our concern must focus instead upon the very fabric of our society that spews out masses of idiosyncratically (neurotic) oppressed people as well as those who bear their suffering in more conventional manners—as an instance, the black majority. Whether it be the downtrodden misery of the black man or of the neurotic, both have similar social origins and psychiatry must fulfill its part in discerning and exposing the structures of our social order which fosters man's fallen condition. (144)

Dr. Thomas Hora interprets the varied forms of emotional disorder as a symptom and consequence of erroneous modes of thinking and desiring-in-the-world. For Hora "contemporary man lives in an increasingly polluted atmosphere, in a 'noosphere' that is, a mental climate, that is more or less overcharged and harmful" (1). The mental climate in which man lives consists in implicitly or explicitly, covertly or overtly, paraconsciously or consciously communicated assumptions, thoughts, affects, values, meanings, ideologies. In this age of mass communications the individual is bombarded with false, destructive messages about what it really means to live and exist in the world and one of the principal results is mental illness. The communication of false meanings and values occurs in diadic situations, in the family and in society. Healing, for Dr. Hora, comes through the gift of enlightenment which takes place within a climate of love. Enlightenment involves the cleansing of the mind and heart from toxic mental and affective content and the reception of the gifts of authentic life-meanings and values.

Lonergan on the Individual-Community Relationship in the Context of Mental Health

Here it is possible only to indicate certain heuristic categories pertaining to Lonergan's analysis of the relationship between individuals and society. For Lonergan, then, individuals are born and raised within communities and the individual's capacity for self-realization is
limited by the available common meanings and values shared by the community (1967:245-246). It is within an inter-subjective community that an individual comes to know himself and his self-knowledge is mediated and molded by language which is the creation of the community (1972). Lonergan stresses that it is through meaning that the world is mediated to man and it is through the creative constitution of meaning in art, polity, economics, etc. that man ever more fully realizes himself. Man as an individual, however, knows the real world largely through participation in the common sense understanding of the community and he constitutes meanings mainly within the larger ongoing constitution of meaning by the community.

Lonergan's key distinction between immanently generated knowledge and belief indicates yet more clearly the awesome role society plays in the thinking and desiring of individuals. Thus, immanently generated knowledge in Lonergan's analysis is a matter of personal insight and verification. I know that England is an island only if I have personally verified it for myself. Belief, on the other hand, is a matter of accepting something as true on the testimony of someone else. Lonergan points out that most of what we as individuals know is, in fact, strictly speaking a matter of belief. Indeed, in his Method in Theology Lonergan remarks: "Convictions and commitments rest on judgments of fact and judgments of value. Such judgments in turn, rest largely on beliefs" (1972:244). Moreover, "few, indeed are the people that pressed on almost any point, must not shortly have recourse to what they have believed" (244). Belief looms so massively in human consciousness that Lonergan can state: "To appropriate one's social, cultural, religious heritage is largely a matter of belief" (41).

In the light of Lonergan's analysis of the role of belief in human consciousness his phenomenological study of group and general bias is most relevant and important in
the present context (1957: chaps. 7 and 8). Tersely expressed, group bias, like individual bias, involves an interference with one's fidelity to the normative exigencies of intelligence. Self-interest is maximized at the expense of anyone whose interests do not coincide with those of the group. Unlike individual bias, however, group bias does not have to defy the judgments of others since all within the group think alike. Moreover, just as individual bias impedes development in the individual and leads to his deterioration as an authentic human being, so group bias introduces a surd on a much broader level and radically impedes the development of those insights which would lead to authentic social development. Finally, general bias is a communally shared indifference to problems that require long range solutions. General bias is at its core the common failure of most to make basic rationality the center of their thinking and judging. Most clearly, then, if society does play a central role in the causation of mental disorders, it will be above all in the areas of belief and of bias that a basic transformation and healing will have to take place.

Two further questions should be raised. First, does Lonergan in his writings show a preference for a particular therapeutic theory and praxis? Second, does Lonergan acknowledge a societal factor in the genesis of emotional disorders in individuals.

In regard to the first, it is to be noted that in *Insight* Lonergan basically makes use of an adapted Freudian--and, to some extent, Jungian--model for explaining the meaning and role of the psyche in human development. In *Method in Theology* Lonergan refers to many contemporary psychotherapeutic approaches in his discussion of meaning and notes that the followers of Freud, Adler and Jung have become less and less rigid in their theory and practice (67). More recently, Lonergan has shown a renewed and deepening interest in Jung. In general, it is
my impression that Lonergan's psychotherapeutic preference lies in the direction of the more complex and comprehensive theories and models. It is perhaps of interest to note, however, that although Freud, Jung and Adler offer the most sophisticated and highly developed hypothetical models of the psyche and psychic life, there is no clear evidence that in practice their therapies are more successful in bringing about mental health than are certain more recent, less complex approaches.

There is the further question: Does Lonergan acknowledge a societal causal factor in the genesis of psychic disorders? In general, in *Insight* Lonergan employs a more individual-oriented approach to the problem of emotional disturbances. For example, Lonergan limits the phenomena of repression-inhibition in the strict sense to the unconscious functioning of censorship à la the Freudian model. Yet, Lonergan also acknowledges that the dialectic of subjects within community "gives rise to the situations that stimulate neural demands and....molds the orientation of intelligence that preconsciously exercises the censorship" (1957:218). Moreover in *Method in Theology* Lonergan evinces a certain openness to the potentialities in various contemporary therapies of a more existential orientation and this would seem to imply an equal openness to the acknowledgment of a more significant role of society in the causation of mental disorders.

The View of Christotherapy on Society's Causation of Emotional Disorders

There is no a priori manner in which the correct view on the possible role of society in the genesis of mental illness in individuals can be determined. The hypothesis of Christotherapy is that society does play a key role in effecting a causal situation in which mental disturbances will either flourish or decline. There is a lot of evidence to support this option and certainly no definitive
Christotherapy evidence for rejecting it. Moreover, if psychotherapists were to choose to delay the exercise of their healing practice until all the evidence was in regarding the nature and causation of mental illness there would perhaps never be any psychotherapeutic aid at all.

Here I might also add that if it should ever be established that all mental illness is the result solely of biophysical causes then, of course, Christotherapy would have to renounce any claim to being an effective agent in the healing of emotional disturbances. Christotherapy would retain, however, its value as a dynamic existential means for overcoming existential ignorance, bias and other destructive factors in human living and as a graced way for actively receiving gifts of ever richer participation in the Christ-meaning and the Christ-value.

Now to indicate the general role of Christotherapy as a *theoria-praxis* in the criticism and transformation of the beliefs, assumptions, viewpoints of societal consciousness I will begin by using Teilhard de Chardin's notions of noogenesis and Christogenesis and Lonergan's notion of cosmopolis. Then I will show the possible relationship of Christotherapy to the so-called "liberation theologies" and how it may be viewed as a form of "conscientisation" or a "pedagogy of the psychospiritually oppressed." I will also point out the dynamic relationship which exists in Christotherapy between *theoria* and *praxis*. Finally, I will make a few suggestions concerning the possible healing relationship of Christotherapy to the American consciousness.

**Christotherapy, Noo- and Christogenesis and Cosmopolis**

Teilhard de Chardin envisages the development that leads up to and goes beyond the phenomenon of human consciousness in stages. First, cosmogenesis or the coming to be of the cosmos precedes biogenesis. Next, biogenesis or the coming to be of life leads to noogenesis or the appearance of reflective thought and love in human consciousness.
Finally, Christogenesis extends and goes beyond noogenesis through the incarnation of God's own son. Christogenesis is the birth of ultrasynthesized humanity or the "whole Christ."

Now Christotherapy is envisaged in the present paper in its ideal form as a comprehensive Christian psychotherapy which both is open in principle to all natural psychotherapeutic methods which are in harmony with Christian revelation and is an integral, heuristic expression of the psychotherapeutic dimensions of the Christ-event. As a meaning and value centered theoria-therapy which in principle is open to all authentic natural psychotherapies, Christotherapy would form a natural component in what Teilhard de Chardin calls the noosphere. Likewise, as a Christ-inspired, Christ-directed, and Christ-oriented theoria-therapy, Christotherapy would naturally constitute an integral component in the process Teilhard describes as Christogenesis.

Teilhard's noosphere has been described by W. Henry Kenney as follows:

In the noosphere, superposed on the biosphere, there is collected all psychosocial and cultural changes, all artistic and scientific achievements, etc. It is, in a sense, a collective memory and intelligence, the milieu in which, increasingly, individual men and all men, think, love, create and feel together as integral members of one organism. (251-252)

From a Christian perspective the noosphere is not an adequate expression of human consciousness as long as it is not transformed and sublated by the activity and intentionality of Christogenesis. In similar fashion any psychotherapeutic approach is inadequate to the extent that it does not take into account man as existentially touched by the realities of sin and grace, of the fall and the redemption. Thus, just as noosphere must be complemented by Christogenesis in order to present a complete picture of the human condition, so natural psychotherapeutic
processes must be evaluated and sublated in the light of the psychotherapeutic process present in the Christ-event if they are to deal with the whole person in a fully adequate fashion.

Lonergan's notion of cosmopolis adds the element of explanatory science to Teilhard's noosphere. In *Insight* Lonergan articulates the notion of a critical and normative science capable of directing the emergent probability of human affairs. He sees the possibility of erecting a human science capable not only of knowing history but of directing it. Lonergan calls this stage of enlightened human consciousness, to which even common sense may at last submit for the sake of its own survival, cosmopolis (238-242).

Lonergan acknowledges, however, that a purely human science is not enough, because

...these sciences consider man in his concrete performance, and that performance is a manifestation not only of human nature but also of human sin, not only of nature and sin but also of a de facto need of divine grace, not only of a need of grace but also of its acceptance or rejection. It follows that an empirical human science cannot analyze successfully the elements in its object without an appeal to theology. (743)

Applied to the area of psychotherapy this comment of Lonergan implies that only a psychotherapy which takes into theoretic account freedom and grace, sin and redemption can adequately come to grips with the healing and maturation of the human psyche in its total range and complexity. This means that only a psychotherapy informed by Christian intentionality can engage in fully adequate and proper diagnosis and discernment of what is authentic and inauthentic in the values, meanings, beliefs, assumptions of a given culture.

Christotherapy, then, as a *theoria* participates in a noogenesis transformed by Christogenesis or, in Lonerganian terms, in a cosmopolis illumined by the truth and values of
Christian intentionality. To be informed by Christian intentionality, Christotherapy must have its roots planted deeply in a foundational analysis of conversion—religious, moral and intellectual—since it is only in the light of conversion as thematized authentically that a complete existential evaluation of the values, meanings, beliefs, assumptions operative in a culture is possible.

A key function of Christotherapy, accordingly, is to perform the theological task of reflecting on the psychotherapeutic dimensions of the Christ-event as applicable in a given cultural situation. This also involves a critique of what is false and destructive and generative of emotional disorders in a culture; and the mediation-constitution of those values, meanings, and beliefs which help prevent emotional illness and foster psycho-spiritual maturation and wholeness. In performing these diagnostic and creatively discerning processes Christotherapy makes use of the general and special categories articulated in the functional specialty, foundations. Of course, dialectic also plays a central role in eliminating false meanings, values and beliefs and fostering what is authentic in a cultural ambience. Likewise, the specialties, doctrines, and systematics are also involved; and in communications theological conclusions are related to other fields. It goes without saying that Christotherapy as theoria is in dialogue with the human sciences and most especially with psychology.

Christotherapy, Liberation Theology and Conscientisation

Christotherapy, I think, enjoys a certain natural affinity with the so-called liberation theologies because it too stresses the need for the oppressed to recognize and understand their state of enslavement and alienation, to seek to overcome the restricting elements in their cultural ambience and to constitute life-giving values and
meanings. Christotherapy is likewise in agreement with the liberation theologies that the Christian religion should be a source of liberation in all areas of human enslavement and alienation and the judgment that if it does not seek the liberation of mankind in all of its servitudes, it is failing in one of its constitutive tasks. Christotherapy is also in full accord with the stress of the liberation theologies on the need for a dynamic unity of *theoria* and *praxis*. The latter can at most be distinguished as two moments in one process but never separated. Divorce between *theoria* and *praxis* is stagnation and finally death.

Juan Luis Segundo emphasizes that what characterizes the Christian is that he is "one who knows." In Segundo's view all men are traveling on the same road toward the same goal aided by God's grace. But he adds:

The only thing is that some people on the road, through God's revelation, know something that relates to all; they know the mystery of the journey. And what they know, they know in order to make a contribution to the common quest. (32) /2/

Christotherapy stresses that "existential ignorance," i.e., either a passive ignorance or an active ignoring of those values and meanings essential for human wholeness and holiness is at the root of much emotional illness. Conversely, the Christ-event is alive with an intentionality, a power for enlightenment which can set mankind free from its existential ignorance and its psycho-spiritual bondage. This accords profoundly with Segundo's view that knowledge of the mystery of life revealed in the Christ-event is what distinguishes the Christian from the non-Christian. It also resonates deeply with the view that what Christians know "they know in order to make a contribution to the common quest." Christotherapy thus sees it as the task of a Christian psychotherapy to provide a higher viewpoint and an integrating structure for the basic psychotherapeutic thrust operative in all authentic natural psychotherapeutic methods.
Conscientization

Conscientization is a term closely associated with Paolo Freire. Conscientization in Freire's articulation is a knowing, but it is more than just a prise de conscience or a simple noncritical awareness or spontaneous apprehension of reality. Conscientization is critical; it implies an involvement, a historical commitment to make changes. It is a critical insertion into history in order to mold it. The conscientized individual not only understands that he is oppressed but he sets out to overcome and transform. The conscientized individual adopts a critical attitude of denouncing and announcing, "denouncing the dehumanising structure and announcing the structure that will humanise" (1974:25-26).

Christotherapy and conscientization have much in common. Central to both is the notion of liberation from oppression. Freire's immediate concern is with liberation from oppressive socio-economic and political structures. Christotherapy has as one of its main concerns the liberation of groups from psychologically oppressive biases, beliefs, assumptions which are an individual and collective expression of existential ignorance and foster mental illness and prevent psychological growth and maturation. Again, both conscientization and Christotherapy express a need for understanding, an enlightened state of mind which is at once diagnostic and positively creative. Freire stresses the need of the oppressed to understand the causes of their oppression and to unmask the myths used propagandistically to keep them from being expressly aware of their oppression. This leads to what Freire calls the act of denouncing. One denounces the dehumanizing structure. Christotherapy emphasizes the need for existential diagnosis; an understanding of the inauthenticity of certain modes of thinking, desiring, feeling-in-the-world. On the level of community this would involve a communal diagnosis of the basic inauthenticity of certain commonly held biases,
beliefs, assumptions, and an unmasking of their destructive, ignorant, enslaving nature. Further, Freire is not concerned merely with the negative, diagnostic moment of understanding. He is equally interested in discerning positive, humanizing structures that lead to the act of announcing. Announcing is a matter of proclaiming the structures which humanize. Christotherapy likewise insists on the positive moment of existential discernment in which the authentic way to think, desire and feel-in-the-world is discovered and lovingly embraced. This type of existential discernment can be done both on an individual and a communal level. Finally, conscientization and Christotherapy agree on the need for the sublation of orthodoxy (here, correct and authentic theory) by orthopraxis (here, liberating action). Freire writes that "knowledge that stays at the level of mere doxa and goes no further to the level of a task (the reality's reason for being, as Mao Tse-tung would say) never becomes full knowledge; it is not a logos of reality" (24). Both agree that the ultimate test of the potential for liberation in a given viewpoint is the fact of liberation. In outlining the stages of liberation of the individual from his psycho-spiritual bondage, I have stressed that the culminating moment in the process is "demonstration," or "the actual living-out of the insight received on the level of revelation" (42) which means the level of existential understanding. Just as Lonergan has recently claimed that nihil vere cognitum nisi prius amatum ("nothing is truly known unless it is first loved") (1977:48), I would add that nothing is truly known unless it is lived out, realized, practiced, demonstrated. This, I think, is the deepest implication of Newman's distinction between notional and real knowledge. Likewise, it is what pragmatism and the Marxist stress on the unity of reflection and action are driving at. As Lonergan put it in a recent lecture, orthopraxis sublates orthodoxy (1974b). An orthodoxy not in principle oriented towards authentic
liberation and action is a pseudoorthodoxy. In sum, both conscientization and Christotherapy insist on a marriage between *theoria* and *praxis* which manifests itself in the healed and liberated consciousness.

### Christotherapy and the Healing of American Consciousness

In concluding this paper I would like to suggest in rather skeletal fashion certain issues with which Christotherapy must come to grips in relation to American consciousness. In view of the primarily programmatic nature of the present paper, I can only indicate certain problematic areas to be considered. Concrete applications must be left for later development.

According to the so-called radical psychologists and therapists, it is not the socio-economic and political structures in America which are the major cause of emotional disturbance in individuals. For example, Roy Waldman, while not a Marxist radical, still contends that contemporary psychiatry "must focus... upon the very fabric of our society that spews out masses of idiosyncratically (neurotic) oppressed people." For Waldman it is the duty of psychiatry to "fulfill its part in discerning and exposing the structures of our social order which fosters man's fallen condition" (144). The Marxist Phil Brown goes much further and indicts American capitalism itself as the chief source of oppression and alienation on all levels, the psychological included (1974).

Now Christotherapy does recognize that unjust socio-economic and political structures do exercise a deleterious influence on the psychological and spiritual health of individuals and that America does have real problems in this area. For example, the excessive stress on competition which Horney and others point to as a frequent source of emotional difficulties in individuals has its roots deep in the socio-economic structures of America. Yet, the issue
of Marxism versus capitalism or a critique of the socio-economic and political structures operative in America can only be adequately handled through the combined efforts of economists, political scientists, sociologists, historians, philosophers, theologians, etc. It is an area, however, in which a Christian psychotherapy can and ought to make its contribution.

Again, Phil Brown argues at length that psychiatry as practiced in America is a tool of the American ideology and increases rather than diminishes psychological oppression. Brown's view that there is a relationship between psychiatry in America and the general institutional American Weltanschauung receives a certain general support from Peter Berger and Thomas Luckman.

Since...every society faces the danger of individual deviance, we may assume that therapy in one form or another is a global social phenomenon. Its specific institutional arrangements, from exorcism to psychoanalysis, from pastoral care to personnel counseling programs, belong, of course, under the category of social control. ...Since therapy must concern itself with deviations from the "official" definitions of reality, it must develop a conceptual machinery to account for such deviations and to maintain the realities thus challenged. This requires a body of knowledge that includes a theory of deviance, a diagnostic apparatus, and a conceptual system for the "cure of souls." (104)

Of course, the analysis of Berger and Luckman would apply as much to Marxist societies and the "therapies" as to the American situation. In any case, it is clearly the task of a Christian psychotherapy as theoria to become cognizant of the relationship which exists in a given culture; in this instance, between the official "mind-sets" and Weltanschauungen of America in culture and its therapies. Moreover, an authentic Christian psychotherapy must make basic and critical judgments in the light of its own understanding of the origin and destiny of man as informed by a Christian intentionality.
Further, recent studies such as that of Patrick Kerans bring out forcefully the collective dimensions of human sinfulness. Kerans points to the "knowing ignorance" that manifests itself in what Lonergan has defined as group and general bias. He argues, for example, that in America today "one group, the middle-class mainstream, are transmitting the message, in accordance with the dominant school system of North American society: 'Be a winner.'" On the other hand, "another group, comprised of the racial minorities, of the poor, of the retarded, are beamed another message: 'You're a loser'" (1974:81). In Kerans' view each of these positions as operative in American society are biased, narrow, destructive and sinful. Karl Menninger has at least in part supported Kerans' analysis by speaking of sin in terms of a certain collective irresponsibility, using examples similar to those of Kerans.

Kerans and Menninger both point up serious sinful flaws in the American consciousness in need of healing. If Mowrer and Menninger are correct, sinful attitudes can generate mental illness. A Christian psychotherapy must therefore engage in a diagnosis of the attitudes pervading the collective American consciousness; it must both show, as did Karen Horney, how these attitudes can and do lead to the increase of mental illness, and offer a healing alternative to these destructive mind-sets and beliefs.

Further, as Mortimer Adler has admonished, "critics--all of them, left and right--fail to recognize that many of their criticisms leveled against America and Americans, apply to all societies and to the human race generally" (1970:232). Adler is correct, I believe, in pointing out that there are certain moral flaws and biases, e.g., sensualism, etc. which are present in all cultures and societies and which are in need of diagnosis just as much as are sinful socio-economic attitudes and beliefs. Along these lines, in Christotherapy I have noted that cultures as well as individuals can be dominated by sensualist,
possessivist, and racist biases and beliefs (94-95). A Christian psychotherapy then must attend to the fact that there is a wide variety of "sinful structures" or mind-sets besides the political and socio-economic which are the source of emotional disturbances and are in need of existential diagnosis and a healing transformation.

Finally, Charles Fair argues that the decline of faith in America has brought about a basic anxiety that flourishes among poor and rich, the sheltered and the exposed alike. Fair speaks of a "Rage to Believe" as characteristic of contemporary American culture (1974:17). Fair notes that individuals in their flight from anxiety experience "an inclination to willful personal belief so strong that it amounts to compulsion" (34). Fair fears an end to rational consensus as individuals give credence to a wide variety of the irrational and to bizarre sects and therapies which promise salvation. Fair's recent commentary on the role of belief in contemporary American society points up the urgent need for a critique of beliefs, a critique grounded in a foundational analysis of authentic conversion and worked out dialectically.

The task of a Christian psychotherapy as theoria is to give careful attention to sinful structures and mind-sets, the irrational ideas, the absurd beliefs, the cultural contradictions, the destructive modes of thinking, desiring and feeling-in-the-world which psychotherapists and social theorists like Ellis, Horney, Hora, Frankl, Waldman, Menninger, and others aver to be a communal source of mental pollution and emotional disturbance in individuals. There is need for a Christian psychotherapy, illumined by the values and meanings operative in a Christian intentionality, to engage in a communal existential diagnosis and prophetic critique of the beliefs, assumptions, etc. present in the American noosphere in an effort to dispel mental pollutants and group biases. Likewise, there is need for a communal existential discernment which will foster authentic beliefs, values and meanings.
To conclude, I have tried to show that a Christian psychotherapy in general and especially Christotherapy has potentially a communal as well as an individual-oriented goal. There is need for a dimension of preventive medicine or therapy in the area of the psychotherapeutic. This basically involves a diagnosis, transformation and leavening of group and national consciousness. I am convinced that a Christ-oriented and Christ-directed psychotherapy can make some important contributions in this vital area.
NOTES

/1/ Horney wrote her classic work in 1937 and some of the contradictions she saw as existing then in American culture are, if anything, much more widespread today.

/2/ Segundo holds that Christ's grace is at work in all men interiorly whether they explicitly have knowledge of Christ or not. I agree with this and would grant that Christ's grace is interiorly present in all therapeutic encounters. I would also stress, however, that explicit knowledge of Christ does make a real difference existentially in a person's life and that it contributes a distinctive element to the psychotherapeutic healing process.
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In the course of his exposition of "stages of meaning" in *Method*, Lonergan says:

Kant's Copernican revolution marks a dividing line. Hegel turned from substance to subject. Historians and philologists worked on their autonomous method for human studies. Will and decision, action and results, came up for emphasis in Kierkegaard, Schopenhauer, Nietzsche, Blondel, the pragmatists. Brentano inspired Husserl, and intentionality analysis routed faculty psychology. The second (realm of theory) stage of meaning is vanishing and a third is about to take its place. (1972c:96)

In this third stage of meaning, Lonergan claims, "modes of common sense and theory remain, science asserts its autonomy, and there occur philosophies that leave theory to science and take their stand on interiority" (1972c:85). In *Doctrinal Pluralism*, Lonergan has named the upshot of this stage of meaning "the modern philosophic differentiation of consciousness" (19-20). This differentiation has a first historical phase running from Descartes to Kant's *Critique of Pure Reason*. Here the emphasis is cognitional activity and claims. In the second phase, beginning roughly with Kant's *Critique of Practical Reason*, the emphasis shifts "from knowledge to faith, will, conscience, decision, action..." (1972c:316).

In my opinion, the urgent area for methodological investigation is the complex relationship of presupposition and complementarity existing between the functional
specialties, dialectics and foundations. An isomorphic set of problems is connected with the passage from the first to the second phases of the modern philosophic differentiation of consciousness. My reasons for stressing the urgency of this area of research, however, are not confined to the questions that may preoccupy that relatively small group of thinkers interested in Lonergan's thought. I am not at all suggesting that it is unimportant to understand what Lonergan has been saying and to submit oneself to the painful and radical changes in self-understanding that task requires. I am suggesting, first, that the unanswered questions that arise from within the framework of Lonergan's method merge with questions moving forward across the plurality of schools and approaches. Secondly, is not Lonergan's intention to forge a "framework for collaborative creativity" (1972c:xi) respected exactly in the discovery that one's attempts to master that framework merge with an implicit and explicit structuring of one's personal approach to problems that are perhaps only implicit in the tendency and unfolding of Lonergan's life-work? In other words, one takes up "the intelligible interlocking set of terms and relations when confronting a situation or tackling a job" (xii).

I believe the most interesting "extramural" articulation of the question concerning the relationship between dialectics and foundations (or about the transition from the first to the second phases of the modern philosophic differentiation of consciousness) is the question about the normative significance and limitations of the Enlightenment. By Enlightenment we may understand either the classical one marked by the dissolution of the Homeric-Hesiodic worldview due to the rise of philosophy in Greece; or the modern one marked by the consequences of the Copernican Turn and typified by the motto of Kant's famous essay on the Aufklärung: Aude, sapè: Have the courage to use your own understanding! In terms of Lonergan's stages of
meaning, the first Enlightenment heralds the passage from the first to the second stages of meaning (common sense to theory). The second Enlightenment encompasses the first phase of the passage from the second to the third stages of meaning (common sense and theory to interiority qua cognitive and technical). The question about the normative significance and limitation of the Enlightenment arises then from the shift from the first to the second phases of the third stage (common sense and theory and interiority qua cognitive and technical to interiority qua constitutive or practical [in the classic sense of praxis vs. techne]).

This problematic of the Enlightenment, then, focuses on the rational and humane constitution of human history: How may we thematize the normative moments in human self-constitution? To list just some of the familiar issues involved in the question: (1) the increasing self-control and autonomy that marks human development from first extrauterine year to maturity; (2) the fact of identity as more or less a function of one's own responsibility, one's self-awareness and choice; (3) the fact that personal identity and self-control may be deflected, distorted, perverted, or even lost through (a) unconscious and preconscious interference of neural-demand functions; (b) personally conscious self-deception, rationalization, inauthenticity; (c) class or group prejudice or bias; (4) the possible relevance of a supernatural component in the process.

For me the most stimulating and constructive grappling with the problem of the Enlightenment (outside the work of Lonergan himself) has been carried on by men who are philosophers by profession. I am speaking of a debate between two continental orientations of philosophy that have received the labels "hermeneutics" and "critique of ideology," respectively. The key figure of the "hermeneutics" position has been Hans-Georg Gadamer; while the "critique of ideology" position has been closely associated with the
Frankfurt School. Its most significant proponents, in my opinion, have been Jürgen Habermas and Karl-Otto Apel.

Locating the Debate

The continental debate between hermeneutics and critique of ideology comes in the wake of Hegel's enterprise. For his was the last great attempt to face the problem of cultural integration in view of the tremendous tear in the fabric of western culture brought about by the scientific revolution, the French Revolution, the Enlightenment, and Romantic movements. In its teleological scheme of a philosophy of history and a history of philosophy, Hegel's endeavor was conceived as a repetition of the achievement of "Greek speculative philosophy" (Gadamer, 1967a:50). Before Hegel, Kant had assumed the primacy for modernity of the problematic of practical reason; and he had epitomized the trend of the Enlightenment by taking the transcendental turn, thus critically relocating the philosophic task within the self-consciousness of the spirit. But Hegel, inspired by the demand "for a speculative science" (50), was not willing to acknowledge the primacy of the problematic of practical reason. Instead, via his notion of the "objective spirit" he tried to surpass the subjectivism of the Kantian critique, and hence to restore speculative reason as the locus of complete subjective and objective reconciliation. Unfortunately, the identity philosophy of speculative idealism, that majestic synthesis of transcendental critique and classical metaphysics, culminated in the subjectivistic-objectivism characteristic of the notion of the absolute spirit.

The current debate is to be seen in the context of the second phase of the modern philosophic differentiation of consciousness, for it is decisively conditioned by the century-long dissolution of the Hegelian system perpetrated within the cultural superstructure by Marx, by the Historical School and Dilthey, by Nietzsche, by Freud, and by the
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pioneers of phenomenology (Gadamer, 1967a:138-139). This
dissolution went forward on the level of the basis with
the disintegration of "the traditional image of the church,
of the nationalistic consciousness of the modern state, and
of the morality of private conscience" (136). The cultural
circumstances of the current debate, then, differ greatly
from Hegel's.

Interestingly, Gadamer has pinpointed a remarkably
clear symptom of this cultural "sea-change." It is the
shift-in-meaning undergone by the notions "interpretation"
and "self-understanding."

Traditionally, interpretation had meant simply a mat-
ter of construing a text, of getting to the meaning of the
author. But in the period when the dismantling of German
Idealism was going forward, interpretation came to express
a deeply and widely felt need "to get behind the obvious
phenomena and the data" (Gadamer, 1972b:334, 369-370)--the
need for critical understanding. And as the critique of
the idealist notion of consciousness reached its extreme,
the critical requirements suggested by the word "interpre-
tation" took on an even more "highly reflective signifi-
cance" (1967a:139). As Gadamer has put it:

Since Nietzsche, there has been added to this notion
the claim that it is interpretation in its rightful
cognitive and interpretive intent that first grasps
what is genuine in the sense of what goes beyond
all subjectivist intending. (1967a:139)

The unconscious (for Freud), the relationships of
production and their determinative significance
for the true social reality (for Marx), the notion
of life and its "thought-forming labor" (for
Dilthey and in Historicism), the concept of Exis-
tens, as it was once developed against Hegel by
Kierkegaard--all these are perspectives for inter-
pretation worked out by our century--i.e., ways of
going behind what is intended by subjectivist
consciousness. (1967a:139)

The thrust of this new sense of interpretation was a
clean break from philosophy as a search for objective en-
tailments and deducibilities. It was a positive outcome
of the breakdown of the Hegelian enterprise. For all the suppleness of Hegel's grasp of "the speculative," it had been the logical ideal and the assumption that philosophy's goal is some first principle whose logical unfolding is supposed to encompass the totality of existence that carried the day in his work. Not interpretation, but an awesome display of *Deduzieren* was Hegel's privileged path to normativity. And as we all know, the orientation typified by *Deduzieren*, demonstration or in George Steiner's phrase, "the mythology of rigor and proof," is one that has a prolongation in the scientific claim "to completely explain a given fact by the deduction of all its conditions, to calculate the fact from the givenness of its conditions and to learn to produce that fact by artificial techniques" (Gadamer, 1972b:338). Hence, the reverberating significance of the philosophic shift in orientation from an attitude of deduction to one of interpretation.

