LONERGAN WORKSHOP

The Structure and Rhythms of Love: In Honor of Frederick Crowe, SJ

volume 13

edited by Fred Lawrence
LONERGAN WORKSHOP

Volume 13
EDITORIAL NOTE

THE 23RD ANNUAL Lonergan Workshop, The Structure and Rhythms of Love, celebrated the life and work of Frederick E. Crowe, SJ. His famous series of articles “Complacency and Concern in the Thought of St Thomas” published nearly forty years ago in Theological Studies provided a focus for this rich harvest of papers. The theme was suggested years ago by Bernard McGinn of the University of Chicago Divinity School. He hailed these articles by Crowe as a too-long neglected classic. Also of the Divinity School and one of Fred Crowe’s oldest friends and admirers, David Tracy’s tribute to Fred was a tour de force on the idea of love in the history of Western philosophy and theology. Mary Ann Glendon (Harvard Law School), recently returned from Beijing as the Vatican representative to the Women’s Conference there, gave two lectures concerning women and the church.

David Burrell, CSC, lectured from notes that have been transformed into the three papers published here. His relatively recent books on medieval Jewish, Christian, and Islamic (philosophy and) theology have been on knowledge of God, creation, and freedom. His papers manifest Burrell’s robust ecumenism and themes relevant for ecological reflection. He reveals within the three religions of Abraham common terrain: their views of creation and human freedom upset the Enlightenment vision of individual people as the lord and master of everything they survey. He also shows how the so-called modern view of autonomy has roots in the thought of Duns Scotus.

Through the years of the Workshop, Fred Crowe’s presentations, most of which are now also available in Appropriating the Lonergan Idea edited by Michael Vertin (Washington, DC: Catholic University of America 1989), have forged radically new paths. Mike Vertin is now editing for publication next Fall the entire set of Crowe’s “Thomist Studies,” of which “Complacency and Concern...” constitutes a crowning part. All of them are brimful of still unexploited aperçus.

Here Crowe explores the implications of complacency and concern for eternal life. Catholic eschatology has been stranded between the exuberance of late Jewish apocalypticism and the much more thin-
lipped affair of the ‘Five Last Things.’ Crowe’s paper gives us much more than a taste of an explanatory systematics of eschatology in the ‘third stage of meaning.’

Mark Doorley’s doctoral dissertation on the development of Lonergan’s thought on feelings prepared him to lecture on a possible transposition of the Crowe/Aquinas theory of complacency and concern worked out in metaphysical terms and relations. Mark accepted the challenge of rearticulating Crowe’s insights into the terms and relations of intentionality analysis, and the published results should stimulate readers to investigate that excellent dissertation.

Robert Doran, SJ, is Fred Crowe’s good friend and close collaborator both at the Lonergan Centre in Toronto and in editing the Collected Works. He contributed this adventuresome paper integrating Crowe’s ideas on complacency and concern with Lonergan’s grounding of the theology of grace in terms of created participations in the relationships that constitute the Trinity. It is a lovely tribute to both Crowe and Lonergan.

Jean-Marc Laporte, SJ, has also been Fred’s valued colleague at Regis for many years and is now President of the Toronto School of Theology. Like Lonergan, Jean-Marc did his doctoral work on Aquinas’ theology of grace, but at the University of Strasbourg in France. Some fruits of this study are in his Patience and Power: Grace for the First World (New York: Paulist Press 1988). Jean-Marc’s ability to make Thomas’ intricate distinctions in the Summa I-II come alive, and his expertise in the detail of Aquinas’s teaching permit him to address Crowe’s thesis on common ground.

Robert Lewis is a veteran teacher of English at Marist College and a faithful attender at summer and weekend Workshops down through the years. As he gradually made Lonergan’s thought more and more his own, he was also at work on a doctoral dissertation on George Eliot’s oeuvre. Bob shows how Lonergan and Eliot mutually illumine one another. Eliot’s themes coincide with the Workshop theme of the structure and rhythms of love. The truth of this claim is evident in one of the most beautiful papers in the Workshop’s 23 years.

Michael McCarthy contributes another piece of his ongoing work towards his book on Hannah Arendt, this time in relation to Arendt’s controversial views on the relationship between Christianity and society. Michael here explores the main lines of the Ernst Troeltsch’s
The Social Teaching of the Christian Churches. His lecture was given at an evening event devoted to politics featuring McCarthy and David J. Levy. It was not part of the morning series devoted to Crowe’s thought.

Hugo Meynell wrote his paper in Fred Crowe’s honor well over a year before the theme of this Workshop was set. Hugo is concerned that the wholesale contemporary rejection of Descartes goes too far in rejecting valuable dimensions of clarity, coherence, and intellectual probity that must not be lost. Hugo’s paper addresses head on the issue of just what aspect of Descartes’ ideas need to be revised in the light of what Crowe calls Lonergan’s *novum organum*.

Treating complacency and concern in conjunction with honoring Fred Crowe furnishes the ideal occasion for Elizabeth Morelli’s paper. An expert in the phenomenological and existentialist approaches to issues pertaining to the ‘fourth level of consciousness’—moods, emotions, desires, fears, anxieties, evaluations, and decisions—Liz was the beneficiary, during her graduate student days in Toronto, of conversations with Fred Crowe on the topics she addresses in her paper. Readers will appreciate the concreteness of her reflections that are sensitive to every complication without sacrificing lucidity.

Sebastian Moore, returned to Britain for several years now, has re-confronted one of the massive influences of Downside Abbey, Illtyd Trethowan, OSB. Fr. Illtyd always championed the Neoplatonic tradition in Christian thought. Sebastian was impelled to come to terms with this tradition’s reading of Augustine, of the experience of conversion, and of the Christian doctrines integrally connected with that experience. In light of a grounding in Aquinas’s and Lonergan’s alternative reading of these things, Sebastian has been able to sound the limitations in the Neoplatonic approach in numerous ways. Here is an account of one of his more recent spiritual—and typically spirited!—jousts with his late mentor.

Michael Vertin has been one of the chief contributors to the discussion surrounding the level(s) of consciousness where feelings, decisions, conversion, and love are in play. He has devoted a great deal of his energy to doing for Crowe what Crowe himself has spent a life-time doing for Lonergan. The cognitional structure of the fourth level of consciousness and the critically grounded metaphysical structure isomorphic to valuing and deciding has everything to do with the transposition of Crowe on complacency and concern.
We are grateful to everybody who joined in this celebration of Fred Crowe. All thanks to the ever patient and dear Kerry Cronin for all she does to make sure this volume sees the light.

Fred Lawrence
Boston College
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HUMAN FREEDOM
AS RESPONSE

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The prevailing contemporary analysis of human freedom goes by the label "libertarian," but it presents a one-sided picture of human freedom as autonomy, a picture which can be traced back to Duns Scotus. The alternative which I shall present, and offer as more akin to Aquinas' analysis, was originally inspired by Fred Crowe's dissertation, published as a series of articles entitled "Complacency and Concern in the Thought of St. Thomas Aquinas."¹ (I have never felt that the English term 'complacency' properly translates Aquinas' complacentia, and so have regularly used 'consent' instead—despite the fact that this term (in Latin) is used by Aquinas himself to identify one of the stages in his anatomy of a free act, rather than the initial resting in the end which Crowe identifies.²) What initially struck me in Crowe’s treatment was the inner connection between speculative and practical reason, or perhaps better, between contemplation and action. By identifying the original act of willing which fuels decisions of practical reason with an orientation of the entire intentional person to the good, Crowe offered a plausible articulation of Ignatius’ goal of "contemplation in action," and did so by mining Aquinas' account of human freedom, which is at once subtle and complex.

Both subtlety and complexity are called for, since Aquinas' project involved reconciling Augustine's treatment of willing with Aristotle's analysis of practical reason. The result proved to be a hybrid, yet a fruitful one. For Aristotle’s account left all implicit the orientation to the

² Summa Theologiae (=ST) 2-1.15: "Of consent, which is an act of the will in regard to means."
good, inherited from Plato’s analysis of human action, which belongs to each action as part of its intentional character. And Augustine’s, taken by itself, could be read as promoting an autonomous faculty by which our lives are directed to their proper end, taking counsel from the intellect along the way. That, of course, is Scotus’ reading of the matter, and a far less complex account than Aquinas’. Yet what it gains in simplicity it loses in coherence, for the question that must be posed of Scotus’ actus elicitus is: what brings it about? My sense is that Scotus simply posits the will as a capacity of spontaneity, and the seat of human autonomy, setting the stage for Kant to frame the issues as he did, so introducing modernity and the “libertarian” picture of freedom.3 On such a picture, choices afford the paradigm for free human actions, with little regard for their direction so long as it is assured they spring solely from the subject’s autonomy.

The inspiration for this account rests with Aristotle’s reflections on human actions as originating in subjects who are thereby responsible for their actions: “the buck stops here.” And such an assertion must indeed be made to assure human dignity as well as constitute human society. Yet I shall argue that the account need not be the simplistic one provided by Scotus, nor should it be, for the source of the celebrated actus elicitus remains mysterious. One simply has to postulate that wills are the sort of things which can move themselves to act, even if everything else in the universe must be moved by another, as Aristotle averred.4 Part of the necessary complexity of Aquinas’ account is that he does not remove wills from the realm of creatures, and so needs to show how we are moved to account for our capacity to be self-movers. This maneuver exhibits once more the truth of Josef Pieper’s prescient

4 “An inadvertent corroboration of this reading can be found in Roderick Chisholm’s 1964 Lindley lecture, reprinted in Gary Watson, ed., Free Will (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1982) as “Human Freedom and the Self”: “If we are responsible, and if what I have been trying to say is true, then we have a prerogative which some would attribute only to God: each of us, when we act, is a prime mover unmoved”(32).
remarks that “creation is the hidden element in the philosophy of St. Thomas.”5 For what Aquinas works out is an account of the freedom proper to a creature of a free creator, all of which must be factored into a full account of human freedom.

It is useful to call this view “freedom as response,” to contrast it with the autonomy ingredient in a “libertarian” picture: response to “the good” which must fuel every human act. We will discern that good differently as we attempt to use our practical reason, abetted by the virtues we have made our own or hindered by our lack of them, but the intellectual appetite which is will must so rest in its natural end that our subsequent choices will be so directed. (As one of my colleagues who served as Dean for 15 years used to say of administrators: “if they want to do it, they can do it.”) Our practical reason will find a way to execute the good in which our appetite rests—for better or for worse. That is what Aristotle and Aquinas meant by saying that choice is directed towards means and not ends; while contrasting it with Jean-Paul Sartre’s insistence that we do indeed choose our ends reminds one of the extent to which Aquinas’ elaboration depends on faith in a creator. Indeed, Sartre’s clarity about all this makes his position an illuminating foil for our view of freedom as response. What complicates matters, of course, is that the ends and means in question are intrinsically linked to each other Chinese-box fashion, so that “the end” often remains quite inaccessible in itself, and only displayed—even to ourselves—in our choice of means.

So it is hardly surprising that people tend to think of choosing as the paradigm of a free act, since the manner in which our will rests in or consents to “the good” is often quite inaccessible to us, to say nothing of others. So the entire account can look as though it is fueled more by analytic demands than by attention to human psychology. Yet some simple reminders of those life-shaping actions, which we prefer to call “decisions” rather than “choices,” can serve to make this view more plausible, as well as suggest a paradigm other than choosing for free

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human action. If we think of vocational decisions, like those which can face a young Catholic man or woman regarding whether to marry or to follow a call to "religious life," or which face one contemplating marriage regarding this person as a spouse for life, it is difficult to classify them as simple (or even complex) choices. Ironically enough, when we come to the point of decision, there seems to be a kind of inevitability involved, even though we must see these as the most free actions we are ever to undertake. Think of celebrating a momentous wedding anniversary, and asking each of the spouses "how they chose the other?" Perhaps out of a field of contenders? Somehow, "choosing" seems quite inappropriate here. Is it not rather that we sense a direction growing in us that corresponds to what we have become and portends what we would like to be?

We could, of course, refuse the step that seems to emerge as ours to take, and pursue a life contrary to what we discern to be our deepest fulfillment—perhaps out of fear of the subsequent demands. At that point there appears to be a "libertarian" dimension even to freedom-as-response, but note that this contrary action is precisely not a response, but rather a refusal. Should we take this "choice," admittedly always open to us, as paradigmatic of freedom? Is this what Sartre in fact does, in insisting that we "choose our ends?" What distinguishes such a refusal from the sort of action which is undertaken with an eye to our proper good—however we may at the time be misled about this—is already signaled by the term 'refusal': the act itself is taken outside of the regular channels associated with prudent action. One's friends will be baffled by it; or find it altogether consonant with a streak of self-destructive behavior. We are pressed into a normative account of human freedom when trying to analyze such life-shaping actions, or their concomitant refusals to "follow our deepest instincts." That very phrase, which suggests itself quite naturally here, corroborates our view of freedom-as-response: rather than autonomy at work, we are in fact "following something" in so acting; and not so in refusing.

6 I have elaborated this in greater detail in Freedom and Creation in Three Traditions (Notre Dame, IN: University of Notre Dame Press, 1993) 87-94, 157-59.
So the logic of this account leads us to remove *refusing* from the category of full-blooded actions, by categorizing it in full as a refusal-to-act. It rather gives the direction of our life over to something else, abdicating the responsibility of acting in favor of giving in to impulse. Or to keep the terms of our analysis: we have allowed ourselves to be drawn by a good which we discern *not* to be our good. How is that possible? Libertarians find no difficulty here; to be free simply means to be able to direct ourselves in whichever way we want to go. But they have a very under-developed grasp of *want*: wanting is simply exhibited in how we choose; everything is categorized as an action emanating from our will. On our analysis of freedom-as-response, however, full action demands an initial letting oneself be drawn by a good perceived. Those actions which are life-framing have a way of being confirmed—not without suffering, or are disconfirmed, as we proceed along the path to which they introduce us. For them to be disconfirmed is for us to have come to perceive another good as more fitting for us; that is what it means for us to “realize we have chosen wrongly,” as we are prone to put it when captivated by the language of choice. So the analysis of freedom as response to the good seems to be corroborated in human discourse about action and decision, and not simply prompted by analytic concerns.

There are further advantages, of course, when it comes to conciliating human freedom with divine providence, since the analysis itself seeks to present a freedom of creatures. Aquinas himself sets out the principles clearly and succinctly: “to be moved voluntarily is to be moved of one's own accord, i.e., from a resource within. That inner resource, however, may derive from some other, outward source. In this sense there is no contradiction between being moved of one’s own accord and being moved by another” (ST 1.105.4.2.). That “other,” of course, is limited to one—the creator: “God alone can really induce a change of this

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7 Readers of Augustine's *Confessions* will be reminded of his analysis of *will* in Book 8.viii: “I was not doing what with an incomparably greater longing I yearned to do, and could have done the moment I so resolved. For as soon as I had the will, I would have had a wholehearted will. At this point the power to act is identical with the will. The willing itself was performative of the action” (translation by Henry Chadwick, Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1991).
kind in the will" (ST 1.111.2). The reason that Aquinas finds no inherent difficulty here, however, is that he does not locate the heart of freedom in autonomy but in response. And that may be closer to our own authentic experience as well.

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8 Again, see my Freedom and Creation (86-89) for a fuller treatment of this relation.
MEDIEVAL JEWISH, ISLAMIC AND
CHRISTIAN PERSPECTIVES ON
 LOVE AND WILL

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Bernard Lonergan gave us simple yet illuminating directions for reading an author or attempting to understand statements like those of Nicea: try to determine the questions to which the answer intends to respond. Then, and only then, can we relate their answer to our questions, and so let them help us respond to questions of our day. That procedure offers a formula for retrieving a tradition through apprenticing oneself to its signal actors. In that vein, let me sketch out the medieval perspectives operative in these reflections. It is an interfaith, intercultural world centered around the Mediterranean, made a “world” originally by Rome, then by Christianity, whereby Rome became Byzantium (always Rûm to the Arabs). During the ninth and tenth centuries Baghdad witnessed a flourishing recovery of Hellenic culture inspired by Islam.¹ They were asking the age-old question: “what’s it all about?” now given, thanks to the Bible and Qur’an the ordinary cast: “where did it all come from?” Clement of Alexandria could count on the innovative work of Philo when he insisted that “we have a wisdom which the Greeks did not know.” The Islamic pattern was interestingly different: conquering tribes from the Hejaz were doubtless overwhelmed with the range of Hellenic learning in the provincial centers of Byzantium, yet they were equally convinced of the truth of their revelation, so some of them could not help attempting to meld the two.

The result, viewed in retrospect from a distant perspective, was that Jews, Christians, and Muslims were putting the same questions to Hellenic sources, with some of them doing so at the very time that Frankish and Muslim armies were battling over the Holy Land. Viewed from this angle, one can begin to situate the task of Thomas Aquinas, with special emphasis on his Neapolitan provenance, in an intercultural, interfaith perspective. This allows us to draw fruitful parallels between his situation and ours, and see his classical Christian synthesis as already embodying an intercultural and interfaith perspective. What we see is that everything turns on creation: how do we understand it? This initial move urges us to recover a patristic orientation which Aquinas shared, thereby overcoming the unilateral sixteenth century focus on redemption, which allowed successive generations of Christian theologians to overlook creation and so virtually eliminate the context for the drama of cross and resurrection. The question which they posed, however, turned on origination: how can we understand it?

Neoplatonism had succeeded in taking the ordinary cast of the question—where did it all come from?—and transforming it from our ordinary predilection for efficient causes ("who started the fight?") into formal or systematic reasons: "How can one explain the order present in the universe?" Plotinus' emanation scheme, linked through Aristotle to the cosmological ordering evidenced in planetary motion, yielded the spheres. What we have difficulty taking seriously, however, was their way of using the tools at their disposal to render the universe intelligible. It was, in short, their version of the seventeenth century's universal mathesis. For the ordering origination of the universe paralleled that of logical demonstration, and so captured the intellectual imagination of the Hellenic world. What threatened the revelatory pictures of the Bible and Qur'an, however, was the inevitable necessity attached to the logical model employed, along with the inadequate distinction of the

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3 See also my *Freedom and Creation in Three Tradition* (Notre Dame IN: University of Notre Dame Press, 1993).
“First” from all that followed necessarily from it. But how challenge so powerful a scheme without falling into ridiculous anthropomorphisms, many of which could be found in the scriptures themselves, which made the One origin of all into a maker, not unlike Plato’s demiurge.

The first to address this complex issue, the Muslim thinker Ibn Sina (known in the west as Avicenna), preferred to adopt the scheme rather than challenge it, even though his crucial distinction between essence and existing would help others to discover alternative ways of presenting the origination of the universe. The first of these was Moses Maimonides, a Jewish polymath whose ambiance in the Islamicate had formed him in Ibn Sina’s thought. He employed that very systematic mode to show that none of those whom proponents enlisted on the side of an eternal emanation of the universe, including Aristotle, had in fact proved it. Yet he also eschewed the mode of argument on the other side which had been advanced by Islamic religious thinkers, pretending to prove that the universe had to have had a beginning. Where the ostensible issue in this debate was an everlasting universe versus its origination in such a way that time began with the world’s inception, the real issue was its free, intentional creation. What Aquinas was able to see, building on the views of both Avicenna and Maimonides, was that a free creation need not be linked with an initial moment of time, but was a quite separate issue. Adopting Maimonides’ strategy, he showed how one could conceive the universe to have emanated freely and everlastingly from one God, yet since neither case enjoyed philosophical proof, believers were free to adopt the biblical (or Quranic) view without displaying intellectual naiveté about ultimate origins.

All this apparently cosmological inquiry sets the stage for our inquiry into love and will. For “the distinction” of creator from creation can only be secured by an intentional creator, yet our conception of that activity must preserve the “intellectual conversion” which the emanation scheme effected.4 The mode of causality involved must

transcend that of a maker or demiurge, and be such as to bestow being with order, without intermediaries and without presupposing anything at all. Yet so exigent a philosophical task is already imaged in the giving of the Torah, in the presence of God in Christ, or in the gift of the Qur'an—revelation offers a fresh intellectual pattern for origination or creation. Indeed, one of the key motivations leading both Maimonides and al-Ghazali to reject Ibn Sina's use of al-Farabi's necessary emanation scheme as a plausible rendering of Genesis or of the Qur'an was that it would leave no room for the gracious gift of Torah or Qur'an.

This parallel of creation with revelation helped Christian medievals to incorporate the perspectives of Clement and of Irenaeus, while thinkers from all three traditions were ready to link the intentionality of the original creation to our creaturely response to revelation. While the linkage will be encoded differently according to the diverse modes of revelation, nonetheless similar dynamics can be discerned. For Jews, the sheer gratuity of God's election of Israel elicits the plausible demand for a wholehearted response on the part of the people—the Deuteronomic theme.5 For Muslims, the "straight path" offered in the Qur'an invites a total response on the part of anyone whose native intellectual orientation [fitra] should lead them to recognize the inimitability of the Qur'an. Indeed, al-Ghazali will show how the very term 'Islam' conveys the wholehearted return of God's utterly free gift—creation itself—to the One who gives it.6 But Aquinas will shows how it comes out most clearly in God's mode of revealing God's own self in Jesus, in such a way that God will be seen to be Father, Son, and Spirit. As he puts it in responding to a query as to what knowing divine triunity adds to our quest to know God by reason: we need such knowledge to have "the right idea of creation. The fact of saying that God made all things by His word excludes the error of those who say that God produced things by necessity. And when we say that in Him there is a procession of love, we

show that God produced creatures not because he needed them, nor because of any extrinsic reason, but on account of the love of His own goodness.’’

A full-blown picture of intentional origination demands a story about the inner life of God not available to human reason, yet once that is given to us, our understanding of our own freedom is transformed as well, in its source and its dynamic. Its source need not be an inexplicable autonomous “push,” wherein a creature’s freedom can be preserved only by making free agents utterly “first movers.” Rather, the source of creaturely freedom will be an intentional creature’s response to a gracious creator: “God first loved us” in creating us! So the dynamic of human freedom can be explicated as one of response, and not of sheer origination. So Mary displays better than Nietzsche the model of a free person. In this way, the intercultural and interfaith perspectives on love and will offered in this medieval inquiry can challenge our current paradigms for freedom, by contrasting “pushing” with “being drawn,” choosing with accepting, and autonomy with response-ability. The second contrast reminds many of us forcibly of Fred Crowe’s masterful thesis on “Complacency and Concern in The Thought of St. Thomas Aquinas.” What he has presented as Aquinas’ analysis of freedom can be seen to rest in one’s acceptance of one’s free origination from a loving God, a faith posture shared by Jews, Christians, and Muslims.

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7 *Summa Theologiae* 1.32.1.3; see my *Freedom and Creation in Three Traditions* 96, 165-66.

THE STRUCTURE AND RHYTHMS
OF LOVE IN TODAY’S WORLD

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JUST LIKE ‘EVIL’ in the infamous “problem of evil,” there is no such thing as love. At least not for authentic followers of Aristotle, since there are at best loving actions or loving persons, as (at worst) evil action and evil persons. But unlike evil, which Augustine showed to be a “black hole” in God’s creation, and Bernard Lonergan aptly called a “surd,” love as in loving actions and loving persons is not only real but what makes the world go around, as Dante reminded us at the very term of the pilgrim’s journey: “the love which moves the sun and all the stars.”

Asked to address its structure and rhythms, I want to call attention to a feature of love which decisively affects our efforts to know: the point where we are forced to reverse the familiar adage—”you cannot love what you don’t know”—to see that its complement is (in other crucial respects) equally true: “you cannot know what you don’t love.” As Augustine reminded us: “Give me someone who loves and they will understand that I am trying to say.” I want to bring this to bear on interfaith relations, because I have come to believe that the signal challenge to religious groups in the twenty-first century is to do their part to assure that Bosnia or Northern Ireland cannot recur. Not that these conflicts could accurately be called “religious wars,” but religion has proved an all too ready fuel.

This is a powerful challenge, for the apparent identification of violence with religious differences tempts us to compare our times with the seventeenth century religious conflicts which spawned the Enlightenment, yet the reaction of the Enlightenment is blocked to reflective persons in the twentieth century, since our century has seen more human beings slaughtered at the behest of purportedly secular ideologies than the rest of human history. The only way forward is to
enrich, enhance, and widen the perspectives of each religious group with the perspectives of its "other," and I shall argue that his best happens when our admiration of others of other faiths elicits cross-cultural personal relations which can lead us to discover dimensions of our own faith traditions hitherto unavailable to us. That dynamic, which I shall call one of "mutual illumination," is certainly cognitive through and through, yet is initiated and fueled by personal contact and friendship, which alone can invite us to breach trenchant doctrinal differences.

My own experience was stimulated powerfully by an interfaith experience called "HOPE Seminar," held at the Ecumenical Institute for Theological Research (Tantur) in Jerusalem, near Bethlehem, during the summer of 1975. Animated by Sister Marie Goldstein, an American whose Jewish father and Catholic mother had made a liminal state of her own life, the program allowed a dozen or more of us—Jews, Christians, and Muslims—to live and study and learn to pray together for a period of six weeks. This was followed closely by a semester teaching in Bangladesh, a country with 92% Muslim plurality, yet whose attitudes proved reflective more of South Asia than of the Middle East. Later study of Arabic and Islamic philosophy and Cairo introduced me to the towering figure of Louis Massignon, the French scholar and activist for Christian-Muslim understanding, who identified al-Hallaj, the tenth century Muslim mystic and martyr, as the spiritual mentor who led him to Christ! These experiences called to mind two slim volumes of Jean Daniélou which had appeared in the fifties: *Salvation of Nations* and *Advent*. Their thesis, like so much of French theology of the time, had anticipated Vatican II, in suggesting that the Christian missionaries who had come to embody their vocation could better be described as "finding Christ" in non-Western cultures than "bringing" him there. Of course, they had been sent, precisely to "bring Christ" to places which had never heard the gospel, and that is doubtless how they thought of themselves. Yet as their work progressed, those who listened as they spoke realized the fruits of what we call today "reader-response" criticism: response to the gospel on the part of persons formed in another culture began to sketch a new face of Jesus!

Let me now turn, as an exemplar of the structure and rhythms of love, to a Christian, indeed a Trappist monk, Christian-Marie de Cherge, prior of the Monastery of Notre Dame of the Atlas in Algeria. In a letter composed at the end of 1993 and published in May 1996 in La Croix, he
avers that his “life was given to Good and to this country,” yet recognizes that “I am caught up as an accomplice in the evil which always seems to prevail in the world.” Anticipating the worst, he insists: “I do not see how I would rejoice that this people [whom] I love should be globally blamed for my murder.... I know full well the contempt in which Algerians generally are held; I know too the caricature of Islam that is fostered by a certain Islamism.” Yet “for me, Islam and Algeria is something different...; I have found here the leading edge of the gospel what I learned at my mother’s knee ... [now from] Muslim believers.” And closing in a valedictory tone, he says: “Within this thank-you, where once and for all, all is said about my life, I include you, my friends of yesterday and today, ... and you, too, my last-minute friend, you who know not what you do,” indeed who “profess to be acting in accord with what [you] believe in Islam.”

Note how it was friendship which opened this man to the possibility of doing what Paul reminded us was even beyond friendship: to give one’s life for one whom one knows not; indeed, to deliver it up to one who would brutally take it from him. Knowing that neither his action or Christians’ suffering was the last word on the event, that his death would become a “return to the Father”: “at last my pounding curiosity will be satisfied.” But how—my friend who read this letter asked—how could he, two years before the fact, establish such contact with his murderer? She found that utterly astounding: a faceless “Islamist” out there somewhere. Yet that question, so presciently put, articulates the structure and rhythms of love embodied in the letter and in the subsequent gift of his life: only by loving them could he already know him. And he averred that he had come to love them, whom his fellow Frenchmen and others of European origin hold in contempt, for they had showed him, by their lives and friendships proffered, an ancient yet fresh face of Christ.

What he had discovered, through them, had immeasurably enhanced his sense of the life which he would most probably be called to return to the Father, through some of them whom the world justly calls terrorists, as a gift. A truncated gift, to be sure, yet the more gift for the friendships he had gained among them. How silly the question sounds: would he have had it any other way? Love and friendship not only offer the only way to come to know individuals—the bugbear of epistemology from the Greeks to us today—but also, on reflection, return us to ourselves and our life to us as the unique, unrepeatable gift which it is.
Even Carl Jung, always tempted by a gnostic vision, realized how friendship alone opens us to that uniqueness, and so has helped countless of us to accept—consent to—our lives as gift. But Christian-Marie shows us the way even more effectively. When dialogue ends there is often nothing left but violence, yet even violence can be redeemed in the witness of martyrdom. That is the crowning teaching of John Paul II in *Splendour Veritatis*, embodied in the actual witness of Christian-Marie and his six confreres; there can be no more eloquent commentary on the structure and rhythms of love.

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COMPLACENCY AND CONCERN
IN THE RISEN LIFE

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THE TITLE OF this paper is more or less the one I agreed on with Fred Lawrence last December. It would have divided the talk into two roughly equal parts: the risen life, and complacency and concern in that risen life.

But an act of God intervened (a pinched nerve which kept me from my desk during the time I would have used for writing the paper) with the result that I am not able to carry out my commitment in full. The first part I can manage, since I wrote on this topic three years ago in Science et Esprit,1 and then one year ago talked on it for a Seminar at the Lonergan Research Institute. That Seminar talk is still on my computer, so I was able to revise it slightly and transfer it to paper for this workshop; you have it in the printout under the subtitle, “Rethinking the Resurrection.” The other half, “Complacency and Concern in the Risen Life,” I was not able to complete, and so merely sketch some questions I might have raised and some answers I might have given, had I been able to complete my task.

RETHINKING THE RESURRECTION

A preliminary remark: what I’m presenting is an idea. I present it for consideration, to be accepted or rejected according to the good judgment

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of Christian believers. The very first bit of cognitional theory most of us learn from Lonergan is the difference between an idea and a judgment, but that's the very last thing most of us learn in practice. An idea becomes a pet idea, and the pet idea becomes a judgment, and the judgment may well be heresy. So I repeat: this is an idea; if it is heading for heresy I will cheerfully abandon it and try another. Ideas, we know, are a dime a dozen, and most of them are wrong.

1. To Be

The simplest possible statement on the risen Christ is to say that he is alive, and so we ask what it means to be alive and what the meaning is of the two simple terms: "to be," and "alive." It is tempting to neglect the first term and concentrate on the second, but if this talk has anything whatever to contribute to the question, it derives mainly from the first term, to be.

Further, the proper approach to the term, to be, is not through the philosopher's "being": a notion of being, an idea of being, a concept of being, a judgment of being, theories of being, and so on—terms that are hardly used except by philosophers and some theologians. The approach is through the clear and obvious everyday term that everyone of us uses over and over, namely, the word "is."

What I have to say on this you can find in Lonergan's *De scientia atque voluntate Dei*, notes for a course he gave in 1950. Now "is," Lonergan says, may be thought of in two ways. First, as contrasted with "was" and with "will be," and this too is clear and obvious and again part of everyday conversation. But there is a second way to think of the matter, one in which "is" is not contrasted with "was" or "will be," one which finds a common element in all three.

What is common to "was," "is," and "will be"? What is common to all three, what underlies all three, what pervades all three, is another notion than that of a relation to past, present, and future. There is an aspect of "is" that does not as such include a reference to time, and this

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is the radical meaning of “is.” We will try to get hold of that radical meaning.

To say that some person A “is” is not just a statement in the present tense; it is to give that someone a place in the universe of being. To say that someone B “was” a thousand years ago seems to imply that B no longer is and so to deny the being of that person, but in the more radical sense it gives that someone too a place in the universe of being, if we think of the universe of being as the totality of being spread through space and time. To say that someone C “will be” seems again to imply that C is not yet and so to deny being to that someone, but in the more radical sense we promise that someone too a place in the universe of being when the future arrives. So, while it is true that the temporal sense of “is” can be used for A alone, it is also true that the whole universe of being is, and with the universe all its ordered parts, including B and C; so there is a sense in which we can set the temporal restriction aside and say that A, B, and C all are. Not in the temporal sense of “are” but in the radical sense that they, all three of them, belong to the universe of being.

Let us go back to that temporal sense. It limits our being to a certain “when,” a “quando.” If we ask the “when” of our example A, the answer is 1996, not 1096, and not 3096. The “when” of B and the “when” of C are similarly restrictive. If, therefore, we are going to say that A, B, and C all are in some radical sense, we have to remove the restriction of that “when”; we must somehow escape the limits of time.

One way we can do that is to think of the four-dimensional universe, the space-time universe, in which all things are included, in which past, present, and future lose some of their isolation from one another, a universe in which yesterday, today, and tomorrow are not divided off from one another. We have no trouble in thinking of the three spatial dimensions of our universe as being present to us all at once. Well, if time is conceived as just another dimension, a fourth dimension, then we can dimly grasp the possibility of one universe of being escaping temporal limitation and simply existing, all of it together, in its whole and in its parts.

But, of course, the primary and perfect instance of that escape is God, who is present to all creation, past, present, and what may come. We really need a technical term for that togetherness. We cannot use “contemporary,” which includes time. Lonergan, writing in Latin, used
the word *simul*. And so God is *simul* with Aristotle, *simul* with Thomas Aquinas, and *simul* with all things that are in the universe of being.³

Can we give this some meaning from the human side? It is easy to assert that God is present to all creation, but what does that mean for us? To answer that, let us set aside for a moment the notions of "when" and "simul" and think of the presence of all things to God as their reality. Am I more real than my grandparents who are dead? Well, put the question in another way: Am I more present to God than they are? And add the further question: Are they present to God only in memory or in their reality? Now generalize the question: Is temporal being more real than the being all creation has outside of time and before God? A negative answer seems the only possible one.

What we have to get hold of here is the reality of the past, of all of the past, in its being before God, in its presence to God. We tend to think of our own life as real, and of the life of our ancestors as past and gone, and so not part of the reality that is. But my grandparents in their earthly existence and not just in their heavenly are just as real before God, just as really present to God, just as really existent, as I am. I am not a special person before God, one with a privileged status, while my poor old grandparents, tough luck to them, are out of the picture. We think of the present as receding into the past, as ceasing to exist, as no longer part of the real world. But to God that is nonsense. And to anyone who thinks of the really real as what is real to God, it is likewise nonsense. The present does not recede into the nothingness of the past; on the contrary, it adds another reality to the reality of the past and forms a unit with it.

This tallies rather neatly with the Lord's argument on the resurrection. The Lord God said to Moses, *I am the God of Abraham, the God of Isaac, and the God of Jacob.* And the Lord Jesus gave his

³ One may ask if Aristotle and Thomas Aquinas are *simul* in this sense. They are obviously not contemporaries. All of us here are contemporaries, as living at the same time, with the same when, in the same year 1996. But Aristotle and Aquinas lived in different centuries. Still, each is *simul* with God, and are not things that are *simul* with the same third thing *simul* also with one another? No, that doesn't quite work. We are talking of three whens, and in this case of three nows: the now of Aristotle, the now of Aquinas, and the now of God. The argument would work only if we understood "now" in the same sense for all three. But God is in an eternal now, while the other two nows are temporal. Aristotle and Aquinas are, and they are together in the universe of being, but they are not *simul* with one another.
Complacency and Concern in the Risen Life

exegesis, He is not the God of the dead but of the living. With the addendum in Luke's Gospel: For all things live to God. Well, the Lord God is the God of my great grandparents too, and the God of my grandparents, and the God of my parents; and if they have their being before God, then they are alive. For all things live to God.

We seem to be on the track of something here. What it means to be in time, what it means to be in a four-dimensional universe, what it means to be in the radical sense of “is,” what it means to be real before God, in God’s presence—there seems to be a trajectory here that maybe will help us understand what happens in our being after death.

2. Being after Death: Ontology

In most of what I’ve said so far I’ve had Lonergan’s On the Knowledge and Will of God as guide. His interest was in the course he was teaching (the providence of God) not in the resurrection. It seems to me that what he said has implications for the resurrection, but in trying to draw them out, I have to take personal responsibility. It’s time then to remind you that I’m presenting ideas that need to be weighed and judged. So here are my ideas on the resurrection: first, an ontology and then a psychology and subjectivity of the resurrection.

We begin by rejecting what according to my idea is a false trail. It starts, that trail, with the familiar question: What body does the soul return to in the resurrection? The supposition here is that the soul left a body old and wasted, or maybe young and diseased, or one crushed and mutilated by violence. Does the soul return to that body? or to the body one had in the prime of life? or to the body one had as an infant in all its innocence? Any choice we make seems open to objections and anyway arbitrary.

But maybe the question was wrong from the beginning. In the view I’m presenting, the soul leaves the corpse—in the sense that it casts it off—but it does not leave the body at all; on the contrary it extends its unifying and controlling power over the whole four-dimensional reality that soul and body together are during seventy years of life on earth (eighty, if we are strong, Psalm 89 tells us, but I will use seventy to stand for the normal totality). If we are going to think with the imagination, we have to think backwards here, over the seventy years from the last moment of life to the first, instead of forwards to death and burial.
For the soul is the formal unity of the living thing. A living thing is a unity-identity-whole, and it is the central form, what we call the soul, that gives the unity, identity, wholeness. If you are looking for the soul, you don't look for a part you can divide off; you look not for division but for summation: the summation of all our activities of seeing, feeling, wondering, loving—their summation and radication in a unity is the ensouled body.

Further, unity at a moment of time on earth becomes in eternity unity over the whole time of one's life. On earth the unifying and controlling functions of soul suffer the limitations of a being with a succession of whens; but in the life of eternity, all the whens are gathered together, and the soul can exercise its role, not just in the here and now of the present moment, but over the whole four-dimensional reality of the seventy years that is my life span.

So what happens in the resurrection? The soul, freed from the restrictions imposed on it by being at a certain when in time, takes full possession of the body, takes possession of the body as it is in God's presence, that is, in the totality of its life. Not then the wasted old body that was there at death, not the body as it was in the prime of life, and not the infant's body as it entered life, but the totality. What before was a partial possession becomes in eternity a total possession. And as the whole of my life is present all at once to God, so in the risen state the whole of it is present all at once to me. When we say Christ is alive, then, we mean he is alive with the whole of his thirty-three years, but now of course in the glorified state that traditional theology speaks of.4

4 It is not then a matter of the soul leaving the body; it is more a matter of the ensouled body ridding itself of the corpse, which is no longer a body at all, but a lot of dust held together artificially till decomposition sets in. There is an analogy with preembryonic material. The spermatozoon and the unfertilized ovum lose their identity in the union that begins a new life; they are excess baggage to the human life that is beginning; or at least they lie outside the totality of that life (Aristotle and Aquinas: "generatio unius formae corruptio alterius"). Similarly at the other end of life, the corpse is excess baggage to the soul that is free to take possession of the totality that a human being is; the corpse lies outside that totality. So the soul does not lack a body; it need not go in search of a body; it has a body, the one it has had for seventy years; it simply takes full possession of that body.

The primary application of this concept is, of course, to the risen Jesus. Christian scholars are struggling with the question whether the tomb was empty on Easter morning, but the view I have presented is compatible with whichever position the church takes. I would note, however, that the usual way of conceiving the
That is the ontological meaning I would give to human life after death, human life that is in continuity with life before death. And not just in continuity, but in partial identity. That has a consequence that affects our present life, our life on earth. For to think of some identity between the present and the afterlife, to think of our seventy years as being in eternity and perduring throughout eternity puts an entirely new perspective on those seventy years as we live them here.

There is a line of thought that I once took, and maybe most of us did, according to which we left our life in time behind us when we went forward to a better life. Life on earth was temporary, literally so, and had the limited value of the temporary. You could think, for an imperfect image, of scaffolding; scaffolding has a temporary value only, and is removed once the building is up. You could think, for a better image, of the day’s work and the pay at the end of the day; the work is over and left behind; we turn from it to receive our pay. You could think of preparations for travel, where the preparations may have little value except as contributing to the travel. You could think of the first and second editions of a book; the revised second edition makes the first obsolete. There are dozens of images we could think up to illustrate the way we thought of life on earth.

But I sense, without having a bibliography or opinion survey to support it, that many people today are restless with such a view of life in time. There is a widespread longing and a deeply felt need to find more lasting meaning and more intrinsic value in this life, to see this life as having meaning and value for its own sake.

The concept I presented responds to that need and longing. Life in time is not mere scaffolding; it is the building itself, going up brick by brick. It is not just work for pay; it is the payment itself, or part of it. It is not just preparatory as means to an end; it is an end in itself. It is not a first edition scrapped as obsolete when the revision is ready; it is a permanently readable chapter in a permanently readable volume.5

resurrection makes the empty tomb an a priori need for believers; the reason is that the resurrection needs a body, and the only “body” there is is the one that was laid in the tomb. In my conception the body of thirty-three years supplies the need; in the language of common sense, it is “there”; more metaphysically, it just “is.”

5 In other words, this life, just as it keeps its being through eternity, so also it retains its value forever. Archimedes did not simply bequeath a law of physics and pass on to leave it behind him; his eureka is his own permanent moment. And that,
It's traditional, of course, to think of the value of each moment of time—"Sixty golden minutes, each set with sixty diamond seconds"—but often it's conceived in terms of a later reward. From the present viewpoint, however, the present value is permanent, and it puts our daily struggles—Will I? Won't I?—in a new perspective to realize that our choice enters the universe of being forever.

There is a negative side to this. We speak of making up for lost time, and tend to apply this to our relation to God: I fail to respond to a grace today, but never mind, I can make up for it tomorrow. The truth is, we can never make up for it; it exists eternally as a lost opportunity. Of course, God can draw good out of evil; of course, there is special joy in heaven over the stray sheep that returned. Nevertheless, there is a permanent gap in the universe of being.

I will say more on such questions in my next section, for we have still to study the psychological meaning of life after death; that means a whole new consciousness. I have talked mainly of "being" in the risen life; I have still to say something on being "alive" in that happy state.

But, before leaving the ontology, there is a corollary worth mentioning. I have seen the resurrection ridiculed on the ground that there wouldn't be room on this earth for the multiplying generations: we would be packed in like sardines in a can. You can answer that in terms of space if you wish. But how much simpler to answer in terms of the reality, namely, in terms of the fourth dimension. That dimension can be extended without limit, making room for generation after generation without crowding, so that my great grandparents have their place and I have mine, and so will generations ten thousand years from now. If there is crowding, it will be in this life and have nothing to do with the resurrection.

