LONERGAN WORKSHOP

Lonergan and the Human Sciences

In Thanksgiving for the Gifts of the Past 1000 Years

volume 16

edited by Fred Lawrence
EDITOR'S INTRODUCTION

With the death of Bill Alfred, a giant has passed. His Christian integrity as a teacher and scholar made him a legend at Harvard, his artistry as a poet and playwright spread his fame abroad, and his great charity allowed him to touch many individuals and institutions, including the LONERGAN WORKSHOP. Dorothy Judd Hall, who introduced Bill to Sebastian Moore and made it possible for him to attend the Workshop when she spoke in Sebastian's honor, has let us publish her brief memoir of and elegy for Bill written on the occasion of his death last May.

I am proud to say that Lonergan Workshop 26 includes radical explorations of Lonergan's thought. The relatively recent disclosure of Lonergan's early work in the philosophy of history and in economics has made it more difficult than ever to assess the significance of his legacy. It is an ongoing task of collaboration that will head into the distant future. The "second reception" of Lonergan called for by David Tracy at the 25th Lonergan Workshop may have scarcely begun, but more and more people who have been working on Lonergan for decades are elaborating truly creative and radical works of their own. Scholars are consciously going beyond interpreting Lonergan to independent and radical understandings of a variety of subject matters, which Lonergan treated under the conditions of his own historicity.

Bruce Anderson, Patrick Brennan, John Coons, Anthony Fejfar, Mary Ann Glendon, and Thomas Kohler have pioneered the relation of Lonergan's foundations to the study and practice of the law. In the course of his pedagogical efforts to exercise the functional specialty of dialectic in relation to the variety of philosophic schools and to the different fields in the human sciences, Michael Vertin returns to the Workshop to explore the field of jurisprudence and legal interpretation of the U.S. Constitution. Happily, he has done so in relation to a great and still unresolved constitutional controversy surrounding the right to privacy. With great logical clarity and foundational precision, Vertin reviews evidence from representatives of three basic alternatives in the contemporary discussion, and reaches conclusions about legal-methodological issues in jurisprudence that are as lucid as they are radical.
Frank Braio’s lecture at LW 26 was both an illuminating commentary and a capsule exemplification of requirements for Dialectic from Method in Theology. For his written paper he has chosen to develop the presuppositions of that presentation in Philip McShane’s mode. Focusing on key passages in Insight and Method, Braio’s paper turns on the idea that the ‘far larger’ explanatory task of method in theology indicated in the Epilogue of Insight is carried out in Method only in the mode of descriptive doctrine. This leaves it to future generations to re-read or reenact Method through the lens of the more explanatory Insight, taking up the descriptive clues from Method and from Lonergan’s other Insight, taking up the descriptive clues from Method and from Lonergan’s other methodological soundings. This possibly relevant interpretation of present and future tasks is a radical and challenging one.

Returning to familiar themes, David Burrell elucidates the mutual normativity of philosophy and theology in Thomas Aquinas. He focuses on St. Thomas’s theology of creation, which was itself made possible not only by the revelation of the Trinity but by what he learned from the Muslim Avicenna and the Jew Maimonides. He also shows how Augustine’s and Kierkegaard’s faith seeking understanding instead of certitude overcame the imaginal separation of philosophy and theology, along with the ‘additive’ picture of the contribution of faith. Burrell appeals to Pierre Hadot to help clarify that, beyond a ‘propositional attitude,’ faith bears upon a way of life. To understand how faith is integral to the exercise of reason without falling into fideism in any way is a major achievement.

Many students have understood Lonergan’s explanatory contribution in terms of a theologically transformed universal viewpoint. The development of the notion of being by way of the ‘protean’ connotations of polymorphism has now been profoundly expanded through the careful scholarship of Ivo Coelho. In 1997 his dissertation at the Gregorian was being called “the best we’ve had in years.” His paper offers a graceful and compendious summary of what his investigation uncovered. Motivated by personal concerns with the transcultural dimension, Coelho reveals the radicality of Lonergan’s truly normative openness.

In his paper on method in biblical studies, Sean McEvenue begins with and goes beyond anything Lonergan said about the study of the Bible. He applies Lonergan’s ideas on elemental meaning and on conversion as foundational to the reality of biblical texts in order to explain why biblical theology’s indispensable historical-critical reconstructions have to be transcended. McEvenue helps us to understand why we experience what we do when, for instance, we read the biblical mediations of a great Scripture scholar like Cardinal Carlo Maria Martini or hear homilies by persons such as the lay leaders of the Community of
Sant'Egidio, who have been spent years in the school of the Gospel. McEvenue himself also provides wonderful clarification-by-contrast 'readings' from the Hebrew/Old Testament Scriptures.

Psychologist and counsellor Thomas McGrath of Milltown Park in Dublin presents his first contribution to the Lonergan Workshop. As a practitioner and theorist, McGrath begins from a balanced assessment of the relevance of Jung as applied by Robert Doran to the promotion of converted living, and then begins to sketch further vistas opened by moving Lonergan’s thought into conversation with insights of Michel de Certeau and of Jacques Lacan. He promises to unfold the implications of this approach in future presentations.

Someone at Regis College told Lonergan how much he had in common with the University of Chicago pioneer in phenomenological psychology, Eugene Gendlin, whom he then read and admired. We are familiar with Sebastian Moore’s interest in befriending his dreams, and in theorists such as Ernest Becker and Alice Miller. We also know he had his own therapeutic experience. Sebastian tells us how, from the hoard of books he’d brought back from the States to Downside, Francis Little, his fellow monk, elected to read Gendlin’s Focusing and then persuaded him to read it. Only then did Sebastian finally ‘cotton on’ to appropriating his feelings in a healing way. His paper combines a personal account of Gendlin’s method of Focusing with reflections on René Girard’s soteriology. The result is a radical exploration of both generalized empirical method and Christian spirituality.

At Lonergan Workshop 25 and elsewhere, Michael McCarthy has noted that the ‘second reception’ of Lonergan’s thought is hampered by the degree to which his thematization of cognitional theory may be considered too modern, and too unaffected by what is legitimate in the postmodern/multicultural critique of modernity. The paper of William Murnion ‘takes the bull by the horns’ in articulating the foundations of liberal arts today. It shows how Lonergan’s reenactment of Aristotle’s and Aquinas’s identity theorem transforms the postmodern/multicultural critique of modernity, in a full-scale transposition of Lonergan’s method into an explicitly postmodern/multicultural framework. This radical proposal bristles with significant aperçus, not least of which is his suggestion to re-thematize ‘interiority’ in terms of ‘liminality.’

At long last we have had the honor of having Giovanni Sala at our summer Workshop. His first presentation is a magisterial interpretation of John Paul II’s Encyclical Fides et Ratio that makes manifest just how completely the challenge of the encyclical has been met by Lonergan’s lifelong vision of philosophy and
theology. Sala, a world-class interpreter of Kant, also wrote up his afternoon Docta Ignorantia talk on that German thinker with whom Lonergan is so often linked. The simplicity and compression with which he presents Kant’s cognitional theory/epistemology is amazing for the clarity of its historical nuance and its comprehensiveness. This paper will be illuminating both for beginners in the study of Kant and for experts. Sala also concisely contrasts Lonergan with Kant, showing precisely how their theories of knowledge differ.

Thanks again to Kerry Cronin both for years-long labor of helping to bring out Fred Crowe’s *Three Thomist Studies* and for her work on the present volume.

Fred Lawrence
Editor
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IS THERE A CONSTITUTIONAL RIGHT OF PRIVACY?

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1. INTRODUCTION

The theme of the 1999 Lonergan Workshop is specified partly as “Lonergan and the Human Sciences.” I trust that what the Workshop Director intends by the phrase “human sciences” corresponds to the distinctive versions of what Method in Theology\(^1\) discusses under that label. For Method, the human sciences may be conceived and pursued on the model of the natural sciences; and in that case they seek to discover and verify universal hypotheses in data taken simply as intelligible. Their efforts to establish general laws and theories of human words and actions purposely \textit{prescind from meanings} as constituents of those words and actions. But the human sciences may also be conceived and pursued on a model that is their own, quite distinct from the natural scientific one; and in that case they attempt to discover and verify universal hypotheses in data taken not simply as intelligible but as potentially meaningful. Their efforts to establish general laws and theories of human words and actions \textit{take full account of meanings} as constituents of those words and actions.\(^2\)

It remains that insofar as laws and theories are general, they also are abstract. But meanings in their basic instances are concrete and particular. “This” concrete particular utterance has its own meaning, as does “that” concrete particular gesture. Methodologically speaking, the formulation and expression of those meanings in abstract general laws and theories is a later step, a step whose validity presupposes the investigator’s valid grasp of the concrete particular


meanings. Method in Theology recognizes this fact by delineating another range of empirical academic investigations in addition to the natural sciences and the human sciences, namely, scholarly studies. The goal of scholarly studies is to discover and verify meanings in all their concrete particularity. Moreover, if I am correct, the arrangement of empirical academic disciplines in ascending order of complexity would place scholarly studies after the natural sciences but before the human sciences as distinctively taken.

I have offered this bit of background to help situate and justify the topic of this paper. I conceive the paper as falling under the heading “Lonergan and Scholarly Studies,” not “Lonergan and the Human Sciences.” Nonetheless, insofar as scholarly studies methodologically precede and prepare the way for the human sciences, a small contribution under the first heading may be construed as a useful preliminary to a contribution under the second heading. Such is my intention. Still, there is a further wrinkle, since a paper under the heading “Lonergan and Scholarly Studies” is not simply an undertaking in scholarly studies. What is the further wrinkle? To answer that question I must tire you with some additional distinctions.

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4 Method, 233-34. Cf. 135, 201-203, 219, 347-49, 364-65. One feature distinguishing objects of the natural sciences is that it is not fruitful to consider them in their particularity. Quite otherwise with the objects of human studies. We do not give proper names to individual electrons, carbon molecules, or tulips; but we do give them to humans.
In a typical investigation, the conclusion to which I come can be viewed as based on the evidential coalescence of two sets of factors: what I encounter in the investigation, and what I bring to the investigation. 5 Let us label the first set of factors “empirical data”; the second, “presuppositions.” Next, the presuppositions can be subdivided into “empirical” and “pre-empirical.” Empirical presuppositions are learned. They are what I bring to my investigation today from what I learned in my investigations yesterday—or last week, or last year. If someone challenges them, the proper way to address that challenge is by appealing ultimately to the empirical data upon which they are based. Pre-empirical presuppositions, by contrast, are structural. They are my stances on certain methodological issues, stances that I may well not have spelled out for anyone (including myself), but that nonetheless are conceptual or operational antecedents of what I do spell out, at least insofar as I am proceeding consistently. 6 If someone challenges them, the proper way to address that challenge is by attempting to show that any effort to falsify them verbally cannot avoid invoking them operationally. The pre-empirical presuppositions in turn can be subdivided into “special” and “general.” My special pre-empirical presuppositions are the characteristic procedures and criteria I employ when conducting investigations within one particular range of empirical academic disciplines rather than another—within scholarly studies rather than the natural sciences, for example. My general pre-empirical presuppositions, on the other hand, are the procedures and criteria I employ when conducting investigations within or beyond every particular range of empirical academic disciplines. 7

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5 Here and throughout, I employ first-person pronouns and adjectives to emphasize that the consideration fundamentally regards not idealized knowers but rather concrete knowing subjects—and ultimately me (or you) as a knower. Obviously I do not intend those words in any narrowly autobiographical sense.

6 The distinction between conceptual and operational antecedents will be amplified below, in Section 3.1 of this essay.

7 (a) To speak of a “typical” investigation indirectly indicates one that is “atypical,” namely, one in which what I encounter in the investigation is nothing other than what I bring to a “typical” investigation. That is to say, an “atypical” investigation focuses not on empirical data but rather on presuppositions. (b) The set of “atypical” investigations that focus on pre-empirical presuppositions corresponds to the enterprise that historically has been identified as “philosophy.” (c) For readers familiar with Lonergan’s writings, let me add a further point about terminology. Lonergan uses the word “empirical” in reference to both data of sense and data of consciousness (and, by extension, the investigations beginning with them). By contrast, I use the word “experiential” in that regard, reserving the word “empirical” for data of sense, and for data of consciousness insofar as the latter are conditioned intrinsically by data of sense. (Thus, for
In light of the foregoing distinctions, I can now characterize my paper more precisely as a Lonergan-inspired effort to illuminate the inevitable influence of special pre-empirical presuppositions on the conclusions reached by any investigator who engages in scholarly studies. Using a concrete example, I will pursue this effort in four main steps. First, I will briefly recount a current dispute about a prominent legally normative text, the Constitution of the United States. Second, I will propose how this dispute reflects important underlying but often overlooked differences between the disputants regarding the nature of textual interpretation as such. Third, I will suggest how the latter differences in turn reflect still more basic but usually neglected differences regarding the nature of knowing in general. Fourth, I will sketch the character and basis of what I take to be the correct stances on the nature of knowing and the nature of textual interpretation, and I will indicate what I think these stances imply for a correct resolution of the dispute about the Constitution.

2. THE DISPUTE ABOUT A CONSTITUTIONAL RIGHT OF PRIVACY

2.1. Background

Beginning in the mid-1960s, the United States Supreme Court issued a series of decisions that asserted the existence of constitutional right of privacy. The judicial justification of these decisions was controversial, both within the Court example, an act of seeing red is empirical insofar as it is seeing red—rather than, say, blue—but pre-empirical insofar as it is seeing.) I adopt this convention chiefly to accommodate the terminology common in histories of explicit philosophy.

8 In other situations, it would be rewarding to consider current disputes about other texts, such as the Bible, or the plays of Shakespeare.

9 I should emphasize that I am not a lawyer, or a judicial historian, or even a highly skilled amateur in matters of constitutional law. Rather, I am a laborer in that field of philosophy commonly labelled "epistemology." In somewhat more Lonerganian terms, I think of myself as a transcendental hygienist. Still more exactly, in this paper I am engaged in the fourth functional specialty, dialectic. My dialectical focus here, however, is special rather than general, interpretative rather than positive, and scholarly rather than scientific. (For more on the latter distinctions, see Michael Vertin, "Dialectic, Hermeneutics, and The Bible as the Word of God," in S.E. McEvenue and B.F. Meyer, eds., Lonergan's Hermeneutics [Washington, DC: Catholic University of America Press, 1989], 41-42.)
Is There a Constitutional Right of Privacy?

itself and in the broader community of legal practitioners and scholars; and the
intensity of the controversy was notable, even for an institution that is no stranger
to controversy. Like the significant social effects of the decisions themselves, the
dispute over their judicial justification continues to this day.

Let me be clear about the question this dispute regards. It is not the *ethical*
question of whether persons (including Americans) possess a moral right of
privacy. (Ethicians debate the existence and character of such a right.) It is not the *historical*
question of whether persons (including Americans) sometimes have
been thought to possess a moral or civil right of privacy. (They have.) It is not the *textual*
question of whether the Constitution (including its amendments) *literally*
asserts a civil right of privacy. (It doesn’t. “There is a right of privacy” or an
equivalent expression appears nowhere in the constitutional text.) It is not the *legal*
question of whether findings by the Supreme Court that the Constitution *tacitly*
assists a civil right of privacy are legally binding. (They are, at least until
superseded or reversed.) It is not the *political* question of whether the Court’s
findings reflected the views of a majority of American voters when they were
made. (By and large, they didn’t.) Rather, it is the *interpretational*
question of
whether the Constitution does indeed tacitly assert a civil right of privacy.
Granted that the Supreme Court has decided that the Constitution does tacitly
assert such a right, and that these decisions possess supreme legal authority as
long as they remain in place, are the decisions themselves examples of accurate
constitutional interpretation? Or are they examples of judicial invention, instances
of judges doing what they are legally authorized but not textually justified to do?

While countless persons have addressed this issue, it is useful for my purposes
to focus on the writings of just three. The first is the individual who was the most
forceful advocate within the Court itself for the view that the Constitution asserts
a right of privacy, William O. Douglas, associate justice from 1939 to 1975. The
second is one of the sharpest critics of this view, Robert H. Bork, a former Yale
law professor, federal appeals court judge, and scholar at the American Enterprise
Institute, who was recently hired by the newly-established Ave Maria School of
Law. Bork was nominated for the Supreme Court in 1987 by President Ronald
Reagan but rejected by the Senate. The third is one of the most widely published
and best known constitutional scholars of recent years, Laurence H. Tribe, a
professor at the Harvard Law School.\textsuperscript{10} Let me provide some samples of the arguments of each.

2.2. The View of William O. Douglas

We can get a good sense of Justice Douglas' contention that there is indeed a constitutional right of privacy by looking briefly at four of his judicial opinions and one of his books.\textsuperscript{11} First, in \textit{Public Utilities Commission v. Pollak} (1952),\textsuperscript{12} at issue was the approval granted by the District of Columbia Public Utilities Commission to the practice of airing radio programs over loudspeakers in the publicly licensed streetcars and buses serving the District. Two passengers appealed this approval to the Supreme Court, arguing in part that the practice infringed on the privacy that is included in the liberty guaranteed by the due process clause of the Fifth Amendment to the Constitution.\textsuperscript{13} In deciding this appeal, the Court held that the Fifth Amendment was not violated; but Douglas dissented. He maintained that the right of liberty surely incorporates the right of privacy, a right that here—as often elsewhere—he equated with the right to be let alone. “Liberty in the constitutional sense must mean more than freedom from unlawful governmental restraint; it must include privacy as well, if it is to be a repository of freedom. The right to be let alone is indeed the beginning of all freedom.”\textsuperscript{14} This meaning of “liberty” in the Fifth Amendment is intimated by the Fourth Amendment’s prohibition of unreasonable searches and seizures,\textsuperscript{15} which asserts the right to be let alone in one’s home, and by the First Amendment’s

\textsuperscript{10} I shall argue that in important respects the views of Douglas, Bork, and Tribe differ from one another. Note, however, that there are more than just three views. And, of course, more than just Douglas, Bork, and Tribe maintain the three respective views that they hold.

\textsuperscript{11} One of his biographers points out that Douglas wrote some 1,200 case opinions during his time on the Supreme Court. He also wrote several books and many articles. (James C. Duram, \textit{Justice William O. Douglas} [Boston: G.K. Hall, 1981], 100).

\textsuperscript{12} 343 U.S. 451 (1952). (This is the standard way of referring to \textit{United States Reports}, the record of U.S. Supreme Court decisions. The first number indicates the volume in which the given decision is recorded; the second, the initial page of the record.) The majority opinion was written by Justice Harold Burton.

\textsuperscript{13} “No person shall ... be deprived of life, liberty, or property, without due process of law” (Fifth Amendment to the Constitution).

\textsuperscript{14} 343 U.S. 451 (1952), 467.

\textsuperscript{15} “The right of the people to be secure in their persons, houses, papers, and effects, against unreasonable searches and seizures, shall not be violated, and no warrants shall issue, but upon probable cause, supported by oath or affirmation, and particularly describing the place to be searched, and the persons or things to be seized” (Fourth Amendment to the Constitution).
guarantee of freedom of religion and freedom of speech, which asserts the right not to be coerced by the government in one's thoughts and beliefs even outside one's home. It this right to be let alone that the Public Utilities Commission's approval assaults. It is a form of governmental coercion of people to make them listen; and the Court is mistaken in not disallowing it. "One who enters any public place sacrifices some of his privacy. My protest is against the invasion of his privacy over and beyond the risks of travel." Next, in a series of lectures delivered in 1957 and published subsequently as The Right of the People, Douglas amplified his earlier account of privacy as a constitutionally protected right. Let us mark four points he makes. First, the right of privacy, the right to be let alone, is not so much a single right as a group of rights. "There is ... a congeries of ... rights that may conveniently be called the right to be let alone. They concern the right of privacy ..." Second, the particular rights in this group regard diverse matters. "This right of privacy protects freedom of religion and freedom of conscience. It protects the privacy of the home and the dignity of the individual. Under modern conditions, it involves wiretapping and use of electronic devices to pick up the confidences of private conversations. It also concerns the problem of the captive audience presented in Public Utilities Commission v. Pollak ... I should also mention the right to travel ..." Third, the constitutional basis of the right of privacy includes at least three amendments. "This right to be let alone is a guarantee that draws substance from several provisions of the Constitution, including the First, the Fourth, and the Fifth Amendments." Fourth, however, the right of privacy is not just a constitutional right. At least some of its elements are natural rights, rights whose ultimate ground is human nature itself. Some of these natural rights are explicit in the Constitution; others, merely implicit—as in the "penumbra" of the Bill of Rights.

[Our advantages over totalitarian regimes] relate to matters of the mind and the spirit. They relate to the inalienable rights of man proudly proclaimed in our Declaration of Independence, and in part engrossed in our Constitution. Some call them legal rights; some natural rights ... 

16 "Congress shall make no law respecting an establishment of religion, or prohibiting the free exercise thereof; or abridging the freedom of speech ..." (First Amendment to the Constitution). 
17 343 U.S. 451 (1952), 468. 
19 Ibid., 87. 
20 Ibid., 87-88. Cf. 90, 144. 
21 Ibid., 88.
The natural rights of which I speak ... have a broad base in morality and religion to protect man, his individuality, and his conscience against direct and indirect interference by government. Some are written explicitly into the Constitution. Others are to be implied. The penumbra of the Bill of Rights reflects human rights which, though not explicit, are implied from the very nature of man as a child of God.22

For our third selection from Douglas’ writings, we return to the realm of judicial opinions. In Poe v. Ullman (1961),23 the Supreme Court considered a married couple’s appeal against a Connecticut law prohibiting the use of contraceptives. A majority of justices found that the issue was not justiciable. Save for one somewhat artificial exception, Connecticut authorities had never enforced the law; and this meant that the dispute lacked the immediacy requisite for the Supreme Court to become involved. But Douglas dissented, maintaining both that the issue was justiciable and the law was unconstitutional. He argued that the Constitution’s notion of liberty is sometimes filled out by the “emanations” of other constitutional provisions or by knowledge gained from living in a community of freedom. “‘Liberty’ is a conception that sometimes gains content from the emanations of other specific guarantees ... or from experience with the requirements of a free society.” In such a manner, the Fifth Amendment’s idea of liberty is filled out in terms of privacy. “‘Liberty” within the purview of the Fifth Amendment includes the right of ‘privacy,’ a right I thought infringed in ... [Public Utilities Commission v. Pollak] because a member of a ‘captive audience’ was forced to listen to a government-sponsored radio program.”24 This privacy “is implicit in a free society.” It “is not drawn from the blue. It emanates from the totality of the constitutional scheme under which we live.”25 But the Connecticut statute invades one of the most private areas of all, namely, “the relationship between man and wife,” “the innermost sanctum of the home.”26 Consequently, that statute is at odds with the Fourteenth Amendment, which requires that the Fifth Amendment’s guarantee of liberty be respected by the states.”27 “This Connecticut law as applied to this married couple deprives

22 Ibid., 89. Cf. 87.
23 367 U.S. 497 (1961). The majority opinion was written by Justice Felix Frankfurter.
24 Ibid.
25 Ibid.
26 Ibid., 519, 521.
27 “No State shall ... deprive any person of life, liberty, or property, without due process of law ...” (Fourteenth Amendment to the Constitution).
them of 'liberty' without due process of law, as that concept is used in the Fourteenth Amendment."

Four years later, in *Griswold v. Connecticut* (1965), the Connecticut law prohibiting the use of contraceptives came under scrutiny once again, as the Supreme Court heard an appeal by two doctors who had been convicted for prescribing them. This time, however, the outcome was markedly different. In an opinion written by Justice Douglas, the Court overturned the convictions and invalidated the law. In what would be the most important and influential of his privacy opinions, Douglas presented his familiar arguments in a manner that was notable for its clarity, detail, and vigor.

He began by citing previous cases, arguing that the Constitution and the Bill of Rights have been construed as affirming certain rights even when they do not mention them. When the exercise of a right that is mentioned depends upon a right that is not mentioned, the latter, "peripheral" right as well as the former, "specific" right has been taken as affirmed. "Specific guarantees in the Bill of Rights have penumbras, formed by emanations from those guarantees that help give them life and substance."

Next, he argued that although neither the Constitution nor its amendments mention the right of privacy, "zones of privacy" are created by certain rights that are expressly guaranteed. For example, privacy in one's associations is implied the First Amendment." Zones of privacy are implied by the Third Amendment prohibition against the peacetime quartering of soldiers in any house without the owner's consent," the Fourth Amendment right to be secure against unreasonable searches and seizures, and the Fifth Amendment right to avoid self-incrimination."

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29 381 U.S. 479 (1965).
31 "Congress shall make no law respecting an establishment of religion, or prohibiting the free exercise thereof; or abridging the freedom of speech, or of the press; or the right of the people peaceably to assemble ..." (First Amendment to the Constitution).
32 "No soldier shall, in time of peace be quartered in any house, without the consent of the owner, nor in time of war, but in a manner to be prescribed by law" (Third Amendment to the Constitution).
33 See above, note 15.
34 "No person ... shall be compelled in any criminal case to be a witness against himself ..." (Fifth Amendment to the Constitution).
Moving then from general to particular, Douglas contended that the marriage relationship stands within the zone of privacy that is "created by several fundamental constitutional guarantees." Consequently, it is protected against governmental interference. "Would we allow the police to search the sacred precincts of marital bedrooms for telltale signs of the use of contraceptives? The very idea is repulsive to the notions of privacy surrounding the marriage relationship." He concluded with a ringing rhetorical flourish.

We deal with a right of privacy older than the Bill of Rights—older than our political parties, older than our school system. Marriage is a coming together for better or for worse, hopefully enduring, and intimate to the degree of being sacred. It is an association that promotes a way of life, not causes; a harmony in living, not political faiths; a bilateral loyalty, not commercial or social projects. Yet it is an association for as noble a purpose as any involved in our prior decisions.

In Roe v. Wade (1973) and Doe v. Bolton (1973), the Court struck down Texas and Georgia laws respectively as unduly limiting abortion. In the first decision, it portrayed the right of privacy, "whether it be founded in the Fourteenth Amendment's concept of personal liberty and restrictions upon state action, as we feel it is, or, as the District Court determined, in the Ninth Amendment's reservation of rights to the people," as "broad enough to encompass a woman's decision whether or not to terminate her pregnancy." However, the Court went on to spell out how the state's interest in protecting potential life justifies the establishment of progressively tighter restrictions on the choice of abortion as one moves from the first trimester of pregnancy through the second to the third.

Douglas wrote a opinion concurring with both decisions, in which he listed three broad groups of fundamental rights that he deemed to be "aspects of" the constitutionally protected right of privacy. Those in the first group are absolute,

35 381 U.S. 479 (1965), 485-86.
36 Ibid., 486.
37 410 U.S. 113 (1973). The majority opinion was written by Justice Harry Blackmun.
38 410 U.S. 179 (1973). The majority opinion was written by Justice Harry Blackmun.
39 On the Fourteenth Amendment's requirement that the Fifth Amendment's guarantee of liberty be respected by the states, see our preceding discussion of Poe v. Ullman. The Ninth Amendment reads as follows: "The enumeration in the Constitution of certain rights shall not be construed to deny or disparage others retained by the people."
subject to no restriction whatsoever: "the [rights of] autonomous control over the development and expression of one's intellect, interests, tastes, and personality." Douglas portrayed these rights as protected by the First, Fifth, and Ninth Amendments. Rights in the second and third groups, though also fundamental, are subject to some regulation by the state: "freedom of choice in the basic decisions of one's life respecting marriage, divorce, procreation, contraception, and the education and upbringing of children"; and "the freedom to care for one's health and person, freedom from bodily restraint or compulsion, freedom to walk, stroll, or loaf." He portrayed these rights as protected by the Fourth Amendment. 41

2.3. The View of Robert Bork

In Robert Bork's judgment, there is no constitutionally protected right of privacy. Now, persons who assert the non-existence of something do not usually build their case by presenting positive arguments of their own. Rather, they proceed by challenging the arguments of their opponents, who assert the thing's existence. Bork's approach to the right of privacy fits this mold. Most prominent in his treatment of the issue are not the reasons he offers in favor of the claim that a constitutionally guaranteed right of privacy does not exist, but rather the flaws he alleges in the arguments of those who claim that it does exist. Those whose arguments he challenges in this way include both individuals and, often enough, the Supreme Court itself. Let us consider four instances of Supreme Court reasoning that he criticizes, often colorfully. 42

First, in reflecting on Griswold v. Connecticut, where the Supreme Court struck down the state law prohibiting use of contraceptives, 43 Bork contends that Justice Douglas' majority opinion rests on manifestly faulty logic. Douglas begins by citing several limited rights explicitly guaranteed by specific amendments, none of which however is violated by the Connecticut law. From here he proceeds to a general right of privacy that supposedly both has implicit constitutional status and is violated by the Connecticut law. Unfortunately, however, Douglas makes

41 Ibid., 211-13.
42 For my account of Bork both here and later in this essay, I rely chiefly on Robert Bork, The Tempting of America: The Political Seduction of the Law (New York: Free Press, 1990), the book written in the years immediately following the Senate's refusal to confirm Bork's appointment to the Supreme Court. It provides an ample resume of his views regarding a constitutional right of privacy (and much else as well).
43 See above, note 29.
the crucial move from particular rights to general right not through careful reasoning but rather through bare assertion—or, more exactly, invention.

None of the amendments cited, and none of their buffer or penumbral zones, covered the case before the Court. The Connecticut statute was not invalid under any provision of the Bill of Rights, no matter how extended. Since the statute in question did not threaten any guaranteed freedom, it did not fall within any “emanation” ... Justice Douglas bypassed that seemingly insuperable difficulty by simply asserting that the various separate “zones of privacy” created by each separate provision of the Bill of Rights somehow created a general but wholly undefined “right of privacy” that is independent of and lies outside any right or “zone of privacy” to be found in the Constitution. Douglas did not explain how it was that the Framers created five or six specific rights that could, with considerable stretching, be called “privacy,” and, though the Framers chose not to create more, the Court could nevertheless invent a general right of privacy that the Framers had, inexplicably, left out.44

The right of privacy affirmed by the Court in Griswold not only lacks an adequate constitutional foundation, continues Bork, it also is dangerously vague in scope. The unclarity about what it covers leaves it prone to being simply a vehicle for imposing Supreme Court justices’ personal preferences regarding privacy on American society.

The Court majority said there was now a right of privacy but did not even intimate an answer to the question, “Privacy to do what?” People often take addictive drugs in private, some men physically abuse their wives and children in private, executives conspire to fix prices in private, Mafiosi confer with their button men in private. If these sound bizarre, one professor at a prominent law school has suggested that the right of privacy may create a right to engage in prostitution. Moreover, as we shall see, the Court has extended the right of privacy to activities that can in no sense be said to be done in private. The truth is that “privacy” will turn out to protect those activities that enough Justices to form a majority think ought to be protected and not activities with which they have little sympathy.45

After the Griswold decision striking down the Connecticut law against the use of contraceptives, Massachusetts passed a law limiting the distribution of contraceptives. Contraceptives could be given out only by prescription, and only

44 The Tempting of America, 98.
to married persons in order to prevent pregnancy, or to married or unmarried persons in order to prevent the spread of disease. In *Eisenstadt v. Baird* (1972), the Supreme Court reversed the conviction of a man who was charged under this law for giving a sample of vaginal foam to a member of the audience following his public lecture on overpopulation. The Court also invalidated the law itself, arguing that in effect it applied the right of privacy differently to married and unmarried persons and thus violated the Fourteenth Amendment's guarantee of equal protection of the laws. "If the right of privacy means anything, it is the right of the individual, married or single, to be free from unwarranted governmental intrusion into matters so fundamentally affecting a person as the decision whether to bear or beget a child." While Justice Douglas agreed with the majority's conclusion, he wrote a concurring opinion arguing that the particular case at issue could be decided on narrower, strictly First Amendment grounds.

Bork observes that the *Eisenstadt* decision notably broadens the scope of the alleged constitutional right of privacy. A right that *Griswold* portrayed as covering the relationship of married persons now is portrayed as extending to the individual desires of any person. Nonetheless, he maintains, this broadened version of the right of privacy, like the earlier version, is without constitutional basis.

> [T]he argument of the Court shifted from the sanctity of a basic institution, marriage, to the sanctity of individual desires. The unmarried individual has, as a matter of fact, the freedom to decide whether to bear or beget a child, of course, because he or she has the right to choose whether or not to copulate. But that did not seem enough to the Court, perhaps because copulation should not be burdened either by marital status or by abstinence from its pleasures. There may or may not be something to be said for this as a matter of morality, but there is nothing to be said for it as constitutional law. The Constitution simply does not address the subject.\(^{48}\)

Third, Bork notes that the Supreme Court's decision in *Roe v. Wade* further expands the scope of the alleged constitutional right of privacy, so that it now includes the right to have an abortion. He goes on to argue, however, that both in failing to specify the textual basis of this expanded right and in presuming to limit

\(^{46}\) 405 U.S. 438 (1972). The majority opinion was written by Justice William Brennan.

\(^{47}\) 405 U.S. 438, 453 (1972).

\(^{48}\) *Ibid.*, 111.

\(^{49}\) See above, note 37.
it, the decision manifests that the driving force behind it is not the Constitution but rather the justices’ own moral and political views. Worse still, the validity of those views is simply taken for granted: no justification for them is offered.

The Court did not even feel obliged to settle the question of where the right of privacy or the subsidiary right to abort is to be attached to the Constitution’s text. The opinion seems to regard that as a technicality that really does not matter, and indeed it does not, since the right does not come out of the Constitution but is forced into it.50

The Roe opinion ... legislated the rules the Court considered appropriate for abortions by balancing the interests of the woman and those of the state. To do that, of course, the Court had implicitly to decide which interests were legitimate and how much weight should be ascribed to each one. That, being unguided by the Constitution, was an exercise in moral and political philosophy, or would have been if some reasoning had been articulated.51

Our fourth example of Supreme Court reasoning about privacy that Bork finds defective is Justice Harry Blackmun’s minority opinion, joined by three other justices, in Bowers v. Hardwick (1986).52 Under a Georgia law that made all sodomy criminal, a man had been convicted for engaging in homosexual sodomy in his own home; and the Court, by a 5-4 majority, upheld the conviction. Blackmun objected that this finding ignored previous Court determinations that the right of privacy covers both “certain decisions that are properly for the individual to make,” and “certain places without regard for the particular activities in which the individuals who occupy them are engaged.”53 Typical of the kinds of individual decisions protected are those regarding one’s “intimate associations with others”;54 and foremost among the places protected is one’s own home, “a place to which the Fourth Amendment attaches special significance.”55 In Bork’s judgment, however, the minority opinion is simply mistaken in claiming a long history of constitutional protection of individual decisions about “intimate associations” right across the board. “Intimate associations,” of course,

50 Ibid., 114. Here Bork is lamenting that the Roe decision leaves open whether the right of privacy is based in the Fourteenth Amendment or the Ninth.
51 Ibid., 114-15.
52 478 U.S. (1986) 186. The majority opinion was written by Justice Byron White.
53 Ibid., 204.
54 Ibid., 206.
55 Ibid.
Is There a Constitutional Right of Privacy?

means sex. It has never been thought, until the rampant individualism of the modern era, that all individuals are entitled, as a matter of constitutional right, to engage in any form of sexual activity that appealed to them."56 And in moving from the Fourth Amendment’s explicit but limited guarantees regarding the home to an allegedly implicit special constitutional reverence for whatever is done in the home, the minority opinion repeats the logical mistake made earlier in Griswold, namely, unwarranted generalization. “When Justice Blackmun extrapolates from protections that exist to create a new protection not to be found in existing law, he performs precisely the same logical leap that enabled Justice Douglas to invent a right of privacy in the first place.”57

In sum, Bork contends that the purported constitutional right of privacy is the product not of interpretation but of invention. It comes not from the Supreme Court’s careful reading of the Constitution, but rather from various groups of justices’ reading their own moral and political values into the Constitution. Such judicial lawmaking is always an abuse of power, whether the values enacted be liberal or conservative; for the Constitution itself assigns the task of lawmaking to the legislative branch of government, not to the judicial branch. It remains that the Court’s trajectory from Griswold through Eisenstadt to Roe, a trajectory that a large minority would extend in Bowers, is a “left-liberal” one. It is the judicial expression of a one stance in the current American cultural struggle, an egalitarianism popular in today’s law schools and the federal judiciary, though not in American society at large. This egalitarianism has two tenets. The first is that the law must be used to enforce egalitarian social and economic results. Hence the proponents advocate legislated quotas to achieve equivalent social and economic outcomes for persons of different races, genders, physical or mental abilities, and so forth. The second is that the law cannot be used to enforce non-egalitarian moral standards. Hence the proponents advocate legislated relativism in such “moral” matters as sex, drugs, art, and religion. The Supreme Court’s “right of privacy” reasoning reflects the latter tenet of this “left-liberal” egalitarianism.

Roe became possible only because Griswold had created a new right, and anyone who reads Griswold can see that it was not an adjustment of an old principle to a new reality but the creation of a new principle by tour de force or, less politely, by sleight of hand. When we say that social

56 The Tempting of America, 122.
57 Ibid., 123.
circumstances have changed so as to require the evolution of doctrine to maintain the vigor of an existing principle we do not mean that society’s values are perceived by the judge to have changed so that it would be good to have a new constitutional principle. The difference is between protecting that privacy guaranteed by the fourth amendment ... and expanding that limited guarantee of privacy into a right not only to use contraceptives but to buy them, into a right to have an abortion, into a right, as four Justices of the Supreme Court would have it, to engage in homosexual conduct, into rights, as a number of professors would have it, to smoke marijuana and to engage in prostitution. If one cannot see where in that progression the adjustment of doctrine to protect an existing value ends and the creation of new values begins, then one should not aspire to be a judge or, for the matter of that, a law professor.58

2.4. The View of Laurence Tribe

Laurence Tribe agrees with Douglas and disagrees with Bork, maintaining that there is indeed a constitutional basis for the Supreme Court’s privacy decisions. Let me summarize eight key points of his explicit argument.59

First, Tribe contends that no justice is able to interpret the Constitution by referring simply to its words. For words have diverse meanings, and the words of the Constitution in particular are the most ambiguous precisely where they are the most important. Hence any justice, whether “liberal” or “conservative” in bent, inevitably imports something from beyond the Constitution’s words in specifying what those words mean.

The central flaw of strict constructionism is that words are inherently indeterminate—they can often be given more than one plausible meaning. ... [T]he meanings of the Constitution’s words are especially difficult to pin down. Many of its most precise commands are relatively trivial—such as the requirement that the President be thirty-five years old—while nearly all of its most important phrases are deliberate models of ambiguity


59 For my account of Tribe both here and later in this essay, I rely chiefly on Laurence Tribe and Michael Dorf, On Reading the Constitution (Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press, 1991). (Although this book is jointly written, Tribe is its senior contributor, and it reliably reflects stances taken by Tribe in other writings under his name alone.) I supplement this through reference to Laurence Tribe, Constitutional Choices (Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press, 1985); and Laurence Tribe, God Save This Honorable Court (New York: Random House, 1985).
... Such vague phrases not only invite but compel the Supreme Court to put meaning into the Constitution, not just to take it out. Judicial construction inevitably entails a major element of judicial creation.60

Second, however, Tribe vigorously affirms that pure judicial subjectivity has no place in proper Constitutional interpretation. The unexpressed factor a justice imports, the unwritten standard a justice invokes, must be something other than his or her own values. It must be some more-than-merely-personal rationale, some set of principles, that stands behind the words.

[To say that judicial construction inevitably entails a major element of judicial creation] is not to say that the Court is free to take the position of Humpty Dumpty, that “a word means just what I choose it to mean—neither more, nor less.” The Justices may not follow a policy of “anything goes” so long as it helps put an end to what they personally consider to be injustice. But the constitutional text is not enough—we need to search for, and explain our selection of, the principles behind the words.61

Third, Tribe argues that these “principles behind the words” cannot be identified, at least directly, with the views of the Constitution’s authors. Such an identification would contravene the Framers’ own intention that the meaning of the Constitution not remain fixed and static but that it develop and grow with the times. And it would contravene the interpretative practices of even “conservative” justices today, let alone “liberal” ones.

[The Constitution] is the grand charter of a democratic republic, the philosophical creed of a free people, and it was written in broad, even majestic language because it was written to evolve. The statesmen who wrote the Constitution meant the American experiment to endure without having to be reinvented with an endless series of explicit amendments to its basic blueprint.62

The belief that we must look beyond the specific views of the Framers to apply the Constitution to contemporary problems is not necessarily a ‘liberal’ position. Indeed, not even the most ‘conservative’ justices today

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60 God Save This Honorable Court, 42-43. Cf. 47, 48. See also On Reading the Constitution, 13-14, 66-69.
61 God Save This Honorable Court, 43. Cf. On Reading the Constitution, 14-18, 69.
62 God Save This Honorable Court, 45. Cf. On Reading the Constitution, 9-10.
believe in a jurisprudence of original intent that looks only to the Framers’ unenacted views about particular institutions or practices.\(^{63}\)

Fourth, Tribe also rejects the notion that the “principles behind the words” should be identified, at least directly, with the views of the Constitution’s authorized interpreters over the years—that is to say, with “precedent.” Such an identification would contravene the actual history of constitutional interpretation, a two hundred year period in which the Constitution’s normative meaning has regularly been identified neither with the personal views of the authors nor with the holdings of Supreme Court justices but only with the meaning that is somehow embedded in the text itself.

[H]istory serves to illuminate the text, but ... only the text itself is law.\(^{64}\)

Fifth, Tribe himself is disposed to identify the “principles behind the words” with certain values that the constitutional text itself spotlights, privileges, marks as special. In relation to given clauses, these privileged values constitute “a middle ground between the literal text of the Constitution and the purely subjective realm of the judge’s own values.”\(^{65}\) To his surprise, Tribe finds himself citing Robert Bork in favor of this identification.

Given his other published views, an unlikely but nonetheless truly eloquent spokesman for this approach was former Judge Bork ... Judge Bork distinguished the enterprise “of creating new constitutional rights” from that of attempting “to discern how the framers’ values, defined in the context of the world they knew, apply to the world we know.”\(^{66}\)

Sixth, just how does one implement Tribe’s proposal? Precisely how can an interpreter pin down concretely the privileged value that supposedly illuminates the meaning and application of this or that constitutional expression? Tribe’s suggestion is that the interpreter consider the given expression within the context of the Constitution as a whole, attempting to discern and spell out the implicit value, the unstated perspective, the unarticulated worldview from which that given expression flows as a conclusion flows from its premises.

\(^{63}\) Ibid., 13. Cf. 13-14.
\(^{64}\) Ibid., 11. Cf. 11-13, 70-73.
\(^{65}\) Ibid., 69.
\(^{66}\) Ibid. Tribe draws Bork’s remarks from his concurrence in Oilman v. Evans, a case he judged as a member of the Federal Court of Appeals for the District of Columbia Circuit: 750 F.2d 970 (D.C. Cir. 1984).
[O]ne way to go about identifying the central value or values implicit in a specific constitutional clause is to locate that clause within the overall structure of the rest of the Constitution—to ask whether the practices that are either mandated or proscribed by the Constitution presuppose some view without which these textual requirements are incoherent. 67

Seventh, Tribe maintains that the Constitution’s implicit values, unstated commitments, tacit affirmations, may include unexpressed assertions of rights. Like the implicit values generally, one arrives at these unenumerated rights “by drawing on other parts of the text, coupled with history.” 68 The history, as noted in points three and four above, is not part of the Constitution’s meaning; but historical retrievals of the political beliefs that were dominant when the text was written and adopted, and of how the Supreme Court over the years has interpreted the Constitution, can serve to illuminate the meaning that is contained in the words. 69

Eighth, employing the foregoing approach, Tribe asks rhetorically whether various parts of the Constitution read together, and especially the Bill of Rights, may not in all likelihood provide the explicit basis of the implicit value, unstated commitment, tacit affirmation, that has come to be labelled a “constitutional right of privacy.”

We can make progress toward the right way [of developing principles of privacy] by looking at the relationship among the Constitution’s provisions. Without seeking a grand, unified theory, we may usefully ask whether the Constitution’s textual commitment to privacy of the home, strongly evidenced by the Third Amendment and the Fourth Amendment, and its textual commitment to freedom of assembly, which the Court has had little difficulty extending to freedom of association under the First Amendment, together create a zone of privacy for associational intimacies in the home—not a zone of total immunity from government regulation, but a zone that the state cannot enter without special justification. 70

67 On Reading the Constitution, 69-70. Cf. 70-71. Tribe argues that if it is done properly, this type of interpretive reading will avoid both exaggerating the Constitution’s temporal and thematic diversity, the “fallacy of dis-integration,” and exaggerating its temporal and thematic unity, the “fallacy of hyper-integration.” (Ibid., 19-30. Cf. 58-60.)
68 Ibid., 59-60. Cf. 45-58. On meeting the problem of deciding between competing articulations, see Ibid., 73-79.
69 Ibid., 70-73. Cf. 11-13.
70 Ibid., 58-59.
Tribe’s answer to his rhetorical question is affirmative. The constitutional text as a whole, illuminated by the history of its original formulation and subsequent interpretation, has a clear orientation toward safeguarding the privacy of the home. This orientation provides a defensible foundation for the Supreme Court’s privacy decisions. Hence, those decisions should not be seen as the justices’ imposing their own values. On the contrary, later decisions such as Bowers v. Hardwick that run counter to the Constitution’s orientation toward safeguarding the privacy of the home are what illustrate the imposition of justices’ own values.

The historical evidence does show that the Supreme Court’s modern privacy jurisprudence has not been mere judicial fiat. When linked to the explicit textual protections for the home and for assembly, the background assumptions of the late eighteenth century provide a plausible basis for affirming the Supreme Court’s privacy decisions from the 1920’s through 1977, and for concluding that those decisions are right and that Hardwick is wrong.

3. AN UNDERLYING DISPUTE ABOUT THE NATURE OF TEXTUAL INTERPRETATION

3.1. Background

Having sketched something of the dispute over the existence of a constitutional right of privacy, I now turn to the second main part of my paper. I wish to suggest that behind the respective conclusions of Douglas, Bork, and Tribe regarding the constitutional question, and behind their respective specifically legal arguments for those conclusions, they maintain crucially different though easily overlooked pre-empirical presuppositions regarding the procedures and criteria of textual interpretation in general. Besides what they encounter in their respective efforts at constitutional interpretation, Douglas, Bork, and Tribe have certain prior convictions they bring to those efforts and by


72 Ibid., 60. When Bowers v. Hardwick was argued before the Supreme Court, Tribe himself was the lawyer who presented Hardwick’s case—unsuccessfully, as it turned out.
which they shape them. These pre-commitments, effective though not necessarily objectified, specify what steps one takes when one is interpreting any text, and what criterion those steps must satisfy if the interpretation is to be successful, sound, accurate. (Obviously this suggestion in turn reflects my own interpretations of Douglas, Bork, and Tribe.)

Three further precisions regarding pre-empirical presuppositions and how they are held may be useful at this point. First, envision some empirical claim I might make—for example, a claim about the existence of a constitutional right of privacy. In the introductory section of this paper, I have already suggested that the evidential basis of such a claim incorporates empirical data, my empirical presuppositions, and my special and general pre-empirical presuppositions. I now add that my pre-empirical presuppositions, both special and general, fall into two groups. The first and less fundamental group includes the pre-empirical stances that are conceptually, logically, theoretically presupposed by my empirical claim. In the present case, for example, the conceptual special pre-empirical presuppositions of my claim about the existence of a constitutional right of privacy are the pre-empirically presupposed general ideas regarding the steps and criterion of my successfully interpreting any text. Those ideas are conceptual, logical, theoretical elements of the evidence on which my interpretative claim is based, and they thereby contribute to that claim’s concrete meaning. The second and more fundamental group of presuppositions includes the pre-empirical stances that are operationally, methodically, practically presupposed by my empirical claim. In the present case, for example, the operational special pre-empirical presuppositions of my claim about the existence of a constitutional right of privacy are the pre-empirically presupposed concrete patterns of the steps and criterion of my successfully interpreting any text. Those patterns are operational, methodical, practical elements of the evidence on which my interpretative claim is based, and they thereby contribute to that claim’s concrete meaning.

Second, for one reason or another the concrete meaning of my empirical claim may end up embodying inconsistencies. For the purposes of this paper, the most important of these possible inconsistencies is one between my conceptual and my operational pre-empirical presuppositions. Whether in the line of special or of general presuppositions, such an inconsistency arises when the general ideas I presuppose are at odds with the concrete patterns I presuppose; and when that

73 In general, inconsistencies arise for cognitional reasons, moral reasons, or some combination of the two. To explore these reasons is beyond the scope of this paper.
happens, the concrete patterns effectively undercut, impugn, falsify the general ideas. To extend the earlier illustration, for example, the general ideas regarding successful textual interpretation that are conceptually presupposed by my claim about the existence of a constitutional right of privacy could be undercut by the concrete patterns of successful textual interpretation that are operationally presupposed by my successful performance as a textual interpreter. The conceptual, logical, theoretical presuppositions of my interpretative claim could be falsified by the operational, methodical, practical presuppositions of my successful interpretative praxis.

Third, I may stand in any of three possible situations regarding the extent to which I have spelled out the pre-empirical presuppositions of my empirical claim, made them explicit, reflexively objectified them. I may have spelled out (a) neither the conceptual nor the operational presuppositions, or (b) the conceptual presuppositions but not the operational ones, or (c) both the conceptual and the operational presuppositions. Even in the first situation (let alone the second and the third), however, where both my conceptual and my operational presuppositions remain implicit, they nonetheless are part of the evidential basis of my empirical claim and hence contribute to that claim’s concrete meaning. On the other hand, unless I attain the third situation, where both my conceptual and my operational presuppositions are explicit, any inconsistencies between them, and the resultant falsification of the conceptual presuppositions by the operational ones, remain just latent, simply tacit, merely implicit.

