LONERGAN WORKSHOP
Volume 18

edited by
Fred Lawrence

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EDITOR'S NOTE

Volume 18 begins with two poems by poets who originally came to the Workshop because of their interest in one of the few poets among Lonergan's students, Sebastian Moore, OSB. They shared them at the Annual Banquet, and here they make them available to readers of Lonergan Workshop.

Paul St Amour of St Joseph's University in Philadelphia completed his dissertation on Kierkegaard at Fordham University. Students of Lonergan are familiar with his references in Insight and in Topics in Education to Kierkegaard regarding radical changes in orientation or conversion. Besides giving us a splendid brief account of Kierkegaard, Paul's paper lets us assess the affinities between these two philosophers of conversion and appreciate the differences between them.

Recently appointed to a Systematics position at Regis College, Toronto, John Dadosky's dissertation was on the relevance of Lonergan for interreligious dialogue and dialectics. Once again, those interested in Lonergan became used to multiple references (in his notes on method and theology) to the works of Mircea Eliade, the influential professor of comparative religion at the University of Chicago. Here John suggestively relates Eliade's approach to religion with the later Lonergan's philosophy of God.

Master of the intriguing title, Boston College colleague Charles Hefling has been slowly, carefully, and painstakingly clarifying for himself and the rest of us an entire series of technical systematic issues in Lonergan's theology in preparation for his own personal work on Christology. In this paper he continues along this path by reflecting on the theology of grace. Charles may consider himself to be skating 'over thin ice' here, but readers of this paper are sure to disagree.

In her paper, Christine Jamieson, Director of the Lonergan Centre for Ethical Reflection at Concordia University in Montreal (now also on the Board of Directors of the Thomas More Institute for adult education and life-long learning), tackles the thorny issue of the psychological conditions for the exercise of genuine freedom. Christine enters into
serious dialogue on this issue with the renowned French-speaking psychologist from Romania, Julia Kristeva. Christine clarifies Kristeva's fascinating contribution of to an appropriation of oneself as in radical need of liberation.

Our former Boston College graduate student in philosophy, Paulette Kidder, is now an Associate Dean at Seattle University. She enters the list of those who are putting Lonergan's thought into the unlikely context of deconstructionist philosopher Jacques Derrida. With her hallmark clarity and concision Paulette demonstrates how this apparently odd couple of philosophers who are open to the religious manifest common concerns in coming to terms with the mysterious reality of gift in spite of important differences.

Another Boston College philosophy graduate abandoned a successful law career to pursue a doctorate in philosophy—Michael Maxwell. He has become a Dean at Marian College in Indianapolis. Those interested in understanding Lonergan's regularly repeated, lapidary contrasts between Aristotle's notion of science and that of modern empirical science will appreciate Maxwell's elaboration of it in this paper because of its detailed and scholarly mastery of Aristotle's own account in his own terms.

As a teacher of undergraduates in philosophy at Maryland's Salisbury College, Jerome Miller has inspired a large number of talented students to pursue graduate and teaching careers in philosophy. Whenever he speaks at the Summer Workshops, we always get a taste of the tremendous existential appeal of his philosophic thought and speech. Here, in terms of a phenomenological ontology of the "throe," he confronts what happens to the vexed issue of normativity once one takes seriously the way Lonergan's acknowledgment of the contingency of humanly attainable truth affects our ability decisively to face life's precariousness.

Sebastian Moore has contributed a long series of explorations of desire to the Lonergan Workshops since the 1970s. These forays into uncharted territory are always deeply conditioned by the frequent ineptitude demonstrated by the Catholic Church's handling both of the issues surrounding sexuality and of the discussion of these issues in theology. Hence, Sebastian's apparently extreme arguments are to be carefully contextualized in dialectical opposition to that institutional clumsiness. They are provocative soundings.
Although we have already published an article by James Pambrun (systematician at St Paul University in Ottawa), this paper is his first to be presented at the summer Workshop. Jim is a Ricoeur scholar, and student of both French scripture scholar Paul Beauchamp and distinguished Catholic philosopher of science and of language, Jean Ladriere (whose magnum opus Lonergan read in preparation for his lectures on mathematical logic). His paper shows him to be a fascinating writer and presenter of the Lonergan-oriented themes of theology and philosophy as grounded in the experience of more or less converted interiority. For those for whom those topics have been forbidding, Jim makes them more accessible; for those already steeped in them, he brings to bear an original perspective.

Thanks to all the authors for their patience in waiting for the publication of their papers. Gratitude again to Kerry Cronin and all those who help to make the Workshop papers available.

Fred Lawrence
Editor
LEAPING,

falling
from the tower,
did he see himself
a child at Montauk
throwing a beached
crab back
into the waves?

or sulking
in his new school
at Mamaroneck
when he put
the stars in
upside down
and Miss
Traynor said
We don’t draw
that way here –

or hurtling over
handlebars
at the corner
of Dekalb
as the grey van
smashed
into his bicycle?

or did he see,
far below
the canyons
of Manhattan,
beruffled Dutchmen
bowling on the village
green –
and further still,
slender Pohatma,
copper skin
glistening
in the morning light,
fishing
on the river bank?

-Dorothy Judd Hall
9-11-2001
THE POET

Passions of the mind!
Wordfire, notions of arrows,
Jolting insights, swift, in flight,
Torments of cognition,
Frenzy of words –
The vertigo of it!
Spilling over time now,
Time before, time unknown,
Time that is not time and
I, slave to these passions
Spin out of control,
In lust with words.
Over and over I harness
These apocalyptic nags
Whinnying madly for the dash,
The prize, the printout.
In the beginning and forever
The fever of the word
Electric, relentless.
In the bristling early hours
The demonic need to write
The blessed curse of the word!
The hand, the lamp, the pen, the paper
Alert to serve the beast,
My urgent, raging bounty,
My genie, my dowry.

-Patricia Benzmiller

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James Pambrun
KIERKEGAARD AND LONERGAN ON THE PROSPECT OF COGNITIONAL-EXISTENTIAL INTEGRATION

Paul St. Amour
St. Joseph University

PART I: THE DIALECTIC OF THOUGHT AND EXISTENCE

I. Introduction

In the Concluding Unscientific Postscript Kierkegaard challenged the completeness of the Hegelian System by arguing that a merely conceptual dialectic can not possibly comprehend the totality because it remains incapable even of comprehending what it means for a single individual to exist in a genuinely ethical or religious manner. Employing a dialectical method of his own, Kierkegaard attempted to demonstrate that the Hegelian System does not grasp the identity of the rational and the real, as it claims to, but in is fact ironically sublated by a more comprehensive dialectic, by an existential dialectic that extends beyond the merely rational. By clarifying this more ultimate dialectic of thought and existence, Kierkegaard sought to demonstrate how the existential dimension lies stubbornly outside the System and contradicts its claim to totality.

I would like to suggest that Kierkegaard's discovery of the dialectic of thought and existence in the context of his polemic against Hegel marks a truly pivotal moment in the history of philosophy and an important advance in what Lonergan termed the "third stage of meaning." The third stage of meaning, we recall, emerged as
developments in modern empirical science called forth a "critical exigence" to raise foundational questions concerning cognitional theory, epistemology, and the possibility of a critical metaphysics.¹ In the third stage of meaning "the modes of common sense and theory remain, science asserts its autonomy from philosophy, and there occur philosophies that leave theory to science and take their stand on interiority."² Lonergan distinguished two chronological phases within the third stage of meaning.³ The first phase followed upon the emergence of the newly autonomous modern empirical sciences. Running from Descartes' Discourse on Method to Kant's Critique of Pure Reason, this first phase was concerned primarily with questions of cognitional activity and epistemological objectivity. Its reflection was motivated in no small part by the need to negotiate an apparent conflict between the world disclosed by scientific theory on the one hand, and the world disclosed by seemingly more basic patterns of common sense understanding, on the other.⁴

The second phase of the third stage of meaning marked a shift in the self-understanding of modernity and in the concerns it would come to emphasize. While the first phase was dominated by questions relevant to the cognitional subject as attempting to know the universe in a scientifically objective manner, the second phase advanced the implications of Kant's Copernican revolution, especially the notions of autonomy and transcendental freedom. Lonergan notes some significant emphases and prominent contributors to this second phase:

Kant's Copernican revolution marks a dividing line. Hegel turned from substance to the subject. Historians and philologists worked out the autonomous methods for human studies. Will and decision, action and results, came up for emphasis in Kierkegaard, Schopenhauer, Nietzsche, Blondel, the

² Lonergan, Method in Theology, 85.
⁴ Lonergan, Method in Theology, 96.
pragmatists. Brentano inspired Husserl, and intentionality analysis routed faculty psychology.5

Such an account of modern philosophy as composed of two major phases, a cognitional or theoretical phase followed by a practical or existential phase, can perhaps too readily suggest that a simple genetic complementarity obtains between the two phases. Yet Lonergan described this shift from the first to the second phase of the third stage of meaning as being primarily a shift of emphasis. A merely historical shift of emphasis however, does not guarantee any adequate understanding of how the distinct concerns of two phases are to be integrated, or even that the need for such an integration will be adequately appreciated. A more subtle problem, I think, is that familiarity with Lonergan's account of transcendental method can make the relation between the cognitional and the existential appear so tidy that the problem of cultural integration, to which it is a response, is liable to be overlooked.

Part I of this paper will attempt to take seriously Lonergan's claim that "it is only through the long and confused twilight of philosophic initiation that one can find one's way into interiority."6 I will argue that an adequately integral understanding of the complementarity of the two phases of the third stage of meaning has not been borne out in the actual history of philosophy. While first-phase philosophers have emphasized the cognitive, the theoretical, the speculative dimension of human nature, and second-phase thinkers have emphasized the practical, the self-constitutive, the existential, few have made it their concern to foster the harmonious integration of the human subject as both a knower and a chooser. This lack of integration generates persistent difficulties. Where there is not an adequate understanding of how acts of meaning are to be integrally coordinated with acts of valuing, and vice-versa, there tends to arise the

6 Lonergan, Method in Theology, 85.
assumption that speculative concerns and ethico-religious concerns are not merely distinct, but separate and unrelated.

The absence of an integral understanding of the relation of thought to existence has resulted in a peculiar dialectic. Grand metaphysical systems, especially those prone to rationalistic excess, tend to occasion the emergence of subsequent thinkers, often ethically or theologically motivated, who arrive on the scene not so much to correct the conceptual mistakes of the previous system, as to reassert the significance of subjectivity and to expose the existential inadequacy of self-absolutizing rationality. While this dialectic of thought and existence came into full philosophical consciousness only in the 19th century, and is exemplified most strikingly in Kierkegaard's polemic against the totalizing aspirations of Hegelianism, I would like to suggest that the dialectic of thought and existence, of rationalistic excess and its subsequent disruption, of extroverted speculation and ethico-religious interiority, not only underpins the broad phases of modern philosophy but thoroughly punctuates the entire history of western philosophy. While I realize that any adequate presentation of this thesis would require a Kierkegaardian re-writing of the history of philosophy that would employ the dialectic of thought and existence from the *Postscript* as its interpretive schema, here it must be sufficient merely to indicate in adumbrated form some of the more obvious moments instantiating this dialectic.

**II. The Dialectic of thought and Existence Instantiated in Pre-Kantian Philosophy**

The dialectic of thought and existence is operative to the biography of Socrates who, while still a young man, turned his back on cosmological speculation and questions of natural science to dedicate his life instead to the pursuit of an illusive moral wisdom and the imperative of living an examined life. While Plato tended to conflate the distinction between speculative wisdom and moral goodness, Aristotle clearly distinguished *sophia* from *phronsis* and argued that the exercise of the intellectual virtues within a *bios theoretikos* was the life most likely to be happy and god-like. The Aristotelian ideal of disinterested

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7 See Plato, *Phaedo* 96b-100b; *Apology* 21b-23c.
theoretical understanding as an end in itself was more or less abandoned in Hellenistic philosophy, where relevance tended to accrue to theory only to the extent that it grounded practical doctrines considered necessary for living out some particular vision of the good life.

Although the tradition of Christian Platonism maintained a high regard for both theoretical and practical wisdom, these were oriented toward spiritual ends not infrequently construed in opposition to the material world. Hence the dialectic of thought and existence can also be recognized in a somewhat perennial religiously-motivated tendency to downplay the value of natural philosophy. Regarding the scientific knowledge of his day, Augustine confesses to God: “Is any man pleasing to You for knowing such things? Surely a man is unhappy even if he knows all these things but does not know You; and that man is happy who knows You even though he knows nothing of them.”8 In light of the exigencies of religious conversion, Augustine’s point is not difficult to appreciate. Yet one wonders whether this posture fostered (and perhaps continues to foster) a religious culture unnecessarily inimical to natural science.

The dialectic of thought and existence is compactly envisioned in Boethius’ *Consolation of Philosophy*. In the *Consolation* Lady Philosophy’s gown is embroidered with an ascending jagged line, resembling a stairway, which connects the Greek letter _ below, to letter _ above. As _ is thought to represent practical philosophy, and _ theoretical philosophy, the elevated position of the latter seems to indicate a certain ascendancy of the theoretical over the practical, probably in deference to the Aristotelian position. Yet the presence of a stairway connecting the two seems also to suggest their integral character. In fact the actual progression of the *Consolation* as a text traces an assent from Boethius’ existential crisis in the initial book to a resolution that Boethius can appropriate only by unraveling the difficult theoretical issues of the final books. The need for some kind of re-integration of practice with theory is also suggested by Lady Philosophy herself, who laments that her robes have been ripped by the

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disputing factions of Hellenistic philosophy. These fragmentary schools have no real appreciation for theory, and no eye for the whole; they do violence to the integrity of philosophy and attempt to pull it in incompatible directions.

The procedures, priorities, tensions, and disputes of the medieval era also instantiate the dialectic of thought and existence. Scholasticism, in contrast to the primarily practical concerns of Hellenistic philosophy, was motivated by a desire to preserve and perpetuate the textual and institutional conditions for maintaining the theoretical life. Metaphysics was considered methodologically primary, and the metaphysical categories employed within faculty psychology tended to obscure the performative and existential character of their referents. Yet there were also some significant challenges to medieval rationalism. Islamic and Jewish thinkers such as Al-Ghazali and Yehuda Halevi challenged the notion that Aristotelian metaphysics could provide a self-sufficient basis either for theology or for the sustaining of religious existence. Aquinas' opposition to the Averroist conception of the unicity of the intellect, as well as to Siger of Brabant's "double truth theory," marked a rejection of abstract rationalism and conceptualism and turned to a confident fidelity in the integral nature of the concretely existing subject. The Augustinian-Anselmian maxim of "faith seeking understanding" and Aquinas' synthesis of faith and reason were among the most integral and salutary responses to the unfolding problematic of the dialectic of thought and existence. Yet because the metaphysical framework of faculty psychology remained unsuitable for allowing the concretely existing subject to thematize itself in terms of its own conscious experience, questions concerning the precise meanings, relations, and relative priority of the various faculties could not be critically adjudicated. Consequently, various interminable tensions arose, ranging, for example, from the relatively innocuous dispute between Aquinas and Bonaventure concerning whether knowledge or love was to be primary in the beatific vision, to the more devastating emergence in the 14th century of forms of nominalism and voluntarism that managed to submerge Aquinas' intellectualism even up to the present day.

It is in the modern period however, that the two phases of the dialectic of thought and existence came to be explicitly apprehended as
such. A harbinger of the problematic which became central in Kantian and post-Kantian philosophy is compactly anticipated in the tension between Pascal and Descartes. In the fourth of his *Meditations*, Descartes argued that the source of error is neither the will as such, nor the understanding, but rather a tendency of the will to overreach the understanding by consenting to ideas which are not clear and distinct. His proposal was resolutely to confine volition strictly within the bounds of knowledge. Pascal however challenged the Cartesian project by suggesting: “God wishes to move the will rather than the mind. Perfect clarity would help the mind and harm the will.” While certainly no despiser of parsimony, Pascal insisted that “everything that is incomprehensible does not cease to exist,” that “the heart has its reasons of which reason knows nothing,” and that faith must surely require something quite other than the certitude supposedly attained by universal methodic doubt. “Reason’s last step is the recognition that there are an infinite number of things which are beyond it. It is merely feeble if it does not go as far as to realize that.”

While these brief examples suggest how Kierkegaard’s dialectic of thought and existence might be projected back onto the history of philosophy as an interpretive schema for understanding the existential dialectic within that history, the dialectic itself is first apprehended as such, and hence as problematic, only by Kant.

**III. The Dialectic of Thought and Existence Instantiated in Kant’s First and Second Critiques**

Lonergan identifies Kant as the pivotal figure in the transition from the first to the second phase of the third stage of meaning. Kant’s contribution to the first phase was a critical philosophy which attempted to negotiate both rationalism and empiricism, as well as the dogmatic and skeptical tendencies they respectively tended to

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encourage, by explicating the precise limitations of speculative reason. What resulted was an anti-skeptical phenomenalism that made way for science, conjoined to an anti-dogmatic noumenalism that made way for morality. Kant's contribution to the second phase was to determine how the exigencies of moral consciousness could be fulfilled given the seemingly deterministic implications of Newtonian physics. While dogmatic metaphysics had invited a skeptical reaction which potentially threatened the new physics, Newtonian physics seemingly invited materialism, mechanistic determinism, and atheism—all of which undermined the metaphysical underpinnings of morality. Hence in the Preface to the Second Edition of the *Critique of Pure Reason* Kant wrote: "I have therefore found it necessary to deny knowledge, in order to make room for faith."14

The faith (Glaube) in question, is only secondarily and indirectly religious faith. Primarily the faith Kant intended was faith in the postulates of practical reason.15 Pure reason in its practical employment (i.e., as determining the necessary conditions for morality) postulates freedom, God, and immortality. As the categorical imperative ought to be fulfilled, yet can be fulfilled only if freedom of the will obtains, transcendental freedom is postulated as a necessary a priori condition for the exercise of morality. Furthermore, as Kant attributed moral worth to actions only insofar as they are done purely for the sake of duty, virtue is not to be motivated by any desire for happiness, but strictly out of respect for the moral law as such. Yet as virtue remains the only criterion of our worthiness to be happy, and as virtue and happiness are seldom perfectly proportioned in this life, practical reason must postulate God and immortality as necessary conditions which could guarantee the conjunction of virtue and happiness in a future life after death.

It is important to note that the postulates of practical reason do not constitute theoretical knowledge of freedom, or God, or the immortal soul. Morality requires that we conduct our ethical lives as if freedom, God, and immortality were the case, yet this practical faith is of an

15 Kant, *Critique of Pure Reason*, 30-1.
entirely different order than speculative metaphysics. While the \textit{Critique of Practical Reason} deduces the postulates of practical reason as necessary conditions for morality, the \textit{Critique of Pure Reason} just as soundly insists that the existence of freedom, God, and the immortal soul can not be demonstrated through speculative reason. The restrictive function of Kant's first \textit{Critique} is only one edge of a two-edged sword however; it is equally the case that the \textit{non-existence} of freedom, God, and the immortal soul remain indemonstrable. Taken together then, Kant's first and second \textit{Critiques} safeguard morality by insuring that no theoretical objection to its necessary affirmations could be raised, either by those rightly impressed by the new physics, or by those rightly skeptical of dogmatic metaphysics and it trans-empirical employment of speculative reason. "Though [practical] reason... requires no assistance from speculative reason, it must yet be assured against its opposition, that reason may not be brought into conflict with itself."\textsuperscript{16}

Kant's differentiation of the practical from the speculative gives rise to questions concerning the relation and possible integration of these two spheres, questions not unrelated to our present concern with the Kierkegaardian dialectic of thought and existence. It should first be noted that Kant does not consider practical reason and speculative reason to be two separate faculties, but rather two distinct ways that reason judges while pursuing two distinct interests. The interest of practical reason is to determine the will in accord with duty, i.e., in accord with the \textit{a priori} moral law that reason legislates to itself. The interest of speculative reason, on the other hand, "consists in the knowledge of objects up to the highest \textit{a priori} principles."\textsuperscript{17} Although there are two distinct interests, they are both amenable to the use of reason. "It is only one and the same reason which judges \textit{a priori} by principles, whether for theoretical or for practical purposes."\textsuperscript{18}

Kant insisted that if there is to be any reason at all, the principles and assertions of speculative reason and of practical reason, though distinct, must not contradict one another. As reason is one, any

\textsuperscript{16} Kant, \textit{Critique of Pure Reason}, 27.


\textsuperscript{18} Kant, \textit{Critique of Practical Reason}, 224-5.
contradiction between practical reason and speculative reason would amount to a contradiction of reason with itself. Yet practical reason does appear to be problematic insofar as it requires certain affirmations that speculative reason simply cannot validate. Practical reason postulates the existence of freedom, God, and immortality; yet as these are not phenomenally given, there can occur no valid speculative judgment concerning them. Although there can be found in the "Transcendental Dialectic" of the Critique of Pure Reason concepts which seemingly parallel the postulates of practical reason, namely the transcendental ideas of God and of the transcendental ego, Kant insisted that these ideas of pure reason function only in a regulative manner. They are merely heuristic notions of unconditioned unity which assist reason in its striving systematically to unify its empirical cognitions. The transcendental ideas remain immanent to pure reason; they do not constitute knowledge of objects.

Yet Kant equally insisted that while speculative reason could never confirm the postulates of practical reason, it could never disconfirm them either. There remains then, not a conflict of the respective judgments of practical and speculative reason, but a conflict of their distinct interests. Kant attempted to adjudicate this conflict by arguing for the primacy of practical reason. Having posited the distinctiveness of the practical and the speculative interests, as well as the notion that these interests are simply two manifestations of one and the same reason, Kant describes his understanding of the problematic of practical reason in the following passage:

If practical reason may not assume and think as given anything further than what speculative reason affords from its own insight, the latter has primacy. But suppose that the former has of itself original \( a \ priori \) principles with which certain theoretical positions are inseparably bound but which are beyond any possible insight of the speculative reason (although not contradictory to it). Then the question is: Which interest is superior? It is not a question of which must yield, for one does not necessarily conflict with the other. It is a question of whether speculative reason, which knows nothing of all that which the

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19 Kant, Critique of Practical Reason, 224.
practical reason offers for its acceptance, must take up these principles and seek to integrate them, even though they transcend it, with its own concepts as a foreign possession handed over to it; or whether it is justified in stubbornly following its own isolated interest...

The question of primacy seems to amount to this: Which interest, the speculative, or the practical, is capable of determining the relation that obtains between speculative reason and practical reason in a manner which does not simply nullify the other interest? If the speculative interest were to prevail by rejecting any judgment that is not constituted by itself, this would indeed nullify the postulates of practical reason, and would, Kant argued, amount to a self-contradiction within reason. As speculative reason has not disproven the postulates of practical reason, however, and in fact has made room for them as possibilities within the noumenal realm, Kant argued that the interest of practical reason could be granted primacy without nullifying the interest of speculative reason. What the primacy of practical reason requires is that speculative reason assume the propositions of pure practical reason "as something offered from the outside and not grown in its own soil and seek to compare and connect them with everything which it has in its power as speculative reason."

Although Kantian practical reason is by no means equivalent to the full-blown notion the existential we find in Kierkegaard, it is in Kant that the dialectic of thought and existence first begins to manifest explicitly itself to philosophically differentiated consciousness precisely as a dialectic. While in some respects Kant's practical philosophy can rightly be seen as a retrieval of something like the Aristotelian distinction between theoretical and practical reason, what is groundbreaking in Kant is his acknowledgment of an exigence to think out both the differentiation and the integration of thought and existence. Whereas Descartes methodologically advocated the primacy of thought by explicitly seeking to constrain the will within boundaries set by the understanding, Kant's phenomenal-noumenal distinction

20 Kant, *Critique of Practical Reason*, 224.
21 Kant, *Critique of Practical Reason*, 225.
22 Kant, *Critique of Practical Reason*, 225.
cleared ground for a distinctively practical or moral employment of pure reason. Furthermore, by arguing for the primacy of practical reason, Kant succeeded in creating the transcendental breathing room which apparently was necessary for the emergence of the second or existential phase of the third stage of meaning.

**IV. The Dialectic of Thought and Existence Instantiated in Hegel’s Critique if Kant**

By arguing for the primacy of practical reason, Kant had acknowledged the need to coordinate at least logically the speculative and practical spheres that he had sharply differentiated. Hegel however, considered it unnecessarily dualistic to regard the differentiation of speculative and practical as an absolute distinction, and he proceeded dialectically to forge an integration of the two spheres far more complete than Kant’s. Kant’s differentiation of the two spheres was to be superseded by a concrete integration which alone would be the only ultimate and adequate position. Whereas Kant had argued for the primacy of practical reason, the Hegelian integration would in effect be dominated by speculation.

The world that human beings know, Kant had argued, is not independent of human subjectivity, but is formally determined by the *a priori* structures of the human mind. As subjectivity plays a constitutive role in all human knowing, the meaning of objectivity must be reinterpreted as relative to the human epistemic faculty. Any presumption to absolute objectivity, or even to a finite objectivity independent of sense experience, is no longer tenable. Objectivity must be circumscribed by the limitations entailed in the phenomenal-noumenal distinction. The metaphysician is no longer free to read the mind of God—or even to neglect his own senses.

Hegel however, sought a universal perspective which would enjoy not relative but absolute objectivity. He considered the Kantian phenomenal-noumenal distinction to be not only a description of the subject’s alienation from things-in-themselves, but also the symptom of a radical self-alienation. Hegelian speculation would attempt to reconcile subjectivity and objectivity by affirming in place of the phenomenal-noumenal distinction the principle of the identity of thought and being. Thought and being are one; only the rational is the
real. This was no static Parmenidean identity, but a concrete and
dynamic process by which the rational would both constitute itself as
the real, and would come to consciousness of itself as having done so in
the course of history.

The identity of the rational and the real did not merely function as
an epistemic principle within the theoretical sphere; it also generated
the practical domains of law, politics, and world-history. Hegel’s
philosophy of objective spirit attempted to situate subjectivity within
the concrete context of objective social institutions. In Hegel’s view,
such a reconciliation of subjectivity with objectivity was precisely what
Kantian morality (Moralität) had failed to do. As Kantian practical
reason prescinded from any concrete social or historical context, the
categorical imperative remained formal and empty, incapable of
prescribing any determinate duties. Practical reason could eliminate
maxims, but it could not generate them. Just as Kantian theoretical
reason was materially dependent upon sensibility for its cognitions, so
too Kantian practical reason remained dependent upon antecedent
desires to supply its practical goals. Furthermore Kantian practical
reason was one-sidedly subjectivist. Its individualist bias placed far
too much in the hands of merely personal conscience. The categorical
imperative theoretically allowed for the universalization of any maxim,
provided only that some individual could will its universalization.
Finally, for all its subjectivism, Kantian morality nevertheless leaves
the individual somewhat oppressed by its objective demands. The
criterion of universalizability is construed as intrinsically
disharmonious with empirical self-interest. The moral life remains an
ongoing struggle of the noumenally free and dignified transcendental
ego against the inherently selfish empirical ego. The only harmony
Kant attempted to forge between natural inclination and the demands
of morality, between virtue and happiness, is deferred until the next
life—a merely postulated immortality, for a merely postulated soul,
guaranteed by a merely postulated God.23

23 Paul Guyer, “Thought and Being: Hegel’s Critique of Kant’s Theoretical
Philosophy” in The Cambridge Companion to Hegel, ed. Frederick C. Beiser
Hegel’s philosophy of objective spirit sought a speculative remedy to these deficiencies. The abstract universality of the categorical imperative is to be superseded by that concrete universal which is the social order. While Hegel claimed that human individuality is to be valued within the social order—indeed the individual finds its meaning, its identity, and its dignity within that order—the individualist pursuit of morality, Moralität, must be superseded by participation in the ethical life of one’s society, in Sittlichkeit. The individual must come to understand himself or herself not primarily in terms of interiority and private conscience but as one who participates in the larger social whole, as one thoroughly immersed in the concrete institutions of family, civil society, and the state. As these institutions are nothing less than manifestations of reason concretely actualizing itself in history, ethical conformity to the public life of one’s people not only eliminates the alienation of the individual from society but also offers the individual a mediated participation in the life of the Absolute.  

V. The Explicit Discovery of the Dialectic of Thought and Existence in Kierkegaard’s Critique of Hegel

Kierkegaard, as I will soon discuss more fully, regarded Hegel’s speculative integration of thought and being as a sophisticated kind of blasphemy. He regarded Hegel’s absolutization of Sittlichkeit as an assault on the integrity of the concretely existing individual and its ethico-religious exigencies. He argued that Hegelianism’s speculative totality conflated the existential into the merely speculative, and therefore amounted to a speculative renunciation of existence. In Lonergan’s terms, Kierkegaard regarded the Hegelian identity of thought and being as a speculative subversion of the second phase of the third stage of meaning. Kierkegaard’s remedy would be an attempt to sublate the Hegelian dialectic, and its unquestioned primacy of the speculative, with an anti-speculative existential dialectic which would

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24 Hegel’s philosophy of absolute spirit claims to offer an even more perfect identification. Insofar as speculation yields a dialectically complete account of the rational and the real, to comprehend the philosophy of absolute spirit is to grasp nothing less than the self-knowledge of the Absolute.
at last be comprehensive and definitive precisely because it would make apparent the demand for a personal decision either to self-cognizantly affirm or to self-forgetfully deny the primacy of the existential. This existential dialectic, which is most clearly differentiated from the speculative dialectic of Hegel by Kierkegaard's pseudonym Johannes Climacus in the Concluding Unscientific Postscript, is of course what I have been calling the dialectic of thought and existence. It is this dialectic that I have suggested can be superimposed on the history of philosophy to elucidate its rationalist-existentialist tensions. If Kierkegaard is correct regarding the primacy of existence, and a speculative identification with being is not what is dialectically ultimate (or even possible), then his apologia for the concretely existing individual is not something to be dismissed as alienated subjectivism, as mere immediacy, as unhappy consciousness to be remedied by a healthy immersion in Sittlichkeit. The need to appropriate existential interiority will be unavoidable.

VI. The Problematic: Cognitional-Existential Integration

Kierkegaard's efforts quite compellingly challenge the notion that Kant's original question regarding the primacy of the speculative or the practical interest can simply be dismissed or superseded by the achievement of any merely speculative system, no matter how certain or comprehensive it may be. Kierkegaard's dialectic of thought and existence resurrects this Kantian question and poses it again in an unmediatable fashion. Yet while the second phase of the third stage of meaning is indebted to Kierkegaard for overcoming its Hegelian impasse by clarifying the distinctive exigencies of ethical and religious existence, I would like to suggest that merely affirming the primacy of the existential over the speculative is not quite the same thing as achieving a normative and integral understanding of the thought-existence relation. We have noted that the two poles of the dialectic of thought and existence can be discerned as principles in tension within individual thinkers (e.g., Socrates, Aristotle, or Kant), or as principles

placing two or more different thinkers at odds with each other (e.g., Pascal and Descartes, Hegel and Kant, Kierkegaard and Hegel). Kant rightly understood that there is an exigence for the integration of the two poles of this dialectic, that a brute separation of thought and existence is both practically undesirable and intellectually problematic. Yet, as Kierkegaard clarified in his polemic against Hegel, it is equally problematic if an attempt to integrate thought and existence results in a position that blurs their distinction, and thereby distorts and oppresses the existential. Lonergan, I will argue, is in fundamental agreement with Kierkegaard on this point, yet he will caution against the obverse peril, the possibility that an affirmation of the primacy of the existential might needlessly obfuscate legitimate concerns for cognitional objectivity and thereby become unknowingly implicated in general bias.26

The sequence of philosophies generated in the absence of any normative cognitional-existential integration appears not to be mounting upward toward any definitive higher synthesis. On the one hand, as Kierkegaard noted, rationalist hubris inevitably recoils to marginalize the occasional anti-philosopher by regarding him as pridefully subjective, insane, or most obtusely, “a minor figure” whose insights can be assimilated in the next round of objectivist system-building. On the other hand, as Lonergan noted, anti-rationalist existential thinkers seldom possess the requisite appreciation for theoretically differentiated consciousness which would be needed to discern the normative component that objective thinking contributes to the making of genuinely choice-worthy human history. While the second phase of the third stage of meaning certainly sublates the cognitional and epistemological priorities of the first stage by placing these within a broader horizon of existential concern, it is a mistake to assume that the historical transition to existential-mindedness somehow nullifies the “systematic exigence,” which originally gave rise to the second or theoretical stage of meaning, or bypasses the “troubled consciousness” and the “critical exigence” which were evoked by the emergence of

modern empirical science. Any such romantic assumption is no less naïve than the enlightenment myth of automatic progress.

Furthermore, the emphatic shift from the epistemological concerns of the first phase of the third stage of meaning to the more existential concerns of the second phase does not of itself guarantee the achievement of any adequate integration of these concerns. To the contrary, we find that the subject-object split counterpositionally presupposed by the epistemology of the first phase tends to be paralleled by an equally problematic subjectivism-objectivism split in the second phase. This transposition of a basic counterposition into the second phase has tended to present fundamental philosophical options in terms of either rationalism or decisionism.

Specified transcendentally, the fundamental task of the human person is the task of constituting oneself to be who one is, both as a knower, and as a chooser. The purpose and value of philosophy, at least in relation to this task of self-constitution, should be to clarify those exigencies which orient human rationality and human freedom toward progressively more normative horizons, both for intelligently knowing reality, and for responsibly discerning and responding to values. I would like to suggest that the perennial tug of war that we witness in the history of philosophy, pitting the primacy of thought or of existence against each other stems from an inadequate understanding of how human intentionality is integrally both cognitional and existential. By repeatedly opening up, and often deepening, what now seems to be a perennial wound, a gulf dividing knowing and choosing, intellect and will, speculative and practical, theory and action, facts and values, the head and the heart, philosophy has tragically been at cross-purposes

27 Lonergan, Method in Theology, 81-5.
28 For a discussion of the subject-object split and some of its consequences, see Frederick Lawrence, "Lonergan: The Integral Postmodern?" Method: Journal of Lonergan Studies 18 (Fall, 2000): 101-2. For Lonergan’s exorcism of the assumed primordiality of the subject-object split see Insight, 399-402.
29 See Lawrence, “'The Modern Philosophic Differentiation of Consciousness' Or What is the Enlightenment?" 274.
30 This terminology of the head and the heart need not be taken in a loose metaphorical sense. In his discussion of faith as a knowledge born of religious love, Lonergan offers an interpretation of Pascal’s notion that “the heart has reasons which reason does not know.” He clarifies that, “by the heart I understand the
with its own authentic foundation, and has been alienated from what Lonergan termed the “subject as subject.”

Kierkegaard’s contribution to philosophy, in part, has been to alert us—far more explicitly than had Kant—that there is a dialectic of thought and existence, that this dialectic remains problematic both cognitively and existentially, and that this dialectic most radically dwells, not abstractly in the history of philosophy, but in concrete individuals who must decisively negotiate their own existence and selfhood. Lonergan’s complementary contribution to philosophy in this regard was to explicate, in a highly differentiated yet personally verifiable manner, the intentionality of human knowing and human choosing in terms of two distinct but related desires—the desire to know the real, and the desire to actualize the human good. It is my hope that the second part of this paper may bring together the thought of Søren Kierkegaard and Bernard Lonergan in a way that proleptically envisions the possibility of a normative re-integration of these two fundamental desires.

PART II:
TOWARD AN INTEGRAL UNDERSTANDING OF THE THOUGHT-EXISTENCE RELATION

I. Existentialism and Propositional Truth

In his 1957 existentialism lectures Lonergan characterized existentialism in the following way: “Existentialism is concerned with the human subject \textit{qua} conscious, emotionally involved, the ground of his own possibilities, the free realization of those possibilities, the radical orientation within which they emerge into consciousness and are selected, his relationship with civilization, other persons, history, subject on the fourth, existential level of intentional consciousness and in the dynamic state of being in love.” By reason (which we presume to identify with the head) Lonergan would understand “the compound of the activities on the first three levels of cognitional activity, namely, of experiencing, of understanding, and of judging.” Lonergan, \textit{Method in Theology}, 115.
Existentialism is concerned with what it is to be a human being, and "not in the sense of having a birth certificate." It is antipositivist because being a human being in this sense "is not any set of outer data to be observed, any set of properties to be inferred from the outer data, any course of action that can be predicted from the properties; it springs from an inner and 'free' determination that is not scientifically observable." Existentialism insists upon decision, freedom, and risk; it is also anti-idealistic: "the various transcendental egos are neither Greek nor barbarian, bond nor free, male nor female; they don't suffer and they don't die; we do." Against idealist tendencies existentialism insists on the concreteness, temporality, and finitude of human existing. Existentialism, Lonergan suggests, offers an alternative to the dominant ways of thinking that have shaped the contemporary world, and it seems to offer the promise of new, more liberating ways of thinking.

Insofar as positivism and idealism have been major determinants in producing the contemporary world, and in the measure that the contemporary world is found unsatisfactory or even disastrous—a common attitude on the continent of Europe after the last World War and the domination of the Nazis—existentialism has a profound resonance. It stands for something that is utterly different from the types of thinking that produced the mess we are in ...

Lonergan's assessment of existentialism was by no means uncritical. "While there is a great deal in existentialism on which we can and should practice the patristic maxim of despoiling the Egyptians, taking what is good in it and bringing it into our own work, we cannot just take it over wholesale without a critical appraisal and a revision in some fundamental points." In his article "Lonergan and..."
Existentialism,” Mark Morelli draws attention to a key passage in Lonergan’s existentialism lectures which he believes indicates one of Lonergan’s foremost misgivings regarding the movement.

At first appearance the existentialists and ourselves seem to be all at one. We affirm external reality, we affirm reality, we affirm morality and freedom, what more can you want? It is a challenge but Scholasticism has to differentiate itself from this movement for existentialism by and large is unconcerned with propositional truths and man’s per se capacities for truth or anything else.... The scholastic deals with concepts and judgments and truths, definitions and truths, and what can be inferred from them. 37

Morelli argues that this “unconcern for propositional truth” is something more serious than a mere “oversight of propositional truth” and he suggests that Lonergan’s “or anything else,” appended to an already complete thought, probably indicated “a certain vehemence” regarding this unconcern. 38

The rationale for Lonergan’s criticism is not difficult to determine. As a theologian Lonergan was mindful of the fact that the Catholic notion of faith involves “not simply confidence in God, fides fiducialis, but faith also as recognizing propositions to be true, faith as assensus intellectus in verum.” 39 If propositional truth is undermined, dogmatic theology becomes an impossibility. Although certain fields such as biblical theology may be enriched by the concreteness of existentialist reflection, Lonergan insisted that “if you have nothing but an existentialist basis you cannot go on to the councils of the church, to Nicea and Chalcedon and Trent and the Vatican and the rest of the councils. The councils are concerned with propositional truth.” 40

In addition to being inadequate for dogmatic theology, the existentialist unconcern for propositional truth is epistemologically

39 Lonergan, Phenomenology and Logic, 229.
40 Lonergan, Phenomenology and Logic, 229.
and metaphysically problematic as well. Although there is in existentialism an interest in subjectivity, there is not an interest in appropriating the subject as an objective knower, which was Lonergan's interest in *Insight*. The existentialist interest in concrete horizons of human meaning does not involve anything even remotely like an unrestricted desire to know. Whatever interest there is in truth does not include an interest in grasping that cognitive self-transcendence proper to the act of judgment: "Concepts and judgments are what you talk about, and that's all; they are not what you are."41 The interest among some existentialists in Being excludes any interest in a notion of being that is isomorphic with the structure of human knowing, or still less in the heuristic anticipation of all that can be known by the totality of correct judgments.

Similar concerns regarding the compatibility of existentialism and neo-scholastic philosophy were shared by other prominent contemporary Thomists. In the assessment of Etienne Gilson, Kierkegaard's thought represented just one more swing of the pendulum in what we are calling the dialectic of thought and existence. It is the correction of one extreme only by the imposition of another. He writes: "In the case of Wolff and Hegel, we had ontologies without existence, but in Kierkegaard's own speculation we seem to be left with an existence without ontology, that is to say, without any speculative metaphysics of being."42 Jacques Maritain, in his own assessment of existentialism, warned that "if you abolish essence, or that which esse posits, by that very act you abolish existence, or esse. Those two notions are correlative and inseparable. An existentialism of this sort is self-destroying."43 While Lonergan shared Gilson and Maritain's conviction about existentialism's neglect of essence, his concern was not so much with the fate of conceptualist metaphysics but that a kind of concreteness in abandoning any essential human nature, thereby precludes the possibility of an adequate philosophical anthropology.

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42 Etienne Gilson, *Being and Some Philosophers* (Toronto: Pontifical Institute of Mediaeval Studies, 1949), 146.
... existentialism is a turning away from the universal, the necessary, and the abstract, to the unique individual, the contingent, the concrete, the *de facto*....

... none of them would dream of discussing man in the abstract, what is common to mewling infants, and people sound asleep, and to men facing a crisis in their lives. They are concerned with people that are awake and preferably confronted with a crisis. Consequently they are not dealing with what per se is so.44

Although Lonergan never specifically addressed Kierkegaard’s philosophy in detail—his lectures on existentialism consider Jaspers, Heidegger, Sartre, and Marcel as representatives of the movement—it is plausible to suspect that at least some of the general criticisms he raised regarding existentialism’s disregard for the essential and the objective might also be applicable to Kierkegaard’s central positions, and particularly to those espoused by his pseudonym Johannes Climacus.

To avoid either misunderstanding Kierkegaard, or prematurely attempting to moderate whatever tensions may obtain between his positions and those of Lonergan, it is necessary to elucidate Kierkegaard’s rationale for having Climacus set forth the thought-existence relation in the manner he did. This requires an appreciation of Kierkegaard’s polemical context and an understanding of why he felt Hegelianism both had misappropriated Christianity and had diminished existential subjectivity.

**II. Speculation and Christianity**

Unlike Enlightenment rationalism, Hegel’s dialectical holism did not straightforwardly reject faith, nor did it attempt to reduce faith to some rationally acceptable minimum. Rather, it attempted to go beyond faith by dialectically sublating it. From the viewpoint of Hegelian holism, positive religion is problematic not because it is irrational or untrue, but rather because it is an inadequate and underdeveloped expression of reason and truth. Hegel’s dialectical

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treatment of religion affirmed the concrete particularity of religious positivity, but attempted to overcome its divisiveness by sublating it under universal and necessary Vernunft. Hegel attempted to preserve the concreteness of Christian revelation and doctrine but at the same time to remain non-sectarian by finding a more ultimate unity-in-difference. This he achieved by making philosophy, and not faith, the complete and fully adequate perspective. Faith is seemingly preserved, yet, having been sublated, no longer finds itself ultimate or absolute.

Hegel's claim was that philosophical mediation provides a kind of higher viewpoint which rationally overcomes the various contradictions that encumber the immediacy of faith. In doing so mediation both annuls the fragmentary one-sidedness inherent in common modes of religious understanding and preserves whatever truth may have been implicit in the partial and conflicting expressions of faith. In this manner speculative philosophy brings about a more adequate expression of the truth of Christianity.

Kierkegaard, however, was suspicious both of mediation's annulling and of its preserving. Mediation's annulling renders faith a superseded moment, something childish to be outgrown. Its claim to preserve faith by rationally going beyond faith implies that faith is merely an inferior and inadequate mode of doing philosophy. Kierkegaard challenged mediation's claim to annul faith by clarifying how Hegel simply presumes that Christianity is something given, something which can be presupposed. If this is not the case with Christianity, however, if Christianity is not possessed in actuality to begin with, then Christianity is quite obviously unavailable to be superseded by the Hegelian dialectic. Kierkegaard also challenged mediation's claim to preserve Christianity on the grounds that its eradication of paradox and contingency and temporality amounts to the eradication of whatever might be signified by "existing" [existerende]. Existence, Climacus clarified, is the only medium in which a Christian can actually live and move and have being.

Becoming a person of faith was, for Kierkegaard, “the highest passion” as well as “the task of a lifetime.” To the Hegelian however, being a Christian was regarded as something far more common, and far easier, than being a speculative philosopher. “Our age has ... changed Christianity into a philosophical theory that is to be comprehended and being a Christian into something negligible.” By transforming Christianity into something intellectually difficult for the few, the System, in its mercy, transformed being a Christian into something relatively painless for the many. In Christendom, it is simply assumed that everyone is a Christian as a matter of course. In short, speculation's abstract, objective, detached, disinterested approach to Christianity is actually a complete misunderstanding and a violent nullification of Christianity. By recalling the demanding requirements involved in striving to become a Christian in actuality, Kierkegaard challenged the notion that Hegelian speculation is even compatible with Christianity, let alone its champion. Once it becomes apparent that mediation can neither annul nor preserve Christianity, it also becomes equally apparent that one can either commit oneself to speculation, or to Christianity— but not both. Precisely by clarifying the irreconcilable differences between Christianity and speculation, Kierkegaard leads his putatively Christian reader to realize that there is a need to make this choice.

III. Speculation and Existence

While the Concluding Unscientific Postscript aims to clarify the distinctive exigencies of Christian existence, its concern is actually more extensive. Climacus suspected that “if people had forgotten what it means to exist religiously, they had probably also forgotten what it means to exist humanly.” Hegelianism's misrelation to Christianity

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47 Kierkegaard, Concluding Unscientific Postscript, 249. Please note that in attributing what is argued in the Postscript to Kierkegaard’s pseudonym Johannes Climacus, rather than to Kierkegaard himself, I am adopting a standard convention in Kierkegaard scholarship which takes seriously the logic of Kierkegaard’s indirect
is merely the symptom of a deeper and more universal distortion of the existential dimension itself. In light of this wider anthropological concern, the Postscript can rightly be viewed as a genuinely philosophical work, and is not to be superciliously downplayed as merely the writings of "a religious thinker."

Hegelianism's distortion of the existential is disclosed, first of all, as an absentminded neglect of existence. In a novel interpretation of what it means to be ethical, Climacus argues that the ethical person is not the person who has become absorbed in speculation or in Sittlichkeit but rather the person who remains infinitely interested in his or her own existing. It is precisely this interest in one's own existing (and what that might require) that differentiates ethical existence both from social conformity and from aesthetic drifting. Ethical existence requires inwardness.

A culture enamored with the speculative totality, with disinterested objectivity, with necessity, and certainty, and epistemic guarantees, tends to relinquish inwardness. It assumes an inhumanly extroverted orientation, a reverence for the attainment of "much knowledge." One who aspires to be a speculative thinker, who becomes fascinated with "the System," impoverishes his existence, becoming progressively lost in matters that perpetually distracted from one's own interiority. In a suggestive analogy Climacus writes: "Having to exist with the help of the guidance of pure thinking is like having to travel in Denmark with a small map of Europe on which Denmark is no larger than a steel pen-point..."\(^{48}\) Climacus finds objectionable the speculative tendency to allow knowledge to become completely dissociated from the existential task of the knower, from the determination in time of one's eternal finality. Because speculation is essentially inimical to ethical and religious self-concern, for Climacus speculation actually constitutes a mode of the aesthetic sphere, a speculative aestheticism. Speculation provides a map upon which one can find everything but oneself.

discourse in part by respecting his strategic request not to be considered the author of his own pseudonymous works.

\(^{48}\) Kierkegaard, Concluding Unscientific Postscript, 310-11.
Climacus’ contention goes beyond this basic accusation that speculation neglects existence. Speculation’s claim, after all, is to be the totality, and so it compensates for its neglect by providing an aesthetic surrogate of its own making. A posture of detached observation is substituted for the strenuous task of ethico-religious existing. An omnivorous outward curiosity and the promise of objective certainty replace the passion and risk of existential self-constitution. No wonder that Christianity comes to be preached objectively and to be received objectively. Christianity “hovers over Christendom like a cloud but does not sink down into the individual, so that the individual says: It is talking about me, it is talking to me.”

Kierkegaard’s efforts to disclose the neglect of the existential subject in his day prophetically anticipated any age alienated from interiority or culture adrift on a vast sea of objectivistic discourse. Kierkegaard feared that modernity was marching into an established order willfully unaware of its own self-deification; into a leveling which would be “abstraction’s victory over individuals;” into a “public,”

49 Søren Kierkegaard, Søren Kierkegaard’s Journals and Papers, 7 vols., ed. and trans. Howard V. Hong and Edna H. Hong, assisted by Gregor Malantschuk (Bloomington: Indiana University Press, 1987-78), 4:4567. Lonergan was also sensitive to the limitations of detached observation, even in areas of purportedly objective inquiry such a religious studies. More than once he appealed to Wilfred Cantwell Smith’s notion that a merely extrinsic consideration of religious symbolism overlooks the essential importance of “involvement, commitment, engagement” on the part of those for whom symbols function as such. Lonergan writes: “To live religiously is not merely to live in the presence of certain symbols but ... to be involved with them or through them in quite a special way ... that may demand the totality of a person’s response, that may affect his relation not only to the symbols but to everything else, to himself, to his neighbor, to the stars.” Bernard Lonergan, “A Post-Hegelian Philosophy of Religion” in A Third Collection: Papers by Bernard J. F. Lonergan, S.J., ed. Frederick E. Crowe, S.J. (New York, Paulist Press, 1985), 216.


Kierkegaard and Lonergan on Cognitional-Existential Integration

characterized by the "idolized positive power of sociality,"53 by a characterless prudence,54 by an incessant "chatter" that cannot truly speak because it dreads silence.55

The flight that evades existential subjectivity is pathological; it amounts to a form of despair, to the refusal of the self to relate itself to itself, to will to be itself, to rest transparently in the power that established it.56 Like Plato, Kierkegaard points to the cave. But while Plato's achievement marked the "bloody entrance" from ordinary language into the realm of theory, Kierkegaard's achievement marks a self-luminous epiphany in that "long and confused twilight of philosophic initiation" which is the third stage of meaning.57 Kierkegaard's cave is our cave, and interiority, not merely the endless accumulation of theoretical knowing, points the way out for us.

IV. The Truth of Existence: System or Subjectivity?

In the Postscript Johannes Climacus argues at length for two bold positions calculated to disrupt the objectivist mindset. First, in principle, finite beings such as ourselves in principle cannot possess a speculative system of existence. Since human living is always situated within the medium of existence, we can have no access to some horizonless viewpoint which conclusively encompasses existence and obviates the need for existential decisiveness. Second, the actuality of existence cannot be adequately rendered in terms of conceptual objectivity; in existential matters, truth is subjectivity. By considering each of these claims in turn, we can better understand Kierkegaard's conception of the thought-existence relation.

Existence is not a System:

Hegelian mediation posited an identity of thought and being which purported to possess the concrete totality dialectically. The subjective dimension of human existence was by no means exempt from this all-

53 Kierkegaard, Two Ages, 86.
54 Kierkegaard, Two Ages, 68.
55 Kierkegaard, Two Ages, 97-8.
57 Lonergan, Method in Theology, 85.
encompassing totality. Climacus protested however, that as the Hegelian totality was a totality immanent in thought, its possession of the existential could be no more than the possession of a concept of existence, which certainly is not its actuality. Climacus argued that the concrete actuality of existence, and all its subjective difficulties, in fact remain obstinately outside the System. As the System excludes the actuality of existence, it simply cannot be the totality it purports to be. Thought falls short of being.

Yet Climacus was astute enough to realize that any attempt to break apart mediation's illicit union of thought and being by directly asserting the superiority of being to thought would itself amount to a performative contradiction.

What does it mean to say that being is superior to thinking? If this statement is something to be thought, then in turn thinking is indeed eo ipso superior to being. If it can be thought, then the thinking is superior; if it cannot be thought, then no system of existence is possible. It is of no help whatever to be either polite or rough with being, either to let it be something superior, which nevertheless follows from thinking and is syllogistically attained, or something so inferior that it accompanies thinking as a matter of course.58

Mediation cannot be overcome by thought alone because mediation is thought alone. The limitations of mediation, or of any existence-denying system for that matter, can be apprehended only in the conscious decisiveness of individuals who affirm their existential actuality by deliberately choosing to live in accord with its supra-cognitional requirements. Hence Kierkegaard's ultimate intention was not merely to get people to think—which, he thought would performatively confirm the supremacy of thought to existence—but to get people to choose, and to appropriate the ethico-religious exigencies inherent in their own existing. He was fully aware that existential self-appropriation is not a gift one human being can give directly to another. At best all one can do is clearly elucidate its conditions. And so Kierkegaard, at considerable personal sacrifice, spent the last twelve years of his life setting black

58 Kierkegaard, Concluding Unscientific Postscript, 333-4.
squiggles on white paper, intending to clarify the either/or as the condition for the possibility of existential decisiveness, to raise questions concerning the major authenticity of Christendom, to edify and possibly to liberate individuals dispossessed of their subjectivity through half-conscious involvement with existence-denying systems.