3. Being after Death: Psychology

What I'm proposing is an eschatology from below. Eschatology from above has its definitive statement in John's Gospel: This is eternal it seems to me, will put a new face on our daily effort to have a better life in these seventy years, to create a better world, to be more aware of our responsibility at every moment for what we are making of ourselves (Lonergan's "existential" decision) and of our world.
life, to know thee, the one true God, and Jesus Christ whom thou has sent.

Our topic then is human life in the risen state, the “alive” in “being alive in eternity.” We are turning from the ontological to the psychological and spiritual, to conscious human living. We have to add the being of a subject to the being of a substance; we have the being of a substance when we are still fast asleep; we have the being of a subject when we wake up and take control of our destiny. What are the consequences of our idea for that aspect of the risen life?

In particular, how are we the subjects of our life in eternity? We are subjects of our living now and that remains part of our eternal reality. But we are subjects in the risen life too with a new consciousness deriving from the vision of God. Is there a new subjectivity also in regard to the seventy years? Are we the subject of those years twice? If there is a new subjectivity in their regard, how is it related to the already existing subjectivity?

A first point is negative; taking possession of the seventy years in eternity is not a reliving of them; it is not the seventy years “in fieri” all over again. They have their full reality already “in facto esse,” and there is no second run. To be concrete, we won’t experience that awful toothache again.

But, to make a second negative point, they will not be simply an object known as part of what we know in seeing God. Aquinas—and Augustine, I think—spoke of seeing everything “in Verbo,” in the Word that God is ceaselessly uttering. But for us that is knowledge of an object, and so far as that knowledge is given the saints, anyone can know me as an object just as well as I know myself. There has to be something less than the first of these two aspects, something less than a reliving, a second run; and something more than the second, something more than my life as an object. There has to be a new subjectivity.

How can we conceive this double subjectivity? I propose the concept of sublation. In Method Lonergan uses sublation for two main purposes: to relate the conversions to one another and to relate the levels of consciousness to one another: for example, the fourth level of decision sublates the third level of truth, and so on. But the first time I

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find him using the term in print is in a quite different context. In December 1964 he wrote "Subject and Soul," intending it primarily for its later use as the Introduction to *Verbum*, and sent it off to *Philippine Studies*. There he speaks of the method of Aquinas and his "delicate procedure of sublation that developed and transformed Aristotelian positions to the point where the incorporation of further and profounder doctrines became possible."\(^7\)

The importance of this for my purpose is not the fact that it is the first occurrence—if it is the first—but the fact that it is used for stages of thought and that the usage I would make is somewhat akin to that: there is a natural transition to the application of the idea to the stages of life in the here and the hereafter. For a classic account of sublation, however, we may use that of *Method*.

... what sublates goes beyond what is sublated, introduces something new and distinct, puts everything on a new basis, yet so far from interfering with the sublated or destroying it, on the contrary needs it, includes it, preserves all its proper features and properties, and carries them forward to a fuller realization within a richer context.\(^8\)

This I would apply, *mutatis mutandis*, to the relation of earthly life to the risen life. Consciousness in the risen life goes beyond earthly consciousness, introduces something new and distinct, puts earthly consciousness on a new basis. But it does not interfere with or destroy earthly consciousness; rather it includes it, preserves its relevant features and properties, and carries them forward to a fuller realization within a richer context.

You notice I omitted one clause: what sublates needs what is sublated. But I omitted it only to draw attention to it more sharply, to underline what is a main consequence of the idea I am presenting. The risen life needs the earthly life, not as a memory but as a present reality. To go back to my set of metaphors: earthly life is not just scaffolding to be discarded; it is not a period of work which we leave behind when we collect our pay; it is not just preparatory to something


\(^8\) *Method*, 241.
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better that replaces it; it is not a first edition that becomes obsolete with the publication of the revised version.

Or, to go back to metaphysics: all that God made is present to God in the divine eternity. Which means that it is; it simply is. We can use the language of temporal duration for this and say it goes on and on, that it remains forever and ever; we are forced to use such language when we try to imagine eternity, but it is a very deficient instrument with which to express eternal realities.

We can do a little better if we turn to the language of the poets—philosophers without philosophical pedigree, I called them years ago. Tennyson gives us the ever vanishing present: “Yet all experience is an arch where-thro’ Gleams that untravell’d world, whose margin fades Forever and forever when I move” (Ulysses). Now Keats gives us the exact counterpart of Tennyson; he found a way to arrest movement in an eternal moment; still he did so only at the cost of depriving that moment of life: “Bold Lover, never, never canst thou kiss, Though winning near the goal—yet, do not grieve; She cannot fade, though thou hast not thy bliss, Forever wilt thou love, and she be fair” (Ode on a Grecian Urn).

But if we would conceive the matter intellectually there is no way I know of except through the radical sense of “is.” Adam and Eve “are” chewing on that apple now, in God’s now and the now of the saints. Caesar “is” now crossing the Rubicon. Thomas “is” putting pen to paper now to write the Summa Theologiae. And what we are doing here and now, at this place and in this passing moment, is part of our eternal being; in the eternal now we are building a permanent home.

This means also that nothing of what is—or of whatever was in our temporal sequence—nothing of what is is lost. It is not lost to God; it is not lost to us in its radical being. There is loss to us here, there is loss to us now; we are only too conscious of that. Home and family, friends and dear ones—we lose them through families growing up and dispersing, more completely in death. We put forth strenuous efforts to keep them with us, to make them somehow present through pictures, keepsakes,

and so on. The real recovery is in the risen life, when we take possession of our real being. Our life becomes present not just in memory but as reality; present not as a reliving, a second run at life, but present in its being; present not just as object, the way it may be present to anyone, but present to me as its subject; present not as experienced all over again but present as sublated.

All this seems to be a rational conclusion from that little Chapter 3 of Lonergan's *On the Knowledge and Will of God*. But if so much be granted I need only one more step in order to speak of complacency and concern in the risen life. I must explain what sublation does concretely in the risen life. A preliminary answer to the question is not difficult, for we have an immediate analogy in the way the reflections and assessments of later life on earth sublate the thoughts, words, deeds, and omissions of earlier life.

There is a story about Samuel Johnson returning in his old age to the town where he grew up, and of his standing all day bareheaded in the marketplace. When he was a boy his father, feeling ill one day, had asked Samuel to take his place in the market bookstall, and Samuel had refused. He could not in old age undo what was when he was a boy and so forever is, but he could reflect and assess and perform his penance. What kind of penance there is in heaven I don't know, but I expect reflection and assessment to be there in abundance.

So all things are made new in the risen life. The sublating factor is new: there is new understanding, new truth, new affectivity. And the sublated life is made new in our knowledge and love through reflection and assessment. Even on earth we suddenly understand something that happened thirty years ago, something that remained in our memory as a half-conscious puzzle; now we see. Much more will this be the case in eternity.

Of course, the heavenly repossession of earthly life respects the hierarchy of human being and so also of human consciousness: experience, understanding, knowledge, moral integrity, love. That which is is the composite, and that which experiences, understands, knows, acts, loves is the composite. But within the composite there is a hierarchy, with a radical difference between the experiential level and the higher spiritual levels, all the difference between the animal kingdom and the human. The difference is reflected in the reality of the levels; the reality of understanding has a permanence even over time that is not
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shared by experience; this has advantages, for we need not repeat yesterday's experience in order to understand it today. Now the sublation too respects the hierarchy. Experience is sublated in its own way in understanding, and understanding in its own way in knowledge, and so on. Along these lines we might meet the obvious question of experience in the risen life, and relate the pain and joy of earthly life to the understanding, knowledge, moral integrity, love, and sublation of love that will characterize our life in eternity.

But that is only of the many directions in which the implications of the idea I have presented will ramify; they would all have to be fully explored before we could pronounce on the validity of the idea. Now among those implications are the consequences for complacency and concern in the risen life. Which brings me to what should have been the second part of this talk, the part I have had to leave unfinished, but which I will at least open up for discussion.

**COMPLACENCY AND CONCERN IN THE RISEN LIFE**

**SKETCH OF AN UNWRITTEN SECOND PART**

1. Complacency

If our life on earth is not destroyed but is sublated in the risen state, and if the sublation includes reflection on and assessment of our earthly life, maybe consists mainly in such reflection and assessment, then there is an obvious field for the attitude that, for lack of a proper word, we call complacency from the Latin *complacere*.

The basic step here is to admit into consciousness the whole reality of our seventy years. Of course, we must accept the universe too with its seeming nonsense and its chaos and its evil. But that is not a preoccupation for most of us. The problem for most of us is to accept our own selves and our own situation and our own involvement in the universe. To put it bluntly, in eternity we have to admit into consciousness that which we spend a good part of our life on earth excluding from consciousness; this step is basic to *complacere*. For it is basic to *complacere* to consent to being, to accept reality, to be in harmony with the world, to be at peace with our situation. In the present context that means we must admit into consciousness
memories we once hid behind a screen; we must allow to emerge into the light of day those experiences that all our life we kept suppressing.

Such acceptance of reality, I suggest, will form a good part of our purgatory. I spoke earlier of recovering all that we lose in the sadness of human life. But now I add that there are two sides to this coin, and the other side is coming to terms with the unpleasant past, the past we make such efforts to conceal from others, but more basically from ourselves. To face that past squarely, to accept it, to come to terms with it is a lifelong task, continued in eternity in the fires of purgatory—where the fire is simply the light of a fully alerted consciousness, and the purgatory is the dying struggle of our pride resisting the illumination.

But _complacere_ is a positive act and under that aspect we will see in our lives the love and mercy and providence of a God who made us, who assumes responsibility for us as the work of the divine hands, who despite all our failures kept on pursuing us for our good, directing our steps, as in Thompson’s _The Hound of Heaven_; Newman’s _Lead, Kindly Light_: “O’er moor and fen, o’er crag and torrent till The night is gone”; Bryant’s _To a Waterfowl_: the providence that “in the long way that I must tread alone Will lead my steps aright”; Lonergan’s _Caring about Meaning_: “When you learn about divine grace you stop worrying about your motives; somebody else is running the ship.”\(^{10}\) In the risen life we finally learn who was running the ship, we see the Captain at work.

2. **Concern**

What role, if any, does concern play in the risen life? Our first thought is to say: None whatever. After all, concern is a tendency toward the object loved, it is activity in pursuit of an end, it is process toward a term. None of this seems to belong in the state of the blessed which is one of rest after labor, a state of the end achieved, in which there will be no more mourning, and every tear will be wiped away. But if the basic meaning of concern is to look beyond what we are, to intend something better, then at least an eschatology from above would admit that form of intending which is a desire to penetrate more and more deeply into the divine mystery, a process that can and will go on.

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eternally. And that concern would overflow into consequences for an eschatology from below; for the more we penetrate into the divine mystery, the more clearly we will see the divine influence operating in our lives, God running the ship.

Further, there is the consideration that God too has divine concerns: In the beginning God created heaven and earth, and gave instructions on using well what was left in our hands. Not only that, but God so loved the world as to send the only-begotten for our salvation. Indeed, not a sparrow falls to the ground without God's protecting care. Are we to suppose that we will enjoy all God's eternal bliss, and not share in the divine concern for creation? Catholic devotion to the saints and confidence in their power of intercession would find their application here.

But I wonder if the contrast between complacency and concern does not vanish, or approach the vanishing point, in their perfect integration in eternal life. The stock instance, the classic case, is that of a departed mother praying in heaven for her erring son on earth. Of course she prays for him, but she does so serenely, at peace with what is. For there is no division in God between what God is and what God does. There is no conflict between the divine peace in being God ("placet sibi suum esse"\textsuperscript{11}) and the divine agape overflowing in creation and providence. When we become like God, we become like the whole of God, sharing in all the divine attributes.

We see a similarity here between Jesus saying, When I am lifted up I will draw everyone to myself, and Therese of Lisieux saying, After my death I shall let fall a shower of roses. Much more will we be assimilated in our risen concerns to the God whose holy word urges "that petitions and prayers, requests and thanksgivings be offered" for everyone. "This is good and it pleases God our Savior, who wants [everyone] to be saved and to come to know the truth" (1 Tim. 2: 1-4, \textit{Good News for Modern Man}).

I made a kind of apology in the beginning for my inability to write this second part of my talk, but in fact that was in a way a happy result for me of an unhappy infirmity. For it would not have been easy to return to serious study of articles I wrote forty years ago. Partly

\textsuperscript{11} Thomas Aquinas, \textit{Contra Gentiles} 1, 72, # 4; see \textit{Theological Studies} 20 (1959) 220, 347.
because of the forty years, but much more because those articles were
an instance for me of writing that enters deeply into what we are. I grew
with them, the growing was quite a bit like growing up, and wonderful
experience though it be, who wants to go back and grow up all over
again?

I am far more interested in the first part of this paper, the area of
my present growth. Still, the second part too is on the table along with
the first for your additions or objections or comments or questions.

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RESTING IN REALITY: REFLECTIONS ON CROWE’S “COMPLACENCY AND CONCERN”

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INTRODUCTION

When I defended my dissertation in October of 1994, Fred Lawrence asked me a question about Fr. Frederick Crowe’s series of articles entitled Complacency and Concern in the Thought of St. Thomas. He wanted to know how my project might be enhanced or undermined by Fr. Crowe’s work in those articles. It was a very straightforward question. The only problem was that I had not read the articles. Holding my breath, I admitted my ignorance of the articles. Not skipping a breath, and much to my relief, Fred went on to another question; but soon after that defense Fred asked me to prepare a talk for this gathering; the talk on Fr. Crowe’s articles on complacency and concern. This is my response to that defense question, almost two years late!

This paper has five parts. The first part is a summary of Fr. Crowe’s position by highlighting significant points he argues in Complacency and Concern in the Thought of St. Thomas. The second part is a brief comment about the shift from faculty psychology to intentionality analysis. In a third part I offer a beginning transposition of the insight on complacency into the context of intentionality analysis. In a fourth part I will suggest a contemporary field of application for this important insight. In a last, very brief, part I will suggest a spiritual exercise which arises from this insight, an exercise which promises much fruit.
COMPLACENCY AND CONCERN IN THE THOUGHT OF ST. THOMAS

1a. A Summary of Crowe's Position

The main thesis of this series of articles is that St. Thomas has a notion of love which is two-fold. There is love that is a resting in, an affective response to, a complacency in, a concord with, the good that is. There is also the love that is a tendency toward possession of the good. Crowe argues that the first form of love, complacentia boni, is the primary act of the will. The will is first the term of a process and only subsequently the principle of a process. To organize these two forms of love Crowe suggests the duplex via as a framework. One way is the passive process of receiving which is exemplified in the process of knowing. There is also the active process of causation as exemplified in the artist's activity by which an artifact is caused to exist, an artifact that was first an idea in the mind of the artist. Within this framework Fr. Crowe summarizes his work in the first article:

Love as complacency is a term in the via receptionis, coming at the end of the process; it is found in this form in the proceeding love of the Holy Trinity; in the passive aspect of willing, in the simple harmony, agreement, correspondence resulting when the will is adjusted affectively to the good independent of all desire. Love as tendency is at the beginning of the via motionis; it is most evident in appetite, desire, the pursuit of beatitude, but perhaps is to be discovered also in an analogous and higher form in the agape which desires to give and communicate the self or what the self has.¹

Fr. Crowe also contends that St. Thomas does not fully integrate this two-fold notion of love so that there arise unintegrated positions in various aspects of Thomas' thought. These unintegrated positions are the subject of the second of these articles. Be that as it may, the notion of complacentia boni can still supply the corrective that Crowe desires for both the contemporary theological separation of eros and agape and the existentialist emphasis on the human project and the attendant

anxiety. In the third article Crowe offers his suggestion in terms of a corrective.

1b. The Highlights

I would like to begin this section with a quote from this series of articles because it captures the motive of Fr. Crowe’s study of St. Thomas, as well as his study of Bernard Lonergan.

As long as developing history continues to generate new problems and new ideas, there will be occasion to go back to Aquinas for what he is so eminently qualified to supply towards solution of the problems and judgment on the ideas, namely a set of fundamental principles which, just because they are fundamental, allow of infinite adaptation. It is not necessarily a matter of finding the answer there in so many words, but of reaching a solid ground, a fixed orientation, a panoramic view whose heuristic value is incalculable; it is a matter of discovering and exploiting the assimilative capacity of old but ultimate ideas.

In this text on the notions of complacency and concern Fr. Crowe does uncovers a set of relations which may be able to address some contemporary issues. If Thomas himself did not have to address these issues, we must find in Thomas' framework the tools for unraveling and reweaving the contemporary conundrums of which Crowe speaks.

I want to highlight what I consider significant points in Crowe’s argument about the priority of complacency in the operation of the ethical subject.

The first point which Fr. Crowe’s discussion of the will in Aquinas makes is that the dominant strain in Thomist moral psychology and ethics is that the will is to be understood as the faculty which tends toward the good as known. The activity of the will is characterized as a movement toward the end:

...the dominant notion of voluntary activity has taken the will as an appetitive faculty whose essential act is inclination manifested in tendency: the will regards an end, and its activity is process towards that end.

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2 Crowe, 6.
3 Crowe, 1.
Crowe points out that the very title of the second and third parts of the *Summa Theologiae* emphasizes this dominant notion: "motus rationalis creaturae in Deum [the movement of the rational creature toward God]." The will moves toward the end. An end is that which is judged good by the intellect. It is not the will's activity to judge something good or not good. It is the will's activity to proceed toward possession of the end.

This dominant understanding of the activity of the will gives rise to the term "concern" in Crowe's title. The will is oriented toward, concerned with, tending toward, in process toward, on the way to, the good that is judged by intellect as good. These terms denote action on the part of the will. The will receives the word from the intellect and moves to possess the good that is known. No one can quarrel with the assertion that the will as an appetitive and active faculty is central to Thomas' treatise on the will in the *Summa*.

A second point centers on the main topic of these articles. However correct it is to assert the dominance of the notion of will as tendency in the *Summa*, Crowe wants to argue that there is another, different, notion that is heard occasionally throughout that same work. This different notion is given the name "complacency." It is introduced within a discussion of love which Crowe claims is the more basic notion of will to be found in St. Thomas. It is the ground for understanding a two-fold of love in conscious life: first, the love that is "passive, quiescent, complacent;" second, the love that is "active, striving, tending to an object". However dominant the second is in St. Thomas, Crowe claims throughout these articles that the first "is basic both psychologically and ontologically"\(^4\); and it is a Thomist idea capable of addressing contemporary issues.

What is the import of this distinction? Crowe concedes that Thomas did not completely work out the implications of this two-fold understanding of love. (The claim that a brilliant thinker has not integrated is not something new to me since my dissertation begins with the claim that Lonergan never integrated his claims about the role of feelings in ethics.) Crowe provides a framework for maintaining the distinction in terms of an integration which presents Thomas with several serious difficulties.

\(^4\) Crowe, 3.
Before the will moves toward the good that is known, the will rests in the knowledge of the good. As Crowe states:

...the will, before being the faculty of the appetite, of process to a term, is the faculty of affective consent, of acceptance of what is good, of concord with the universe of being, and that the basic act of will is to be understood only if it is regarded not as an impulse to a term, or even the principle of process to a term qua principle, but simply as itself a term.\textsuperscript{5}

Crowe provides evidence for his claim about the will as \textit{complacentia boni} as primarily a resting in the goodness of reality. Not a scholar of Thomist texts, I will say only that my own limited reading of Thomas supports Crowe’s claims regarding Thomas’s indication of the relationship of “acceptance” by the will of what is. This “consent,” this “concord,” this “acceptance” of the will is a resting of the will in what is known through intelligent grasp and reasonable affirmation. Subsequent to this resting the will moves toward the good that is known.

A third point that I would like to highlight is the framework in which these two notions of love are understood. The \textit{duplex via} is used by Thomas in a variety of places, yet never given any particular prominence. However, Crowe notes that it recurs often enough to warrant its relevance as a way to make the data on love coherent. He finds the clearest articulation of the framework in Thomas’ discussion of the reciprocal priority of intellect and of will. This discussion is found in \textit{De Veritate}, q. 14 where Thomas distinguishes between \textit{in via receptionis} and \textit{in via motionis}. The intellect moves the will insofar as the intellect supplies the will with a desirable object. The will moves the intellect insofar as the will moves the intellect to discover the means to an end.

Another discussion in which this \textit{duplex via} is evident is in the two-fold order of knowledge. There is knowledge that is received from things (\textit{via receptionis}) and the knowledge that is causative of things (\textit{via motionis}).\textsuperscript{6} In the former the form of the thing is received by the intellect insofar as the intellect understands what a thing is. In the latter the form is in the intellect, as the painting is in the mind of the painter, and thus is causative of the thing to which it gives form.

\textsuperscript{5} Crowe, 4.
\textsuperscript{6} Crowe, 11.
Within this framework, Crowe claims, the passive and active dimensions of love can be brought together in a way that safeguards the integrity of each dimension. In the *via receptionis* love is passive, responding affectively to being. In the *via motionis* love is active, tending toward that which is good. The will, then, can be understood as the faculty of two motions. First, the motion as a change in the will where the will is the term of a movement from the thing, through knowledge of the thing, to the will. Second, the motion as a change in the will where the will is the principle of movement toward the good as end. The will is first a term of knowledge. Once the term is reached, then the will becomes principle of subsequent action in regard to the good. The obscurity of this two-fold movement often leads us to miss the quiescence of the will in what is, although it has a psychological and ontological priority over the tendential character of the will.

A fourth fundamental point in Crowe's work is the priority of intellect over will, illustrated by the relationship between faith and charity. In the generation of the theological virtues faith is prior to charity because one cannot love what one does not know. Charity responds to what is known by faith. "The basic act of will is a term rather than a principle". More importantly, it is simply a term. No parallel holds between the procession of insight to word and the procession in the will from the intellect. The resultant act of responds to what is, rests in what is, contemplates what is. As a particular virtue, charity is *complacentia boni*; as the mother of all virtues, it is *intentio finis*.

A fifth point: to further demonstrate his contention about *complacentia boni* Crowe introduces the discussion of the Trinitarian processions. Since Augustine theologians have employed an analogy from human consciousness in order to understand the divine life of the triune God. If the act of the will is to move toward the good in order to possess it, the procession of the Holy Spirit from the Father and the Word is understood on the analogy of will as a movement toward possession of the good. This would imply that God needs the proceeding Spirit in order to complete Himself. Human experience of the will as tending always entails a sense of incompleteness. Is the life of God incomplete so that the Holy Spirit must be understood as moving

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7 Crowe, 14.
toward what will complete God? If, as Crowe suggests, the basic act of will is quiescence in what is, then we can avoid this interpretation of the Trinitarian processions. From this more nuanced account of human consciousness, one can understand that the Holy Spirit proceeds as love from the Father as Utterer and the Word. The Spirit is analogous to quiescence in what is—in this case, the unrestricted intelligibility of God, conceived and uttered in the Word.

Sixth, Crowe bases the movement of human love on a more general treatment of motion. Every agent of motion either repels or attracts that which is moved. In the case of attraction, Crowe points out three moments, “the agent first gives an indication or aptitude for being moved; secondly, it gives motion (if the body be not already a term of motion); thirdly, it gives rest in the term.” Applying this three-fold analysis to the field of sensitive appetites, the agent becomes the good which gives an “inclination,” or “appetite,” or “connaturality” towards the good. In other words, the subject responds in love to that which gives an “inclination.” The agent then gives motion towards acquisition of it as “desirable.” Lastly, it gives rest in its possession. The three moments can be characterized by the following terms: complacency, desire, and joy. St. Thomas speaks of the connaturality of the will to that which is good and he designates this connaturality as a natural, rational love. There is first a movement of appetite which is a mere complacency in the object as known quite distinct from any subsequent movement toward possession of the object. St. Thomas says this is the principle of all further action toward the good.

A seventh point: Crowe also demonstrates that the general notion of *velle* manifests a similar structure in which the relationship of conscious subject’s will to the good is initially a *complacentia boni*. Again the beatific vision is the complete *complacentia boni* since one is in union with all that is. Such a completeness is only imperfectly mirrored in the complacency in the finite good experienced by the conscious subject in relationship to what is known by intelligent grasp and reasonable affirmation.

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8 Crowe, 26.
9 Crowe, 26.
10 Thomas Aquinas, *Summa Theologiae* 1-2, q. 26, a. 2c.
To summarize, Crowe demonstrates that there is a passive act of the will prior to any tending toward the good. This passive act is "an affective response to the good that is, rather than a seeking in any form, selfish or self-giving, of the good that is not". The quiescence of the will is difficult to raise to explicit awareness, because of the predominance of concerned human action in the world. Busy about our many concerns, we have lost a sense of resting in what is, instead of striving to bring what is not into existence. The emphasis on concerned human activity has also led to a growing existential dread in the face of the future when so much human activity seems to have proven useless and meaningless in the face of growing absurdity.

We now turn to some of the issues in the second of Fr. Crowe's articles. Let us briefly look at potential areas of conflict between the two notions of love.

Regarding the idea of the good itself, on the one hand, Thomas insists that the good is the object of appetite as tendency; the good is a perfection of being and all things desire their own perfection. On the other hand, the convertibility of being and the good suggests another way of understanding the good. One can speak of being in itself or being in relation to another. One mode of being in relation is termed convenientia, a term which has been variously translated as "agreement," "harmony," or "correspondence." Such a relation characterizing being in general entails a nature open to such a relation, namely, the soul which has appetitive and cognitional powers. As cognitive the relation is termed the "true" and as appetitive the relation is termed the "good." From the convertibility of being and the good there follows an affective harmony with what is that renders complacentia boni intelligible. As perfective, the good is the object of love as appetitive; as simply harmonious with the affective will, the good is the object of love as complacent. Which approach is more illuminating? How can they be integrated with one another?

As regards the good-for-me, Crowe refers to Pierre Rousselot's suggestion that either love is ecstatic (that is, for the other and so no reference to self is involved) or love is physical (in the sense of pertaining to a physis or nature), and so all love is self-love. Rousselot

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11 Crowe, 18.
12 Crowe, 202.
argues that Thomas held for physical love. Along with other Thomist scholars, Crowe suggests that the predominant notion of love in Thomas is physical, but there is enough evidence to argue that Thomas also accepted what Rousselot calls ecstatic love. This latter Crowe finds in complacency. However, is love, even the love of complacency, ever not self-love? According to Crowe the affective correspondence between the subject and being is self-love only in the sense that the subject has a faculty which is oriented toward being. Insofar as this faculty is oriented toward being in general, the affective correspondence is not self-love in the sense of desiring one's own perfection but rather perhaps self-love only in the sense that the affective correspondence does perfect the subject by reason of bringing about the simple affective correspondence to being.

As regards the order of judging the good and willing it, Thomas's dominant teaching is that we must judge a thing good before we can love it. However, according to Crowe, the convertibility of being and the good is based on the fact that the primary object of the will is not the good but being. The good is defined through a notional relation added to being, and we judge and will the good by judging and willing being. Both intellect and will are related to being by corresponding, distinct notions: the true and the good. If will is related to being primarily, then we first know being, then love being, then proclaim its goodness. In fact, because we love being we proclaim its goodness. Crowe expresses this succinctly: "Things are; we know things are, and, knowing our knowing, call them true; we love the things that are, and knowing our loving, call them good".13 He goes on to say that "there is first judgment of being, then there is mere affective response in the will, or correspondence, or complacency, or, if you like, consent to being".14 Because we are dominated by a search for what is perfective or to be acquired, we have difficulty attending to this often subtle affective response.

Turning to the distinction between speculative and practical intellect, Crowe says that speculative intellect regards being and in the knowing of being moves the will to affective harmony with what is. Practical intellect also moves the will but this movement is of the appetite in pursuit of the good as intentio finis. So both speculative and

13 Crowe, 208.
practical intellect move the will; the motion in each case being of a different kind.

As for the possession of the good, there is possession of the good in the resting of appetite in the completion of its movement toward the good. However, there is also a resting of will in the good that is. Thomas says that the good is possessed by intellect, by understanding. To the judgment of being there corresponds an affective response. The good that is known can be of three kinds: 1) that which is and is understood, 2) that which is and not yet completely understood but consented to with the hope of further understanding, and 3) the good that is known yet its potentiality is recognized and actuality desired. In any case what comes first is a complacency in the good that is known in the judgment of being, whether that good is understood, inadequately understood, or understood as potential. Once this complacency is achieved, the shift to the via motionis may occur.

Understanding complacency in God helps us get beyond both the intentio boni as the only valid interpretation of Thomas’ teaching on the will, and the analogy for the Trinitarian processions that compares the Spirit to a tendency toward what is needed for perfection. However, since God is always already perfect, complacentia boni is a better analogy for the procession of the Spirit from the Father and the Son. The Word proceeds from the Father’s unrestricted act of understanding; the Spirit proceeds from the Word, uttered by the Father, as complacency in what is, Being, God. Similarly, the creative act of God is not an act of a being in potency moving toward act, but an act of God’s love, completely free.

Finally, as regards religious life, there has been a centuries-long discussion about the relationship between contemplation and action. The primary virtue of charity is realized in action for and with one’s fellow creatures, while charity (love of God) is also the goal, or end, of religious life, which can only be achieved through a contemplation of God, of Being, of what is. In some places Thomas puts active charity above the contemplative variety; at others, he also speaks of the priority of love of God achieved through contemplation. According to Crowe, the love of God for religious is complacentia boni even as the conditions for

15 Crowe, 217.
such a love are fulfilled through a series of virtuous acts, which themselves are guided by charity in the *via motionis*.

In treating all these issues Crowe shows how in spite of Thomas's not having fully integrated the *duplex via* in the will's relation to the good, there is still the potential for a rich harvest of applications.

Crowe's retrieval of the Thomist teaching on the will rests on Bernard Lonergan's recovery of the "rational character of love in its procession from the word of intellect. To say that love is a rational act in the field of rational consciousness is to say that it is an *emanatio intelligibilis* from a mental word, from a judgment, from an affirmation of what is." As Crowe says, this formulation downplays the more dominant notion of the will oriented toward the not-yet and directs our attention to the existing world and the will's passive response to it.

On what basis can we claim that the will is a passive recipient of the word of judgment? What corroborates this claim that judgment of what is gives rise to an affective response of the will? Crowe calls upon the notion of natural spontaneities. A child is known to constantly ask questions and when answers are given, no matter how fanciful, the child delights in whatever "order" arises in her world. Gratitude is the response of a child when the parent "explains" the lightning, and Santa Claus, and the tooth fairy. Can we not claim that this delight and gratitude is the inchoate response of the child's will to what is known? Yes, Crowe proclaims, and we can notice this in our own consciousness whenever we arrive at knowledge of what is: the delight, the gratitude, the joy. This is not to deny that usually we almost immediately also understand what is lacking and desire to pursue what is perfective, the *intentio boni*. But to race to that which is lacking, is to run the risk of missing the richness of the good that is. This is the crux of Crowe's articles on complacency and concern.

2. *From Faculty Psychology to Intentionality Analysis*

Before I attempt the transposition from faculty psychology of Crowe's recovery of complacency and concern, I would like to explain the

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16 Crowe, 229.
17 Crowe, 345.
18 Crowe, 345.
19 Crowe, 369.
significance of the shift from faculty psychology to intentionality analysis. In one place Lonergan typifies this in terms of a shift from logic to method. Instead of focusing on propositions, one focuses on concrete human subjects. In order to appreciate Fr. Crowe’s work we have to situate it in an analysis of human subjectivity.

For classical and medieval thinking, metaphysics is the queen of the philosophical world, with all other reflection under its dominance. The object of metaphysics is being as such. Any other science, including rational psychology, is about being in a qualified sense. Metaphysics as the first science supplies all other sciences with their basic terms and relations. Cognitional activity, then, must be explored in terms of metaphysics. Logic prevailed over cognitional theory. From metaphysical terms and relations, logic arrives at the conclusions of a particular science through the inexorability of deduction.

The modern turn to the subject focuses on the activities of human subjectivity as the starting point for philosophical reflection. Lonergan makes this turn, arguing that the foundation for metaphysics is to be found in the process of self-appropriation rather than in the deductions of logic. Logic begins with abstract propositions; the method of self-appropriation begins with concrete human subjects. Logic is not abandoned; it plays a valuable role in the method of self-appropriation. However, its role is not central to the project as it is in classical Thomistic metaphysics.

What is intentionality analysis? It begins with attending to one’s consciousness. Allow me to list the activities one will find if he or she adverted to his or her consciousness. These activities are: seeing, hearing, tasting, touching, smelling, bodily movement, feeling (of various kinds), imagining, remembering, wondering, asking questions, struggling to answer them, analyzing one’s experience, understanding, expressing that understanding, wondering if one is correct, marshaling the evidence, seeking confirmation from one’s own store of acquired insights or from a community of fellow questioners, grasping the virtually unconditioned, asserting a positive or negative judgment on one’s understanding, questioning the value of what one has come to know, responding to the

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value/disvalue of what one has come to know, questioning one's course of action in regard to this value/disvalue, deliberating about possible courses of action, marshaling the resources of one's own experience and the wisdom of the community of which one is a member, grasping the relative value of these courses of action, choosing one course of action and realizing it in action.

Lonergan's analysis of this long series of activities has yielded a short-hand account of the activities of human consciousness: Experiencing, Understanding, Judging and Deciding. Each of these activities displays a normativity which, if heeded by the subject, grounds objective judgments of fact and judgments of value. The world that exists is known through the combination of experiencing, understanding and judging. Just as knowing is a compound activity so the object that is known is a compound object. That which is intended by experience is the potentially intelligible. That which is intended by understanding is the formally intelligible. That which is intended by judging is the actually intelligible. Only with the assertion of judgment is reality known. What is known is what exists. There is no reality outside of what exists. So, when the human subject heeds the normative exigencies of consciousness, revealed through the method of self-appropriation, objective knowing is assured. The same can be said for objective valuing. When the human subject asserts a judgment of value, produced by an authentic adherence to the demands of conscious intentionality, what is pronounced valuable is valuable, independently of the one who is valuing.

Thus, intentionality analysis examines the activities of concrete human consciousness. It notes that some conscious activities are intentional, in the sense that an object is made present by their operation. As intentional, these intentional operations can supply a foundation for a methodical metaphysics, offering a way to critically control the meaning of the various metaphysical terms and relations. When confusion arises in metaphysical discussion, an appeal can be made to the data of consciousness which supply the concrete specification of the terms and relations of metaphysics. Whereas classical philosophy begins with metaphysics and deduces a cognitional

21 For the sake of brevity, and because there are other, more eloquent discussions of this issue, I am not going to discuss of either a psychic level or a fifth level constituted by falling in love.
theory (faculty psychology), a methodical philosophy will begin by analyzing conscious intentionality of an incarnate subject. On this unrevisable foundation one can account for objectivity, metaphysics and the human good, which will enable the human community to continue the quest for the more effective guidance of the unrestricted desire to know and love. This is the source rather than the effect of abstract metaphysics.

C. A Transposition of Complacency

We can know ask whether we can discern what Crowe calls *complacentia boni* in the operational flow of intentional consciousness? If the thesis of his series of articles is correct, then such a discernment ought to be possible. I find the complacency in the goodness of being to be an element in the flow of human consciousness. What I mean by complacency may be designated as concord, or resting, or harmony. In these feeble attempts to translate the insight which *complacentia boni* articulates in the medieval context language limps along until a conversation can distill the best term.

If there is an element in the flow of conscious intentionality which corresponds to *complacentia boni*, I think that Crowe is correct when he says that the discernment of complacency is a difficult achievement. There is so much that militates against an awareness of complacency, such as the prevailing existentialist motto that we are the decisions that we have made. As Lonergan so often wrote: authenticity must decide what authenticity wants to become. The emphasis on becoming, on the future, on our project, tends to obscure the subtle yet real complacency.

A first clue to discovering that there is some such element to human consciousness is Crowe’s suggestion to attend to what he calls “our natural spontaneities”.22 When a child asks questions about the world and her questions are greeted by the enthusiastic answers of a parent or teacher, however nominal the answer might be, the response of the child is gratitude. Crowe suggests, rightly I think, that such a response is evidence of a natural, spontaneous, orientation of human consciousness to what is. We desire to know that which is around us; following upon achieved knowledge is joy or gratitude.

22 Crowe, 369.
Allow me to clarify. I am not suggesting that children are authentically affective in every way. Yet children do still manifest in a clear way the natural love for what is. The wonder of children and their resulting joy and awe in response to the meanings discovered in their world provides a field in which *complacentia boni* can be discerned.

The developmental psychologist Erik Erikson tells us that the first task of human development is to acquire a basic trust in the universe. This is mediated, at first, through the attentiveness of the parents, but later it is mediated through their affirmation of the inquisitiveness of the young mind. However fanciful might be the “answer” to the question about thunder and lightning, for example, the child relishes the meaning of her world that is enshrined in the answer. Spontaneously, human consciousness is oriented toward what is. This orientation is rooted deeply in a psyche which seeks to establish a secure foothold in the world. That security is mediated to reasonable consciousness through the answers that are discovered. In the case of the child, the virtually unconditioned of judgment is reached through assent based on the trustworthiness of the parent or teacher. In the case of the adult, the virtually unconditioned is reached through a marshaling of evidence, part of which are accumulated beliefs, and part of which are the immanently generated further relevant questions and answers of the intelligent and reasonable subject. However, the achievement of a virtually unconditioned elicits the natural spontaneity of consciousness in the childlike response of joy or gratitude.

Fr. Crowe presents complacency as a response to knowledge. The true is known and, as known, is the object of a response of love which may then lead to a judgment about the goodness of the known. I agree with this presentation and suggest further that *complacentia boni* can be further differentiated in accord with the various patterns of experience in which it occurs.

To be stopped in one’s tracks by the music of Mozart or the beauty of a sunset is to operate in the aesthetic pattern of experience. To grasp the meaning of Chapter Five of *Insight*, and to be awed by its enormous relevance, is to operate in the intellectual pattern of experience. To puzzle out the intricacies of an air-conditioning unit, successfully installing it in one’s bedroom window, and to respond with satisfaction at one’s achievement, is to operate in the common-sense pattern of experience. In each pattern of experience *complacentia boni* is
experienced as the term of the process initiated by the openness of intentional consciousness to what is.

Limiting our discussion to the first three levels of consciousness whose operations constitute human knowing allows us to begin to understand the role of complacentia boni as a response to what is known. However, does complacency also occur on the fourth level of consciousness whose operations constitute the subject as a chooser? In the language of faculty psychology complacency is the term of the process of knowing while it is the principle of the process of doing. From that perspective, complacency as a resting in response to the good that is seems limited to the faculty of human knowing whereas complacency as the principle of action concerns the field of human choice. In the language of intentionality analysis, complacency is the response of the subject to that which is known in a judgment of fact. This response, then, is a resting, a quiescence, in what exists. As complacency in the good, such a response is not identical with the deliberative insight which grounds a judgment of value but it might be a necessary, although not sufficient, condition for the occurrence of such an insight. In other words, in the subject operating on the fourth level of consciousness, as intending the good, complacentia boni is a necessary condition for the occurrence of an authentic judgment of value. It is not a sufficient condition for such a judgment, but a necessary one. Authentic human subjectivity on the fourth level of consciousness is conditioned by complacentia boni by resting in the good that is.

That is a very provocative statement. Authentic subjectivity is rooted in an adherence to the dynamism of human consciousness. That dynamism is articulated in the transcendental precepts: Be Attentive, Be Intelligent, Be Reasonable, Be Responsible. If I am faithful to these precepts, then the dynamism of my consciousness will be satisfied. It is not a self-centered satisfaction sought because I don't want to feel the anxiety of infidelity. No! The rest, the quiescence, that is achieved in the fulfillment of the transcendental precepts is the natural term of the natural process of conscious intentionality whose object is being as mediated by knowledge of fact and knowledge of value. I suggest that what Thomas calls natural love is what occurs when the human subject is faithful to the exigencies of his or her conscious life. That natural love will vary in degrees of purity insofar as the subject's fidelity to the unrestricted desire to know and to love governs the other desires.
Among the many questions that remain to be asked and answered is a basic one. Do we experience *complacentia boni* in our conscious activities? Given our cultural tendency to want to act, to change the world, to conquer it, to manipulate it, to instrumentalize it, I found it quite difficult to discern the subtle change referred to by the term complacency. As difficult as it was to discern it, it is even more difficult to communicate it effectively. It is most discernible in the dramatic turning points of one's life—those moments out of which come life-changing, or life-enhancing, decisions. I will recount one such in my life, not for the sake of self-dramatization, but as an image or example to facilitate the requisite insight in your minds.

One of the dramatic biases at work in my life was the belief that I had placed myself beyond the pale of God's love. This belief was rooted in a sense of guilt deep in my psyche and which I found impossible to escape. However, I thought that I could somehow cover over my ontological shame with many good works. This is the recipe for a long life of distrust in a God who might never accept my good works as good enough. In this existential stance toward God there are, of course, echoes of a parent figure for whom good is never good enough!

Several years ago I had the good fortune to staff a six-day retreat for families in New Hampshire. One of the rituals of the retreat was a mime performed by five young people. The characters were: Jesus, Mary Magdalene, Peter, Lazarus, and a child. The mime cannot be done justice in words, since its power is not simply conveyed by words, but by music and gesture as well. However, a brief description of the mime should suffice to suggest the experience I want to highlight. The mime is about story of Jesus' life. At the beginning each of the disciple figures is down in a fetal, closed, position. The Jesus figure comes to each, lifts each up, embraces them with a smile, and invites them into a circular dance. The mime unfolds and these same disciple figures crucify Jesus. After witnessing the death of the Jesus figure, the four disciple figures return to their original fetal, closed, positions. The Jesus figure rises from death, goes to each disciple, and in exactly the same way as at the beginning, lifts each up, embraces each with a smile and invites each into a circular dance.

Watching this mime I suddenly understood and judged correctly that it is not my good works that make me acceptable to God, but God loves my being, my existence, who I am, my personhood, with all of my
shame, guilt, fears, dreams, hopes. And the response to that knowledge? I did not experience a tendency to deliberate, choose, and act. I simply rested in that knowledge and the tears streamed down my face. I was struck immobile by the drama that had unfolded before me.