Assisted by the three foregoing precisions, I now can point out that my following accounts of Douglas, Bork, and Tribe articulate what I take to be the conceptual pre-empirical presuppositions of their respective conclusions regarding the existence of a constitutional right of privacy—first and more amply, their special presuppositions regarding textual interpretation; second and more briefly, their general presuppositions regarding knowing as such. It will be clear that, at least in my view, the respective sets of presuppositions differ in important ways.74

74 At this juncture, the reader might ask: Which of the respective sets of presuppositions, if any, is correct? To ask this question is to raise an issue that ultimately is inescapably autobiographical. For the proximate concrete truth-standards of the respective conceptual pre-empirical presuppositions of Douglas, Bork, and Tribe are nothing other than their respective operational pre-empirical presuppositions. But the ultimate concrete truth-standard of their respective operational pre-empirical presuppositions is nothing other than my own operational pre-empirical presuppositions. I will return to this issue briefly in the final main section of my paper.
I can also point out that the presuppositions I am imputing to Douglas, Bork, and Tribe are not articulated very fully in their writings—probably, I surmise, because they are not reflexively objectified very fully in their minds. Hence the presuppositions’ contributions to the concrete meanings of their respective written claims about the existence of a constitutional right of privacy remain largely just latent, tacit, implicit. Moreover, my own articulations of those presuppositions are interpretive constructions based on individual points that each of the three writers does make expressly, plus my own estimate of how those points most likely hang together. This means that my quotations from the three will usually not constitute conclusive evidence for my hypotheses, even in the eyes of a sympathetic reader. For in the nature of the case, evidence about a person’s largely unarticulated presuppositions will always be indirect and suggestive rather than direct and definitive. In the present instances, the basic though remote evidence I propose is that my hypotheses regarding the three interpreters’ respective pre-empirical presuppositions cohere uniquely with the respective assemblages of their articulated claims. For the reader to check that evidence, she must read widely in the writings of all three. The subsidiary evidence I propose consists of the more immediate logical presuppositions of certain explicit claims the three interpreters do make about specifically constitutional interpretation. Even here, however, the evidence sometimes remains just indirect, since those presuppositions (especially in the case of Bork) sometimes are discernible only as the opposites of stances the three argue expressly against.

3.2. The View of Robert Bork

I move now to amplify my suggestion that behind their respective claims regarding the existence of a constitutional right of privacy, Douglas, Bork, and

75 As one might expect, given the fact that Douglas spent most of his adult life as a Supreme Court justice, his writings are devoted far more to judicial decisions than to reflections on the process of arriving at them. Bork and Tribe, on the other hand, have written at some length on that process. But none of the three has offered more than a few remarks, here and there, concerning a general theory of textual interpretation.

76 It is worth spelling out an interpretational principle I will be employing here. If a person expressly affirms Y but not X, and if Y nonetheless conceptually presupposes X, then I can interpret that person as tacitly affirming X, unless the person (albeit inconsistently) expressly denies X (or, in my judgment, would deny it if asked).

77 In offering evidence for my account of Douglas, though not of Bork or Tribe, I introduce some material from reputable secondary sources. I do this to compensate at least partly for the difference mentioned in note 75, above.
Tribe maintain crucially different though easily overlooked pre-empirical presuppositions regarding the nature of textual interpretation in general. To keep my accounts concise and to facilitate comparisons, I will use a brief syllogism to highlight what I take to be the fundamental relationship of claim and presuppositions in each of the three cases.\textsuperscript{78} Because I judge it the least complex of the three, I will begin with Bork's view.

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\textbf{The Structure of Bork’s Argument} \\
1. If and only if I \textit{genuinely} know the fundamental sense of a text, then what I know is the true fundamental sense of that text; and the relations between the elements of that true fundamental sense are isomorphic with the relations between the acts of my genuine knowing of it. \\
2. The acts I experience myself performing when I genuinely come to know the fundamental sense of a text are (a) \textit{attentively experiencing} the words, plus (b)—\textit{prompted} and \textit{guided} by those words—\textit{attentively intuiting} and \textit{deducing} the primary meaning the writer \textit{displayed directly} and \textit{indirectly through} them. \\
\hspace{1cm} A. Therefore, the true fundamental sense of a text is the primary meaning that the writer displayed directly and indirectly through the words—words I attentively experience—and that, prompted and guided by those words, I attentively intuit and deduce. \\
3. The primary meaning that the authors displayed directly and indirectly through the words of the U.S. Constitution—words I attentively experience—and that, prompted and guided by those words, I attentively intuit and deduce, \textit{does not include} the assertion of a right of privacy. \\
\hspace{1cm} B. Therefore, the true fundamental sense of U.S. Constitution \textit{does not include} the assertion of a right of privacy. \\
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\textsuperscript{78} For these syllogistic summaries, I adopt the convention of using numbers to indicate premises, and letters to indicate conclusions. In each of the summaries, the important steps are those headed by numbers, the premises. The steps headed by letters simply spell out the conclusions. Also recall note 5, above.
3.2.1. My Summary’s First Three Steps

Let me begin with the first premise of my syllogistic summary of Bork, a premise identical to the first premises of my summaries of Douglas and Tribe. By “text” I mean an ordered set of written words that is not only somehow intelligible but that is able somehow to disclose experiences, understandings, judgments, evaluations, and/or decisions. By “fundamental sense” I mean the meaning (whether simple or compound) that is basic, central, essential, rather than secondary, peripheral, incidental. By “genuinely” I mean validly, successfully, with epistemic objectivity. By “true” I mean real, actual, factual, noumenally objective.

This premise is a functional specification of the true fundamental sense of a text. Its aim is to make clear a twofold point. First, like Douglas and Tribe and everyone else, Bork inevitably (though perhaps without being reflexively aware it) approaches the task of interpreting a text with the pre-empirical presupposition that what he is aiming to know is nothing other than the basic meaning that would be attributed to the text by an interpreter whose knowing is genuine, valid, successful, epistemically objective. What is the true fundamental sense of a text? Whatever else you want to say about it, it is the basic meaning that a successful interpreter would grasp. Second, the overall structure of that meaning is prefigured by the overall structure of successful textual interpreting, regardless what each turns out exactly to be. Although this twofold point becomes obvious when you ponder it carefully, the advantage of stating it up front is that it highlights what otherwise is prone to be overlooked, namely, the foundational primacy of interpretational praxis. Indeterminately but inescapably and exhaustively, the procedures and criteria employed by the successful textual interpreter foreshadow, anticipate, specify in advance what any textual interpreter is looking for.

The second premise of each summary is that summary’s most significant step. For it articulates what I take Bork, Douglas, and Tribe respectively to presuppose that successful textual interpreting involves; and the differences between them on this issue underpin their differences on the remaining issues. Let me draw out three points I am proposing in the second premise of my summary of Bork.

First, Bork does not doubt that at least on occasion successful textual interpreting does indeed occur. He presupposes that a concrete subject is present to herself as one whose interpretational effort sometimes is genuine, valid,
epistemically objective, rather than merely apparent, invalid, epistemically just subjective.

Second, Bork envisages textual interpreting as involving two main steps. In the initial step the interpreter encounters a text as text, a text not simply as an ordered set of marks that somehow indicates intelligibility but as a human artifact whose words somehow are able to manifest something of the meanings that previous users employed them to express. Then, both spurred and governed by the words of that text, in a subsequent step the interpreter grasps the primary meaning (whether simple or compound) that the text's writer displayed through the vehicle of those words. She grasps that primary meaning immediately, straightaway, intuitively, insofar as the writer displayed it directly, explicitly, in so many words. She grasps it mediately, discursively, through logical deduction, insofar as the writer displayed it just indirectly, merely by conceptual implication, without verbal explicitness.

Third, Bork presupposes that textual interpreting is genuine, valid, successful, epistemically objective, precisely because and insofar as it is attentive, heedful, observant. An interpreter meets the criterion of successful interpreting by submissively taking in all that is "objective," and scrupulously disregarding all that is "subjective." Hence at the step of experiencing, she pays attention to all the words of the text, but only those words, and to all the meanings commonly associated with those words in the era when the text was written, but only those meanings. And at the step of intuiting and deducing, she attends in its fullness to the primary meaning that the text's writer displayed through the words, and only to that meaning. In particular, she prescinds from all intentions that the writer may have had but did not display through the words. She ignores all significance that may have accrued to the text from the labors of subsequent interpreters. And not least importantly, she sets aside her own opinions, predilections, and biases, and restrains her own imagination. In sum, interpretational epistemic objectivity always presupposes total interpretational non-subjectivity.79

The initial conclusion of my summary of Bork follows from the pre-empirical presuppositions expressed in the first two premises. The true fundamental sense of a text is identical with the primary meaning that the writer displayed directly and indirectly through the words of that text. This is exactly the meaning I grasp insofar as my experiencing of the words is attentive, and insofar as my intuited

79 To facilitate later comparisons, I should emphasize that the expression "interpretational non-subjectivity" excludes activity (by contrast with mere passivity) on the part of the interpreting subject, though in the case of Bork (as I understand him) it excludes not only that.
and deducing of the dominant meaning toward which those words prompt and
guide me are likewise attentive. Moreover, just as the true fundamental sense is
displayed through the words but in no way constituted by them, so also my
successful grasping of that true fundamental sense is extrinsically conditioned by
my attentive experiencing but in no way constituted by it.

3.2.2. The Evidence for My Interpretation of Bork

For the reasons indicated at the end of Section 3.1, it is not an easy matter to
show conclusively that Bork is committed to these two general interpretational
premises and their conclusion. I suggest, however, that such a commitment is
intimated by his proffered grounds for denying the existence of a constitutional
right of privacy, grounds we have already glimpsed in Section 2.3. I suggest as
well that such a commitment is logically presupposed by certain claims he makes
about constitutional interpretation in general. For example, the conviction that a
text’s true fundamental sense is nothing other than primary meaning the writer
displayed through the words seems plain in Bork’s insistence that the successful
constitutional interpreter seeks a meaning “having explicit textual support,”80 a
meaning “rooted in the text or structure of the Constitution,”81 “the meaning
understood at the time of the law’s enactment,”82 “the original meaning of the
words,” “the meaning the lawmakers were understood to have intended,”83 the
meaning that was a matter of “public understanding [at the time],” not “subjective
intentions [of the lawmakers].”84

The conviction that this true fundamental sense is unrelated to the
interpreter’s knowledge of other matters seems illustrated by Bork’s denial that
successful constitutional interpretation relies on the interpreter’s own “academic”
knowledge,85 or her assessment of current social needs,86 or even to her supposed
knowledge of the natural law. “I am far from denying that there is a natural law,
but I do deny both that we have given judges the authority to enforce it and that

81 Ibid., 120. Cf. 166, 179.
82 Ibid., 144. Cf. 5.
83 Ibid., 145. Cf. 162-63.
84 Ibid., 144.
85 Ibid., 192, 254-56, 355.
86 Ibid., 264.
judges have any greater access to that law than do the rest of us. Judges, like the rest of us, are apt to confuse their strongly held beliefs with the order of nature."

The conviction that this true fundamental sense is unrelated to the interpreter's own values seems obvious in Bork's fervent and repeated claims that the successful constitutional interpreter pursues "a meaning independent of our own desires [as interpreters]." It is a meaning that is consonant with judicial neutrality "in deriving, defining, and applying principle." It is the meaning that, as governed by the text itself, constitutes a salutary limitation on the arrogance of interpreters, even interpreters who invoke "tradition and morality" as their guides.

Whatever line-drawing must be done starts from a solid base, the guarantee of freedom of speech, of freedom from unreasonable searches and seizures, and the like. By contrast, judge-created phrases specify no particular freedom, but merely assure us, in sonorous phrases, that they, the judges, will know what freedoms are required when the time comes. One would think something more is required as the starting place for a line of reasoning that leads to the negation of statutes duly enacted by elected representatives. 'Ordered liberty' is a splendid phrase but not a major premise.

The judge who states that tradition and morality are his guides ... leaves himself free to pick through them for those particular freedoms that he prefers. History and tradition are very capacious suitcases, and a judge may find a good deal pleasing to himself packed into them, if only because he has packed the bags himself.

3.2.3. My Summary's Last Two Steps

With its third premise, my summary moves from the pre-empirical to the empirical line. This premise simply spells out something that, in Section 2.3, we have already seen Bork effectively affirm by rejecting its dialectical opposite. What does he think a successful interpreter discovers about what the

88 Ibid., 143. Cf. 178, 220-21, 252, 262.
89 Ibid., 146ff.
90 Ibid., 118.
91 Ibid., 119.
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Constitution's authors92 intended regarding a right of privacy? In Bork's firm view, the primary meaning those authors displayed via the constitutional text neither expressly contains nor logically implies the assertion of such a right.

The summary's final step portrays Bork's stance on the privacy issue as a conclusion based upon the three preceding premises and one preceding conclusion that I have articulated. In other words, Bork's denial that the assertion of a right of privacy belongs to the Constitution's veritable fundamental sense is a denial with precisely the meaning that derives from the set of those prior syllogistic steps, both pre-empirical and empirical, and with exactly the grounds that are provided by that same set of steps.

3.3. The View of William O. Douglas

Next, let me turn to the interpretational stance I am imputing to Douglas.

3.3.1. My Summary's First Three Steps

The first premise of my summary of Douglas, identical to that of my summaries of Bork and Tribe, specifies the true fundamental sense of a text in terms of the acts through which it would be known. The true fundamental sense—of a text is the basic meaning that would be grasped by an interpreter whose knowing is genuine, valid, successful, epistemically objective; and the global structure of that basic meaning is prefigured by the global structure of such interpreting. At least operationally, if not always with reflexive awareness, every would-be interpreter approaches her task with this presupposition already in place.

The second and most important premise of my summary spells out what I think Douglas presupposes successful textual interpreting to include. Let me highlight three points I am attributing to him.

First, Douglas is not an interpretational skeptic. Like Bork, he presupposes that not all textual interpreting is merely apparent, invalid, unsuccessful, epistemically just subjective. On the contrary: genuine, valid, successful, epistemically objective textual interpreting at least sometimes actually does take place.

92 I use the word "authors" to include both the Framers and those who wrote and ratified the subsequent amendments.
The Structure of Douglas' Argument

1. If and only if I genuinely know the fundamental sense of a text, then what I know is the true fundamental sense of that text; and the relations between the elements of that true fundamental sense are isomorphic with the relations between the acts of my genuine knowing of it.

2. The acts I experience myself performing when I genuinely come to know the fundamental sense of a text are (a) attentively experiencing the words, plus (b)—prompted and guided by those words—attentively intuiting and deducing the primary meaning the writer and/or subsequent interpreters displayed directly and indirectly through them, AND/OR (c) discerning at best attentively or inventing at best creatively some extra-textual meaning and ascribing it at best responsibly to those words as their primary meaning.

A. Therefore, the true fundamental sense of a text is the primary meaning that the writer and/or subsequent interpreters displayed directly and indirectly through the words—words I attentively experience—and that, prompted and guided by those words, I attentively intuit and deduce, AND/OR the extra-textual meaning that I discern at best attentively or invent at best creatively and ascribe at best responsibly to those words as their primary meaning.

3. The primary meaning that the authors and/or subsequent interpreters displayed directly and indirectly through the words of the U.S. Constitution—words I attentively experience—and that, prompted and guided by those words, I attentively intuit and deduce, AND/OR the extra-textual meaning that I discern at best attentively or invent at best creatively and ascribe at best responsibly to those words as their primary meaning, includes the assertion of a right of privacy.

B. Therefore, the true fundamental sense of the U.S. Constitution includes the assertion of a right of privacy.
Second, Douglas presupposes that textual interpreting includes as many as three main steps. In the initial step the interpreter encounters a text as text, a text as a human product whose words somehow are capable of disclosing something of the meanings that previous users employed them to express. (Thus far, what Douglas envisions is the same as what Bork envisions.) This initial step is followed by either or both of two possible subsequent steps.

One possible subsequent step is similar to a step envisioned by Bork, though not identical with it. Both impelled and oriented by the words of the text, the interpreter grasps the primary meaning (whether simple or compound) that the text’s writer and/or intervening interpreters displayed through the vehicle of the words. That is to say, a text as encountered by a given interpreter may have had meanings displayed through it not only by the person who wrote it but also by later persons who read it; and which of those meanings (or combination of them) is now the primary meaning emerges case by case for the interpreter. Moreover, insofar as the primary meaning has been displayed directly, explicitly, in so many words, the interpreter grasps it immediately, straightaway, intuitively. Insofar as it has been displayed just indirectly, merely by conceptual implication, without verbal explicitness, she grasps it mediately, discursively, through logical deduction.

The other possible subsequent step is quite different from anything Bork would count as part of textual interpreting. Discerning or inventing some extra-textual meaning, the interpreter ascribes it to the words of the text as their primary meaning (whether simple or compound). In other words, textual interpreting can have a certain resemblance to artistic producing. The interpreter’s quest for the meaning of a text need not be confined to the meanings that other persons have displayed through its words. It can include (or, in the limit, be concerned solely with) a meaning that she herself discovers or originates and then imputes to those words, like an artist configuring the materials at her disposal. And just as the dominant configuration of the materials can include (or even be simply) the configuration now given them by the artist, whatever the prior configurations they may have had, so the primary meaning of the words can include (or even be simply) the meaning now given them by the interpreter, whatever the prior meanings they may have had. Whether in a given instance the primary meaning of a text actually does include (or, in the limit, is nothing other than) a meaning given it by the interpreter is something that emerges case by case for the interpreter.
Third, Douglas has a twofold presupposition regarding the genuinity, validity, successfulness, epistemic objectivity of textual interpreting. Insofar as the primary meaning is a meaning displayed through the text by the writer and/or intervening interpreters, the criterion of successful interpreting is attentiveness, heedfulness, alertness. (In this regard, Douglas' presupposition is similar to Bork's.) But insofar as the primary meaning is a meaning ascribed to the text by the present interpreter, the criterion of successful interpreting is satisfied by whatever interpreting actually occurs. Every ascription is genuine, valid, epistemically objective. Like an artist's discernment or invention of a pattern and her subsequent configuration of materials according to that pattern, an interpreter's discernment or invention of a meaning and her subsequent ascription of that meaning to a text proceed at best attentively, creatively, and responsibly. Or, in a word, they proceed at best authentically—at best in a way that is faithful to the interpreter's own fundamental beliefs, values, and emotions. But even if the steps that culminate with the ascription of meaning happen to be inauthentic, the ascription remains epistemically objective. For just as the artistic act of configuring materials includes genuinely knowing the pattern in light of which one does the configuring, whether the emergence and employment of that pattern are defective in certain other respects or not, so the interpretational act of ascribing a meaning to a text includes genuinely knowing the meaning one ascribes, whether the emergence and ascription of that meaning are defective in certain other respects or not. In sum, where "interpretational subjectivity" indicates activity (by contrast with mere passivity) on the part of the interpreting subject, interpretational epistemic objectivity always presupposes total interpretational non-subjectivity. (In this regard, Douglas' presupposition is markedly at odds with Bork's.)

The initial conclusion of my summary of Douglas follows from the preempirical presuppositions spelled out in the first two premises. The true fundamental sense of a text is identical with the primary meaning that the writer and/or intervening interpreters displayed directly and indirectly through the words of that text, AND/OR the extra-textual meaning that I as present interpreter ascribe to the words as their primary meaning. This primary meaning is exactly what I grasp insofar as, prompted and guided by the words that I experience attentively, I intuit and deduce attentively the dominant meaning toward which those words prompt and guide me, AND/OR insofar as I myself ascribe a meaning to those words as their dominant meaning. Moreover, just as the true fundamental sense is displayed through and/or ascribed to the words but in no
way constituted by them, so also my successful grasping of that true fundamental sense is extrinsically conditioned by my (attentive) experiencing but in no way constituted by it.

3.3.2. The Evidence for My Interpretation of Douglas

What is the evidence that Douglas is committed to these two general interpretational premises and their conclusion? As indicated at the end of Section 3.1, in the nature of the case the evidence is primarily indirect and suggestive rather than direct and definitive. What I propose as the basic evidence, namely, the unique coherence of the premises and conclusion with the aggregate of Douglas' writings, stands out only when one reads widely in those writings. Some subsidiary evidence, on the other hand, is manifest both in the reasons Douglas gives for affirming the existence of a constitutional right of privacy, reasons we have already caught sight of in Section 2.2, and in the logical presuppositions of certain claims he makes about constitutional interpretation in general.

For example, in a winningly frank admission found in Douglas' autobiographical review of his years on the Supreme Court, one sees evidence of the conviction that a text's true fundamental sense can be a meaning that the interpreter ascribes to the words as their primary meaning mainly because she prefers it.

"[Chief Justice Charles Evans] Hughes made a statement to me which at the time was shattering but which over the years turned out to be true: 'Justice Douglas, you must remember one thing. At the constitutional level where we work, ninety percent of any decision is emotional. The rational part of us supplies the reasons for supporting our predilections.'

I had thought of the law in the terms of Moses—principles chiseled in granite. I knew judges had predilections. I knew that their moods as well as their minds were ingredients of their decisions. But I had never been willing to admit to myself that the 'gut' reaction of a judge at the level of constitutional adjudications ... was the main ingredient of his decision. The admission of it destroyed in my mind some of the reverence for the immutable principles. But they were supplied by Constitutions written by people in conventions, not by judges. Judges ... represent ideological schools of thought that are highly competitive. No judge at the level I speak of was neutral."\(^93\)

Again, in Douglas’ appeal to the realm of natural rights in his effort to explain
and justify a constitutional right of privacy, and in his general practice of making
current social needs an important factor in his constitutional findings, one sees
evidence of the conviction that the meaning the successful interpreter ascribes to
the words as their primary meaning can be determined by an extra-textual fact,
order, or situation she has come to know.

Douglas saw an organic interconnection between the natural and legal
world, between the Constitution and basic human rights ... He saw the
constitutional right of privacy as an instance of a broader natural right of
privacy, which people from all parts of the world and all walks of life
share as an attribute of their humanity.94

Douglas ... did not hesitate to look beyond the explicit language of the
Constitution to protect what he considered to be the contemporary needs
of the nation.95

Still further, in Douglas’ acknowledged readiness to replace constitutional
precedents with meanings he himself judges more in tune with the times, one sees
evidence of the conviction that the meaning the successful interpreter ascribes to
the words as their primary meaning can be determined by a choice she has made.

I once said, to the consternation of a group of lawyers, that I’d rather
create a precedent than find one, because the creation of a precedent in
terms of the modern setting means the adjustment of the Constitution to
the needs of the time.96

When the law is wrong, Douglas wrote in a telling passage of An Almanac
[of Liberty], it ought to be changed. Judges had often used precedent to
preserve the status quo, at the expense of human rights. That was bad

Wasby, ed., *He Shall Not Pass This Way Again*: The Legacy of Justice William O. Douglas
(Pittsburgh: University of Pittsburgh Press, 1990), 166. Cf. 165-66. Also see above, Section 2.2,
as well as Howard Ball and Phillip J. Cooper, *Of Power and Right: Hugo Back, William O.
Douglas, and America’s Constitutional Revolution* (New York: Oxford University Press, 1992),
279.
& Row, 1980), 349.
96 William O. Douglas, in “Mr. Justice Douglas,” a radio program in the series CBS Reports,
taped on September 6, 1972, p. 13 of the transcript (cited in Duram, *Justice William O. Douglas*,
131).
policy and worse constitutional law. "The Constitution is written in general terms," wrote Douglas. "The language gathers meaning from a judge's experience and philosophy. What other judges may have said it meant cannot be binding on the newcomer. For the Constitution was written for all ages."  

3.3.3. My Summary's Last Two Steps

Following the pattern established earlier in my summary of Bork, with its third premise my summary of Douglas moves from the pre-empirical to the empirical line. It spells out what Douglas effectively if not altogether explicitly thinks a successful present interpreter grasps about the relationship of the constitutional text, the intentions of the Constitution's authors and intervening interpreters, the interpreter's own ascriptive intentions, and the right of privacy. In his view, the primary meaning the authors and/or intervening interpreters displayed via the constitutional text, AND/OR the meaning that I as present interpreter ascribe to that text as its primary meaning, includes the assertion of a right of privacy.

The summary's final step portrays Douglas' stance on the privacy issue as a conclusion based upon the three preceding premises and one preceding conclusion that I have laid out. That is to say, Douglas' view that the assertion of a right of privacy is part of the true fundamental sense of the Constitution is a view with precisely the meaning that derives from the set of those prior syllogistic steps, both pre-empirical and empirical, and with exactly the grounds that are provided by that same set of steps.

3.4. The View of Laurence Tribe

Now let me turn to the interpretational stance I am imputing to Tribe.

3.4.1. My Summary's First Three Steps

The first premise of my summary of Tribe is identical in wording and rationale to the respective first premises of my summaries of Bork and Douglas, which I have already discussed. Hence nothing further need be said about it here.

97 Simon, Independent Journey, 342. Cf. Ball and Cooper, Of Power and Right, 280-81. On my hypothesis, Douglas views himself as doing what any successful interpreter of the Constitution could do, except that insofar as he is part of a majority of Supreme Court justices on a given interpretational issue his interpretation is not simply correct but also legally binding. (For more on this point, see Glancy, "Douglas's Right of Privacy," 164-65.)
The Structure of Tribe's Argument

1. If and only if I genuinely know the fundamental sense of a text, then what I know is the true fundamental sense of that text; and the relations between the elements of that true fundamental sense are isomorphic with the relations between the acts of my genuine knowing of it.

2. The acts I experience myself performing when I genuinely come to know the fundamental sense of a text are (a) attentively experiencing the words, plus (b) intelligently forming a hypothesis about the primary meaning the writer both intended and managed to embody in those words, plus (c) reasonably affirming the noumenal objectivity of that hypothesis.

A. Therefore, the true fundamental sense of a text is a composite of the words that I attentively experience, plus the hypothesis that I intelligently form about the primary meaning the writer both intended and managed to embody in those words, plus the noumenal objectivity (of that hypothesis) that I reasonably affirm.

3. The written words of the U.S. Constitution are words I attentively experience, the hypothesis I intelligently form about those words is that the primary meaning the authors both intended and managed to embody in them includes the assertion of a right of privacy, and the noumenal objectivity of that hypothesis is something I reasonably affirm.

B. Therefore, the true fundamental sense of the U.S. Constitution includes the assertion of a right of privacy.

The second premise, as always, is the most significant. It lays out what I think Tribe presupposes successful textual interpreting to include. As in my previous accounts, I will amplify three points from this premise.

First, Tribe is no more an interpretational skeptic than Bork or Douglas. Like them, he presupposes that genuine, valid, successful, epistemically objective textual interpreting at least sometimes actually does happen.
Second, Tribe presupposes that textual interpreting comprises three main steps. In the first main step, the interpreter encounters a text as text, a text as a human artifact whose words somehow are able to indicate something of the meanings that previous users employed them to express. (Thus far, what Tribe thinks does not differ from what Bork and Douglas think.)

In the second main step, the interpreter constructs a possible answer to this question: What is the central meaning (whether simple or compound) that the writer of this text both aimed to embody in words and succeeded in embodying in these words? Just as an art work is fundamentally composed of the pattern the artist has given to the materials plus the materials to which that pattern has been given, so a text is fundamentally composed of the meaning the writer has given to the words plus the words to which that meaning has been given. Furthermore, just as the actual pattern of the artistic composite is not simply the pattern the artist had in mind but, more precisely, a pattern conditioned both by her skill at artistically actualizing what she had in mind and by the potentialities of the materials available to her when she produced the art work, so the actual meaning of the textual composite is not simply the meaning the writer had in mind but, more precisely, a meaning conditioned both by her skill at linguistically actualizing what she had in mind and by the potentialities of the words available to her when she wrote the text. Finally, just as the artistic interpreter's second main step is making an informed guess about the dominant pattern the artist may have both aimed to give and succeeded in giving to the materials that now belong to this artistic composite, so the textual interpreter's second main step is making an informed guess about the dominant meaning the writer may have both aimed to give and succeeded in giving to the words that now belong to this textual composite.

In the third main step, the interpreter confirms his possible answer to the earlier question. She verifies her informed guess about the central meaning the writer aimed to embody in words and succeeded in embodying in these words when she wrote the text. She affirms the content of her hypothesis as actual, factual, noumenally objective. Just as the artistic interpreter’s native verificational

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98 (a) I would not deny that writing a text is, in important respects, not simply like producing an art work: it is producing an art work. However, the thrust of the present contention is clearest if, rather than immediately assimilating writing to artistic producing in general, one compares it with to such specific arts as painting and sculpting. (b) As we shall see shortly, the textual composite (like the artistic composite) comprises a third element in addition to its material and structural elements: factuality, reality, noumenal objectivity.
proficiency is enhanced by increased familiarity with the theme the art work regards, with the art work itself, with the artist, and with herself as artistic interpreter, so the textual interpreter’s native verificational proficiency is enhanced by increased familiarity with the theme the text addresses, with the text itself, with the writer, and with herself as textual interpreter. And in the one area as in the other, the verificational affirmation follows the interpreter’s consideration of all known concrete alternatives; she must often be content with a hypothesis that is not manifestly certain but simply the most likely of the alternatives known at the present time; and thus in a given instance she may come to affirm her hypothesis as virtually certain, or as solidly probable, or as relatively plausible, or as merely possible.

In its second and third main steps, the notion of textual interpreting I am attributing to Tribe differs plainly from the respective notions I have maintained that Bork and Douglas presuppose. To highlight those differences summarily: constructing and verifying a hypothesis about a meaning embodied in the words is more self-involving for the textual interpreter than intuiting and deducing a meaning exhibited through the words, but less self-involving than ascribing a freely selected extra-textual meaning to the words.

Third, Tribe presupposes that textual interpreting is genuine, valid, successful, epistemically objective, exactly because and insofar as it is attentive, intelligent, and reasonable. Just what do the latter words mean? Proximately, “attentive” signifies that at the step of experiencing, the interpreter pays attention to all the words of the text, but only those words, and to all the meanings commonly associated with those words in the period when the text was written, but only those meanings. “Intelligent” signifies that at the step of forming her hypothesis about the central meaning embodied in the words of the text, the interpreter is an insightful questioner and answerer. After resourcefully considering the entire range of alternatives, she settles on the possible answer that takes fullest account of her familiarity with the topic the text addresses, with the words of the text.

99 Though I cannot develop the point here, I would maintain that insofar as one proceeds consistently, one’s acts as textual interpreter are inevitably conditioned by one’s acts writer, as textual producer, and thus that familiarity with oneself in the former respect is incomplete unless one also has familiarity with oneself in the latter respect.

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itself, with the writer, and with herself as textual interpreter. "Reasonable" signifies that at the step of verifying her hypothesis, the interpreter is a judicious questioner and answerer. Aiming to avoid both rashness and timidity, she proportions her affirmation exactly to the evidence she grasps. Thus the strength of that evidence is what determines whether she affirms her possible answer as virtually certain, or as solidly probable, or as relatively plausible, or as merely possible.

Ultimately, however, "attentive," "intelligent," and "reasonable" have a more profound meaning. Ultimately they signify the unfolding of the textual interpreter's acts in a way that is authentic—faithful to the interpreter's own interpretational epistemic criterion. When her experiencing, hypothesis-forming, and hypothesis-verifying proceed as described above, the underlying reason they constitute successful knowing of a text's fundamental sense is that they satisfy her own standard of successful interpreting. By contrast with the view I have imputed to Douglas on this point, however, I suggest that for Tribe that criterion or standard is something more precise than the interpreter's own fundamental beliefs, values, and emotions. Methodically prior to any particular knowledge she attains, prior to any choice she makes, and prior to any particular feeling or emotion she experiences, the interpreter possesses a set of expectations regarding the possibilities of human knowledge, achievement, and expression. This set of pre-empirical expectations is a dynamic structural feature of her very self as interpreter. At best she chooses to adopt it as her basic interpretational horizon, thereby determining her basic categories of interpretational meaning and her basic criterion of interpretational truth; and at best she maintains fidelity to that horizon in all her particular interpretational efforts. On the other hand, she remains free to adopt some other horizon as basic, or to be unfaithful to the given horizon after having adopted it as basic. That is to say, in both major and minor fashion she remains free to choose to proceed inauthentically, at variance with the structure of herself as interpreter. But the price of such inauthenticity is the preclusion of interpretational epistemic objectivity.

The latter point may be underscored through a double contrast, where "interpretational subjectivity" indicates activity (as distinct from mere passivity) on the part of the interpreting subject. For Tribe, it is not the case that interpretational epistemic objectivity always presupposes total interpretational non-subjectivity, as it does for Bork. Nor does it sometimes presuppose partial (or

101 Methodical priority of course does not imply chronological priority.
even total) interpretational subjectivity, as it does for Douglas. Rather, it always presupposes authentic interpretational subjectivity.

The initial conclusion of my summary of Tribe follows from the pre-empirical presuppositions articulated in the first two premises. The true fundamental sense of a text is a composite whose constitutive elements are the words that I attentively experience, the hypothesis that I intelligently form about the primary meaning the writer both intended to embody in words and succeeded in embodying in these words, and the reality that I reasonably affirm the content of my hypothesis to possess. Moreover, just as the true fundamental sense is not displayed through the words and/or ascribed to them but rather is partly constituted by them, so also my successful grasping of that true fundamental sense is not just extrinsically conditioned by my attentive experiencing but rather is partly constituted by it.

3.4.2. The Evidence for My Interpretation of Tribe

What is the evidence that Tribe’s pre-empirical presuppositions regarding textual interpretation are accurately portrayed by the two foregoing premises and their conclusion? Like what I have indicated in discussing Bork and Douglas, the basic evidence is the unique coherence of premises and conclusion with the whole of Tribe’s writings; but this coherence becomes apparent only when one reads widely in those writings. Some subsidiary evidence, however, is apparent both in the reasons Tribe gives for affirming the existence of a constitutional right of privacy, reasons we have already glimpsed in Section 2.4, and in the logical presuppositions of certain claims he makes about constitutional interpretation in general. Let us review four passages that articulate some of those claims.

Early in his book On Reading the Constitution, Tribe notes two approaches to constitutional interpretation that are extreme opposites, both of which he deems inadequate. He rejects both the unduly passive interpretational approach that treats the text like a bottle containing meanings intended by the author, and the unduly creative interpretational approach that treats the text like a mirror for meanings intended by the reader.

Just as the original intent of the Framers—even if it could be captured in the laboratory, bottled, and carefully inspected under a microscope—will not yield a satisfactory determinate interpretation of the Constitution, so too at the other end of the spectrum we must also reject as completely
unsatisfactory the idea of an empty, or an infinitely malleable, Constitution.¹⁰²

Positively, Tribe argues that proper constitutional interpretation includes both the consideration of given materials and, inevitably, a certain constructive contribution by the interpreter, even to the point of basic choice-making.

As is true of other areas of law, the materials of constitutional law require construction, leave room for argument over meaning, and tempt the reader to import his or her vision of the just society into the meaning of the materials being considered.

In the book Constitutional Choices, one of us argued that as a result of this fluidity, judges have to acknowledge, as they read the Constitution, that they cannot avoid making at least some basic choices in giving it content.¹⁰³

Slightly later, in an especially rich passage, Tribe expands on his own idea of how to establish a constitutional interpretation, a way that stands between the two extremes he has rejected.

It may not be possible to "prove," in the way one proves a mathematical conjecture to be true or false, that a particular fanciful, ingenious argument about the Constitution simply doesn't count as a plausible interpretation. But from the impossibility of that sort of proof, all that follows is that law, like literature, is not mathematics ... It should not be terribly surprising to learn that judicial deliberation, like all legal discussion, cannot be reduced to scientific processes of deduction and induction, although some people apparently continue to be surprised by this truism.

The impossibility of airtight "proof" does not, however, translate—as some seem to believe it does—into such total indeterminacy that all interpretations of the Constitution are equally acceptable. Nor does it follow that the only way to judge an interpretation is to ask whether it advances or retards your vision of the good society. It is possible to do much better than that, although not nearly as well as some might wish.

Part of the difficulty is in no sense peculiar to law, but relates, rather, to the deep and abiding problem of how to imagine, conceptualize, and understand the process and the practice of giving reasons, of engaging in rational persuasion, without leaning on notions of timeless, universal, and

¹⁰² On Reading the Constitution, 14. Cf. 15. See also Constitutional Choices, 3-4.
¹⁰³ On Reading the Constitution, 15. Cf. 66, 80. See also God Save This Honorable Court, vii-viii, x-xi; and Constitutional Choices, 5, 267-68.
unquestionable truth. A great many people have lost faith in the idea of the timeless, the universal, and the unquestionable. Yet somehow, in their ordinary lives, they can still distinguish what sounds like a good argument from what sounds like sophistry: they know that slavery and murder are wrong, even if they cannot derive these truths from first principles. Nor does it require treating judges or other interpreters of the Constitution as if they had access to some mathematical algorithm of interpretation to conclude that for practical reasons it makes sense to entrust to people removed from the political fray the process of reason-giving, even in an environment where we lack the metric—the external measure—to prove conclusively that reason X is no good while reason Y is decisive.104

In the concluding pages of *Constitutional Choices*, Tribe sketches his view of the basic perspective within which constitutional choice-making at best unfolds.

[W]e can be truly free to pursue our ends only if we act out of obligation, the seeming antithesis of freedom; to follow our everchanging wants wherever they might lead is license, but license is a pale shadow of liberty. To choose without losing the thread of continuity that makes us whole with those who came before, we must be able to reason about what to choose—to choose in terms of constitutive commitments we have made, however tentatively, to bodies of principle by which we feel bound, a constitutional system that endures even as it evolves.105

Now I suggest that the four foregoing passages, together with what earlier we have seen Tribe maintain, provide at least five elements of subsidiary evidence supporting the attribution to him of my summary’s first two premises and their conclusion.

First, in Tribe’s previously noted contention that interpreting the Constitution inevitably requires grasping both the words and “principles behind the words” that are somehow embedded in the text itself, one sees evidence of the conviction that the true fundamental sense of a text is a composite of words and intra-textual meaning.

Second, in Tribe’s previously noted identification of the Constitution’s global central meaning with an implicit set of values or unstated perspective or unarticulated worldview from which the particular constitutional passages flow, and in his insistence that that meaning is illuminated but not constituted by the

105 *Constitutional Choices*, 267-68.
106 On the intrinsic limitations of the subsidiary evidence I propose, recall above, the end of Section 3.1.
history of the Constitution's original formulation and subsequent interpretation, one sees evidence of the conviction that a text's central intra-textual meaning is identical with the primary meaning its writer both intended and managed to embody in the words.

Third, in Tribe's remarks about the inescapability of choice-making on the part of constitutional interpreters, one sees evidence of the conviction that a text's intra-textual meaning comes to light through the activity, not the mere passivity, of the interpreter. For at the level of Tribe's relatively more explicit but less basic presuppositions, choice-making is simply the token of the interpreting subject's activity.107

Fourth, in Tribe's notion that constitutional interpretations emerge not as universal and unquestionable truths grasped through logical derivation from self-evident first principles, but rather as just concretely justified conclusions resulting from insight into particulars, one sees evidence of the conviction that a text's intra-textual meaning is functionally equivalent to the intelligently formed and reasonably verified content of the interpreter's hypothesis about the meaning embodied in the words she attentively encounters.108

107 I would say that Tribe's phenomenology of the interpreting subject—at root, of himself as interpreter—is underdeveloped. Consequently, what he maintains at the level of more explicit but less basic presuppositions sometimes lacks the degree of nuance that would match what he maintains at the level of less explicit but more basic presuppositions. In the present instance, for example, I think that, without scrutinizing it very carefully, he accepts the fairly common current view that in one way or another all activity of the concrete human subject is choice-making activity. Then, employing that view to articulate a more basic conviction, namely, that the meaning of a text comes to light only through activity (as distinct from mere passivity) on the part of the interpreter, he ends up claiming that the meaning of a text comes to light only through choice-making on the part of the interpreter. And this in turn leads him to blur certain distinctions that I judge to be implicit in his work as a whole: the distinctions between (a) the methodically foundational step any concrete subject takes (namely, *horizontal choosing*); (b) the additional step any constitutional interpreter takes (namely, determining what is in the Constitution, which is a matter of *fact judging*); (c) the further step a Supreme Court justice typically takes (namely, determining what follows from the Constitution, which includes *value judging* as well); and (d) the still further step a trial court judge typically takes (namely, determining fitting punishments for violating the Constitution, what follows from it, or another law, which includes *categorial choosing* as well). A more ample development of Tribe's phenomenology would draw out the differences between choice-making and the other activities of the concrete human subject. And this in turn, far from compromising his basic conviction, would enable him to give a more nuanced account of it, both in general and as it regards specifically constitutional interpretation.

108 A further illustration of Tribe's underdeveloped phenomenology of the interpreting subject is evident in the propensity of his writing to blur another important distinction that nonetheless I
Fifth, in Tribe’s claim that constitutional interpretation proceeds at best in terms of the interpreter’s non-arbitrary constitutive horizontal commitments, one sees evidence of the conviction that the interpreter in general has a set of pre-empirical expectations regarding the possibilities of human knowledge, achievement, and expression, and that at best she chooses to adopt this set of expectations as her basic interpretational horizon, thereby establishing her basic categories of interpretational meaning and her basic criterion of interpretational truth.

3.4.3. My Summary’s Last Two Steps

As in my earlier two summaries, so also here: with its third premise the summary moves from the pre-empirical to the empirical line. It lays out what Tribe effectively if not altogether explicitly thinks a successful interpreter grasps about the aims and achievements of the Constitution’s authors regarding a right of privacy. In his view, the primary meaning those authors both aimed to embody in the constitutional text and succeeded in embodying in it includes the assertion of such a right.

The summary’s final step portrays Tribe’s stance on the privacy issue as a conclusion based on the three preceding premises and one preceding conclusion that I have spelled out. In other words, Tribe’s view that the assertion of a right of privacy belongs to the Constitution’s true fundamental sense is a view with precisely the meaning that derives from the set of those prior syllogistic steps, both pre-empirical and empirical, and with exactly the grounds that are provided by that same set of steps.109

judge to be implicit in his work as a whole. For example, in the third of the four passages just cited in my text, Tribe argues that notions of “timeless, universal, and unquestionable truth” are not very useful in rational discussion; hence we should be satisfied instead with something less determinate. But in making this point, he conflates two different kinds of “indeterminacy”: (a) the “indeterminacy” characteristic of empirical hypotheses, namely, their variation in accord with variations in relevant data from one time and place to another, their lack of utter changelessness and universality; and (b) the “indeterminacy” characteristic of empirical verifications, namely, their exclusion not of all abstractly conceivable alternatives but merely of all concretely unreasonable ones, their lack of definitive certainty.

109 Certain readers may notice some similarities between the stances on constitutional interpretation that I have attributed to Bork, Douglas, and Tribe, on the one hand, and the orientations that textbooks in the philosophy of law are wont to label “legal positivism,” “legal realism,” and “natural law” respectively, on the other. (See, for example, J.W. Harris, Legal Philosophies [London: Butterworth, 1980].) For two reasons, I have avoided introducing the latter labels into my discussion. First, the orientations designated by them are not nearly as clear and
4. THE POSITIONAL STANCE ON TEXTUAL INTERPRETATION, AND ITS IMPLICATIONS

4.1. The Character and Ground of the Positional Stance

Thus far, I have recounted the issue of whether there exists a constitutional right of privacy; I have reported the affirmative conclusions of William O. Douglas and Laurence Tribe on that issue and the negative conclusion of Robert Bork; and I have proposed that those conclusions are conditioned respectively by diverse pre-empirical presuppositions about the procedures and criteria of textual interpretation in general. At this point, there naturally arises the question of my own evaluation of those diverse interpretational presuppositions. Which, if any, do I think is correct; and why?

Before addressing that question, however, I would like to delay for a moment in order to emphasize one feature of my hypothesis that I deem centrally important but also is easy to overlook. In my syllogistic summaries of Douglas’ and Tribe’s central arguments, the conclusions are verbally identical, but they rest on different grounds—most importantly, on the different interpretational presuppositions expressed in the respective second premises. But the concrete meaning of any conclusion includes not just what the conclusion asserts but also why it asserts it. Consequently, conclusions that rest on different grounds are semantically different, even when they happen to be verbally identical. More simply, Douglas and Tribe do not mean exactly the same thing in their conclusions, even though they say exactly the same words. As with all other disputes, any analysis of the constitutional dispute that simply takes it for granted that people mean the very same thing whenever they say the same words is an analysis that is bound to be shallow.

Now, back to the diverse pre-empirical presuppositions. And here I must be painfully brief. I would say that insofar as Douglas, Bork, and Tribe are internally consistent not just as textual interpreters but more broadly as empirical investigators, then underlying their diverse special pre-empirical stances there are unambiguous as the labels tend to suggest. Second, premature employment of the labels is apt to obscure this unclarity and ambiguity, thus infusing discussion participants with unwarranted confidence that they know exactly what they are talking about. By contrast, my approach here has been to avoid stock labels and concentrate instead on elucidating the actual claims and presuppositions of concrete individual interpreters.
crucially different general pre-empirical stances, stances on general noetic phenomenology (What acts do I experience myself performing whenever I am engaged in what I label "knowing"?), general epistemology (Why, if at all, is performing those acts genuine knowing?), and general metaphysics (What are the recurrent features of what, if anything, I genuinely know?).\textsuperscript{110} If I had to select prominent figures from the history of explicit philosophy who maintain general pre-empirical stances similar to the ones that I think underlie the special pre-empirical stances of Douglas, Bork, and Tribe, I would select Sartre, Plato, and Lonergan respectively.\textsuperscript{111} And because my research in the laboratory of self manifests my inability operationally to deny the general account of myself as knower that is proposed by Lonergan, I find myself also committed to the correlative special account of myself as textual interpreter that I have argued is presupposed by Tribe.

4.2. The Implications of the Positional Stance

What is the implication of my stance on pre-empirical presuppositions for my stance on the constitutional issue? Here I have two short comments.

First, pre-empirical presuppositions by their very nature are merely heuristic. They constitute one's disposition to employ certain investigative procedures and criteria rather than others, and they prefigure the outcome of that employment; but such prefiguration, though inescapable and exhaustive, is only indeterminate. To reach a determinate outcome, the investigator must do empirical research. Regarding the existence of a constitutional right of privacy, then, I am saying that I approach that issue with the same pre-empirical presuppositions that I have argued are maintained by Tribe. But whether I agree with his conclusion depends as well on a further matter, namely, whether I agree with his empirical findings. That is an empirical issue, not a pre-empirical one.

Second, do I agree with Tribe's empirical findings? Interpreted in terms of the pre-empirical presuppositions with which Tribe approaches it, does the Constitution assert a right of privacy? I am inclined toward an affirmative answer to this question. It seems to me that Tribe makes a pretty good case that the

\textsuperscript{110} Readers will recognize these as versions of Lonergan's "three basic questions" of philosophy. See, for example, \textit{Method}, 25. Cf. 20-21, 83, 238-40, 261, 297, 316.

\textsuperscript{111} I should emphasize that I am not necessarily claiming that Douglas is a thoroughgoing Sartrean, Bork a thoroughgoing Platonist, or Tribe a thoroughgoing Lonerganian. I am merely employing familiar historical figures to illustrate the global tendencies I see in the approaches of our three constitutional interpreters.
constitutional text as a whole, illuminated by the history of its original formulation and subsequent interpretation, has a clear orientation toward safeguarding the privacy of the home, and that this orientation provides a highly probable ground for concluding that it does indeed include the assertion of a right of privacy. However, I reiterate that I am far from expert in this particular area of empirical research; and thus I remain open to enlightenment by more knowledgeable students of the Constitution.
THE "FAR LARGER" WORK OF INSIGHT'S EPILOGUE

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INTRODUCTION

LONERGAN'S SITUATION WHEN he arrived at the actual task of writing Method in Theology is common knowledge among Lonergan students. In short, he was not the same energetic man who wrote in Insight of the far larger work that was called for to complete his task: a structuring of a method for theological inquiry. When he wrote the Epilogue to Insight he was 49. And he was spending his last summer in Toronto before beginning his Roman appointment in the autumn of 1953. Again, he had expressed the hope\(^1\) that the Roman job could be postponed since he still had four chapters of Insight to write.

What follows here is a brief discussion of key sections of the book Method in Theology, the book that did, in fact, emerge and is familiar to us all. The thesis of this discussion is that the "far larger" task of Insight's Epilogue was replaced by a work that is, primarily, 'doctrinal description.' What that phrase means is the topic of the first section, below. But it is the central question of the paper.

The following three sections will treat, in turn, of three pages of the text of Method in Theology. These sections have a twofold aim: to confirm the thesis; and to bring out the key doctrinal content of Lonergan's writing contained in those pages. The fifth section returns to a central difficulty. That difficulty lies in

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\(^1\) In a letter to Father Crowe. Let me express my gratitude to the people of the Lonergan Institute in Toronto for periodically making archival material from Lonergan's Roman period available to me relevant to my work. In particular, there are the various sets of notes for graduate courses, such as "De Intellectu et Methodo" and "De Systemate et Historia." Again, there is the file of February, 1965, which contains creative pointers towards the discovery of functional specialization, a full sketch of the first chapter of a "Method in Theology" and the first nine pages of that chapter. The latter file has been published as chapter two of Darlene O'Leary, Lonergan's Practical View of History, Axial Press, Halifax, 2000.
the definition of metaphysics in *Insight*. Briefly, it asks about how Lonergan understood the meaning, character and project of “implementation” in that definition. And it suggests how his understanding of that implementation process expanded discontinuously beyond the horizon of *Insight* in *Method in Theology*. The final section will return to my original thesis. And it will work out some of the questions it poses for the future of Lonergan studies.