As Kierkegaard could not proceed by direct discourse to break the Hegelian identity of thought and existence, he proceeded indirectly, by way of irony. Irony has the power to unsettle what is explicitly assumed to be settled, fixed, and self-luminous by insinuating a slowly mounting sense of performative contradiction. In the abstract, where thought is left absolutely alone with itself, there can be no irony. To transform, irony must lure abstract thought into the concrete, where thought might enter into tension with existential actualities not of its own making. Hence in the Postscript, Climacus makes a variety of attempts to introduce speculative thought, the System, to the elusive Mr. Speculative Thinker. This awkward meeting evokes a sense of performative contradiction. The speculative thinker who is made to encounter the concreteness of his own existence is made to realize that "there is something true for an existing person that is not true in abstraction ... that the pure being is a fantasy, and an existing person is debarred from wanting to forget that he is an existing person."59 When the parade of speculative thought is brought to a halt by a rain of comic judgment, the speculative thinker is confronted with an either/or which cannot be mediated. One must choose: either to comically and tragically persist in speculation, or to exist.

Irony is the background against which Climacus explicitly makes the claim that "existence ... cannot be a system for any existing [existierende] spirit."60 To choose to exist is to understand the Hegelian identity of thought and being for the shadow play that it is. It is also to appropriate one's own responsibility for self-constitutive freedom and for one's relation to God and neighbor. Any merely human system that desires to encompass existence, to be conclusive, closed, or final, does violence to existence, for existence is always unconcluded, vulnerable to risk and uncertainty, oriented by freedom to an indeterminate future.

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59 Kierkegaard, Concluding Unscientific Postscript, 305-6.
60 Kierkegaard, Concluding Unscientific Postscript, 118.
Truth is Subjectivity:

We turn now to Climacus' claim that "truth is subjectivity" and to consider what this indicates concerning how thought and existence are to be related. 61 "Truth is subjectivity" does not mean that there is no objective truth or that all truth is subjective. It is not to be identified with moral subjectivism. 62 Rather, it is an ethico-religious rejoinder to speculative aestheticism's demand that truth be construed exclusively in terms of its own objectivistic bias. While Climacus does affirm the legitimacy of the objective approach to truth in matters not of ethico-religious significance, he denies its legitimacy in matters that are. In the existential domain therefore, Climacus calls for a properly subjective approach to truth. 63 The notion that truth is subjectivity serves as a check upon speculative hubris, an unmediatable reminder that beyond all merely human systems there remains an existential domain in which objective truth—no matter how conceptually adequate, certain, or complete it may be—is at best secondary and at worse woefully inapplicable and meddlesome.

Intending to broaden the notion of truth beyond the confines of objectivism, Climacus argued that the same truth can in fact be approached in two quite distinct manners—either objectively, in which case one would be concerned with the conceptually substantive "what"—or subjectively, in which case one would be concerned primarily with the existentially performative "how" of appropriation. In ethical and religious matters, there can be no truth without this concern for appropriation, for becoming what one knows.

61 See Kierkegaard, *Concluding Unscientific Postscript*, 189-300.
62 The moral subjectivism inherent in degenerate forms of what Charles Taylor has termed "the ethics of authenticity" is rightly associated, not with Climacus' own position (let alone with Kierkegaard's) but rather with what Kierkegaard has critiqued as the aesthetic mode of existence. See Charles Taylor, *The Ethics of Authenticity* (Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press, 1991), 18-9.
63 Merold Westphal's clarification that "truth as subjectivity is not a general theory of truth" but a theory of human truth applicable only to ethical and religious modes of knowing is salutary, and serves to preempt any facile interpretation of Climacus as a subjectivist. See Merold Westphal, *Becoming a Self: A Reading of Kierkegaard's Concluding Unscientific Postscript* (West Lafayette, IN: Purdue University Press, 1996), 116.
When the question about truth is asked objectively, truth is reflected upon objectively as an object to which the knower relates himself. What is reflected upon is not the relation but that what he relates himself to is the truth, the true. If only that to which he relates himself is the truth, the true, then the subject is in the truth. When the question about truth is asked subjectively, the individual's relation is reflected upon subjectively. If the how of this relation is in truth, the individual is in truth, even if he in this way were to relate himself to untruth.\footnote{Kierkegaard, \textit{Concluding Unscientific Postscript}, 199. Emphasis mine.}

That objectivity and subjectivity are polarized by Climacus' novel distinction between the what and the how is evident from his suggestion that a person could remain in the truth even while relating to an untruth. This possibility is certainly disconcerting to the objectivist—as Climacus definitely intended it to be. To the extent that one can be brought to recognize this as a real possibility, it accomplishes nothing less than the dissolution of objectivism's monopoly upon truth. Nor is Climacus content to be provocative yet vague about what he might mean by this possibility. In a notorious example, he tells us precisely what he means:

If someone who lives in the midst of Christianity enters, with knowledge of the true idea of God, the house of God, the house of the true God, and prays, but prays in untruth, and if someone lives in an idolatrous land but prays with all the passion of infinity, although his eyes are resting upon the image of an idol—where, then, is there more truth? The one prays in truth to God although he is worshiping an idol; the other prays in untruth to the true God and is therefore in truth worshiping an idol.\footnote{Kierkegaard, \textit{Concluding Unscientific Postscript}, 201.}

Granted that neither person worships the true God in a true manner (as would obviously be the ideal) the reader is nevertheless asked, where is there more truth, in the true God worshipped falsely, or in the false god worshipped truly? Where is there more truth, in the conceptually substantive what, or in the existentially performative how? Kierkegaard recognized the wrong-headedness of attempting to
answer this question for his reader, but he does indulge in having Climacus say that "there can be no doubt about the answer for anyone who is not totally botched by scholarship and science." Furthermore, to those who would evade this self-revelatory decision by proposing some vague middle ground between objectivity and subjectivity, some compromise between the what and the how, Climacus insists that the participants in this thought-experiment remain mindful of the fact that they are existing human beings; consequently mediation is to be prohibited a priori; "to be on both sides equally is not granted to an existing person." Hence Climacus confronts his readers with two conflicting paradigms of truth. Asked to choose between the conceptually substantive what and the existentially performative how, between objectivity and subjectivity, the reader is offered the painful but edifying possibility of self-knowledge and self-choice. What do I really value most? If it came down to it, who would I rather be, the idolater who objectively worships, but subjectively betrays, the true God, or the idolater who objectively worships a false god, but subjectively prays in truth?

Because objectivism neglects the existential subject and presumes that attainment of the conceptually adequate position obviates the need for appropriation of truth in any other sense, Climacus sought to clarify an alternative notion of truth in which the need for certitude would not be the dominant concern. While those truths which are not essential to existential striving (e.g., the earth is round, 2+2=4, etc.) can legitimately be apprehended in an objective manner, ethical and religious truths must be passionately incarnated in the living of their knowers. If they are not, they are not to be countenanced as truths at all. To clarify this divide, Climacus crafts a definition of truth that he believes would be adequate for the existential domain:

When subjectivity is truth, the definition of truth must also contain in itself an expression of the antithesis to objectivity, a memento of that fork in the road, and this expression will at the same time indicate the resilience of the inwardness. Here is such a definition of truth: An objective uncertainty, held fast through

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66 Kierkegaard, Concluding Unscientific Postscript, 201.
67 Kierkegaard, Concluding Unscientific Postscript, 201.
appropriation with the most passionate inwardness, is the truth, the highest truth there is for an existing person.  

Recognizing that a merely abstract discussion of this issue would be performatively and ironically contradicted by its very form, Climacus pointed to Socrates as a concrete example of someone who lived in the truth because he was willing to tolerate, and even to cultivate, objective uncertainty—yet not in the manner of a passionless skeptic. In fidelity to his vocation, to his "voice" and "the god," Socrates attempted to lure his fellow Athenians into the awareness that much they supposed to be certain was actually uncertain. Socrates lived in a tension, never despairing of the possibility of finding the truth, yet vigilantly rejecting the ubiquitous temptation to cover over objective uncertainty with mere words.

In the Phaedo, an imprisoned Socrates considers a question, one last objective uncertainty quite pertinent to his own immediate predicament—the question "if there is an immortality." Climacus sharply contrasts the subjective certainty—the confidence in the face of his own death—that Socrates exuded despite his objective uncertainty concerning the possibility of immortality, with the subjective uncertainty that modern objectivistic thinkers betray despite their objective certainty afforded by rational proofs demonstrating immortality.

He [Socrates] stakes his whole life on this "if"; he dares to die, and with the passion of the infinite he has so ordered his whole life that it might be acceptable— if there is an immortality. Is there any better demonstration for the immortality of the soul?

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68 Kierkegaard, Concluding Unscientific Postscript, 203.
69 In pointing to Socrates as an example of one who subjectively lived in the truth, Kierkegaard was employing what Lonergan called "incarnate meaning," which is "the meaning of a person, of his way of life, of his works, or of his deeds." See Lonergan, Method in Theology, 73. I suggest that there can be found much, especially in the post-Insight Lonergan, which seems to support and complement Kierkegaard's general notion of truth as subjectivity. In Method, for example, linguistic meaning is merely one mode of meaning among many; it is situated alongside intersubjective meaning, artistic meaning, symbolic meaning, and incarnate meaning—all of which Lonergan clearly affirms as having their own legitimacy and value.
70 See Plato, Apology, 28d, 31d.
71 Kierkegaard, Concluding Unscientific Postscript, 201.
But those who have the three demonstrations do not order their lives accordingly. If there is an immortality, it must be nauseated by their way of living—is there any better counter-demonstration to the three demonstrations?72

While it is obvious that Climacus' rejection of the objectivist approach is primarily motivated by ethico-religious concern, he is also raising an epistemological objection. Briefly stated, in ethico-religious matters, the objective approach simply does not grasp, and cannot replace, that truth which is constituted by subjective appropriation. Existential truth, and the truth of Christianity in particular, is a matter of "inward deepening" and passionate appropriation, not of detached, uninvolved looking. "The speculative thinker... wants to look at Christianity. It is a matter of indifference to him whether or not anyone accepts it..."73 But objective indifference will never come to know what is known either by those who struggle with Christianity and accept it, or by those who struggle with it and reject it. In Philosophical Fragments and Practice in Christianity Kierkegaard made appropriation an issue by arguing that Christianity amounts to a grand paradox, to which one can respond either with faith, or with offense, but not with objective indifference. While the objective approach presumes that one can become a Christian merely by understanding Christianity (or, easier yet, merely by living within the boundaries of Christendom), for Climacus this posture is fundamentally misguided.

What if Christianity is indeed subjectivity, is inward deepening, that is, what if only two kinds of people can know something about it: those who are impassionedly, infinitely interested in their eternal happiness and in faith build this happiness on their faith-bound relation to it, and those who with the opposite passion (yet with passion) reject it—the happy and the unhappy lovers? Consequently, what if objective indifference cannot come to know anything whatever?74

72 Kierkegaard, Concluding Unscientific Postscript, 201-2.
73 Kierkegaard, Concluding Unscientific Postscript, 52.
74 Kierkegaard, Concluding Unscientific Postscript, 52.
One cannot partake of Christian truth merely by “looking” at it, merely by thinking about it. To relate oneself to this truth, one must risk assuming a passionately interested and personally decisive relation to it; otherwise, one remains merely a spectator and an outsider—and no amount of objective truth can ever move one beyond this.

Besides the specific problem of Christian existence, there is the more general claim of Kierkegaard’s epistemology of inwardness:

Like is understood by like, and the old sentence, *quicquid cognoscitur per modum cognoscentis cognoscitur* [whatever is known is known in the mode of the knower], must indeed be amplified in such a way that there is also a mode in which the knower knows nothing whatever or that his knowing amounts to a delusion. With reference to a kind of observation in which it is of importance that the observer be in a definite state, it holds true that when he is not in that state he does not know anything whatever.75

There are no objective shortcuts to ethico-religious truth, and there is no substitute for subjective appropriation. Those who assume they can possess existential truths without entering into the connatural existential states required by these truths are deluded. Kierkegaard’s epistemology of inwardness, in brief, is this: “If a man does not become what he understands, then he does not understand it either.”76

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75 Kierkegaard, *Concluding Unscientific Postscript*, 52.
76 Søren Kierkegaard, *Journals and Papers*, 4:4540. Kierkegaard did not realize that this notion could be generalized beyond the existential domain to include all knowing. All knowing is by identity because all knowing involves an isomorphism of knower and known. This oversight is not surprising given both Kierkegaard’s rightful disdain for the existential havoc wrought by the Hegelian identity of thought and being, and the fact that Kierkegaard’s own epistemological horizon was basically confined to that of “the immanentist subject.” See Lonergan, Bernard Lonergan, *The Subject: The Aquinas Lecture 1968* (Milwaukee: Marquette University Press, 1968), 13-29. Kierkegaard was certainly not alone in his unawareness of the possibility of a more modest and human identity of thought and being, a limited identity which could be achieved in any act of understanding and verified in any virtually conditioned act of judgment. This was simply the major blind spot of German idealism. “Why did Fichte, Schelling and Hegel write their enormous systems? Because for them the possibility of judgment was that you have to know everything about everything; that was the only possible unconditioned. They didn’t have the
Again it would be fatally ironic if the notion that "truth is subjectivity" were itself to be conceived in a objectivistic manner, as yet another doctrine among doctrines. "Truth is subjectivity" is not a proposition merely to be understood; in fact it cannot be understood unless it is first chosen, acted upon, lived.\textsuperscript{77} As John Elrod states, "Kierkegaard's epistemology requires that the individual discover his self-being in existence. The individual cannot have rationalistic access to his own being. If he is to know himself, he must know himself through choosing himself in existence."\textsuperscript{78} In Lonergan's terms, "truth is subjectivity" can be apprehended only in and through self-appropriation at the fourth or existential level of conscious intentionality. This is not a knowledge to be had independently of existential decisiveness, but rather is a knowing and choosing of such decisiveness, especially in the awareness of its distinctness from the merely cognitional.

We are now in a position to determine the proper relationship between thought and existence for Kierkegaard. In contrast to the existential truncation which characterizes much modern philosophy, Climacus submits that the ancient Greeks implicitly understood the primacy of the existential, that existence is the medium of thought and that thought resides nowhere but in an existing thinker. "In Greece a thinker was not a stunted existing person who produced works of art, but he himself was an existing work of art. Surely, to be a thinker virtually unconditioned." Lonergan, \textit{Caring About Meaning}, 111. See also Lonergan, \textit{Insight}, 397-8.

\textsuperscript{77} Both C. Stephen Evans and Gregor Malantschuk have suggested that Kierkegaard's redefinition of truth as subjectivity may have been an attempt to elucidate the significance of John 14:6, in which Jesus states: "I am the way, the truth, and the life." What would have to be meant by truth if this statement is to make sense? Truth, in that context (which for the Christian is the ultimate context), simply can not mean the objective truth possessed by a speculative thinker; it must mean something else—and Kierkegaard took it upon himself to indicate as best he could what that something else was. See C. Stephen Evans, \textit{Kierkegaard's Fragments and Postscript: The Religious Philosophy of Johannes Climacus} (Atlantic Highlands, NJ: Humanities Press International, 1983), 134-5 and Gregor Malantschuk, \textit{Kierkegaard's Thought}, ed. and trans. Howard V. Hong and Edna H. Hong (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1971), 96.

should least of all mean to be a variant from being a human being." Kierkegaard and Lonergan on Cognitional-Existential Integration

Greek thinking was “thought in existence” and it remained passionate in a way that modern philosophy did not precisely because it remained mindful of existence.

Hegelian “pure thought,” by contrast, cannot be reconciled with existence because it has completely severed its relation to existence. Pure thought posits the identity of thought and being and thinks that by possessing this identity it possesses the totality. Pure thought thereby renders itself incapable of acknowledging that anything might remain beyond its totality, for in this sense a totality is absolute, outside of which nothing is allowed to remain. Because nothing can elude the identity of thought and being, there is nothing remaining to remind pure thought that it is abstract, that it has in fact abstracted from existence, that despite its own aspirations to be concrete it has in fact withdrawn from the concrete by banishing existence.

The cure for modernity will be to withdraw from merely abstract thinking and from the illusion of pure thought, and to return to the concrete and what Climacus calls “concrete thinking.”

What is abstract thinking? It is thinking where there is no thinker. It ignores everything but thought, and in its own medium only thought is. Existence is not thoughtless, but in existence thought is in an alien medium.... What is concrete thinking? It is thinking where there is a thinker and a specific something (in the sense of particularity) that is being thought, where existence gives the existing thinker thought, time, and space.

In this and other passages we may begin to appreciate that Kierkegaard's intention in separating subjectivity from objectivity and existence from thought was simply to recontextualize rationality within the wider and more encompassing horizon of existence. It is important to note that Kierkegaard does occasionally acknowledge the fact that decision and action are qualitatively conditioned by thought: “understanding in relation to acting is like the springboard from which the diver makes his leap—the clearer, the more precise, the more

79 Kierkegaard, Concluding Unscientific Postscript, 303.
80 Kierkegaard, Concluding Unscientific Postscript, 332.
passionate (in the good sense) the understanding is, the more it rises to action..."81 The emphasis of this metaphor is clear: a good springboard may be necessary for making a good leap, but what really counts is the leaping. One who would bounce endlessly on the springboard is to be pitied. Yet the danger of reflection is precisely this endless bouncing; thought, especially in an excessively reflective age, can easily forget and forgo its essential orientation to action. Kierkegaard writes that "reflection is not the evil, but the state of reflection, stagnation in reflection, is the abuse and the corruption that occasion retrogression by transforming the prerequisites [i.e., thoughts] into evasions."82 In Lonergan’s terms, Kierkegaard is claiming that it is possible for full self-transcendence to be stifled, cut short, truncated. It is possible for persons to fail to appropriate their own practical and existential decisiveness. While from one perspective such absentmindedness is comic, from another it is rightly viewed as a mode of aesthetic despair. Speculative aestheticism is a despair whose loftiness can degrade an entire culture; in Kierkegaard’s view, it is a despair that has driven Christianity clear out of Christendom.

V. Objective Knowing and Authentic Human Existence

Near the end of “Cognitional Structure,” Lonergan remarked that the migration of philosophical concern away from abstract metaphysical and epistemological issues and toward more concrete existential issues has been accompanied by a shift in the meaning of subjectivity: “Subjectivity once was a pejorative term; it denoted a violation of the normative exigencies of intelligence and rationality. But it has come to denote a rejection of misconceived objectivity and a reaffirmation of man’s right to be himself even though he cannot untie the hard and intricate knots of philosophy.”83 Lonergan regarded this reassessment of subjectivity with ambivalence. The transition from the first to the second phase of the third stage of meaning must be appropriated dialectically.

81 Kierkegaard, Practice in Christianity, 158.
82 Kierkegaard, Two Ages, 96.
On the one hand, Lonergan would be the first to admit that modernity has generated all too many subject-neglecting accounts of objectivity. Philosophy has been dominated far too long by those who "have thought of truth as so objective as to get along without minds."84 His own philosophical contribution attempts to remedy such objectivism by demonstrating precisely how "the fruit of truth must grow and mature on the tree of the subject."85 On the other hand, Lonergan cautioned that when subjectivity comes to be promoted in opposition to objectivity, we are left with a merely pejorative notion of objectivity, and no normative notion. Lonergan's unease with those who would disparage objective knowing while elevating subjectivity is not some stubborn reaction of a scholastic theologian against a development he was incapable of appreciating. Just as Kierkegaard's unwillingness to compromise with Hegelian mediation and his need to construe subjectivity and objectivity in an either/or relation were grounded in what he personally apprehended about the task of existence, so too Lonergan's unwillingness to compromise objectivity and the notion of being was grounded in his own self-appropriation, in personal apprehension and assent to the human capacity to reach the virtually unconditioned in the act of judgment.

Furthermore, it is important to understand that Lonergan's concern for objectivity was by no means speculative. His quest to maintain the proper integrity of epistemology, metaphysics, theology, and the theoretical life was motivated in part by ethical and religious reasons. For existentialists who have come to view the two motivations, the theoretical and the ethical, as more or less mutually exclusive interests, this would seem an unusual claim. A primacy of the ethical is asserted and authenticity is construed in contradistinction to theoretical aspiration. For Lonergan, however, theory bears a "strange relevance" to practice, and disregard for theory sooner or later bears tragic consequences in the drama of human history: a "longer cycle of decline."86 He warns of the danger in attempts to promote subjectivity at the expense of objectivity.

84 Lonergan, The Subject, 5.
85 Lonergan, The Subject, 3.
86 Lonergan, Insight, 251-67.
The danger is that the values of subjectivity in its more recent sense will be squandered by subjectivity in its prior and pejorative sense. Unless the two meanings are sharply distinguished, praise of subjectivity seems to imply a condemnation of objectivity. But condemnation of objectivity induces, not a merely incidental blind spot in one's vision, but a radical undermining of authentic human existence.  

To forgo a normative understanding of objective human knowing is to relinquish the basis for discriminating genuine interpretations and facts from mere ideology. If the disinterested desire to know comes to be regarded as a naïve fiction because no trouble has been taken to elucidate the dynamism of human knowing and its standards, then it is difficult to envision any rational grounds for protesting when these standards are violated by the rationalizations of those who would obscure, exploit, and dominate. Hence a merely pejorative notion of objectivity threatens, rather than promotes, authentic subjectivity and authentic community.  

One positive contribution Lonergan made in this regard was to clarify precisely what objective knowing and authentic human living have in common: "It is quite true that objective knowing is not yet authentic human living; but without objective knowing there is no authentic living; for one knows objectively just insofar as one is neither unperceptive, nor stupid, nor silly; and one does not live authentically inasmuch as one is either unperceptive or stupid or silly."  

VI. Kierkegaard's Salutary and Defensible Either/Or  

Hegel opposed the abstract universality of Enlightenment thought with a conviction that the totality of being must be apprehended in its concreteness. Ironically, this same concern for the concrete also pitted Kierkegaard against Hegel. While Hegelian speculation claimed to dialectically possess the totality, Kierkegaard sought to demonstrate that in completely prescinding from the concrete actuality of ethico-

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87 Lonergan, "Cognitional Structure" in Collection, 220.  
88 See Lonergan, "Cognitional Structure" in Collection, 221: "A real exclusion of objective knowing, so far from promoting, only destroys personalist values."  
89 Lonergan, "Cognitional Structure" in Collection, 220.
religious existence, fact mediation remained abstract. Lonergan's thought extends and culminates, this same dialectic. While Lonergan certainly approved of existentialism's concreteness; he objected that the movement was not concrete enough. Insofar as existentialism neglects the legitimacy of objectivity and of theoretical life rightly-understood, it too is abstract, one-sided, absentminded. To disparage the intellectual pattern of experience is to misconstrue the integrity of human existence. In *Method in Theology*, Lonergan writes that the "unity ... of differentiated consciousness is, not the homogeneity of undifferentiated consciousness, but the self-knowledge that understands the different realms and knows how to shift from any one to any other." By denigrating the realm of theory and the intellectual pattern of experience, existentialism needlessly contradicts its own best intention to be a philosophy of concrete existence. Furthermore, once one affirms with Lonergan that objective knowing and authentic human living share the transcendental precepts to be attentive, intelligent, reasonable, and responsible, one realizes that existentialist opposition to any normative notion of objectivity undermines the existentialist project, and perhaps even renders itself incapable of noticing.

To grasp why Kierkegaard worked out the thought-existence relation in such a polarized manner, recall that it is necessary to understand that his main purpose in the *Postscript* was not to make objective counter-assertions against objectivity, which only would have amounted to a performative contradiction on his part, but to set conditions for his reader to appreciate the need for a decision, a self-constitutive choice between two ways—the way of objectivity, and the way of subjectivity. For Kierkegaard, such a choice would not readily be apparent unless these two ways of subjectivity and objectivity were first apprehended as mutually exclusive alternatives; so Climacus heightened his reader's understanding of the various subtle ways that speculative aestheticism nullifies the subjectivity of the concretely existing individual.

In *Either/Or*, Judge William clarified the need for decision that definitively sets the ethical mode of existence apart from the aesthetic;

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in the Postscript, Climacus clarified the either/or that enables the ethico-religious mode of existence to be set apart from speculative aestheticism. Climacus encourages one to become a thinker mindful of existence, to become an existing thinker. The either/or cannot be mediated by mere thought, but brings one to the point where one can say to oneself: Either exist, and cease participating in fantastical speculations that seemingly exempt you from existing, or continue your speculations, but realize that in doing so you comically and tragically contradict your innermost task, which nevertheless remains, to exist.

Any assessment of the way Kierkegaard worked out the thought-existence relation will require an understanding of his polemical context. Once one adequately understands what Kierkegaard meant by existence and speculation, by the ethico-religious and speculative aestheticism, by subjectivity and objectivity, one should be able to appreciate why these dualities could only be mediated by a decision. Those who feel that Kierkegaard is simply being inflexible in his insistence upon an either/or, or those who suspect that he is merely exaggerating for rhetorical purposes, or those who too quickly pursue some sort of compromise, middle ground, or “both-and” solution probably have not adequately grasped Kierkegaard’s polemical context.91

To understand Kierkegaard’s context is also to understand that Kierkegaard was not opposed to human intelligence as such, but rather to a pernicious form of existence-denying abstract thought. The boundary line of Climacus’ either/or does not lie between thought per se and existence, or even between “abstract thought” and existence, but only between Hegelian “pure thought,” totalizing speculation, and existence. Self-absolutizing, self-deifying rationality has departed from existence; Kierkegaard merely wished to clarify this fact by disclosing the various ways we are half-tempted to overlook it. Hence Kierkegaard’s polemic is misunderstood if it is taken to be an unqualified attack upon thought, or reason, or intelligence per se.

91 I am recalling here some of my own initial assumptions about Kierkegaard. It was not until a third reading of the Postscript that I began to adequately appreciate the full significance of Climacus’ insistence upon the either/or. The Postscript is in many ways a very repetitious work, circling as it does around a series of closely related themes—perhaps just what an obtusely objective age requires.
Kierkegaard was not attempting to relieve humanity of the need to think, but rather to prevent speculation from relieving humanity of the need to exist.

VII. Lonergan's Reintegration of Thought and Existence

We have discussed the problematic tension between thought and existence that Kierkegaard had to negotiate, and we have considered his rationale for articulating the thought-existence relation in a polarized manner. Kierkegaard's normative achievement, his contribution to the second phase of the third stage of meaning, was to promote self-appropriation of the neglected subject as existential. The historical unfolding of the existentialist project initiated by Kierkegaard has generated difficulties of its own, however. The later existentialists' construction of existential subjectivity and its demands as both superior and opposed to cognitional objectivity, has led to a pervasive disinterest in (and perhaps even a contempt for) the project of harmoniously integrating the cognitional and existential dimensions of human identity.

In the concluding sections of this paper I will argue that, with Kierkegaard, Lonergan affirms the significance of existential subjectivity and definitively opposes any rationalism that conflates the demands of ethico-religious existence with something merely cognitional. Lonergan differs from Climacus by opposing rationalism in a manner that fully respects both the primacy of the existential and the exigencies of concretely situated human rationality. Lonergan's understanding of the thought-existence relationship unambiguously preempts the imposition of an illegitimate either/or upon thought and existence, reason and freedom, cognitional objectivity and existential subjectivity.

Lonergan fully affirms both objectivity and subjectivity, not by some balanced compromise, not by a blurring of distinctions, not by a speculative melding of thought and existence, but by promoting a self-appropriation that reveals how authentic subjectivity is the source of both cognitional objectivity and of moral and religious self-

transcendence. While Kierkegaard could merely hint at the possibility of such a both/and relation, full self-appropriation discloses the precise functional relations among distinct, functionally interdependent levels of conscious intentionality. Existential and cognitional operations are related, not by dialectical opposition, but by “sublation.” We turn now to a consideration of this important notion.

Self-appropriation involves the attentive, intelligent, rational, and responsible affirmation and commitment of oneself as experiencing, understanding, judging, and deciding. Discursive accounts of the levels of conscious intentionality tend spontaneously to construe the various levels as being earlier and later, lower and higher. Lonergan emphasizes that “the real meaning is neither spatial nor chronological. The real meaning is in terms of sublating and sublated operations.”93 Understanding how the levels of conscious intentionality are related as a series of successive sublations is crucial to understanding Lonergan’s conception of an integral relationship between thought and existence.

According to Lonergan, “what sublates goes beyond what is sublated, introduces something new and distinct, puts everything on a new basis, yet so far from interfering with the sublated or destroying it, on the contrary needs it, includes it, preserves all its proper features and properties, and carries them forward to a fuller realization within a richer context.”94 Sublation occurs in any act of direct understanding. When we ask questions regarding our experiences, what is intended is not some change in the experiential data as such, but an act of understanding that will supervene upon the data to remedy some apprehended lack of intelligibility with respect to what has been experientially given. When insights occur, they respect and preserve what has been experienced, yet they also unify and integrate experiential data by illuminating their possibly immanent intelligibility. Experience is “retained, preserved, yet transcended and completed” by the act of understanding.95

95 Lonergan, The Subject, 21. To borrow an example from Joseph Flanagan, S.J.: A geologist and a tourist descending together into the Grand Canyon are patterning their sensible experiences in two quite different ways, even though what they sense
Sublation also occurs at the level of reflective understanding. When we wonder whether particular acts of understanding are correct, our “questions for reflection go beyond the concepts, definitions, hypotheses, theories, systems thought out by intelligence. They direct conscious intentionality beyond mere understanding towards truth and reality.”

Although cognitional operations on the level of judgment critically scrutinize what has been understood, these operations respect understanding as functionally normative. Judgment does not re-do the work of understanding, as a supervisor might re-do the work of an incompetent subordinate. Operations on both levels remain distinct and autonomous, yet together they are complementary. Judgment needs understanding to supply in concepts and propositions the intelligibly conditioned content to be affirmed or denied. Conversely, understanding needs judgment; without judgment, what has been understood remains merely hypothetical. Judgment carries understanding forward beyond the hypothetical world of bright ideas into the “richer context” of truth and reality.

Finally, as Kant affirmed the priority of practical reason and Kierkegaard affirmed the priority of existence, Lonergan affirmed a series of “distinct but related levels of consciousness, in which the existential subject stands, so to speak, on the top level.” Kierkegaard was concerned that thought would illicitly attempt to sublate existence. Self-appropriation definitively lays this concern to rest; existence sublates thought. “Human intelligence goes beyond human sensitivity yet it cannot get along without sensitivity. Human judgment goes beyond sensitivity and intelligence yet cannot function except in conjunction with them. Human action, finally, must in similar fashion both presuppose and complete human sensitivity, intelligence and judgment.” As the intelligent subject sublates the experiential

is virtually the same. As the geologist descends, she experiences the canyon wall as a series of temporally ordered strata; by her understanding she is transported hundreds of millions of years back in time through successive geological eras. As the tourist descends, the canyon wall is experienced merely as the canyon wall. If the tourist could be said to be transported in time at all during the descent, it is merely from the early afternoon to suppertime.

97 Lonergan, The Subject, 20.
98 Lonergan, The Subject, 21-2.
subject and the rational subject sublates the intelligent and experiential subject, so too the responsible subject sublates the rational, intelligent, experiential subject. "Rational consciousness is sublated by rational self-consciousness, when we deliberate, evaluate, decide, act. Then there emerges human consciousness at its fullest. Then the existential subject exists and his character, his personal essence, is at stake."99

The full expansion of the dynamism of conscious intentionality reveals the emergence of the existential subject. The sublation that occurs in this emergence is of particular concern to us. In the process of self-appropriation, "as we move from level to level, it is a fuller self of which we are aware."100 This "fuller self," we discover, respects the integrity of thought, but (depending on the presence or absence of moral or religious conversion) also situates thought within a wider ethical or religious horizon, which is at once both practical and existential. Hence the dynamism of conscious intentionality is normatively oriented beyond mere knowing. By deliberation and evaluation one chooses not only what one will make of one's world, but also what one will make of oneself. Lonergan writes:

... questions for deliberation sublate the previous three levels. They are concerned with the good. They end the one-sidedness of purely cognitional endeavor to restore the integration of sense and conation, thought and feeling. They not merely ask about a distinction between satisfaction and value but also assume the existential viewpoint that asks me whether I am ready, whether I am determined, to sacrifice satisfactions for the sake of values. Having put the question of moral authenticity, they reward acceptance with a good conscience and they sanction rejection with an uneasy conscience. Finally, they push the requirement of authenticity to the sticking point: good decisions must be complemented by good conduct and good actions; and failure in this respect is just the inner essence of hypocrisy.101

100 Lonergan, Method in Theology, 9.
In fundamental agreement with Kierkegaard, Lonergan insists that knowing cannot serve as a surrogate for deliberating, choosing, and acting. Yet Lonergan clarified, in a way that Kierkegaard did not, precisely how knowing informs choosing and acting, as well as the need to respect and promote the underlying cognitional operations. The thought-existence relation disclosed by self-appropriation does not pit the existential subject against the subject-as-knower but rather reveals the existential subject as the higher integration of the subject-as-knower.

The fourth level of intentional consciousness—the level of deliberation, evaluation, decision, action—sublates the prior levels of experiencing, understanding, judging. It goes beyond them, sets up a new principle and type of operation, directs them to a new goal but, so far from dwarfing them, preserves them and brings them to a far fuller fruition.  

**VIII. Implications of the Successive Sublation Paradigm**

Lonergan's notion that the dynamism of conscious intentionality is ordered in the manner of a series of successive sublations is extremely fruitful. I would like now to consider several implications of this paradigm.

First, the successive sublation paradigm offers a critical foundation for adjudicating the standoff between Hegel and Kierkegaard and, more generally, for interpreting and resolving what we have been discussing as the dialectic of thought and existence. While Lonergan, unlike Hegel, maintained a real distinction between the cognitional and the existential, a distinction upon which Kierkegaard, following Kant, also vigorously and rightly insisted, we do not find in Lonergan, as we do in Kierkegaard's *Postscript*, a separation or opposition between these two domains. While I find no basis in transcendental method for opposing Climacus' clarification of the disjunction between speculative aestheticism and the ethico-religious, and many reasons to affirm and appropriate it, transcendental method clearly invites one to resituate this disjunction within a more integral

understanding of the thought-existence relation. Hence Lonergan attempts something which Kierkegaard did not preclude but, for reasons we have discussed, could not strongly promote either, namely the re-integration of thought and existence. Lonergan achieves this integration, not in the manner of Hegelian speculation, but by standing speculation on its head and affirming a primacy of the existential. "The fourth and highest level is that of deliberation, evaluation, decision. It follows that the priority of intellect is just the priority of the first three levels of experiencing, understanding, and judging."103 While in Hegelian speculation it is thought which presumes to sublate existence, Lonergan's successive sublation paradigm clarifies how, in the full expansion of the dynamism of conscious intentionality, it is existence that sublates thought, the fourth level which sublates the previous three, and not vice-versa. In this regard at least, Lonergan's philosophy carries out Kierkegaard's departure from Hegel.

Second, there is the issue of "objectivity," over which Lonergan does part company with Climacus. The discrepancy here is at least partially terminological. Objectivity for Climacus signified a lack of subjectivity or inward appropriation. "Objectivity is purchased by abstracting from everything subjective— which is to say from just that first-person dimension of human life without which the ethical and the religious become meaningless."104 While Lonergan refuses to employ the term objectivity in Climacus' pejorative manner, he is, I believe, fundamentally sympathetic with Climacus' intent in protesting the neglect of subjectivity.

The account of subjectivity disclosed by transcendental method situates human knowing within a broader existential horizon characterized by operations of deliberation, evaluation, and responsible choosing. On Lonergan's account, what Climacus is calling "objectivity" is actually a collapse of the spirit, a failure to be deliberately operative on the fourth level of conscious intentionally. Now if this were to be the definitive meaning of the term "objectivity," then Lonergan would quite clearly share Climacus' antagonism. For reasons disclosed in interiority but not adequately appreciated by most existentialists,

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Lonergan sought to recover a normative understanding of objectivity in its basic sense. The notion of objectivity Lonergan developed in *Insight* does not overturn, or even directly address, the legitimacy of Kierkegaard's critique of objectivity. Transcendental method does however yield a normative, verifiable, integral understanding of the meanings of subjectivity and objectivity, and this understanding certainly undermines the adequacy of construing subjectivity and objectivity as mutually opposed.

Third, there is the construction of knowledge as "detached" and "disinterested." In Kierkegaard there is a tendency to identify passionate, interested subjectivity with ethico-religious striving, and to equate disinterested objectivity, a posture of detached observation, with speculative aestheticism. Climacus writes: "Ethically the highest pathos is the pathos of interestedness (which is expressed in this way, that I, acting, transform my whole existence in relation to the object of interest); esthetically the highest pathos is the pathos of disinterestedness."105 Climacus places the two tendencies in opposition and dismisses the possibility that disinterested knowing might have an inwardness and an ethico-religious significance of its own. Kierkegaard probably shares an assumption, common both to naive realists and to idealists, that knowing must somehow be analogous to "taking a look." Detached and disinterested knowing, objective knowing, amounts to taking a really good look—a look that is good precisely because nothing inward or subjective has been allowed interfere with it. On this interpretation of detached and disinterested knowing, it is not difficult to understand why Kierkegaard dismissed such knowing as irrelevant or detrimental to the task of existential self-constitution.

Lonergan's cognitional theory and epistemology challenges the aforementioned assumption that knowing like taking a look. "The original relationship of cognitional activity to the universe of being must lie in the intention of being," which is the dynamism of conscious intentionality itself, and not in that "picture thinking" common to the naive realist claims to grounding of objective knowledge of reality in perceiving and the idealist assumption that *Anschauung* immediately

relates us to objects.\textsuperscript{106} Knowing occurs, not by confrontation, but by identity. Knowing is not a matter of confronting a world already out there and then of somehow getting accurate representations of that world into our heads. Knowing involves the active and conscious performance of experiential and intelligent and rational operations whereby the knower intentionally becomes that which is known. In knowing there is performed an identity, a unity, an "isomorphism" between knower and known.\textsuperscript{107}

In this account of knowing, Lonergan makes clear that the detached, disinterested, unrestricted desire to know does not imply indifference, lack of concern, or the absence of subjectivity. Lonergan uses his terminology of detachment and disinterest merely to emphasize the fact that the fulfillment of the desire to know has to prevail over interests extrinsic, or even contrary to the desire to know. These interests must be kept in check and the exigencies of wonder and critical rationality must be respected if knowing is to occur.

More positively, the term "disinterested" is related to Lonergan's thematization of knowing as a specific, profoundly human form of desire. And the term "detached" is integral to Lonergan's thematization of human knowing precisely as a conscious activity: as a conscious desire, knowing involves a passionate concern for objectivity, something legitimately—perhaps even superlatively—human.\textsuperscript{108} This is a possibility Kierkegaard in particular seemed to acknowledge, and existentialism and post-modernism in general seem even at times to disparage.

Fourth, there is the issue of knowledge construed as "abstract." Kierkegaard was rightly critical of an Hegelian rationalism that claimed to possess the totality conceptually when, in actuality, it had abstracted entirely from the ethico-religious dimension. However,
intellectualism need not be equated with rationalism; and for that non-hubristic modes of human understanding abstraction need not amount to impoverishing abstraction. Lonergan agrees with Hegel that human knowing intends the concreteness of being. Lonergan and Kierkegaard affirm that human knowing never completely apprehends the concrete totality. Yet Lonergan does not assume that by retreating from abstraction we get closer to an apprehension of the concrete simply. The so-called ‘abstract’ is usually the incompletely determined apprehension of the concrete, and all human apprehension is incompletely determined. Indeed, intellectualist apprehension is more complete than the apprehension of undifferentiated consciousness, and it is just the ignorance of undifferentiated consciousness that complains about the abstractness of the intellectual.\(^{109}\)

Lonergan’s cognitional theory clarifies a kind of enriching abstraction proper to human understanding in its ordinary and typically non-rationalistic employment.\(^{110}\) Kierkegaard’s critique of the abstraction of Hegelian rationalism is not legitimately applicable to this abstraction as verifiable in any act of understanding. While the naïve realist would attempt to confront the concrete perceptually by supposedly withdrawing from abstractions altogether, the critical realist (for whom the possibly real is the intelligible) knows that the way to the concrete is mediated by abstractions and must pass through them. To protest in the name of concreteness that intellectual achievements are abstract is simply one more way undifferentiated consciousness surrenders to general bias.

Fifthly, existentially motivated objections to intellectualism are well taken, if they mean explicitly acknowledging that intellectual endeavor depends for its concrete actuation upon fourth level operations of deliberation, evaluation, and choosing. Although the intellectual pattern of experience emerges spontaneously inasmuch as human beings by nature desire to know, it is also the case that human beings deliberately organize the conditions of their living in ways that


\(^{110}\) See Lonergan, Insight, 111-2 and The Subject, 10-11.
foster the exercise of the intellectual pattern. The bios theoretikos is not practically sustainable in the absence of such deliberate support.

While knowledge may be considered abstractly as such, in the concrete, human knowing is always the act of an existing knower who has made particular choices about implementing his or her cognitive potential.

The speculative intellect or pure reason is just an abstraction. Scientific or philosophic experiencing, understanding, and judging do not occur in a vacuum. They are the operations of an existential subject who has decided to devote himself to the pursuit of understanding and truth and, with greater or less success, is faithful to his commitment.111

The normative intention of the intellectual pattern is simply to know the truth, and so it requires a posture of disinterest, an almost ascetical prescinding from extrinsic existentially motivated preconceptions regarding what one might prefer the truth to be. The actual choice to enter into the intellectual pattern of experience in the first place, and to sustain it over the long run, must itself be motivated by an existential decision that more or less explicitly affirms the value of theoretical understanding. In the intellectual pattern of experience one chooses "to submit entirely to the exigencies of knowing and to meet completely the demands of the effort to know."112 For some at least this choice takes on all the characteristics of passionate dedication.

Deep within us all, emergent when the noise of other appetites is stilled, there is a drive to know, to understand, to see why, to discover the reason, to find the cause, to explain.... It can absorb a man. It can keep him for hours, day after day, year after year, in the narrow prison of his study or his laboratory. It can send him on dangerous voyages of exploration. It can withdraw him from other interests, other pursuits, other pleasures, other achievements. It can fill his waking thoughts, hide him from the world of ordinary affairs, invade the very fabric of his dreams. It

111 Lonergan, Method in Theology, 340.
can demand endless sacrifices that are made without regret though there is only the hope, never a certain promise, of success.\textsuperscript{113}

Lonergan admits that insofar as a person is engaged in the intellectual pattern of experience, his or her responsibility is focused on arriving at the truth: "The will is willing the good, but the good it is willing is the good of the intellect, the true."\textsuperscript{114} Yet he is by no means willing to characterize intellectual endeavor per se as a merely aesthetic pursuit or an evasion of all responsibility. As in the pursuit of an ethico-religious existence there is a demand for self-transcendence, so too in the intellectual pattern of experience there is a demand for the self-transcendence that achieves objectivity. There exist normative exigencies intrinsic to cognitional structure itself, standards to which the knower either chooses to be responsibly faithful, or else fails in the task of cognitional self-transcendence.

Sixthly, Kierkegaard's critique of absolute idealism clarifies the comic hubris of a merely human rationality which would attempt to pass itself off as the totality of being, thereby exempting individuals from existential striving. Kierkegaard sought to remedy idealism by insisting that thought remain mindful of its human thinker. Human thought is not absolutely sufficient unto itself, but must consciously bear in mind its essential relation to the ongoing task of existence. Lonergan's successive sublation paradigm allows us to clarify this relation in terms of the metaphor of "withdrawal and return."

\textsuperscript{113} Lonergan, \textit{Insight}, 29.
\textsuperscript{114} Bernard Lonergan, \textit{Collected Works of Bernard Lonergan}, vol. 10: \textit{Topics in Education: The Cincinnati Lectures of 1959 on the Philosophy of Education}, ed. Robert M. Doran and Frederick E. Crowe (Toronto: University of Toronto Press, 1993), 87. On the nature of this focused responsibility Lonergan writes: "Insofar as the subject is willing the true, the subject himself and his other concerns are placed in abeyance. The subject's responsibility contracts to arriving at truth... He is not committing himself in the way in which he would have to when dealing with the good in a more ample sense than the good of truth. His responsibility is contracted to saying just what he knows, no matter how little. He is committed to explicitness, to exactitude, to distinguishing certitude from probability, to carrying out the precepts that formulate the meaning of the intellectual pattern of experience." Lonergan, \textit{Topics in Education}, 87.
Lonergan borrowed this metaphor from Arnold Toynbee. He employs it to suggest that a withdrawal from undifferentiated consciousness into differentiated consciousness can mediate an enriched return to concrete living. He offers the example of St. Paul and of St. Ignatius who “withdrew from practical life to a life of quiet” but then “returned to the world and made a terrific difference.”\textsuperscript{115} Another example can be found in Isaac Newton: “When Newton was writing his \textit{Principia mathematica philosophiae naturalis}, he lived in his room day and night, had his meals brought to him, and could barely stand any interruption. He was just absorbed in the business of getting out the big idea, the idea that put modern science on the map.”\textsuperscript{116} When Newton emerged from his room, the universe to which he returned was not the same.

Absolute idealism is a withdrawal that never returns; it is a withdrawal that has forgotten it is a withdrawal. Existentialism, in reaction to idealism, is tempted to become a permanent return, a refusal to ever withdraw from the concreteness of experience. Lonergan effectively offers a critique of both. What is fully adequate is neither mediation alone, nor immediacy alone, but withdrawal and return, the ongoing repetition of mediated returns to immediacy.

On the one hand, the existential tendency to refuse to withdraw from practicality to enter into the intellectual pattern of experience can cast practicality into “a total blindness that makes choice indistinguishable from mere force or instinct or passion or arbitrariness.”\textsuperscript{117} Recalling the dynamics of general bias and its longer cycle of decline, suggest that such a refusal is never free of practical and existential consequences. On the other hand, the idealist’s speculative tendency to neglect the return—to view reason as absolutely sufficient unto itself and to abstract entirely from the task of existence—constitutes an aesthetic renunciation of existence, a devastating truncation of the dynamism of conscious intentionality, and a subversion of its full unfolding. Lonergan writes: “To give oneself over entirely to the practical is to become blind, whereas to give oneself

\textsuperscript{115} Lonergan, \textit{Phenomenology and Logic}, 241.
\textsuperscript{116} Lonergan, \textit{Phenomenology and Logic}, 235.
\textsuperscript{117} Lonergan, \textit{Phenomenology and Logic}, 241.
over entirely to the speculative is to become ineffective. To be bold, open-eyed, and effective, one has to go in for both."118 For Lonergan's the complementarity of theory and praxis is not a negotiated compromise between one-sided idealism and one-sided existentialism, but a disclosure of the integral thought-existence relation that self-appropriation makes possible.

IX. Lonergan's Both/And: Affirming the Whole Dynamism

Are Kierkegaard and Lonergan in agreement regarding the need for a decisive either/or between thought and existence? The answer hinges upon an equivocation in the term "thought." If by "thought" is meant Hegelian speculation in particular or, more generally, the speculative aestheticism which seems to be a universal feature in all rationalism, then both Kierkegaard and Lonergan would insist upon such an either/or. When any merely human rationality takes itself to be absolute, or purports to exempt the individual from ethical and religious striving, one is then confronted with a choice. Either persist in the absolutization of thought—but not without embroiling oneself in the ultimate performative self-contradiction, neglecting one's own existence. Or choose to exist—but not without disavowing existence-denying systems, and not without allowing one's thinking to be situated within the more unpretentious yet more demanding horizon of finitude. Climacus expresses this either/or by an analogy that contrasts subjective heaviness to objective lightness. Just as it becomes impossible for a woodcutter to continue sawing a log if he should press straight down on the saw blade, so too, "whoever is impassionedly, infinitely interested in his eternal happiness makes himself as subjectively heavy as possible. Precisely thereby he makes it impossible for himself to speculate."119

Lonergan's affirmation of existential subjectivity and his account of how the fourth level of conscious intentionality sublates the cognitional levels make clear his agreement with Kierkegaard's

118 Lonergan, Phenomenology and Logic, 241. By "speculative" Lonergan means theoretical knowing; he does not mean speculation in the self-absolutizing rationalistic sense which disturbed Kierkegaard.
119 Kierkegaard, Concluding Unscientific Postscript, 57.
existential opposition to thought as either Hegelian speculation or speculative aestheticism. Yet "thought" can certainly also have a normative meaning. In terms of the concrete and differentiated sense disclosed by self-appropriation, thought understands itself as situated in relation to existence according to the successive sublation paradigm. The correct position regarding the thought-existence relation is no longer one of an either/or, but of apprehending and affirming an integral both/and.

Lonergan was quite mindful of what Kierkegaard claimed Hegel forgot: that is, that all knowing is the performance, not of some abstract transcendental ego, but of a concretely existing, finite, historically embodied human subject—a subject whose knowing is conditioned by imagination, accompanied by feeling, motivated or thwarted by various desires, differentiated or undifferentiated in various ways, developed to various degrees, oriented or disoriented by the presence or absence of the various conversions. Lonergan insisted that fidelity to the concretely existing subject involves a concern, not merely for knowledge, or the known, but also for the knower and the process of coming to know. "The fruit of truth must grow and mature on the tree of the subject, before it can be plucked and placed in its absolute realm."120 Truth for humans is attained by a pattern of cognitional operations normatively performed by an actually existing knower or knowers; ontologically the truth we know does not exist independently of such knowers. Truth, again, is not "so objective as to get along without minds."121 When this is forgotten because of a fascination with the absoluteness and the objectivity of truth that is oblivious of the cognitional performance by which truth comes about, there arises the neglect of the subject.122

Climacus' notion of "concrete thinking," his admiration for the intellectual probity of the Socratic ignorance, and his commendation of ancient Greek thought as passionately situated in existence all indicate that Kierkegaard was not unaware of the possibility of an integral thought-existence relation. Yet in comparison to Lonergan's

120 Lonergan, The Subject, 3.
121 Lonergan, The Subject, 5.
122 The "neglected subject" is described by Lonergan in The Subject, 2-8.
explication of the structure of conscious intentionality as a series of precisely specified, personally verifiable, functionally related and sublated operations, Kierkegaard’s inchoate notion of integral subjectivity remained largely undeveloped and unpursued. Mainstream continental and analytic philosophies have not capitalized on new opportunities opened by existentialism and phenomenology for the integration of cognitional and existential subjectivity. Moreover, there have occurred dubious misapplications of Kierkegaard’s legitimate either/or, and exaggerations of his critique of rationality originally aimed at Hegelianism to simply assail intellect, reason, and thought per se. The perennial gulf separating knowing and choosing, intellect and will, speculative and practical, theory and action, the head and the heart, remains as wide as ever.

The authentic either/or, as transcendental method would disclose it, is neither the choice of existence over and against thought, nor the choice of thought over and against existence, but rather a self-choosing which affirms both thought and existence. Lonergan’s either/or regards whether or not one will affirm the full expansion of the dynamism of conscious intentionality in both its cognitive and its existential dimensions. Existentialism’s tendency to side with the heart against the head is no less abstract, and no less a failure to apprehend the concrete, than is rationalism’s tendency to side with the head against the heart. These options merely represent two opposing ways of betraying the concreteness of the cognitional-existential subject, the subject who is integrally both a knower and a chooser.