Complacentia boni does not imply an action in which the subject moves toward possession of that which is judged valuable. Complacentia boni denotes the resting of the subject in that which is known, not as good, but as true. It is a spontaneous response to what is, to what is real. There is a natural affinity between human consciousness and reality known through experiencing, understanding and judging. Complacentia boni is realized only in response to a judgment of fact, although it continues to play a role in possible subsequent processes of deliberation.

The affective response of the subject to that which is known is not the answer to a question. It is not the answer to the question: Is it good? It is, rather, a necessary, though not sufficient, condition for an answer to that question. I think we must hold with Fr. Crowe that the affective response is a response to knowledge of fact, not to knowledge of value. Hence, knowledge of a thing or scheme of recurrence is followed by an affective response of love to the existence of the thing or scheme of recurrence, which is followed in turn by a judgment that the thing or scheme is good. The affective response is an actuation and manifestation of the spontaneous orientation of human consciousness to that which is. That which is is known to exist only through a judgment of fact. So, on the third level of consciousness the term is a judgment of fact which is complemented by an affective response. The affective response is a mediated response to some aspect of existence. It is mediated by the operations of the first three levels of experience. So, the affective response of love is not a knowing of fact. It is a distinct activity of consciousness which is conditioned by the authentic knowing of the subject. Underlying all the cognitional activities of the subject is the pure desire to know. It is this desire which will not accept obscurantism and which demands the virtually unconditioned of judgment. Authenticity in cognitional activity is adherence to the demands of the pure desire to know. Spontaneously, the human subject is oriented toward what exists. Knowledge of what exists is achieved through a judgment of fact. The process initiated in the questioning of experience rests when the judgment of fact is made.
This resting is the complacency of which Fr. Crowe writes. It is complacency in the good that is! What exists does not become good because I judge it to be good. It is good and my knowledge of its goodness changes me, the knower; it does not change the object of that knowledge. If the convertibility of the transcendentalists (being, the true, and the good) has any meaning, it is that being is true and good, regardless of my knowledge of its truth or its goodness. My knowledge of its truth and goodness conditions my ability to participate in the ongoing emergence of the universe, but it does not condition the truth or goodness of the being that already exists.

The question of value, Is it good?, is a further question following upon the knowledge of “it.” The affective response to what is is not a judgment of value. The naturally spontaneous response to being is not a judgment of value. A judgment of value is a personal act precisely because by positing the judgment the subject is making claims about the kind of world he or she lives in and the kind of character he or she has. The affective response does not take the place of the personal testimony of the judgment of value. However, the affective response is a necessary condition for an authentic judgment of value. The question for deliberation is answered through a process of deliberation which involves a sifting of the evidence as to the value of that which is known. A crucial aspect of the data is the affective response. The subject must advert to this response, its presence or absence, its relative intensity, in the process of deliberation if he or she wants to reach an authentic judgment of value.

I have repeatedly made the claim that *complacentia boni* is a necessary condition for authentic subjectivity. It seems that I am demanding from the human subject a certain affective response, or feeling if you will, in order to achieve authenticity. Whether or not I am demanding such a response is irrelevant. What is relevant is that the structure of human intentionality, driven by the intention of the true and the good, demands that this intention be fulfilled. Fr. Crowe mentions the beatific vision as the moment when the unrestricted desire to know will be fulfilled completely. Until then imperfect fulfillment of that desire to know is what is accessible to us, and as accessible, it is a condition for responsible performance in the world. Complacency in the good that is constitutes the affective dimension of the fulfillment of the unrestricted desire to know as realized in a limited judgment of fact.
What can we make, then, of people whose affectivity is disoriented, or whose natural and spontaneous harmony with being has been disrupted or disordered? Fr. Crowe speaks to this point briefly when he introduces the practice of spirituality, or religious asceticism, as a purgative instrument, making the heart, or will, ready to be responsive, or in tune with, the intention of the true and the good. The need for a heart that is open and in tune with being demands a pedagogy which is interested in more than an intellectual grasp of what is, but is also interested in a formation of the heart such that a knowledge of what is will be greeted, as well, by an affective response to what is known. In what might that pedagogical methodology might consist?

D. A Contemporary Application

As Fr. Crowe suggested in his text, the discussion of complacentia boni is quite beside the point if it has no contemporary application. I would like to suggest a possible point at which the notion of complacency might provide a contemporary corrective. Our century is overwhelmed by concern. This concern manifests itself in the ecological movement, the feminist movement, the reform movements in the Church, the advances of medicine and science which seek to meet the needs of the community and the ongoing calls for social justice. We are so concerned to change the world at our doorsteps that we rarely stop and notice that world for what it is, for its own sake. I would like to discuss briefly one manifestation of this dominant concern for change.

The hegemony of a technological approach to reality is driven by the concern for change. Technology seeks to discover more efficient and effective ways by which we can master and thus change our reality. Technology is future-oriented and problem-oriented. Both are valuable orientations but such orientations become truncated or reductionist when they are too privileged. Technology regards reality as a problem to be solved by breaking down the problem into its component parts, discovering the explanatory relations between the parts, and using those relations to solve the problem. This approach is invaluable when dealing with physical, chemical, even biological situations. Is technology equally appropriate in the realm of human affairs? Are psychological, social, religious, cultural and personal elements the proper objects of techniques? Never more than partially, because technology tends to be
adequate in the subhuman world mediated but not constituted by meaning and value.

If the realm of human affairs is considered exclusively in terms of technology, human affairs are misinterpreted, because they are constituted by meanings and values. Such a misinterpretation leads to an obfuscation of the intricacy and mystery of human affairs. Such an obfuscation devalues human affairs, lending credence to the belief that one need only find the right instrument or technique to fix any problem or relationship. If I cannot fix my wife, my husband, my parent, my church, my boss, my friend, my school, I need to find a better tool or I must leave.

The notion of complacency provides a powerful corrective to this type of thinking. The technologist assumes that reality is a problem to be fixed, rather than a mystery to be appreciated. Complacency is the fulfillment of the natural spontaneity of human consciousness which desires to rest in the goodness of what is, however difficult, mysterious, painful it is. Such a resting in what is provides a needed balance in one's deliberation about what ought to be. Our tendency to dominate and control reality, our pragmatic bias, often blinds us to the goodness involved in the struggle, the pain and the disappointment. Complacentia boni can balance our approach to reality, which guides our deliberations in a more reasonable and responsible manner.

Complacency enacts self-transcending feelings. Knowledge of the real is greeted by self-transcending feelings responding to the value of what is, independently of its usefulness or lack thereof. Such feelings are not nurtured in a world of self-regarding feelings, a world filled with dread about the future, a world that does not trust the goodness of being. Here psychology, spirituality and philosophy come together in common cause. Psychology seeks basic trust in relationships. Spirituality seeks a basic trust in the mystery that answers to the basic drive in human consciousness for wholeness and rest. Philosophy seeks a ground for meaning and value.

John Stuart Mill characterized the noble feelings all human beings are capable of experiencing as tender plants which must be nurtured and cultivated or they will die. The same holds true for complacency. If it is not nurtured, it will die. If it dies, the human spirit is deprived of an

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original spontaneous relationship with reality. It is nurtured by contemplation, as Fr. Crowe suggests in his discussion of religious life. The religious is dedicated to loving God, becoming intimate with the divine mystery which calls him or her into ongoing relationship. It is this relationship which gives vigor and strength to the ministerial lives of religious. But what holds true for religious is no less true for all people. It is the love of God which fuels the work by which the Kingdom of God is brought into existence.

I am not devaluing action. Nevertheless, Thomist complacentia boni can supply a helpful corrective to an age and culture which glorifies technology in the service of agendas pushed by specialists, by platforms of particular political parties or from within the ideological viewpoints. By appropriating the spontaneously contemplative dimension of human consciousness we can render more responsible our endeavors to overcome the obstacles facing human civilization, and our desires to manifest the kingdom of God.

The insights of eastern religions, the insights of native American spirituality, the rise of meditation practices throughout First World societies, point toward the existence of some communities which have either kept alive or have rediscovered ways to cultivate the complacent attitude in response to the goodness of reality. The ecological movement should rest on the complacent experience of the goodness of the environment beyond its usefulness.24

E. The Complacency of God

This has been a very long paper, yet I want to add one last suggestion. It is a spiritual one I have found fruitful for meditation. Arguing by analogy from the acts of human consciousness to the dynamism of the Trinity gives us a very rich vocabulary to speak of God. Paraphrasing Fr. Crowe's reflections on the trinitarian implications of complacency, the Trinity consists of the unrestricted Act of

24 There is much that can be said in this context about the characterization of being as a gift. The natural response to a gift is gratitude. When gratitude is the starting point for reflection on the meaning of the universe, one might see a shift from trying to force Nature's secrets out of her for our human benefit to an attempt to preserve the gift to all living things. David Burrell's reflections in this volume seem, as well, to point to the fruitfulness of an extended meditation on the gift of Creation and the corresponding response of the human subject to that gift.
understanding which is expressed fully in the Word which is wholly loved in the Spirit. The created analogue is the restricted act of human understanding, expressed inadequately in a word, and loved in the complacentia boni. God regards the world in and through not only an unrestricted act of understanding and an adequate Word, but also in a complete complacentia boni. In other words, God loves God wholly, completely. There is no lack in the love of God. An aspect of what God understands is everything to be understood about the universe. An aspect of what God loves completely is the universe as existing.

Thus, God is a God of complete and utter love for that which exists, including that which is painful and troublesome. Everything that exists is an object of divine complacency. If the imago Dei can try to regard things from God's standpoint, all that exists can be an object of human complacency as well. This does not eliminate the need for human action to set the conditions for the possible emergence of what ought to be but is not. However, an exercise in imaginative divine complacency might open the eyes of the blind, open the ears of the deaf, broaden the imaginations of those blocked by false images, answer the questions of those who wonder, thus setting the conditions for actions which are congenial and harmonious with reality.

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"COMPLACENCY AND CONCERN"
AND A BASIC THESIS ON GRACE

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In two recent articles in Method: Journal of Lonergan Studies,1 I have tried to express a basic thesis on sanctifying grace by transposing some of the material from Lonergan's first thesis in De ente supernaturali2 into categories that are derived more directly or proximately from interiorly and religiously differentiated consciousness than are the metaphysical categories employed by Lonergan in that thesis.3 Subsequently I have discovered that Frederick E. Crowe's articles on "Complacency and Concern in the Thought of St. Thomas"4 are pertinent to these attempts, and in the present article I wish to rely on these articles to state my thesis.

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3 Note that this is not to set up an opposition between the metaphysical categories and those that I have been suggesting. The metaphysics remains necessary, but it must be critically grounded.

4 Frederick E. Crowe, "Complacency and Concern in the Thought of St. Thomas," Theological Studies 20 (1959) 1-39, 198-230, 343-95. Henceforth CC plus the number of the article (thus CC1 28 means the first article, page 28).
I. THE QUESTION

At the end of chapter 18 of *Insight*, Bernard Lonergan reaches a point in his analysis "from below" of human understanding and of what we understand, where a disjunction is posed: either there is more in the universe of proportionate being, whose immanent intelligibility is an emergent probability, than the intelligibilities grasped in the physical, chemical, botanical, zoological, psychological sciences and in the cognitional theory, epistemology, metaphysics, and ethics of a book like *Insight*, or human beings are condemned to "an incapacity for sustained development" (I 653). There is a basic tension rooted in the duality of human consciousness, a tension that, without proper maintenance as what I have called an integral dialectic of limitation and transcendence, "divides and disorientates cognitional activity by the conflict of positions and counterpositions. This conflict issues into contrary views of the good, which in turn make good will appear misdirected, and misdirected will appear good. There follows the confounding of the social situation with the social surd, to provide misleading inspiration for further insights, deceptive evidence for further judgments, and illusory causes to fascinate unwary wills" (I 653).

The problem, which I have argued is one of distorted personal, cultural, and social dialectics in reciprocal correlation with a distortion of the entire scale of values, is, says Lonergan, radical, permanent, independent of underlying manifolds, rooted in personal rather than social distortion, real, and not to be resolved by discovering a correct philosophy, ethics, or human science or by setting up a benevolent despotism to enforce such a philosophy, ethics, or human science (see I 653-55). Its only solution is "a still higher integration of human living" (I 655) than anything discussed to that point in the book, an integration that works through our intelligence, reasonableness, freedom, and

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7 Ibid., chapter 4 and passim.
psychic and intersubjective spontaneousities but that is not a product of our own insights, judgments, and decisions. "... only a higher integration leaves underlying manifolds with their autonomy yet succeeds in introducing a higher systematization into their nonsystematic coincidences. And only a still higher integration than any that so far has been considered can deal with the dialectical manifold immanent in human subjects and the human situation" (I 655).

This higher integration would entail "a further manifestation of finality, of the upwardly but indeterminately directed dynamism of generalized emergent probability" (I 655-56). It would be not simply a higher viewpoint in the mind but a higher integration in being, an integration that, among other things, makes possible a higher viewpoint in the mind (I 656).

The series of higher integrations studied up to this point in Insight was restricted to "proportionate being," that is, to being, that, in Insight's terms, does not lie "beyond the limits of human experience," to whatever is to be known not only by intelligent grasp and reasonable affirmation but also by human experience (I 416). This restriction is now lifted, and the question is raised of our knowledge of transcendent being and of our “ulterior finality” (I 656).8

The source of the necessary higher integration lies in what Christian theology calls grace. Insight's chapter 20 studies grace primarily as healing, as gratia sanans, and also primarily as habitual, as introducing into human intellectual and volitional activity the

8 It should perhaps be noted that “proportionate being” has reference to the “proportion of nature” that is so important to Lonergan in establishing his notion of the supernatural in the second thesis of De ente supernaturali, and is perhaps better designated in such terms than in terms of what exceeds or lies beyond human experience. While God is not a datum within this universe and while operations that attain to God uti in se est are absolutely beyond the proportion of any finite nature and so are simply or absolutely supernatural, such operations do occur, and they are conscious; that is, there is such a thing as religious experience, but it is a function of grace and so does not lie within the proportion of nature. Our effort here is to attempt a delineation of one basic feature of such experience. Transcendent reality does in some way enter into our experience, and the important point, the issue that in fact is before us at present, is to delineate something of how this occurs. Our point is that God enters our experience through created grace, that is, through the external terms of the divine relations constitutive of trinitarian life. Our effort here is to formulate something of what the external terms are that constitute our religious experience.
supernatural conjugate forms or habits that are the theological virtues of charity, hope, and faith, and into psychic activity the psychic correspondences to these virtues at the level of image, symbol, feeling, and intersubjective spontaneity; these psychic correspondences are the primary field of a "mystery" that abides in human living despite all advances in human knowledge. But at the very end of chapter 20 the possibility is raised of "something more" than a grace that heals, something whose reality is explicitly affirmed in a theology of grace, which in fact Lonergan makes the very starting point of a systematics of grace that proceeds, according to the ordo doctrinae, "from above downwards." In De ente supernaturali, that something more is called a communication of the divine nature itself, and in De Deo trino a created participation of the active spiration of the Holy Spirit by the Father and the Son. Habitual grace is radically gratia elevans, it is at its roots

... there are four real divine relations, really identical with the divine substance, and therefore four quite special modes of grounding an external imitation of the divine substance. Furthermore, there are four absolutely supernatural realities, never found unformed, namely, the secondary act of existence of the incarnation, sanctifying grace, the habit of charity, and the light of glory. Therefore, it may fittingly be said that the secondary act of existence of the incarnation is a created participation of paternity, and so that it has a special relation to the Son; that sanctifying grace is a [created] participation of active spiration, and therefore that it has a special relation to the Holy Spirit; that the habit of charity is a [created] participation of passive spiration, and therefore that it has a special relation to the Father and the Son; and that the light of glory is a [created] participation of filiation, and so that it leads the children of adoption perfectly back to the Father.

Thus would I translate an extremely important four-point systematic hypothesis (to use an expression from Philip McShane, in correspondence with me on these issues) found in Bernard Lonergan, De Deo trino, vol. 2, Pars systematica (Rome: Gregorian University Press, 1964) 234-35. McShane argues, correctly, that the four points are best treated together in one systematic presentation; for my present limited purposes, however, I believe that only two of them (sanctifying grace and charity in their respective relations to active and passive spiration) can be treated without distorting the total systematic impact of what I regard as a brilliant statement of intellectus fidei on Lonergan's part. The greater part of an entire systematic theology can be organized around this four-point hypothesis.

Lonergan studies the complex development of the theology of grace from Augustine to Aquinas—grace as healing and elevating, as operative and cooperative, as habitual and actual—in chapters 1 and 2 of Grace and Freedom, ed. J. Patout Burns (New York: Herder & Herder, 1971).
distinct from the habits or virtues of charity, hope, and faith; and the source of its power to heal, of its character as *sanans* as well as *elevans*, lies in the fact that it is the created communication to us of a participation in the very life of the triune God.

In *De ente supernatuali* Lonergan explicitly leaves unanswered the question of what the created communication of the divine nature is. It is, of course, materially identical with sanctifying or habitual grace, and yet it is formally distinct from sanctifying grace in that it is sanctifying grace not as such but insofar as this grace is a remote and proportionate principle of *operations* on our part in which we attain to God *uti in se est* (see DES § 14), namely, the operations of charity. The proximate principle of these operations is the habit of charity itself, but the remote principle is the “something more” affirmed at the end of chapter 20 of *Insight*, the absolutely supernatural base whose “sole ground and measure is the divine nature itself” (*I* 747), the base that makes us “children of God, sharers in the divine nature, just, friends of God, and so forth” (DES § 14). Beyond this we are warned not to venture: “Do not attempt a positive and intrinsic understanding of the created communication of the divine nature. This communication belongs to the realm of faith and of the mysteries. The first and most important thing to seek is the absence of a contradiction; then, insofar as you are able, you may seek some imperfect understanding” (DES § 33) in accord with Vatican I’s direction (*DB* 1796, *DS* 3016: “… *ratio quidem, fide illustrata*, cum sedulo, *pie et sobrie quaerit*, aliquam Deo dante mysteriorum intelligentiam eamque fructuosissimam assequitur tum ex eorum, quae naturaliter cognoscit, analogia, tum e mysteriorum ipsorum nexu inter se et cum fine hominis ultimo”).

While our own attempts to understand this mystery must heed such a caution, we also note that Lonergan’s own practice indicates that he did not mean by this caution that we are to cease from all further attempts to understand this communication of the divine life. We begin, then, by referring, as we did in “Revisiting ‘Consciousness and Grace,’” to Lonergan’s own suggestion in *De Deo trino* that this created communication of the divine nature, materially identical with sanctifying grace, is a created participation of the active spiration of the Holy Spirit by the Father and the Son, and we add to this suggestion the observation that, as active spiration is really distinct, by mutually opposed relations of origin, from the passive spiration or proceeding Love.
that is the Holy Spirit, so the created communication of the divine nature that is sanctifying grace will be really distinct, again by mutually opposed relations of origin, from the habit of charity that is the created participation of passive spiration or of the Holy Spirit. Sanctifying grace, according to Lonergan's pregnant formulation, has a special relation to the Holy Spirit, because it is the created external term of the very divine relation of which the Holy Spirit is the uncreated internal term. That divine relation, the active spiration of the Holy Spirit by the Father and the Word, is really identical with paternity and filiation, and only conceptually distinct from them; and so, in keeping with his four-point hypothesis, Lonergan will refer to those gifted with this external term as "children of adoption" (filios adoptionis). Charity has a special relation to the Father and the Word, because it is the created external term of the relation of passive spiration, by which the Holy Spirit proceeding from Father and Word is related back to both.

Our question once again, as in the two previous articles, is, Is there anything in consciousness itself that would be indicative of these distinct realities, these really distinct entia supernaturalia, these mutually opposed relations of origin not as in the divine life itself but as in that participation in the divine life in the created external terms of the divine relations? This time we can put our question as follows: Are there mutually opposed relations of origin at the level of religious love in human consciousness? If the answer is yes, then we have what we need. The question is essentially the same question we have asked in the two previous articles, and our answer simply builds on what we have said there and perhaps refines the argument a bit. I began this investigation suspecting that something seems to have been lost in Lonergan's own transposition of these issues from metaphysics to interiority (or, perhaps better, in his grounding of the metaphysics in religious interiority). "Being in love" is too compact a manner of speaking of two created external terms of two uncreated divine relations, at least in terms of explanatory supernatural conjugates. I want to restore the lost created external term of active spiration, but to do so in the language of the grounding religious interiority and not that of (the still essential) metaphysics.10

10 The relevance of the question for the number of levels of consciousness was probably made too central an issue in “Consciousness and Grace,” and this may
This time we will rely on, and eventually transpose into our own context, some of the material from a series of very important articles that appeared in *Theological Studies* nearly forty years ago, articles written by my colleague and friend Frederick E. Crowe, and entitled “Complacency and Concern in the Thought of St. Thomas.” We first intend to understand what Crowe is saying on several points essential to our question, and second, to apply this understanding to our present question. The material we will investigate is contained in the first article and in the section of the second article entitled “Complacency in God.”

**II. FREDERICK CROWE ON COMPLACENCY AND CONCERN**

Conveniently enough, Crowe begins his second article with a summary of the first and with several comments anticipating the rest of his argument. His thesis is that “there are two distinct attitudes of willing or loving, which may be called complacency and concern” (*CC2* 198). Thomas provides, however unthematically or incompletely, a basic “structure of willing sufficiently broad and firm to account for both,” and that “fundamental framework” is one of a *duplex via*: “the passive process of receiving and the active process of causation” (*CC2* 198). More fully:

have detracted from the primary concern, which had to do with restoring the lost category. Lonergan clearly affirmed more levels of consciousness than the four levels of *intentional* consciousness that are the centrepiece of his work. If *Philosophy of God, and Theology* (Philadelphia: Westminster Press, 1973) 38 is for some not satisfactory evidence of this, “Philosophy and the Religious Phenomenon” (*Method: Journal of Lonergan Studies* 12 [1994] 125-46) clinches it. The question of the actual number of levels is secondary (and, I submit, still to be answered). How we are to talk about these additional levels—and there are at least two of them, one at the base (as it were) and one at the top—is now the central issue, and as my efforts to speak of psychic conversion were intended, as Lonergan recognized, to be a contribution to an understanding of the “lower,” symbolic operator, so the present articles on grace are inviting reflection on our understanding of an “upper” operator, when that operator is the gift of God’s love.

11 I would like to thank Fr Crowe for reading an earlier version of this paper. He gave me several very useful suggestions, told me that I had not misrepresented his position in his articles, and made it very clear that as for the rest I am on my own!
Love as complacency is a term in the *via receptionis*, coming at the end of process; it is found in this form in the proceeding Love of the Holy Trinity, in the passive aspect of willing, in the simple harmony, agreement, correspondence resulting when the will is adjusted affectively to the good independently of all desire. Love as tendency is at the beginning of the *via motionis*; it is most evident in appetite, desire, the pursuit of beatitude, but perhaps is to be discovered also in an analogous and higher form in the *agapē* which desires to give and communicate the self or what the self has. (CC2 198)

Crowe contends that Aquinas "never really integrated these two modes of love with one another, or brought them together in sharp confrontation, or employed them as a scheme in the systematic articulation of his world" (CC2 198). But Crowe himself attempts some of the necessary integration, and we will subsume elements of Crowe's integration into our question, as already informed by Lonergan's suggestion of an analogy between active and passive spiration in the Trinity, on the one hand, and sanctifying grace and the habit of charity (the respective created external terms of these relations), on the other hand. Our question, so informed, is, What in consciousness is the relationship between sanctifying grace and charity, between our created participation in active spiration and our created participation in passive spiration? Can we provide terms and relations from intentional and nonintentional consciousness as categories to express an understanding of the actual higher integration in being that is absolutely supernatural because its sole ground and measure is the divine nature itself? As the Holy Spirit is the uncreated term of an active spiration, that active spiration which is really identical with paternity and filiation, so sanctifying grace is the created external term of the same active spiration; that is to say, sanctifying grace is the created participation of this divine relation, releases the capacity, given with the gift, for acts of love whereby God is attained *uti in se est*. That capacity is the habit of charity grounding the regular performance of such supernatural acts. Note the structural parallel between
sanctifying grace and the habit of charity. Sanctifying grace is a consequent condition of our participation in the active spiration of the Holy Spirit by the Father and the Son (an active spiration that is the paternity and the filiation—or Father and Son—as one principle of the Spirit); again sanctifying grace is a consequent condition of our being given the proceeding Love that is the Holy Spirit of adoption, since as a created participation in the divine nature it proportions us to the reception of this gift. Similarity charity is a consequent condition of our participation in the passively spirated loving that is the Holy Spirit, a participation manifest in operations of charity whereby God is loved uti in se est.

Such is our schema. Our effort is to understand it in terms of consciousness, and we turn to Crowe's articles for help in articulating it in a manner that builds on our previous achievements.

2.1 The Duplex Via

Crowe begins by indicating basic agreement with a minority view among Thomists that "the idea of love as a completion and lulling ... of the will has not disappeared in the later works of St. Thomas, nor indeed has that of formation. Desire is tendency and movement, but love, like delight, implies presence already of the good and hence a state of rest ... [I]n the later works of St. Thomas, as in the earlier, there is the quietatio which expresses the psychological repose of the will and there is something like an ontological formation of a potency" (CC1 2-3). In fact, Crowe goes on to say, there are two distinct but complementary roles to love: "... in one role love is passive, quiescent, complacent; in the other it is active, striving, tending to an object." Aquinas speaks of the latter role most regularly, but the former role is most "basic both psychologically and ontologically" (CC1 3).

Crowe uses the terms "complacency" and "concern" to refer to the first and second role respectively. Agapé and eros are derivative from an "ontologically and psychologically passive" complacency, as "consequent active forms" that, depending on one's terminology, may or may not be listed as instances of concern (CC1 4). "Complacency," then, is for Crowe a general term that "indicates that will, before being the faculty of appetite, of process to a term, is the faculty of affective consent, of acceptance of what is good, of concord with the universe of being, and that the basic act of will is to be understood only if it is regarded not as an impulse to a term, or even the principle of process to a term qua
principle, but simply as itself a term” (CC1 4). “...(W)illing basically is the end of a process, a quiescence; only secondarily is it the initiation of another process” (CC1 5).

The key to understanding this lies in the couplet of the via receptionis, and the via motionis. “There is a double direction in psychological process: in one direction will is at the end of the process and receives from intellect, but in the other will is at the beginning and moves the other potencies to their activity” (CC1 10). Crowe offers the following statement from De veritate (q. 14, a. 5, ad 5m) as “the best” articulation he has found in Aquinas of the distinction. “Will and intellect have a mutual priority over one another, but not in the same way. Intellect’s priority over will is in receiving (in via receptionis), for if anything is to move the will it must first be received into intellect.... But in moving or acting (in movendo sive agendo) will has priority, because every action or movement comes from the intention of the good; and hence it is that the will, whose proper object is the good precisely as good, is said to move all the lower powers.” The via receptionis, Crowe says, has “a close connection in idea” with the via a rebus ad animam, and the via motionis with the via ab anima ad res (CC1 10-11). The whole scheme “enters deeply into [Thomist] cognitional theory” (CC1 12) as it affects intellectual activity as such, but it can be found too in discussions of will. The difference between the cognitional and the volitional discussions, one that makes for considerable difficulty, is that “intellect precedes will in one way but follows it in another, so that its two functions are separated psychologically by the intervention of an act of will ..., whereas will is a hinge point and its diverse functions [do not] appear so clearly to consciousness” (CC1 13-14). The same difficulty appears in the case of the particular question that concerns us here: what is the relation in consciousness between sanctifying grace and charity?

For Crowe’s study—and our transposition later will have to come back to this—the fundamental point is “the priority of intellect over will and the corresponding dependence of will on intellect” (CC1 14). This is what is meant and is summarized by the principle, “The basic act of will is a term rather than a principle, and 'simply term.'” “... (I)t is not a compound act in which an inchoate willing as principle produces another willing as term to provide a parallel with intellect where understanding
produces the word. Still less is it a matter of will's producing its own first act, lifting itself by its bootstraps" (CC1 14).

Two Thomist doctrines in particular are appealed to, in order to argue the point: the procession of the Holy Spirit and the fundamental passivity of will.

2.2 The Procession of the Holy Spirit

On the procession of the Holy Spirit, Crowe relies on Lonergan's studies of *verbum* to argue (quite correctly, I believe) that for Thomas the analogy in the creature is “not any procession from the will or any procession from something in the will, but the procession of love in the will from the intellect ... the procession of love is an *emanatio intelligibilis* from the inner word as the word is an *emanatio intelligibilis* from understanding. And as the word is a term, so the act of love is a term” (CC1 15-16).

2.3 The Passivity of Will

On the passivity of will, Crowe argues (again correctly) that for Aquinas “will is first passive before it can be active in the sense of being an efficient cause” (CC1 16). All of its self-determination supposes that it has already been actuated. It is actuated with regard to the end, and moves itself to will the means, thus actuating its own potency. But the actual willing of the end is not from will itself but from an external object *quoad specificationem* and an external mover *quoad exercitium* (CC1 17). So too, *gratia operans* (whether habitual or actual) is “an effect 'in which our spirit (mens) is moved but does not move [anything]’” whereas *gratia cooperans* is an effect “in which our spirit both moves and is moved” (CC1 17). The passivity of the will with regard to its object belongs to the *via receptionis*, where willing is a term, and its efficient causality belongs to the *via motionis*, where will is a principle. The judgment on the good as end, itself a word proceeding from understanding, specifies the act of willing the end, which is a passive act in which the will is moved, not moving. Under the influence of this same act in the *via motionis*, the intellect takes counsel searching out means
to the end, and this counsel is followed by the choice of some means, an act in which the will is moved and moving.\textsuperscript{12}

\subsection{2.4 The Basic Act}

In an important step, the argument is then extended by Crowe so that the first act of will is separated from any idea of an end to be sought. In the latter schema, this act is first passive and then active, but there is required, says Crowe, "a passive act ... that is just passive, that is simply the end of a process, a coming to rest, an act that is more accurately named complacency in the good than willing an end, ... an affective response to the good that is, rather than a seeking in any form, selfish or self-giving, of the good that is not" (CC1 18). Only under this aspect does love provide the analogy for the procession of the Holy Spirit. "... the Third Person is a term bringing the divine processions to a close and is certainly not a Love for an object good-to-be-made, to-be-done, to-be-attained, or to-be in any way that involves a not-yet" (CC1 18). This passive act is complacency in the good (complacentia boni).

\subsection{2.5 Complacentia Boni}

In Aquinas, complacentia boni is an "aspect of charity" and of the general form of human love (CC1 23). It is a \textit{quies} preliminary to charity's movement or love's movement as \textit{intentio boni} (CC1 20-23), and both it and the subsequent movement are explained by analogy with physical motion.

Every moving agent attracts or repels the body moved. In attraction three stages are distinguishable: the agent first

\textsuperscript{12} While the issue is secondary for our present concerns, it should probably be added here that there is a \textit{subsequent} freedom with regard to the end itself, that is, a freedom that is subsequent to the will's being moved by God with respect to the end. See George P. Klubertanz, "The Root of Freedom in St. Thomas's Later Works," \textit{Gregorianum} 42 (1961) 701-24. I used Klubertanz's interpretation in my M.A. thesis, "The Development of Saint Thomas's Theory of Freedom" (Saint Louis University, 1964), in which I argued for this subsequent freedom with regard to the end itself in interpreting Thomas's position in \textit{De Malo} and the \textit{Prima Secundae} of the \textit{Summa Theologiae}. It is \textit{possible} that Lonergan does not sufficiently emphasize this in his presentation of Aquinas's doctrine of freedom, and again it is \textit{possible} that this subsequent freedom is better disengaged in Lonergan's later presentation of the notion of value than in his earlier writings on the issue; but I raise these two distinct questions only as questions.
"Complacency and Concern" and a Basic Thesis on Grace

gives an inclination or aptitude for being moved; secondly, it
gives motion (if the body be not already at the term of motion);
thirdly, it gives rest in the term. When the idea is transferred
analogously to the field of sensitive appetite [and Crowe
reminds us that the point is asserted by Aquinas to hold for
rational love as well], the agent becomes the good which gives
'inclination,' or 'aptitude,' or 'connaturality' towards the good,
and this response of the subject pertains to love. Then the
agent gives motion towards acquisition of the good (desire), and
last of all it gives rest in the good acquired (delight, joy). (CCI
26; the relevant text in Aquinas is *Summa Theologiae*, 1-2, q.
26, a. 4).

The preliminary quies is here called an inclination or aptitude for being
moved, a connaturality toward the good, and in q. 25, a. 2, a proportion
to the end. The proportion itself is love, and the love is defined as
complacency in the good. It precedes desire and joy, the second and third
steps in the process. In q. 26, a. 1, the same quies or complacentia boni
is called a coaptatio of appetite to the good, and in q. 29, a. 1, a
consonantia. And in several texts it is spoken of in terms of formal
causality: it is informatio quaedam ipsius appetitus (*De spe*, a. 3 c.), and
its object "causes love by adapting and 'conforming' appetite to itself"
(*Summa Theologiae*, 1-2, q. 30, a. 2 c.). The desirable itself changes
appetite ut ei appetibile complaceat (ibid. q. 26, a. 2, ad 3m). The change
brings about "a relationship, a harmony, an agreement, a resonance, a
similarity, a concord," terms that "seem just as well suited to the notion
of love as a term as to the notion of love as a principle of tendency" (CCI
29). Aquinas's proliferation of words, says Crowe, shows him "struggling
to express ... an idea that has not yet acquired its own technical name"
(ibid.), and corresponds to the "linguistic lacuna" he pointed out for
speaking of the names of the Holy Spirit. "We have a word ... to express
the relation of knowledge to its object, scil. intelligere ...; we have also
words to express the process of intellectual conception, scil. dicere and
verbum; hence we can use intelligere for divine essential knowledge, and
dicere and verbum to add the relations which distinguish Father and Son.
But we have no parallel wealth in talking of the will; amor expresses a
relation to the object (love of this or that); but there are no special words
for the process by which love originates and for its relation to its
principle; and so we must use the same word, amor, for both essential
love and proceeding Love" (ibid. 29-30). Crowe contends, reasonably
enough I believe, that the lack of a suitable terminology in one case and
the other is the same lack: "... the question of the nature of love in itself is solidary with that on its origin as an emanatio intelligibilis from the word of intellect, and that is the aspect in view when St. Thomas says we have no special word for proceeding Love in the Trinity" (CC1 30).

2.6 Conclusion of General Argument

To this discussion of the general form of love, Crowe adds in his first article treatments of (a) the general form of velle and (b) beatitude, to conclude as follows:

The framework of the duplex via shows how we may integrate a passive, merely affective attitude of the will with its consequent, active pursuit of the good. The questions dealing directly with complacency, by the very fact that they make it the principle of all movement as well as by other evidence, show that complacency itself is not a movement but a simple change of will. The general rational psychology of St. Thomas puts at the beginning of all volitional activity a passive act that seems at least to share some of the characteristics of complacency. The doctrine on beatitude is in perfect accord, for it asserts a state of will in the imperfect beatitude of earth which is akin to the heavenly state, and the latter is certainly not one of tending to a goal but rather one of quiescence in a term attained. (CC1 38-39)

To quote again the basic conclusion of Crowe's first article, love as complacency "is found in this form [that is, as a term in the via receptionis, coming at the end of process] in the proceeding Love of the Holy Trinity, in the passive aspect of willing, in the simple harmony, agreement, correspondence resulting when the will is adjusted affectively to the good independently of all desire" (CC2 198).

The first of these instances is discussed in more detail in a section of the second article. The section is called "Complacency in God" (CC2 219-24).

2.7 Complacency in God

Complacency in God, of course, affects both divine essential love, common to all three Persons, and the notional Love that proceeds as the Holy Spirit from the Father and the Son. Regarding divine essential love, various proofs for will in God are summarized, and it is noted that "the love which is analogous to love in God comes with the possession of the
good at the term of process and is posited in God by negating the process” (CC2 222).

As for divine notional Love, “... many characteristics of the love of complacency are predicated of the Holy Spirit, though not under the name of complacency.” The first of these is that “the Third Person is conceived as proceeding from the Verbum and the Dicens, from the Word and the One uttering the Word. That is to say, it is not as tendency that this Love is primarily conceived, but as proceeding, as term, as bringing process to a close” (CC2 222). Secondly, the Holy Spirit is said to be analogous to quaedam impressio ... rei amatae in affectu amantis, the impression that what is loved makes on the affection of the lover (Summa theologiae, 1, q. 37, a. 1 c.). But the loved object is present in the lover by complacency, which is the “reception of the good into the affective faculty” (CC2 223), so that the divinity of the Holy Spirit is “the presence of God in divine proceeding Love” (CC2 223). Again, the Holy Spirit is aliquid manens in amante (Summa theologiae, 1, q. 37, a. 1, ad 2m), so that “the divine processions reach an internal term in the Love which is the Holy Spirit” (CC2 223). Finally, Crowe reviews the use of the notion of love as tendere in what Aquinas writes of the Holy Spirit, but only to suggest that it can be discarded: “Clearly, the Holy Spirit is to be conceived on the analogy of complacentia boni. For that is love in its basic form, love as a term, love in clearest dependence on the word, love as passive” (CC2 223-24).

III. A TRANSPOSITION

It would be tempting for us to make a simple identification of sanctifying grace with one form of complacentia boni and of charity with the resulting intentio boni, and to have done with the matter. While our position will approximate this double identification, the texts of Aquinas and Crowe do not allow it precisely as just stated. For both aspects of love (complacentia boni and intentio boni), when the love is supernatural, are aspects of charity, and charity in the Thomist system is radicated in the will, whereas sanctifying grace is radicated in the essence of the soul. “Charity as a general virtue governing all others is a motive force, an efficient cause; as such it must precede what it governs, whether this be a judgment or some other act coming under
charity's universal sway. But charity, like every other act of will, follows a judgment, in this case a judgment of faith; and under this aspect it seems to correspond more to a contemplative, affective function and to the *via receptionis*" (CC1 13-14).

On the other hand, if Aquinas himself never adequately integrated these two approaches, perhaps room is left to others to try to do so. A central question in such an effort, perhaps the central question, would be, What is it that renders the conscious human subject somehow proportionate to God, in the sense in which Aquinas speaks of "proportion to the end" as correlative with the quies that is *coaptatio* or *consonantia*? More precisely, can we identify something in consciousness itself, something that affects the whole of consciousness and not just the fourth level that in an intentionality analysis includes primarily the activities that a faculty psychology ascribed to will? Can we link this "something" to the basic repose, the quies, that Crowe is talking about? I think we can, and my arguments are an attempt to establish this point.

We begin by noting that Crowe in these articles, the early Lonergan, and Thomas are all working from an understanding of the basic relationship of knowing to willing and to loving that conceives that relationship "from below upwards." But in *Method in Theology* and later writings Lonergan proposes a basic relationship between loving and knowing that proceeds "from above downwards." Moreover, in a very late paper and in some comments made in the Boston College Lonergan Workshops in the 1970s, Lonergan proposes as well an analogy for the trinitarian processions and relations that proceeds "from above downwards."13 Our efforts will pick up on each of these later

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13 The psychological analogy...has its starting point in that higher synthesis of intellectual, rational, and moral consciousness that is the dynamic state of being in love. Such love manifests itself in its judgments of value. And the judgments are carried out in decisions that are acts of loving. Such is the analogy found in the creature.

Now in God the origin is the Father, in the New Testament named *ho Theos*, who is identified with *agapē* (1 John 4.8, 16). Such love expresses itself in its Word, its *Logos*, its *verbum spirans amorem*, which is a judgment of value. The judgment of value is sincere, and so it grounds the Proceeding Love that is identified with the Holy Spirit.

There are then two processions that may be conceived in God; they are not unconscious processes but intellectually, rationally, morally
developments, in order to effect a certain transposition of the emphases highlighted by Crowe.

First, then, we need not quote in detail Lonergan's point made at several points in *Method in Theology*, namely, that there are exceptions to the Latin tag *Nihil amatum nisi praecognitum*, Nothing is loved unless it is first known. In that case, however, Crowe's "fundamental point," namely, "the priority of intellect over will and the corresponding dependence of will on intellect" (*CC1* 14), is not without exceptions. And so we must ask, What happens to his principle that the basic act of will is a term rather than a principle, and "simply term," "not a compound act in which an inchoate willing as principle produces another willing as term to provide a parallel with intellect where understanding produces the word" nor "a matter of will's producing its own first act" (*CC1* 14)? Does the principle still hold if the basic act of "will" in some instances does not proceed from human intellect uttering a word, a judgment of value, on the basis of a grasp of sufficient evidence for such a judgment to be uttered? Does the principle still hold when the movement between love and knowledge in human consciousness goes the other way round, when love precedes knowledge, as seems to be the case for Lonergan in religious experience?

I believe that the principle still obtains. In the matter that we are considering it obtains in the following way. Sanctifying grace, as created external term of the divine relation of active spiration, is simply term, but *it proceeds not from any human word but from the divine Word eternally generated by the Father*. Human consciousness has some conscious, as are judgments of value based on the evidence perceived by a lover, and the acts of loving grounded on judgments of value. The two processions ground four real relations of which three are really distinct from one another; and these three are not just relations as relations, and so modes of being, but also subsistent, and so not just paternity and filiation but also Father and Son. Finally, Father and Son and Spirit are eternal; their consciousness is not in time but timeless; their subjectivity is not becoming but ever itself; and each in his own distinct manner is subject of the infinite act that God is, the Father as originating love, the Son as judgment of value expressing that love, and the Spirit as originated loving.

awareness of this terminal state precisely as gift, as something that
does not correspond to or result from anything we have ourselves
understood or judged or decided, something that in no way depends on
any human *verbum interius*, but still something that is not experienced
as irrational or absurd or random or arbitrary, and so that can be said to
proceed from the Word of an intelligent Speaker. I have suggested
several ways of speaking of this awareness once we have reflected on
it—being loved, assurance, and so on—all of which are meant to
objectify a *quies*, a being proportioned, a being attuned, a consonance,
that in itself is simply experienced; theologically, the objectification will
speak of being on the receiving end of an actively spirating Love and
Judgment of Value, and so of being *given* the Holy Spirit. If there is a
created external term of active spiration, an external term that is a
consequent condition of the gift of God’s love to us, an external term that
proportions us to the reception of that gift, what in consciousness
corresponds to that created external term? What is its conscious
representation, assuming that it has one (and surely there is no *a priori*
reason to think that it does not)? I continue to maintain that the answer
to this question involves some kind of reception of love, some awareness
that in subsequent theological reflection can then be objectified as being
on the receiving end of the actively spirating Love and Word as the
divine foundation of the universe created through the eternal Word.
Christian language speaks of this created awareness in terms of
receiving the Holy Spirit, just as the internal term of active spiration is
the very uncreated Person of the Holy Spirit. The awareness of which I
speak, as awareness, is not limited to Christians, even though the
Christian language about it is probably as clear as any we can expect. It
is more articulate and doctrinally more accurate than any other of
which I am aware.