In this paper, I do not see the need for adding numerous footnotes to my presentation. For much of the material that led me to my view was found over the last decade in Lonergan archival material. Most of it is currently unavailable. And, again, I think that my central point is both too simple and too important to surround with detailed references.

There is a sense, then, in which the thesis which I am proposing here is in the manner of a crucial experiment, a crucial reading. I will return to this in my conclusion. But here it can be stated simply. And that is the task of our reading of the three texts that control sections 2-4, below. Is it so, then, that in all three texts, Lonergan is communicating doctrinally and descriptively a precise strategy for theology? What that question means, however, is the topic of the first section.

I must add, before I begin, that the question emerged for me very concretely. For it developed out of the project presented to me by Professor Fred Lawrence, of presenting the workshop on *Method in Theology* in recent years at the summer “Lonergan Workshops” held at Boston College. My background was not theology, but philosophy and the world’s religions. And, further, my doctoral work was on the book *Insight*. The problem of adequately relating the two books has colored this effort at presenting the fuller task of Lonergan’s methodology.

1. DOCTRINES

On the first page of chapter fourteen of *Method in Theology*, Lonergan distinguishes various types of doctrines. There are, he writes, church doctrines, theological doctrines, methodological doctrines. Then he points to “the application of a methodological doctrine that results in a functional specialty called doctrines.” But what is this application to which he is pointing? What, for instance, is the methodological doctrine applied here?

The functional specialty ‘doctrines’ is the result, at first merely nominally understood in vague anticipation, of the application of the doctrine of functional
specialization. But what, then, is the doctrine of functional specialization the ‘result of’?

That, as gradually will be seen in the course of this essay, depends on the origin of the doctrine. In section five, below, I will draw attention to the probability of the emergence of such a doctrine. That probability, I will argue there briefly, lies in the pragmatic needs of a range of secular disciplines. It would consist in something like a ‘policy’ that results from the fragmentation and consequent inefficiency of work within these disciplines: “we had better divide up our efforts.” In section five, then, we will find that this meaning takes on serious relevance for the future of theological studies. But, clearly, this is not the meaning of ‘results’ in the mind of Lonergan as he begins the chapter on doctrines in Method. For by this time, fifteen years since he had finished writing Insight, he had worked his way up to a refined meaning of “functional specialization.” Indeed, I would suggest that the refined meaning that he had reached at that point included a list of differentiations of consciousness which he never included under his list of categories in chapter eleven on foundations in Method in Theology, i.e., the functional specialties.

Why have I brought up this latter claim? For Lonergan explicitly refers almost to the whole of the book Insight in his listing of the general categories. But why should functional specialization be included here?

Lonergan’s search for categories of the theological project resulted in a leap of discovery in February 1965. Everything that he had integrated and thematized in the previous decade fell into a new context. His search did not end there—to this I will return in the concluding section—but it is clear, both from his later conversations and from the excitement of his unpublished notes at the time, that the needed breakthrough had occurred. The foundations of theology certainly included, for him, functional specialization.

Was this inclusion explanatory? An inclusion in a viewpoint, even a heuristic viewpoint, involves an understanding of the empirical reality of its object. The object in this case, functional specialization, a global task of the human community, did not exist. However, in Lonergan’s own mind over these years, there was going forward a massive reordering of his own specialized work of almost five decades. So, I would suggest that it is, indeed, true that he had an explanatory heuristic of functional specialization in mind. And that it determined the character of this reordering.
If this is so, why did Lonergan not list this explanatory heuristic of functional specialization in the specification of foundations in the book *Method in Theology*? Reflection on this question, I hope, will lead to my central thesis.

Again, there is the inclusion that consists in the consideration, in section 3 of chapter five, of the “Grounds of the Division.” This section follows a presentation, as Lonergan says, “in summary fashion,” of the eight functional specialties. Reflecting on this word “summary,” we realize that it is a key to our thesis in this essay. Again, perhaps it also is a key to a larger perspective on the functional specialties, on metaphysics and on human intellectual growth in general.

2. THE STRUCTURE OF DIALECTIC

Lonergan’s presentation of dialectic, this central structural feature of the creative collaboration that is functional specialization, is little more than a page of text. That page, p. 250, places along the path to self-appropriation both an enormous challenge and an extraordinary prospect.

As I said publicly last summer, I can envisage an entire book devoted to the explication, in fuller description or explanation, of the elements involved in the strategy outlined on that page. What, then, is being suggested here?

Shall I offer another summary of its intent? A slightly lengthier presentation of the same project? In fact, I think that the answer to this question is deeply significant. For I see this essay as a descriptive anticipation of the development of the full field of inquiry that should be named “methodology”—the study of methods. That full field of inquiry, on the horizon of Lonergan’s writings, eventually will be a genetic account of methods. Methods, then, would be the “data” to be understood of such a method. To this, briefly, we will return in the concluding section.

However, here we may think of Lonergan’s summary consideration of dialectic as a piece of history. But what, then, is going on in this page? What is going on, I propose, is a very precise normative description of dialectical process. It is both a very precise and cunning description. And it is calculated to achieve a discomfiting revelation of selves, the ‘objectification of subjectivity,’ which

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Lonergan describes at the end of the following section. Lonergan’s explication of the process proceeds tamely at first. But, gradually, it gains in momentum and incisiveness. Finally, I would add that, although his description of dialectical method is situated within the field of methodology, it could be compared to a breakthrough in a mature contemporary science. And, as such, it will be both a piece of and a turn within history. Here, I would like imaginatively to address something of that historical turning.

Functional specialization is to be envisaged as a global theological project. Again, in the fourth section, below, I will suggest that it is a drive to an unqualified global dialogue. Among the specializations of that dialogue, dialectic is, perhaps, the most difficult. It is most difficult since it involves its subjects in the unease of hunting through and sifting out, with full self-present involvement, the alleged intentional achievements and failures of the past. As such, dialectic will not be an enterprise for the young. Perhaps, then, we may think of its subjects as ten wise elders of the theological community—each undertaking the dialectical task sketched by Lonergan.

The solitary task they are to take up is described in very broad and demanding outline at the top of page 250 of Method. The further methodological description of this task occupied a substantial portion of my Workshop lecture corresponding to this paper. But, let me hurry past that presentation now, for it calls for a book, not an essay. Further, it would, perhaps, distract us from the single point being made here briefly. I would only draw attention to a single word on the second line of that page: “events.”

Might I suggest that the dialectical process which our dialecticians, in their maturity, are taking up is an open structure? But, then, they will not adequately be discharging its demands unless, eventually, they take up the significance of the ‘events’ that constitute the slow scientific revolution from Egypt and China, from Pythagoras and Archimedes. Again, the demand has a certain urgency. For one may recall here that Lonergan regularly references Butterfield’s point, that the scientific revolution in its post-medieval maturity was the event of the past millennium. One cannot, then, be thinking here of some type of closed dialectical theology. To this we must return in the last two sections.

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3  I am referring to section 6 of chapter ten of Method in Theology, especially the third paragraph on p. 253.
4  Cf. Chapter III, section 4.2 of Insight.
We must turn to the second long paragraph on the page 250 of *Method*. The ten dialecticians will not produce ‘uniform results.’ What can be done?

Consider the results that each accumulates as the substantial part of a book being composed by each dialectician. But, Lonergan goes on, there are to be two concluding chapters written by each of them. In a second to last chapter, each does his or her best to pin down luminously positional development: what they feel and think are rooted elements of progress in history. This already involves a difficult task of self-exposition. There is, however, a final chapter. It is a personal and relatively detailed indication of their own foundational positions; think of Lonergan’s listing of foundational elements in the following chapter. And, then, think of the task of writing out just what your own explanatory heuristic view is!^5

Now, ten books have emerged. And each is a serious effort at dialectic. But, with delightful cunning and wit, Lonergan claims that this does not complete the task with which dialectic sought to engage them. That task requires a ‘re-run.’ The ten dialecticians take the ten books, and engage the processes of assembly, completion, comparison, etc., all over again. Again, this re-engagement of dialectical process has for its theme the contents of the ten books just authored by the dialecticians! Through this re-engaged process, the dialecticians author ten more books!

The process described on this page is not obscure. The question that the description raises now most urgently for us is this. Are we still, after many years and so many varied and strenuous efforts, still far away from undertaking the task to which it points? Again, the question that is raised in regard to the primary thesis of this paper is, “Is this page not, clearly, ‘descriptive methodological doctrine’”?

3. CATEGORIES

The next focus of attention is a single paragraph in the center of page 287 of *Method in Theology*. Lonergan has just listed the components of his categorial perspective to which I have been referring regularly, i.e., the general categories. Then he adds an extraordinary paragraph. It is worth quoting in full. For then we can give it a fresh and, I hope, provocative meaning.

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^5 This is to be done under the pressure of the subjectivist linguistic turn described on p. 88, note 34 of *Method in Theology*. 
“Such differentiation [i.e., the general categories constituting his categorial perspective] vastly enriches the initial nest of terms and relations [i.e., the subject’s operations on four conscious and intentional levels]. From such a broadened base one can go on to a developed account of the human good, values, beliefs, to the carriers, elements, functions, realms and stages of meaning, to the question of God, of religious experience, its expressions, its dialectical development.”

This paragraph, perhaps the central paragraph of the book, invites us to reflect. In the second sentence quoted, above, Lonergan writes: “one can go on....” Can I go on? Have I arrived at the enrichment of the initial nest of terms and relations that Lonergan is talking about? Without it, am I able to proceed to the ‘broadened base’ for the ‘developed account’ which Lonergan explicitly is telling us he had in mind?

With less unease, the burden of going on can be thrown back upon the ten wise dialecticians we introduced in the previous section. For the paragraph I have quoted immediately, above, is talking about the final chapter of the first set of books they were asked to write. Can we envisage ten people adequately facing this task sometime in this first century of the new millennium? Again, we might think in terms of the analogy of the mature sciences, as the first page of Method in Theology invites us to do. But, then, the task of reaching the broadened basis of theology is not an essentially creative one. Rather, it is a task of rediscovery, of repeating Lonergan’s climb described very summarily in the list of nine points on these pages in Method. It is the task of “reaching up to the mind,” to the viewpoint of—Lonergan. This point, then, raises the question of new educational strategies, of a new kind of cultural context.

It would be a cultural context that depends upon our encouragement, upon our continued honesty and humility. It would be a community in touch with the shadow of philosophical and theological formations that did not prepare those it formed for such a development. What will prepare the ten dialecticians of the next decades for such an intellectual reach? Surely, it would include a fresh seriousness of involvement in the “event” of the scientific attitude, an attitude that broke through and surged forward during the preceding millennium.

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6 As is well known, Lonergan uses this phrase on the last page of the old Insight, and the next to the last page of the new edition.

7 This was Lonergan’s clear point in the second section of chapter seventeen of Insight.
Again, the effort to read page 489 of *Insight* (page 464 of the older edition), which begins with the words, “study of the organism begins with....” brings the need for such an involvement home. For in the course of the struggle to do such a reading—a struggle for a metaphysical control of the search for the dynamics of the living organism—one is faced with one’s own lack of such a controlling perspective. But such a perspective is one part of the difficult, integral heuristic structure of proportionate Being. That structure is outlined in chapter fourteen of *Insight*. And it is mentioned explicitly as point six among the general categories of *Method in Theology*. Specifically, that perspective is the part of the integral heuristic structure that is necessary to control and guarantee the openness and anti-reductionism of organic growth studies in the next millennium. More generically, it is the part of the integral heuristic which is necessary to the new theological systematics. For the latter would involve nothing less than the genetic retrieval of the developing positions, and the reversal of the developing counterpositions of the past. On the other hand, the development of this point would be a remote and difficult interruption of the argument here. My interest now cannot lie there. It lies, rather, in drawing attention to the problem of reaching the enriched basis of theological reflection. As a symbol of that reach, we might consider it as the problem of carrying forward the hurried sketch of chapter sixteen of *Insight*.

After this digression, possibly, we can appreciate a little better the uneasiness to be called forth by Lonergan’s suggestion on page 287 that “one can go on....” Where does he suggest “one” go? The suggestion is that it is a personal development up to and into the perspective of Chapter sixteen of *Insight*. And it suggests, further, the shifting of chapters two, three and four of *Method in Theology* into the full, interiorly rooted, explanatory perspective achieved there. The gradual realization of that suggestion over the last several years was a quite a shock to me, as, perhaps, it is to you.

It is necessary, then, to return now to the earlier point regarding two types of doctrine. I have described *Method in Theology* as primarily ‘descriptive’ methodological doctrine. What of the book *Insight*? I would suggest that it is primarily ‘explanatory’ methodological doctrine.

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8 Fr. Robert Doran is attempting to retrieve Lonergan’s unpublished searchings in this area in a series of articles in *Theological Studies*, 1999, 2000. His work focuses especially on the graduate courses that I mentioned in note 1. On the other hand, one already can see the perspective in Lonergan’s references to genetic method, development of doctrine, and the treatise on the mystical body, in the Epilogue of *Insight*. 
I do not wish to enter into the difficult refinement of this distinction in this paper. It is best merely to go back to the distinction between popular presentations of Einsteinian physics—in terms, say of accelerating trains and elevators and returning astronauts—and introductory graduate courses in that area. Again, it is important to follow up that analogy in regard to chapter sixteen of *Insight*. For that chapter is very much like a graduate introduction to the topic of the science of metaphysics. But like the content of the graduate course in relativity theory, that science of metaphysics needs to be developed in this new millennium. Thus, like a good graduate introduction in physics, it gives methodological leads to be taken up and developed rather than satisfying and consoling images.

Here, then, it must suffice merely to raise the question of the full explanatory perspective called for on pages 286-288 of *Method in Theology*. It must suffice, also, to have raised the question of the dissemination and personal appropriation of such a broadened viewpoint. How might it become common meaning in the contemporary theological and philosophical communities much as relativity theory is common meaning for contemporary physicists?

Again, it is important to link such questions with a search for adequate symbolism. As Lonergan points out in the first paragraph of section three of chapter fourteen of *Insight*, such a search for symbols is integral to the tasks of the metaphysician. Again, one must keep in mind the image of the means used by a successful, collaborative culture like physics. These means include libraries, journals, internet entries, CD-ROMs, conferences, global and critical controls, etc., all structured by the common achieved or to-be-achieved meaning of its members. Again, from such an image, one must extrapolate forward imaginatively to a future theology.

Like physics, again, in its internal dialogues, such a theology will be remote from commonsense discourse. Yet it will be publicly engaging and effective in its images, its symbols and the affective, intersubjective responses they call forth. On the other hand, its initial remoteness from public discourse is, of course, one of the difficult and perhaps unacceptable challenges of the future of theological dialogue. Still, the functionally specialized withdrawal from undifferentiated

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9 Lonergan makes the same point on p. 80 of *De Constitutione Christi Ontologica and Psychologica* (Rome: Gregorian Press, 1961). In the twenty-fourth place of his discussion of Christ's constitution, he notes that one's grip on something can be either virtual or formal: but it will not be formal unless one has the necessary back-up images. Clearly, the same would be true of the complex metaphysics which would include the constitution of Christ.
consciousness is not extrinsic to such a community's effort. Rather, it is required if the return through the eighth functional specialty, communications, seriously is to shift and transform the cultures of the globe.

4. GLOBAL HEURISTICS

So we can and have turned easily from the reflection on theological categories to a reflection on communications. This shift parallels, indeed, the shift from the first section of chapter fourteen of *Method* to the second section.

The first short section, entitled "Meaning and Ontology," re-expresses the challenge of categorial meaning with which we have been dealing. And it can profitably be read in the context of the understanding of p. 287 of *Method in Theology* which we have set forth.

The second section of the chapter turns to common meaning in another sense. For its topic is theology's communicative reach towards global cultures. Again, Lonergan is thinking of the genetic- and geographically-structured mediation of that reach by theologians operating in an eighth functional specialization, 'communications.' However, my purpose here is not to supply a fuller explication of the viewpoint which Lonergan too hastily lays out in this chapter. Rather, it is a matter of illustrating fruitfully the thesis that *Method in Theology* is primarily 'descriptive' methodological doctrine.

So, here let me focus on the concluding paragraphs of page 364, from which I will be quoting momentarily. Let me note, first, that the center of that page is dealing with the heuristic lift of the geographically-structured operation of the Christian church. "In the foregoing fashion the Christian church will become a process of self-constitution but also a fully conscious process of self-

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10 Lonergan uses the word conscious here in a loose colloquial sense. Professor Philip McShane informed me of his correspondence with Lonergan regarding this point during McShane's indexing of *Method in Theology* on December 1, 1971. McShane drew attention to the loose meaning of "unconsciously" in parts of the text. Lonergan replaced the word with "inadvertently" in these places. They did not pursue more detailed corrections. "Fully conscious" can be taken to refer to the full luminosity of a metaphysics operating within the functional specialists. It would be an ideal to be continually aimed at by the cycle of collaboration that makes the conversions and differentiations of consciousness a topic.
constitution. ...[but it will do so only] when theology unites itself with all other relevant branches of human studies."¹¹

Lonergan goes on from here to indicate that the concrete possibility of that integration lies in the emergence of functionally specialized forms of collaboration. Such collaboration will take place within all the various fields of inquiry, including physics. Here again, images are necessary for a formal grasp of possibilities and probabilities.

Thus, first there is the need for an image that holds history and geography together in some positive symbol of emergence. Within such a unified image, there must be placed the crisis of the contemporary sciences. That crisis slowly has been generated by the fragmentations, specializations and foundational misdirections of these past centuries. Again, this crisis raises the technical question of probability distributions. Thus, it asks how likely is the emergence in practice, in each concrete discipline of inquiry, of the specific division of labor that Lonergan has thematized as functional specialization?

Next, there is need of an image of the possibility of an integration of collaboration. Envisage, then, the functional specialties of theology as moving up and down the two sides of a standardly sloped archway. The apex or keystone¹² of the arch can be taken to represent the turning to the future being achieved by subjects of the fourth and fifth functional specialties. Envisage, further, arches branching out at other angles from around the same keystone. They would have, possibly, different slopes to their ascent and descent. In any event, what is symbolized here is, very simply, something of Lonergan's perspective on dealing with and reversing the counter-positions both within and across disciplines and cultures. Hopefully, then, the image captures both the positional encirclement and confinement of the subject which is the keystone of *Insight*, and the positional openness to which it leads.¹³

Again, neither the pragmatic need for such a division, nor the preceding image of its functioning, need initially alert the members of the given discipline in which it emerges to the full implications of functionally specialized practice. An economist, then, may not realize that dialectical analysis of his field is needed,
that such analysis needs to be concrete, that it will exert an ongoing pressure for such concreteness.

On the other hand, such a need and pressure for theological concreteness is symbolized by the arch-slopes in the proposed image. For these slopes represent, respectively, the community’s sorting out of the viewpoints which both have informed and will inform both history and its writing both generally and across the disciplines of human science.

Again, because their slopes converge upon and diverge from the keystone functions of dialectic and foundations, these disciplines all, eventually, will find themselves faced with the problem of an existential methodology or philosophy. Again, here we might refresh our image of our book-writing dialecticians. Developing that image, we realize that in Lonergan’s terms, “methodology of...” or “philosophy of...” is not something that varies across disciplines—except in terms of their degrees of maturity. But, then, the “foundations of X” eventually are the “foundations of theology.” Thus, the integration of those foundations was symbolized by a common apex or keystone both of its radiating archways and of the flows of activities in the disciplines and in history which these archways span.

It is further noteworthy that such theological process is in the form of a mutual self-mediation. On the one hand, theology is invited by integral studies in and of the disciplines to make the moves we have been describing in the preceding two sections of this paper. On the other hand, by performing these functions, theology’s activity will take on the kind of ‘scheming,’ the kind of historically informed practical wisdom that dovetails with the occurrence and execution of schemes of emergent probability.

Assuming that at least something of Lonergan’s intent on p. 364ff has been captured, what has he been about? Reviewing the preceding paragraphs, I suggest that he has been about offering us pointers. Or, one might call them descriptive ‘doctrines.’ These are the ways to proceed. Keep these images in mind. This is what you would need to do. Keep such and such elements within the situation connected, etc.

If it holds for the immediately preceding reflections, the thesis of this short essay seems to hold very clearly about all three passages that we have discussed. Again, the passages selected, however short, refer to broad sweeps of Lonergan’s writing both in *Insight* and *Method in Theology*. Thus, the thesis can be extended to both books. As said, I have suggested a distinction between the books that would lead to the view that *Insight* can be considered to be doctrine in an ‘explanatory’ mode and *Method in Theology* considered as ‘descriptive’
methodological doctrine. Where this view leads us is a matter to be taken up in the final section. So, we may turn now to the penultimate section of this paper, which carries us back to two topics of *Insight*: Implementation and Cosmopolis.

5. IMPLEMENTATION

The topic *implementation* did not find its way into the index of either the first or second editions of *Insight*. Again, the topic *cosmopolis* is introduced in the concluding section of chapter eight only to return in the last section of chapter eighteen and, finally, at the end of the book's epilogue. Again, the nature of cosmopolis is very evidently related to that of implementation. For cosmopolis would represent a progressive change in the efficiency of human action, individual and communal. Again, in the context of *Insight*, that positive shift in efficiency is associated almost entirely with the divine solution to the problem of evil.

But in the final pages of chapter seven of *Insight*, one can sense a reach for more. Could Lonergan be reaching there for a 'lower blade' to the dynamics of history's successful flowering?

Certainly, one can consider metaphysics as sketched in *Insight* to be a contribution to that goal. Again, this becomes more obvious if one lifts the discussion of section 3 of chapter fourteen on the method in metaphysics, into the full, non-moving perspective that emerges from the implementation of chapter sixteen through generalized method as Lonergan viewed it later.

But, perhaps, Lonergan's central metaphysical achievement was to specify in *Method in Theology*, a lower-blade discontinuity in the efficiency of human collaboration. This is the fundamental, breakthrough character of Lonergan's discovery of functional specialization. Again, in a short article like this, only a few suggestions on this point can be attempted.

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14 The principle occurrence of the word is, of course, in the definition of metaphysics on p. 416 in the new *Insight* and p. 391 of the first edition. In the new *Insight*, the word also occurs on pp. 254, 259, 261, 263, 517, 530, 544, 565, 628, 652, 655, 708, 743, 744, 748, and 757. In the first edition, it occurs on pp. 229, 234, 236, 238, 493, 507, 521, 541, 605, 629, 632, 688, 722, 723, 726, 735. The topic also would have to be traced. We may expect and hope that these occurrences would be referenced more fully in the next edition of *Insight*.

15 See the reference below in note 20, and the description of generalized empirical method quoted in my text there.
The suggestion is best made by noting that the implementation that is essential to metaphysics\(^\text{16}\) has to be differentiated into eight genera of inquiry within theology. Again, further genera would have to be added to bring in theology’s relations to cultures, sciences, media, etc. Perhaps we might focus on foundational implementation, since that has been the implicit topic all along here.

Foundational implementation is open-ended. It is a never-complete transformation of the subjectivity of the foundations person. As we have seen, such a transformation includes the dialectician’s task. For the effort of such a specialist is ever towards the completeness of his or her self-revelation.

It is ever a contemplative withdrawal. And it is ever through such withdrawal, an openness to the universe of Being, to the “cosmic word.” Such openness would be mediated by the efforts of subjects of the earlier functional specialties. It would be motivated by the project both to live the theoretic life and to make one’s small contribution to the healing of global disarray and to the upswing of progress. Again, it would generate foundational speech and writing—to this difficult topic we return in the final section.

The effort to envisage the full set of implementations internal to methodical theology must be left to the reader. On the other hand, such efforts should call forth spiral and double helix images of particular dialogues between functional specialists. As noted, such dialogues will be internal to theological process. And their success will be contingent on their increasing non-availability to public discourse.

I would assume that, like me, the reader finds this to be a strange notion: yet the doctrinal pointings of Lonergan that we have touched upon all seem to be in this direction. Successful science is not popular. Again, the notion and assumption in much contemporary sensate culture that science is intrinsically destructive is a thriving of general bias. Thus, it would be an expression of “the power of the mass media to write for, speak for, be seen by all men.... Never before has the [the functionally mediated] need to speak effectively to undifferentiated consciousness been greater.”\(^\text{17}\)

To discharge the needs for effective speaking and for the adequate differentiation to mediate it, calls forth the need to withdraw into the effort doctrinally described by Lonergan. With such needs in mind, one might well now

\(^{16}\) Implementation is part of the essence of metaphysics as Lonergan defines it. But the more profound reason is that which Lonergan gives in *Topics in Education*, University of Toronto Press, 1993: there is the unity of a science that relates to efficient causality (see p. 160).

\(^{17}\) *Method in Theology*, p. 99.
study the first page of the last short chapter on 'Communications' in Method in Theology. For it may offer a fuller perspective of the challenge towards a massive, discontinuous renewal in theology.

Further, one must hold to this point in considering the eighth functional specialty in general. For ‘communications’ is not a sudden leap to communicability. It too is under the explanatory doctrinal rule, “the use of the general theological categories occurs in any of the eight functional specialties.”18 Theology at present is relatively easy to read, relatively easy to follow. Might one, perhaps, say that it is in doctrinal tension with Lonergan’s aspiration in Method? Perhaps, then, it is time for a temporary hiatus in our struggle with Lonergan’s aspirations in Method? Perhaps, like the ten female and male dialecticians of p. 250, struggling to be wise, we might grapple with our own doctrines of discipleship, of cultural need, of methodological progress.

6. CONCLUDING DOCTRINAL SEARCHINGS

My essay might well end here. For it is the previously mentioned question of the hiatus implicit in Lonergan’s work that is its central issue. The issue, as has been pointed out by Frederick Crowe, is “the formation of a thinking style, a kind of morality of cognitional activity.”19 The issue is, again, our own doctrine of thinking. And it is the dialectical issue of the possibility of an opposition between that doctrine and a foundational self-understanding that is under the control of a mature, critical metaphysics. Autobiographically, the issue, perhaps, is that people were apprenticed to traditions of philosophy and theology that mistook and, therefore, substituted for the larger, foundational tasks of thinking forms of doctrinal competence.

Immediately after raising the question of thinking style, Crowe goes on to express his “repugnance for exposing [Lonergan’s cognitional] doctrine in the context of the present essay.” Why? Because, he suggests, the real issue is the failure of Lonergan students to undertake “a parallel labor.” Crowe, here, obviously is aware of the operative distinction between doctrines and foundations. My essay, on the other hand, has made an effort explicitly to shift that distinction

18 Method in Theology, p. 292.
to stage center and to a slightly higher level of clarity. On the other hand, Crowe makes the same point as he continues. Without that parallel labor, he says, Lonergan scholars "have little chance of understanding what Lonergan is doing or talking about." After the several years since its publication, is Crowe's doctrine about Lonergan's doctrine still timely, still to be heard?

Let me approach the same point in another way. Lonergan's doctrine of 'generalized empirical method' names his project for the achievement of a massive, discontinuous cultural shift across the globe. As is well known, his mature statement of that project reads as follows: "Generalized empirical method operates on a combination of both the data of sense and the data of consciousness: it does not treat of objects without taking into account the corresponding operations of the subject; it does not treat of the subject's operations without taking into account the corresponding objects." The doctrine made precise here is the doctrine of 'empirical involvement.'

This doctrine of the empirical involvement of the subject dwells in the background of all of the doctrinal pointings in Method that we have been taking up. The historic center of this doctrine, perhaps, can be located symbolically by attending to the word "events" on p. 250 of Method in Theology. Lonergan requires us to attune ourselves to the events of the cosmic word, especially the place of the advance of scientific understanding within that word. It does not matter whether it is the study of the organism, or the study of feelings pointed to in chapter two of Method, or the study of meaning and its history described in chapter three. One is not proceeding conscientiously without the heuristic acknowledgement to which the "going on" of p. 287 of Method points us.

Again, that acknowledgment can be familiarly identified by returning to the question of metaphysics. A full contemporary metaphysics is what is doctrinally pointed to particularly by Insight, chapters 8, 15 and 16. Such a metaphysics is an 'empirical,' a posteriori achievement. Again, it pivots on the events of the scientific revolution. As I noted already, section 1.2 of chapter 17 of Insight, entitled "The Genesis of Adequate Self-Knowledge," is quite straightforward on this point: "such adequate self-knowledge can be reached by man only at the summit of a long ascent."

But even without that ascent, we can glimpse the climb intended for us, for instance, in Lonergan's account of genera and species in Insight, Chapter 8.3-8.6.

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etc. Again, we can arrive at a nominal source of the humility of human endeavor in the face of the unknown physics and chemistry and biology of realities that we at present describe and deal with so comfortably, perhaps even so complacently, in our everyday lives.

When I finished the June morning lecture at Boston College that is the source of this paper, a member of the audience remarked to me, “You have certainly given us work to do.” But my point is that that is the needed acknowledgment. Again, it may involve the further acknowledgment that that work is beyond my generation, beyond even my own best efforts. But, perhaps this task could be opened up for those who come after us? How might we do that?

Obviously, the issue is implementation. Recall the three preceding sections of this essay. They are interpretations of, respectively, pages 250, 287 and 364 of *Method in Theology*. Certainly, they are relevant starting points for the question. Take simply the doctrine of page 250. What are its implications for many of our comparative studies, whether of persons and movements, or of Lonergan and Whitehead or of Lonergan and post-modernism, etc.? Might not reflection motivate fresh efforts to shift such comparative studies into a much different context? Again, this brings us back to the issue on the horizon of this essay, the issue of foundational work.

I have suggested that *Method in Theology* is primarily ‘descriptive’ methodological doctrine. I suggest further that the book *Insight* is ‘explanatory’ methodological doctrine. Both books are invitations to develop, to try an interiorly mediated ascent for oneself, slowly to reach up. Again, because of the cultural discontinuity which these books represent, they may or will be identified—*a posteriori*—as adequate expressions of such an invitation. But, what are *assembly, completion, comparison, reduction, classification, selection*? Perhaps, when we have ‘assembled’ sufficient data on doing them badly, we will be in a better position to specify what doing them well is. On the other hand, if the invitation to try them is refused or ignored, we cannot go on in the name of dialectic yet still honestly claim that we are following Lonergan’s doctrine.

Let me conclude this essay by raising and developing one further question: if Lonergan’s major work *Insight* is only a doctrinal work, what of the foundational task? Perhaps I will be allowed once more to appeal to the valuable analogy of the successful sciences. Comprehensive doctrinal graduate texts normally have a host of detailed exercises behind them historically. On the other hand, Lonergan left no detailed record of his climb, except perhaps in the challenging area of economics. So we may conclude with a return to the problem of the title.
In the far larger work that Lonergan anticipated writing, he probably would not have shifted forward into foundational writing. Rather, he probably would have carried forward the explanatory doctrinal approach of *Insight*. *Insight* itself, then, looks beyond itself to a far larger work. But it is the work that we and the next generation are called to do. We will not do it in isolation, but within the manner diagrammed in the comments on p. 364 of *Method*.

Again, if we put together the attitude reflected in the three texts that we considered—pages 250, 287 and 364—we may be led to the key element in the emergence of the third stage of meaning. That emergence will mark the end, as a culturally respectable phenomena, of ‘pure’ philosophy and ‘pure’ theology. There will emerge methodology. It will be a science dealing with methods in a way that parallels the manner in which zoology deals with animals.

With methodology new light will emerge on the notion of “The Ongoing Genesis of Methods.”21 There also will emerge a sense of what Lonergan meant when he wrote in February 1965, in the beginnings of a chapter one for a book on method, of a distinction between a “second order” consciousness, which would be a study of method, and a “third order” consciousness, the field of methodology.22

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21 This is the title of chapter 10 of *A Third Collection*.

22 The text of that draft chapter is available in the book cited in note 1, above.
THEOLOGY AND PHILOSOPHY*

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These reflections intend to explore the range of relationships obtaining between theology and other disciplines, or less stringently put, between faith and culture. Yet astute readers will immediately perceive that the terms themselves are far richer and more fluid once we begin to detach them from their conventional role of naming established academic disciplines. Or put more constructively, the perennial vigor of those very disciplines attests to the fact that they are always reaching beyond settled modes of discourse to discover new approaches to their subject. In short, a discipline like theology is constantly transforming itself, and the key to that transformation lies in the way in which the very terms it must employ inevitably carry considerable cultural freight. So it should prove illuminating if we let the word ‘philosophy’ in the title stand for ways of understanding which the current cultural milieu considers acceptable. So in Aquinas’ time, the commanding way in which the writings of Aristotle had broken open new ways of understanding constrained Aquinas to open his Summa Theologiae by asking whether theology could be a scientia, that is, a mode of knowing. The way in which he proceeded to answered that question would open up avenues hitherto unsuspected by Aristotelians, as we shall see, yet more significant for our purposes is the way he put the question. For if theology could not be considered to be a form of knowledge, then faith would at most be a matter of the heart and not of the mind, whereas for Aquinas it had to address both if it were to be a fully human perfection.¹

Faith indeed provides the initial principles proper to theology, as rational reflection on the data of our senses provides the first principles of philosophy, and

¹(Blackwell Companion to Theology)

therein lies the mark distinguishing one from the other. Yet we could also address
the main topic by asking what relation theology bears to faith, for the conception
we have of theology will depend a great deal on the ways we have seen those
initial principles of faith being elaborated into a theology. Presuming that the
principles of faith come from revelation, and so differ categorically from the
deliverances of our senses, are they treated as given there, much as some
empiricists were wont to treat ‘sense-data’ as given, so generating what
philosophers like Wilfrid Sellars were later to caricature as “the myth of the
given”? Or does the use of reason to inquire into the meaning of revelation issue
in a dramatic to and fro of interpretation, which we call theology, so that this
mode of inquiry becomes a quest for understanding not unlike continuing rational
reflection on our sense experience? I shall indeed argue that a picture like this
latter one best reflects the work of the great spirits who have shaped the discipline
of theology, and who have given us the working definition of “faith seeking
understanding.” I shall also show how theology executed in this way belies the
simple conjunction of our title, “theology and philosophy,” which suggests that
we are faced with two adequately distinct endeavors.

But it were best not to jump to such a conclusion, but to begin with what the
title does indeed suggest: that theology is one thing and philosophy another. And
the time-honored way of marking the difference is whether one employs data (or
premises) from revelation or not: philosophy does not do so while theology must,
for that is what sets it apart. A simple enough distinction, certainly, yet
difficulties begin when we note the recurrent presumption that what supplies the
paradigm for understanding is philosophy, so that whatever we might claim to
know-by-faith must pass that bar. This presumption is often implicit, but what
lends it credence is the original contention that knowing-by-faith adds something
to what we have come to call knowing. Now if that is so, how can we assess
whether or not knowing-by-faith is properly a form of knowledge? That is, how
can we determine whether or not what theology asserts is true? Notice how easily
this conundrum is generated by the image of faith as something added, or better,
the deliverances of revelation as adding something to knowing tout court. For
what is added must then measure up to that to which it has been added. Yet such
an image has been congenial to both sides of the faith/reason debate; it has long
represented a time-honored way to distinguish these two disciplines. As we shall
see, however, everything turns on the way in which the “additive” image is
employed. Without critical attention to actual practice, the additive image will
reinforce the implication of the original conjunction: that these are two separate
things, each originally and necessarily quite extrinsic to the other. But how else can it be taken?

It may help to place this apparently intractable issue in two contexts which in fact envelope it. Think first of Aristotle's own reflections on knowing (or epistêmê) in his Posterior Analytics, and how those explicit methodological prescriptions are often quite at variance with his own practice. In fact, Aquinas will later note that his rules for constituting bona fide knowledge can only characterize a constructed science like geometry. So explicit pictures of procedures for relating bodies of knowing, or even rules for constituting knowledge itself, can often shipwreck on actual practice. Another more theological context would be the vexed history of the relation of natural to supernatural orders. Is the latter something added to nature, with the resulting picture of a universe constructed of two-storeys which theologians must then busy themselves relating to each other? This is the baroque picture which Henri de Lubac succeeded in dismantling, and so opened the way for that mode of theology which animated Vatican II.  

A similar mindset among Thomists of the time divided Aquinas' treatment of God into two parts: de Deo uno and de Deo trino, with that which treats of God's oneness proceeding in a philosophical mode, while theology enters only when triunity is at issue. Aquinas does indeed divide his treatment of God in two parts, but the division is pedagogical and systematic rather than descriptive; moreover, the entire treatment takes place in his Summa Theologiae [=ST], and only after he confirms its title as a work of theology by explicitly showing how theology can be a mode of knowing, a scientia.

So one begins to feel the need for a critical way of appropriating the time-honored distinction between philosophy and theology. Let us look more closely at the combinations and permutations which result when we factor in the implicit presumption that philosophy sets the norm. Two diametrically opposite inferences can result, as can happen, for example, either when one reads Aquinas that way, and so will hear him saying that knowing-by-faith exalts knowledge properly speaking, or reads a modern rationalist like Freud, who will thereby find it redundant. Moreover, one could go on to ask the Aquinas so figured: how will knowing-by-faith exalt ordinary knowing? And the answer could be at least two-fold, reflecting two very disparate views of transcendence. The first response would be closer to Aquinas but arrived at only by re-configuring the distinction in

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a more critical fashion: knowing-by-faith can enrich or fulfill human understanding; while the second would construe knowing-by faith as allowing us to escape the limitations of human understanding and of human life—a view of transcendence roundly (and rightly) criticized by many an ancient or contemporary thinker. And the charges of redundancy can be understood quite differently as well: as Freud does, that faith not only adds nothing cognitive but even retards critical acumen to keep believers in an infantile relation to reality; or as new age folks might claim for “spirituality,” that what the humdrum world finds redundant is actually ecstasy for the initiated.

Another set of responses is generated when the additive picture is left intact and believers undertake to reverse the presumptive normativity of reason, embodied in philosophy, to replace it assertively by theology. Then it would be faith which sets the norm, and does so precisely to make up the deficiencies of reason. While this strategy more properly captures the Reformers than medievals like Aquinas, traces of it can be found in him as well. In both cases, the deficiency of reason can either be de facto, given the extreme difficulty in adjudicating issues surrounding divinity; or de jure, reflecting different views of the effects of original sin on human understanding. The logical difficulties which such a strategy elicits, as displayed in Karl Barth's increasingly self-critical elaboration of it, point to the incoherence of any merely additive picture: the very terms required to articulate the norm of faith must be taken from reason. So it becomes increasingly clear how pointless it is to try to identify the norm in theological matters either with faith or with reason; both must be operative, and theologians can be ranked by the way their work displays this mutual normativity.

Such will be my contention, in any case, and it should prove the more persuasive if the arguments for it display that rhetorical structure which properly befits theological inquiry. That is, arguments purporting to establish the mutual normativity proper to theology can only proceed indirectly, by noting how a mode of argumentation which rests on reason alone cannot adequately articulate its subject. The subject here is the understanding proper to human beings, which cannot but be curiously open-ended. In the global terms we have been using to this point, one can propose that philosophy points beyond itself in such a way that theology fulfills it, or correlatively, that philosophy cannot ground itself, so that philosophical reflection begins and ends in wonder—as Aristotle noted in an uncharacteristically rhapsodic passage. That wonder offers an opening for revelation, which theology will proceed to elaborate precisely to thematize the wonder itself. For if a revelation cannot be seen to be doing just that, then it can
be dismissed as redundant. So it is the very picture of the sufficiency of reason to express the human condition which theology must use reason to undermine, in a way proper to it and best described as rhetorical. Interestingly enough, it is this very mode of argument which Aquinas displays at the opening of his *Summa Theologiae*, in the second question, often mistaken as offering five ‘proofs’ for God’s existence. Following Aquinas’ own explicit comments, all responsible commentators have recognized that these cannot be proper demonstrations, but many have attempted to make them probative in some other sense. Yet the careful way in which he structures them presents them as argument-forms which show how we might put to the test (and in that sense, probe [probare]) any attempt to offer a complete explanation of the universe and its order. If we can be brought to see how our attempts to do just that continue to fail, then we might be able to open our minds (and eventually our hearts as well) to that One “whom we call God.”

**AQUINAS’ Approach to Mutual Clarification**

The upshot of ‘turning around’ (the Hebrew metaphor rendered *metanoia* in the New Testament) the usual presumption that ‘philosophy’ sets the norm is to discover that the understanding available to us needs to be completed, fulfilled. But how? By adding something to it, some additional propositions, perhaps? Were that the case, as it appears to be for many philosophers of religion, there would be no mode of understanding proper to knowing-by-faith, nor would the additive picture require any critical appropriation. Aquinas offers another way of identifying what might be added: images from revelation to supplement what the world supplies to our senses, plus a perspicacity by way of divine light which enhances our capacity to perceive the import of these “God-given images” (ST 1.12.13). No divinely proffered propositions here, for propositions are of human making; rather multivalent images awaiting our probing and elaboration. Just as what the world affords our senses causes us to wonder, so these images offer a yet more ample field for wonder. Alternatively, and this is John Henry Newman’s tactic, what if the actual use of reason always involved faith of some sort? If that were the case, then the faith corresponding to a purported divine revelation would not be totally foreign to us, even though it would clearly be of a different order than the native trust which animates anything we do. Yet a revelation which could offer the best help in articulating that native trust would thereby flesh out and
enrich our operative understanding, and notably our understanding of the very reaches of human understanding. One clear presumption of this argument is a robust realism: that there is something to know. The issue then becomes: how can we best know it?

Yet does not Aquinas also say that faith adds propositions as well? In an especially prescient response to the query whether God's triunity can be attained by reason without the benefit of revelation, he gives reasons why that could never be the case, reasons which reinforce his keen appreciation of just how "negative" is the knowledge that creatures can have of the creator (ST 1.32.1). In brief, accustomed as we are to tracing causal pathways in seeking explanations of any sort, it is quite another thing to try to trace the way to a cause of being, to the "universal cause of all existence" (ST 1.45.2). Even armed as he was with Aristotle's rich phenomenology of 'four causes,' it is problematic which one of these, if any, could answer to the 'cause of being.' So even should we stretch human reason to arrive there, with the help of intervening thinkers like Plotinus (relayed to him by pseudo-Dionysius), we could know little or nothing about that One, since it would completely escape Aristotle's mode of defining things, as Moses Maimonides had so clearly shown.3 So a fortiori, the very inner life of God, revealed in the person of Jesus, and so intimated in the Christian scriptures but articulated within that community only after four centuries of struggle with diverse formulations, could hardly be proposed as a proper object for rational inquiry. Yet once revealed and formulated, Aquinas goes on to note that such a revelation can serve as a powerful corrective to apparently inevitable error regarding the relation of the 'cause of being' to beings: namely, that it could only be an impersonal and necessary emanation. This quite unexpected response (in the context of showing how God's triunity surpassed the powers of reason [ST 1.32.1.3]) unveils the deeper roots of Aquinas' own treatment of creation, wherein the inner-divine processions of Word and of Spirit serve as the eternal

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3 For an illuminating historical account of Aquinas' debt to pseudo-Dionysius (and through him to Neoplatonism), see Edward Booth, Aristotelian Aporetic Ontology in Islamic and Christian Writers (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1983) and for a more systematic treatment, see Rudi te Velde, Participation and Substantiality in Thomas Aquinas (Leiden: Brill, 1950). For Aquinas' relation to Maimonides and others, see my "Aquinas and Islamic and Jewish thinkers" in Norman Kretzmann and Eleonore Stump, eds., Cambridge Companion to Aquinas (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1993) 60-84.
exemplars of an utterly free action on God’s part: free because it was a fully intentional activity of expression (Word) and of ecstatic love (Spirit).4

What emboldened Aquinas to identify what had been the prevailing philosophical picture of the origin of all things— impersonal and necessary emanation—as an ‘error’? Precisely what had come to be revealed to him, through a revelation formulated in a tradition, about the creator. It was this revelation—tradition which allowed him to question the only account which philosophers to that time had deemed creditable.5 Besides being used to gain critical purchase on alternative accounts, the same tradition had also built these hard-won propositions into theological account in its own right. In our time we have distinguished these two efforts into philosophical and systematic theology, yet as we have seen, Aquinas engaged in both efforts with equal grace. Indeed, properly executed, one informs the other, and the result can be called ‘mutual clarification,’ in a phrase which captures the way Gilles Emery has characterized Aquinas’ method in theological inquiry.6 If this account offers both an accurate and attractive picture of properly theological inquiry, note how itformulates nicely the mutual normativity of faith and of reason, so leading us away from that ‘foundational’ model of knowing which had insisted on a clear separation of theology from philosophy, while presuming that ‘philosophy’ provided the norm by which any purported assertion had to be assessed.

Bernard Lonergan regularly contrasted these alternatives as the “need for certitude” versus the ‘quest for understanding,’ identifying what philosophers call ‘foundationalism’ with the need for certitude.7 Another look at Descartes’ Discourse on Method as expressing a deep-seated need for certitude helps to underscore the import of this contrast, especially when one notes what different dimensions of the human psyche are reflected by needs rather than by quests. The quest for understanding formulates Augustine’s classical definition of theology as “faith seeking understanding” in an idiom which alludes as well to Aristotle’s intellectual virtues, thereby reminding us that understanding in divinis will always

4 For a detailed study of this correlation between “processions” and creation, see Gilles Emery, La Trinité Créatrice (Paris: Vrin, 1995), or a fine review and summary of the argument by R. E. Houser in Thomist 60 (1996) 493-97.
5 My Knowing the Unknowable God (Notre Dame IN: University of Notre Dame Press, 1986) details the way in which Aquinas assimilated the work of Avicenna and of Maimonides to forge his alternative account.
6 La Trinité Créatrice 285-341.
7 Lonergan’s seminal work, Insight, has recently been re-published as part of his collected works by the University of Toronto Press (1997).
involve growth in understanding. This idiom also alludes to the fact that faith is ever a journey, and that the propositions which attempt to formulate 'articles of faith' are at best guideposts along that way, which opens as a way to wisdom for those intent upon the quest. In that aspiration to wisdom, of course, reason needs all the help it can get, so pressing the quest for understanding to serve the journey of faith affords philosophy its medieval distinction of being the 'handmaid of theology.' We have seen how critical a role creation, and indeed the proper account of creation, plays in this synthesis, so it will not be surprising to note how the subsequent drive to "liberate" philosophy to an autonomous status involved disregarding the link to a creator. Indeed, the dramatic movement inherent in modernity did more than effect a return to Aristotle's insouciance about the question of origins, for it presented itself as a post-medieval alternative to a created universe. The key to the 'mutual clarification' which philosophy and theology can provide for each other lies in articulating creation.

To mention the shared goal of wisdom returns us to the etymology of the term 'philosophy'—something easily forgotten when either of our key terms are identified via current academic disciplines. Rendering 'philosophy' as Socrates presented it, as the desire for wisdom rather than its achievement or possession, reminds us that both disciplines are fated never to achieve their goal. Indeed, that is the reason why Clement of Alexandria explicitly pre-empted the classical name 'philosophy' for Christian theology, calling it the "true philosophy." Here again the testimony of a rich tradition reminds us that distinctions cannot be separations, and that each one needs the other. Indeed, we have been correcting the additive picture all along to show at once how the very formulations of theology require continual assistance from reason, and how the presence of revelation can release philosophy, regarded as a particular way of using intellectual skills, to serve its animating purpose of a search for wisdom by questing for understanding. Using Aquinas as a paradigm thinker, the additive picture has been enhanced, if not replaced, by one of 'mutual clarification.' Other theologians will offer parallel testimony, corroborating the mutuality inherent in those disciplines which were presented at the outset of this inquiry as separate and so needing to be linked. In fact, the linkage is already present, even though often implicit, in the conceptual care with which theologians must proceed in their

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rarefied atmosphere, as well as in the original faith that must be present to animate any philosophical inquiry, once one has discarded a foundationalist picture of rational inquiry.