Finally, it should be emphasized that the value of self-appropriation is not merely that it grounds objective knowing. Self-appropriation has ethical significance (in the thick and peculiarly Kierkegaardian sense of the ethical) insofar as it promotes not merely self-knowledge, but also a radical self-choice. We recall that self-appropriation involves a reduplication of conscious intentionality. While at the third level this reduplication yields self-knowledge—an experiencing, understanding, and judging of experience, understanding, judging, and deciding—the final movement, at the fourth level, adds to this self-knowledge a further “deciding to operate in accord with the norms immanent in the spontaneous relatedness of one’s experienced,
understood, affirmed experiencing, understanding, judging and deciding."\textsuperscript{123}

Lonergan's \textit{Method} account of self-appropriation gives us a way of understanding and evidence for affirming, Kierkegaard's claim that the fundamental problem is not reason \textit{per se}, but rather what he calls "stagnation in reflection."\textsuperscript{124} Mere self-knowledge does not in itself guarantee that one will habitually actuate one's attentive, intelligent, rational, and responsible potencies. Normative human living occurs does not automatically, but only more or less deliberately. A four-fold bias confounds the desire to know being, and subverts the desire to actualize the good.\textsuperscript{125} While the transcendental precepts do have their ground in the ontology of the human subject, it is salutary to be mindful of the fact that these nevertheless remain \textit{precepts}. These precepts tend to be routinely fulfilled only to the extent that there is present some kind of deliberate appropriation of what one's self-knowledge reveals regarding what it means to be human (and what it means to fail to be human). Hence, Kierkegaard is fundamentally correct both in his insistence upon the ethico-religious necessity of self-choice, and in his suspicion of any purported self-knowledge which would neglect self-choice. Full self-appropriation renders normative praxis more probable precisely because it is both self-knowledge and self-choice; it is both a concrete knowledge of one's humanity and a cooperative fidelity to this humanity, to what one most fundamentally is.

\textbf{X. Intentionality Analysis and the Integral Subject}

Lonergan's intellectualist existentialism mediates the reintegration of existential subjectivity and cognitional objectivity in a manner which definitively departs from rationalism and at least implicitly addresses central Kierkegaardian concerns. Transcendental method, I submit, remains systematically open to the intussusception of Kierkegaardian insights and phenomenological typologies which could imaginatively enflesh Lonergan's relatively terse functional explanations of what self-appropriation at the existential level involves. I have suggested that

\textsuperscript{123} Lonergan, \textit{Method in Theology}, 15. Emphasis mine.
\textsuperscript{124} Kierkegaard, \textit{Two Ages}, 96.
\textsuperscript{125} See Lonergan, \textit{Insight}, 214-27, 244-67.
the remarkable integrative potential of Lonergan's philosophy is due to its understanding of how the levels of conscious intentionality are related in the manner of a series of successive sublations. This paradigm, in turn, was possible only because Lonergan was able to effect a transition from faculty psychology to intentionality analysis. I would like to suggest that insofar as faculty psychology is implicated in the tendency to dualistically oppose thought and existence, the transition to intentionality analysis will provide an important key for resolving the dialectic of thought and existence by understanding the integrity of these two dimensions.\textsuperscript{126}

Faculty psychology attempts to know the soul by means of metaphysical terms and relations. Because metaphysical terms are liable to remain uncorrelated to conscious operations, they typically do not facilitate access to the subject as such. The reification of such terms may in fact abet the neglect of the subject.\textsuperscript{127} Because metaphysical relations are specified logically and causally, such relations are not likely to be correlated to any conscious flow of intentional operations. As a result there have arisen interminable conflicts concerning which faculties are to be given priority.

As long as psychology is basically a discussion of faculties or potencies, there arise questions regarding the relative priority or importance of the sensitive, the conative, the intellectual, and the volitional components of human living and acting. Moreover,

\textsuperscript{126} This desire to establish an understanding of the unity-in-difference between thought and existence may arouse suspicion from Kierkegaardians. Is the integrative project presented here simply a post-Kierkegaardian revival of Hegelian mediation? And if so, is the existential dimension not liable to suffer at the hands of Lonergan as it suffered at the hands of Hegel? The suspicion is legitimate and a Kierkegaardian clarification is in order: The intended cognitional-existential integration would be a definitive achievement only in the realm of thought. Any resolution of the dialectic of thought and existence would eliminate, or at least attenuate, a perennial tension in the history of philosophy. The intended integration would not be definitive however, in the sense that Kierkegaard rightly feared, in the sense that such an understanding could present itself as a surrogate for the existential, or claim to obviate the need for ethico-religious striving. That this is so, and that the intended integration would only heighten and clarify the awareness of the need to exist, requires only an appropriation of what Lonergan meant by the primacy of the existential.

\textsuperscript{127} Lonergan, \textit{The Subject}, 6-8.
since clear-cut solutions to these questions do not exist, there result unending complaints about the one-sidedness of the other fellow's stand.\textsuperscript{128}

Intentionality analysis provides an alternative to faculty psychology. In this approach the conscious subject comes to know herself by adverting to her own intentional operations on what come to be apprehended as distinct but related levels of cognitional and existential activity. Intentionality analysis is inherently more concrete than faculty psychology; it identifies and relates, not the faculties of the soul considered abstractly and metaphysically, but rather the cognitional and existential operations of a conscious subject who happens to be none other than oneself. As one comes to understand one's conscious and intentional operations in their functional relatedness and interdependence, one comes to understand oneself as a unified dynamism whose intentionality is integrally both cognitional and existential. Insofar as faculty psychology is implicated in the neglect of both cognitional and existential subjectivity, the transition from faculty psychology to intentionality analysis constitutes a shift "of considerable importance."\textsuperscript{129}

The tension between Kierkegaardian existentialism and Hegelian rationalism is merely a particularly lucid episode in the more sweeping dialectic of thought and existence. Lonergan's transcendental method supplies the higher viewpoint which overcomes and resolves this dialectic thought and existence. Regarding the classical distinctions between intellect and will, speculative and practical, theory and action, Lonergan writes: "none of these distinctions adverts to the subject as such."\textsuperscript{130} In a discussion of his own philosophical approach he stated: "I wished to get out of the context of a faculty psychology with its consequent alternatives of voluntarism, intellectualism, sentimentalism, and sensism, \textit{none of which has any serious, viable meaning}, and into the context of intentionality analysis that distinguishes and relates the manifold of human conscious operations and reveals that together they head man towards self-

\textsuperscript{128} Lonergan, "Philosophy and the Religious Phenomenon," 129.
\textsuperscript{129} Lonergan, "Philosophy and the Religious Phenomenon," 129.
\textsuperscript{130} Lonergan, \textit{The Subject}, 20.
transcendence."\textsuperscript{131} Priority is to be given, not to any particular faculty of the subject, not to any particular level of operations, but to the whole subject as such, to the subject-as-subject. Lonergan affirms with Kierkegaard "a priority of the existential," a priority of the fourth level of conscious intentionality. This priority, however, is merely penultimate; it is nested within the more fundamental and comprehensive priority of the subject-as-subject, which includes and integrates all four levels of conscious intentionality, both existential and cognitional.\textsuperscript{132}

In an incisive and liberating statement of the basis of personal integration Climacus writes: "The true is not superior to the good and the beautiful, but the true and the good and the beautiful belong essentially to every human existence and are united for an existing person not in thinking them but in existing."\textsuperscript{133} Lonergan's approach provides a way of appropriating what Kierkegaard proleptically envisioned in this passage by clarifying precisely how the notion of being and the notion of the good (as well as the aesthetic pattern of experience) are discovered by reflecting upon oneself as the unfolding of a differentiated self-transcending dynamism. The unity of this dynamism of conscious intentionality provides the key for understanding the unity of the transcendentals: truth, goodness, and beauty. Lonergan writes: "The levels of consciousness are united by the unfolding of a single transcendental intending of plural, interchangeable objects."\textsuperscript{134} Insofar as the unity of the transcendentals can be apprehended in the unity of one's own existential ontology, it is unlikely that one will feel the need to affirm any radical opposition or separation of these transcendentals. As the subject at the existential fourth level sublates the cognitional subject as experiencing, understanding, and judging,

\textsuperscript{132} Lonergan, The Subject, 27.
\textsuperscript{133} Kierkegaard, Concluding Unscientific Postscript, 348.
\textsuperscript{134} Lonergan, The Subject, 22. In an endnote to this entry, Lonergan writes: "These objectives are approximately the Scholastic transcendentals, \textit{ens, unum, verum, bonum}, and they are interchangeable in the sense of mutual predication, of \textit{convertuntur}" (35).
... sublating means not destroying, not interfering, but retaining, preserving, going beyond, perfecting. The experiential, the intelligible, the true, the real, the good are one, so that understanding enlightens experience, truth is the correctness of understanding, and the pursuit of the good, of value, of what is worth while in no way conflicts with, in every way promotes and completes, the pursuit of the intelligible, the true, the real.\textsuperscript{135}

The attentive, intelligent, reasonable, responsible appropriation of cognitional and existential subjectivity makes it apparent that dichotomies between thought and existence, intellect and will, speculative and practical, theory and action, head and heart, are misguided abstract. These dichotomies, and the dialectic of thought and existence in general, have emerged from philosophical perspectives alienated from a self-knowledge which would elucidate the concrete unity of the subject-as-subject. In addition to disclosing this unity, intentionality analysis also quite readily settles questions regarding the precedence and relative importance among the various cognitional and existential operations.

Now from the viewpoint of intentionality analysis and sublation the old questions of sensism, intellectualism, sentimentalism, voluntarism merely vanish. Experience, understanding, judgment and decision all are essential to human living. But while all are essential, while none can be dropped or even slighted, still the successive levels are related inasmuch as the later presuppose the earlier and complement them inasmuch as the earlier are ordained to the later and need them to attain their human significance.\textsuperscript{136}

Insofar as the subject-as-subject comes to disclose itself as the unified intentional source of all human operations, both cognitional and existential—it becomes apparent that to philosophize well is to appropriate more fully the entire range of conscious intentionality, and that to exist well is to strive more fully for cognitional-existential integrity in one's knowing and choosing.

\textsuperscript{135} Lonergan, \textit{The Subject}, 28.
\textsuperscript{136} Lonergan, "Philosophy and the Religious Phenomenon": 131.
THE SACRED AS REAL: ELIADE'S ONTOLOGY OF THE SACRED AND LONERGAN'S PHILOSOPHY OF GOD

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INTRODUCTION

The renowned Rumanian scholar of religion, Mircea Eliade, spent much of his life attempting to identify the patterns and structures involved in religious knowing; he drew from the vast array of data from the history of religions. His voluminous writings reflect his laborious attempts to understand the sacred, insofar as the sacred can be understood. His endeavors led him to develop a comprehensive theory of the sacred that inevitably entailed questions concerning the relationship between the sacred and the structure of human consciousness, i.e., to examine the structure of religious knowing. However, there is a lack of philosophical clarity in Eliade's ontology of the sacred that has left him open to criticism from various scholars of religion. While several authors have come to Eliade's defense, their attempts have been complicated by the fact that Eliade never responded to his critics. Robert Segal summarizes the problem in Eliade's ontology in this manner: "Eliade, in the fashion of the idealist

tradition which goes back to Plato, views the world dualistically: there is appearance and there is reality.” In other words, Eliade reduces the profane world to appearance or illusion and elevating the world of the sacred—the invisible or camouflaged world—as the real.

This paper summarizes Eliade’s ontology of the sacred and offers an analysis of his presuppositions in the light of the Canadian thinker Bernard Lonergan’s philosophy of God. The hope is to clarify Eliade’s notion of the sacred in view of comments made by some of his critics concerning his ontology of the sacred, focusing on the ontological status of the sacred in Eliade’s theory of hierophanies and in his theory of sacred myths. Next, pay specific attention to the criticism that Eliade’s ontology of the sacred reflects the negative aspects of a Platonist ontology. Third, I suggest an interpretation of Eliade’s ontology of the sacred in light of certain aspects of Lonergan’s philosophy of God, especially those that follow from the notion of the unrestricted act of understanding and in relation to the subject’s full religious horizon. This applies Lonergan’s understanding of differentiations of consciousness to the sacred-profane distinction.

THE ONTOLOGICAL STATUS OF THE SACRED

The whole illusion of a separate holy existence is a dream.
-Thomas Merton

There are two ways Eliade articulates the ontological status of the sacred. First, for ‘primitive’ or archaic people the sacred is the real, while the profane is the unreal or illusory. The second is a more precise development of the first. In his discussion of sacred myths he suggests that myth, as he understands it, expresses the real as opposed to ‘history’ or profane time.

1.1 The Sacred as ‘the Real’

According to Eliade, “The sacred always manifests itself as a reality of a wholly different order from ‘natural’ realities.” The sacred is

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3 Segal, “Eliade’s Theory of Millenarianism,” 160.
apprehended through its diverse manifestations which Eliade calls *hierophanies*.

However, there is a basic problem with Eliade’s presuppositions regarding the sacred and profane in that it is difficult to determine whether he claims the objects belonging to the sphere of the profane actually exist or not. He gives the impression that the profane sphere is illusory:

"...for primitives as for the man of all premodern societies, the *sacred* is equivalent to a *power*, and, in the last analysis, to *reality*. The sacred is saturated with *being*. Sacred power means reality and at the same time enduringness and efficacy. The polarity sacred-profane is often expressed as an opposition between real and *unreal* or pseudoreal...Thus it is easy to understand that religious man deeply desires to *be*, to participate in *reality*, to be saturated with power."

For Eliade, when the manifestation of the sacred in profane space occurs the hierophany reveals “absolute reality, opposed to the nonreality of the vast surrounding expanse.”

The surrounding expanse of “profane space represents absolute nonbeing.” He also indicates that sacred time “is an ontological, Parmenidian time; it always remains equal to itself, it neither changes nor is exhausted.”

His reference to Parmenides suggests a possible monistic interpretation of the distinction between sacred time and profane time in the sense that profane time functions as a veil of illusion concealing sacred time. Indeed, Eliade’s claim that the sacred “unveils the deepest structures of the world” would seem to indicate that the profane world is illusory, disguising a deeper sacred reality. As we will see in the next section, he has been criticized primarily for maintaining dualistic assumptions.

Reinforcing this juxtaposition of sacred time and profane time in Eliade’s ontology of the sacred is the *sacred center*, as “pre-eminently

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5 *SP*, 12-13.

6 *SP*, 21.

7 *SP*, 64.

8 *SP*, 69.
the zone of the sacred, the zone of absolute reality."\textsuperscript{9} The sacrality of the center is set over against profane, “illusory existence.” “Attaining the center is equivalent to a consecration, an initiation; yesterday’s profane and illusory existence gives place to a new, to a life that is real, enduring, and effective.”\textsuperscript{10} Moreover, for Eliade the desire to live in the sacred is equated with the desire to possess sacred power and live in objective reality:

...the sacred is pre-eminently the \textit{real}, at once power, efficacity, the source of life and fecundity. Religious man’s desire to live \textit{in the sacred} is in fact equivalent to his desire to take up his abode in objective reality, not to let himself be paralyzed by the never-ceasing relativity of purely subjective experiences, to live in a real and effective world, and not in an illusion.\textsuperscript{11}

He equates the sacred with \textit{being}: “on the archaic levels of culture \textit{being} and \textit{the sacred} are one.”\textsuperscript{12} Hence, the existential desire for the sacred is reflected in a \textit{thirst for being}: “This religious need expresses an unquenchable ontological thirst. Religious man thirsts for \textit{being}.”\textsuperscript{13} Eliade also identifies this existential thirst for being as a \textit{thirst for the real}.\textsuperscript{14}

\section*{1.2 Sacred Myth and Reality}

For Eliade the topic of myth is complex in his very specific meaning of the term. Myth “means a ‘true story’ and, beyond that, a story that is a most precious possession because it is sacred, exemplary, significant.” He contrasts this with the tendency of Enlightenment thinkers to regard myths as fictitious rather than factual.\textsuperscript{15} For Eliade, archaic and ‘primitive’ myths always refer to the account of the original act of

\textsuperscript{10} Eliade, \textit{Myth of the Eternal Return}, 18.
\textsuperscript{11} \textit{SP}, 28; Eliade’s emphasis.
\textsuperscript{12} \textit{SP}, 210.
\textsuperscript{13} \textit{SP}, 64.
\textsuperscript{14} \textit{SP}, 80.
creation of the universe or have to do with the origin of some created reality. Since archaic and 'primitive' myths account for the origin of realities, they are considered sacred and likewise eternally true.

...[M]yth is thought to express the absolute truth, because it narrates a sacred history; that is, a transhuman revelation which took place at the dawn of the Great Time, in the holy time of the beginnings (in illo tempore). Being real and sacred, the myth becomes exemplary, and consequently repeatable, for it serves as a model, and by the same token as justification, for all human actions. In other words, a myth is a true history of what came to pass at the beginning of Time, and one which provides the pattern for human behaviour. In imitating the exemplary acts of a god or of a mythic hero, or simply by recounting their adventures, the man of an archaic society detaches himself from profane time and magically re-enters the Great Time, the sacred time.

Myth is "regarded as a sacred story, and hence a 'true history,' because it always deals with realities." Accordingly, Eliade contrasts sacred or mythic time-history with profane, chronological time-history. "[B]y 'living' the myths one emerges from profane, chronological time and enters a time that is of a different quality, a 'sacred' Time at once primordial and indefinitely recoverable."

Moreover, Eliade suggests above that in recounting the true history of a people, myth serves as an exemplary model for human behavior. Consequently, the origin of the cultural mores of archaic and 'primitive' society can be traced to the paradigmatic patterns enacted by the characters in sacred myths. Each myth contains the sacred stories that recount the actions of the gods in the primordial time of creation. One can say that for the 'primitive' the sacred myth serves as a reservoir for the behavioral and ethical code of the community.
which reveals the significant meanings of a group or culture, who consider it as sacred, i.e. ultimately true, real, and valuable.

Myths reveal reality through *archetypes* as ritually repeated "exemplary and paradigmatic gestures." However, Eliade does not mean what Jung means by "archetypes." He explains:

...I have used the terms "exemplary models," "paradigms," and "archetypes" in order to emphasize a particular fact—namely that for the man of traditional and archaic societies, the models for his institutions and the norms for his various categories of behavior are believed to have been "revealed" at the beginning of time, that, consequently, they are regarded as having a superhuman and "transcendental" origin. In using the term "archetype," I neglected to specify that I was not referring to the archetypes described by Professor C. G. Jung. This was a regrettable error. For to use, in an entirely different meaning, a term that plays a role of primary importance in Jung's psychology could lead to confusion. I need scarcely say that, for Professor Jung, the archetypes are structures of the collective unconscious. But in my book I nowhere touch upon the problems of depth psychology nor do I use the concept of the collective unconscious. As I have said, I use the term "archetype," just as Eugenio d'Ors does, as a synonym for "exemplary model or "paradigm,"" that is, in the last analysis, in the Augustinian sense. But in our day the word has been rehabilitated by Professor Jung, who has given it new meaning; and it is certainly desirable that the term "archetype" should no longer be used in its pre-Jungian sense unless the fact is distinctly stated.22

For Eliade then the archetypes operate as paradigms or exemplary models that are revealed in the creation myths of various cultures. We have indicated that they are considered sacred and real in contrast to profane time-history. Specifically in the context of myth, the archetypes are *real* and have the power to confer reality insofar as the archetypes are imitated. In turn, to the extent that reality is conferred on the profane, the profane becomes sacred. Imitation involves repeating the archetypes or exemplary models established by the 'gods' or mythical

ancestors. Eliade states: “an object or act becomes real only insofar as it imitates or repeats an archetype. Thus, reality is acquired solely through repetition or participation; everything which lacks an exemplary model is ‘meaningless,’ i.e., it lacks reality.”

Hence, the repetition of archetypes as acted out in the ritual life of traditional archaic and ‘primitive’ cultures enables them to stay in close contact with reality while simultaneously enabling them to confer reality and meaning (i.e. constitute and effect reality and meaning) upon every aspect of their lives. Eliade explains further:

What does living mean for a man who belongs to a traditional culture? Above all, it means living in accordance with extrahuman models, in conformity with archetypes. Hence it means living at the heart of the real since...there is nothing truly real except the archetypes. Living in conformity with the archetypes amounted to respecting the “law,” since the law was only a primordial hierophany, the revelation in illo tempore of the norms of existence, a disclosure by a divinity or a mystical being. And if, through the repetition of paradigmatic gestures and by means of periodic ceremonies, archaic man succeeded, as we have seen, in annulling time, he none the less lived in harmony with the cosmic rhythms.

1.3 A Platonist Ontology?

From the above summary it may not be surprising that Eliade has been accused of adhering to the denigration of material this-worldly reality commonly attributed to Platonist ontology at least with respect to what he posits concerning archaic or ‘primitive’ religion. Indeed, his suggestion that reality is conferred upon the profane, insofar as the profane imitates the archetypes, is a notion that harks back to Plato. Thus, the scholar of religion Robert Segal remarks, “Eliade, in the fashion of the idealist tradition which goes back to Plato, views the world dualistically: there is appearance, and there is reality. Reality is unchanging, eternal, sacred, and as a consequence meaningful. Appearance is inconstant, ephemeral, profane, and therefore

23 Eliade, Myth of the Eternal Return, 34.
24 Eliade, Myth of the Eternal Return, 95.
meaningless."\(^{25}\) Moreover, Eliade himself suggests that a Platonist ontology agrees with his understanding of the ‘primitive’ ontology: "[I]t could be said that the ‘primitive’ ontology has a Platonist structure; and in that case Plato could be regarded as the outstanding philosopher of ‘primitive mentality,’ that is, as the thinker who succeeded in giving philosophic currency and validity to the modes of life and behavior of archaic humanity."\(^{26}\) Similarly, Eliade acknowledges indebtedness of his own theory of archetypes and repetition to Greek philosophy in general, and specifically to Plato’s theory of forms:

In a certain sense it can even be said that the Greek theory of eternal return is the final variant undergone by the myth of the repetition of an archetypal gesture, just as the Platonist doctrine of Ideas was the final version of the archetype concept, and the most fully elaborated. And it is worth noting that these two doctrines found their most perfect expression at the height of Greek philosophical thought.\(^{27}\)

In light of these criticisms, Robert F. Brown cautions that it is important to distinguish Eliade’s ‘archaic philosophy’ from Plato’s theory of forms.\(^{28}\) Likewise, Robert Segal has carefully delineated the major similarities and differences between Eliade and Plato:

For Plato, reality is a distinct metaphysical domain, one which wholly transcends appearance and stands over against it. For Eliade as well, reality is a distinct metaphysical domain which transcends appearance, but at the same time reality manifests itself through appearance. For Plato and Eliade alike, reality confers meaning on appearance, but where for Plato reality confers meaning by the ‘participation’ of appearance in reality, for Eliade reality confers meaning by almost the reverse: the manifestation of itself in appearance. When Eliade speaks, for


\(^{26}\) Eliade, Myth of the Eternal Return, 34.

\(^{27}\) Eliade, Myth of the Eternal Return, 123.

example, of sacred space, he means not the metaphysical realm of the sacred but a physical place in and through which that realm reveals itself. By contrast, Plato scarcely regards any physical entity, any portion of appearance, as the revelation of the sacred, or the real. No one physical entity is for him any more or less real than another, the way, for Eliade, one place, one rock, one tree, or other phenomenon is sacred and another profane.

Where for Plato the forms bestow meaning on the world, for Eliade 'archetypes' do. Where the forms give meaning to physical objects—table, stone, hand—and philosophical ideals—goodness, beauty, justice—archetypes give meaning to physical objects and human acts. Where the meaning which forms give is exclusively intellectual, the meaning which archetypes give is religious as well: where forms define and explain phenomena, archetypes also make them sacred. Where the forms are sacred because they are real and indeed are 'sacred' only in the sense that they are real, archetypes are real because they are sacred: they are divine prototypes, or models, of physical objects and human acts. The archetypes of physical objects are their divine counterparts; those of human acts are the acts of the gods, as described in myths. Man does not discover the archetypes on his own, the way he does the forms. The gods reveal them to him. Where, finally, the forms are metaphysically rather than temporally prior to the phenomena they explicate (unless one reads the Timaeus as cosmogony rather than cosmology), archetypes are both temporally and metaphysically prior to the phenomena they 'sacralize'.

While a detailed study of the influence of Plato on Eliade's thought lies beyond the scope of this study, one should be cautious when trying to assess Eliade's indebtedness to Plato. There is no indication that he ever studied Plato's thought in any great detail. Guilford Dudley suggests that Eliade's early work on Renaissance Humanism might have "oriented" him to the revival of Platonism that characterizes

much of Italian Renaissance thought. But this may be stretching things and does not account for an additional complicating factor. One must consider to what extent Eliade’s ontology of the sacred has been influenced by his study of Indian philosophy. As a young man, he studied Indian philosophy in depth for three years in India; the fruit of his work culminated in an extensive study on yoga. As a result, some theorists such as Dudley argue that Eliade’s ontology of the sacred may be as much Indian as it is Platonist. Dudley suggests it is Platonist in the sense that “it refers to forms or archetypes, in comparison with which all nonarchetypal or nonparadigmatic phenomena are unreal.” However, he also suggests that Eliade’s ontology of the sacred is Indian, specifically in the tradition of Vedantic thought and yogic practices, because it “rejects profane time or history as the vehicle for ontological reality.” For example, it is not uncommon for Eliade to make references to Indian philosophy, and in particular to the notion of Mâyâ or ‘cosmic illusion’:

For Indian thinking, our world, as well as our vital and psychic experience, is regarded as the more or less direct product of cosmic illusion, of Mâyâ. Without going into detail, let us recall that the “veil of Mâyâ” is an image-formula expressing the ontological unreality both of the world and of all human experience; we emphasise ontological, for neither the world nor human experience participates in absolute Being. The physical world and our human experience also are constituted by the universal becoming, by the temporal: they are therefore illusory, created and destroyed as they are by Time. But this does not mean that they have no existence or are creations of my imagination. The world is not a mirage nor an illusion, in the immediate sense of the words: the physical world and my vital and psychic experience exist, but they exist only in Time, which

30 Dudley, Religion on Trial, 43. Eliade’s master’s thesis focused on Italian humanism including, among others, the work of Giordano Bruno. See Mircea Eliade, Autobiography I, 128.
32 Dudley, Religion on Trial, 78-79. For a more elaborate discussion of the influence of Indian philosophy on Eliade’s thought see Chapter 4, “The Indian Roots of Eliade’s Vision,” in the same text by Dudley.
for Indian thinking means that they will not exist tomorrow or a hundred million years hence. Consequently, judged by the scale of absolute Being, the world and every experience dependent upon temporality are illusory. It is in this sense that Māyā represents, in Indian thought, a special kind of experience, of Non-being.\textsuperscript{33}

This passage indicates that for Eliade Māyā, or let us say the profane world, is not wholly illusory in the sense that it has no ontological reality. If we are correct in identifying Māyā with the profane, such statements by Eliade lead us to believe that at least to some degree he posits, an ontological status to the profane world. If so, the profane world cannot be wholly illusory. Statements like these illustrate the ambiguity regarding Eliade's philosophical presuppositions with respect to the profane world.

Dudley suggests that the notion of Māyā or cosmic illusion coupled with a hidden absolute reality may have influenced Eliade's early ontology of the sacred. Likewise, he suggests that one must be cautious when trying to establish Eliade's reliance on Plato. However, it would seem that, whether or not Eliade was influenced by Platonist philosophy or by Indian philosophy, the need remains for some clarification on the ontological status of the profane.

LONERGAN'S PHILOSOPHY AND THE SACRED AND THE PROFANE

The chalice of this realm of spirits foams forth to God's own Infinitude.

-G. W. F. Hegel

In this section I propose a reading of Eliade's distinction between the sacred and profane that may help to clarify his ontology of the sacred. First, we will interpret the distinction in terms of Lonergan's philosophy of God in \textit{Insight}. Secondly, I suggest an interpretation of the distinction from the viewpoint of the religious subject: 1) as understood in terms of Lonergan's notion of \textit{being-in-love in an unrestricted manner},

\textsuperscript{33} Eliade, \textit{Myths, Dreams, and Mysteries}, 238.
and 2) as a differentiation within the subject’s consciousness that leads to an understanding of two distinct worlds.

2.1 The Unrestricted Act of Understanding

According to Lonergan, human beings possess an unrestricted desire to know; and when it unfolds properly, it heads towards intelligent understanding and reasonable judgment. For Lonergan, knowing in the strict sense occurs in the operation of judgment when one reaches the virtually unconditioned.

For we do not know until we judge; our judgments rest on a grasp of the virtually unconditioned; and the virtually unconditioned is a conditioned that happens to have its conditions fulfilled. Thus every judgment raises a further question; it reveals a conditioned to be virtually unconditioned, and by that very stroke it reveals conditions that happen to be fulfilled; that happening is a matter of fact, and if it is not to be matter of fact without explanation, a further question arises.34

In Lonergan’s metaphysics, what is known through the cumulative operations of experience, understanding, and judgment is being, and more specifically proportionate being, which is proportionate to our human knowing.

Throughout the whole of Insight Lonergan constructs a philosophy by beginning with the operations of intentional consciousness. From these operations he moves through an epistemology, to the known as metaphysics, to the general outline of a foundation for ethics and, in the final chapters, to general and special transcendent knowledge.

In Chapter 19, “General Transcendent Knowledge,” Lonergan raises the question of the existence of God. Without going into detail concerning the validity of Lonergan’s treatment, or without going into the complex issues involved in his argument, let us briefly highlight those aspects directly pertinent to this study. His argument begins with the subject’s cognitional acts of direct understanding and of

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reflective understanding's grasp of the virtually unconditioned grounded in judgment. From understanding he extrapolates to the possibility of an unrestricted act of understanding that comprehends everything about everything. Likewise, on the basis of the virtually unconditioned affirmed in judgment there arises the possibility of affirming the formally unconditioned, the ultimate ground of all true judgments. By invoking the notion of efficient causality Lonergan deducing proposes that the virtually unconditioned must depend upon a formally unconditioned, which "is itself without any conditions and can ground the fulfillment of conditions for anything else that can be" (IN, 679). If subjects attain a grasp of the virtually unconditioned, then the ground of their judgments lies ultimately with the formally unconditioned. When one reaches a grasp of the virtually unconditioned, the content of the judgment is affirmed as true, which also means the content is affirmed as existing, or real. Similarly, one can say that the reality affirmed by a grasp of the virtually unconditioned is dependent upon the absolute reality of the formally unconditioned. Therefore it can be said that the unrestricted act of understanding that understands everything about everything is at once the formally unconditioned, or absolute truth, and absolute reality.

From the possibility of an unrestricted act of understanding and a formally unconditioned, several conclusions follow: Because the "unrestricted act understands itself" it would also be the primary intelligible (IN, 681). So the formally unconditioned is identified with the primary intelligible. Likewise, just as the virtually unconditioned is dependent upon the formally unconditioned so secondary intelligibles are dependent upon the primary intelligible. Secondary intelligibles refer to intelligibility derived from God's understanding. In other words, they refer to the knowledge of everything that God could create. They are distinct from the primary intelligible but their very intelligibility rests upon the primary intelligible (IN, 683).

Recall that for Lonergan "what is known by correct and true understanding is being." We noted that this claim is the basis of Lonergan's metaphysics. Extrapolating from his metaphysics, he deduces that "the primary intelligible would be also the primary being" (IN, 681). Similarly, the unrestricted act of understanding would be identical with the primary being, which would also be identified with
the primary intelligible, and with the formally unconditioned. In addition, although Lonergan does not mention the term in Chapter 19, one can speak of secondary beings or created beings as those which are dependent upon the primary being for existence. In other words the primary being is the condition for the existence of all secondary or created beings.

Now let us apply elements of Lonergan's philosophy of God in *Insight* to the distinction between the sacred and the profane. We have stated that the virtually unconditioned is dependent upon the formally unconditioned for existence or reality. One could say that whereas the virtually unconditioned obtained in judgment affirms what is real, the formally unconditioned denotes the absolutely real, or the really real. In this way, when one considers the virtually unconditioned in relation to the formally unconditioned in more descriptive and less explanatory terms, the virtually unconditioned seems to pale ontologically in comparison with the formally unconditioned. Comparing the world of the virtually unconditioned to the formally unconditioned from the standpoint of things as related to us, the ontological status of the former appears to be illusory or nonexistent in view of the fact that the formally unconditioned is the condition for existence of the virtually unconditioned, not because the world of the virtually unconditioned has no ontological status whatsoever. This distinction helps us to clarify the ontological status of the sacred as expounded by Eliade.

The distinction we just made between the real as the virtually unconditioned and the absolutely real of the formally unconditioned. Let us analogously apply to the distinction between the sacred and the profane. Thus, in Eliade's ontology of the sacred the sacred is directed towards the absolutely real, or the really real, while the profane appears to pale ontologically in comparison, just as, from a common sense perspective, the virtually unconditioned appears to pale in comparison to the formally unconditioned. The profane may appear to be illusory or nonexistent in comparison with the sacred but this is only from a descriptive viewpoint of things-in-relation to us. This does not mean that the profane has no ontological status and we can avoid the ambiguity in Eliade's presuppositions regarding the sacred as real and the profane world as less real or illusory.
This is not to say that the sacred is identical with the formally unconditioned or God. Rather, it is to help us understand the relation between the sacred and God in terms well expressed by Josef Pieper:

The terms *holy* and *sacred*, therefore, are used here neither for the infinite perfection of God nor for the spiritual superiority of a man; rather, they are used to mean certain intangible things, spaces, times, and actions possessing the specific quality of being separated from the ordinary and directed toward the realm of the divine.\(^{35}\)

Hence, what makes something sacred is its directedness towards or its relatedness to the divine. In this way, Eliade states, the "sacred always manifests itself as a reality of a wholly different order from 'natural' realities" (*SP*, 10). The hierophanies and sacred myths mediate this 'supernatural' reality by simultaneously directing one's attention to the reality that transcends the natural world of the profane—to the reality that is more complete than the profane because it is the condition for the profane. One can say that the revelations of the sacred both through *hierophanies* and through the archetypes in sacred myths are 'more real' than the profane in the sense that they connote or direct one to a more profound reality. The profane may *appear* to be illusory when compared to hierophanies, for hierophanies mediate in varying degrees the *really real*.

In addition, recall that for Lonergan the formally unconditioned is identified with the primary intelligible and the primary being. I suggest that the notion of the primary being can help to understand such comments as Eliade's remark that *homo religiosus* thirsts for the real, which is simultaneously a thirst for being.\(^{36}\) Such statements are philosophically ambiguous, and, as such, their lack of clarity has left Eliade's theory open to misinterpretation. Obviously, Eliade does not mean that *homo religiosus* thirsts for *any* being, such as secondary beings, like a desk or chair for example. Therefore, a more precise interpretation would be that the existential thirst of *homo religiosus* is directed towards the ground of all being, or the ultimate being. I have


\(^{36}\) *SP*, 80, 64.
indicated that this reality would be the primary being in Lonergan's *Insight*. When Eliade makes statements about the thirst for the real and the thirst for being; it would make more sense for the sake of philosophical clarity to refer that thirst as a thirst for the primary being, which is also the really real. In the next section, the thirst for being will be interpreted in terms of the desire for fulfillment that is attained through what Lonergan calls unrestricted being-in-love.

### 2.2 The Subject's Full Religious Horizon

**Unrestricted Being-in-Love**

We have noted that Lonergan later admitted that chapter 19 of *Insight* is a philosophy of God in the classical Thomist tradition, the chapter does not account for the subject's full religious horizon. Lonergan says that the subject's religious horizon requires "that intellectual, moral, and religious conversion have to be taken into account." Naturally, this entails explaining for the significance of religious experience. Naturally, this entails explaining for the significance of religious experience.

Lonergan interpreted religious experience as the experience of the gift of "God's love flooding our hearts through the Holy Spirit given to us." The experience is transformative; as religious conversion it is "other-worldly falling in love." "Being in love with God, as experienced, is being in love in an unrestricted fashion. All love is self-surrender, but being in love with God is being in love without limits or qualifications or conditions or reservations." For Lonergan, the experience of the gift of God's love, and the dynamic state of being in love that flows from this experience functions as a first principle. As a first principle it is self-justifying: "People in love have not reasoned themselves into being in love." In other words, a man does not justify his love for his wife; he just accepts it. The experience of falling in love for Lonergan is the font from which everything else flows: "From it flow one's desires and fears, one's joys and sorrows, one's discernment of values, one's decisions and

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38 Ibid., 50-51.
40 *MT* 106-107.
41 *MT*, 105.
42 *MT*, 123.
deeds." It involves, then, a transvaluation of one's values and a reordering of one's world in light of one's being in love.

In addition, being in love with God is the basic fulfillment of our conscious intentionality.

As the question of God is implicit in all our questioning, so being in love with God is the basic fulfillment of our conscious intentionality. That fulfillment brings a deep-set joy that can remain despite humiliation, failure, privation, pain, betrayal, desertion. That fulfillment brings a radical peace, the peace that the world cannot give. That fulfillment bears fruit in a love of one's neighbor that strives mightily to bring about the kingdom of God on this earth.

The dynamic state of being-in-love in an unrestricted manner functions as a first principle in the sense that that which one is in love with is the most real and most significant feature of one's life.

This notion may provide the basis for a correct interpretation of the ambiguity in Eliade's claim that the sacred is the real while the profane is illusory or unreal. Saying that the sacred is real relative to the profane equates the sacred with the mysterious content of being-in-love in an unrestricted manner. That which one is in love with, along with the fulfillment that accompanies this being-in-love, provides a basis for interpreting the sacred as the most real and most significant reality in a person's life. This interpretation would most likely agree with that of Mac Linscott Ricketts. In attempts to clarify Eliade's assumptions concerning the ontological status of the sacred, Ricketts admits that Eliade has "misled some readers by his definition of the sacred as the 'real'." However, he insists that "All [Eliade] means here is that for the believer, that which is sacred for him is the Real, the True, the meaningful in an ultimate sense." Just as being in love in an unrestricted manner represents that which is ultimately meaningful to human beings, so does the sacred as authentically embraced become the fundamental guiding principle in someone's life. The thirst for the real, which Eliade attributes to a fundamental orientation in human

43 MT, 105.
44 MT, 105.
beings, may correspond to what Lonergan calls a fundamental orientation towards transcendent mystery or, one could say, the longing to fall in love in an unrestricted manner.

*The Sacred and Profane and Differentiations of Consciousness*

In his early reflections on method in theology, Lonergan draws upon Piaget’s theory of development and identifies “three fundamental antitheses: the sacred and profane, the subject and the object, common sense and theory.” These distinctions are antithetical in that the members of each pair “cannot be put together, but must be left apart,” so that “generally, one shifts from one to the other.” In other words, these antitheses cannot be grouped because the operations each entails pertain to different worlds. The antitheses cannot “interpenetrate” in the sense that one cannot be reduced to the other, e.g. one cannot exist simultaneously in the world of common sense and in the world of theory. However, Lonergan is not using the word *interpenetration* in the same sense as he uses it in other places such as in the first part of Chapter 17 of *Insight* where he asserts the possibility of the interpenetration of the two spheres of variable content. In the case of undifferentiated consciousness and elemental meaning, for example, there can be an interpenetration, but it is an interpenetration in the sense that a clear distinction between the sacred and the profane is not clearly made. As such, the interpenetration is not a reduction of one distinct world to another but rather an elevation. The world is viewed as it truly is, revealing the sacrality of all existence. However, this does not mean that the distinction between the sacred and profane does not exist in some rudimentary way prior to their differentiation.

In his 1962 lectures from the “Method in Theology Institute,” Lonergan attempts to explain the fundamental antithesis between the sacred and profane in terms of the movement from undifferentiated to differentiated consciousness.

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47 IN, 556.

In Chapter 17 of *Insight*, Lonergan suggests that there exists two spheres or fields of variable content wherein there is a field available to the commonsense subject in the world of the ordinary, and there is a field linked with the paradoxical known unknown, where a spade, for example, can acquire a deeper significance reflecting "the undefined surplus of significance and momentousness." He refers to these two spheres again in his 1962 lectures presumably in order to clarify the distinction between the sacred and profane: "there is a fundamental division between the immediate and the ultimate, the proximate and the ultimate, and that opposition grounds the distinction between the sacred and the profane." There is the field in which "a spade is just a spade; but there is also one that is mediated by that field." This distinction of the two fields harks back to Lonergan's distinction of the two spheres of variable content in Chapter 17 of *Insight*. However, in the Method in Theology Institute lectures he indicates a link between the *sphere of the known unknown* and the sacred: "The distinction between the sacred and the profane is founded on the dynamism of human consciousness insofar as there is always something beyond whatever we achieve." One could say that his reference to the "something beyond whatever we achieve" is a reference to the known unknown, and that he is linking the sphere of the known unknown with the sacred.

Moreover, it appears that the 1962 lectures on method in theology are pivotal in that they provide a link between the first part of Chapter 17, "Metaphysic as Dialectic" in *Insight*, and his later work on *Method in Theology*. In Chapter 17 of *Insight* Lonergan acknowledges that the sphere of the known unknown is a function of an indeterminately directed dynamism that he calls finality:

In brief, there is a dimension to human experience that takes man beyond the domesticated, familiar, common sphere, in which a spade is just a spade. In correspondence with that strange dynamic component of sensitive living, there is the

49 *IN*, 556.
50 Lonergan, "Lectures from the Method in Theology Institute," 64.
51 See *IN*, 556.
52 Lonergan, "Lectures from the Method in Theology Institute," 78.
openness of inquiry and reflection and the paradoxical ‘known unknown’ of unanswered questions. Such directed but, in a sense, indeterminate dynamism is what we have called finality.\textsuperscript{53}

At this point in \textit{Insight}, Lonergan prescinds from explicating in theological terms the ultimate aim of finality. However, in the 1962 lectures he gives us a clue by linking the sphere of the known unknown with what human beings desire ultimately, namely, God in the beatific vision:

There is a field in which we can be the master, in which a spade is just a spade; but there is also one that is mediated by that field. It is what is beyond it, above it, before it, at the beginning or in the world to come, it is absolute and obscure. We do not know it properly, but it is the ultimate end of all our desiring, and not only of sensitive desire, but of intellectual desire, the natural desire for the vision of God according to St. Thomas. It is the natural desire for beatitude, and the need for having an ultimate foundation for values.\textsuperscript{54}

Lonergan suggests that our directedness or finality can be expressed as directedness towards the sacred: “the sacred is what is beyond what is known only mediately and analogously. It is what is desired ultimately.”\textsuperscript{55} In the 1962 lectures on method Lonergan goes beyond \textit{Insight} to suggest that theoretically, human finality is directed toward what the Catholic tradition calls the beatific vision of God. In \textit{Method in Theology}, he describes this finality as the fulfillment of our conscious intentionality through falling in love in an unrestricted manner.

The 1962 lectures Lonergan invokes the same text by Wordsworth used in \textit{Insight} and in “Time and Meaning,”\textsuperscript{56} to illustrate the distinction between the sacred and the profane as apprehended by undifferentiated consciousness:

\textsuperscript{53} \textit{IN}, 557.
\textsuperscript{54} Lonergan, “Lectures from the Method in Theology Institute,” 65.
\textsuperscript{55} Lonergan, “Lectures from the Method in Theology Institute,” 66.
The distinction between the sacred and the profane is the result of a differentiation. Among primitives, that differentiation does not exist. For the primitive, there is a sacralization of the profane and a secularization of the sacred, and for him, that is the only way to conceive things. For example, there is Wordsworth's "Ode: Intimations of Immortality from Recollections of Early Childhood":

There was a time when meadow, grove, and stream
The earth, and every common sight,
To me did seem
Apparell'd in celestial light,
The glory and the freshness of a dream.

In that stage, the spade is not just a spade: it has a plus, and for undifferentiated consciousness of the primitive, there is always that plus to everything. The sacred interpenetrates with the profane and the profane with the sacred. 57

The distinction between the sacred and the profane emerges with a differentiation in consciousness and results in separate worlds:

The dynamism of consciousness leads to a differentiation between operations that regard the ultimate—the religious acts we perform when we say mass, meditate, recite the breviary—and the activities of studying and teaching, of eating and recreation. They tend to form and the more they develop the more they tend to form, two separated fields of development. This gives us the distinction between the sacred and the profane. 58

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58 Lonergan, "Lectures from the Method in Theology Institute," 83.
This distinction between the sacred and the profane has become the basis for the modern differentiation between the worlds of the sacred and profane, and underlies much modern discourse about the secular and the sacred (religious). The distinction between the worlds of the sacred and profane can become distorted by either promoting a radical secularism that excludes religion altogether, or by promoting a "pure religiosity" founded on sentiment or feeling. In order to avoid such distortions one should strive to integrate the seemingly opposing worlds of the sacred and profane. Lonergan explains the meaning of integration by calling upon Arnold Toynbee's phrase, "withdrawal and return." Integration is, "being able to move coherently from one world to another, ...being able to give each its due."

Once the differentiation in consciousness has occurred, the possibility of a permanent return to undifferentiated consciousness becomes improbable, if not impossible. The question remains as to what extent the sacred and the profane can ever fully interpenetrate. There is a suggestion in Lonergan that even in undifferentiated commonsense consciousness there remains some fundamental antithesis between the two: "There are fundamental antitheses that cannot be put together, but must be left apart, and generally, one shifts

59 Lonergan reflects on the complex relationship between the secular and religious points of view, in "Sacralization and Secularization," edited by Robert Croken, unpublished lectures, Lonergan Research Institute of Regis College, Toronto, 1-23. Interestingly, there are no references to Eliade in this lecture; the impetus for Lonergan's reflections was a series of articles published in Sacralization and Secularization, Concilium, 47, ed. Roger Aubert (New York: Paulist Press, 1969).


63 Lonergan states, "The primitive does not distinguish between the sacred and the profane—the profane is sacralized and the sacred is secularized: a spade is not just a spade, but is open towards infinity. Mircea Eliade thinks it impossible for a person of the modern world to achieve that lack of differentiation, but he has described the way the world appears to the primitive, in which the most ordinary actions are as liturgical as rites, and liturgy is sacred action, while on the other hand, the liturgy and the sacred actions are just as practical as anything else." Lonergan, "Lectures from the Method in Theology Institute," 85.
from one to another.”64 He refers to the example of Teresa of Avila to illustrate the antithesis between the sacred and profane: “St. Teresa was able after many years of progress to carry on her work of founding convents all over Spain, and at the same time be in a profound mystical state; but she found herself, as it were, cut in two.”65 This example demonstrates the difficulty in negotiating the fundamental antithesis of the sacred and profane within the subject’s consciousness. It illustrates the difficulty that St. Teresa experienced while trying to live in two worlds: a commonsense world that required her to work in the concrete world of people, places, and things in order to accomplish tasks, and a mystical world where she experienced ecstatic heights. Despite her ability to negotiate these two antithetical states of consciousness, Lonergan emphasizes that she found herself “cut in two.” Similarly, according to Eliade, life for homo religiosus “is lived on a twofold plain; it takes its course as human existence and, at the same time, shares in a transhuman life, that of the cosmos or the gods.”66 Indeed, there appears to be an “abyss” that divides the two modalities of the sacred and profane.67

**CONCLUSION**

I have been attempting a corrective interpretation of Eliade’s ontology of the sacred using aspects of Lonergan’s philosophy. Referring to his more traditional philosophy of God outlined in Chapter 19 of *Insight*, I used this argument to provide more adequate philosophical clarification of the sacred and the profane—one that does not result in the negative aspects of a dualist Platonist ontology. In addition, I suggested that Lonergan’s notion of *unrestricted being-in-love* might clarify the distinction between the sacred and the profane in terms of the subject’s religious horizon. Further, I suggested an interpretation of the sacred and the profane in terms of Lonergan’s understanding of

64 Lonergan, “Lectures from the Method in Theology Institute,” 63.
66 *SP*, 167.
67 *SP*, 14.
differentiated human consciousness, as consciousness leading to the distinction of two separate worlds.

One should note, however, that if it is difficult to determine to what extent the lack of clarity in Eliade’s ontology of the sacred might be due to his multiple roles as historian of religions and as literary author, still leading Eliade scholar, Mac Linscott Ricketts, suggests that philosophical clarification lies outside the methodology of Eliade’s history of religions. Ricketts states: “As to what the Real ‘really’ is, Eliade never ventures an answer: such a question lies beyond the methodology of the history of religions.” In addition, even though we have not fully considered the role of Eliade’s literary temperament in relation to the lack of clarity in Eliade’s ontology of the sacred, in fact he was not systematic thinker and he had little interest in philosophical precision.

It is impossible to know whether Eliade would agree with the interpretations proposed in this study. However, this clarification of ontological status of the sacred may hold the promise of preserving some of Eliade’s contributions to the study of religion, and perhaps even incorporating his insight into theology.

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OVER THIN ICE:
COMMENTS ON 'GRATIA:
GRACE AND GRATITUDE'

Charles Hefling
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This is a 'second-order' essay. Its purpose, a presumptuous one perhaps, is to explain and amplify, from a 'Lonerganian' viewpoint, an article of my own that was written for an audience less likely to share that viewpoint than are readers of the Lonergan Workshop journal. The article, "Gratia: Grace and Gratitude," was written for a special issue of a theological journal. Its topic, the Holy Spirit, did not fall within the zone of systematic theology I am most familiar with. My specialization is Christology. But if there is anything that I am sure of, it is that the most important questions in Christology today are not Christological questions. They are logically and methodologically prior questions about the foundations and status of theology, and about other departments of systematics, above all the Trinity. Since many of the same questions have much the same bearing on Pneumatology, the theology of the Spirit, it was on these that I decided I could responsibly write. The result is described in the subtitle of the article: 'prolegomena to Pneumatology' in the shape of fifty short theses.

The article tries to cover a lot of ground, and as it acknowledges at the outset, the value of the fifty theses lies in their having covered that ground in a coherent way. They sacrifice depth for breadth, in order to map in broad outline a position that has certain implications for understanding Christian assertions about the Holy Spirit. It is a

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1 Charles Hefling, "Gratia: Grace and Gratitude. Fifty Unmodern Theses as Prolegomena to Pneumatology," Anglican Theological Review 83.3 (Summer 2001). The editor for this special issue on the Spirit, which is to be published also as a separate volume, was Robert B. Slocum, for whose gentle importunity and imperturbable patience I here record my thanks.
position that might be expected to interest persons who are interested in Lonergan, for the simple reason that it is Lonergan's position. Or, if that is too strong a claim, I can say that my basic aim was to present, in a not very technical way, what I have learned from Lonergan and from his students about the issues at stake.

This is not to say that the article belongs to the genus that Lonergan himself characterized as 'the doctrine of $X$ according to $Y$.' The content of the theses is in some ways more, and in many ways less, than a report of Lonergan's statements. By intention, they offer a synthesis, in direct discourse. Accordingly I had to make a good many decisions about what to omit, what to highlight, what to expand and perhaps carry forward. Some of those decisions were governed by considerations more prudential than theoretical. As the beginning of the article puts it, I skated, knowingly, over some thin ice. And some of the places where the argument is in greatest danger of floundering are places where I have interpreted Lonergan, either for myself or for my intended audience, in ways that may be — and, I think, are — open to criticism.

The present essay is largely about three such places. My rationale for expatiating on them in some detail here is twofold. First, they touch on certain 'specialist' questions that may be found important by students of Lonergan's theology, if not by others who will read the article. Then, secondly, I should like to think of "Gratia: Grace and Gratitude" as a progress report, open to refinement and correction, and the constructive criticism I should most value will come from those who share my conviction that what Lonergan has achieved on the relevant topics is a permanently valid achievement. By making more explicit how my article is related to his achievement, I hope to invite the kind of comment that will help to consolidate the position the article presents.

**SOURCES, HORIZON, AND CONTEXT**

Partly because of constraints of space, and partly to present a position that would stand (or fall) on its own merits, I dispensed in the article with the customary fringe of footnotes acknowledging my sources. Sources there were, of course. The article relies on both 'early' and 'later'
writings of Lonergan, and also on those of his first and most normative interpreter, Frederick Crowe, similarly divided into 'early' and 'later.' In both cases 'early' means 'in a Thomist context'; 'later' means 'after the publication of Method in Theology.' Specifically, the 'early' Lonergan works relevant to my fifty theses are the articles on the concept of *verbum* in Thomas Aquinas ² and the second volume of *De Deo Trino*, a Latin textbook on the Trinity.³ Between these, in chronological order, come Crowe's three articles on "Complacency and Concern in St. Thomas."⁴ The 'later' Lonergan writings, besides *Method* itself, include the articles on "Christology Today"⁵ and "Mission and the Spirit."⁶ The 'later' Crowe writings are his Lonergan Workshop paper on the divine missions⁷ and a very significant address on these missions in relation to world religions.⁸

In this list, the terms 'early,' 'Thomist context,' and 'late' are meant to acknowledge a hermeneutical complexity that has become familiar to students of Lonergan's work. His *verbum* articles belong to what he would later call the functional specialty 'Interpretation'; not, that is, to 'Systematics.' They are about Thomas directly, and about the Trinity at one remove, as it were. Much of what Lonergan finds Thomas doing, he

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³ The two volumes of *De Deo Trino* have a complex history of publication. The final version of the second volume, *Pars systematica*, was published by the Gregorian University Press in 1964. Its subtitle had been the title of the first version: *Divinarum Personarum conceptio analogica*, 'an analogical conception of the Divine Persons.'