Is this the same as what Crowe means by *complacentia boni*? In a
sense, yes, but it is not entirely identical. *Complacentia boni*, it seems to
me, has in fact two meanings in his articles. The primary meaning is
simply as term; and the secondary meaning is as a term that becomes
principle. The reception of God’s love of which I am speaking is, I believe,
the primary instance of *complacentia boni* in its primary meaning. But
in the other meaning, as term that quickly becomes principle of other
acts, it corresponds to charity, as Crowe points out.
But what about Crowe’s strictures regarding Thomas’s other language regarding the Holy Spirit about love as tendere? Here is what Crowe says:

Clearly, the Holy Spirit is to be conceived on the analogy of complacentia boni. For that is love in its basic form, love as a term, love in clearest dependence on the word, love as passive. Nor is there any loss to Trinitarian theory through discarding the notion of love as tendency. St. Thomas felt obliged to assign a Scholastic sense to the word ‘Spirit’ and did so in terms of tendency, but we can drop that attempt today and so avoid the incongruity of comparing the Holy Spirit with an impulse ad aliquid faciendum. Moreover, the divinity of the Spirit is as well conceived through the presence of the loved object in the will by complacency as by its presence as the term of movement. The twofold habitudo, to the Word as principle and to the divine goodness as object, still remains. The difference between a procession which results in a similitude by reason of the mode of procession (generatio) and one that does not on this account result in a similitude but for another reason, also remains. There seems to be no significant loss and a clear gain. (CC2 223-24)

I suggest, rather, that as there are distinct relations of origin between complacentia boni and intentio boni, so active spiration and passive spiration are distinct by reason of mutually opposed relations. The love that proceeds in the Trinity is a loving. It is spirated, and so the term of divine procession; but nonetheless it grounds a relation to the Father and the Son from whom it proceeds which is distinct from the spiration by which it proceeds. Its created external term as our participation in that relation is charity, a created external term that has a special relation to the Father and the Son in the mode of a tendere, an intending of good.

Let us conclude, then, with a transposition of part of Lonergan’s first thesis in De ente supernaturali, building upon our earlier attempts in the two articles mentioned in note 1 but adding something we have learned from Crowe.

The gift of God’s love poured forth into our hearts is an uncreated grace (the Holy Spirit) that effects in us, as a consequent condition of the truth of its reception and simultaneously a relational disposition to receive it, the created grace adding a dimension of consciousness distinct from the intentional levels discussed by Lonergan in his intentionality
analysis. At this distinct and nonintentional level—nonintentional because, while it has a content, it has no apprehended object—we experience what, upon reflection, can be objectified as an inchoate and abiding satisfaction of our intentional longings for intelligibility, truth, and goodness, and of the psychic correspondences of these longings. This inchoate and abiding rest (quies, assurance, consonance, attunement, etc., etc.) from intentional striving is a secure base that sustains and carries us in our intentional operations. It can be further objectified, with the help of the revelation manifest in Christ Jesus, as a resting in divine love, a being loved, a being gifted with God's love. This resting in God's love can be understood in a Christian theology as a created participation of the active spiration of the Holy Spirit by the Father and the Word. It invites and empowers us to love, and the love to which we are invited and empowered is a created participation of the passive spiration that is the Holy Spirit.

The initial and grounding nonintentional “complacency” can be theologically objectified as the conscious reflection of our share in the inner trinitarian life of God. With our assent and cooperation, which themselves are enabled by the gift itself, a dynamic state of being in love is released by it. This is what the Scholastic tradition called the infused virtue of charity, which is the proximate principle of the operations of charity whereby God is attained uti in se est. But the created, remote, and proportionate principle of these operations involves as part of its constitutive formation a distinct dimension of consciousness: the nonintentional experience that can be objectified in Christian terms as a resting in God's unqualified love. This is what Scholastic theology using metaphysical terms called the entitative habit or sanctifying grace of a created communication of the divine nature. As a dimension of the created external term of active spiration, this experience entails a real relation of origin to the indwelling God who, as Father and Word, is principle or subject of the relation, because it is a created participation of the active spiration that gives, breathes, the Holy Spirit. The charity this loving releases is also a created participation in that Spirit as proceeding Love, in so far as it is specially related back to the Father and Word from whom it proceeds. The dicere and verbum from which the created communication of divine life proceeds are not a human dicere and verbum but the divine Dicere and Verbum that are Father and Son. The created participations in active and passive spiration are
constituted by the indwelling God as consequent conditions of the truth of the indwelling itself.

IV. CONCLUSION: A CLARIFICATION AND A QUESTION

Two further points require clarification. The first is the relation of sanctifying grace to St. Ignatius Loyola’s consolation without a cause. I owe this clarification to correspondence with Tad Dunne. Strictly speaking, Ignatius’s consolation without a cause is gratia operans as actual grace; sanctifying grace is gratia operans as habitual grace. But sanctifying grace as gratia operans is analogous to Ignatius’s consolation without a cause even though it is habitual (“Remain in my love”) rather than actual and neither transitory nor specifically related to particular circumstances in our lives, because it has a content, without any apprehended object; it is received without being caused by anything that we have understood, affirmed, or decided; like actual grace, it flows from divine, not human, Dicere and Verbum. The revelation of God in Christ Jesus enables us to name it and to attempt some obscure, imperfect, analogous, but (we always hope) fruitful understanding of it.

Secondly, the ratio cognoscendi for Lonergan’s “new” analogy based on what he says in “Christology Today” seems to be our experience of charity, the very created participation of passive spiration that is a dimension of our supernatural “being in love;” we make the judgments of value that originate from our being in love, and then the acts of loving that proceed from our verbum spirans amorem. In this way our created participation in the Holy Spirit as charity, with its special relation to the Father and the Son, becomes the very starting point of an analogy for understanding the divine processions; the created participation of passive spiration is what gives us a created analogue for the “origin” of the processions, that is, for God (ho theos) as Love (agapê)! “The psychological analogy ... has its starting point in ... the dynamic state of being in love.”14 Can we rehabilitate the Augustinian and Bonaventurian

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14 Ibid. 93.
distinctions of imago Dei and similitudo Dei\textsuperscript{15} here? Only the saint's life of unqualified love, only the life of one who is a "subject in Christ Jesus"\textsuperscript{16} through the gift of the Holy Spirit, provides a living, existential similitudo Dei. Moreover, perhaps only such an existential likeness makes us aware in the first place that the very structure of our intentionality from below, as unfolding through intelligere-dicere-verbum-amor procedens, is an imago Dei; and perhaps only the charity of the graced subject enables us to "[decide] to operate [from below] in accord with the norms immanent in the spontaneous relatedness of one's experienced, understood, affirmed experiencing, understanding, judging, and deciding" (Lonergan, \textit{Method in Theology} [latest reprint, Toronto: University of Toronto Press, 1996] 15). Historically the realization that the structure of intentional consciousness as unfolding from below upwards is an imago Dei has not occurred independently of lived Christian faith, that is, apart from saints like Augustine and Aquinas, holy people who live the similitudo Dei of intentional consciousness unfolding from above downwards, from the gift of charity—the created participation of the passive spiration that is the Holy Spirit.

This, of course, is a subject for future exploration, but in a publication honoring Frederick Crowe, I wonder whether this line of reflection might help in treating the vexing questions about the Holy Spirit that continue to attend even the best reflections, such as Crowe's, on the trinitarian theologies of Aquinas and Lonergan.\textsuperscript{17}

\@ Robert M. Doran, SJ


\textsuperscript{17} For some of these questions, see Frederick E. Crowe, "Rethinking the Trinity: Taking Seriously the 'Homoousios,"' \textit{Science et Esprit} XLVII:1 (1995) 13-31.
THE MOTION OF OPERATIVE AND COOPERATIVE GRACE: RETRIEVALS AND EXPLORATIONS

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Grace and Freedom, in its original form Bernard Lonergan's doctoral dissertation, was the occasion for him to grapple with a thorny text from the Summa Theologiae, Ia-IIae 111 2, in which the later Aquinas dealt with the motion of grace, making a distinction between operative and cooperative grace. To interpret that text Lonergan situates it in the genetic context of Aquinas' own evolving thought and in the broader speculative context of Aquinas' theory of operation in general, of divine transcendence and human freedom in particular.

Frederick Crowe, who taught me grace, trinitarian theology, Christology, and foundational theology at Regis College from 1964 to 1968, explored the ramifications of a cognate area of thought in an especially thoughtful series of articles on complacency and concern in Thomas Aquinas, exploring in depth Aquinas' understanding of love, and bringing out its contemporary relevance. I am delighted to be able to honor him and recognize his contribution in this article.

Operative/cooperative grace and procession of the Spirit in Aquinas' theology are overlapping areas: crucial to both of them, though from a different perspective, is an analysis of the act of love which

emanates within the will. My exploration is within the first area and Crowe's exploration of complacency and concern takes place within the context of the second area.  

To trace the evolution of Aquinas' thought regarding free will in a clear and incontrovertible way is more than usually difficult. What may at first blush appear to be a radical shift may prove to be a particular happy integration of elements which were present earlier, but in somewhat different contexts. My main thrust will be to refine and further our understanding of the movement of the will under operative and cooperative grace in a way that relates not only to Aquinas and Lonergan on that topic but also to Crowe on complacency and concern. As I carry out my task I hope to further refine and develop the distinction between the will in a mode of complacency and the will in a mode of concern developed by Crowe.

Lonergan soon systematized his approach to Aquinas' doctrine of operative and cooperative grace, emergent in GF, in De Ente Supernaturali, but in his later works he gives this doctrine no further detailed development, though he offers significant signposts. This

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3 In other contexts Crowe has dealt with gratia operans/cooperans, and that theme is not totally absent from Crowe's articles: cf. CC p 17. More recently Crowe has weighed in against the position of T. Tekippe who has claimed that Lonergan in dealing with this question had misinterpreted the evolution of Aquinas' thought on human freedom under grace. Tekippe returns to the fray in a short book, and in his conclusion acknowledges the pitfalls and difficulties of interpreting an author such as Thomas. (Terry Tekippe, Lonergan and Thomas on the Will. An Essay on Interpretation, Lanham, University Press of America, 1993, p. 140, henceforth LTW.) Further considerations are found in Michael Stebbins, "What did Lonergan really say about Aquinas' Theory of the Will", Method: Journal of Lonergan Studies, 12(1994), 281-305; Daniel Westberg, "Did Aquinas Change his Mind about the Will?", Thomist, 58(1994), pp. 41-60. It is not my intention to deal with this controversy except obliquely in this article.


5 Bernard Lonergan, De Ente Supernaturali, Mimeographed Notes for Students, Immaculée Conception, Montreal, 1944 (henceforth DES).

6 Bernard Lonergan, Insight: A Study of Human Understanding, New York, Philosophical Library, 1957 (henceforth INS). He incorporates in its chapter on general transcendent knowledge an account of divine transcendence and human freedom (cf. 661-664), but nothing corresponding to the doctrine on operative and cooperative grace. The later Lonergan offers clues which we will develop in due
article is a probe in the direction of this further development. It will focus on *Ia-IIae* 111 2 c, which Lonergan analyses in *GF*, and whose essential structure I present in the following diagram:

![Diagram of the motion of Operative and Cooperative Grace]

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course. The most explicit one is to be found in his *Method in Theology*, London, Darton Longman & Todd, 1972, 241 (henceforth *MIT*).

7 This diagram is based on *GF* 39, with the addition of the further subdivision of *actus exterior* found in Aquinas' text, which gives the two ways (inward and outward) in which God assists the will towards the exterior act. There follows the text of *Ia-IIae* 111 1 c upon which this outline is based:

Respondeo. Dicendum quod, sicut supra dictum est, gratia dupliciter potest intelligi: uno modo, divinum auxilium quo nos movet ad bene volendum et agendum; alio modo, habituale donum nobis divinitus inditum. Utrumque autem modo gratia dicta convenienter dividitur per operantem et cooperantem. Operatio enim alicuius effectus non attribuitur mobili, sed moventi. In illo ergo effectu in quo mens nostra est mota et non movens, solus autem Deus movens

operatio Deo attribuitur, et secundum hoc dicitur gratia operans.

In illo autem effectu in quo mens nostra et movet et movetur operatio non solum attribuitur Deo, sed etiam animae, et secundum hoc dicitur gratia cooperans.

Est autem in nobis duplex actus.

Primus quidem interior voluntatis.

Et quantum ad istum actum, voluntas se habet ut mota, Deus autem ut movens; et praeceptim cum voluntas incipit bonum velle, quae prius malum volebat.

Et ideo secundum quod Deus movet humanam mentem ad hunc actum dicitur gratia operans.

Alius autem actus est exterior;

qui cum a voluntate imperetur, ut supra habitum est,
My probe, in a direction which I intend to be in continuity with Lonergan’s, will deal with that part of the diagram which outlines grace as motion. I will seek further understanding of the distinction between interior and exterior acts, and between the two ways, internal and external, in which God assists us in performing exterior acts. The issues surrounding the rest of the diagram, which deals with the relationship of grace as motion and grace as habit and which outlines grace as habit, are complex and warrant separate treatment.

I intend to offer some helpful suggestions for recasting Aquinas’ distinctions in more contemporary terms, especially in terms of the intentionality analysis which Lonergan adopted in his later years (section 2). Before such a recasting, I will engage in a further analysis and retrieval of Aquinas’ own teaching, setting Ia-Ilae 111 2 c in its own broader doctrinal context. (section 1)

A FURTHER RETRIEVAL OF AQUINAS ON THE MOTION OF GRACE

This retrieval of Aquinas calls for a few words situating Aquinas in terms of intentionality analysis and faculty psychology, terms which Lonergan has contrasted more than once. Of course Aquinas does not have at his disposal a sophisticated 20th century approach to the inward data of consciousness. At the heart of his approach to what he terms the powers (not faculties) of the soul and their activities, however, there is a structured dynamic, akin to Lonergan’s levels of consciousness, of distinct but related inner events which constitute a complete increment of human activity. Aquinas’ intellectualism respects the interiority of spirit and his account of real distinctions is

consequens est ut ad hunc actum operatio attribuitur voluntati.
Et quia etiam ad hunc actum Deus nos adjuvat,
et interius confirmando voluntatem ut ad actum perveniat
et exterius facultatem operandi praebendo;
respectu hujusmodi actus dicitur gratia cooperans.

8 The term “actual grace” which Lonergan uses in this context emerges not out of Aquinas’ usage—he prefers to speak of grace as auxilium movens—but out of later scholasticism.

9 I develop these points in greater detail in my book Patience and Power: Grace for the First World, New York, Paulist, 1988 (henceforth PPG), ch. 5.
very open to compenetration of presence and activity between the spiritual powers of the soul, intellective and volitional.\textsuperscript{10}

In addition it may be useful to mention that Lonergan is not alone in exploring these texts of the Doctor Communis. Two works that stand out are Bouillard's *Conversion et grâce chez S. Thomas d'Aquin*, which came out in 1944, a few years after *Grace and Freedom* in its original form in *Theological Studies*, and Max Seckler's *Instinkt und Glaubenswille nach Thomas von Aquin*, which came out in 1961.\textsuperscript{11} Lonergan in his later work refers to neither of these authors, nor do they to Lonergan, as I have been able to discover. My own doctoral thesis, published in 1974,\textsuperscript{12} and my later work, *Patience and Power*, which came out in 1988, will also enter into this section.

And now to the question at hand. In the last and culminating chapter of *Grace and Freedom* Lonergan attempts to clarify the distinction between operative and cooperative actual grace as Aquinas formulates it in *Ia-IIae* 111\textsuperscript{2}. To do this, he must clarify the distinction between *actus interior* and *actus exterior* in this text. He seeks light on the matter by enumerating different possibilities and testing them one by one:

The difficulty of the passage is this: it gives a *duplex actus*, one internal to the will and one external; but the theory of the will gives a *triplex actus*, will of end, choice of means, and bodily execution. If we denote the pair by $A$ and $B$, and the trio by $X$, $Y$, and $Z$ respectively, then the possible interpretations may be listed as follows: (1) $A$ is $X$ and $B$ is $Y$; (2) $A$ is $X$ and $B$ is $Z$; (3) $A$ is $X$ and $B$ includes both $Y$ and $Z$; (4) $A$ includes both $X$ and $Y$ and $B$ is $Z$; (5) $A$ is $Y$ and $B$ is $Z$.\textsuperscript{13}

\footnotesize
\begin{itemize}
  \item \textsuperscript{10} Cf. the theory of real distinction in *INS* 488-90. The distinction between powers would come under the heading of real distinction between principles of being (*entia quibus*) rather than between beings (*entia quae*). The compenetration of intellect and will in Aquinas' view is clear from their common openness to being (*De Ver* 1 1\textsuperscript{c}; *Ia* 79 2 ad 3); from their ability to reflect on themselves and on each other (*De Ver* 22 12\textsuperscript{c}; *Ia* 16 4 ad 1); and from their essential symbiosis in human activity (*Ia-IIae* 9 1 ad 3).
  \item \textsuperscript{12} Jean-Marc Laporte, *Les structures dynamiques de la grâce: grâce médicinale et grâce élevante d'après Thomas d'Aquin*, Montréal, Bellarmin, 1974 (henceforth *SDG*).
  \item \textsuperscript{13} *GF* 132-133
\end{itemize}
Laporte

Lonergan finally opts for (3): thus the internal act of will is with respect to the end: the external act is not merely the bodily execution but also the act of will commanding this execution (136).

This solution conforms *prima facie* to Aquinas’ text in which the *actus interior* is a single act, whereas the *actus exterior*, the performance of the act, requires an inward confirmation of the will and an outward assistance to make performance possible.¹⁴

Nonetheless an apparent inconsistency emerges here. The second of the will acts, listed as Y, is choice of means, and the third, listed as Z, is bodily execution. But when Lonergan states his own preference, Y becomes “the act of will commanding this execution” rather than the choice of means.¹⁵ But it is clear that for Aquinas *electio* is an act of will distinct from and prior to *usus*, (*Ia-IIae* 16.4.c) election having to do with the choice of means and *usus* with the implementation of these means under the command of reason.¹⁶

A fuller survey of Aquinas’ doctrine on the various acts of the will and their corresponding acts of the intellect as a person moves from the first spontaneous attraction (interior act) to some end to the performance designed to achieve that end (exterior act) will help us in our task.¹⁷ For Aquinas there are six acts of the will with their

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¹⁴ It is important to note here that there is a double internal/external pairing in the text of Aquinas. There is first the *actus interior* and the *actus exterior*. Then there is a distinction between God assisting the *actus exterior* both inwardly (interius) and externally (exterius).

¹⁵ *GF*, p. 136. In *DES*, a later work, Lonergan describes this second will act prior to bodily execution as a choice of means rather than a command. To the extent that our will is moved towards a good as end grace is operative; to the extent that the will in a subsequent free act chooses means grace is cooperative. This can be seen in the *Probatio* of Thesis 5a, under #3 b.

¹⁶ In *Ia-IIae* 111.2 Aquinas loosely speaks of the will commanding the exterior act. When he deals specifically with these issues in *Ia-IIae* 16 and 17, it is clear that for him reason commands and the will executes.

¹⁷ These acts are presented schematically in *PPG*, 212. My first treatment of them, composed roughly at the same time and totally independently from Crowe’s *CC*, was in an MA thesis at the Université de Montréal, *The Interplay of the Intellect and the Will in the Moral Act according to St. Thomas*, 1957. A recent account with a good summary of the earlier literature can be found in Daniel Westberg, *Aristotle, Action, and Prudence in Aquinas*, Oxford, Clarendon Press, 1994, esp. ch. 8 and ff. He fails to incorporate the distinction between simple volition and intention, which is deeply rooted in the Augustinian tradition, and highly pertinent to an account of operative and cooperative grace.
corresponding cognitive acts. Three of them refer to the end: volition, intention, and fruition; and three refer to the means and situate themselves between intention and fruition in the complete increment of a human act: consent, election, and application (usus). Aquinas' thought in this matter is not totally knit together, but, in a simple example, we will present the traditional sequence of these acts.\(^{18}\)

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Volition</th>
<th>The thought comes into my mind to pursue a religious vocation. I experience a simple, spontaneous attraction to this as a good-in-itself.</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Intention</td>
<td>I move to a second order, one of reflection. Is this good-in-itself something I really want to pursue as a good-for-me? Is such a pursuit feasible? As a result of this reflection I may actually intend to pursue this good as a good-for-me or I may fail to intend it. This intending encompasses the means in a global way: to intend is to move towards performance and achievement, taking whatever means are necessary.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Consent</td>
<td>I deliberate about what means to take. If a number of means emerge, I can give them my general consent (except for those particular means which may evoke in me a revulsion, a non-consent). If one means emerges, I can give it my consent, and in this case consent is tantamount to election.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Election</td>
<td>I bring to an end the process of deliberation by a freely emitted practical judgment, thus choosing the means to take here and now: e.g. think about it some more, seek someone to talk to, write the vocation director of this or that community, etc.</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

\(^{18}\) In the introduction to \textit{Ia-IIae} 8 Aquinas tells us that he will first discuss the will acts which deal with the end (questions 8-12) and then with those which deal with means to the end (questions 13-17). Intention opens the way for consideration and implementation of means (Cf. esp. \textit{Ia-IIae} 12, 1, ad 4, and \textit{Ia-IIae} 11, 4, ad 3). The means having been implemented, the will enjoys the achievement of the end. Thus the traditional sequence, found in Billuart's \textit{Summa Sancti Thomae hodiernis Academiarum moribus accommodata...}, T. IV, diss. 3, prol., written before 1757, and also found in Gardeil's article on "Actes Humains" in the \textit{Dictionaire de Théologie Catholique}, col. 343, of volition, intention, consent, election, execution, fruition, maintains its soundness.
application I execute the means chosen, applying myself (my mind to do more thinking, my hands to fetch the phone book to find the right number, etc.) to the task at hand. In this process as Aquinas understands it, the mind commands (imperium) and the will applies the other powers to the chosen purpose (usus).

(The process of deliberation, consent, election, application continues as long as is necessary to actually achieve what I intend. If an obstacle comes in the way, I may have to reassess my original intent.)

fruition I rest in the achievement of the good which originally evoked in me a feeling of attraction, not as a good-in-itself (simple volition), not as an absent, desired good (intention) but as a present, fulfilling good. Ultimate fruition is of the final end, but there are many relative fruitions on the way: e.g. I am satisfied that my action to write the vocation director has yielded useful information, I am satisfied that I have come to a resolution to enter religious life (or not to do so) and am engaged in the way of life I have chosen, etc.

Lonergan's account of the human act at this point is truncated. His triplex actus, i.e. will of end, choice of means, and bodily execution, relates only to three of the six acts of the will. Moreover the term "bodily execution" is misleading to the extent that it does not allow for the possibility of an execution or performance which is that not of a bodily organ but that of the human spirit itself in one of its powers.19 Thus he does not allow for the same range of possible interpretation of Ia-IIae 1112 as does Aquinas' own scheme.

The actus exterior of Ia-IIae 1112 is the act of performance done under the influence of imperium and usus. God's providential orchestration of the circumstances that facilitate the execution of a wholesome aspiration of the will (Deus exterius praebens facultatem operandi) is lucidly presented by Lonergan in his account of premotion in Aquinas.20 The issue is how to situate Deus interius confirmans

19 Cf. Ia-IIae 17 5 and 6. Lonergan shows he is aware of this point (GF 137).
20 Cf. GF ch. 4. Aquinas makes a similar point in his treatise on grace, for example when he states that to do good and avoid evil we need in addition to habitual grace
voluntatem within the sequence of the six acts of the will. Lonergan’s
description of this confirmation suggests a possible answer:

the need of grace in good performance is not to aid efficacious
will in effecting its imperium but to change mere good desires
into efficacious willing. Once the will really wills, the bodily act
follows: indeed “tanta est facilitas ut vix a servitio discernatur
imperium.”

The original movement of the will caused by God (actus interior) is a
simple volition of the end which of itself is inefficacious. It has not as
yet been appropriated by the person and made into an intention by
which the person resolves to take whatever means are necessary to
actually move towards the end in question and perform the good act. In
intention I move myself towards the end; in simple volition I am moved
towards the end. Intention, not election or application, appears to be
pivotal in the shift from “mere good desires” to “efficacious willing.” This
readily corresponds to the data of experience. When someone proposes a
objective to me, the first focus of my freedom is not which means I will
take to implement it, but whether or not I want to pursue it. At times
this distinction is painful: I experience the cleavage between what I
would like to be able to do and what in effect I set out to do, between
velleity (Augustine’s velle) and effective willing (Augustine’s posse).

the help of the omniscient and omnipotent God to direct and protect us. Cf. Ia-IIae

21 GF 135

22 To say that this act is inefficacious is not to relegate it to a secondary status.
Indeed the volition of the end is the mainspring of all human activity. Only when the
will is moved to an end can it further move itself in a personally assumed act
towards the achievement of that end. One of the biases of our own culture is to
relegate such acts to the level of velleity. A simple volition which remains just that
indeed is a velleity: it remains ineffective. But without simple volition, human
activity, rooted in affectivity rather than in conativity, does not begin. This account
broadly concurs with Crowe’s CC. The distinction between intendio boni and
complacentia boni which he develops on pp. 5 ff. is very close to the point I am trying
to make.

23 Cf. Ia-IIae, 12 5. Intention is contrasted to the instinct of brute animals in that
the former is an act by which the agent moves himself/herself, and the latter is an
act by which the agent is moved. Likewise the will in the originating act of simple
volition is moved to its act: the section on simple volition in the Ia-IIae contains two
questions, 9 and 10, which present the ways in which the will can be moved.
Is intention free? Aquinas does not address this question head on. Free choice, and the deliberation which precedes it, is about means. Should the pursuit of an end require deliberation, that end would be considered as a means to be chosen or not chosen in virtue of a higher end (*Ia-IIae* 13 3). In a general sense deliberation is about ends as well as about means (*Ia-IIae* 6 2). Inasmuch as the good intended is a particular good, the will's tendency to the universal good is not satiated by it, and the will remains free to pursue or not pursue it. The basic point is made in *Ia-IIae* 13 6, but more thoroughly in *De Malo* 6 1. Thomas grounds the will's ability to act freely in the discrepancy between particular goods and the universal good which alone necessitates the will. The goods which trigger the simple reaction of the will are particular goods. The subsequent reflexive act of intending them is not necessitated. But the end as end is the principle of a deliberation and not its conclusion: from that point of view, intention is not free.

Can this point be developed in greater detail? My preferred hypothesis—a reconstruction rather than a retrieval of Aquinas—is that when my will is actuated in an act of simple volition of a particular good, as a spiritual self-present being I am present to the orientation of my own will to good-in-general, and in the light of that orientation the particular good becomes known as a particular rather than universal good, as a means rather than an end, as non-necessitating rather than necessitating. In this way intention is free. 26

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24 *Contingit id quod est in una operatione ut finis, ordinari ad aliquid ut ad finem. Et hoc modo sub electio cadit. (Ia-IIae 13 3 c)*

25 *Perfectam igitur cognitionem finis sequitur voluntarium secundum rationem perfectam, prout scilicet apprehenso fine aliquis potest, deliberans de fine et de his quae sunt ad finem, moveri in finem vel non moveri. (Ia-IIae 6 2 c)* A striking example of this is the first free act of human beings come to the age of reason, in which they deliberate about themselves and the prevailing objective of all their choices: *Ia-IIae* 89 6 c and ad 3. This point is developed in greater detail in the final section of this article.

26 Where I would posit the tacit orientation of the will to the good-in-general as pivot between simple volition and intention Crowe appears to insert a distinct will act. For him (1) there is a basic complacency of the will towards the good based on a knowledge of what is. From subsequent knowledge of the good that can be, there emerges (2) a complacency of the will towards that good as end. Once a further judgment that this good is feasible has been emitted, there occurs (3) the first efficacious act of intending the end which marks the emergence of freedom (*CC* 218). In effect he appears to divide the traditional judgment of convenience and possibility
Is the prior act of simple volition free? It is certainly free in the sense that it is voluntary, emerging by spontaneity rather than by coaction. But is it also free in the sense that the one positing the act could have chosen not to posit it? In De Malo Aquinas holds that the will always remains free in the order of exercise. Presented with any good, it can always will it or not will it. But it is also true that our spiritual selves, latent, powerless to act without external stimuli over which they have no control, are caught up in a temporal process in which they are first moved, and then are able to move themselves. Thus the effective power to will or not to will is in two steps, a first in which the will spontaneously reacts, moved by an object, a second in which it reflects on its reaction and chooses to move or not to move towards the object presented. Our spiritual selves, incarnate rather than angelic, in and of themselves are latent, powerless to act without external stimuli over which they have no control, and need to be moved before they can move themselves. The effective power to choose or not to choose in the order of exercise implies a second moment of reflection.\footnote{The case for this is made in PPG pp. 223-226, and more fully in SDG pp. 179-189.}

These points need to be applied to the motion of grace, and we will use the example of justification which Aquinas develops at length. In talking about justification in Ia-IIae 113 he endorses Augustine's saying that the God who creates humans apart from themselves will not justify them apart from themselves (the exception being those who have not yet reached the age of reason). God moves our free will to accept his grace, but moves us with due respect to our spiritual nature which calls for free self-disposition (Ia-IIae 113 3 ad 3). When speaking about human free will accepting the gift of grace Aquinas uses two terms which he defines more specifically elsewhere: consent (1112 ad 2; 113 7 ad 1)\footnote{The word consent occurs in a variety of contexts in the writings of Thomas: the interplay of the will and intellect in the human act which we have already presented; consent to the grace of justification; consent to the solicitation of a disordered movement of passion (e.g. Ia-IIae 77 1 c). Its meaning in each case should primarily be taken from the context in which it is found. The attempt to link up these contexts that precedes election in Billuart's scheme into a judgment of convenience which grounds complacency of the will towards a particular end and a judgment of attainability which grounds the intention of that good as an end to be pursued by taking appropriate means.} and desire (113 5 c). One consents to something as a means to
an end which one already intends: indeed if only one means presents itself, the free act of consent in effect confirms the intention and moves it forward towards fruition. In the stricter sense of the word, desire is a passion of the concupiscible appetite. But the term has a clearly broader connotation, evident even when reading the articles devoted to it in the treatise of the passions in the *Ia-IIae*. One desires something to the extent that one does not yet possess it. The corresponding act on the spiritual level is that of intention, in which I choose to pursue a good which is as yet absent. A justifying God seen face to face would lead to an irreversible act of fruition. A justifying God discerned through faith, through a glass darkly, leaves the will free to consent or to dissent to the movement of grace, to intend a pattern of living consistent with a converted heart. But what it consents to or dissents from is a work of grace which has already begun to transform the human heart. We are moved before we move ourselves. But even when we move ourselves, we do so under grace which cooperates with and inwardly confirms our will towards its act (*Ia-IIae* 111 2 c).

**EXPLORATIONS AND TRANSPOSITIONS FOR TODAY**

In this section we will attempt to pursue the issues left unresolved on the relation between operative and cooperative grace as motion, this time from the perspective not of the earlier Lonergan who interprets Aquinas but of the later Lonergan who moves in new directions. The shift from the earlier to the later is gradual. Already *Grace and Freedom* offers a powerful move away from the mechanistic models which presided over the quarrels on grace which were part of his theological upbringing, and adumbrates some of the themes of a fully developed intentionality analysis, which implies a shift away from a metaphysical universe to one in which persons, the transactions between persons, and communities of persons are taken as the primary analogate. Our remarks are situated in the continuation of that trajectory. The distinction between complacency and concern which Crowe aptly

and to elaborate a set of interrelated meanings presents an interesting and worthwhile task which is beyond the confines of this paper.
delineates in his three articles is also part of the same movement of thought.

In our earlier attempt to more fully retrieve the context of Aquinas' distinction between operative and cooperative grace, we began to delineate a pattern other than the one which Lonergan appears to advocate, i.e. a passive act of willing the end followed by an active act of choosing the means, but one which still upholds, in accord with Lonergan's view, a double will act, the first passive and the second active. The key to this view was the distinction between simple volition of the end and intention of the end. In this section we will seek clues from the later Lonergan which will help us further develop this line of thought. Indeed we are in effect suggesting that the later Lonergan opens the way for a more satisfactory solution than that developed in *Grace and Freedom*.

The initial clue is the relationship between the second and third levels within Lonergan's analysis of intentional consciousness. These levels are cognitional levels, and are distinguished by the fact that the first is direct and the second is reflexive. The "Eureka" of insight is simple and spontaneous. The "Yes" or "No" of judgment is the fruit of reflection in which I stand back from my insight, consider it in relation to the data from which it emerges, assess the adequacy of that data as evidence, and emit a rational judgment in harmony with the pure desire to know at the root of my being. Like insight, simple volition is spontaneous; like judgment, intention is an act which has received the imprint of *ratio*, of rational reflection.\(^{29}\)

The second clue is taken from Lonergan's treatment of the analogy between temporal (human) and eternal (divine) subjects in *De Deo Trino: Pars Systematica*.\(^{30}\) The Persons of the Trinity exist in total self-appropriation and self-acceptance; human persons struggle towards that goal in a long journey. This journey in time takes place in two phases. In the first phase, temporal subjects are actuated in their

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\(^{29}\) This distinction emerges clearly in *IIIa* 18. voluntas ut natura is spontaneous, necessary in its movement towards a good taken absolutely; voluntas ut ratio is free, marked by the work of reason which relates the willed good to something else.

intellectual natures beyond their own intention, *per accidens*. In the second phase, temporal subjects, already actuated, are the subjects of their own intellectual nature *per se*, i.e. from their own intention.\(^{31}\)

One would not expect to find a similar line of thought in a pre-modern author such as Aquinas, but one does, for example in the treatise on sin in the *Ia-Ilae*. There Aquinas considers the first free act of human beings who have come to the age of reason. What they first do is to deliberate about themselves:

> And if they ordain themselves to the right end, through grace they receive the remission of original sin. If they do not so ordain themselves to the right end, they will, inasmuch as they are at that age capable of discretion, sin mortally, not doing what lies within their power. (*Ia-Ilae* 89 6 c). The first thing that occurs to human beings who have come to the age of discretion is to think about themselves, and to what they will ordain other things as to an end: for the end is first in intention. (ad 3).

Contemporary persons versed in spirituality and psychology are not likely to go along with the notion that human persons are able to come to such a fundamental option at the very dawn of their reflexive activity as actuated subjects of an intellectual nature. The important point is that Aquinas makes room for reflexive activity in the all-important process of coming to a free self-disposition before God.\(^{32}\)

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\(^{31}\) In Brezovec's translation, the pertinent passages are "...inasmuch as one considers the intention of the temporal subject himself, it is also clear that the actuation of intellectual nature cannot be intended by the temporal subject prior to that subject's knowing that he possesses an intellectual nature: and it is no less evident that a temporal subject can not know that he has an intellectual nature prior to the actuation of this very nature of his...this same temporal subject governs his own intellectual operations in a spontaneous manner prior to his learning these same operations on the basis of his own understood, approved, and chosen intention" (p. 168) "...the temporal subject is involved in two times: there is an earlier time in which it is on the basis of natural spontaneity that he is the subject of his actuated intellectual nature; and there is a later time in which he is the subject of his own intellectual nature, actuated and to be actuated, not spontaneously, but knowingly, willingly, and through his own intention." (p. 169).

\(^{32}\) S. Dianich studies this question extensively in *L'opzione fondamentale nel pensiero di S. Tommaso*, Brescia, Morcelliana, 1968. Other texts from Thomas Aquinas: *II Sent* 28 1 3 ad 5; *II Sent* 42 1 5 ad 7; *De Ver* 24 12 ad 2; *De Ver* 28 3 ad 4; *De Malo* 5 2 ad 8; *De Malo* 7 10 ad 8, ad 9. Also cf. *SDG* 216-219.
I am suggesting that Lonergan’s treatment, which presents the macro-structures according to which the temporal subject develops in time, provides an analogy for particular micro-increments within that development, increments which take place through complete human acts, which entail the key transition from simple volition to intention. Simple volition, no matter what its particular object, actuates the will whose orientation is to the fullness of good. That orientation having been actuated, I become present to it, and am enabled in a second reflexive phase to freely dispose myself towards the limited good which happens to have actuated that orientation, intending to pursue it or not to pursue it as a means to the all-encompassing good to which my will is oriented by nature. Even the gift of justifying faith, as we have seen, offered during this human journey, is presented as a limited good which leaves the will free to accept or to reject it.

On this view simple volition is to intention as simple apprehension (insight) is to judgment. In other words just as judgment adds a note of reflection, of self-transcendence to simple apprehension, so too does intention to simple volition. Simple volition is the spontaneous actuation, specified by a particular object, of my basic orientation to a personal fulfillment which only God in face to face relation can provide. That actuation lies within the scope of the unlimited openness of my spirit to being and I become present to it. Within this reflective space, the particular good which has specified and activated my unlimited orientation emerges as the non-necessitating possible object of a free self-disposition. To employ Crowe’s terms, the passive complacency of

33 This point is not clearly developed by Thomas. Just as my knowing presence to my own native orientation to knowledge yields the fundamental notion of being which orients my intellectual endeavor, so too my knowing presence to myself as incarnate spirit oriented to unlimited good yields the first principle in the order of volition, bonum est faciendum, good is to be done. But then any particular good, precisely because it is particular, fails to necessitate my willing self. Its goodness may evoke my spontaneous attraction but I may or may not consider it as perfective of me in my own quest for the good.

34 One could envisage a further development of this parallelism. The cognitional sequence which Lonergan deals with in his levels of consciousness is experiencing, understanding, judging. The parallel volitional sequence would be feeling, willing, intending. The standard account of the levels of conscious operation presented by intentionality analysis puts deciding after judging, which fits Aquinas’ scheme. But there are also feeling and willing. Such apprehensions of value are prior to judgments of value (MIT, pp. 37-38).
the will in a good is followed by the reflective and active concern of the will to achieve it.

The movement of grace espouses the phases in time of my basic reality of me as incarnate spirit, as temporal subject. In the first phase, that of grace as operative, I find myself moved in this or that particular way, there emerges an inchoative convergence between grace stirring within the depths of myself and grace beckoning me from without. In the second movement, I react personally, take a stand of my own, hopefully one of consenting to what God has already begun in me apart from me. To that extent, under the impact of the same grace, this time seen as cooperative, I achieve personal self-transcendence. Election, consent, application come under the sway of this cooperative grace, but the prior pivotal moment is that of intention. Moreover in and of themselves consent, election, and application do not yield fruition without the proper constellation of further events, acts, opportunities, facilities. The God who interiorly confirms the will in actual cooperative grace must also exteriorly make available the means for my effective action (Ia-IIae 111 2).

This particular investigation has come to an end. However other cognate topics beckon the student of Lonergan and of Aquinas. The coordination of grace as motion and grace as habit in Aquinas and in a contemporary vein is a complex field for further fruitful exploration. Another is the role in moving us to gracious acts of what Aquinas would call the sensitive appetites, concupiscible and irascible, open to higher psychic integration in humans and at the service of biological survival in other animals. The movement of grace is deeply attuned to the human reality, as Thomas Aquinas, Bernard Lonergan, and Frederick Crowe reminded us.

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LIMITS, THE ILLIMITABLE, AND THE 
DISCIPLINED IMAGINATION: 
GEORGE ELIOT'S MIDDLEMARCH 

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I 

[Conversion] has been pawed and fingered by unctuous hands for now near two hundred years. The bloom is gone from the flower. The plumage, once shining with hues direct from heaven, is soiled and bedraggled. The most solemn of all realities have been degraded into the passwords of technical theology. 

(J.A. Froude, in his Life of Bunyan) 

THE ANXIETY WHICH Fr. Crowe describes in the final section of "Complacency and Concern in St. Thomas"—that painful hypertrophy of moral consciousness in an unaccommodating universe—is a defining symptom of much Victorian literature. The resolute moral earnestness of so many Victorian intellectuals masks their psychic fatigue as they discern that the burden of progress they so devoutly assume has little or no ontological ground beyond their own unceasing volition. In his Autobiography John Stuart Mill details his emotional collapse beneath the weight of a relentless Benthamite education, and his discovery in 

Wordsworth's poetry of some gratuitous, rationally unsubstantiated, principle of emotional vitality and self-validation. To Matthew Arnold also, that most zealous apostle of culture to the Philistine middle-class, Wordsworth's poetry evoked distant, fitful strains of "The Buried Life" of feeling in a world of "doubts, disputes, distractions, fears." ("Memorial Verses")

However, Wordsworth's "wise passivity," which Father Crowe cites as a nineteenth-century analogue of Thomistic "complacency," remained unassimilated into an adequate psychology and ontology. Isolated from reason, the life of feeling and imagination lacked philosophical ground in this Utilitarian age and was reduced more often than not to a nostalgic respite from wearisome moral effort. Arnold fairly early on abandoned the writing of poetry when he found it only mired him more deeply in melancholy, and he devoted himself somewhat quixotically to a program of cultural and literary criticism which might promote the equipoise of Homer and Sophocles as counter to the unceasing contentiousness of his time.

Hence the characteristic oscillation in so many Victorian writers between energetic, altruistic effort on behalf of some distant, hypothetical ideal of moral progress, and those fugitive moments of glory uncovered in the wake of the former's barren rigors. This pattern can be found across the spectrum of belief in Victorian England. It characterizes the careers not only of the agnostic Mill and the Broad Church, "Hellenist" Arnold, but also that of the Evangelical Ruskin and, to an extent, even of the Catholic Hopkins. Hopkins' "Terrible Sonnets" record states of psychic exhaustion every bit as harrowing as Mill's.