To be sure, the manifold implications of this tacit assumption ushers in a radically new sense of "self-understanding." I quote Gadamer:

"Self-understanding" can no longer be oriented toward a complete self-transparency, i.e. to complete (reflective) presence of oneself for oneself. Self-understanding is ever only on-the-way, i.e. on a route whose completion is a clear impossibility. If there is a whole dimension of opaque consciousness; if all our actions, desires, drives, decisions, and modes of conduct—in short, the totality of our human and social existence—leads back to the obscure and concealed dimension of the unconscious drives of our animality; if all our conscious representations might be only masks, pretexts under which our vital force or our societal interests pursue their own goals in an unconscious manner; if all the most obvious and evident insights we possess are exposed to such doubt, then self-understanding can surely not signify a taken-for-granted self-transparency of our Dasein. The illusion of bringing to light the obscurity of our motivations and tendencies must be rejected. (1972b:33)
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The imperious demand for interpretation in this peculiarly modern sense together with this chastened self-understanding makes for the demise of philosophy as speculative (Gadamer, 1974:532-541). Indeed, it is the modern task of philosophic interpretation as abandoning demonstration (as apodictic proof) "to become engaged in a continuous process of self-enlightenment concerning (reason) itself and its conditions through dialogue and discussion" (1970:5)—not a bad formulation of at least something of what Lonergan means by dialectics.

On the continent at present, this task has been taken up by two similar but differently oriented styles of philosophy: that of Gadamer's philosophical hermeneutics, which I shall be calling "integral hermeneutics"; and that of the ideology-critics, Habermas-Apel, which is a version of "hermeneutics of suspicion."

From the vantage of integral hermeneutics, the modern philosophic task is thought of as a renewal of Aristotle's efforts in practical philosophy to explicate the ineluctable conditions for personal and social order. Interpretation becomes philosophy of action (praxis) in the context of living social communication. In Gadamer's version of integral hermeneutics, therefore, not only does the primacy of practical reason come into its own, but Marx's famous eleventh thesis on Feuerbach is fulfilled in the recognition that the interpretative quest for self-knowledge is never only interpretation rather than a response to the need for changing the world. It is itself a response to the need for change. As philosophy, it is both praxis and reflection on praxis.

In parallel fashion, philosophy as critique of ideology—working a hermeneutics of suspicion—takes up the central concept of the European Enlightenment (namely, the autonomous moral subject as articulated by Kant) and plants it within the matrix of a community mediated and constituted by meaningful discourse. Its emancipatory project asks
how the double pillars of universalist morality--i.e. the autonomous individual and the universal validity of moral norms--might be concretely mediated through a public process of formation of will in a way that satisfies the principle of unrestricted communication and domination-free consensus. Implied here is a full-blown philosophy of history oriented toward praxis. Bringing Hegel's dialectic into the medium of social labor and class struggle means doing phenomenology as critique of ideology (Habermas, 1968a:85).

Hermeneutics of Suspicion vs. Integral Hermeneutics

The Basic Objections

In a Forschungsbericht entitled Zur Logik der Sozialwissenschaften, Habermas has taken up a series of approaches to the problem stated in the title. Among these is the hermeneutical approach; and the work of Gadamer is its main concern. There Habermas subscribes to the way Gadamer's approach not only offers a critical perspective over against a positivistically oriented social science, but also a way of critically sublating the favorable aspects of the phenomenological and linguistic approaches. Habermas goes on, however, to convey his grievances with integral hermeneutics. The main objection runs along the following lines.

Gadamer's prejudgment in favor of the rights of the prejudgments highlighted by the tradition has the effect of disputing the power of reason. That power consists in this: that it can just as well deflect the claim of traditions (as ratify them). Substantiality in Gadamer's sense crumbles when submitted to reflection because the latter not only rubber stamps, but also shatters dogmatic forces (175)....The hermeneutical self-reflection of language subverts the transcendental conception....Hegel's experience of reflection shrivels up into the consciousness that we are delivered over to an event in which the conditions of rationality are changed irrationally according
to time and place, epoch and culture....For a transcendental consciousness that has been hermeneutically broken down and shoved back into the contours of the traditions, the way to absolute idealism is blocked. But does it have to remain unwaveringly on the route of relative idealism.... (177)

According to Habermas, then, integral hermeneutics subverts the Enlightenment thrust toward emancipation by playing into the hands of dogmatism. The reinstatement of "prejudgment" comes to a concession to the sort of obscurantism that is the all too helpful resource of oppressive regimes. It virtually legitimates authoritarian domination. Moreover, the tendency toward dogmatism is only exacerbated by the "idealistic presupposition that linguistically articulated consciousness determines the material being of the life-praxis" (1967:179). To narrow down one's philosophic focus to language-in-use is to ignore the context of language. It is to forget the dependence of the symbolic realm upon factual relationships of organized power. In this way integral hermeneutics renders itself incapable of passing over into a critique of ideology. According to Habermas,

the objective context of social action, however, is not subsumed within the dimension of inter-subjectively intended and symbolically transmitted meaning. The linguistic infra-structure of society is a moment in a larger context made up of constraints of reality, which admittedly are symbolically modulated: by the constraint of external nature, which enters into the procedures of technical manipulation; and by the constraint of internal nature that is reflected in the repressions meted out by the societal relations of power. Both categories of constraint do not merely comprise objects for interpretations; they even influence the very grammatical rules according to which we interpret the world, behind the back, so to speak, of language. The objective context out of which alone social actions may be apprehended are constituted simultaneously by language, labor, and domination. (1967:179)
What integral hermeneutics lacks, suggests Habermas, is a framework (Bezugsystem) which can "make tradition as such and in its relationship to other movements of the social context of living comprehensible, so that we can assign conditions outside of tradition under which transcendental rules of world apprehension and action vary" (1967: 179). In its critical awareness that communicative interaction is conditioned from below by the concrete situation of labor; and from above by "the powers that be," this framework is to enable knowing consciousness to "strip away the pattern of tradition in which it finds itself" (1968a:84).

The recipe for the attainment of this end is as follows: "(I)n the measure that it grasps the formative process of the species as a movement of class antagonism ever mediated by process of production," the knowing subject "knows itself as a result of the history of the actually appearing class consciousness; and it thereby frees itself from the objective illusion" (1968a:84). In other words, cognitional theory and social theory are to go hand-in-hand. And the goal is true knowledge about mankind as it is contingently given.

Amplification of Habermas's Objections to Gadamer

1. Breakdowns. Habermas amplified his objections to integral hermeneutics in the Gadamer Festschrift. This time around, Habermas attacks the assumption of integral hermeneutics that usually any given occurrence of communication will be normal; that in communicative interaction a reciprocal, self-transcending movement of personal standpoints will happen as a rule. On the contrary, in the real situation of the socio-cultural system what Habermas calls "systematically distorted" communication is the rule. Normal communication is exceptional; pseudo-communication is what we usually experience. Hence, the claim to universal and normative relevance on the part of integral hermeneutics
is exaggerated. In fact, as Habermas's student, Albrecht Wellmer, put the matter in his book, *Kritische Gesellschaftstheorie und Positivismus*:

The Enlightenment knew what (integral) hermeneutics forgets; that the "conversation" that, according to Gadamer, we "are," is also a context of violence, and precisely to that extent not a conversation at all.... The universal claim of the hermeneutic approach (may be) maintained only when one begins with the assumption that the context of tradition as the locus of possible truth and factual agreement is at the same time the locus of factual untruth and lasting violence. (48-49)

If integral hermeneutics cannot account for breakdowns in communicative interaction and consensus, it cannot recommend the diagnosis and therapy by which such breakdowns may be reversed. From the perspective of the critique of ideology, integral hermeneutics has to be sublated by a rather nuanced version of a hermeneutics of suspicion that is both explanatory and normative. For the components of systematically distorted communication can only be comprehended in the light of a *theory* which specifies the general conditions for the pathology of ordinary linguistic communication.

In his afterword to the second edition of *Erkenntnis und Interesse*, Habermas has made some noteworthy clarifications on the nature of this normative and explanatory viewpoint. Its key is the Enlightenment notion of reflection: i.e. one which incorporates "reason as the principle of non-violent communication over against the experienced reality of communication distorted by violence" (1970:98). The desired metatheory, then, is the philosophic implementation of such reflection: "universal pragmatics" (1973b: 371). It includes two principle dimensions: first, "the reflection on the conditions of the possibility of the competence of the knowing, speaking, and acting subject in general"; and secondly, "reflection on the unconsciously produced constraints to which any given determinate subject (or a
determinate group of subjects or a determinate species-subject) subordinates itself in the course of its formation" (1973b:411). The first dimension is called "reconstruction"; and the second, variously, "self-reflection," "self-critique," or simply, "critique."

Reconstruction would refurbish Kant's transcendental undertaking in the mode of a full-scale theory of the constitution of experience (language, knowledge, action, roles) with the aid of Piaget's developmental psychology (under severe reservations) (Habermas, 1973b:414), Chomsky's generative linguistics, post-Wittgensteinian ordinary language analysis (Austin, Searle), and Kohlberg's theories of moral development.

In general, reconstruction regards: (1) the objects of possible experience; (2) subjects as anonymously transcendent; and (3) abstract rule-competencies. Self-critique or critique, however, relates to (1) pseudo-objects (1973b:412-413); (2) subjects in the particularity of their dialectical development; (3) practical changes in consciousness. It is dependent upon the theorems or hypotheses arising from reconstruction (414) for its normative backdrop.

As for the distinctive makeup of critique, Habermas has been keen enough to see the inadequacy of the Marxian version of it. According to these latter-day critics of ideology, Marx's turnover of the Hegelian dialectic tended to reduce what is basically a problematic of practical enlightenment into one of technical expertise (Habermas, 1968a:59-77). It is clear that they have taken integral hermeneutics seriously enough to demand that the desired explanatory framework never subordinate the peculiar dignity of dialogue to the manipulative control of technique. Consequently, they seek the elements of an adequate model of emancipatory reflection in the first instance from Freudian analysis, especially along the lines of refinements worked out by Alfred Lorenzer (Habermas, 1970:83-96).
For here is a science that, to use Habermas's phrasing, "...for the first time makes a methodical use of self-reflection, whereby in this case self-reflection means the uncovering and analytic elimination of the pseudo-aprioris of unconsciously motivated barriers to perception and constraints to action" (1973b:380). But besides and more basic than individual progress and decline, there is social and cultural decline.

Now in transposing this psychoanalytic model to the plane of social theory, the critical theory of the critics of ideology differs from the systems-theoretic and functionalistic approach (cf. Habermas's debate with Luhmann) that concentrates on the aspect of growing interdependency of various functions and the expanded steering capacities within socio-cultural systems. From the ideology-critical standpoint, the specific difference of the socio-cultural system (qua human) is truth-relevant utterances of socialized individuals. Hence, within communities constituted by intersubjective deliberation and cooperation of socialized individuals, planning and policy is to be mediated by discursive formation of will; the solution of crises by a self-reflective change of established mechanisms of control. The ideal which this reflective "philosophy of history with practical intent" believes possible of achievement is the linking of socio-cultural systems to self-reflection itself as the mode of steering through a politically consequent institutionalization. The central philosophic contribution toward the realization of this ideal is the elaboration of a model for deciding practical questions: namely, a consensus-theory of truth. To this theory we return in section three.

2. Modern Science. The second major zone of ideology-critical dissatisfaction with integral hermeneutics is modern science and its relationship to the progress/decline of ordinary life-experience. To begin with, there is the problem of science as prime factor of production as well as
background ideology (scientism) (Habermas, 1968b). Admittedly, integral hermeneutics supplies the lineaments for a critique of positivism, whether within both the natural sciences (a view being promoted vigorously by the so-called New Philosophy of Science by Kuhn, Radnitzky, Kisiel, Heelan) and the humane sciences; or in relation to the intended or non-intended political effectiveness of scientific theory and expertise. But the salient arguments as developed by integral hermeneutics itself are so general and so quickly assumed into a rather esoteric ontology of language as to be incapable of public justification either with respect to the current status of research in the empirical sciences or before the forum of contemporary Wissenschaftstheorie.

On account of this methodological insouciance, complains Habermas, integral hermeneutics cannot greatly aid in the mediation of scientific results into the Lebenswelt: the precisely technical character of scientific language on its own terms lies outside the range of its competence. Still less, then, will integral hermeneutics afford transposition into a differential scientific framework (Habermas and Luhmann) that will ground hypotheses about such problematics pressing upon us in our day as:

a) the logic of possible societal developments in the dimensions of:
   1) forces of production—given the fact of both accelerated and guided social change;
   2) steering capacities (systems-theory)—given the disproportion between the need for steering and the capacity to do so;
   3) interaction structures—given the felt contradiction between universalist principles of legitimation and the de-facto particularism of political power;
   4) worldviews—given the ongoing erosion of tradition vis-a-vis group and personal identity;

b) the mechanisms of limit conditions which furnish retrospective explanations of de facto developments;
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c) crisis-engendering disproportionalities between levels in various dimensions that signal progress or decline. (Habermas and Luhmann: 475-476)

Actually, the reason singled out by Habermas and Apel for the inability of integral hermeneutics either to criticize the sciences immanently and in detail or to help in the construction of a social-theoretic framework with genuine hypothetical relevance is that it is not normative enough.

According to Habermas, instead of confronting these problematics at the present level of their complexity and according to a logic of trial and error (1969:43 n. 6), integral hermeneutics retreats to an ivory-tower ontology, where it is immune from normative and methodological relevance. It cannot and does not really ask, for example, "whether there can be a theory adequate to the structure of natural languages-in-use that grounds a methodically certified interpretation of meaning" (1970:82). Or again, "Is it possible to have an interpretation of meaning for the context of ordinary language symbols that is not bound to the hermeneutic presuppositions of context-dependent processes of understanding, but...goes behind natural language-in-use as the ultimate meta-language?"

Apel focuses his criticism concerning the normative and methodological irrelevance of integral hermeneutics on the fact that it invokes the transcendental turn, while at the same time "rejecting all pretentions to a philosophic 'justification' (Rechtfertigung) of the 'validity' (Geltung) of knowledge" (108-112). As far as Apel is concerned, integral hermeneutics falls short of completing the transcendental project insofar as it attempts to thematize the conditions of possibility of knowledge by asking only the quaestio facti, thus shunting aside the quaestio juris. This tactic, says Apel, cannot explicate the condition-of-the-validity of knowledge. (At most, he concedes, it might
be an adequate transcendental thematization of the pre-scientific forms of knowing.) The result is a "separation of the constitution-of-meaning problematic from the validation-of-meaning problematic." Inversely, for Apel the core of a scientifically relevant transformation of transcendental philosophy would be the bridging of that separation. This is to be done, he suggests, by spelling out the criterion of possible progress in understanding through (1) an acceptance of Hegel's concept of a substantial and reflective self-penetration of the spirit; and (2) a simultaneous reduction of that claim to a regulative principle in the Kantian sense. This is to be executed concretely by a mediation of hermeneutics by ideology-critique.

3. Truth and Right Living. The underlying issue of the ideology-critical dispute with integral hermeneutics is that it is indifferent to truth in any substantive sense of that term. As I have indicated above, the pivotal point of Habermas's critical theory of society lies in his consensus theory of truth.

Against integral hermeneutics, Habermas points out: "the insight into the way interpretation of meaning possesses a structure of prejudgment does not ensure the identification of any factually reached consensus with a true one. This only leads rather to the ontologizing of language-in-use and to the hypostatizing of the context of tradition" (1970:99). In the name of the Enlightenment principle of democratization which posits "reason as the principle of violence- or domination-free communication" (98) (the only permissible violence being that of a better reason), Habermas asserts:

We would be justified in equating the sustaining agreement that, according to Gadamer, always precedes any lack in mutual comprehension, with any factual state of agreement only if we could be certain that each consensus woven into the medium of ordinary-language tradition has come about
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without compulsion and in an undistorted manner. But the depth-hermeneutical experience teaches us that there is effected by the dogmatic movement within the context of tradition not only the objectivity of language in general but the repressiveness of a relationship of violence (coercive power) that both deforms the intersubjectivity of mutual comprehension and systematically distorts ordinary language communication. Therefore, any consensus in which interpretation of meaning reaches term stands fundamentally under the suspicion of having been perpetrated by pseudo-communication: of old it was called masking or delusion (Verblendung) when misunderstanding and self-misunderstanding were perpetuated in the illusion of factual agreement. (1970:99)

The gut issue here is the notion of truth at the heart of the hermeneutics of suspicion of today.

Truth is the peculiar compulsion towards universal recognition; but this is connected with an ideal situation of discourse, and that means a form of life in which compulsion-free universal agreement is possible. To this extent, critical interpretation of meaning has to imply the formal anticipation of right living....It is the formal anticipation of an idealized conversation as a form of life to be realized in the future that first guarantees the ultimate sustaining counterfactual mutual agreement that binds us from the outset, and in terms of which every factual agreement, when it is false, can be criticized as false consciousness. (1970:100)

Habermas goes on to claim that this regulative principle may not only be demanded but grounded through the demonstration that it is also constitutive of all non-monomological interaction. Accordingly, there could be no conversation in which this unrevisable principle is not actuated; this idealized, counterfactual reciprocity between individual participants not at least intended.

We are not able to invoke experience alone for the fact that in any penetrating interpretation this formal anticipation is not merely factually held to but also must be held to. In order to articulate the grounds of validity, we must elaborate the implicit knowledge by which a depth-hermeneutical
analysis of language is always already guided into a theory that affords derivation of the principle of rational discourse as the necessary regulative of any real discourse from the logic of ordinary language. (Habermas, 1970:100)

This latter has to be accomplished not only to put teeth into the critical thrust of emancipatory reflection in a way that the integral hermeneutical rehabilitation of tradition omits or rules out; but also to eliminate the decisionism according to which the logic of any chosen framework must be rigorously coherent while the choice of framework itself is merely arbitrary. The latter according to Habermas is the consequence drawn by all who, like Carnap, Popper, Weber, etc., try to separate instead of merely distinguish fact and values. At any rate, Habermas would hold that either a doctrinaire decisionism or the ontological self-understanding of integral hermeneutics would leave the project of a revived Enlightenment without a critical basis.

Integral Hermeneutics and the Possibility of Critique

Gadamer's position is rather nuanced. He holds, on the one hand, that the accomplishment of a complete Enlightenment is an illusionary goal (1974:517); and, on the other, that he "in no wise belong(s) to the obscurantist side that rejects the Enlightenment in toto" (305 n. 8). He finds himself unable to see an exclusive opposition between Enlightenment and authority (1971:304).

Against Idealism

Gadamer says that the notion of meaning-interpretation that his critics adopt is an idealist one that he has rejected. To hear the ideology-critics' characterization of meaning-interpretation, he says, is to be reminded of the idealist heritage (from Vico and Hegel) transmitted in Germany by such men as Dilthey, Litt, Rothacker, and
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Spranger (1974:534, 1971:313). But a crucial purpose of his entire attempt to regain the question of truth with respect to the experience of art in the first part of *Wahrheit und Methode* had been to dismantle such an idealist framework. His writing in this section had been inspired by the critical insights that (a) the Kantian limitation of cognitive claims to the sphere of the phenomenal was based on a truncated model of experience; (b) the "merely subjective" status of practical knowing and aesthetic judgment (not to speak of the reduction of religion to a merely moral function in Kant) resulted from having been tailored to fit the Precrustean bed of a subjectivity whose freedom from heteronomy had been purchased at the price of an extreme isolation and privatization.

In order to display (in his ontology of art) the mutual interaction of trans-subjective and subjective that is both regulative and constitutive of any radical human orientation, and indeed any mediation of true meaning and value, Gadamer called upon the highly relational notion of game-play (*Spiel*) (1965:97-107). According to this model of experience, realized experience is *both* caused by *and* impinges upon the subject. Game-play stresses the medial structure (i.e. combining both active and passive voices) of human world-orientation. For how is it that self-understanding is always actuated with respect to something other (the other within intentionality) in an event by which both that other and the self-understanding undergo a transformation or a sublimation in the world constituted by meaning?

The idealist tradition (from which, Gadamer believes, the ideology critics themselves fail to deviate) had tended to answer this question in terms of the critical notion of limit as what sets the subject off, what isolates or seals him or her off from what is not the subject, as, for instance, in the notorious phenomenal/noumenal bifurcation of the Kantian problematic. Underpinning this critical stance
was a paradigmatic image of self-transcendence as exteriority: getting out to what is already out there now (e.g. the role of \textit{Anschauung} in Kant's transcendental aesthetic). And so for the idealist, the operative meaning of limits is governed by the dominant image of an insurpassable container. Both the apparent modesty of, say, the Kantian conception of objective knowledge and the seeming hubris of the Enlightenment mirage of autonomous reason pay dues to the complementary images of transcendence as exteriority and limits as insurpassable container.

Gadamer's ontology of game-play, however, subverts these images. From the perspective of game-play, the notion of limit begins to indicate rather the sources from which finite transcendence appropriates true meaning and value. For the encounter with the work of art as autonomously and gratuitously revealing a fuller sense of life discloses the temporalization (finite actuation in time) of human luminosity (the non-objective source of ever further questioning and questing and so of fuller living as well). By virtue of this breakthrough, Gadamer had helped to lay waste to the favorite dichotomies of "picture-thinking" (\textit{vorstellendes Denken}): the universal thing-in-itself vs. the particular; the historical present vs. the historical past; and again, the "human" vs. the theological--the very divisions he sees his critics reviving.

For Gadamer the temporal actuation of human being has to it the combined features of \textit{supervening occurrence} (the advent of meaning and value moving in and through the activity of the subjects as creating, performing, or receiving) and a \textit{fateful appropriation} (the active, disciplined involvement or attunement of and by the subject through intelligent, responsible consent) that have been closely associated with the Christian theology of grace. The parameters revealed in authentic aesthetic experience allow him to make the statement that the "authentic notion of
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self-understanding" is "not to be thought on the model of perfect self-consciousness but from the standpoint of religious experience" (1967a:68). The decisive—at once descriptive, yet somehow normative—contrast is that between "sovereign mediated—all-by-itself-ness of self-consciousness" on the one hand; and "the experience of oneself that occurs to one, and that, seen theologically, takes place in the call of proclamation..." (84). As Gadamer phrased the matter in an article on Goethe: "Not in the isolated freedom of being-over-against, but in everyday relation-to-world, in letting oneself in for the conditionings of the world does man win his own self. So too," he goes on, "does man first achieve the right position for knowing" (1967b:94).

Consciousness and Reflection

This is the context of Gadamer's first reply to Habermas, in which he accuses his accuser of having an abstract and idealistic misunderstanding of what consciousness is (1967a:113-130). It is today's critics of ideology who oddly enough fail to redeem the promise of the critique of that idealist notion of consciousness on the part of Nietzsche, Freud, Marx, Husserl, Scheler, and especially Heidegger. There are two disastrous consequences of this misunderstanding.

First, it results in a distorted view of what reflection (emancipatory or otherwise) is. The phenomenologically tenable view of consciousness takes into explicit account the concomitant and background quality to intentional acts. Precisely as background or latent, it is what lets foreground acts and objects be. Such background awareness may be brought into the foreground, but always only partially. Thus, Gadamer speaks of consciousness possessing an immanent reflexivity (in actu exercito) that is the condition for the possibility of explicit reflection
on oneself and one's acts (in actu signato). But explicit reflection on self can never completely overtake the prior, background, implicit reflexivity. This background, however, is not a mystery to be mongered, but the openness that may be actuated in the arresting, arousal, and heightening of awareness by which we are to some extent liberated from what has till then dominated us without question, or what Gadamer names Sein als Erfahrung (1965:88). According to Gadamer, the ideology critics' incorrect understanding of consciousness, especially in relation to its objectification by thematizing reflection, leads to (an at least performative) blurring of the distinction between technical application and practical action so central to their quest for the normative moment in control of self, society, and culture.

Secondly, this misapprehension of the nature and limits of reflective consciousness is taken further astray by the tendency to identify the reasonable with knowledge that is immanently generated by the rational operations of the individual; and hence to relegate all believed knowledge or prejudgments to the dustbin of the dogmatic and the oppressive. Gadamer, therefore, further accuses Habermas and Apel of a regression to the naivety of the Cartesian doubting. For they imply that integral to the critical process is a procedure that shirks the implications of the inescapable symbiosis within any mind of immanently generated knowledge and belief. One seems to be enjoined to engage in an impossible experiment of, if not eradicating, then at least holding suspect all that is merely believed. But such an overemphasized doubting turns a possibly legitimate hermeneutics of suspicion into a sort of intransigent blindness.

In short, Gadamer would accuse the critique of ideology of the same shortcomings that position would hold against his style of hermeneutic philosophy: idealism and a mistaken notion of reflection.
On the Amplifications of the Basic Critique

1. On Breakdowns. Gadamer has been particularly neuralgic to the critique of ideology objection that integral hermeneutics is not sufficiently cognizant of breakdowns in communication and of their etiology. For his philosophic strategy is not merely indebted to the Heideggerian *Hermeneutik der Faktizität*, but has a Socratic-Platonic provenance as well. As a Platonist of the first rank, he is quite aware of the rise of classical philosophy out of the context of a crisis of conventional morality, a degeneration of Athenian morality in which the *kalon* diverged increasingly from the *agathon*; and further, out of the peculiar complication introduced into this context by the "new higher learning" of the Sophists, who were more willing to be relevant politically (i.e., adapt their skills to the interests of varying enclaves within the body social) than to seek the grounds for true discrimination and discernment. And so Gadamer, too, takes up the philosophic tactic of doubling back upon the taken-for-granted self-understanding (especially as in our age it regards "science" as the overriding cultural norm) and calling it into question. Hence, Gadamer's leading question, *Wie ist Verstehen möglich?*, is neither "technical" in the sense of being tied up with the will-to-power, nor "speculative" (in the pejorative sense of a concern for the truth of what is, independently of our constituting activity), but "practical" in the sense of concern for the goodness or badness, the rightness or wrongness of ourselves and our world: What are we doing when we are knowing not simply what is, but what is better? This is why Gadamer has been willing to identify the philosophic intention involved as taken from the mold of Aristotelian *philosophia practica sive politica*: "Hermeneutics is philosophy, and as philosophy, practical philosophy" (1972b).

It is with some irritation, therefore, that Gadamer listens to the post-Machiavellian and post-Hobbesian critics
of ideology make their claim to this effect: The Aristotelian practical philosophy may have been able to base itself upon a relatively authentic human situation; but modern, post-industrial society is dominated not by good but by rank performance as well as by social and cultural, economic and political patterns that make bad performance the order of the day; so a renewal of Aristotelian practical philosophy is not only anachronistic but obscurantist. Gadamer finds such complaints self-contradictory. For, he will say, performatively and tacitly these critics assume something like his own philosophic standpoint in discriminating good human performance from bad in the first place; and then they turn around and use factually bad performance as a reason for rejecting his standpoint (1971:304-305, 309).

The theory of hermeneutics of itself cannot decide on the correctness of the assumption that society is dominated by class struggle, that no basis for dialogue between classes is present. Obviously my critics have mistaken the claim of justification that consists in the reflection on hermeneutic experience. Otherwise, they couldn't have been scandalized by the thesis that everywhere common judgments and common commitments are possible, that solidarity is presupposed. They make the same assumption. Nothing justifies the apprehension that on my part the "sustaining-agreement" has been claimed more for the conservative than for the revolutionary solidarity. It is the notion of reason itself which cannot abstain from the notion of the common agreement. That is the solidarity that unites all. (1971: 308-309)

2. On the Philosophic Task and Modern Scientific Differentiation. Gadamer's reply to the objections concerning the apparently ad hoc and undifferentiated character of integral hermeneutics is an adamant appeal to the Aristotelian model of practical philosophy and Aristotle's insight into the autonomy of moral knowledge as about praxis vis-a-vis the strictly technical (technē) and the strictly theoretical (epistēme). Here he found a guideline
for the shift from an idealist to a phenomenologically transformed transcendental philosophy. It is transcedental, because it asks about the conditions of the possibility of interpretation and common meaning, not as "methodically disciplined behavior towards texts" but as "the form of actuation of human social life, which in its final and most formal articulation is a community of dialogue or civil discourse" (1971:289). It is phenomenologically transformed, because it does not eschew the "almost question-begging" empiricism (Lonergan, 1974:82) of Aristotle's Ethics. The transcendental explication of the basic structures of human experience must be verified in what "affords description as an experience of the subject" (Gadamer, 1965:xvii). The break with Kant's undertaking is clear: The objective is not the de jure but the de facto conditions of the possibility and actuality; not what should be the case, but what is the case (xvi).

For Aristotle, "the crux of philosophic ethics lies in the mediation between Logos and Ethos, between the subjectivity of knowing and the substantiality of being"; and "moral knowledge culminates not in the universal concepts of courage, justice, etc., but in the concrete application which concerns the here and now doable in the light of such knowing" (1967a:184). And Gadamer claims a like scope for philosophical hermeneutics: "What men really need is not the simple and undistorted raising of the ultimate question, but, equally, a sense for the doable, the possible, the right thing here and now. The philosopher ought to be the first one, I think, to be aware of the tension between his own claim and the reality in which he stands" (1965: xxiv). The interest is evidently not comprehensive synthesis but transforming reorientation and integration of one's living. As Gadamer put it:

What is altogether at stake is the correction of a self-understanding. To this extent such hermeneutic reflection is "philosophical"--not because
it claims for itself a distinct philosophical legitimation; but, on the contrary, because it disputes a distinct "philosophical" claim. (1971:288-289)

Now one purpose of Gadamer's ontology of art and of the game-play had been "to apprehend the notion of experience in a broader way than Kant so that the experience of a work of art can be understood as an experience" (1965: 93). For Gadamer, this means experience as not isolated from the overall challenge set human existence to relate itself to and be in the truth. Thus, an encounter with a work of art is not a matter of sheerly immanent, nontransitive, non-self-transcending feeling ("a mere sensation" [Kant, 1932:161]); but "an encounter with what is most real (dem Eigentlichen), as an act combining an aspect of familiarization and of being surpassed" (1967b:6). Similarly, hermeneutics as practical philosophy will break out of the limited viewpoint on moral reflection expounded in Kant's second Critique. For in part, Gadamer's portrayal of the deficiencies of the foundations laid by German Idealism, Schleiermacher, and Dilthey for the construction of the historical world runs parallel not only to the insight that the departure from the creating (i.e. Kant's problematic of "genius") or the appreciating (i.e. Kant's problematic of "taste") subject alone cannot account for the experience of the work of art; but also to the recognition that the autonomous, encapsulated subject at the center of the Critique of Practical Reason is a very weak basis on which to ground a philosophy of action in all its social, historical,—in short, trans-subjective—implications. Consequently, the shift from reflection on the noumenal self, whose imperatives and regulative ideas are set apart from empirical facticity (and only so, in Kant's eyes, guaranteed sovereign freedom and spontaneity) to reflection on phronesis (especially because it is a type of judgment that has itself as part of its subject matter [1965:297]) for which the concrete, the contingent,
and the particular is not only the point of departure but remains permanently and ongoingly determinative for the content of the right judgment—such a shift marks a new departure in modern German philosophy. Gadamer turns around and points a finger at the critics of ideology for not having made it.