⁴ These articles were originally published in 1959, again in *Theological Studies*. They are now available as the second of the studies published in Frederick Crowe, *Three Thomist Studies*, ed. by Michael Vertin (Chestnut Hill, MA: Lonergan Workshop, 2000).


does himself in *De Deo Trino*; but he was later inclined to speak disapprovingly of this and his other Latin works, although he never disowned them and, as will be mentioned, cites *De Deo Trino* in one of his latest essays. Without going further into detail, it can be said in general that it is always a question, which should not be answered in advance, how far 'later' Lonergan can be interpreted by 'earlier,' and vice versa. The problem is most pressing in regard to the basic terms and relations in which theology can and should frame its direct discourse. For the 'early' Lonergan and the 'early' Crowe, it went without saying that Thomist metaphysics provided those basic terms and relations. The 'later' Lonergan abandons the vocabulary of Thomism, if not its meaning, and it seems evident that the direct discourse of doctrinal and systematic theology, as he envisions it in *Method*, will not express itself in metaphysical terms. Yet those are the terms in which his most extensive and important work on the Trinity is framed, and that work underpins the 'later,' less detailed statements.

A central methodological problem of the theses, then, is the problem of how to 'transpose,' or 'carry forward' into a new and different context, meanings that are true and valuable but expressed in a conceptuality which (in my judgment) is defunct. In principle, there is nothing wrong with specialized, technical language. Indeed, contemporary theology needs such a language as much as any other discipline. That the appropriate language can be the language of Thomist Scholasticism, however, seems highly improbable, even in Roman Catholic circles and much more in an ecumenically-minded milieu.

Now, the 'new and different context' to which my theses aspire to be relevant is a context in which theology is conceived in the way the 'later' Lonergan conceives it — as, in the first instance, reflection on religion. Although the theses do have something to say about religious traditions other than Christianity, it is principally Christian religion that they have in view, and more specifically Christian worship. A sentence from Augustine defines a basic premise of the article: "The gist of religion is imitation of the one who is worshiped." Worship is what humans are ultimately good for; that is their 'end.' But the One

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9 *Religionis summa imitari quem colis* (City of God VIII.17).
who is worshiped by Christians is three, the Father, the Son, and the Holy Spirit. Moreover, the paradigmatic act of Christian worship is eucharist, that is, thanks-giving. And that which Christians who worship eucharistically give thanks for turns out to be the same as he whom they give thanks to, namely the self-giving God.

Such is the ‘horizon’ of the article, which becomes explicit in theses 33–35. It stands to the horizon of the ‘later’ Lonergan’s writings roughly as the specific to the generic, in the sense that Method is framed in terms that are less explicitly Christian than transcultural. At the same time, there has long been a recognition that Method’s account of religion has roots in a Trinitarian apprehension of the transcultural ‘religious phenomenon,’ and a brief review of some significant connections will help to introduce the ‘Lonerganian’ basis of my article’s central theses on the Trinity.

The obvious place to begin is Romans 5:5, quoted so often in Lonergan’s later works and, in Method, repeatedly identified with the experience of religious conversion. The love of God, Paul writes, has been poured into human hearts by the Holy Spirit given. This gift Lonergan identifies with grace; in particular, with what Scholastic theology called ‘sanctifying grace.’ And it should be pointed out that this identification, so familiar to students of Lonergan, is more radical than it might seem. Romans 5:5 notwithstanding, the connection between grace and the Spirit is by no means a strong one in Paul’s letters. It can be found in Augustine, if you look for it. For the most part, however, Christian tradition has been content to speak of two divine ‘influences.’ Grace has been understood in a somewhat more ‘impersonal’ way, and the Spirit in more ‘personal’ terms. Grace has been associated with ‘election’ and ‘justification’; the Spirit, with ‘sanctification.’

12 Part of the reason for keeping the two apart is that grace, in the New Testament, is a characteristically (though not quite exclusively) Pauline term. So, for example, while the gospel of John has much to say about the Spirit, what it says makes no reference to grace by name. There are only three uses of charis in John, all in the Prologue. Luke uses the word once, Matthew and Mark never.
This tradition notwithstanding, Lonergan brings grace and the gift of the Spirit together under a common description: being in love in an unrestricted way. And if his chief concern in Method is to integrate the experience of such a love into his methodological proposal, other ‘later’ writings trace its connections with the theology of the Trinity. “Mission and the Spirit,” in particular, having ended its section on the human subject with a reference to Romans 5:5, turns at once in the next section to “the self-communication of divinity in love,” which “resides in the sending of the Son, in the gift of the Spirit, in the hope of being united with the Father.” Further on, Lonergan discusses the complementary of the visible ‘mission’ of the Son and the invisible ‘mission’ of the Spirit. But these are no more than hints. For a more extensive account of the missions there is no alternative to his Latin theology. In De Deo Trino the missions appear at the very end of the second, ‘systematic’ volume, and their placement signals an important methodological point. The missions of the Son and, especially, the Spirit are realities in this world, and so are prior quoad nos, most immediate from the standpoint of those to whom the Son and the Spirit are sent. In that regard they might be expected to stand at the beginning. But only at the conclusion of his Trinitarian treatise is Lonergan in a position to treat these realities in an explanatory way. In other words, an understanding of the mission of the Spirit, precisely as a gift through which unrestricted love is ‘poured into’ human hearts, depends on an understanding of the Trinity ‘itself.’

The same ‘logic’ governs my fifty theses. Not until thesis 39 does an account of religious experience makes its appearance. The previous thesis points in the direction of what Lonergan calls self-appropriation; two later theses (41 and 42) add descriptive concreteness, mostly borrowed from Method in Theology. Before any of that, however, the theses make a highly abbreviated attempt at providing what the ‘systematic’ volume of De Deo Trino provides, namely, as its subtitle indicates, ‘an analogical conception of the divine persons.’ In brief, then, Lonergan’s account of religion in Method, with Romans 5:5 as its focus, stands to the psychological analogy expounded in De Deo Trino in approximately the same relation as the end of “Gratia: Grace and

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Gratitude” stands to the version of the same analogy expounded in theses 20 through 32. Intellectually as well as sequentially, these theses are the core of the article. They also include the ‘thin ice’ mentioned earlier. Accordingly, I propose to concentrate on them in the remaining sections of this essay. Before concluding this section, however, something needs to be said about the first nineteen theses.

The theses that lead to the Trinitarian analogy in my article are there because neither Lonergan’s position on Trinitarian questions nor the procedures by which he addresses them have much in common with today’s discussions, so far as I am aware of them. At present the climate of opinion on Trinitarian theology is, to say the least, confused, although there are certain recognizable trends, which are alluded to at the beginning of the article. The language of ‘immanent Trinity’ and ‘economic Trinity,’ for example, is lingua franca, backed as it is with the authority of Karl Rahner. This is not the place to go into detail about the current ‘Trinitarian agenda,’ as Bruce Marshall terms it; nor could my article undertake such a discussion. Sorting out all the relevant issues would be an exercise in Lonergan’s functional specialty ‘Dialectic,’ and a very large exercise at that. Still, it would have been foolhardy, in an article meant for a general theological audience, not to take any account of the context within which, as likely as not, it would be read. So it seemed necessary to provide a statement of what an ‘analogical conception of the divine persons’ is meant to do, and all the more necessary in that the analogy presented would be a ‘psychological’ one.

Broadly speaking, then, theses 1 through 19 are meant to outline a kind of ‘counter-context.’ Their gist is that what Trinitarian ‘Systematics’ in general, and a psychological analogy in particular, are for is not directly to organize and explain the New Testament data. The point, rather, is to arrive at some insight into the mystery of the Trinity, as Christian apprehension of that mystery in the New Testament data has moved into a context of ‘theoretically differentiated consciousness.’ In other words, ‘Systematics’ in Lonergan’s sense begins with ‘developed’ doctrine — in this case, with the Trinitarian doctrine worked out by the early councils and the Cappadocian fathers. There is an assumption involved here, obviously — the assumption that the Trinitarian developments of the
first six centuries were legitimate, appropriate, and right. Once again, this is not an assumption that is strongly evident in the current context, and to establish that the early development was, in fact, legitimate would be another large project, leading, by a different route, to ‘Dialectic.’ So, in order to move fairly expeditiously to ‘Systematics,’ the article lays a makeshift foundation in two ways.

First, there is an appeal to the authority of the *Quicunque vult* or ‘Athanasian’ Creed, which is a fair specimen of ‘developed’ Trinitarian doctrine, and with it there are some indications of the sort of questions that were asked during the development that led up to that formulation. Second, perhaps more importantly, there is a rather unspecific appeal, beginning in thesis 5, to ‘theological grammar.’ What I had in mind was Kathryn Tanner’s *God and Creation in Christian Theology*, with its extended argument that “God is identified by rules for discourse that announce the general inadequacy of the language we use for talk about the world.” The rules Tanner proposes turn out to do much the same work as was done by old-fashioned ‘rational theology.’ By introducing them idea through the doctrine of creation, I hoped to avoid the charges brought against ‘merely’ philosophical theism; by emphasizing their ‘second-order,’ grammatical function, I meant to suggest a ‘control of meaning’ that is heuristic. Stated in Lonergan’s terms, however, what I was gesturing towards is of course the metaphysics of proportionate being, extended, as in chapter 19 of *Insight*, to the argument for God’s existence and the ‘natural’ knowledge of the divine attributes that follows. My strategy is not innocent of subterfuge. But metaphysics as Lonergan conceives it does, in fact, serve as a kind of regulative grammar, and there was nothing to be gained by giving it the now-incendiary name he gave it.

By whatever name it is called, ‘natural’ knowledge of God cannot be dispensed with if Lonergan’s position on the missions of the Son and the Spirit is to make sense. Without that knowledge, whether or not it is folded into a doctrine of creation, there is no line of reference in relation to which it is possible to conceive the divine missions as supernatural. This point will return in connection with my discussion

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below of the 'ad extra rule.' For the moment, suffice it to say that while for 'later' Lonergan "religious conversion is the event that gives the name, God, its primary and fundamental meaning,"15 there are further meanings which can only be arrived at by 'proofs' such as the one in chapter 19. And those further meanings have a decisive bearing on what it might mean to say that the Trinity is one God.

In sum, then, my first fourteen theses amount to a statement of what there is to be understood — what the doctrine of the Trinity, as a doctrine of God, asserts in such a way as to call for some further exposition, some intellectual conception, even if it is only an analogical one. Theses 15 through 19 add methodological disclaimers: an explanation by analogy is not an apodictic demonstration; an analogy that is psychological has a certain antecedent likelihood of being more satisfactory than one that can be imagined; and the triad of lover, beloved, love, often referred to as the Augustinian psychological analogy, is not the best we can do.

THE ANALOGY IN THESIS 20:
PART ONE

At the beginning of this essay I said that I would be concerned largely with three places in "Gratia: Grace and Gratitude" where I am aware of having written in a way that may not do justice to Lonergan's position on the relevant issues. The first patch of 'thin ice' will be given the most extensive treatment here. It comes in thesis 20's announcement of the basis for an analogical understanding of the Trinity. While I think that what I have presented there is substantially 'Lonerganian,' it introduces one major modification which there is only a wisp of Lonergan's explicit authority for making. Accordingly, the first question here should be: Exactly what is Lonergan's own psychological analogy?

When it comes to questions like this, my settled inclination is to begin with Lonergan's most recent statements and then, as appropriate, work backwards. To the best of my knowledge, there is

15 Lonergan, Method, p. 350; see also p. 341.
only one passage in the 'later' Lonergan's writings that alludes to the relevant component of Trinitarian theology:

The psychological analogy, then, has its starting point in that higher synthesis of intellectual, rational, and moral consciousness that is the dynamic state of being in love. Such love manifests itself in its judgments of value. And the judgments are carried out in decisions that are acts of loving. Such is the analogy found in the creature.\(^\text{16}\)

It is possible to trace the main lines of this brief account through nearly thirty years of Lonergan's writing. Some of what it says remains constant throughout, but there are also variations. What remains constant is, first, the two psychological acts at the center of the analogy — an act of judgment, here specified as judgment of value, and an act of love, here specified as decision. Also constant, secondly, is the relation between these two — the dependence of the latter on the former, of the act of love on the act of judgment, here specified in terms of judgment's being 'carried out' in decision.

All this, Lonergan would maintain, is psychological fact. Applied analogically to God, the constant elements I have mentioned give rise to four points which, I believe, are similarly constant throughout Lonergan's Trinitarian writings.\(^\text{17}\)

1. In God, what is 'spoken,' namely the Word, is analogous to an act of meaning and more exactly to an act of judging.
2. In God, what expresses or 'speaks' the Word, namely the Father, is analogous to an act of understanding and more exactly an act of reflective understanding, that is, an act of grasping the sufficiency of evidence.\(^\text{18}\)
3. In God, what is 'spirated' (the traditional verb), namely the Spirit, is analogous to an act of love.
4. In God, what 'spirates' this proceeding love is the Word, the *verbum spirans amore*.

\(^{17}\) See the ‘additional note’ at the end of the present essay.
\(^{18}\) The passage quoted from “Christology Today” scarcely makes this point explicit, but it is alluded to a few lines further on when Lonergan speaks of “the evidence perceived by a lover.”
Now, for the purposes of theses on the Holy Spirit, the third and fourth of these assertions are obviously important. They bear on the 'second procession' in God, the 'spiration' of the Spirit. How is that to be conceived? More especially, how is it to be conceived in a way that is coherent with the point from which the present essay set out and to which the 'logic' of the theses is moving, namely, the Holy Spirit given in such a way that the love of God is poured into human hearts?

The steps that need to be followed begin to be outlined on the same page of "Christology Today" that I have just quoted. One must, he writes,

\begin{quote}
  take the psychological analogy of the Trinitarian processions seriously, [and] one must be able to follow the reasoning from processions to relations and from relations to persons ... The two processions ground four real relations, of which three are really distinct from one another; and these three are not just relations as relations, and so modes of being, but also subsistent, and so not just paternity and filiation but also Father and Son. \footnote{Lonergan, "Christology Today," Third Collection, p. 93.}
\end{quote}

This outline is another 'constant.' It sets out the sequence that Lonergan uses in De Deo Trino, to which "Christology Today" refers at this point. And it is that sequence which I attempted to honor in the central theses of my article.

The passages I have quoted from Lonergan set the framework for the theses in my article that are belong, roughly, to 'Systematics.' There is not much about the Spirit, unfortunately, but then Lonergan's immediate topic was Christology. And not all that the first passage does say about an analogy for the Spirit is carried into the expanded paraphrase that is thesis 20 of my article. \footnote{Thesis 20 reads as follows.}

\begin{quote}
  Love is "existential," a state of one's whole being that integrates thought and feeling. It is a conscious state characterized by two sorts of conscious activities, which have a certain internal order. They are (1) approving, affirming, valuing, yea-saying or benediction, and (2) delighting, rejoicing, thanksgiving. Someone who is "in" love recognizes or discerns or grasps the evident goodness of someone or something — the beloved. Inasmuch as the discernment is not abstract, the lover (1) inwardly and soundlessly "pronounces" the affirming, evaluative judgment which expresses that the beloved is indeed good. And inasmuch as this silent benediction is wholehearted,
\end{quote}
thesis speaks of 'thanks' and 'gratitude,' and the difference is more than verbal. This is where the going gets tricky.

I had several reasons for using the language of gratitude and thanks. None of them is decisive on its own, but together they seemed to constitute sufficient evidence for judging the alteration to be worthwhile.

First, as is evident in the first quotation above, Lonergan is proposing that God as such, the divine essence, is being-in-love, conceived as dynamic and as a higher synthesis of intellectual, rational, and moral consciousness. In this regard there is a difference from 'early' works, in which God is thought of as an infinite act of intellectual consciousness, which is to say an unrestricted act of understanding. This earlier analogue is no doubt included in a 'higher synthesis' at the existential level of consciousness; but referring to the integration as love sharpens a problem that had already appeared in Lonergan's Thomist writings on the Trinity — the problem of distinguishing 'essential love,' which applies to God as God, from 'notional love,' the love proper to the Spirit. In the context of Thomism, a phrase like 'notional love' need not be misunderstood, but in the largely commonsense context of my theses, some other, less misleading word seemed to be called for.

Second, as I pointed out earlier, my article was influenced not only by Lonergan but by Crowe's "Complacency and Concern" articles. This title refers to two moments or aspects of love, which Crowe distinguishes and relates in a way that I was, and remain, convinced is true to experience. Unfortunately, 'complacency' labors, like 'notional love,' under the burden of potentially misleading connotations. One substitute or synonym that Crowe mentions is 'gratitude,' and in adopting his position on complacency (for reasons to be discussed in the following section) I also adopted this suggested alternative.

Third, I was influenced by a passage in De Deo Trino, which is more or less transcribed in my thesis 46. Lonergan distinguishes three meanings of 'grace': favor, gift ('gratuity'), and gratitude. Given the connection, drawn later in the theses, between the mission of the Spirit

the lover (2) rests content, delighting in and thankful for the goodness he or she has discovered and come to know.
and sanctifying grace, this third meaning seemed especially significant. What the Spirit is in God, and what the Spirit as given corresponds to, might well share one name.

Fourth, the argument I present is not deductive, nor was it written deductively. Besides the connection with grace, I had in mind a further connection with statements made later in the theses, namely statements about worship. If worship is carried out 'in' the Spirit, and if Christian worship is first and foremost eucharistia, thanksgiving, there is a certain congruity in thinking of the Spirit as divine gratitude.

Fifth, as I was in the midst of working out my theses, my attention was called to a passage in a published series of interviews with Lonergan, which I had certainly read and had just as certainly forgotten, though it may well have exercised a covert influence.

Oh, my whole theory of the Trinity has changed, you know. ... According to Aquinas, the Son is verbum spirans amorem — the judgement of value, not a judgement of freedom. According to Rosemary Haughton (though she doesn't put it this way), what in Thomas is called amor procedens, the Holy Ghost, is thanksgiving. ... It is the same sort of relationship, only it is the procession of judgement of value from agape; and of thanksgiving from both.21

This is the 'wisp of authority' mentioned above.

All five considerations, as well as certain others that will be discussed below, entered into my endeavor to fill out the programmatic sketch of Trinitarian reasoning that Lonergan gives in "Christology Today." Such an endeavor assuredly ought not to be just a matter of substituting one word for another — of writing 'gratitude' where Lonergan wrote 'decision.' What matters is not 'outer words' but the 'inner word,' the insight, they express. Accordingly, it would seem appropriate to go back to the 'early' Lonergan's own discussion of the second procession in God, to ask what function the term — 'love,' 'proceeding love,' 'decision' — fulfills in the unfolding of his Trinitarian systematics.

In this regard there is a good starting-point in the summary comment that Lonergan makes at the beginning of the final *verbum* article:

[In prevalent theological opinion ... the analogy to the procession of the Holy Spirit is wrapped in deepest obscurity. ... It seemed possible to eliminate the obscurity connected with the second procession by eliminating the superficiality connected with opinions on the first.]^{22}

From this we may gather that there is some kind of similarity between the second procession and the first. More exactly, the reasons for holding that there is, in God, something analogous to the procession, in us, of an 'act of love' should be the same as the reasons for holding that there is something in God analogous to the procession with which most of Lonergan's discussion in the *verbum* articles is concerned, namely the procession of the 'inner word' of concept or judgment. But while the reasons for drawing the two analogies ought to be same, the analogues ought to be different, so as to account for the fact that in God the Word is not the Spirit. In other words, the two processions need to be processions in the same sense, but not the same procession.

What, then, do we learn from the *verbum* articles about the procession of the Word?

*First,* we know that this procession in God is analogous to (1) the emergence of a concept from an act of understanding, or (2) the emergence of judgment, the act of affirming, from an act of grasping the sufficiency of evidence. In God, there is no distinction between these two, and the divine Word is thus concept and judgment. Thus it would seem that if we follow the 'later' Lonergan by distinguishing between judgments of value and judgments of fact, that too is a distinction which does not apply to God.

*Second,* we learn that this 'emergence' is *within* 'intellect' as distinguished from 'will.'

*Third,* we learn that specifying the nature of this procession is not easy — much of Lonergan's effort in the *verbum* articles is put into sorting out Thomas's terminology — and that there is no really good

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English phrase to designate it. The relevant point is that although both the act of reflective understanding or grasping evidence, and the act of judgment, are themselves acts which emerge in or from the intellect, their emergence in this respect is the emergence of a 'perfection.' Consequently they are poor analogies for divine processions, since God does not improve. Rather, it is the emergence of one of these acts from the other — of the act of judgment from the act of reflective understanding — that provides a relevant analogue. Still more relevant is the fact that judgment proceeds from grasp of evidence because the evidence is known to be grasped. In the much-maligned phrase that Lonergan never abandoned, the procession of an 'inner word' is an *intelligible emanation*. For not only is such an emergence conscious, but the consciousness is intellectual self-presence, luminous to itself.

In light of these three points on the first procession, we may go on to ask about the second. Lonergan's argument, which he maintains is a faithful interpretation of Thomas's position, has several components. The procession of the Spirit is, most importantly, a procession of one act from another; in that regard, it is similar to the procession of the 'inner word.' Next, since it is the emergence of love, it has to do with 'will' as distinct from 'intellect.' Here the suggestion easily insinuates itself that the two processions are parallel. Such a parallel, however, Lonergan flatly and firmly denies. The two acts relevant to the second procession are not both 'within the will.' Rather, the love that emerges, although it does emerge in the will, or 'into' the will, emerges from the word of judgment, which — this is the important thing — is in the intellect. It follows, then, that the emergence of an act of love from an act of judgment is, like the first procession, an *intelligible emanation*. Prying these points out of the *verbum* articles is no easy matter, but once they are grasped their congruity with the passages from "Christology Today" quoted at the beginning of this section is plain. So far, so good. Now for the complicating factors.

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23 A good diagram is always helpful. For a clear and graphic presentation of the relevant points, see Crowe, *Three Thomist Studies*, p. 88 note 33.
I am not the only person who has felt an urge to adjust Lonergan's way of understanding the procession of the Spirit. Among others, three may be mentioned here: William Murnion, Frederick Crowe, and Philip McShane.

Murnion's dissatisfaction is the most radical. The interpretation of Thomas on the second procession laid out in the *verbum* articles is carried over into his own *De Deo Trino* with no significant change. It is just this Lonergan-and/or-Thomas position that Murnion has recently criticized:

Lonergan was wrong about the analogy of love he used to represent the procession of the Spirit within the Trinity. He interpreted Aquinas incorrectly, and he was mistaken about the nature of the love necessary for the analogy. Contrary to what Lonergan contended, Aquinas said that the procession of love within the will as rational is not simply *from the intellect*, but *from the will as well*. For in the will as rational, love proceeds as a *dilectio*, a commitment or devotion, [1] from the *inclination* of the will to the good and its intention of an end, as well as [2] from the intellect making an *electio*, a rational *decision* based upon an understanding of the truth.24

This critique raises not one but two questions. The first is whether Lonergan's view of the second procession, *as* an interpretation of Thomas's view, is correct. The second is whether it is correct in its own right, whether the analogue for the second procession that he expounds is a matter of psychological fact.

As to the first question — how Thomas is best interpreted — Lonergan was well aware that on point under discussion he was parting company with the general run of Thomists. The following passage from *De Deo Trino* sets out the alternatives, and also lays down what, for Lonergan, is the final criterion for deciding between them.

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There are some who get their trinitarian analogy as follows: They establish that in us there are two processions, one within the intellect and another within the will \([\text{intra voluntatem}]\). On the basis of the first procession, an act of understanding produces a word; on the basis of the second, the act of love produces "the beloved in the lover."

This is the notion of parallel processions, mentioned above. Lonergan acknowledges that Thomists, by and large, accept it. His own way of arriving at a Trinitarian analogy is different, as the passage goes on to state:

We, however, get our trinitarian analogy this way: We experience in ourselves two processions, the first within the intellect, but the second from the intellect into the will \([\text{in voluntatem}]\). On the basis of the first procession, we judge because and on the basis of the fact that we grasp \([\text{perspicimus}]\) sufficient evidence, while on the basis of the second, we choose \([\text{eligimus}]\) because and on the basis of the fact that we judge. Thus we do not follow the Thomists' opinion in this matter, both because it prescinds from our inner experience in conceiving a psychological trinitarian analogy, and because it prescinds from our inner experience in interpreting Thomas's texts on psychological reality.\(^{25}\)

Now what Lonergan says about interpreting Thomas applies equally well to interpreting Lonergan. Where 'Systematics' is concerned, what matters is not so much the account of a psychological analogy given by an authority, whoever it may be. What matters is the psychological analogy that is myself, and the data for that analogy are available only through self-appropriation. At the same time, as anyone who has tried will know, self-appropriation of intellectual and rational consciousness, along the lines set out in *Insight*, is difficult enough, and in this case it is not simply intellectual consciousness or rational consciousness but rational self-consciousness, 'existential' consciousness, 'fourth-level' consciousness, that provides the 'inner experience' for self-appropriation. We need all the help we can get. Unfortunately, it is only

fair to say that interpreting Lonergan on 'fourth-level' consciousness is evidently not an easy matter. At least there does not seem to be a consensus among his students on exactly how judgments of value are related to feelings, judgments of facts, deliberations, decisions, faith, being in love, and so on.

Returning, however, to the quotation from De Deo Trino: it introduces the notion that gives rise to a further question. Thomas speaks of love as 'the presence of the beloved in the lover.' What exactly does that mean? So far as I have been able to determine, Lonergan took an answer from the Contra Gentiles, made it his own, and never changed his mind. It is an answer with four aspects.

First, the 'presence of the loved in the lover' is the lover's love for the beloved. In other words, it is not as though I first love $X$, and then, because I do love $X$, there results in me a presence of $X$. That is the position of the Thomists mentioned in the quotation, for whom the act of love produces 'the beloved in the lover.' It is perhaps Murnion's position as well. For Lonergan, the act of love constitutes the presence of the beloved.

Second, if we ask what kind of presence is referred to, Lonergan's answer is that it is a presence which is to be conceived 'dynamically,' as being moved towards, as desiring, as appeti, "as a goal is in tendency to the goal"; in a word, in terms of final causality.²⁶

Third, conceiving the second procession in this way distinguishes it sharply from the first procession. The presence of the loved to the lover, in the will, is an experience quite different from the presence of the known to the knower, in the intellect.

Fourth, as the preceding quotation indicates, the most suitable name for the act of proceeding love, conceived in this way, is electio, choice: "we choose [eligimus] because and on the basis of the fact that we judge." Notice once again the continuity between De Deo Trino and "Christology Today," which speaks of "judgments ... carried out in decisions that are acts of loving."

Meanwhile, though, not long after Lonergan had published the verbum articles, but before De Deo Trino had moved very far towards publication, Frederick Crowe's studies of 'complacency' and 'concern'

²⁶ Lonergan, Verbum, CWL 2, p. 210
Over Thin Ice: Comments on Gratia, Grace and Gratitude

appeared in print. They do not say that Lonergan misconstrued Thomas in the *verbum* articles; on the contrary Crowe cites them approvingly. He does say there is more to Thomas than the *verbum* articles present. Love, as Thomas understood it, has two aspects, which Thomas himself never succeeded in integrating. On the one hand, there is love as tendency, desire, and appetition. For this aspect, Crowe's general rubric is 'concern.' On the other hand, and in a certain sense prior to the love of concern, there is love that is harmony, consonance, rest, quiescence — *complacentia boni*, 'complacency' in the good.

Now, 'love' is not an isolated term. Its meaning affects and is affected by the meaning of others. Thus many of the questions that Crowe addressed revolve in one way or another around three interrelated terms in the metaphysical psychology that Thomas derived from Aristotle: (1) will; (2) the object of will, which is the good; and (3) the will's basic act, which is *love*. By and large, for Thomas will is an appetitive or desiring faculty, the good is conceived as an end, and love is conceived as a tendency or inclination. But 'by and large' does not mean 'exclusively and consistently,' and Crowe offers extensive evidence suggesting that Thomas chafed at the confines of Aristotle's definitions. At times the idea that "love is tendency and the good the object of desire or an end" became something of a nuisance; it "dogs" Thomas throughout his writing. Similarly, Crowe takes note of Thomas's "haunting dissatisfaction ... with the notion of will as appetite."27 Thus part of the argument in "Complacency and Concern" is that Thomas recognized, at least incipiently, that the will is *not* just appetitive or desiring, that the good is *not* just something which is 'away,' something to be headed towards, and — most relevantly, here — that love is *not* just tendency or concern, whether in the form of *agapê* or the form or *eros*.

These conclusions about Thomas lead Crowe towards direct discourse, including a proposal for understanding the Trinity, and the second procession in particular. Complacency, he writes,

is an affective response to the good that is, rather than a seeking in any form, selfish or self-giving, of the good that is *not*. It is under this aspect that love corresponds to and provides an

27 Crowe, *Three Thomist Studies*, pp. 124, 137.
analogy for the procession of the Holy Spirit in the Trinity, where the Third Person is a term bringing the divine processions to a close ... 28

This is by no means a replication of Lonergan's account in the *verbum* articles, where the love that is analogous to the procession of the Spirit is unmistakably the love that Crowe names concern, not the love he names complacency. At the same time, however, it is to be noted that Crowe is not siding with those Thomists from whom Lonergan would later distinguish himself in *De Deo Trino*. It is still the act of uttering and the uttered word, the *dicere* and the *verbum*, which 'spirate' divine complacency — not the will itself, and not anything that the will provides. 29 Moreover, Crowe does not consider that discarding the notion of love as tendency has any adverse effect on Trinitarian theory. Referring to the two aspects of love he has studied, he asks:

which of the two is to be retained and exploited in the Trinitarian analogy? Clearly, the Holy Spirit is to be conceived on the analogy of *complacentia boni*. For that is love in its basic form, love as a term, love in clearest dependence on the word, love as passive. Nor is there any loss to Trinitarian theory through discarding the notion of love as tendency. ... the divinity of the Spiritis as well conceived through the presence of the loved object in the will by complacency as by its presence as the term of movement. The twofold *habitudo* [relationship], to the Word as principle and to the divine goodness as object, still remains. The difference between a procession which results in a similitude by reason of the mode of procession (*generatio*) and one that does not on this account result in a similitude but [does result in a similitude] for another reason also remains. There seems to be no significant loss and a clear gain. 30

The final sentence of this quotation indicates what seems to be the only real disparity between Crowe's way of construing the procession of love and Lonergan's. For Lonergan the presence of the loved, as the presence of an end in tendency to that end, cannot be thought of as likeness or

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similarity to the beloved. The divine Word is an 'image'; the Spirit is not. If the phrase I have added in square brackets gives an accurate reading of Crowe's sentence, his meaning is that the Spirit, on his analogy, is in some sense an image or likeness or similitude, though not for the same reasons as with the Word. Whether that is a serious flaw is a further question, but it might be pointed out that Eastern Trinitarian theology commonly speaks of the Spirit as an image of the image which is the Word.

At present, however, there is a different question to be asked. Granted a difference between Crowe and Lonergan on a point of some importance to systematic Pneumatology, how is one to discriminate? To judge either of them as an interpreter of Thomas is beyond my competence, though I do find convincing the reasons Crowe offers in explanation of why Thomas emphasized concern and tendency at the expense of complacency and rest. But I have already suggested that the authenticity of Lonergan's Thomism is not the final criterion, and the same goes for Crowe. Accordingly, if I apply the criterion that Lonergan himself appeals to — if I do not prescind from inward experience in interpreting Crowe — I am led to conclude that he is indeed speaking about realities, and speaking accurately, whether he speaks in consort with Thomas or not. For purposes of formulating a psychological analogy, the question is whether the 'act of love' that springs from the 'inner word' of affirmation is better named and conceived in line with Lonergan's phrase, "decisions which are acts of love," or instead in line with Crowe's argument that "[w]hat the Holy Spirit is in the Trinity, the act of complacent love is analogously in the imago Dei."31 My theses take the second option.

Before leaving this point, I should mention a sadly neglected proposal for drawing Crowe's refinement of Thomas into a unity with Lonergan's 'early' Trinitarian theology. Philip McShane, in an article on intelligible emanations,32 advances the thesis that in human psychology there are not, as for Lonergan, three acts that proceed by intelligible emanation, but four. One such procession gives rise to

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concept, another to judgment, a third to complacency, and a fourth to decision. But, McShane argues, just as there is no real distinction in God between the act of conceiving and the act of judging, so also there is no real distinction in God between the two acts of love, complacency and decision. It is an attractive argument, for a number of reasons; but I have not pursued its implications. And obviously there is no hint of it in my theses.

What the theses do reflect is my own judgment that, at the end of the day, I can and do know something good; I can and do grasp the evidence of its goodness, so that I can and do judge that it is good and is therefore to be loved; and I can and do love it — not in the sense of yearning or desiring, of deciding or choosing, of wishing to do anything about it or for it, but simply in the sense that I am awed by it, pleased, 'complacent,' enlarged somehow by its presence in me just as being the good thing, the value, that it is. Such, I would say, is love of beauty. I have a good deal of sympathy with Archibald MacLeish's often-quoted opinion that "A poem should not mean | But be." To be sure, a poem can also mean. Art generally can mediate meaning. But, if so, that is a further and in some sense a derivative value. Nor do I think that adducing the case of 'aesthetic' love is irrelevant. As Crowe observes, 'the good' is a transcendental notion, and therefore love as the basic human act in correlation with the good should not be conceived in a way that limits it to any specific kind. And even if the love of persons is supreme and definitive, it does not follow that love of artistic beauty is a different reality, for as Nédoncelle has observed, art "is the creation of a quasi-person in the work itself."33 Moreover, if the comparison may be allowed, we are told that when the divine Artisan had finished his work, seen it all, and grasped the evidence for pronouncing it 'very good,' he did not decide anything. He rested. That rest, we might venture, was a 'complacent' relishing of the goodness of creation.

I have been marshalling various reasons to explain why the psychological analogy proposed in my article, beginning with thesis 20, does not follow Lonergan in its characterization of the procession of the

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Spirit. As far as they go, I believe them to be sound reasons. But as I remarked earlier, the real test is whether "the reasoning from processions to relations and from relations to persons"\textsuperscript{34} can be followed, taking as a working hypothesis that 'gratitude,' construed in the way that Crowe construes complacentia, is a suitable analogue. Accordingly, after describing the whole analogy in thesis 20, the article goes on to insist that love is not blind — in other words, that the two 'activities' it posits are intelligible emanations, at least approximately. That is thesis 21; thesis 22 stakes a claim to generality, such as I have just mentioned here. Thesis 23 applies thesis 20's description to the 'Athanasian' Creed's doctrine. Thesis 24 brings in a distinction between the two 'emergings' in God, and the 'going forth' of creatures, as creatures, from God. Then comes another patch of thin ice.

**FURTHER DIFFICULTIES:**

**THESIS 25**

The twenty-fifth thesis of my article begins the move from 'processions' to 'relations.' There are two problems, which are technical, serious, but not fatal or, I think, incorrigible. The first I was aware of introducing when I wrote; the second I have since recognized. Here I will describe them briefly.\textsuperscript{35}

(1) Thesis 25 involves a certain amount of what is at best legerdemain and at worst deception. "It follows," according to the thesis, "that God is 'related to' God in three ways." Not so. To repeat

\textsuperscript{34} Lonergan, "Christology Today," *Third Collection*, p. 93, as quoted above.

\textsuperscript{35} Thesis 25 reads as follows.

Thus, analogically speaking, we may say there are two emergings or emanations in God, which hereafter will be termed benediction and thanksgiving. It follows that God is "related to" God in three ways. (1) There is a relation of the uttering source to the uttered word of benediction. In God, the affirming of goodness is completely honest, holds nothing back. Call this relation, then, sincerity. (2) There is a relation of the expressed good to the expressing, the relation of the word spoken to the speaking that speaks it. In God, the utterance corresponds completely and truthfully to the goodness discerned and grasped. Call this relation, then, fidelity. And (3) there is a relation of delighted contentment to the event of speaking, to the expressing and the word expressed. In God, the good honestly approved and truthfully expressed is enjoyed, rested in, relished in its completeness. Call this relation, then, gratitude.
Lonergan's formulation in "Christology Today," "[t]he two processions ground four real relations, of which three are really distinct from one another ..."36 The names he assigns to the four in De Deo Trino are paternity, filiation, active spiration, and passive spiration. Of these first two have their ground in the procession of the Word, and each is 'really distinct' from the others. The procession of the Spirit grounds the second two, but only passive spiration is 'really distinct,' and to this relation corresponds what the thesis describes as "a relation of delighted contentment to the event of speaking."37

The thesis thus omits quite a lot. It omits to mention that if one procession gives two relations, the other procession must do likewise, making four in all. It omits to mention that there may be any number of relations in God, but that only relations which are real, not merely logical or rational, have a bearing on Trinitarian theory. It omits to mention that relations which are real may nevertheless fail to be really distinct, and that such is the case with one of the (four) relations in God. By means of all these omissions, the thesis does succeed in omitting this odd fourth relation, active spiration, which would get omitted anyway, since it is not a divine person, as are the other three. But the only justification for skipping so many steps of reasoning is the not very admirable plea that in making its way through these steps in particular, Lonergan's argument can — and for many, including at times myself, does — take on a kind of Alice-in-Wonderland quality. We have two processions; why is it necessary to pass through four relations in order to arrive at three persons? There is, of course, a reason why. But I judged it unlikely that readers of the article would be acquainted with the Thomist context which makes that reason a valid reason. And since I was already imposing on them a fairly heavy dose of technicalities, I decided to leave this one out.

(2) The same thesis gives names to the two relations that are grounded in the first procession: 'sincerity' and 'fidelity.' Here too, 'context,' in the sense of what the intended audience might be expected to have in mind, played a part. As I had observed earlier, a psycho-

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36 Lonergan, "Christology Today," Third Collection, p. 93, as quoted above; emphasis added.
37 The phrase 'event of speaking,' which corresponds in the Scholastic terminology to the uttering and the uttered, the speaker and the word, considered as a single 'spirator,' was suggested by Jeremy Wilkins.
logical analogy "has the advantage that its basic terms are not gender-specific" (thesis 22). The issue of masculine terminology is a pressing one for at least some discussions of Trinitarian theology, and since I did not abandon 'Father' and 'Son' (which are Scriptural words) I hoped at least to find some alternative to 'paternity' and 'filiation' (which are not).

Now, in saying that the relation of speaking to spoken, dicere to verbum, is 'sincerity,' and in saying that the converse relation of word to speaker is 'fidelity,' I think I was saying something true. Moreover, I think it is also true to say, as thesis 26 goes on to do, that sincerity and fidelity, together with gratitude, are modes of being-in-love. The problem is that 'sincerity' and 'fidelity' do not function in the same way as 'paternity' and 'filiation.' They denote relations, but not relations of origin. Sincerity, that is, does not make a speaker be speaking a word, and being faithful is not what makes a word be spoken by a speaker. Insincere speaking is still speaking, and an unfaithful expression is still a word. To put it a different way, the procession of an 'inner word' of judgment does ground relations that can be termed sincerity and fidelity, but not because it is a procession. The idea of origination is missing.

If, as I anticipate, the contents of "Gratia: Grace and Gratitude" become part of a larger argument, thesis 25 will need to be reconsidered. The next two theses, however, I believe are fundamentally sound. Thesis 26 endeavors to say, without using the Scholastic terminology, that the three distinct relations in God are 'subsistent.' It is one of several points in the article that invoke the notion of 'theological grammar,' here in order to assert that what God is, and how God is or that whereby God is, are identical. The metaphysical basis of such a 'grammatical' rule, of course, is the fact that esse and essentia, existence and essential nature, are identical in God.

Next, thesis 27 asserts that the three relations, each of which is God, are conscious relations. Since to be, consciously, is to be a subject, each of the three 'subsistent' relations in God is a subject of one divine consciousness. It may be noticeable that nowhere in the thesis — and for that matter, nowhere in the whole article — does the word 'person' appear. This perhaps conspicuous absence is deliberate. As with any other word, the meaning of 'person' depends on its use, that is, on a
tacit or explicit context of questions and answers. The meaning can be controlled by introducing a definition, such as 'a distinct subsistent in an intellectual nature.' Even if its component terms are made clear, however, such a definition can scarcely hold its own against the pressure of more recent, richer, and unfortunately less precise meanings of 'person.' But 'person,' however traditional, is not an indispensable term, and instead of including a complicated exposition I dispensed with it. 'Psychological subject' is not an exact equivalent,38 but the differences are slight and in any event do not pertain to God.

About thesis 28 I will be brief. It has been revised several times, and it is still not altogether satisfactory. Chief among its blemishes is the imprecise way it uses the verb 'express.' Properly formulated, the thesis — and other passages in the article — ought to make it clear that the Father does not express but speaks. It is the Word that expresses.

In spite of all the dubious statements that detract from theses 20 through 28, I think that on the whole there is congruity between my analogy of speaker, expression, and gratitude, and Lonergan's analogy of speaker, word, and love. There remains one further step of reasoning — from the divine subjects to the divine missions, the mission of the Spirit in particular; and to take that step is to encounter one final difficulty — a question of how to interpret Lonergan.

THE MISSIONS AND THEIR CREATED COUNTERPARTS

Thesis 29 begins a series of moves that bring to completion the reasoning from processions to relations to subjects to missions. Here I introduce the so-called 'ad extra rule,' which shows up frequently in contemporary Trinitarian discussions. Its meaning is that all the 'works' of God that are 'outside' God, ad extra, belong not to any divine person individually but to the Trinity. A 'strict constructionist' of the ad extra rule would maintain — as in fact is sometimes done — that all

38 Not, that is, on Lonergan's position. If I am alive but unconscious under anesthesia, I am a person, defined as a distinct subsistent in an intellectual nature. I am not, however, actually a subject, since a subject by definition is the subject of conscious acts and I am not consciously acting. This latter point is made in thesis 28.
three divine persons were incarnate in Jesus, just as creation is the work of all three. Indeed, on a strict construction the rule would seem to exclude any 'economic' Trinity, any relation of specific finite realities to one divine person but not the others. Human knowledge of divine triplicity, on such a position, is wholly a matter of 'revealed' truths, and cannot be anything else.

It was in order to replace this unsatisfactory view with an understanding of the Trinity as a 'mystery of salvation,' rather than an extrinsic theologoumenon, that Rahner wrote his much-discussed treatment of the triune God as Urgrund of salvation history. Lonergan, aware of the same problem, takes a rather different approach. Like Rahner, he modifies the ad extra rule (which he does not, incidentally, refer to explicitly). But the result is very different from Rahner's position.

Since the ad extra rule derives, ultimately, from Augustine, it carries an all but unimpeachable authority. Anyone who modifies it is claiming, in effect, to know something Augustine did not know—always a dangerous thing to claim, in Western theology. Still, Western theology did develop, and one development that Lonergan, from first to last, regarded as pivotal was the development leading to the 'theorem of the supernatural.' In its bearing on Trinitarian 'Systematics' the theorem can be regarded either from the side of created reality or from the side of God.

(1) On the one hand, the theorem of the supernatural is to the effect that there is in this existing universe, which God has created, an 'entitative' order, an order of beings, which is beyond the scope of any finite nature. As such, there is some sense in which supernatural realities are not finite.

(2) On the other hand, what this supernatural order amounts to theosis or 'divinization,' a sharing or participation in, an assimilation to, the life of God. Since, as Crowe points out, the only God there is to participate in is Father, Son, and Spirit, the term 'trinification,' which he proposes and which I have used in the article under discussion, is suitable. But further, if it is truly God's life that is truly shared, the sharing is—again, in some sense—not 'outside' God, not ad extra.

Not the least of Lonergan's achievements lies in his bringing together these two aspects in a coherent and thorough way. For their
connection, he argues, there can be only one analogy: the relation of the *natural* order to God. Hence the philosophy of God in chapter 19 of *Insight* becomes, as I mentioned earlier, the basis for filling out a heuristic anticipation of the supernatural order that, in *Insight* itself, is limited to a role in relation to the problem of evil. The main point, for present purposes, is that divine transcendence as Lonergan conceives it means that God is the same God whether or not he creates any universe. If he does, that universe exists, and the fact of its existence establishes the truth of the assertion that God has indeed created it. Creation is thus an ‘asymmetrical’ relation of dependence in which the whole natural order stands to God, who is nevertheless Creator whether any universe stands in this relation or not. By analogy, if there exist any *supernatural* entities, their existence will likewise establish the truth of some contingent assertion about God, other than the assertion that he has created — for example, a contingent assertion that he has shared his own nature, or that he has given himself, or that he has made humans “partakers of his divinity” (2 Peter 1:4). Putting this the other way around, it is true that God has communicated himself with mortals if and only if there exists within creation an appropriate ‘external term,’ or terms; and any such term has to be irreducible to the fact of finite existence, since the fact of finite existence is what makes it true that God has created. Lonergan’s proposal is that the relevant external terms do exist, and that they correspond, not to deity-in-general, but to deity as triune. The supernatural order is what it is because God is what God is — Father, Son, and Spirit.

To this point, Lonergan’s position is fairly clear, though it needs to be studied in full detail. As every created reality participates naturally in God’s existence — his being and goodness — so supernatural realities participate in God’s essence, in divine love, of which there are three divine subjects. The problem of interpretation I mentioned arises because Lonergan has two ways of conceiving this supernatural participation in divine life. They are not (so far as I can tell) the same,

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and neither of them (so far as I can tell) comes down to the other. One of them — the one that the article follows in theses 29 through 32 — appears in the two Latin treatises on Christology.40 The other appears in De Deo Trino.

The first way begins, in one of Lonergan's discussions of it, from the notion of the good. There is absolute good, which is God, and there are 'goods by participation,' that is, finite goods, including particular goods and the good of order. But there are also 'goods by communication,' goods that are common because of the communication, the sharing, of the divine nature; in other words, because of divine self-communication. There are three of these 'goods by communication':

(1) One such good is eschatological — the 'light of glory.' It is a gift that corresponds to God's giving himself to be seen, that is, to the 'beatific vision.' Since this vision is enjoyed only by the blessed and, according to Lonergan, by Christ in his earthly life, we know nothing positively about it.

(2) A second 'good by communication' also regards Christ, in this case exclusively. It is a gift that corresponds to God's giving of the Son to humankind as one of us, and consists in a 'secondary act of existence' in the Incarnation. The reality of this external term is what makes it true to say of Christ's human nature that it was assumed by the divine Word alone. Again, we are not in a position to know anything positive about this good.

(3) Thirdly, however, there is a 'good by communication' that corresponds to God's giving of the Spirit to humans. And this good we do experience, since it is sanctifying grace.

This scheme is quite elegant. Its three-part enumeration of 'goods by communication' fits with a conception of salvation as 'trinification,' such that the mission of the Son and the mission of the Spirit conspire in bringing men and women 'home' to the glory of the Father.

40 See Lonergan, De constitutio Christi ontologica et psychologica (Rome: Gregorian University Press, 1964), §§51 and 52, pp. 51–53, and §73, p. 82; also De Verbo Incarnato (Rome: Gregorian University Press ad usum auditorum, 1964), pp. 263, 315–316, and 566. Both treatises are most detailed when it comes to discussing the esse secundarium of the Incarnation, but De Verbo Incarnato also has a thesis on the beatific vision. These two, as I shall point out presently, are invariably included whenever Lonergan speaks of supernatural participations in the divine life.
Lonergan's other way of working out the connections between the supernatural order and the persons, processions, and relations of the Trinity has a greater *a priori* authority, appearing as it does in *De Deo Trino*. In this version, he speaks not of 'goods by communication' but of 'absolutely supernatural entities,' of which he says there are not three but four — the three listed above, plus the 'habit of charity.' These four are correlated, not with the divine persons but with the divine relations, of which, as I have mentioned, there are four that are real even though only three of these are really *distinct*.

It is this second way of proceeding that Robert Doran has studied extensively, and has endeavored to transpose into categories based on self-appropriation. As he recognizes, such a transposition has to meet a number of conditions, one of which is that there must be *two* 'external terms,' two realities in the existing universe; and between these two there must be a difference such as to justify speaking of human participation in the two divine relations that are 'active spiration' and 'passive spiration.' Stated in somewhat more accessible terms, the transposition depends on a self-appropriatable difference between the habit of charity on the one hand and sanctifying grace on the other.

For 'Systematics,' then, there are two aspects to the problem under discussion. The first pertains to Trinitarian theology as such. Are supernatural participations in divine love to be thought of (1) as relating created reality to the divine subsistent relations, of which there are four? Such is Lonergan's view in *De Deo Trino*. Or are these participations to be thought of (2) as relating created reality to divine subsistent relations *that are persons*, of which relations there are three? Such is the position of Lonergan's Latin Christology. The second aspect pertains to the created realities as such, and in particular those which are, or may be, knowable by self-appropriation — grace and charity. A real difference between grace and charity is not hard to conceive in metaphysical terms: charity is a habit of the will, whereas sanctifying grace is an 'entitative' habit, 'radicated' in the *essence of the soul*. The question, then, is whether this metaphysical difference, corresponding to the difference between the soul as substance and the will as one of its faculties, survives in what Lonergan calls the 'third stage of meaning,' the stage in which philosophy (and theology) begin to take a
stand on interiority. It is the decisive question, I think. I am not yet convinced that it has been answered altogether satisfactorily.

To attempt an answer of my own would be to make this essay longer than it already is, so I will simply mention what seem to me to be the two salient points. Although in *Insight* Lonergan still speaks of ‘will’ and ‘willingness’ in terms that strongly echo the old ‘faculty psychology,’ the ‘later’ Lonergan has made the transition to a psychology of the subject and the subject’s conscious acts, which occur on distinguishable ‘levels.’ This is the context in which he speaks of religious conversion as ‘being in love in an unrestricted way’ and identifies it with sanctifying grace. Such statements amount to using ‘charity’-language with reference to grace. On the other hand, when he says that being in love is a “habitual actuation” of the whole person’s whole capacity for self-transcendence, or says that “the converted have a different self to understand,” he seems to be applying ‘entitative habit’ language to conversion. On the whole, I think it fair to say that either Lonergan’s ‘later’ works subsume both charity, as a habit of will, and sanctifying grace, as ‘entitative’ habit, within a more global notion of ‘unrestricted love,’ or the ways he found to express himself in *Method* are insufficiently differentiated to allow of drawing a distinction that would imply two different participations in divine life. This is not to say that such a distinction cannot be drawn, but only that to draw it would be to go beyond Lonergan’s own statements — as Doran has, in fact, done.

For purposes of my article, however, such refinements were out of the question. The route I took was not only simpler and neater but also, at least arguably, more in keeping with the ‘later’ Lonergan’s standpoint.

**INCONCLUSIVE CONCLUSION**

This essay is of a kind that does not lend itself to a ‘conclusion’ in the ordinary sense of the word. If you think of “*Gratia: Grace and Gratitude*”

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as a meal — a pretty dry meal, admittedly — and its author as the chef, then what the present essay has added is a tour of the kitchen and a disclosure of the ingredients. The tour could have gone on longer, and the ingredients analyzed more exactly. But at some point there has to be a finish, if not a conclusion.

Nevertheless, there is perhaps a moral to be drawn. Even if the meal turned out dry, preparing it was both exhilarating and frustrating, and for both reasons it was instructive. In *Method* Lonergan speaks of the functional specialty ‘Systematics’ as “really quite a homely affair.”⁴³ That is no doubt true enough, by comparison with the grandiose speculative idealisms he had in mind. Still, homely though the task of understanding truths of faith may be, what Lonergan says about the functional specialty ‘Dialectic’ should certainly be said as well of ‘Systematics’: its aim is “high and distant.”⁴⁴ Just how high and distant, I am beginning to perceive.