The writings of the essayist, translator, and novelist George Eliot offer a unique perspective on the unstable relationship of "complacency and concern" in the Victorian sensibility because of their singular fusion of passionate imagination with richly informed intellect. Eliot's novels reflect with unusual self-consciousness her own—and her age's—struggles to formulate an integrated vision of life out of the dominant and, we might say in hindsight, inadequate philosophical traditions of her day. On the one hand Eliot's realism, her extraordinary capacity for disciplined observation of nature, of society, and especially of individual consciousness, draws its philosophical sanction from the empiricism of Mill and Comte. Their dogmatic positivism, however, constrains that native trust in nature she inherited from her Romantic forebears and
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Narrowly circumscribes the range of effective freedom her characters can exercise. On the other hand, her ardent benevolence appealed to various strains of nineteenth-century religious or philosophical idealism for its rational justification. As we shall see, this latter resort often strands her heroines, in flight from a complacent materialism, in a rarefied atmosphere of moral enthusiasm divorced from circumstance—and from their own most authentic desires. Thus, one might conceive Eliot as struggling to escape that “incoherent realism” Lonergan describes as an illusory middle between materialism and idealism. With imperfect philosophical tools, but with probing symbolic language, Eliot tries to negotiate a course between a naive realism condemned to the fixed limits of the world “out there” and an idealism that purchases illimitable subjective vistas at the cost of full, incarnate engagement with experience.

II

George Eliot was born Mary Anne Evans, in 1819, in rural Warwickshire. She hearkened back to the Wordsworthian enchantments of this world in her early fiction, notably in *Adam Bede* (1859) and in the early sections of *The Mill on the Floss* (1860). These nostalgic idylls were composed, however, amidst the intellectual tumult of London, in which George Eliot participated vigorously as an editor and book reviewer for the prestigious *Westminster Review*. An ardent Evangelical Anglican in her youth, Eliot was exposed in her early twenties to the rationalist Higher Criticism through the writings of Charles Bray, and of Charles Hennell, whose *Inquiry Concerning the Origins of Christianity* (1838) equipped her to attack the doctrines of orthodox Calvinism for which she had developed a growing distaste. By the time she began writing fiction, in her late thirties, Eliot had translated the whole of David Strauss’s massive *Das Leben Jesu* (3 vols., 1846), Spinoza’s *Ethics* (unpublished in her lifetime), and Feuerbach’s *Essence of Christianity* (1854).

Eliot found in the writings of Comte, Feuerbach, and Strauss a horizon of aspiration wider than the contentious theology of her day,

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which was too unsure of its own methodological ground to embrace the liberating insights of science and critical history. Nevertheless, she maintained a critical distance from Feuerbach's dogmatic materialism and from the more programmatic aspects of Comte's Religion of Humanity. Strauss initially appealed to Eliot as a way to salvage some of the poetry of Christian belief that had earlier fired her imagination, while jettisoning its unpalatable "supernaturalism." But she also wearied of Strauss's relentless demythologizing, and she lamented the way in which he had absorbed the palpable Christian symbols of Cross and Resurrection into a purely abstract dialectic. ("I am Strauss-sick," she wrote her friend Sara Hennell at this time, "...Do you not feel how hard it is not to give full faith to every symbol." Letters, I, 181) Neither Strauss, nor Feuerbach, nor Comte, in whose secular Religion of Humanity she found public outlet for her humanitarian fervor, met the full demands of her heart. None of these offered the experience of direct, vivid participation in a narrative of transformation, as had the biblical stories, and her beloved Pilgrim's Progress. None could bestow on her that gift of an original glory that leavens moral effort and that helps to purge it of arrogance and self-will.3

In what is possibly the most intimately autobiographical passage in all her writings, the opening of The Mill on the Floss, Eliot celebrates this unwilled access to an unspeakable plenitude. There Maggie Tulliver stands, her hand in her brother Tom's, transfixed before the cascading waters of the mill, and there Eliot's narrator stands in memory, in mingled delight and dread at how the eager currents of the Floss, embrace, and in turn are embraced by, the tidal flow from the limitless ocean. Maggie's subsequent exile from what Fr. Crowe describes as the child's "joyful orientation to being" to the "desert of his concerns," (372) parallels Eliot's own reluctance to trust a universe which, the thought of her day told her, was ruled by impersonal undeviating natural sequence. The stern logic of circumstance all but consigns Maggie to a life of

3 Sebastian Moore, O.S.B. cites Frank Lake's use of this term to signify one's "first experience of ecstasy-in-trust," (94) an undifferentiated "Eros previous to all caution." (93) "In Water and Blood," Lonergan Workshop, Vol. 11 (1995), 91-104. Both phrases capture splendidly the quality of Maggie Tulliver's childhood awareness.

Maggie's favorite book, it might be noted, is Pilgrim's Progress. Her awe and ecstasy before the river Floss is no doubt informed by her imaginative assimilation of that river over which Christian and Christiana must pass to enter the Heavenly City.
barren duty. Eliot redeems her from this fate only by means of that extraordinary ending in which she is reunited with her estranged brother, both restored briefly to that glory, but only in death on the floodwater of the Floss. Ten years later, in *Middlemarch* (1871-72), Eliot details even more fully the web of natural and social circumstance in which human lives are enmeshed, but now with greater awareness of how natural and social limits can not only circumscribe but also liberate human desire by disciplining the imagination to specific, concrete intelligibilities that cumulate within an ever-expanding horizon of mystery.

To conclude this opening section, we may say that Eliot's novels belie her explicitly formulated philosophical allegiances. Their narrative disjunctions, and their metaphoric and symbolic language, reveal a deeper fascination with the intimate, transformative potential latent in the passionate relationships of men and women. (To be sure her Feuerbachian and Comtean preachments do too often intrude into the novels, but the narrative logic supersedes their ideological rigidities.) In symbolic rather than technical language Eliot's fiction breathe life into that "solemn" reality of conversion which Froude thought to be degraded by the arid theological polemics of his day.

III

"Care is taken that trees do not grow into the sky." [Eliot's translation of a German proverb]...in other words, everything on this earth has limits that may not be overpassed. Even imagination, which used to be in high repute for its immensity, is seen nowadays to be no more than a worker in mosaics, owing every one of its glinting fragments and every type of impossible vastnesses to the small realm of experience; nay, finds herself beaten by discovery and sits amazed, like a sorcerer outdone. And discovery? That too must end somewhere and under the name of knowledge has long been recognized as a mere parenthesis in a context of irremovable darkness."

(Eliot, unpublished essay from the 1860's)⁴

“Every limit is a beginning as well as an ending.”

(Middlemarch 573)

None of Eliot’s heroines more dramatically illustrates the perils of a moral idealism dissociated from concrete experience, none undergoes a more disconcerting conversion to the transformative energies latent in complacency before that experience, than Dorothea Brooke, the protagonist of Eliot’s masterpiece.

The novel’s title, Middlemarch, invokes Pilgrim’s Progress. Middlemarch is both a realistic place, a meticulously detailed provincial town in the Midlands of England on the eve of the Great Reform Bill of 1832, and it is a spiritual landscape, like those desert valleys, barren plains, and Sloughs of Despond in which Bunyan’s pilgrims languish, forgetful of that Heavenly City which alone can satisfy their desires. It is the symbolic middle of the journey of life for any number of characters who have settled for a great deal less in life and a great deal less from themselves than they had anticipated in their youth. The mayor of Middlemarch, Mr. Vincy, boasts that he has long since abandoned any pretense at “threading a path for principles in the world”; he is content to take the world as he finds it “in trade and everything else.” (88) The Reverend Mr. Farebrother, an understanding friend to Dorothea and to Dr. Tertius Lydgate, the novel’s other protagonist, has resigned himself to being a “decent makeshift” of a clergyman. (121) He gambles at pool,catalogues insects, and collects benefices.

Dorothea stands out in bold relief from the dispiriting mediocrity around her—as does Lydgate—by the uncompromising loftiness of her aspirations. In the “Prelude” to the novel, the narrator likens Dorothea’s quest to the famous childhood fantasy of St. Teresa [Eliot anglicizes the spelling to “Theresa”] for an “epic life” fighting beside her brother against the pagan Moors. No more than Teresa’s could Dorothea’s imagination be satisfied by “conventional romance and social conquest.” Instead, she hungered after “some illimitable satisfaction, some object which would never justify weariness, which would reconcile self-despair with the

literature of science of her day and during the 1860’s served as amanuensis for her spouse, the naturalist G.H. Lewes, while he was composing his Problems of Life and Mind.

rapturous consciousness of a life beyond self.” (xiii)

These intoxicating words suggest Dorothea’s moral grandeur—and her fatal ignorance of herself. Dorothea luxuriates in what others have forsaken, her own unbounded eros and her awful power of choice. She craves what St. Teresa craved, the “illimitable satisfaction” of union not only in thought but in “far-resonant action” with a universe of unspeakable moral loveliness. She initiates this quest by summarily dismissing an offer of marriage from Sir James Chettam, a wealthy landlord and friend of her uncle Mr. Brooke, in favor of devoting her energies to the “far-resonant action” of social reform, in this case by rehabilitating the dwellings of her uncle’s tenants.

But Dorothea lacks the balance and discernment St. Teresa cultivated within a living tradition of spiritual formation. Teresa’s ardor for the illimitable God was so closely attuned to her body’s imperatives that she could scold a colleague for remarking on her too robust consumption of the evening meal: “There is a time for partridge and a time for God.” One can hardly imagine Dorothea Brooke uttering so fulsome a retort, brought up as she was in “English and Swiss Puritanism” and “fed on meagre histories and on art chiefly of the hand-screen sort.” (134)

Likewise, the reforms Teresa effected in the face of unreasoning opposition from fellow religious, and from ecclesiastical authorities, required a soul well instructed in the psyche’s capacity for self-deception and self-indulgence, and a soul well versed in the political realities both constraining and enabling the creative exercise of her spirit. Dorothea by contrast indulges generous but sentimental fantasies that her unfocused labors will initiate the millennium; she thinks it will be “as if the spirit of Oberlin had passed over the parishes to make the life of poverty beautiful.” (20) Dorothea’s counterpart, Dr. Lydgate, similarly embarks on the reform of medicine in Middlemarch with a benign contempt for political reality that grows from the underside of his idealism. Unlike the Arthurian knight who must encounter his own darkness in the course of pursuing the Holy Grail, Lydgate courts the “fair unknown” of scientific inquiry in ignorance of those “spots of commonness”— garden variety male chauvinism and lust for respectability—that will pollute his quest. (188)

In Insight Lonergan defines a “law of limitation and transcendence” which operates in all human development. There is, he maintains, an
ineradicable tension between the intellect, with its “detached and disinterested desire to know” and to choose what is rationally affirmed to be worthwhile, and the “self-centered sensitive psyche,” subject to centripetal fears, resentments, and blandishments. (497-99) Dorothea and Lydgate mount frontal attacks on the “illimitable” largely in ignorance of inner and outer limits—of their own organic and psychic spontaneities and of the complex social web within which they choose. Their “ardent and theoretic” natures seek outlet in the afterglow of the Enlightenment, when the methods of the sciences and of historical scholarship have displaced metaphysics and theology as the privileged vantage points on reality, and when such methods are practiced in isolation from traditions of spiritual discernment:

...something [Dorothea] yearned for by which her life might be filled with action both rational and ardent; and since the time was gone by for guiding visions and spiritual directors, since prayer heightened yearning but not instruction, what lamp was there but knowledge? Surely learned men kept the oil? (58)

Unfortunately, in this society the oil for the lamp of knowledge is kept by the likes of the Reverend Edward Casaubon, Dorothea’s middle-aging suitor and the epitome of a mindless, barren scholarship bred of unheroic fears and paltry ambitions. Mrs. Cadwallader, wife of the local Vicar, accurately characterizes Casaubon as a “great bladder for dried peas to rattle in.” (38) Casaubon has spent years in the dark recesses of archives amassing an unmanageable body of notes in the service of an unprovable thesis, namely that the radiant diversity of pagan myth is in fact a web-like unity deducible from a singular primitive revelation. As age and a weak heart bring the prospect of death nearer, Casaubon guards this projected Key to All Mythologies ever more desperately from the interrogations of other scholars—nor does he read the German scholarship which would discredit his facile correlations. Marriage to the worshipful, ingenuous Dorothea, he mistakenly believes, will provide reassuring companionship and a measure of defense against his own self-doubts.6

6 Dorothea obviously embodies much of George Eliot’s own “ardent and theoretic” temperament. Through Dorothea’s choice of Casaubon, Richard Ellmann speculates,
Courtship and marriage are of course the staple ingredients of the plots of nineteenth-century English novels. In this respect Middlemarch, which examines closely not one but four marriages, is no different. But the courtship of Dorothea and her subsequent career as Casaubon's disillusioned but devoted wife, then as his embittered widow, and finally as the object of his nephew Will Ladislaw's love, acquire an unusual resonance by virtue of the larger intellectual contexts within which George Eliot's richly informed imagination places everyday domestic reality.

The narrator at one point refers to her tale as the "home epic." (573) Indeed, Dorothea's tragic choice of Casaubon parallels the seduction of Eve and Adam in Paradise Lost. At the same time, Eliot re-interprets that fall within the context of the peculiar temptations of nineteenth-century religious and intellectual life.

A rebel against the bland materialism of her culture, Dorothea has

Elliot may have exorcised memories of those "youthful short-circuits of sensual emotion" in her Evangelical years. (758) See Richard Ellmann, "Dorothea's Husbands," in Middlemarch, ed. Hornback, 750-63. But Casaubon may also express aspects of Eliot's character. Several years after her death, F.W.H. Meyers recorded a conversation in which George Eliot, when she was asked how she had conceived Casaubon, pointed "with a humorous solemnity, which was quite in earnest, nevertheless, ...to her own heart." (Ellmann 757)

Casaubon may indeed embody an aggrandizing conceptualism which Eliot grew to suspect in her youthful intoxication with Comtean positivism. Her first published book review, in 1850, is a sympathetic treatment of Charles Mackay's study of comparative mythology. As Eliot sees it, the plethora of Greek and Roman myths Mackay describes yields a singular, Casaubon-like lesson:

The master-key to this revelation is the recognition of the presence of undeviating law in the material world—of that invariability of sequence which is acknowledged to be the basis of physical science, but which is still perversely ignored in our social organisation, our ethics and our religion. (Ellmann 754, my emphasis)

Eliot's celebration of "undeviating law" and "invariability of sequence" as respectively the architect and stern executant of material creation, points to another bondage (after Evangelicalism) that Eliot embraced with renunciatory zeal, namely her early allegiance to the positivism of the Victorian scientific clerisy: Mill, Spencer, and Auguste Comte.

It is this bondage which provokes the crisis of The Mill on the Floss. There natural history's "invariability of sequence" makes the future a foreordained, inescapable outcome of the limiting conditions of the past and drives Eliot to the desperate stratagem of the visionary and apocalyptic ending.
cultivated a religious idealism that leaves her prey to that most subtle of temptations, the Gnostic illusion of a complete knowledge which will exempt her from the humble, uncertain labor of intelligence—but also, as a consequence, from the unpredictable, unsettling glories of concrete experience. In a memorable early scene, Dorothea’s sister Celia appeals to her to accept their deceased mother’s necklace. Dorothea’s fear of the disorientation that her very capacity for sensory delight might occasion, leads her, at first, to decline: “If I were to put on such a necklace as that,” she says, “I should feel as if I had been pirouetting. The world would go round with me, and I should not know how to walk.” (6) She cannot reconcile such serendipitous ecstasy with that “lofty conception of the world” which she plans to embody in her “rule of conduct” in the parish of Tipton. (2) Dorothea is nevertheless bewildered by the jewels’ brilliance as sunlight plays off them and remarks on how their colors “penetrate, like scent.” She struggles to rationalize the embarrassing immediacy of this delight by appealing to that dichotomous theology in which she has been nurtured. She feels bound to “justify her delight in the colours by merging them in her mystic joy” and by attributing their effect to the emblematic significance described in the Book of Revelation. In Dorothea’s Puritan and Idealist imagination jewels may correspond to heavenly joys, but they cannot incarnate them.

Still, Dorothea’s fundamental goodness and her passion to experience reality as an august whole have bestowed on her a fervent and suffusive aesthetic responsiveness that awaits tutoring. This scene concludes as Dorothea accepts the jewels, allegedly to please her sister, but in fact so that, as she imagines, she might “feed her eye at these little fountains of pure colour.” (7) Though Dorothea lacks the technical language to express her experience, and though she is in fact trapped within categories that mute it, the narrator suggests through her actual response that the beauties perceived in nature and represented in art are not simply notional types but intelligible forms, enrichments of sensory experience, all the more palpable for being grasped by, and contemplated in, the disciplined imagination.

Dorothea’s ambivalence about the jewels foreshadows the conflict she later experiences in assimilating the far more disorienting delight occasioned by her realization her growing of her love for Will Ladislaw. But it also dramatizes the habits of mind that direct her initial, disastrous choice of Casaubon. Dorothea is intoxicated by the moral
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sublime and has dwelt in the rarefied atmosphere of its imperatives without sufficiently testing her imagination against the resistant surfaces of life. Her consciousness of the absolute claims of duty bestowed on her a terrible beauty. The painter Naumann sees her as a “Christian Ariadne.” Her beauty, he says, derives from a greater suffusion of matter by spirit than does its pagan equivalent, which rests “in the complete contentment of its sensuous perfection.” (131) Such beauty, one might conclude, strains against limits toward the illimitable.

But the fire of enthusiasm blinds Dorothea to those realities she needs to read even more carefully in her lonely eminence as an iconoclast. “Signs are small measurable things, but interpretations are illimitable,” the narrator observes. For a girl of Dorothea’s ardent temperament, “every sign is apt to conjure up wonder, hope, belief, vast as a sky, and coloured by a diffused thimbleful of matter in the shape of knowledge.” (15) Thus, the signs of Casaubon’s unworthiness, so palpable to the unassuming eyes of her sister Celia, Celia’s husband Chettam, and Mrs. Cadwallader, are dissolved in the unbounded interpretive horizons of the myopic Dorothea.

As Casaubon describes his intellectual labors, Dorothea stares “into the ungauged reservoir of [his] mind,” rather than studying his actual manners, and predictably finds “reflected... in vague labyrinthine extension every quality she herself brought.” (14) This Christian Ariadne imprisons herself in the labyrinth of the Minotaur Casaubon through the most heroic, and tragic, species of egotism, an overweening impatience for the absolute. She imagines herself listening to Milton’s “affable archangel” as Casaubon describes the singular “true position” from whose vantage point “the vast field of mythical constructions became intelligible, nay luminous, with the reflected light of correspondences.” (14) The facile resonance of this sentence captures precisely the tainted nature of Casaubon’s aspiration as it finds unholy ground in Dorothea’s Puritan Idealist consciousness.

In language throughout recalling John Milton’s, Eliot describes Dorothea as impelled to “justify by the completest knowledge” that exalted “thing which seemed to her best.” (17) Casaubon is cast as an unwitting Satan, tempting Dorothea, as Satan had tempted Eve in Paradise Lost and Christ in the Gospels, to embrace the Gnostic delusion
of a “complete knowledge” which will confirm her “devoted piety.” (14)7 Dorothea defines marriage to Casaubon in ideal and solipsistic terms, as a privileged intellectual access to the wisdom of a “living Bossuet,” a “modern Augustine.” The serpent tempts her to know as God is presumed to know, through a singular and comprehensive metaphysical intuition which absorbs all multiplicity into itself. Union to Casaubon will purchase her exemption from humanity’s humbler vocation to seek insight, within a community of inquiry, in that arduous and uncharted pilgrimage which Lonergan calls “the self-correcting process of learning.” (Insight 197-98)8

7 Casaubon no doubt differs from the ancient Gnostics in the way he seeks this definitive knowledge—by plodding rational scholarship rather than by mystical intuition. Yet in his conceptualism he shares the ancient Gnostic’s disdain for the concrete universe, in which the divine purpose is incarnated and through which it unfolds in intelligible, but unpredictably emergent ways. He shares as well the Gnostic’s presumption to be exempted, by the privilege of this gnosis, from the need for atonement and for the ascesis of charity. Casaubon is Voegelin’s modern Gnostic. Unequal to the challenge of faith in a genuinely immanent and transcendent divinity, he flees to the fallacious certainties of his rational system, in which he has thoroughly immanentized the transcendent.

8 Some commentators have taken Eliot’s criticism of Casaubon’s and Lydgate’s misconceived projects as evidence of her judgment against any sort of intelligible order in experience. See, for example, J. Hillis Miller, “Optic and Semiotic in Middlemarch,” in The Worlds of Victorian Fiction, 1975, 125-45. Miller concludes that the novel’s “implicit contention that what’s really there has no order other than what the individual mind projects onto it” undercuts “the generalizing...order-finding activity of the narrator,” and in the process effectively dismantles all metaphysical theories “governed by concepts of totality, of origin, of end....” (140, 143).

David Carroll’s recent study (George Eliot and the Conflict of Interpretations, 1990) argues in a similar vein that a reader experiences the novel as “a hypothesis continually collapsing under the weight of the new evidence which the different segments of the narrative bring to light.” (234) The narrative overall, says Carroll, dramatizes how the various “totalizing” images the protagonists employ to order reality are “trapped in their own metaphoric nature” (234).

I would concur with Miller and Carroll that the novel rejects all metaphysical theories that proceed deductively from “totalizing” preconceptions. But he and Miller seem to be governed their own kind of post-modernist preconceptions: (a) that metaphysics must be conceptualist and deductive, and (b) that the integrative exigence is a luxury at best and an aberration at worst. One might contend instead that the intelligibility sought by the scientific or artistic imagination rests on what Lonergan calls “the notion of being”, the heuristic anticipation of a total intelligibility, without which all intellectual inquiry would be immobilized. This “notion of being” is not a static preconception but an impetus to ask questions of all
"In Eliot's novels," Judith Wilt observes, "it is necessary to put on the garment of fear or dread in order to participate in the wedding feast of life." (174)9 Eliot's treatment not only of Dorothea but of other heroines like Dinah Morris, Romola, and Gwendolyn Harleth suggests that intimacy is the ordinary, and indeed the indispensable, vehicle of conversion. The dreadful confines of daily conjugal life unleash energies—of enmity as well as tenderness—that expose self-deceit, provoke painful self-assessment, and make possible more authentic self-love. (No doubt the same can be said about the dreadful confines of monastic life.) Much later in the novel, the widowed Dorothea warns the shallow, self-centered Rosamond against leaving her husband Lydgate and escaping those frightening limits within which real transformation occurs. "With a gathering tremor," she tells Mrs. Lydgate, "Marriage is so unlike kinds, to try out images of all kinds in the search for verified insights into nature's intelligible structure, and to accumulate and integrate such insights into ever higher viewpoints (Insight 372-98). This kind of metaphysical drive is not a luxury, but rather, as Lonergan says, an imperative of the mind by virtue of its own inner unity.

Moreover, Miller's and Carroll's interpretations conflict with Eliot's manifest common-sense sanity as a knower. Although she used the German idealist tradition to free herself from the constraints of Comtean positivism, she also relished the objectivity of the world and valued science as a discipline towards apprehending people and things in their "rapturous" otherness.

9 Prof. Wilt's Ghosts of the Gothic: Austen, Eliot, and Lawrence (1980) opens up a very stimulating perspective on the religious dimension of Eliot's novels by studying them within a persisting Gothic tradition in English fiction. At the heart of the Gothic imagination, Wilt maintains, is a vision of reality "more consonant with the early Christian cosmos than with the eighteenth-century deistical cosmos." (18) (Or, one might add, with the nineteenth-century Comtean cosmos.)

This "Trinitarian" cosmos proceeds according to "the mysterious rhythm-paradox of 'Kenosis,'" rather than to the linear pattern of utilitarian progress. (18) God and the human relationships in community modeled on the Trinitarian Godhead are a "community," constituted by a flow of passional energy. Although Wilt does not use the term, I would argue that "conversion" stands as the crucial event in such a world, a world impelled, as she puts it, by the crisis of "emptying out to be filled up."

Eliot's heroes and heroines, and her rank villains, signal their place in such a theological cosmos in reciprocally related ways: by the "dread" they experience in their vocation to that higher life which calls for such emptying out; or by the "dread" that fills them when they contemplate their own or another's capacity to alienate themselves from the rhythmic flow of passional energy that constitutes reality.
everything else. There is something even awful in the nearness it brings." (549)

The course of Dorothea's transformation in this school of intimacy can be charted only in broad terms in this paper. It begins on her honeymoon in Rome, when daily life with the reclusive Casaubon, who excludes her from his scholarly inquiries, induces some weighty sorrow of vast, inarticulate proportions. In one of the novel's most brilliant passages, Eliot sets the disintegration of Dorothea's old consciousness against the backdrop of Rome's multi-layered, ambiguous history:

...all this vast wreck of ambitious ideals, sensuous and spiritual, mixed confusedly with the signs of breathing forgetfulness and degradation, at first jarred her as with an electric shock, and then urged themselves on her with that ache belonging to a glut of confused ideas which check the flow of emotion. Forms both pale and glowing took possession of her young sense, and fixed themselves in her memory...and in certain states of dull forlornness Dorothea all her life continued to see the vastness of St. Peter's, the huge canopy, the excited intention in the attitudes and garments of the prophets and evangelists in the mosaics above, and the red drapery which was being hung for Christmas spreading itself everywhere like a disease of the retina. (134-35)

The sensuous forms of St. Peter's frescoes and statuary penetrate Dorothea even more sharply than had the jewels' colors, now to incarnate in consciousness the proud heights of the "excited intention" from which she has fallen. The final image dramatizes her awful initiation with breathtaking precision. On the feast of light, Christmas, the eye of the Puritan Idealist Dorothea is gorged and darkened by an alien Catholic tradition which affronts her with its baffling mixture of spiritual grandeur and sensualism. Through this violent yoking of her consciousness to the dreadful pageant of history, Dorothea embraces the intimacy she evaded in her girlish fantasies of marriage.

In her extremity Dorothea is accorded the grace of new eyes to see

her husband as he is rather than as a prop in the theater of her own preconceived destiny. It had been easier, the narrator observes, to imagine herself as Casaubon's intellectual acolyte than it would have been

to conceive [him] with that distinctness which is no longer reflection but feeling—an idea wrought back to the directness of sense, like the solidity of objects—that he had an equivalent centre of self, whence the lights and shadows must always fall with a certain difference. (146)


Mason traces Eliot's particular use of the term to G.H. Lewes's later writings, which record his shift from Mill's Comtean to William Whewell's Kantian paradigm of scientific method. The latter grants human subjectivity a more constitutive role in inquiry. The good scientist, according to Lewes and Whewell, does not simply copy an alien and external nature but assists the organism's adaptation to its environment by a "shaping conception, radiating from a disciplined mind." (165) "Feeling," Mason argues, "is almost a technical term in Lewes' Foundations of a Creed, the crux of that co-operative association of organism and environment... which makes subjectivity reliable." (169).

Eliot had no doubt assimilated Lewes's, and indirectly Whewell's, language and viewpoints by the time she composed Middlemarch, but one must allow that she gave these the stamp of her own mind, which retained a robust realism even when it borrowed the language of German Idealism. Though Kantian thought corrects Comte's neglect of the human subject, it ultimately limits understanding and judgment to the formal, adaptive regulation of the intuitions of sensibility.

It seems that in Eliot's later novels "feeling" makes subjectivity reliable precisely because whatever complex of organic and mental operations it designates—and Eliot does not delineate these operations with sufficient philosophical precision for us to be conclusive about the issue—"feeling" keeps prodding the inquiring subject on, past the lesser, oft times egoistic gratifications of adaptation to an environment, toward the "rapturous consciousness of life beyond self." As she uses the term in context "feeling" is the root and comprehensive passion, the desire to know, which in Lonergan's terms urges the mind toward the direct insights of understanding and the definitive reflective insights of judgment and decision.

I think Eliot not only borrowed from, but also struggled against, the idealist tradition of thought which in some ways proved so liberating for her. John Kucich, in Repression in Victorian Fiction: Charlotte Bronte, George Eliot, and Charles Dickens (Berkeley, U of California P, 1987) studies how this heritage of philosophical idealism insulates Eliot's characters from a fully embodied relation to the world, but he does not take sufficient stock of how the novels also strain against that limiting
Eliot struggles here to describe the disciplined imagination, in language that inevitably fails of technical precision and full clarity. That form of cognition, it would appear, conceives its "ideas" out of its passionate attention to distinct mental images. Such "ideas," "wrought back to the directness of sense," are not disjoined from the given of actual experience. They wed us more palpably to the world of sensory objects and of other human subjects, other "equivalent centres of self," than idle, solipsistic "reflection" can. At the same time, the light of the disciplined imagination confers on the limited singular experience an heuristic capacity to illumine whole new ranges of experience. Perhaps this is one further implication of Eliot's cryptic, but suggestive observation that "Every limit is a new beginning."

Eliot's difficulties in threading a path between positivist empiricism and romantic idealism, and in articulating a cognitional theory adequate to her own instincts, are mirrored in the uncertain progress of her heroine. Although Ladislaw cautions Dorothea to cultivate "a sturdy neutral delight in things as they are," her habits of idealizing die hard.

(201)12 Shut out from her first project of self-oblation as Casaubon's amanuensis, she conceives a second ill-conceived outlet for her generous nature, proposing to Casaubon that she bestow on the impecunious Ladislaw a portion of her own inheritance, to rectify the injustice done him when Ladislaw's grandmother—Casaubon's Aunt Julia—was disinherited for marrying below her station. Absorbed by her own rectitude, Dorothea fails to imagine concretely how her proposal might threaten the jealous, insecure Casaubon.

The "unresponsive hardness" with which he meets her overtures plunges her, one particular evening, into a dark new awareness of the resentments that rule beneath the innocent surface of her benevolence. Casaubon's behavior acquaints Dorothea with her own capacity to hate, as his unfathomable coldness offends against her absolute claims upon inheritance in their depiction of transformative moments of conversion.

12 Although somewhat callow and irresolute, Ladislaw possesses a more patient and trusting mode of intelligence than either Casaubon or Dorothea. In contrast to the latter, he delights in how Rome's fragments "stimulated the imagination and made him constructive." (148) His mind trusts to "the generous intentions of the universe." (156) Under his tutelage Dorothea practices Ladislaw's habit of taking the pressure of what confronts her, rather than judging it against ideal preconceptions. As a result, "Some things which seemed monstrous to her were gathering intelligibility." (149)
life to acknowledge all her good intentions. The “noble habit of her soul” reasserts itself, however, and as the evening slowly deepens into night Dorothea waits for her husband to retire, having shed another layer of well-intentioned self-exaltation. (295) As she greets the melancholy Casaubon on the landing, her devotion has been sufficiently clarified that it penetrates briefly even his darkened consciousness and evokes the single—and one hopes saving—gesture of reciprocal affection in his stunted life.

In the perverse logic of life, more complex than Comte or Feuerbach would allow, this uncommon exchange of fellow-feeling does not extricate Dorothea from the labyrinth, but only imprisons her more deeply within it. She is seduced by Casaubon’s meager and uncharacteristic display of affection into a renewed resolve of submission—to extinguish all personal desires on the altar of wifely duty. Casaubon in turn is emboldened by her submissiveness to lay across her future life the “dead hand” of his scholarship. As he dictates his commentaries on Greek myth to Dorothea one afternoon, this Minotaur pauses at “the second excursus on Crete,” to extract from her a solemn commitment to consecrate her life, in perpetual widowhood, to the editing of his notes after his death.

After a night of agonized deliberation, Dorothea enters the garden at Lowick to accede to this awful request. Her virtue, her innocence, conspire to enslave her; she is “too full of dread at the thought of inflicting a keen-edged blow on her husband, to do anything but submit completely.” (333) There occurs at this crucial point one of those narrative disjunctions that effect a dispensation from the undeviating rule of circumstance in Eliot’s novels—Dorothea discovers Casaubon’s lifeless form and is liberated from her own self-willed bondage. Such Gothic strains in Eliot’s novels acknowledge the presence in experience of an ambiguously destructive and buoyant principle that operates, like grace, in the interstices of natural sequence, to convert limits into new beginnings.

After Casaubon’s death, Dorothea can not sedate herself on duty and renunciation. The fleeting gesture of affection wrung from Casaubon during this crisis, and her subsequent disillusion at the revelation of his treachery—Casaubon has added a codicil to his will making Dorothea’s inheritance contingent on her not marrying Will Ladislaw—only sharpen her hunger for “a fuller sort of companionship.” Exhausted by an
exclusive regimen of moral concern, she entertains images of an 
elemental complacency in which she would not simply submit to another 
but “repose on his delight in what she was.” (329) Passion progressively 
uncovers the shameful hope Dorothea guards from herself behind the 
mask of righteous adherence to moral necessity—shameful because 
erotic attraction to Ladislaw acknowledges the claims upon her of actual 
entities, rather than ideal ones.

As her desire for Ladislaw grows, the battle in her soul also 
intensifies. She thirsts to see him, but on terms dictated by her own 
sentimental imagination. “If a princess in the days of enchantment,” she 
fantasizes,

had seen a four-footed creature from among those which live in 
herds come to her once and again with a human gaze which 
estisted upon her with choice and beseeching, what would she 
think of in her journeying, what would she look for when the 
herds passed her? Surely for the gaze which had found her, and 
which she would know again. (372)

Eliot’s allusion characterizes Ladislaw as a fusion of sexual and spiritual 
energies. (He is associated throughout the novel with Dionysus and 
Apollo.) His gaze, like that of those divinities who assumed animal form, 
possesses rare power to reawaken and revivify Dorothea’s self-love, 
enfeeble not just by Casaubon but by the primal hurt to self-love 
sustained in every childhood. Dorothea is orphaned, as are so many of 
Eliot’s protagonists, either literally or by virtue of their parents’ or 
guardians’ derelictions.

This daydream nevertheless resists the full implications of the 
desires it indulges. While Ladislaw is a figure of incarnate desire, 
Dorothea still thinks she is thirsting for him with her “soul” and still 
regards him, from that eminence, as a special being set out from the 
herd, with whom she can mate spiritually, unaffected by the pull of 
circumstance to which the herd is subject. She basks in Will’s regard for 
her; she has still not estimated how exigent and utterly concrete is her 
attraction to him. The old gnosticism still lingers in the corners of 
Dorothea’s consciousness.

When Will, who has been frequenting the home of Lydgate’s wife 
Rosamond, departs Middlemarch for London, he bids her a fervent 
farewell and somewhat allays her apprehensions about his apparent
infidelity. Then an unwholesome sort of joy fills her at the thought that after all “it was really herself whom Will loved and was renouncing, that there was really no other love less permissible, more blameworthy, which honour was hurrying him away from.” (438) That is to say, she relishes possessing the now absent Ladislaw whole and pure in the inviolable precincts of her own mind.

The full crisis of Dorothea’s conversion occurs some weeks after this, when, unbeknownst to her, Ladislaw has returned to Middlemarch. She undertakes an errand of mercy to Rosamond, who has threatened to leave her husband Lydgate because of a scandal in which he has been implicated. Dorothea’s benevolence is submitted to another, even greater shock when she sees Ladislaw in the arms of Rosamond, and mistakenly interprets his intentions. (Ladislaw is simply comforting the distraught Rosamond.)

Dorothea locks herself in her boudoir that evening and as the day darkens, she lies stretched out on the cold, bare floor, subdued by an anguish so keen that it cuts away her pious constructions of Ladislaw’s character. At this point she more closely resembles the fervent Spanish Carmelite Teresa to whom she had been compared initially. The shocking “nearness” of Ladislaw in her consciousness overwhelms Dorothea, much as Teresa suffered in ecstasy the presence of the person of Christ, not some pious idea of him. (543) In the darkened room Dorothea stretches her arms toward the retreating form of this ideal lover “with a full consciousness that had never awakened before.” This “full consciousness” is a vast inner poverty born of the painful death of Dorothea’s ideal preconceptions.13 Into that vacuum sweeps the unsettling image of the actual, flawed Ladislaw, whom she loved and who has shattered the factitious mental wholeness to which she had clung. As the night yields to day and the tumult of jealousy subsides, Dorothea awakens to the “involuntary, palpitating life” beyond her window and to a future “not determined by her own fancy.” (544)

Dorothea’s vigil completes an initiation into a more embodied relationship to others, but her conversion is by no means complete. Her habits of idealizing experience rather than closely attending to it, habits

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13Eliot uses this phrase “full consciousness” to characterize Adam Bede’s state of mind at Hetty Sorrel’s trial, as his innocent conception of Hetty suffers extinction, and as he likewise undergoes a definitive transformation.
indulged in her gentlewoman’s world as a genteel substitute for a real education, will not quickly disappear. When his name has been cleared, Will renews his courtship of Dorothea and rekindles her ardor. But even then it takes a bolt of lightning—in a rather melodramatic proposal scene—and Will’s stubborn resistance to fatality, to jar her into yielding to the feelings she had acknowledged in her night of crisis.

And indeed it will take much longer before Dorothea might even approach that high destiny that she thought was hers by right of noble impulse. It will take a lifetime’s accumulation of limited insights into the “glinting fragments,” as Eliot called them, of that “small realm of experience” which Dorothea is granted by historical circumstance.

The narrator tells us at the novel’s conclusion that Dorothea’s “full nature spent itself in channels which had no great name on the earth”—as wife and mother. Some have complained that Eliot failed in not according Dorothea a destiny commensurate with her “substantive and rare” spirit. They might consider, nevertheless, how passion, like flowing water, acquires transformative momentum by such channeling and disciplining—even in such unassuming settings. I picture Dorothea, her imagination trained on that “small [limited] realm of experience” which expands exponentially toward the illimitable with every insight achieved, finding herself “beaten by discovery,” sitting before her experience “like a sorcerer outdone,” recapturing in a second naiveté that elemental complacency in which Maggie Tulliver once reposed.

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14 A number of feminist critics have chastened Eliot for betraying Dorothea’s revolutionary energies by assigning her a subordinate social role as wife to the “public man” Ladislaw. The complaints ignore Eliot’s realistic assessment both of the historical context and of Dorothea’s limited attainments. Dorothea, Eliot understands, needs much more than “young and noble impulse” to carve out an independent life—especially in the England of the 1830’s and 40’s, when the professions were not open to women, and when only a woman with “substantive and rare” learning—like George Eliot herself—could rise to such eminence.
LET ME BEGIN with an expression of thanks. I welcome the opportunity to share with you some recent reflections that arise from a book I am writing entitled The Political Humanism of Hannah Arendt. The book is focused on Arendt’s exposition and defense of the civic republican tradition, a public philosophy centered on the dignity and importance of democratic self-government. Political or civic humanism prizes and encourages “public liberty”, the voluntary participation of republican citizens in the conduct of human affairs. An important chapter in the book examines what Arendt has called “Our Tradition of Political Thought.” In that chapter I review and appraise her controversial thesis that the formative sources of Western political theory have been essentially anti-political in character.

Four case studies drawn from her critique take center stage in my analysis. Two of them are classical and two are modern. The classical sources include the political philosophies of Plato and Aristotle and the orthodox tradition of Christian moral theology derived from the writings of Paul, Augustine and Thomas Aquinas. The modern sources include the English liberal tradition of Hobbes, Locke, Adam Smith and Mill, as well as Marxism in both its communist and democratic socialist variations.

This summer I am working on Arendt’s critique of traditional Christian theology insofar as it has influenced our understanding and appraisal of public life. Arendt contends that the explicit teaching of the early church undermined the basic political assumptions of classical
Greece and Rome. To cite two examples from several that she considers: first, the ancient *polis* or classical republic as a voluntary association of self-consciously mortal citizens seeking through greatness of public word and deed to immortalize themselves in a temporally enduring world is directly contrasted with the apocalyptic expectations of early Christianity's emphasis on the immortality of the individual soul and the mortality, even the imminent death, of the decaying world. In the second example, the culture of classical politics stressed the special importance of the brightly lit public realm, a realm in which the citizens' speech and actions can be seen and judged by their civic peers. This public visibility was understood to be a necessary condition for historical remembrance and immortal glory. Arendt contends that the Christian ethic of goodness preached by Jesus of Nazareth deliberately reversed this assessment of communal visibility by stressing instead the concealment and radical hiddenness of one's good deeds. In the language of Matthew's gospel: “Whenever you fast, pray or give alms you should do it in secret, so that not even your left hand will know what your right hand is doing.”

Concurrent with this work on the early Christian tradition, I have also been thinking and writing about the connection between Christianity and modern republicanism as it is explored and defended in Alexis de Tocqueville and Charles Taylor. I have been particularly interested in Tocqueville's effort to unite the spirit of Christian morality with the spirit of modern liberty in both its liberal and republican institutional forms. Two important claims that Tocqueville advanced in *Democracy in America* have especially arrested my attention. First, the secular self-transcendence achieved by authentic patriotism's love of country, and the spiritual self-transcendence commanded by Christianity's wholehearted love of God and neighbor, are needed to correct the modern spirit of "democratic individualism" and the confinement of individual awareness that progressively narrows the modern citizen's attention and concern until it becomes centered exclusively on the solitude of one's own heart. And second, the most important difference between the French and American democratic traditions was that in revolutionary France the spirit of religion and the spirit of liberty had become antagonistic rivals, whereas among the American revolutionary leaders they had remained united and reciprocally influential. Since my personal allegiances in these matters
are both “Galilean and republican” to quote from Bernard Williams’ review of Taylor's Sources of the Self, I have been approaching Arendt’s political critique of Christianity with both interest and reservations.

This conjunction of historical and topical concerns leads to the questions I will only begin exploring, either directly or indirectly in this paper.

1) Is it the case that the nineteenth and twentieth century attempts to unite Christianity with republican political theory and practice constitute a dramatic departure from the theological traditions of the ancient and early modern Church?

2) Is Arendt justified in her political critique of early Christianity, and if she is justified does that mean that Tocqueville and Taylor are attempting to do the impossible or at least something theologically unorthodox?

3) Finally, if the attempt to combine Galilean and republican allegiances is not misguided, how are we to account historically for this significant reversal in the Christian attitude towards politics and public life?