AUGUSTINE AND THE PART WHICH PRACTICE PLAYS

Just as those who thought themselves modern could not escape being post-medieval, so we are fated to be post-modern once we reject a foundational account of inquiry. Yet the way beyond rejection to a constructive account has already been suggested by alluding to Newman’s Grammar of Assent, composed as a direct riposte to modernist conceptions of philosophical inquiry in their heyday. The strategy of mutual clarification outlined here has been structured by Alasdair MacIntyre’s elaboration of Newman’s prescient suggestions into a general account of inquiry as invariably “tradition-directed.” His observations prove particularly enlightening for theological inquiry and its internal relation to a tradition focused on articulating revelation. If the actual use of reason to pursue a substantive inquiry inevitably presupposes something akin to faith (which Alvin Plantinga characterizes as “basic beliefs”), then a tradition like that of Christian theology offers abundant illustration of this path of mutual clarification, for it has found it opportune from the beginning to mine Hellenic modes of thought to elaborate its key doctrines of divine incarnation and triunity. Indeed, it now appears that the medieval understanding of philosophy as a handmaid of a yet richer understanding may suggest a way to liberate philosophical skills from the pretensions of complete comprehension to their proper role of facilitating human understanding. What is at stake here is a conception of philosophy that is not inflated, which answers to its originating impulse of wonder while retaining a properly self-critical edge. The work of Pierre Hadot may well show us a way of coming to a renewed appreciation of those dimensions, for his unveiling of the critical role which “spiritual exercises” played in ancient philosophy suggests a

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11 A good beginning for Plantinga’s work is his essay “Reason and Belief in God,” in A. Plantinga and N. Wolsterstorff, eds., Faith and Rationality (Grand Rapids MI: Eerdmans, 1983).
context within which to place the modern notion of "propositional attitudes" in order to bring out some features of understanding which that conception can easily overlook.\footnote{Pierre Hadot’s original work, \textit{Exercices spirituels et philosophie antique} (2nd ed. 1987) is now out of print, but an excellent summary of his thought is available in his \textit{Qu’est-ce que la philosophie antique?} (Paris: Gallimard, 1995) and a superb collection of his articles has been translated and presented by Arnold Davidson: \textit{Philosophy as a Way of Life} (Oxford: Blackwell, 1995).}

That context is, of course, that of intellectual virtues. It can perhaps best be illustrated by invoking another thinker in the Christian tradition who should prove enlightening in his own way: Aurelius Augustine. Readers of the \textit{Confessions} steeped in modernity find it odd when, in his struggle for intellectual clarification detailed in the seventh book, he feels it necessary to decide between Platonism and Christianity. Why can’t he think of himself as a Christian Platonist? Certainly many have done just that. Yet Pierre Hadot’s familiarity with the demands which ancient philosophy makes on philosophers themselves reminds us that they could only see this mode of thinking as involving the entirety of a person’s relation to the universe, and so comprehending not just a ‘set of beliefs’ but a way of life as well: a way of life embodied in a set of practices that embraces one’s life and forms one’s attitudes. Now Christian liturgical formation is intended precisely to: introduce us into a world that should become more and more an alternative to the world in which we live; indeed, into the ‘kingdom of God.’ If the Platonism of his time pretended, as philosophies tend to do, to offer a complete comprehension of the universe, then it would come replete with practices as well, and some of these would inevitably clash with the mystagogy of Christian initiation. That is, at least, a plausible reconstruction of what faced Augustine. What is more telling for us is that we needed to reconstruct our own conception of philosophy to appreciate his dilemma, yet that reconstruction may bring us closer to an authentic understanding of the role of philosophy in human existence than its modernist frame of a set of beliefs (or “propositional attitudes”).\footnote{It would be fascinating to ask whether ‘philosophy’ so conceived would be vulnerable to the critique which Richard Rorty reserves for what he takes it to be, following the modern Cartesian paradigm.}

Yet more constructively, however, can we mine this same thinker for a positive conception of the mutual clarification which reason and faith can bring to one another? The answer is contained in an attentive reading of the \textit{Confessions} themselves, for the final word is not one of opposition, but one which reshapes
the Plotinian directions that initially gave him a way of entering the world of spirit as the domain of mind and of mind's internal good, God. That reshaping will follow the form of the incarnation of the Word made flesh, to bring human beings into a tensive relation between time and eternity, flesh and spirit, precisely there where Platonists tend to oppose them. What allowed him so to reconceive philosophy and its role was the fresh context which revelation provided, an illumination the *Confessions* puts in disarmingly simple terms: "the mystery of the Word made flesh I had not begun to guess. ... None of this is in the Platonist books" (7.xix, xxi). He would not even be able to 'guess' such a mystery, of course; nor indeed can we, for that very thought exceeds our imagination for what is possible—even when imagination for what is possible is the very thing on which philosophy has long prided itself! These final chapters of Book 7 of the *Confessions* offer a paradigm of "faith seeking understanding," the celebrated formula of Augustine's that animated the work of medieval philosophical theologians beginning with Anselm.

Book 7 documents the discovery of the idiom which Augustine needed to find a proper way of conceptualizing God, not as another being among beings, but as the "life of the life of my soul" or the wisdom which grants wisdom to the wise—in short, the source of all that is and hence should never be thought of as standing over against anything that is.

Probably the *Enneads* of Plotinus offered him this idiom, and chapter 16 notes why it recommended itself: "I asked myself why I approved of the beauty of bodies, whether celestial or terrestrial, and what justification I had for giving an unqualified judgment on mutable things.... In the course of this inquiry why I made such value judgments as I was making, I found the unchangeable and

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15 For an illuminating discussion of the linguistic-conceptual apparatus indispensable to articulating God as 'distinct from' creation, yet in a way that forbids us to think God as something else in the universe, see Kathryn Tanner, *God and Creation in Christian Theology* (New York: Blackwell, 1988); and for a lucid presentation of 'the distinction' of creator from creation as decisive for Christian theology, see Robert Sokolowski, *God of Faith and Reason* (Notre Dame IN: University of Notre Dame Press, 1981).
authentic eternity of truth to transcend my mutable mind” (7.xvi). The text goes on to describe how he appropriated that idiom for his own quest:

And so step by step I ascended from bodies to the soul which perceives through the body, and from there to its inward forces, ...[and] from there again I ascended to the power of reasoning to which is attributed the power of judging deliverances of the bodily senses. This power, which in myself I found to be mutable, raised itself to the level of its own intelligence, and ... at that point it had no hesitation in declaring that the unchangeable is preferable to the changeable, since unless it could somehow know this, there would be no certainty in preferring it to the mutable. So in the flash of a trembling glance it attained to that which is. At that moment I saw your “invisible nature understood through the things which are made” (Rom 1:20) (7.xvi).

It should be clear how intimately this description relies on the neoplatonic structure of the mind’s capacity to return to its origin, yet equally clear how that logic now actively structures Augustine’s own search for the truth. The description is just that: an account of language put to use and becoming a trusted tool for discovery. This is indeed faith seeking understanding by utilizing a mode of understanding made available to it, yet pressing it on to hitherto unsuspected reaches. The final citation from scripture indicates what animates that extension and potential transformation of the original idiom: this is reason at the service of an understanding offered by revelation and available through faith—indeed, otherwise unimaginable, yet one which human beings need to articulate by using all the resources available to us.

**KIERKEGAARD’S WAY OF CONTEXTUALIZING REASON**

If our earlier guides can be classed as “pre-modern,” our final mentor managed to presage much that is “post-modern,” as well as share with Newman an admiration which Wittgenstein reserved for few thinkers, and these two alone among theological minds. Søren Kierkegaard exploited pseudonyms in order to be able to dramatize the diverse postures which religious persons can (and often should) assume towards the faith which continues to beckon them. For while a faith

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16 For a discussion of Augustine’s sources, see Henry Chadwick’s translation (which I shall use throughout) of the *Confessions* (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1991) xix.
tradition can lay claim to our allegiance, we can only respond in kind by way of
critical reflection which must at once scrutinize what the tradition offers as well
as let that tradition challenge currently touted norms of rationality. Kierkegaard
displayed his appreciation of this call for “mutual clarification” by creating within
himself and his readers enough space for reflection on the deliverances of faith
and of reason, in order to show how each could indeed illuminate the other. The
pseudonym most apt to display the inner reciprocal relation between faith and
reason (or theology and philosophy) is that of Anti-Climacus in *Sickness unto
Death.* For it is conceived by way of contrast to that of Climacus in the more
directly philosophical *Concluding Unscientific Postscript* so that the work can be
“edifying,” and thereby stand on the very threshold of a properly religious work.
Here S.K. anticipates the work of Pierre Hadot by reminding us that a philosophy
which leads beyond itself will require of its adherents as well as its novices a set
of practices designed to “build up” in them the appropriate responses to the calls
they have heard, and so facilitate their hearing yet others, while the interaction
between practices and reflection will help us discern the authenticity of the calls.

The rhetorical structure of the work is designed to dethrone the reigning
conception of philosophy, that of Hegel’s “system,” and to do so by displaying an
alternative which will alone be capable of leading one to what the Enlightenment
sought: “the individual.” He names the sickness which structures this inquiry
“despair,” and by ‘despair’ he means the recurring and often acute sense of
privation which we cannot help but feel in being unable to attain to “that unique
individual” which we are called to become. The human ideal opened up by the
Reformation and endorsed in an autonomous fashion by the Enlightenment is in
fact unattainable, yet we human beings regularly mask that fact from ourselves by
countless distractions (as Pascal remarked), while philosophers do so in a more
elaborate way by constructing “systems” in the image of Hegel. Yet the claim to
an autonomous philosophy which would supercede the older medieval faith
issued in a mode of discourse so abstract that it bypassed the very goal of that
endeavor: to make of oneself “an individual.” The polemical portions of this work
of S.K.’s (not to be attributed, *tout court*, to Kierkegaard himself) will engage us
with a prose redolent of “the system,” thereby showing us how “tolerably well”
he knows it, yet designed to display how wide of the mark it will carry us. The

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17 An English translation by Howard and Edna Hong, with extensive critical apparatus, was
published by Princeton University Press in 1980; a later translation by Alastair Hanay by Penguin
mark, again, is a conception of the human person able both to delineate our specificity as well as lead us to realize it individually. The conception to which S.K. introduces us is that of relating, borrowed from the medieval articulation of spirit as what is able to "relate to all things" (itself cribbed from the opening lines of Aristotle’s *Metaphysics*) and of the earlier Cappadocian attempt to articulate the triunity of God by identifying the “persons” of the divine trinity as “subsistent relations.”

This conception, introduced by a definition which takes the form of a conceit but which formulates precisely the specificity of human beings by accentuating the gerundive form, “relating”, is opposed to that of a synthesis, by which he can distinguish himself from a favorite ploy of Hegel’s. Yet he also implicitly targets Aristotle’s definition of human beings as “rational animals,” thereby showing his own modernity while trenchantly criticizing its current icon. Indeed, this gesture reminds us of an aporia in Aristotle’s work: if living things, indeed human beings especially and notably Socrates, serve as paradigms for his decisive category of *substance*, he nonetheless fails to bring out how humans transcend that very category in the very act of defining it. This, of course, is what Hegel showed so well, and in that sense S.K. is building on him while rejecting the omnivorous instincts of his philosophical legacy. So we are not “a relation” but “a relating,” which accentuates how our very being is already an activity, and also how as a relating it is a "being towards." (Aquinas had noted how the very “to-be” [*esse*] of creatures is “to-be-related” [ST 1.45.3].) Yet the transcendence proper to rational creatures which allows them to fulfill their destiny (or reject it) is also present in this very “being-related” as an inner exigency. That is to say, Kierkegaard adopts a classical view of freedom as a “hunger for the good,” steadfastly refusing the modern reduction of freedom to aimless choice, or the mere “ability to do otherwise,” with its roots in Scotus. This sets the stage for his evocative use of “despair,” which captures a range of attitudes linked to the experience of a *privation*, that is, something which ought to be present yet is not.

It is this “category” of despair which signals our awareness of being spirit, that is, of being-related in the very constitution of our being. Yet such an awareness must be “everywhere dialectical,” as he puts it, executing what Hegel proposed as the heart of an authentically philosophical logic better than even Hegel knew how to do. That is, most of us find ourselves living lives of “quiet desperation” because we are indeed “in despair” but remain oblivious of the fact, save for a nagging sense of “not being there” or of “not being able to get through,” which becomes S.K.’s operative sense for despair. Get through to
what? S.K.'s answer reveals how much his view of human being and of human freedom is rooted in Plato's inner quest for "the good," yet the path he takes reveals the power of this dialectical logic. It is in fact a dialectic of consciousness, of degrees of awareness of one's own state of inner alienation from one's proper good. The stages move from the common one of endemic lack of awareness to an acute awareness (which is close to our poignant use of 'despair') and on to the demonic despair of refusing any remedy for our situation, which S.K. cannily likens to a manuscript error which takes on a life of its own to challenge the writer by insisting that it "will not be corrected." Short of demonic despair, there is but one way out of the acute awareness of having "missed the mark," and that lies in our being able to name the good from which we have alienated ourselves as the God who reveals a forgiving face in Jesus, thereby calling us to faith via repentance. This dynamic retains accents of his Lutheran formation and also displays the finest lineaments of Dante's sensibility, by showing just how redundant is forensic judgment when our own inner orientation suffices to foreshadow the way we must go. We are unable to overcome despair ourselves, yet it will evaporate once the relating finds itself "rooted in the power which constitutes it," a point where the definition of self transmutes into that of faith.

What Kierkegaard helps readers to do, in Sickness unto Death, is to appropriate Hegel's dialectic in a way which allows it both to reveal and to serve a profoundly human movement to faith in the "power which constitutes" us, namely, the creator who is also our redeemer. So S.K.'s own faith perspective directs him to a novel use of Hegel's acute philosophical tools, and one which displays Hegel's acuity far better than the "system" which had captured him for S.K.'s generation, and threatened to undermine authentic Christian faith by making it subservient to a sovereign and omnivorous reason. In short, Kierkegaard succeeds in turning the tables on the pretenses of "philosophy" by utilizing those very philosophical skills to show how it can best fulfill its own aims by serving an innately human movement to faith. The operative premise, of course, is that we are in fact creatures of this God, which this work does not set out to prove since its peculiar pseudonym had identified the author as one on the way to faith. Indeed, Anti-Climacus is teetering on its very threshold, open to exploring how a key premise like the free creation of the universe might illuminate a philosophical, indeed a proto-psychological, picture of humanity. So if Kierkegaard's clearly pseudonymous works make him appear to be an "irrationalist" to philosophers, that should alert us to the polemical steps he felt it necessary to take in the face of a reason captured by "rationalism."
mediating work, however, utilizes the attentuated pseudonym of "Anti-Climacatus" to show how reason and faith can collaborate in illuminating what it means to be human in a far more searching way than the current rationalist paradigm allowed. Once again, a properly rhetorical use of reason, employed to show how Christian faith can illuminate the darker reaches of the human spirit, offers a fresh paradigm for self-understanding.

THEOLOGY AND PHILOSOPHY

The ways in which the respective disciplines of philosophy and theology relate to each other is clearly a function of one’s conception of reason and of faith. This selection of examples ranging over the Christian tradition has shown us how culture-bound such conceptions can be, and so should help us to correct the preconceptions we might bring to such a discussion. Moreover, having the perspective we do on modernist conceptions of the endemic opposition between the two should open us to appreciate those who saw them as more complementary than opposed. An historical-systematic approach to the tradition can help us to mine it for conceptions and distinctions which our age may have obscured. In this way we will not only be alerted to our own preconceptions, but can also work to correct them in the light of a richer range of mentors. That very exercise should allow us to appreciate traditions as vehicles for reflection rather than repositories of opinions, and so free us to pursue our own inquiry in a more self-critical and promising spirit.
In a series of articles, Felix Wilfred, a leading Indian theologian, has been pointing out that the key question in inculturation is hermeneutics. However, he cautions against aping Western hermeneutics. Recent Western hermeneutics, deriving from Heidegger and Gadamer, has concentrated on the existential and historical aspects of interpretation; Asian theology instead has to deal not only with temporal but also with cultural distances. Accordingly, an Asian hermeneutics will have to be cross-cultural rather than merely existential and historical.¹

Wilfred finds the prevalent models of inculturation defective. One problem is the instrumentalization of culture: the cultures of peoples have not been sufficiently valued in themselves; they have been considered simply as means through which Christianity can be made indigenous. Yet cultures are themselves the result of God’s action in history and of the presence of the Spirit among people. Another problem is the distinction between a substantial core which must be maintained and accidental differences which can be sacrificed, between a faith that is permanently valid and cultural differences that are variable. The basic problem, according to Wilfred, lies in the method: the prevalent models begin from the gospel and move to inculturation. He instead would begin from within a particular culture and assimilate the gospel from within that culture. True inculturation can take place only when the anthropological precedes the theological.² The transcultural problem according to Wilfred, therefore, would not

² Wilfred, “Inculturation as a Hermeneutical Question” 170-71.
be how to preach the gospel to a different culture, but rather, how to assimilate
the gospel from within a particular culture.

Inculturation is necessary because the gospel was preached in a particular
culture but at the same time demands proclamation to all cultures. But what is
true of scripture is true also of the dogmas. Wilfred does not accept that dogmas
are universal and transcultural formulations of the faith. Dogmas are themselves
acts of inculturation. As such, they also demand transposition into the idioms of
other particular cultures. Besides, dogmas are expressed in conceptual language,
but conceptual language embodies merely a brief period in human history: most
peoples and most cultures use symbolic language.3

What then of the process of inculturation? The chief problem here seems to be
that of criteria: how are we to judge whether a particular effort at inculturation is
continuous with the past? Wilfred's answers are scattered over several articles.
They might be brought together thus:

The supreme criterion is the gospel and tradition. But the problem is that the
gospel and tradition are themselves available to us only through a process of
interpretation.4

There are in fact no criteria of truth which are so objective as to be completely
independent of some frame of reference and cultural conditioning. It is best
therefore to entrust the task of inculturation to the local community: the local
community is the best judge of inculturation. Judgment can be done only from
within: this is what sociologists call an *emic* understanding of culture.5

This position is moderated by two further criteria. Communion with other
local churches is described as the touchstone of authenticity; it is maintained
through dialogue.6 Again, *anubhava* or experience is regarded as the 'yardstick of
truth.' *Anubhava,* explains Wilfred, is more ontological than epistemological. It is
regarded as subjective only within the epistemological framework of the subject-
object distinction. Properly understood, it involves an identification of oneself
with reality. Either *anubhava* itself, or else the personal transformation that
results from it, would seem be to an important criterion of truth in theology.7

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3 Ibid., 191.
4 Ibid., 187-89.
5 Ibid., 181-82.
6 Ibid., 192-93.
7 F. Wilfred, "Theology, the Divine Mystery and the World," *Beyond Settled Foundations: The
Journey of Indian Theology* (Madras: Department of Christian Studies: University of Madras,
1993) 175-77.
Wilfred then sets the problem of inculturation rather sharply: inculturation is a hermeneutical question which is not merely existential and historical but also cross-cultural; all expressions of the faith, including dogmas, are historically and culturally conditioned, and all need to be transposed; the supreme norm of inculturation is the gospel and tradition, but the problem is that these are themselves available to us only through a process of interpretation.

My aim in this paper is to study not Wilfred but Lonergan on the question of inculturation, or contextualization, or transcultural mediation of Christian meanings and values. Lonergan struggled for a great part of his life with the transcultural problem in theology, and he moved from a solution that bore traces of classicism to a solution that was more respectful of particular cultures. His final position is summarized quite exactly by the aphorism that gives the title to my presentation: “Et Judaeus et Graecus e metodo” [both Jewish and Greek through method]. This aphorism is found in a little known unpublished manuscript in Lonergan’s Nachlaß, a course entitled De methodo theologiae given at the Gregorian University in the Spring semester of 1963. My construction of Lonergan’s jotting reads thus: if in the New Testament the question was “aut Judaeus aut Graecus” [either Jewish or Greek], if the technical formulations of the conciliar and medieval period were a question of “neque Judaeus neque Graecus” [neither Jewish now Greek], now it is possible to be “et Judaeus et Graecus e metodo”.8 The contention of my paper is that, in his thinking on the transcultural problem, Lonergan himself seems to have moved from a position that resembled “neque Judaeus neque Graecus” to “et Judaeus et Graecus e metodo.”

I. “NEQUE JUDEAEUS NEQUE GRAECUS”

In the first chapter of Divinarum personarum conceptionem analogicam... (1957) Lonergan points out the inevitability of what he calls the ‘transcultural problem’ among Christians: revelation was given to a particular people at particular times and under particular circumstances, and so is to a certain extent bound up with particular cultural conditions; yet the gospel is for all human beings of all times,

8 Cf. De methodo theologiae (handwritten notes for the course given at the Gregorian University, Rome, Spring semester 1963, LRI Archives Batch V.11) item z+7, p. 4. The handwritten text reads: “NT Aut Judaeus aut Graecus / Tech [...] Neque Judaeus neque Graecus / Meth et Judaeus et Graecus e Methodo”.
places and cultures.\textsuperscript{9} \textit{Insight} had already noted, both in chapter 20 and in the Epilogue, that the proclamation and transmission of the divine solution to the problem of evil involves “recasting the expression of the solution into the equivalent expressions of different places, times, classes, and cultures.”\textsuperscript{10} This is what the text of 1957 refers to as the \textit{transcultural process}, which it explains as the process from the \textit{priora quoad nos} in one culture to the \textit{priora quoad nos} in another.

The task of proclamation involves re-expression because expression is relative to audience, and audiences are many.\textsuperscript{11} \textit{Divinarum personarum}... explains that audiences are many because of the basic instability and variability of the \textit{priora quoad nos} in the human sciences. The transcultural problem therefore is that of finding a transcultural principle for making systematic transitions from what is prior in one culture to what is prior in another.\textsuperscript{12}

Lower level solutions exist (the use of transcultural symbols, scholarship on the basis of historical sense, the use of other sciences) but are inadequate: they settle only the material side of things, but are unable to deal with problems rooted in conflicting viewpoints or philosophies. Scholars either tend to avoid this latter problem, or else subscribe to some form of relativism.\textsuperscript{13} Yet, as “Theology and Understanding” points out, it is the latter type of question which is extremely relevant to theology.\textsuperscript{14} At issue, in the ante-nicene movement, for example, are the implicit philosophies of various authors: the naive realism of Tertullian, the idealism of Origen, the rationalism of Arius, the realism implicit in the Word of God.

The solution, says \textit{Divinarum personarum}..., lies in an appeal to absolute truths in human interiority.\textsuperscript{15} This is of course the solution outlined in \textit{Insight}, and \textit{Divinarum personarum}... makes explicit reference to it.\textsuperscript{16}


\textsuperscript{10} Ibid., 586.

\textsuperscript{11} B. Lonergan, \textit{Insight} (CWL 3 1992) 742-43, 761.

\textsuperscript{12} Ibid., 29.

\textsuperscript{13} Ibid., 29-31.

\textsuperscript{14} B. Lonergan, \textit{Collection} (CWL 4, 1988) 129.

\textsuperscript{15} Lonergan, \textit{DP}, 31.

\textsuperscript{16} The references made are to the discussion of relativism (\textit{Insight} 342-47 = \textit{Insight} CWL 3: 366-71), the problem of internal and external relations (\textit{Insight} 493ff = \textit{Insight} CWL 3: 517-19), and the discussion of the truth of interpretation (\textit{Insight} 562-94 = \textit{Insight} CWL 3: 585-617). Cf. Lonergan, In the ante-nicene movement, 31.
How then is the transcultural problem resolved in the church? From the Epilogue of *Insight* as well as from *Divinarum personarum* ... we gather the following:

1. The ordinary magisterium may either confirm or else itself engage in the transcultural process in particular instances. These are "authoritative pronouncements that call for dutiful submission".17

2. Historically, 'speculative theology' attempts to solve the transcultural problem by taking advantage of 'perennial philosophy' to rise to universal formulations of the faith.18 This is what *Divinarum personarum*... refers to as the theological process, which it explains as a movement from the *priora quoad nos* of scripture or in the Fathers of the Church or of some particular culture, to what is prior in itself.19

3. The extraordinary magisterium may confirm this theological process by issuing dogmatic definitions. *Divinarum personarum*... refers to this as the dogmatic process. We may note how this handles in one stroke both the problem of expression and the problem of truth: the Church not only speaks with one voice to all cultures and to all times, but also judges infallibly about her own ascent.20

4. Lonergan himself proposes a methodical speculative theology working on the basis of a theologically transformed universal viewpoint, producing pure or universal formulations accessible to "any sufficiently cultured audience".21 The transcultural principle he has been calling for is this theologically transformed universal viewpoint. The universal viewpoint is based on 'absolute truths in the inner life' - it arises from grasp of the invariant structure of cognitional activity; and it is theologically transformed by the assent of faith. Since *Insight* presupposes a classical notion of faith, the theologically transformed universal viewpoint includes assent to truths revealed by God and taught by the magisterium.

5. Another part of Lonergan's solution is a historical theology working on the basis of the theologically transformed universal viewpoint. Its task is the *munus nobilissimum* of showing the identity in difference and in development of the various historical expressions of the Christian faith.

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The terms dogmatic theology, speculative theology, historical theology are rather fluid in Lonergan's usage, and it is best that we clarify immediately their meaning at this stage. Thus *De constitutione Christi...* (1956) describes dogmatic theology as consisting of an imperfect yet most fruitful understanding of the faith; this dogmatic theology subdivides into positive theology and speculative theology. Positive theology here is obviously the same as the historical theology we have been discussing, for its task is to discover the same truth under different expressions according to different cultures and a developing understanding of the truth. Speculative theology instead aims at understanding revelation and formulating the *quoad se* in such a way that the same truth be discernible amid cultural variations.²²

*De constitutione Christi...* indicates a very close relationship between positive and speculative theology. Positive theology cannot perform its task without the assistance of speculative theology: unless speculative theology expresses revelation as it is *quoad se*, positive theology cannot discern the same truth in its varied historical expressions.²³ This gives a very crucial role to speculative theology.

We could ask here: is this close relationship valid only for positive and speculative theology as they have existed in history, or does a *methodical* historical theology also depend in a similar way on the pure formulations of a methodical speculative theology? We could try to answer this question by asking how historical theology might function. On the basis of the theologically transformed universal viewpoint it would divide the historical series of expressions of the faith into positions and counterpositions. Further it would identify genetic and dialectical sequences in this historical series. But all expressions will related to one another either genetically or dialectically, and so historical theology can proceed towards a universal viewpoint that embraces both positions and counterpositions. Finally, since the expressions are related among themselves, the unification achieved would be explanatory.²⁴

A further question will arise at this point: we easily understand how historical theology would identify philosophical and moral positions and counterpositions; but how would it identify specifically religious and Christian positions and counterpositions? The point is not very clear. Should we say that Lonergan has no more than a dogmatic solution here? Or should we turn perhaps to the

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²³ Lonergan, *De constitutione Christi...* 43.

transformation of dialectic into a tripolar affair by the advent of the absolutely supernatural solution to the problem of evil?25 According to The Way to Nicea the problem with Arius was his rationalism; this seems to be an example of a Christian counterposition, since it involves a refusal to accept the possibility of an absolutely supernatural solution. At any rate, Lonergan himself clearly believed, as early as 1959, that Catholic theologians’ submission to the magisterium does not exempt them from making judgments of their own.26

6. Lonergan insists on the universality of the formulations of the theological process: the transcultural process terminates in categories proper to particular cultures, but the theological process, since it terminates in what is priora quoad se, in no way terminates at the hellenistic or medieval stage or at any other stage determined by particular cultural circumstances. He goes on to add the same thing about the dogmatic process: for the same reason, the dogmatic process is distorted if homoousion is considered to be merely hellenistic or transubstantiation merely medieval.27

7. We may note that there is no mention of a descent to particular formulations. The reason might be found in the fact that, in the language of Verbum, formative abstraction enables spontaneous re-expression. Insight speaks of this in terms of the ‘problem of identification’: identification is that understanding which enables one to teach, to select and arrange and indicate to others the combination of sensible elements that will give rise to the same insight in them; it is that understanding which enables one to vary one’s examples so as to communicate one’s insight.28 Along the same lines “Theology and Understanding” (1954) speaks of the fruitfulness of the ordo doctrinae: the single view which it provides of the mysteries of the faith “bestows upon one’s teaching the enviable combination of sureness of doctrine with versatility of expression.” Such a view remains fixed upon one’s memory, so that the Catholic priest “spontaneously expounds the epistle or gospel of the Sunday in the light of an understanding that is common to the ages.”29 As Crowe has noted, the descent does not seem to be a theological problem for Lonergan at this stage.30

25 Insight 749.
27 Lonergan, DP, 33.
28 Lonergan, Insight 582.
29 Lonergan, Collection 125.
8. Lonergan’s solution to the transcultural problem at this stage therefore involves two things: a speculative theology rising to universal formulations of the faith, and a historical theology demonstrating the identity in difference and in development of the various historical expressions of the faith.

Lonergan’s contribution is to have put the dogmatic and medieval efforts onto a methodical footing; but he does not move away from the dogmatic and medieval solution which handles the transcultural problem by rising to universal formulations. Thus we might describe his solution as "Neque Judaeus neque Graecus."

The roots of this solution seem to lie in traces of faculty psychology as well as classicism. The universal viewpoint, for example, arises from a grasp of knowing but never includes the level of doing. When Insight has to speak of the invariant structure that includes the level of doing, it prefers to speak of ‘upper context’.

Significantly, generalized method does not manifest any such limitations: with equal ease it yields both a method of metaphysics and a method of ethics. Again, perhaps there is a streak of classicism in the very notion of a universal viewpoint which wants to overcome the relativity of expression to a manifold of particular audiences by finding a universal mode of expression. The Epilogue of Insight reveals in fact a rather normative notion of culture when it speaks of universal formulations accessible to “any sufficiently cultured audience.”

As for the theologically transformed universal viewpoint, we have noted that it presupposes a classical notion of faith. Also, its theological transformation is patterned on classical fundamental theology, and not on an appropriation of religious experience.

Faculty psychology, classicism, a classical notion of theology: these seem to be some of the tensions inherent in the transcultural principle that is the theologically transformed universal viewpoint. Lonergan himself is of course not aware of these tensions at this point. They come to light as he begins to work on theological method. As he indicates in the Georgetown course of 1964, they come

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32 Ibid., 761.
to light concretely through the entry of ‘positive studies’ into theology, with their different notion of science and historical consciousness.\textsuperscript{34}

\section*{II. “ET JUDAЕUS ET GRAECUS E METHODO”: PROGRAM}

If the solution to the transcultural problem lies in the theological process, it should not be surprising that Lonergan shifts attention to this latter process in his subsequent thinking. Thus \textit{De intellectu et methodo} (1959) reflects on the link between scriptures and theology. It notes a triple problematic: that of the foundations of transitions from one ordering of questions to another, that of the historicity of terms in different orderings, and that of the chasm between the scriptures and theology. The solution is a relatively straightforward application of \textit{Insight}: a general method which is subsequently adapted for theology.

As far as speculative theology is concerned, there is a significant novelty: both \textit{De intellectu et methodo} and the philosophy of education lectures of the summer of 1959 speak not only of the ascent to universal formulations but also of a descent to the particular. In the latter set of lectures especially, Lonergan continues to insist that (systematic) theology gives the Church a mode of thought and expression which is independent of cultural differences. But he also goes on to point out that this provides a solid basis for re-expression in terms of the mentality of an age. How is re-expression done? If one knows theology, one has the habit of understanding. If one has the habit of understanding, one is not tied to technical terms, and can easily re-express the same truth. Without the habit of understanding instead, there is the mere repetition of formulae.\textsuperscript{35}

Where the lectures on the philosophy of education see the descent to the concrete as a spontaneous affair, \textit{De intellectu et methodo}, despite being given in the semester prior to these lectures, sees the descent as somewhat more complex. It draws attention to the problem of the chasm, not only between speculative theology and the scriptures, but also between speculative theology and the ordinary believer.\textsuperscript{36} It proposes that theologians should acquire a scientific

\textsuperscript{34} B. Lonergan, “Method in theology - internal problems” (notes pertaining to the Summer Institute on The Method of Theology, Georgetown University, Washington, July 13-17, 1964; LRI Archives, folder entitled “Various Papers”) 1.

\textsuperscript{35} B. Lonergan, \textit{Topics in Education} (CWL 10) 1993 248.

\textsuperscript{36} B. Lonergan, \textit{De intellectu et methodo} (autograph typescript of chapter I of the course given at the Gregorian University, Rome, Spring 1959, LRI Archives Batch V.2.a) 11.
understanding of their faith, and that they should be able to adapt this scientific understanding for the use of people of different classes and cultures. The basis of this adaptation is the link between intellect and sense, for intellect is not merely concerned with the universal and necessary, but also is able to grasp intelligibility in the sensible itself. But the method of adaptation involves the mediation of the human sciences: a psychology of the incarnate spirit, a theory of art, and an explanatory differentiation of different modes of thought such as the primitive, the mythic, the popular, and the semi-educated.  

*De intellectu*...probably contains Lonergan’s first explicit notice of the problem of historicity. But perhaps the awareness of historicity is not as yet complete, for we have seen that the lectures on the philosophy of education continue to insist on the transculturality of the universal formulations of speculative theology. We might say that Lonergan is aware at this point that expressions differ (*Insight* already admits this much); but he is not yet ready to say that all expressions, including those of speculative theology and of the dogmas, are historically conditioned.

*De intellectu et methodo* begins a period of intense concentration on history and on historical theology. The basic search here is for an adequate upper blade, and Lonergan’s strategy here is to break up the question by distinguishing different cases: the history of a special science, the history of philosophy, the history of theology, and general history. For the history of a special science, the upper blade is knowledge of the science in its contemporary form. History of philosophy also calls for an upper blade, but here the problem is the multiplicity of philosophies. “The Philosophy of History” (1960) indicates that the relevant upper blade here is a philosophy of philosophies, and the manuscript of the lecture explicitly identifies this with the universal viewpoint.  

What about history of theology? This is possible insofar as it exists as a science, for then the contemporary state of theology will function as an upper blade, though here also the problem of the multiplicity of philosophies will recur, and in addition also the problem of

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37 Ibid., 19.

differences in faith. But the real problem is the prescientific stage of theology and the transition to the scientific stage, which is a shift from the commonsense mode of apprehension to the systematic point of view.\textsuperscript{39} Lonergan remarks here that the full impact of the development of historical science is hitting theology, and that theology has not yet thought its way through this problem.\textsuperscript{40} His discussion of the problem of general history however seems relevant here. For general history is a non-conceptualized field, and the a priori component, which is relevant for general history is the analysis of the good as developing object; it is also relevant for the prescientific stage of theology.\textsuperscript{41}

We may note here that the a priori for theology is more concrete and existential than the universal viewpoint, since it includes not only the level of doing but also a consideration of sin and grace.\textsuperscript{42} Further, as Lonergan himself notes, it is a psychological analysis of development and a human account of the good, as compared to the ontological analysis of development and the cosmic account of the good in \textit{Insight}.\textsuperscript{43} In keeping with the greater concreteness of the new a priori, Lonergan begins to speak, not of differentiations of the notion of being as in \textit{Insight}, but of differentiations of consciousness. These are to be linked with the discussion of the modes of thought in \textit{De intellectu et methodo}.

Attention to the theological process continues in the courses of 1962. The ‘first problematic’ of \textit{De methodo theologiae} which is described as being rooted in ‘antithetical worlds’, aims at showing the link between life and theory, so as to show the link between scriptures and theology. This effort is complicated by the entry of positive historical studies, with their new notion of science and historical consciousness. Accordingly, there is a ‘second problematic’ dedicated specifically to historical studies, and the first problematic itself addresses the problem of the integration of the new notion of science and of historical consciousness.

The solution to the problem of antithetical worlds is a general method which is more concrete and existential than the universal viewpoint. Its basis is operations in general rather than cognitional operations alone, and it deals not

\textsuperscript{39} Lonergan, \textit{Topics in Education} (CWL 10, 1993) 233-47.
\textsuperscript{40} Ibid., 247.
\textsuperscript{41} Ibid., 251-55.
\textsuperscript{42} Ibid., 58-69.
only with being but also with the good. It is able to handle not only intellectual but also moral and religious conversion. This general method is able to integrate antithetical worlds by integrating the operations which give rise to these worlds.

The general method of 1962 is able to integrate the new notion of science with the old Aristotelian notion by reducing both to the two basic questions, What is it? and Is it? Such an integration, says Lonergan, amounts to an integration of wisdom and prudence; it is able to handle not only not only the universal and the necessary, but also the empirical, the concrete, the particular, the changing, the contingent.

The courses of 1962 also attempt to address the problem of historical consciousness. Thus general method is able to handle development, and the encounter with the Geisteswissenschaften leads to a differentiation of the hermeneutics of Insight into a hermeneutics based on common sense and a history that is explanatory.

Coming to the transcultural problem, one of the aims of the first problematic is to show the validity of a properly scientific speculative theology. As we have said already, the links between scripture and such a theology are shown by examining the transition from life to theory, and then from faith to theology. The principle of transition is basically the dynamic of the question. The basis of the transition is the transcendence of truth: since truth is independent of the subject and of the circumstances in which it arises, it can be transferred from one context to another. Nothing is said specifically about universal formulations, but if

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44 B. Lonergan, De metodo theologiae (autograph typescript of notes for the course given at the Gregorian University, Spring semester 1962, LRI Archives Batch V.1.c) 7.
46 This novelty is the result of the developments of the preceding years, the most significant of which is the enriched notion of operation and of habit derived through a reading of Piaget for the 1959 lectures on education. (Cf. esp. chapter 8 of Topics in Education.) Where Aristotle's habits were broken up according to potencies, the new notion is united by a single development, and thus accounts better for the unity of habits. (Topics in Education chapter 8; cf. B. Lonergan, The Method of Theology, Summer Institute at Regis College, Toronto, July 9-20, 1962, Graham transcript 7-8.) Most importantly, it is confined neither to some single faculty nor to a single mind. Cf. the 'operational habit' mentioned in the 1959 course De systemate et historia, which resides in several potencies at once. A science is an explicitly conscious operational habit, and so need not be confined to some single faculty: it may reside in the intellect as well as in sense and in sensitive memory, and also in the will which selects method and faithfully follows it. (De systemate et historia, LRI Archives batch V.8.a, item 1.)
47 Lonergan, De metodo theologiae (autograph, 1962) 34.
48 Ibid., 62-72.
speculative theology is properly scientific, it certainly will have formulations which are systematic and theoretical and not merely symbolic and intersubjective.

Historical theology, or positive theology as it is called in 1962, has both a genetic and a dialectical component. It is chiefly concerned with transformations over contexts, and its general theory, Lonergan tells us, is given in chapter 17 of *Insight*. Its key tool is dialectic; it is dialectic which provides the criterion of continuity between revelation and subsequent doctrinal formulations. This criterion is intellectual, moral and religious conversion. *Per se*, thematizations are valid; *per accidens*, when one or other conversion is lacking or not proper, they can be mistaken.49

To sum up, the courses of 1959 begin insisting on a return to the concrete, and *De intellectu*...indicates that this return is not merely spontaneous but might involve the mediation of the human sciences and of explanatory differentiations of consciousness. The courses of 1962 concentrate on the challenges arising from the entry of historical studies into theology. Faculty psychology and classicism are both recognized, and begin to be tackled. But the classical notion of faith and of theology remain firmly in place. This constitutes a tension, for historical studies regard all texts as data, but the starting point of theology in truths continues to be affirmed right up to 1964. Historical consciousness and the new notion of science have been acknowledged, but their implications have not as yet been fully integrated. The *De methodo theologiae* course of the Spring semester of 1963 contains the aphorism, “*Et Judaeus et Graecus e methodo,*” but this is still only a program, not yet achievement.

### III. “ET JUDEAEUS ET GRAECUS E METHODO”: ACHIEVEMENT

The question regarding the starting point of theology is crucial for the integration of historical studies into theology, for if theology begins from truths, then historical studies are not really part of theology. By 1967, Lonergan comes round to conceiving of theology as a quasi-empirical science, with its starting point in data. This allows historical studies to be regarded as theology, but also raises the problem of foundations: if the foundations of theology are not truths, what can

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they be? Lonergan’s answer in 1967 is that foundational reality lies in the subject, in conversion.50

Achievement of new theological foundations occurs however only in 1968, upon acknowledgement of the primacy of the existential.51 The basic moment in these new theological foundations is the reversal of the relationship between knowledge and love. The love of God is a gift; it is not the product of our knowing and choosing. Faith is to be distinguished from beliefs; faith is the eye of love, fruit of the gift of God’s love, the horizon within which religious doctrines are found to be meaningful.52 Theology had of course always regarded the *initium fidei* as supernatural, but it had felt the need of adding on a fundamental theology carried out in the light of pure reason. New theological foundations recognize that pure reason does not exist, and that what is needed in the first place is not so much a proof of God’s existence as a bringing to light of one’s ongoing response to the gift of God’s love. New theological foundations are, in other words, a question of the thematization of religious conversion. In place of the theologically transformed universal viewpoint therefore we have a theological method which, for the reasons we have been trying to outline, does not need to undergo theological transformation.

If the overcoming of the classical notion of faith and of theology leads to new theological foundations, the consistent shift from faculty psychology to intentionality analysis leads to a sidelining of the universal viewpoint in favor of transcendental method.

The general method of 1962 leads to the replacement of the universal viewpoint with the notion of ‘basic context’, which recalls the ‘upper context’ mentioned in the Epilogue of *Insight*, and which like general method is able to deal not only with intellectual but also with moral and religious conversion.

In 1963 Lonergan works out a new notion of horizon in place of the Aristotelian-scholastic pair potency and formal object. He finds that this notion is more concrete than the Aristotelian-scholastic notion, because its subject pole is not an abstract potency but the concrete subject, and its object pole is not the object considered from a particular angle, but some concrete totality of objects attained

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by the concrete subject.\textsuperscript{53} One consequence of this is that the language of viewpoint is replaced by the language of horizon, and the place of the universal viewpoint is taken by the Gesamt- und Grundwissenschaft or total and basic horizon of "Metaphysics as Horizon" (1963) or the methodical horizon of De methodo theologiae of the Spring semester of 1963.\textsuperscript{54} It can be shown that this methodical horizon is another way of speaking about transcendental method,\textsuperscript{55} so that Lonergan's achievement may be regarded as a shift from 'metaphysics as horizon' to 'method as horizon.' From now on, it is no longer merely heuristic structures but method itself that serves as upper blade, and explicit notice of this is not lacking.\textsuperscript{56} Method in Theology in fact makes it more than clear that the basic set of categories is now psychological rather than metaphysical; metaphysics is explicitly and deliberately derivative.\textsuperscript{57} As Lonergan says in "Philosophy and the Religious Phenomenon," the priority of metaphysics in the Aristotelian tradition led to a faculty psychology. The overcoming of the priority of metaphysics leads instead to a shift from faculty psychology to intentionality analysis.\textsuperscript{58} Such a shift explains the mention of the universal viewpoint in the list of derived general theological categories.\textsuperscript{59}

Thus in Method, the functions of the universal viewpoint are taken over by transcendental method, and similarly those of the theologically transformed universal viewpoint by theological method. This, as we have been saying, is a result of the shift from faculty psychology to intentionality analysis, of the


\textsuperscript{55} Method describes transcendental method as a heightening of consciousness that leads to a cognitional theory, an epistemology and a metaphysics. The "Questionnaire on Philosophy" (\textit{Method: Journal of Lonergan Studies} 2/2 [1984] 3ff, 23-24) speaks of the Gesamt- und Grundwissenschaft as a total and basic science which includes cognitional theory, epistemology and metaphysics, and goes on to identify this with total and basic method or generalized empirical method. Cf. also the \textit{Method} chapter on Doctrines which speaks of transcendental method as a general science: MT 316.


overcoming of classicism, and of the integration of historical studies into theology. What difference does this make in the way Method handles the transcultural problem?

1. Insight was aware of the need to recast doctrines for different cultures, but the formulations of dogmas and of speculative theology were regarded as universal and transcultural right up to 1959 at least. In Method, all expressions, dogmas included, are regarded as historically conditioned. Theology is now conceived as a quasi-empirical science, and the functional specialty research begins not from revealed truths but from data.

2. Method notes that church doctrines are not simple reaffirmations of scripture and of tradition. They are not merely re-expressions for different cultures, for re-expressions involve a principal insight communicated by a different expression corresponding to the habitual development of a culture. They are rather new insights and new expressions, because they meet "the questions of the day for the people of the day",60 and they give rise to a new line of development within a culture.

3. In Lonergan’s thinking, cultures are relative horizons. Relative horizons are rooted in development, whether psychological, social or cultural, whereas absolute horizons are rooted in presence or absence of conversions. Absolute horizons are incommensurable universes of discourse: direct communication is impossible.61 If then cultures are relative horizons, the attempt to make cultures into incommensurable universes of discourse is quite mistaken. It follows therefore that transposition over different cultural contexts is possible.

4. Method in Theology firmly rejects the classicist insistence on uniformity, where unity of faith is a matter of everyone subscribing to the same formulae,1 but goes on to affirm both the permanence and the historicity of dogmas. The meaning of dogmas is permanent, because what is true is permanent, and because we have no evidence for changing what we could not have known had not God revealed it. But it is also historically conditioned, because every statement has meaning only within a context. Does this mean that Lonergan has abandoned the distinction between commonsense and systematic statements? Obviously not: the

60 Ibid., 296.
61 Cf. "Hermeneutics - Alternative ending" (autograph typescript of the lecture during the Institute on The Method of Theology, Regis College, 1962, LRI Archives, file entitled "Various Papers") 11: transcendental horizons exclude direct communication. Differences in transcendental horizons can be surmounted technically only through self-appropriation, distinction of positions and counterpositions, dialectic.
Method chapter on Interpretation continues to affirm that the more a text is systematic, the less it stands in need of exegesis. The point is that all statements, whether they need extensive efforts at interpretation or not, have meaning only within a context, for judgments arise only within a prior context of judgments and take their place within that context.

5. The canon of relevance, that the interpreter begin from the universal viewpoint, is dropped. The achievement of new theological foundations in conversion make it possible for theology to be a quasi-empirical science, with its starting point in data. Neither intellectual nor moral nor religious conversion, much less acceptance of the Christian faith, is a prerequisite for engaging in method. Theological method therefore is open to all comers. Further, the addition of dialectic which flowers into dialogue makes it a method that is intrinsically ecumenical and inter-religious.

6. Functional specialization makes theological method far more practical than the hermeneutical method of chapter 17 of *Insight*.

Coming more directly to the transcultural problem, we could say that the whole aim of the transcendental method of 1971 is to handle the question of the transcultural mediation of Christian meanings and values, to learn from a past and to communicate to a present, to mediate between a religion and a culture. How does transcendental method do this? The pattern is as before: by ascending from theological data to a transcultural base, and then descending to particular cultures and situations.

The ascent, it seems to me, would include the first seven functional specialties; the descent would be the concern of the last specialty, communications.

Research, interpretation and history are largely commonsense affairs. Dialectic and foundations function as upper blade. We should mention here a development that becomes thematic only in the post-Method years: dialogue. Method envisages a double application of dialectic. The first application is already an encounter with the history-making persons of the past. The second application amounts to an encounter with the history-writing persons of the present, and so the communitarian dimension of knowledge is integrated even

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63 Ibid., 153.
more explicitly into method. This double application of dialectic is completed and crowned by dialogue. For the second application may itself be done in two manners, one of which deals with subjects as objects and the other with subjects as subjects. The latter possibility is dialogue.

Doctrines are formulated on the basis of the general and special categories generated seminally in dialectic and with explicit commitment in foundations. The categories are transcultural at their core, though historically conditioned in their actual expression; accordingly, we can expect doctrines that are transcultural at least in their core. Again, the basic set of categories is psychological rather than metaphysical, and so doctrines formulated on the basis of method will differ from doctrines formulated in a metaphysical context.

As for the descent, Frederick Crowe has pointed out that this is a transition from general to particular, from a transcultural base to various particular cultures. This, he says, is not a logical process; rather, it is a question of intelligent mediation. As such, it calls for fuller understanding of the particular. Further, there are no shortcuts to this fuller understanding, no a priori, armchair work; it involves the use of the human sciences, it involves turning to the experts in these sciences. The correctness of the transitions to the concrete is correlative to the correctness of the fuller understanding of the particular.

In general we might say that understanding and wisdom are the key. Understanding and wisdom mediate between concrete and abstract: they move from concrete to abstract, and then again from abstract to concrete. A consequence of this is that systematic theology is called to provide the basis for communications. For to communicate one must understand what one has to communicate; otherwise one is condemned to mere repetition of formulas. It is understanding alone “that can say what it grasps in any of the manners demanded by the almost endless series of different audiences.”

Both ascent and descent require the help of the human sciences. Which are the relevant human sciences in theology? For the first movement, we obviously have


research, interpretation, history; but there are also other disciplines which are required. The supplementary mode of expression required by the functional specialty interpretation, for example, requires the knowledge of experts in the development of languages and expression. Again, the lecture on “Hermeneutics” of 1962 had noted that the human sciences would provide tools for the scientific communication of commonsense understanding of texts, the sciences in question being those concerned with the order of human living in family, society, morals, education, state, law, economics, technics, and with the meaning of human living in intersubjectivity, symbol, art, language, history, religion, literature, science, philosophy.70

For the second movement, the relevant disciplines are probably cultural anthropology, cultural studies, sociology, etc.: all the disciplines which might enable us to approximate to fuller understanding of particular cultures. We might recall here the suggestions made in De intellectu et methodo (1959): a psychology of the incarnate subject, a theory of art, explanatory differentiations of consciousness.71 Similarly “Theology and Man’s Future” (1968) notes that religion “has to know the uses of symbol and story, the resources of the arts and of literature, the various motivations on which in any given area it can rely, the themes that in a given culture and class provide a carrying wave for the message.”72

How does Method demonstrate the identity in difference and in development of the various historical expressions of the faith? The question is never raised explicitly, but all the elements of a solution are there. History determines what was going forward, working on the results of research and interpretation. Dialectic and foundations handle the question of conflicting horizons or viewpoints, and move towards the explanatory unification of viewpoints and expressions of the faith that is the universal or comprehensive viewpoint. The possibility of development of doctrine is discussed at length in terms of the differentiations of consciousness and the ongoing discovery of mind.73

71 Lonergan, De intellectu et methodo (autograph, 1959) 19.
What merits exploration is the ‘afterthought’ that there is no one manner in which doctrines develop, and that the ongoing discovery of mind is merely one way in which doctrines develop. The example given is the development of Marian dogmas, which would seem to involve a development of human feelings rather than of the mind. Is not transcendental method comprehensive enough to include not only the development of mind but also of other aspects of human reality? Lonergan does not attempt an answer in Method, but is content to say that development is an intelligibility immanent in historical process, and accordingly it is to be discovered a posteriori, by means of the first five functional specialties. However, the later acceptance of psychic conversion and the talk of the passionateness of being just might be relevant here.