Integral hermeneutics on this model, then, is "neither theoretic science nor sufficiently characterized by the fact that it is 'praxis-oriented'" (1971:286). As "critically reflective knowledge" (287), it is: (a) distinct and yet inseparable from praxis, (b) realized in communication (310-314; 1972a:344), and (c) "directed toward the clarification of the civil community." Its reflective thematization of practical judgment (with its mobile object, its practical aims, its political method) is somehow theoretic: It goes beyond the level of opinion to "mediate 'universal' knowledge about human conduct and the forms of 'political' existence" (285-286): a universality ut in pluribus, a teachable knowledge of typical structures. So Gadamer considers it a strength of integral hermeneutics to remain so distinct from current forms of science and technical application that it really can shed light on the problematic of practical enlightenment.

3. On Truth and Right Living. Gadamer claims that because the critics have not remained faithful to the distinction between poiesis and praxis, they have been unable to appreciate the recontextualizing of the truth-question brought about by integral hermeneutics. The truth Gadamer deals with is strictly pre- and post-propositional: the truth or falsity of personal orientation and of human self-constitution (1967b:6, 7). It is not simply a matter of well-meaning poetic license on Gadamer's part to extend the proper use of truth and falsehood in human judgments of fact to the wider context of constitutive meaning. What he is arguing is that the proper and primary meaning of truth is the primordial one of attunement of one's life-orientation
to the limits of human rootedness and finitude; that that attunement is actualized in an ongoing process of self-transcendence never fully achievable this side of death; and that one may, by metonymy, narrow down this primordial sense of truth to include only the sphere of propositional truth. Truth, in Gadamer's sense, therefore, is the context of propositional truth.

Moreover, by the primordial character of truth is meant its transcendental character—in the sense of a turn away from the categorial and the content of propositions toward the principle from which propositional contents originate: the performative (and, finally, trans-subjective) horizon within which such contents have meaning and value. Truth for Gadamer connotes the normative moment in human experiencing as situated on this level rather than on the level of the proposition. This means that the criteria for truth include propositionally gauged standards, but move beyond them into the realm of the existential, of conversion, of responsibility. "Hermeneutical reflection," says Gadamer, "is restricted to laying open opportunities for knowledge that without it might not be caught. It does not itself mediate a criterion of truth" (1971:300).

Gadamer bases much of his defense of himself on the fact that, as operating on this level, he holds the structures he displays to be phenomenologically accessible (empirically verifiable) in a more radical way than his radical critics.

The hermeneutical job is to decipher ever anew the fragmentary meanings of history precisely as they are bounded and break upon the dark contingency of the factual and especially upon the twilight in which the future is shrouded for any present consciousness. Even the "anticipation of the rounded whole" that pertains to the structure of interpretation, is called "anticipation" with special emphasis, in so far as the subordination to what must be interpreted is never fully retrievable by any explication. So one is surprised when, according to Apel, and Habermas...hermeneutic
reflection ought to be raised up via the glaring light of an explanatory science to the status of a completely idealist transparency of meaning.

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In this vein, then, Gadamer places his own objections to the emancipatory reflection and the counterfactual agreement about compulsion-free communication.

For one thing, it is too vague and indeterminate to be able to illuminate for consciousness the decisive contrast between the merely desirable things and genuine goals of real decision. Here Gadamer invokes the Aristotelian critique of the Platonic Idea of the Good.

The human good is something one comes up against in human praxis and it cannot be determined outside the concrete situation in which one thing is preferred to another. This alone, not counterfactual agreement, is the critical experience of the good. It has to be elaborated in the concreteness of the situation. As a general idea, such an idea of right living is "empty." (315-316)

The meaning of being plugged into the tradition (which itself, Gadamer tells us, "is only in constant change") is connected with the way plans and wishes always outstrip reality; the relevance of being "plugged in" to the tradition is "to mediate between the anticipations of the desirable and the possibilities of the doable, between mere wishing and real choosing, i.e. concretizing our anticipations in the stuff of reality" (307). For Gadamer, real critique is the discriminating that goes on only in this relationship to praxis. The counterfactual agreement implies instead that one knows before the practical confrontation what one doesn't agree with. "The meaning of hermeneutical praxis is not to start from a counterfactual agreement, but to make such agreement possible and bring it about, which means nothing else than: to convince someone by concrete criticism" (312). The critique that goes beyond immanent, detailed evidence collapses into mere declamation.
Along the lines of what has already been said above in connection with breakdowns, the counterfactual agreement tends to be undialectical. It forgets that the very ideal of reason which really would ground all social partnership and interpretive concerns also forbids that one claim for oneself the right insight into the delusion of another.

For the knowledge of practical reason is not a knowledge conscious of its superiority over against the supposedly unknowing one. Rather in these situations we meet in each person the claim to know what is right for the whole. What this means for social life together, however, is that men have to convince other men—naturally not in the sense that politics and the formation of social life were nothing but a mere community of dialogue, so that one would look to a compulsion-free conversation...as the true meaning of salvation. Politics requires of reason that it bring interests to the formation of decision, and that all social and political pronouncements of will are dependent upon the build-up of common convictions by rhetoric. That includes, and by this I mean that it pertains to the notion of reason, that one has to reckon with the possibility that the contrary conviction...might be right. (316-317)

This coincides with "the age-old hermeneutical principle that interpretation of the strange or alien—be it the unfathomable will of the Gods, the kerygma, or the works of the classical authors—always entails in a constitutive way the subordination of the interpreter to the one pronouncing and furnishing what is to be interpreted" (301).

Turned against the ideology critics, this point motivates such statements by Gadamer as this: "To speak of compulsive or oppressive communication with regard to love, to the choice of a model, and to loyalty in virtue of a willing sub- and super-ordination seems to me a dogmatic prejudice regarding the meaning of 'reason' among men." Or this: "...I cannot see how communicative competence and its theoretic mastery ought to remove from between groups the barriers which are erected in the mutual critique by each
of the compulsive character of the common convictions at work in the other" (305). Gadamer believes that to speak of delusion in every case of unbridgable differences between social and political groups arising from differences in interests and backgrounds "would presume one's solitary possession of the correct conviction." Integral hermeneutics understands communication as "the reciprocal testing of prejudgments" (307).

Furthermore, Gadamer considers the counterfactual agreement at the center of emancipatory reflection dogmatically undialectical regarding role of reflection. According to him, "reflection is concerned not merely with the application of rational means to the accomplishment of pre-given purposes and goals." As hermeneutically schooled, such reflection "raises ends to consciousness, but not in the sense of an antecedent knowledge and fixation of already posited and highest ends for which reflection only pursues suitable means"--for that is precisely the sense of reflection as technical.

What is at stake in reflection is the consequentiality of the very ability to choose. One who finds himself in a genuine situation of choice needs a standard of the preferable, under the guidance of which he executes this reflection as headed toward a resolution. The result of this reflection and resolution, then, is always more than mere correct subordination to the orientating standard. The particular plan, policy, or action one holds as right determines the standard itself, and indeed not only so that thereby resolutions in the future become pre-decided, but also in such a way that thereby the resolution toward determinate goals of action actually takes shape. Consequentiality in this context ultimately means the continuity that alone constitutes in a contentual way one's identity with oneself....But from this determination of "the right" one can derive with Aristotle and a tradition reaching down to our day a model of right living, and one would have to agree with Aristotle that this guiding model, socially preformed as it is, is constantly being further determined when we make "critical"
decisions--indeed to such a state of determinacy that we can no longer choose otherwise; and that means that our "ethos" has become our "second nature." (1974:532-533)

For Gadamer authentically emancipatory reflection may be operative "whenever it is concretizing itself to new goal-images precisely by dissolving old ones." In this way it obeys the gradual laws of historical and social life itself. (Emancipatory reflection)...would be empty and undialectical, if it wishes to conceive the idea of a completed reflection, in which the society, from a process of an ongoing process of emancipation in which it loses itself from traditional constraints and constructs new binding values, would be elevated to a final, free and rational self-possession. (533)

Undialectical blindness is therefore only avoided in taking one's stand in "the broad stream of humane knowledge such as art and religion, custom and ethos, economy and law (that) flows from the tradition outside the sphere of scientific competence from the most ancient times right down to our own highly rationalized time" (Gadamer, 1972c:xxviii).

For the conditions of possibility and actuality of any concrete planning, policy making, and critique include "a socially mediated normative image of man" (xxxvi) that (as Gadamer's notion of effective history has made thematic) is an inevitable component of one's horizon.

This component is partly a matter of immanently generated knowledge, but far more preponderantly a matter of belief. Hence, the task of critique may be said to be not the absolutist one of even asymptotically approaching the elimination of belief, but of using immanently generated knowledge to criticize belief in the circle of believing to understand and understanding to believe.

The application of this component remains dialectical, first, when it is not a matter of bringing this normative image as ready-made universal principle handed down from on high to bear on particular situations: Gadamer's critique of Kant's *Kritik der Urteilskraft* rejects as too abstract the
separation of the subsumption of the particular under a given universal from the search of a universal principle for a particular: "The universal under which one subsumes a particular is further determined and clarified in the concreteness of the case." Thus, insight into the norm, or the development of one's sense of the typical applicability of the norm is one with becoming more insightfully attuned to the contingent and exceptional circumstances of the particular situation in question; for these are involved in shaping the meaning of the very norm to be applied in a way that is not true in the grasp of strictly theoretic necessity and impossibility. Such resolution is dialectical, then, because it requires a "taking counsel with oneself."

Such deliberation is never carried out in isolation. The deliberative application of one's normative image "includes a commonness quite different from abstract universal validity. It allows other persons to have the word as well as oneself....At the term of such deliberation stands neither the performance of a work nor the production of a desired condition, but a solidarity uniting all."

Again, and more radically, practical enlightenment is dialectical precisely in that it is a matter of self-knowledge. Not only is the pragmatic situation not given with a label attached, but the relevance of the subject's background orientation or habituation to that situation is not like a closed set of propositions which may be applied paradigmatically in analyzing situations. What is needed is eminently self-correcting and self-critical activity (Gadamer, 1965:296, 304-306). The application of the communally mediated consensus on the comprehensive goals of human aspiration only serves to open one up to further demands and further horizons implicit in those goals. This self-critical dimension fits precisely with the necessity of a "successful dialogue" as "subordinated to the truth of the relevant subject matter that binds the partners to a
new communality, that far surpasses the original subjective opinions of the conversation partners." What is true of intersubjective dialogue has its roots in the way human consciousness is structured.

...Plato knew full well the essence of thinking when he called it the inner dialogue of the soul with itself—a dialogue that is a constant being overtaken and that by doubting and making objections requires a constant return to oneself and one's meanings and opinions. And if anything characterizes our human thinking, then it is this endless dialogue with ourselves that never reaches a final result. This is what distinguishes us from that ideal of an infinite spirit for which everything that is and is true lies opened out before him in a single view. It is our experience of language, our growing up into this inner conversation with ourselves, that is always simultaneously the anticipated conversation with others and the inclusion of others in this conversation with ourselves, in which alone the world in all the realms of experience is opened up and ordered for us....There is no limit for the inner dialogue of the soul with itself: That is the thesis I hold in opposition to the suspicion of ideology. (1977:86-87)

Finally, Gadamer's defense of his hermeneutic ontology of language seems to make an unexplicated shift from a dialectical ground to a foundational ground.

...(T)he real misunderstanding about the linguisticality of our interpreting is a misunderstanding about language that thinks of it as a set of words and sentences, of concepts, perspectives, and opinions. Truth is actually the one word whose virtuality opens up to us the infinity of speaking still further and of speaking with one another as well as the freedom of uttering oneself and of letting ourselves be uttered. Not its already elaborated conventionality, not the weight of the preschematizations, by which we are overwhelmed, is the key to language, but the generative and creative power always again to set such totalities afloat. (1977:92-93)

My provisional comments toward the completion, comparison, reduction, classification and selection of what is only a partial assembly of data on a dialectical issue (in Lonergan's terms) come to this:
1. The critique of ideology tries to meet the issues arising from the passage to the second phase of the modern philosophic differentiation of consciousness largely by means of deploying the resources of the first phase. Its intentions are practical: It asks the question of ortho-praxis. But it frames its questions mainly in cognitive terms.

2. Hence, its foundational relevance to the problems of planning and policy in our time tend to be individualist and rationalist; but at the same time its movement into metascience permits it to be at least potentially relevant to those problems qua technical and scientific or theoretic.

3. This methodological and normative relevance to modern theory in its role as guiding sociocultural development is vitiated to the extent that it does not face the concrete exigencies of a critique of belief—Gadamer's hermeneutic circle; and this shortcoming is only emphasized to the extent that the interplay of archeology and teleology not only is not allowed to unfold, but the fully religious and moral dimensions of the question: What am I doing when I am transcending myself? are systematically screened out.

4. Integral hermeneutics has the advantage of focusing on the subject as subject even more consistently than the critics of ideology tend to do. This opens up its distinct advantage over the critique of ideology, namely, a truly balanced formulation of the problematic of the critique of belief.

5. Moreover, its paradigmatic model of game-play, when coupled with its application to intersubjective and trans-subjective communication according to a logic of question and answer, leaves it open to a transposition of the problematic of the critique of belief into that of a critique of faith in which the interplay of archeology and teleology may be further contextualized by a vertical finality.
6. But the ontological character of its dialectics tends toward an unwarranted fusion of dialectics and foundations, on the one hand; and a lack of differentiation that keeps it from being methodologically and normatively relevant to theory in its connection with planning and policy. Hence, its attempt to face the issues emergent from the passage to the second phase of the modern philosophic differentiation of consciousness by the truly salutary yet ultimately unsatisfactory retrieval of Plato and Aristotle in all their nuance and fruitful ambiguity.

For Lonergan, of course, the "modern philosophic differentiation of consciousness" comes to fruition in a philosophy that is "neither a theory in the manner of science, nor a somewhat technical form of common sense, nor even a reversal to Pre-Socratic wisdom"; but rather one which "finds its data in intentional consciousness." The primary function of this philosophy is "to promote the self-appropriation that cuts to the root of philosophic differences and incomprehension"; and its secondary function is "distinguishing, relating, grounding the several realms of meaning and, no less,...grounding the methods of the sciences and so promoting their unification" (1972c:95).

Now it seems that the evolution of this philosophy by Lonergan may be said perhaps to have passed through two phases. Correlative to the first phase of the modern philosophic differentiation of consciousness, Lonergan has worked out his cognitional theory: What are you doing when you are knowing?; his epistemology: Why is doing that knowing?; and his metaphysics: What do you know when you do it? This we find chiefly in *Insight*. But corresponding to the second phase of the modern philosophic differentiation, Lonergan's "moving viewpoint" has progressed to a more adequate elaboration of the transcendental notion of value and the entire fourth level of intentional consciousness--the level of deliberation, evaluation, decision, action--along
with a methodological exploration of the dialectical and foundational ramifications peculiar to this level.

Indeed, to have studied the *Praemittenda* of the *De Deo Trino* with its summary and methodologically oriented résumé of the development of trinitarian doctrine was to see the issue, dialectics, centered on the "Yes" and "No" of judgments of fact--whether in the form of simply dogmatic (and post-systematic) realism or in the form of a critical realism as well. Again, to have worked through the last chapters of *Insight* and to have read carefully such *notae ad usum auditorum* as *De ente supernaturali* was to come to grips with the foundational issue in terms of "the natural desire to know God." To dig up the old notes on the *Analysis fidei* or *De methodo theologae* was, in large measure to prescind from judgments of value that did not bear directly on truth and to specify the human side of faith in terms of what Lonergan has more recently been calling religious belief, without the benefit of any thematization of the "different basis" (Lonergan, 1972c:118) which qualifies the structure of belief as religious. In retrospect one senses that Lonergan was caught up in the first phase of the modern philosophic differentiation of consciousness.

In like manner, the *homo sensibilibus immersus* who had been slowly and painfully struggling for years with the issue of self-appropriation, had been personally engaged in a dialectic preoccupied with the "crucial issue" (1957:xviii) of intelligent and rational consciousness and the implications of a conversion *ex umbris et imaginibus in veritatem* (1967:236). While he had been aware that "objective knowing is not yet authentic human living" (238), still the further he had gone along the *Insight* route of self-appropriation, the stronger he had felt that "without objective knowing there is no authentic living" (238). The dialectical business of encountering persons tended to be especially a matter of having to know and inviting the
persons one came into contact with to know; since "a real exclusion of objective knowing so far from promoting, only destroys personalist values" (239). Then, too, if he happened to be a Roman Catholic Christian, he may have found the approach to such foundational issues as knowledge of God (most notably as evinced in Chapter XIX of *Insight*) and religious beliefs (as, for instance, theologically reflected upon in *De Deo Trino* and *De Verbo Incarnato*), in Lonergan's own phrase, "unfavorable" or "not very well furnished" (1973:11-12), still, he possessed at least the solidly grounded feeling that his knowledge of God was not incompatible with "any sufficiently cultured consciousness that expands in virtue of the dynamic tendencies of that consciousness itself..." (1957:xxviii); that his acceptance of religious beliefs entailed absolutely no sacrifice of intellectual probity, since appropriated rational self-consciousness sponsors both "the work of the speculative theologian seeking a universal formulation of the truths of faith, and...the work of the historical theologian revealing the doctrinal identity in the verbal and conceptual differences of the (dogmatic theological context)," on the one hand; and on the other hand, a radical, non-cartesian "critique of beliefs" (1957:713-718).

The type of person I have been describing should not be made to look ridiculous from the vantage of hindsight. For he would have been an old enough hand at the business of "heightening of awareness" and introspection to be aware that "the subject moves to a further dimension of consciousness as his concern shifts from knowing being to realizing the good" (1967:237). In all likelihood, he would, in making this shift, have concentrated on "dedicating himself truly, totally, efficaciously, and perseveringly" to "the good as intelligent and reasonable" (1956:14-19; 1957:606). And this means that with respect to both dialectics and foundations he would have been operating principally out of the modern differentiation of
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consciousness in its first phase. Chances are that he would not necessarily have held "for the primacy of practical reason...for the primacy of the questions that lead to deliberation, evaluation, decision" (1974:242).

But chances are, too, that this same type of person I have in mind was prepared to undergo the further move into the second phase of the modern philosophic differentiation of consciousness. Years before, when he had first taken up Insight, he had been warned that "the appropriation of one's own rational self-consciousness...is not an end in itself, but rather a beginning" (1957:xxviii). And in reading and re-reading that work, he had gotten the feel of the "moving viewpoint" (xxiii-xxvii). More significantly, in struggling toward an intellectual conversion, he had had to come to terms experientially and performatively with the fact that such an achievement bore the marks of Newman's "real" rather than merely "notional" assent. Or to put it more technically, "the personal, decisive act" (xix) required for the intellectual conversion had been a matter not of a horizontal but of a vertical exercise of liberty.

Consequently, Lonergan's explicit and rather novel introduction of the transcendental notion of value would not only amount for him to an invitation by Lonergan "to move on" to the second phase of the modern philosophic differentiation; but it would have had a real resonance in one's prior experience of self-appropriation. One's experience of real self-transcendence needed thematization. And this called for expanding the process of adverting to, distinguishing, naming, identifying, recognizing into that "further dimension of consciousness" where "freedom and responsibility, encounter and trust, communication and belief, choice and promise and fidelity" emerge (1967:237).

For the modern philosophic differentiation of consciousness in its second phase, then, "the good is not simply the intelligent and reasonable, but distinct" (1974:277). Moreover, (and how strange sounding this was in the
ears of one who had been waging a long and seemingly losing war on pathological "desires and fears"!), that good is actually "aspired to in the intentional responses of feeling to values." Correlatively, the ground of ethical philosophy is no longer simply the consistency of operations on the fourth level of consciousness with the operations on the level of intelligence and rationality, but the moral conversion that shifts motivations from satisfactions to values (1972c:240; 1972b:308). Moral conversion sublates intellectual conversion, adding to merely cognitive or intentional self-transcendence the new, distinct, and far richer context of real self-transcendence (1972c:241-242).

But as was by now to be expected, this richer context only provides the opening for further contexts. Indeed the thematization and appropriation of this distinct level of responsibility and existence with the concomitant possibility of a moral conversion from satisfactions to values seems only to set the stage for Lonergan's notice of "minor" and "major" exceptions to the rule (nihil amatum nisi prae cognitum) that "ordinarily operations on the fourth level of intentional consciousness presuppose and complement corresponding operations on the other three levels" (1972c:122). As Lonergan has stated the matter:

There is a minor exception to this rule inasmuch as people do fall in love, and that falling in love is something disproportionate to its causes, conditions, occasions, antecedents. For falling in love is a new beginning, an exercise of vertical liberty in which one's world undergoes a new organization. But the major exception...is God's gift of his love flooding our hearts. Then we are in the dynamic state of being in love. But who it is we love is neither given nor as yet understood....So it is that in religious matters love precedes knowledge and, as that love is God's gift, the very beginning of faith is due to God's grace. (122-123)
The major exception is, of course, the religious conversion that achieves the fulfillment of man's capacity for self-transcendence. It sublates both intellectual and moral conversion (242-243).

So it is that Lonergan's personal passage into the second phase of the modern philosophic differentiation of consciousness fructifies in "a philosophy that is open to the acceptance of Christian doctrine, that stands in harmony with it, and that, if rejected, leads to a rejection of Christian doctrine" (1972b:309). Within the framework of such a philosophy, the focus of theological dialectic changes from the "Yes" and "No" of judgments of truth to "the reasons for the conflicts" among such judgments (1972c:129). These reasons stem from persons operating on the level of self as originating value. Dialectics becomes a matter of "meeting persons, appreciating the values they represent, criticising their defects, and allowing one's living to be challenged at its very roots by their words and by their deeds" (247). As dialectical, theology faces the implications of the fact that convictions and commitments are a matter of not only judgments of fact but judgments of value; and that "such judgments in turn, rest largely on beliefs" (244).

And yet there is the intriguing suggestion of Lonergan that "decision is reached only partially by dialectic"—because dialectic "is not to be expected to go to the roots of all conflict, for ultimately, conflicts have their ground in the heart of man" (141).

This suggestion needs to be understood, I believe, in the context of Lonergan's notice above of exceptions to the ordinary order of fourth level operations. One can get a hint of the relevant context in Lonergan's 1967 lecture, "The Natural Knowledge of God."

One goes beyond the quae esti juris to the quae est factum when one turns from conditions of possibility to conditions of actual occurrence (of the
natural knowledge of God)....I do not think that in this life people arrive at natural knowledge of God without God's grace, but what I do not doubt is that the knowledge they so attain is natural. (1974:133)

With the recognition of feelings as distinct ways of apprehending values, Lonergan begins to quote Pascal on the heart's reasons by way of giving a methodological specification to a type of knowledge not explicitly acknowledged by the modern philosophic differentiation of consciousness in its first phase emphasis on reason (1972c:115-118): knowledge born of love. Here a more precise meaning of "the heart" of man becomes clear. It is not simply the subject on the fourth, existential level of intentional consciousness, but that subject on that level precisely as in love. The hint about the quaestio facti and the breakthrough to heart come together in the doctrine on the causal relationships among intellectual, moral, and religious conversions.

...First there is God's gift of his love. Next, the eye of this love reveals values in their splendor, while the strength of this love brings about their realization, and that is moral conversion. Finally, among the values discerned by the eye of this love is the value of believing the truths taught by the religious tradition, and in such tradition and belief are the seeds of intellectual conversion. (243)

Now the person in the first phase of self-appropriation had known that his self-control was at best "only rough and approximate" (1967:242); that "the critical point is never transcended" (242). He knew that "being oneself is prior to knowing oneself" (249). But he may not have been able with ease and precision to differentiate foundationally between faith as a matter of "affirming true propositions, meditating on them, concluding from them, making resolutions on the basis of them, winning over our psyches, our sensitive souls, to carrying out the resolutions through the cultivation of pious imagination and pious
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affects, and multiplying individual effort and strength through liturgical union" (250); and faith as the eye of love (1972c:106, 115-118). In the latter case, faith is not simply belief, but the totality of cognitive transformations flowing from the dynamic state of being in love religiously (106). But once faith and belief are discriminated, theology's foundational issues of knowledge of God and religious beliefs are inserted explicitly into the unique environment of "content without an object," a something that is real "whether or not its subject has the foggiest notion of what it is or whether it has occurred" (1972a:227).

The decision that dialectics only partially reaches, then, is the decision that "selects one horizon and rejects others" (226), the decision that "moves from one set of roots to another" (1972c:271). But this decision, unlike the majority of our decisions that constitute only horizontal exercises of liberty (40-41), corresponds to "a change in one's antecedent willingness" (1972a:226). And this change in antecedent willingness is "not the product of our knowledge and choice," but "dismantles and abolishes the horizon in which our knowing and choosing went on and sets up a new horizon in which the love of God will transvalue our values and the eyes of that love will transform our knowing" (1972c:106). So far is it from being an arbitrary choice, it seems to be rather a consent to a transsubjective necessity, to "a vector within subjectivity, an undertow, a fateful call to a dreaded holiness" (113). Indeed since it is an exception to the ordinary laws of selfconstitution, Lonergan moves from the vocabulary of self-making and self-determining freedom to a language of granting and transformation and the contrasting inclination or stance this implies. For decision is one thing, but decision as gift is not adequately reducible to simple decision.

My chief contention in this paper is that once our putative person begins to appropriate the modern philosophic
differentiation of consciousness in its second phase, he is put in the way of being able to sort out the problematic of the Enlightenment. For once one has a purchase on the radical and normative implications of the shift from "classicist" to "modern" controls of meaning, i.e. from controls conceived as "a universal fixed for all time" to controls "as themselves involved in an ongoing process"; one may go beyond both the critique of ideology and the hermeneutical viewpoints while at the same time avoiding their characteristic shortcomings to identify and define two problem areas within this shift in controls and, it happens, at the very center of the Enlightenment problematic.

First, there is the problem-area concomitant with the differentiation of a normative moment on the fourth level of intentional consciousness as both distinct from and sublating the normativity of the empirical, intelligent, and rational levels. As distinct from the normativity at the level of simply intentional or cognitive self-transcendence, fourth level normativity is safe from any taint of rationalism; as sublating third level normativity, however, it is kept from collapsing into the "decisionism" that unites both existentialists and positivists. To perceive, let alone work out the implications of this distinction and this sublation, calls into play not an interplay of "universal immediacy" and unprincipled efficiency, but a deepening sensitivity to what Lonergan has named the critical and methodical exigencies of conscious intentionality.

This problem-area and these exigencies provide the context for a general reformulation of the question about the normative significance and limitations of the Enlightenment: How effectively complete the shift from the classicist to the modern control of meaning in a way that (1) does justice to the normative moment proper to the fourth level of intentional consciousness; while at the same time
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(2) remaining open to and indeed critically grounding the differentiations and specifications of cognitive self-transcendence suitable to the superstructure of today's society and culture (technology, economy, politics, education, law, science, philosophy, and theology)?

Secondly, there is the problem-area connected with the various specifications of the existential subject's "heart": namely, the subject as guided (or not) by the distinct loves of intimacy, of community, of the cosmos; or again, the subject as in love with other human beings qua human, or as in love with God as well. Here the intersecting issues of (a) personhood, community, and divine transcendence; (b) horizontal and vertical exercises of liberty; (c) horizontal and vertical finality; (d) decision as free self-determination and decision as gift/decision as response become intertwined with "the light and darkness of dialectic" that gives rise to "the divided community, their conflicting actions, and the messy situation...headed for disaster" (1972c:358).

This problem-area provides the context for a more specific re-formulation of the Enlightenment problematic: What is at stake for the rational and humane control of history when humankind defers to nothing higher than itself, if in fact the condition of actuality of being attentive, intelligent, reasonable, and responsible over the long haul is an other-worldly being-in-love? But to really ask this is to evoke not only the critical and methodical but the transcendent exigence; and to push the problematic of the Enlightenment as merely dialectical to the threshold of foundations: Does true Enlightenment ultimately have to promote more than "man's proud content to be just a man"? What if it is true that "if he would be only a man, he has to be less"? (1957:729).

Now such translations of the query, What is the Enlightenment?, open out onto a vast and painstaking enterprise that lies well beyond the scope of a paper like this:
a comprehensive examination and critique of the concrete symbols, life-forms (institutions), feelings, and values at work in the "messy situation" of our day. However, to the modern philosophic differentiation of consciousness in its second phase, it is evident that the sensibility capable of engaging in the sorting out, deciding upon, and thematizing of issues involved will have to undergo ever fuller appropriation not only of mind but of heart. For adequately to discriminate good from bad symbols and plausibility structures means bringing into the fray a prior and ongoing discernment of the "variable constants" at work in the sphere of Pascal's "reasons."