In addressing these questions, I have drawn on a variety of historical and philosophical sources. One of the most thoughtful and interesting is a two volume work written by Ernst Troeltsch, a German philosopher, historian and theologian in the Lutheran tradition. Troeltsch's masterwork, completed in 1911, is entitled Die Soziallehren der Christlichen Kirchen und Gruppen and The Social Teaching of the Christian Churches and Sects in its English translation. Troeltsch's study is a scholarly history of the public philosophy of Christianity as it develops from the gospel of Jesus through the political theologies and institutional practices of post-Reformation Europe. The more than one thousand page length of Troeltsch's magisterial narrative is divided into four main sections: the social teaching of the ancient Church through the Greek and Latin Fathers; the (dramatically different) social ethic of Thomas Aquinas developed at the apex of medieval scholasticism; the disintegration of medieval social theory in the early modern age leading to the political theologies of Luther and Calvin; a concluding section that criticizes traditional Christian social ethics, both Catholic and Protestant, for their failure to address the complex public realities of early twentieth century Europe. While I have neither the time nor the desire to summarize Troeltsch's philosophical narrative, I do want to borrow several of his analytic categories as a way of exploring the early
Christian attitude to the social and political institutions of the Greco-
Roman world. I shall do so by concentrating on the three terms in my 
subtitle: the gospel, the kingdom, and the world.

A. The Gospel

What was the gospel ethic expressed in the teaching and ministry of 
Jesus of Nazareth? According to Troeltsch, the heart of Jesus’ ethic is to 
be found in the Sermon on the Mount, where Jesus proclaims his faith in 
the absolute goodness and unwavering providence of God, our heavenly 
father. Jesus’ God commands each person to seek intimate union with 
Him through voluntary obedience to the divine will. There is an infinite 
and immeasurable worth to each individual soul that is freely united to 
God through gracious faith and love. The natural overflow of this mutual 
love between God and the faithful believer creates a longing for human 
fellowship and a readiness for Christian service. Human beings are 
commanded by God to love their neighbor in the same unconditional 
spirit with which their heavenly father loves them. The gospel of Jesus 
proclaims an ethic of radical perfection and holiness ("Be perfect as your 
father in heaven is perfect"). It is an ethic of agape or self-sacrificing 
love that reverses the normal priorities of the pagan world, an ethic in 
which the lowly of the earth are exalted by divine grace and the great 
one of history are submitted to the severity of divine judgment.

B. The Kingdom of God

In Matthew’s gospel, especially, Jesus proclaims the imminence of the 
Kingdom of God; “the Kingdom of God is at hand.” What did Jesus mean 
when he spoke of this kingdom he apparently came to affirm and 
establish? It would seem that the Kingdom of God is the communal 
fulfillment or realization of the gospel ethic. In the governance of 
the kingdom, God’s holy will is the sovereign authority, and in the life of the 
kingdom God’s law of wholehearted love is faithfully observed by all its 
citizens. As the Christian liturgical prayer proclaims, God’s kingdom is a 
realm of justice and peace, of holiness and truth, of blessedness and 
grace. The punishments that derive from the sin of Adam, the struggle 
for existence, the fear of death, the estrangement of human beings from 
one another, the remoteness of God, none of these sources of human 
distress and despair are present in the kingdom. The kingdom of God
therefore is radically unlike the earthly realms that are governed by Caesar and Herod. As Jesus tells Pilate at his trial, there truly exists a kingdom of which he is the king, but it is not of this world. And yet Jesus says that it is at hand; it is not far off. So much so that the apostles question Jesus about the honors they will enjoy with the imminent arrival of the kingdom.

Because it is believed to be imminent, and because it is so radically unlike the kingdoms that dominate the ancient world, the kingdom of God becomes the object of early Christian eschatological hope. The disciples of Jesus expect its coming soon, when this mortal world of sorrow passes away, and the power and providence of God re-establish the union between creator and creature from which human sin has exiled us but for which we were originally created.

C. The World

What did the early Christians mean when they spoke of “the world?” Generally, the earthly antithesis of the kingdom of God. According to Troeltsch, “the world” signified the ensemble of economic, social and political institutions of the ancient Mediterranean Civilization not directly conditioned by Christian ideas, motives and aspirations. If the providential will of God governed the kingdom, then the sinful wills of powerful men governed the world. In fact, the pagan world of the early Roman Empire was permeated by slavery, war, coercive state power, a commercial economy based upon money and private property, the rule of the Caesars and their imperial legions. It was a world in which might often made right, in which, to quote Thucydides, “the strong do what they can and the weak suffer what they must.” Not only did the central institutions of the Empire fail to comply with the gospel ethic, but often they openly opposed the teachings of Jesus and initiated the persecution of Christians who sought to live by his commands and example.

D. The Church: In but not of the World

To judge by the testimony of the evangelists, Jesus himself seemed heroically indifferent to the powers of the world. On the one hand, they did not frighten and intimidate him in any way; on the other, he was not openly contemptuous of their political authority. “Render unto Caesar the things that are Caesar’s and to God the things that are God’s.”
Jesus' public teaching was indeed radical, but it proclaimed a message of spiritual conversion rather than socio-political reform. "Seek first the kingdom of God and its righteousness," and everything you require will be provided by your Father who loves you and takes care of your needs.

As Jaroslav Pelikan has shown in his study, *The Images of Jesus Through the Centuries*, there have been numerous attempts to portray Jesus as a radical social revolutionary, but none of them really seem faithful to the remarkable figure dramatized in the New Testament narratives. There is no credible evidence that Jesus attempted to overthrow the institutional and legal order of the Roman Empire. After Jesus' death on the cross, a small fellowship of Christian believers emerged centered around the apostles in Jerusalem. According to the description of this community given in the *Acts of the Apostles*, they attempted to live in compliance with the gospel ethic and to await the imminent return of Christ in glory. They practiced the commandments of love among themselves by sharing their goods and possessions, but they did not attempt to transform the Greco-Roman world in the direction of their gospel-inspired communism.

The conversion of Saul of Tarsus to the new Christian faith marked an historic turning point in the history of Judaism. Where Jesus emphasized obedience to the Father's will, Paul emphasized faith in the Risen Christ. Where Jesus confined his public ministry to Galilee, Judea and Samaria, Paul brought the liberating message of the resurrection to the entire Mediterranean world. Where Jesus gathered a small group of Jewish apostles around himself, Paul established a universal church for Jews and Gentiles organized for common worship, mutual support and encouragement, and missionary activity. The evangelical journeys of Paul and his colleagues brought the church of Jesus Christ into direct contact with ancient Greco-Roman culture. Although Paul was heroic in his defiance of traditional Jewish custom and law, he openly sought the protection of the Roman Empire in his disputes with the Jewish authorities in Jerusalem. He insisted on his legal rights as a Roman citizen and generally directed his followers to cooperate with the Roman imperial authorities.

Troeltsch sees in Paul's conduct and epistolary teaching the creation of a pattern that would shape the outlook of the ancient church. On the spiritual plane Paul was a genuine revolutionary, emphasizing how the redemption effected in Christ made all human beings equal
before God. "In Christ, there is neither Jew nor Greek, slave nor free, male nor female." A radical and decisive equality exists that extends to all humanity under the sight and protection of Jesus' Father. At the same time, Paul accepted the social institution of slavery and the hierarchical ordering of both political and marital relationships.

To Paul the spiritual equality that exists in the heavenly kingdom is fully consistent with the acceptance of significant inequality in the structures of the church and in the institutions of authority inherited from the pagan world. Troeltsch discerns in Paul's position an interesting mixture of spiritual radicalism and socio-political conservatism. According to Troeltsch, the sociological energy of early Christianity was essentially focused on the spiritual realm, on the formation of the church and the transformation of its members' interior lives. The evangelical fervor of the disciples coexisted with a general acceptance of the political and social authority of the Roman Empire. And this pattern of interior conversion and public compliance did not significantly change, even after the apocalyptic expectations of early Christianity were abandoned as premature. Both the eschatological and non-eschatological phases of the ancient church were quietistic and conservative. The early Christians, like the other inhabitants of the Roman Empire, essentially perceived the institutional practices of "the world" as fixed and unchangeable.

E. The Compromise of the Church with the World

In the internal life of the early church, there was an authentic effort to practice the gospel ethic, an ethic increasingly interpreted in Pauline terms. The eschatological hope for the coming of the kingdom was still kept alive, but Christians had come to accept that "they knew not the day nor the hour" for its appearance. They had also come to recognize that the established powers of the Greco-Roman world, which did not live by the gospel, were going to continue to exist and the followers of Jesus continue to live among them, even though the spirit of their lives and the spirit of those who adhered to the practices of the world were often in sharp opposition. In these early centuries, according to Troeltsch, an uneasy compromise was struck between the church and the world, between the gospel and the kingdom on the one hand, and the visible powers of this earth on the other.

At the same time, there always existed dissenting groups within the church who objected strongly to this compromise because it violated
the heroic oppositional spirit of the gospel. Troeltsch calls them "sects." However, the goal of these early Christian sects was not to transform the institutions of the world, but to withdraw from participation in them and to wait in voluntary exile and purity for the coming of the kingdom that Christ had promised to his disciples.

As the gospel-centered culture of the early church intersected the intellectual currents of late antiquity, an attempt was made by the Greek and Latin fathers to articulate a justification for this compromise. In this way, early Christian patristic theology came to unite the faith of Jesus of Nazareth framed in Jewish terms with philosophical ideas drawn from the Neo-platonic and Roman Stoic traditions. The Stoic distinction between the absolute and relative laws of nature was particularly significant in this regard. Stoic moral theory assumed the prior existence of a golden age in which the law of divine reason effectively governed the entire cosmos. With the decline of the golden age, coercive institutions like slavery first appeared in the world, institutions that observed the original law of reason in only a restricted and partial manner. According to the Stoics, the citizens of the Roman Empire had come gradually to live under a relative rather than an absolute moral law and in imperfect rather than fully rational institutions.

The fathers of the church connected this important Stoic moral distinction with their own understanding of two great scriptural symbols, the Fall and the Kingdom. The golden age of the Stoics was frequently identified with the original state of creation before the Fall. The age of moral decline corresponded to the history of human existence after the sin of Adam. Jesus' proclamation of the kingdom constituted a divine summons to recover our original created integrity, an integrity lost through sin and the resultant deviation of the world from God's divine law and peace. Until the emergence of the kingdom and the restoration of God's original peace, the structures of earthly life would be marked by several features that directly conflicted with the gospel ethic. The positive laws and ordinances of the world differed from the law of Christ in their acceptance of war, slavery, private property and the coercive power of the state with its reliance on punitive sanctions and force.

The greatest of the Latin fathers, St. Augustine of Hippo, treated these irremediable aspects of the existing world as poena et remedium peccati, as both a punishment for sin and a hard-edged secular remedy
for its destructive consequences. Indeed, we find in Augustine’s theological masterpiece, *The City of God*, a powerful synthesis of the different ideas we have been discussing. The *civitas Dei*, the city of God, is Augustine’s Latin symbol for the reality of Christ’s kingdom. The heavenly city is a transhistorical commonwealth internally governed by the gospel ethic. Its citizens faithfully observe the two great commandments of love, love of God with one’s whole heart, mind, soul and strength and the charitable love of one’s neighbor as oneself. The temporal church on earth is not identical with the city of God; rather it is the visible institution established by Christ in the world that proclaims the gospel of Jesus and through the mass and the sacraments bring about the redemptive recovery of union with God and neighbor lost through original sin.

The *civitas terrena* is Augustine’s name for the sinful kingdom of the world. It is inhabited by those whose pride and concupiscence prevent their observance of the Christian commandments of love. The *civitas terrena*, like the Roman Empire to which it is compared, has both dark and noble aspects. Yet even at its martial best, in the courageous patriotism of the great Roman soldiers and heroes, it is the love of worldly glory and remembrance rather than the love of God and neighbor that moves its citizens to act with heroic nobility.

According to Troeltsch, the patristic compromise between the church and the empire, a compromise ratified by the magisterial authority of Augustine, had the effect of creating an ethical dualism within the Christian community. This dualism is reflected in the traditional distinction between lay and monastic life and in the ambiguous worldly position of the Christian clergy, whose pattern of living historically oscillated between worldliness and asceticism. The Christian laity who live, work and act within the institutions of the world are required to observe the relative natural law, a law that reflects the sinful nature of economic, political and military life. The strict and heroic gospel ethic of perfection is not required of them in their lives as traders, statesmen and soldiers. At the same time, the gospel ethic of holiness does become the basis for monastic life, a form of innerworldly asceticism for those who have chosen to follow Jesus’ injunction to be perfect even while they remain on the earth.

Ironically, it was within the Christian monasteries of the early medieval period that the cultural life of antiquity was preserved after
the barbarian conquest of Rome. Thus, the monasteries simultaneously practiced the original ethic of the gospel and conserved the secular treasures of Greco-Roman civilization. However, the gospel command to be perfect did not cease to influence the world in spite of the creation and withdrawal of the monastic orders. The monastic ideals served as a needed check on the worldly tendencies of the Christian clergy and continued to have a powerful though indirect effect on secular practices and institutions.

This indirect influence can be summarized in four permanent contributions that early Christianity as portrayed by Troeltsch made to our understanding of human existence:

1) It continually affirmed the unconditional worth of each individual person as a being created in the image and likeness of God and as a free subject called to loving union with the divine creator.

2) It also affirmed the solidarity of the entire human race, in that all human beings (living, dead and unborn) are united with God through their common creation, fall and redemption. Concretely, this meant that the neighbor whom we are commanded to love as ourselves may well be our enemy and rival according to the adversarial terms of the fallen world.

3) It combined a deep commitment to spiritual equality, the equality of all persons in the sight and judgment of God, with an acceptance of natural and social inequalities that were assumed to be sanctioned by God's inscrutable will. Spiritual equality, therefore, was not thought to imply an egalitarian social, political or economic order either within the church or the world.

4) Finally, it established charity, *caritas*, as the lasting requirement of social existence, not only in order to comply with the gospel imperatives, but as a necessary and permanent corrective to the inevitable shortcomings of secular institutions, both economic and political.

Several centuries after the fall of Rome, the rise of the town civilization of the high middle ages gave birth to a worldly order ostensibly more consonant with Christian ideals than the pagan culture of imperial Rome. In that very different social and cultural context, the brilliance of Thomas Aquinas created an original and multi-sourced theological ethic that placed the polarized descriptive contrasts of early Christian rhetoric in an explanatory framework. I am referring to Thomas' celebrated ethic of nature, sin and grace.
Thomas' moral theology substantially replaced the sharp opposition between the Christian gospel and the virtue ethics of classical antiquity with a theoretical distinction between nature and super nature. This made it possible rhetorically to underplay the polemical contrasts between the gospel, the kingdom and the world. Thus, the transposition of the Pauline and Augustinian descriptive rhetoric of polar opposition by the Thomist theory of the functional complementarity between nature and grace along with the unnatural character of sin, the political and social institutions of this world could be accorded a new dignity and importance by the Christian tradition. But that is a story for another workshop paper.

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ENLIGHTENMENT:
OLD AND NEW

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I FIRST MET Fr. Fred Crowe in 1970, at the Lonergan conference in Florida. I was a stranger in the Lonerganian world, and he took me in; being unsure of myself, I was noisy and assertive, and he treated me with the gentleness and unfailing courtesy which are so characteristic of him. Among the writers on Lonergan (as a rival I hate to admit this), Fr. Crowe is unique for his perceptiveness, clarity, fidelity, and sheer detailed knowledge of his subject. As a scholar, he stands out for his mildness in controversy; however—in this respect he resembles St. Thomas, and Lonergan himself—when he is angry, the reader knows it, and the effect is always salutary. St. Thomas was vexed at the 'ravings' of David of Dinant to the effect that God was prime matter, 1 Lonergan at those of the reverend Father who arraigned him for holding opinions which seemed tantamount to Christological heresy; 2 Fr. Crowe is incensed at the suggestion (curiously boneheaded as indeed it must seem to any Lonerganian) of one liberation theologian, to the effect that Lonergan's work is tailor-made for the use of oppressive governments—presumably on the grounds that he can be difficult and obscure, and does not produce texts bristling with exhortations to political revolution. However, as Fr. Crowe points out, while a person who doles out cups of soup may help hundreds of the poor, the scholar who labors at his desk working out a new economic theory may ultimately bring prosperity to millions. 3

1 Summa Theologica I, iii, 8.
3 Frederick E. Crowe S.J., Appropriating the Lonergan Idea, ed. Michael Vertin

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Apparently Lonergan himself was not entirely happy with Fr. Crowe's description of his work as a *novissimum organum*, providing for our time a structure and program for knowledge rather as Aristotle's *organon* and Bacon's *novum organum* did for theirs; but for my part, with due deference to the great man, I find the comparison not only apt but compelling. As Fr. Crowe says, those who apply such an instrument to Christian theology are liable to find themselves at the 'extreme centre'; rather than at the far right, which is so enamored of the past that it leaves the contemporary theologian with no original contribution to make, or at the extreme left, whose representatives make one wonder why they bother to go on identifying themselves as Christians at all. At this rate one can hardly disagree with Fr. Crowe's judgment that while *Humanae Vitae*, as an official pronouncement by the Pope himself, should be studied with care and respect by Catholic theologians, there are strong reasons for dissenting from its conclusions, and it makes no claim to infallibility. And after all, 'ecclesiastical imperialism' over human life may be thought to have been officially renounced by the Church at the Second Vatican Council.

But of all the many profound things that Fr. Crowe has written, it is a passage from his notes on the Holy Trinity that has given me the most matter for thought. What I have derived from his reflections—I am not sure that he himself would wholly approve—amounts briefly to this. The attitude of the Enlightenment, with its exaltation of the intellect at the expense of the emotions, is like embracing the Son without the Spirit, whereas the romantic reaction seems to cleave to the Spirit without the Son. Finally, the sense of meaninglessness which afflicts the human soul in the twentieth century amounts to loss of the Father. I would like to meditate in what follows on the implications of his reflections, and on the question of how human consciousness in the future can be a less distorted reflection of Trinitarian life.

In thinking about the Enlightenment from the point of view of Lonergan's 'generalized empirical method,' it is worth comparing and contrasting Descartes' original project with the materialism which was derived from it by the leading thinkers of the French Enlightenment, the

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4 Ibid., 73.
5 Ibid., 173.
6 Ibid., 170.
derived from it by the leading thinkers of the French Enlightenment, the
so-called philosophes; and which is the direct ancestor of the ‘scientism’
that, in spite of its palpable inconsistencies and confusions, has
prevailed in many intellectual circles right up to the present. The
attitude of the philosophes to Descartes’ thought was ambivalent; and
the following propositions are important among those at issue:

1. There is a general method of inquiry, which is applicable to all
matters within the range of potential human knowledge.

2. Things as they really are, as opposed to merely related to our
senses, are to be known in terms of concepts not immediately related to
sensation (Descartes’ ‘clear and distinct ideas,’ Lonergan’s ‘pure
conjugates’).

3. Mechanistic determinism is an essential postulate of scientific
explanation, and applies to all material objects as such.

4. The ground of knowledge, and the existence and special nature of
the self in its role as the subject of knowledge, are to be determined by a
transcendental argument—to the effect that one cannot coherently
doubt that one is a doubter.

5. A kind of certainty is available on questions of epistemology; the
availability in principle of such certainty is a necessary condition of
scientific and ordinary empirical knowledge.

6. There is a close relationship between reasoned belief that there is a
deity, and advertence to the fact that we can come to know, by
appropriate use of our minds, about states of affairs which are the case,
and largely are as they are, prior to and independent of us and our minds.

In the case of propositions 1 and 2, the philosophes followed
Descartes, and both were right in the light of the generalized empirical
method; in the case of proposition 3, they did so and both were wrong. In
the case of propositions 4, 5 and 6, the philosophes repudiated
Descartes, but it looks as though they were wrong to do so.

As Peter Schouls has pointed out, the philosophes embraced with
enthusiasm Descartes’ ideals of progress and of mastery of the
circumstances of human life, and his method as the most effective
means of implementing those ideals. This made them all the more
resentful of what they regarded as his failures; and their resentment
was increased by the fact that some of their opponents actually
his metaphysics, for all his protestations to the contrary, was more influenced by imagination than by reason; in illustration of this, they cited his urge to build systems, and the dualism with its attendant psycho-physical parallelism which resulted from this. One may surely retort, on Descartes’ behalf, that not to think systematically may well be to lay oneself open to the danger of being dominated by a system which is unconsciously and therefore uncritically accepted. Simply to adopt materialism in the place of dualism seems to be rather an abandonment of than a solution to the problem which Descartes faced. How can it be that the same human organism can at the same time direct itself by thoughts, and be totally subject to the laws of physics and chemistry?

The common Enlightenment claim, that to practice metaphysics at all is to take reason beyond its proper limits, ought to lead to agnosticism about the typical issues of metaphysics, such as the existence of God, and the relation of the mental to the physical aspect of human beings. But of course those who make the claim are apt to use it to justify the conviction that there is no God, and that materialism is the metaphysics that is true. However, it is one thing to say that reason is incompetent in some sphere of human concern, quite another to maintain that reason shows that this sphere of concern should be abandoned, or that the assumptions on which the concern are based are probably or certainly false. Indeed, a moment’s reflection will show that these positions are inconsistent with one another. The thinkers of the Enlightenment who were opposed to religion, whether their beliefs about the subject were actually true or false, seem largely to have overlooked this crucial distinction, and hence to have failed to think as clearly as Descartes about the implications of his method, rather than, as they claimed, to have taken those implications further than Descartes himself had done.

An oversight like the one just pointed out may be said to lurk in Condillac’s distinction between two sorts of metaphysics, of which “the one, vain and ambitious, wants to search into every mystery”; while “the other more reserved, proportions her researches to the weakness of human understanding; and not concerning herself with what is above her
sphere, but eager to know whatever is within her reach, she wisely keeps within the bounds prescribed by nature"\textsuperscript{10} D'Alembert's complaint about the lack of 'taste' shown by those who pursue metaphysical questions\textsuperscript{11} really gives the game away; the philosophes disliked these kinds of questions, and therefore not only refrained from pursuing them themselves, but discouraged others from doing so. However, the aesthetic sensibilities of the philosophes really have little bearing on the issue of whether these questions are actually worth pursuing.

They reproached Descartes for purveying a metaphysical system, but they themselves were ridden by uncriticized metaphysical assumptions. The relations between the fundamental elements constitutive of our conception of the world—mind, value, cause, space, God, matter, time and so on—are either critically worked out or uncritically assumed. Notoriously, the nature of the relation between mind and matter remains a problem: you either solve it or resolutely evade it, whether by forgetting all about it, or by concocting ingenious but highly implausible solutions to it in the manner of philosophers from Descartes through Kant right up to Davidson.

Proposition 5, which is common to Descartes' philosophy and the generalized empirical method, is not popular at present among philosophers, who are wont to espouse a comprehensive fallibilism. And yet the proposition seems to me to be inescapable. The reason may be clearly seen, as soon as one tries to articulate exactly what fallibilism amounts to. The following might be tried as a first approximation: all (non-analytic) propositions are fallible, but they tend to approach the truth so far as, while they are in principle falsifiable, in fact they survive rigorous attempts to falsify them. But what is the status of that proposition? Must it not in some sense be certain, if it is to be believed at all? What does a first order fallibilism amount to, in fact, without a second order infallibilism to back it up? What is the point of trying to falsify my beliefs, unless it is certain that, by and large, I tend to approach the truth so far as I am conscientious about testing my opinions in the light of the available evidence? In accordance with the generalized empirical method, its certainty is a matter of its


\textsuperscript{11} Schouls, \textit{Descartes}, 8-9.
contradictory being self-destructive. Suppose I deny it. Do I make my denial on the ground that it is the most satisfactory way of accounting for the relevant evidence; in other words, that alternative judgments turn out to be false when they are scrutinized? If I do, I am providing a counter-instance to my denial by the very fact of uttering it for reasons. But if I do not make my denial on any such grounds, why should it be taken seriously? The point, of course, is closely related to the one famous as having been made by Descartes, that I cannot coherently think that I am not a thinker.

In accordance with generalized empirical method, I can be as certain of the existence of a world external to me as I can be of my own existence as a mind. It is self-destructive to deny that we can get at the truth by attending to evidence, by hypothesizing, and by judging to be so in each case the hypothesis which best fits the evidence. The real world, of which I and my body are but a tiny part, is and can be nothing other than what I come to know about so far as I attend to evidence, hypothesize widely, and judge scrupulously in accordance with the evidence. Unless I in effect assume this, the very distinction between appearance and reality, or between the world as anyone merely believes it to be and the actual world, can get no purchase on our thought and language. So the notorious crevasse alleged to exist by Descartes between the conscious subject and the world external to her is effectively bridged.

We come to attain knowledge of the world, of course, simply by the threefold process described. This is somewhat different from the method of acquisition of knowledge commended by Descartes, for whom the ultimate principles underlying the world and our knowledge of it are to be grasped by 'intuition' that they must be as they are, while every other state of affairs is to be known by 'deduction' from these principles. The objects of 'intuition' as envisaged by Descartes seem rather a mixed bag, comprising the facts that one exists and that one thinks; that a triangle is bounded by only three lines; the meanings of 'cause,' 'one' and 'straight;' and what knowing, doubt, ignorance, figure, extension, motion and existence are. In generalized empirical method, the equivalent of

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12 Insight, 388-90.
13 On 'intuition' and 'deduction' as together constituting the sole means of knowledge for Descartes, see Rules for the Direction of the Mind, IX and XI (The Philosophical Works of Descartes, translated by Elizabeth S. Haldane and G. R. T.
Descartes' 'intuition' is grasp of the principles of that method, and of how they justify themselves in the manner already sketched; that of his 'deduction,' its application to the acquisition of knowledge in general.

On the basis of 'intuition' and 'deduction,' Descartes propounded the view that physical nature is a vast deterministic system, virtually every aspect of which is to be deduced from the nature of God.14 (On occasion, indeed, observation or experiment may determine what laws God has actually instilled in nature, when \textit{a priori} two or more options would have been equally possible.15) This view of things must of course inevitably lead to difficulties about how human beings can operate in a more or less rational manner, when they are so intimately associated, or even identical, with bodies which are completely determined by laws of quite a different kind. While Descartes himself may be said to have ducked the problem by proposing that the soul acts upon the body through the pineal gland,16 his 'Occasionalist' successors confronted it head-on, and could only extricate themselves from its implications by maintaining that divine Providence had ordered the world from the beginning with such wonderful foresight, that entities of two utterly disparate kinds, namely souls and bodies, would always exactly coincide in their operations, though they never really interacted with one another.17 (As I write this sentence, I, who am essentially a soul, am trying to make a point about seventeenth-century philosophies of mind; while this has no effect whatever on my body, according to Occasionalist theory, God's infinite goodness and ingenuity has arranged physical nature from the very beginning in such a way that my body will necessarily behave in the appropriate fashion.)

The universe as conceived in terms of generalized empirical method, however, is not deterministic. Besides the 'classical' laws which

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\item Ross (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1969; HR in subsequent references) I, 28, 33). On what can be directly intuited, see Rules II, VI, and XII (HR I 7, 15, 41; see Schouls, 33, 35-37).
\item 14 On how the basic characteristics of matter are to be inferred from the divine nature on Descartes' account, see Bernard Williams, \textit{Descartes: The Project of Pure Enquiry} (Harmondsworth: Penguin Books, 1978) 268-270. Descartes' various treatments of the issue do not appear to be quite consistent with one another.
\item 15 See Descartes, \textit{Principles of Philosophy}, Part III, XLVI; Williams, 272.
\item 16 See \textit{Passions of the Soul}, I, XXXI (HR I, 345-46); Williams, 289.
\item 17 See Bertrand Russell, \textit{A History of Western Philosophy} (London: Allen and Uniwin, 1946) 590.
\end{itemize}
tell you what must happen if and so long as certain states of affairs obtain (as one can predict indefinitely into the future where the planet Venus will be in relation to the earth and the sun unless the general disposition of the solar system is disturbed, perhaps by the arrival from outside of a sufficiently large body), there are 'statistical' laws from which events non-systematically diverge (as the number of sixes in a sufficiently long series of throws of fair dice will approximate to a sixth of the total, even though the outcome of no particular throw can be reliably predicted). 18 Again, in a sample of a radioactive element, it may be known for certain that half the atoms will have changed into atoms of another element after a certain length of time; but there is no good reason to suppose either that we could ever know for certain how soon any particular atom is going to make the change, or that the intrinsically statistical talk of the 'half-life' of such elements is a mere cloak for ignorance. Similarly, a social scientist may make very reliable predictions about the behavior of large groups of people, without being too much the wiser as to how any one person will behave. 19 The principles underlying physical reality as a whole, and those specially characterizing each level in the hierarchy of beings in which it consists (the physical, the chemical, the biological, the sensitive-psychological, and so on), are to be grasped not by 'intuitions' of what cannot but be the case, but by hypotheses awaiting confirmation in experience, and indefinitely to be improved and revised in the light of such experience. 20

As to minds and bodies, the conscious human subject can impose laws of rational thought more or less on what remains unsystematic and indeterminate at the sensitive psychological level (one thinks of T. S. Eliot's 'undisciplined squads of emotion'); thus the laws of 'mind' can supervene quite snugly upon the laws of suitably-organized 'matter'. 21 Yet the only element from 'dualism' that may be said to remain is that

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18 Insight, chapter IV.

19 On the necessary complementarity of classical and statistical law, and the operation of both types of law within our universe, see B. Lonergan, Insight (London: Longmans, Green and Co., 1957) chapter IV. From the point of view of generalized empirical method, Descartes confuses the correct requirement that matter be in a sense wholly intelligible (since a state of affairs which instantiates no coherent possibility is nothing), with the error that it must be subject to mechanistic determinism. A great many persons of science have of course followed him in this.

20 On the hierarchy of 'forms' in the universe, see Insight, 437-442.

21 Insight 189-91, 195-96.
there is no question of any 'reduction' of the mental to the physical. Some observable phenomena can be best explained in terms of intelligible states of affairs which do not themselves involve the operation of intelligence; others in terms of states of affairs which do. The speech and writing of Albert Einstein, or for that matter of the most assiduous and ingenious of psychological reductionists, cannot be explained in terms of the mere operation of physical and chemical laws, but some measure at least of intelligence in their causes has to be invoked. When it comes to natural theology, according to both Lonergan and Descartes, the knowability of the world is ultimately to be attributed to God. For Descartes, divine providence ensures that we can know what is not intrinsically knowable; for Lonergan, the world is nothing other, and cannot be coherently conceived to be anything other, than what is to be known—but he clearly insists, in opposition to Descartes, that which particular set of scientific laws is realized in the universe is up to the divine will, and is to be established by human inquirers not a priori, but by the exercise of intelligence and reason on experience.

Generalized empirical method issues in what may seem like close agreement with Descartes, as with the prima facie implications of the scientific world-view, on the nature of physical things as they are in themselves, as opposed to how they appear to us. As a result of systematic inquiry, qualities are discovered to belong to things such that, while they are not directly identical with what we may sense, are yet verifiable by reference to such experience.22 (One may consider the 'mass' of a cannon-ball in relation to the 'weight' we feel as we try to lift it, or measurable waves of light in relation to seen color.) The crucial difference is that, for generalized empirical method, 'matter' is in essence related to the human mind as an aspect of what is to be intelligently conceived and reasonably affirmed. These fundamental properties of 'matter,' as intentionally related to mind, were in fact overlooked by Descartes with dire effect on subsequent thought.

One effect of Descartes' influence on the Enlightenment was certainly to encourage the wholesale repudiation of tradition. Opinions about the world, humankind and God, were to be retained only so far as

22 On 'pure' or 'explanatory' as opposed to 'experiential conjugates', see Insight, 79-82.
they could be vindicated at the bar of an empirical method that was not
generalized to include the data of consciousness, and rejected so far as
they could not; and the philosopbes generally thought that the upshot
was atheism and materialism. But of course it is one thing to say that
people tried to justify atheism and materialism by appeal to Descartes'
method; another to say that it was a necessary consequence of its
application. Descartes himself was notably scrupulous in regard to
tradition with respect to Catholic belief and practice;23 the possibility
that he was sincere or even consistent in this matter cannot be
dismissed out of hand. After all, the most rigorous possible application of
our reasoning powers might confirm belief that there is a God, and that
the divine nature and purposes for humankind have been specially
revealed in the way that Catholics suppose. And, quite apart from
Descartes' attitude to Catholicism, a hint at least of a more favorable
attitude to tradition than was characteristic of the French
Enlightenment may be found in his suggestion that persons of the past,
so far as they reached well-founded or true beliefs on any matter, must
themselves have had some knowledge of his method.24 Could not many
of the beliefs handed down to us by tradition have been arrived at by
means liable to ensure that they were true, even if those responsible
were not able to spell out with any precision, in the manner attempted
by Descartes himself, just why this was so? People have often argued
quite logically though ignorant of the rules (formulated by Aristotle and
his successors) which they were following in doing so. As Fr. Crowe
remarks, the prostitutes who argued their case before Solomon knew
very well what it was for one claim to contradict another claim, even if
they could not spell out what this amounted to or apply such an account
to the discovery of truth in the way that was later done by Peter

23 Schouls, op. cit., 37. Schouls maintains that, for all that Descartes remained a
devout Catholic, the essential thrust of his thought was against Catholicism, in that
he gives human beings the last word in determining what is true. Might one surely
make the same objection to the thought of Thomas Aquinas, on the ground that he
presents to human judgment reasons for believing in the existence of God and so for
accepting the Christian revelation? See Summa Theologica I, ii, 2-3; Exposition, de
Trinitate, ii, 3.
24 This was a propos of Rule IV of Descartes' Rules for the Direction of the Mind;
see HR, I, 10. See Peter A. Schouls, The Imposition of Method. A Study of Descartes
Abelard. So too, one may spontaneously speak in a way which is grammatically correct without any conscious acquaintance with the rules of grammar.

But at all events, whatever the effects of the application of the Cartesian method to the beliefs and value judgments constitutive of any tradition, the generalized empirical method of Lonergan is at least as apt to confirm as to undermine them. Notoriously, Lonergan was at least as committed to Catholicism as was Descartes, and regarded the application of his method as not only consistent with this, but as actually tending to support it. And on many matters other than religious faith, it seems plausible to suppose that our predecessors have thought and spoken with some measure of attentiveness, intelligence, and reasonableness; it would thus be folly rather than wisdom to reject their beliefs and values root and branch. And in any case, every person in every culture takes on trust the vast majority of the beliefs and values on the basis of which she lives her life; abruptly to stop doing so would be the road to barbarism rather than to an enhancement of civilization. But this is by no means to imply that the methodical critique of tradition is impossible, or that it is superfluous. A thorough investigation of relevant evidence, and a vigorous canvassing of alternative possibilities, may well reveal that much traditional belief is mistaken, and that many revered customs would be better abandoned or revised. Now contemporary defenders of tradition have a lively sense of the harm done by one kind of self-styled ‘rationalism,’ which does indeed owe something to Descartes’ method; but they do not seem to me to offer us any very clear conception as to how we are to

25 Crowe, Appropriating, 44.
26 This was brought vividly home to me when I began to study German. I was irritated to find that, whereas the endings for the present tense of verbs differed as between first and third person singular, they did not do so in the case of the aorist. Then it suddenly occurred to me that just the same applied to English; and though I had been following the rule almost all my life, I had never adverted to it.
27 Insight, chapters XIX and XX.
28 On the role of ‘belief’ (i.e., the acceptance of a judgment as true on the authority of others) in human affairs, see Insight 728-735. It should be noted that Lonergan’s use of the term ‘belief’ is somewhat different from that usual among contemporary philosophers.
29 On the methodical critique of belief, see Insight 735-739.
discriminate between the good and the bad, the well-founded or the ill-founded, in what our predecessors have handed down to us.

What is to be concluded about what may be called 'the Cartesian nightmare,' so enthusiastically embraced by much of the Enlightenment, of a universe of dead, mechanical, pointless and ultimately unintelligible 'matter,' utterly indifferent to the human spirit? How did it come about, how is it to be counteracted, and what virtues, if any, does it have or has it ever had?

First, it ought to be frankly acknowledged that Cartesian assumptions have proved invaluable for the development of the sciences over several centuries. It will not do to submit uncritically to the present fashion of undervaluing the Cartesian ambition of directing and controlling the physical environment for the enhancement of human life. It is easy to forget, in a mood of sentimental and one-sided nostalgia for the past, that we are the better off for the majority of our children not dying in infancy, and for being without the periodic scourges of smallpox and bubonic plague.

Second, what does seem to be of the essence of science is the assumption that the universe is intelligible, which should naturally issue in a Platonic vision of reality as radiant with intellectual light; this was modified and in some ways refined, but not intrinsically altered, by Aristotle's more empirical emphasis.31 Such a conception of the universe, as connatural to the human mind, and fitted for the expansion of the human spirit, is confirmed by generalized empirical method; but, quite largely due to the influence of Descartes himself, it has been replaced in modern times by that of a dead and intrinsically unintelligible waste awaiting human manipulation and control.32 The fundamental incoherence of this conception has always, of course, been pointed out by philosophical idealists from Berkeley onwards. Their objections have been reiterated recently by Hilary Putnam, who has cogently argued that while 'scientism' is incompatible with the existence and operation of minds and values, science is ineluctably dependent on them; since scientific theories only commend themselves as the product of human

31 That Plato and Aristotle are complementary thinkers, and that one should seek for a synthesis between them, is argued by F. C. Copleston. See A History of Philosophy, Vol. II (London: Burns, Oates and Washbourne, 1950) 561.
32 Hans Urs von Balthasar has called 'matter' as so conceived “a projection of human despair.”
minds operating well.\textsuperscript{33}

Finally, the crucial false step taken by Descartes, I believe, was in conceiving the material world as no longer essentially related to minds as that which they can know by employing the right methods; but rather as artificially linked by special divine dispensation to minds which essentially have nothing to do with it. When, after the separation of philosophy from theology, God drops out of the picture, one is left with a universe with no real place either for mind or for value. Fortunately, the errors in this view are being made ever clearer by developments in modern science (especially physics) itself.\textsuperscript{34}

'Science has taught us that the world is an uncaring machine,' said the lady to Putnam.\textsuperscript{35} But she was wrong, however many millions have agreed with her. It was not science, but Cartesian metaphysics, that taught her this. Lonergan’s philosophy, on the contrary, presents the world as intrinsically intelligible, affirmable and lovable, fit to draw us toward contemplation of the triune Creator who is conception (‘Son’) which arises from understanding (‘Father’), and love (‘Spirit’) which proceeds from both.\textsuperscript{36}

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\textsuperscript{34} F. Capra, \textit{Science, Society and the Rising Culture} (Toronto: Bantam Books, 1982).

\textsuperscript{35} Putnam, \textit{Realism}, 135.

\textsuperscript{36} Lonergan, \textit{Verbum. Word and Idea in Aquinas} (London: Darton, Longman and Todd 1968) chapter V.
I WANT TO take an indirect approach to the question of the mystical vis-a-vis the psychological. I think we have something to learn about this relationship from the history of Christian theology in the West. The main idea I am using is inspired by an admirable paper, "Aquinas and the Philosophy of Aristotle," by Giles Hibbert, O.P.

AUTOBIOGRAPHY AND NEO-PLATONISM

We are learning at last that theology has to be autobiographical. But this was already understood by Augustine who, in the Confessions, makes such a dramatic departure from established theological forms. Theology is defined as faith in search of understanding, and in the Confessions we see the birth of faith in God-in-Christ attempting to give an account of itself to the intelligent reader.

The philosophy, the grammar of self-understanding, used by Augustine in the Confessions, derives from Neo-Platonism, that extraordinarily fertile development from Plato. Plato and Aristotle really represent the two great generic options we have in the West for thinking about things. If A. N. Whitehead could say that all philosophy consists in footnotes to Plato, maybe all philosophers may be corralled into one of these two pens: either the ideas that come to me are my window on the world — the Platonic position — or we have to start from the world as we perceive its detail through the senses — the Aristotelian position. Aquinas, I believe, found both positions congenial, but this amazingly synthetic vision never caught on, although for people who believe that the Logos is in the flesh it should have. When Augustine in his
Confessions refers to "the Platonists" as his main source of intellectual nourishment, he means the Neo-Platonists, who carried Plato's position on the mysticism of mind all the way, teaching a form of meditation whereby the mind opens to "the One" that is beyond all diversity. They assisted in his great intellectual struggle to come to the realization that "real" does not mean the same thing as visible and tangible.

The main intellectual work recorded in the Confessions is that of getting beyond the naive realism for which "real" means visible, tangible, there for the senses. For if "real" does not mean tangible and visible etc., the way is open — but only open, not defined — to that reality we call God as the supremely real. A void opens (in which Christ has to die and be reborn in us, as we shall see later in this paper.) The breakthrough in Confessions 7. 10. 16 is breathtaking:

By the Platonic books I was admonished to return into myself. With you as my guide I entered into my innermost citadel, and was given power to do so because you had become my helper. I entered and with my soul's eye, such as it was, saw above that same eye of my soul the immutable light higher than my mind — not the light of every day, obvious to anyone, nor a larger version of the same kind which would, as it were, have given out a much brighter light and filled everything with its magnitude. It was not that light, but a different thing, utterly different from all our kinds of light. It transcended my mind, not in the way that oil floats on water, nor as heaven is above earth. It was superior because it made me, and I was inferior because I was made by it. The person who knows the truth knows it, and he who knows it knows eternity. Love knows it. Eternal truth and true love and beloved eternity: you are my God. To you I sigh 'day and night.' When I first came to know you, you raised me up to make me see that what I saw is Being, and that I who saw am not yet Being. And you gave a shock to the weakness of my sight by the strong radiance of your rays, and I trembled with love and awe. And I found my self far from you 'in the region of dissimilarity' and heard as it were your voice from on high: 'I am the food of the fully grown; grow and you will feed on me. And you will not change me into you like the food your flesh eats, but you will be changed into me.'

And I recognized that 'because of iniquity you discipline man' and 'cause my soul to waste away like a spider's web' and I said: 'Surely truth cannot be nothing, for all that it is not diffused through space, either finite or infinite?' and You
cried from far away; ‘now, I am who I am.’ I heard in the way one hears within the heart, and all doubt left me. I would have found it easier to doubt whether I was myself alive than that there is truth ‘understood from the things that are made.’