IV. PLURALISM IN DOCTRINES AND SYSTEMATICS?

The return to the concrete, we have noted, is the task of the final functional specialty, communications. It is here and only here, that Lonergan seems to envisage a legitimate pluralism. But to someone coming from a non-Western culture, the question immediately arises: why not a plurality of doctrines and of systematics? I would like to propose this question for your consideration: could Lonergan’s method be seen as allowing for such a plurality? There seem to be some elements which might ground such a possibility.

The first element is the description of foundational categories as transcultural in their core but historically conditioned in their actual expression. To speak of religious experience in terms of love, for example, would seem to many adherents of other religions as quite sectarian. Lonergan himself seems to admit as much in an article of 1975: “Any formulation is in the context of some tradition and milieu; diverse formulations reflect different traditions .... Hence, at the present time specific discussion of emerging religious consciousness has to proceed on the basis of some convention. If it is not to be merely generic, it has to adopt the formulation of some particular tradition at least as a temporary or momentary

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74 Ibid., 319.
convention.” 77 But would not religious experience as infrastructure, “the dynamic state of being in love in an unrestricted fashion”, at least qualify as properly transcultural? Lonergan seems to admit quite clearly that even this is historically conditioned: the adherents of other religions, he says, may wish to ascribe to the distinct suprastructure of Christianity the characterization of religious experience as being in love. 78

The second element is method as involving interreligious collaboration. Such a method will be an intrinsically dialogical affair, and the data need not be restricted to what pertains to the Christian religion. What kind of effect will this have on the generation of basic categories? Will the basic plurality of ways in which different traditions express their core religious experience be overcome? Or will there be mutual recognition of basic equivalence, mutual recognition of the common transcultural core, without the need of uniformity in expression? Is it not possible that Christians and Buddhists come to a recognition of the deep affinity between unrestricted loving and the anatta or selflessness manifested in karuna (compassion)? Lonergan himself has made repeated references to William Johnston and the Zen experience of Japanese monks, indicating that a common infrastructure might underlie differences in suprastructure or interpretation. 79

A third element is the description of method as being concerned with the transposition of systematic meaning from a static to an ongoing, dynamic context, as being concerned with the process from one system to another. 80

On the basis of the first two elements, there seems to be some possibility of a pluralism in the very foundations, the possibility of a plurality of basically equivalent sets of general and special theological categories. But this would mean that there would be a pluralism in doctrines themselves: doctrines which are transculturally equivalent, but still different in their actual expression.

A pluralism in systematics would have to follow such a pluralism in doctrines. But here perhaps we can envisage an even greater pluralism, for while the truths of the faith are permanent in their meaning, the understanding proposed by

78 Ibid., 71.
systematic theology is merely hypothetical. Given the inexhaustible intelligibility of the supernatural mysteries of faith, and given that we can arrive at a merely imperfect though still very fruitful understanding of them, what is there to prevent a plurality of systematics? For if method is concerned with the process from one system to another, it would ensure the equivalence of transpositions and control over the ongoing process. Lonergan of course makes a strong case for basic continuity rooted in the normative structure of conscious intentionality, the gift of God’s love offered to all, the permanence of dogma, and the occurrence of genuine achievement in the past. But he also admits development arising through inculturation of the gospel and differentiation of consciousness, and revision arising from developments within a culture, which in turn may give rise to revisions that are more properly theological. None of the factors that make for continuity would, in my opinion, militate against a legitimate and real pluralism in systematics.

The question then is, are we to understand Method as projecting an abolition of all differences in systematics, and allowing only a pluralism of communications? It would seem to me that theology which is merely descriptive, or merely theoretical if you wish, will go on despite the existence of method. It will go on, and, I think, there is no reason why it should not go on. I for one would love to see not only proclamation and catechesis in Indian categories, but also an Indian systematics. I would love to see Church doctrines which are not simple reaffirmations scripture and tradition, but rather new insights and new expressions meeting “the questions of the day for the people of the day”. I would love to see transculturally mediated christian meanings and values giving rise to a new line of development within a culture, and indeed undergoing the Wendung zur Idee. It is sufficient that there exists a method which is able to show their unity in diversity. Such a method Lonergan has provided, a method which truly facilitates a more complete return to the concrete: “Et Judaeus et Graecus e methodo.”

82 Ibid., 351-53.
CONCLUSION: WILFRED AND LONERGAN

Indian theology is engaged in a process of transcultural mediation of Christian meanings and values. Like every other historical process, this also is a dialectical process in which positions develop and counterpositions tend to reversal. The problems seem to be mostly in the area of intellectual conversion: the notion of truth, reality, objectivity. Perhaps there is also a problem of rationalism. This process can be speeded up with the help of a method which insists on scholarship, but also provides for critique and synthesis; which makes police work superfluous; which occurs in teams; which appeals to anubhava (experience) understood as the ongoing process of threefold conversion; which therefore is not primarily theoretical or metaphysical but rather methodical and experiential. This has the effect of proceeding along the lines which Felix Wilfred has hinted at.

1. Wilfred calls for a method of inculturation in which the anthropological precedes the theological, one which begins from within the culture of a people rather than one which attempts to use a culture to give local color to the gospel. Lonergan proposes a method which expects people to begin from where they are, from their actual relative and absolute horizons, from their psychological, social, cultural, historical backgrounds as well as their intellectual, moral and religious conversion or lack of it.

2. With Wilfred, Lonergan admits that not only the scriptures but also the dogmas are historically conditioned. However, he would not accept that conceptual language belongs to merely a brief period in human history. He would hold instead that the realm of theory is one possible realm of meaning among many, including also the symbolic. There is no question of an either-or choice, but rather a question of recognizing different realms and stages of meaning, together with the legitimacy and usefulness of each. The dogmas aim at clarity; many of them have arisen in the context of great controversy; they do not aim at substituting for the gospels or other symbolic expressions of the faith. Further, there is the possibility of a new expression of the meaning of the dogmas on the basis of categories derived from interiority.

3. Lonergan would agree completely with Wilfred when he points out that, though the gospel and tradition are the supreme criterion and norm, they themselves are available to us only through a process of interpretation. There are in fact no criteria of truth which are so objective as to be completely independent
of some frame of reference and cultural conditioning. The best we can say is that the yardstick of truth is *anubhava* and the personal transformation that results from it, together with communion maintained through ongoing dialogue. Lonergan would therefore place theological foundations, not in propositions and truths, but in the reality of the subject, or perhaps more properly, in the reality of subjects in communion, for conversion is not merely personal but also communitarian. Thus objectivity is the fruit of authentic subjectivity. Such authentic subjectivity is indeed *anubhava* or experience, but considered in all its dimensions, not only religious but also psychic, intellectual, and moral. Further, theological method is an intrinsically collaborative enterprise which is open to all, regardless of philosophical, ethical or religious affiliations, and it handles the problem of standpoints and values by means of a dialectical method which proceeds ultimately by appealing to the human desire for authenticity and so flowers into dialogue. It would seem therefore that Lonergan invites us to proceed along paths which Wilfred has himself also pointed out.
SNAPSHOTS OF A HOLY MAN:
HARVARD PROFESSOR
WILLIAM ALFRED (1922-1999)

Dorothy Judd Hall
Boston University

Why did she die in the spring?
Roses bloom and robins sing.
Roses die and live again.
It is not the same with men.

All that nature gives us
Is one spring and one fall.
Cry for this creature,
Then cry for us all.
Cry for us All
Every act of the body is an act of the soul.

William Alfred

T. S. ELIOT OBSERVES, "Humankind cannot bear very much reality." I have come to think that this is another way of saying no one can look at the face of God and live. We mortals can bear only glimpses, snapshots of reality. But when those glimpses are so pure—as in the case of my dear friend William Alfred—they change our lives forever. Bill was fond of an inscription on an old Vermont tombstone: It is a fearsome thing to love what death can touch. These words, which he used in his play Agamemnon, took on fresh meaning for me last spring.

It was the beginning of the Memorial Day weekend, cold for late May. After the funeral I followed the cortege to Mount Auburn Cemetery, drove through the tall stone pillars and down a slender lane. Those ahead were already at the grave site, on top of the highest hill. The grasses were damp and slippery, so I took off my shoes and scrambled barefoot up to join them—Father Salzmann, Faye Dunaway, Peter Wolf, Sally Fitzgerald and a host of others that I didn’t know by
name. All around, daffodils and narcissi were blowing in the stiff breeze. Below, the city of Cambridge glistened in morning light—a map of Bill’s life, frozen in time.

Reaching into my jacket pocket for a tissue, I found a holy card. I had picked it up at the rear of St. Paul’s before the Mass. On it, a quotation from *The Philokalia*: All men are made in God’s image; but to be in His likeness is granted only to those who through great love have brought their own freedom into subjection to God.

Of how few, I thought, could these words be spoken without a hollow ring. “Sorrow deepens one,” Bill told me once. Sometimes the price of wisdom comes too high. I’d forswear it gladly, if we might have him back. God had another plan. He took Bill home last May, in the month of Mary. Cry for this creature, / Then cry for us all.

As I drove away from the cemetery, the lyrics from Bill’s musical *Cry for Us All* rang in my ears: “All that nature gives us / Is one spring and one fall.” Is this, then, all? A terrifying question. Bill’s life—whether in the theatre, the classroom, or at home on Athens Street—answered that question with a resounding No.

In the late 1960s Bill’s tragicomedy “Hogan’s Goat” took Broadway by storm. It launched Faye Dunaway’s acting career. Overnight the quiet Harvard English professor became a national celebrity. Photo-stories appeared in Life, People magazine, and elsewhere. Then a few years later “Cry for Us All,” a musical based on the play, opened. I was in New York and caught a matinee performance—a stunning production with music by Mitch Leigh, book by William Alfred, Joan Diener and Robert Weede singing a magnificent score. Critics were not so pleased. “Whoever heard of musical tragedy?” one asked. “Whoever heard of opera?” I wrote back. Within a week the theatre lights went out. The “well-made” drama was giving way to theatre-of-the-absurd. Bill continued to write plays, good ones. But Broadway had moved on.

“Hogan’s Goat” dramatizes the plight of Irish immigrants in America—their loves and laughter, heartache and tears. The theme is universal, for we are all exiles in a strange land—cast out, east of Eden. Bill recognized the exile in us all. That recognition was the source of his compassion. It made him a good listener, a good playwright. He relished the rhythms of speech, and his ear for dialogue was impeccable: “I love the sound of voices on the streets of New York.” Rural isolation was not for him. His little Manhattan apartment was his getaway—“my house in the country,” he called it fondly. Most of his time, though, he spent in Cambridge. His narrow frame Victorian—with its front door just three steps up
from a brick sidewalk, became a haven to the homeless—students, actors, street-people.

In a newspaper article, "Remembering a Saint in Harvard Square" (15 June 1999), Richard Griffin wrote: "Like an old-fashioned saint, he did not stop to question how the person arrived at such need but simply responded then and there. He did not mind being renowned as a soft touch.... Bill Alfred reached out to others ..., whether they were literary lights or more humble folk. He took people into his home where he lived alone, notably his friend, the poet Robert Lowell, and others down on their luck.

The same picture every season of the year: Bill walking along Bow Street each morning after Mass, his pockets stuffed with one-dollar and five-dollar bills. Street-people lingering in doorways that lined his route, to the corner store at Putnam Square for the newspaper, then back home. Seeing them, he'd stop. They'd cross to his side of the street. "Hi, Professor. Thank you." The old-timers among them, from the Vietnam era, would say, "Good morning, Bill." Hardly disrespectful, they said his first name with affection. Any who missed the morning ritual would show up later at his front door. He kept on hand a stash of cookies too—for the children who rang his bell.

Poverty has many faces. Those without a roof above their heads and those whose spiritual embers needed tending—all beat a pathway to his door. Without Bill Alfred, I cannot imagine how my own life would ever have been turned around. Yet he never tried to convince me of anything. He knew that rational arguments wouldn't work on a doubting Thomas like me. Haunted by the God Question, I had traveled from geometry to philosophy, and eventually to poetry in my quest of "Truth." I admired the clarity of geometry, but it proved too cold and abstract. Gradually, I began to suspect that philosophers were stacking the deck, selecting a premise that favored a desired outcome. (If this, then that.) Poetry was more attractive, emotionally satisfying, but as Plato warned, poets lie. Besides, the modern poets I was drawn to seemed as troubled as I. Truth eluded me still.

Meanwhile, as the years passed, I watched the way Bill lived. I was astonished by his unwavering faith. The consistency of his life closed the gap between words and deeds. After getting lost down countless blind alleys, through him I found my own path back to God, back to the Church I'd been secretly baptized into as an infant. I came back in May, about a decade ago—in the month of Mary.

A dedicated scholar, Bill resisted the lure of academic pedantry and glittering prose. He fixed his gaze on the stillness within the dance of words. His classroom
style was learned but casual—at times, baffling. Circling round his material, digressing frequently into reminiscence and anecdote, he let the listener discover the meaning concealed within his stories. One had to listen carefully; his manner was deceptively simple.

In the spring semester, a year before he retired, he invited me to audit "The Nature of Drama," a strenuous course that ranged across centuries—from Aeschylus and Sophocles to Beckett and Genet. He loved Beckett, heartily disliked Genet, but felt it would be unfair to exclude him. How puzzling I found the opening lecture! He read aloud from Virginia Woolf's memoirs—the passage about moments of being, instants when consciousness receives a shock and we become aware of "some real thing behind appearances":

From this I reach what I might call a philosophy; at any rate it is a constant idea of mine; that behind the cotton wool is hidden a pattern; that we—I mean all human beings—are connected with this; that the whole world is a work of art; that we are parts of the work of art. Hamlet or a Beethoven quartet is the truth about this vast mass that we call the world. But there is no Shakespeare, there is no Beethoven; certainly and emphatically there is no God; we are the words; we are the music; we are the thing itself.

He closed the book without comment. No one in the lecture hall raised a hand. Woolf's argument was impressive, seductive. Her notion of a spiritual continuum reminded me of Bergson's \textit{élan vital}. But what about her dismissal of Shakespeare, of Beethoven, of God? Did Bill agree with that? Through the ages religious mystics have reported intuitive flashes, transcendent moments. Woolf put a different spin on the tradition. I was disturbed by her negations, but I couldn't figure out how to frame a question. I decided to wait.

Some years later my patience paid off. Talking with me one day about Woolf's upbringing and religious rebellion, Bill inadvertently cast light on the enigmatic passage. He laughed sympathetically and said, "She believed in art, God help her!" At last I came to understand. Bill differed with Woolf as to the kind of "pattern" hidden behind the "cotton wool." The difference is significant. Woolf confused art, a self-transcending human activity, with ultimate reality. Bill, firmly rooted in his Catholic faith, recognized the finite character of all human endeavor. Nevertheless he respected Woolf's artistic talent. I remember his final lecture in The Nature of Drama—how he brought the course full circle: "Every moment can be a moment of being." His own life bore out the assertion.
In an age of religious upheaval—in the Harvard climate of sophistication and skepticism—he was an anomaly. He loved God and Church in an old-fashioned way. Yet he was far from naive; he was simply good. His learning was directed toward deeper understanding—toward discerning the unspoken truth at the core of literature and scripture. He meditated on the writings of the devout in every age—Augustine, Aquinas, Merton. But he was no slavish follower. "Thomas was wrong, you know," he told me the morning Groucho, my third schnauzer, died. (To Bill, Aquinas was "Thomas"—an old friend.) I was worried about dogs not going to heaven. "It's what we love," he assured me. Then he recalled his mother's dying words—to the dog she'd lost many years earlier: "Come, Blacky, come." Bill was a third-order Franciscan. Like Saint Francis, he didn't want to keep any animals, including the human kind, out of heaven. The next time we met, Bill had a gift for me: The Hidden Life of Dogs.

Augustine's dictum, Love, and do what you will, was Bill's unstated credo. A risky teaching, it is often misappropriated to endorse self-centered, irresponsible behavior. Properly understood, it negates egocentrism and affirms God as the center of our being. Bill lived by Augustine's words; he didn't have to think about them.

When at last I came back to the Church, he slipped a piece of paper into my hand as he passed by my pew. It was a prayer by Thomas Merton:

My Lord God, I have no idea where I am going. I do not see the road ahead of me. I cannot know where it will end. Nor do I really know myself, and the fact that I think that I am following Your will does not mean that I am actually doing so. But I believe that the desire to please You does in fact please You. And I hope that I have that desire in all I am doing....And I know that if I do this You will lead me by the right road though I may know nothing about it...

That May morning I realized Bill had seen through my oblique questions, my "logical" confusion. He had chosen just the right prayer for me. But I get ahead of my story.

I first met Bill in the early 1960s—about a year after I came up from Brooklyn to begin my graduate studies at Boston University. I later learned that he too hailed from Brooklyn—and his grandmother, who raised him, came from County Mayo. (My mother spent her childhood there, in the town of Ballinrobe.) Besides teaching Freshman Comp, I soon found myself assisting Professor Robert Sproat in a newly launched course, The Modern Temper. Aware of my passion for Robert Frost, Sproat asked me to lead the class the day we took up Frost's
poetry. Delighted, I held forth in the large lecture hall as only a fledgling Teaching Fellow can, blending my own memories of Frost at Bread Loaf (he had recently died, in January 1963) with lines from the poems.

Afterward, a student who called himself "PJ" approached me tentatively: "Do you know William Alfred?" I shook my head. "Then you must meet him—Bill was a good friend of Frost. Frost used to come down from Brewster Street to talk with him." The student, I later learned, was another lost soul—a "drop-out" of privileged birth. He relinquished (temporarily) his blue-blood lineage and Newport wealth to live in a Cambridge basement and play guitar at local coffee houses. Every now and then, when he couldn’t come up with the rent, he spent the night sleeping on Bill's couch. So through PJ's intercession, I too beat a path to 31 Athens Street. How well I recall that first encounter. Bill pointed to the red brocade chair where Frost liked to sit: "It's all frayed. I can't bear to reupholster it." Love engineered the meeting; my love of Frost had led me to Bill's door.

How can we tell coincidence from destiny? Gradually, during the next three decades, Bill became the major spiritual force in my life. And yet, I tried to recede into the background, knowing how many friends—young and old, famous and obscure—made demands upon him. He was always there for me, though, at moments of crisis. A sympathetic listener, he never tried to solve my problems, but he had a store of anecdotes to fit the situation. My visits with him left me feeling so much lighter—more than that, restored. Poets collect images—not deliberately, but instinctively. "Why do some memories stay so indelibly in our minds?" I asked Bill one Sunday as we walked along Bow Street after Mass. Without any hesitation he replied, "It's the things we hold dear." Unqualified love, for God and for all us lost souls, was the guiding force in Bill's life. The mental snapshots I offer here in prose and verse most surely hold him dear.

One is a picture of Bill walking along Athens Street toward Harvard under overcast skies on an afternoon in mid-June. I had brought Sebastian Moore, a dignified Benedictine monk, to Bill's home for our annual visit—a cherished tradition ever since I introduced the two about ten years earlier. As always on these occasions, Bill, Sebastian, and I chatted for hours, while we passed around watercress sandwiches and refilled our glasses from a frosty pitcher of lemonade. To be more accurate, I listened as they ranged freely through art and religion—from Eliot (Sebastian's favorite poet) to Shakespeare (Bill's master), from Beckett (spiritual exile par excellence) to Wallace Stevens (convert to Catholicism). Stacks of books teetered precariously on the table by the front
window, and Saint Anthony smiled down from the fireplace mantel, holding his own amid a clutter of old photos and religious objects.

The clock chimed four. Sebastian and I got up to go. Bill took his little battered hat from the rack, his black umbrella from the stand in the hall. "I'm going to check my mail" (his mailbox at Harvard, he meant). We offered him a ride, but he declined: "The walk will do me good." Sebastian and I, on our way to my car, stood transfixed, watching Bill make his way slowly down the middle of Athens Street—slightly bent, his Beckett-tramp hat propped on his head as he tapped the pavement with the tip of his loosely folded umbrella. "There goes a saint!" Sebastian exclaimed. And we knew in our hearts that the likes of William Alfred would not pass this way again.

In the deepest sense Bill was a mystery—even, I suspect, a mystic. I asked him one Sunday if there was a difference between "the abyss" and "the dark night of the soul." "Oh yes," he nodded. Without explanation he moved directly into an anecdote. "Once I was teaching Lowell's poetry. It was up on the second floor of Warren House. Suddenly, I looked out the window and there was nothing there. That's the abyss." Then we both grew quiet.

Walking with him another time, I posed a guarded question: "What is your view of reality?" (I wanted an insight into his idea of God.) He threw me a gentle curve: "Read Yeats' Per Amica Silentia Lunae." The following day I checked out the text at Mugar Library. A strange view of reality! But on I ventured into the silence of the moon. "We must not," says Yeats, "make a false faith by hiding from our thoughts the causes of doubt, for faith is the highest achievement of the human intellect, the only gift man can make to God, and therefore it must be offered in sincerity."

The subtlety of faith pushes Yeats toward metaphor: "We could not find him if he were not in some sense of our being, and yet of our being but as water with fire, a noise with silence." Looking back, I'm convinced that Bill guessed the religious nature of my question, but he chose to let me work out my own answer. He sent me to Yeats' lunar realms where imagination opens upon the via negativa: "I shall find the dark grow luminous, the void fruitful when I understand I have nothing, that the ringers in the tower have appointed for the hymen of the soul a passing bell."

Bill told me once, "Transcendence is the shadow of our longing for God." But God is invisible. Words are the visible forms of our longing, our link to one another. And so last May, when I came home from the funeral, I took Bill's Agamemnon from my book-shelf. I turned to the Preface:... if you read this play
to learn my views on God, or man’s society, or his motivations, you will be cheated. You will not find opinions here, but what I take for facts. My cry is the cry of the truly ignorant, “I do not think; I know!” ... All I have is a puzzled but affectionate interest in people and the lives they lead, and a desire to capture what I have seen and come to feel sure about them, so that it will not be wholly lost.

Suddenly, behind Bill’s protestations of ignorance I heard the sonorous inflections of the Celtic bard: “I seek an image, not a book. Those men that in their writings are most wise/ Own nothing but their blind, stupefied hearts.” Yeats’ words shed light on Bill’s unqualified humility.

Every act of the body,” Bill liked to say, “is an act of the soul.” I have tried in these pages to capture his wisdom, his genuine love and concern for others. All I can offer are snapshots, as in the following poem. The occasion was an impromptu visit I made to his home one warm summer morning when I was deeply troubled. My mini-schnauzer was with me. “Is Groucho thirsty?” he called from the kitchen. “Well, do you have an old chipped dish in the cupboard?” After a moment Bill appeared, carrying a magnificent porcelain artifact. Ignoring my protests, he said calmly, “Mme. Chang’s niece brought me this bowl from China.”

**Chinese Bowl**

Cobalt blue on white porcelain,
far larger than a chalice—
so big my little dog could curl inside
and rest—you bear it with cool water
from the kitchen tap, along the dimlit hallway, your arms full-circle round it,
yourself bent forward by its weight.
Then setting it among pink flowers
at the border of your rug for him to drink,
you light the huge black hole
that I climbed out of this June morning
to find my way to Athens Street
and knock again at your well worn front door.

The next snapshot, I trust, speaks for itself. I wrote the poem around Christmas, but it describes an event that occurred in springtime. The title, from its Latin root, implies a sign of something to come.
Advent

I must have imagined
the way in that one moment—
that Sunday after early mass
toward the end of May
three years before I crossed the threshold—

I must have imagined
how he
emerging from St. Paul's into morning light
had found me hiding
way at the other end of Arrow Street—

imagined
how he waved
as if to say "Come,
why have you been waiting there so long?"

I must have imagined all that—
except
I didn't imagine
his wave.

Bill was no plaster saint. Holy, but not at all solemn, he never lost his sense of wonder. He loved childhood phrases and got excited about the small things that make children glad. Each spring, shortly after Memorial Day, my husband would save a seedling tomato plant for him from our freshly dug bed. Bill would plant it in a large pot on his side terrace and joyously report its progress all summer long. I recall a particular morning in early June when once again I climbed his front steps with the tiny green offering. He opened the door before I had a chance to ring the bell. He seemed pensive. "Summer's almost here," I said. Immediately he brightened, took the plant from my hands and exclaimed, "Hotdiggity!" For an instant he was a child again, about to run and play on the streets of Brooklyn.

And I remember, with a shudder, his grace under fire—the way, as he later told me, he faced down some young punks who broke into his house to rob him. Surprised by Bill's presence (they thought him upstairs), one drew a gun. Bill
knew the fellow, having many times befriended him. To the gunman's amazement, Bill stood his ground: "You should be ashamed of yourself!" Spiritually disarmed, the young man dropped his weapon.

How pleased ... Bill was by little things: a basket of flowers from the nuns on May Day, a bag of freshly baked muffins hung anonymously on his doorknob, the grapevine—offshoot of a former student's vine—that climbed ever higher along the wooden fence beside his terrace. I remember especially a picture postcard I mailed him from California, a photo of a monk's cell at San Carlos Mission in Carmel, where Father Junipero Serra had died in his sleep in 1784. On my next visit to Athens Street, Bill pointed toward my postcard. It had earned a place of honor on his mantel. Then he told me that he had loved Father Serra since childhood, when he met him in a grade-school text. Little did I guess, that morning, how Bill himself would die—like the old Spanish monk, in bed with his rosary beads on the table at his side.

Sometimes I wonder what Bill's academic colleagues thought of him. Surely they respected him. But they must have been confounded. They must have asked themselves, What makes Bill Alfred tick? I got an insight into that question on another occasion when Sebastian Moore and I were visiting him. Every five or ten minutes the telephone would ring—the same caller each time. And each time, Bill would pick up the receiver (he had no answering machine) and try a new approach to the problem at hand. Piles of books toppled around his feet—Shakespeare, Yeats, Eliot. He was trying to find some quotation the caller might use to fit her present crisis, apparently a serious setback in her career. Sebastian and I joined in, offering quotes. But each time—just when we imagined we'd solved the problem—in a few minutes, the telephone would ring again. Nothing we came up with seemed quite to fit. Then Bill said, "She's just upset, you know. I don't want her to feel alone." Bill himself knew how it felt to be alone. His favorite play was King Lear. Beckett's Godot, a close second. Lear naked on the heath, Lucky encumbered with baggage and ropes—extremity situations. I shall never forget the evening when The Athens Street Players, Bill's band of actor-friends, put on a recitation at Sanders Theatre. The other performers chose eloquent passages from classic texts, ancient and modern. Then it was Bill's turn. He shuffled to the lectern and droned four moving lines from an old Negro spiritual:

Sometimes I feel like a motherless child,
Sometimes I feel like a motherless child,
Sometimes I feel like a motherless child,
Far, far from home.

A faint applause rippled through the bewildered audience. Bill returned to his straight-back wooden chair on the stage and sat down.

In his last year he became quite frail—after the van struck him and knocked him flat on the ground. (A wonder he survived.) The driver was speeding to make a light at the corner of Mt. Auburn one weekday morning as Bill was crossing for early Mass at St. Paul’s. From then on he walked with a cane. He tilted a bit at the shoulders as he went up to the altar. It was then too the weekly ritual began: my friend Carolyn and I driving him back home each Sunday after seven-thirty Mass, stopping to pick up the newspapers on the way—The Boston Globe, The New York Times, and The Daily News. “I can’t miss Little Orphan Annie.” His eyes filled with childlike delight at the thought of his beloved comic strip. Perhaps he felt a kinship; Little Annie was a motherless child.

On that final Sunday—we were sitting in my car at Porter Square, waiting for Carolyn to come back with the newspapers—Bill told me about a friend who, a few nights earlier, “died in her sleep.” He reported the event without comment. Then, as though no link were necessary, he went on to a dream he had that week about Wallace Stevens. Again, no details. Stevens had paid him a visit, that was all. Bill never turned anyone from his door, whatever the time of day or mode of arrival. After a moment’s pause, he said quietly, “He was a wonderful man. I must have a Mass said for him.”

We rode back as usual, round again past St. Paul’s, turning left at Mt. Auburn, down to Athens Street—Bill beside me in the front seat, Carolyn in the rear. “Bless you, Bill,” I said, as he struggled to get his feet from the floor of my car down onto the macadam. “Bless you,” was his soft reply. Then Carolyn took his arm and guided him across the street, up his worn front steps. She held her palm against the small of his back until he made it, sack of newspapers in hand, safely through the carved mahogany door. “You left some music playing,” she said. “Yes, I don’t like to come back to an empty house.”

Fragrance of Oranges

An elegy for William Alfred

on his birth date, August 16th

I roam the streets of Cambridge
this midsummer morning, seeking
some sign of you, dear Bill.

The recessed doorways along Bow Street,
your route home from church, are empty.
Where are they gone—those who huddled
in the cold, chewing a discarded crust
of bread, or draining Saturday night’s wine
bottle, waiting for you to appear?

The pew on the left side of St. Paul’s,
behind the fourth column, where you knelt
each morning is vacant.

I must content myself with images—

Your long graceful fingers—grown thinner
through the years—curved in prayer,
resting gently on the wooden
back of the pew in front.
Your shuffling gait as you make your way
along the side aisle after Mass. The twinkle
as you turn to greet a child
whose innocence rolls back the years—
“Her grandmother,” you tell me later,
“had the last salon in Cambridge.”

Your trademark hats. The scrunched-down
grey felt, blown off by winter winds
as you cross Mt. Auburn. You bend
to pick it up in the gutter where it came to rest,
brush it off and plop it back on your head.
The leghorn straw with its black grosgrain band,
eralding summer’s arrival.

Time stopped in May, before that festive ritual.
The miniature orange tree on the table
at your front window on Athens Street,
its tiny fruit glistening in the sunlight.
The day when I admired it and you said,
"It almost died" til an old Italian
woman told me to bury a worn shoe
beneath its roots." You paused
and whispered, "I love the fragrance
of oranges."

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SCHOLARSHIP’S IMPENETRABLE WALL

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INTRODUCTION

LONERGAN CONCEIVED and composed Insight and Method during the 50’s and 60’s, at a time when biblical interpretation was still quiescently, and even triumphantly, satisfied with its “historical-critical method.” And the place Lonergan gave to scripture was designed to accommodate the Bible as appropriated in that precise way.

Lonergan himself, before writing Method, did extensive biblical research, as is evidenced in his tractates De Verbo Incarnato, and De Deo Trino.1 However, a rapid survey of publications by Lonergan and his students since then would indicate that his school has not followed the rest of the Church in focusing heavily on the Bible. Conversely, and unfortunately, it is hard to find practicing exegetes who have seriously read Lonergan’s work.

The time has come to recognize and correct this growing gap. Lonerganians must note the sea-change in exegesis that has occurred in the interval. The historical-critical method, though still an absolutely required step in the discipline of interpretation, no longer defines biblical interpretation. It is a crucial first step whose importance must not be overlooked since it serves to clarify so much. But is only the first of many steps. Form criticism has taken precedence over historical criticism, and reader response modes of interpretation have further weakened the historical guidelines. As a result, the basic steps of critical exegetical method, i.e. first, textual criticism, corresponding to research in Lonergan, and, second, source criticism, which is the crucial step toward history in Lonergan, remain basic; but they no longer define biblical interpretation. I

1 Published by the Gregorian University Press beginning in 1960.
would suggest that form criticism and reader-response interpretation represent a higher viewpoint and have begun to be what exegesis is about. Thus, research and history regarding the Bible remain, but the role of history has receded in importance, and interpretation regarding the Bible no longer fits between history and research in the way Lonergan intended. 2

**DISSATISFACTION WITH BIBLICAL HISTORY**

Specifically Lonergan’s step to history has become problematic for biblical scholars, and this in more than one way. First of all, we have become progressively more and more aware that we don’t have the data for much useful critical history of the biblical period. If we are to interpret the meaning of biblical texts on the basis of their historical context, we can come up only with very fragile guesses. This is true in many areas of the Bible. Most dramatically the sources of the Pentateuch have vanished into myriad uncertainties: for example, the beguiling 8th century Elohist was simply not mentioned by the authoritative Westermann in his 1981 commentary on Genesis, for the good reason that by then most European scholars had ceased to believe in his existence. Moreover, the familiar 10th century Yahwist is now shredded in the school of Rolf Rendtorff, especially Erhard Blum in Germany and John van Seters in the United States, where, if he still lives in some sense, he is sometimes dated after the Deuteronomist in the post-exilic period. The Priestly Writer alone survives steady as we go, but whether he was originating stories, or rewriting them, is now

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2 To complete the activities of theology *in obliquo*, a word should be said about dialectics. The role of dialectics in bible study is never parallel to dialectics in other reading, since a dialectical disagreement with scripture is not an occasion for correcting counter-positions in the author, but only for personal conversion in the reader. Dialectics in reading the Bible can be a tremendous struggle, in which one’s salvation is at stake, but this is not described by Lonergan in his book on method in theology.


very uncertain. And for the overall picture, if one beleives the highly respected Frank Crüsemann, one has to undertake to re-imagine one’s whole schematic master-image of the history of thought in Israel.² He argues that in Israel, as in the surrounding cultures, there was no concept of a law from God, either civil law or even cultic law, during the time of Abraham Isaac and Jacob, during the time of Moses, Joshua and the Judges, or even the time of the kings and prophets, down to the fall of Samaria in 722 BCE. No Sinai, no ten commandments, no Torah. With the law gone, what rump of historical context does one still have for interpreting all that text?

Or, let us take some New Testament examples. For those who have read John Meier’s captivating *A Marginal Jew,*³ or followed the Jesus seminar, it has become clear that the historical data we can recover from the New Testament period, rich as it is, cannot provide knowledge of what Meier calls “the real Jesus.” It can only provide knowledge for an artificial abstraction called “the historical Jesus”, who is well described as a marginal Jew, i.e. a man of little importance. We know more about Jesus, according to Meier, than about almost all other persons in the ancient Mediterranean world, and yet that history is a caricature. Or, take another example, the synoptic problem: I have believed for over 30 years that to interpret a text from Matthew, you have to read it as an expansion or correction of its predecessor in Mark and Luke. But Adrien Leske has just published a commentary on Matthew based on the hypothesis that Matthew wrote the first account of Jesus.⁴ Leske’s Matthew understood Jesus without the help of Mk and Lk. Rather he reads Matthew as an expansion and correction of Second Isaiah, and a few other texts from the law and the prophets. What has happened? The Anchor Bible Encyclopedia article on the Synoptics, written by Ed Sanders, tells us that the priority of Mark is no longer a hypothesis sustainable on academic grounds. Thereby is scrambled the credibility of much of the historical framework upon which most of us hang our grasp of the New Testament.

⁷ Cf. (Farmer, Dungan, McEvenue, Levoratti, eds.), *The International Bible Commentary, a Catholic and Ecumenical Commentary for the Twenty-First Century,* Collegeville, 1998.
HISTORICAL CONTEXTS FOR INTERPRETATION

Historical-critical exegetes had thought that the work of interpretation began with inquiry into historical context. As this was handed down in the seminar of Gerhard von Rad, for example, one looked to context through a three-part question: "Who said what to whom?" In other words, historical context consists of the history of the author (who said?), of the object (what?), and of the original readers (to whom, or Sitz-im-Leben?). But now, a few decades later, all three parts of this question have become questionable.

First the author In recent years, many idiotic things have been said to eradicate the importance of the author. I will not take time to refute them here. But, even for those of us who maintain the authority of the historical author, the personal history, or political involvement, of the author is not relevant in the Bible. The original texts of authors are known to us only as edited by later writers, and placed into new contexts, intended for other generations of readers, and for other centuries and eras. Sometimes the name of an author is given, such as Moses, or Solomon, or Isaiah, to identify the literary genre of the text, often at the cost of falsifying its historical time by centuries. In other cases, even when the Bible provides the real name of the author of a determined text, as, for example, the Gospel of Mark, this external identification gives us little significant historical context, and no precise indication of the contents of his memory or experiences or preoccupations at the time of writing, any more than the name of Shakespeare helps us interpret his sonnets. Paul’s authentic epistles may be a unique exception, and we do have brief glimpses of the real lives of Hoseah, of Jeremiah, of Isaiah, and of Sirach. But even in Paul, where the rhetorical text of his epistles provides those historical elements which he wanted us to use in interpreting his meaning, still these historical elements are certainly not factual history in the modern sense, and they are remarkably at odds with the account of Paul in Acts. This is not the place where the ideas in a text confront the hard data which should give it meaning.

It follows that an attempt to determine meaning on the basis of the historical context of the writer, in the case of most biblical authors, is not going to yield credible results. Moreover, it goes against the manifest intention of the biblical
text itself, which persistently eliminated and falsified and hid the identity of authors.

**Secondly, the original reader** Reflection on historical data regarding the original readers does not provide terribly useful clues about meaning, for the simple reason that the biblical texts have been edited, combined, and structured over centuries so that they might communicate with different readers in ever new situations. Of course it is true that the texts were originally written in the presence of specific historical realities, and the basic meaning of the words requires that we learn from this what we can. However, when Isaiah, for example first edited his collected works in chapter 8, those texts were not scripture texts as yet. Only when someone turned them into a book, in an editorial effort which lasted over 3 centuries, did we get the biblical Isaiah which we now have to interpret. This emerging biblical Isaiah was shaped to provide instruction to Jews in Judah during the monarchy, to Jews in exile after the kings were dead, and then to Jews after the return from the exile. A biblical text, as we have it, is a text which deliberately and authoritatively has been made to carry a meaning for a believing community, for Israel or for the Church, of any today: It cannot legitimately be broken down into hypothetical original pieces with reduced meanings for original readers.

**Thirdly, the object about which it was written** This too offers little or no historical context. The object of a biblical text is always some spiritual reality which transcends history. This spiritual reality is often sung about, or narrated, in connection with historical events or realities, but the formal object spoken of is almost always a attitude of faith, or an attribute of God, which is of value in any time. Moreover, the historical realities which occasioned the text were usually as remote in time for the author as the Magna Charta is for us, or King John, or King Arthur. The author in say 6th century Judah had no historical knowledge whatever, in Lonergan’s sense of history, of Abraham, Isaac, and Jacob. They were approximately as remote from him as Charlemagne is from us. Similarly, even of the great founder Moses, whose work had been carried out about 600 years earlier, there existed only knowledge of a legendary sort, analogous to what we might know of the deeds of Richard the Lion Heart, or of the virtues of the saintly King Louis of France. Such remote history is closer to being paradigm or metaphor, in which some value is affirmed rather than some physical event in a specific time.
Thus von Rad's historical-critical method, which resulted in his two-volume masterpiece Theology of the Old Testament, no matter how subtle, precise, and profound, can't really be read anymore. And in fact it is not.

LITERARY CRITICISM VERSUS CRITICAL HISTORY

Over the past 30 years, often even the most basic historical contexts for interpreting the Bible have proven to be weakly hypothetical or pure mirage. This has forced all but the toughest to look for an academic method which takes what it can from history, but which does not depend on history. Within the universities, literary scholarship, and the discipline of literary criticism have provided significant help. English literary studies had broken away from historical criticism well before Bernard Lonergan wrote Insight, let alone Method. Right from the 1930's F.R. Leavis, who was the supreme authority in interpretation theory throughout the British Empire and Commonwealth, and also the United States, had come to the conclusion that historical context was irrelevant to the meaning of literary texts, even if the author was still living. Leavis published and lectured on this theme in universities throughout the British Isles, in Australia, in India, and North America. He argued that the meaning of the texts was totally incarnated in the words of the texts. It was to be sought exclusively in those words, and in the myriad relations between those words, and particularly in the relations between the parts of the text and the whole. His approach determined the mode of publication we know as “The Oxford Editions”, whose introductions and footnotes deal only with the text; and it determined the way people of my generation were trained in English-speaking universities to read literature—prescinding from historical contexts, whether national or personal to the author, and taking care to read the whole text before fixing on the meaning of any of its parts.\(^8\)

Biblical scholars, during the 40s 50s and 60s, apparently ignored this revolution in the craft of interpretation. Rather, they turned even more to archaeology. But, suddenly, in the late 60's and 70's, French philosophy, with structuralism and deconstruction and semiotics, and through the international star quality of Jacques Derrida, began to lead all literary scholars in a dizzying dance. Biblical scholars

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\(^8\) Based on a lecture given by Hugh Kierans at Lonergan College, Concordia University, Montreal, 1981.
too woke up and began to notice that their assured method was sure no longer. And this at the same time as German historians were tearing up our historical certitudes. Eventually, Reader Response criticism, particularly through its best exponents such as Stanley Fish, enabled us all to reestablish critical meaning while breaking even further from historical methods.9

LONERGAN'S PLACE

Now Lonergan may not have foreseen all of this, but he had armed us in preparation for it.

First it must be clear that Lonergan, in writing Method, did fall into a trap. His chapter on interpretation clearly expects to understand the text in the sense it had at the time it was written. And he does discuss Scripture explicitly in relation to Theology in that chapter. The meaning is determined by the context, including precisely the historical context, of the author (p.163). The example he uses is his own study of the writings of St. Thomas concerning free will and grace, and the evolution over time of Thomas’s thought. He uses this example because of its clarity, even though one might argue a thomist text is too close to a text from Euclid to really need interpretation. He explains his choice on page 166: “it is uncluttered by the complexities involved in interpreting instances of intersubjective, artistic, symbolic, or incarnate meaning.” Of course biblical texts are almost always “cluttered” with such things—in fact the form of expression in the Bible, and the genius of the Bible as religious communication, always involves at least the artistic and the symbolic. As for intersubjective and incarnate meanings, they also play a major role in many biblical texts. Narrative texts for example are crafted in ways which engage the personal reaction of the reader to the acts of meaningful historical persons.

Logically, it would seem, Lonergan should have excluded biblical texts from his chapter on interpretation as a theological operation, since he recognizes earlier in the chapter that “the Scriptures have been removed from the context of Christian doctrinal development and restored to the pre-dogmatic context of the

history of religions” (p. 155). If that is correct, and if he were to rewrite Method today, he would help us a lot by renaming the chapter on “interpretation” so as to make clear that that chapter is about the method of understanding non-literary texts. It is not about biblical exegesis at all.

Of course there arises then the question of where Scripture fits into Method. His view of method requires attention to religious experience, including attention to other “pre-dogmatic contexts” such as Scripture. His understanding of theology as mediating “between a cultural matrix and the role of religion in that matrix” (p. xi) is far broader than “the context of doctrinal development” from which he removes Scripture. And, later, in dealing with foundations, while he recognizes that “scholarship builds an impenetrable wall between systematic theology and its historical religious sources,” this wall is itself the reason, as Lonergan writes in the same place, to employ all the resources of interiority in making Scripture serve the needs of systematic theology. I would suggest he would need to add a special section on biblical interpretation as an excursus to his chapter on foundations, dealing with the normative experience of hearing biblical texts. In it he would bring together analyses and definitions now found dispersed in his book.

The fact is, however, that he adds a section dealing with Scripture right within the chapter on interpretation. (pp. 171-173) He follows the lead of Albert Descamps, “Réflexions sur la méthode en théologie biblique”, written in 1959, and talks about “biblical theology”, advancing the notion that there are as many theologies as there are biblical authors, and desiring to organize these various theologies in historical sequence with the hope of explaining their developments as genetic. And he proposes that in choosing categories, the exegete should express these biblical ideas in categories and words which come from ancient times. I suggest that in this Lonergan is following Descamps, but no longer really thinking his own thoughts. I say this, because it does not bear critical scrutiny. It would make sense on three conditions: 1) if it were possible to establish the identity, or even the century, of most of the biblical authors and editors in their historical sequence; 2) or if the biblical authors and editors had not often disguised those identities and deliberately confused historical contexts oblivious of genetic history; 3) and if one believes that the meaning of a given biblical text can be described as “a theology” among many theologies, as though it were an

idea or doctrine, or one collection of ideas or doctrinal system, i.e., one conceptually articulable message among other similar messages. The burden of this paper so far has been to argue that the first two conditions are not met; what now follows will attempt to show that the third condition also makes no sense.

Lonergan probably saw nothing wrong with the first two conditions 50 years ago, particularly when he was following Albert Descamps who not doubt still believed that the biblical authors could be identified and dated, and that genetic history was possible. If Method were rewritten today, it would not follow Descamps. However, much of Lonergan's own thought about literature should have led him to reject the notion of "biblical theologies" even 50 years ago.

First of all, his theological method mediates religious experience, both personal and shared experience. Now, experience can be narrowed by conceptualization, and augmented by judgment, and then turned into a communicated message. But experience, of itself, it is not a message. Moreover, for Lonergan theology in obliquo ends through criteria based on conversion, and in recto begins with conversion, termed "foundational reality." Conversion is a religious experience, which can be conceptualized, but which is of itself not a message. Conversion is needed day after day as the theologian reverses counterpositions, defines doctrines and devises systems and communications. What the exegete must communicate to theologians are not "theologies" or messages, but rather clues toward experiencing the biblical text. Such clues are of many sorts: for example indicating what in the text is original, or what is emphasized by the structuring; or elaborating the images or traditions which are evoked by the use of certain words; or by identifying analogous complexes of meaning in contemporary experience; or by showing what a text does not say so that the reader wonders again what it does say; or by uncovering the sub-text where it is not obvious. In particular, New Testament exegetes who identify citations from the Old, but fail to suggest the passionate religious tradition which the citation is intended to evoke, have left their readers on the surface of the text. Such clues are the product of scholarly research, of theological insight, and of interpretation theory. They are not paraphrase of the meaning, but they tell us how to experience that meaning as elemental meaning, as we shall see in what follows, and as conversion.

Second, Lonergan understood literary theory. Under the term "elemental" meaning, which he treats in Method, in the chapter dealing with meaning (Cf. pp. 63, 64, 67, and 74), he identifies well the experience of artistic or literary understanding. It is an act of understanding which is pre-conceptual—often it is...
sharing that author’s or artist’s understanding of something which cannot be conceived, and which has for this very reason been captured in artistic or poetic form. Pre-conceptual understanding often occurs with an inner shock: for example the moment of “getting” a joke, or the experience of suddenly understanding a poem, or of suddenly being swept up by the beauty of some music or the emotion of a movie. What is understood in elemental meaning is usually too complex to be conceptualized or to be expressed in another constellation of elements. A sharply marked step of understanding has taken place, and yet if one is asked to express what is understood one can only retell the joke, or reread the poem, or go back to the theatre. The tedious labor of exegetes aims finally at recovering this sort of understanding of the biblical text—certainly not at a paraphrase of the text, but at a pre-conceptual insight into the elemental meaning of a work of art. There may be some doctrinal statements in the Bible, but they are the very rare exception. Most of the Bible is stories, songs, poems, rhetoric. One has to work to understand them, because of cultural distance. But when one succeeds, it is an opening of the eyes so that they see, and the ears so that finally they hear. It is not a message in the sense of an easily articulated truth or exhortation. One can attempt to conceive it, and explain it, but one’s words sound hollow, and they would follow a logic on the wrong plane of experience. If someone asks why you have tears in your eyes as your read e.e. cummings, or why you change color when you listen to Mozart, or why you don’t get up immediately and walk out of the movie when the lights come on, you won’t help them understand by showing them the sheet of musical notes, or by paraphrasing what e.e. cummings has written, or by narrating the final scene of the movie. You might help them by inviting them to repeat more attentively the experience they have had in listening to the original.

To understand any piece of literature, as F.R. Leavis notes, one has, not so much to think about and judge, but rather to feel into and to become, “to realize a complex experience that is given in the words.” The text demands of the reader a growth toward understanding, “not merely a fuller-bodied response, but a completer responsiveness.”


12 It is clear that Lonergan understood all this. I was astonished to note the following example of his appropriation of text-book stuff on literature. Conventional notions of of literary criticism holds that one can analyze a text by following its meaning in 4 directions: first, the relations of the parts to one another internally, second, the relation to an object, third the relation to the author,
Now such understanding as personal growth is certainly elemental meaning. It is not significantly genetic or historical. Certainly it does not consist of identifying the historical context of the writing, or tracing a progress in thought between authors. Certainly one would not recommend that the exegete attempt to express it by taking care to retain ancient words, and to conceptualize it in ancient patterns of thought. One would ask, rather, that the exegete absolutely refrain from conceptualizing it. The task of the exegete is, first, to find and provide that theological and historical information which might help the reader identify some historical objects mentioned in the text; and, second, to make visible the shaping of words and verbal structures so that the reader might perceive the unique shaping and juxtaposition of words and things which the author used in an artistic attempt to communicate what had never been said, and what can never quite be named. Elemental meaning is pointed at, not articulated; it is not quite communicable and yet is contagious.

Lonergan, in *Method*, has offered us the basis for understanding this much of the task of interpreting literature and art. But he did not formulate the relation between Theology and our literary-artistic Scripture. Instead he himself joined scholarship in building an impenetrable wall, by placing scripture within that operation which he called interpretation rather than within foundations, and by thus implicitly reducing it to a preparation for history, and even subjecting it to dialectics.