Moreover, if Enlightenment turns out in the end to be not a "calculating transition from unenlightened to enlightened self-interest" (Strauss), but a conversion of concern for satisfactions to concern for the terminal values that may coincide with the realization of the kingdom of God, then the vast undertaking of a comprehensive critique of beliefs is more than likely going to play into a critique of faith. In other words, the deepest intentions of Habermas's ideology-critique and of Gadamer's hermeneutics might in large measure be fulfilled by what Lonergan has phrased "a theology that mediates between a cultural matrix and the significance and role of a religion in that matrix" (1972c:xi).
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There is a question in the air, more sensed than seen, like the invisible approach of a distant storm, a question that I would hesitate to ask aloud did I not believe it existed unvoiced in the minds of many: Is there hope for man? Robert L. Heilbroner

Introduction

Robert L. Heilbroner's recent *An Inquiry into the Human Prospect* joined the swelling tide of literature spelling out the end of an era (1974; Meadows, 1972; Habermas, 1973; Richter; Oelmüller, 1972b; Barnet and Müller). Yesterday's utopias seem to pale into tomorrow's forgotten dreams as the evidence of today's massive problems intimates nightmares still to come. Overpopulation, crime, urban deterioration, racism, mass starvation, sexism, pollution, energy crises, depleting natural resources, inflation, military-industrial complexes, political scandals, exploitation, repression—the litany evokes the disturbing reflections of Lonergan's *Insight.*

There are deeper ills that show themselves in the long-sustained decline of nations and, in the limit, in the disintegration and decay of whole civilizations. Schemes that once flourished lose their efficacy and cease to function; in an ever more rapid succession, as crises multiply and remedies have less effect, new schemes are introduced; feverish effort is followed by listlessness; the situation becomes regarded as hopeless; in a twilight of straitened but gracious living men await the catalytic trifle that will reveal to a surprised world the end of a once brilliant day. (210)
Ever since the Enlightenment removed the world from the hands of God and placed it squarely on the shoulders of mankind (Prometheus and Atlas revisited), man has built his autonomous identity on the success stories of deeds well done, of economic expansion, of scientific and technological progress, of political peace with honor. Human history became a success (hi)story. The success of mathematics and the natural sciences meant their methods became the canon of all exact knowledge—what could not be quantified lacked meaning. The success of technology meant that the machine became the model of rational order and process—what could not be programmed should not exist. Man began to see himself as made in the image of his own mechanized creations: organic and psychic processes were seen as no more than highly complex physico-mechanical events; the mind and consciousness were dismissed as illusory, sooner rather than later to be mapped out in cybernetic biocomputer input-output schema; play became the prerogative of a sport industry; work was reduced to assembly-line regulated productivity; interpersonal relations became techniques of successful interaction and role functionalisms. In short, man's success-oriented autonomous identity demanded the absorption of his own subjectivity into a mechanomorphic objectivity.

Yet this mechanistic identity of modern "enlightened" man has its dark side. The irrelevance of God for modern autonomy meant that He was no longer about to blame for failure and suffering. The fragile identity of success had to be protected against the forces of nonidentity and negativity: finitude, illness, suffering, destruction, failure, guilt, death. If man alone was responsible for the world, and if he could no longer find his identity in a gifted redeeming love but only in successful autonomy, then he set about constructing elaborate defense mechanisms to exonerate himself from the concrete history of suffering (Metz, 1973b). Conservatives would try to atrophy past
successful histories, immunizing their own autonomy
against the inroads of others by the judicious use of
legal, economic, "humanitarian," and armed force. Lib-
erals would make "nature" the scapegoat for the history of
suffering: human failures are ascribed completely to an
unenlightened past and will be absolved by the advance of
science, education, and therapy. Marxists have no diffi-
culty in attributing the nonidentity of alienation to
those enemies of the proletariat who still have power over
history, and so impede the successful march toward a
classless society. Finally, such defensive mechanisms
find their apotheosis in those contemporary technocrats
and advocates of positivist structuralism who see in the
very mechanomorphic identity of man an exonorating escape
from responsibility for the history of suffering. Just as
some Enlightenment theodicies found a final solution to
the problem of God's existence in the face of suffering by
denying the existence of God, so the inherent conceptual-
ist solution within modern identity is to deny that man
exists at all as a responsible historical subject--the
anthropodicy of today proclaims the "death of man" and the
advent of a "post-historic" era!

This rift between contemporary man's vaunted success
history and his repudiated suffering history goes deeper
than any separation between his conscious and unconscious.
The therapy of depth psychology cannot of itself heal it,
for such therapy often has functioned as a defense mechan-
ism against nonidentity (Yankelovich and Barrett; Turner).
What is at stake here is not only the relation between con-
sciousness and the unconscious but between conscious au-
tonomy itself and its relation to heteronomy (Marquard,
1972, 1973a). If theology has been ignored by the modern
human sciences, it is not only because of the latter's in-
sistence upon the autonomous success history of self-
enlightened modern man. It is also because too often, as
Prof. Metz indicates, theology's insistence upon heteronomy
and nonidentity--upon suffering, guilt, sin, death--was used within a sociopolitical context to prevent believers from experiencing their own effective freedom. The heteronomy of faith was set purely in opposition to human emancipation and enlightenment (Metz, 1973b; 1970a). Thus the rift between modern science, with its insistence upon autonomous identity, and any theology faithful to heteronomous nonidentity prohibited a critical mediation of the two.

The present study explores the possibilities of sublating this rift found in the work of Bernard Lonergan and Johannes Metz. Both have articulated a unity between identity and nonidentity relevant to the contemporary crisis. Lonergan's transcendental method or metamethodology has effectively cut through the Gordian knot of objectivism; it provides a compelling account of why the natural sciences are successful by calling attention to the related and recurrent operations capable of yielding cumulative and progressive results, not only in the physical sciences, but in all spheres of human performance. Presupposing that the reader is familiar with Lonergan's invitation to conscious self-appropriation, the first section of this study will show how Lonergan's methodically elaborated exigencies of meaning provide a framework for critically mediating the differentiation between autonomy and heteronomy, between the sciences and theology. I shall try to indicate how the schools of metascience (or philosophies of science) by not adequately coming to terms with the methodical exigence have not only had difficulty accounting for scientific performance, but have also too uncritically dismissed the nonidentity in human experience and the question of God. The second section will then take up a typology of theologies in order to sketch both the reasons why theology has failed to critically mediate its message to modernity and why, in this writer's estimation, the political theology of Metz offers a crucial and creative
context for meeting the contemporary crises resulting from the split between identity and nonidentity. The final section takes up the methodological implications of political theology and the central contributions Lonergan's methodical work can make to its program.

Metascience and Metamethodology

The advance of the empirical sciences since the Enlightenment increasingly eroded the metaphysical and theological worldviews underpinning traditional societies (Habermas, 1968b). The Kantian turn to the subject set the problematic for modern philosophy as a shift from metaphysics to cognitional theory. Yet, as Wilhelm Dilthey clearly saw, the objectivism of Kant's idealism was no match for the expanding success of the natural sciences along with the positivism and empiricism that claimed to be their philosophical exponents (Lamb, 1972). Dilthey perceived how Kantianism, French positivism, and British empiricism were all too exclusively dependent upon the mathematics and natural sciences of their day in articulating their respective cognitional theories. Nevertheless, Dilthey's own attempt to provide a cognitional theoretical grounding of the cultural sciences, or Geisteswissenschaften, by separating those sciences from the operations of the natural sciences, was doomed to failure (Lamb, 1977).

Lonergan, on the other hand, moves from cognitional theory to methodology. This move could not be content with immunizing certain fields of conscious human performance from others. Thus Lonergan's

use of the terms, insights, understanding, is both more precise and has a broader range than the connotation and denotation of Verstehen. Insight occurs in all human knowledge, in mathematics, natural science, common sense, philosophy, human science, history, theology. (Lonergan, 1972:212-213)
Mindful of the Hegelian critique of Kantian cognitional theory (Tracy, 1970:91-93; Habermas, 1970a:14-35), Lonergan's cognitional theory-praxis has not been elaborated in isolation from the actual performance of the sciences. It transforms cognitional theory into method, shifting method from its classical Cartesian concern with axioms and rules of procedure (technique) into an appropriation of the inner dynamics of human performance in all those domains mentioned by Lonergan (praxis) (Lonergan, 1972:xi, xii, 3-5).

In his book, Contemporary Schools of Metascience, G. Radnitzky provides a rather accurate overview of the Anglo-Saxon and Continental schools of metascience, that he respectively designates as the Logical Empirical (henceforth LE) and the Hermeneutical-Dialectical (henceforth HD) schools or trends /1/. Although Lonergan has not addressed himself to the problem of metascience as Radnitzky formulates it, anyone familiar with Lonergan's work cannot fail to see how his articulation of metamethod has unique possibilities for critically integrating the differentiations within contemporary schools of metascience (Heelan, 1971b; Tracy, 1970:105-113; Lonergan, 1957:90-139). I wish to propose that the trends associated with LE are the metascientific correlative of Lonergan's systematic exigence. The HD trends, on the other hand, are the metascientific correlative of what Lonergan terms the critical exigence. This is not a facile syncretism, for it raises the question of the dynamic orientation of the systematic and critical exigences to the methodical and transcendental exigences, thereby indicating how the errors within both the LE and HD schools might arise from their failure to grasp their respective perspectives. The following discussion will indicate the possible relevance of the four exigences to today's metascientific debates.
1. The Systematic Exigence and Anglo-Saxon Schools:

The systematic exigence arises inasmuch as the quest for meaning is not content with the commonsense meanings of everyday discourse. The latter is concerned with persons, things and events as meaningfully related to us. It is the sphere of ordinary language, where the self-correcting process of learning is not controlled by scientific knowledge but by the day-to-day usage common to the linguistic cultural milieu into which we were born and grew up (Lonergan, 1957a:189-191; 1972:70-73, 81-83, 86-90; Tracy, 1970:224-228; Berger and Luckmann). The systematic exigence of meaning can intervene within this process to give rise to a world of theory distinct from, yet related to, the world of common sense. Lonergan sees two primary exemplifications of this exigence in Hellenic and Modern scientific theory.

The emergence of Greek epistemic theory is illustrated in the early Platonic dialogues where Socrates is depicted as inquiring after universal definitions of such commonly ascribed attributes as justice, courage, temperance, etc. The Athenians knew within the commonsense world of discourse what they meant when referring to individuals as just, courageous, temperate; but they were hard pressed to come up with the universal definitions Socrates was after (Lonergan, 1967:256-258; Snell: 246-250, 371-400). The transition from the Platonic dialogues to Aristotle's *Nicomachean Ethics* indicates that the answers to Socrates' questions could not be found within the context of commonsense language or literary language but within the context of a theoretical treatment of virtue and vice. Indeed, the theoretic context goes beyond the commonsense questions to establish its own control of meaning (Lonergan, 1967: 252-267; Voegelin, 1957b:304-314, 323-331, 355-357).

Moving through the Aristotelian corpus and the entire thrust of Hellenic and Medieval theory, one can see common
characteristics of classical scientific theory (Lonergan, 1967:252-263; Tracy, 1970:82-91; Diemer: 4-32). The ideal for scientific theory was certain knowledge through necessary causes or principles. The necessary, immutable and eternal was the norm for "episteme" and "scientia" (Diemer: 15-29; Ritter: 9-33; Snell: 412-413). The universal was its presupposition and goal. Corresponding to these classical criteria were the insistence upon logical deduction and induction, the concern for essential definitions and, because a knowledge of first principles allowed deduction, the possibility of individuals to master the main lines of classical science (Tracy, 1970:84-90; Diemer: 24-32, esp. 25). Since the only proper attitude towards the necessary, immutable, eternal was a contemplative theoría, all praxis was viewed as a carthetic preparation for theory (Lobkowicz: 3-88).

Modern scientific performance, despite the tendency to interpret itself within classical categories, effectively moved beyond the limitations of the classical conceptions of systematic control (Picht: 135-140; Habermas, 1967:231-259). From Galileo onwards there is a progressive shift towards a quest in the natural sciences for a de facto intelligibility (Blumenberg, 1965; Gusdorf, 1969a: 236-278). Aristotelian logic gave way to more precise measuring devices whereby physical properties were correlated systematically by plotting their interactions on the number field to obtain mathematical functionals (Heelan, 1967; Mittelstrass: 207-308). Deductive procedures made way for methods of ever more exact empirical observation, hypothesis formulations in mathematico-mechanical models, and verification through controlled experimentation and observation. The self-correcting process of learning entered a specialized context of highly technical languages. The classical carryover in the Renaissance uomo universale rapidly gave way to increasing collaborative ventures of
specialized communities of scientists, technologists, and scholars adept in the technical languages (Lonergan, 1967: 261-266; Weinberg, 1967).

Insofar as the systematic exigence of meaning differentiates the worlds of theory with technical languages from the world of common sense with ordinary languages, it accounts not only for the emergence of Hellenic science but also for Modern science (Mittelstrass: 15-130; Tracy, 1970:54-60). As such it also has relevance to contemporary Anglo-Saxon and French schools of metascience. The Ordinary Language trend finds its goal in articulating the commonsense usage of both everyday and technical discourse (Schnidelbach; von Savigny; Radnitzky: 1.51-54). The Formalist use of the linguistic analysis of Russell, Moore, and the early Wittgenstein to develop an ideal or improved theoretic-technical language seems to grant validity only to the world of theory (Radnitzky: 1.22-39). The dependence of the Formalists on classical elements of theory is clearly explicated in the Reconstructionists, who concentrate more on ontology after the linguistic turn (40-47). The Pragmatists show a greater concern for the subject of both worlds, seeing man as the user of language and producer of science; yet they seem unable to move beyond an extrinsic conceptualism (48-51; Apel, 1973:2.157-219). The Structuralists, like the Formalists, are so taken up by the intelligibility of function that they tend to reject the notion of the subject (Schiwy; Piaget). Finally, those who adopt Popper's ideas on the growth of scientific knowledge, as well as those who appeal to systems-analysis and cybernetics, are keenly aware of the difference between classical and modern science, and although they are highly critical of the tendencies of LE, still remain within an objectivist framework (Apel, 1973:1.12-22; Albert, 1969; von Bertalanffy; Radnitzky: 2.139-146).

Why are all of these trends, from the perspective of Lonergan's metamethod, within the systematic exigence?
one form or another all these trends operate metascientifically within the boundaries of that exigence's definition either of the world of common sense or of theory. If Ordinary Language and Pragmatism opt more for commonsense usage, the world of theory is clearly predominant in the Formalist ideal of an improved language and their quest (along with the Structuralists, Reconstructionists, and Popperians) for the ideal of a unified science in terms of ideal concept-formation, ideal confirmation patterns, ideal attributes of empirical languages, and ideal explanatory procedures (Radnitzky: 1. 112-169). Insofar as they are dependent upon the Prinicipia Mathematica or any two-valued logic, probability and statistical methods are at best problematic to their "eternalistic" ahistorical framework (101; Lonergan, 1957a:35-46; Heelan, 1971). A reductionist tendency is more or less evident in these schools insofar as physics, mathematics, or logic is seen as providing the best systematic coordination of knowledge. Methodology is thereby conceived as laws or axioms or syntactical procedures descriptive of logical or structural regularities; or method, especially in Popper, is seen as prescriptive of the effort to attain ever closer approximations of an ideal criticist frame. Praxis within such a context is no more than the function of hypothesis-checking (Radnitzky: 1.57, 98-101, 117). There is an inclination to regard science as value-free and superior to the common sense of prescientific discourse (72-91; Lonergan, 1972:248; Matson: 3-65). Where such elitism is less evident, there is still the expectation on the part of these "systematic" schools of metascience to assume that only the precision and order of the world of theory can bring intelligibility into the chaos of common sense. This tendency is evident in the reductionism whereby the human sciences are denied a specific methodology of their own in the utopias of social engineering and in the disrepute of the political (Habermas, 1965:157-198, 231-256; Matson: 66-112).
As long as classical metaphysics was the dominant framework for interpreting the world of theory, the world of common sense could be left to the direction of a more or less privatized phronesis. The emergence of modern scientific methods, however, has rendered the man of so-called "practical" common sense rather obsolete (Lonergan, 1967:260; Aubenque; Fulda). Metaphysics itself has become replaced by Kant's "turn to the subject" in an objectivistic epistemology which in turn has been replaced by scientistic positivist or empiricist methodologies (Habermas, 1970a:234-236). These latter are in effect witnesses to the immense rift between the world of common sense and that of theory—with a one-sided option for the latter. The two-culture problematic is symptomatic of this (Picht: 135-140; Matson: 56-66; Habermas, 1968b:48-119). If there is such a profound differentiation, how can a critical integration be effected? Must one choose between one or the other and use it as the norm of critique, as the Ordinary Language does in opting for commonsense usage, and the Formalist linguistics does in attempting an improved language ideally unifying science? (Radnitzky: 1.22-54).

The problem runs deep, for the particularity of commonsense worlds of discourse is grounded in the concreteness of historical contexts, whereas theoretical worlds of discourse tend towards the abstract and universal (Gusdorf, 1969b: 433-460; Lonergan, 1972:175-196). Is metascience bound to remain within the world of theory? Are the only metascientific norms for understanding history to be gleaned from an objectivistic systematic effort at historical explanation? (Radnitzky: 1.170-187).

If this is so, Structuralists like M. Foucault would be correct in announcing the "death of man," the advent of a posthistoric era (367-373, 386-387; Mumford, 1972:120-136). The transformations of the world of common sense through technology appears to reenforce the notion that "technique" can succeed in absorbing the world of historical
praxis and common sense into odorless, air-conditioned worlds of rarified theory and science. Lewis Mumford has already charted this tendency to sublimate persons, societies, and histories into the regimentation of megamachine structural functionalisms (1968, 1970).

2. The Critical Exigence and Continental Schools

After an extensive study of conscious performance in both the world of common sense and that of theory, Lonergan concluded that there could be no sublation of one into the other (Lonergan, 1957a:289-299, esp. 293-299; 1972:83-85). They are as different as Eddington's two tables (1958:273-292). The differentiation caused by the systematic exigence leads to what Lonergan calls the critical exigence (1972:82-83). Indeed, since Kant awoke from his dogmatic slumber there has been a massive effort to do justice to this exigence: to seek a proper interrelation between the worlds of common sense and theory in terms of interiority (93-96). Against the trend of LE, the HD schools of metascience have insisted that the critical exigence cannot be subsumed into the systematic. In one way or another the HD schools have called attention to how the critical exigence demands attending to a subjectivity which transcends total mediation by the worlds of common sense or theory. The concrete historical praxis of subjects spans both worlds. Lonergan sees the critical exigence as opening up the world of interiority—the subject-as-subject grounding all interaction of subjects to subjects. This world of interiority, as a unity of identity and nonidentity with the worlds of common sense and theory, provides the norms for a proper mediation of theory and praxis, and keeps metascience from an infinite regression into meta, meta, etc. theoretical systems (Peukert, 1969; Lonergan, 1957a:xxiv-xxvi).

As Lonergan stated in 1957 during a lecture on the insufficiency of purely systematic objectifications:
The subject-as-subject is reality in the sense that we live and die, love and hate, rejoice and suffer, desire and fear, wonder and dread, inquire and doubt. It is Descartes' "cogito" transposed to concrete living. It is the subject present to himself, not as presented to himself in any theory or affirmation of consciousness, but as the prior (non-absence) prerequisite to any presentation, as a priori condition to any stream of consciousness (including dreams). The argument is: the prior reality is not object-as-object nor subject-as-object; there only remains the subject-as-subject; and this subject-as-subject is both reality and discoverable through consciousness. The argument does not prove that in the subject-as-subject we shall find the evidence, norms, invariants, principles for a critique of horizons; it proves that unless we find it there, we shall not find it at all. (1957b:28)

It is the social reality of this prior presence the HD intends when it points out how all science originates in a Lebenswelt (W. Marx; Brand: 3-34). It was this priority that Marx affirmed in saying that social life (Leben) determines theoretic consciousness (Bewusstsein) and not vice versa. It was this prior self-presence that led Dilthey to differentiate the methods of the natural sciences from those of the cultural sciences in order to overcome the pathos of the Enlightenment (Lamb, 1977).

Lonergan's Insight and his subsequent work attempts to articulate how the critical exigence does in fact enable us to uncover the evidence and invariant norms within the subject-as-subject. He sees the critical exigence as defined by three fundamental questions, which I shall here cast in a metascientific fashion. The first is a cognitive theory-praxis question: what do the sciences do when they know? Then there is the epistemological question: why is doing that knowing? And finally the metaphysical or ontological question: what does science know when it does it? For Lonergan the second and third questions can only adequately be answered when the first is. It is only in the light of the first question that one can critically
integrate history and science, common sense and theory, the natural and cultural sciences, without derogating from the very different epistemological and ontological procedures and objects they are concerned with (Lonergan, 1972: 20-25, 83, 261, 287, 316; Tracy, 1970:227-229). The HD schools of metascience have essayed critical responses to these questions. Indeed, from insufficient answers to the first there is a progressive concentration on the second and third until, in the work of contemporaries like K.-O. Apel and J. Habermas, there is a renewed interest in the first.

The failure of German Idealism to construct a conceptually coherent and historically verifiable total system demonstrated the philosophical impotency of the systematic exigence to answer the critical questions. Against the totalitarianism of Concept over Life both Dilthey and Marx protested, and in them we have the origins of the HD trends in metascience (Krüger; Lorenzen): in Dilthey the origins of the hermeneutical interests of metascience; and in Marx the concern for dialectics. A brief survey of these hermeneutical and dialectical origins of HD will show how they fall within the critical exigence of Lonergan and illustrate how from insufficient answers to the cognitional theory-praxis question there had been a progressive concentration on the epistemological and then ontological questions.

Dilthey's differentiation of the Geisteswissenschaften from the Naturwissenschaften emerged from a critical concern for the cognitional theory-praxis question of what the sciences do when they know. The pathos of the Enlightenment, i.e., the increasing anarchy of convictions regarding norms for man's free constitution of history, led Dilthey to seek those norms within the experience of conscious interiority grounding the cultural sciences. For the latter had emerged from the social life praxis of man (Dilthey; W. Marx; Brand). Nevertheless, the hermeneutics
of Dilthey tended to immunize this experience of the subject-as-subject within the realm of the cultural sciences; it neither tried a critical integration with the natural sciences, nor resolved its own inner dichotomy between experience (Erlebnis) and concept (Begriff) (Lamb, 1972).

E. Husserl's phenomenology attempted to overcome this deficiency by stressing the intention of objects in consciousness. The critical exigence in phenomenology concentrated on the epistemological question of why what the sciences do is knowledge. In this Husserl was primarily dependent for paradigms to phenomenologically analyze upon the natural sciences and mathematics, with their logics. Yet his failure to clear up the ambiguities of the prior cognitional theory-praxis question led to an irreconcilable conflict between his analysis of intentional constitution and his reliance on intuition in determining the epistemological criteria of verification (Ryan). As a result, phenomenology was unable to adequately correlate the concrete Lebenswelt of common sense and the concept of world constitution derived from intentionality (Brand: 104-117). There emerged an increasingly conceptualist Wesensschau which bracketed through Epoché a truly critical grounding of the empirical sciences (W. Marx: 224-231; Adorno, 1956; Habermas, 1969).

The inadequacy of phenomenology's epistemology led M. Heidegger to turn from the epistemological to the ontological question with his fundamental ontology of Dasein. The early Heidegger projected an analysis of "the origins of science emergent in authentic existence" (Heidegger, 1963: 356-364; Tugendhat). The abandonment of this project along with fundamental ontology in the later Heidegger can be traced to his failure to work out the prior cognitional theory-praxis question (Lonergan, 1957a:xxviii-xxix; 1957b: 14-17; Brand: 133-137; Apel, 1950). Instead Heidegger tried to immunize his profound insights into the being-structures
of existence by labeling the history of Western intelligence as a forgetfulness of being that reaches its apotheosis in the technicity of modern science (Heidegger, 1962; Richardson: 256-258, 284, 326, 396-399). Unable to distinguish between how the sciences actually perform and the positivist or empiricist accounts of what they do and know, Heidegger and Gadamer left method in its Cartesian caricature. Thereby their philosophical hermeneutics has proven itself incapable of providing a metascientific critique of horizons since, as Gadamer admits, hermeneutics "does not of itself mediate a criterion for truth" (1971:300; 1967:46-58; also Habermas, 1971:76-92; Tugendhat: 360, 376, 399; Bormann).

A similar pattern can be found in the development of dialectics in Marxism. The failure to articulate a proper cognitional theory-praxis in Dilthey led to an epistemology in phenomenology which could not critically ground the sciences, to an ontology in philosophical hermeneutics which could only isolate itself from the dominance of science and technology. There is an opposite trend in Marxism. The dialectical position of K. Marx was clearly within the critical exigence as a shift from common sense and theory to consciousness. Only this shift was not a preoccupation with cognitional theoretical questions, but an effort to overcome the opposition between Idealism and Materialism in the self-conscious action of the proletariat (A. Schmidt, 1969, 1962; Fetscher: 127-132). A dialectical, nonidealistic, "turn to the subject" can be seen in Marx's critique of Feuerbach for not understanding objective reality as also constituted by the praxis of human subjective action (K. Marx, 1845). Marx saw that having "one basis for life and another for science is apriori a falsehood," since both are grounded in the transformation of nature through the historical life action of man (K. Marx, 1972). A. Schmidt has documented this cognitional theory-praxis in Marx. He was aware of the need to stress
the unity of identity and nonidentity—"thought and being are indeed distinct, but they also form a unity"—yet this did not lead Marx to a dualism of methods for knowledge of nature and of history; all science is historical activity (A. Schmidt, 1962:38-41; K. Marx, 1845). Had Marx explained this unity in cognitional theory-praxis terms, had he shown how a nomological approach to history could avoid neglecting the anthropological and praxiological approaches, he would not be so susceptible to the criticisms of encouraging an abstract reification of history (Fleischer: 13-43; Böhler).

Both Engels and Lenin turned from Marx's original insights to a more epistemological orientation that was not so concerned with what scientific knowing does as with why it is a knowing. Engels' "dialectic of nature" transformed Marx's subject-oriented history into an objective process of nature. A theory of evolution replaced the unity of historical praxis by a unity of nature: "The dialectic is...the science of the general laws of motion and evolution of nature, of human society and of thought" (1954:172; A. Schmidt, 1962:41-50). The epistemology of Engels and Lenin is concerned with how the sciences "mirror" or "reflect" the objective dialectic of nature. Lenin's Erkenntnis-theorie does not advance the dialectical critique of Marx but seeks rather to force it into an empiricist epistemology of the natural sciences (Dietzgen; Lenin; Wetter: 53-57). The naive realism that resulted undermined the unity-in-difference between nature and history in the field of praxis, replacing it with an objectivistic unity in material process (Fetscher: 132; A. Schmidt, 1962, 1969).

This involution of Marx was completed in the writings associated with J. Stalin, whose almost total identification of dialectics with evolutionary processes in nature sought to satisfy the critical exigence by turning to materialist metaphysics (however crypto) of nature. "The so-called subjective dialect of our thinking is a reflection
of the objective dialectic of the development of the phenomena of the material world" (Stalin: 132). There is an analogous insight in Engels and Popper regarding the impossibility for belief in scientific progress. But where this led Popper to opt for an "open society" of competing beliefs, it led Stalin to solidify the Leninist doctrine of absolute party fidelity. As I. Fetscher saw, the analogue with Comtean positivism is obvious, leading to an "ontological objectivism of history" wherein the party has a premium on knowing what it is that we know when we scientifically study the "laws" of history (87; Böhler on Marx's responsibility; also Metz, 1973b).

It is not surprising, therefore, that the contemporary HD schools of metascience are involved once again in a return to the cognitional theory-praxis question. The writings of Karl-Otto Apel and Jürgen Habermas reveal a dissatisfaction with the insufficiently critical positions in previous hermeneutical and dialectical thought. If the systematic exigence led to a differentiation of theory from common sense, then the critical exigence is concerned with uncovering a realm of meaning and norms for action underlying them both. Where the LE schools of metascience seek an ordering and grounding of the sciences within the context of the systematic exigence, the HD trends are more aware of the inherent limitations of such a context and seek to base their metascience within the critical exigence. The HD seems more aware of the crisis sketched in the Introduction to this study. Lonergan himself does not see a resolution of the crisis in terms of a cognitional theory as theory; he claims that the problems raised by the systematic exigence cannot be answered within theory or system (1972:83-96). Nor does he subscribe to the hermeneutical or dialectical attempts outlined above insofar as they proceed from an insufficient grasp of critical consciousness. The increasingly recognized insufficiency of phenomenological epistemology and Heideggerian ontology in
hermeneutics, and of a naive materialist epistemology and naturalist ontology in dialectics, has reopened the question of a prior methodological appropriation of cognitonal theory-praxis.

3. The Methodical Exigence: Complementarity between LE and HD?

It is precisely here that for Lonergan the critical exigence becomes the methodical exigence. If the critical exigence uncovers worlds of interiority (Dilthey) and historical responsibility (Marx) as distinct from the spontaneous world of common sense and the reflective world of theory, this distinction is not a separation. Insofar as the critical exigence accentuates the cognitional theory-praxis problem it becomes the methodical exigence, where the subject-as-subject becomes aware of its own experiencing, understanding, judging, deciding and acting as the proper methodical ground of all human and historical activity or praxis. The study of Frederick Lawrence indicates the relevance of Lonergan's notion of method to the present debate in the HD schools of metascience between hermeneutics and the critique of ideology. Here I should like to indicate how Lonergan's methodical exigence offers a context for sublating any onesided isolation of the LE and HD schools from one another. There are two areas where this is especially relevant: the relation of conscious intentionality to language, and the relation of the systematic to the nonsystematic.

Both Habermas and Apel have called attention to the possible convergence of LE and HD in their fundamental concern for language as the methodological framework for answering the gnoseological question (Habermas, 1970c:184-285; Apel, 1973:1.9-76). They recognize, however, how both trends or schools have approached language from different perspectives. By and large the LE schools have seen in language an object-ive and public phenomenon capable of
explanatory analysis, the methods of which are identical with those of positive and empiricist science. This can be documented in the Formalist, Structuralist, and in aspects of Chomsky's Linguistics and the Ordinary Language trends (Apel, 1973:1.138-166, 339-376; 2.264-310). On the other hand, the HD schools tended to see in language the manifestation of the subject's Being-in-World, the ontological structures of which could only be thematized by a phenomenological and hermeneutical reflection distinct from the objectivistic methods of empirical science (Apel, 1973:1.22-52). Common to both these approaches is a transformation of the cognitional theory-praxis question from the context of conscious intentionality (the Erkenntnistheorien als Bewusstseinsphilosophie) to the context of language. At first glance it would seem that Lonergan's methodical exigence, with its movement to the operations of the subject-as-subject, has been bypassed by the contemporary methodological efforts of metascience. Does Lonergan's methodical exigence fall under the linguistic critique of a "methodological solipsism" based on an appeal to "private mental acts"? (Apel, 1973:2.311-313). Three essential elements of Lonergan's metamethod show how it not only avoids such methodological solipsism but can positively contribute to the present discussion.