So mind has revealed itself in its enormous depth where it opens onto the infinite. Augustine at this point is becoming aware of a tension. This mystical dimension of mind is accounted for very satisfactorily by Neo-Platonism. But when he comes to the moment of his conversion in the garden, what Augustine is concerned with in the Confessions is something quite distinct from the overpowering sense of God in Confessions 7.10.16, for which Neo-Platonism does provide an adequate philosophical explanation. What happens in the garden, on reading the words, “Not in riots and drunken parties, not in eroticism and indecencies, not in strife and rivalry, but put on the Lord Jesus Christ and make no provision for the flesh in its lusts” (Rom. 13: 13-14), is the seizure of Augustine at the very core of his self-awareness as a sensual man, by “the Lord Jesus Christ.” A new way of being a human person becomes, suddenly, available and compelling. So radically does the new Man take possession of his sensuality that he is suddenly enabled to “make no provision for the flesh and its demands.” The terror of being without what seemed to be absolutely needed is removed by the New Man within, surrender to whom is pure delight and swallows up all the fear of life without lusting.

THE LIMITS OF NEO-PLATONISM

Why is Neo-Platonism not capable of telling the whole story for Augustine? Because philosophy, in so far as it does take upon itself the “exploration into God” — remember Christopher Frye? — perforce turns away from much that is human, and will see sexuality and politics as distraction, whereas once you are into the divine reversal, God’s searching-out of us, nothing that is human escapes. “Nil humanum a me alienum puto” is an axiom far more fully verified for the theologian who has begun to know what he or she is doing, than for the professed humanist. Only Jesus, the executed outcast and scapegoat of society, can warn us that God cares about us and the whole tangle of our corrupt worldly existence more than we do. Only a theology that is possessed of
this love of God for us has an adequate space for all the human self-understanding now available to us in the human sciences. The mystical is not some kind of a pure essence boiled off the melting-pot of the human. It throws its roots into the depths of the human, into the darkest reaches of our dreams. But this is only true within the ambit of a faith that is a being known and loved by God and thus valuable in one's own eyes.

How Merton felt this, as events in the world and his own experience made him more and more human in his relationship with God! And how he was crucified by the stubborn spiritual privacy and political and psychological indifference of the monastic establishment! A worn-out half-baptized Neo-Platonism confronted a world on the edge of nuclear holocaust — and "prayed about it!"

Like the other great moment in the Confessions, the moment in the garden is a conversion to God. But as a being overtaken by God in his sensuality, it differs completely from the other moment. It can only be explained or accounted for by what Christians believe to have happened with the Christ event. What was this? In my current way of trying to think about it, the commonest religious experience is that God is remote and untrustworthy, and life is liable to be disastrous. Of this experience the Jewish scriptures are, among all religious literature, the only honest portrayal—an incipient disclosure, in a pagan world of dreams, of the real God. When people encountered Jesus our victim risen from the dead and their heart burned within them these two presences of God to consciousness (the God above and the God absent from calamity), fused into a single meaning that was love. They became "the Father" and "the Son" in "the Spirit" enflaming the heart. This change is the paradigm of all conversions. It catches Augustine in the garden, torn this way and that by the memory and seeming needfulness of lust: for while in the mind we grope for the God beyond, by our sensuality we are locked into the world with all its proneness to disaster, the world that on its own terms dictates to us our needs. To change a person there, takes precisely that totally new opening-up of the disaster-prone world, now radiant in the risen victim, to the God seen for the first time as his and our loving Father. It is in nothing less than the power of the resurrection that Augustine hears the words, "and make no provision for the flesh with its needs!" God now is more spiritual and more sexual than I can be. And this has practical consequences. The beyond no longer allows a
pharisaic contempt for the unspiritual, the fleshly no longer justifies an equally contemptuous hedonism. The beyond and the fleshly are one, and this is love pervading all my existence. The process can be called: God taking shape in the soul, not the shape we give him, Pharisaic or Nietzschean, but the shape of love.

The love that draws us together into itself is the love that creates all. It must be! The human species becomes a people, a body, a kingdom, ecclesia, only through a love that is so beyond us that it knows us into being. There is a coming-together of us that overcomes so much that makes us fearful of each other so that if we are educated, we must attribute it to a higher, all-resourceful source. The first witnesses — preeminently John the beloved — knew that the whole story was summed-up in “love one another,” and that it only could be so summed-up through direct experience of a higher power that is — and this was absolutely new — stronger than death, death that separates us from each other and says to us, “You die alone!”

The triumph of Jesus over death, so easily shunted off track into the language of the conquering hero, is only understood as the triumph of love over the mutual fear in which we live because we believe in death as absolute. It is our belief in death as absolute that dictates our “it’s us or them!” attitude to life and politics, that shapes the scapegoat mechanism whereby we attribute all that goes wrong to a human agent whose sacrifice (translation: murder) will restore us. When Jesus our scapegoat returns from the dead, from the place to which we consign our victims, we encounter, for the first time in human time, in his word of forgiveness and peace, that which is stronger than death and robs death of its power to reign over us, that is, declare to us the kind of world we are in.

Now since it is love that takes autobiography from being “my story” into being “the story, in me,” we have to ask the question: What does it mean existentially, experientially, as autobiography, to say that love is born of God, that one who loves is born of God. The answer is closely connected with the great contribution of the Gospel to our self-understanding: that love is, at root, not a feeling (though of course it is feeling as the person fully alive) but a virtue, an inner-directedness of a person to the good of another and of others, a will for the other to be well (as opposed to the Sartrean “other” as threat, under the reign of death). This will towards-the-other is creative. It spreads creation to the other.
It promotes others in a way that continues their creation. The receiver of such love is encouraged to blossom in the sunrise of a God who creates him or her, to feel created, loved into being. Thus a person who loves, who advances the creation of another and of others, is Godlike, born of God.

This means that to love is most fully to be. It is to have that more abundant life that Jesus said he came to bring. To love is most fully to be, in promoting the being of another and of others. It is to be of God who only creates, and who alone creates. Jesus says that “those others” came only to destroy, in contrast with him who comes to bring abundant life. The point is not to put those others down, but to clarify the contrast between God’s influence, which is only life-advancing, and the influence of a God who is the God worshipped and served by man as death-dealer. Man the victim-victimizer lives the belief in death, in “us or them.” His God is death. The work of Jesus is to get his Father “cleared” of the death-dealing that man the killer has immemorially seen in his God.

If it is Christianity that has taught us love as a virtue, as the prime virtue or vigor of the awakened soul, then as the influence of Christianity declines in our society the notion of love as virtue disappears. The always complex interplay between love and sex loses its effortful, tragic, comic and sometimes blissful quality, and becomes, more or less naively, their equation. Love becomes simply attraction, that may well cease, and then a marriage dies. Thus rather than deplore the frequency of divorce, the Church should attend to its own failure to mediate the Gospel understanding of love as virtue. In a climate where this impoverishment is not felt, there is nothing amiss in saying, “I don’t love you any more.” That this means “I never did love you” is no longer understood.

To come out of a world in which this is not understood into the world of God’s love flooding our hearts, is to be converted. To be converted is to have that word love change forever its meaning for us.

**CONVERSION AND THE TRINITY**

Love is our theme this year. That word, whose meaning wobbles between the ecstatic and the vacuous, between doxology and empty abstraction, is the word that it is the task of a useful theology to learn again as God’s first name. Love so understood takes us from Augustine
telling his story with the aid of Neo-Platonism (the best self-help psychology of the time), to Augustine understanding his conversion as his envelopment by the Trinity. The doctrine of the Trinity is the spelling-out of conversion, his story becoming the story in him.

For what is the story? What is it that makes the work of René Girard a sort of "anthropologie enflammée" (as the Pensees of Pascal are called “une geometrie enflammée”) The world’s victim returned from the dead showed himself to be the beloved Son, and the God we thought of as remote and angry is thus his and our loving Father: the extremes of God and disastrous world met and thus love was born; the Spirit was given in which all were one in a new life, the ecclesia. This conversion, of individual into church, thus finds its primary expression in the confession of Father, Son and Holy Spirit. Before that confession, you have the dismal triad: above us, doubt; about us, tragedy; between us, mistrust. This gives way to: above us, a loving Father, about us, the risen embracing victim Son; between us, the Holy Spirit.

The Good News that spread like wildfire through the ancient world was thus a contagious ecstasy of liberation from the immemorial human burden of the remote and angry God and the near and calamitous world. This total conversion that supervened on consciousness was the realization of the graciousness of our victim raised from the dead “to give repentance to Israel. This means healing sorrow for a murder we are otherwise incapable of bringing to consciousness, the consequent newly apparent lovingness of a God ‘til then feared, and the coming-together of these two in the conversion experience itself. We received a new feeling of God and of each other in God, the Spirit, life of the ecclesia. This is the doxology, the first articulation, as happiness with life for the first time ever, of what would later be packed into a neologism: tri-unity, trinity. The happiness is that God is ineffably God, and God is amazingly in the nightmare of history, and God plies between these two old places called divine and human.

The point to get hold of and to hold onto is that this all-together-at-last is happiness for the first time, what we call conversion: God from above and God from below, these conjoined in feeling reborn. Now you could say, “that makes three.” And one knows only too well the kind of mind for which “that makes three” will be the first observation. But this is not the point. That it is not the point is made enormously clear when Lonergan points out that between the original ecstatic happiness and
"three persons in one God" there supervene five functional specialties that hinge on the conversions, religious intellectual and moral. Thus when I think and write and speak of the Trinity, I either have behind me conversion or I am thinking of a God I have thought up; and I am trying to conceive of this "God" begetting and "spirating." I am doing the latter, I have not understood the principle and foundation of Trinitarian theology: that the doxology is the source of the doctrine, not the reverse. Instead of indiscreetly probing into "the depths of the Godhead" for a begetting of the Word — "as though they had been the midwives," as Irenaeus said of the Gnostics — I must abase myself before a celebration of supervening pentecostal ecstasy. I must try to explore that in myself, in the I that is we, in the huge contrast there is between this happiness and the dire condition of humankind, itself understood for the first time. ("The doctrine of Original Sin," says Alison, is "a parting glance at a condition no longer ours.") The Trinity is not theory but soteriological fact.

Now in Being as Communion, John D. Zizioulas has warned us against the Roman fallacy of starting our exposition of the Trinity with "the divine nature," making of this the source of the generation of the Logos, in a spiritual begetting analogous to physical generation. I suppose he would regard Augustine's de Trinitate as typical. Zizioulas is surely right that we must not, try to understand the persons as the unfolding of an already supposedly understood divine nature. No, we must start with the person we call Father and see this person as source of the Son. I remember what a liberation this shift was for my old friend and mentor Illyyd Trethowan. God, he said, is the Father, the Son and the Spirit, and there's no going behind that. Assuredly there's no going behind that, but something more has to be said, even if not the Latin theology talking of an unfolding of a divine nature. What then? Because Zizioulas leaves us with unrest of mind, some kind of unifying principle is needed, if mind is to stay mind. Clearly it is the context of conversion in which the doxology has to be heard. It is the hearing of the doxology as our salvation from hopelessness come upon us from above, from below, and in a resultant community of new life. The oneness of Father and Son in the Spirit is our liberation from the reign of death. This is implied in Paul's ecstatic writing of God beyond and God beneath and these together as our enjoying of God in bliss and God in disaster as one new life. It is the oneness of God understood at last in a complex of saving
There is no attempt here to get behind the Father's begetting of the Son. There is only the providing of a more adequate context than Zizioulas' bare assertion that we just have to start with Father, Son and Holy Spirit. Yes, all we have is the Father and the Son in the Spirit. But we only have them in the coming into happiness for the first time, the happiness of our two worlds (and of course the Jewish and the Gentile worlds) coming together. Jesus, our victim come to us from the dead is the Son of a God we thus know for the first time as loving birthing parent, in the Spirit that ensouls us as one body. It is conversion that allows God to be known, as if for the first time, as Father and Son in one Spirit.

Now with our idea of the Trinity grounded in conversion, we may take a few cautious steps into its logical requirements. The Fathers in the early church councils got hold of and liked to repeat, that there is no difference between the Father and the Son other than that between generating and being generated. However, to speak of love between them is to imply that they have separate individual existence, which in our world is the condition for love to be between two persons. So we may not speak of love between the Father and the Son. There is nothing between the Father and the Son. They are, each, the meaning of the other, and to understand this is to understand love in its infinite origin, the original shaping of love. Love, in other words, comes of a delight that is beyond our understanding, the delight of Father and Son, of Arche and Logos, in each other, the delight of truth in itself. This evades us, because in our experience it is delight that results from loving, whereas in the origin, at infinity, it is love that “proceeds” out of delight. We have an analogy for this in the creative artist, in whom, yes, love results from “getting it out.” Love in God results on the infinite ultimate reality getting out its Word. And we do image God most fully when we are creative. (Perhaps, though, when the artist interprets his/her Godlike order of delight-before-love as his way of life, and sacrifices his spouse to his work, he is getting this original Godlikeness wrong and falling into the original temptation, “You shall be as gods.” I have heard it suggested that Picasso did this.)

The way in which God-as-above and God-from-below come together in the person who thus comes into the limitless love, and the puzzle we get into when we try to deal logically with two persons who differ only as begetting and begotten vanish into each other in a way that, if it is not meaningless, is an inconceivably total in-each-other-ness that must be
the uncreated origin of love. This is a kind of logical shadow to the conversion experience where the coming on us, as one, of the God who is above and the God of the crucifixion is clearly the birth of unlimited love. When little Willie, in that picaresque novel The Last Western, asked in catechism class, "Why did God kill Jesus?" and his old Indian grandmother taught him about love, that in him which had asked the question got its answer, and he was able conscientiously to make his first communion.

The shape of conversion is: God overcomes in people the dualism of Pharisee and Nietzschean in a love that they become conscious of as pervading their whole being, inducing compassion for "all sentient beings." This shape permits some logical exposition, which reaches the crisis-point when two nothing-but-persons disappear into each other. This is either quite meaningless or it speaks to what the converted person actually feels, namely love starting and stopping nowhere.1

As Augustine embarked on the de Trinitate, he had before him the homoousion of Nicea. Nicea had clarified the impossibility of the Logos of creation being finite. If God as origin or Arche is one who says "I am," an "I" without an equal "thou" is impossible.2 So the Logos has to be the equal of the Arche, has to be infinite as the Arche is. The Son is coequal with the Father. But this logic points us to a necessity rooted in the conversion experience itself: that the force transforming Augustine's sensual being be as emphatically divine as the God that grounds being. Without this equality of Son and Father, the conversion experience is not itself, not a transformation of the flesh from within to respond to the God who is beyond. God as one in beyondness and in our flesh is the essential grammar of the conversion experience. Is the whole of Trinitarian doctrine is a ruse for getting God and sex into the same place, against our insistence on keeping them apart?

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1 Why is it that truly converted people speak of nothing but love, so that our eyes glaze over and we say, "Of course!" It would be good if they could understand how "love" comes to be the only thing one can say! If they could show us some of the homework in which they move, as Merton did, from saying the world is damned to saying, in lyrical ecstasy, "I always obey my nurse!" This is the first line of a poem he wrote in praise of his nurse while in surgery for back trouble. He fell in love with her and wrote his best poetry in celebration of this.

2 A fact whose denial lies at the root of all our woes, glaringly of the woe that is contemporary Tory Britain and Gingrich's America.
My main point that the experience of conversion has to preside over one's theological treatment of the Trinity, has to be doxology-based is nowhere more needed than when we pass to the "second procession" of the Holy Spirit. For it is the Spirit we know first, since the new life in us by which we know the Father and the Son has to be thought about differently, as a person "proceeding" from the Father and the Son. If we come adrift from the conversion moment, this "proceeding" presents a problem. What is this proceeding? It is not a generation, but a "spiratation," — a verbal ridiculeus mus, if there ever was one. This concealed tautology, or rather lexicographical hodgepodge happens because we have come adrift from the conversion moment in which we know the Spirit as "the Father and the Son coming together." For once we are thinking of the two worlds of God coming together in the conversion moment, we understand the Spirit as "coming from" the Father and the Son. The becoming-one of Father and Son in the Spirit is the proceeding of the Spirit from the Father and the Son. Lonergan might want to say that I am talking more properly about the mission of the Spirit, than of the procession. I am concerned to show that the procession is not so arcanely hidden behind the mission as to require a mystificatory word like "spiratation" that says nothing, but is supposed to refer to what we have a sense of in the conversion moment. The coming together of Father and Son in that moment is the very substance of conversion. If a primary understanding of the Trinity is the articulation of conversion, this is supremely verified in the procession of the Spirit, the beyond and the catastrophic becoming life for us. Any sense of what is meant by Father, Son and Spirit refers to the conversion moment, of new life brought by God out of disaster. The Trinity means our conversion before it means a doctrine. God from above and God from below come together, and this is the birth of unlimited love in the Spirit. The conspiracy of Father and Son inscribes itself in the psychology of conversion.

Nothing brings home more dramatically the identity between confessing the Trinity and being converted, than the fact that once you miss this identity the thing most deeply known in conversion becomes the most abstract — to the point of gobbledygook — in doctrine. Augustine's mistake here (certainly the mistake we make when we read into him our unconverted mind) is the slip of the mind that lets a mystery we live in become a problem to be solved. As opposed to begging
the question, trying to get a third person out of the first two is begging the answer. To give an example of the ordinary error called begging the question, during a discussion on how to revive the monastic life, some twit has an “insight” and says, “That’s it! We have to revive it!” He’s begging the question, going to the question for an answer. To find a problem as to how a third person can come out of the first and the second, is to make the answer — the reality of “Father” and “Son” for us in life and discourse — the question.

“PER TE SCIAMUS DA PATREM, NOSCAMUS ATQUE FILIUM.”

It is ironic that Augustine got us into the habit of trying to get a third person intellectually out of the other two and thus botching-up our whole understanding of the Trinity, because for Augustine the Trinity explains his conversion, and conversion is the Holy Spirit in action — Holy Spirit, the miraculous becoming-real to me of the incomprehensible Father and his enfleshed Son. “Per te sciamus da Patrem, noscamus atque Filium.” Through thee may we know the Father and the Son. That wobble over Holy Spirit that problematizes the enveloping mystery, lays Augustine’s de Trinitate open to the enormous misunderstanding (the main burden of Hibbert’s article and of this paper) namely, theologians’ failure in the following centuries to read the de Trinitate as the required sequel to the Confessions. Here is established the theological habit of thinking of the Trinity primarily as a theme of abstract speculation, and not as the shape of Christian conversion. Hence, Christian conversion is left with the radically inadequate explanatory system of Neo-Platonism, which de Trinitate proposed to outgrow, leaving our theology impotent to meet the questions of contemporary psychology.

We must clarify this vital question of Neo-Platonism and its continuing influence on, at least, monastic spirituality. Hibbert’s contends that for centuries the Augustine of spirituality remained the Augustine of the Confessions, whereas it should have been the Augustine of the de Trinitate. And the Augustine of the Confessions was still using Neo-Platonism as his philosophic model for spirituality. As a philosophy of spirituality, Neo-Platonism broke through to a direct access of the mind to the ultimate mystery not through any activity of the mind but in the way of what The Cloud of Unknowing calls a naked intent, and
Abbot Chapman “attention to nothing in particular (which is God of course).” This “attention” is of its nature apolitical and a-everything else, for all these concerns involve the particular, and this attention is to nothing in particular. However, this nothing embraces all, and where there was a good prayer tradition it has always been understood that if a person praying this way was not increasing in sensitivity to others and in responsibility, he or she was doing it wrong. Whenever the spirit and practice and above all teaching of the seemingly formless act of prayer gets lost, all that remains is the Neo-Platonic setting of indifference to politics and to all that people do. So Merton’s superiors told him to shut up about the bomb; and he could not obtain from them any help in the exercise of contemplative prayer, where being apolitical is a functional necessity.

Neo-Platonic spirituality tends to degenerate from a mystical to a pious Neo-Platonism, both apolitical and spiritually impotent. Abbot Chapman said it was twenty-five years before any director “told me about this,” “this” being the possibility of wordless and formless attention to God; and John Main, who learned it from a Buddhist while serving in the army, was forbidden by his Benedictine novice-master to practice it “because it isn’t Christian.” He had to wait to leave the novitiate to find the practice in the teaching of Cassian and, by implication, in the Rule of our Holy Father Benedict.

In other words, the Neo-Platonism that continues long after Augustine under his name is not Augustine’s Neo-Platonism that demanded to be outgrown as he sought to give the only adequate account of his conversion, which is Trinitarian. This Neo-Platonism keeps the Trinity purely dogmatic and nurtures aloofness from the anguish of contemporary people. It is killing monastic life.

But perhaps the difference between the Neo-Platonic and the Christian accounts of the conversion experience can be expressed this way. I may be ravished by the sense of God’s transcendence, liberated from materialism and naive realism. That’s the Plotinian breakthrough of Confessions 7.10.16. But how on earth (and I use these words most advisedly) am I to know, in the way a man knows when he is in love and loved, that the transcending one loves me? The Christian story is the story of how this reality, of the infinite’s love for the finite, has been got through to us. First, a man, Jesus, has known this about himself, and dared to go all the way with this knowledge — the human drama of this
has been powerfully demonstrated by Dennis Potter's play *The Son of Man*, agnostic though the standpoint is. (Why is it, I wonder, that our culture is simply unable to dramatize the Christian story as believed in by the Christian?) Then, *everything* in us that fears to know this, to be naked to the unknown, crucifies him, and he rises from the dead and says, "It's all right, there's nothing to be afraid of, it had to be this way!" There is a memorable moment in Potter's play, when Jesus says to Pilate, "Don't be afraid, there is no need to be frightened," and Pilate, after a long pause, bursts out, "Take him away! Take the idiot away! I confirm sentence." Those who "see" him after his death know that "burning of the heart" that is the response to *being* loved by the unknown, in which "I" and "we" are identified, the ecclesial ecstasy of Easter.

That is Augustine's moment in the garden. Christ, the new Man consummated in love with God, ravishes him and totally rearranges the furniture of his consciousness. The uncreated love, the original shape of love as burning the heart in the presence of the risen victim, like the radiance of a consummate work of art, seizes hold of him just where people spend sleepless nights wondering if they are loved.

It is an extraordinary thing: as I look back on all my experience and experiments with sexuality and love, the one thing I find I have most wanted, most avoided, most forgotten, is primitively and immediately to know that another loves me. This need is put through all the paces of evasion and games-playing that the alcoholic's need is put through. This is easily mistaken for the desire, very strong in men especially, to receive from a woman something not, we feel, had in the very beginning from the mother. People with no sense of this early lack still hunger for the certainty I am speaking of. When it comes, the overcoming of alcoholism is easy — in that special sense the word "easy" has in his saying, "My yoke is easy and my burden light."

Note that Merton did much work on the distinction between the still-felt need for first comfort and the mature need that conversion in the Spirit meets. He was concerned to show contemporary psychologists that mystical experience is not a regression to the womb, but rather the experience of re-birth in God, in synch with the eternal birth of the Son in the Holy Spirit. This is the Christian conversion. Not a matter of in any sense *adding* Christ to the Plotinian conversion, it is
the satisfying of the hunger that the Plotinian conversion awakes and cannot itself satisfy.

A SYNTHETIC VIEW

Throughout the Middle Ages the Augustine of spirituality was the Augustine of the *Confessions*, the Neo-Platonist manner. The result was devastating. When the works of Aristotle got into Europe, instead of this excitingly new empirical sense of our world finding a ready welcome in the late Augustine's *incarnational* spirituality, it found itself in conflict with the unworldly Neo-Platonic spirituality that still went by the name and the immense authority of Augustine.

Aquinas did not fall into the trap of this mistaken and sterile opposition. He embraced Aristotle with the enthusiasm of a Christian mystic, one for whom "the glory of God is man fully alive," as Irenaeus says. But Langmead Casserley insisted in *The Christian in Philosophy* that Neo-Platonism is the proper philosophy of Christianity, and that Aquinas, who should have known better, only appealed to Aristotle for apologetic purposes, to save a generation of students enthusiastic for the new philosophy. Except that it reflects what actually did happen, this would be such a travesty of Aquinas and indeed of the intellectual life that it is not to be taken seriously. The synthetic genius of Aquinas never caught on (Alasdair MacIntyre makes the same point for ethical theory.) Instead we got the opposition between a rationalism called Thomist and an other-worldliness called Augustinian, neither of which have a home for the human sciences of today, which can require that theology have something to say to them about the transcendence-dimension of our psychology, our anthropology, our politics, our sexuality etc.

Thus the vital significance of the Trinity to our life is lost! Quite a loss! How starved we are of this mutual encounter of the mystical in us with the psychological. Recently, when counseling someone who was in a very intensive same-sex relationship I remarked that it had been "given" to me in prayer to ask Jesus, "What do you think about these (specified) sexual fantasies of mine?" I experienced immediate lightening of the spirit. Jesus was saying, "So glad you brought that up — I get so bored with endless liturgically correct sentiments!" When a few days
later we parted, she said, "That thing you told me, I know I shall never, never forget!" This suggests the appalling aridity of a spiritual tradition for which this communication was such a big deal.

The mystical and the sexual are in one sense poles apart, the mystical austere in its otherness, the sexual warm in its immediacy. But beware of any understanding in the Catholic tradition of that otherness in the Catholic tradition other than on its own terms! It cannot be understood in terms of a pious platonic remoteness from the turmoil of the flesh. I think of Merton again. When, in the course of back-surgery, he fell in love with his nurse, and knew himself sexually for the first time in the mystical context of his whole monastic life, he simply could not see his brethren as representing a state beyond where he now was. He came to see the monastic institution as representing precisely the version of the mystical we create by our platonizing philosophy and encapsulate in our cloisters, over-against a God who towers over all and bewilders us, touching the very nerve of our sexual being, so that we wonder, "Whose side is God on?"

Don't we have to understand that the weirdest things that go on in me and in the people I interact with have a meaning; and that the most recondite theological wisdom — the whole Trinitarian conundrum — somehow contains that meaning? How does the God I grope after in the darkness of our Abbey church where that great lamp hangs like a star, meet with the God who stammers in my sexual fantasies and, more, in my growth as a person in so far as this is discernible to me? Sometimes the two are one in the Spirit, and this is the moment of conversion, a new inrush of tolerance and noticing things in the lives of others.
CONCLUSION:
TO SEE THE AUTOBIOGRAPHICAL NATURE OF TRINITARIAN THEORIZING

To sum up, conversion, the effective inbreaking of the Absolute in person on a person, finds its explanatory language in the theology of Trinity and Incarnation. It has however another language furnished by the breakthrough philosophy called Neo-Platonism, for which mind is directly exposed to the One in whom it is a participation while the Neo-Platonic language expresses the human reaching toward the divine, the Trinitarian language expresses the divine grasping the human. The Neo-Platonic language, since it is concerned with the human reaching out, deals only with the part that reaches out to the divine. The Trinitarian language expressing the divine’s grasping of us, embraces the whole of us. It follows that Trinitarian language, understood as the full language of conversion, opens Neo-Platonism to the whole human reality, reminds the mystic of his or her sexual dreams, and wakens our spirit to the whole world of psyche and cosmos.

When the Trinitarian language is not understood as the language of conversion, as the autobiography of the converted person, the story of God’s inbreaking into his or her life, it turns into nothing but an abstract of the Christian story understood as purely “out there,” not autobiographical. Then the Christian has no language of conversion that includes all that is human. The result is that the mystical is denied its full Trinitarian habitat where it is at home with all that is human, and retreats into its Neo-Platonist habitat, where the mystical is only a part of the human. Thus spirit and psyche return into their separate corners. Roughly, what has happened is a huge failure in consciousness due to the failure to see the autobiographical nature of Trinitarian theorizing.

When Jesus, in John’s mystic Gospel, prays “that they may be one, Father, as you and I are one,” one may paraphrase that they may have it all together, as you and I are it all together in the Spirit. This, Augustine eventually understands, is what happened to me in the garden. I was called to be, beyond my wildest dreams and with Godhead itself as my model (deus meus, forma mea, he says somewhere), alive.
The Christian text is not “memento mori!”
The Christian text is “Death, where is thy sting?”
Simply we have forgotten the first story
At least as anything that we can sing.
We are held back, though, from that first confession
Of death defeated: we believe in death
The silent instrument of our oppression
Of our own shadow world, believed-in threat.
Now that we know what kills our rhetoric,
The murderer we harbour deep within
We can begin to feel again the prick
Of death — Paul’s rarest metaphor for sin.
For the first time I know what mercy means:
It spoke in an upper room, towards us leans.

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Coda

Sex, after all, is one of the main sources, if not the main source, of our being afraid of each other. This fear would be allayed if the Gospel condition of supernatural, subject-centered love were seen not as describing a special kind of love but as a generalizable notion of all love. The allaying of mutual fear in the area of sexuality would consist in the opening to each other of both genders in each, as opposed to having these as shadow, bargaining-chip, and God knows what else. Thus the perfect love that casts out fear would be realized in a love which exorcised the mutual tyranny implied in gender.

Never were we more aware of the games the sexes play with each other. Never, therefore surely, were we closer to the possibility of a love that enjoys itself without these games. The Gospel enables us to be Christ to each other. This is a condition whose understanding requires a subject-centered notion of love. We do not see Christ in each other unless we can be Christ to each other, unless we practice, not “the love that dare not speak its name,” but “the love that, being born of the unknown, is most easily
forgotten, allowed to slip out of our calculations, as it does in these days of massively widespread marital breakdown.

The notion of talking of sex in terms of the turn of the subject came out of a conversation about a mutual friend, in which my interlocutor had said, “he needs to recognize his gay side.” I had replied, “Rather, he needs to allow his feminine side to be present in his self-presentation to others.”

How would a subject-centered treatment of love speak, for instance, of homosexual love? It would speak of it in an explanatory not a descriptive way. To speak of it descriptively is to do so in terms of the attracted-to — the same sex. To speak of it explanatorily might involve something like a love in which both the masculine and the feminine aspects of the subject are in play, the feminine awaking the masculine in another, the masculine the feminine, setting up a diagonal as opposed to an agonizing pattern of contrasexuality. Then mature homoerotic love would be as rare as mature heterosexual love: a man, or a woman, making both genders of him-or herself available to others, not necessarily for copulation but rather for emotional enrichment, encouragement of another to be all they are.

This last point — “not necessarily for copulation” — brings out the chastity implicit in a subject-centered notion of love. Enjoying each other as men and women, like enjoying each other as women, or enjoying each other as men, would be a way of describing a subject-centered notion of sexuality. Enjoying each other means, being available to each other, inviting to each other, encouraging to each other, celebratory to each other, playful to each other.

Trying to “practice” charity is a kind of self-exposure to injury that is the subject-centered love I am talking about. The charitable person is vulnerable, as is the exemplar and source of charity, who hangs upon a cross.

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REFLECTIONS ON THE APPROPRIATION OF MORAL CONSCIOUSNESS

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THIS CONFERENCE ON “The Structure and Rhythms of Love” has been convened in honor of Frederick E. Crowe, S.J. In reflecting on how I might contribute to such a conference, I recalled a scene from my early days as a graduate student at University of Toronto. I was doing research in the stacks of the library at Willowdale (Lonergan was living at Willowdale at that time, and we had just met for lunch), and Fr. Crowe stopped and asked me whether I thought that the appropriation of the fourth level of consciousness, specifically, the act of decision, was particularly problematic. In his paper “Dialectic and the Ignatian Spiritual Exercises,” we find Crowe’s formal statement of this question regarding the appropriation of decision:

...subjectivity is methodically involved when there is self-appropriation by the subject; such appropriation is achieved by practice: “One has to produce in oneself the corresponding operation. One has to keep producing it until one gets beyond the object intended to the consciously operating subject.” [Method, p. 15] But just here the fourth level of consciousness, on which dialectic is operative, presents a real problem....If it is a real decision it seems that cases for practice are excluded on principle. If it is a real decision, it involves me existentially, and then it is no mere “practice”; if it is a mere exercise, an example chosen for the practice, then it is not real decision, for it does not involve me existentially. The paradox: The practice
of decision, by the very fact that it is merely practice, is not practice at all.\textsuperscript{1}

After stating this paradox, Crowe proceeds to suggest that the difficulty of appropriating fourth level operations might be somewhat mitigated:

Of course, the situation is not desperate....[A]s a student to whom I explained this paradox said to me, we involve ourselves every day in every real decision we make, even the small ones. And one can advert to those decisions later for purposes of self-appropriation.\textsuperscript{2}

I vaguely recall offering this answer. It was the question and the honor of being asked the question that have stood out in my memory.

I would like to return today to this question of the appropriation of decision. As Fr. Crowe concluded in "Dialectic and the Ignatian Spiritual Exercises," "I believe my paradox remains to block any formal exercises in dialectic, and I think it is worth pondering, for it brings home to us the demands that the fourth level is going to make on us...."\textsuperscript{3} The appropriation of the fourth level is worth pondering; however, in taking up this question, my focus is not primarily Crowe's paradox, but on certain preliminary issues which bear generally on the question of the appropriation of the fourth level of consciousness.

The questions I propose to investigate may seem to some of you to be old ground already well-covered by numerous workers in the field of Lonergan studies. Do these vines have any fruit left worth harvesting, or should we all be moving on to newer rows? Kierkegaard's aesthetic author in Either/Or, using an agricultural metaphor, advocates employment of the rotation method, an intensive rather than an extensive exercise, in order to squeeze the greatest possible enjoyment out of life. While we have a different purpose in mind, we can follow this lead and return to familiar ground for more intensive inquiry.

So, let us ask ourselves again, what precisely we mean by the appropriation of the fourth level of consciousness. I shall use the term "moral consciousness" to refer to the fourth level of consciousness,


\textsuperscript{2} Ibid. 250.

\textsuperscript{3} Ibid.
variously called rational self-consciousness, existential consciousness, the level of decision, the level of responsibility. Lonergan himself uses the term "moral consciousness" in *Insight*, and I find its generality helpful in approaching the subject matter without prejudgments. It is also useful in opening dialogue with other thinkers in this area. I am not asking so much about the nature of moral consciousness, although we will have to review its basic outlines and elements, but about what it means to appropriate this consciousness. I shall also not have the time to get into the question of how we might foster moral consciousness in ourselves. I shall be considering moral consciousness as given. This question is also not about the implications of such appropriation, for example, the implications for dialectic in theology or for our understanding of human community, but rather about its concrete possibility. This question requires a review of the meaning of some all-too-familiar Lonerganian terms such as "appropriation" and "rational self-consciousness," and the meaning of consciousness itself must be at least briefly reviewed, because we are concerned both with its fourth level and with its heightening.

Two more preliminary remarks should be made regarding the focus of my exploration. In 1974, Fr. Crowe presented a paper entitled "An Exploration of Lonergan's New Notion of Value" at the first annual Lonergan Workshop here at Boston College. Eleven years later he presented the Workshop paper "An Expansion of Lonergan's Notion of Value." In the first he explores the development that can be discerned in Lonergan's thought on moral consciousness from *Insight* to *Method*. In the second, he shows how Lonergan's thought on value "might be expanded through the suggestive power of his two ways of development," from below upwards and from above downwards. In the introduction to the latter paper, Crowe remarks: "Even with the many studies now available—too many to take account of here—I would still maintain that we have only begun to explore Lonergan's work on values,..." I think this view expressed in 1985 is still true today, but I

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5 Ibid., 344.
also believe that we have only begun to explore Lonergan's work on the many facets of moral consciousness, not only on the issue of value.

First, in what follows I will be drawing on Lonergan's thought in both *Insight* and *Method*, his account of moral consciousness in terms of a rational self-consciousness and his account of moral consciousness in terms of a distinct level of responsibility. I find it worthwhile to return to Lonergan's account in *Insight*, even though it is couched in the faculty-psychological terms of will, willingness and willing, and even though it minimizes the role of affectivity in moral consciousness, because some of the explanatory points he makes regarding moral consciousness in *Insight* have yet to be transposed into the language of intentionality analysis. Second, moral consciousness is the level of consciousness on which the notion of value emerges as directive of our existential self-determination. Of the many facets of moral consciousness, the central role of value and concomitantly the role of feelings as revelatory of and as responsive to values and disvalues, and as motivating moral self-transcendence, have drawn the most attention in Lonergan studies. In my own work on anxiety, I focused on the affectivity of moral consciousness in its many dimensions. But I shall leave the exploration and expansion of Lonergan's account of values and feelings to other sessions of this Workshop. My present concern is with a prior question: How can one appropriate one's own moral consciousness? What does it mean to heighten a consciousness which is not only self-conscious, as is true of any consciousness, but which is also already self-reflectively self-conscious? My question regards the nature of the consciousness which is the heightened consciousness of rational self-consciousness. To put it another way, what does it mean to appropriate acts which are themselves existentially self-appropriative?

In addition to reviewing the meaning of consciousness, moral consciousness, and appropriation, I shall conclude with a related problem which emerges in reflection on these issues. The problem relates directly to Crowe's paradox, but it does so paradoxically. He was concerned with how an act of decision could be at one and the same time an instance of real self-transcendence and an exercise in methodical practice. There is a logical contradiction inherent in such an attempt, but he also suggests a practical difficulty. How does one generate occasions of acts of decision? Crowe refers to techniques of simulating
moral consciousness: "I believe that in group dynamics they cook up artificial situations and give you a role to play which more or less successfully simulates an existential involvement." 6 But we might ask with the existentialists Kierkegaard and Sartre, who provide such nuanced accounts of moral consciousness, whether as conscious we are ever not morally conscious. This concluding question regards, then, the pervasiveness or ubiquity of moral consciousness.

CONSCIOUSNESS AND MORAL CONSCIOUSNESS

Before we take up the question of the nature of moral consciousness, it will be helpful to recall certain features of Lonergan's account of consciousness itself. One can find in most of Lonergan's works a foundational section devoted to explaining the nature of consciousness. This is so because the data of consciousness is the ground of Lonergan's generalized empirical method, the transcendental method of inquiry he employs in approaching philosophical and theological questions. I don't intend to provide here a compilation of his many accounts of consciousness, or an account of the development of the notion of consciousness in his thought. I shall limit myself to the mention of three features of consciousness relevant to the question at hand.

1.1 Consciousness and the Intentional Act

The first is that consciousness is not itself an act. It is a quality or a characteristic immanent in intentional acts. While Lonergan defines consciousness as "an awareness immanent in cognitional acts" in Insight,7 he also clarifies that not only cognitional acts are conscious.8 In Chapter 18, for example, he is concerned with the volitional act of decision, which is rationally self-conscious, and in Method Lonergan, following Scheler and von Hildebrand, writes of intentional responses to value, affective acts, which are on the fourth level of consciousness. So,

6 Crowe, "Dialectic and the Ignatian Spiritual Exercises," 250.
8 Ibid., 345.
consciousness, which is not itself an act, is a characteristic of intentional cognitive, affective, and volitional acts. But consciousness is not only characteristic of intentional acts, for Lonergan also acknowledges non-intentional states and trends, such as fatigue and hunger, which are conscious affects. He also seems to distinguish in Chapter One of *Method*, between attending and intending, when he writes: “The object is present as what is gazed upon, attended to, intended.”⁹ But he proceeds to identify attending as a mode of intending, the selective but not creative intending of our senses.¹⁰ Whether attending is strictly speaking an intending or a pre-intentional receptivity, it remains conscious—specifically, empirically conscious. So, we find that consciousness is characteristic of a range of intentional, non-intentional, and pre-intentional, affective, volitional and cognitive phenomena.

We can understand, then, why Lonergan says that consciousness is not only a quality immanent in cognitional acts. This point is worth noting, because there is a tendency to read Lonergan as suggesting that conscious intentionality is a matter of stepping stones, even when these cognitional acts are understood to be self-assembling in a dynamic structure. Phenomenological studies of the conscious act reveal its complexity. For example, Sartre’s early analysis of the constitution of intentional acts reminds us “that action requires time to be accomplished. It has articulations; it has moments.”¹¹ Sartre sees the act as a unity that is not itself given. We experience the conscious fragments that together constitute an act that can be identified as such. One might counter Sartre’s point here with the distinction made by Aristotle in Book 10 of the *Nicomachean Ethics* between acts as energeia and acts as kinesis. Not all acts are processes that assemble over time. But I believe that Sartre is making a critical point when he describes an act as a transcendent unity, transcendent of the immediate givenness of consciousness. Acts are not found in consciousness as already constituted, as Lonergan’s explanatory

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¹⁰ Ibid., 10.
account of the four moments in the genesis of a definition, two of which are moments in the process of insight, in Chapter One of Insight illustrates. We have to be on guard against the “already out there now real” becoming the “already in here now phenomenal.”

Lonergan would not embrace, on the other hand, what Sartre calls the “essential principle of phenomenology,” which he adopted from Brentano and Husserl, that “all consciousness is consciousness of something,” because Lonergan does not identify consciousness with intentionality. As we have just seen, for Lonergan consciousness is not restricted to intentional acts. In addition to conscious and intentional cognitional, affective, and volitional acts, there are also conscious non-intentional affective states and trends, conscious pre-intentional acts of attention, and we might even add conscious moments or fragments of acts. Furthermore, even if we restrict our analysis to the consciousness of intentional acts, Lonergan does not identify consciousness with intentionality. For while every intentional act is conscious, the intentionality of the act and the consciousness in the act are two distinct characteristics. This seemingly minor point can serve as the ground of dialectical critique of the inherent duality in phenomenological accounts of introspection, or what Sartre calls “reflective consciousness.” When we take up the question of appropriation, we will find that the distinction between consciousness and intentionality also grounds the possibility of the appropriation of moral consciousness.