**A CONCRETE EXAMPLE: GEN 27:41—28:22**

The story of Jacob’s dream at Bethel of a ladder between heaven and earth can provide a simple, but substantial example, of historical-critical, versus literary,
interpretation. Those who follow the classical source criticism of Wellhausen, Noth, S.R. Driver, von Rad, etc., see here three different sources.\footnote{Details differ slightly between authors. I shall follow here the classical source division conveniently presented by Anthony Campbell and Mark O’Brien, \textit{Sources of the Pentateuch, Texts, Introductions, Annotations}, Minneapolis, Fortress Press, 1993.}

The priestly source retains of this story only the fact of the journey, and focuses on its motive:

27:46—Then Rebekah said to Isaac, “I am weary of my life because of these Hittite women. If Jacob marries one of the Hittite women such as these, one of the women of the land, what good will my life be to me?”
28:1—Then Isaac called Jacob and blessed him, and charged him, “You shall not marry one of the Canaanite women. 2—Go at once to Paddanaram to the house of Bethuel, your mother’s father; take as wife from there one of the daughters of Laban, your mother’s brother.

So the purpose of the trip is to keep marriage within the tribe. And the text goes on seven verses more to explain that this will assure possession of the land which God gave to Abraham, and then to narrate how Esau learned from this incident that he should take another wife, this time from Abraham’s progeny. And later, in ch 31, the priestly writer has God appearing to Jacob, upon his return from Paddan-aram, to promise to give him the land, and to give it to his offspring, all twelve of whom are then named.

The historical context for the priestly writer is, of course, the exile and the return from exile. During that time, the future of the Jews as a people was very much in doubt. They were now dispersed in several countries, and initially they had no hope of returning. The kingship and the temple were gone, and other gods seemed to have taken charge of them. It was natural that the priestly writer was concerned for marriage within the tribe, to preserve the identity of the Jewish people dispersed in exile, and overwhelmed by foreign peoples in their own land. And we see in Chronicles and in Esra and Nehemiah how the question became a burning issue: who belongs in the tribe, and who does not belong— who has right to land when they return from exile, and who has no rights. Hence the endless lists of family names and their members in chapter after chapter of genealogies, and also in the draconian laws of marriage. So, on a historical-critical reading, that is what our text is all about.

Thus the meaning of the text can be expressed as a commandment: thou shalt not marry outside your tribe. Westermann’s commentary on Genesis
interprets it that way. Such a commandment, of course, has no spiritual value for us. Scholarship has indeed build an impenetrable wall. Moreover it embarrasses us, as it makes us think of racism, with all that means in our century. Westermann deftly relieves the malaise by pointing out that this commandment did not get added to the ten commandments, and he explains that it was a commandment for a specific point in time, not a general ethical law. Thus historical criticism plants the meaning in a precise remote time. In future years I expect the historical precision will increase, and with it will increase the irrelevance of this text for us. We need the brick wall.

The Yahwist account gives a very different motive for the trip which brought Jacob to Bethel. He begins in 27:41-45 by invoking the thoughts of Rebekah, as the priestly writer did, but for the Yahwist she was not thinking about getting Jacob married aright. No, she was worried about how angry Esau was because Jacob had stolen his blessing, and she was afraid that Esau might kill Jacob. And so she tells Jacob to flee to Haran, and stay with her brother Laban there. This is very much the busy interventionist mother Rebekah, whose character we know from the previous Yahwist story when she helped Jacob trick Esau and Isaac both.

The Yahwist text goes on in 28:10—11, with Jacob on his way, and coming to a certain place where he sets up camp. Then in vv 13-14 Yahweh appears to him and repeats the same great promises he had made earlier to Abraham of the land and a prosperous tribe, numerous like the dust of the earth, and he adds the detail that it will “spread abroad to the West and to East, and to the North and to the South.” Finally, in v 15 Yahweh assures him that he will accompany Jacob in his travel wherever he goes, and will bring him back safely. Why? Because “I will not leave you until I have done what I have promised you.” Finally in v 16 Jacob wakes up, and names the place Bethel, because Yahweh was present in this place.

In classical source theory, the historical context for the Yahwist was thought to be Solomon’s court. One can see the special sense this story would have in that context. Solomon was unique in Israel’s history in that he consolidated and administered a very extensive international network, an economic empire stretching from Egypt to Anatolia, stretching as far as one could desire “East and West and North and South” as promised in the Yahwist text of Gen 28. Moreover, in 10th century belief, gods were territorial, and the territory of Yahweh was coextensive with the tribal territories of Israel. Solomon’s international staff of diplomats and envoys had no reason to believe Yahweh would protect them when they were traveling in territories belonging to other gods. Not until Gen 28 came
to the rescue. This text could assure them that they would be in the presence of Yahweh not only on their home territory, but also that, like Jacob, they would be protected by Yahweh in their travels because those travels were about fulfilling the promise, which the text recalls, that Yahweh would bless Israel and make it prosper. And what was the connection between Yahweh’s presence and the name Bethel? Well, Bethel was originally not the name of a place, but the name of a local god. One of the Yahwist’s constant agenda points was to affirm that each local God was just another name for Yahweh. Thus we have pin-pointed the original meaning of this text, in so far as meaning can be determined from what we know of historical context.

But Jewish readers, after Second Isaiah, and Christian readers since then, know that there is only one God over all the world. This Yahwist text, therefore, like the priestly, offers us Bible readers little to write home about. All the more so, as Bethel has been a rubble ever since Josiah reduced it in the 7th century BCE. Historical critical method leads us to a yawn at the Yahwist.

**Finally, the Elohist text:**

28: 11— Taking one of the stones of the place, he put it under his head and lay down in that place. And he dreamed there was a ladder set up on the earth, the top of it reaching to heaven; and the angels of God were ascending and descending on it. 17— And he was afraid, and said “how awesome is this place! This is none other than the house of God, and this is the gate of heaven.”

18— So Jacob arose early in the morning, and he took the stone he had put under his head and set it up for a pillar and poured oil on the top of it. .. 20— Then Jacob made a vow saying, “If God will be with me, and will keep me in the way that I go, and will give me bread to eat and clothing to wear, 21— so that I come again to my father’s house in peace, 22— then this stone, which I have set up for a pillar, shall be God’s house; and of all that you give me I will surely give one tenth to you.”

Later in ch 35 the Elohist narrates Jacob’s return to Bethel and his building a temple there.

Classically the historical context for the Elohist was believed to be most immediately the Yahwist text in reference to which it was written as a complement and corrective. The social context for the Elohist was believed to be the Northern Kingdom. The theological and political sore point in the Northern
Kingdom was the temple and liturgy at Bethel, which Jeroboam set up in opposition to Jerusalem. This text took the Yahwist’s story about the presence of Yahweh in Bethel, and expanded it to a major doctrine about a stable place of revelation in Bethel, imaged in the ladder (which may have been a pre-Israelite Canaanite legend), and about a vow of Jacob to build that temple there and to sacrifice there and to tithe there. All of this would be very helpful as a vindication of the independent cult at Bethel in the Northern Kingdom.

One cannot easily find this “theology” very significant after the Northern Kingdom was annihilated in 722 BCE, and the temple in Bethel flattened a century later. Historical-critical method here has recovered for us an understanding which was meaningless long before this text was integrated into a biblical Torah. Is the Elohist version of the story just as useless to our faith as were the versions of the Yahwist and of the priestly? Apparently so. And this spiritual poverty is only accentuated by the fact that contemporary source critics do not believe there ever was a separate Elohist text in the Northern Kingdom.

In all of this historical method, we have been using our mind to dig into the text in order to discover what the author did not say, and did not mean, in order to uncover realities which lay behind his words. History does that. It searches out the realities which the authors often did not even know, and which their contemporaries did not know, but which only a later generation would perceive. Thus history reveals a reality which is going forward, a reality which judgment will affirm, a reality beyond interpretation but in which interpretation moves from idea to truth.

But, interpretation of literature is more passive than that. It learns a discipline of attentive listening, with respect for what the author did know and did want to have us hear. Moreover, in the words of F.R. Leavis cited above, interpretation should not be so much a question of thinking and judging, but rather of feeling into and becoming. It is precisely the thinking and judging of historical criticism, the effort of objectifying and conceptualizing who said what to whom, confronting what historical context, which has brought us to the sterile interpretations of the text we have just seen. If we simply hear the text, attentive to its articulated meaning, but also to its interpersonal, artistic, symbolic, and incarnate meanings, then a very different interpretation occurs.

First, Jacob is there, and he is incarnate meaning as patriarch of the Jewish people. What happens in his life happens to all Jews for ever. In the context of the Christian Bible, it happens to all Christians forever. Reader response criticism can point out that we read this text, as though we were there. This is easy in biblical
narrative, because all the great personages in the Bible, with the exception of Christ, are left emphatically human in size—they are never either saintly, or heroic, or demonic. Jacob is ordinary like you and me, but chosen by God like you and me.

The text begins with two arguments from his mother—one for Jacob: she tells him he must go, because Esau is dangerous; and another for Isaac: she tells him their son must go because she just can’t stand these Hittite women. This is not unique or unfamiliar narrative material. It corresponds to parallel experiences in our own lives. Most mothers, trying to convince the family of something, will use one argument with the son and another with the husband. And Isaac picks up the marriage argument, preferring to base his own little speech on that, for reasons which we can easily imagine but which are not given in the text. So Jacob heads off toward the home of his uncle. And we go with him. We are neither heroes, nor theological purists, nor racists. We have no doctrine about this trip—not so far at least. We are going with the flow, and the flow is about God generally blessing our family or community or people or Church, and about Jacob being a normal favorite son.

When the sun sets, we lie down with a rock for a pillow. Suddenly we are in the presence of God, who makes astounding promises about greatness in the future, and about protection during our immediate travel. We feel gratitude, and profound peace. Moreover we are immediately standing at the gate of heaven, standing suddenly in the presence of the whole court of heaven as, for example, Ignatius Loyola continuously stood there. We receive a message of love, in continuity with the immense tradition of mystical experience in the Jewish and Christian community. We are touched by an angel. And the text presents this state of revelation as connected with a special place on earth, a place where heaven and earth meet, where messengers come down to us, and then bring our messages up to be heard in heaven. We promise to sanctify this place and serve it physically and financially. We can associate these ideas with shrines and holy places through the centuries, where Mary has been the messenger, or with the sacramental system of the Church. All of the above provides, not a paraphrase of the biblical meaning, but rather a number of clues about comparable complexes of meaning which we can experience in contemporary life.

This is, of course, can be dismissed as pious reading. It is not historico-critical. And it does correspond to some of the methods for meditation proposed, for example, by Ignatius Loyola. But still it is academic, as it follows the academic procedures of literary criticism. It is critical in that it begins with the
Scholarship's Impenetrable Wall

precisely determined data of the test. Moreover it is preferable, because the meaning it finds is much closer to what the author actually did mean than were the truncated ideas found in historical critical interpretation. Finally it is interesting to note that Lonergan himself suggested this approach through feeling toward elemental meaning and reader response, when he wrote that readers should be “shown how to find in their own experience elements of meaning, how these elements can be assembled into ancient modes of meaning.”

The quality of the reader’s reading experience will depend on the reader’s depth and awareness and readiness to live a fuller responsiveness. A demand for conversion will be there, at least for renewed religious conversion and further psychic conversion as well.

Moreover, the text does make affirmations. For example, it implicitly affirms that God cares about us humans on earth, that the spiritual world is in communication with our daily world, that without our planning it, God may intervene in human affairs. It also implies moral demands. For example, it demands that we be attentive to the spiritual, that we trust God, that we spend some time, effort and money on cultic objects. None of these doctrines are said by the text, and yet they are easily drawn from the text. They are not observed by science, or deduced from principles, but they are available through interiority. If we feel into the text, and become the text, we are drawn to respond to these specific values, and through interiority we can identify them, and understand them, and judge them, and choose them.

SCROLL AND THEOLOGY

It is clear that Lonergan was right in establishing a wall between the scholars of the Bible and theology, in so far as some scholars produce an academic product which is brilliant but not related to theology. He is also right in so far as his statement shows that the Bible offers, not ideas, but elemental meaning. In this sense, it is not to be placed in one of the eight operations of theological method, certainly not at interpretation in an historico-critical sense.

Scripture provides religious experience. And not only some religious experience but precisely that religious experience which is common to all members of the Christian community. The Christian community is a community

in so far as it shares that experience, understands it in the same way, judges it in the same way, and makes compatible decisions in the light of compatible judgments of value. Scripture is normative in that regard. I believe that it has been read in the Church precisely in this way for two millennia.

I do not agree with the notion that the Bible should be placed back into the history of religions. The historico-critical Bible, just like The Marginal Jew, may contribute to the history of religions. But the Bible itself is written intentionally in a timeless manner, and one who reads it in the best traditions of literary method, i.e. with an attentive and open mind and a fully living heart, will feel its voice as present today. The language of the Bible, just as that of Shakespeare or of Homer, may need to be learned, and the effort must be made to perceive the artistic form of the writing, and to determine what is being written about, but once that work has been done, there is no need to distance oneself in time from the speakers and no trouble hearing their voice as contemporary.

Scripture did not, for the most part, formulate doctrines. But doctrines have been and can be formulated out of Scripture. Such doctrines then can be compared to the history of Christian doctrines, and this will require research, interpretation, history, and dialectic regarding that history, not regarding Scripture. Once that has been achieved the best formulation of doctrine can be worked toward, and systematic theology expanded, and communications created.

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15 Cf. Method, p. 79.
16 This is even thematized in at least one biblical text: "Not with our ancestors did the Lord make this covenant, but with us who are all of us here alive today." (Dt 5:3)
17 Cf. note 2 above. One can't go into a dialectic with Scripture anymore than one can with a sunset. It is just there. Scripture is accepted as the normative experience of Jews and then of Christians. Our reactions to Scripture (preaching we draw from it, doctrines we base on it) can become the object of critique if they don't account for the data, or of dialectic if they proceed from a failure of human authenticity or of sanctifying grace. But Scripture itself is thought to be written by God and God lacks no conversions. Translated that means that Scripture, like all great literature, has been selected by a process of reading through many generations to identify those texts which are authentic, spirit-filled, expressive of unlimited love.
FOUNDATIONS,
THE SUBJECT OF PSYCHOLOGY,
AND SCIENCE

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INTRODUCTION

The significance of Lonergan’s method for the discipline of psychology, and especially depth-psychology/psychoanalysis is potentially profound. The following is no more than a review of some issues which arise around that significance for psychology, in general, and psychoanalysis in particular. The aim is to reach greater clarity about the applicability of Lonergan’s method and what this suggests for psychoanalysis, as well as to clarify that method itself and its operations in this particular field.

I will look first at Robert Doran’s work drawing on his critical application of Lonergan’s method to one particular kind of depth psychology. Some critical questions will emerge from that. In a second part of my paper I will explore some of the difficulties attendant upon applying this approach to psychology and psychoanalysis because the object of the sciences of psychology and psychoanalysis is also their subject.

FOUNDATIONS IN THEOLOGY

Doran is primarily concerned about theology, as is evident in his major work on Theology and the Dialectic of History (TDH). It is however interlaced with critical questions and suggestions about Lonergan’s method both for psychology and theology, and it is hoped that an examination of it will give important clues to our more central question here in regard to psychological method in particular. Here we will pick out a number of crucial elements in Doran’s analysis and suggest
some implications. Let me state perhaps rather baldly at the outset what my own particular interests are in this concerned theological and psychological language and symbolism and the mechanisms of mediation operative in theology and psychology. This concern is foundational: it regards more than Lonergan’s functional specialty called communication because it touches in a basic way on what is to be communicated.

In the present context what is meant by conversion in general, and in particular, by psychic conversion, is of central relevance. Although our focus is on what Doran says of that psychic conversion (p.62) but firstly it will perhaps be helpful to recall in a general way conversion and its relationship to foundations in Lonergan’s own work before we proceed to look at what Doran has to say.

THEOLOGICAL FOUNDATIONS AND CONVERSION: SOME QUESTIONS

For Lonergan the central component in theological foundations is the moment of religious conversion, which in turn is related to authentic subjectivity. For Lonergan doctrines derive from and, in the context of, foundations, because doctrines are those truths which are judged to be true in the context of religious conversion. Doctrines could be considered to be the truths of faith that arrive from the converted theologian goes though the prior steps in method to the point of foundations on the basis of which doctrines can be formulated. Lonergan states that Christian conversion is basic to Christian living and an objectification of that conversion provides theology with its foundations. However, a problem arises here in that what the functional specialty dialectics will throw up is ascribable to different horizons what is called for is conversion, that is to say, a radical shift in horizon. This is the point where the theologian—on the basis of his own appropriated conversion—asserts one position of the many emerging out of dialectic to be the correct one and other positions to be incorrect by implication.

The assertion of what is correct / incorrect is discerned on the basis of foundations. So on the basis of foundations there emerged doctrines which affirm and negate truths of faith that are explained in systematics. Systematics is concerned to understand and formulate appropriate systems of matters theological and spiritual, and so on. Communications is concerned with theology in its relations with other disciplines, such as art, language, literature, and other religions as well as with natural and human sciences.
In general the first phase of the first four theological specialties is broadly what Lonergan refers to as the mediating phase, the listening phase, concerned with the activity of assimilating the past, revealing the religious situation; and it leads up to conversion or decision. The objectification of that conversion or decision gives theology its foundations and the remaining specialties in the second phase build on these foundations towards doctrinal and systematic accounts of theological content that can be communicated. Lonergan does not claim any startling novelty for his proposed division of the theological enterprise and in fact suggests that as theological tasks currently carried on could be readily integrated into it. What is new, he suggests is the systematic relationship of these different tasks to each other and the call on the theologian to specify for himself/herself precisely what s/he is doing in theological inquiry. Clarity in relation to this enables the theologian working in any particular specialty to relate what he or she is doing, much more precisely to the work of other theologians. The validity and function of each specialty—if generally recognized—will result in a specialty pursuing its own particular kind of understanding without specialists in that area regarding themselves as real theology while other specialties are just of peripheral importance. Lonergan here urges the importance of a more teamwork in theology as a whole and expects that the emergence of a dynamic unity and clarity of issues will result.

This is familiar to us, but there remains the general concrete question about how conversion is to be adequately specified. A weakness in the present approach is that the centrality claimed for conversion is not matched by a sufficiently clear set of criteria against which one can measure its presence or absence in the theologising subject. It is to this point that Doran’s work on conversion helps to make the issue of foundations more secure.

PSYCHIC CONVERSION AND THE DIALECTIC

Psychic conversion is defined as the release of the capacity for internal communication that occurs in the subject between different levels of their being. It brings about certain radical transformations\(^1\). The key to a critical appropriation of Jung on the basis of Lonergan’s foundations lies in the distinction of two kinds of opposites: a dialectic of contraries exemplified in the tension of spirit and

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\(^1\) The functioning of dialectic in Jung and Lonergan is examined in *TDH.*, p.350
matter, and a dialectic of contradictories manifested in the opposition of good and evil. The integral resolution of the dialectic of contraries is in every instance a path to the good, while the distortion of the dialectic of contradictories is at the heart of the mystery of evil. Between the opposites of a dialectic of contradictories there can be only one choice but one chooses one pole when one pursues an integral reconciliation of contrary opposites and chooses the other when one succumbs to the sinful nature’s tendency to disequilibrium. With this distinction firmly in mind, positions are readily developed and counter-positions easily reversed.

The distinction, however has both conditions, and implications, and these need comment. The conditions are philosophical, the implications theological. The philosophical conditions of grasping and affirming the distinction among different kinds of opposites lie in differentiating consciousness from knowledge and in distinguishing the duality of consciousness from the duality of knowledge. The implications become important when one asks what concretely and existentially enables one, not to grasp and affirm the distinction of the opposites, but to live in the integrity of the dialectic of contraries. The source of this integrity is supernatural: grace as healing a distortion, and grace as elevating a person to habitual schemes of recurrence in our inclinations and actions which are beyond the capacity of unaided nature. More precisely, grace heals precisely because it elevates. It can be spoken of only in the special categories that constitute discourse as properly theological. To the non-theologian Doran has become explicitly theological at this point; and this will require further clarification.

However, Doran is concerned with Jung, who penetrated to the region of existence where the mystery of the supernatural is at work, while not only failing to acknowledge the theological intelligibility of this realm, but choosing instead to set up an alternate intelligibility rooted in nature, and nature alone. Epistemological factors surely are part of the difficulty, for Jung never transcended his Kantian presuppositions. But more radical still is an existential factor that will not submit to a divinely originated resolution of the problem of human integrity.

We may indeed agree that Jung penetrated to the region of existence where the mystery of the supernatural is at work, as Doran says. The problem is with that sudden transformation into mystery, so that it is no longer clear in what realm we find ourselves. To the present writers there is a sudden emergence into mystery and it is not clear to me what steps have led us to this point.
Doran’s intention has been primarily to mine the resources in Jungian insights for a psychological complement to Lonergan’s intentional self-appropriation.

It was through exposure to a Jungian maieutic of the psyche that I was able to develop the notion of psychic conversion. That notion is fundamental to the position on dialectic that is so crucial to the argument that follows. Equally fundamental to the position are Lonergan’s explications of intellectual, moral and religious conversion and these are what make it possible that a theological appropriation of Jungian psychology be, not wholesale, but critical, dialectical and normative.

The positive fruits of such an appropriation are: first, Doran says Jung’s finalistic understanding of the psyche can easily be integrated with his own position on the dual nature of the data of interiority; namely, the sensitive psyche has a finality that is an upwardly directed dynamism towards participation in the operations of inquiry and understanding, reflection and judgement, deliberation and decision and in the dynamic state of being in love, in intimacy, in the community and with God.

The question occurs about the existential or real implications of a finalistic understanding of Jung. What does it mean operatively? To be sure, one might adopt some such understanding, and see it as in line with the dynamism in Lonergan’s account of knowing and of the subject. It is quite another matter to assert simply that that is an adequate account of what is involved in subjectivity.

One is reminded of one of Freud’s texts—in particular “Beyond the Pleasure Principle” —where it seems that the issues of destructiveness, of aggression and of the pervasiveness of something like evil are at least included at an earlier stage in the discussion. These issues raise some fundamental questions in relation both to Lonergan and Jung about the adequacy of their understanding and perhaps positive view of both the finality of the psyche and the finality of the subject in fundamental way. The quality of psychic life does affect, positively and/or negatively, the ease and alacrity with which our intentional operations are performed, and Jung’s notion of the complexes displays a quite accurate and effective understanding of the psychic component of human performance. Moreover, it can easily be sublated into a theology of moral impotence and the need for grace.

There are questions obviously here too. It is perhaps not too difficult to draw general parallels between Jung’s notion of complexes and to examine ways in which it might be sublated into theology and moral impotence etc. The radical
question is, what has one thereby achieved? Perhaps it is much too pragmatic to question that, but there is some question about the radical meaning of having made such a sublation possible. What does it amount to in the end? Thirdly, Jung’s insights into the transformation of psychic energy through a catalytic agency of symbolic process can be employed theologically to enrich our understanding of the love that meets us in our darkness, elevates us to new schemes of recurrence, and heals our contorted energies so as to make us God’s work of art.

Again, it is quite possible that parallels can be found or discovered between what Jung called the transformation of psychic energy and the operations of symbolic process; and that indeed we may be able to use that language to express what we mean about of love, and the love of God. Has the understanding of the operations of that love thereby been enriched or clarified? Or have we simply expressed Johannine notions and put it into psychological language? The question regards the extent to which further understanding has been thereby achieved.

Equally one can consider Jung’s archetypes as possible specifications of the sensitive consciousness and its orientation to mystery, but the present writer wonders if that distinction actually helps us to separate mystery from myth. Of more crucial importance for our present purposes is the final point that Doran claims as a fruit of the appropriation of Jung.

Finally Jung’s locating of the psyche as mediating the tension of spirit and matter is of extraordinary significance for the resolution of the basic dialectic of contraries constitutive of the human subject. Moreover it specifies not only the theological or superstructural but also the religious and infra-structural significance of the cultural phenomenon of psychotherapeutic praxis. For this dialectic is the set of processes intended by the theological special categories of integrity, concupiscence, sin, and conversion; and naming the psyche’s participation in this dialectic specifies the manner in which psychic analysis can mediate something of an appropriation of the mystery of divine grace.

Doran’s basic purpose is to set forth the basic considerations pertinent to a critical appropriation of Jungian insights. He has concentrated throughout the discussion on the potential psychological complement to Lonergan’s intentionality analysis; it is a needed complement that grounds the positions of his text. Doran sets forth this complement as fully as possible, and indicates the relevance of Jung’s thought—relevant, that is, to the appropriation of this
psychological complement to Lonergan’s work. He also subjects Jung to dialectical criticism.

But the paragraph quoted above reveals something of what might be involved in the juxtaposing Jungian analysis with Lonergan’s intentionality analysis, when Doran says that Jung’s specification of the psyche as mediating between the tension of spirit and matter is of extraordinary significance for the resolution of the basic dialectical contraries constitutive of the human subject. The questions about (1) how this mediation takes place, (2) in what this tension of spirit and manner consist, and (3) what is the extent to which the dialectic of contraries is constitutive of the human subject, simply give rise to many further questions. Of interest in the present context is what is implied by the cultural phenomenon of psychotherapeutic practice. According to Doran, as specifying the theological, or superstructural, and also the religious infrastructural significance of that praxis, the purpose of psychotherapy is to mediate between the spirit and matter and to help towards the resolution of the dialectical contraries. In general is this a helpful and elucidating or clarifying view of the practice of psychotherapy? It may very well indeed help towards the resolution of the contraries but how, and what will the resolution be? Psychologists or psychotherapists in general do not dare to answer or rather does not dare to ask these questions, because they are beyond their area of competence and they require a level of interpretation of personal and social phenomena that psychotherapists would generally consider outside their brief. But it is of significance nonetheless.

BASIC FURTHER QUESTIONS

Several crucial questions arise in relation so what has been proposed as the role of Jungian depth psychology in mediating between the experience of the converting subject and the expression or symbolization of that experience by the subject.

First of all, there is some doubt as to the explanatory power of Jung’s psychology. Does it amount in the end to another set of words for the experience, and does it add anything to our actual understanding of the processes involved? I contend that it adds no more than the possibility of inter-disciplinary dialogue between theologians and Jungians. Each group will have their own language for naming what is involved and it is to be expected that dialogue between them will issue in some more adequate understanding on both sides of what the other
means; and there might emerge from such dialogue a clearer sense on each side of what they are referring to, with some clarification of what they are asserting by them. Considering Doran’s suggestion again briefly perhaps I can make that clearer.

Certainly, there is a kind of ready-to-hand correlation between Jung’s finalistic understanding of the psyche, and the direction of the operations of inquiry and understanding towards love, intimacy and God. But does it amount to more than substituting one set of terms for another?

Doran has suggested that understanding the quality of psychic life in terms of complexes can “easily be sublated into a theology of moral impotence and the need for grace.” But if sublation involves adding something new, one can fairly ask what is added that is new? There is the Jungian theory of the transformation of psychic energy through the agency of symbolic process which can enrich our understanding of, the “love that meets us in our darkness”(p. 351). Further on Doran suggests that Jung’s discussion of the archetypes specifies Lonergan’s generic discussion of the orientation of sensitive consciousness to mystery, even as the latter discussion provides a criterion for distinguishing the archetypal from the anagogic, and for discriminating in the realm of the transpersonal what is mystery from what is myth”(p.351). That discrimination is of course crucial, and I want to suggest that we now examine both how science is more widely understood within psychology and psychoanalysis, and another approach to the foundational reality within that field.

**PSYCHOLOGICAL FOUNDATIONS AND SCIENCE**

There is a peculiarity about the subject-matter of psychology that is not adequately reflected in the procedures of mainstream psychology: namely, that the agent of theory-building in psychology is at the same time the object about which understandings or explanations are sought. The subject of the study is at the same time the object of that study. This could be said of all of the human sciences such as economics, anthropology, sociology etc., but probably in no other scientific endeavor is the tension so marked. This is because the concern of the psychologist is the individual subject, and whatever emerges from that study is inescapably a matter for the individual psychologist at the same time. What are the implications of this fact for the scientific study of the human subject? Since its inception as an independent science more than a hundred years ago, mainstream
scientific psychology has opted for a natural science methodology, on the model of physics, chemistry, and biology etc. In so doing it has been concerned to separate itself off from its pre-history in theology and philosophy, on the one hand, and from all imaginary and intuitive preliminary understandings of itself in the domain of commonsense approaches to its subject matter. It has striven in this way to achieve a degree of respectability and acceptability by the other sciences, hoping in that way to be taken seriously and to have its findings and research results suitably valued. There is an underlying unease among many practitioners of the science that it may have excluded large areas of what could be properly regarded as its subject matter in order to achieve this apparent respectability.

From the perspective of psychoanalysis, though, it would be claimed that in opting for a natural science paradigm, psychology has in fact ceded its most essential set of concerns, namely the constitution of the human subject in its basic nature and totality. Psychology has largely adopted a methodology which doesn’t allow it to pursue what should really be its proper object of study, namely the human subject with all the complexity that it involves. In a sense then, analysis understands itself as a necessary adjunct to psychology, challenging it to extend its self-imposed methodological limitations to take account of what emerges from the work of psychoanalysis. But for this to be possible there would have to be some form of interrelationship between the operative paradigms within the two related areas of concern. Some possibility of communication between the disciplines or at least some elements of common language which would enable that dialogue to take place are needed. I present the following considerations towards that end.

The questions for psychology in relation to proper object are profoundly philosophical ones, and go beyond the limits of the present introductory considerations. Suffice it to say for the moment that psychology’s problems are rooted in its philosophical underpinning in philosophical empiricism. The experimentalism of Wilhelm Wundt totally neglected the starting point of Franz Brentano and his considerations on psychology from what he called an empirical standpoint. In regard to the relationship between psychology and psychoanalysis, Theodor Reik reminds us that: “The psychoanalyst is above all a psychologist,

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2 A useful discussion of the issues arising here can be found in Frosch, S., *Psychoanalysis and Psychology: Minding the Gap*. 1989 Macmillan.

3 For an analysis and comparison of Wundt’s and Brentano’s starting point for psychology see my unpublished MA thesis on, “The Implications of Lonergan’s Insight for Cognitive Psychology,” University College Dublin, 1976.
whatever else he may be (physician, teacher, jurist, pastor)...analysis will exist as an essential part of psychology or not at all." Reik calls for the re-centering of the aims and methods of psychology in the light of the discoveries of psychoanalysis. This would lead psychology to focus on the speaking subject as distinct from the main focus hitherto, namely, the experimental subject. It is fundamental to a psychoanalysis properly so-called to regard the speaking subject as the center of its concern. That is the locus of the emergence of the unconscious of the subject and of the desire that structures everything else. Drawing on the re-reading of Freud by Lacan, one can challenge psychology to address all that emerges from such a contemporary analysis and look at its implications for its own methods and approaches to its subject matter. Lacan argues, following Freud, that desire is central to the human subject, and any theory of human nature which does not take account of that is fundamentally flawed. It is further clear from Freud that desire is basically unconscious. This applies of course also to the desire of the analyst. The central challenge to the science of psychology is to find ways of accommodating the findings of analysis with all that that implies. Scientific psychology could no longer then simply adhere to the common paradigms of what is regarded as science, but would have to elaborate a method proper to its own peculiar topic, namely, the human subject.

A WORLD OF MEANING

Human subjects are born into a pre-existing world of meaning, and the goal of development is to constitute ourselves in that world and take a position in it. The world as experienced in sense experience is radically a mediated world and the predominant mode of that mediation is linguistic or symbolic. So it follows that an understanding of subjectivity will involve the psychologist—as well as the analyst, and all other disciplines concerned with human sciences properly so called—with the basic question of meaning. One can of course take the word in the sense of a noun, where, following Wittgenstein, it has to do essentially with the overall context of the word and how it is used in the language. Where does the word make sense, fit in, or where does it belong in such a manner as to conform to the grammar and syntax of the language of which it forms a part. The meaning of a word is its place in the chain of language, or of signifiers as Lacan has it. Any human subject can be said to understand the meaning of the word when they can use the word as it is understood by the hearers. But besides the meaning as a
substantive, there is the sense of meaning as intending, wanting, planning, etc. and of course, in a basic way, desiring. The world given by pre-existing meaning is already there, given to the experiencing subject. It is to that larger world mediated by meaning that we refer to when we speak of the real world, and in it we live out our lives. But the subject knows this world to be insecure because meaning is insecure, since besides truth there is error, besides fact there is fiction, besides honesty there is deceit, and besides science there is myth. Lonergan speaks also of meaning in this second sense. Besides the world given in experience there is also the world that we make, as he puts it. The world that we make, we first intend, and this might be followed by planning, structuring, and organizing. What is intended is a transformed world. Human subjects don't simply accept the world as given, but through their desire they attempt, however unsuccessfully, to transform it. In that sense, subjects constitute their world. Lonergan, out the emergence of the existential subject, when the subjects find out for themselves that they have to decide for themselves what they have to make of themselves.

Lonergan's account of meaning is important here even though he doesn't explicitly advert to the operations of the unconscious in any clear way. What is useful is the detailed analysis of human meaning, and its place in the structure of the human subject. I suggest that the Lacanian symbolic order is conceivable in terms of the world both as mediated and as constituted by the subject as progressively emergent in the unfolding of human desire.

This particular sketch of a theory of meaning is offered simply to indicate the challenge to a human science of psychology. It would have to make the basic issue of meaning a central concern, and to include the enormous elaboration of that in Freud's initial discoveries and Lacan's later re-formulations of them.

Jung has offered us an elaborate set of words or metaphors for talking about what might be in process as a human subject moves towards its goal or its actualization—or individuation. Does it, however, have the explanatory power in a strict sense, or does it offer a descriptive model to put together a plausible set of related hypotheses is a network of terms related to each other? To study Jung in depth is to a degree to learn a new language, and in the end one is still left with the basic question how to relate that language to one's own experience and to communicate the meaning of it to others. I think Doran has set two discourses

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4 For a useful discussion of meaning in this sense, see Lonergan, B., Dimensions of Meaning, in Collection, pp. 252-267. Published by Darton, Longman and Todd, 1967.
side by side and indicated very interesting ways in which they might be interrelated and translated into each other. But the question about what is thereby achieved doesn't go away. It is clear that Lonergan repeatedly stresses that the reality of conversion is subject to external verification or correction in some way. The dialectic within the subject takes place in the context of the wider dialectics within the community and society. But the process of verifying the appropriateness of the conversion, or the correctness of the directions embarked upon on the basis of it, remains uncertain.

Doran does refer briefly to Ignatian discernment in the context of the decision for value, but he does not concern himself with the details of what might be involved. He simply says that consolation is the state of dynamic creative finalistic orientation that he calls the integral dialectic of the subject; desolation is the displacement of that dialectic in the direction of 'too little possibility'. But surely it is crucial to determine whether what is apprehended is of real value or not, and—as with Ignatius—the feelings have to be articulated, appropriated and understood. Of course, Ignatius speaks of such discernment—I think primarily in the context of a subject engaged in seeking direction accompanied by a guide/director. This in turn implies that the sense of value as felt by the subject is to be checked by the other—in this case the spiritual director. It calls for articulation and retrieval into language. This process is also the central preoccupation of psychoanalysis, the goal of which is the speaking of one's own truth. This journey can be long, and will involve the retrieval of personal history and mythology, the exploration in an open context of one's dreams and imaginings, the unfolding of the repressed in whatever ways the censor can be noticed to be operating. 5

Subjects of a Jungian analysis will learn about Jungian psychology and formulate/articulate themselves in that language to a greater or lesser extent, and are thus in the position of someone who has taken on a new language for elaborating their self-understanding. In the ideal case pursuing an analysis will result in a formulation and articulation of self which is profoundly one's own, and in a language which is more transparent to the self and the other than was heretofore the case. But there is a question of fact here. Has self-appropriation

5 I would suggest that both Doran's (TDH, p.59) and Lonergan's (Insight, p.192)—on which it is based—discussion of repression needs very much more elaboration. It is crucial to know whether the censor is operating repressively or constructively, and this can only emerge in the context of a thorough analysis.
been achieved, and how is this to be verified? Perhaps this calls for a great deal of further refinement. 6

CONCLUSIONS

Doran has done an enormous service both to theology and psychology in—among many other things—juxtaposing the intentionality analysis of Lonergan and the psychic analysis of Jung. He has opened up a vast range of questions which would give rise to very fruitful exploration. But more particularly to me he has suggested that a great deal more needs to be done in particular to inter-relate the more critical and precise instrumentarium of psychoanalysis to the range of critical questions surrounding conversion and the emergent formulations of personally grounded faith. As Lonergan has indicated many times, this will need to be a corporate or communal effort. Formulations that are not understood or not directed and received/responded to by the other can at best, perhaps, be regarded—in Lonergan’s terms—as only potential acts of meaning. To achieve fuller, constitutive meaning they will have to be heard and responded to, and contradicted or corrected; and so the dialectic of the individual psyche is taken up into the wider dialectic of the community and society.

In the present context much more needs to be said about the dynamics and levels of communications, for that is where the crucial problems lie.

6 In Subject and Psyche Doran says: “The only alternative, however, to the neglected or truncated or immanentist or alienated subject lies in cognitional and existential self-appropriation. Psychic self-appropriation is obviously to take place within the context of existential self-appropriation. The articulation of the dynamics of cognitional and existential self-appropriation constitutes the new maieutic. More precisely, the self-appropriating subject is the new maieutic, the only viable control of meaning in modern culture. No finer instrument of cognitional self-appropriation has been provided than Lonergan’s Insight. But, I believe, the dynamics of existential self-appropriation can be given further refinement. pp. 47/48. Quoting this text in TDH, p.699, footnote 7, Doran omits what is underlined.
I WANT TO introduce you to an exercise that anyone may learn but few do. If you do learn it your life will change and you will begin to change life for other people. Let's jump in at the deep end!

First, get into a comfortable sitting position, upright but relaxed, move your neck around just to get your body into one piece all the way up. It will help your concentration if you shut your eyes, but you don't have to. Rather than tell you what to do, I'll tell you what I do, and you can come along with me. I ask myself: How do I feel? Is there anything just now that is getting between me and feeling fine—a hassle, a deadline I can't meet, a tiresome person, a messy situation. Probably quite a few things. I choose just one, and put it center-stage in my mind. Now I put it a little to one side, but tab it because I'm going to want it back in just a minute. [Pause]

Now I ask myself, can I remember a moment, or a short period, when I was really happy, a holiday with friends perhaps, something really great. Let me take a little time to trawl my memory in search of some nice fish—it could be something

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1 The method is called Focusing. It was much praised by Bernard Lonergan, who had a good nose for psychological methods. See Eugene Gendlin Focusing, (New York: Bantam Books, 1989 2nd ed.). The list of all his work is given in his new book, Focusing-oriented Psychotherapy 1996, The Guildford Press, which contains the best descriptions of the pivotal experience which he calls the felt sense. The book I quote from in this paper is by Edwin M.McMahon Beyond the Myth of Dominance: An Alternative to Violent Society, Sheed and Ward, 1993. The author, in collaboration with Peter Campbell, has been giving workshops in ‘Biospirituality’ in five continents for thirty years, with, according to Peter, never a dull moment! They are both Catholic priests. All particulars of the movement and information on resources are given at the back of this book.
quite small in itself. A woman in my class in Boston College noted in a paper ‘the
time my Dad mended the swing.’

I put myself back into that moment, that good time, that situation. My body
remembers it well, because then it totally relaxed, as it does only in pleasure,
nothing tense: off-guard. [Pause]

Still there, still feeling so good, so unselﬁsh, I recall my present
problem or messy situation. I look at this situation from where I still am, happy
and relaxed, from where I’ve really been and so still can be. I look at my problem
from there, I take a further step: I ask, how does this painful intrusion now feel, as
I take it into my relaxed and easy-going body? How does this feel? What’s it feel
like? Try a sentence that begins, ‘Well, it’s as though...’ I’m giving ‘the happy
me’ and ‘the hurt me’ a chance to come together. Very likely nothing will come at
ﬁrst, so perhaps I’ll give my happy memory a boost, put myself back there. Then
I turn and face squarely the present painful business. How does this feel? How
does me happy feel about this thing that’s bugging me now? Good question! Take
time! [Pause]

Perhaps something like this: I feel stuck, or I feel left out, or out in the cold. I
want to move on and can’t. This has happened before. It’s my story repeating. Oh,
yes, it always seems to go like this ... Yes, of course. I kind of know better what’s
going on, even feel a little better. It’s still messy, but I’ve got a handle on it. I
experience a sigh of relief. And I feel strangely grateful for what has come to me.
I say thank you, Holy Spirit, or simply ‘good old life,’ the bigger-than-me that’s
carrying us all along.

Now what we just did is the opposite of what we normally do with unpleasant
experiences and problems with people and work and family. Here is the opening
paragraph of the book I shall be introducing to you. ‘What do you do in order to
feel better when you’re afraid or hurt?’ asked the sixth-grade (age 12) teacher.
Forty pairs of youthful eyes were riveted on him, then gradually grew thoughtful
as young minds turned inward to check their own experience. It was their ﬁrst
class on drug abuse and the number one question right up front was dealing with
difficult feelings. ‘I pound my pillow.’ That came from the back of the room. ‘I
ignore those feelings’—from an intelligent-looking young man in the front row. ‘I
try to read them away,’ offered a thoughtful girl in the second row. ‘I get busy
with other things.’ ‘I jog or ride my bike until it goes away.’ The litany picked up
speed. ‘I listen to music, go to a movie, dance, go shopping, play sports, talk to
my friends on the phone’—and so on.
‘What do you do, Elizabeth? The teacher’s friendly eyes picked her face out of the sixth-grade class. She remained still for a moment and then said: ‘I stay with the feelings. I stop and be quiet with them until something comes that helps them to change.’ The teacher looked stunned, pondering what she had said, weighing this young response to a question for which he himself had only the shakiest of answers, and then he moved on. Elizabeth has been taught at home to care for scary and hurting feelings since she was five years old.’

What she had been taught is what I want to share with you. It’s about the body. From the moment I get up in the morning and go through the boring routines of getting another day going, my body is responding to its environment, registering hot and cold and wet and other people, an orchestration of responses that would amaze us if we took in even a little of it. Some scientists claim that there is a body-brain as well as the brain that’s in the head. At least this is a brilliant working hypothesis. The body-brain not only responds to all that is happening. More importantly, it remembers. The elephant never forgets, we say, and the elephant is a good symbol of the body—a huge faithfulness to experience.

Now the most important thing about the body’s memory is the way it remembers happiness. The body really likes to be a happy person, as opposed to a person feeling awkward and on-guard. The body is not relaxed when you go to a party and step into a room full of people, none of whom you know. When a person is happy the body is on holiday, with all-systems-go. And so my body is only too glad to be called up and allowed to remember itself at its best, to remember itself, to have all its members together. This is much more than a matter of proper functioning—although inattention to breathing is one of the most extraordinary deficiencies in our culture, even in the study and practice of medicine. But the body relaxed in pleasure is much, much more than functioning well. It is affectionate. Off-guard, friendly. It is open to the entry of another, of which the sexual entry is only one of a vast variety of admissions. It is ready to laugh, and the human has been defined as an animal that laughs. One easily falls in love, I find, with someone who finds funny exactly what I find funny.

So what I am doing when I call up the happy carefree body in a moment of stress or messiness or painfulness is that I am having my body at its best meet this painful situation and thus say exactly what hurts about it! That’s what someone of you may, just may have experienced just now when we did our exercise.

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2 Beyond the Myth of Dominance, p. 1
According to a recent book whose title I forget, the young urgently need to be able to name the source of their discomfort.

My body may even say where it hurts, name some part of itself. Our common language registers this. We describe a situation or a person as ‘a pain in the neck,’ or ‘in the ass,’ as I learned to pronounce it in America. But we have long forgotten how these phrases arose in the first place, so that we have come to regard them as metaphorical! You are not a metaphor! You are the source of metaphor.

Now let us say that my body has really delivered, said not only what hurts but where it hurts. I shall find that when I come to meet that difficult person it helps to become aware of this part of my anatomy. This will make me relate to the person more humanly. I recall from the early days of my studies a statement of St Thomas Aquinas, ‘The passion of fear causes a contraction of the testicles, as the Philosopher [Aristotle] says.’ In relating to a member of our community who intimidates me in a subtle way, I find it helpful to connect with him from that tender and vulnerable place, rather than from a quick-thinking and aggressive mind. One of our sixth-formers said to me, à propos; of these matters, ‘what you are really teaching us is to relate to events not with the penis but with the testicles!’ Not far off! From the aggressive-phallic to the vulnerable life-bearing!

The most important effect of letting the body have its say in a difficult situation is that I feel better about it. It is so much better to feel better about a problem than it is to solve it—I mean, of course, problems of the human kind, not mathematical problems. When I feel better I am changing, and as I am certainly apart of the problem, the problem is changing. The word here is not ‘solution’ but ‘resolution.’

Now life moves from one difficult situation to another, especially the way we have it today with all its technological speedings-up. So when from time to time the body is allowed to have its say, we find ourselves approaching what happens quite differently. Between the usual alternatives, ‘fight or flight,’ I begin to find a third way.

The third way goes against almost everything we are taught, for we are taught to seek solutions, to fix things, and of course to fix people—preferably with bombs at no cost to our own lives. Religion, alas, is no exception. We come to regard God as the super-fixer. And this brings me to Christianity, as we come to understand it for the first time. Christianity says to the idea of God the Fixer a most emphatic No! Christianity focuses on a Failed Messiah. The Messiah-figure was for the Old Testament the most thoroughgoing symbol of God the Fixer. He was God’s warrior-king to defeat the Romans and the Babylonians and, further
back still, the Egyptians and all the other oppressors. Jesus stepped into this role, and made a complete mess of it, ending up on a cross. Shortly after this, the impossible happened. He came back from the dead, not in a spooky way, and not in a spectacular way either, but in a way that said, ‘My way, of being vulnerable even to the point of letting you all destroy me, is God’s way: it’s the way reality is. Your way, of violence, the endless building of civilizations on victims, is illusion.’

How did a small group of marginalized Jews find the nerve to proclaim that a failed Messiah was God among us? Only through the return of Jesus ‘in the power of the Spirit’ (as they called it). It caught on, because something in us knows that life is about love not violence. We also know that persuading ourselves of this costs everything—even the killing of God.

It has taken Christianity two millennia to grow up to a non-violent God, although this is clearly written into all the teaching of Jesus, ‘Turn the other cheek’ etc. ‘Take up your cross and follow me!’ is exactly what you do when you let in the pain of a situation and feel more alive, that is, more like Jesus who is life.

Jesus is the role-model for the practice I’ve been talking about and am so bad at, that we call Focusing. How so? Let me recall the practice we went through just now. The body, out of the experience of itself at its best, receives the pains that people inflict, and this leads to resolution and growth in love—a word I’m using here because it means everything, and people think they know what it means, and don’t really. What was the body of Jesus ‘at its best’? How would your body feel if you knew God who made the universe loved you as an only child? Relaxed, I’d say. Ready even for the cross!

Outbreaks of violence of an inane and uncontained kind should be warning us that our culture is driving people into themselves where a deep sense of rejection generates a rage at society that is total and indiscriminate. This rage is at the opposite pole to ‘feeling finding its own words.’ If I don’t know what I feel, I could be a killer. If I don’t know feelings in myself, how should I know them in anyone else, for instance an aversion to being killed? That little girl of five, who is already finding ‘the words to say it’, is the new millennium on our doorstep. We can grow from what Americans call bad experiences.

I recall the body at its happy best
And turn hence to the pain of present failing,
Await the word whereby you may be blessed,
A sweet alternative to useless railing.
Body is at its best when we are loved:
There's nothing else to make my body me
For others, not afraid to be reproved,
And so it isn't true we are born free.

What God is like when Jesus captures me
As deep end and beginning of a story
Is Father for our living blissfully
While Christianity grows old and hoary.
Between two worlds the body is the door
Jammed with bliss deferred, and we adore.

**PART 2: EXPERIMENTS**

'Children, don’t do what I have done
I couldn’t walk and I tried to run
So I, I just got to tell you
Goodbye, goodbye

John Lennon

It will be helpful to give you a few examples of focusing in my own experience.

The first of these is really of my initiation into focusing as part of my life in future. It occurred while I was taking part in an intensive week-long workshop, conducted in England by Frs. McMahon and Campbell. It occurred about halfway through the week, by which time I was very preoccupied with the heavy load of introspection imposed. Not surprisingly, I had one of my totally sleepless nights, the kind I dread, a *nuit blanche*, uninterrupted even by drowsiness. Around 4 AM I suddenly became very angry with the way I was—the way my body was—and half-shouted, ‘What the f ... am I doing?’ Then I thought, rather peevishly, ‘Well, what about focusing?’ So I tried to do as they say, ‘befriend’ this fury at myself. No good. Useless. Worse. Then I remembered how, at our plenary session the previous day, we had been asked to give examples in our experience of what they call a ‘felt sense’, the key moment when the body ‘delivers’ a word or image. I had given the following example. When I lose something I badly need—generally something borrowed that the owner has to have back at once!—I panic and, as I go to one place after another, something in me knows it’s not in any of those places. Something in me knows where it isn’t but not where it is. Ed had asked,
'Well, do you attend to that 'something'? and I had said, somewhat impatiently, 'Oh no, that would stop me panicking and take the urgency out of the search.' And then my mind leapt back to a moment at BC when I'd lost a student's final paper, not on her computer, with Commencement a few days off, and was whipping myself up into a frenzy of useless searching, and something in me said, 'There's no dignity in this!' That word 'dignity', thus recalled, came at me now like a bolt from the blue, a revelation. I remembered to say, 'Thank you, thank you very much!' (for this I knew was grace) and breathed a deep sigh of relief in which my whole life seemed to find its resolution, as I saw it in the perspective of that word which was to be my word. I was being shown my way of always dancing to other people's tunes. I was being given back to myself as a place to be. Normally the day after a white night is pretty awful. This one was great. I felt reborn.