First of all, the entire thrust of Lonergan's method is aimed at overcoming once and for all the empiricist and idealist misunderstandings of the subject as locked within the confines of private mental acts. He provides a very telling critique of the dichotomy between subject and object found in Cartesianism, Lockean empiricism, Kantianism, and Husserlian phenomenology (Lamb, 1977:56-93, 357-452). As the term of meaning is being, so the core of the act of meaning is the intention of being so that the unrestricted desire to know of the subject-as-subject in its intention of being provides a unity of identity and nonidentity between linguisticality and meaning (Lonergan, 1957a:357-359).
There is an identity insofar as there is "a solidarity, almost a fusion," between "the development of knowledge and the development of language" (1957a:554-555). There is a nonidentity insofar as no categorical language-games or linguistic systems can exhaust the transcendental reflection of the subject-as-subject in its intention of being. This unity of identity and nonidentity might be referred to as the isomorphism between meaning and linguisticality (553, 357-359). Inasmuch as Lonergan has been able to articulate the methodical norms implicated in the relation of being to meaning he does provide a context for integrating the hermeneutical concerns of Heidegger and Gadamer regarding the being-structures of language with the methodological concerns of Apel's transformation of Kantianism and Pragmaticism in order, on the basis of the later-Wittgenstein's language-games, to show how all language implies an acceptance of the transcendental language-game in its competence to arrive at a consensus commensurate with the ideal of an unlimited community of communication (Apel, 1973:1.9-76; 2.311-329). Indeed, Lonergan can be more explicit in his methodical normativity than Apel since the publicity-criteria in his notion of the virtually unconditioned (i.e., Are the conditions fulfilled to which all further relevant questions on the matter must refer?) allows Lonergan to give a very detailed analysis of the truth intention in all forms of knowledge (Lonergan, 1957a: 279-316).

Secondly, Lonergan's metamethod would provide a more adequate context within which to formulate the reflectivity of language (i.e., an understanding of language that does not fall under a Cartesian dichotomy between subject and object) than the Idealist traditions both Habermas and Apel use (Habermas, 1968a:234-261; Apel, 1973:2.220-263). Similar to Lonergan, the latter are critical of Kant's split between the noumenal thing-in-itself and phenomenal appearance; likewise they agree that critical method must overcome
the split between theoretical reason and practical reason, and their elaboration of the linguistic competence to achieve an undistorted consensus provides a sociolinguistic articulation of Lonergan's unrestricted desire to know. (Lonergan, 1957a:174-175, 286-293, 300-304, 397, 398, 448-449, 558, 622-623, 713-718; Sala; Habermas, 1968a:14-59; Apel, 1973:2.157-177; also Habermas, 1967; Apel, 1973:2.356-357, 358-435). Despite this, however, Habermas has to refer to Fichte's notion of the pure interests of reason and Apel to Kant's notion of regulative ideas in order to assure freedom without relativism in their emphasis on the competence for consensus (Habermas, 1968a:252-262; Apel, 1973:1.74-76, 2.223-225, 327). How can they do this, however, without succumbing to the rift between empirical reality and transcendental ideality inherent in Fichtean egology and Kantian regulative versus constitutive ideas? The entire intention of Habermas's notion of communicative competence and Apel's transcendental hermeneutic of language depends upon whether they can adequately mediate empirical facticity and critical normativity. It is important, therefore, that the competence for communication and consensus not be merely regulative; it must be in some way constitutive if its presence or absence is to critically determine to what extent undistorted communication has occurred. Such a constitutive freedom as normative can be found in Lonergan's notion of the subject-as-subject, where the unrestricted desire for meaning and value is articulated into the transcendental imperatives, "Be attentive, Be intelligent, Be rational, Be responsible," which the subject need not follow (in which case their absence constitutes an increase of bias or surd situation). Facticity and normativity are co-constituted inasmuch as the observance or nonobservance of the transcendental precepts are facts with normative connotations (Lonergan, 1972:20-25).
Nor can Lonergan's unity of identity and nonidentity between meaning and language be faulted with inattention to the linguistic turn. The objectivist linguistic analysis of the Formalists in LE has to a great extent run the dead-end course the early Wittgenstein himself saw as imminent: analogous to Gödel's insight in mathematics, the *Tractatus*'s paradox indicated how any system-analytic of language could only lead to an infinite regress of meta-, meta-, meta-, etc. languages (Apel, 1973:1.229-250; Peukert, 1969; Lonergan, 1957a:xxiv-xxvi). Even the shift in the later Wittgenstein to language usage and the trends of Ordinary Language and Chomskyan linguistics cannot substantiate a total identification of meaning and language. Habermas has pointed out the subjective aspects in Chomsky, Fodor, and Katz; and Apel has reinterpreted Wittgenstein's prohibition against "private languages" in order to refer to the transcendental language-game of anticipated ideal consensus where an individual can introduce new rules de facto unverifiable by established language-games and not to categorical language-games. If these recognitions are not going to fall into a Kantian apriori content or ideal form but truly respect the constitutive intention of truth, then the transcendental language-game has to be acknowledged as not a set of objectified rules but the intentional orientation of the subject-as-subject towards meaning and value (Habermas, 1970c:249-251; Apel, 1973:2.346-357) /2/.

Thirdly, not only does Lonergan's notion of originating meaning find parallels in Habermas and Apel /3/, but the isomorphism between language and meaning allows a semiotic transformation of the operations of the subject-as-subject far more exact than Pierce's similar transformation of Kant (Apel, 1973:2.157-177). Applying the notion of functional specialization, one can come up with a methodological framework for integrating much of the present work in metascience. The semiotic correlations would be:
The syntactic level involves empirically formalized relations between symbols or signs. Grammatically, syntax is concerned with relations between conventional parts of speech. Logically, syntax handles the laws of formation and transformation pertaining to analytic propositions; hence, not only a good deal of classical logic, but also those logics of LE concerned with reducing or relating all logical relations to protocol sentences expressing empirical observation, operate on this level (Lonergan, 1957a: 304-315; 1957c:10) /4/. In metascience the LE Formalist ideal of a unified science and the Structuralist program are primarily operative on the syntactic level of meaning. Semantics deals with the meanings of symbols and signs capable of formalization beyond the limits of syntactical relations. Grammatically, there is the shift from syntax to philology and lexicography. Logically, there are the formal terms of meaning and provisional analytic principles where one, e.g., moves beyond a Bloomfieldian emphasis upon syntactical relations to the semantic logical relations evidenced in some of Chomsky's work (Klaus: 561-564; Lyons; Lonergan, 1957a:304-309) /5/. Metascience has evinced this semantic shift in Dilthey's grounding of the cultural sciences, in much of Husserl's phenomenology relative to mathematics and natural science, as well as in the trends of General Systems Theory (von Bertalanffy: 30-86; Brand: 65-103; Stegmüller: 1-71). Sigmatics, usually included within semantics, deals with what is meant, signified or symbolized. This corresponds to Lonergan's full terms of meaning and analytic principles, as well as to statistical methods (Lonergan, 1957a:304-309, 357-359; Klaus: 565). Thus one moves from possible meaning to the conditions for actual meaning. Grammatically, there is the move from
lexicography to encyclopedic methods. Logically, the discussions of the truth value problematic indicate a sigmatic function, especially as this is handled in Heelan's logic of framework transpositions, with its metacontextual approach to language 6/. Metascientifically, there are the positive gains of the early Heidegger's ontology, the process position of Whitehead, as well as the critical metaphysics of Lonergan's own transformation of ontology (Apel, 1973:1.22-34, 276-334; Lonergan, 1957a:385-430).

Finally, pragmatics involves the relations of symbols and signs to their users. Grammatically, one has the generative grammatics of Chomsky. Logically, there are the efforts at performative logic as well as most of the logical articulation of usage in Ordinary Language. In metascience, there are the praxiologists, and most especially the work of such men as Habermas and Apel, as well as the ethical extension of Lonergan's own method (Radnitzky: 1.48-51, 2.78-100; Apel, 1973:2.357-436, 264-310; Evans; Lonergan, 1972:74-75).

If Lonergan's methodical unity of identity and non-identity between meaning and language provides the possibility of working out a semiotic complementarity between LE and HD, it should not be concluded that the particular and the concrete dimensions of historical living are minimized in the methodical exigence. Even in the physical sciences Lonergan has shown how the classical methods, anticipating systematic explanatory knowledge, can never sublate the statistical methods which set up probability variables from which events can vary only in a random or nonsystematic fashion. The complementarity Lonergan elaborated between classical and statistical methods in emergent probability not only made possible his development of genetic method, but also dialectic methods (Lamb, 1972: 153-160). The methodical exigence is not an Hegelian absorption of the world of everyday commonsense living into the world of theory. The nonsystematic simultaneously
grounds the possibility of development and decline, of success and failure. There are no hidden, ironclad laws of history which, once known by science and applied technically, would guarantee a systematic-automatic functioning of progress (Habermas, 1973b:389-398; Marquard, 1973a, 1973b). By showing how the methodical exigence sublates the critical and systematic exigences through an appropriation of the structures of freedom as experiencing-understanding-judging-deciding, Lonergan has unmasked the objectivistic pretensions of modern man's autonomous identity based on success (hi)story. Those pretensions impaled modern man on the horns of a dilemma. On the one hand, he could appropriate the conceptualist heroicism of modern science and technology, only to discover that his much vaunted autonomy would be pronounced illusory by the empiricist, positivist, behaviorist, materialist, mechanist reductionisms of "successful" science. Autonomy was really an objectivist heteronomy as the res cogitans was no more than a projection of the res extensa of stimulus-response mechanisms, of forces and relations of production, of supply and demand interactions, of unconscious libidinal impulses conflicting with superego constructs, of role differentiations supporting structural functionalisms, etc. The nonsystematic was only a provisional ignorance to be replaced by the discovery of exact scientific laws; the nonidentity of suffering, guilt, and death was to be exorcised by the demands of business, the advance of medical science, the techniques of psychoanalysis, the challenges of class warfare, the distractions of unlimited consumerism and omnipresent amusement. Man was to become a mechanical mannequin! On the other hand, modern man, shocked into a recognition of nonidentity through the horrors of world wars and the soulless boredom of megamechanistic society, could assert the ultimate meaninglessness of mechanomorphic meaning, could isolate his fragile subjectivity within the cocoon of a cosmic cynicism whereby any intelligibility or
meaning in the universe is declared random chance. Success is but a temporary postponement of failure; as a being-towards-death man's identity is a flicker in the face of ultimate nonidentity, absurdity, nothingness. Autonomy is a chance occurrence of converging heteronomies; man is free but he cannot possibly know the origins and destiny of his autonomy for there are none. His burden is too heavy to carry yet too light to take seriously. The dilemma of either identifying autonomy with systematic process (and so negating it in proportion to the success of system) or of identifying it with nonsystematic chance (and so denying it any inherent value or orientation) is unavoidable as long as the systematic and nonsystematic, identity and nonidentity, law and chance are objectivistically juxtaposed.

Lonergan's methodical exigence sublates that dilemma by uncovering the related and recurrent operations of the subject-as-subject. These operations constitute the open structures of freedom; they ground both the worlds of science and of day-to-day living. Yet just as the methodical exigence is able to meet the critical exigence by going beyond the worlds of common sense and of theory to interiority, so in its turn does the methodical exigence raise questions which call forth another exigence. Do the transcendental precepts (be attentive, intelligent, reasonable, responsible) truly reflect the inner dynamics of the universe despite the massive insensitivity, stupidity, irrationality, and irresponsibility in human history? Are there indications in the conscious operations of the subject-as-subject (experiencing, understanding, judging, deciding, acting) of horizons beyond a secular being-in-the-world? Is the subject-to-subject communication of the human race within this historical and cosmic universe capable of resolving the problems posed by the nonidentity of suffering, guilt, death?
These questions are not extrinsic to metascience. J. Habermas has called attention to the fact that there are no psychological, sociological, or philosophical theories that can explain away the realities of suffering, guilt, and death (Habermas, 1973a:164-166). If metascience is not to degenerate into metascientism, then the questions cannot be ignored or repressed.

4. The Transcendental Exigence and God-Question

Initially, transcendence is the common experience of raising further questions. As the questions for understanding arise out of the data of empirical consciousness and go beyond (transcend) them by asking their meaning; as questions for reflection arise out of hypothetical formulations of meaning and go beyond (transcend) them by asking if they are true or false; as deliberation arises out of knowledge and goes beyond it (transcends) by responsible decisions and action; so one can question the questioning drive of human knowing and doing itself without retreating to obscurantism: no relevant questions can be dogmatically or arbitrarily brushed aside. Will the day ever dawn in human history when all questions will be answered? It is this questioning drive that both moves the individual from experiencing through understanding and judging to deciding and acting, and that underpins the transitions from the systematic to the critical to the methodical exigence (Lonergan, 1972:6-25, 81-85).

Transcendence is not absolute knowledge, transcendental ego or apriori innate forms. It is struggle and search; it is as concrete as the vast efforts of human beings on this planet to slowly and painfully discover, to resolutely overcome the setbacks endured throughout history. Cognitive self-transcendence has given rise to the vast sweep of mankind's intellectual achievements: his art, technologies, literatures, sciences, philosophies. Moral self-
transcendence as a quest for value is as concrete and real as mankind's achievements of personal, social and political values expanding effective freedom. The absence of such transcendence is etched in the scars and blood of repressed, alienated, maimed, broken and destroyed human lives (Lonergan, 1972:27-55; Lamb, 1977:480-485).

But are these the only forms of transcendence? If so, it is understandable why modern man based his autonomous identity upon success (hi)stories. Cognitive self-transcendence would indicate a virtually endless progression of technological and scientific advances, each successive one going beyond some of the limitations of the previous ones. Moral self-transcendence would suggest a progression in moral sensitivity, at least in the general sense of more humane and just social, economic, and political orders. Indeed, it is precisely the restriction of transcendence to these cognitive and moral dimensions which has characterized secular thought and society since the Enlightenment. Science and technology provided the model for this exhilarating experience of "transcendence without a Transcendent" (E. Bloch) in their promise of an exponential growth-without-end-of knowledge, material progress, economic benefits, etc. The extrsive thrust of his transcending quest would continually fashion new heavens and new earths. Unbounded visible progress became the foundations of modernity (Richter: 7-31, 72-127).

Now those foundations are beginning to crumble. As Lonergan states it, man's capacity for continuous development is limited genetically and dialectically (Lonergan, 1957a:634-730). Genetically, nature is unable to sustain unlimited material progress. Whatever corrections and qualifications must be made to the M.I.T. and Club of Rome reports in The Limits to Growth, no one can deny that its critique of exponential growth as based upon the false presupposition of endless resources marks the end of an epoch (Heilbroner, 1974; Meadows, 1972; Habermas, 1973a; Richter;
Oelmüller, 1972b; Barnet and Müller). Nor could human history find adequate meaning and value in continuous genetic development. That would mean that the significance and value of any given generation of men would consist in contributing materials for succeeding generations to surpass: human meaning and value would be condemned to continually die in the waiting room of the future. Yet these false genetic presuppositions of progress have led to the dialectical opposite of progress. Having equated cognitive transcendence with extrorsive quantification and mechanization, technology has been both trivialized and fanaticized in the competition for "progressive success." While millions are condemned to subhuman life and death, the successful industrialized nations scavenge the earth for the resources to fuel their production of the endless trivia of luxury and the expansion of their ever more lethal weaponry. Lest men question the value of their total dedication to megamechanistic productivity, "work ethics" from Calvin to Marx and Hitler assured them that the moral asceticism of labor offered transcendent rewards of increased freedom and material prosperity (Weber: 227-356, 642-678, 753-817; Neuss: 178-234).

Today as never before we must ask with W. Benjamin: "Is it progress when cannibals use knives and forks?" Were not Horkheimer and Adorno perhaps correct in their analysis of the horrors of the Third Reich as only symptomatic of what is intrinsic to the perversion of cognitive and moral transcendence in modernity? Could it be that the Nazi extermination camps with their portals proudly proclaiming Arbeit macht frei cynically symbolize the fate of modernity's much vaunted autonomy? How long can the human holocaust in the Promethean fires of exponential productivity last? Is there not a danger that the multinational corporations of today, with their profit charts and power curves, are becoming clean efficient cults of a megamachine Idol?
Clearly, if mankind's cognitive and moral transcendence is to overcome the bias and scotosis of its mechanomorphic perversions, then empirical human science is going to have the difficult task of becoming truly critical; and moral reflection must recognize the disastrous consequences of accepting man alone as the ultimate moral norm in the universe. Man's self-encapsulated autonomy seesaws between a fanatical absolutizing of relative meanings and values and a trivializing cynicism or indifference towards any ultimate meaning and value. In either case man ends up destroying his own effective freedom, his own ability to extend the sphere of attentiveness, intelligence, rationality, and responsibility. Hence it is that Lonergan sees the methodical exigence as leading to the transcendent exigence if one is to seriously appropriate "the eros of the human spirit" (1972:12-13; 1957a:657-777). For it is only by attending to one's experience of the transcendent exigence that the unrestricted character of human quest(ion)-ing can attain an intimation of its limitless sweep without in any way jeopardizing the finitude of human being-in-the-world.

This lack of limitation, though it corresponds to the unrestricted character of human questioning, does not pertain to this world. (1957a:671)

Lonergan indicates how in questions for intelligence, in questions for reflection, and in questions for deliberation, the question of God is implicit: if mankind is the only instance of conscious attentiveness, intelligence, rationality, and responsibility then its quest for meaning and value cannot reach beyond the possible historical attainments of meaning and value; if that is the case, then all meaning and value (so circumscribed) is ultimately negated by the finitude and nonidentity of historical suffering, guilt, death. Developing human autonomy as ever more capable of attention, insight, reasonableness, responsibility and love shatters on the massive heteronomy of "the butcher's block of history"
(Hegel). Yet our very ability to recognize and painfully experience heteronomy as heteronomous, absurdity as absurd, intimates that the autonomous subject-as-subject in its individual and collective quest(ions) for meaning and value goes beyond all particular historical instances of meaning and value in its very experience of those limited instances. Otherwise we would be unable to experience the latter as limited; because we do so experience them, a questioning of our quest(ions) for meaning and value includes an orientation to (a quest-ioning of) unlimited meaning and value.

Such is the question of God. It is not a matter of image or feeling, of concept or judgment. They pertain to answers. It is a question. It rises out of our conscious intentionality, out of the a priori structured drive that promotes us from experiencing to the effort to understand, from understanding to the effort to judge truly, from judging to the effort to choose rightly. In the measure that we advert to our own questioning and proceed to question it, there arises the question of God. (1972:103)

There are several aspects of this transcendental exigence which should be discussed in relation to metascience. First, the God-question of the transcendental exigence recognizes the validity of religious experience, but it does not thereby legitimate all religious expressions. Insofar as historical religions have tended to oppose the unfolding of human attention, intelligence, reasonableness, and responsibility they have been guilty of alienating religious expressions from an authentic experience of the God-question. God is not experienced in history as an answer, for the God-Answer would sublate all history. Rather He is experienced as Question and Mystery, as the assurance that the ultimate quest(ions) of meaning and value are real questions and so answerable only in going beyond the limitations of any finite achievement. Thus the critique of religion in, e.g. Freud and Marx would be correct only insofar as a given religion failed to express the unity of immanence and transcendence in the God-question. But such
a critique undermines its own intentionality if it dis-
misses the God-question, for then it would be opposing the
meaning and value of a further unfolding of human atten-
tiveness, intelligence, rationality, and responsibility
(Ricoeur, 1969b; Böhler). The transcendental exigence
guarantees human autonomy (the subject-as-subject) that no
matter how overwhelming the heteronomies and nonidentities
of existence are, they do not finally extinguish the au-
tonomy and identity of meaning and value. The God-question
does not therefore abolish heteronomy or nonidentity, but
preserves the unity of identity and nonidentity that allows
man to experience his gifted finitude, and so removes the
illusory defense-mechanisms of modern man's encapsulated
autonomy based on success (hi)stories.

Second, the transcendental exigence allows human au-
tonomy to be and become because it does not interfere with
the unfolding of the previous exigences. The God-question
is not introduced in the systematic exigence, as it was by
the Rationalists such as Spinoza, with his *scientia intuitiva*
of infinite substance as *natura naturans*; or Leibniz, with
his geometric apriori proofs; or Hegel, with his *Begriff
des Begriffes* as absolute knowledge/7/. Such an approach to
the God-question tends to liquidate the validity of all
presystematic experience, religious or otherwise, and abso-
lutize finite systems—all too evident consequences in the
post-Enlightenment modern period. Nor is God introduced
into the critical exigence in order to have a divine *intui-
tus originarius* mediate phenomenon and noumenon in history,
as with Kant; or, with Schelling, to account for a self-
grounding of intellectual intuition (Weischedel: 191-213,
this would imply an uncritical God-of-the-gaps (Kant:
"Knowledge must give way to faith.") ill-suited to the
critical issues of human and religious knowledge. Nor is
the God-question handled in the methodical exigence's con-
cern with the subject as it is in Schleiermacher's dialectic
and in existentialist and personalist philosophies (F. Wagner, 1974:156-172; Metz, 1967-1968). For then there is a tendency to short-circuit the properly methodical reflection on the subject's own autonomous development. Lonergan, on the other hand, investigates the autonomous operations of the systematic, critical, and methodical exigences, and only in the context of their critical appropriation does the God-question become a real question.

Finally, the transcendental exigence unmasks the element of abstract totalization of emancipation in the metascience of J. Habermas and K.-O. Apel. Metz has rather pointedly called attention to the "dialectic of emancipation" that can cleverly reproduce the dangers of the dialectic of Enlightenment by failing to be aware of the defense-mechanisms operative in the success (hi)stories of the history of emancipation (1973b). Both Habermas and Apel have contributed much to the methodical elaboration of a critical complementarity between contemporary schools of metascience. They have done so on the basis of an articulation of a critical theory-praxis mediation. Nevertheless, their rather broken relation to the possibility of theology could jeopardize their entire project (Theunissen, 1969; Oelmüller, 1972a). On the one hand, their articulation of the competence for consensus within an ideally unlimited community of investigators (as constitutive of a properly critical scientific enterprise) correctly preserves the unity of identity and nonidentity within rational discourse. On the other hand, however, Habermas concedes the secularist restrictions of communicative interaction by excluding the possibility of attaining a consensus on the meaning and value of the ultimate nonidentities of human life, namely, suffering, guilt, death--"with these we must on principle live on without hope" (Habermas, 1973a:165). Such a restriction on the competence for consensus tends to be an arbitrary limitation of further relevant questions; if allowed to stand it can develop into the
defense-mechanisms analyzed by Metz. For if precisely those questions are not faced, there is a fatal susceptibility to a nihilistic cynicism which would see in any creative activity of man only "a neurotic activity that diverts the mind from the diminution of time and the approach of death" (Heilbroner, 1974:140). Metascience can dismiss the possibility of theology only at the risk of truncating its own commitment to attentive, intelligent, rational, and responsible science. The positivist "truncated reason" against which Habermas has rightly argued is not unrelated to that deeper scotosis which refuses to acknowledge the answerability of nonidentity. As Lonergan remarked: "...the relentless modern drift to social engineering and totalitarian controls is the fruit of man's effort to make human science practical though he prescinds from God..." (1957a:745).

If the universe is not to be degraded to the status of energy reservoir and junkyard at the service of a cold and calculating megamachine whose exponential growth is the materialist perversion of transcendence; if men themselves with their achievements and histories are not to be degraded into means used by, and ponds used for, the "success" of scientistic technocracy, then the God-question must be critically dealt with in metascience. For it is only that theological question that is open to the meaning and value of a Cosmic Word to the universe and can gift human autonomy with a sacredness promoting the full unfolding of man's transcending quest for meaning and value.

A Typology of Theologies

Theology has historically and dialectically been engaged in relating fides and ratio, religion and culture, religious practice and social reality: "A theology mediates between a cultural matrix and the significance and role of religion in that matrix" (Lonergan, 1972:xi). This
mediation is specifically distinct from psychological, sociological, anthropological, or comparative studies of religion. The latter also contribute to mediate the significance and role of religion in and to a cultural matrix, but they avoid the further question as to whether or not what they mediate is true and calls for assent and commitment.

In distinction from other sciences of religion, theology has the foundation and goal of its reason (logos) in faith. It serves the responsible appropriation of faith and the consciousness of mission unfolding within faith. (Metz, 1964)

The truth-intention of faith is not only preached and practiced within the personal and social Lebenswelt, it must also be mediated to the scientific and scholarly Wissenswelt, especially at a time when the latter is so strongly influencing the former (Metz, 1964; 1971:10-23; Tracy, 1970:54-71, 184-205).

Within the context of the discussion of method and metascience not every theology is of equal value in functioning as mediator. Just as the exigences of meaning provided a critical framework for discriminating between a reflection on science capable of advancing human growth and those schools of metascience that would (however involuntarily) hinder that growth, so I now shall attempt to outline a typology of theologies capable of a discriminating illustration of how theologies mediate faith and culture. There are four general characteristics of such a typology.

First, the typology is dialectical. Insofar as the truth-intention of faith is taken seriously, there cannot be a total identification of faith with its cultural matrix. Historically religious faith has been professed and practiced in a vast diversity of cultures, and the theologies reflecting on such confession and practice have been equally diverse. However, this does not mean that faith and theology have been no more than expressions of this cultural
diversity. Indeed, confessional formulations, if expressive of the truth-intention of faith, exhibit a transcultural dynamism nonidentical with the cultural matrix (Lonergan, 1972:295-330; Rahner, 1970a:11-35). Just how this dialectic of identity and nonidentity between faith and culture has been formulated varies according to the type of theology. I shall argue that the type found in Metz's political theology is the one most methodically suited to a critical contemporary mediation.

Second, the typology is metacontextual. It is a methodological reflection upon theological contexts, seeking to articulate how the transcendental exigence (as experienced in faith) is a unity of identity and nonidentity within varying cultural contexts, so that theologies necessarily exhibit transcultural patterns in their effort to mediate the truth-intention of faith. As metacontextual such a typology presupposes that the emergence of historical consciousness and critical consciousness explicate not only the first-order pluralism and relativism within theology, but also the possibility of a second-order (or metacontextual) sublation of any total relativism, such as is found in positivism and historicism. The latter presuppose that any religious expression or theological system must be totally identified with its cultural matrix. In this view any truly scientific reflection can only come up with a series of disparate religious and theological contexts; any metacontextual intentionality operative within those contexts and transcending their particularity is denied. In this respect historicism and positivism ignore their own intentionality, for they posit total relativity as characteristic of all contexts, i.e., they intend a metacontextual attribute inasmuch as they speak of total relativity. Moreover, as our discussion of metascience has shown, if there is any one outstanding characteristic of contemporary reflection on science, it is a critical concern with articulating a metacontext for integrating the various trends of
metascience. Theology, therefore, is not abrogating its cultural mission if it attends to the metacontextual structures or typologies operative within its concern to mediate the truth-intention of faith.

Third, the typology is critically praxis-orientated. It tries to determine how faith and culture is actually mediated in theologies. Faith is functionally defined as a knowledge originating within a community experiencing religious self-transcendence; a knowledge then expressed in religious beliefs (Lonergan, 1972:115-124). Cultural matrix is functionally defined as those sets of basic assumptions and expectations which underly the commonsense, theoretical and practical activities of a particular society or culture. In this sense it is the cognitive infrastructure to the commonsense, scientific, technological, social, economic, and political suprastructures. Obviously a typology of the five basic trends within which theology can relate faith and culture will not issue in direct practical norms for pastoral activity. The praxis-orientation is rather methodological; it seeks to spell out some of the main elements needed for theology to creatively come to terms with the problems facing contemporary man. In doing this, the typology is not value-neutral; it will criticize the first four types in the light of the last type.

Finally, the typology is both diachronic and synchronic. If the typology is metacontextual it cannot be applicable to only a narrowly defined historical period. Indeed, I would maintain that the five types could be fruitfully applied throughout the history of Christian theology. Limitations of space and competence, however, lead me to restrict the study to modern and contemporary theologies. That they are metacontextual does not mean that they are ahistorical /8/. I must emphasize, nonetheless, the formal nature of this typology. I do not enter into a detailed analysis of the theologies but offer the
outlines of a methodical framework for understanding how they relate faith and culture. The five basic types are referred to as paleomorphic, neomorphic, fideomorphic, criticomorphic and politicomorphic respectively. Each will be discussed in succession.

1. Paleomorphic Theologies

Theologies are paleomorphic if their mediation of faith and culture is in terms of older (paleo) cultural forms (morphic). A theology which may have been very contemporary at one period of history, if carried over and preserved within a different cultural context, becomes paleomorphic. There is a marked tendency in these theologies to stress an identity between the theological articulation of faith and the characteristics of the older cultural matrix. A modern illustration of this can be seen in the scholastic theologies present in European Protestant fundamentalism and those that predominated in Roman Catholicism up to Vatican II.

Those scholastic theologies drew their conceptuality and method from the classical context of the sixteenth and seventeenth centuries, where the truth-intention of faith was identified with propositions revealed by God in Scripture and/or tradition. K. Barth remarks how the Bible was treated like a "corpus of law"; A. Dulles sees the Catholic theologians of the period taking a static and objectivist view of revelation as though it were a received commodity. And Lonergan has called attention to the origins of dogmatic theology in that period as an effort to shift theological method from the Medieval quaspetto to an emphasis on propositional certitude (Barth: 156; Dulles: 51-53; Lonergan, 1974a). This conceptualistic approach to the truth-intention of faith was, at that time, paralleled by an equally classical cultural matrix. Thus J. Habermas refers to the "superiority criteria" of traditional societies; K. Rahner sees them as definite and homogeneous cultures; while
Lonergan analyses them under the rubric of classical cultures (Habermas, 1971:94; Rahner, 1970b; Lonergan, 1967: 252-267; 1972:xi, 124, 301-302, 315, 326, 363). Cognitively, these cultural matrices exhibit static, stable, and hierarchical worldviews providing metaphysical and theological legitimizations of the institutions constituting the culture. Scientific knowledge is seen as true, certain knowledge of causal necessity, while the socio-political infrastructure has a centralized ruling power and a hierarchical ordering of socio-economic classes (Ritter: 9-33; Snell: 371-439; Lobkowicz: 3-58, 75-88; Voegelin, 1957a). These cognitive and socio-political aspects led to a universalizing of particular cultural and political systems, as is clear not only in the normative elitism of the "cultured" over against the "barbarians," but also in the way theologies provided divine sanctions for hierarchical centralization (Feil, 1969: esp. 113-117).