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ADDITIONAL NOTE

Transcribed here, for the sake of completeness and because they influenced my formulations in the central theses of “Gratia: Grace and Gratitude,” are all of Lonergan’s English-language statements about the Trinity that have been published, besides the ones in “Christology Today” quoted above. They date from the his years as a professor of dogmatics in Rome, when he was writing and lecturing on the psychological analogy.

The earliest is a note, which the editors of Lonergan’s Collected Works have included in the published version of his 1959 lectures on education.

The Blessed Trinity: God as Rational Consciousness.

Procession of the Word: as rational judgment from grasp of unconditioned: eternal Truth (sense of criterion)

Procession of the Spirit: as act of love from rational judgment of value and infinite understanding of identity of understanding, truth, being, good

Perfection of act; perfection of order (interpersonal as in society; immanent in a single consciousness as in Imago Dei).

The other two passages appear in the edited version of “Consciousness and the Trinity,” a lecture that Lonergan delivered in 1963. The first is in the lecture itself; the second is a comment, also transcribed, in response to an undecipherable question.

There is only one act [in the Trinity], but there is a distinction because the three persons have the same consciousness differently: [1] the Father is God in a manner analogous to the grasp of sufficient evidence that necessitates one to judge; [2] the Son is God in the same consciousness but now a consciousness analogous to that of the dependence of the judgment on the grasp of sufficient evidence; [3] the Holy Spirit is the same consciousness in a third manner, namely, as the dependence of the act of love on the grasp of sufficient evidence and the rational affirmation.

The infinite act of understanding grasps that infinite perfection is love, rational love. This necessitates the judgment: there must be love. This judgment occurs within the consciousness of the infinite act. Because it occurs within God, it must be infinite. If it were finite, it would be outside God. But there is only one infinite and consequently it must be identified with it. The difficulty is not with explaining an emanation in the infinite, but in having simultaneously the emanation and the identity of principle and term. We can't get that clear in consciousness.46

THERE IS SOMETHING strangely compelling in this statement by Victor Hugo. The words connote a sense of destiny about ideas, as though ideas have a destiny independent of those who think them, as though the thinker is a mere vehicle through which an idea emerges and achieves its realization. It is not the seeming dispensableness of the thinker that is compelling. Rather it is the power of an idea. I suspect what is compelling about the power of an idea is the irreducibility of an aspect of human life to the manipulation or control of any individual or any group. Ideas have a life of their own. They can be thought, and thought on purpose, but they cannot be generated at will. Ideas emerge when their time has come, and to this extent they do indeed appear to have a life of their own.

The story of Archimedes demonstrates this. King Heiron II of Syracuse was suspicious that the new crown he had ordered was not pure gold but, rather, that silver (and perhaps other less valuable metals) had been added. The King asked Archimedes to devise a way to discover the truth (preferably without melting the crown). Sitting in the bath relaxing one day, Archimedes, noticing water spill over the sides of
the tub, discovered the insight he needed to solve the riddle.¹ Like all thinkers, Archimedes did everything in his power to solve the problem or answer the question. However, the solution or the answer appeared to “pop up” when it was least expected—while Archimedes was bathing. Thus, we can strive to solve riddles or answer questions, but, as Bernard Lonergan clearly shows, insights come when all the conditions have been met. Those conditions are not controllable either individually or communally because there are always unknown variables. Thus, we do everything in our power to set up a problem in a way that will achieve the desired solution or the insight. When all the pieces of the puzzle have been put together properly, the solution or insight emerges.

There is an enigma here. On the one hand, an insight (or an idea) appears to have a “life of its own” independent of the person who has the insight. It appears this way because a person cannot force an insight to emerge. Rather, a person can only try to set up the conditions necessary for the insight to emerge. On the other hand, insights do not emerge independently of those who think them.

There is a relationship between an insight and the person who has the insight that bears some resemblance to the relationship between destiny and freedom. This introduction serves to highlight that relationship and provides the backdrop to what I will explore in this paper: first, the perplexing relationship between destiny and freedom, and second, what that relationship has to do with the “mysteriousness” of the emergence of insights or ideas noted both in Victor Hugo’s statement and in the example of Archimedes. In order to do this, I will

¹Michael Macrone explains Archimedes insight this way:

Take a lump of pure gold weighing exactly as much as the crown in dispute. Drop the lump in a tub of water and measure (either by weight or by volume) the amount of water it displaces. (This would be the amount of water that spills over if the tub is full, or the amount the water rises in the tub if it isn’t full.) Repeat the process with the crown. If both lump and crown displace the same amount of water, then both have the same volume, and the crown is pure gold, since no other metal is exactly as dense as gold. If, however, the crown displaces more water, it must be composed of gold alloyed with a less dense metal—its volume would be greater than that of the lump.

draw on the thought of Bernard Lonergan and Julia Kristeva. In exploring the theme of freedom and destiny, we are broaching a topic that recurs consistently when one reflects on the history of ethics as well as the current state of ethics.

In four steps, I will first consider the words destiny and freedom indicating the tension between destiny and freedom. Second, I will consider a few specific texts from Lonergan that deal with destiny and freedom. Third, I give a brief overview of some pertinent aspects of Kristeva’s work in order to understand what she has to say about destiny and freedom. Finally, I will offer some insights from both thinkers toward resolving the quandary set up at the beginning of this paper.

DESTINY AND FREEDOM

There are two senses of the word ‘destiny’ found in the Oxford English Dictionary. The first sense is “the predetermined course of events; that which is destined to happen; the fate of a particular person, country, etc.; the ultimate condition; a person’s lot in life.” So we have in this first sense the unfolding of events in a manner that has been predetermined and, thus, is beyond the control of individuals or groups. We also understand from this first sense that there is a “plan” which is being lived out both individually and communally. The second sense refers to “the power or agency that (supposedly) predetermines events.” Thus, this second sense refers to that which is responsible for the unfolding of events or the “plan” of our individual and communal lives. Although the word is not found in the Bible, there is a correlation between destiny as understood above and the biblical doctrine of God’s providence. In Matthew 6:28-29, we are told that not even a sparrow falls without God’s knowledge and permission. Certainly the story of

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The topic of this paper is part of a broader project to work out some of the convergences between Lonergan and Kristeva’s thought. Part of that project, although I will not deal explicitly with it here, is to articulate how Lonergan’s tools of analysis that allow one to overcome what I think are the limits of Kristeva’s work.

Israel is a story of a people fulfilling their destiny. Thus, to have a
destiny can provide us with an identity. It can, in a very real sense, offer
us solace on our journey. It can provide meaning and dignity to the life
of the individual or the life of the community.4

Similarly, I would like to highlight two senses of the word
“freedom” found in the Oxford English Dictionary. First, freedom means
“exemption or release from slavery or imprisonment.” Second, it means
“the quality of being free from the control of fate or necessity; the power
of self-determination attributed to the will.”5 Thus, freedom as release
from imprisonment connotes a severing of the links between an
individual or a community and that which determines the fate of that
individual or community. It is freedom in a negative sense. Freedom
here means escaping from something that limits us. The second sense
of freedom is positive. It connotes the positive act of determining who
we are or what we become.6 Thus, freedom in this second sense means
the freedom to decide about our lives. It is a freedom that requires a
certain level of growth or maturity because it presupposes that we are
able to some degree, in this heightened development, to transcend
necessity.

Thus, there is a tension between destiny and freedom both in the
first and second senses of each word. In the first sense the tension is
between destiny as an Omnipotent Being guiding and directing our
lives and freedom as emancipation from forces (fate or destiny) outside
ourselves. In the second sense the tension is between destiny as a
predetermined course of events upon which we have no say or impact
and freedom as self-determination, where we decide about our lives.

F. Childress and John Macquarrie (Louisville, KY: Westminster John Knox Press,
1986).
6For a fuller explanation of these two senses of freedom, see Kenneth R. Melchin’s
Living with Other People: An Introduction to Christian Ethics Based on Bernard
BERNARD LONERGAN

In *Method in Theology*’s chapter on “Meaning,” Bernard Lonergan elaborates five quite distinct carriers of meaning: intersubjective meaning, artistic meaning, symbolic meaning, linguistic meaning and incarnate meaning. I would like to highlight two of the carriers of meaning: art and language. Lonergan refers to a liberation that occurs through art and language. It is this liberation as it is experienced through the carriers of meaning that I will explore. In his explanation of artistic meaning, Lonergan speaks of art as “the objectification of a purely experiential pattern.” 7 Lonergan observes that art expresses an elemental pattern that resonates with the perceiving subject. The function of art is to evoke and enrich a human person’s affective life. Art transforms the subject and transforms the subject’s world. Art is not meaning fully developed which, according to Lonergan, “intends something meant.” 8 Rather, art is purely elemental, purely experiential. It is the elemental or experiential purity of art that transforms the subject and his or her world. This transformation, in Lonergan’s view, is a liberation.

[The subject] has been liberated from being a replaceable part adjusted to a ready-made world and integrated within it. He has ceased to be a responsible inquirer investigating some aspect of the universe or seeking a view of the whole. He has become just himself: emergent, ecstatic, originating freedom. 9

While elemental meaning is pure experiencing, the process of expressing that meaning requires a distantiation. The artist must distance himself or herself from the ecstatic purity of the experience in order to convey that experience as meaning, thus, transporting the perceiver of the art object into that elemental experience. Art facilitates affective liberation. It facilitates the withdrawal "from

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practical living” so that one may “explore possibilities of fuller living in a richer world.”\textsuperscript{10}

If artistic meaning transports the subject to a world that is richer than the “practical world” of everyday life, still the liberation that one experiences in this world is affective, rather than the liberation of developed consciousness that is found in language. In his observations concerning linguistic meaning, Lonergan observes that “[b]y its embodiment in language, in a set of conventional signs, meaning finds its greatest liberation.”\textsuperscript{11} While art makes possible an ecstatic liberation of the individual, language, because “conventional signs can be multiplied indefinitely,”\textsuperscript{12} is the highest accomplishment of human beings’ capacity to collaborate and coordinate actions.\textsuperscript{13} Language moulds developing consciousness, and orders one’s world. Yet Lonergan qualifies that “greatest liberation” of meaning. He reminds us “that conscious intentionality develops in and is moulded by its mother tongue.”\textsuperscript{14} Thus, despite the potential liberation of meaning that language affords the human subject, it is the language we are born into which “takes the lead”\textsuperscript{15} in our lives. Language massively conditions our capacity to know and understand. It measures out the horizon against which we understand and make judgments in our world. It both limits and liberates us.

In a 1963 lecture, Lonergan speaks of an understanding of destiny which we can link to his comments above about the liberation and constraint one finds in language. Lonergan is speaking of the autonomy of the individual. Yet, he remarks that autonomy

is not the whole story. From the community [an individual] has his existence, his concrete possibilities, the constraints that hem him in, the opportunities he can seize and make the most of, the psychological, social, historical achievements and aberrations that constitute his situation. One can perhaps think of destiny

\textsuperscript{10}Lonergan, Method, 64.
\textsuperscript{11}Lonergan, Method, 70.
\textsuperscript{12}Lonergan, Method, 70.
\textsuperscript{13}James Sauer, Notes on Method in Theology (Ottawa: The Lonergan Website, 2001).
\textsuperscript{14}Lonergan, Method, 71. (Italics added.)
\textsuperscript{15}Lonergan, Method, 71.
as the working out of individual autonomy within the community.¹⁶

There is, for Lonergan, an intrinsic relationship between the autonomy
of the individual and the individual's destiny within a community. For
Lonergan, "individual destiny [is] the working out of autonomy within,
under the conditions of, human community."¹⁷ Thus, it is through an
individual's insertion into a community that autonomy is possible.
Autonomy, the condition of freedom for an individual, is realized only
through and in a community of others. Likewise, because of an
individual's attachment to a community of others there are constraints
to his or her autonomy.

**JULIA KRISTEVA**

Lonergan's understanding of how different carriers of meaning produce
different degrees of freedom, and his view of the role of destiny in
working out one's autonomy contain significant correlations with the
overall thrust of Kristeva's work. Let me elaborate by first speaking a
bit about her background which will help us to grasp her position on
freedom and destiny and her unique approach to ethics.

Julia Kristeva was born in the Balkan state of Bulgaria. She
spent the first 25 years of her life, until 1966, witnessing the political
violence and psychically absorbing the politically adrift and
disillusioned Bulgaria, formed as a result of the Second World War.
She witnessed the seizure of political power by the Communist party
under the surveillance and intervention of the Soviet Union. She grew
up during a time when religion was systematically repressed. To some
extent it was a time when religion was becoming subversive. The terror
of personal vendettas and political vengeance infiltrated the then
dogmatic political realm. The outlets (often subversive) of art and
literature at many levels absorbed the interests of the Bulgarian
people. Kristeva also lived in the midst of courageous resistance to the

¹⁶Bernard Lonergan, *Philosophical and Theological Papers* (Toronto: University of

severe repression and isolation of the Chervenkov years when Marxist-Leninism dominated all spheres of science and culture, and dissent and individuality were suppressed. After 1949, Kristeva was one of the children educated in the newly remodelled education system (remoulded "in the spirit of socialism, proletarian internationalism, and indissoluble fraternal friendship with the Soviet Union."\(^{18}\)). However, despite the severe repression there remained a sense of creativity in Bulgaria and something of a transcultural spirit. Absent a strong sense of national identity (due to the political upheaval of the twentieth century), the Bulgarian people showed an openness to outside influence, a kind of spirit of receptiveness that was severely lacking in Bulgaria's more insular neighbours.

Kristeva received a scholarship in French literature and thus travelled to Paris in late 1965 to pursue post-doctoral studies. Although intellectually stimulating, most of those early years in Paris under the auspices of a Franco-Bulgarian cultural agreement were difficult for Kristeva. She was a foreigner in a city open to foreigners yet keeping them at a distance, "set[ting] aside for the foreigner a solitary curiosity, the weird charms of which soon prove to be a source of scorn."\(^{19}\) The experience of living in exile (a self-imposed exile in that Kristeva chose to live in France because it offered the intellectual stimulation and freedom unavailable in Bulgaria) led Kristeva to reflect on that painful condition:

For me this situation [of living in exile] was painful, and thus it pushed me to know more about myself, about exile as more than a sociological fact, as part of my psychic structure: some people choose to be foreigners not only in response to political pressures but because they have never felt at home anywhere.\(^{20}\)


Yet, she decided to explore precisely this experience of exile, what Kristeva calls "foreignness" as the underlying dynamic of human beings. Her task was to bring this dynamic into focus, to understand how it plays out in human living. She does this initially through the study of language and, later, the study of the psychic structure of human beings.

THE SPLIT SUBJECT

For Kristeva, all human beings have the experience of exile in common at a deep psychic level. In order to understand this phenomenon, it is necessary to consider both language and psychoanalysis in terms of the development of the "speaking subject." Kristeva's initial work in linguistics led her to distinguish between two aspects of language that are connected yet quite distinct. On the one hand, there is the "poetic" dimension of language, the "materiality" of language—the actual physical aspect of language—the sounds, rhythms, combinations of letters, the form of texts, their articulation and style. This aspect of language underlies, on the other hand, language's capacity to convey a message—the language of "transparency," that is, "when the work is forgotten for the sake of the object or concept designated." (As we will see, in Kristeva's work in psychoanalysis, this dialectical dimension of language parallels a dialectic within the psychic structure of the human person.) Also relevant for Kristeva is an understanding of how language conveys meaning. Words and phrases—sounds and articulations—do not convey the meaning of things in themselves. Rather, meaning emerges from the relation between the sounds and articulations. More than this, meaning evolves from the difference between sounds and articulations. Language is a system of signs. The capacity of language to convey meaning stems not from a correspondence between a word or a sound and an object "out there." Rather, language conveys meaning indirectly through the difference between sounds that comes to

21A good example of this is James Joyce's *Finnegan's Wake.*
represent meaning. Kristeva focuses on the dynamic interplay between the materiality of language and the transparency of language. Language is not one or the other but both in dialectical relationship.

A key question for psychoanalysis is how an infant becomes a speaking subject. How does the child enter language or how does the child begin to speak? Originally, the child lives a symbiosis with its mother. It does not differentiate between self and other. It is only through language that this differentiation begins to take place. As the child develops it begins to separate from the all-powerful and all-encompassing mother. This refers to the mother-child relationship at a strictly bodily level. The child, in its development, begins to break away from the body of the mother. As well, division makes up the body of the child itself. The child experiences drives within its body—oral drives and anal drives, both related to openings in its body, both related to the primal division of inside and outside, what is taken in and what is expelled. The child's original experience is in some sense a total ecstasy in having all its drives and needs met in the body of the mother. There are no constraints.

In order for the child to achieve an identity, a separation process must begin to take place. The child and the mother must separate. This separation in fact begins at the very origins of the human person, before birth—the separating process within the mothers' body starts to take place at conception. Consequently, Kristeva posits that there is a dialectic at the very foundations of the human person. What is this dialectic? Kristeva refers to two processes within the human person, the semiotic process and the symbolic process. The semiotic process is equated with the infantile experience mentioned above, that is pre-subject/object, before the child differentiates between itself and its mother.23 The semiotic is not left behind as the child becomes a speaking subject; rather the semiotic process enters a dialectical with the symbolic process. The symbolic process emerges with the entrance of a “third” to disrupt the child's undifferentiated experience. What interrupts, for the child, the mother-child relationship is the mother's distraction away from the child toward another person or another thing.

23It may prove fruitful to explore whether there is a correlation between the semiotic and Lonergan's “purely experiential pattern.”
The beginning of differentiation is the beginning of language. It is the time in the child's development that signifies a repression of the undifferentiated maternal relationship where all drives and needs are given full reign. This signifies the emergence of the initial stages of the formation of the child's identity, which is the child's possibility and capacity at once to become a speaking subject and an "I," or one who distinguishes between "I" and "other" through language. So the symbolic refers to the restraints put on the child through "the establishment of sign and syntax, of grammatical and social constraints." For Kristeva, this underlying structure constitutes the speaking subject. Consequently, Kristeva would define the speaking subject as a "split" subject, because although the repression of the semiotic or maternal relationship is absolutely necessary for the human person to achieve an identity, we must be aware of the dialectical relationship between the semiotic and symbolic. If we, as individuals and societies, repress one or the other of these two processes that constitute who we are, it can lead either to a psychotic state where there is no meaning, or to a totalitarian state with only law and constraint but no creativity.

When Kristeva asserts that what we all have in common is that we are all exiles, she is not so much referring exile from our mothers. Rather, the condition of exile is what constitutes our very identity. From the origins of our existence we emerge (literally) via the state of being exiles. The semiotic dimension must be repressed in order for the child to become a speaking subject. Yet it does not (nor can it) disappear because our identity is constituted in the dialectic, not the break or the repression. How does this work? One way to understand this is through the distinction, noted earlier, between the transparency of language and the materiality of language. Meaning, which emerges in and through language, comes about through a dialectical relationship with the materiality of language (the differentiation of sounds, etc). But the materiality of language must be kept in the background if meaning is to come to the fore. If one focuses on the

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sounds and the differences in sounds when someone is speaking, the intended meaning is lost. That dimension of language must fade into the background. If it becomes the focus, meaning and thus communication is impossible. We regress into a meaningless world, a strange world, an uncanny world where nothing is familiar.

Our lives are constituted in a separation. That separation is between, first, the semiotic process where there is no constraint but a fluidity without boundaries or censorship, and, second, the symbolic process which comes about through constraints, rules, laws, boundaries. This is the condition of being human, of being a speaking subject, which we enter into relationships with at an individual level and a group level.

Identity is key. Our psyche’s boundary condition can be fragile at times. This fragility leads to two possible outcomes. First, certainly people with psychosis have a difficult time maintaining the division. The semiotic realm tends to invade their world and they live in realities that literally do not make sense. Second, the need for identity can also create an imbalance on the side of the symbolic realm. Too severe repression of the semiotic dimension leads to a rigid adherence to constraint, to law, to the dimension of identity. We grasp at an identity as female or male, black or white, Canadian or American, wealthy or poor, etc. We become entrenched in these identities so that the “other”—what we are not or what is not us—becomes the enemy, threatening our identity. Yet what is threatens our identity according to Kristeva is not the “other” but the semiotic dimension of our psyches. We project our fear of our own psyche’s fragility onto the “other,” whoever or whatever that “other” constitutes. This psychic scheme underlies Kristeva’s approach to freedom and destiny.

With this background in mind, we can begin to understand why Kristeva maintains that it is that some measure of freedom is possible only through psychoanalysis. Freedom, for Kristeva, is both the realization of desires and a censorship of desire. Through placing ‘drives’ and ‘desires’ in dialectical relationship, Kristeva can maintain this tensive relationship between realization and censorship of desire. In her exploration of Freud’s thought, Kristeva draws attention to the Freudian insight concerning “the emergence of thinking as realized in a
shared language that reins in the drive and commands it."\textsuperscript{25} It is the "command" of "thinking as realized in a shared language" that converts biological drive into desire. This shift within the human psyche is a shift from sheer biological drive to representation in desire. It is a shift from self as biological being to self as speaking subject -that mysterious process that makes shared meaning possible.

For Kristeva, psychoanalysis permits the speaking subject to "discover her desire and to go to the depths of herself."\textsuperscript{26} It is precisely this permission that makes psychoanalysis a vehicle of freedom. The psychoanalyst listens and asks questions. The listening and the questioning are designed neither to release nor to repress desire. Rather, the psychoanalyst's stance of listener and questioner facilitates the emergence of a self-renewal or a rebirth. Yet Kristeva remarks, "[i]f the history of psychoanalysis teaches us one thing, it is surely that the psyche is too complex and unpredictable to know completely in advance."\textsuperscript{27} Thus, the psychoanalytic process is not contrived, but creates an "open" space. The tool of psychoanalytic listening is key for Kristeva in her task of relieving the suffering of speaking subjects in a time of crisis. Kristeva's book, \textit{In the Beginning Was Love: Psychoanalysis and Faith}, Kristeva describes the analytic sessions with a patient she calls "Paul." She states that,

Together, then, we created a world, which to the objective observer (for objective observation is also part of my role as analyst) is completely unreal and illusory, an amalgam of pretences, games, and masks. We are in a sense actors who take up our roles at the beginning of each session. But this imaginary relationship is able to accommodate the very real violence of Paul's memory, rendered mortal and lethal by repression.\textsuperscript{28}

Kristeva's capacity to listen psychoanalytically creates an open space within the analytic session where her patient is able to speak

\textsuperscript{26}Kristeva, "Psychoanalysis and Freedom," 7.
\textsuperscript{27}Kristeva, "Psychoanalysis and Freedom," 9.
\textsuperscript{28}Julia Kristeva, \textit{In the Beginning was Love: Psychoanalysis and Faith}, translated by Arther Goldhammer (New York: Columbia University Press, 1988) 17.
and live the *drama* of his repressions. Thus, he is able, at the end of the session, to walk away from the meeting "calm and neutral." Psychoanalytic listening is an attentive listening. It is a listening that hears the *meaning* of the words being expressed, yet also hears the wild, the inexpressible and the violent. It hears everything that cannot be expressed through the transparency of language, in the customary mode of listening outside the analytic session. The relationship between analyst and analysand is crucial precisely because, according to Kristeva, freedom is actualized in that bond where the relationship "invites the reactualization of past experience, of memory, and especially of traumatic memory, and their re-elaboration."29 Precisely through (symbolic) language the patient is able to communicate his or her desire to the analyst even though, most often, that desire precedes language. The goal of analysis is not an ending (of the analysis, although that happens) but the possibility of continual beginning. Kristeva relates this to what she discovered in St. Augustine's:

Biblical preoccupation with "beginnings" ("In the beginning God created...", "In the beginning was the Word") [which] becomes... an insistence on that specific beginning that is the birth of each human being, in its irreconcilable singularity: the simple fact of this unique birth is the guarantee of our eventual freedom of thought, will, and judgement, whose development needs to be protected and nurtured.30

According to Kristeva, no other modern experience opens up the space for this freedom. Psychoanalysis creates an openness within the patient for what is irreconcilable about himself or herself and, subsequently, about the world. Kristeva states that "[p]sychoanalysis is... experienced as a journey into the strangeness of the other and of oneself, toward an ethics of respect for the irreconcilable."31 Thus, the patient's capacity for ethical relationships is opened up to the degree that this freedom that psychoanalysis permits emerges. Kristeva calls this freedom "freedom-revelation." It is a freedom that "has to do with

29Kristeva, *In the Beginning was Love*, 9.
30Kristeva, *In the Beginning was Love*, 12.
the revelation of self in the presence of the other through speech." It is freedom that is facilitated through the human aptitude for producing meaning. This aptitude for producing meaning links the speaking subject to another in a heightened sense. It is much more than biological destiny. Not an idealistic reading of reality, it is both free and dynamic.

Convergence

The depth of insight both Lonergan and Kristeva bring to their consideration of destiny and freedom converge at two key points despite vast differences in language and methodology. First of all, there is an 'ecstatic' freedom that both writers highlight and value. For Lonergan we see this ecstatic freedom in his consideration of art as evoking emotion and enriching human life. For Kristeva, ecstatic freedom occurs in the release of the wild, the violent, and the inexpressible that each person must repress in order to function in a symbolic world. Now, if the ecstatic freedom of art and unrepressed emotion provide a vehicle for a primal experience of liberation, that freedom would be understood in the first sense of 'freedom' outlined above - freedom from restraint. Yet, within this freedom from restraint there is an element of destiny involved. Neither art as transforming the perceiver through elemental meaning nor the human psyche as free of repression connotes self-determination. Art "evokes" the experience of freedom within the perceiver. The lifting of repression that is permitted in psychoanalysis plunges the analysand into the depths of a wild, inexpressible freedom. Thus, art and the lifting of repression provide us with an experience of freedom that is primal. It links us to an experience that is preverbal and so, beyond our capacity for choice or determination. It carries us, in some sense, to a destiny beyond our deliberation and beyond our imagining.

Kristeva writes as a psychoanalyst and a linguist. Her writing is elliptical, almost elusive in her effort to describe human experience and the role of psychoanalysis. Kristeva evokes a response in her readers in much the same way a poem might evoke emotion and possibly transformation. Lonergan is a theologian and a philosopher who utilizes an empirical and logical style in much of his work. Thus, the differences are significant but, in my view, not mutually exclusive.
The second point of convergence between Lonergan and Kristeva is more important. Neither Lonergan nor Kristeva restrict the experience of liberation to that primal, ecstatic level. In fact, both point to a heightened liberation that occurs at a higher level—the level of (symbolic) language or linguistic meaning. At the level of language, we have an understanding of freedom that relies on the human capacity to convey meaning. Language, in its capacity to convey meaning, liberates the human person in the second sense of freedom, freedom as self-determination. As we saw above, for Lonergan, language is the vehicle for meaning’s greatest liberation. It provides the means for collaboration between human beings. It facilitates the human person’s emergence from the murky realm of preconscious or impersonal experience to the “human achievement of bringing conscious intentionality into sharp focus and, thereby, setting about the double task of both ordering one’s world and orienting oneself within it.”

Similarly, when suggesting that no other modern experience apart from psychoanalysis provides the possibility of freedom, Kristeva is referring to psychoanalysis’ capacity to allow for meaning to emerge within the relationship between the analysand and the analyst. The constant process of questioning that occurs in the analytic discourse actualizes what Kristeva calls “the timelessness of the unconscious” and achieves a “psychic flexibility” within the analysand. Thus, the analysand begins to be free of the rigidity of repression and, as that occurs, begins to experience the freedom of self-determination. The analysand is able “to take a position in order to assume responsibility for a judgement in a specific situation, and being able to question it from someone else’s place…”

Yet despite the heightened liberation of language, for both Lonergan and Kristeva there remains a sense of destiny as understood in the “lead” that language takes in the shaping of our lives. Lonergan’s explication of the dialectical relationship between the autonomous individual and the community where that autonomy is lived out speaks explicitly of a destiny that is beyond the control of autonomous individuals. Similarly, Kristeva recognizes how there is an

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34Lonergan, *Method*, 70.
unpredictability within the analytic session that emerges from the relationship between the speaking subject and the structure of language. Just as Lonergan recognizes the dependence of individual autonomy on community, so Kristeva recognizes the dependence of the speaking subject on the structure of language. Freedom as self-determination in both Lonergan and Kristeva is a qualified freedom because it is in related something larger than freedom. For Lonergan that larger thing is community and for Kristeva it is the structure of language. Thus, for our purposes, it suggests deeply the relationship between freedom and destiny.

Conclusion

The query at the beginning of this paper concerning ideas and insights as having a "life of their own" is clarified somewhat after this exploration of the relationship between freedom and destiny. Especially helpful are the contributions of Bernard Lonergan and Julia Kristeva. Both draw our attention to the crucial relationship between a qualified freedom and a qualified destiny. Human beings are neither completely free nor completely destined, but there is an element of destiny and an element of freedom in all our lives. These elements of freedom and destiny are in tension with each other yet absolutely rely on each other. One cannot exist without the other. To have freedom, we must have destiny. To have destiny we must have freedom. Perhaps that is why ideas and insights are not completely the creation of human beings. Human beings play a crucial role in the creation of ideas and the emergence of insights. But human beings do not have the last word. The last word, it seems, relies on something beyond our capacity. It relies on community and on language which shape who we are and facilitates who we become.
DERRIDA AND LONERGAN ON THE GIFT

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"An expected, moderate, measured, or measurable gift, a gift proportionate to the benefit or to the effect one expects from it, a reasonable gift...would no longer be a gift; at most it would be a repayment of credit, the restricted economy of a difference, a calculable temporization or deferral. If it remains pure and without possible reappropriation, the surprise names that instant of madness that tears time apart and interrupts every calculation."¹

“Experience of grace, then, is as large as the Christian experience of life.”²

IN PREPARATION FOR this year's Lonergan Workshop I went back to a number of articles by Lonergan scholars who have worked to think through Lonergan's relationship to postmodernism. At the same time I re-read a number of articles from Collection and A Third Collection. My experience reading these essays was something like the famous Gestalt drawings of the duck that turns into a rabbit and then back to a duck—or the drawing of the young woman that becomes that of an old woman, depending on how one looks at it. Lonergan's voice in his articles reminded me of the revolutions in Catholic thought and education through which he lived and for which he was a leading spokesperson: from classicist to historical thought, from faculty

psychology to intentionality analysis, from an intellectualist theology to a theology based on religious experience and the recognition of a plurality of cultures. Lonergan in these articles clearly speaks from the "cutting edge" in philosophy and theology.

At certain moments, however, another picture superimposes itself on that of Lonergan the cutting-edge thinker. With his frequent mention of "structures," "presence," "method," and other terms that have been cast into disrepute by postmodern thinkers, Lonergan begins to look more old-fashioned, his voice apparently calling for stability and moderation. Those who have studied the relationship between Lonergan and postmodern thought have marked out a third alternative to the dilemma of Lonergan as cutting-edge vs. Lonergan as traditionalist, finding common ground between Lonergan and postmodern thinkers in their shared opposition to modernist epistemology. At the same time, as Jim Kanaris has pointed out, a consistent theme of most commentators has been to argue that Lonergan's thought has the advantage over postmodernism because Lonergan is able to avoid postmodernism's relativist implications.

The present essay is informed by these debates but does not attempt to enter them directly. Instead of taking on the general question of Lonergan's relationship to postmodernism, I propose to make a rather narrow comparison of Lonergan and Derrida on a topic that is central to both thinkers: the phenomenon of gift. I will begin with an interpretation of Derrida's two major works on the gift, *Given*


5 Jim Kanaris, "Calculating Subjects: Lonergan, Derrida, and Foucault," in *Method: Journal of Lonergan Studies* 15 (2), 1997, pp. 135-150. Kanaris suggests that the charge of relativism against thinkers such as Derrida and Foucault is a misreading since they may be writing in the artistic rather than the intellectual pattern of experience.
Time: I. Counterfeit Money, and The Gift of Death (both published in the early 1990’s). Following this, I will draw a comparison to the role of gift in Lonergan’s thought, focusing on his late essay, “Mission and the Spirit.” I hope that this comparison of Lonergan and Derrida on a topic of fundamental concern to them both may shed light on broader questions regarding their commonalities and differences. My own experience is that the juxtaposition of these texts on the gift works a kind of transformation on the image of both thinkers, such that Derrida appears much more connected to some of the deepest concerns of the Western tradition than I (at least) had expected him to be, and Lonergan looks less and less like the defender of a stolid traditionalism.

DERRIDA ON THE GIFT: MARCEL MAUSS MEETS CHARLES BAUDELAIRE

Derrida’s work has often been preoccupied with questions that for him are related to the phenomenon of gift. In Given Time, he draws connections among a number of texts, most notably Marcel Mauss’s The Gift and a vignette by Charles Baudelaire, “Counterfeit Money.” Mauss’s essay, a classic of sociology, examines gift-giving practices in diverse indigenous societies, with an eye to establishing that gift exchange is an economic system that both predates market capitalism and coexists with it in contemporary Western societies. For Mauss, gift exchange is distinct from buying and selling in several ways: it concerns groups (often participating in a circle of exchange, in which the one who receives a return gift is not identical with the person who gives

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7 For a list of Derrida’s works concerning gift, see Given Time, footnotes 1 and 2, pp. ix and x.
the initial gift) more than it does individuals; it governs not only property but rituals, feasts, and consumable goods, and it maintains a paradoxical balance between having to appear (or be) strictly voluntary while being at the same time enforced by (sometimes severe) social sanctions.\textsuperscript{10} While an exchange of goods through purchase usually occurs all at once, gift exchange occurs over time (i.e., time must pass between the original gift and the return gift). For this reason, and because objects given retain a permanent association with the giver, gift exchange builds long-term bonds of trust among participants.\textsuperscript{11} In societies where gift exchange is dominant, one's wealth is measured not by how much property one accumulates but by how much flows through one to others. At an extreme, gift exchange takes the form of the potlatch, in which vast amounts of wealth are given away or simply destroyed, in part as a means of establishing participants' positions in a social hierarchy.\textsuperscript{12}

Mauss concludes his essay by drawing "moral conclusions," arguing in favor of the adoption of aspects of gift exchange in modern life, including the attitude that our possessions are not ours but that we are trustees for others who are in need.\textsuperscript{13} He sees gift exchange as a healthy corrective to the point of view that sees individuals as motivated only by calculations of their own economic gain.

Derrida is known for his practice of addressing the world mediated by written texts,\textsuperscript{14} and in those readings for proceeding playfully but attentively, undermining any unequivocal expressions of insight or judgment by discovering double-meanings, paradoxes, and unacknowledged contradictions.\textsuperscript{15} Derrida follows just such practices in his reading of Mauss, drawing out the following themes, all of which involve an instability of meaning, a contradiction, or a paradox:

\begin{itemize}
\item \textsuperscript{10} Mauss, p. 3.
\item \textsuperscript{11} Mauss, p. 31.
\item \textsuperscript{12} Mauss, pp. 37ff.
\item \textsuperscript{13} Mauss, p. 66.
\item \textsuperscript{14} See \textit{Given Time}, p. 100.
\end{itemize}
1) Derrida questions how Mauss can legitimately treat the various manifestations of what he calls gift exchange, all of which occur in different languages and cultures.16

2) Following through on this concern for the mediation of meaning through language, Derrida considers throughout the book the many meanings of the words “give” and “gift” and related words in multiple languages. Of special interest is the German use of the word Gift to mean “poison,”17 which has a parallel in the use of the Latin dosis and the Greek pharmakon, both of which can mean either medicine or poison. Derrida cites as well the ways in which “giving” is linguistically linked to its apparent opposite, “taking,” in many languages.18 The linguistic links between “giving” and “taking” indicate for Derrida that the usual opposition between the two words is not final.

3) We saw above that Mauss describes a central paradox of gift-giving, that a gift is supposed to be freely given and yet at the same time obligatory, and that the very lapse of time between gift and countergift and the uncertainty of a return of the original gift is what develops trust among the participants in a circle of gift exchange. This paradox is central to Derrida’s reading of Mauss. Arguing that a gift that indebts someone is poisonous (Gift) and that a gift repaid is a gift “annulled,”19 Derrida concludes that “there is (il y a) gift” only if the gift is not only left unpaid, but also if it is not even recognized as a gift, either by the giver or the recipient (for then it will be repaid by self-congratulation or by gratitude).20 “Consequently,” he writes, “if there is no gift, there is no gift, but if there is gift held or beheld as gift by the other, once again there is no gift; in any case the gift does not exist and does not present itself. If it presents itself, it no longer presents itself.”21

One might be tempted to explain away the internal contradiction between freedom and obligation in gift exchange by saying that gift is

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17 Given Time, p. 36 and p. 81.
18 Given Time, p. 81.
19 Given Time, p. 12.
20 Given Time, pp. 13-14 and 23. Compare Derrida’s comments on this question in Deconstruction in a Nutshell, pp. 18-19.
21 Given Time, p. 15.
only a primitive form of market exchange (concluding that the obligation to repay a gift is real and the freedom not to return a gift is illusory). Derrida admires Mauss, however, for “stubbornly” preserving gift as distinct from calculated self-interest (even at the price of paradox). Derrida further notes that the phenomenon of the potlatch, in which surplus property is destroyed, strains the already paradoxical meaning of “gift” past the breaking point. To use the word “gift” to describe such phenomena is truly “madness,”22 and yet it is a fitting madness in that language itself is here “unable to return” to a central meaning of the word “gift” just as gifts, to be gifts, must not return to the giver.23

4) Derrida notes in a later discussion of these matters that this madness or impossibility of gift, this (something) that cannot ever appear as itself, nevertheless is what “gets things moving,” in the sense of initiating a circle of exchanges.24 He concludes that while the existence of gift is “impossible,” nevertheless “there is” gift, in a Kantian sense of something that can be thought but not known.

In the latter part of the book, Derrida links Mauss’s essay to a brief vignette by Baudelaire, “Counterfeit Money,” a story in which a man receives a counterfeit coin in change at a tobacconist’s and passes the coin to a beggar. Knowing the coin he gave the beggar was counterfeit, he nevertheless appears to wish to take credit for doing a good deed (to “win paradise economically.”) The narrator (his friend) decides not to forgive him, concluding that “To be mean is never excusable, but there is some merit in knowing that one is; the most irreparable of vices is to do evil out of stupidity.”25

Derrida’s meditation on this story centers on the following themes:

1) The story begins at a tobacconist and thus invokes the image of a gift that goes up in smoke26 (as in the destruction of property in a potlatch).

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22 Given Time, p. 39.
23 Given Time, p. 48.
25 Given Time, pp. 32-33.
26 Given Time, p. 107.
2) The story centers on a "gift that seems to give nothing" (i.e., the gift of a counterfeit coin) and of "a forgiveness that is finally withheld."27

3) The two friends who meet the beggar, having received gifts of fortune, are obligated to make a return gift by the beggar's need. His appearance is a trial to them to see what they will offer in return.28 (This passage recalls Mauss's account of the way gifts move in a circle to the most needy participant.) There is an implicit competition or potlatch between the two friends, a contest regarding which will offer more. The friend apparently wins the potlatch, but admits that the coin was counterfeit. His admission is open to multiple interpretations, which the narrator silently considers. Since this is a work of fiction, it is impossible to know the real intention behind the gift of the coin, and perhaps there is no real intention even on the part of Baudelaire.29

4) Forgiveness, which is withheld in the story, has a paradoxical structure similar to that of gift, for it forgets or absolves a fault that nevertheless remains a fault.30

5) Ultimately, the narrator withholds forgiveness because of his friend's "stupidity," which Derrida interprets as the friend's failure to reciprocate Nature's gift of a faculty of understanding.31

I hesitate to draw out a central thesis from Derrida's text, since clearly one of the points of his writing is to show that every text is open to a multiplicity of plausible readings. With that precaution in mind, nevertheless it is safe to characterize Derrida's purpose here as at one level an exercise in deconstruction in the sense for which he is known. Derrida has shown that the central terms on which Mauss relies dissolve continually into their opposites and that the phenomenon Mauss is trying to describe cannot possibly exist. In linking Mauss to the Baudelaire story, Derrida implicitly raises the deconstructive question about whether there is any difference generally between originals and counterfeits.

27 Given Time, p. 115.
28 Given Time, p. 145.
29 Given Time, p. 152.
30 Given Time, p. 36 and 163.
31 Given Time, p. 169.
Beyond the fact that the Mauss and Baudelaire texts invite paradoxical and playful readings, what might Derrida's interest be in this topic? It might be based in the role of Mauss's work in the early development of structuralism. But Derrida's concerns in the book go deeper, in that he links the paradoxes of forgetfulness inherent in Mauss's account of the gift to those of Heidegger's Being (and to his account of Ereignis). The paradox of gift is thus the paradox of that which in its giving disappears, while in its giving must not be thought as a giver.

These links to Heidegger, as well as the links to language that we have seen above, raise a more general question of our own role as fundamentally recipients of gifts. The questions Derrida raises here in some sense transcend the texts of Mauss and Baudelaire to reflect back on the lived experience of Derrida's readers, at least in the sense that our own lives are mediated for us through the texts that have had an impact on us. Derrida's discussion of Baudelaire may lead his readers to ask if we are obligated to repay in some fashion the gifts of fortune and understanding that we have received. Derrida himself does not claim that we as his readers owe such debts, or that we should take Mauss's "moral conclusions" seriously. In fact, he leaves us with so many ambiguities that his own position can only be simply the ambiguity and paradox with which he discusses these questions. At the same time, the ambiguity he has raised is an ambiguity regarding gift and responsibility, and so it has the effect of prompting a further reflection on and openness to these questions.

**THE GIFT OF DEATH**

In *The Gift of Death*, Derrida fulfills these hints that the notion of gift illuminates fundamental questions of responsibility and debt and develops a connection to religion as an account of gifts received from God and the debts we may or may not owe in return. *The Gift of Death* is a commentary on one of Jan Patocka's *Heretical Essays on the Philosophy of History*. Patocka's essay explores Europe's Biblical and Greek inheritance and the roots of contemporary questions of

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32 *Given Time*, p. 23.
responsibility. As distinct from the Platonic account of responsibility as a rational and free response to the eternal Good, Christianity according to Patocka situates responsibility in a personal relationship to God as the wholly Other, one who sees without being seen. Christianity is a response to the “gift of death” in its multiple meanings as 1) a reinterpretation of what death is, 2) the gift of Jesus’ death as sacrifice, and 3) the willingness to perform a sacrifice of life as represented in Abraham’s willingness to sacrifice Isaac. Following Kierkegaard, Patocka and Derrida interpret the sacrifice of Isaac as a betrayal of the (Kantian) ethics that must give a general account of itself, in favor of a singular relationship to God. The paradox of Abraham is that his very responsibility to God renders him ethically irresponsible.

Derrida argues that Abraham’s paradox is not at all unique but rather is commonplace in that every decision to respond to the needs of someone entails not responding to all the others who are equally in need. Like Abraham, we must remain silent about those whose suffering we fail to address. This paradox of ethics goes beyond individuals and implicates a whole society that “not only participates in this incalculable sacrifice, it actually organizes it” for “because of the structure of the laws of the market that society has instituted and controls, because of the mechanisms of external debt and other similar inequities, that same ‘society’ puts to death or (but failing to help someone in distress accounts for only a minor difference) allows to die of hunger and disease tens of millions of children...”

Derrida further situates the paradox of Christian responsibility within a gift economy, thus implicitly connecting this text to his reflections on Mauss. Abraham’s sacrifice “without hope of exchange, reward, circulation, or communication,” participates in an economy of

33 Gift of Death, p. 25.
34 Gift of Death, p. 33.
35 Gift of Death, p. 80.
36 Gift of Death, p. 64.
37 Gift of Death, p. 68.
38 Gift of Death, p. 70.
39 Gift of Death, p. 86.
40 Gift of Death, p. 96.
risk, in which there is hope of rewards or "salary" to be paid in heaven but there are no guarantees. Like the gift that must not appear as gift lest it be annulled, Christian responsibility must deny itself (the right hand is not to know what the left is doing). As in Mauss's gift circle which begins with the giving away or destruction of property without guarantee of return, Christianity withdraws from a market of tit for tat exchanges (eschewing revenge and retribution) and places its faith in the "excess" or surplus value represented by doing good to those who hate you.

As in Given Time, Derrida here leaves us with a deeply ambiguous assessment of Judeo-Christian responsibility and of the Christian participation in a kind of gift-economy with God. Derrida concludes the book by citing Nietzsche's claim that the belief in Christ's sacrifice for us is self-serving, and this citation along with his remarks on the paradox of ethical responsibility (because one cannot respond to the needs of one without neglecting the rest) and his identification of Biblical revelations with (fragmentary and ambiguous) postcards received from God leave one wondering whether Derrida's assessment of the role of gift in Judeo-Christianity is intended as a replay of Kierkegaard's Fear and Trembling minus Kierkegaard's affirmation of faith, or whether Derrida is also affirming some aspect of the Christian tradition.

My own sense is that he is at least affirming that the gift dimension found in Mauss is basic to Christianity and therefore to the inheritance of Western thought. But if gift is a basic aspect of both Christian spirituality and ethics, then there are two consequences: 1) a kind of wildness (paradox, excess) characteristic of gift exchange is hidden within what sometimes appears to be the manageable rationalist ethics and economics of Western societies, and 2) exploring the paradox of gift within our spiritual, ethical, and economic heritage may help open up new possibilities of political and economic life (i.e., possibilities based on something other than rational self-interest).

Gift then represents for Derrida, I think, a wild card within the Western tradition that serves as the basis on which to find paradoxical new interpretations of traditional texts. In another sense, it also may

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41 Gift of Death, p. 91.
symbolize for him the possibility of deconstruction itself as the emergence of something new in a text when it is read by a new interpreter. Insofar as Derrida associates gift with surprise, with lack of guarantee, with destruction (as in the potlatch), with the impetus to movement, and with openness to an unknown future, gift is an appropriate symbol or placeholder for what makes deconstruction possible and desirable (as well as potentially poisonous, like any gift). To follow this line of thought further might lead us to ask whether Derrida’s deconstructive project has the roots of its own possibility within a (traditional) stream of thought concerning gift within the history of Western philosophy.

LONERGAN AND GIFT IN “MISSION AND THE SPIRIT”

In the last section of this paper, I will argue for three similarities and one difference between the role of gift in Lonergan’s thought and its role in Derrida’s, drawing primarily on the essay, “Mission and the Spirit.” Briefly, I am claiming 1) that the phenomenon of gift pervades Lonergan’s account of human knowing, 2) that the role of gift in Lonergan’s thought is one of the sources of his resistance to some of the more objectionable tendencies of modernism, and 3) that the phenomenon of gift is ambivalent for Lonergan for some of the same reasons it is for Derrida. Finally, I will claim that Lonergan differs from Derrida in his sense that to name a gift as gift somehow annuls or destroys the gift. Yet at the same time Lonergan shares to a great extent Derrida’s sense of mystery concerning the source of the gifts that most concern him.

1) First, then, the phenomenon of gift is pervasive in Lonergan’s account of human knowing. In Lonergan’s descriptions of the experience of the unfolding of the desire to know through the levels of cognition, it is easy to infer that this experience shares the qualities of gift-giving as open-ended and contingent that we have seen emphasized by Mauss and Derrida. Like the one who initiates a gift exchange, we give our effort to

42 I am indebted to Fred Lawrence’s discussion of this essay in “Fragility of Consciousness.”
unraveling some problem, but we can never be sure that an answer will come to us in return for our efforts. Questions, images, insights, or judgments are not experienced as our own doing but as something new and surprising that comes to us.\footnote{See Lawrence, “Fragility of Consciousness,” p. 198.} In “Mission and the Spirit” Lonergan alludes to the way answers come to us as if by a gift when he describes the role of a “passionateness of being” that “underpins and reaches beyond the subject as experientially, intelligently, rationally, morally conscious.”\footnote{“Mission and the Spirit,” p. 29.} What Lonergan terms a “quasi-operator” “presides over the transition from the neural to the psychic,” serving the desire to know by shaping images, recalling overlooked evidence, bringing to mind our own misdeeds, and providing symbols important to our psychological development.\footnote{“Mission and the Spirit,” p. 29.}

In addition to describing the experience of unfolding inquiry in ways that display some of the qualities of gift exchange, Lonergan here goes further to claim that the development of human consciousness toward ever greater self-transcendence is a gift in the sense that it is brought about by God through the operation of vertical finality (our participation in ends higher than our proportionate ends)\footnote{“Mission and the Spirit,” p. 24.}. Lonergan writes that as “the cause of the whole universe” brings about from lower species the emergence of higher species, so God also works to bring human consciousness through its levels of operations to greater self-transcendence. By placing the human desire for knowledge/self-transcendence in the context of vertical finality, Lonergan places the whole of his cognitional theory in a theological context. If for Lonergan God is the source of our quest for knowledge, it seems plausible to say that our \textit{experience} of self-transcendence as gift is borne out by a theological understanding and judgment.

2) My second claim is that the gift-character of Lonergan’s cognitional theory is one of the sources of his resistance to modernism. As I mentioned above, when one asks a question, it is as if one begins a circle of gifts with no guarantee of a return. This lack of a guarantee in
Derrida and Lonergan on the Gift

the process of inquiry is characteristic of vertical finality, according to Lonergan's description of it in "Mission and the Spirit:"

"Vertical finality is to its end, not as inevitable, but as a possibility. Its ends can be attained. They need not be attained. They or may not be attained.

"Vertical finality is multivalent. There need not be just one end beyond a given proper proportion. Indeed, the lower a being is in a hierarchic scale, the more numerous are the higher ends beyond its proper reach.

"Vertical finality is obscure. When it has been realized in full, it can be known. When it is in process, what has been attained can be known, but what has not, remains obscure....

"Vertical finality to God himself is not merely obscure but shrouded in mystery. In this life we can know God, not as he is in himself, but only by deficient analogy. God himself remains mystery..."47

As participating in vertical finality with its contingency and open-endedness (which I have equated with the qualities of a gift exchange), the unfolding of human knowing and doing, far from being the mirroring of nature, the intuition of eternal essences, or the imposition of static Kantian categories on sense data, is for Lonergan always partial, multiple, open-ended, uncertain, and mysterious. In this sense the gift-character of his account of human knowing is a source of its resistance to modernist epistemologies.

3) The third claim I am making is that the gifts of unfolding knowledge are for Lonergan, as they are for Derrida, ambiguous (as for Derrida, they may amount to nothing, or they may be poisonous,). Just as the quasi-operator described in "Mission and the Spirit" may cooperate with the movement of self-transcendence by throwing out questions, images, and insights that assist inquiry and bring us to awareness of our own shortcomings, so it may instead operate out of egoistic, group, or commonsense bias (which Lonergan here attributes to sin).48

47 "Mission and the Spirit," pp. 26-27. See Fred Lawrence's discussion of this passage in "Fragility of Consciousness, p. 189. My argument in this section has some affinity to Jerry Miller's characterizations of Lonergan as sharing the concerns of deconstruction; see his essay "All Love is Self-Surrender."

suppressing images, insights, and further relevant questions. Through the workings of bias, “the intelligence of progress is twisted into the objectification of irrational bias,” followed by rationalizations to legitimate a now-distorted situation. For Lonergan, then, the gifts of insights that come to us from our own questioning, as well as the inherited meanings we have received from our languages and our traditions, contain poisonous distortions. For Lonergan as for Derrida, it seems plausible to say that such inherited meanings can only benefit from a deconstructive reading to discover the tensions and paradoxes within them.

4) As Lonergan names bias “sin,” he names the gifts that break down sin as “grace.” Both the outer word of Jesus’ life and mission, and the inner word of the Spirit (“God’s love flooding our hearts”) play an essential role in the overcoming of sin in individuals and societies.49 At the end of “Mission and the Spirit” Lonergan places the whole discussion of self-transcendence and the overcoming of bias in the context of grace, claiming that “experience of grace...is as large as the Christian experience of life.” “It is experience of man’s capacity for self-transcendence, of his unrestricted openness to the intelligible, the true, the good. It is experience of a twofold frustration of that capacity: the objective frustration of life in a world distorted by sin; the subjective frustration of one’s incapacity to break with one’s own evil ways. It is experience of a transformation one did not bring about but rather underwent, as divine providence let evil take its course and vertical finality be heightened, as it let one’s circumstances shift, one’s dispositions change, new encounters occur, and —so gently and quietly—one’s heart be touched...”50

In this passage Lonergan could never be mistaken for Derrida, for he names the gift as gift and expresses gratitude to the giver. Even the ambiguities and distortions of bias and social decline seem to have their place as part of a providential plan. In their responses to gift at this basic level, Derrida and Lonergan appear to part ways. Derrida remains content never to name a giver, express gratitude, or describe

49 “Mission and the Spirit,” p. 32.
an expected outcome to the process of textual and political inquiry in which he is engaged.