I have spoken at a former Lonergan workshop of the obsessive nature of panic in my life. I now speak of it to you as the point at which focusing placed this in a context, my life itself finding a word for the center from which panic is in night. It is very helpful for me to remember here that my friend and long-standing colleague Chip Hughes was excited by the discovery that 'dignity' was the concept he had been looking for to describe what everybody is somehow trying to realize. It is also helpful to recall that John Courtney Murray saw a significant improvement in the Vatican II decree on religious liberty when the word 'dignity' was substituted for the ambiguous 'religious freedom.' It is a word I have tended to be impatient with—until that night!

Here is my second example. I had been talking with a visiting priest who is a kind of theological broker for trainees for the priesthood. We had got on like a house on fire as he expatiated on Wagner, whose operas he knows very well and has loved since a fortunately opera-exposed childhood. Then we got onto the doctrine of original sin, and he underwent a visible character mutation: became red in the face, insisting that a very middle-of-the road theologian I had mentioned was heretical, and that original sin is transmitted 'by propagation not imitation.' I quoted Lonergan's first words to me, 'Concepts have dates!' to which he replied, in effect, 'Maybe, but not all of them.'

That afternoon, lying on my bed in siesta-time and trying to get calm, I focused, and was led to see his red-faced dogmatic fixation as mirroring to me my own psychological fixation, a stuckness intolerant of opposition, a real mimetic frenzy (to marry up Gendlin and Girard, which happens frequently I find). Then
out of this meeting between these two fixations, I felt something emerging in me that I had to call 'my story.' My reaction to that man's obtuseness became 'my story.' I wish I could explain this part better, because it's so important. I think I stood outside myself and saw my reaction to the man as 'me all over,' I saw my behavior as part of my story, and it was in that moment that I understood for the first time the crucial nature of 'story' for all matters of conversion and faith. It is 'by my story' that I am 'picked up' by the fishing-line of faith. My reaction to what the man was saying was not merely 'irritation' but 'me shown to myself in my characteristic behavior as a story working itself out, stories being the way lives spin out, the order they come in.' Becoming my story, my irritation became part of something changing. Tiresome qualities do not change. As story they do. That is how we change. Conversion and story go hand in hand. The word 'story', minted anew for me in this moment, meant my setting-free from the sheer routine of my answering obtuseness with my inner stuckness. The notion of 'story' was born for me as therapy, as salvation. It no longer meant something they all write about and say how important it is; it was my lifeline. And it came from the retrospect on a tiresome bit of conversation.

It became obvious to me that if the uplifting and upholding Higher Power (the theme-of my third section) is a reality in this world we all share, it must reveal itself in a story. The story of Jesus concentrates the stories of a race who live on stories, so that one Rabbi could say that God created the world because he loves stories. There must a be a people of the story, and to see in their story my own, and to consent to this, is to become part of this people, its story my own. This is what it means to join the church, and why joining the church is totally different from joining any other movement or party. It is to join my story, that sets me free from chaos, the panic and emptiness, to the story of God with us. And the grammar of this kind of language is acquired in the exercise I have described.

This suggests, strongly, that the language of salvation in the liturgy is given directly by the body, if we can learn its grammar. If the body can speak, this means that my body can speak to me what it speaks to you by the fact of bodiliness. What does it mean that the body is a language, that by my body I am addressed to you? The language that my body is to you is now the language in which I am finding myself, free from some captivity that has been synonymous with civilized consciousness. This is the end of individualism. We are stumbling into the same sense of new convergence that has led Girard to say that we must see ourselves as 'interindividual.' The marriage of Gendlin with Girard is astonishing.
The end of individualism is the removal of the veil over the heart Paul refers to as he describes the legalistic mind. Because of this veil we read Paul’s statement that we are the Body of Christ as a corporate metaphor, whereas John Robinson has pointed out that Paul is speaking ‘not corporately but corporally.’ To say that we are all one body of Christ is to speak of the body in the most lucid and revealing way. Mutual love is said by John to be the essential and sufficient description of Christian belief because the raising-up of the body we have killed is the full lucidity of the body, its inner and its ‘inter’ signifying the same: love. Resurrection and Spirit release the original system of humanity from the darkness of the reign of death over humans. Lonergan’s favorite scripture quote, ‘the love of God has been poured into our hearts by the Holy Spirit,’ is explained by Augustine to mean that we love one another. Augustine says, ‘If you want to know whether you have the Spirit, ask “Do I love other people?”3

The absurdity of the human condition is that where we are most exposed to each other, we are most hidden from ourselves. When my body (at once my exposure and my private house) speaks to me, then the human cover is blown. I suppose love is the full acceptance of this blown cover, the blood that circulates in the awakened body.

Individualism persists in Catholic spirituality because in Catholic theology, spirituality is a poor relation (officially called ‘spiritual theology’). While mainstream theology picks up the phenomenological approach of Focusing, spirituality lags behind, trapped in the individualist mindset of the Counter-Reformation. Didn’t Bellarmine say to Descartes, ‘You will save the church’? The spirituality promoted by Opus Dei is individualist, turned away from the body. As we see now, this means ‘away from the Body, from Christ today.’

My third example is more ambitious. I shall introduce it with a story from the book I am quoting.

‘I am in charge of a school in an upper-middle-class area, largely populated by professionals. Hardly what anyone would call a ‘deprived’ class of people. These kids appear to have everything. Yet, this week I have realized more than ever before just how deprived they really are, which is something I have been suspecting for a long time, but just couldn’t put my finger on. Gradually, as this week unfolded[at a focusing workshop], I have come to understand what a very special little boy said

3 Tract 6, 9-10, Sources chretiennes 75, 296-300. There are some astonishingly good things in these sermons on John, more exciting than anything I remember in the de Trinitate.
to me only a couple of weeks ago. This child is so bright, sensitive, and promising, and had always been a top student when things started to change a few months ago. Increasingly homework is neglected. He is becoming a troublemaker with other children, even in his family as well, and his parents are mystified and asking me for help. In the classroom his behaviour and cooperation is deteriorating every day. Just a couple of days before I came here [to this workshop] I called him into my office again, not really knowing what to do. As he sat there before me with his eyes cast down and his shoulders slumped, in desperation I said: ‘Can you tell me how I can help you?’ Without looking up he shrugged an ‘I don’t know’, but seemed to go deep inside himself for a long time. I didn’t break the silence. Then ever so thoughtfully, out of some place deep down, he said: ‘Inside me it feels like a mistake that I was born, because everybody wants me to be somebody else.’

Now that little boy is speaking for, and as, numberless people, for a people of spiritual pain. Alice Miller wrote of and for them in _The Drama of the Gifted Child_. There are many ways in which the child gets the message: you exist not simply as you but to meet the needs of your parents or family; you are essentially part of someone else’s hopes and plans. John Lennon put this colorfully in a song for which a friend has just given me the text.

Some of you sitting there with your cock in your hand
Don’t get you nowhere don’t make you a man
I heard something ’bout my Ma and my Pa
They didn’t want me so they made me a star
I, I found out!
I, I found out!

Now to express this sense of myself accurately calls for sophisticated language beyond the reach of a very small child—though our young friend in the story is remarkably precise. But the experience itself, as perhaps the earliest of pain, is certainly that of the child. It is not simply the projection of introspective adult hindsight. The effect of becoming more centered, as an old person, is that one as it were sees all the way back, a really three-dimensional maze that becomes less amazing with the years.

We are easily misled by Jung’s clinical account, that ‘the religious problem’ tends to emerge in the second half of life, when the main social requirements have been met and the person begins to wonder, ‘What else is there?’ All that this

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4 _Beyond the Myth of Dominance_, p. 34.
shows is that in our culture we only recognize the religious dimension when it presents itself as an option, an alternative, above all, as something entirely private. We do not recognize the religious implication in the painful feeling of that child, that it would have been better if he had not been born. The key word here is 'painful.' Our culture is the sworn enemy of spiritual pain. It doesn’t want to know—and so, as Alice Miller warned, it fabricates time-bombs in the shape of desolate creative children.

The pain of ‘feeling like I am a mistake’ is a cry to God as piercing as any that goes up from a tortured world. It is the most enduring of spiritual pains. It is the most likely to appear as ‘the way it’s always been with me’ as one looks back along that rather clear bearing that becomes more perceptible with age.

This spiritual pain can have no relief as long as it stays ‘in the head’, as the unavowed anger one feels in so much creative writing and artistic expression. I don’t like it at all when people see it in what I write because no one likes being reminded of difficulties in their lives that they feel they can do nothing about. As a friend pointed out to me some years ago, the crudest way to put someone off their stroke is to say, ‘I feel your pain!’

This existential angst cannot be dealt with in the head. It is in the body! So until the body is ‘heard’, there is no resolution of the anguish. When the body is heard, resolution, or at least movement and change, begins. In fact an elementary map of the body’s feeling life begins to emerge. The ‘axis’ of this chart that little boy is expressing is ‘the pain of its not being all that good to be me.’ Spiritual pain denied is pain inflicted on the body. For our culture spiritual pain is denied in the name of the Enlightenment; and the body in consequence is the victim of a whole arsenal of pain killers, from an awful lot of religion to all the drugs, chemical and otherwise. In a stampede we fly from the pain we deny, the pain of the spirit, to the pain we can kill. We kill in the body the pain we cannot rid ourselves of in the spirit.

The reversal of this deadly process is what Focusing is all about. We listen to the pain we inflict on the body by the denial of spiritual pain. Now to do this is to ease the way to the acceptance of spiritual pain as—what? As the opening to God, the confident voicing of the cry that poor child sent up despite himself.

At this point, the two dimensions of salvation in the body open up for me. First, forget rhapsodizing about aboriginals and Songlines, the great cop-out of the affluent. Our own culture is based on spiritual pain denied and inflicted on the body. Its icon it will not look at is the body on the cross. Even Eisenhower saw this when he said we’d got humanity on a cross of iron. The Good News is that
God has raised this crucified body that we all are from the dead to be ‘in the heavenly places.’ Second, that kid has persuaded me to ‘come out’ and see my birth as reparation to a betrayed father and as the idol of a repentant mother, doomed from the start to be someone else’s people’s beachball as a young Jesuit I know said of himself. (He has left the Jesuits, I hope not just for a wider beach!) This is my spiritual pain.

What did Newman mean, in that famous sermon on Christian sympathy, about each person’s having a secret that could never be told but which, when told, turns out to be everyone’s secret? In this focus, I see the bully at prep school, and the bullied. I see the monk listening to the chanted words, ‘One of the soldiers opened his side with a spear...’ and knowing, beyond all possibility of doubt, that this was my destiny as a maker of theology. The spiritual pain of not being able to be me, this pain denied and so inflicting bodily pain on myself and others, was brought into focus in the crucified as radiant with healing. The canons in that ‘stucco-y’ church in the Campagna, singing abominably, said it all.

As there is no resolution save in the body that has been the victim of spiritual pain denied, so there is no absolution save in the crucified and risen one. The same intrinsic dynamic shapes Focusing on the body as so long made to bear in silence the denial of the pain of no-me, and the Gospel’s invitation, ‘Come to me, you who are burdened, and I will refresh you.’ Every fruitful moment of Focusing reflects the huge resolution of the cross of Jesus.

In what consists spiritual pain? For me it is never having felt allowed, or invited, or loved, to be me. The little boy in the story understands that ‘being me and no one else’ depends on the people who, in fact, are not giving him this affirmation but, on the contrary, want him to be someone else. I share the fate of narcissistic children of narcissistic mothers. It’s up to her to give him his own self, but all she can do is wear him as an adornment of herself. So he only exists as an entertainer, and at the center of this existence is the acute pain of not being able to be. But I am only able to look squarely at this pain now that I am finding open to me the body that has had to ‘take’ the pain I could not face. The wonderful Dominican scripture scholar, J-M Lagrange, commented on the Letter to the Romans that we only discovered what we had been saved from when we were saved. Is not focusing offering this release from the torture of [well, Nietzsche, why not?] into the longsuffering and friendly body? (I too easily forget that I have received a communication from my mother, non-visual, in the depths of my spirit. She is saying, ‘Go for it! All the way! Any way!’)
Of the denial of the spirit's pain the body is the victim. We take out on the body what we think we cannot endure in our minds. It is a commonplace, whose full significance we don't get, that things not dealt with land a person in depression whose bodiliness is well-recognized with an armory of anti-depressant pills. We're supposed to be able to 'deal' with our anger. Descending into the body to do this is not known. We wait till the descent happens involuntarily in the form of listlessness, and then there are pills.

Claudia Koonz in her book, *Mothers in the Fatherland*, tries to understand the motivation of some very powerful women who managed to rally the women of Germany to an avowedly misogynistic movement. She interviews one of the leading women, who has managed some kind of survival underground. She is quite impenitent, all her replies are fluent and systematically evasive. All was well, she keeps saying, this was the regeneration of a people. It dawned on Koonz that she herself was becoming bored. Then, under the boredom, she was becoming depressed; and then, under the depression, she realized that she was very angry. A very focused interviewer! During the interview her body moves from the less unconscious boredom through the more conscious depression to fully conscious anger, as the woman who had done so much to facilitate the nightmare denied the whole monstrous situation of people disappearing into death camps under cover of banners and rallies and triumphal emblems.

I am beginning to know what my spiritual pain is, and it is extremely unpleasant. The word 'pain' sends us directly to the body, upon which the whole Focusing movement is centred. But the trick is, that it is precisely in the body that we fail to locate it until we learn to focus, because the 'pain' is *in the mind* fleeing from it. People in the women's movement, especially in the church speak of the 'pain and anger' that they feel at social and ecclesial attitudes towards them. It begins to make sense when McMahon says that all violence stems from the denial of pain. The focusing movement offers an ostensive definition of *spiritual* pain as what hurts so much that you have to deny it to yourself and to everyone else.

The 'pain' of 'pain and anger' always means being treated in a way that does not recognize me as a person, violates my dignity. It describes psychologically the receiving end of worldwide injustices-and injustices done in a way that 'rubs it in.' Aristotle puts this in a pithy way: 'the source of rebellion is not injustice but insult.' Today's protest at injustice is as widespread as its perpetration suggests that 'pain' may be universally so understood.

For the final step, though, I must go into myself, where I find what that little boy in the story may have found: a gnawing disbelief in me as someone in my
own right. Something in me fits with, or lets in, the non-respect that I seem to hear from others. It is perfectly clear to me that my story is only one form of the human story under the reign of death. There is spiritual pain. It is felt wherever humans feel. And it is a self-doubting that fear feeds and only love relieves. Now I may learn to take this way in an exercise that matches very closely contemplative prayer. As long as I never forget that this is the real way of the cross, I may be at peace with it.

PART 3: THOUGHTS ON THEOLOGICAL IMPLICATIONS

Through the practice of Focusing, I am coming to a new sense of the goodness of my life. I recall a moment when I was a boy at Downside, another boy said to me, ‘It’s good to be alive on a day like this!’ and I said, ‘I’m not at all sure!’ Now that I am learning to listen to my body, the ‘felt sense’ that this gives, with the confirmatory ‘body-shift’, is a new sense of the goodness of being alive, and the sense of my life as a story.

My Christian faith, which has had to survive all these years unbacked by a sense of the goodness of my life, finds itself newly backed by human flourishing. This suggests a revision of the way I think about, and therefore try to live by, faith. If faith has hitherto supplied for a lack of a felt sense of goodness, what happens when such a sense is at least beginning to be mine? Is faith now not needed any more? I remember one of the most brilliant young men I have known back in my early days in the States, discovering that he had only joined the Jesuits because, orphaned and then abandoned by an older brother’s getting married, he had nowhere to go. Overwhelmed by this discovery, he left the Jesuits, the priesthood, the church, and belief in God. Nor has he ever, so far as I know, revoked this drastic step. Such a step does not suggest itself to me—although survival if I took it at over eighty would be problematic!

I feel that I am led in the opposite direction. This new felt sense of my life’s goodness has its own kind of precariousness, letting-go, one by one, and very half-heartedly, of all my former ‘fixes.’ Not only on faith was I driven to rely by a life prone to fear and panic. I was also driven to fix things for myself, and to regard others as allies or enemies of my survival project. A woman who came to know me too well by falling in love with me, was amazed at my system of psychological safety-nets. So it is these that I am encouraged to loosen as my life comes to feel more grounded. The recovery of the body introduces me into a new
continent of myself, in which the messy and incomplete, especially with a new sense of the unchangeableness of others, has to be resolutely preferred and lived in to experience more life. (Appropriate to this vita nuova are the experiences known by the acronym ‘AFOG.’)

With things this way, the role of faith looks very different. Far from something chosen because life feels desperate, faith represents the kind of plunge into the unknown only possible when the known is so satisfying: in other words, into a real beyond. Life now fills with meaning through a learned skill, and faith starts to speak the its own language as what Voegelin calls the extracosmic understanding of transcendence. This is the language of Abbot Chapman, and of the western mystical tradition. Now, ‘Do I believe?’ becomes a real question, as if for the first time.

And it’s subtler than this. The void into which I have to plunge is not only beyond a life newly satisfying. It is within, as this new life shows itself to be full of interstices and ways of feeling the draught. The relationship between the new sense of the intrinsic value of being alive and the mysterious upholding of faith is an extraordinarily subtle one. It seems paradoxical, because the new sense of value both works with the sense of being upheld and shows it to be precarious. The whole thing is more conscious, and ‘conscience doth make cowards of us all.’ The stakes are raised. The more my sense of myself and of my life supports the mysterious power that is supporting it, the more it reveals it as supernatural, and therefore quite gratuitous and me hung from it as by a thin thread. This experience exposes the sheer crassness of the argument that dominated the theology I was taught at Rome in the old days, according to which ‘supernatural’ seemed to meant ‘unsupported, uncorroborated, unwelcomed by any natural desire.’ This reasoning was a bull in the china-shop of intelligence, and as open to reason as a bull. This spiritual insensitivity stamped out Quietism in a way that left contemplative prayer ‘guilty until proved innocent,’ thus consigning generations of seminarians to the torture of celibacy without the taste of God, contributing to the present crisis of the priesthood.

The more my experience leads me to ask ‘Why?’ of the mysterious upholding, the more I have to ask, ‘Why not?’ and the ‘why not?’ exposes the ‘why?’ in all its starkness. This paradox is reflected in Psalm 8 which, in the context of wonder at the order of creation, asks ‘What is man that you should keep him in mind?’ It reveals itself to some scientific minds, for whom the discovery of our insignificance in the cosmos highlights the significance of our knowing this.
Consciousness is precariousness. This breaks with our normal habits of mind and therefore of religion, making us far more attuned to the law of the cross, to the mysterious mind that stepped deliberately into the conquering role of Messiah and made a complete mess of it by ending on a cross. In this perspective the whole Girardian revolution makes sense of the crucifixion as we never have and yet, makes me ask 'Why humanity at all? Why anything at all?' It is when you see that God cares that you ask, 'Why should he? Why the whole business at all?'

In the cost of consciousness, the raising of the stakes, the synergy of the divine and the human enhances the gratuitousness of the divine. This is what is pointed to when we say that the salvation of the world will depend on a few people coming alive. It resonates in my mind through the words of Karl Jaspers when I first heard them quoted by Fred Crowe in this assembly: 'During the present century it has been slowly dawning upon us that scores of centuries are coming to a close.' The whole turn of philosophy from the subjectivity of Descartes to the existential subject reflects this being launched on uncharted seas. The practice of Focusing, as the homely practice appropriate to this bewilderment, seems to me to be crucial.

5 The vast philosophical implications of Focusing for our western philosophical tradition are well expressed in the following observations of Les Brunswick:

‘Felt sense’ is Gendlin’s term for what was first clearly identified and described in the last hundred years by existential and phenomenological philosophers, including Husserl, Heidegger, and Merleau-Ponty. Why was it not discovered before? Heidegger says that, since the Greeks, the assumption has been that Being (reality, roughly speaking) consists only of things that stand out in perfect clarity and exactness. Since the felt sense is always partly vague, it was ignored by philosophers as not being fully real.

This idea of reality being perfectly clear goes with a domimative stance towards the world. If everything is perfectly clear, then you can grasp it all with your mind and even control it. But Heidegger says that Being is actually always partly hidden, mysterious, and not clearly formed. Rather than dominating the world, we need to patiently attend to what is, exactly as it shows itself to us (and if we do this, then more may form than was clearly formed before). Heidegger calls this dwelling, and what Gendlin has done in developing Focusing is teach us exactly how to dwell. Thus, Focusing is not just a method for psychological growth, but has to do with your whole relation to reality.

Supernatural faith or *fides divina* as it was called, is a conviction of the goodness of my life, mysteriously upheld.\(^6\) In contrast to the best of our western spirituality—that of Chapman, John of the Cross, Teresa, de Caussade—in which an uncompromising sense of divine transcendence makes each moment precious, for the kind of spirituality made possible by Focusing. The goodness of every moment does not depend on the supernatural upholding, but is something to be cultivated. This is now done by children in a way that puts adult spirituals to shame, as they reach only by struggle what children seem to pluck as ripe apples. It goes with the body as the body works, not just as God seems to work.

Roger Martin du Gard, in his unremittingly exciting thousand page novel *Les Thibault*, records the overwhelming effect of Gide’s *Les nourritures terrestres* on a young man, initiating him into a flesh kept from him by centuries of moralism. And we have Hopkins versus Whitman, whose allure he certainly felt. Yet Hopkins, describing a situation that was the worst that even the Jesuits of that time could design for him, could say, ‘This place is the will of God—which, for me as you know, is violets knee-deep.’ And then Chapman insists that if you feel suffering doing you any good, it isn’t real suffering and isn’t doing you any good. In a way the follower of Focusing doesn’t contradict this, for like the ascetic tradition it makes an uncompromising demand that we embrace the messiness, in our life as does.

My monastic confreire Francis Little (we celebrated our eightieth birthday together last year!) says that Jesus’ word, ‘Take up your cross, and follow me!’ means, ‘Bring your pain, which is the one thing that you, like everyone else, want to deny, into focus and totally accept it as you—for-now, and you are on my way into the fullness of joy.’ I only got onto Focusing because Francis picked up and made me read Gendlin’s book, among the thousand or so books that I brought home from the States.

The practice of Focusing perhaps adds to traditional *askesis* new human and humorous resonances. One contemporary spiritual writer, for instance, contrasts the faith of beginners, as belief, with the faith of the maturing, which is trust, suggesting that only a few reach this stage. Focusing could open the later stage to many more. Trusting God, letting oneself be dangled in life by one knows not

\(^6\) I have disturbing hunch, though, I get that this enhanced sense of spiritual subtlety would succumb to the brutal rigor of persecution and torture more easily than a simpler faith. I am told that Jehovah’s Witnesses and ordinary Catholic priests had the best track records in the camps.
who or what, is a humanly available option for someone learning to taste the
creative uncertainty of life itself. I imagine Jesus saying, ‘At last!’ as his teaching
passes from the hands of its grim purveyors into those of children.

How does all this affect the manner in which seekers of truth are going to hear
each other? Specifically, how is someone Focusing going to be heard by a fellow
seeker who has not got onto it, at least in a formal way. (Needless to say I have
someone in mind, it’s useless otherwise.) My friend hears the confidence with
which I write and preach about the human validity of its content and notes that in
a world where things are getting more and more confused and confusing, I am
joining ‘them’! I’ve enlisted in the growing ranks of the certain in an increasingly
uncertain world. And he’s probably right. Yet I believe the upholding grace picks
up a nature now more in tune with it. God makes more human sense to me than
ever before, especially when I invoke Girard’s tour de force, the crucifixion of
Jesus, his scapegoating as the climax of the human story? He points out to me that
Mary Douglas, another world-class anthropologist and a Catholic, gets furious at
Girard. However, of its nature an argument between two people on an issue of
crucial import them into their heads, and the head easily becomes the echo­
chamber of anger.

What hope is there for ‘the turn to the body’ when Nietzsche is thinking about
Wagner? The very matter of contention, Wagner’s alleged infidelity to its
Dionysiac claims, is the body. This makes not a scrap of difference to what goes
on inside that brilliant brain.

Still, if I am interpreting the upholding power as telling me how right I am, Oh
boy, am I in for trouble. Our age has to learn to hear Dylan’s ‘With God on our
side’ in a quite new, and very disturbing way. The human switch from God the
great Fixer to God the one fixed by us on our cross is still trying to be made. The
historic pivot of Messiahship is the role chosen by Jesus to be failed in, thus
showing us our violence.

I am teased by the ambiguity involved in making much more conscious
Eliot’s ‘the point of intersection of the timeless with time.’ The two priests who
have been spreading this method for thirty years as Biospirituality became very
excited, when in their first conversation with the still unknown psychiatrist,
Eugene Gendlin, one of them asked, ‘If we follow your method, are the results
certain?’ The reply came, ‘No, it’s what you guys call grace!’ That is when they
saw they were tapping the point of intersection: grace, the unknown, the
wayward, the totally unpredictable hinted at by chaos theory, and the only-too-known, the screwed-up psyche, yours and mine.

The supernatural 'Catch 22' in getting into Focusing and making it a regular practice is that I am feeling upheld in my newly awakened body. But the upholding power is terrifying: it held Therese of Lisieux in a darkness only entered, according to one biographer, by Nietzsche. That the outcome is a shower of roses only adds to the confusion. Indeed, one effect of the kind of awaking I am trying to convey is that one finds oneself in a relationship with phenomena of the Medjugorje type which is more and more ambiguous; the very ambiguity is built somehow into the substance. It's as though the unknown were saying to us, 'Look, if you can't be tossed and rolled around like a ball at this time, you're lost.' Gil Bailie makes this point in his interpretation of 'To him that hath shall be given.' He says that in a time of total transition, the one who boldly picks up on the new possibilities that are emerging will grow into the new age, whereas the one who doesn't 'have' this extra risk-willingness but 'has' only the tried and true rules of the old age, will lose even these as the world they belong to falls away.
In the eleventh place, transcendental method offers a key to unified science.... Through the self-knowledge, the self-appropriation, the self-possession that result from making explicit the basic normative pattern of the recurrent and related operations of human cognitional process, it becomes possible to envisage a future in which all workers in all fields can find in transcendental method common norms, foundations, systematics, and common critical, dialectical, and heuristic procedures.


As Bernard Lonergan himself suggested, the method he conceived for theology can and should be generalized into a methodology for all of the arts and sciences. It can be, for two reasons. First, Lonergan developed his conception of transcendental method in reaction to some of the achievements of the arts and sciences: the achievements of the natural sciences and mathematics in *Insight*; the achievements of history and the human sciences in *Method in Theology*. Second, transcendental method, by its very nature as well as in Lonergan’s conception of it, is inherently fundamental and comprehensive, based as it is upon a set of conversions-intellectual, moral, and religious-that provides a foundation for every aspect of human behavior, the arts as well as the sciences, common sense as well as theory, action as well as thought. And if Lonergan’s conception of transcendental method can thus be generalized, it should be, for the sake of theology as well as for the sake of the other liberal arts. Such a generalization would, at the least, free theology from the risk of being considered an intellectual ghetto, walled off by its own peculiar methodology from the other disciplines of the academy, all of which enjoy the legitimacy of their own autonomous methodologies. More importantly, it would provide a sound and common framework for liberal education, no matter how narrowly or broadly it might be conceived—whether as Catholic, Christian, religious, or humanistic; whether as American, Western, or multicultural.
Yet it should not be expected that a generalization of Lonergan’s methodology from theology to all of the arts and sciences could be accomplished without a concomitant transformation of it to incorporate the achievements of the other liberal arts and to correspond to the inclusiveness of liberal education. In addition, any attempt to generalize transcendental method must take cognizance of the changes in the intellectual climate, in Catholic education as well as in the larger society, in the twenty-seven years since Lonergan published *Method in Theology*. The adaptation of Lonergan’s conception of transcendental method to all of the arts and sciences is not, therefore, simply a matter of expanding his eight functional specialties to embrace other fields of research and additional academic departments. It demands a reconception of the meaning and function of transcendental method.

The components of what I think such a reconception entails are four. The first is a reconception of dialectic to include a critique of modern culture, in addition to a modified version of the elements of personal conversion. The second is a reconception of foundations to appropriate categories from the arts and sciences to be used as ideal types in a construction of world history. The third is an analysis of the implications of this reconception of transcendental method for the concept of religion and the function of theology. The final point will be to review the status of transcendental method in light of its expanded application to the entirety of liberal education.

**DIALECTIC AS HORIZON ANALYSIS**

To generalize Lonergan’s transcendental method to include all of the arts and sciences we need to revise his conception of dialectic, first, by reconstructing his notion of personal conversion and, then, by complementing it with a critique of modern culture. In *Method in Theology*, Lonergan presents dialectic to be the functional specialty by which a theologian comes to recognize the set of personal conversions—intellectual, moral, and religious—necessary to arise above one’s own historicity and achieve full self-transcendence. Against this horizon he says a theologian can then resolve fundamental conflicts in historical interpretation: the ones arising from false philosophies, bias, or personal inauthenticity. The limitation of this conception of dialectic is that it is restricted to theology, and indeed to theology in a modernistic perspective. If transcendental method is to provide a framework for all of the arts and sciences in a postmodernist context,
the scope of dialectic must be broadened to make conversion functional for all academic disciplines and to include a critique of modernity.

Lonergan’s conception of dialectic in *Method in Theology* was perfectly understandable given his own horizon and his purpose in writing the book. Lonergan’s horizon was that of a Roman Catholic Jesuit theologian who sought to modernize Catholic (perhaps Christian) theology so that it could promote the aggiornamento of the Roman Catholic church authorized by the Second Vatican Council. His strategy was to show how theology could be transformed from a theory for the explication of church doctrine in terms of Aquinas’s version of Aristotelian metaphysics into a method for interpreting the meaning of the Christian religion according to the methods of the human sciences. The basis from which Lonergan thought theology could appropriate the methods of the human sciences, while remaining faithful to its mission to communicate the meaning of religion was interiority or intentionality analysis: the process of objectifying the data of consciousness regarding the operations-experience, understanding, judging, and deciding-by which human beings constitute the meanings of their lives. This process showed, Lonergan argued, that to make life meaningful human beings had to undergo a set of conversions-intellectual, moral, and religious—that originated from an culminated in religion: the love of God poured forth in their hearts. In making the meaning of religion the logical first in the construction of theology, Lonergan hoped to restructure theology into a two-phase process by which historical research into the meaning of religion in the past could provide the materials for a communication of the meaning of the Christian religion for the future. At the hinge between the two phases he placed the complementary functional specialties of dialectic and foundations. Dialectic was supposed to show how the set of conversions could resolve any fundamental conflicts in historical research, while foundations would formulate from the horizon determined by conversion the transcultural categories—those general to theology and other academic discipline and those special to theology—that were suitable for the communication of the Christian religion. Under this regime Lonergan thought theology could perform its function of making the Christian religion meaningful in the modern world.

That is a project that is, no doubt, still a work in progress. Yet I would argue that before it can succeed, Lonergan’s conception of horizon analysis must be amended. Even for it to perform its function for theology it must be broadened to allow for the inclusion of the other arts and sciences, and it must do so in a postmodern context. In a postmodern context the basis for incorporating the
achievements of the arts and sciences cannot be interiority exactly, but must be liminality—the threshold between exteriority and interiority, between immanence and transcendence. On this new basis the set of conversions necessary for dialectic to resolve fundamental conflicts of historical interpretation can be reconfigured to become more inclusive. And the analysis of the conversion necessary for self-transcendence can be complemented by a critique of modernity. A dialectic of this kind would lead to foundations capable of formulating categories to interpret the meaning, not just of religion, but of all the basic factors in human existence.

Postmodernity

The historical context for liberal education, inclusive of theology, is no longer modernity but postmodernity. Postmodernity is the era of deconstruction or anti-foundationalism in philosophy and multiculturalism in the sciences. Deconstruction or anti-foundationalism is the denial of the propriety of any metaphysics, even in the Lonerganian sense of an integral heuristic structure for understanding the meaning of being. It is a denial of the assumption that anything can be regarded as self-evidently real or being as such. Immediately, it is the rejection of the modern assumption that it is the self—a transparently self-conscious mind—that is self-evidently being par excellence. This is the postmodern critique of Enlightenment rationalism, the movement originating in Descartes’ constitution of the ego on the basis of the cogito and culminating in Hegel’s phenomenology of Absolute Spirit. But behind the Enlightenment promotion of the self to the status of being as such, postmodernism spies the specter of God. Thus the mediate target of postmodern criticism is medieval theology—Jewish and Muslim, as well as Christian—in its fundamental assumption that being as such is God, first principle and final end of the universe. Yet postmodernism does not stop with a rejection of a transcendent ground for being; it attacks as well the assumption basic to classical philosophy that everything has a natural explanation. Ultimately, it repudiates, therefore, the very basis by which philosophy originally sought to rout mythos with logos: the assumption of a self-evidently intelligible nature. In a word, the Heideggerian critique of metaphysics at the root of postmodernism in philosophy is a rejection of the assumption that any being—nature, God, or the self—is in itself being per se and the paradigm for the existence of every other being.
This is the assumption Heidegger attacked as the definition of the forgetfulness of being he claimed was endemic to all of Western metaphysics after the Pre-Socratics.

But the postmodernism of deconstructionists and neo-pragmatists alike takes Heidegger a step further by arguing that the perennial reliance upon the chimera of a self-evident being to found metaphysics is evidence enough that being is best forgotten because of being utterly meaningless. In postmodernism nothing and only nothing can be taken for granted-in the sense both that the being of no being can be taken as self-evident and that it cannot be assumed there is any determinate meaning to truth or reality. In this context, no academic discipline, let alone theology, can presume to operate on the assumption that the being of any being can be taken for granted.

In the human sciences, postmodernism is the denial of any metanarrative for history in favor of a multiculturalism. From this perspective only regional, partial, and provisional interpretations can be given of history, each from the perspective of the social group for whom it is devised. Instead of regarding fundamental conflicts of interpretation as an obstacle to be overcome in historical research, multiculturalism takes these conflicts as an opportunity to be exploited. Race, gender, and class become the foci for historical research and social criticism within the Western world; dependency theory becomes the medium for defending the Third World against at least Western capitalism, if not the entire southern hemisphere against the capitalist and the socialist economies of the northern hemisphere. Multiculturalism in history and social criticism is, then, the counterpart to deconstruction or anti-foundationalism in philosophy.

**Liminality**

In this context, a common horizon for academic discourse cannot be interiority, any more than it could be exteriority or transcendence. A common horizon for all of the interlocutors in the academy cannot be what some of them choose to reject—the self, nature, or God—but what everyone cannot but accept—the experience of nothingness. This is what is meant by the condition of liminality. Liminality is the threshold on which there is no differentiation between interior and exterior, between immanent and transcendent. It comprises, first of all, the identity of the knower and the known in the act of knowing, a situation Aristotle first noted, and one that Aquinas and then Lonergan took as the key to solving the problem of knowledge. From this perspective the problem was not, as Plato and all subsequent perceptionists supposed, how to bridge a gap between an already
self-conscious in-here subject and an already out-there-now reality, a presumption that only created the dilemma of having to choose between idealism and empiricism. The problem was, rather, how best to understand and then verify within experience the differentiation between the subjective and the objective poles of knowledge, so as to arrive at a critical realism cognizant of the isomorphic structures of the mind and reality. Given this conception of the problem, it is understandable how Lonergan could approve a division of labor in which the sciences took up the task of investigating the objective pole of knowledge—the dimensions of reality, in this interpretation—whereas philosophy retained the prerogative of investigating the subjective pole of knowledge—the human mind.

Liminality includes, second, the human predicament of desiring to know the meaning of being from the data of experience. Wonder about the meaning of being was what Aristotle claimed was the inspiration for the development of all of human knowledge, including common sense, the arts and sciences, and wisdom itself. Aquinas said this wonder amounted to a natural desire for the beatific vision. Lonergan reinterpreted it as the unmitigated desire to know, which he said had being as its object. Hence, rather than facing the Hobson’s choice of either positivism or fideism, liminality takes the differentiation of the immanent and the transcendent as something to be demonstrated by reflection upon the contrast between the origin of knowledge in the data of experience and the goal of knowledge to know the meaning of being. In liminality, therefore, the tradition from Aristotle to Aquinas to Lonergan already anticipated the postmodern rejection of metaphysics in the name of the experience of nothingness.

**Exterior Dialectic**

From the viewpoint of liminality, the dialectic for attaining a horizon of personal authenticity must have an exterior as well as an interior component. The concreteness of the personal subject’s compresence with others in the world, acknowledged as vigorously by Lonergan as by Heidegger, implies that self-transcendence cannot be achieved by interior conversion alone, but must also include a critique of the milieu. The possibility of framing a set of transcultural categories for a realistic interpretation of world history depends, therefore, as much upon a critique of modernity as upon the appropriation of rational self-consciousness.

The interior dialectic is what Lonergan analyzed in *Method in Theology* under the concept of conversion. The set of conversions he thought necessary to attain
complete self-transcendence were intellectual, moral, and religious. Although Lonergan did distinguish between the definition and the actuality of self-transcendence, his definition of self-transcendence would restrict the authentic performance of theology to mystics who had adopted a philosophy of critical realism and an ethic of existential value formation. Instead of imposing this greatest upper limit upon all scholars and scientists, I would suggest finding the lowest common denominator at which academic discourse becomes possible. A step in that direction would, I suggest, be a reconfiguration of conversion into pragmatic, aesthetic, rational, and ontological components. This reconfiguration of conversion corresponds to aspects of Lonergan’s own thought while it would allow for a broader conception of self-transcendence.

Pragmatic Conversion

Pragmatic conversion is the term I would use for Lonergan’s intellectual conversion applied to common sense. Common sense in Lonergan’s terms is, of course, the concrete spontaneous, practical, informal, and open-ended effort to make sense of the world for the sake of solving personal and social problems, reaching responsible decisions, an acting effectively. But common sense is, as we know, notoriously uncommon; it is an achievement rather than a given. Much more common, as Lonergan noted, is individual bias: the phony pragmatism in which egoism short-circuits intelligence in the pursuit of self-interest, to the disregard of social reciprocity. Narrow-minded, short-sighted, self-centered egoism can be transcended only by a pragmatic conversion in which we come to understand not only how we can use the things that interest us but also how they are in themselves. Critical realism, in this sense, is necessary both for private negotiations and for scholarly pursuits. It is to be found in the self-corrective process of learning Lonergan has shown is characteristic of the scholarship developed in the functional specialties of interpretation and history. Objectivity in either specialty is the fruit not of an intuition into preconstituted facts but of a pursuit of questions until the answers coalesce into the best available opinion. Pragmatism in this sense is precisely what Lonergan acknowledges is the source of the autonomy of the natural and the human sciences. From this perspective critical realism would not immediately be the philosophical position opposed to the counter-positions of empiricism and idealism but rather the personal achievement later to be thematized in the philosophical position.
Aesthetic Conversion
An aesthetic conversion must also be an ingredient in the achievement of personal authenticity. If a pragmatic conversion is a recognition of the conditions necessary for making sense of experience, an aesthetic conversion is a recognition of the power of imagination to achieve insight into experience. On this point, Plato’s use of a model the Meno to try to demonstrate that learning was actually recollection only went to prove the contrary. It became the catalyst for the tradition from Aristotle to Aquinas to Lonergan to insist that learning arose rather from the use of the imagination to produce models for gaining an insight into the meaning of experience. That is a lesson that even today, forty-two years after the publication of Lonergan’s Insight, remains to be learned by the majority of the philosophical community. With the rare exception—Dilthey, Husserl, Langer, Goodman come to mind—philosophers remain virtually unanimous in the belief that the genesis of knowledge is either a mystery, perhaps to be explored by psychologists, or else a function of informal logic, a category inclusive of scientific method. Literary and art critics, however, recognize the value of the imagination for devising and divining the truth of what Lonergan has called the dramatic development of the human subject. Art as the objectification of symbolic patterns of experience converts the factual into the paradigmatic. Folklore, mythology, and fiction, totems and statues and paintings, architecture and landscape, all are testimony to the power of artistic creativity for revealing both the inner secrets and the outer contours, both the individual genius and the social expressiveness, of human intersubjectivity. Only an aesthetic conversion enables one to recognize and to utilize the role of symbol and art in the genesis of meaning.

Rational Conversion
To recognize the nature of meaning itself a rational conversion is necessary. By rational conversion I mean the self-conscious achievement of what Lonergan divided into intellectual and moral conversion. The self-transcendence to be achieved through critical realism has, I believe, both a theoretical and a practical dimension. In the theoretical dimension it is the explicit adoption of objectivity as a pursuit of a virtually unconditioned judgment about the differentiation between the subjective and the objective poles of the initial identity of knower and known in the act of knowing. This is the philosophical position opposed to the counter-position of perceptionism in the guise of either empiricism or idealism. The practical counterpart is the development of conscience as a recognition of one’s
personal responsibility for acting upon decisions taken in light of judgments of value. This is the position opposed to the counter-position of heteronomy in the guise of either deontology or teleology. In essence, rational conversion is a recognition that it is up to each of us to determine for ourselves, from our own inner resources, what we can know about both the world and ourselves and in either case what we ought to do about it. Through a rational conversion we become capable of appreciating and appropriating Lonergan’s conception of the meaning of meaning, in all its elements and functions, in all its realms and stages. That provides a personal horizon transcending both the specious objectivity of a classical metaphysics grounded in empiricism and the solipsistic subjectivity of the kind of transcendental method characteristic of rationalism.

**Ontological Conversion**

The final conversion necessary for personal authenticity I would call ontological. I say ‘ontological’ rather than ‘religious’ for two reasons. First, I think it is question-begging to call the conversion to the meaning of being religious except within the context of theology, the only discipline in which the ultimacy of religion is an *a priori*. Second, Lonergan himself differentiates, even within a theological context, between the implicit love of God operative in the self-transcendence of commitment to the meaningfulness of being and the explicit love of God found in religious belief and religious judgments of value. Hence, I think it is necessary to ground liberal education in a global context in an open-ended conception of the conversion to the meaningfulness of being.

For this option there is considerable support in the tradition from which Lonergan comes. In the *Metaphysics*, Aristotle shows how wonder seeks the wisdom of knowing the first principle of being and the final end of knowledge before he attempts to demonstrate that there is such a being in the person of the First Unmoved Mover, whose nature is to be the understanding of understanding. In the *Summa Theologiae*, St. Thomas Aquinas supposes it is logically necessary to demonstrate the possibility of a first cause of being to correspond to the innate human desire to understand the meaning of being before either demonstrating from experience that such a being actually exists and can legitimately be called God or explaining the conditions under which a person, through the grace of God, converts from a life of sin to the love of God above all things. In *Insight* Lonergan clarifies the meaning of being as the object of the pure desire to know, and frames a congruent metaphysics and ethics, before dealing with the issue of the transcendent knowledge necessary to know God, and only in *Method in Theology*...
does he explicate the nature of religious conversion as the experience of being overwhelmed by the love of God.

The procedure, in each case, of establishing the meaning of being as the object of the desire to know before attempting to demonstrate the nature and existence of the object of the desire illustrates Heidegger’s contention that to the extent Western metaphysics has simply presumed the self-evident being of some being it has been implicitly an oblivion of being. At the same time, this thumbnail sketch of ontology shows that Aristotle, Aquinas, and Lonergan, at least, are innocent of Heidegger’s charge. Ontological conversion is necessary, therefore, to escape the dilemma of either metaphysics, in the sense of a presumption that some being is being as such, or deconstruction, in the sense of a presumption that being is meaningless as such.

This reconfiguration of the elements of conversion retains the possibility for dialectic to resolve fundamental conflicts of historical research without restricting the discourse to theology. It also correlates the elements of conversion with the realms of meaning. It corresponds better to what Lonergan had to say in Method about the achievements of interpretation and history and what he had to say in Insight about the centrality of imagination to understanding. Finally, it serves to join theology with the other academic disciplines in a common pursuit of the meaning of being.

Critique of Modernity
For dialectic to be complete, the interior dialectic of conversion must be complemented by the exterior dialectic of a critique of modernity. To prepare for a realistic encounter with world history, the self-presumption of the modern Western world to be the culmination of world history and thus the peak of human perfection can hardly be taken for granted. In fact, it has been evident for some time that we are coming to the end of the modern era and the beginning of the future. Two world wars, the Great Depression, totalitarianism and terrorism, outbreaks of genocide, thermonuclear warfare, the pollution and depletion of natural resources, global warming, all are signs of the exhaustion of modernity. At the same time, radically new possibilities are coming to realization: revolutions in science and technology; the globalization of commerce and culture; civil rights movements in Western nations accompanied by the de-colonialization of Asian and African nations; the breakup of the Soviet Union, the liberation of Eastern Europe, and the groundswell of change in China; the emergence of a polycentric international polity; space exploration; instantaneous global
intercommunication via satellite television and the Internet. Clearly, this is a time of crisis, a time of judgment for modernity. The possibility of creating a humane future depends upon learning from the malfunctions of modernity why the most advanced culture in the world history failed to provide a definitive realization of the human good.

Modernization may be conceived of as a complex process of capitalist industrialization, humanism, liberal democracy, and secularization. Each facet has contributed to the excellence of modern Western culture while it has also generated problems of its own, to which agents of change have responded with proposals for the future. The critique of modernity is, then, an analysis of how modernization has precipitated its own end by provoking reactions from within to the unintended side-effects of its successes.

The industrial revolution promised an economy that would simultaneously end work and need by harnessing the forces of nature to produce every desirable commodity. While it has created wealth for some, it has driven the many into poverty, as it has also depleted and polluted the natural resources upon which it depends. The unintended consequence has been, as Marx argued, alienation: alienation between human needs and natural resources, between human abilities and human achievements, and between classes of human beings. It is only common sense to recognize that human adaptation to nature requires a sustainable economy and social justice. These have been the goals of socialism and environmentalism.

In its Renaissance, Enlightenment, and Romantic phases, humanism promised an end to alienation in a culture made in the image and likeness of man. While it created an art and a literature, a cityscape and a landscape, of unprecedented and unparalleled beauty, it rests upon the presumption of a white, adult, male, heterosexual, aristocratic paradigm of human identity, a paradigm demeaning to people of color, to children and the elderly, to women, to homosexuals, to the working-classes and the poor. The unintended consequence of humanism has been, to use Freud’s term, anxiety: not just the anxiety of all those humanity has remained unrecognized, but the anxiety as well of those who have recognized the tendentiousness of their exclusive claim to humanity. The dramatic development of human identity must evidently be polymorphic, pluralistic, and inclusive. This has been the goal of civil rights movements, feminism, and multiculturalism.

Liberal democracy promised a nation state protective of the rights of its citizens, regardless of their race, religion, gender, age, or class. While it has generally been the motivation for nations to assure justice and peace for the
majority at home, it has nevertheless allowed for the neglect at home of minority rights (both indigenous and immigrant) and for engagement in war and imperialism abroad. The consequence has been domestic anomie and international anarchy. It is only rational to assume that peace and justice require a commitment to a common set of values within and between nations. This has been the goal of, again, civil rights movements, and of the peace movement, communitarianism, and world government as well.

With the displacement of religion by science, secularization promised a world free of superstition and oppression. Not only has science fostered the technology necessary for industry, enhanced the humanities with the human sciences, and transformed political philosophy into political science, it constitutes a new worldview generated from what Edmund O. Wilson has dubbed the “consilience” of cosmology, sociobiology, and cognitive science. Yet science has also enabled the invention of weapons of mass destruction, facilitated the manipulation of public opinion, and eroded the sense of individual human responsibility crucial for comity. In reducing explanation to experimentation it has authorized not just a forgetfulness, but an amnesia, about being. It is only human though, to ask the ontological question: to wonder about the meaning of being. That is why in this most secular of ages there have appeared, from one direction, what has been called “the revenge of God”—the upsurge of fundamentalism in Judaism Christianity, and Islam—and, from another, the proliferation of new age religions blending Eastern religions with old-fashioned self-help remedies.

A critique of modernity, therefore, complements a dialectic of conversion. A pragmatic conversion assures the common sense necessary to expect a sustainable economy and social justice. An aesthetic conversion requires a dramatic development of human identity that is polymorphous and inclusive. A rational conversion inspires a pursuit of peace and justice at home and abroad. An ontological conversion subordinates science to wisdom. The result is a postmodern horizon capable of an encounter with the past and an anticipation of the future.
FOUNDATIONS AND GENERAL CATEGORIES

In Lonergan's conception of the development of method, horizon analysis completes dialectic with foundations. Once dialectic becomes capable of resolving fundamental conflicts in historical research through the personal authenticity achieved by conversion, foundations serves to formulate from the viewpoint of personal authenticity the general categories needed to articulate and communicate doctrine. Now Lonergan's immediate concern was a method for theology; mine is a method for the arts and sciences. Lonergan presumed that religious conversion validated religion as the foundation of theology; I presume that ontological conversion validates the quest for the meaning of being as the foundation for the arts and sciences. Lonergan's goal was to enable theology to make religion meaningful in a modern world; my goal is to enable the arts and sciences to make all of the basic factors in human existence meaningful for the future. Thus the task I see for foundations is the broad and complex one Lonergan envisioned for it rather than the narrow and specific one he actually articulated in Method in Theology.

Yet the crisis of modernity and the ambiguity of modern historicism suggest how the task of foundations might be approached. The fourfold crisis of modernity suggests fourfold set of relationships corresponding at once to the set of conversions necessary for self-transcendence and the institutions constitutive of human existence. The ambiguity of historicism as both method and ideology suggests how the myth of progress can be transformed into a sequence of historical eras. Together, the set of basic human institutions and the sequence of historical eras can form the ideal types necessary for a collaborative and open-ended world history.