Obviously, such a classical cultural matrix does not correspond to the empirical and pluralist matrices of today.

Nevertheless, a study of the manuals of Catholic theology from 1900 to 1960 reveals the following characteristics. First, they are written in Latin and are intended primarily for use in seminaries. These seminaries are almost uniformly isolated from daily contact with the contemporary culture. In this they reflect the often parallel isolation of the so-called Catholic Ghetto, either from a surrounding Protestant or secular society, or, in those countries where Catholicism is the state-recognized religion, the isolation of those countries from the mainstream of modern secular nations (Wills: 38-78). Secondly, the manuals in their very format of theses with lists of adversaries, proofs and corollaries, are examples of deductive classical reason. Rigid conceptualism is obvious in their failure to adequately attend to the advances of historical criticism vis-a-vis the Scriptures and Church history. Their discussions of science are almost exclusively within
the conceptuality of Aristotelian science (Schoof: 14-55, 175-180; Tracy, 1970:55-56). A third characteristic of the manuals is their defensive and negative thrust. Even a cursory reading of the references to modernity in these manuals would indicate the hostile and negative evaluation of most things modern. It is not surprising, as Lonergan remarks, that when Rome wanted to condemn the heresy that sums up all heresies, they called it "modernism" /9/.

This manual theology, or as Karl Rahner calls it, *Schultheologie*, was indeed dominant in Roman Catholicism until Vatican II. And most of the post-Conciliar conflicts might be traced to the fact that the majority of bishops and administrators within the Church were formed by such paleomorphic theologies. Thus T. H. Sank's study of the doctrine of the magisterium taught at the Gregorian University between Vatican I and Vatican II indicates the profound influence this theology has had on American Catholicism inasmuch as the overwhelming majority of American bishops have studied their theology at the Gregorian University.

Needless to say, such paleomorphic theologies performed a very positive function insofar as they opposed the irrational tendencies of pluralist cultures. Yet they were often unable to distinguish the wheat from the cockle in those cultures to which they had the mission of bringing Christ's saving message. A summary of the differences between the classical and Aristotelian notion of science and the modern empirical notion of science will illustrate how conflict was inevitable. First of all, modern science has moved definitively away from the classical identification of the scientific ideal with certitude. That ideal had made any such notion as "scientific opinion" or "scientific probability" impossible. For it clearly separated science and opinion, *episteme* and *doxa* (Lonergan, 1967: 259-261; Diemer: 24-25). The quest for certitude was not only evident in the various *Notae* attached to each thesis
but also in the attitude of the Roman congregations bent upon preserving both the *depositum fidei* and their hierarchical privilege (Sank: 67-68). Secondly, classical theology was built on eternal, changeless verities. It considered redemption not so much as an historical process, but as an achieved fact. Modern science is operational, interested in development and process. It is hypothetical, seeking its verification in the empirical process itself. Where manual theologies drew a sharp distinction between theory (dogma) and practice (moral), modern science is increasingly aware of the interaction between theory and praxis. The separation of theory and praxis found its ontological ground in the distinction between being and time, which led to the distinction between wisdom and the theoretical life on the one hand, and the practical and political life on the other. The necessary and eternal cannot undergo change, hence the proper attitude is not empirical investigation or revolutionary practice, but contemplation. In classical theology this led both to the priority of the contemplative ways of life over the apostolic, and to the isolation of systematic and dogmatic theology from moral theology (Lobkowicz: 59-88). A consequence of this can be seen in the old political theology by which the Church was only too ready to legitimate unjust social orders as long as these latter did not interfere with her ecclesial (contemplative) functions of worship and teaching (Vogt; Feil).

Thirdly, classical science defined itself primarily in regard to "formal objects," whereas modern science is primarily field-orientated. Thus paleomorphic theologies tend to shun any interdisciplinary collaboration insofar as they see the formal object as exclusively theological. This has also had a detrimental effect on pastoral praxis insofar as it restricted worship and faith to an isolated relationship with God and failed to take into account the total social field of Catholic practice (Tracy, 1970:87-88; Greeley, 1967).
Fourthly, paleomorphic theologies tend to restrict themselves to an almost exclusive reliance on a classical or Aristotelian logic (or some decadent offspring thereof). As D. Tracy remarks:

Indeed, much of what passed for theology in post-medieval Roman Catholicism seems to have found in logic all the science it needed for its "theological" method: one had, it seems, one's certain "Catholic" principles, definitions, axioms and postulates (Scripture, councils, magisterial decrees, consent of the fathers, consensus of theologians, etc.); one next used logic to deduce equally certain conclusions from them; those conclusions were theology. (1970:88)

Nowhere did this centrality of logic at the expense of empirical or historical method become more embarrassing than in attempting to deal with the development of doctrine. Manuals have constructed very elaborate, logical explanations of formal and virtual revelation (Winifred Schulz: 99-223, esp. 171-212).

Finally, where modern science is necessarily a communal venture, classical theology was individualistic, almost privatized, based upon the Renaissance ideal of a uomo universale. Aristotle had conceived science as a dialetic virtue or habit through whose application an individual would find true fulfillment in the theoretic (contemplative) life. Hence the paleomorphic manuals, and the seminary educational system tried to impart a knowledge de universa sacra theologia to each of the students. This had a very damaging effect upon priests trained in a dogmatic tradition, ill-suited to the complexities and ambiguities of contemporary pastoral activity (Ritter; Voegelin, 1957b:293-314).

One can find this same paleomorphic identification of theological reflection with past cultural forms in the various Protestant fundamentalist theologies, e.g., American fundamentalism is as much a product of frontier life and values as Roman Catholic scholastic theologies are a
product of sixteenth and seventeenth century classical culture.

2. Neomorphic Theologies

Where paleomorphic theologies identify reason and culture with older forms, the neomorphic theologies identify reason and culture with their contemporary forms. Theological reflection is no longer bound to outmoded classical notions of science but rather almost totally identified with modern notions of science and reflection. Protestant forms of neomorphic theology can be found in the various liberal theologies of the nineteenth and early twentieth centuries where the truth-intention of faith was rigorously evaluated by the methods of historical criticism (Cooper; Kähler). The Catholic response to these theologies on the part of men like A. Loisy and other modernists was equally involved in accepting historical-critical methods as decisive in attaining the truth intention of faith. Where paleomorphic theology tended toward a sectarian or ghetto isolation from the contemporary world, these neomorphic theologies tended very much toward a compromised assimilation to modern secular views so that one could ask what the purpose of theology or of faith was. Why put a Christian label upon ideas and movements which could just as easily be attained or espoused without any faith commitment? (Bartley; Hitchcock; McBrien; Cox, 1973).

The characteristics of neomorphic theologies are a tendency to an almost uncritical identification with the Zeitgeist of the age; a reductionism which is increasingly embarrassed by any truth intention in faith insofar as the age is secularist; and a pathos for relevancy which seems unable to critically evaluate the dangers present in the particular age with its cultures and social institutions. Examples of these tendencies can be found not only in liberal Protestant or Catholic modernist theologies at the turn of the century, but also in American secular and civil
religions as well as in the many forms of secularization and God-is-dead theologies of the 1960s (Clebsch; Richard; Xhaufflaire and Derksen). An increasing number of studies on secularization theologies show how the characteristics of neomorphic theology mentioned above can be found in them. They are especially unable to distinguish positive and negative aspects of contemporary culture. Thus, at a time when American cities were about to erupt in ghetto and race riots, Harvey Cox was somewhat naively singing the praises of American city life in his bestselling *The Secular City*. At the same time, the Civil Rights and Peace Movements exposed the naiveté of American civil religions (Xhaufflaire, 1970; Dullaart; Cox, 1970; van den Oudenrijn, 1970; Berger and Neuhaus; Bianchi).

At present, perhaps, the most obvious form of a neo-morphic theology can be found in the movement known as "Critical Catholicism" (van Onna and Stankowski). Where liberal Protestant and Catholic modernist theologies tended to identify their methods with historical criticism, and where secularization theologies tended to identify their methods of reflection with liberal secular thought, Critical Catholicism identifies its critique of the former, and indeed of all theologies, with a Marxist critique of religion. Such an identification, however, reduces the function of theology to an eventual sublation or negation of any and all theologies. In a somewhat unconscious manner such a theology has in effect been too uncritical of its own identification with Marxist reflection and method. Thus Metz can write of such theological attempts that they lead to a "liquidation" of theology (1971:21; van den Oudenrijn, 1972).

The various neomorphic and paleomorphic theologies are variously identified with conflicting cultural matrices. As long as there is only an identity thought pattern present, there is no way for such theologies to develop precisely those critical methods of reflection commensurate
with the critical potential of the truth-intention of faith. The conflict, therefore, is primarily and almost exclusively one of cultures. No foundations are available for a transcultural theological enterprise with the result that the dogmatism of the right is matched by the dogmatism of the left. This was evident within the regression of Marxist dialectics discussed above.

3. Fideomorphic Theologies

We have seen how the previous two forms of theology tend to identify their reflections on the truth-intention of faith with a particular cultural understanding of reason or criticism. Against these trends the fideomorphic theologies tend to accentuate the nonidentity of faith and culture. The truth claim of faith is not primarily mediated by any historical-critical method or philosophical notions. Unlike the paleomorphic theologies, these theologies do not overtly identify their reflections with any past cultural matrix except insofar as those matrices were expressions of revelation and faith. Often the fideomorphic theologies tend to conform with paleomorphic positions insofar as they are dependent upon the Judaeo-Christian amalgamations of faith and culture in at least the Old and New Testament periods, or, where Catholic fideomorphic theologies are concerned, with the patristic and early medieval "ages of faith."

One sees, for instance, how Karl Barth's theology was a clear fideomorphic protest against the identification of faith and culture in the liberal Protestant theologies. It is only in this light that one can understand the Nein! of Karl Barth to the efforts of E. Brunner's attempts at correlating nature and grace (Smart; von Balthasar, 1962; Fürst). Barth also represents the difficulty fideomorphic theologies have in articulating the critical potential of the truth-intention of faith. The accentuation of non-identity helped Barth in the face of the Aryanism of the
German Church. This showed the political potential within the fideomorphic stance. However, Barth could only articulate the negative potential of his theological position in paradoxical terms. According to Metz, Barthian theology is really more paradoxical than it is dialectical; for dialectic involves not only contradiction but also a concrete continuity or relation between the contradictory terms or elements (Metz, 1970b; Rendtorff, 1966; Lonergan, 1957a: 217-219; 1972:235-237). Yet it was precisely the Barthian acceptance of the Kierkegaardian infinite qualitative difference between God and man that led to the negation of any continuity between the Word of God and the words and actions of men. H.-D. Bastian has convincingly shown how this paradoxical and, at bottom, fideist reliance on obedience to the Word of God has had such a detrimental effect on preaching and kerygma (1971).

Within Catholic theology the fideomorphic trend can be seen within various forms of monastic theology: the accentuation of flight from the world and asceticism with regard to both nature and culture. This is especially exemplified in the early writings of such monks as Eugene Boylan and Thomas Merton (Ladner; Chadwick; Heussi; Marrou) /10/. Hans Urs von Balthasar's efforts at elaborating an aesthetic theology have many parallels with Barth's paradoxical theology. Although von Balthasar criticizes the Kierkegaardian denigration of aesthetics, his main purpose in using aesthetic categories is to accentuate the gift quality of revelation. This aesthetic quality or element in revelation underlines the shock character of God's revelation to and transformation of cultural poverty and ugliness in the Old and New Testaments (1964; 1966-1971).

Another form of fideomorphic theology common to both Protestantism and Catholicism can be found in the proliferating pentecostal theologies. These exhibit a fundamentalist disregard for cultural and critical reflection upon religious experience. As with Barthianism, pentecostalism
exerts a very strong attraction on persons caught within the crisis of cultural relativism and confusion. It demands obedience if not to the Word of God as expressed in Scripture and/or tradition, at least to the authority of a conversion experience which has strong tendencies toward a privatized neglect of social and institutional responsibilities (Tracy, 1968).

Fideomorphic theologies tend toward fideism, stress prayer, sacrament and worship (if they are Catholic), or the Word of God and the obedience of faith (if they are Protestant). Finally, although they may offer many profound reflections on history, science and culture, these reflections originate primarily from the sources of their own faith commitment, whether that be Scripture or tradition. Because they attempt to articulate the understanding of faith without explicit dependence upon a cultural matrix, they are not as prone to the ghetto mentality as is the paleomorphic. By the same token, however, they often seem naive and uncritical vis-a-vis the presuppositions of their own theological reflection.

4. Criticomorphic Theologies

These theologies attempt to overcome the limitations of either an identification with culture (as found in the paleomorphic and neomorphic) or of a nonidentification with culture (found in the fideomorphic). Criticomorphic theologies are concerned with doing justice to both the concern with modern culture and the concern with the truth-intention of faith and revelation. They therefore attempt to articulate a unity of identity and nonidentity between faith and culture. I have referred to these theologies as "critico" because they use the critical-historical methods in their appropriation of the sources and institutions of faith and they are critical of many aspects of contemporary culture. Perhaps the most difficult task for these theologies is articulating the normative unity of identity and
nonidentity. They find that normative unity neither in classical culture nor in the "progressive" elements of contemporary culture, nor in an exclusive reliance upon the Word of God. They seek it rather in the interaction between faith and reason or between theology and culture.

Criticomorphic theologies seem to predominate in the academic world of theology today. The primary exemplification of such a theology in Protestantism can be found in Rudolf Bultmann. In the 1920s and 30s, Bultmann was concerned with critically appropriating both the advances of liberal theology and the truth claims of Barth's "dialectic" theology. He formulated the normative unity which would permit him full use of the historical-critical methods while still maintaining the scandalum crucis of the Christian kerygma through reliance upon the existential categories of Martin Heidegger (Schmithals; Malet). Admittedly, the structure of that normative unity of identity and nonidentity was tenuous; Bultmann had to claim that the only relationship between the level of Historie (factual history open to critical investigation) and Geschichte (existential history constituted by decision and encounter) was in terms of the kerygma. Thus his demythologizing of the New Testament brought on the angry criticisms of the fideomorphic Kein Anderes Evangelium movement and the more neomorphic criticisms of Fritz Buri with his reliance upon Karl Jaspers (Greshake; Buri).

Within Roman Catholicism forms of criticomorphic theology have been widespread. One may, perhaps, differentiate these forms according as they have sought different perspectives out of which to critically appropriate both the sources and institutions of faith and the aspirations of contemporary culture. Thus with some simplification one can say that the theology of Hans Küng finds its critical unity in the New Testament Christian experience; that the theologies of the Lyon Jesuits, H. DeLubac and J. Daniélou found a critical unity in the patristic unity of diversity;
that the Le Sauchoir Dominicans, M.-D. Chenu and Y. Congar found a critical unity for their theological reflection in the synthesis of faith and reason of St. Thomas Aquinas; that the theological work of T. de Chardin found its critical unity in the Christian interpretation of the dynamics of modern science; and that the moral theologies of such men as B. Härting finds its critical unity in the moral imperatives of Christian action /11/. Karl Rahner finds the critical unity of his theological enterprise in the anthropological turn of transcendental reflection (Eicher). All of these theologies, while often appealing to either past or present cultural matrices, do so only within a critical reflection upon the presupposition of such an appeal.

In order to appreciate the task these criticomorphic theologies have set themselves, it is necessary to understand the historical-cultural situation to which they were responding. In one way or another, they have all sought to integrate the critical consciousness generated by empirical science and historical scholarship with the truth stance of their faith traditions against the extremes of neomorphic rationalism and fideomorphic fideism. These theologians gradually incorporated the historical-critical methods within their understanding of faith by an appeal to various philosophical analyses of historical subjectivity /12/.

The central issue in this redefinition was the relationship between the competence of the historical-critical methods and the demands of faith with its authority. Could an acceptance of historical methods avoid the pitfalls of liberalism and fundamentalism? Were there not limits to the competence of historical-critical methods which not only "left room for" but actually presupposed dimensions of man's historical being as transcending (and grounding) the empirical facticity open to methodical investigation?

In elaborating affirmative answers to these questions, theologians could draw upon the conceptualities of various
philosophies of historicality. These philosophies seemed eminently suited to the task of avoiding historicism and dogmatism insofar as they retained vestiges of a Kantian phenomenon-noumenon dichotomy with its inherent limitation on any empirically critical methods such a distinction insured. Thus for W. Dilthey, the inexhaustibility of inner lived experience as the ground of historicality escaped any adequate mediation through the methods of rational thought (Lamb, 1972). Dilthey was about as unsuccessful in mediating these polarities of Erlebnis and Denken as E. Husserl was in mediating empirical facticity through his Epoché, with its Weltvernichtung in an effort to attain transcendental subjectivity. This failure was exposed in M. Heidegger's question to Husserl on how the absolute ego is also the factual "I" (Prufert; Brand: 104-106). Despite the brilliance of Heidegger's own analysis of Dasein, the ontological difference seemed unable to effectively mediate the ontological and the ontic, so that W. Richardson could ask how Dasein is related to ontic individuals, or Being-as-history to ontic history (Huch, 1967).

Given this philosophical background on historicality, it is not surprising that these theologians, especially those dependent on Bultmann and Rahner, would articulate the scientific self-understanding of theology in reference to historical-critical methods without fear of falling into either liberalism or modernism. For historicality revealed a polarity or dichotomy which set limits to any critical mediation. The designations of the poles or extremes vary in the different theologies: One has Bultmann's Historie as the level of factual history open to critical investigation and his Geschichte constituted by existential decision and encounter. Rahner speaks of categorical history and future as subject to the causal or functional determinations of scientific explanation, and the transcendent or absolute future identified with the mystery of the Godhead. Or one
has G. Ebeling's distinction between considering history as merely factual and considering it as a word-event. W. Pannenberg has criticized the existentialist and salvation-history approaches to the problems of integrating the historical-critical methods. Yet he himself seeks an integration in terms of a universal history as a tradition-history whose transcendent unity is in God (Greshake: 59-75, 277-311; Ogden, 1961:111-126; Ebeling, 1959; Robinson and Cobb, 1964; Funk: 47-71; Ogden, 1966:71-98; Pannenberg, 1965:7-20, 91-114; 1967:22-79, 91-122, 123-158; Robinson and Cobb, 1966) /13/. Parallels might be drawn to Tillich's synthesis of autonomous and heteronomous reasons in theonomy (81-94).

Criticomorphic theologians could draw upon M. Blondel's philosophy of action, E. Mounier's personalism, and Bergson's vitalism for categories with which to handle historical process. Such categories, however, were also open to the ambiguity of relating transcendence to immanence, personal commitment to social concern (Flamand, Bouillard). Likewise, the process theologians in America could appeal to the philosophical categories of Whitehead and Hartshorne in order to do justice to the empirical and historical consciousness. Nevertheless the serious question remained as to how adequate those metaphysical categories were to handle not only the methods of empirical and historical science, but also the demands of the Christian tradition (Moltmann, 1972; Pannenberg, 1972). Common to all these theologies seems to be an attempt at articulating a critical normative unity of identity and nonidentity which itself transcends critical mediation. This keeps theology from either a liberalist or modernist reduction to a psychology, sociology, anthropology, or philosophy of religion. This does not take away from theology as a science since the acceptance of the historical-critical methods operates within a reference-frame which allows a critical mediation only from the past into the present. The future is indeed recognized
as at least a, if not the, constitutive element in historicity. The eschatological dimension of theology is duly emphasized. But this is done in a manner that places it beyond the pale of critical methods. Hence, Bultmann rejected any dekerygmatization in theology (Buri). Ebeling asserted how the "whole which encounters man" is a reality encountered in faith alone (Ebeling, 1963a; cp. with the article on historical criticism, 1963b). Rahner insists on theology as a *reductio in mystérium* and sees the theologian's function as the custodian of a *docta ignorantia futuri* (Rahner, 1970:79-126, 519-540) /14/. Or one has the affirmations of Chardin and other evolutionary theologies regarding the movement of the cosmos toward point Omega or increased order without any clear criteria for mediating the personalizing forces of Christian faith to the collectivizing trends of modern industrial technology (Metz, 1972a).

This lack of critical reflection upon the articulation of the normative unity within these criticomorphic theologies has had far-reaching consequences for a theological understanding of the concrete praxis of the believer and the Church. For the accent is placed more on historicity constituting man than on man constituting history. The ground, center, or goal of history was encountered in a moment of existential decision (Bultmann), in a reality-recognizing act of faith (Ebeling), or in an assent to the transcendent mystery of existence with its implicit openness to the divinely willed ecclesial mediation of salvation (Rahner). This implied that praxis was ultimately determined by kerygma, faith, Church, etc., and little attention was given to how such a determined praxis actually functions in contemporary society. Perhaps it is not too far from the truth to suggest that these theologies tended to conceive of the future as a given, or gift, in the way they also thought of the past. Only where the past is given and susceptible of critical investigation, the future is given in a transcendent sense. So, for example, Bultmann:
The man who understands his historicity radically, that is, the man who radically understands himself as someone future, or in other words, who understands his genuine self as an ever-future one, has to know that his genuine self can only be offered to him as a gift by the future. (1962:150) /15/

There is little room in this understanding of theology for methods aimed at a critical mediation of the present into the future. Invaluable contributions were made by uncovering the centrality of \textit{Existenz}, of decision and conversion. Yet this domain of religious praxis was not integrated methodologically with the concrete historical and social conditions of the faithful and their institutions. The Catholic criticomorphic theologies found their efforts at appropriating a critical "return to the sources" supported at Vatican II, yet they seemed ill prepared for the further critical questions posed by the problems of contemporary society faced with a confusing pluralist present and an ominous future (Metz, 1972a; Tracy, 1975).

5. Politicomorphiс Theologies

The fifth and final type of doing theology might be termed politicomorphic. In many ways this type of theology is an extension, or further elaboration of criticomorphic theologies. Like them it seeks to articulate a unity of identity and nonidentity, i.e., it seeks to do justice to the identification with contemporary culture and the non-identification of the truth-intention of faith with culture. Unlike those theologies, however, the politicomorphic does not rely on philosophies of historicality (German), of immanence or vitalism (French), or of a metaphysics of process (American). In general, one might say that the methodological shift in politicomorphic theologies is a shift from concern with a critical mediation from the past into the present to a concern with a critical mediation from the present into the future (Lamb, 1974). Here one
has the various theologies of revolution and liberation, which are especially dominant in the developing countries (Herzog; Alves; Gutiérrez; Feil and Weth). Within Europe the political theology of Johannes B. Metz is especially characteristic of this type of theology.

In order to assure a critical mediation not only from the past into the present, but also from the present into the future, politicomorphic theologies cannot rest content with a basically uncritical thematization of the unity. The main thrust of the criticisms by political theology has been directed against the deformations in praxis to be found in ecclesial and social structures and policies (Metz, 1970c:99-146; 1969c; 1970a). Any praxis, whether authentic or alienating, has theoretical presuppositions; just as any theory has practical presuppositions and implications. Against the paleomorphic theologies Metz not only directs the usual criticomorphic critique about its naiveté regarding its own presuppositions. He specifically remarks the shortcomings of the "old political theologies" with their identification of the Church with the Kingdom of God; and so their failure to preserve the eschatological nature of the Church; and their consequent repressive praxis and cunning identification with political systems (1970a). Against the neomorphic theologies he shows how the almost complete identification of theology with contemporary psychological, sociological, or philosophical liberal or Marxist thought and methods only leads to a liquidation of theology and its critical potential for opposing the abstract totalizing operative in positivist liberal and idealist Marxist notions of human emancipation (1973b). Against the fideomorphic theologies he raises the objection that they tend too easily to identify the historical realities of nonidentity with the mysteries of faith. The paradoxes of Barthianism and von Balthasar's theology are not adequately dialectical (1967-1968).
It is possible to delineate the main lines of Metz's critique of criticomorphic theologies in the light of the present inquiry into the methodological presuppositions of political theology. One has to ask why the philosophies of historicality are unable to serve as the foundations for a critical mediation from the present into the future.

A critical mediation of future orientated praxis implies a radical critique of any scientistic identification of method with an objectivistic (Cartesian) rationalist, or merely logical, calculation. This would identify praxis with technique and collapse socio-political interaction into a managerial social engineering. On the other hand, a critical mediation implies that method is not totally nonidentical with planning and technique. If it were, there would be no alternative to a completely negative attitude towards technology on the part of praxis, i.e., mediation would give way to negation (Habermas, 1968a; 1968b). The success of a critical mediation depends, therefore, on a multi-dimensional approach to method capable of maintaining the unity of identity and nonidentity between the many particular methods operative within the spheres of prescientific (commonsense) social interaction, aesthetic creativity, historical scholarship, scientific theory and technique, philosophical and theological reflection. Such a unity of identity and nonidentity presupposes that there are values and interests operative within these various spheres of human theory and praxis, that those values and interests are susceptible of objective (not objectivistic) analysis, and that there are rational and responsible foundations for a critical evaluation of such interests and values.

The philosophies of historicality seemed so involved in rejecting the identification of their methods with either an Hegelian logicism or a positivist empiricism that they tended towards a total nonidentity between historical understanding and scientific explanation. This led to a
growing isolation of praxis from a society dominated by a rapidly increasing technology. The concept of historicity (Geschichtlichkeit) itself arose in German philosophy as a reaction against the revolutionary momentum of the empirical sciences and the political programs they inspired, especially in the French Enlightenment and French revolution (von Renthe-Fink).

Positively, the philosophies thematizing historicity called attention to the errors of mechanistic positivism, with its objectivistic and scientistic (mis)understanding of socio-historical realities. They emphasized the constitutive role of historical tradition and historical subjectivity in the understanding of specifically human phenomena. Negatively, however, they were so intent upon delimiting their approaches from the methods of the empirical sciences that they ended up isolating the critical potential of historical subjectivity from any effective social mediation, thereby privatizing or ontologizing historicity (Metz, 1968:89-91, 99-102; Picht: 281-342).

For example, the Kantian context of criticism is severely hampered by the principle of Anschauung and the resulting dichotomy between noumenon and phenomenon. As phenomenal, subjectivity was subject to empirical and critical investigation; as noumenal, the self with its imperatives and regulative ideas transcended empirical facticity. This seemed to guarantee individual freedom and spontaneity, but in actual practice it isolated that freedom, depriving it of any effective critical function in a society more and more controlled by specialized and technocratized structures (Habermas, 1968a:252-253; Schwemmer: 175; Picht: 183-202, 304-317, 427-434). The interests and values constituted by that freedom became less and less relevant to the "objective" sphere of factual scientific knowledge, which then claimed to be the paradigm of knowing /18/.
Similar dilemmas can be traced throughout the philosophies of historicality. Although Dilthey recognized the central role of meaning and value in the constitution of historical experience, his descriptive analytic methods offered no foundations for a critical differentiation of true and false meanings and values (Diwald: 64-71, 76-77; Habermas, 1968a:178-233). Husserl did indeed recognize how the concrete social world is constituted by praxis, yet the unresolved conflict between his notion of intuition and that of intentional constitution made him unable to mediate that praxis through the primordial constitution of the material world, which occurs prior to intersubjective praxis (Tugendhat: 252-255; Ryan; Rasmussen). Heidegger's ontological radicalization of understanding and disclosure was also unable to offer the basis for a critical mediation of praxis. As the early Heidegger seemed more concerned that truth is disclosed in understanding, rather than how it is disclosed, so the later Heidegger sees the mitten of being in thought as unmediated by any experience. How then are we to mediate authenticity—or how will Being mediate itself—in a critical manner to the contemporary social situation? (Tugendhat: 350, 356-362, 376, 399; Weischedel: 484-489; Huch, 1967; Pöggeler: 44-46; Adorno, 1967; Habermas, 1971:76-92; Brand: 135-137). Metz's eventual rejection of a Heideggerian ontology as the unity of identity and nonidentity finds its philosophical basis in the dependence of such an ontologizing upon the privatized autonomy of Kantian noumenal subjectivity (Huch, 1967:9-42).

The pattern in these philosophies of historicality indicates a limitation on critical methods. They tend towards an almost exclusive nonidentity between reflections aimed at elucidating the ground of historicality and the methods of empirical and critical analysis. They would see any mediation between the two as only an effort to reduce
the understanding of historicality to a type of objectivistic behavior analysis. This, however, presupposes that a basically Cartesian interpretation of scientific understanding and method is the only viable one /19/. If that were the case, then there could be no unity of identity and nonidentity in a methodologically critical mediation, and the only alternative would be to delimit the modes of understanding historicality from the modes of an objectivistic and scientistic knowing which would be the domain of empirical science.

The utilization of such an abstract nonidentity pattern by the theologies of historicality inevitably led to a serious restriction of even the historical-critical methods. H. Peukert has indicated the incongruity of such restrictions.

Aber während auf der einen Seite die historische Forschung die geschichtliche und soziale Bedingtheit aller Aussagen mit angemessenen Methoden herausarbeitete, wurde das Verstehen selbst fast ausschließlich als Ausstieg aus der Sozialisation in den Bereich transzendierender eigentlicher Existenz gedacht. (1971:viii)

The notion of "application" so central to the hermeneutical procedure was privatized or ontologized, since the critical methods were restricted to the mediation of the past into the present. The eschatological dimension of faith and theology was not critically mediated to the ambiguities of the contemporary world situation, but was reduced to either a call to personal responsibility or, as a realized eschatology, was seen as already having negated the ambiguities with the equally privatized arcanum of (an existentialist, personalist, or Kantian transcendentalist) converted subjectivity. While a limited critical control was practiced in the archaeological or diachronic dimensions of history, the synchronic and eschatological (or future-orientated) dimensions, in which the application concretely occurred, was left without critical methods to guide the concrete,
future-influencing praxis of the ecclesial community (Metz, 1969b).

This, I believe, is the context for political theology's critique of criticomorphic theologies. Bultmann's existential hermeneutics results in a privatized praxis, with its uncritical acceptance of contemporary man's reality criteria and its inability to disclose the relevance of religious conversion to the social ills of that reality. Rahner's way of relating his transcendent thematicization of religious experience to the other domains of human experience, e.g., the scientific and social ones, is similarly inadequate. Rahner realizes the profound influence these secular domains of experience are having on the church and theology, but all he does is see them as part of the pluralistic reality of modernity. Metz wonders if he does not overlook the very real dangers of an irrationalism—and a resulting paralysis of praxis—in an acceptance of pluralism without critically mediating methods capable of at least distinguishing the wheat from the cockle.