In a roundtable discussion at Villanova University, Derrida told a story of a man who met the Messiah dressed in rags at the gates of Rome. Recognizing him, the man asked the Messiah, “When will you come?” Derrida interprets this story in part as saying that our responsibilities are not in the future but here and now. He also interprets it as saying that “the Messiah is the one I expect even while I do not want him to come. There is the possibility that my relation to the Messiah is this: I would like him to come, I hope that he will come, that the other will come, as other, for that would be justice, peace, and revolution...and, at the same time, I am scared.... [A]s long as I ask you the question, ‘When will you come?’, at least you are not coming. And that is the condition for me to go on asking questions and living...”\[51\]

Derrida’s comments here epitomize the role of the deconstructionist as one who is waiting expectantly for something that he is profoundly reluctant to name, perhaps for fear of falling into the same closure of possibilities that he has worked to correct in his readings of traditional texts. Lonergan, in contrast, to Derrida, is eager to name that which he awaits, using traditional theological and pastoral terms such as grace, salvation, Son, and Spirit.

In affirming what Fred Lawrence has called a “friendly universe,”\[52\] even while maintaining that God’s purposes are mysterious, does Lonergan go too far in the direction of making God appear to be an object of knowledge, of “annulling” the gift in Derrida’s terms? I don’t know how to answer that question; at this point I can only point to it as a point of disagreement —perhaps a basic one—between Lonergan and Derrida. In spite of this disagreement, however, I have become convinced of the perhaps unexpected conclusion that there is much that unites Lonergan and Derrida. The Gestalt of each of them with which I began has changed in the course of my work on this paper; I trust that it will change further through the give and take of discussion in the Workshop.

\[51\] “Deconstruction in a Nutshell,” p. 25.
\[52\] “Fragility of Consciousness,” p. 206.
LONERGAN'S CRITIQUE OF ARISTOTLE'S NOTION OF SCIENCE

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LONERGAN'S REMARK IN *Method* about "bolder spirits" developing an "analogy of science" based on the procedures and precepts of the conspicuously successful science of their time is of particular relevance for understanding Aristotle's notion of science as it is expressed in the *Posterior Analytics*.¹ For a number of reasons, philosophers of nature had by Aristotle's time made little progress in achieving common methods and principles for investigating the world of human experience.² The story of the mathematical sciences, specifically the science of geometry, was quite different. Remarkable progress had been made in geometry by the 5th Century, working out a common method and vocabulary, common definitions, elements and principles, and common criteria for assessing whether a problem had been solved successfully.³ In particular, its method of demonstrating conclusions about its objects based on antecedently established principles caught the eye of Aristotle. It was Aristotle's goal to establish an analogy of science patterned on the method of geometry that could serve as model for any scientific investigation.⁴ The *Posterior Analytic* is Aristotle's basic articulation of this analogy of science.

Lonergan’s admiration for the brilliance of Aristotle’s philosophical achievement is evident throughout Lonergan’s intellectual career. In particular, Lonergan was convinced that Aristotle’s reflections on the act of direct insight into sensible experience and his heuristic specification of the goal of theoretical intelligence in terms of specific explanatory questions represent permanently valid achievements in the history of western philosophy.\(^5\) However, despite Lonergan’s appreciation of Aristotle’s achievement, he was also critical of some key aspects of Aristotle’s position. One criticism that increased in importance for Lonergan after the publication of *Insight* focused on Aristotle’s presentation of scientific knowing in the *Posterior Analytics*.\(^6\) More specifically, Lonergan was critical of Aristotle’s view that science can attain demonstrative knowledge of explanations that are known to be *true of necessity*. For Lonergan, even on Aristotle’s own account of the ground of scientific knowing, such knowledge is not, without more, attainable by human beings.

The purpose of this paper is to present Lonergan’s criticism of Aristotle’s understanding of scientific knowing on this point. That is, we will explore why for Lonergan science cannot, even on Aristotle’s own terms, achieve knowledge of explanations that that are known to be true of necessity.

To my mind, the importance of this topic for Lonergan cannot be overstated. Attempts by thinkers after Aristotle to achieve his notion of scientific knowledge had far-reaching and deleterious consequences for the history of western thought. One of the most important consequences was the degeneration of philosophical and scientific theory into what Lonergan termed “conceptualism.” In its search to achieve demonstrative knowledge of scientific explanations known to be true of necessity, philosophy and science tended toward “static abstractions” that were unsupported by any real understanding of


\(^6\) Cf. *Understanding and Being*, CWL 5, p. 400, editors note d.
things and events in the concrete. This degeneration into conceptualism was most evident in the aftermath of the Augustinian-Aristotelian controversy that occurred during the twelfth and thirteenth centuries at the University of Paris. The negative assessment of Aristotle's substantive works in physics, biology, psychology and metaphysics implied by the condemnation of 1277 against the Latin Averroists meant that Aristotle's logical works came to take center stage in both theology and philosophy. Increasingly, the focus of thinkers such as Duns Scotus and William of Ockham was not to understand things and events in the concrete but to satisfy Aristotle's requirements for achieving scientific knowledge:

[Duns Scotus and William of Ockham] were by-products of the Augustinian-Aristotelian conflict. They accepted Aristotle's logical works. His other writings they discarded as merely pagan. In consequence they took the Posterior Analytics at face value. Their basic concern was whether or not this or that issue could be settled demonstratively.

The results of conceptualism were twofold. First, because only the employment of analytic propositions seemed to satisfy Aristotle's

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9 Second Collection, p. 196.
10 Philosophy of God, pp. 30-31.
requirement that science attain demonstrative knowledge of explanations known to be true of necessity, increasingly knowledge of reality was relegated to the realm of faith, conceived along voluntaristic lines. To the extent that certain questions were still treated philosophically, there was a shift to analysis in terms of the logical doctrine of *suppositio*. Second, there emerged the decadent scholastic rhetorical form of disputation that focused on the defining of terms and the subdividing of distinctions. Its focus on the defining of terms led to an excessive verbalism that amounted to little more than a process of reifying the common sense meaning of terms. Its focus on the subdividing of distinctions led to a collapse of the distinction between philosophical reflection and rhetoric: "[Distinctions] enabled a disputant to add his afterthoughts, and while such thoughts could be brilliant, they also could be convenient inventions of the moment over which there was no effective control."

Much of modern philosophy that emerged with Descartes can be understood as a reaction to the philosophical skepticism and decadent scholasticism wrought by the degeneration of philosophical and scientific theory into conceptualism. In general, Descartes sought to overcome philosophical skepticism by transposing into an epistemological context Aristotle's requirement that science attain knowledge of explanations known to be true of necessity. In so doing, Descartes conceived science as a logically ordered system of necessary truths derived from self-evident epistemological principles:

For Descartes, scientific knowledge is the logically ordered system of true ideas that accurately represents the causal order in nature . . . . To construct a systematic order of truths, the mind must identify those elemental ideas and axioms whose truth value can be determined by a single self-authenticating act. These privileged internal representations are the foundations of

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13 Third Collection, p. 42.
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Cartesian science... They provide the self-evident principles required for a system of knowledge modeled on deductive geometry. The task of foundational epistemology is to discover these ultimate truths, to establish their certainty, and then to erect the edifice of knowledge upon them.15

Postmodern thought can itself be understood in many ways as a critical reaction to modern philosophy’s attempt to attain within an epistemological context scientific explanations known to be true of necessity.16 In this regard, Lonergan’s own criticism of Aristotle’s understanding of science is in continuity with this aspect of postmodern thinking.17 However, unlike the tendency of postmodern thinking to revert to a new form of philosophical skepticism as a consequence of its critique, Lonergan’s own critique opens to an understanding of authentic scientific praxis as the attainment of probable knowledge of verified explanatory possibilities. Accordingly, Lonergan’s position serves as a needed corrective to the postmodern critique in that it seeks not the “destruction” of the possibility of scientific knowing but a “reconstruction” of its philosophical basis consistent with the intention veterna novis augere et perficere.18

We will first explore those aspects of Aristotle’s understanding of science relevant to Lonergan’s critique. Two caveats are in order. First, my presentation of Aristotle’s position is in no way exhaustive. I have focused on only those elements of Aristotle’s position that are essential for understanding why Lonergan is critical of it. In particular, many details regarding Aristotle’s requirements for demonstration, details that comprise a large portion of Aristotle’s reflections in the Posterior Analytics, are not discussed because they are not relevant to the

16 Cf. Second Collection, pp. 69-73.
question at hand. Second, my presentation of Aristotle is in no way definitive. There is still a fair amount of disagreement among scholars as to the proper interpretation of Aristotle on a number of issues, including issues that are of relevance to understanding Lonergan's critique. On these points, I have endeavored to present an interpretation of Aristotle's position that approximates Lonergan's own interpretation because, obviously, it is this interpretation that was the subject of Lonergan's critique.

After we have completed our review of relevant themes in Aristotle's understanding of scientific knowing, we will turn to a presentation of Lonergan's own position on human knowing, concentrating in particular on Lonergan's notion of the "remote" criterion of truth. It is this notion that forms the basis for Lonergan's critique of Aristotle's understanding of science. Lastly, we will examine the implications of this criterion for scientific knowing. This examination will show why for Lonergan science cannot attain knowledge of explanations that are known to be true of necessity.

ARISTOTLE'S UNDERSTANDING OF SCIENTIFIC KNOWING

Aristotle makes his most basic statement about what he means by scientific knowing in terms of two requirements set forth at the beginning of Section 2, Book I, of his *Posterior Analytics*:

We think we that we know each [fact] without qualification . . . when we think that (a) we know the cause through which the [fact] exists [or occurs] as being the cause of that [fact], and that (b) the [fact] cannot be other than what it is.²¹

¹⁹ I would like to make special mention at this point of my gratitude to Patrick Byrne for his insightful comments on a previous draft of this paper. His efforts, in my judgment, have improved the presentation on several key points.

²⁰ In a number of cases, I employ Lonergan's own reflections on Aristotle's position to guide my interpretation.

²¹ *Posterior Analytics* 71b10-13. As a general rule I employ Hippocrates G. Apostle's translation of Aristotle's *Posterior Analytics* in *Aristotle's Posterior Analytics* (Grinnell, Iowa: The Peripatetic Press, 1981). However, I do at times deviate from
The first requirement Aristotle specifies for knowing to be scientific highlights that for Aristotle science is concerned primarily with knowing the "causes" through which "facts" exist or occur."\textsuperscript{22} In other words, scientific knowing is not of the "mere fact" but of the "reasoned fact."\textsuperscript{23} The "mere fact" is a thing or event known in terms of one's sense experience of it.\textsuperscript{24} For example, to use one of Aristotle's favorite illustrations, the "mere fact" of a lunar eclipse is a lunar eclipse known in terms of one's sense experience that "the moon is darkened without its visibility being obstructed."\textsuperscript{25} It is the "mere fact," understood as sense experience of a thing or event, that for Aristotle is the point of departure for scientific investigation.

The "reasoned fact," by contrast, is a thing or event known in terms of the reason that explains the "mere fact" as a consequence of that reason.\textsuperscript{26} For example, the "reasoned fact" of a lunar eclipse is a lunar eclipse known in terms of the explanation of the sense experience of the "the moon being darkened without its visibility being obstructed." In Aristotle's day the explanation of a lunar eclipse was already well known; namely, the reason that explains the sense experience of "the moon being darkened without its visibility being obstructed" as a consequence of that reason is that "the earth is interposed between the moon and the sun."\textsuperscript{27} It is the "reasoned fact," understood as a thing or event known in terms of the reason that explains the thing or event as experienced, that for Aristotle is the goal of scientific investigation.
Knowing a thing or event in terms of the reason that explains it is, for Aristotle, knowing the explanatory "what" or reality of that thing or event. In other words, the explanation of one's sense experience of a lunar eclipse is the reality of a lunar eclipse from an explanatory perspective – a lunar eclipse is "the moon being darkened without its visibility being obstructed" because "the earth is interposed between the moon and the sun." As Aristotle relates this point:

For it is evident that in all these the whatness and the why are the same. Thus, to the question "what is an eclipse?" one may answer, "It is the privation of light from the moon, [caused] by the earth's interposition"; and to the question "Why is there an eclipse?" or "Why is the moon being eclipsed?", one may answer, "Because its light disappears when the earth is interposed between the sun and the moon." 28

The second requirement Aristotle specifies in his basic statement of what constitutes knowing to be scientific is that one must know that "the [fact] cannot be other than what it is." This means that to possess scientific knowledge one must know that the reason that explains one's sense experience of a thing or event is the necessarily true explanation of that sense experience. 29 The necessity at issue is not that the thing or event to which the explanation pertains always exists or occurs. If this were the case, there could not be scientific knowledge of an event such as a lunar eclipse, which occurs only "sometimes" or "recurrently." Rather, the necessity at issue is that the thing or event is of "such and such a kind" (as explained) assuming its existence or occurrence. 30 This is why for Aristotle science seeks knowledge of particular things and events not as particular (as actually existing or occurring) but as "falling under" a universal (as such and such a kind). As Aristotle comments in this regard:

As for demonstrations and sciences of thing which happen frequently, e.g. of an eclipse of the moon, it is clear that qua

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28 Posterior Analytics 90a15-17.
30 For a discussion of the connection between necessity and universality, see Irwin, First Principles, pp. 118-20.
being of such and such a kind, they are always [true], but qua not always existing, they are [true] under certain circumstances. As in the case of an eclipse, so it is in other cases.\textsuperscript{31}

There are basically two aspects to knowing that the explanation of a thing or event as experienced is true of necessity.\textsuperscript{32} First, one must know that the existence or occurrence of the thing or event as experienced entails of necessity the fulfillment of the conditions specified by the reason that explains the sense experience (the existence or occurrence of the thing or event as explained). Second, one must know that the fulfillment of the conditions specified by the reason that explains the sense experience (the existence or occurrence of thing or event as explained) entails of necessity the existence or occurrence of the thing or event as experienced. For example, one knows that the explanation of a lunar eclipse as experienced is true of necessity if one knows both that: (1) the occurrence of the a lunar eclipse as experienced ("the moon is darkened without its visibility being obstructed") entails of necessity the fulfillment of the conditions specified by the reason that explains it ("the earth is interposed between the moon and the sun"); and (2) the fulfillment of the conditions specified by the reason that explains it ("the earth is interposed between the moon and the sun") entails of necessity the occurrence of a lunar eclipse as experienced ("the moon is darkened without its visibility being obstructed"). It is basically a matter of \textit{if and only if} A (the fulfillment of the conditions specified by the explanation), then B (the occurrence of the thing or event as experienced).\textsuperscript{33}

\textsuperscript{31} \textit{Posterior Analytics} 75b21-37.
\textsuperscript{32} The question of what Aristotle means by this requirement is not a settled issue among scholars. See, e.g., Irwin, \textit{First Principles}, pp. 523 n. 20; 528 n.7.
\textsuperscript{33} That this is how Lonergan interpreted Aristotle on the question of necessity is indicated by two sources in his writings. The first source is Lonergan's discussion in \textit{Understanding and Being} at page 126 that scientific knowing is only probable because it cannot establish "\textit{If A, and only if A, then B}" (the italics are Lonergan's). To know that B follows \textit{only if} A is to know that the occurrence of the thing or event as experienced ("B") entails of necessity the fulfillment of the conditions specified by the explanation ("A"). Likewise, to know that B follows \textit{if} A is to know that the fulfillment of the conditions specified by the explanation entails of necessity the occurrence of the thing or event as experienced. The second source is Lonergan's usual translation of Aristotle's requirement in the \textit{Posterior Analytics} as knowing
For Aristotle, knowing that the explanation of a thing or event as experienced is true of necessity entails knowing *all the reasons that explain why this explanation is the true explanation of the relevant sense experience*. Generally, these reasons for the truth of the explanation are known when all questions about why the explanation is the true explanation have been raised and answered. In other words, when one knows the reasons that establish the *unquestionable* truth of the explanation of the relevant sense experience, one knows that the explanation of the relevant sense experience is true of necessity. Lonergan's own approach to analyzing knowledge of these reasons will be helpful for understanding this point. Lonergan makes a distinction between, on the one hand, the conditions for the truth of an explanation that are implied by the reasons proffered in support of the truth of the explanation and, on the other hand, the fulfillment of these conditions that is asserted by these reasons.

Accordingly, knowing the reasons that establishes the unquestionable truth of an explanation involves that "the effect cannot be other than it is." See, e.g., *Third Collection*, pp. 41, 136-37. This translation implies the second aspect of knowing that the fulfillment of the conditions specified by the explanation entails of necessity the occurrence of the thing or event as experienced (the "effect").


As Irwin notes in *First Principles*, page 130: "To justify the conclusion [the explanation of the thing as experienced], in [Aristotle's] view, we must show conclusively, with no further questions to be raised, that it is derived from premises [reasons] that are prior and better known. We have not shown this if we can only offer a local demonstration [reason not themselves established by reasons] since that leaves open a further question about the status of the premises [reasons]."

This topic will be discussed more fully below. In this regard, Lonergan makes the following relevant comments in an early essay entitled "The Form of Inference": "It appears a fact that spontaneous thinking sees at once the conclusion, B, in apprehending the antecedents, A. Most frequently the expression of this inference will be simply the assertion of B. Only when questioned do men add that the 'reason for B' is A: and only when a debate ensues does there emerge a distinction between the two elements in the 'reason for B,' namely, the antecedent fact or facts, A, and the implication of B in A (if A, then B). Thus the transition from informal to formal inference is a process of analysis: it makes explicit, at once in consciousness and in language, the different elements of thought that were present from the first moment. For when B simply is asserted, it is asserted not as an experience but as a conclusion; else a question would not elicit the answer, B because of A. Again, when this answer is given, there would be no meaning to the 'because' if all that was meant was a further assertion, A. On the contrary, the casual sentence (because A, therefore B) compresses into one the three sentences of the formal analysis (if A, then B; A; ∴ B)." Bernard J. F. Lonergan, *Collection*, Collected Works of Bernard Lonergan, vol. 4, edited by Frederick E. Crowe and Robert M. Doran (Toronto: University of Toronto Press, 1988), pp. 4-5.
knowing both the conditions for the truth of the explanation and the fulfillment of these conditions.

Returning to the example of a lunar eclipse, one knows that the explanation of a lunar eclipse as experienced is true of necessity only if one knows the reasons that establish the unquestionable truth of the explanation. One reason for the truth of the explanation of a lunar eclipse is that "the moon is something illuminated by light from the sun." In other words, one reason it is true that "the earth being interposed between the moon and the sun" is the explanation of "the moon being darkened without its visibility being obstructed" is because "the moon is something illuminated by light from the sun." The conditions for the truth of the explanation implied by this reason is that "something illuminated by light from the sun is darkened without its visibility being obstructed because the earth is interposed between it and the sun."

Aristotle's typical approach in the Posterior Analytics for displaying knowledge of reasons for the truth of an explanation is to cast these reasons in the form of one or more deductions or "syllogisms." Generally speaking, a syllogism for Aristotle is "discourse in which, certain things being stated, something other that what is stated follows of necessity from their being so."38 The "certain things being stated," which are statements "affirming or denying something of something," are the premises of the syllogism.39 The "something other than what is stated" that "follows of necessity from their being so" is the conclusion of the syllogism. The main point of a syllogism is to display both knowledge of the conditions for the truth of a scientific explanation and knowledge of the fulfillment of these conditions. The major premise of a syllogism displays knowledge of the conditions for the truth of the explanation.40 The minor premise displays knowledge of the fulfillment of these conditions. The conclusion, as following from the premises, displays knowledge of the scientific explanation as a

39 See Byrne, Analysis and Science, pp. 31-32.
40 See, e.g., Understanding and Being, CWL 5, p. 118.
conditioned known to have its conditions for truth fulfilled. As Lonergan notes in this regard:

What is the function of a syllogism? Is the function of a syllogism a matter of writing down a formula that exhibits what happens in mental chemistry, the way the chemical formula represents what happens in chemical processes? The function of writing out syllogisms, or clarifying your thought to the point where you are able to put your assertions as conclusions from other premises, is that it puts into form the object of reflective understanding. Reflective understanding is aided by the syllogistic form of exposition because the syllogism exhibits the conclusion, the prospective judgment, the conditioned, as a [a conditioned having its conditions fulfilled]. You have the question, Is B true? Is the proposition or set of propositions under consideration true? The act of reflective understanding grasps that the propositions or set of propositions is [a conditioned having its conditions fulfilled]; because of that grasp you have a grasp of an absolute, and you say, "Affirm B; B is true."41

The foregoing can be illustrated with the construction of a syllogism that displays knowledge of one reason for the truth for the scientific explanation for a lunar eclipse:

**Major Premise:** Something illuminated by light from the sun is darkened without its visibility being obstructed because/when (if and only if) the earth is interposed between it and the sun.

**Minor Premise:** The moon is something illuminated by light from the sun.

**Conclusion:** Therefore, the moon is darkened without its visibility being obstructed because/when (if and only if) the earth is interposed between the moon and the sun.42

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The preceding syllogism displays a reason for the truth of the explanation for a lunar eclipse as experienced by showing in part why it is true that the interposition of the earth between the moon and the sun explains the moon being darkened without its visibility being obstructed. This reason is in terms of the moon as "something illuminated by light from the sun." In other words, one reason "the earth being interposed between the moon and the sun" explains "the moon being darkened without its visibility being obstructed" is because "the moon is something illuminated by light from the sun." The major premise of the syllogism ("something illuminated by light from the sun is darkened without its visibility being obstructed because the earth is interposed between it and the sun") displays knowledge of conditions for the truth of the scientific explanation. The minor premise ("the moon is something illuminated by light from the sun") displays knowledge of the fulfillment of these conditions. The conclusion ("therefore, the moon is darkened without its visibility being obstructed because the earth is interposed between the moon and the sun"), as following from the premises, displays knowledge of the scientific explanation as a conditioned known to have its conditions fulfilled.

The reason for the truth of the explanation set forth in the syllogism does not, however, by itself, establish the necessary truth of the explanation because it does not establish the unquestionable truth of the explanation. In other words, all questions pertinent to knowing both the conditions and their fulfillment for the truth of the explanation are not answered by this reason. There are further questions about the truth of the reason itself that are pertinent to knowing the conditions and their fulfillment for the truth of the explanation. One may ask, for example, in connection with this reason "Why it is true that something illuminated by light from the sun is

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43 For Aristotle, one cannot, strictly speaking, demonstrate the "what" of something. However, in the present case, a lunar eclipse does not, strictly speaking, have a "what" because is not actually a substance or a "something." Rather, it is an attribute of the moon due to its location relative to the locations of the sun and the earth.

44 It should be noted from the foregoing that the reasons for the truth of an explanation of a thing or event as experienced usually involves additional explanations that pertain to things or events that may be the same or different from the things or events referenced in the conclusion.
darkened without its visibility being obstructed when the earth is interposed between it and the sun"? The process of answering this and related questions takes one in the direction of a theory of optics that explains why these conditions for the truth of the explanation are themselves true.\(^45\) Hence, one does not know the reasons that establish the necessary truth of an explanation unless and until one has raised and answered all questions about the truth of these reasons.\(^46\) The implication of this is that one knows that an explanation is true of necessity only if one also knows that the reasons for its truth are true of necessity.\(^47\)

The preceding analysis poses serious difficulties for Aristotle's understanding of science. On the one hand, for Aristotle one does not achieve scientific knowledge unless one knows that the reason that explains a thing or event as experienced is true of necessity by answering all questions relevant to the truth of the reasons that justify the explanation. On the other hand, the reasons achieved in answering these questions seem only to generate further questions about their own truth. The result is an infinite regress in the giving of reasons for the truth of previously given reasons.\(^48\) Aristotle's solution to this dilemma is his position that the giving of further reasons eventually terminates in knowledge of immediate, indemonstrable reasons termed "principles" that are known to be true of necessity without recourse to additional reasons.\(^49\) His basic notion is of reasons for the truth of a scientific explanation whose truth is unquestionable because

\(^{45}\) Cf. Byrne, *Analysis and Science*, p. 104. These additional reasons would include an explanation of the fact that the interposition of the earth between the sun and an object illuminated by light from the sun results in a darkening of that object because the object is deprived of light from the sun by the interposition. These additional reasons could be displayed syllogistically with the premises of the original syllogism being deduced as conclusions. See generally, McKirahan, *Principles and Proofs*, pp. 149-63.

\(^{46}\) Irwin, *First Principles*, p. 130.

\(^{47}\) This is the reason for Aristotle's requirement that premises of a demonstration be necessary. See, e.g., *Posterior Analytics* 73a22-28. As it stands, then, our syllogism for a lunar eclipse does not qualify as a demonstration of the "reasoned fact" of a lunar eclipse.

\(^{48}\) *Posterior Analytics* 72b5-24.

their truth is self-evident.\textsuperscript{50} In other words, the reasons "contain" or "establish" the fulfillment of their own conditions for being true. As such, these reasons are known to be true of necessity without recourse to additional reasons:

Things are true and primitive which are convincing on the strength not of anything else but through themselves; for in regard to the first principles of science it is improper to ask any further for the why and wherefore of them; each of the first principles should command assent in and by itself.\textsuperscript{51}

The most important characteristic of the principles that state these reasons is that they involve "essential" or per se predication.\textsuperscript{52} Recall that for Aristotle the premises that express reasons for the truth of a conclusion are always a proposition "affirming or denying something of something."\textsuperscript{53} The "something" that is affirmed is an understanding involving additional things or events that functions as the predicate of the premise. The "something" of which the predicate is affirmed are these additional things or events. For example, the minor premise of the syllogism for a lunar eclipse expresses an understanding of the moon ("the moon is something illuminated by light from the sun"). The predicate that is affirmed of the subject is the understanding ("something illuminated by light from the sun"). The subject of which the predicate is affirmed is the thing understood ("the moon").

For Aristotle, a predicate belongs to a subject per se when knowledge of the fulfillment of the conditions for affirming the predicate of the subject follow from knowledge of the very "what it is" (ti esti) of either the subject or the predicate. \textsuperscript{54} For purposes of illustration, the minor premise in the syllogism for a lunar eclipse

\textsuperscript{50} See Irwin, First Principles, pp. 130-33.
\textsuperscript{53} Posterior Analytics 75a20-22.
\textsuperscript{54} See generally, Byrne, Analysis and Science, pp. 94-99, 125-371; McKirahan, Principles and Proofs, pp. 80-102.
would involve *per se* predication if knowledge of the fulfillment of the conditions for affirming the predicate of the subject ("the moon is something illuminated by light from the sun") followed from knowledge of the "what it is" of either the subject ("the moon") or the predicate ("something illuminated by light from the sun"). In other words, the affirmation of "the moon" as "something illuminated by light from the sun" would establish the fulfillment of its own conditions for being true if its truth followed from either what it is to be "the moon" or from what it is to be "something illuminated by light from the sun." If this requirement is satisfied, the truth of the affirmation is true of necessity because it establishes, as a matter of definition, the fulfillment of its own conditions for being true.

The basic problem with Aristotle's account is that it seems to beg the question. Although the affirmation of the predicate "B" of the subject "A" is true of necessity if one assumes that it is true of necessity that the "what" of "N" is that "A is B," how does one know that it is true of necessity that "A is B"? Aristotle's approach to justifying knowledge of reasons that establish the fulfillment of their own conditions for being true succeeds only if he can establish that one can achieve a knowledge of the "what it is" of "A" such that one knows that "A is B" is true of necessity. Aristotle's explanation of how knowledge of these reasons is achieved fails to do this, however.

Aristotle's explanation is that these reasons are known by *nous* through immediate induction from sense experience. Aristotle gives a description of knowing by immediate induction from sense experience in an often celebrated and usually disputed passage at the end of the *Posterior Analytics* that is the point of departure for Lonergan's critique:

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55 For discussions of knowing principles by *nous* through induction from sense experience, see Irwin, *First Principles*, pp. 26-50, 134-37; Byrne, *Analysis and Science*, pp. 165-89. Because induction is the knowing by which principles are known, for Aristotle it is the ultimate ground of all scientific knowing: "[S]ince scientific knowledge and [induction] are always true and no genus [of knowledge] exists with is more accurate that scientific knowledge except [induction]; since the principles of demonstration are [by nature] more known that [what is demonstrated], and all scientific knowledge is knowledge by means of reasoning whereas there could be no scientific knowledge of the principles; and since nothing can be more true than scientific knowledge except [induction]; it follows from a consideration of these facts that [induction] would be the [habit or faculty] of principles, and that a principle of a demonstration could not be a demonstration and so [the principles] of scientific knowledge could not be scientific knowledge. Accordingly, if we have no genus of a true [habit] other than scientific knowledge, [induction] would be the principle [or starting point] of scientific knowledge." *Posterior Analytics* 100b10-16.
Accordingly, from a sensation there arises a memory, in the manner we have stated, and from many memories of the same thing there arises [one] experience (for many memories [of the same individual] are a single experience). Again, from experience[s] or from every universal which is now stabilized in the soul and which, being one besides the many, would be one and the same in all of them, [there arises] a principle of art or of science . . . of science if it is a principle about being. So neither are these habits [i.e., principles of science and art] present in the soul [from the start] in any determinate way, nor do they come into being from other more known habits. [They arise] from sensation, like a reversal in battle brought about when one man makes a stand, then another, then a third, till a principle is attained. * * * Let us state once more what has just been said but not clearly. When one of the [things] without differences has made a stand, [there is formed] in the soul the first universal . . . and then again another [universal] among these makes a stand, [and the process goes on] till a universal which has no parts makes a stand . . . . Clearly, then, we must come to know the primary [universals] by induction.56

The meaning of the passage can be illustrated with the reason for the truth of the explanation for a lunar eclipse set forth in the syllogism above. Knowledge of the fulfillment of conditions for the truth of the explanation (“the moon is something illuminated by light from the sun”) is known by immediate induction from sense experience. The relevant sense experience is a sensible aspect of the moon that an attentive observer would notice. This sensible aspect is that the illuminated side of the moon is always toward the sun whenever the moon is observed. The question arises, “Why is the illuminated side of the moon always toward the sun whenever the moon is observed?” In response to this question, one “induces” that the reason for this sensible aspect of the moon is that the moon is illuminated by light from sun, which reason is expressed in terms of conditions and their fulfillment in the major and minor premises of the syllogism. Aristotle himself makes reference in the Posterior Analytics to the induction from sense experience that is the basis for the major and minor premises:

56 Posterior Analytics 100a5-100b6. See Irwin, First Principles, pp. 32-33.
Acuteness is the discerning of the [reason why] in an imperceptible time. For example, having observed that the moon has its lighted side always toward the sun, a man quickly thought of the reason for it, namely, that the light comes from the sun.⁵⁷

This example of induction from sense experience is certainly not an example of knowing from the “what it is” of “A” that “A is B” is true of necessity. This would be the case only if there were no further questions about the truth of this affirmation. But in fact, there are further questions. In particular, there are questions about why the sense experience of “the illuminated side of the moon being always toward the sun whenever the moon is observed” leads to, or is evidence for, the affirmation that “the moon is illuminated by light from the sun.” Stated another way, there are questions about the correctness or adequacy of the conditions for the truth of the affirmation that are implied by the reason for affirming it; namely, the condition that “something with its illuminated side always toward the sun whenever it is observed is illuminated by light from the sun.” The answering of these questions would, once again, move one toward a theory of optics that, along with other areas of investigation, could provide reasons for explaining why this sense experience is evidence for the reason offered. Lonergan’s basic difficulty with Aristotle’s position comes to light as soon as one generalizes these considerations and realizes that there is always the concrete possibility of further questions about the truth of a reason based on induction from sense experience.⁵⁸ It is to Lonergan’s critique that we now turn.

⁵⁷ Posterior Analytics 89b10-12.
⁵⁸ The point at issue here is not the traditional scholastic problem that there is the possibility of further sense data that would contradict a universal definition (i.e., an instance of “S is not P” contradicting the definition “All S are P.” As will be developed through the rest of the paper, the point at issue is that the unlimited scope of pertinent questions in science leads to ever-widening explanatory contexts such that each answer to a pertinent question brings to light further questions with explanatory significance. I am indebted to Patrick Byrne for alerting me to this point of clarification.
Lonergan's basic criticism of Aristotle's understanding of scientific knowing stems from Aristotle's position that it is possible to arrive at reasons for the truth of a scientific explanation by induction from sense experience that are known to be true of necessity because they establish their own conditions for being true. Stated simply, Lonergan does not think that such knowledge is properly attainable by human beings. On the one hand, a reason that establishes the fulfillment of the conditions for its own truth because the fulfillment of these conditions follow from the definition of either the subject or the predicate of the proposition that expresses the reason is merely an analytic proposition whose truth is tautological. On the other hand, a reason that is based on an induction from sense experience is always subject to further questions about why the relevant sense experience leads to, or is evidence for, affirming the reason. The most that science can achieve is knowledge of explanations that are probable; that is, explanations that are verified possibilities known to be true within the limits of the questions that have been raised and answered about their truth. As Lonergan notes in an important passage in *A Third Collection*:

In the second chapter of the first book of [the *Posterior Analytics*] one is aware that Aristotle's basic concern is with causal necessity. We think we understand, he notes, when we know the cause, know that it is the cause, and know that the effect cannot be other than it is. But straightway this concern with things and their causes is transposed into syllogistic theory. We are told how knowledge of causal necessity is expressed in appropriate subjects and predicates, premises and conclusions, and thereby manifests its nature as science. But when at the end of the second book it is asked how the initial premises are obtained on which the whole deductive structure has to rest, we are told about a rout followed by a rally. The line breaks. *Sauve qui peut!* But as the fleeing line scatters in every direction, somewhere someone will turn and make a stand. Another will join him, and then another. The rally begins. The pursuing enemy now is

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59 See *Insight*, CWL 3, pp. 329-34
scattered. Victory may be snatched from the jaws of defeat. I think this military analogy is sound enough. For it represents the chance accumulation of clues that can combine into a discovery. But it is not at all clear that a necessary truth will be discovered and not a mere hypothesis, a mere possibility that has to be verified if it is to merit the name not of truth but of probability. If the only premises the Posterior Analytics can provide are just hypothesis, verifiable possibilities, then we have many words about causal necessity but no knowledge of reality.60

The remainder of this paper is devoted to explaining Lonergan's critique of Aristotle on this point, beginning with Lonergan's notion of the remote criterion of truth.

1. The Remote Criterion of Truth

On Lonergan's account, human knowledge of reality is achieved through a reflective grasp of the "virtually unconditioned." A virtually unconditioned is a conditioned known to have its conditions fulfilled. The "conditioned" is the content of a possibly true act of direct insight on the level of intelligence that is arrived at in response to, and satisfaction of, a question for intelligence.61 The question for intelligence is itself the expression of a concern to reach an understanding of some aspect of sense experience that will in some way "makes sense" of it.62 The question for intelligence can be articulated in various ways, including "What is it?" or "Why is it what it is"?63 The content of the direct insight achieved in satisfaction of the question for intelligence is a possibly correct understanding of sense experience. It is this content of a direct insight that is the conditioned in the grasp of the virtually unconditioned.

The reflective grasp of the virtually unconditioned occurs in response to a question for reflection, which is the expression of a concern to know whether the content of a direct insight is indeed the

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60 Third Collection, pp. 136-37.
61 Insight, CWL 3, pp. 304-06; Understanding and Being, CWL 5, pp. 112-15.
62 Understanding and Being, CWL 5, pp. 21-32.
63 Insight, CWL 3, pp. 33-34; Understanding and Being, CWL 5, pp. 149-51.
true or correct understanding of the relevant experience. The question for reflection can be articulated in various ways, including "Is such and such understanding true?" or "Is such and such explanation the way it really is"? The content of the act of reflective insight achieved in satisfaction of the question for reflection is a grasp of sufficient reason for affirming the conditioned. This grasp of sufficient reason involves both knowledge of the conditions linked with the conditioned, which are the conditions for the truth of the conditioned, and knowledge of the fulfillment of these conditions. It is this knowledge of both the conditions and their fulfillment for the truth of a conditioned that for Lonergan constitutes knowledge of a virtually unconditioned, which is expressed by a judgment of fact that such and such understanding is the way things really are.

Lonergan illustrates the grasp of the virtually unconditioned in *Insight* by means of a simple deductive syllogism:

If X is material and alive, X is mortal
But men are material and alive
Therefore, men are mortal

Similar to our discussion above in regard to the syllogism for a lunar eclipse, the premises of this syllogism express a reason for the truth of the explanation stated in the conclusion. The major premise ("If X is material and alive, X is mortal") expresses knowledge of conditions ("If X is material and alive") for the truth of the conditioned ("X is mortal"). The minor premise ("But men are material and alive") expresses knowledge of the fulfillment of these conditions. The conclusion ("Therefore, men are mortal") expresses knowledge of the conditioned as virtually unconditioned relative to the conditions stated in the major.

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64 Collection, CWL 2, p. 207; Understanding and Being, CWL 5, p. 149; Third Collection, pp. 28-29.
65 Understanding and Being, CWL 5, pp. 111-12.
66 Insight, CWL 3, pp. 304-06; Understanding and Being, CWL 5, pp. 112-15.
67 As Lonergan articulates this point: "A prospective judgment will be virtually unconditioned if (1) it is a conditioned, (2) its conditions are known, and, (3) the conditions are fulfilled." Insight, CWL 3, p. 305. Lonergan distinguishes the virtually unconditioned from the formally unconditioned. The formally unconditioned has no conditions to be fulfilled. Insight, CWL 3, pp. 305, 402, 682, 692.
premise; that is, a conditioned known to have its conditions for truth fulfilled.

Lonergan notes in *Insight* that the judgment of fact displayed by this syllogism is not the most basic example of knowing the virtually unconditioned because “it presupposes other judgments to be true.”68 Lonergan's point is that knowledge of this reason for the truth of the judgment expressed in the conclusion is based on a set of additional judgments whose truth is presupposed relative to this judgment. More specifically, when a judgment is expressed as the conclusion of a deductive syllogism, the conditions for the truth of the conditioned expressed in the major premise are known by an additional judgment. Likewise, the fulfillment of the conditions expressed in the minor premise is known by yet another judgment.

Of course, knowledge of the truth of the judgments underpinning each of the premises is also based on a reflective grasp of both the conditions for their truth and the fulfillment of these conditions. Furthermore, knowledge of these conditions and their fulfillment may be known by yet a further set of judgments that are part of a total context of judgments. The consequence is that knowledge of the meaning and truth of any judgment in the context is dependent on, relative to, and limited by, knowledge of the meaning and truth of all the judgments in the context:

[Y]our grasping of [a virtually unconditioned] can depend on past judgments, as soon as someone disputes the judgment, you begin invoking those past judgments to justify our present judgment. Again, you invoke them to limit, qualify, clarify, and explain just what you mean when you make this judgment. A judgment occurs within a context of other judgments, within a context of some determinate development of intelligence, and this contextual aspect of judgment is fundamental. We know our worlds not by one judgment but by an accumulation of judgments, as the fruit of a long series of judgments, and the meaning of any judgment is dependent upon a retinue of other connected judgments that explain it, give its presuppositions,

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68 *Insight*, CWL 3, p. 306. Hence, in the example, the conditioned is only virtually unconditioned relative to the fulfillment of the condition displayed by the premises.
exhibit its consequences, exhibit all the other complementary things that, in some extremely delicate fashion, qualify and elucidate the particular judgment we are making. 69

The foregoing analysis leads to the same difficulty we encountered in our discussion of Aristotle; namely, the infinite regress that results if one is always establishing knowledge of the conditions and their fulfillment for the truth of a judgment by additional judgments. The solution to this problem for Lonergan is to recognize that knowledge of the conditions and their fulfillment for the truth of a judgment is not always supplied by additional judgments. Rather, it can be supplied by components within the structure of cognitional intentionality itself:

[I]f A and B, as representing the conditions and conditioned in a virtually unconditioned, must always be judgments, then we are driven back to an infinity of prior judgments before we can have one. There has to be an infinity, because every final judgment, every judgment B, depends on other judgments. If, however, we can find A [the minor premise] and the major premise, if A, then B, within the prior process of knowing, and reflective understanding capable of using A and B as they exist in this prior state, then we can get the judgment. 70

Of immediate relevance to our present discussion is how the conditions and their fulfillment for the truth of a judgment are known as components within cognitional process when the judgment under consideration is what Lonergan terms a "concrete judgment of fact." 71 With a concrete judgment of fact, knowledge of the conditions for the truth of the conditioned is had on the level of intelligence by a direct insight that specifies that certain sensations must occur on the level of sense experience in order to affirm the conditioned as virtually unconditioned. Knowledge of the fulfillment of these conditions is had on the level of sense experience by the occurrence of the relevant sensations. Knowledge of the virtually unconditioned, as a conditioned known to have its conditions fulfilled, is had on the level of rational

69 Understanding and Being, CWL 5, p. 115. See also, Insight, CWL 3, p. 573.
70 Understanding and Being, CWL 5, p. 120.
71 See generally, Insight, CWL 3, pp. 306-08; Understanding and Being, CWL 5, pp. 120-21.
reflection by a reflective insight that grasps the fulfillment of the conditions specified by the direct insight by the occurrence of the relevant sensations:

[In a concrete judgment of fact] you will have the fulfillment of the conditions on the level of experience; links between conditions and conditioned – a conjunction of the two (major premise) – on the level of intelligence; and a grasp in the two of the virtually unconditioned on the level of rational consciousness.72

The judgment that “the moon is something illuminated by light from the sun” is an example of a concrete judgment of fact. The conditions for the truth of the conditioned are known on the level of intelligence. It is an understanding of the conditions that must be fulfilled on the level of sense experience in order to affirm the conditioned (“something that has its illuminated side toward the sun whenever it is observed is something that is illuminated by light from the sun”). The fulfillment of these condition is known on the level of sense experience. As was discussed above, it is simply the experience that an attentive observer would have about the moon; namely, that “the moon has its illuminated side toward the sun whenever it is observed.” Lastly, the virtually unconditioned is known on the level of rational reflection. It is the knowledge that the conditions of the conditioned have been fulfilled, which is expressed in the judgment that “the moon is something illuminated by light from the sun.”

As the preceding analysis indicates, Lonergan's notion of concrete judgments of fact correlates closely with Aristotle's notion of knowledge by induction from sense experience, for they are judgment whose fulfilling conditions are known immediately on the level of sense experience. Similar to Aristotle's position that the ultimate basis of scientific knowing is knowledge of reasons by induction from sense experience, it is Lonergan's position that knowledge of the conditions and their fulfillment for the truth of any judgment in a context of judgments is ultimately based on a set of concrete judgment of fact whose conditions for truth are fulfilled immediately by sense

72 Understanding and Being, CWL 5, p. 121.
experience without recourse to additional judgments. Furthermore, like Aristotle, Lonergan recognizes that that the conditioned that is affirmed in a concrete judgment of fact involves an "intellectual leap" beyond sensations and memories, memories and experiences, to the grasp of a "universal."  

Lonergan seems more cognizant, however, of the implications of this "intellectual leap." More specifically, that the leap beyond the level of sense experience to a grasp of intelligibility on the level of intelligence is discontinuous with, and irreducible to, what is known on the level of sense experience. For example, the grasp of intelligibility that "the moon is something that is illuminated by light from the sun" that explains the sense experience that "the illuminated side of the moon is toward the sun whenever it is observed" is not an amalgamation, generalization or "impoverished replica" on the level of intelligence of what is known on the level of sense experience. One cannot, as such, experience "the moon is illuminated by light from the sun" because this is not an object of sensation. Rather, it is an object of understanding that explains an object of sensation; namely, "the illuminated side of the moon is toward the sun whenever it is observed."

Because of the discontinuity in concrete judgments of fact between the conditions for the truth of the conditioned known on the level of intelligence and the fulfillment of these conditions known on the level of sense experience, a question inevitably arise as to how one knows the truth of concrete judgments of fact. As was the case with our discussion about knowing the truth of reasons based on induction from sense experience, this question concerns how one can know that the conditions for the truth of a concrete judgment of fact specified by a direct insight on the level of intelligence, which are that certain sensations must occur on the level of sense experience, are the necessary and sufficient conditions for affirming the conditioned as virtually unconditioned. This question is important because knowledge of the conditions and

73 That Aristotle was aware of this characteristic of understanding, see Byrne, Analysis and Science, pp. 133-37.
74 For a good discussion of this point, see Patrick H. Byrne, "Lonergan's Galileo," paper given at the First International Lonergan Workshop, May 10, 2001, pp. 22-23.
their fulfillment for the truth of any judgment in a context of judgments is ultimately "reducible" to knowledge of the conditions and their fulfillment for the truth of the concrete judgments of fact that underpin the context.

For Lonergan, knowledge of the truth of concrete judgments of fact is achieved by what he terms "judgments on the correctness of insights." A judgment on the correctness of insights is a judgment that the direct insight that specifies the conditions for the truth of a concrete judgment of fact is correct in the sense that it specified the necessary and sufficient conditions for the truth of the concrete judgment of fact. Like any judgment of fact, a judgment on the correctness of insights is based on a reflective grasp of both the conditions for the truth of a conditioned and the fulfillment of these conditions. Like concrete judgments of fact, knowledge of these conditions and their fulfillment is not supplied by further judgments. Rather, it is supplied by the dynamic structure of cognitional intentionality.

The conditioned in a judgment on the correctness of insights is simply whether the direct insight that specifies the conditions for the truth of a concrete judgment of fact is correct (specifies the necessary and sufficient conditions for the truth of the concrete judgment of fact). For example, with respect to the concrete judgment of fact that "the moon is illuminated by light from the sun," the conditioned would concern whether the direct insight that specifies the condition for the truth of this judgment ("something with its illuminated side toward the sun whenever it is observed is illuminated by light from the sun") correctly specifies the necessary and sufficient conditions for affirming this judgment. The conditions for the truth of the conditioned in a judgment on the correctness of insights are that all questions pertinent to a determination of whether the direct insight is correct have been raised and answered. In the case of the judgment that "the moon is illuminated by light from the sun," these questions would involve a number of issues, including issues that are addressed in a theory of optics. The fulfillment of the conditions is the actual raising and

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75 See generally, Insight, CWL 3, pp. 308-12.
76 Understanding and Being, CWL 5, p. 120.
answering of the pertinent questions through the self-correcting process of learning. As Lonergan summarizes the foregoing:

Such, then is the basic element in our solution. The link between the conditioned and its conditions is a law immanent and operative in cognitional process. The conditioned is the prospective judgment, "This or that direct or introspective insight is correct." The immanent law of cognitional process may be formulated from our analysis. Such an insight is correct if there are no further pertinent questions. At once if follows that the conditions for the prospective judgment are fulfilled when there are no further pertinent questions.\(^\text{77}\)

In judgments on the correctness of insights, the link is that the insight is correct if there are not further pertinent questions, and the fulfillment lies in the self-correcting process of learning reaching its limit in familiarity and mastery.\(^\text{78}\)

For Lonergan, knowledge of the fulfillment of the conditions for the truth of a judgment on the correctness of insights through the self-correcting process of learning is the remote criterion of truth.\(^\text{79}\) When there are further pertinent questions to be raised and answered, the direct insights that specify the conditions for the truth of concrete judgments of fact are still "vulnerable" to modification, qualification and revision by further insights and judgments. As these further pertinent questions are raised and answered through the self-correcting process of learning, these direct insights undergo modification, qualification and revision by the addition of further insights and judgments. At the limit, when there are no further pertinent questions to be asked and answered, the direct insights are "invulnerable" to further modification, qualification and revision. As such, they specify the necessary and sufficient conditions for the truth of the concrete judgments of fact that underpin a context of fact judgments. As Lonergan comments in regard to the self-correcting process of learning:

\(^{77}\) Insight, CWL 3, p. 309.
\(^{78}\) Insight, CWL 3, pp. 3, 340.
\(^{79}\) Insight, CWL 3, p. 573.
Let us . . . distinguish between vulnerable and invulnerable insights. Insights are vulnerable when there are further questions to be asked on the same issue. For the further questions lead to further insights that certainly complement the initial insight, that to a greater or lesser extent modify its expression and implications, that perhaps lead to an entirely new slant on the issue. But when there are no further questions, the insight is invulnerable. For it is only through further questions that there arise the further insights that complement, modify, or revise the initial approach and explanation.80

The remote criterion of truth implicates the intellectual authenticity of the knower because it demands not the raising and answering of questions that seem pertinent to me but the raising and answering of questions that are pertinent period:

It is not enough to say that the conditions are fulfilled when no further questions occur to me. The mere absence of further questions in my mind can have other causes. My intellectual curiosity may be stifled by other interests. My eagerness to satisfy other drives may refuse the further questions a chance to emerge. To pass judgment in that case is to be rash, to leap before one looks.81

The implication of the knower's intellectual authenticity by the remote criterion of truth means that achieving a judgment on the correctness of insights with respect to any issue of intellectual significance is not an easy task. In particular, because human intellectual authenticity is itself conditioned by the sensitive and psychic dimensions of human existence, the achievement of such a judgment involves the concrete development of the whole person. As Lonergan notes in this regard:

It is not easy to settle by a general rule when we have reached invulnerable insight. There is not formula for producing men of good judgment. Some people are temperamentally rash, and some are temperamentally hesitant. The rash are nearly always

80 Insight, CWL 3, p. 309.
81 Insight, CWL 3, p. 309.
sure and definite, the hesitant nearly always slow to make up their minds and rarely are they certain. * * * Again, psychic disturbances can eclipse judgment, for the level of judgment is a much more delicate level, one on which the balance of control is more difficult. * * * In short, a man may be rich, over rich, in insights, but the control needed for judgment may be lacking. One needs for judgment a fuller control of all faculties than one needs for insight. The control of judgment requires a poise of consciousness and the control of sensitive presentations and images that can be disturbed in the human makeup. If that control is disturbed, judgment is disturbed.\textsuperscript{82}

Because the remote criterion of truth is a function of how many pertinent questions have been raised and answered, the meaning and truth of any context of judgments is relative to, and limited by, the scope of pertinent questions raised and answered in reaching judgments about the correctness of the direct insights that specify the conditions for the truth of the concrete judgments of fact that underpin the context. In other words, the context of judgments is known to be true only if, and to the extent that, one knows that the questions pertinent to a determination of the correctness of direct insights that specify the conditions for the truth of these concrete judgments of fact have been raised and answered. The consequences of this for scientific knowing are what led Lonergan to his critique of Aristotle's position of scientific knowing.

2. The Implications for Science

What distinguishes science from other realms of human knowing, such as common sense knowing, is that its specific concern is to understand things and events in terms of the complete set of relations that obtain among those things and events. Accordingly, scientific knowing is not restricted like common sense to understandings that define things and events in terms of human experience of them.\textsuperscript{83} Rather, its goal is to reach understandings that define things and events "by their internal

\textsuperscript{82} Understanding and Being, CWL 5, p. 123; See also, Topics in Education, CWL 10. pp. 150-153.

\textsuperscript{83} Insight, CWL 3, p. 103.
relations, their congruencies, and differences, the functions they fulfill in their interactions." The "world" correlative to this goal is the "comprehensive, universal, invariant, nonimaginable [world]" that was "approximated by Plato's distinction between the flux of phenomena and the immutable forms;" was "affirmed . . . in Aristotle's distinction between what is first for us and what is first in itself;" and "reappears in Eddington's two tables: one brown, solid heavy; the other colorless, mostly empty space, with here and there an unimaginable wavicle." 