First, the set of institutions suggested by the crisis of modernity. The alienation precipitated by an economy lacking in social justice and destructive of the environment suggests that the adaptation of human being to nature can succeed only if work is preservative of nature and imposes equal burdens and provides equal benefits for all. The anxiety created by a monolithic culture of white male superiority suggests that the development of human identity through the appropriation of rational self-consciousness must be a possibility for everyone, no matter what their race, gender, or class. The anomie and anarchy bedeviling the polity within and between nations suggests that human
communication presupposes a common set of values, including most notably a commitment to justice and peace. The amnesia about being evident in the secularization of rationality suggests that the attitude of human being before being itself should be one of wonder and worship. In other words, the failures as well as the achievements of modernity reveal an underlying set of exigencies necessary for fulfilling the structure of the human good.

These exigencies are an ambivalent set of basic human relationships. The first is the relationship of human being to nature through work, which if successful results in adaptation, but if not becomes alienation. The second is the relationship between each human being and the self in consciousness, the achievement of which constitutes identity, the failure anxiety. The third is the relationship of human beings communicating with one another in society, the realization of which is rationality, the frustration anomie. The fourth is the relationship through wonder of human being to being itself, positively, in faith and negatively in angst.

On that hypothesis, the structure of the human good can be taken to consist in the set of conversions necessary to meet the demands of the fourfold set of human relationships operative in the institutions of human society. The economy has the commonsense function, then, of enabling the adaptation of human nature to the rest of nature through work. The culture has the aesthetic function of facilitating the development within rational self-consciousness of human identity. The polity has the rational function of assuring peace and justice in the communication among the members of human society. And the value system, comprising in particular religious denominations and educational institutions, has the ontological function of opening and maintaining the faith of human beings in being itself. In the encounter with the past and the approach to the future precipitated by the crisis of modernity, we should then expect every stage and form of history to be a specific mode of seeking the human good through the set of institutions necessary for fulfilling the fourfold set of relationships constitutive of human existence.

**Critique of Historicism**

To this heuristic of the human good derived from the crisis of modernity the complement, I would argue, should be a scheme of history derived from modern historicism. Historicism is both a method and an ideology, and the method must be separated from the ideology before it can be utilized for an authentic encounter with the past. The method is, as Lonergan noted, the German historical school's achievement of turning history into a discipline directed to understanding the past
Method in the Arts and Sciences

‘as it actually was,’ through the exclusive use of the evidence preserved in contemporaneous documents and monuments. Yet, though Ranke himself said every culture “was equally close to God,” historicism is also the ideology that history records the inevitable progress of mankind to the perfection of modern Western culture. This presumption of a single universal metanarrative of progress to modernity is what postmodernism seeks to distinguish from a critical historiography capable of reconstructing the past as it actually was, recognizing the present for what it now is, and anticipating what the future may be.

Historicism as an ideology is what Alan Richardson termed the “Enlightenment myth of progress.” It is embodied first in the by now familiar depiction of Western history as a three-step sequence from the ancient through the medieval to the modern world. In this approach, the ancient world has often been given the benefit of the doubt. If Greco-Roman mythology presents something of a problem for rationalists, the Greeks have nevertheless been credited, particularly in a fifth century Athenian Enlightenment supposedly comparable to that of eighteenth-century Britain, for having founded, or at least for having advanced, the civilization by which Europe has raised itself above the savagery and barbarism besetting much of the rest of the world. Rome, for its part, has been lauded for having incorporated Hellenistic civilization into an empire, acquired, it is true, by conquest, but maintained, it is alleged, through a rule of law guaranteeing the famous pax Romana. The middle ages, by contrast, have generally been an object of scorn. Under the rubric of ‘Dark Ages’ they have been reviled as a reversion to barbarism and superstition: the former because of the barbarian invasions, the latter because of the sway of Christianity. This is the darkness of barbarity and religion, which the Enlightenment is supposed to have banished in the modern world. Reason—in the guise of Protestantism and science, the nation state and the free market, liberalism and democracy, independent universities and autonomous academic disciplines—is what historicism credits with having inaugurated the modern era and brought Western peoples to maturity.

When modern historians have expanded their horizon from the West to the world, the metanarrative has remained basically the same. Whether they have taken Comte or Hegel as their guide, they have still represented world history as the story of the progress of humankind to the triumph of modern Western civilization. Thanks to the reports first of explorers and missionaries and later of ethnographers and government officials, they have been able to add to the saga of progress the stage of primitive culture, lower and earlier than classical civilization. The discovery of the cities and the sacred books of India and China
has induced them to add the high cultures of both of these regions to the stage of classical civilization first confined to Greece and Rome, and later traced to Mesopotamia and Egypt as well. There have been dissidents, it is true, to this ideology of progress. On the right, Catholics, conservatives, and Romantics, who rejected progress as a myth, while they have called for a restoration of medieval values and institutions in the West. On the left, Marxists had no trouble with the ideology of progress, and have advocated a world revolution to continue the path of progress by adding a stage of global communism to the course of history. Yet the consensus remains among modern historians that history, in the world at large as well as the West, has been a story of humanity’s progress to the peak of perfection in modernity.

Today this ideology of historicism seems quaint, but that should not be allowed to impugn the methodology of historicism, which in fact is the best means to undermine the ideology. The sciences, natural as well as human, which have been devised in the modern Western world to discover, understand, and explain the course of history, first in the West and then in the rest of the world, remain viable means to situate the crisis of modernity within a scheme of the stages of meaning. This scheme would not follow Lonergan’s lead in correlating the stages of meaning in world history with his own conception of the realms of meaning. That hermeneutic is too private to gain consensus and too simple to correspond to the complexity of history. No, the way to go is to adopt the methodologies invented by modern arts and sciences to elucidate at once the stages of world history and the strata of modern society. This strategy is recommended by Lonergan’s own recognition of the autonomy achieved by the natural and the human sciences in developing self-regulating procedures of research and interpretation. A common adoption of the methodologies of the arts and sciences integrates them into a concerted effort to comprehend world history and facilitates interdisciplinary communication and collaboration.

The procedure for reaching a common interpretation of world history is to adopt as general categories the same heuristic constructs or ideal types the various arts and sciences have devised for their respective interpretations of world history. These heuristic constructs each reflect at their subjective pole the specific perspective of a set of the arts and sciences and denote at their objective pole what is at once a historical event, a paradigmatic stage of meaning, a basic factor in every form of culture, and a salient ingredient of modern culture. While they have all survived the internal criticism by which the modern arts and sciences have become autonomous disciplines, they have also enabled the postmodern
critique of the ideology of historicism. Together they enable an empirically based, multi-faceted, open-ended interpretation of world history.

These heuristic constructs are seven in number. The boundary concepts, at the beginning and at the end of history, are prehistoric humankind and the future. In between come, first, the successive eras of world history—primitive/primal culture, classical/ancient civilization, city/nation/imperial state, historic/world religion—and, second, the modern era as both the sedimentation, the transformation, and the investigation of these eras. This is not the occasion to analyze these eras in detail. I want to indicate, first, though, how prehistoric humankind and the future exemplifies the characteristics of ideal types as historic breakthroughs, paradigmatic achievements, permanent factors, and ingredients of modern culture. Then I will list the correspondences between various sets of disciplines and the four eras of world history. I will conclude this section with a sketch of the import of this conception of world history for the modern era.

Prehistoric humankind reflects the outlook of the discipline of history in the broadest sense of the term, because human history has to be placed within the larger framework of the history of the universe to correspond to the human desire to know the meaning of being. This construct has both a scientific and a philosophical or theological dimension. Scientifically, prehistoric humankind reflects the successively broader outlooks of paleoanthropology, evolutionary biology, and cosmology. Philosophically and theologically, it reflects the correspondence between anthropology and ontology in determining the meaning of being. In expanding dimensions, the historical breakthroughs to which the heuristic construct corresponds are the origin of humankind, the origin of life on earth, and the origin of the universe. The correlative paradigmatic stage of meaning is the time between the origin of the universe between twelve and fifteen billion years ago, and the appearance of modern humans about thirty to forty thousand years ago. The permanent factor it represents in every form of culture is, of course, the establishment of humanity as the possibility of seeking the meaning of being. The salient dimension prehistoric humankind represents for modern culture is the fundamental historicity not just of modernity but of humanity itself. The inclusion of prehistoric humankind within world history expresses and facilitates the integration of the natural sciences into a comprehensive quest for the meaning of human existence.

At the end of history is the future. From a scientific perspective, the future immediately reflects the outlook of the various forms of future studies but, more generally, those of multicultural studies and interdisciplinary studies of all kinds.
From a philosophical perspective, it reflects the postmodernism initiated perhaps by Nietzsche, made programmatic by Heidegger, and turned into a movement by Lyotard, Foucault, and Derrida. The future began as a distinct period between 1870, when prospects of a technological utopia sparked dreams of a new era of peace and prosperity for all of humankind, and 1945, when future studies began to define itself as a separate academic field. As a paradigmatic stage of meaning, it is the entire time between now and the end of the universe, fraught with all the apocalyptic hopes and fears that each new millennium of the common era seems to ignite. The salience of the future in the modern era is the crisis of modernity in its revelation of the inadequacy of the modern era to provide a definitive fulfillment of the human good.

Between prehistoric humankind and the future, and before the modern era, come the traditional eras and forms of history recognized by the various arts and sciences. These traditional eras and forms are four in number. Primitive or primal culture reflects the outlook, on the one hand, of archaeology and physical anthropology, and on the other, of ethnography and cultural anthropology. Classical or ancient civilization reflects the outlook both of archaeology and the history of civilizations and of the humanities and the human sciences of linguistics, psychology, and sociology. In the forms of city, nation, or empire, the state reflects the outlook of philosophy from one perspective, and of political history and political science from another. Historic or world religion reflects, originally, the outlook of theology and of religious studies (inclusive of the philosophy of religion, the history of religions, and the scientific study of religion) in the modern era. Like prehistoric humankind and the future, each of these eras represents a historic breakthrough, a paradigmatic human achievement or stage of meaning, a permanent factor in every form of culture, and an ingredient of modern culture. As a paradigmatic human achievement or stage of meaning, they each have a distinctive mode of the four institutions—economy, culture, polity, and value system—constitutive of the dynamics of human existence.

On this interpretation of world history the modern era is just another period. It succeeds the traditional forms of culture without, however, being the peak of human progress. Modernity is indeed a complex sedimentation of prehistoric humankind and the traditional forms of culture. It has also been a transformation of the traditional forms of culture. The industrial and democratic revolutions represent the modern approach to the adaptation to nature initiated in primal culture. From the Renaissance to the Romantics, humanism recapitulates the
dramatic development of human identity first highlighted in the myths of ancient civilization. The creation of the nation state is the modern counterpart to the attempted rationalization of the social bond in the city states and the imperial states of yore. Secularization is the modern effort to substitute an immanent foundation of beliefs and values for the transcendent foundation established by the historic religions. Because of these developments in modern culture, the modern arts and sciences have had both the material and the stimulus to investigate the traditional forms of culture. Each of the ideal types is a heuristic construct devised by a set of arts and sciences to understand an aspect of world history in a mode compatible with its outlook.

This is world history from a postmodern foundation. It is not a single metanarrative, but a complex of overlapping narratives, each having its own value. It is not an ideology of progress but a recognition of the determinate value of each form of culture. It does not reify ideal types as if they were preconstituted facts, but rather uses the heuristic constructs of the arts and sciences as perspectives and modes of investigation. It does not confine itself to just one layer of meaning but is open to the multiplicity of meanings revealed by different modes of investigation. It treats modernity not as the peak of progress but as the threshold between the past and the future. It is the composite project of all of the arts and sciences.

THE IMPLICATIONS OF A POSTMODERN PERSPECTIVE FOR RELIGION

This postmodern approach to transcendental method implies an account of religion different from the one Lonergan gives of it in *Method in Theology*. He said himself that his account was Christian; I would say, Catholic. Lonergan did make a gesture toward squaring his account with definitions of religion that Rudolf Otto and Friedrich Heiler claimed are applicable to all world religions. As is clear from the text as much as from his own admission, his account of religion as falling in love with God is a modern version of the traditional Christian doctrine of conversion as the grace of God. While nothing else would have been appropriate to Lonergan’s explicit purpose of establishing a foundation for method within Christian theology, a broader conception of religion is necessary if theology is to be an integral component of religious studies and if the methods of other modes of religious studies are to be compatible with theological method.
The issue of the definition of religion is, no doubt, a perennial controversy among students of religion. Some scholars say no definition of religion is necessary; others that none is possible. None is necessary, some say, because the commonsense notion everyone has of religion is good enough for scholars and scientists to undertake the study of particular aspects of the subject. But others counter that no definition of religion is possible, since a commonsense definition is inadequate for a scientific or a scholarly study and a scientific definition is the asymptotic goal of religious studies. For the most part, though, students of religion agree some definition is both necessary and possible and that an ostensive or a heuristic definition would fill the bill. What such a definition would be, though, is again a matter of dispute. Some say, look it up in the dictionary: that will give the ordinary public meaning of the term. But apart from the multiple definitions of the term the dictionary contains, some think a dictionary definition is too vague and superficial to capture the subtleties and depths of religion. They argue, instead, that a definition should be drawn from the reports mystics have given of religious experience. The last strategy is, of course, the one Lonergan adopted, basing his definition upon his own religious experience.

At any rate, definitions of religion abound, in monographs and in textbooks. Inevitably they reflect the disciplinary biases of their authors. To my mind, the person who has cut through this morass is Wilfred Cantwell Smith, in *The Meaning and End of Religion*, his study of the origin and development of the use of the term ‘religion’ in Western culture and of the propriety of applying the term to non-Western as well as to Western religious traditions. The merit of Smith’s approach is that it has the potentiality for arriving at a public and heuristic definition of religion, exactly the characteristics necessary for a definition of religion that would be acceptable to all religious scholars and useful for the collaborative and comparative study of world religions.

Smith claims that ‘religion’ in modern European languages derives from the Latin ‘religio’ and has no precise counterpart (with one exception, to be mentioned later) in any other linguistic tradition. Originally, the term denoted any sacred bond, from a contract or the demands of filial piety to the respect due to civic officials, preeminently the emperor, and, of course, the obligation of worshipping the gods. Its first application to the attitude or the organization of a group defined by its worship of a god, or of God, was to Christianity, which seemed to have no other defining quality. The reaction of Christians was divided. Some rejected the appellation on the grounds that the defining quality of Christianity was not religion, which they identified with the Roman state religion
of renamed Olympian gods and the divinity of the emperor, but rather faith (pistis or fides), the gift of divine grace by which one worshipped the one true God revealed in his Son, Jesus Christ. Other Christians accepted the term, faute de mieux, and distinguished Christianity as true religion from the Roman state religion as false. The strange thing was that once Christianity became acceptable, then established within Roman empire, and then eventually the universal religion of Christendom, the term ‘religion’ ceased to be used to connote the defining attitude or the distinctive organization of Christianity. It was used instead, as in Aquinas’ Summa Theologiae, to denote the part of the virtue of justice pertaining to the obligation of divine worship or a commitment to a life of the evangelical vows. From the fifth to the fifteenth century, Smith says, not one book was published with ‘religion’ in the title. What we are perhaps inclined to think of as the most religious era in Western, if not world, history seems not to have been especially concerned about religion.

Because of exploration and reformation, however, the term ‘religion’ acquired new life in modern time. It was the term chosen to compare the distinguishing features of Christianity with that of other groups who, if they were not exclusively characterized by their worship of God or gods, still made such worship an integral part of their culture. Judaism and Islam, of course had long been the most appropriate candidates for the designation of religion. Islam in fact had been the first organization or society to be explicitly founded as a religion. Muslims stipulated that the Arabic term ‘dina’ would be the official translation for the Latin ‘religio.’ But the reports missionaries, merchants, and colonizers brought back from Asia, Africa, and the Americas showed that there were analogates to Christianity and, more generally, to the monotheistic religions all over the world. Much to the chagrin of Matteo Ricci and Roberto de Nobili and their Jesuit confreres, the Oriental Rites controversy resulted in Rome’s declaration that Confucianism, on the one hand, and Hinduism, on the other, were indeed religions, in which membership was incompatible with being a Christian. So ‘religion’ became the designation for both an attitude and an organization analogous to Christianity in particular and monotheism in general.

Likewise, ‘religion’ became necessary within Christianity to designate the divisions precipitated out of the unity of Christendom by the Reformation. Like some of the early Christian apologists, Luther preferred ‘faith’ for his own reprimization of evangelical Christianity, reserving the use of ‘religion’ for Roman Catholicism, which he assimilated to the superstition and idolatry of ancient Roman religion. But Calvin, entitling his masterwork Institutes of
Christian Religion, adopted the term. Eventually ‘religion’ became the common term in Reformation and Counter-Reformation polemics for both the attitude of belief in and piety toward God and an organization founded upon such an attitude. Kant, Hegel, and Schleiermacher all contributed to making ‘religion’ the term of choice for Protestant scholars to designate the relationship of humanity to God. By choosing ‘religion’ to denote conversion to God, Lonergan was nudging Catholic theologians toward ecumenical dialogue with their Protestant colleagues.

Meanwhile, though, ‘religion’ had become the term of choice outside ecclesiastical circles for the modern study of what we now cannot help calling religious phenomena. In the Enlightenment, ‘religion’ was a term of abuse, the epitome of everything opposed to ‘reason.’ A bollix of magic and superstition, it was supposed to be a primitive reaction to nature, a charge intended to put Christians on a par with prehistoric hominids and contemporary savages. This was a prevalent attitude among students of religion, whether in philosophy, history, or science, from the seventeenth century to the nineteenth century, and probably into the twentieth century as well. Beginning in the nineteenth century, though, religious studies began to emerge as an independent academic discipline. At this point, the independence has clearly been achieved, and religious studies (comprising philosophy of religion, the history of religions, and the scientific study of religion) operates on the presumption that a descriptive rather than a polemical definition of religion can be given.

For his part, Smith says that the somewhat chaotic development of the term ‘religion’ has left us with “four quite distinct senses” of religion:

First, there is the sense of personal piety.... Secondly and thirdly, there is the usage that refers to an overt system, whether of beliefs, practices, values, or whatever. Such a system has an extension in time, some relation to an area, and is related to a particular community; and is specific. In this sense, the word has a plural and in English the singular has an article.... Finally, there is ‘religion’ as a generic summation, ‘religion in general.’

(Smith 48-49)

Despite being able so neatly to summarize the historical development of ‘religion,’ Smith counsels that the term be abandoned as hopelessly complex and prejudicial in favor of adopting ‘faith’ for a religion’s own self-conception and ‘cumulative tradition’ for religion as the subject of scholarly study.

His suggestion is a non-starter given the common Western use of the term throughout the modern era and the international adoption of the term in the twentieth century. On the assumption that ‘religion’ is the only term eligible for
the comparative study of religion, and that it was up to religious scholars to make
sure it could be used in a public and heuristic sense, the Sixteenth Congress of the
International Association for the History of Religions (held in Rome in 1989)
took as its topic "The Notion of 'Religion' in Comparative Research."

In that spirit, I suggest that a definition of religion which both profits from
Smith's historical study of the development of the term and corresponds to its
contemporary usage among religious scholars might be: Religion is (1) ultimate
concern, in the sense either of faith or piety concerning God or gods or of
commitment to something taken as transcendent or absolute; (2) a consequent set
of beliefs and values, taken either normatively (as an ideal for believers) or
factually (as an empirical phenomenon for scholars); (3) the institution of such a
set of beliefs and values, both in a set of constitutive factors (such as ritual, myth,
doctrine, clergy, art and architecture, organization) and as the form (i.e., church)
or as a subset (i.e., sect) of an entire culture; (4) the set of all such institutions,
taken either historically or theoretically.

This definition reflects the fact that Christianity was the original paradigm of
religion and that 'religion' is predicated of other institutions by analogy. First,
Judaism and Islam, because of a common tradition of monotheism. Then other
salvation movements founded by charismatic leaders comparable to Jesus Christ:
Buddhism and Jainism, for example. By extension, the shamans and rites of
primal culture, the clergy and mythology of ancient civilization, the civil religions
of Athens and Rome, of India, China, and Japan. Finally, modern secular
institutions, like science, nationalism, socialism, which require of their members
an absolute commitment, as well as the 'new religions' which synthesize exotic
spiritual traditions with familiar self-help methods. In the expansion of the
definition of religion from its original paradigm to this vast array of institutions a
feedback loop enriches the connotation of the definition with the features from its
new applications.

At the same time, an ideal type can be constructed for religion by attempting
to derive its modal economic, cultural, social, and valuative characteristics from
the original paradigm and the most immediate analogates. Economically, religion
seems to have been characterized by an appeal for the dispossessed and the
outcasts of society. Whether the sense of deprivation is absolute or relative,
religion has arisen from the conviction that justice cannot be achieved without
either the grace of God, harmony with nature, or tapping the forces of history.
Culturally, religion has been distinguished by a revelation or enlightenment
mediated to its adherents by a charismatic founder. A band of disciples transmits
an oral or written tradition of the founder’s words and deeds. Socially, a religion can be either a sect of born-again elite separated for the masses of an entire society from the world or a church. In either case, it is divided into a ministry entrusted with its preservation and a laity exemplifying its norms in their personal and professional lives. It is in its values, however, that religion is unique: it rejects the ultimacy of any other form of culture, indeed the ultimacy of a ordinary human existence. For traditional religions, world-rejection is the counterpart of faith in another world, beyond death, where communion is achieved with God or another form of ultimacy. For the secular religions of the modern world, world-rejection is the function of a commitment to a utopian but still mundane form of human perfection. As an ideal type, this heuristic construct would have to be adjusted to accommodate the facts that it helped to uncover as a tool of research.

This is a conception of religion I think should be acceptable throughout the academy since it is a derivative of the work of the entire academy. While it derives from the separate disciplinary paths within religious studies, it can in the future serve as the foundation for interdisciplinary research into religion.

THE ROLE OF TRANSCENDENTAL METHOD IN LIBERAL EDUCATION

The expansion of transcendental method from theology to the entirety of liberal education has a number of important implications. First, transcendental method is, as Bernard Lonergan has said, a personal experiment—an “experiment in truth,” to borrow the Gandhian term. The genius of Lonergan was to have exemplified the fact that the quest for truth is the development of personal authenticity. There are hardly any more intimate passages in modern academic writing than Lonergan’s analysis of religious conversion in Method in Theology. He revealed himself as who he was to demonstrate how transcendental method is a spiritual exercise rather than an intellectual artifice. To every theologian he showed that there is no way to perform one’s professional function without attempting to achieve personal authenticity. It is a tension everyone in the academy has to learn, no matter what one’s field or discipline. The only way to resolve fundamental conflicts of interpretation is, as Lonergan said, through a common effort to achieve self-transcendence.

Still, for transcendental method to fulfill Lonergan’s intention of unifying the arts and sciences, I believe it should be modified in the ways I have suggested.
The base should be designated as liminality rather than interiority because the subject of the exercise is not a Cartesian *cogito* but a Thomist *mens*. The dialectic should have an exterior as well as an interior component—a critique of the subject's historicity as well as a set of conversions to self-transcendence—because the subject is not a disembodied ego but a concrete individual. The set of conversions should be reconfigured both to correspond to the realms of meaning and to be open to the complete spectrum of human subjects: intellectual conversion should be regarded as pragmatic in nature; an aesthetic conversion should be added; rational conversion should be given both a theoretical and a practical component; and religious conversion should be divided between an ontological conversion consisting in a commitment to the meaningfulness of being and the properly religious conversion of falling in love with God. In foundations the general categories for the stages of meaning should not be the realms of meaning as such, but the heuristic constructs developed by the modern arts and sciences for both historical research and social criticism. In the case of religion, this means defining religion not on the basis of religious experience but in terms of the development of religious studies.

Finally, dialectic has to be a means of resolving basic conflict without becoming a refutation of every alternative position. For Aristotle, dialectic was a way to winnow what could be gathered from the state of opinion in a field so as to save as much of it as further research could validate. For Aquinas, the arguments pro and con for a thesis contained elements of the thesis itself. For Lonergan, though, the history of philosophy, ancient and modern, seems to have been little but a series of counter-positions to be refuted from the ramparts of his own position. The appreciation he showed for the achievements of scientists and scholars disappeared when he confronted other philosophers.

If Lonergan's work is to gain the hearing it deserves, it will be incumbent upon those of us who have profited from it to demonstrate its affinities and affiliations with the work of other philosophers. A number of Lonergan's students have already shown us the way. But the task cannot be accomplished simply on an ad hoc basis, philosopher by philosopher. We must develop a kinder, gentler version of dialectic, one whose intent is not just to refute what is false in alternative positions but also to appreciate what is true about them. Only in that way, I believe, will Lonergan's method be enriched by the insights of philosophers from other traditions, and philosophers from other traditions be encouraged to benefit from Lonergan's insights.
KANT’S THEORY OF KNOWLEDGE

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In this paper I will give an overall view of Kant’s Critique of Pure Reason.¹ For many years I have been wrestling with this major philosophical work and I have published the results in several articles and some books;² here I shall concentrate on a few points, which in my opinion bear on Kant’s whole doctrine on knowing and consequently on his conception of being. Wishing to play fair I make clear from the very beginning that I have tackled Kant’s thought from an Aristotelian-Thomist viewpoint. How much my understanding of Kant’s Critique is indebted to my teacher at Rome’s Gregorian University, Bernard Lonergan, will be quite plain to everyone who has some acquaintance with Lonergan’s thought.

I will treat the following points: 1) How Kant’s Critique of Pure Reason arose, 2) the structure of the book, 3) its epistemological and metaphysical core, 4) the alternative position of Lonergan.

I. THE DEVELOPMENT
OF KANT’S CRITIQUE OF PURE REASON

The KrV had a long gestation. The Dissertation of 1770 (“De mundi sensibilis atque intelligibilis forma et principiis”) is seen as marking the beginning of the so-called “critical period” of Kant. In it Kant still maintained a realistic position on the understanding (intellectus): with its “conceptus intellectuales,” which are a

¹ In the course of the paper I will refer to it with the abbreviation of the German title: KrV = Kritik der reinen Vernunft. “A” or “B” without any other mention respectively means the first (1781) or the second (1787) edition; the numbers following “A” or “B” refer to the page(s) of these original editions.

priori and correspond approximately to the future categories of the KrV, our understanding is able to know things as they are ("sicuti sunt"). On the other hand he gave up the realistic position on sensibility. Our sensibility is endowed with two a priori forms, space and time, which constitute the form of the sensible world as we know it, since everything which affects our senses cannot be known by us except under these forms. Consequently Kant maintained that these two forms or pure intuitions are very true concepts ("conceptus verissimi"), although what they mediate to us are only appearances: things "uti apparent."

We have here for the first time an anthropological interpretation of truth and reality, and thereby the transition from a correspondence-theory of truth to a consensus-theory of truth. Truth is no longer conceived as a knowledge which corresponds to reality as it is in itself; truth is a knowledge about which all people agree. Thereby we have already in this early writing of Kant the main element of the so-called "critical" epistemology and metaphysics.

The explicit posing of the problem, which eventually in 1781 led to the Critique of Pure Reason, took place on the date of February 21st, 1772. On this date Kant sent a letter to his former pupil Marcus Herz in which he posed the question with which he would wrestle up to the end of 1780: "On what foundation is the relation of that in us which we call representation [Vorstellung] to the object based?" More precisely, the question concerned the conceptus intellectuales, of which Kant had spoken in the Dissertation as the means by which we come to know things as they are. How is it possible that these concepts, which have their source "in the nature of our soul," agree with things without being themselves acquired from experience (they are in fact a priori concepts) and without being themselves the causes of the things, since our intellect does not create reality?

You see the two presuppositions of the question out of which the KrV was to be born: 1) A realistic conception of human knowledge. We know objects, which Kant at this time assumes to transcend the subject, as independent in their being from the subject. 2) A rationalistic presupposition: we are in possession of a priori concepts (or principles, or straightforward knowledge—on this point rationalism is rather vague), since out of experience we can gain for ourselves no universal and necessary knowledge (B 4). Incidentally, you see here how completely was oblivious to the act of insight into the concrete, namely of the source of universal concepts.

This problem, out of which the KrV developed, has been called by Hans Vaihinger the "antithetic problem," for the problem is "that we are capable of
making valid a priori statements about objects that are nonetheless independent of us."

The solution, which Kant found after years of reflection, consisted simply in the rejection of the realistic presupposition that lay behind the question as it was raised in 1772: "Objects known a priori are not objects in themselves, but things as they appear to us; they are precisely not independent of us, but conform to our understanding, which is the 'author of experience' (B 127)."³

Such a solution is evidently an extension of the principle by which Kant in the Dissertation had maintained that space and time are a priori forms of our sensibility and nevertheless are objectively valid, since they are constitutive principles of the reality which we know. Time and space are true representations because they hold for all men.

In the same way the pure concepts of understanding are true, are objectively valid, because they constitute (they are the intelligible components of) the objects which we can know as universal and necessary objects—the objects of natural science (the mechanics of Newton), which Kant intended to explain.

The so-explained objectivity of our knowledge was appropriately named in 1792 by a certain Selle "subjective objectivity."⁴ Truly objective is that which holds for all human beings. This solution was worked out in the section of the Transcendental Analytic which is entitled “Transcendental Deduction of the Pure Concepts of Understanding”—the real kernel of the KrV, insofar as one sees in the foundation of transcendental idealism the all-embracing purpose of Kant’s first Critique. This interpretation was upheld especially by the Neo-Kantians of the Marburg-School (Hermann Cohen, Paul Natorp), but in fact it is a very one-sided interpretation.

³ Hans Vaihinger, Kommentar zu Kant's Kritik der reinen Vernunft, Vol I, 1881, p. 394. In the “Summary Representation of the Correctness of this Deduction of the pure Concepts of Understanding” we find a very clear formulation of this idealistic solution of the antithetic problem: “If the objects with which our knowledge has to deal were things in themselves, we would have no a priori concepts of them. From what source could we obtain these concepts? ... But if, on the other hand, we have to deal only with appearances, it is not merely possible, but necessary, that certain a priori concepts should precede empirical knowledge of objects. For since a mere modification of our sensibility can never be met outside us, the objects, as appearances, constitute an object which is merely in us” (A 128 f).
II. THE STRUCTURE OF THE CRITIQUE OF PURE REASON

A few words will be sufficient on the structure of Kant's first Critique. Its three parts—Aesthetic, Analytic and Dialectic—all three qualified as "transcendental"—are conceived as three steps of a transcendental philosophy in the sense of one system of a priori principles of knowledge. Such principles are: the two intuitions of sensibility in the Aesthetic, the twelve categories of understanding in the Analytic, and the three ideas of reason in the Dialectic.

The Transcendental Aesthetic works out our sense-knowledge on the same line as the Dissertation of 1770.

The Transcendental Analytic is mainly dedicated to the solution of the problem Kant posed in his letter to Marcus Herz, namely, explaining how we can have a universal and necessary and therefore, according to Kant, a priori knowledge of objects. The argument that Kant gives in the section entitled "Transcendental Deduction of the Pure Concepts of Understanding" can undoubtedly be shown to be without unity and coherence. In fact it is a collection of different attempts at different times to solve the problem of how concepts a priori can agree with the objects we come to know, whereby the objects are not supposed to depend in their being on the subject. This explains how it is possible that every year in German universities several dissertations are written on this part of the KrV, in a Tantalus' labor to find a unitary argumentation in a piece that has none.

But the outcome of the "Transcendental Deduction" is quite clear: we can have an a priori knowledge of the intelligibility of nature because we ourselves are, by means of the pure concepts of understanding and of the synthetic principles of pure understanding, "the author of the experience in which...objects are found" (B 127). Exactly this thetic way of knowing on the part of the understanding together with the pure intuitions of sense makes up the foundation of Kant's transcendental idealism, which maintains the object-constitutive role of these a priori principles of knowledge.

Whereas the Transcendental Analytic has worked out the new critical ontology, the ontology of being as appearance, the following Transcendental Dialectic is devoted to the critique of the traditional metaphysica specialis. It is up to the Dialectic to demonstrate that Psychology as the science of the human
subject, Cosmology as the science of the world in its totality and structure, and Theology as the rational knowledge of God, have no objective validity.

The trouble with this part of the Critique, which follows the foundation of the Transcendental Idealism in the Aesthetic and Analytic, is that Kant in the sixties had already elaborated his critique of the *metaphysica specialis* on a realistic basis and without any recourse to transcendental idealism. In this part of the KrV he takes up his pre-critical critique again, almost without changes in the case of theology, and with some changes and updates for psychology and cosmology.

Now in the Introduction and in Book I of the *Transcendental Dialectic* Kant deduces from the three forms of syllogism the three transcendental ideas of soul (human subject), world, and God as three a priori ideas, and then in Book II he works out his examination of traditional metaphysics. The structure of the Dialectic itself and its position as the last part of the three-step transcendental philosophy, suggest that this examination and critique are the consequence of the transcendental idealism of the Aesthetic and Analytic. But in fact this is not the case; the critique is not done on an idealistic basis. Therefore the reader is led to approach this part of the KrV under a totally inappropriate perspective.

### III. THE EPISTEMOLOGICAL AND METAPHYSICAL CORE

#### 1. The Critique of Pure Reason and German Idealism

I have shown how the KrV arose, and then its structure and contents. If now I want to examine the epistemological and metaphysical core of this main work of Kant, it would seem that the topic to be treated should be the transcendental idealism of the KrV which follows from its doctrine on the forms of sensibility and on the categories of understanding. This conclusion is only partially right. Kant is considered to have been the initiator of that extraordinary movement known as German Idealism. Kant, Fichte, Schelling and Hegel are the thinkers of this philosophical world-view, whose influence lasts even after the movement as such came to an end. But Kant did not at all see his own work in this way.
The first reviewer of the KrV had classified it as "a system of transcendental idealism." This judgment elicited a prompt correction from Kant: The purpose of the transcendental idealism is "merely to make intelligible the possibility of our a priori knowledge of the objects of experience." That means that the idealism is the only possible way of explaining how we can have a science of nature. Consequently "it [the idealism] by no means makes up the soul of the system," it is rather "the sole means of solving the above problem," namely of explaining the possibility of an a priori synthetic knowledge.

Some years later, in 1799, Kant wrote a public declaration about Fichte's Wissenschaftslehre, which had attempted to work out a fully coherent idealism and therefore had eliminated the "Ding an sich" as an uncritical remnant of dogmatic realism. In this declaration Kant maintained with extreme decisiveness that he had never thought of making the human subject the source of reality.

In fact, if idealism is prominent in the KrV insofar as Kant found no other means to explain our scientific knowledge (Newtonian mechanics), there is no less evident a realistic layer (in the sense of a naive realism) underlying the same work.

2. Knowing as a composition of intuition and thought

In the Introduction to the second edition of the KrV we read: "There is no doubt that all our knowledge begins with experience. For how should our faculty of knowledge be awakened into action did not objects affecting our senses partly of themselves produce representations, partly arouse the activity of our understanding to compare these representations, and, by combining or separating them, work up the raw material of the sensible impressions into that knowledge of objects which is entitled experience?" (B 1).

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5 I. Kant, Prolegomena zu einer jeden künftigen Metaphysik, die als Wissenschaft wird auftreten können (1783), Anhang, A 204 = Vol. IV of the Academy Edition of Kant' works, p. 373.
6 Ibid. A 207 note = IV 375.
7 Ibid. A 205 = IV 374.
8 Ibid. A 211 = IV 377. See also A 68 = IV 292.
9 See this "Erklärung" in vol. XII, 370 f. In a letter to J.H. Tieftrunk on 5 April 1798 Kant wrote that Fichte's position "seems to me like a ghost—when one believes to have caught it, one has caught not an object, but only oneself; indeed one finds only the hand that strives after the ghost" (ibid. 241).
There is no doubt that Kant here thinks of real objects, the things in themselves, which affect our senses. He thinks of the beginning of our cognitional process in a quite realistic sense.

But then he goes on: "But though all our knowledge begins with experience, it does not follow that it all arises out of experience. For it may well be that even our empirical knowledge is made up of what we receive through impressions and of what our own faculty of knowledge (sensible impressions serving merely as the occasion) supplies from itself. If our faculty of knowledge makes any such addition [Zusatz], it may be that we are not in a position to distinguish it from the raw material, until with long practice of attention we have become skilled in separating it" (B 1 f).

The beginning of the cognitional process is a realistic one: things themselves affect our senses and so they set our faculties of knowledge in motion. But in the following cognitional process the faculty "supplies from itself" an element (indeed formal elements: the intuitions of sensibility and the categories of understanding), so that the result of the process is the knowledge of an object which—as known—is no longer a thing in itself; on the contrary it is a product of the subject. This means that the outcome of the cognitive process is knowledge in an idealistic sense.

In the light of what Kant in the course of the KrV says extensively, we are able to understand the quoted programmatic passage as follows: There is in our knowledge a passive or receptive moment of sensibility. This and only this (as we shall see) mediates us reality. But as soon as we try to know the reality which has affected our senses, the a priori forms of sense and of understanding intervene, so that what we come to know is the reality "for us," "relative to us"; in a word reality as it appears to us: "appearance" (Erscheinung, A 20).

In the same sense, Kant explains the passage of the Introduction we have just read in another passage at the beginning of the Transcendental Aesthetic. In my opinion this passage contains the core of Kant's doctrine of knowledge and reality. The passage is well known to you and is the main passage to which Lonergan refers when speaking on Kant's doctrine of knowledge. "In whatever manner and by whatever means a mode of knowledge may relate to objects, intuition [Anschauung] is that through which it is in immediate relation to them, and to which all thought [alles Denken] as a means is directed" (A 19).

In other words, intuition is the only way (the only mode of knowledge) by which knowledge is related to its object. In a concise formula: knowing is essentially intuiting (looking). I note that in German "Anschauung" is not at all a
special mode of knowledge as the English word "intuition" would suggest; it is simply the same as the ordinary English verb "to see." Such an affirmation—that only an intuition, and indeed a sense intuition, relates us as knowing subjects to a known reality, or gives us an object as object of knowledge—is not a *hapax legomenon*; on the contrary it is found innumerable times in all the parts of the *KrV*.

On the basis of these texts we can draw the following conclusion: the operations that contribute to the constitution of our knowledge are manifold; but when we ask "what brings it about that our knowledge is knowledge of an object and therefore (!) knowledge at all?" we must answer "intuition, *Anschauung.*" However many indirect relations to the object other operations might establish, there must be an activity which by its very nature bridges the knower and known, for otherwise one would fall into the nonsense of a series of mediating relations, none of which reaches the thing that is to be mediated. According to Kant this activity is intuition. To know is for Kant essentially "*anschauen,*" an act that both brings about the presence of an object to a knowing subject and, at the same time, maintains the duality between subject and object. To establish such a cognitional relation an operation must occur which instantiates what we experience most clearly in seeing with our eyes. I would like to name this conception of knowledge the “principle of intuition.”

To know is some sort of intuition (*quaestio iuris*). What kind of intuition do we human beings in fact possess (*quaestio facti*)? Kant answers in the same passage I have already quoted: Our intuition is an "empirical" one (A 20). Intuition occurs only insofar as an object affects our senses: “Our nature is so constituted that our intuition can never be other than sensible” (A 51).

Now among philosophers it was an old doctrine that the senses give us the object not as it is in itself, but rather according to the various subjective conditions and dispositions of the senses themselves. From this Kant concludes that our knowledge a) is limited to sensible reality, that is, to the world as the realm of possible experience, and b) within these boundaries we know reality, being, in its ontological status of appearance.

This is the quintessence of Kant’s theory of knowing and being. The examined passage belongs to the first two paragraphs of the *Transcendental Aesthetic*. More than eight hundred pages follow; they complicate enormously this key-position, but they do not change it.

What are all these pages about? They investigate the other cognitional operations belonging to human knowledge. Kant is no pure empiricist! In the
_quoted text Kant refers globally to these other operations with the term “thought” (Denken): “intuition is that [mode of knowledge] through which it [our knowledge] is in immediate relations to objects, and to which all thought as a means is directed” (A 19). This means the following: Whatever thought might do in particular, one thing is certain from the start, namely, that thought (that is, all our intellectual, non-intuitive operations) can reach no reality. What and how much of reality is known, is given us already from the very beginning by intuition. For intuition alone can see reality. We can express this aspect of Kant’s epistemology by speaking of the non-cognitional character of thought in Kant.\textsuperscript{10}

\textbf{3. The role of understanding and the role of reason}

Let us investigate more closely Kant’s doctrine of Verstand (understanding) and Vernunft (reason).

3.1 I begin with the latter. Reason is a cognitive faculty insofar as it looks for the unconditioned (das Unbedingte). “The unconditioned is the real transcendental idea” (A 417): the a priori of reason. But since senses can provide no unconditioned, no absolute, this idea has no “constitutive employment” for our knowledge of objects. It begins to work after we, by means of the pure intuitions of sense and of the categories of understanding, already have come to know objects (the “appearances”). The transcendental ideas of reason (which Kant specifies as the ideas of soul, world and God, in order to have three clues for his critique of \textit{metaphysica specialis}) have just a “regulative employment,” namely, that of giving systematic order to our pieces of knowledge about the human subject, the world and God.

3.2 More complex is the doctrine about the activity of the understanding. Here it is necessary to distinguish a first aspect of the pure concepts of understanding (the categories), according to which they play no cognitional role since they deliver no new reality (or, more exactly, no new metaphysical component of reality) besides that which the senses have already mediated; and a second aspect, according to which the categories have a cognitive function since they add something (the intelligible component of the “appearances”) to the content of sensation—but this something is straightforwardly a product of the subject itself.

\textsuperscript{10} Thought (Denken) stands for Kant in the service of sensible intuitions; therefore sensibility makes up the criterion of reality (real or being is that, and only that, which our senses deliver to us) and sets the range of our knowledge, “the range of possible experience”, as Kant says again and again. There is no doubt that human knowledge requires the cooperation both of sense and understanding, but what serves what? That’s the question.
3.2a The well known pages of A 50-52, where human knowledge is described as a twofold structure composed of intuition and concept, may seem to disprove my statement about the non-cognitional character of thought and about intuition as, according to Kant, the essence of knowledge. “Intuition and concepts constitute the elements of all our knowledge, so that neither concepts without an intuition in some way corresponding to them, nor intuition without concepts, can yield knowledge” (A 50). And again: “Only through their union [of intuition and concept] can knowledge arise” (A 51).

As a matter of fact such statements on a twofold structure of human knowledge are evidence of Kant’s repeated attempts to overcome his own sensualistic intuitionism. However we can by no means view these attempts as successful. It is no accident that Kant writes precisely in this same passage at the beginning of the Transcendental Analytic that “the understanding can intuit nothing” (A 51). This means that even here Kant maintains his thesis according to which the contents of our knowledge, namely what and how much we know of reality, still come exclusively from sense-intuition.

In the second version of the Transcendental Deduction of the Pure Concepts of the Understanding Kant describes human intellect as “a faculty which by itself knows nothing whatsoever, but merely combines and arranges the material of knowledge, that is, the intuition, which must be given to it by the object” (B 145). For Lonergan to combine the contents of sense-perceptions, that is, to grasp relations between data, is to grasp the intelligible component of reality, the form. For Kant, on the contrary, this is simply a subjective or practical operation; it is not a cognitional operation that grasps a metaphysical component of reality which sense-intuition cannot see at all.

3.2b In spite of all that I have said so far about the non-cognitional character of thought in Kant, we must recognize that there are passages in which Kant attributes to our understanding a cognitional function. But such a cognitional function is conceived in an idealistic sense: the understanding knows something that senses cannot know, because it “supplies” this something (namely the intelligible component of appearance) “from itself” (B 1); it puts it “into” the a posteriori data of the senses (A 125, B XIV); it “prescribes” it to nature (B 159-160, 163). Therefore Kant speaks of our understanding as a “lawgiver” (A 126), and explains this by stating that “the objects [in fact the objects of natural sciences] as appearances constitute an object that is merely in us” (A 129).

The conclusion of what has been said so far regarding the respective roles of intuition of sensibility and thought of understanding in the constitution of human
knowledge can also be stated as follows: The "Principle of Intuition" in its sensualistic version makes up the infrastructure of the Kantian theory of knowledge; the doctrine of the two forms of our sense-intuition (space and time) and of the twelve pure concepts of understanding (the categories) makes up the phenomenalistic-idealistic superstructure of the same theory of knowledge (and being).

But a closer examination reveals that infrastructure and superstructure are largely independent of one other. That's why many Kant-scholars have pointed out a strong sensualistic undercurrent in Kant's critique beneath the predominantly rationalistic-idealistic terminology. Despite repeated attempts, Kant could not find the precise point at which understanding and reason fit into sensibility. Because of this lack of inner unity, Kant's investigation of the intelligible components in human knowledge (in order to sublate Hume's empiricism and German rationalism) led him to an idealism which is superimposed on his foundational empiricism and phenomenalism, without however overcoming and eliminating it from within.

The most striking consequence of this heterogeneous duality is the well-known aporia between the realistic starting point of the KrV, according to which the objects that affect the senses are things-in-themselves, and its idealistic conclusion, according to which the objects of knowledge are all the result of the thetic-organizing activity of the subject. F.H. Jacobi, a contemporary of Kant, gave this aporia a famous formulation: "For several years I was forced to read over again the Critique of Pure Reason, since I was unremittingly misled by the fact that without that presupposition [of things-in-themselves] I couldn't go into the system and with that presupposition I couldn't remain in it."  

What must we say about the thing-in-itself (das Ding an sich), the real reality, that for Kant is totally unknowable? (But oddly enough he knows that it exists and that it affects our senses!) According to Kant we would know the real reality if we were equipped with an intellectual intuition (B 72). Unfortunately, says Kant, we don't have such an intuition.

But what exactly is this intuition? Since Kant in his own way acknowledges in us an understanding (Verstand) and a reason (Vernunft), we must conclude that this intuition, that he has sought for in us but not found, is neither intelligent nor rational—since we do have, according to Kant, an intelligence and a reason! It

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cannot be doubted that Kant conceives this missing intellectual intuition according to the model of that extroversion which characterizes our sense-intuition. There is therefore a disparity between the intellectual intuition that he denies to us and the acts of understanding and reason that he attributes to us. Such a disparity leads to a non-intelligent and a non-rational conception of the alleged real reality, because such a reality (the thing-in-itself) is correlative to an intellectual intuition, whose fundamental characteristic is extroversion and not intelligence and reasonableness.\textsuperscript{12}

**IV. LONERGAN'S ALTERNATIVE POSITION**

The way out of this cul-de-sac, which Lonergan has worked out in *Insight. A Study of Human Understanding*, is well-known to you. He has simply dropped the myth of intuition, namely that an act, in order to be a cognitive act, must be a kind of seeing. Instead of this postulated mythical intuition he has investigated—in an introspective analysis—the conscious activities which we perform when we know. His starting point is therefore the content of our inner experience (consciousness). His result can be summarized in two major points.

First. Human beings are equipped with an intelligent and rational (and also moral) dynamism which strives for knowledge. We can designate this drive to know with the traditional term “intentionality.” Such a dynamism is unrestricted in its range; there is no limit to our questions. Consequently nothing is absolutely beyond the range of our intentionality, which is our ability to inquire.

Second. Our dynamism towards knowledge works in two phases: one which is released by a question for intelligence: “What is this?,” and one which is released by a question for reflection: “Is it so?” But since intentionality cannot put its first question for intelligence if it has no materials, no data to ask about—and these data are ultimately supplied by our sensibility—our cognitional process consists of the threefold structure of experience, understanding and judgment, so that reality or being, which we are seeking from the very beginning, namely, from wonder about the data, is known only in the rational judgment. Our “seeing,” our “Anschauung,” our experience, our coming into contact with reality occurs in

\textsuperscript{12} This conception of reality corresponds exactly to the naive realism of common-sense persons, not in its performance (the common sense uses intelligence and rationality in order to know things as they really are!), but when asked to explain how we have come to know something his answer is: Well, I have seen (or heard or touched ...) it!
judgment. "The impalpable act of rational assent is the necessary and sufficient condition for knowledge of reality" (Insight, 538).

Lonergan has no objection if one wants to call this act, which concludes and sublates the whole cognitional process with its different moments, an intuition of being. But the exact meaning of this metaphoric term, he would say, must be recovered not by means of a comparison with our ocular vision, but through an introspective analysis of what we do when we know.

In fact, when we want to know something we pay attention to the data (be attentive!), we try to understand all relevant data (be intelligent!), we weigh the pros and cons of our interpretation of the data (be rational!)—and all this does not occur without the responsibility of the knower. But if by "intuition" one means another act besides the acts I have mentioned, and which everyone can verify in their own cognitive experience, then I would answer with Lonergan: "I have looked for it and failed to find it. I know no reason for affirming its occurrence" (Insight, 269).

But if knowing being is a matter of using our intelligence and reason, then being is correlative to such operations; it is intelligible, that is, it is not apart from, nor beyond, nor different from the intelligence and rationality of our drive to know (cfr. Insight, 499). Thereby Lonergan has overcome that disparity between being and intelligence or reasonableness, which underlies Kant's baffling "Ding an sich."

A theory of knowledge that aims at disclosing what is peculiar to human knowledge requires an intellectual conversion that moves from a picture thinking, which is content to compare knowing with looking and to accept the consequences that flow from that comparison, to the truth of judgment, which is attained only through the personal and responsible performance of our intentionality.
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