As Metz can criticize the abstract neglect of concrete suffering in the emancipation proclaimed by J. Habermas, so he warns of an almost fideomorphic abstraction of nonidentity into the Christian understanding of God on the part of J. Moltmann's Der gekreuzigte Gott, in Hans Küng's talk of the historicality of God, and in von Balthasar's interpretation of the paschal mystery. What Metz suspects in these otherwise praiseworthy theologies is an abstract conceptualizing of the concrete reality of nonidentity in suffering (1973b).

Moltmann himself tended to criticize Ebeling's theology for being open to the danger of making the gospel a religious legitimation and justification of the Establishment, insofar as Ebeling mystified the real suffering in our social condition by offering a promise of freedom in faith without concretizing that freedom in critical methods
aimed at bringing freedom to an unfree world (Moltmann, 1967:119-121, 128-146; Geyer, Janowski and Schmidt: 61-63). Finally, although W. Pannenberg has justly criticized the false restrictions of the historical-critical methods by existentialist and salvation-history theologies, others have asked how Pannenberg's seemingly exclusive reliance on the historical-critical methods would ever enable him to move from a hermeneutics of universal history to a critique of ideologies alienating our own socio-historical situation (Geyer, Janowski and Schmidt: 63-65).

Metamethod and Political Theology

The typology of theologies clearly indicates that from a methodological point of view the politicomorphic type of theologizing represented by Metz seems most suited to bringing the transcendental exigence and God-question to bear on the socio-political (un)realities of contemporary being-in-the-world. If the churches have an important role to play in reversing the priorities of consumerist societies, then theology cannot remain content with an uncritical faith-stance towards the future (Meadows, 1973). In this final section of my study, I shall explore some of the contributions which political theology can make towards the elaboration of theological method, as well as the contributions Lonergan's metamethod decisively offers to the program of political theology.

1. Political Theology's Contributions to Theological Method

The distinction which Lonergan draws between the tasks of the methodologist and the theologian is not a disjunction. If the transcendental exigence arises out of the methodical, then one would expect that an historically conscious theology would have critical contributions to make to methodology. If my interpretation of the politicomorphic theology of Metz is correct, then like Lonergan he does not
place the foundations of theology in the past but rather in the movement in the present from the past into the future. Here I shall sketch two areas where political theology is especially relevant: the area of theological foundations and its elucidation of the dialectic of Enlightenment.

*Foundations of Theology.* To critically mediate the Christian message from the present into the future means that the very foundations of theology cannot be located in the past—whether in scriptural, patristic, conciliar, or other ecclesial traditions—and then mediated theoretically into the present. Rather the foundations are in the praxis of the present as actually orientated toward the eschatological Kingdom of God. I should like to spell out briefly some of the important consequences this shift in foundations has for theological method.

Firstly, the fundamentally critical problem for theology is not the problem of integrating dogmatic traditions with critical-historical scholarship. For this problem is only one aspect of a far deeper problem of relating the concrete experiences, understandings, assertions, and decisions of believing communities to the historical processes constituted by social praxis (Metz, 1970b). As long as theology concentrated on the historical-critical methods and the resulting problem of dogma versus history, it could only indicate the crucial significance of *Existenz*, conversion, responsibility for the preunderstanding of history and dogma. In this way the criticomorphic theologies recognized the problem of historical consciousness but tried to tie this in with the older discussions on the "nature" of the church and of theology (Tracy, 1970:84-91). The philosophies of historicality allowed them to discuss the "nature" of history. Hence the criticisms leveled against the privatizing or ontologizing of *Existenz*, conversion, and responsible decision-situations: such theologies are able to handle neither the concreteness of history itself--
the *Leidensgeschichte* and the narratives of history—nor the concreteness of the historical-critical methods themselves. For those methods arose, not out of a classical concern with nature and substance (nor any of the more sophisticated conceptualities of the historicality philosophies), but from the specifically modern concern with empirical historical processes and functions (Tracy, 1970: 91-103; Kelley). By restricting critical mediation from the past to the present within the conceptuality of the philosophies of historicality, such theologies could not handle what is actually going forward from the present into the future. To handle that political theology calls attention to both narrative and praxis in both its commonsense and its scientific forms.

Secondly, political theology does not maintain that the actual praxis of believing communities can be adequately mediated methodologically by the methods of psychologies, sociologies, anthropologies, or philosophies of religious praxis. But whereas the criticomorphic theologies tend to assert this nonidentity in terms of a supra-historical and supra-critical (noumenal) realm of an existentialist, personalist, transcendentalist, or historicalist subjectivity, political theology asserts that an adequately critical mediation of religious praxis demands properly theological methods in order to do justice to the true meanings and values operative within that praxis as eschatological or future orientated /20/.

These meanings and values are not enshrined in some supra-critical monstrance completely nonidentical with secular social praxis; nor are they identified with those programs of secular social praxis which claim to represent an identifiable subject of world history and social process—whether those programs be formulated in secular ideologies (as in orthodox Marxism and liberal capitalist progress) or in ecclesial ideologies (as in the paleomorphic forms of political theology) (Metz, 1973b; Adorno, 1966;

Thirdly, just as the eschatological orientation of religious praxis is a dialectical unity of identity and nonidentity with the concrete social praxis of secular and ecclesial communities and institutions, so will the methods of a theology concerned with a critical mediation from the past into the present and the present into the future exhibit a dialectical unity of identity and nonidentity with the methods operative in the efforts to theoretically and practically understand and guide historical and social praxis /21/. Thus political theology is attentive to both the spontaneous world of narrative and story and the reflective world of scholarship and science. There can be no one-sided effort to sublate story into thought, narrative into argument, or vice versa (Metz, 1970a, 1970b).

This means that in its collaboration with the sciences and philosophies in their methodical efforts to mediate social theory-praxis, political theology is concerned with methods open to both the spontaneous world of narrative and to the nonidentity of religious praxis. In this way political theology not only learns from those methods but actively contributes to them insofar as it would liberate them from either a trivializing relativity or a fanaticizing totality. Just as in concrete social praxis there are not only alternative interests and values but also distorted ones, so there is not only a pluralism of methods but also the conflict of opposed methods. Such a dialectic of methods without theology is truncated insofar as it then tends either to trivialize method, reducing it to an end-means calculation without any critical normativity beyond concepts and axioms, or to fanaticize method, claiming that
the praxis is absolute and without conditions (Horkheimer and Adorno; Gilkey).

Fourthly, this emancipation of the methods of the other sciences and philosophies from trivialization or fanaticization is not done by any direct intervention in their methods by theology. Rather it is done indirectly and heuristically inasmuch as political theology would succeed in interrelating the intellectual praxis of science with the moral praxis of political social life and the religious praxis of ecclesial institutions. Theology would thereby be an instance of socio-critical concern within the academic world just as the church should be one within the political world. For it would oppose any conceptualism that would separate theory from praxis, thought from life. Such an interrelation of intellectual, moral, and religious praxis would necessarily be critical, insofar as the concrete practices of scientific, socio-political, and religious institutions contradict intelligence, responsibility, reverence and love. Within this dialectic of progress and decline, political theology is not immediately concerned with particular programs of reform and revolution. For such programs can at best be ambiguous unless they are carried out within the context of a fundamental appropriation of critical consciousness. Metz is concerned with a theological appropriation of such critical consciousness, and only mediately (i.e., as mediated by that appropriation) with particular programs of change (Metz, 1970b) /22/.

The Dialectic of Enlightenment and Interdisciplinary Collaboration. How Metz understands the appropriation and articulation of theologically critical consciousness is first of all determined by his understanding of the basic dialectic operative in all spheres of contemporary theory-praxis. That dialectic is the dialectic of the Enlightenment, not in the sense of an unhistorical reproduction of Enlightenment positions and counterpositions, but in the
sense of the fundamentally new possibilities of freedom on the one hand, and the enormous threats to human freedom and dignity on the other (Horkheimer and Adorno: ix-x, 1-49; Metz, 1970a). The dialectic of the Enlightenment might be characterized as a contradiction between goal and method. The goal was autonomous, free, mature rationality; but the method was increasingly dominated by empirical forms of research which identified rationality with manipulative technique /23/. The growing success of the natural sciences became identified with progress in general, and a scientistic identification of knowing with the procedures of the natural sciences set in. Quantification became the canon of exactitude, and the autonomy of the rationally critical subject rapidly was transformed into the anonymity of intensified specialization as theory and praxis were put at the service of industrialization (Horkheimer and Adorno: 3, 11, 13, 31-33).

The critique which the Enlightenment had performed on the systems of belief and value in pre-Enlightenment societies became internalized within industrial society. The apodictic certitude of the mathematico-mechanical methods gradually dispensed with an intelligent discussion of long-range goals or purposefulness. Objectivity absorbed subjectivity. Pragmatic utility replaced morality. Technique seemed more appropriate than praxis as theory approximated calculation. While religion was relegated to the free choice of private individuals whose individuality seemed ever more unenlightened and irrational, ecclesial institutions were left with the alternative of either a paleomorphic "orthodox" rejection of, or a neomorphic "liberal" accommodation to, modernity /24/.

What has been the consequence of this process? Because of the contradiction between the goal of the Enlightenment and its method, the unity of identity and non-identity has disintegrated. Thus the dilemma of ecclesial
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institutions between nonidentity or identity with the contemporary situation is by no means an isolated phenomenon. We have already seen how historicality philosophies sought to articulate a realm of historical subjectivity with methods nonidentical with those that sustain modern science and technology. Indeed, with the advance of the latter, efforts at mediating historicality and empirical science on the part of Dilthey and Husserl gave way to more antithetical positions. On the one hand, Heidegger and Gadamer have claimed a complete nonidentity between historicality and scientificality; and on the other contemporary Logical Empiricism and Structuralism have claimed an identification of the two to the point of proclaiming the advent of a post-historical era (Bauer; Brand: 3-55, 135-137; Marcuse: 170-199; Schmidt, 1969; Seidenberg).

Even the Marxist attempt to reinstate the goal of the Enlightenment in terms of a fundamental critique of ideology and alienation found its widespread acceptance through an objectivistic identification of this goal with a deterministic and scientistic interpretation of socio-historical processes (Wellmer: 69-127; Böhler: 302-328; Fleischer: 128-169). Hence, with respect to the expanding advance of science and technology, the differences between the socio-political realities of late Capitalism and established Communism are practically insignificant (Adorno, 1970:176-188; Galbraith). Late Capitalism tends to stress the nonidentity of historical subjectivity and freedom from the objective processes of an increasingly technocratic industrialized society, thereby restricting freedom to the private sphere with so little reference to the objective social situation that the "free market" is a myth; Communism, on the other hand, tends to identify historical subjectivity and freedom with the attainment of classless society through state ownership of the means of production, thereby determining the critical normativity of freedom in an objectivistic manner (Birnbaum: 94-129, 367-392; Garaudy, 1970a;
Galbraith; Barnet and Müller). A monopoly-controlled state or a state-controlled monopoly is the cynical choice left when a quantified objectivity sublates subjectivity.

Within this context of the dialectic of the Enlightenment, political theology has called for a new relationship (1) of religious freedom and ecclesial authority, (2) of morality to politics, (3) of goals, purposes, and interests to scientific and technological performance (Metz, 1970a, 1971, 1972b). The appropriation and articulation of critical consciousness, then, does not seek identification between religion and society, morality and politics, philosophical speculation and science. Nor does such an appropriation wish to further a nonidentity between these sets of factors. For, as I have already indicated, such a nonidentity leads to a type of dialectical defense-mechanism or identification which results in an objectivistic reduction of goals into manipulative methods, of moral responsibility into "successful" political expediency, of freedom into a totalitarianism of tolerance.

In the light of this dialectic, political theology is involved in an appropriation of critical consciousness itself in such a way that a new methodological appropriation of the unity of identity and nonidentity is required. This appropriation will concretely function in Metz's program for interdisciplinary collaboration between the sciences and theology to be institutionalized at the State University of Bielefeld (Oelmüller, 1971). Four of this program's heuristic and critical anticipations seem especially relevant to the present discussion.

In the first place, there can be no restriction of knowing to the paradigm of science /25/. A methodological appropriation of the unity of identity and nonidentity will, therefore, mean that method must be capable of elucidating all forms of human performance. This means that its appropriation of critical consciousness is both differentiated from and operative in the narrative world of common sense
and the reflective world of science. In the second place, even within science the forms of knowing which are concerned with the control and domination of nature must be correlated (and so relativized) with a methodical interest in the hermeneutical and dialectical forms of knowing (Metz, 1971:17-19; Rendtorff, 1971; Peukert, 1971). Methodologically this implies that there must be an explanation of the unity-in-difference between these various forms of knowing so that the critique of scientism would not just be a rear guard action seeking to preserve certain privileged areas from the incursion of scientific methods, but rather an effort to show that scientism itself (or any appeal to manipulative methods as the paradigm of knowing) cannot adequately account for the performance of even the natural sciences themselves. This means a methodological foundation must be found which is not posited on the separation of the natural and human sciences but can differentiate and interrelate them.

In the third place, any metascientific discussion of the role of theology in interdisciplinary collaboration raises the question of the universality of theology. But, as Metz has pointed out, the problems of universality are inherent in any metascientific discussion (Metz, 1971:21-22, 93-99). A methodological appropriation of the unity of identity and nonidentity would remove the danger of either a positivist identification of some universal method with particular methods of the natural sciences, or an idealist identification of universality with particular hermeneutical traditions; it would simultaneously avoid the various forms of skepticism which—in the guise of historicism and relativism—would universalize nonidentity to the point of rejecting the very possibility of any future consensus on true meaning and value. Only an approach to universality that incorporates both identity and nonidentity can be true to the "known unknown" of a universal viewpoint (Lonergan, 1957a:531-534, 546-549).
Finally, the critical anticipations of interdisciplinary collaboration do presuppose a multi-dimensional approach to method. For as Metz is careful to emphasize, such collaboration seeks to avoid any canonization of particular paradigms of knowing or methods while also recognizing the imperatives of truth (Metz, 1971:14, 18). In this sense the methodological appropriation of the unity of identity and nonidentity involves a heuristic openness to all particular methods which is at the same time capable of dialectical criticism.

These aspects of the program of political theology touch on the main elements involved in a truly critical mediation of both the past into present and the present into the future. As long as theology depended chiefly upon the historical-critical methods for its scientific self-understanding, it did not need to concern itself with those forces in contemporary society which were involved in transforming social praxis from the present into the future. Tradition and the Christian memory were viewed in an objectivistic manner insofar as they were susceptible of historical-critical analysis, while the preunderstanding and lived experience sustaining the truth of those traditions and memories were privatized or ontologized, i.e., they were effectively removed from the sphere of critical consciousness. This was true of not only the fideomorphic but also the criticomorphic theologies.

Metz, in insisting upon the subversive power of Christian tradition and memory in the present praxis as eschatological, is attempting to explicate precisely how the memoria, as operative in the present, can be understood only within the horizon of critical consciousness itself. The methodical exigence must, therefore, arise within this exigency for critique. Critical consciousness cannot only be concerned with its own foundations but must also seek to enlighten particular instances of contemporary theory-praxis.
Nevertheless, my purpose here has been to point out how these more immediate concerns of political theology with, e.g., ecclesial authority, ecumenism, the meaning of Christian dogmas, a narrative soteriology, etc., are within the context of more fundamentally methodological interests capable of furthering interdisciplinary collaboration between theology and the sciences. Unless one is aware of the shift which has occurred on this level in political theology, viz., the attempt to provide a critical mediation not only from the past into the present but also from the present into the future, one would fail to do justice to political theology as fundamental theology (Metz, 1970b).

2. Contributions of Metamethod to Political Theology

The dialectic of the Enlightenment may be adequately met through the methodological contributions arising from Lonergan's discovery and thematization of that forgotten and repressed subjectivity capable of critically sublating the objectivism of scientism. Here I should like to discuss four areas of metamethod's possible contributions to the program of political theology.

Transcendental Reflection as Empirical and Critical. The inability of historicality philosophies to come up with an adequate basis for a critical mediation from the present into the future was due in large part to their at least implicit reception of the Kantian phenomenon-noumenon dichotomy. Within the context of Kant's transcendental philosophy as expressed in his three Critiques, this dichotomy accounted for the split between regulative and constitutive principles, between phenomenal necessity and noumenal freedom, and led Kant to postulate an *intuitus originarius* or *intellectus archetypus* of God to assure that the phenomenal effects of a noumenal subject acting in accordance with the categorical imperative would truly contribute toward the progress of good in history. Yet as recent studies have
shown, Kant's own more concretely orientated socio-critical writings were not integrated with his transcendental philosophy. Nor could historicality philosophies mediate their own thematizations of historicality with the concrete socio-historical praxis of individuals and societies (26). The dimension of memorative narration or story was disjoined from reflection and argument (Metz, 1973b). Historical reason was, so to speak, bifurcated inasmuch as it could not adequately interrelate its transcendental analysis of historical freedom and subjectivity with the empirical historical-critical methods. For as long as the transcendental aspects of those philosophies suffered from the growing "Diskrepanz zwischen dem, was angeblich a priori ermittelt wird, und dem, was sich in der geistig-wissenschaftlichen und gesellschaftlich-politischen Wirklichkeit der Moderne ausgebildet hat," there was no way in which they could empirically and critically elaborate the heuristic operations of historical subjectivity in its future-constituting praxis in the present (Oelmüller, 1969: 108-109). Metz has, therefore, rightly called attention to the unfruitfulness of the reception of Kant's transcendental philosophy, especially his Critique of Pure Reason, among theologians (1970a:62-63; Wild).

Certainly, if political theology could only turn to the type of transcendental reflection found in Kant and the historicality philosophies, then its concern with appropriating critical consciousness would necessarily involve the rejection of any "Entwurf von Wissenschaft...der im Sinne der Transzendentalphilosophie beansprucht, Fundamentalphilosophie zu sein" (Oelmüller, 1969:109). But such a rejection of a Kantian or Idealist position must not itself slip into an objectivistic neglect of subjectivity which would belittle or even negate the possibility of historically transcending the structural functionalisms of naturalist, positivist, or historicist determinisms (Habermas, 1968a:88-92; Huch, 1969). Such a neglect of
subjectivity would surrender reflection to the conceptualist aridity of argumentative logic, severing thought from the sources of story and narrative.

For instance, D. Böhler has criticized Marx’s critique of ideology for its neglect of an adequate reflection on the conditions of its own possibility. Going beyond Marx, Böhler argues:


The danger of absolutizing the relative and situational can only be counteracted by some recognition of transcendence. It is not surprising that both Metz and Moltmann have called attention to a relation between future and transcendence, even if they have not elaborated the methodological implications this relation has in regard to reflection (Metz, 1973c; 1967-1968:165-179; Moltmann, 1965). Metz has indicated the concealment of the future in the Kantian transcendentalist position (1968:89-91) /27/. From this one might conclude that if a transcendental reflection is going to explicate the conditions of the possibility of a critical mediation from the past into the present and the present into the future, then such reflection cannot be
noumenally disjoined from a truly empirically verifiable openness to the future. Such empirical verification of openness would be verified in the factually ongoing efforts at understanding and improving one's individual, interpersonal, and social situations; insofar as the heuristic anticipations of such understanding and improvement contradict the present situation, it would be counterfactual. This implies that transcendental reflection is not beyond experience or criticism; that its grounds are not noumenally unknowable; that such reflection does not reveal some absolute starting point or foundation but the conditions regulating and positively or negatively constituting the socio-historical process.

Lonergan has come up with such a novel version of transcendental method that the present writer has found it advisable to refer to it with the less philosophically loaded expression of metamethod /28/. F. Crowe has mentioned how if Lonergan's "Insight could be defined with respect to Kant as a correction and completion of his work, so the new phase (of Lonergan's writing) can best be defined with respect to Dilthey" (1964:26). More importantly, in the measure that Lonergan was able to radically correct the Kantian program of transcendental method, to that extent he would also avoid any charge of obscurantism in seeking to relate his transcendental method with the many methods operative in natural and human sciences /29/. For Lonergan's metamethod decisively moves beyond the dichotomies associated with either a scientific objectivism (as in Logical Positivism or Structuralism) or that abstract subjectivism associated with an Erkenntnistheorie, Epoché, Erkenntnismetaphysik, or Fundamentalontologie. The key to metamethod lies in its invitation to a self-appropriation of the praxis of human understanding and performance in all spheres of human activity whatever they might be. Lonergan, then, could not accept a half-hearted critique of Kantianism; he does not offer a theory of understanding relevant
only to certain fields of human experience; for him there can be no appeal to any noumenal realm totally beyond the ken of inquiry /30/. Nor does he accomplish this by invoking some type of Hegelian absolute knowledge. The key, once again, is self-appropriation which involves not only what factually is (e.g., all the manifold concrete situations resulting from equally diverse social, political, philosophical, scientific, aesthetic, etc. traditions); but also uncovers within these factual situations certain dynamically related and recurrent operations of human historical subjectivity capable of grounding a critical evaluation of those situations.

Unity of Identity and Nonidentity. This leads into the second area of possible contributions to political theology: a methodological elaboration of the unity of identity and nonidentity. Such a unity is operative in political theology in several manners, e.g., the eschatological Kingdom is both immanent in the future and non-identical with it; determinate negation asymptotically identifies truth and value through the determination of concrete instances of nonidentity; the church can preserve her identity only through sublation of that identity in the Kingdom; fidelity to tradition demands changing that tradition; the Parteilichkeit of the church is her identification with those nonidentifiable with the establishment, etc. (Metz, 1968:75-89, 99-116; 1969c:13-32, 34-38; 1970a; Feil and Weth: 268-301). A similar unity is operative in the mediation of theory and praxis: there is an identity insofar as there is a praxis of theory and a theory of praxis; but also a nonidentity insofar as praxis is not totally theoretisierbar and theory is not immediately practical. Likewise, transcendence is identified with experience's own going beyond (or nonidentity with) itself; the critical presence of the future in the present is the openness of the present to the radically new.
The appropriation of the truth in the narrativememorative experience is essential to critical rationality yet nonidentified with it. The nonidentity of the concrete history of suffering unmasks the abstract totalizing of liberal capitalist, positivist and Marxist schemes of emancipation, yet this nonidentity can be identified within the mystery of Christ and the church.

Now, if there were no unity operative in these relations between identity and nonidentity, Metz would be dealing with paradox rather than dialectics; he would succumb to his own criticism of Barthian theology as paradoxical rather than truly dialectical. Metz's own formulation of the instances of identity and nonidentity, however, involves an implicit definition of one by the other and so a unitary relationship between them (Lonergan, 1957a:12-13, 392, 491-492).

How can this unity be determined with due justice to both identity and nonidentity? Methodologically one needs to avoid both a scientistic identification of the ideal of knowing with the methods of the natural sciences and any obscurantist privatizing or ontologizing of historicality which would assume methods of reflection on man's socio-historical reality nonidentical with other modes of scientific inquiry. What is this evasive unity of identity and nonidentity? How could it methodologically function to facilitate the type of broad interdisciplinary collaboration between the sciences, philosophies and theologies envisaged by political theology? How can memory and narrative be dynamically related to critique and argument?

There are many options open to political theology in choosing the horizon within which to thematize the unity. The formulation of the dialectical framework of Metz's thought owes much to the Idealist and Marxist traditions, as these traditions have been criticized and applied by E. Bloch, T. Adorno, M. Horkheimer, and J. Habermas. If I have used the unity of identity and nonidentity to formulate the
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Indeed, one could argue that just as in Hegel's *Science of Logic* and *Phenomenology ofgegenwahrhaftigkeit*, and in *Göttingische Gelehrtenblätter*, and *Theological-Historical Journal*, with its attempt to constitute history in the sense of a noumenal transcendental mediation of mind with a phenomenological empirical progression of mind which would allow for a critical mediation of theoretical and practical actions from present practices to articulate new historical and practical transformations when it came. The influence of the Kantian phenomeno-noumenal dichotomy under the methodology of dialectical philosophy has thus been implicit in the works of Hegel and Marx. In *The Dialectic of Right and Left* and *Science of Right*, however, one can see that even Hegel's own articulation of the dialectic was conducted by a latent positivism which was an assimilation of man's ability to constitute history in the sense of a noumenal transcendental mediation of mind with a phenomenological empirical progression of mind which would allow for a critical mediation of theoretical and practical actions from present practices to articulate new historical and practical transformations when it came. The influence of the Kantian phenomeno-noumenal dichotomy under the methodology of dialectical philosophy has thus been implicit in the works of Hegel and Marx.
the skeptical nonidentity of self-consciousness with the Absolute led in practice to Hegel's allowing the Prussian monarchy what he did not allow God, so Marx, in transposing the unconditionality of the Absolute to the socio-historical and empirically identifiable proletariat, minimized those dimensions of consciousness which were not identifiable in terms of work and production. This meant that Marx allowed the relations and forces of production what he did not allow God, in the sense that he neglected to explicate the subjectivity operative in socio-historical process in the way he had done in his critique of religion. Thus Böhler can argue rather convincingly that Marx was as much a prisoner of the classical theory-praxis dichotomy as Hegel, except that he came down on the side of praxis (104-117, 310-328; Theunissen, 1971:447; Adorno, 1966:313-315). No wonder then that critical theory or political theology, in trying to appropriate the critical consciousness in Hegel and Marx by explicating a new relation of theory-praxis, are accused by some of identifying with particular revolutionary groups while they are accused by others of an idealist failure to identify a subject comparable to the proletariat.

This problem such thinkers as Habermas or Metz experience in trying to articulate the unity of identity and nonidentity lies in their primarily reflective concern with philosophical issues which are at once profoundly theoretical and fraught with practical implications. Those identified with the Establishment resent their involvement in practical criticism, while those nonidentified with the Establishment resent their concern with consciousness. To the former they are aiding and abetting anarchy and revolution; to the latter they seem "idealist" and "transcendentalist" (Xhaufflaire, 1972; Negt). Both of these attitudes miss the real significance of critical theory and political theology in terms of the long range need to thematize the proper relation between theory and praxis in terms of a
unity of identity and nonidentity. This is not a middle-of-the-road compromise. Metz often quotes Brecht's *Die Wahrheit liegt in der Mitte... begraben!* It is an open-eyed dedication to a rigorous and critical reflection on the presuppositions of changing the established order so that those changes can be promoted *consciously* and *responsibly*. This is all the more necessary today, when the complexity of modern society increasingly dominated by scientific technological forces of production have quite literally overwhelmed many critical social theories (Meadows; Touraine; Gouldner; Habermas, 1968b).

Lonergan has carried through an analysis of the subject which is able to account not only for identity but for nonidentity as well /33/. Such a unity can be grasped, he insists, not simply through some transcendental *theory*, but only by the praxis of self-appropriation which elicits an awareness of the subject's own factually contrafactual (insofar as they are alienated by bias) drives toward attentiveness, intelligence, critical rationality, responsibility, and love (Lonergan, 1957a:319-347; 1972:3-25, 53-55, 231-232). For the subject-as-subject is not some Leibnizean monad, not a Cartesian *cogitans me cogitare*, not a Kantian transcendently noumenous subjectivity, and not an Hegelian carrier of absolute knowledge. The subject-as-subject does not correspond to such objectivations insofar as they fail either to account for the empirical and heuristic functioning of the subject in its socio-historical development; or to provide an adequate framework within which to meet the further relevant questions and responsible demands for action posed by history.

For Lonergan the subject-as-subject is not some system or theory, not some particular class or group of individuals, not some institution or organization. Yet it includes all these insofar as they have genetically contributed to attentiveness, intelligence, reasonableness, responsibility; or insofar as they have dialectically
contributed to inattention, stupidity, irrationality, and irresponsibility. Indeed, Lonergan's approach to the subject is heuristic enough to embrace the entire sweep of human reality, yet it is also normative enough to ground a universal dialectics capable of integrating the many particular dialectics operative in history. This involves, then, both a concrete identification of the subject individually and collectively, and a heuristic nonidentification capable of accounting for alienation and ideology as well as for an openness to the future which escapes any complete predictability.

Moreover, Lonergan makes it abundantly clear that, the movement from the subject-as-subject to the subject-as-object is no type of transcendental deduction. There is no question of an *Ursprungsphilosophie*. The subject as conscious is not primarily self-conscious but functions within the horizon of the common sense and common nonsense of his particular family, community, national, social, and cultural milieu. With Marx, Lonergan maintains that social life determines consciousness, but, as recent Marx studies also bring out, consciousness as action can affect and change social life (Fleischer: 51-75, 104-127, 130, 134, 140, 151-153; Habermas, 1968a:45). Social life, meaning social institutions and orders, is not some force completely independent of conscious acts of meaning and decision but results from and is informed by interlocking sets of such acts as they coalesce into accepted modes of behavior and interests.

The unity, therefore, is defined in reference to the subject, where identity is taken as the subject-as-object and nonidentity as the object-as-object. The unity cannot be mistaken as an identity, for obviously the subject cannot escape the inherent limitations of concrete historical and social existence. Neither, however (and this is of the utmost importance due to the objectivistic trend of modern technological culture), can the unity be dispensed with in
the name of a total nonidentity where the subject would be in the position described by T. Adorno: "Automatisch sowohl wie planvoll sind die Subjekte daran verhindert, sich als Subjekte zu wissen" (1970:145-146). Objectivism might be defined as the failure to recognize the praxis of the subject in the constitution and mediation of objects. Hence one sees the emphasis in both critical theory and political theology to challenge the specter of contemporary objectivistic scientism with its scornful neglect of the subject.

Such a thematization of the unity of identity and nonidentity is not to overlook the very real differences between critical theory and political theology. It is not to seek some half-hearted theological compromise with the dialectic of emancipation, against which Metz has warned. Rather, it is to ferret out those presuppositions and intentions underlying the emergence of the modern and contemporary problematic of which critical theory is one manifestation.