In relationship to this goal of scientific knowing, the scope of further pertinent questions for reaching judgments on the correctness of insights is unlimited. A pertinent question is any question whose answer would in any way lead to a modification or revision of the insights that specify the conditions for the truth of its concrete judgments of fact. The pursuit of answers to these questions leads to ever more comprehensive contexts of explanation. In the limit, knowledge of the fulfillment of the conditions for the truth of judgments on the correctness of insights is not achieved until a systematic explanation of all data in a given domain of investigation is achieved:

The law of the lever is simplicity itself. But to have an independent measurement of weights, one needs the law of the spring. To test the law accurately, one needs the geometry of perpendiculars. Automatically one has embarked upon a vectorial representation of forces, an assumption of Euclidean geometry, a theory of the application of forces at a point, a parallel investigation of the tension of wires, and a certain amount of dabbling with gravitation. Further questions arise. Not only do they arise from the concrete problems set by tension and gravitation. What is far more significant is the presence of the highly abstract theorems and procedures. Can every force be represented by a vector? Are all forces applied at a point? Did Euclid have the last word? The initial abstraction allows one to return to the concrete only after the exploration of successively widening circles of inquiry. Statics is mastered only to raise the

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84 Method, p. 82.
85 Insight, CWL 3, p. 319.
86 Third Collection, p. 241.
problems of kinetics. Kinetics is mastered only to reveal that thermal and electromagnetic phenomena may be the antecedents or the consequents of local movement. One begins to get the lot in line and to feel that the future of physics is a matter of determining accurately a few more decimal points when along comes a Plank and an Einstein with their further questions. 87

This concern toward compete, systematic explanation of all data in a given domain that is a consequence of the unlimited scope of further pertinent questions in authentic scientific praxis means that science never reaches virtually unconditioned judgments on the correctness of insights because the limit of knowing that no further pertinent questions remain to be asked and answered is never satisfied. There is always a concrete possibility of further questions whose pertinence is not currently known or recognized:

Systematization is no more than probable until the limit of no further pertinent questions is reached. But that limit is not reached, first, if there may be further unknown facts that would raise further questions to force a revision, or secondly, if there may be further, known facts whose capacity to raise such further questions is not grasped. 88

The implications ramify through the whole domain of scientific knowing. One cannot know with certainty that the conditions for the truth of judgments on the correctness of insights are fulfilled; therefore, one cannot know with certainty that the insights that specify the conditions for the truth of concrete judgments of fact are correct; therefore, one cannot know with certainty that the necessary and sufficient conditions for the truth of these concrete judgments of fact are fulfilled; therefore, one cannot know with certainty that the conditions for the truth of any scientific explanation known by judgments within the context underpinned by these concrete judgments of fact are fulfilled. Accordingly, science does not achieve knowledge of explanation that are known to be true of necessity. Rather, it only

87 Insight, CWL 3, p. 327.
88 Insight, CWL 3, p. 327.
attains knowledge of verified hypothesis known to be true as a matter of probability:

[T]he virtually unconditioned really does involve and absolute. Positively, the scientist can say that if the theory or hypothesis is true, then it conforms to the data. But he cannot establish the alternative; namely, that there is no other theory that would cover all the data we have at present and account for further data that at the present are not accounted for. His argument, then, is really a matter of affirming the consequent; and the hypothetical argument in which one affirms the consequent is not logically valid. The scientist does not reach the virtually unconditioned. The scientific argument from verification is generally of the following type: If A, then B; but B; therefore A. If the theory, A, is true, then we have all these things that we account for; but we have all these things accounted for; therefore, the theory is a fairly good account of them. This is not a logically valid argument; but it is an approach towards having A established. When you establish “If A, and only if A, then B,” then you can say, “B, therefore A.” But in general, scientific theory is not that kind of thing, and consequently the scientist says his theory is probable; he is satisfied to keep on explaining as many of the data as he can, moving on to more and more satisfactory theories and hypotheses. 89

CONCLUSION

Although science does not reach explanations that are known to be true of necessity, this does not mean for Lonergan that science does not reach true knowledge of reality. It is in this area that Lonergan’s position is most need as a corrective to the tendency of postmodern thinking toward skepticism. The fact that science does achieve explanations that are probable means that these explanations are based on at least some measure of attainment in the answering of questions pertinent to explaining the data in a given domain of

89 Understanding and Being, CWL 5, p. 126.
investigation. Accordingly, within those limits and to that extent, science does reach judgments that are virtually unconditioned in a qualified sense. Furthermore, then, the greater the attainment in answering pertinent questions, the more probable, the more true, are the scientific explanations based on the answers to these questions. In other words, all explanations are not equal, and the better ones are those that are based on answers to a broader scope of questions.

Furthermore, because scientific explanations are based on some measure of attainment in the answering of pertinent questions, any further attainment, even one involving a "leap" to a higher viewpoint that results in a fundamental revision of principles, does not entail a radical negation or "deconstruction" of the explanations already achieved. Rather, it entails a "reconstruction" of these explanations on a new and fuller basis:

[The Chemist] knows that even if there were to arise some fundamental revision of chemical concepts, such as arose in physics through relativity and quantum mechanics, nonetheless any further new theory would have to contain in equivalent form all the correlations he has already established. So you can see how science is moving toward wisdom. It is closing in upon a wisdom in the measure that its differentiation of being becomes ever fuller, ever more exact, and extends to a wider embrace.90

The true wisdom of science, then, resides not with the attainment of knowledge that is true without question. Rather, it resides in the attainment of knowledge that is true within the limits of the questions that at any given time it has been able to raise and answer.

HISTORICITY AND NORMATIVE ORDER

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The claim that, if God does not exist, everything is possible, everything permissible, presupposes that if human living is not grounded in and governed by a normative order that transcends history, the most horrific historical possibilities will be unleashed. This presupposition leads to a horrified recoil from historicity and gives rise to what is now known as the "foundationalist" enterprise—the attempt to securely anchor culture to an order prior to and independent of historical time. The terror of history has profoundly influenced, if not governed, our political, philosophical and theological traditions. It underlies and informs, for example, Plato's description of the devolution of the polis from philosophical rule to anarchy, as well as the efforts of natural law theorists to ground ethical theory in an ontological order prior to human action. Given the foundationalist logic of our traditions, it was inevitable that the heightening of historical self-consciousness—the recognition that human existence is, in fact, historical through and through—would produce a profound cultural crisis, especially since those contesting the tradition did not reject foundationalist logic itself, which weds the concept of normative order to a recoil from history; but only its minor premise, i.e., the belief that human knowing can transcend its historical conditions. This crisis seems interminable because the dilemma that produced it seems intractable: the choice between a belief in normative order that recoils from historicity and an affirmation of historicity that abandons normative order or historically relativizes it.

In the reflections which follow I will explore the possibilities that open up when we liberate our thinking from the presuppositions about both historicity and normative order that underlie this dilemma. In
doing so, I will be guided by and thematizing, the revolutionary understanding of time operative in Lonergan’s theory of emergent probability and his account of human existence. Lonergan himself does not, to my knowledge, explicate the revolutionary understanding of time immanent in his work or explain its relevance to unraveling the relationship between historicity and the human response to normative order. His principal philosophical preoccupations concerned the aporia of modernity as crystallized by Kant, not the deconstructive aporia of post-modernity that threaten to unhinge historicity from normative order. Moreover, his own foundationalist orientation, along with the rhetoric of modernity he sometimes employs, tends to cover up, even to repress, the most ground-breaking implications of his thought. This is why I believe a post-modern re-thinking of Lonergan is a pre-requisite for a Lonerganian re-thinking of post-modernism. However, precisely the spirit animating Lonergan’s thought, which his modernism is unable to repress, provides the clue to these revisions and the revolutionary understanding of time they require. I would describe this spirit as impassioned openness to the future. It is operative in Lonergan’s philosophizing insofar as the latter has no fixed horizon, is guided by a moving viewpoint and is motivated by a passion to inquire that continuously pushes further into the unknown as unknown. According to Lonergan’s own account, the emergence of such impassioned openness brings to culmination the historical evolution of a universe which is itself open to the unprecedented future. In what follows I will explore how this conception of the impassioned subject presupposes a radical re-thinking of time and leads to a radical re-thinking of our relationship to normative order.

I

Let me begin with Heidegger’s conception of the future, which construes it not as another “now,” not as a horizontal extension of the present, but as radically heterogeneous from the present. Our efforts to make the future conform to our plans for it are not only symptomatic of our desire to repress this radical alterity but the evidence that we are already exposed to it. If we recoil from the future in its radical alterity,
this is because we are always already caught in the throre of it, always already borne toward the “not” from which we shrink.

This Heideggerian conception of the future is, I would suggest, immanent in the Platonic view of time and helps us to appreciate the Platonic recoil from history. I think it is a mistake to argue, as countless interpreters including Heidegger are wont to do, that Plato’s recoil from the radical “not” of the future is provoked by a dread of nothingness. To be sure, the soul of the philosopher shrinks from the “not” and desires to re-gain possession of the unchanging “is;” it recoils from historical possibility in its very character as possibility and desires re-turn to eternity. But it does so because justice is eternal, and because the historical future is inherently a threat to justice insofar as it moves away from the “is.” Plato’s recoil from the historical future is animated not by a dread of nothingness but by moral horror—by his belief that the historical future necessarily obscures the trace of eternity indelibly inscribed in the soul and leads it to become ensnared in possibilities that are not tethered to normative order. Indeed, from the very moment it is embodied, the soul is already ensnared; the throe of history in which it is caught will plunge it into a gyre of violence unless it re-collects itself from its dispersion in possibility and retrieves its knowledge of the normative/ontological order that exists prior to and independently of history. Precisely because historical possibility is not tethered to this order, it is problematic not only from an ontological but from a normative point of view.

Two “moments” in this Platonic response to history are, I believe, present in all foundationalist thinking, and give it what I will argue is its tragic character. On the one hand, there is the recoil of the soul from the throe of history in which s/he is already ensnared; on the other, there is the desire of the soul to secure its hold on normative order so that its operations can be grounded in it, and not be subject to the anarchy of possibility. This desire, according to Plato, is “heavenly eros”—in the language of the schools, intellectual appetite—but it is not “pure” and “detached.” It is not, in fact, love of the Good. For what it desires is possession of the Good, so that the desire to possess privileges possession of the Good over the Good to be possessed. This is an irony inherent in foundationalist thinking, justifying a deconstructive critique of it. For in seeking to securely ground himself in normative
order, the foundationalist is, like Oedipus, prioritizing his own desire to be securely grounded over the exigencies of normative order itself. This subverts the relationship of the subject to the Good. Thus, the foundationalist’s recoil from the possibility of moral horror, like Oedipus’s recoil from murder and incest, sets in motion the very evil it is intended to avert. This terrible irony does not excuse or mitigate the evil thus committed. As Aristotle explained, it gives this evil a majestic, tragic character, and awakens in those who appreciate its horror an uncanny shudder of pity for those who commit it and the terrifying suspicion that we ourselves are among them.

If Aristotle’s own ethical theory provides a purgative to this tragic irony, it is because, together with his ontology, it is receptive to possibility in a way that Platonic thought is not. Here the historical future is not contrasted with an eternity from which it threatens to separate the soul, but instead is understood in terms of the potentialities immanent in “natures.” The possible—the historical future—is still bound up with the “not,” but the “not” is now the “not yet”—a not-yet actualized potentiality intrinsic to an already existing essence. Living beings are open to the future insofar as they are capable of development; but the range of possibilities to which they are open is pre-determined by the nature which is constitutive of them, and the process of self-actualization is grounded in and anchored to a nature that is antecedent to and presupposed by it. Normative exigencies are identified not with an eternal order to which the soul must adhere but with a natural order that is open to and, indeed, calls for development. Because Aristotle grounds the possibilities to which beings are open in their natural potentialities, his thinking does not seem to be characterized by the same “terror” of possibility and recoil from history that governs Platonic thought.

However, the Aristotelian conception of nature, like all such conceptions, is itself a historical achievement, and one which requires, as Aristotle’s own methodological preoccupations suggest, a very sophisticated differentiation of consciousness. The understanding of natural order cannot provide a secure basis outside of history for making moral judgments about historical possibilities because this understanding is itself conditioned by history and by particular ways of responding to history. The foundationalist attempt to ground
normative order in "natural law" can succeed only if it can ground its understanding of nature in nature and so make it independent of historical conditions. But the very quest for such a ground is itself a recoil from history even if it also testifies to the inescapability of shifting historical conditions. A Heideggerian critique of Aristotle's theory of possibility suggests, correctly I think, that such a recoil is operative in it. In Aristotle, the dread of historical possibility, so pronounced in Plato, is abated, but only because the future has been domesticated and its radical alterity covered up. Understanding the "not" constitutive of the future as a potentiality that has "not yet" been actualized enables Aristotle to assimilate the future into his understanding of the present. The future, understood as an avenue of horizontal development for a "nature," which is antecedent to and independent of history, does not fill us with foreboding. This Aristotelean "naturalizing" of the future represses its constitutive heterogeneity. It makes the Platonic recoil from history unnecessary by repressing that which makes the future dreadful from the Platonic standpoint: its unprecedented, un-presence-able character.

II

If Aristotle "naturalizes" history, Lonergan "historicizes" both our understanding of nature and nature itself. He assimilates Aristotelian metaphysics into his conception of world-process in a way that radically transforms it by opening it to what it represses: the unprecedented future. I believe Lonergan's theory presupposes a Heideggerian insight into the radical alterity of the future which Lonergan never thematizes, but makes relevant to the evolution of the cosmos, a topic which Heidegger egregiously ignored.

Evolution, understood as emergent probability, is not only absent in Aristotelian cosmology but impossible in as much as the range of possibility in Aristotle is predetermined by the "nature" in which it is immanent. The "not-yet" is derivative from the "already;" nothing can emerge in the future that is not explainable in terms of the actual, where the actual is specified primarily by "form," conceived as an already existent intelligible nature. Were we able to know the
intelligible natures of beings completely, we would be able to know everything that can possibly happen and anticipate all natural developments. Formal, efficient, and final causality explain the actualization of possibility by appealing to principles that are anterior to it. In the theory of emergent probability, on the other hand, it is possible for an intelligible order to emerge that is not explanatorily reducible in terms of any already extant order. Such a possibility is utterly unprecedented; from the point of view of the classical science that understands the already extant intelligible order and all that is possible in terms of it, the eventuality is not just a surprise but an impossibility in so far as it is not a "not-yet" actualized possibility immanent in the "nature" of what already is. The order existing in the present is actually open to this possibility as to a future that radically transcends it, a future that is radically heterogeneous from and cannot be reduced to it. Immanent in this future is a radical "not" which makes it irreducible to the "is" of the already actual. This irreducibility of the intelligible order that emerges to any preceding intelligible order means that the universe is open to and moves into an unprecedented future that cannot be located on a horizontal time-line of "nows." The evolution of world-process is not horizontal but vertical; the future into which it moves is not situated within the horizontal sequence of "nows" constitutive of time Aristotle's conception. The universe as a whole is not just open to but irretrievably caught in the throe of a future that is unprecedented.

Hence, insofar as openness to the unprecedented future is constitutive of historicity, not just Dasein but the universe itself is historical. The emergence of the human subject does not, as for Heidegger, inaugurate history. This does not mean, however, that this emergence is not revolutionary, for with the human subject openness to the future takes on an entirely new meaning—or, to put it more accurately, takes on meaning for the first time. The universe is open to the radical future but the emergence of the human subject renders this openness intelligent, rational, and responsible for the first time. This is revolutionary because, while the universe as a whole moves toward the radical future and hence is historical, the lower intelligible orders within the universe are "natural" in a way that the human subject is not. Occurrences at these lower levels take place in accord with
“classical laws;” the operations of the beings belonging to these orders are governed by their natures, i.e., by the intelligible patterns explained by classical laws. On these levels, the Aristotelian understanding of “nature” as a principle which accounts for the range of the possible remains appropriate, since the actions occurring at these levels horizontally actualize potential immanent in the intelligible order that governs, and hence can be said to “ground” them.

The subject as subject, on the other hand, is always already caught in the throe of an unknown future that is radically heterogeneous from and not grounded in any order anterior to it. Wonder and dread, for example, are not “horizontal” extensions of sensory experience; they throe the subject open to an unknown which is irreducible to the given as accessible to all the senses. All the operations of the subject as subject occur inside this throe and are, in one way or another, a response to it. There is no ready-made intelligible order that grounds the operations of the subject as subject. Rather, the operations of the subject themselves engender or fail to engender an intelligible ordering of human existence. We might be tempted to say that it is human nature to be intelligent, rational and responsible since intelligence, reason, and responsibility are immanent “givens” for the subject as subject. But if these capacities break us open to an unknown which is radically heterogeneous from immediacy, a future which cannot be adequately understood in terms of the present, the fact that they are inescapable means precisely that the subject is always already historical, always already caught in the throe. If the movement of the universe into the vertical future becomes intelligent, rational and responsible in and through the emergence of the human subject, it does so precisely because of the fact that the verticality of the future is constitutive of the subject and conditions the exercise of intelligence, reason and responsibility.

Moreover, if the operations of the subject are inextricably bound up with the throe of the future, this means that these operations are groundless. This is an insight Lonergan never thematizes and the Lonerganian foundationalist contests it by insisting that self-appropriation provides the “intellectually converted” subject a secure, invulnerable basis for all her operations. However, as I have argued elsewhere, “self-appropriation” in Insight ought to be understood as a
“moment” within the process of “self-surrender” described in Method. It invites the subject to realize that insights are not grounded in sensations, that judgments are not grounded in insights, and that the knowledge to which we are brought by entering into the throe of the cognitional process cannot be verified independently of that process itself. The cognitional process as a whole cannot be grounded in the universe of being because we have no access to this universe except by entrusting ourselves to the throe of this process.

But while I would insist that, at its core, Lonergan’s thought is not foundationalist, I would also argue that the foundationalist project influences not only his rhetoric but also the substance of his thought to some degree. It does not prevent him from entering into what I have called the throe of thinking, but it does prevent him from thinking through the meaning of the throe. This is perhaps most evident in the priority which he gives to wonder as the primal opening of the subject to the unknown as unknown, the future as future, and in his almost total neglect of the experience of dread which Heidegger, I believe rightly, argues to be primordial. The mystery of the unknown beckons us—and makes us tremble. The future in its radical heterogeneity awakens longing, and fills us with foreboding. Wonder evokes in us the passion to know and engenders questions; dread of the unknown, of its radical heterogeneity from all that is familiar, tempts us to recoil from it and to repress the process of questioning that leads us we know not where. The verticality of all human operations makes subjectivity dreadful. These operations do not extend the “horizon” of familiarity; because they are groundless, they involve our plunging into a throe that we experience as an abyss. They lead us, Lonergan insists, toward the universe of being—but only, Heidegger retorts, by exposing us to the possibility of nothingness.

But this is not all. If we know only by entrusting ourselves to the throe of inquiry, then not just our knowledge of the universe of being but also our knowledge of normative order is groundless. We cannot bring a knowledge of normative order with us when we enter into the throe of history because we are always already caught in this throe, and have no knowledge prior to or independently of our participation in it. And if knowledge of normative order is groundless, so too are the choices the existential subject makes. Caught in the throe of history, the subject is
throe-n open to unprecedented possibilities without having any secure grounding in normative order enabling her to evaluate these possibilities and know which ought to be chosen. Precisely this prospect provokes Platonic thought into recoiling in moral horror from the throe of history. This recoil itself is deeply problematic not just because, as Nietzsche and Heidegger charge, it involves repressing the dreadfulness of historicity but because the heuristic of the ground it leads us to employ subverts normative order by subordinating it to our desire to be securely grounded in it.

Now if the recoil from the throe of history is a morally tragic subversion of normative order, entering into the throe of history must itself be a fundamental normative imperative—the very fundament of moral existence. The question is, how can this possibly be the case if entering into this throe deprives us of the grounding in normative order that we would like to have and requires that we open ourselves, without any inhibitions, to the dreadful abyss of possibility?

III

Consider, then, what it means to open oneself.

We are always already caught in the throe of possibility, always already throe-n open. Insofar as we are already and irretrievably throe-n, our existence is historically determined. But historicism understood in terms of the heuristic of the throe differs fundamentally and dramatically from the kind of historicism that grows out of a science dependent on the heuristic of the ground. What is "determined," i.e., utterly inescapable, is precisely our being borne into a future that is radically heterogeneous from what is anterior to it. The historical subject as subject cannot not be open to the future as future, the unknown as unknown. She cannot escape or succeed in repressing the throe as throe. And precisely because the throe throes the subject open to possibility, it does not determine how the subject responds to possibility. In this sense, the throe frees: it makes it possible for the subject to open herself to or recoil from the future into which she is always already being borne.
Now insofar as one is already being borne toward the future, opening oneself to it involves first undergoing the throe and allowing it to have its impact. To open oneself is to suffer, in the etymologically original sense of the term. Passio—to suffer—is both the etymological and existential root of passion. Suffering, however, in this sense, is not to be confused with sheer passivity, because to say “one suffers” is to speak in the active, not the passive voice. To suffer the future is to open oneself to it—to allow oneself to be affected and moved by it. All the affections are rooted in the suffering of a throe that is at once wondrous and dreadful. But the affective dimension of wonder and dread is inseparable from their cognitive character; for dread and wonder are awakened precisely by our cognitive awareness of the unknown as unknown. Allowing oneself to be moved by the unknown involves allowing it to draw one toward it, allowing it to provoke in oneself the passion to explore it.

But this passion itself is no longer simply the passio of suffering. To be impassioned does not mean simply to undergo or allow or, as Heidegger would say, to let be. It involves giving oneself entirely, without inhibitions or reservations, to that toward which one is drawn. The subject is always already throe-n open to the future; but opening herself to it involves not just allowing it to move her but throe-ing herself into it. Passion, in short, is donative. It is not, as the Aristotelian conception of possibility requires us to say, an exercise in self-actualization. For it involves entrusting oneself to the radical heterogeneity of the future and participating in a possibility that does not belong to but rather transcends oneself. Such self-transcending participation is at once ecstatic and dreadful; it involves giving oneself to the throe of a mystery accessible to us only by entering an abyss—only by opening oneself to the “not” constitutive of the future as future. Love is this impassioned self-donation and vulnerability—the “pure,” “disinterested,” “unrestricted” surrender of oneself to the dreadful throe of history.

But just as it is possible for us to give ourselves to this throe, so too it is possible for us to recoil from it and from the “not” that makes it threatening. This recoil occurs in and as desire, which is antithetical to passion. Whereas passion is self-donative, desire is acquisitive and possessive, irrespective of what it desires—irrespective of whether it is,
Historicity and Normative Order

in Plato's terms, "heavenly" or "carnal." At first glance desire seems to be focused on the good it desires; but in fact, it subordinates whatever good it seeks to the goal of gaining secure possession of it. Desire is not love but an attempt to repress the possibility of losing what is loved, a possibility which is immanent in the future as future. Desire recoils from and attempts to repress the throe of history. Such repression is perhaps most evident in the constriction of inquiry and the refusal to ask the question that will rupture assumptions; it occurs, at an even more primordial level, when the subject closes himself off to wonder and dread by sinking into sensory immediacy. But it is also operative whenever practical intelligence seeks to dominate the future in an effort to insure that the future will conform to its plans. Paradoxically but not surprisingly, the heightened historical self-consciousness of modernity and the development of modern technology has turned this desire to control the future into a deliberate, self-conscious obsession.

The fact that human desire is antithetical to passion does not mean it is equiprimordial with it or that, together, they form one of those binary oppositions whose poles presuppose each other. Human desire is not, as Lonergan sometimes implies, the intrusion of the sensory into the "higher" operations of the subject. Desire, as I have defined it, is a uniquely human, indeed, a uniquely historical phenomenon. Only a being that is historical, only a being that is caught in the throe of the future, is capable of recoiling from this future. Desire derives from passion: it the inversion of passion, its turning in upon itself to protect itself. It is the recoil of passion from its own vulnerabilities, its flight from its own dreadful possibilities, its refusal to undergo the suffering that is constitutive of historicity. This has profound implications. It means that it is profoundly misleading to say simply that desire's projects are among our historical possibilities, because this fails to take into account the fact that, while the actions driven by desire are historical, their underlying purpose is precisely to repress the radical heterogeneity of the future—to repress possibility as such—to repress history.

Now the exigencies of normative order are categorical: they do not condone the subordination of the good as such to anything other than itself, but rather demand that we give ourselves wholeheartedly, unreservedly, without inhibition, to a good which both transcends us
and invites us to participate in it. It follows from this that *we can be responsive to exigencies of normative order only through an impassioned openness to the radical future.* As beings who are historical through and through, we can give ourselves to the good only by entering into the throe of the future and never by recoiling from this throe. Normative order comes to us from and as the future toward which we are borne, by which we are called. Our understanding of the Good is always prophetic: we subvert it when we employ the heuristic of the ground in an effort to gain possession of it; we access it only by abandoning the heuristic of the ground in favor of the heuristic of the throe. It is not true, as Plato feared, that such uninhibited openness to the future will throe us open to possibilities that ought to fill us with moral horror. Only desire and its violences are morally horrific, and these violences, though they occur in history, are attempts to recoil from and repress the throe of history. Openness to evil is a contradiction in terms because we do evil precisely by closing ourselves off from, by fleeing or evading or trying to control, the mystery of the good into which we are always already borne and in which we are called to participate. Evil is, to be sure, a possibility, but we commit it precisely by repressing possibility and refusing to enter the throe of history. We cannot do evil by entering into the throe of history because this throe is the throe of the Good itself.

The fact that we are inescapably historical means that our lives cannot be grounded in normative order; to shift to the idiom with which I began, they cannot be anchored in God. But it does not follow, as the opponents of post-modernism fear, that once this is recognized human history is doomed to devolve into a gyre of violence. Underlying this fear is the failure to appreciate the fact that normative order itself calls the human subject to intelligently, rationally and responsibly enter into the throe of the future. Lonergan's thought not only provides an account of the universe that enables us to understand the emergence of the historical subject; it also articulates the normative exigencies which enjoin the subject to donatively participate in a Good that transcends her. To be attentive, to be intelligent, to be rational, to be responsible—these "transcendental precepts" are not imperatives that the self-appropriating subject legislates for itself, exigencies which come to us from and draw us toward a "universe of being" which we can enter only by giving ourselves attentively, intelligently, rationally, and
responsibly, to the throe of radical mystery. If, at the behest of the prophetic imagination, we agree to call this mystery divine, we must say that God comes to us as the future which ruptures us—and that, as David Plante has written, if God does not exist, nothing is possible. To enter into the future in its radical heterogeneity is dreadful for it costs "not less than everything." But who among us does not know, in our heart of hearts, that it is by opening ourselves to death that we become participants in life and that by abandoning all we desire to possess we enter into the terrible mystery which, from our very inception, has been beckoning us?
A WORD FOR SEXUAL DESIRE: 
ORDER IS IN THINGS 
NOT OVER THEM

Sebastian Moore, OSB 
Downside Abbey

In my paper, I attempt some understanding of sexual desire. In this search, I am attempting to reverse the flight from understanding in its most vigorous form, and since it is Lonergan alone who has warned us of this flight as an ever-present temptation, presiding over the longer cycle of decline, I consider this paper eminently Lonerganian. And since our theme for this year is polymorphism, well, need I say more? As Charles Goldsmith, my Jungian therapist for many years, once said to me, “you name it; somebody has been turned on by it!”

In this pursuit, I am addressing a feeling among the Catholic laity that I sense is worldwide and world-old, that is often expressed but more often unexpressed: that the church, when it talks of sex, is talking a language that does not touch their experience of it. This gap is more often named than addressed. I want to suggest that this failure of church teaching to touch our sexual experience is due to something far more basic than the lack of sexual experience on the part of the clergy (other than of the furtive kind, that makes things worse) It is that the mind behind the teaching does not honor sexual desire as what it is, namely how people awake sexually to each other. If it is desire that is the generic force of humanity, to which we awake in the morning and which moves us about our day, then sexual desire has to be seen as this vital force channeled into mutual attraction.

Understood in this way, sexual desire is obviously a good thing. But do we know what it is, other than by experience? Obviously we know this ostensibly, by pointing and telling stories and discussing novels. But what is good about it? How is it a part of human flourishing? Why should I thank God for an erection, or for the more
diffused bodily pleasure of a woman? It is easy to see the role of sexual desire in creating a lasting relationship, but this is an assessment of it post factum, and says nothing whatever to the experience of wanting someone overwhelmingly. And this is what the church teaching is always doing, pointing to results, invoking the big picture, ignoring the tubes of paint and the palette. This is where the church talks past the people.

Is there anything about sexual desire that would make us want to value it highly? Well yes, there is, if the experience of wanting someone “that way” could be understood as a significant human moment, a flourishing of what normally we are content simply to live and often to suffer.

We think by comparisons. So what is the difference between wanting someone and wanting a better computer? Why are we obscurely conscious that wanting someone is a bid for happiness in our being not just in our having?

Now would it help us in our search if we were able to locate sexual desire on a map comprising all desire? Then the difference between wanting that person and wanting another computer could be understood by locating these desires at different places on the map of desire. This is not just of intellectual interest. It will encourage me to scrutinize my experience, to remember certain feelings, in ways I would not do if I had no map. The best definition I know of a hypothesis is that of Charles Hefling, that it enables us to think simultaneously of many different things, to obey the great E. M. Forster precept, “only connect!”

For what I am after can only be a hypothesis, a generous suggested way of looking at the whole. The hypothesis is that of Rene Girard (who never claims more than hypothetical status for his theory), and it runs as follows. With the quantum leap from the animal to the human, instinct is “sublated” by, lifted up into the larger world of, desire. And desire involves us in each other in a way most radical, for desire is something I first woke to in myself by seeing it in someone else. John and Peter, age two, are in their playpen. John picks up a toy, and Peter finds that toy attractive in a way the others aren’t. The whole of advertising, especially in our “designer” age, exploits this fact of the coloring of desirable objects—cars, computers, trainers—by the suggested desires of others.
Thus we have a triangle: the desired object, the toy; John's desire for it, evoking Peter's desire; and the tussle between John and Peter.

Now what happens to this triangle when desire is sexual? The two persons involved no longer look to each other for stimulus in their rivalistic pursuit of an object. One of them, both if they're lucky, finds the other the object of desire. Let us concentrate on one of the two. Is the other only the object of desire? No, the other "models," suggests desire. The other is "sexy." The other suggests excitement. Girard was fascinated by the observation of Proust, that the girls Marcel sees on the beach are exciting him by making him jealous of a desire they have for themselves. Marcel feels excluded from a circle, and wants in.

But something more important is afoot. Not only do I want that person: I want that person to want me. And how do I go about getting this result? I find myself, quite out of character, wanting to expose my desire, to risk making a fool of myself, to show my desire to her or him in a way that beautifully balances her showing me desire in her.

Beautifully is the word. And the beauty we meet here, the invitation to two people to lose themselves to each other, is the beauty, the effulgent goodness of sex, about which the teaching church manages, in defiance of the facts, to be boring.

Now let us return to our map. What is the meaning, the intentionality of the intense mutual involvement of us created by the mimetic, or unavoidably imitative, nature of desire? If we believe in a finality for the human at all, this intentionality is love. Don't we then suddenly see that sex is the way it is because it is a halfway house between desire in the raw—John and Peter in the playpen, and most adult non-sexual desire—and love. At this midpoint, I want to make a fool of myself, which is out of character, but not at all out of alignment with "the awful daring of a moment's surrender which an age of prudence can never retract." Eros gets a whiff of agape. And in so far as the teaching of the church does not trust eros to get this smell, the church is failing humanity in a radical way. To speak boringly of what people sometimes experience as the most exciting thing in life, is the greatest disqualification a teacher could have.

So sexual desire is a hint of the ultimate mystery of us that is love. And this quality of mystery shows itself in sexual desire's feeling different from just ordinary wanting things. But we can say quite a lot
about what makes this difference. We can say that when I am turned on to wanting something by the sight of someone else who is after it, I am inclined not to let on that I too want it, whereas when I am being turned on sexually by someone, I want above all to let on! I am inclined to expose myself to the risk of being snubbed. I am inclined to act out of character. The sexiness that I see in that person excites my sexiness to show itself to him or her. Desire, in this new mode of itself, is the invitation to a game that is unpredictable and risk-laden with the risk worth taking. Thus sexual desire parts company from common desire in the direction of fun and risk; and, looking further, of life's mystery. When the risk pays off, people come into the feeling whose representation by a cliché only proves its universality and importance: This is bigger than both of us! Recognition of the shallow water is a part of culture. One of the most boring things about our culture today is, that unlike the French, we do not flirt.

It is the "bigger than both of us" in deeper waters, and the varieties of fun in the shallower, that is what we experience as sex; and about which we feel that the church is not talking when it talks about sex. People experience sex as the mystery in their lives, while the guardians of mystery show no sign of understanding this. A more fundamental failure in communication could hardly be imagined. That our contemporary culture is taking the mystery out of sex and making it, like everything else, a commodity, does not change this situation. It makes it worse. For the church attempts to put things right by concentrating on the mystery, its way, which is not the way they experience it. Further, the clues they are given—to say "No" to contraception and to homosexuality for instance—are palpably not talking about their "sex." The church insists on the mystery, but ponderously.

Pope John Paul has given us a book, *The Theology of the Body*, comprising five years of weekly audiences. His training and preferred way of thinking is phenomenological, yet one searches in vain in all this for a phenomenology of sexual desire. Indeed its absence is phenomenal! He assembles an armory of symbols biblical and

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otherwise, and sex without symbols is merely exhausting, yet none of
the symbols evoked in this treatment work for us as we read the book. There's no fun anywhere, as Luke Timothy Johnson points out in a
review entitled “A Disembodied Theology of the Body.” All that the
great symbols are allowed to do is keep in place a life-long commitment
of a man and a woman to each other with a procreative outcome. It's as
though we had a refined description of a superb piece of machinery,
with no mention of oil—indeed, of fuel!

Pope John Paul has named a space never named by a pope—or
priest for that matter—before. But what is in the space is sex in all its
protean beauty and brutality and absurdity, above all sex which, not
understood in its own right, keeps closed the door to the Garden of
Love—not just as in Blake but as in the Song of Songs.

That this treatment does not extend its phenomenology to sexual
desire rampant, mountant and mounted, was rather painfully shown at
the time of these papal audiences, when the world press was suddenly
awakened by the statement that husbands could, and should not, lust
for their wives. The trouble was a categorial poverty that indicates no
homework done, and by an author who certainly does not shirk
homework; I mean, that there was clearly no concept of “sex at full
blast” other than the concept of lust—which is a splendid word,
especially as against the papal desert of noble postures, but which is
the moralist’s word for sexual desire preferred over all mutual respect.
If the only word you have for this most exciting and crucial of human
emotions is a word that means its pursuit in contempt of another
person, then this emotion is, for the theologian, under the sign of
Muddle, or perhaps Muggle! That is what the pope ran into, and that
Reuther picked up. At one point, I remember, he was asked what he
thought about what people call sex, and his reply used words such as

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3 This is a case of the absence of the control of meaning, which is what is
happening when the meaning of a word changes without the writer being aware. In
the audience of October 1, 1980, the pope is saying that a husband cannot be guilty of “lust in the heart” for his wife, but a week later, in the conference of October 8th, he states confidently that even husbands “can sin in this fashion.” Clearly lust does
not mean the same thing in both places.
joy, connotive of the peace rather than the storm. No, the homework was still undone. The world that most people live in, certainly the world most fruitful in crises, of people making out together, remained untouched.

How untouched this fact of sexual desire remained was shown by the fact that tens of millions of people who have this desire do not have it for a member of the opposite sex. Sexually, homosexuals show up on this map as non-persons—especially in a papal treatment of sexuality unprecedented in its would-be thoroughness.

This failure of the pope's phenomenology to extend to sexual desire is the theme of the review-article by L. T. Johnson to which I have referred. He said, "I would welcome from the pope some appreciation of the goodness of sexual pleasure—any bodily pleasure, come to think of it!"

But how shall the pope honor sex as it actually happens, given language the way it now is? I mean, how can one speak of it without using words like "fun," "a bit of a giggle" and so on, which would not be appropriate for a papal document Why not? people will ask, but that really is a silly question and, much more importantly, it takes our attention away from the real problem, which is the absence of serious language for sexual desire. There is no funomenology!

But there is good theory. I like the scientist's objection to some bright experiment: it works all right in practice, but does it work in theory? The point being that if you don't have a good theory your practical solution will turn out to be partial. And nothing, I think, in moral philosophy is more in need of a good theory than sexual desire. We all know that sex can be done in ways that are abusive, but what is wrong in these ways of behavior? The nearest we seem to get to an answer is that in these ways the other person is not respected. But respect for another person is required in every conceivable connection between persons, so sexual wrongness is not being specifically dealt with this by this criterion. I would suggest that sexual disrespect is what children, who are native moralists, would call cheating. It is not making a fool of myself, not exposing myself, not taking a risk, not entering the game which is the prelude to the mystery. I don't capture another person for myself sexually the way I do this in the market. I do it in a way offensive to life's mystery embodied in us.
To use more traditional philosophic language, wrong sex (let's learn from the pope's experience and not talk of lust!) is disordered sexual desire. But what is ordered sexual desire? And here, not surprisingly, we run into the erroneous assumption that underlies all modern philosophy until the discovery of phenomenology: that order is something imposed on the body by the mind, that order comes from an authority external to the to-be-ordered. Eugene Gendlin, the discoverer of Focusing, exposes this error in a new book, Thinking Beyond Patterns, not yet published but downloadable. So what is the order in sexual desire?

I think we get a hint of the answer when we locate sexual desire as a halfway house between desire in its rivalistic playpen form which of course extends into industry, and love as the ultimate intentionality of human togetherness. The order of sex is the game. That's why "cheating" is such a good word here; for cheating happens at a game. It is not surprising that Wittgenstein who has liberated philosophy from the straitjacket of order-as-imposed, discovered the language game.

Now it so happens that, in trying to explicate in Girardian terms the saying of John Stuart Mill that we demand that other people resemble ourselves, I reached the conclusion that I want others to be like me because I am already like them; and this may prove to be the clue we want. My likeness to you underlies your modeling for me, but it is not conscious, I only know unaccountably that your manifest desire for something awakens mine. Now with sex, this submerged likeness to you surfaces and comes together with your likeness to me. Sex is mutual admiration. Sound familiar? Are we not already touching, with our theorizing, the real world? Sex is a drama of confluence, in which people's desire for each other is fired by the desire they are awaking in each other. Lacan, who got so much so right, said that lovers want to feel themselves as causing desire in each other. Sound familiar? Are we not at least nearer the terrain so systematically fenced around by the pope—the garden of love in fact, the middle garden between Eden and Gethsemane? Phyllis Trible, in God and the Rhetoric of Sexuality, which is the best piece of biblical theology that I know, says that in her fantasy "the cherubim and the flaming sword appear to guard the entrance to the garden of the Song. They keep away those who lust, moralize, legislate, or explain. They also turn away literalists. But at
all times they welcome lovers to romp and roam in the joys of eroticism."\(^4\)

A few years ago, I preached a sermon to our boys, in which I moved through three axioms: Envying, I reduce myself. Admiring, I become myself. Admired, I change things. People liked it. But it was quite chaste! It said nothing about what was in the heads of most of my congregation most of the time and that is giving them the agenda for the next few years. It had them sailing through from meanness to incipient sanctity without sex.

To recapitulate, sex between people internalizes the desired. The desired is no longer the object, John's toy for Peter, Peter's toy for John, but it's Peter for John and John for Peter. Oops! John for Mary and Mary for John of course! With mature love, the object has become "God" or "the life-force lived with" or cosmic as with D. H. Lawrence. But in sexual desire we are halfway there, as Pius XI implied in parts of *Casti Connubii*, that Lonergan picked up when he pointed out that the pope was saying that married people are pursuing the beatific vision together. That is not far from what an irreverent friend once called the great F-k in the sky!

So in sexual desire, desire is manifestly love trying to happen. This is the halfway house. Incipient love is fed by the other's desire for the desirer become now the other's object; the toy, the zest-maker, is internalized, is between the lovers, and is being fed by being the desired; is mutual admiration; is "I want you like me because I'm like you" all conscious at once. I am rather floundering here, and no wonder considering "the state of the question"! Try saying that the object is internalized so that the partners become object to each other in a desire that is mutually mimetic. They are imitating each other's imitation of each other, in a way that may lead to take-off. It's hilarious nonsense, like contemplative prayer.

Now I suspect that sexual desire, acquiring for the first time ever *droit de cite* in pastoral discourse, thus breaking a long, long silence, will surprise us. For with sexual desire, sexual pleasure, as the focus of discussion, everyone has a stake in it, for pleasure is not confined to

heterosexuals! Having been sexual non-persons in a funless and irresponsible theology of the body, homosexuals will find themselves recognized as possessed of the only thing now under consideration. A new solidarity of gay and straight people follows on the decision to take sexual desire as the to-be-understood. This solidarity is arising today among younger people. We seem to be returning to an Elizabethan age of sex abundant and going off its regular tracks all over the place, the world of Shakespeare in Love. Freud says of that world, and of the world of the Greeks, that the question was not, "am I heterosexual or homosexual?" but "how do we keep this damn thing under any sort of control?"

In this showing, homosexuality may look more like a sexual excess than a sexual deviance, the latter classification now abandoned by the American Psychological Association and other modern bodies and clung to by the CDF that has left the sphere of dogma for its own home-made psychology. And gay men do seem to suffer from too much "mutual admiration" which characterizes sexual desire generally, a pitfall shared with all, but especially to look out for. Slowly sanity and sex come closer to each other. It is a pity that the teaching church is the slowest to appreciate this, although there is a place for dragged feet on this dancing floor.

We may be rediscovering the gaiety of sex. Until we get some clue of this, we shall not have homosexuality right. For this new meaning of "gay" is not all that new. Rosemary Haughton, in her big book The Passionate God,\(^5\) sees the birth of romantic feeling and poetry in the eleventh century as a huge corrective of an excessively legalistic moral code, based not on an Aristotelian order but on a freshly appreciated order of feeling, with courts of love, the most famous one presided over by the Countess of Champagne! To this "gai saber," both Nietzsche and Marx said that we owed all that we really know about love. And Nietzsche took over that title, "Gay Science," for his book, the one that contains the parable of the Madman in search of a lost God. We shall never know just how or why this movement got connected with the Albigensians, because of the scorched earth policy of the crusade, when the fury of Christendom was turned in on itself. It is what a Jewish

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friend of mine used to call the old Christian rage, the warped mind that could see Pinochet as upholding Christian civilization. This is, I suppose, too general a matter to provide the theme for one of the papal apologies for our past. Look, folks, we're the oldest thing around, and we're just sorry!

It is difficult to keep all this stuff under control, and that's the only real difficulty with sex. But I think I am touching now on what is really meant when it is said, so often, that on sex "the church" and "the laity" aren't speaking the same language. We mean, that there is a common language, and it has not yet been found. I think Girard's theory of desire points the way to it.

And when all is said and done, Revelation is ahead of us. For no one can possibly deny today that the Song of Songs is celebrating sexual desire. And the whole monastic reading community down the ages has seen that text as the preeminently revelatory one for those who pray. That monks are spearheading a revolution in our understanding of something that monks aren't supposed to have, has at least the force of irony.

But I have still to look at an area of sexuality in which official church teaching is most vulnerable, that of the homosexual. I shall conclude that this increased vulnerability of received teaching is due to the fact that sexual desire, never properly understood, is most obviously not understood in its "improper" form. An unusually insightful book on the gay lifestyle bears the title The Culture of Desire. Richard Holloway, in his Godless Morality, has a chapter entitled "Is the Trojan Horse Gay?" suggesting that the newly articulate and clamant gay culture will turn out to be the Trojan Horse for settled Christian sexual teaching.

Following this hint of Holloway's, let us look at homosexual desire in terms of my halfway house language. But first let me expand a bit on this language. The image is helpful, for placing sexual desire between the two extremes of rivalry and divine union. And it is helpful to see that the halfway position partakes of both the extremes, of physical violence and spiritual transformation. We now have to say that sexual desire, so placed, is manifestly what I once described desire as, love trying to happen. Our secretary at Campus Ministry in Marquette University found a lecture note of mine headed "Desire is love trying to
happen” and said, “Spot-on! That’s the only thing you’ve ever written that I understand.” Carol had a wisdom that I covet. So sexual desire, a halfway house between violence and love, is love trying to happen.

Now the way the church has handled sex so far avoids the phenomenology of sexual desire by going straight on from love to procreation. Sexual desire is not love trying to happen but a baby trying to happen. Sexual desire between same-sex partners cannot be a baby trying to happen; that oversight or process-skipping is not available to us; so it has to be love trying to happen! Thus we have the paradoxical result already pointed out that it is the homosexual fact that forces the church to take sexual desire seriously as thresholding love. The queers are teaching the church that thinks she’s straight!

And here we meet the overwhelming witness of the mature homosexual: that it is love between two persons that the homosexual experience is all about. They see their coupling as love enfleshing itself differently, so that Rome’s concentration on the act of sex misses the point, misses them. It also misses, and avoids, the phenomenology of sexual desire. It is the same miss!

Once sexual desire has been recognized as love trying to happen, there is no way homosexual desire is going to answer to Rome’s current definition of it as “objectively disordered,” a definition arrived at by observing that it is not a baby trying to happen and bypassing love altogether.

For me at least the attempt to place sexual desire on the human map suggested by Girard shows the definition of homosexual desire as objectively disordered as off the map, as well as deeply offensive to homosexuals. It scandalizes them in the Gospel sense brilliantly unfolded by Girard. It causes them to stumble. It was with this scandal in mind that Cardinal Hume spoke in praise of “homosexual love” after hearing of two homosexual suicides provoked by the CDF’s 1987 statement. That more than a decade later Archbishop Bertone could require Robert Nugent to say, “I adhere with religious submission of will and intellect to the teaching that the homosexual inclination, though not in itself a sin, constitutes a tendency towards behavior that is intrinsically evil, and therefore must be considered objectively disordered,” shows how impervious Roman authority is to the bitter facts of people’s lives.
The introspective homosexual is uniquely qualified to focus on and explicate sexual desire, because he is not subject to the "process-skipping" (Gendlin) or "oversight" (Lonergan) of thinking of it simply as a baby in the making. Catholic teaching, by its unique emphasis for most of its history on the procreative finality of sex, discouraged people from understanding sexual desire as the working of God in them bringing them into his love, which of course is the only climate babies can grow in to become real men and women. The church's besetting sin is erophobia, which is the fear of life—homophobia is only a subset of this. This is now climaxing in blasphemous assertion that one form of sexual desire that is, Fr. Bede Jarrett told me when I was a boy, worldwide and world-old, and so God-given, is "objectively disordered."

The Trojan Horse is in today's seminaries, so let us look at the long-standing tradition of religious celibacy male and female. The institution of religious celibacy was, from the point of view of the social engineer, a brilliant invention. It enabled men and women who for whatever reason did not want to get married a meaningful and a fulfilling existence. Dame Gertrude More, one of our Benedictine contemplative models, says that she became a nun because she didn't want to marry. Among such were homosexuals, and in fact many of the most creative religious celibates have been what is now called gay. So what you had was a social empowerment of sexual desire. Feeling attracted to other men was something one could bring into the cloister, not in search of quarry but rather to be able to think of one's sexuality not as something odd and awkward, which it would be in a society bent on ordinary mating, but as the theme of a renunciation shared with "ordinary" men. The gay person found his of her sexual desire empowered in this special society. This empowerment was still empowerment, even though sexual desire was not supposed to be allowed its full physical scope. It was empowerment at the vital level of self-esteem. You weren't odd as a homosexual monk, as you were as a homosexual in society. The sometimes horror in growing-up gay was offset by something else, and something very powerful, the whole monastic tradition. We had other things to talk about than our latest nocturnal escapades.

Now this traditional social empowerment of the homosexual finds itself confronted today with another empowerment, that set going by
the Stonewall revolution. In this confrontation, the more noisy, media-hyped empowerment tends to swallow the older, gentler and more prayerful empowerment, as the taste of Classic Coke might wipe out the nascent taste for a good claret. The result, noted by Cozzens in a careful and tolerant book has been the creation of a gay-clerical subculture that makes straight members feel unwelcome.\textsuperscript{6} This huge role reversal, with the gays calling the shots, is asking for, and getting, a reaction of authority that epitomizes the epistemology of panic. Gays shall be screened out from the ranks. So what was originally a significant strength in clerical society becomes the enemy!

Now what most interests me in this situation is that its main casualty is the understanding of sexual desire. Sexual desire of the gay variety is now a menace, so there is no incentive to understand it. The fireman is not about to ask what exactly fire is. The sign of the Flight from Understanding here is that Authority, asked to justify the exclusion of homosexuals from the ranks, falls back on the notion that sex is for procreation. These dangerous invaders of the celibate community are non-breeders. That's what's wrong with them: that they can't do what the sound members of the celibate community could-and of course mayn't! And just to push a little harder, the celibate community which formally was able to assure the gay member that he wasn't odd, now has to tell him he is. Odd, and out!

It was never enough to define sexual desire as a baby in the making. The demand of sexual desire to be understood presses upon us the more where desire is drawn to a member of the same sex. The baby explanation, never adequate, is now unavailable.

When Dan Maguire, over the heads of the alumni establishment, was invited to speak at Boston College some years ago, he asked, "what is God trying to tell us through homosexuals?" I have to report that I was vaguely shocked by the question at the time. What was really shocking, I now think was the implication that God might have a special role for sexual desire as a unifier not as a baby-maker, as a unifier of a couple who can't make a baby.

Maybe Holloway is right. Nowhere does the failure of Christian thinking about sex show up so clearly as in our handling of homosexuality. The reason for this is that the ungrasped nettle is sexual desire, and where straight sex is concerned we have a cover-story for not grasping this nettle: sexual desire is a baby-in-the-making. With the homosexual, the cover-story is torn away, leaving us the option: grasp or get stung. We are being badly stung just now. Paradoxically, it is when we find ourselves incapable of giving any real help of a teaching kind to an unusual form of sexuality that we come to see that we haven’t been of much use to those of the usual persuasion.

This triggers my old-age total-recall syndrome. I was in Rome during the days of the papal commission on birth control, and an Irish priest with whom I was having lunch said to me, “You know, you’ll never persuade Rome to give on this one. In the Roman mind, the Catholic soul is basically virgin!” This takes us back to Gregory VII and his reform of the church largely inspired by Peter Damian, monk and mystic. The reform saw the secular priest as a monk without a cloister, bound to celibacy and the daily recitation of the hours. Now this flawed notion of priestly life as quasi-monastic was applied above all in the area of sex. The celibacy whose original and proper context was the same-sex community was enjoined on the priest not so supported, with enormous and painful consequences. And there is another aspect to this expansion of the monastic model. It affects our understanding of the homosexual. The official position on this, that there is nothing wrong with being homosexual, only you mustn’t express it physically, makes good sense in a monastic community because there is a good reason for it other than the belief that homosexual coupling is “unnatural”: namely that it is unfair to the heterosexual members, who aren’t allowed their kind of sex. But take away the monastic setting, and you take away the good reason for the official line and expose the latter to the challenge of the articulate homosexual, which I think is unanswerable: as Andrew Sullivan says to his church, that is very much his church, “this is the argument of my life, and I have to win it!”

It is the attempt of the official position to hold its own in the cold draught of this challenge that we see in the wrestle with words as we try to make sense of an orientation, a direction of a person’s libido, that is simply the way some people are, and therefore is good, that
nevertheless (poor tired old "nevertheless") is "tempted" to do
something that is against nature. Now temptation is the rhetoric that
persuades a good desire to follow the urge of ego, self-love to be selfish.
But there is supposed to be nothing wrong with my sexual attraction to
another man, Wyatt then will temptation do with this attraction? It
will make it selfish, exploitative. (It will make it all the things that
furtive homosexuality on the part of some priests tends to be, as "the
boys in the square" know full well.) But no, we're not allowed this
answer, which dangerously implies that there is generous homosexual
coupling. We have to give the answer that temptation here urges the
following of a desire already admitted to be good! Sorry, it won't do,
Holloway has seen something that is not about to go away.

When I was a boy at Downside, I read a Catholic Truth Society
"Pamphlet on Purity" by Fr Bede Jarrett O.P. In it I read that some
people are attracted to their own, not the opposite sex. This attraction,
he said, "is worldwide and world-old." It is only the action that is sinful.
These were the words of a saintly and humane Dominican. They made
sense in a context of religious life vaguely expanded beyond itself into a
Catholic world.

For some perhaps, this context still exists, and we must not allow
ourselves to be bullied by liberals out of seeing homosexuality in some
as a vocation to an uncommon relationship with God in people. There
have been many people whose homosexuality led them to monastic life.
I may be one of them, but the older I get the more I puzzle myself. What
about those people today, people who might say, not "the world's my
oyster" but "the world's my cloister"?

Now the huge lacuna which we have been looking at in our sexual
thinking as church, the overall failure of the teaching to touch people's
lives, and the new problem of the emergence of a clerical gay subculture
due to a swallowing of the ancient empowerment of the homosexual by

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7 'The boys in the square' occur in James Alison's new book, *Faith Beyond
The boys in the square are male prostitutes some of whose customers are priests
who by day fulminate against homosexuality. The kids call this "lace by day, leather
by night." I find I have to be careful not to "rejoice" in this "iniquity," thus coming
under the stricture of 1 Corinthians 15, which is what Alison's book is really about I
think.
celibacy in the clamorous empowerment of gay pride, all this points to a need for new resources in human living, for it is only in the resolution offered by more creative living that these problems can hope to find ways forward. Let me end a somewhat distended paper by introducing you to what are for me the two principal resources for creative living now on offer. The first is focusing, which I have already shared with you. The second is the staggering discovery made by Eckhart Tolle. Here is his account:

“I cannot live with myself any longer.” This was the thought that kept repeating itself in my mind. Then suddenly I became aware of what a peculiar thought it was. “Am I one or two? If I cannot live with myself, there must be two of me, the ‘I’ and the ‘self’ that ‘I’ cannot live with.” “Maybe,” I thought, “only one of them is real.” I was so stunned by this strange realization that my mind stopped. I was fully conscious, but there were no more thoughts. Then I felt drawn into what seemed like a vortex of energy. It was a slow movement at first and then accelerated. I was gripped by an intense fear, and my body started to shake. I heard the words ‘resist nothing’, as if spoken inside my chest. I could feel myself being sucked into a void. It felt as if the void was inside myself rather than outside. Suddenly, there was no more fear, and I let myself fall into that void. I have no recollection of what happened after that. I was awakened by the chirping of a bird outside the window. I had never heard such a sound before.... That day I walked around the city in utter amazement at the miracle of life on earth, as if I had just been born into this world.... Later I understood that the intense pressure of suffering that night must have forced my consciousness to withdraw from its identification with the unhappy and deeply fearful self, which is ultimately a fiction of the mind. This withdrawal must have been so complete that this false, suffering self immediately collapsed, just as if a plug had been pulled out of a collapsable toy.8

The other great resource is Focusing, discovered by Eugene Gendlin some thirty years ago and now world-wide. The discipline of the Power

8 The Power of Now, by Eckhart Tolle, Hodder and Stoughton.
of Now, which is nothing other than the sacrament of the present moment taught by de Caussade, dovetails wonderfully into the practice of focusing. Tolle gives us the taste for now, Gendlin the taste of now. I am still to "have a dream" when the world brought into being by these newfound skills of inwardness swallows up the moral world of Catholic statements on sex so that these tumble like old towers into a new solution in which nothing of their truth is lost, and all their harmful rubbish goes "into the shit-hole," to follow John Dominic Crossan's scholarly translation of that saying of Jesus. Sorry to end on this gauche note, but it is a direct quote from the Gospel!

**APPENDIX A**

There is another huge ramification of the failure of our teaching on sex. It is the indiscriminate outlawing of condoms. So as not to clutter up this paper, I confine this to an appendix.

The same curious detachment from the fact of sex as the main physical bond between people, that exasperates the more well-to-do, is dictating a policy in the poorer worlds of today which is wasting millions of lives and has been described, not without reason, as homicidal. This is the elevation of the condom to the status of an absolute evil. In Sub-Saharan Africa fatalities from AIDS have reached epidemic proportions. Given the near starvation level of the majority of the population, the immediate measures that are needed are education, the ample provision of free condoms, and massive injections of finance. Although a vaccine is being developed, it is estimated that it will be at least ten years before it can be freely available in Africa. The palliative therapy available in the affluent countries is way beyond the present resources of the poorer countries. The tragic situation, at present, is that not only are adults dying of AIDS, who may be deemed by some to be responsible for the consequences of their sexual behavior, but the HIV virus is being passed on to hundreds of thousands of children who rapidly die of AIDS. This is a crisis in which all the agencies wishing to help need to speak with one voice and to spend their money in order to save lives. The official Catholic position on the use of condoms is
gravely discordant, and can be justly accused of being at best unrealistic and at worst profoundly immoral.

This paragraph has been written by my friend Brian Butler, who works with an AIDS-related charity. He wrote it before either he or I had paid attention to the following observations in L.T. Johnson's article. "Fourth, the absolute prohibition of artificial birth control becomes increasingly scandalous in the face of massive medical realities. One might want to make an argument that distributing condoms to teenagers as a part of sex education is mistaken, but that argument, I think, has to do with misgivings concerning sex education—and a general culture of permissiveness—as a whole. But what about couples who can no longer have sexual relations because one of them has innocently been infected by HIV, and not to use a condom means also to infect the other with a potentially lethal virus? When does "openness to life" in every act become a cover for "death-dealing"? Given the fact that in Africa AIDS affects tens of millions of men, women, and children (very many of them Christian), is the refusal to allow the use of condoms (leaving aside other medical interventions and the changing of sexual mores) coming dangerously close to assisting in genocide? These are matters demanding the most careful consideration by the church and the deepest compassion. It is difficult to avoid the sense that the failed logic supposedly marshaled in the defense of life is having just the opposite result. If the political enslavement of millions of Asians and Europeans led the papacy to combat the Soviet system in the name of compassion, and if the enslavement and murder of millions of Jews led the papacy to renounce the anti-Semitism of the Christian tradition in the name of compassion, should not compassion also lead at the very least to an examination of logic, when millions of Africans are enslaved and killed by a sexual pandemic?"

Here finally is a horror story of my own. About ten years ago, I happened to read a report of a statement made by the Dean of the John Paul II Institute for Marriage and the Family. He was reported as saying that if one of the partners to a marriage had tested HIV-positive, they should abstain, but if this would imperil the marriage, then they should have intercourse without a condom. He justified this extraordinary opinion by saying that they would thus be preferring the
good of love to the good of health. I wrote to the Tablet, and the editor checked the Italian original, which was what I had read. I published the matter, ending my letter by saying, “all that is left to us is outrage.” There were no replies.

**APPENDIX B**

I think the keynote to this paper is my statement, desire is love trying to happen. I have not realized until recently just how intuitive this statement is, and I should like to expand on this and thus, I hope, add firmness to my grasp in this paper.

“Love trying to happen” refers to love without naming a subject. Love itself is the subject. But how can this be? It is people who love, as it is people who desire. Clearly two people are implied in the statement, but they stand in a peculiar relationship to the “love” that is “trying to happen.” Neither of them initiates it. It is rather as though love were a higher activity or state of action, and one or both of the persons, by a new insight or generous impulse, were consenting that this higher activity be happening between them. Desire trying to be love is a willing leap to a higher level that is “already there.” It occurs to me that this vital insight into the emergence of love has been hijacked by romanticism that has put its stamp on the event. “This is bigger than both of us!” has become a romantic statement. In reality, it is nothing of the kind, it is a statement about the levels of being. We are in the area of “what you guys call grace,” to quote the memorable rejoinder of Gendlin to McMahon and Campbell when they asked whether his results would follow on a correct use of his procedure.

Now we ought to be able to say more about this idea of love as a higher level, reachable only by a quantum leap. And indeed we can. What is involved here is a whole notion of the universe that has been dawning on us during the last century, associated with the work of Gurdjieff and Ouspensky, with its disastrous sidestep into Scientology. I have recently met with it in a book called *Masters of the Universe*, by J. G. Bennett. This “work,” as the followers of Gurdjieff called it, is not academically reputable; but it has this crucial edge on the world of academe: that it offers and requires a practice, as reputable as contemplative prayer. Bennett, whom the movement led into the Catholic Church, came to see love as the highest energy in the universe,
and Jesus as love's acknowledged representative. Contemplative
prayer would be a prime example of love as desire trying to happen.
Abbot Chapman, one of our leading masters, dared to name as closely
as "idiotic" the state of desire on the way to being love.

A wonderful advantage of this "levels of energy" theory with love
as the highest energy is that it lets us off the hook of David Hume: If
God is all-powerful he cannot be all-loving. If he is all-loving, he cannot
be all-powerful. My beloved confrère Illtyd Trethowan, toward the end
of his life, was saying—rather in private—that God is doing all he can
to bring things to a loving outcome. This implies a not-almighty
God—hence the privacy, Illtyd was tired of ensures—but not
necessarily. The fact is that theodicy is a bit of a bummer, because all
it gives us to play with are the infinite and the finite. On the one hand
an ultimate reality whose "omnipotence" has to be qualified with
"whatever that means," and on the other, the vast and infinitely
complex world of "creatures," the latter name concealing its content as
much as the name "creator" conceals its.

How shall we define love? It is not an attraction—at least not a
being attracted by. Rather it is a being attracted to, as Peter was
attracted to Cornelius or Philip to the eunuch. And once we see this, it
becomes clear that love is a world-wide and world-old conspiracy. In
pulling people up to its level, it opens them to each other. So the
communion of saints is not known via the doctrine, but the doctrine via
a vibrancy of the highest energy level of the universe. It becomes more
and more evident that we are discovering an inner rhythm of which the
fact of Jesus and his resurrection and people-inspiriting is the
enfleshment in our world.

I have already referred to the most dramatic instance of
transformation that I have ever heard tell of itself. Elkhart Tulle said,
"I can no longer live with myself" and experienced a longing for
annihilation. Then he thought what a peculiar thought this was. "Are
there two of me? Perhaps only one of them is real. I was so stunned by
this strange thought that my mind stopped. There were no more
thoughts." Then that inner suction felt in the centre of the body—the
focusing place, incidentally—and the growing terror, with the words
"resist nothing!" Then the accelerated suction, then the total surrender,
and oblivion. Later, the awakening to the sound of a bird like a
diamond in music. Then the rapid progressive rebirth into a world whose beauty has, since then, only increased. Then the attraction exerted on others, and a spreading network of souls in transformation. I am more impressed with this than with anything I know of hagiography or the doctrine of the communion of saints. This is the mechanics of the thing, laid bare for the modern science-shaped mind.

And this is what must be meant by love, whose transformative influence is the nearest thing we can know, by experience, to omnipotence. And is surely to know enough of omnipotence. An ancient Latin collect praises God who manifests his omnipotence most (maxime) in the exercise of mercy and deliverance.

The leap of desire to the level of loving is of course massively documented in the world of the classical mystics, St. John of the Cross being the clearest. It is satisfying to be locating this in a wide-ranging conspiracy, in sexuality especially. The "moment critique" in a sexual relationship is this moment of floundering, of lostness of desire, with its imagined subject, in a bewilderingly larger world.

I wonder, by my troth, what thou and I
Did till we loved. Were we not wean'd till then
Or snorted we in the seven sleepers den
Or sucked on country pleasures childishly?
THE TWIN DOORS

There are those who have pushed through
the invisible swing doors of the universe
into an unimaginable bliss.
Eckhart Tolle and Thérèse of Lisieux
(Who said I don't get over it but under it)
There is no way to describe this way
this sudden given generosity
under the given words Resist nothing.
There are hints of this way in the middle
When the great pile-up of incompatibles of people's stories
is taken into the body, not taken out on it by the exasperated mind.
There is the sudden capacity for non-existence
of everything so far taken as me
in the sure knowing that this is grace.
It was taken, I believe, in the Garden of Olives
when the twin doors gave onto the Angel of the Passion.
I have to say I believe
across history's huge sea of doubt
but then there are moments when everything converges
for me on the other side of the sea
and I am in the cloud of witnesses
the cloud of unknowing
and my nostrils cool-quicken to new breath.

Buckets of non-existent then
left behind at the twin doors into now
Countless mouths to devour us
if the Lord had not been on our side;
I can just taste myself as someone's juicy mouthful
happily as I slip between the doors.

-Holy Week, 2001
I WISH TO address the question of the relationship between theology and philosophy from the perspective of systematic theology. In Lonergan’s comments on the functional specialty Systematics, he calls for a new collaborative synthesis between theology and philosophy.¹ In that light, I wish to begin with two remarks from Lonergan regarding theology and philosophy. These remarks consist of, first, a general comment on the dynamic character of the notions philosophy and theology and, secondly, a comment on the differentiation between and integration of these disciplines. Following these preliminary remarks, I shall explore what a synthesis may look like today given Lonergan’s own claim that we have moved from a stage of meaning governed by logic to one governed by interiority. Furthermore, since Lonergan calls upon theology to mediate religion to culture, I shall develop the lines of such a synthesis between theology and philosophy in the context of the relationship between faith’s avowal of God as Creator and the event of modern science.

I. PRELIMINARY COMMENTS: THEOLOGY AND PHILOSOPHY

Comment One: Character of the notions

Characteristic of Lonergan’s reflection on the notions of theology and philosophy is a recognition of their dynamic quality. Lonergan reminds us that philosophy

and theology are not static notions. They do not represent fixed meanings about fixed disciplines. Both disciplines have a history. In that history there is continuity and discontinuity. A continuity, at least at a surface level, is reflected where present initiatives recognize an identity through historical developments. The air of a family resemblance among philosophers and theologians persists across the ages. Yet, within these families there are also the stories of existential dramas and these existential dramas testify to the fact that both philosophy and theology have changed.

This dynamic quality does not suggest arbitrariness, nor does it suggest that theology and philosophy are reactionary responses to random events and challenges. More profoundly, the dynamism reflects an effort of meaning on the move. Furthermore, I would suggest that for Lonergan it is an effort of meaning structured by two specific poles: knowledge of self and the objectification of horizons. These poles relate to one another in a form of mutual tension and support. A mutual reciprocity exists between self-understanding and an enriched understanding of the world. In my judgment, how that reciprocity reflects an act of authentic subjectivity and self-transcendence and how that reciprocity reflects "the open and unrestricted desire to understand," help us to understand the nature of the encounter and conversation between theology and philosophy.

Comment Two: Differentiation and synthesis

We are accustomed to speak of differentiation and of the relative autonomy of distinct disciplines, of the plurality and diversity of human discourse, the polymorphic character of human discourse. This being said, I believe Lonergan suggests that communication is possible between theology and philosophy not simply because each discipline continues to refine its own questions and methods to the point where both may reach consensus or a common language. Rather, communication is predicated upon the differentiation and mediation of meaning. However, given our previous comment, I would suggest that a more fundamental point of encounter between philosophy and theology occurs by adverting to and by attending to psychic, intellectual, moral and religious conversion, keeping in mind Lonergan's view that religious conversion precedes and grounds moral.

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2 Philosophy of God and Theology, p. 45.
3 See, for example, Lonergan comments regarding the functional specialty 'Dialectics' in Method in Theology, pp. 245-250.
conversion and both religious and moral conversion precede and ground intellectual conversion. 4

In light of this, one of the features of Lonergan’s approach to the relationship between theology and philosophy which I have found to take on new significance is his call for a new integration between theology and philosophy. Lonergan laments the loss of a synthesis which once characterized the relationship between philosophy and theology. 5 He gives as a concrete example the separation between philosophy of God and systematic theology. 6 The present situation has relegated the study of the philosophy of God to the philosophy department. Lonergan maintains that it properly belongs to the theology department and to the systematic theologian. His reason for this is that both the theologian and the philosopher love and seek an understanding of the same God. Such a love and such an understanding are born of an experience of God as the originating moral agent of the universe, a view of the universe as the goal of God’s moral act, and our self-understanding as persons is grounded in the priority of religious conversion, 7 in short, the combination of the experience of the Holy Spirit “flooding our hearts” and the deep and abiding knowledge in faith that “we live in a friendly universe.” 8

The present state of affairs is the result of truncated and static notions of philosophy and theology, notions which have, for Lonergan, not made the transition from the stage of logic to interiority. 9 The concrete effect of this separation is, unfortunately, a truncated philosophical and theological formation of the student whom we teach and who desires to understand God, “sending them away empty,” writes Lonergan. 10 Given Lonergan’s appeal to philosophy

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5 Philosophy of God and Theology, see especially Chapter 2.


7 Method in Theology, p. 116.

8 Method in Theology, p. 117.


11 Method in Theology, p. 337.
and theology as dynamic realities, we realize that the corrective is not to return to
the specific form of the medieval or Thomistic synthesis. While the angelic
doctor’s achievements were grand, they did not reflect developments in modern
science, philosophy or scholarship. Thus my own question: What would a
synthesis between theology and philosophy look like which has been informed by
modern developments in science, philosophy and scholarship? And, just as
Lonergan offered a concrete example of such a synthesis in Aquinas’ organization
of questions in the *Summa* with respect to the notion of the Trinity,¹² I would
also like to focus on a concrete case, namely: What would an interpretation of the
doctrine of creation look like which is informed by a synthesis based on a turn to
conversion and interiority?

I shall develop my remarks in two stages. First, I shall say a word about the
relationship between science and philosophy. My aim is not to show how this
relationship can clarify the contents of science. Rather, I wish to emphasize how
modern science represents a spiritual crisis for philosophy and how philosophy
has had to come to terms with that crisis. Paradoxically, it is in coming to terms
with that crisis that a validity of scientific reasoning emerges, a validity deeper
than one which science on its own could claim for itself. At this point I argue that
it is precisely the role of philosophy to elucidate something of the reciprocity
between self-understanding and objectification of horizons that takes place in
science as an act of reason.¹³ Furthermore, in the elucidation of this experience,
philosophy radicalizes our experience of our “open and unrestricted desire for
understanding” which can be open to a possible encounter with an experience of
faith, namely, the avowal of God as Creator.

Secondly, I claim that the theologian is one of the beneficiaries of the
spiritual drama of philosophy. We can call this the spiritual crisis of reason – not
in the sense that theology will gain from the limits, fragility or weakness of its
interlocutor, but rather that theology may learn something of its own spiritual
crisis. If the theologian has followed the differentiation of the act of understanding

¹² See his account of Aquinas’ development from the *Contra Gentiles* to the *Summa* with
respect to the question of the Trinity in *Method in Theology*, p 346.

¹³ Jean Ladrière emphasizes that we need to be careful not to regard philosophy as simply a
critical instance independent of science. Philosophy seeks to discern something which is true
about the life of reason in science. “Il serait injuste de réduire la pensée scientifique à son aspect
opératoire et formel, et de réduire la pensée philosophique à son instance critique la plus radicale.”
Classe des lettres et des sciences morales et politiques* (Discours, séance publique du lundi 18
in the dynamic character of philosophy, he/she can only heighten his/her own awareness of a struggle to understand. How can the theologian be the beneficiary of this crisis? By appropriating the positive existential core of the act of understanding and rethinking our own historical effort of an "open and unrestricted desire" to understand God.

I shall attempt to show how this form of the question invites us to approach with new eyes the first creation narrative of Genesis (Gen. 1,1 – 2, 4). My aim here is not to exegesis, but to show how experience can speak to experience, how theology, in the elaboration of the inner structure of the experience of God as Creator, can attune itself to the inner experience of reason in science, in short, to show how religious experience may communicate with culture. In this way, I hope to contribute to Lonergan's own call to think the polymorphic character of modern disciplines within the horizon of a synthesis.

II. PHILOSOPHY, THE RELATIONSHIP BETWEEN PHILOSOPHY AND SCIENCE, AND THE LIFE OF REASON

In an essay entitled "Insight: Preface to a Discussion,"14 Lonergan underscored the priority of cognitional operations for understanding understanding. Metaphysics and metaphysical terms, he argued, are always derived. This said, the cognitional operations, that is, experience, understanding and judgment, do not exist in the abstract. They are found in acts of reasoning and are empirically verified in developments occurring in our interpretation of the material universe. Since modern science is a privileged locus of our understanding of the material universe, it is clear that developing an understanding of understanding cannot ignore developments in modern science. Changes in how we understand the material universe have led to changes in our understanding of understanding and, consequently, in our understanding of philosophy.15

Lonergan's argument also reflected a historical background, namely, an interpretation of the stages of meaning and the shift from a static and logical form

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15 It must not be forgotten, however, that the priority Lonergan placed on cognitional operations remained a function of another relationship, the relationship of "the interdependent procedures" between ontological and cognitional operations. "Insight: Preface to a Discussion," p. 144.
of reasoning to a more dynamic form of conceiving philosophy. The emergence of modern science represented a dramatic moment for modern philosophy. Philosophy can only develop an understanding of reason based on its identification of cognitional operations. Such an understanding is affected by developments in modern science. But science has claimed its autonomy from philosophy: there has been a splitting. A crisis develops, one internal to the life of reason. I call this dramatic crisis a spiritual crisis also, for something of the self-understanding of reason, of the nature and task of philosophy is at stake. Philosophy must step back, divest itself of a certain authority, open itself to a new encounter and relation. But, in light of what?

Following Lonergan’s advice, the answer to the crisis demands that philosophy shift from logic to interiority. Philosophy cannot compete with modern science. Modern science works! It is successful! Nor can philosophy set itself up as a competing discipline in face of modern science. That would not advance an understanding of reason at work. The key to interiority is the discovery on the part of philosophy of the truth of reason which is operative within all acts of understanding and operative within all disciplines. In order to progress in its own effort of self-understanding, philosophy must recognize the validity of operations intrinsic to the diverse disciplines. How can this take place in such a way that we acquire an enriched understanding of reason at work? How does this lead to a deeper appreciation of the work of philosophy? And, finally, how does this lead to a renewed understanding of the relationship between theology and philosophy?

With respect to operations specific to modern science, I am broadening the conversation with Lonergan to include the voice of a Belgian philosopher and philosopher of science, Jean Ladrière. Ladrière’s approach is characterized by a meticulous and precise attention to the meaning of the notions and operations of modern science. At the same time, Ladrière demonstrates how, by following scientific reason in its diverse acts and differentiated disciplines, we are introduced to the wider dynamism of the act of reasoning. My remarks on Ladrière are a way of following Lonergan’s own advice to the systematic theologian: work it out for yourself!

I shall not go into a full account of Ladrière’s own speculative and phenomenological account of scientific operations. I shall limit myself to two remarks. The first concerns the role of theory in scientific investigation, and the second, the role of an affirmation of concrete world in judgment. I focus on these two features in order to expose how Ladrière, through his own attention to these
operations, identifies novelty to be at the core of understanding and how this awareness of novelty invites us to attend to the relationship between a heightened awareness of self and an enriched understanding of the world (objectification of differentiated horizons).

i. Theory

At the heart of scientific reasoning is the role of theory. What is particularly significant about theory is that it is an act of interpretation and, as such, moves beyond data to construct a way of imagining and re-imagining the world. Theory is a moment of novelty. Students and professors routinely draw upon theories to ask questions and solve problems. However, we should not overlook how any theory represents an incredible moment of human creativity. In that moment, a decision is made about intelligibility. The word hypothesis defines this moment. In modern science, hypotheses anticipate a recurrent and ordered set of relations. Data on their own do not account for this. Theory and hypothesis are introduced as moments of construction, of freedom, a poetic moment I would say, in which we are invited to anticipate how, in the way we learn to ask questions, the world shows itself to us. Is this not what it means essentially to learn a discipline, e.g., physics, chemistry, biology, etc., that is, to learn to ask questions and to anticipate in this way the novelty of the world? This being said, I underscore that, although this is a moment of novelty, it never abandons the data. Theory is not arbitrary, for there are answers to questions. This leads me to my second point — on affirmation.

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ii. Affirmation

Scientific theory, as a moment of initiative and novelty, is quite a complex operation and it draws upon significant resources. Mathematical reasoning, models and forms of representation converge. As an operation, theory remains purely formal and open. It needs a language of relations and the language which responds to that need is normally mathematics. Mathematics is also by nature a formal order of reasoning. It itself remains open. In order to mediate between mathematical form and the concrete world, models are designed or adopted. The virtue of a model is its ability to represent structured sets of relations, functioning operations and, eventually, to allow for experimental verification. There is a give-and-take between models and theories. Science is a practical activity. Theory uses experimentation in order to attune itself to the way some 'thing' shows itself. Theory reflects upon model, Ladrière suggests, in order to anticipate the concrete fulfilling conditions, their structured pattern and ordering. If these conditions are met through experimentation, we say that there exists an attunement between the theory and the self-disclosure of a feature of the world's existence, its thingness.

What is remarkable about affirmation and judgment is, again, novelty. Perhaps we are so accustomed to performing scientific operations that we lose a sense of this. The affirmation of what exists is never really a confirmation of what is already perceived with data. Lonergan and Ladrière remind us that what is disclosed in the affirmation is an enriched understanding of the world. More specifically, Ladrière draws our attention to the prospective character of theory and why, in science, we privilege operations. Yes, theory anticipates a return to the concrete world. But its return is by way of a knowledge of the world which elucidates the original data. The singularity of data is seen anew in the augmented knowledge of the world, which is informed by the passage through theory.

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18 The relationship between theory and model is complex and concerns the role of imagining and how theories construct their account of operations and relations of the world. See Jean Ladrière, "Model, Representation and Reality," in The Information Society: Evolving Landscapes. Edited by Jacques Berleux et al. (NY, North York:Springer-Verlag, Captus Press, 1990), pp. 424-448. Moreover, we should not forget that modern science and its findings are not the result of the application of one theory. Disciplines consist of a complex set of mutually supporting theories, and scientific disciplines themselves are part of a larger set of empirical disciplines on the move.


20 See Ladrière's emphasis on the operative character of modern science in The Challenges Presented to Science by Science and Technology, pp. 28-30.
world may have been anticipated in the direction informed by theory. But the world, once affirmed in light of the operations and sets of conditions identified by theory, is known in a remarkable newness and complexity.

I believe this is Lonergan's principal argument in his article to which I referred earlier, "Insight, Preface to discussion." At the end of the article, he distinguishes between intuition of existence and knowledge of existence, that is, the knowledge which brings to a term the full complex and ordered set of cognitional operations.21 If judgment simply confirmed what is already there, that is, what is intuited in sense experience, there would never be an enriched understanding of the world, nor an act of knowing which merits the designation knowledge.

What is the significance of these two moments of scientific investigation, theory and affirmation? I believe science helps us to radicalize our experience of the relationship between self-knowledge and objectification of horizons. Something new is discovered about the world. In Ladrière's terms, "it is a remarkable thing that there are answers to questions."22 Yet, this something new, this enriched and differentiated view of the world, has as its correlate a heightened awareness of self.

We see here the difference between logic and interiority. Science is remarkably formal in its procedures. As such, it provides no simple and inevitable logical development from one level to the next, that is, from acts of scientific investigation and their discoveries to our discovery of self and new horizons. A leap to a higher viewpoint takes place. Is this not what Lonergan means by conversion? We become aware of this relationship between the enriched view of the world, objectification of horizons, and the heightened awareness of the sense of self. 23 This recognition of the relationship between self and the world requires that we attend to a dynamism of understanding which is wider than the dynamism of scientific investigation on its own. Thus, attending to interiority is itself a higher order insight. Interiority is itself a theory contributing to the novelty of a differentiated and critical philosophical moment, one which transcends scientific disciplines and sets the modern emergence of science within the wider life of reason.

21 "Insight: Preface to a Discussion," p. 152.
23 "... he will have a different self to understand." Method in Theology, p. 246.
At the same time, such understanding is a deepened understanding of the singular data of the diverse disciplines, including those of modern science. Philosophy has benefited from the emergence of modern science. Philosophy is reflexive and critical. It comes back over this experience from a higher viewpoint. There is a doubling, Ladrière refers to a "redoublement," of the reading of experience. This is one of the striking features of Ladrière's own account of the history of this 'splitting' between science and philosophy. This event of the splitting constitutes, on the part of reason and philosophy, a stage whose own effort of a heightened self-awareness resolves the inner "disjunction" within the life of reason. The question then is: How do we articulate the structure of that wider experience?

As I indicated, the philosophical moment is a heightened awareness of the relationship between an enriched sense of self and fuller horizons, but now, not only as a person who knows, but also as one who is responsible. In his chapter on 'Dialectics,' one of the fundamental features Lonergan identified as a result of intellectual conversion was the ability to encounter the other. The discovery of a new sense of self in relation to a richer world allows one to see this relationship in the other and to open lines of genuine communication. The real fruit of experience of intellectual and moral conversion, then, is generosity, a capacity for communication and an attunement with the genuine desire in the other.

I believe this is what Lonergan himself emphasized when he referred to authenticity. The fruit of authentic subjectivity is objectivity. Objectivity is disinterested, that is, it seeks to discover the inner conversation in the other, to discover how a relationship between knowledge of self and objectification of horizons is also mediated in the other. Because of this, a potential for communication, Lonergan's eighth functional specialty, exists. And because this is rooted in the structure of a bond between knowledge of self and the objectification of differentiated horizons, we realize that the foundation for this communication is

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not arbitrary. But what is the full measure of the inner self and the inner conversations that we are, to borrow a phrase from Gadamer?

The experience of the encounter with the other brings with it new questions, which intensify the drama of philosophy. What, we may ask, is the outcome of this desire and dedication to this desire? Yet, at this precise moment the very question of the self-understanding of reason emerges in its deeper existential density. Philosophy itself becomes the home of the radicalization of the experience of existence. Is it possible to hold out hope for human reason? Is the entire enterprise of authentic knowing worthwhile? It would be too quick to suggest that it is precisely at this point, where the question of hope and meaning are radicalized, that religion or faith simply appear on the horizon.

If we have learned from the experience of understanding, the answer is not found in another realm. Neither philosophy nor, eventually, theology desires to escape from finitude. Rather, in Ladrière’s language, we wish to radicalize this experience, to deepen it. Theology does not speak to emptiness and failure but to the effort to understand. Moreover, if philosophy has learned from modern science, can we not also say that, at least structurally, the correlate of that desire is an anticipation of encounter and event?

Authentic selfhood seeks encounter and is open to the novelty of event. But here we do not mean an event which science identifies as part of order of events within the emergence of the order of nature. Rather we intend, as philosophy has shown, that more radical novelty which is at the basis of the intrinsic ‘eventful’ character of the world and its own capacity for novelty. Life

26 "... the basic idea of the method we are trying to develop takes its stand on discovering what human authenticity is and showing how to appeal to it. [...] man’s deepest need and most prized achievement is authenticity." Method in Theology, p. 254.
28 Emmanuel Levinas’ opening phrase of the preface to his Totality and Infinity: An essay on Exteriority. Trans. Alphonso Lingis [Duquesne Studies; Philosophical Series; 24] (Pittsburgh: Duquesne University Press, 1969) reads, “Everyone will readily agree that it is of the highest importance to know whether we are not duped by morality,” p. 21.
29 “The significance of our life is suggested to us by the encounters which we have. But those encounters are according to our measure. The generous man encounters great circumstances, and the shabby man encounters circumstances which are devoid of exaltation. [...] To believe that there is meaning and that it belongs to us only to reveal it, this is hope of reason.” Jean Ladrière, “Hegel, Husserl, and Reason Today,” Modern Schoolman xxxvii (March 1960), pp. 171-195, p. 193.
30 “La perspective eschatologique en raison,” ibid, p. 190-191.
is! The world exists! It is the experience of radical givenness, of gift, which holds in union both knowledge of self and new horizons. For Ladrière there is a desire for fullness which is testified to in the experience of gift, which corresponds to the deepest desire of philosophy and the deepest hope of reason. Can theology speak to this experience and contribute to a form of synthesis grounded in such a turn toward interiority?

III. THEOLOGICAL MOMENT: ISRAEL AND THE AVOWAL OF GOD AS CREATOR

What implications do these reflections on the life of reason, its form in the encounter between philosophy and science, have for theology and for the relationship between theology and philosophy? Before theologians can appropriate the experience of reason, they must not only appreciate but also make their own the spiritual crisis of reason. This means that theologians increasingly are asked to revisit the developments within their own discipline, for these developments themselves are based on understanding on the move. In light of developments in understanding understanding, new questions need to be asked of our own theological traditions; new questions regarding doctrines and the history of doctrines are to be raised.

For this reason, the following remarks invite the reader to shift to a different context in order to follow not the inner drama in philosophy's encounter with science, but the inner drama in theology's encounter with the interpretation of the biblical text. It is my hope that this second effort of interpretation, one more proper to the act of theology, will expose a drama in the act of understanding which, in its cognitional and existential features, is not foreign to the drama just exposed between philosophy and science. In the long run, by exposing these two disparate dramas in two distinct stages, I intend to show how theology and philosophy can encounter one another in their common participation in the self-transcending act of understanding itself.

In this second stage I shall take up the question of the creation. I mentioned above how new developments in understanding how understanding works have led theologians to re-read their theological traditions. With respect to the doctrine of creation, for example, we are constantly asked to read and re-read classical texts with new eyes. How does an education of understanding help us to re-read texts, in particular classical texts of creation? As systematic theologians, what does this mean for our interpretation of scripture and, in particular, for our reading of creation? In what follows I propose that one of the major insights we have learned from the relationship between science and philosophy and the need to follow the inner operations of a discipline is the need to attune ourselves to the inner drama in the other. Intellectual conversion is an openness to encounter the other. So, with respect to the experience of God as Creator, I ask: What is the inner drama of Israel such that Israel is seized by this experience of God as Creator and places this experience at the opening of the Torah?

That question calls for us to identify operations specific to reading a biblical text: first, operations which attune us to the self-constituting identity of a people and, secondly, operations which attune us to the act of reading going forward within scripture itself. I shall explore these operations by widening the conversation partners again, this time to include two biblical theologians and exegetes: Ben Meyer and Paul Beauchamp. My aim is to show that novelty emerged with the avowal of God as Creator in which Israel discovered a knowledge of self given unimaginable new and differentiated horizons of hope.

i. Ben Meyer: Reading and the Self-constituting Identity of a People

In his book *The Church in Three Tenses*, Meyer writes that "revelation is entrusted to a people defined as such by receiving it." There is an insight into reading history which is born of an understanding of the role of the self-constituting acts of identity and meaning. Transposed to the scriptural text, such a

32 At this point, the question of the relationship between exegesis and systematic theology deserves to be taken up. However, given the limitations of this paper such a topic would need to be taken up in a different context. As an indication of recent discussions, see for example, William M. Thompson, *The Struggle for Theology's Soul. Contesting Scripture in Christology* (NY: Crossroad, 1996). Michael Cahill, "The History of Exegesis and our Theological Future," *Theological Studies* 61 (2000), pp. 332-347. Marie Anne Mayeski, "Quaestio Disputata: Catholic Theology and the History of Exegesis," *Theological Studies* 62 (2001), pp. 140-153.


hermeneutical reading suggests that the avowal, the praise, of God as Creator (not just the doctrine of creation) is an insight into experience of God which constitutes the truth of a people defined as such by hearing the Name of God. It is important, in light of this ongoing historical effort, to recall that the first creation narrative, while placed at the beginning of the Pentateuch, is a rather late edition. And it increasingly appears, moreover, that the form of the Pentateuch is fixed simultaneous with this heightened experience of God as Creator. All indications are that this experience was born of a spiritual crisis, the event of the Exile, an experience which raised at its core the question of the future of the people of Israel and its inner self-understanding.

However, to catch such an act of self-understanding in the biblical texts requires that the empirical data be more than simply the smallest identifiable textual units (e.g. Gen. 1,1 - 2, 4a; Gen 2, 4a - 3, 24). Following Ben Meyer, a further textual moment of sufficient breadth, reflexive and critical in nature, is needed in order to catch this act of intentionality and meaning.\(^{35}\) In light of this and in order to take it a step farther with respect to the notion of creation, I myself find particularly helpful the work of the French exegete and biblical theologian, Paul Beauchamp.\(^{36}\)

**ii. Paul Beauchamp and reading the biblical text**

**a) Pentateuch as Narrative and Law**

In his approach to the reading of Scripture, Beauchamp identifies the interaction of the three major classes of writings which make up the First Testament: the Pentateuch, the Prophets and the Writings (Wisdom Literature).\(^{37}\) In this light, I would suggest that the basic textual unit for the first creation

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narrative, its empirical unit of meaning, is the Pentateuch, the Torah, the Law. The question becomes, then: what does the creation narrative mean which is placed at the beginning of a text which ends with the death of Moses, named the greatest of all prophets, and the entrance of the people into the land of Canaan? The fact that we have a remarkable unit of meaning here is evidenced by the general structure of the Pentateuch which is made up of narrative and law. If it were just some kind of foundation text of historical beginnings, we might with Von Rad speak of a Hexateuch. But an earlier historical narrative was cut and reinterpreted by Law. In this conjunction of narrative and Law, the Torah has become the foundation text. To it Israel will refer with respect to the truth of its existence and the truth of its historical order. Thus the closure of the Pentateuch is a historical literary operation, a canonical act, a principle of reading and, as such, constitutes an act of interpretation which re-reads the historical traditions and offers an interpretation of what it means to be Israel.

b) the operations of typological reading

How does this act of interpretation take place? As there exist rational operations to scientific method, there exist rational operations internal to Israel's acts of self-understanding. Paul Beauchamp, drawing upon the work of the Jewish scholar Michael Fishbane, reminded us of the typological character of this act of interpretation. Typology identifies and isolates specific events, personages

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38 Beauchamp emphasizes how Deuteronomy refers to a "second (Deutero-) law (nomos)." See Beauchamp's reflections on 'deutero' in L'un et l'autre testament I, pp. 150-163.

39 There are clear similarities to Eric Voegelin's reading in Israel and Revelation, Order and History I (Baton Rouge, LA: Louisiana University Press, 1956). The manner in which Beauchamp views the interaction of the three classes of writings and his analysis of narrative, given attention to the operations of writing, provide distinct emphases of meaning.

40 "Les problèmes soulevés par les modalités du canon restent donc foisonnants, mais ils ne mettent pas en danger la décision de prendre le principe canonique comme principe de lecture." Paul Beauchamp, "La théologie biblique," p. 218.[Eng: "The issue of canonical forms teems with difficulties, but these do not endanger the decision to adopt the canonical principle as a principle of reading."


42 Questions have been raised with respect to the relationship between typological exegesis and modern biblical exegesis. Addressing these in light of modern exegesis, see Anne-Marie Pelletier, "Exégèse et histoire," Nouvelle Revue Théologique 110 (1998), pp. 641-665. See also, note 32 above. With respect to Beauchamp's own thoughts on typological exegesis, see Paul Beauchamp, "Exégèse typologique, exégèse d'aujourd'hui," Connaissance des Pères de l'Église 51 (1993), pp.
or situations with a view to establishing a correspondence between what happened in an earlier time with what is happening in the present in light of a novum, a new future. Similar to novelty in science, there are particularly significant hermeneutical features to this operation of typology.

First, in such an act of interpretation Israel is not simply recounting a linear or successive series of historical events. Recognizing that a correspondence exists between former and present events is the fruit of an insight into the present. Secondly, the discernment of a novelty in the present with respect to past events is born of an anticipation of a new future. This reference to the future is not purely a formal, contentless openness. Rather, it is precisely because there has been an experience of novelty in the past, e.g., the Exodus event, that novelty can be anticipated in the present. Furthermore, for Israel, there is an ontological character to this. The past event is the res (the reality, the truth) of God’s powerful action. God has acted in the past; God’s power is discerned to be active in the present.

Thus, in typological interpretation, the newness breaking into the present is viewed as the place where the relationship between a future and a past intersects. But hermeneutically, just as the events are not seen purely as moments within a series of successive events, the meaning of both the future and the past is deepened, radicalized to express a sense of origin and fullness. The future, which is an interpretation of God’s own power, is seen as a fullness of hope which breaks open time. Past events become the reality (res) of God’s active presence and are interpreted as events which reveal the source of the emergence of history in the first place. For this reason, the foundation text, the Pentateuch or the Torah, is regarded not as a chronological beginning in a historical series of events, but rather as an origin which refers to the constituting relation of God to Israel.

Consequently, the origin itself is perceived within a horizon of hope. Creation is fundamentally an eschatological truth. Beauchamp emphasizes how it


43 Paul Beauchamp, “Le Pentateuque et la lecture typologique,” p. 243
is only in the correlation between a notion of origin and eschatological fullness that a past event can be recalled and become a figure of newness occurring now, in present events. Creation only emerges when there is first an experience of new creation. How does this relate to our question of the first creation narrative and the Pentateuch?

c) Reading the experience of creation

Following upon Beauchamp’s insights, it is important to examine the experience of creation from the side of the prophets, the second class of writings. Without an experience of newness (novum) there is no typological reading. But where does this newness show itself. Paradoxically, in the Exile, at that moment when the Exile begins to be read and understood not as the end of Israel’s existence but as the inbreaking anew of God’s creative power. Isaiah, in the Book of Consolation, is one of the first instances where we begin to see this spiritual experience taking form. In Isaiah we also find one of the first expressions of God as Creator. Among the principal operations of interpretation in Isaiah is the rereading of the Exodus. The Exile is interpreted as a new Exodus.

However, this should not imply that it anticipates a future which will simply become a return to the beginnings, simply a restoration of Israel to its form of its existence before the Exile. The power of God is not shown in the restoration of a first creation but in the establishment of a new creation. Along this line,

44 “The only time the Old Testament stops to consider the theme of creation at any length is when it takes up the notion of a second creation.” Paul Beauchamp, *L’Un et l’Autre Testament* 1, p. 255.

45 See the comments of Carroll Stuhlmueller, “Deutero-Isaiah: Major Transitions in the Prophet’s Theology and in Contemporary Scholarship,” *The Catholic Biblical Quarterly* 42 (1980), pp. 1-29. Stuhlmueller identifies an insight in Deutero-Isaiah which was moving Israel to think “beyond Israel to include the Nations” p. 14. Stuhlmueller refers to “hints of universal salvation” (p. 18), to “an ever deepening attitude of faith” (p. 19), to “the slow ticking away of the time bomb, soon to explode in favor of universal salvation” (ibid), to “the colossal leap [...] to world salvation” (p. 27). On the relation to the idea of Yahweh as “Creator of the Universe,” see, p. 13.

46 I cannot overemphasize the importance of a reading of the full text of Isaiah. It is precisely the present insistence among biblical scholars to divide their commentaries between First and Second Isaiah and Third Isaiah which leads to a different, a less enriched and differentiated meaning of hope. On the implications of the full reading of the book of Isaiah with respect to a fuller objectification of the horizon of hope, see Anne-Marie Pelletier, “Le livre d’Isaïe et le temps de l’histoire,” *Nouvelle Revue Théologique* 112 (1990), pp. 30-43. If the Book of Isaiah is read in segments, one may believe that what is at issue is the restoration of Israel. However, if read to the end – the empirical unity of meaning being the entire book – the newness has something to do not with restoration to a previous form of existence, but with Israel’s relation to the Nations. See Don Levenson, *Sinai and Zion: an entrance into the Jewish Bible* (Minneapolis: Winston Press, 1985).
Beauchamp remarks how, through abiding the experience of the Exile, the prophetic literature radicalizes the experience of death. The prophets advert to a fundamental difference between life and non-life. Paradoxically, Israel experiences its utter fragility not before its enemies, but at that moment in history where the origin of life appears to withdraw. Yet, it is precisely in abiding with this experience of the silence of God that Israel discovers an instance of a deeper interiority, a radicalization of its experience of the new possibilities of life.  

What does this signify? The newness interprets the present event, the Exile, as the in-breaking of the fullness of time. This is taking place now where God, the source of Israel’s history, acts just as God has acted in the past. The new creation is the work of the Creator who abides with Israel in its history. This relationship with God, the Creator, remains, as is shown in the Torah, the inner form of Israel’s existence. It is inconceivable, writes Beauchamp, that the formation of the Pentateuch was not related to this event of the spiritual self-understanding of Israel. However, such a closure does not take place independent of a rereading of earlier traditions, indeed, a rereading of the earlier Law or Torah. This is why, Beauchamp argues, there is a Deuteronomist reading, literally a second (Deutero-) Law (nomos). At this time, the definitive act of the closure of the Torah occurs. And in this act, the earlier events read in light of the Torah are seen as the prototypes of newness. The Torah contains the figures, the prototypes (e.g. the desert, Sinai, Moses as the greatest of all prophets, the crossing of the Jordan, etc.), which become the acquired capital of the expression of the abiding presence of God and his action in the present.

But if there is a radicalization of this experience of origin as the presence of God who is Creator, it reflects a corresponding radicalization of hope, of the experience of newness. Typology is typically a discourse generated by an

47 "... la nouveauté qui déborde l'espérance" Anne-Marie Pelletier, "Le livre d'Isaïe," p. 41.
49 "Il ne peut pas ne pas y avoir un lien entre le processus littéraire et canonique de la constitution de la Torah comme corpus, d'une part, et la fermeté des déclarations du temps de l'exil sur la spécificité d'une ère qualifiée comme ancienne" Beauchamp, "Le Pentateuque et la lecture typologique," p. 248.
50 See, for example, Beauchamp's comments on the major figures of the 'mountain,' the 'desert' and the 'Jordan.' L'un et l'autre testament I., pp.44-65. But again, these references are not simply to earlier chronological events, but events as figures of a newness, the creative power of God taking place in the present. Earlier events are preserved in their typological significance. These events remain the truth (res) not just “as they really happened,” as if they corresponded to the “already out there now.” They are indeed literal events, but as interpreted events (verba et gesta), and these words which interpret can never be severed from their relation to those particular events.
eschatological understanding. The fullness and novelty expected is unexpected. Let us recall the two poles Lonergan identified in ‘Dialectics.’ A knowledge of self increases with the objectification and differentiation of horizons. The more enriched the horizon, the greater and deeper is the knowledge of the self.

As an indicator of this, let us recall the entrance of Israel into the land of Canaan. What is fascinating about the opening of the book of Joshua is the nature of the report which the scouts bring back. They do not come back with strategic information suitable for a battle plan. Rather, they come back with the remarkable news, “we have heard the greatness of your God!” In other words, Israel does not enter into the land of Canaan until such time as the other has “recounted history according to the narrative of Israel.” Only where the inner word of the Spirit of God has gone does the movement of the outer word follow. With respect to the spiritual crisis of the Exile and the avowal of God as Creator, something is happening at the level of Israel’s self-understanding. The truth of Israel’s existence involves Israel’s relationship to the Nations.

In my judgment, the novelty in the order of Israel’s existence is the discovery that, in its covenant with God, Israel discovers that God desires a covenant with the Nations. The writing of Israel’s story has an audience, a third party. Fundamentally, it is not a story for God, not a story simply for Israel, but a story to be told to the other and on behalf of the other. Israel’s knowledge of itself bursts the limits of its own self-determined image. Are self-determined limits not precisely what the prophets challenge? Israel’s knowledge of self bursts the limits of an earlier covenant experience at that moment when, in an utter and unexpected insight, Israel discovers a horizon in which the very truth of its existence is that in Israel God desires a covenant with the Nations. In light of this the Pentateuch is not the narrative of the origins of Israel. The Pentateuch is the


narrative of the relationship between Israel and the Nations.53 God desires that all human beings have life. To recall one of Lonergan’s favorite scriptural phrases, “God wills all people to be saved” (1Tim 4, 10)

This paper does not allow a full and complete account of this experience. However, is it possible, through exegeses of texts and the interaction of classes of writings, to discover a depth to the self-understanding of Israel which transformed it completely and led to the adoption of the Torah at the beginning of which is God’s act of Creation? Typology, figure, builds upon typology and figure; historical experience abides with history and, at a critical moment, insight occurs. What is that insight of newness, of the unexpected in-breaking into Israel’s history in the present? My hypothesis is that Israel discovers what it means to be a covenant people at that precise moment when Israel discovers that the God of Abraham, Isaac and Jacob who desires that Israel exist, that Israel be, is the Creator who desires that all humanity be. What does this mean for Israel? It means that Israel discovers that the inner truth of its existence before God is the truth of all peoples before God. In Israel, in the depth experience of Israel’s own inner dialogue, Israel discovers a presence so radical and so interior to itself a communication with the other becomes possible.

The evidence for this, I believe, is Wisdom literature and the array of the traces of this Wisdom throughout the Pentateuch. Wisdom is the universal truth of all people.54 The emphasis is not on Israel’s predefined desire for newness, not on Israel’s expectation of hope ‘already out there now,’ but on the radicalization of an inner dialogue, the inner attunement of Israel’s desire to God’s own desire for humanity. We have seen that intellectual conversion, for Lonergan, leads to communication. Authentic interiority comes with a discovery of a depth to my own experience that allows me to attune myself to the experience in the other.55 The singularity of Israel’s experience is religious conversion. Yet the truth and authenticity of that religious conversion is that Israel can see this truth of its


54 “Par la Sagesse, Israël jouit d’être universel, mais c’est encore Israël. […] Pour honorer l’universel, il faut se connaître soi-même” Paul Beauchamp, L’un et l’autre testament I, p. 118.

55 On the significance of an encounter with the other, see Bernard Lonergan, Method in Theology, p. 247. On the significance of this for an encounter between the Church and culture, see Bob Doran, “System and History,” p. 674.
covenant relationship, can discover it in the other as God’s own abiding desire that the other be as the other. This relationship with Israel as covenant people remains the perpetual truth \((\text{res})\), the revelation of God’s love for and desire on behalf of all humanity.\(^{56}\) Its pre-eminent expression is the avowal of God as Creator.

IV. CONCLUDING REMARK:
RETURN TO PHILOSOPHY AND THEOLOGY

Lonergan called us to think from the perspective of a synthesis. I attempted to develop a heuristic for conceiving the synthesis between theology and philosophy. My focus was on Lonergan’s notion of interiority which held in mutual tension and support both knowledge of self and objectification of horizons. Through Jean Ladrière’s reading of the dynamism of science and Paul Beauchamp’s reflections on creation in scripture, I have suggested that the radicalization of the experience of understanding in science and in the covenant experience of Israel can speak to one another. Both experiences are rooted in an “open and unrestriced desire” grounded in religious conversion and recognized first, not our desire for God, but God’s desire for us. God’s desire is the inner drama of love which desires that the world be and that this world have life in its fullness. For Israel it was the Exodus experience, narrated and re-narrated, of God’s abiding presence among the covenant people. Isaiah discovered, in the reality \((\text{res})\) of the Exodus, a truth about itself which was greater than Israel could possibly imagine. To communicate religion to culture was also to discover the truth of this truth \((\text{res})\) in other. In the avowal of God as Creator and Lord of the universe, Scripture reveals a depth in our notions of origin and fullness.

The truth of science is also a truth about the act of interpretation in its own history. The genuine scientist discovers in his/her scientific investigations an inner dynamism which attunes itself to the emergent character of the world. In the expectation of the emergence of unexpected events, the world discloses its own relation to a form of genesis. This relation in turn awakens our wonder to the event character of the world as world, and the utter and singular experience of the truth that the world is, it exists! In this way, placed culturally and philosophically within the wider life of reason, science testifies to a sense of origin and a sense of

\(^{56}\) Fred Lawrence cautions against a “supercessionist” reading of Israel. See his “Athens and Jerusalem: The Contemporary Problematic of Faith and Reason,” p. 225, n. 8.
fullness, that is, life as pure givenness and gift, which, in my judgment, becomes the existential core of scientific investigation.

The heart speaks to the heart, as Newman wrote (cor ad cor loguitur). Christian tradition refers to two books of revelation, nature and scripture. Modern philosophy, in the polymorphic character of disciplines, perhaps even in the experience of their fragmentation, in the 'splitting' of science from philosophy, is the story of the inner drama of reason. Abiding with this history is a spiritual experience, a testimony of philosophy’s ability to attune us to the newness of life. For the theologian, an attunement to this drama in the inner life of reason helps to attune him/her to newness testified to in the inner and outer word of scripture. God desires that the universe be\textsuperscript{57} and that we have life to the full!

There is an analogical truth between these two books\textsuperscript{58} in the sense that the reality (res) of the world (God’s act as Creator) becomes the abiding truth of God’s revelation in history.

\textsuperscript{57} “But in the light of faith [...] terminal value is the whole universe” Bernard Lonergan, \textit{Method in Theology}, p. 116.

\textsuperscript{58} “Nous apprenons Dieu en lisant l’Écriture, mais nous l’apprenons aussi en lisant le livre du monde.” Jean Ladrière, “La science est-elle proportionnée aux exigences intellectuelles de l’homme contemporain?” p. 29.