Overcoming Cartesianism. In the third place, this understanding of the unity of identity and nonidentity in terms of the subject sublates the Cartesian notion of method as a generalization from mathematics. Obviously the enormous changes in mathematics from Descartes' day to our own has made such a correlation of mathematics and method more complicated, yet the claim of scientism (that the physical sciences provide the paradigm for verifiable or falsifiable knowing), as well as the quest of logical empiricism for a unified value-free science, indicate the persistence of the correlation. Throughout the changes the Cartesian assumption that the procedures of mathematics provided the canons of clarity and certitude for scientific method remains a constant /34/. If Descartes rejected the idea of a probable science and doubted that history and politics could attain the stature of sciences, Leibniz and Spinoza had no such qualms. For Descartes' method remained
fundamentally uncritical as long as it simply presupposed the correspondence of subject and object (self and world) in the mind of God (Mittelstrass: 383, 395-396; Löwith, 1967:24-40; Weischedel: 165-175). Certain parallels could be drawn between the contemporary debates on method and those prevalent during the transition from the Renaissance to the age of mechanistic Reason. The Renaissance approached method according to an analogy with art: knowledge was to be gained by a familiarity with the Masters of antiquity. Vico attempted to articulate the validity of this approach (Caponigri: 36-70, 144-187; Gusdorf, 1967: 293-306; Gadamer, 1965:16-20). Descartes, on the other hand, was committed to a notion of method understood according to the analogy of mathematical science. This divergence in the understanding of method runs through both the nineteenth century disputes between the Naturwissenschaften and the Geistes- or Geschichtswissenschaften, and today's conflicts between the logicism of the critical rationalists and the dialectical hermeneutics of the critical theorists (Gusdorf, 1969b:333-346, 407-418; Gadamer, 1965: 16-20, 209-211, 260-265; Lonergan, 1972:3-5). Descartes succeeded in differentiating philosophy and science from theology; the eighteenth and nineteenth centuries saw the differentiation of science from philosophy. The contemporary momentum toward interdisciplinary collaboration calls for a proportionate effort at elaborating a basic approach to method capable of assuring an open, ongoing, and critical communication between the increasing specialization.

The foundations for such a methodic collaboration, however, cannot consist in any one-dimensional insistence upon science or art, reason or tradition, as the paradigm for the collaboration. Metz has called attention to this danger of universalizing a particular categorical method.

Die Gefahr nämlich, daß sich ein bestimmtes, kategorial erfolgreiches Verfahren doch heimlich als universal inthronisiert und daß damit die inter-
interdisziplinäre Kooperation unter den anonymen Druck eines bestimmten Verfahrensideals gerät. 
(Metz, 1971:18)

The danger will not be averted by any simple-minded concordism or mere juxtaposition of methods. What is needed is a method of methods; a transcendental or meta-method in this sense capable of attentively, intelligently, critically, and responsibly interrelating the manifold methods actually constitutive of present social, political, scientific, artistic, philosophical and religious performance.

There are two aspects to this need. First, many of the presently articulated particular (or first-order) methods are really not adequate to the actual performance of people operating in the just-mentioned spheres of action (social, political, scientific, etc.), especially to the degree that the articulation of methods in the sciences is influenced by a reductionist ideal of a unified science. This would be an example of a particular, categorical method assuming a universal significance it does not possess (Radnitzky: 1.86-92, 140-145; Matson: 3-110; F. Wagner). Second, there is a need for establishing some coherent base or foundation for interrelating the increasingly specialized spheres of human activity. In other words, the transcendental or meta-dimension may not be completely extrinsic to any of the particular and categorical spheres of human activity. The problem is to determine how that dimension is operative in the categorical spheres of human activity, how it could be properly articulated and so serve as a basis for an open, ongoing, and critical correlation of the methods operative in those spheres. This is to affirm the validity of the historical trend of the differentiation of philosophy from theology, science from philosophy, art from handicrafts, or theory from common-sense living (Lamb, 1965). It also affirms the need for a higher order integration which would prevent any particular mode
of operation from imposing itself on any of the others and promote an ongoing collaboration between the specialized methods.

In regard to meeting these two aspects of the need, the general orientation of political theology in the matter of interdisciplinary collaboration does not enter into the particular debates on methods within the specialized fields. This demands specialized competence which a theologian does not have for fields other than his own. Nevertheless, any representative from any discipline can object when methods valid and successful in one field are arbitrarily set up as the standard and norm for other fields /35/. This will be a constant danger as long as sufficiently adequate metamethodological foundations are lacking.

This can be observed in the present disputes on method in Germany. W. Stegmüller argues for the applicability of logical analytical methods to historical reality (Stegmüller: 335-427). H.-G. Gadamer has sharply criticized the Cartesianism of method and called attention to the centrality of art and traditions in the understanding of historical truth. If a Hans Albert sees in this position an obscurantist delimitation of science, a K.-O. Apel and a J. Habermas try to critically mediate both positions (Albert, 1969, 1971; Radnitzky: 1.22-25). In America this effort at a critical mediation can be found in the work of T. Kuhn, who has indicated the interplay between tradition and creative insight within the process of scientific development (Kuhn; Lakatos).

These new discussions attack Descartes' premise—regarding the possibility of reducing all methods to a *mathesis universalis* (Husserl, 1967:58-86; Diemer: 174-223; Wellmer: 7-68, 128-148; Habermas, 1970c:184-307). Dilthey's endeavors to thematize methods proper to the human sciences and history were directed against the empiricist scientism which could not be checked by the transcendentalist-idealistic
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traditions in Germany. In this respect he did not hold for the possibility of a universal scientific methodology according to the analogy of a *mathesis universalis*. Neither his model of science nor his cognitional theory or notion of truth was Cartesian (Lamb, 1977). Nevertheless, Dilthey's differentiation of the cultural sciences from the natural sciences in terms of a verifiable reference to living experience as the certain ground or foundation for the former was not without Cartesian connotations. Gadamer objects to Dilthey's contention that such a lived experience could assure the *Geisteswissenschaften* methodological foundations in the manner in which Dilthey formulated that experience. In Gadamer's view, Dilthey's reliance upon an introspective (yet empirical) psychology could not do justice to the complexities of historical experience as a manifold of *Wirkungszusammenhänge*. He sees in Dilthey's position too great an esteem for that ideal of science which has sought to articulate its own foundations apart from (and often in critical opposition to) historical traditions (Gadamer, 1965:205-228; Lawrence).

However much Lonergan might agree with many of Gadamer's criticisms of Dilthey, perhaps the greatest contribution of Lonergan to this debate is to have removed meta-methodology from its dependency upon either the analogy of art or the analogy of science. Yet he still sees the need to focus on the sciences--and specifically the natural sciences--in his preliminary derivation of the notion of method (1957a:361-365; 1972:3-6).

Lonergan's interest in doing so is methodical insofar as the natural sciences exemplify well the categorical methods in their recurrent and related operations of experimentation, observation, hypothesis formation, and verification through further experimentation and observation. They offer a ready and highly developed field for deriving a preliminary notion of method. But Lonergan's interest is also critical because the need for the human sciences and
history to develop their own first-order methods cannot be answered simply by delimiting those methods from the methods of the natural sciences; there are significant similarities between the operations of the natural scientist and those of the human scientist (Albert, 1971:106-149; Apel, 1973:1.12-15).

Lonergan sees in the rightful differentiation of first-order methods a challenge to move beyond a reliance on analogy (whether in terms of science, art, or tradition) in the determination of a transcendental method of methods or metamethodology. The move, he admits, is difficult for it entails a completely new understanding of method. It is not a set of objectivistc rules or axioms to be followed blindly by the adepts of the method, but an appropriation of the creative and critical structures of human subjectivity, in every aspect of theory or praxis. In other words, Lonergan's use of modern science as the starting point for deriving a preliminary notion of method and his consequent elaboration of a metamethodology recognizes the crucial importance of meeting head-on the dialectic of the Enlightenment.

Functional Specialties and Collaboration. This brings us to the fourth and final area of the possible contributions of the present study to the program of political theology. Metz's program hinges on the possibility of a critical mediation in theology from the present into the future as well as from the past into the present, and on the critical mediation of narrative and argument, of autonomy and specialty. That implies not only a critical hermeneutics and history, but also a dialectics and communication for theology. Such a critical mediation implies a quest for methodological foundations capable of being both transcendental and empirical through a thematization of the unity of identity and nonidentity, and thereby sublating the Cartesian ideal of a science universelle or of a metamethod...
based on the reduction of all forms of knowledge and action to those in the natural sciences and mathematics.

The foregoing discussions are not as extrinsic to theology as they might appear. Descartes excluded theology from method (Gusdorf, 1969a:244-249; Lonergan, 1957a:388-389, 422-423; Löwith, 1967:24-40; Weischedel: 165-175; Walter Schulz). French positivism under the influence of Voltaire and d'Alembert and British empiricism from Hobbes to Hume rejected any appeal to the Divine Mind and affirmed the sufficiency of objectivistic methods in the investigation of all phenomena (de Lubac: 75-159; Misch; Matson: 6-65; Cassirer, 1932:123-262). The future became a threat man had to control through the manipulative methods of technological reason (Willms: 105-111, 176-215; Blumenberg, 1966:11-200, 405-432). German thought through Idealism to Marxism reveals in a more profound manner a somewhat similar pattern. Kant's response to empiricism and positivism was to reinstate the primacy of thought; he conceived of method as systematizing principles and sought to establish the priority of critical method over skeptical and dogmatic methods (Kaulbach: 99-105; Patton; Sala). Yet Cartesian overtones were apparent in the dichotomy between noumenon and phenomenon, between Vernunft and Verstand. The intuitus originarius of God could not suffice to ground the moral imperatives on which Kant based both his philosophy of history (from the past in the present into the future) and his philosophical theology. Yet Kant's system was not closed; the gaps between noumena and phenomena, between reason and understanding, between freedom and necessity, between theoretical and practical reason were all an integral part of his thought (Weyand: 22-39, 137-185; Weischedel: 191-213; Horkheimer, 1968b:306-318; Adorno and Horkheimer: 88-104). Yet nonidentity, when it is not related to identity in some heuristic and critical unity, is of little defense against the totalitarian ambitions of a closed identity-system, what O. Marquard has
aptly designated as *Kontrollvernunft* (1958; Bartuschat). Through Fichte and Schelling to Hegel, Idealism worked out the implications of intellectual intuition in a brilliant but futile effort to overcome the dichotomies in Kant (Adorno, 1966:293-351; Becker, 1969:66-85). Unable to thematize a heuristic and critical unity of theory and praxis, of archaeology (past into present) and eschatology (present into future), Hegel could no more account for a contingent affirmation of absolute reality than he could incorporate into his system the ongoing and probable character of modern science (Theunissen, 1971:325-447; Riedel: 204-215) /36/.

Intellectual, moral, and religious exigences found often completely inadequate and contradictory expressions in Idealism; and their diverse developments still define much of the contemporary situation. Intellectually, the thrust of modern science and technology with its increasing specialization of knowledge and skills seemed to defy any attempt at synthesis; the empirical methods of historical research and interpretation issued in an historicism (Löwith, 1958:62-152; Whitehead: 119-141; Heussi, 1932; Collingwood: 86-204; Picht: 281-407). Morally, the social and political praxis of modern man seemed ever more constrained by an increasingly industrialized technocracy and bureaucratic polity which allowed the satisfaction of only those needs consonant with the growth of its own structures rather than the growth of human freedom and communal responsibility (Ritter: 281-309; Ollman: 43-51, 131-146; Habermas, 1970a:219-242) /37/. Religiously, there was the retreat of religion from the public to the private, personal sphere of human performance, with theology attempting to appropriate the critical mediation of the past into the present yet unable to articulate the dialectical significance of religion in a world of increasingly secularist meanings and values (Thulstrup; Metz, 1970c:51-71, 99-116; Xhaufflaire and Derksen).
As the intellectual exigence arose from modern empirical science and historical studies, so the moral exigence was highlighted by Marxism and the character of late capitalism, while the religious exigence found expression in existentialist, personalist and secularization theologies. Political theology must take these into account in a critical manner by means of theological foundations which neither Idealism nor these movements have provided. Lonergan has thematized a notion of understanding and reason capable of integrating the three exigences. The task of articulating an understanding of reason consonant with the exigences of modernity and contemporaneity requires not only a radical appreciation of the autonomy of human cognitional and practical performance but also, on the basis of that autonomy, a new and critically grounded explicitation of the religious exigence as at once personal and social (Weischedel: 165-457) /38/.

Insofar as political theology is seriously committed to the critical consciousness of modernity, it has to bridge the gulf between the empirico-critical methods of science and the domain of religious belief and practice (Metz, 1973b). A critical mediation from the present into the future cannot be based upon the unquestioned assumptions of both Cartesianism and Idealism regarding the cooperation of man and God; nor can it be based upon the disregard by positivism and empiricism of the orientation to totality underpinning the questioning drive of intellectual and moral performance /39/.

Lonergan sees intellectual, moral, and religious conversion as the very foundation of theology (Lonergan, 1972:130-132, 235-244, 267-293; Picht: 318-342). He has been able to formulate succinctly and precisely how both the empiricist and idealist traditions have confused the unity-in-difference between subjectivity and objectivity, and how that confusion accounts for the claim that the
objectivity of such disciplines as mathematics and science is not attributed to philosophy, ethics, or theology (Lonergan, 1957a:xxi-xxix, 84-86, 245-254, 319-347, 372-374, 401-430; 1972:93-96, 262-265, 314-318, 237-244; 1965:202-239). Moreover, both empiricism and existentialism or personalism do not accord authentic subjectivity the status of objectivity on account of this same confusion of the immediacy of the object in sensation and the critical mediacy of the object in the horizon of critical rationality.

Still that context survives only as long as there survive the ambiguities underlying naive realism, naive idealism, empiricism, critical idealism, absolute idealism. Once those ambiguities are removed, once an adequate self-appropriation is effected, once one distinguishes between object and objectivity in the world of immediacy and, on the other hand, object and objectivity in the world mediated by meaning and motivated by value, then a totally different context arises. For it is now apparent that in the world mediated by meaning and motivated by value, objectivity is simply the consequence of authentic subjectivity, of genuine attention, genuine intelligence, genuine reasonableness, genuine responsibility. Mathematics, science, philosophy, ethics, theology differ in many manners; but they have the common feature that their objectivity is the fruit of attentiveness, intelligence, reasonableness, and responsibility. (Lonergan, 1972:265)

It is within this totally different context that the question of God can be critically approached. The uncritical Cartesian and/or Kantian appeal to God as mediating subject and object (as thing-in-itself) is dispelled without recourse to any (Hegelian) absolute system, because the autonomy of authentic human subjectivity is grasped in its open and heuristically related and recurrent operations. Insofar as this autonomy is attentive, intelligent, reasonable and responsible it yields cumulative and progressive results in all fields of human theory and praxis; insofar as those fields are the result of inattentiveness, stupidity, irrationality and irresponsibility, that autonomy is
contrafactual. The thematization of that autonomy is constitutive of metamethod. In this way Lonergan can overcome the dichotomies of the past without sacrificing the real differences between the many fields of human endeavor and history to the tyranny of a great idea or an absolute system or a complacent tolerance. There is no reason to belittle human autonomy, to sublate knowledge in order to make room for faith; instead, by insisting on the full actualization of autonomy and knowledge one opens up the concrete possibility of the question of God (Dupre: 13-147).

It is in the light of such metamethodological foundations that Lonergan can elaborate the many methods of theology which critically mediate the past into the present and the present into the future. For theology is not only cast in the oratio obliqua of what tradition has handed on, but also in the oratio recta whereby the believing communities constitute living tradition through their own words and actions. As the functional specialties of research, interpretation, history, and dialectics interrelate the critical methods for mediating the past into the present, so foundations, doctrines, systematics, and communications are concerned with the critical mediating functional specialties from the present into the future. Lonergan's application of metamethod to theology in terms of functional specialization provides a critical and ongoing framework for incorporating the various theological field and subject specialties into the general scheme of archaeology (past into present) and eschatology (present into future) (Theunissen, 1971:325-429; Ricoeur, 1969b). It is critical because it takes into account in a foundational way the auto-authenticating reality of human subjectivity; it is ongoing because it sets up the various specialized methods in a feedback pattern (Lonergan, 1972:133-145, 364-367).
This is not to assume that Lonergan's metamethod provides all the answers to the questions posed by political theology—on the contrary. Lonergan himself has only sketched in the broadest way the social implications of his approach. In relation to the specific programs of political theology, one must elaborate the inherently social character of religious and specifically Christian conversion. This would have the effect of enabling one to see more clearly how doctrines are not only historical expressions but also embodiments of what Metz refers to as the subversive and dangerous memory of Christian good news; how systematics in its quest for a probable and analogical understanding of doctrines is socio-historically conditioned; and how communications is not only a matter of preaching and teaching but also and primarily of doing the Word, of praxis /41/. The functional specializations assure that such a creative praxis will be communicative of a systematic planning and policy priorities that express mankind's foundational cognitive, moral, and religious self-transcendence. Man's freedom as essentially gifted and effectively autonomous need no longer absolutize finite success (hi)stories. For the very becoming of his being-in-the-world as quest(ion) necessarily involves the God-question.

Conclusions

The unmasking of the crypto-theological pretensions in the success (hi)story of modern and contemporary science and technology on the part of political theology, and the articulation of a metamethodology capable of critically relating autonomous science with theological specialization, offers the possibility of a hope for mankind faced with the gigantic complexities of contemporary history. If that possibility is to be actualized, it will in no small measure depend upon the ability of existing religious traditions and institutions to seriously appropriate the
dynamics of religious conversion, and to relate that conversion to the exigences of mankind's intellectual and moral achievements and aspirations. The myths of Prometheus and Atlas are terribly deficient, for in the face of the nonidentity of suffering, guilt, and death those myths collapse into the cynicism of Sisyphus whose courage is meaningless because it lacks the depth of an ultimate concern and love.

The many theoretical issues discussed in this study—a methodical critique of contemporary metascience that calls for a recognition of the transcendental exigence, a methodical critique of theologizing that would bring the God-question to bear on contemporary knowing and doing—these issues cannot be concluded by a neat summation of the points scored. They touch on the very well-springs of our human being-in-the-world; they challenge us to deepen our own attentiveness, intelligence, rationality, responsibility and love; they intimate the transcendental dimensions of those structures of human becoming, as well as the catastrophic consequences of an objectivist perversion of those dimensions. Time is running out.
NOTES

/1/ His designation of the Anglo-Saxon schools as Logical Empiricist is not meant to minimize the very pointed criticisms Ordinary Language philosophers have made of logical empiricism. However, insofar as they repudiate any reference to the operational patterns of the language-user as subject, they still subscribe to the objectivism of the Formalists. Anthony Kenny shows how Wittgenstein's later critique of "private languages" is based on a conceptualist understanding of the relation between experience and knowledge (1972).

/2/ Apel insists that the challenge of reflection is not sidestepped in his understanding of linguisticality (1973:2.311-329). But unless he defines the "communal Logos" within the Kommunikationsgemeinschaft (354-356) in terms of the subject-as-subject, he could fall into the objectivism he criticizes in the early Wittgenstein (1973:1.242-245). Note also how both Habermas, in his interests, and Apel, in his transcendental language-game, are led to an affirmation of transcendentality as a heuristic unity of identity and nonidentity not unlike Lonergan's relation of originating meaning to ordinary meaning (Lonergan, 1972:255-262).

/3/ Lonergan's originating meaning can be devalued into a "private language" only by those still caught in confusing publicity and objectivity with extroverssion. Lonergan's analysis of objectivity in Insight is thus applicable to language publicity in terms of syntactics, semantics, and sigmatics, while his unity of identity and nonidentity between language and meaning could be articulated in a methodical pragmatics.

/4/ These four dimensions of semiotics are handled by Klaus in a formalist objectivist fashion. However, when they are treated in the context of method, then they provide an isomorphic relation to the related and recurrent operations of the subject-as-subject capable of more incisively grounding the project Apel envisages (1973:1.9-76; 2.178-219). On the syntactical aspects of LE, cf. Radnitzky (1.72-75); also Ricoeur (1969a:31-100).

/5/ Semantics would then be dealing with hypothetical meanings, or, in terms of metascience, with modes of possible being-in-the-world, and with the logical range of such possibilities of meaning and language.

/6/ Heelan's elaboration of a Quantum Logic with its nondistributive lattice correlations is not primarily concerned with possible meanings or logical relations, but with logical framework transpositions capable of mapping
out the actual logical relations operative in any given set or sets of actual language systems (1970, 1971).

/7/ See Spinoza, Ethica more geometrico demonstrata, I, definitio 6; and II, propositio 47, nota. See Leibniz, Philosophische Schriften, 4.403ff. On Hegel, see Weischedel (290-305, 356-360).

/8/ To give an example of how these five typologies might apply to theology in the apostolic age: the Judaic Christians followed paleomorphic tendencies; the Hellenic Christians represent neomorphism; Peter and the Jerusalem community tended more toward fideomorphism; criticomorphic theology can be found in Paul, whereas politicomorphism issued in Roman orthodoxy. The typology could also be applied to Patristic theology, scholastic theology, Reformation theology, and the Enlightenment period, but such applications diachronically lie beyond the scope of this study.

/9/ "One may lament it but one can hardly be surprised that at the beginning of this century, when churchmen were greeted with a heresy that logically entailed all possible heresies, they named the new monster modernism" (Lonergan, 1974b:94).

/10/ It is interesting to note how the Thomas Merton of Seven Storey Mountain and The Waters of Siloe emphasized a nonidentity between religious faith and the world, only to discover in his middle period (Sign of Jonas) the presence of the world and a particular cultural stance in monasticism; and finally in his later writings (Conjectures of a Guilty Bystander) to stress the need for a critical witness vis-a-vis the oppression and dehumanizing tendencies of contemporary industrial society.

/11/ This is not to imply that these theologians, when they draw upon past theological systems or syntheses, either uncritically or even simply in a critical historical fashion attempt to restore those past syntheses. Rather, they function as the dialectically normative moment in their critique of contemporary society both inside and outside the Church.

/12/ The following reflections are principally directed toward the German theological context both Protestant and Catholic. For it is in that context that the shift in the methodological self-understanding of theology occasioned by political theology is most evident.

/13/ This problem in Pannenberg is closely related to the philosophical hermeneutics of Hans-Georg Gadamer in his Wahrheit und Methode. The problem might be formulated as:
can a universal history that appeals to Gadamer's *Horizontverschmelzung* adequately handle the concrete dialectics operative in history? Is there not only a hermeneutical "merging of horizons" in history, but also a dialectical "conflict of horizons"?

/14/ There is, of course, a way in which Rahner is hereby insisting upon the need for theology to preserve the nonidentity essential not only for the recognition of mystery but also to preserve an openness to the future. Yet in Rahner this is not adequately related to an identifiable praxis.

/15/ Parallels could be drawn between the present discussion in hermeneutics on the relation of history and critical freedom, and the Medieval problematic on grace and freedom. If historicality constitutes man—"In Wahrheit gehört die Geschichte nicht uns, sondern wir gehören ihr" (Gadamer, 1965:261)—then how does one go about a critique of false prejudgments? Note also that I translate *Geschichtlichkeit* as "historicality" rather than "historicity" since the latter more commonly renders the German "historisch."

/16/ Notice how within the perspective of political theology the critique of Cartesianism is not restricted to the specifically hermeneutical phenomena of understanding, but applies to the inherent limitations of formal system theories and their logics (Peukert, 1969; Metz, 1969a, 1973c; Habermas and Luhmann).

/17/ Note how this methodological perspective provides a framework for political theology which is not immediately tied down to either a practical-critical philosophy of history or an anthropology since it is capable of grounding both (Lonergan, 1957a; Lepenies and Nolte; Metz, 1970a:63).

/18/ This was certainly not the intention of Kant, and it is not surprising that Neo-Kantians such as E. Cassirer prefer to drop the phenomenon-noumenon dichotomy (1953:110-113). For a critique of Kant's practical philosophy based on the dichotomy, see Adorno (1966:281-292).

/19/ "Die Gewißheit der Wissenschaft hat immer einen cartesianischen Zug" (Gadamer, 1965:225; 1967:49-50). This is not the place to criticize this interpretation of modern science. Suffice it to note that B. Lonergan has come up with a very different interpretation of both scientific performance and method (1957a:408-411). Moreover, his notion of method has been fruitfully applied not only to problems in the interpretation of physics, but also the contemporary hermeneutical problems (Heelan, 1963, 1970).
Metz sees political theology as relating everything to the eschatological message of Jesus by means of the new starting point of critical reason since the Enlightenment, and as this new approach to reason found articulation in Hegel and Marx (1970b). Metz does not do this by attempting to reestablish the naive identification of society and religion. Instead he fully accepts the challenge of critical reason and through an appropriation of that reason seeks the validity of a theological method and religious praxis which, as a zweite Reflexion, will respect the post-critical validity of narrative (1973a). Compare P. Ricoeur's second naïveté in regard to religious symbolism (1960:323-332).

This could well be the methodological significance of Metz's determinate negation, for this among other factors accounts for his interest in interdisciplinary collaboration (1970b).

Critical consciousness is not some idea of class but, as Horkheimer pointed out in connection with critical theory, it is the "totality" which I would suggest is heuristically anticipated by the transcendental imperatives of attentiveness, intelligence, rationality, and responsibility (Horkheimer, 1968; Lonergan, 1957a:267-270, 348, 639-641, 684-686; Feil and Weth: ix-x, 112; Peukert, 1976:280-282; Habermas, 1968b).


Thus the very limitations of any purely systematic mediation of knowing demand a correlation of science with other modes of conscious experience and knowledge (Metz, 1971:16-17).

Metz depends on Bloch's notion of a noch-nicht-Bewusstsein as a transcendence without a Transcendent (129-203). Note that while the heuristic character of Lonergan's metamethod in no way involves a Kantian appeal to God in the mediation of subject and object, in the movement from experience to knowledge, still it does not skirt the transcendental exigence. One has then a unity of identity and nonidentity between immanence and transcendence that is critically mediated.

On the profound differences between Lonergan's transcendental method and German *Transzendentalphilosophie*, see Lonergan (1972:13-14 n. 4; Lamb, 1972:321 n. 1).

Thus Lonergan can derive a preliminary notion of method from the operations of the natural sciences (1972:3-6). And he can bring his appropriation of the related and recurrent operations of the subject-as-subject to bear on problems in the natural sciences (1957a:3-172).

Since Lonergan does not approach the subject in a theoretic or conceptualist manner, he can incorporate the "known unknown" dynamism of the human mind (what Kant struggled with in his idea of the noumenal) as an effective check on any tendency to a total identity thought-pattern (1957a:531-535).

Implicit definition is what is operative in dialectical method, where the reality of the terms is not distinct from the reality of the relation itself (Lonergan, 1957a:492-495). B. Ollman has shown how this method was central to Marx's social thought, i.e., his philosophy is based on internal relations (27-43). On the unity of identity and nonidentity in Marx, see Ollman (52-71). If Metz's political theology will articulate a critical-dialectical mediation from the present into the future, then Lonergan's metamethod has much to offer.

These philosophical roots of political theology have yet to be fully thematized (Peukert, 1969b:185-216). Metz does, however, mention his indebtedness to Hegel, Marx, Bloch, and the Frankfurt School (1970b).

The unity is here interpreted as the subject-as-subject, so that identity is the subject-as-object, while nonidentity is the object-as-object. This is not, therefore, to equate unity with identity (as in Idealism) since the subject-as-object is really distinct from the
subject-as-subject, i.e., immediate conscious experience is never totally sublated in knowledge (as it is in Idealism). Although the distinction is real, one does not end up in absolute nonidentity since the operations of the subject-as-subject constitute the subject-as-object and mediate the object-as-object. That is, objectivity is self-transcending subjectivity (1957a:488-490; 1972:37-38, 265, 292, 338, 179-180). Hence the unity of the subject is not absolute since it is only virtually unconditioned, i.e., its conditions happen to be fulfilled. Compare Habermas's interpretation of Marx's notion of the unity of the subject (1968a:44-45) with Lonergan's (1957a:336-338).

This is clear in the persistent quest of LE for a reductionist unified science, where the objectivism of method is shown to move from mathematical logic to an analytical logic of language through a sublation of the Kantian critique of reason (Radnitzky, 1.72-92; Mittelstrass: 121-132, 207-211, 377-528, 555-578). An example of this objectivism of LE is clearly seen in W. Stegmüller, "Wichtig ist dabei, daß für jeden einzelnen Schritt einer längeren Ableitung die Überprüfung der Korrektheit dieses Ableitungsschrittes auf rein mechanische Weise vollzogen werden kann" (6; see also Hegel: 145; Husserl, 1967:83-85; Schnädelbach: 105-130; Horkheimer and Adorno: 9-49).

An obvious historical example of such an attempt was Leibniz's effort at composing the elements of philosophy more mathematico, which in turn could provide the basis for an ecumenical theology formulated according to mathematical methods, projects to which he alluded in his small but significantly entitled work Specimen demonstrationum politicarum of 1669. Less obvious but far more prevalent, is the contemporary scientific notion that the physical-mathematical sciences provide the norm for all valid human knowledge (Gusdorf, 1969a:247-250; 1969b:17-119, 347-393; Habermas, 1971:11-36; Radnitzky: 1.22-25).

The failure to adequately account for the transcendence of subject to object in the sphere of human experience led to the breakdown of Hegel's conception of God-consciousness (Weischedel: 384-385). Hegel saw no possibility for a renewal of theology through interdisciplinary collaboration with the sciences, but only through a systematic thematization of absolute truth (Oelmüller, 1969:269-270). German Idealism never did realize the shift from classical to modern science (Lonergan, 1965:252-267; Taminiaux; Diemer: 3-62).

The duality of Kant's position on practical reason and the relation of morality to politics led, through the Idealist identity of Hegel, to the praxis-oriented
relational view of Marx. Marx, however, was unable to elaborate a nonclassical mediation of theory-praxis (Böhler: 9-14, 104-117, 302-328, 328-350).

/38/ The Marxist critique of religion should, therefore, be viewed within the context of the Marxist critique of idealist self-consciousness. Böhler indicates the probable transition in Marx from a synergy of God and man in the "historiosophy" of Cieszkowski to a synergy of man and the logic of history. Hence the danger of an objectivistic totalizing of history (135-139, 152-187).

/39/ On the problematic of totality and critique, only if the totality is heuristically anticipated in the subject-as-subject can the normativity be found in attentiveness, intelligence, rationality, and responsibility in such a way that it would criticize any totalitarianism.

/40/ It might seem strange to think of doctrines, systematics, and communications as a complex of methods for critically mediating the present into the future. But these are operative within the horizons defined by the foundational reality of intellectual, moral, and religious conversion. As such they are directed towards the communication of an authentic and liberating message and praxis to society. Moreover, the functional specialties allow for critical interdisciplinary collaboration between theology and the other forms of knowing (Lonergan, 1972:361-367; Lamb, 1977).

/41/ It is important to understand the conception of critique that is the basis of metamethod. As providing the framework for creative collaboration, metamethod sees the critical justification of the entire theological enterprise as an ongoing process. It cannot be theoretically deduced--unless one adopts a classicist conception of critique. Rather theology must enter into a mutual mediation of religious knowledge and praxis within a heuristic of mankind's socio-cultural progress and decline on this planet. To my mind, Lonergan has brilliantly provided the conditions of the possibility for such a critical project.
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