1.2 Consciousness as Self-Consciousness

So, for Lonergan consciousness is a quality immanent in intentional acts; it is not itself an act. The second feature of Lonergan’s characterization of consciousness is that it is universally self-conscious. In this regard, Lonergan is in agreement with both Husserl and Sartre. Consciousness is awareness which is always and simultaneously self-awareness. Husserl writes of a double intentio, the self-aware heeding which is shot through every intentional act.12 And Sartre, while rejecting the necessity of a pure ego attached to every act, nevertheless insists that all consciousness is self-conscious. He is able to make this move in

part because he distinguishes, as does Lonergan, between self-consciousness and self-knowledge. Self-consciousness is simply an essential characteristic of consciousness as extension is a characteristic of material bodies. It might just be mentioned that the attribution of self-consciousness to consciousness is currently disputed. Neuropsychologists since the mid-seventies have conducted experiments to test whether every instance of consciousness is self-conscious. However, I have found the natural scientific approach in these studies to be uncritical, reductionistic, materialistic, and in a word, counter-positional. The studies of blind-sighted patients, for example, are rife with methodological oversights; chief among them is the failure to distinguish between the self-consciousness of the test subjects and their self-knowledge.¹³

Lonergan describes the self-consciousness of consciousness in his familiar discussion of the three kinds of presence in "Cognitional Structure":

There is material presence, in which no knowing is involved, and such is the presence of the statue in the courtyard. There is the intentional presence, in which knowing is involved, and it is of two quite distinct kinds. There is the presence of the object to the subject, of the spectacle to the spectator; there is also the presence of the subject to himself, and this is not the presence of another object dividing his attention, of another spectacle distracting the spectator; it is presence in, as it were, another dimension, presence concomitant and correlative and opposite to the presence of the object. Objects are present by being attended to; but subjects are present as subjects, not by being attended to, but by attending.¹⁴

In this passage Lonergan characterizes self-presence as a kind of intentional presence, but we saw previously how Lonergan distinguishes between the intentionality and the consciousness in the act. How is the


self-preservation immanent in an intentional act itself intentional? Lonergan does not mean that the self becomes for itself an object of the intentional act: the presence of the subject to himself “is not the presence of another object dividing his attention.” Self-preservation is not another intentional act. As he explains in *Method*, “It is not another operation over and above the operation that is experienced.”15 I think Lonergan calls this form of presence “intentional” in the way that Aristotle says we might call a certain food healthy. This third form of presence, or self-consciousness, is intentional in the sense of being involved in an intentional act, as being essential to an intentional act.

Lonergan also characterizes this third form of presence as concomitant, correlative and opposite to the presence of the object. Self-presence is opposite to the presence of the object, as subject is opposite to object. Sala explains that, “every psychic act aims in two directions, towards the object as that which is experienced, understood, known..., desired, and willed, and towards the subject as that which experiences, understands, judges, desires, and wills.”16 The opposition of subject and object is brought out clearly in Sala’s passage, but we must keep in mind that this “aiming towards the subject” is not another intentional act. Self-presence is correlative to the presence of the object. One cannot have an object present to one unless one is self-present. As Lonergan says in *Understanding and Being*, “For you to be present to me, I have to be already present to myself.”17 But this self-presence is not a precondition of intentionality, it is a concomitant correlation. As Sartre puts it: “Consciousness is aware of itself in so far as it is consciousness of a[n] object”18 The concomitance of self-presence or self-consciousness with the intention of the object is a most significant characteristic of self-consciousness for our question regarding the appropriation of moral consciousness. We will find that it is the very simultaneity of self-consciousness and the intentional act that makes appropriation of conscious intentionality possible.

15 *Method*, 8.
To summarize the first two points about consciousness, then, while one can be conscious without intending, one cannot intend without being conscious; and this consciousness which in every case is self-consciousness is not an additional act distinct from the act which it qualifies.

1.3 THE QUALITY OF MORAL CONSCIOUSNESS

The final feature of consciousness to be recalled is the fact that this self-conscious consciousness, which is a quality of intentional and non-intentional acts and states, varies in quality. Consciousness has the universal characteristic of being self-conscious, yet the quality of this self-consciousness varies with the kind of acts performed, and with the emergence of the transcendental dynamisms which gives rise to acts and states on successive levels. For this audience a review of Lonergan's account of the four level structure of conscious intentionality is not necessary, but I shall discuss three sets of features of the quality of consciousness characteristic of moral consciousness: first, moral consciousness as a heightened consciousness; second, moral consciousness as subsumptive and, thus, as entailing transformed characteristics of the preceding levels of conscious intentionality; and third, moral consciousness as bearing its own distinctive characteristics.

1.3.1 MORAL CONSCIOUSNESS AS HEIGHTENED

First, the consciousness immanent in the operations and states of each level of consciousness has a quality which is a function of the fundamental intention of that level, and of the distinct elements of that level. As the finality of the human spirit awakens one from sleep, one becomes empirically conscious, as wonder gives rise to questioning, one becomes intelligently conscious, as desire for truth gives rise to doubt, one becomes rationally conscious, and as concerned conscience gives rise to deliberation, one becomes morally conscious. Consciousness in each case is self-conscious, but there is a progressive awakening as the exigencies of the human spirit emerge.

The first point to note regarding the variable quality of consciousness, then, is that it varies in intensity. One is simply more conscious on each higher level of consciousness. As a rheostat can
adjust the light in a room in smoothly graduated increments or in sudden jumps in illumination, so one can gradually increase in awareness as one moves through the day and one's varying activities, or at times there can be sudden awakenings, as when one's alarm goes off, or when suspicion breaks into one's enjoyment of a theoretical account, or when one unexpectedly witnesses an injustice in one's immediate situation. It is also possible to flow at some one degree of intensity for an indefinite period of time, and, of course, the intensity of consciousness can also gradually or, less frequently, abruptly diminish, as when the analysand in an ordinary session suddenly becomes extremely drowsy.

Moral consciousness is more aware than rational, intelligent, and empirical consciousness, but I think it would be incorrect to say that moral consciousness is more self-conscious. All consciousness is self-conscious as all bachelors are unmarried. An older or taller or richer bachelor is not more unmarried. The way in which we are self-conscious in moral consciousness is qualitatively different from the way in which we are self-conscious on the preceding levels, but it would be misleading to speak of a quantitative change in self-consciousness.

Moral consciousness is a heightened consciousness in relation to the preceding levels, but it also has the inherent potential for even greater intensification. As we learn in Chapter 20 in Insight and in Chapter 4 in Method, the introduction of the habits of charity, hope, and faith transforms our knowing, deciding, and feeling. "Being in love with God is the basic fulfillment of our conscious intentionality."19 The intensity of this transformed consciousness is suggested by Lonergan's references to the experience of deep-set joy, radical peace, and the mysterium fascinans et tremendum.

In Insight, Lonergan writes of the introduction of new conjugate forms, and one could understand him to mean a higher level of integration. But he is writing of new habits in intellect, will, and feeling, in other words, new orders and frequencies of the conscious and intentional acts we have always already performed. "But man's intellect is an unrestricted potency, and so it can receive habits of any kind; man's will...can receive habits that correspond to the habits received in

19 Method, 105.
I think there is no need to conceive of a new set of conscious and intentional acts organized on a fifth level of conscious intentionality. The transformation of consciousness brought about in religious conversion is a transformation of moral consciousness itself, not a higher level of consciousness. As Lonergan clearly states in *Method*:

But it is this consciousness brought to a fulfillment, as having undergone a conversion, as possessing a basis that may be broadened and deepened and heightened and enriched but not superseded....So the gift of God's love occupies the ground and root of the fourth and highest level of man's intentional consciousness."

Recently Patrick Byrne published a detailed analysis of levels of consciousness, in which he argues for a fifth level in response to Michael Vertin's argument to the contrary. I shall not take the time here to develop my position in relation to the many dimensions of this issue, but I simply have not been convinced that there is any need to postulate an additional level of conscious intentionality. The fact that consciousness is primarily a qualification of the subject as subject, which point I will develop later in this paper, does not diminish the persuasiveness of the view that religious love is the introduction of a habit into our existing structure of conscious intentionality. Furthermore, the unrestricted potency of the fourth level of conscious intentionality, which enables us to respond to the mystery of an unmeasured love, also enables us to sense the abysmal depths of meaningless hatred. As Kierkegaard warns us in one of his most chilling remarks: "No matter how deep an individual has sunk, he can sink still deeper...." The more potentiated one's consciousness, the graver is one's choice. As the gift of God's love can occupy the ground and root of moral consciousness, so can one's own demonic choice. Moral consciousness is open to the introduction of

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20 *Insight*, 719.
21 *Method*, 107.
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habits ranging from petty virtues or vices to profound virtues or vices, but a new habit does not a level make.

1.3.2 MORAL CONSCIOUSNESS AS SUBSUMPTIVE

In the above reflection, I referred to the unrestricted potency of moral consciousness. This may seem to be a mistaken rendering of Lonergan's reference in Chapter 20 to the unrestricted potency of man's intellect, but I have done this purposely. This brings us to the second point I wished to make regarding the quality of moral consciousness; namely, that moral consciousness is subsumptive of the underlying levels of conscious intentionality. Every act performed on the levels of experience, understanding, and judging can be identified in moral consciousness as well. Thus, it is not incorrect to characterize moral consciousness as attentive, intelligent, and rational, as well as responsible. Let us consider, for the purposes of illustration, the intelligence and rationality of moral consciousness.

Chapter 18 in Insight includes an account of moral consciousness, which Lonergan there terms rational self-consciousness. This account includes an analysis of practical intelligence, specifically, the nature of the practical insight into possible courses of action. Practical insights, he writes, "reveal, not the unities and relations of things as they are, but the unities and relations of possible courses of action."24 There is not only a role for direct understanding in moral consciousness, but also for reflective understanding. In the case of reflection on the correctness of an insight into a possible course of action, however, we do not proceed to a grasp of the virtually unconditioned:

When speculative or factual insight is correct, reflective understanding can grasp a relevant virtually unconditioned. But when practical insight is correct, then reflective understanding cannot grasp a relevant virtually unconditioned; for if it could, the content of the insight already would be a fact; and if it were already a fact, then it would not be a possible course of action which, as yet, is not a fact but just a possibility.25

24 Insight, 633.
25 Ibid.
While there has been much interest in the axiological dimension of moral consciousness, the fact that we are intelligent in moral consciousness has lately been glossed over. But it is in the practical insight and in the frustration of the reflective desire to grasp a virtually unconditioned that we confront possibility. Consciousness of possibility is the precise definition of moral consciousness for existentialists from Kierkegaard to Sartre. To face possibility is to face nothingness in the sense of what is not assertoric but only possible; it is to face the future in the sense of what is not yet; it is to face oneself as one may be; it is to face one's freedom. Further, this consciousness of possibility is anxiety. As Kierkegaard writes, “anxiety is the dizziness of freedom, which emerges when...freedom looks down into its own possibility, laying hold of finiteness to support itself.”

The abyss has been a popular image for existential writers. Nietzsche, who had not read Kierkegaard at the time he wrote Zarathustra, quips, “Courage also slays dizziness at the edge of abysses: and where does man not stand at the edge of abysses?” Sartre describes the vertigo of the man who faces the horror of the possibility of throwing himself over into the abyss. In fact, because anxiety just is consciousness of possibility, and consciousness of possibility is moral consciousness, Sartre proceeds to identify moral consciousness with anxiety.

Consciousness of possibility, then is a ground of existential accounts of moral consciousness, freedom, and anxiety. Yet, existentialists do not give an account of how we get in touch with possibility. Sartre may describe man as the nothingness that secretes nothing into the world through the nihilating act of consciousness of possibility, but what makes us conscious of possibility? Possibility does not just hit you in the face. Opportunity can knock, but somebody has to be home. It is in Lonergan's prosaic account of the mundane practical insight that we find an answer. Consciousness of possibility is a function of practical insight, and it is the infrequency of practical insights that renders some individuals particularly non-nihilating.

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A fundamental significance of the intelligence of moral consciousness as we saw above, is a certain unrestrictedness which allows for the introduction of habits of all kinds from religious love to demonic self-absorption.

Moral consciousness is also rational. The rationality of moral consciousness is prominent in Insight, where Lonergan calls moral consciousness rational self-consciousness, and where the emergence of the rational exigence for consistency between one’s knowing and one’s doing is the core of moral consciousness. This emphasis on the rationality of moral consciousness is in line with the tradition in ethical thought from Aristotle’s and St. Thomas’ treatments of practical reasoning to Kant’s formal ethics, which grounds ethics in the a priori law of reason. With Scheler’s persuasive phenomenological account of a material a priori ground of ethics, values and their apprehension in affectivity came to the fore. With Lonergan’s incorporation of normative axiology into his account of moral consciousness, one could lose sight of the critical role still played by rationality in moral consciousness. Two points can illustrate the significance of working out the role of rationality on the fourth level.

In Method Lonergan describes feelings as not only responding in the moment to values and disvalues, but also as underlying and pervasive: “there are in full consciousness feelings so deep and strong, especially when deliberately reinforced, that they channel attention, shape one’s horizon, direct one’s life.”28 Feelings are described here as motivating our actions, but in Insight, Lonergan writes of the rational exigence for consistency as motivating our actions: “Man is free essentially inasmuch as possible courses of action are grasped by practical insight, motivated by reflection, and executed by decision.”29 As we learn in his lengthy description of moral reflection or deliberation, reflection alone will not bring us to act. The only thing that will put an end to moral reasoning is the act of decision, yet here he attributes a motivational role to reflection itself. The rational exigence for consistency is powerful in the human spirit, powerful enough it seems to move us to action. What is the relation of this rational exigence, as conscious and effective,

28 Method, 32.
29 Insight, 643.
to the motivating feelings described in *Method*? I don't know, but the question reminds me of Kant's designation of respect for the law of reason as the only significant moral feeling. Curiously, when Scheler introduced his *a priori* hierarchy of values as a more adequate ground of ethics than the law of reason, he ignored Kant's notion of the feeling of respect as having foundational ethical significance.

Scheler arrives at his hierarchy through an application of phenomenological method, a method of eidetic intuition. A universal scale of values or order of the heart is given in pure evidence through conscious and intentional acts of preference. Of course, Scheler is not naive, and he acknowledges the possibility of a perversion of the *a priori* value hierarchy. In fact, he wrote a whole book on *ressentiment*. Yet, my students always have a difficult time with the claimed universality of the value hierarchy discovered by Scheler, and I confess I do too. It is not that I would propose a different hierarchy, it is just that I question the account of its genealogy. In the account of the value hierarchy found in Scheler, von Hildebrand, and also in Lonergan's *Method*, the order of the heart is reasonable and yet its ground in rationality is not acknowledged. For example, why should social values be higher than vital values? Lonergan simply says, "Social values, such as the good of order which conditions the vital values of the whole community, have to be preferred to the vital values of individual members of the community."30 They have to be, but often they aren't. What is the meaning of this necessity? I think it is precisely the necessity of the rational exigence. Again, personal values are placed above cultural values because the person is "the originator of values in himself and in his milieu."31 It is only rational that the source and cause should be of more value than the effect. One could feel that the pursuit of justice, for example, should take precedence over any concern for individual persons who may stand in the way of one's cause, but this would at least be rationally inconsistent.

We find, then, that fundamental questions regarding the role of rationality in moral consciousness remain. Is the consciously experienced rational exigence for consistency between one's knowing and

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30 *Method*, 31-32.
31 Ibid., 32.
one's doing, itself a motivating feeling? Could it be understood as a powerful intentional response to the value of personal integrity? On the other hand, is the hierarchy of values revealed through acts of preference and intentional responses itself rationally ordered?

Reflecting on the quality of consciousness characteristic of moral consciousness, we have found that moral consciousness is both intelligent and rational. I have only brought out a few ways in which moral consciousness is subsumptive of the underlying levels of conscious intentionality. The third aspect of the quality of moral consciousness to be considered is its distinctive nature.

1.3.3 MORAL CONSCIOUSNESS AS DISTINCTIVE

Moral consciousness is characterized in *Insight* as awakened by a desire for the good, and as driven by the exigence for rational consistency in our actions. In *Method*, this desire for the good and for self-perfection is characterized as the transcendental intention or notion of value. This *a priori* notion transforms our conscious intentionality. The acts of questioning, insight, formulation, reflection, and judgment that constitute moral consciousness are essentially the same kind of acts that occur on underlying levels, but as morally conscious they are transformed by the notion of value; so for example, direct insight becomes the practical insight. In addition to these transformed acts, we find in moral consciousness a new act distinctive of this level, the act of decision.

An adequate account of decision would require an exploration of a nest of terms, many of which we have already mentioned. We choose from among possibilities. It is the decision which puts an end to rational reflection, but the decision does not occur spontaneously, or as a logical conclusion. Decision is an act of freedom, which we are ever free not to make. We are motivated to decide, drawn to act, through apprehension of value or disvalue. We feel compelled to act through the exigence to be rationally consistent. Yet, the decision is radically contingent and is always made in anxiety. Decision is the assumption of responsibility, not only for the choice made and its consequences, but also for the self one constitutes through this act. So, the decision is also existential. Finally, the achievement of the decision is moral self-transcendence; as Lonergan explains:
...We experience our liberty as the active thrust of the subject terminating the process of deliberation by settling on one of the possible courses of action and proceeding to execute it. Now, in so far as that thrust of the self regularly opts...for the true good, the self thereby is achieving moral self-transcendence; he is existing authentically; he is constituting himself as an originating value.\(^{32}\)

The transcendence characteristic of moral consciousness is a real self-transcendence. One not only transcends subjectivity to the objectivity of the content of the moral judgment. In the act of decision, one transcends oneself ontologically. The self that I am is transcended in the act of decision and I become a new self. This move is what Kierkegaard calls "Gentlalgese", repetition. The self repeated through the decision is now a new self.

One feature of moral self-transcendence bears particularly on the question of the appropriation of moral consciousness. In moral consciousness and specifically in the act of decision, one experiences the heightened tension of human development as described by Lonergan in Chapter 15 of Insight. One is drawn or prodded by conscious intentionality towards the future, towards the self one is to be in the next moment, but simultaneously one is pulled towards the self one is already. The experience of this pull and counter-pull (to use Plato's and Voegelin's image) is what is meant by anxiety. The apprehension of the sheer possibility before one, is conjoined with an apprehension of one's rootedness in an established situation. It is to this latter apprehension that I shall now turn.

We can find in existential accounts of moral consciousness the conception of a sense of the self which is immanent in moral self-transcendence. In Kierkegaard, for example, an idea of retrieval plays a central role in his account of decision. Choice is described in Either/Or as decisive for the constitution of the personality. The choices one makes and, significantly, the choices one fails to make constitute the self one is. He writes:

One sees, then, that the inner drift of the personality leaves no time for thought experiments, that it constantly hastens onward and in one way or another posits this alternative or

\(^{32}\) Ibid., 50.
that, making the choice more difficult the next instant, because what has thus been posited must be revoked.33

In order to choose at this moment, one must take into account where one has come, and, if necessary, beat a retreat to an original starting point. This retrieval of one's position involves a revoking of what one has allowed inadvertently to pass.

A similar idea to Kierkegaard's self-retrieval is found in Sartre's *Notebooks for an Ethics*. He develops in this later work a notion of "radical conversion" by which he means a decision to turn from self-deception to authenticity. Such a decision requires an assumption of the self one has already constituted. Sartre uses the term "assumé" to refer to this reflective taking up of oneself.34

Do we find a similar concept in Lonergan? I am not asking at this point about Lonergan's concept of self-appropriation, but about an apprehension of the self as an essential element in moral self-transcendence. In the section on human development in *Insight*, Lonergan writes:

Every development involves a starting point in the subject as he is, a term in the subject as he is to be, and a process from the starting point to the term. However, inasmuch as a development is conscious, there is some apprehension of the starting point, the term, and the process.35

Moral self-transcendence is such a conscious development. The term is the self that one is to become in the possibility chosen. The process is the act of decision. And, the starting point is the self one already is. This present self is apprehended in the act of decision. To what degree this self-apprehension is explicitly objectified depends upon a number of factors. We haven't time to work out all the possible variations at this point, but they are factors such as one's stage of development, one's differentiation of consciousness, and the kind of decision being made, for example, whether it is horizontal or vertical. Regardless of the degree of

35 *Insight*, 500.
explicit formulation of oneself, the act of decision, insofar as it is a conscious development of the self, necessarily entails some sense of the self one has become. This is perhaps why Lonergan refers to moral consciousness as rational self-consciousness. After all, each level of consciousness as conscious is already self-conscious. But to refer to a "rational self-consciousness" is not simply to be redundant. There is then an appropriative dimension to moral consciousness. The act of decision is at once self-transcending and self-appropriative.

This last characteristic of the quality of moral consciousness raises an interesting problem for our understanding of Lonergan's notion of self-appropriation. We have seen how moral consciousness is self-reflective and the highest level of conscious intentionality. Yet, self-appropriation is a program of heightening consciousness and self-reflection. What does it mean to appropriate moral consciousness, when moral consciousness itself is already appropriative of the self?

THE APPROPRIATION OF MORAL CONSCIOUSNESS

At the end of Plato's *Meno*, Socrates is concerned with the question of the difference between knowledge and right opinion. In the course of his discussion he alludes to the statues of Daedalus, which according to legend, must be tethered down or else they will run away. He suggests tethering a true opinion by working out the reason why it is so.36 Similarly, Lonergan is not content to communicate a theory about the structure of conscious intentionality to his readers. Lest these beautifully crafted truths run away, he invites his reader to engage in the self-appropriation of his or her own rational self-consciousness.

In his treatment of the appropriation of truth in *Insight*, Lonergan distinguishes three moments in the process of appropriation: learning, identification, and orientation. His analysis here is in terms of the first three levels of consciousness, and so he locates the problem of learning on the second level of understanding and formulation; the problem of identification, on the first level of experience, sense experience and the experience of consciousness; and the problem of orientation, on the third

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level of reflection and judgment.\(^{37}\) The necessity of learning as an element of appropriation is suggested in *Method*, when Lonergan cautions that “self-appropriation occurs only slowly, and usually, only through a struggle with some such book as *Insight*.”\(^{38}\) The arduous process of learning required is also mentioned later in his discussion of the methodical objectification of subjectivity involved in dialectic:

> Results will not be sudden or startling, for conversion commonly is a slow process of maturation. It is finding out for oneself and in oneself what it is to be intelligent, to be reasonable, to be responsible, to love.\(^{39}\)

This passage reveals that Lonergan is concerned with the appropriation of at least four levels of consciousness in *Method*. There is also the added complexity of the relation of conversion to appropriation.

This issue bears on the third element of appropriation, orientation. In the *Insight* discussion, Lonergan is concerned with one's cognitive orientation, with the dialectic of position and counter-position, grounded in one's judgments on knowing, objectivity, and reality. In *Method*, one's basic orientation is a matter of religious and moral conversion, as well as intellectual conversion. Inasmuch as conversion is an act of decision, a vertical exercise of one's freedom, the problem of orientation is located properly, not on the level of rationality, but on the level of moral consciousness.

One must be properly or authentically oriented to engage in the process of acquainting oneself with the terms and correlations of intentionality analysis. Interest in and openness to an adequate account of the structure of moral consciousness is required for its appropriation, but the second element of appropriation, identification, is I think the key to the appropriation of moral consciousness. Of the three “tethers” Lonergan names for tying down his account of rational self-consciousness, it is the most critical. By identification Lonergan means locating in one's own conscious experience the data that confirm the account. In order for one's understanding of moral consciousness to be more than theoretical, more than a supposition, one must be, in

\(^{37}\) *Insight*, 582-83.

\(^{38}\) *Method*, 7, n2.

\(^{39}\) Ibid., 253.
Lonergan’s words, “able to find in one’s experience just what it is that falls under the insight’s grasp and what lies outside it.”

How is it possible to find in one’s own moral consciousness the data required for such appropriation? One might think that it is simply a matter of recollection. We could recall times when we were bothered by conscience, or recall practical insights we’ve had, or moments of unmistakable anxiety. Appropriation of moral consciousness would be a matter of self-reflection in the sense of looking back over past experience, and recognizing instances that correspond to the matter under discussion. In such an exercise a distance is introduced between the conscious subject one is now and the subject as object of reflection. It is both a temporal and a real difference, for the conscious and intentional acts being performed now in order to recall moral consciousness are not the acts of moral consciousness recalled.

Lonergan, however, explicitly stipulates the simultaneity of the self-reflection involved in self-appropriation: “the ultimate basis of our knowing [of the self] is not necessity but contingent fact, and the fact is established, not prior to our engagement in knowing, but simultaneously with it.” He writes of an immediate access to man we enjoy through consciousness. Because of this immediate access, we “escape entirely the merely supposed, the merely postulated, the merely inferred,” that is characteristic of scientific accounts which rely upon sense data. The possibility of this immediate, simultaneous access was also asserted clearly by Husserl: “every intellectual process and indeed every mental process whatever, while being enacted, can be made the object of a pure ‘seeing’ and understanding, and is absolutely given in this ‘seeing.’”

Lonergan and Husserl express the same point regarding the necessity of simultaneity for the sake of providing an verifiable ground for accounts of conscious intentionality. However, Lonergan’s account of the nature of this immediate access differs from Husserl’s. Appropriation of one’s own consciousness is not a matter of “seeing” or looking inward, it is not an introspective process. To paraphrase

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40 Insight, 559.
41 Ibid., 356.
42 Ibid., 357.
Lonergan's well-known line, we do not uncover moral consciousness by introspection, as we can point to Calcutta on a map. So, not only is there no temporal distance in appropriation, there is also no distance between the self as looker and the self as looked at.

Sartre, following in the phenomenological tradition, becomes bogged down in his attempt to objectify moral consciousness or "reflective consciousness." While he insists on the simultaneity of reflective consciousness, he cannot rid his account of the distance introduced by an ocular model of knowing. Thus, he arrives at the contradictory conclusion that reflective consciousness must be and not be the consciousness reflected on at the same time.

If consciousness is not intended by an additional act, how then is this appropriation of consciousness accomplished? Lonergan is able to circumvent this difficulty by the distinction, introduced previously in our discussion of consciousness, between the consciousness and the intentionality of the act. The act is the actual event. Consciousness and intentionality are simply characteristics of the act. In fact, Lonergan even writes that strictly speaking it is an abstraction to describe the act as conscious: "Concretely, consciousness pertains to the acting agent." Ironically, although Sartre understands consciousness to be nothingness, he tends to reify consciousness, describing it as intentional, as free, as anxious.

The distinction between the consciousness and the intentionality of the act enables Lonergan to explain how we can have immediate, simultaneous access to our own act. He calls this a heightening of consciousness. Heightening of consciousness is basically a shifting of one's attention. In Insight, the shift is from the content of the intentional act to the act itself. In Method, the shift is from the act as intentional to the act as conscious: "It is a matter of applying the operations as

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44 Insight, 347.
46 Ibid., 350.
47 Ibid., 345.
intentional to the operations as conscious." Both of these descriptions are basically the same, for the content of the act is what is intended. Thus, we are invited to focus not on the direction of intentionality towards the content, but on the awareness, which is self-conscious, in that intentional act. Contents are innumerable variable, but fortunately the series of acts is limited and recurrent. With practice one can begin to identify in one's own experience, the conscious and intentional acts described. Heightening consciousness is more easily done than described. It is similar to the shift in focus required to see the pictures hidden in "magic eye" pictures. Once you do it, it becomes easier to do again, but it is something that you have to do and not just think about.

In *Method* Lonergan proceeds to recount how appropriation, which he refers to here as transcendental method, involves a reduplication of the four-fold structure of conscious intentional operations. We should note, however, that while the full process of appropriation involves the whole structure of acts being turned on one's conscious intentionality, the actual heightening of consciousness is limited only to the experience of the acts on the four levels. Heightening of consciousness is attending to one's acts as conscious, that is, as experienced, while one performs them. It should be noted that when Lonergan writes that appropriation is a fourfold matter, including the experiencing of experience, he is speaking loosely. For he goes on to explain that while the higher order acts can be reduplicated, actually the experience of one's experiencing, understanding, judging and deciding is just consciousness. One is already conscious and self-conscious in the performance of any act on any level. To experience that consciousness is not to add a consciousness to that consciousness; it is not a matter of experiencing experience. It is a heightening of the selfsame consciousness.

Appropriation involves more than simply heightening one's consciousness. The application of higher level acts to one's conscious intentionality contributes to self-knowledge. Knowledge of the subject as subject, that is as self-present, is a matter of intelligence and rationality, as is any knowledge. Lonergan explains that turning higher level operations on this heightened experience, does not further heighten

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48 *Method*, 15.
49 Ibid., 15.
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consciousness: “to formulate [consciousness] does not make one more conscious, for the effect of formulation is to add to one’s concepts. To affirm it does not make one more conscious, for the effect of affirmation is to add to one’s judgments.” Sala highlights this strictly empirical nature of consciousness when he writes that “consciousness is always and only experience.” He explains that, “The so-called conscientia subsequens or reflexa is no longer consciousness, but knowledge of self...” His remarks are helpful in contributing to a distinction between self-consciousness and self-knowledge, but they could also be misread. We should recall that while subsequent, higher level operations performed on a conscious act are not themselves mere experience of that act, they are themselves conscious as well as intentional. So, while consciousness is only empirical, we have, so to speak, empirical intellectual consciousness, empirical rational consciousness, and empirical moral consciousness.

In summary then, appropriation, for Lonergan, is an arduous process requiring a proper orientation, an effort to engage in the self-correcting process of learning, and an identification in one’s own consciousness of the terms of intentionality analysis. Such identification is possible because inasmuch as consciousness is essentially self-consciousness, one has immediate access to one’s own consciousness. One can exploit this immediate access by heightening one’s consciousness, by attending to the conscious experience of the act as one performs it. And, this attention is not an additional intentional act. It is a qualification of the selfsame act.

Let us attempt to apply these points to the appropriation of moral consciousness. First of all, one is not dealing with a consciousness of moral consciousness, but with a heightening of the consciousness which already qualifies the intentional acts of moral consciousness. The consciousness which qualifies moral consciousness is already heightened, insofar as it is reflective and self-conscious as self-appropriative. To heighten one’s consciousness on this level is to attend to oneself as concerned with value and as concerned with oneself, as responsible, as free, as anxious. Attending to oneself as such does not

50 Insight, 350.
51 Sala, 92.
make one more responsible, or freer, or more anxious. It simply sets the stage for a methodical objectification of oneself as morally engaged.

Secondly, in order to appropriate one's own moral consciousness, one must be morally conscious. The data of moral consciousness is given immediately as one experiences it. Without this simultaneity appropriation becomes inference, speculation, or at best recollection. This stipulation returns us to the problem raised by Fr. Crowe. How is one to appropriate moral consciousness, appropriate the act of moral self-transcendence, if one must actually make a decision in the present in order to do so? Practice moral self-transcendence is not real moral self-transcendence, as batting practice with a pitching machine is not the same as facing the pitcher in the actual drama of the game.

On the other hand, we might ask with the existentialists whether the conscious self is ever not morally conscious. For both Kierkegaard and Sartre, to be conscious is to be aware of possibility, and to be aware of possibility is to be anxious. Kierkegaard describes anxiety as inevitable, ineluctable, insurmountable. It is our human condition: to be spirit, to be a self is to be anxious. Sartre also identifies consciousness with freedom, and to be free is to be anxious. With Nietzsche we may ask, "Where does man not stand on the edge of abysses?"

Are these views simply the excesses of a kind of adolescent romanticism? Surely, we are not always deliberating over critical matters; we are not always on the brink of a radical decision. We could not always be morally conscious. After all, Lonergan clearly distinguishes four levels of conscious intentionality, and one only attains the highest level of moral consciousness with the emergence of the notion of value.

Yet, there are remarks made by Lonergan himself, and themes running throughout his works that may cause us to pause. In Understanding and Being, he remarks that Sorge determines the world one perceives: "Consciousness is not determined simply by the object. We have spoken of Sorge, concern, as the root of one's world, and also of a selective inattention...Consciousness itself has a fundamental freedom."52 The fundamental freedom of consciousness is not only evident in the flow of precepts. Lonergan's whole account of the ever

52 Understanding and Being, 228.
present possibility of the flight from understanding in *Insight* suggests a freedom of intellectual and rational consciousness. For example, moral guidance is offered by Lonergan in his discussion of how to steer a course between rash judgment and indecision.\footnote{Insight, 310.} Further, the transcendental precepts: Be attentive, Be intelligent, Be rational, and Be responsible, inasmuch as they are imperatives, imply that we have the freedom to abide by them or not.\footnote{Method, 53.} As Lonergan himself states, “I have the power to elicit certain types of acts when certain conditions are fulfilled.”\footnote{Insight, 354.} Perhaps, the view that all consciousness is moral consciousness is not so far-fetched after all, but then how do we account for the emergence of a distinct level of conscious intentionality called moral consciousness? Or, conversely, how can there be three levels of conscious intentionality that are not morally conscious?

I suggest that we employ Lonergan’s distinction between essential and effective freedom to resolve this issue. While Kierkegaard and Sartre claim that all consciousness is consciousness of possibility, of freedom, and hence is anxious, they also both describe how the normal response to this human condition is flight and denial. So, Kierkegaard writes of the self that is unconscious that it is a self, unconscious of its own anxiety. And, Sartre’s whole account of bad faith is a typology of flight from oneself as free. (I remember one of my graduate school professors, a Bertrand Russell scholar, who walked around with his shoulders habitually hiked up to his ears. When he learned that I was writing on anxiety, he complacently told me, “I have never felt anxiety.”) If we are essentially free, if as Lonergan says consciousness itself is free and we are free to engage in acts or not, free to be attentive, to be intelligent, to be rational, as well as to be responsible, this does not mean that we are aware of this freedom. To be effectively free, we must be at least morally conscious.

To respond again to Fr. Crowe’s question, if we are concerned with the appropriation of moral self-consciousness, and wish to appeal directly to the data of the fourth level of consciousness, we need neither rely on previous experiences of decisions as I had suggested originally,
nor on practice sessions involving hypothetical decision-making or value-clarification workshops. One need only advert in the moment to the freedom we exercise through the decision to pursue this question. The scholar, the philosopher, the theologian, the dialectician, the researcher, the historian, and the methodologist stand at the edge of abysses too, in the library, in front of the computer monitor, in the classroom. Inasmuch as one is conscious, one can become aware of one's essential freedom, the possibility to be authentic or inauthentic, at any time and in any context.

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LONERGAN'S METAPHYSICS
OF VALUE AND LOVE:
SOME PROPOSED
CLARIFICATIONS AND IMPLICATIONS

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INTRODUCTION

In the Afterward of his recent study of Lonergan's early writings on
grace, Michael Stebbins briefly summarizes Lonergan's contribution to
theology's advance from being based in abstract theory to being based in
concrete method.1 Stebbins observes that after the initial, theoretically-
based phase of his theological work, Lonergan devoted great efforts to
elaborating the general philosophical component of methodical
theology—and this in two stages. From about 1950 to 1964, and
especially in Insight: A Study of Human Understanding,2 he showed
explicitly and in great detail just how the threefold structure of
explanatory metaphysics is grounded in the threefold structure of
concrete intentional consciousness. From about 1964 onward, and
especially in Method in Theology,3 he elucidated an additional level of
intentional consciousness, but without providing nearly the degree of

1 Michael Stebbins, The Divine Initiative: Grace, World-Order, and Human Freedom
in the Early Writings of Bernard Lonergan (Toronto: University of Toronto, 1995) 297-
98. I have indicated my highly positive assessment of this book in a review
2 Bernard Lonergan, Insight: A Study of Human Understanding (London:
Longmans, Green, 1957; Toronto: University of Toronto, 1992).
3 Bernard Lonergan, Method in Theology (London: Darton, Longman & Todd,
1972).
detail about that level and its metaphysical correlative that he had provided earlier about the first three. Moreover, in this later period he claimed that at least sometimes we experience ourselves as being in love without restriction, that this experience provides the basic theological component of a methodical theology, and that it is really identical with what theoretical theology calls sanctifying grace. As with his account of the fourth level, however, he did not develop these claims in much detail.

Against the background of his brief summary, Stebbins indicates the two main tasks he concludes must be addressed in order to complete the transition from a theoretical to a fully methodical theology in general and a methodical systematic theology of grace in particular. In his view, it is necessary first to develop a more detailed account of the fourth level of intentional consciousness; and then, within the framework of that account, to elucidate the systematic implications of the dynamic state of being unrestrictedly in love. 4

I quite agree with Stebbins' conclusion. But I note that, within the Lonerganian perspective, addressing the two tasks he mentions is essential to elaborating the fully methodical foundations not just of theology but also of every other academic discipline. 5 That fact, together with my own interest in the methodical foundations of multidisciplinary studies as such, is why in two previous essays I have tried to contribute to the phenomenology and epistemology of intentional consciousness on level four and being unrestrictedly in love. 6 In the present essay, my goal is to contribute in some way to the corresponding metaphysics. 7

Specifically, in what follows I aim to propose some clarifications and implications of what I shall label, first, Lonergan's metaphysics of

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4 Stebbins, The Divine Initiative 297-98.
5 Lonergan's claim (for example, Method in Theology 243) that religious conversion methodically antecedes moral conversion and intellectual conversion implies an updated version of the view that theology is regina scientiarum.
7 Readers familiar with Lonergan will recognize in this sequence his “three basic questions” of methodical philosophy. See, for example, Method 20, 25, 83, 238-40, 261, 297, 316.
value and, second, his *metaphysics of love*.\(^8\) I should emphasize the modesty of this aim. I intend to limit my consideration to a few basic but confusing matters that surface regularly in my discussions both with my students and with myself. As it happens, these matters are not unrelated to the theme of the 1996 Lonergan Workshop, “The Structure and Rhythms of Love.”\(^9\)

**ON LONERGAN’S METAPHYSICS OF VALUE**

2.1 *Transcendental Valuability, Primary and Secondary Valuables, Transcendent and Proportionate Valuables, Responsible and Non-Responsible Valuables*

Let us begin by relating and distinguishing some important meanings carried by the words “value” and “values” in the framework established by Lonergan’s later writings.\(^10\)

One of the more distinctive features of Lonergan’s philosophical approach is his characterization of metaphysical elements in function of conscious-intentional elements. Thus, for example, he characterizes the metaphysical “intelligibilities” proportionate to my knowing as what I

\(^8\) What will ultimately come into play here is not just the metaphysics of proportionate being, “proportionate” metaphysics, but the more inclusive metaphysics that treats transcendent being as well, what Frederick Crowe suggests might be labeled “expanded” metaphysics. See Frederick Crowe, “Tracking Stray Ideas in Lonergan (15): Expanded Metaphysics,” *Lonergan Studies Newsletter* **17** (1996) 15-16. (My own suggestion would be that since transcendental being includes both proportionate and transcendent being, an appropriate adjectival designator for the all-inclusive metaphysics would be “transcendental.”)

\(^9\) I should note my esteem for “Complacency and Concern in the Thought of St. Thomas,” the magisterial study by Frederick Crowe, this year’s Workshop honoree. (First presented in *Theological Studies* **20** [1959] 1-39, 198-230, 343-95, this work is scheduled to be republished in the near future as Part Two of Frederick Crowe, *Three Thomist Studies*, a supplementary volume of *Lonergan Workshop*.) I have drawn on the study in the second of my two aforementioned essays, though I will not be referring to it extensively in the present one.

\(^10\) (a) Consistent with the distinction I noted when citing Stebbins, by “later” writings I mean those after about 1964. (b) I say “in the framework established by” those writings to signal that my approach here, as indeed throughout the present essay, is broadly interpretative rather than narrowly exegetical.
seek whenever, on the second level of conscious intentionality, I ask such questions as *what is it* and *why* and *when* and *how often* about this or that particular set of experiential data; and they are what I grasp insofar as I intelligently achieve explanatory answers to those questions. Again, he characterizes the metaphysical “realities” proportionate to my knowing as what I seek whenever, on the third level of conscious intentionality, I ask such questions as *is it* and *is this real* and *is that really so* about what I have reached through my answers on the second level; and they are what I grasp insofar as I reasonably achieve answers to those questions. Similarly, the later Lonergan characterizes the metaphysical “values” proportionate to my knowing as what I seek whenever, on the fourth level of conscious intentionality, I ask such questions as *is it good* and *is it worthwhile* and *is this more choiceworthy* and *ought that be so* and *so what* and *what should I do* about what I have reached through my answers on the third level; and they are what I grasp and implement insofar as I responsibly achieve answers to those questions and choose in line with them.

It remains, however, that Lonergan proposes even more basic and comprehensive characterizations of the metaphysical in function of the conscious-intentional. For the particular questions I ask on the second, third, and fourth levels respectively manifest but by no means exhaust certain unrestricted conscious-intentional appetites I experience on each of those levels. These unrestricted conscious-intentional appetites or “transcendental intentions” regard not only what is proportionate to my knowing and choosing; they regard the totality of what I can wonder about and yearn for. Hence Lonergan is able to characterize the metaphysical not just in function of my “categorial” knowing and choosing, but also and more fundamentally in function of my “transcendental” intending.\textsuperscript{11} Transcendental metaphysical “intelligibility” is the goal of my transcendental intending on the second level; transcendental metaphysical “reality” is the goal of my transcendental intending on the third level; and transcendental

\textsuperscript{11} The transcendental intending is “transcendental” in both the scholastic sense of “transcategorial” and the Kantian sense of “strictly a priori.” Categorial knowing and choosing is “categorial” in both the scholastic sense of the term and the Kantian sense of “a posteriori.” For more on this, see Vertin, “Lonergan on Consciousness” 26, note 55.
metaphysical "value" is the goal of my transcendental intending on the fourth level.

Before proceeding further it is worthwhile to underscore a terminological nuance intended to signal a crucial distinction. When speaking of the proportionate metaphysical correlatives of conscious intentionality, I have used plural nouns. For proportionate intelligibilities, realities, and values are the metaphysical correlatives of my categorial knowing and choosing—my acts of understanding, judging, and evaluating and deciding respectively; and as the latter, so also the former are multiple. By contrast, when speaking of the transcendental metaphysical correlatives of conscious intentionality, I have used singular nouns. For transcendental intelligibility, reality, and value are the metaphysical correlatives of my second-level, third-level, and fourth-level transcendental intentions respectively; and as the latter, so also the former are unitary. Moreover, the distinctions among these unitary metaphysical correlatives themselves are merely notional, not real; for each correlative is really identical with the concrete universe of being, the totality of what-is. Transcendental intelligibility is the concrete universe viewed as intrinsically understandable. Transcendental reality is the concrete universe viewed as intrinsically affirmable. Transcendental value is the concrete universe viewed as intrinsically valuable.12

The foregoing considerations imply an admonition to avoid overlooking the distinction between transcendental metaphysical contents and proportionate ones.13 In particular, transcendental value is not a value, one among many. Nor is it the abstract commonality of proportionate values, a universal content that emerges insofar as I prescind from the features that distinguish proportionate values from one another. On the contrary, transcendental value is concretely universal, the all-encompassing objective of the transcendental

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13 This admonition is, I believe, a more detailed analogue of Heidegger's well-known admonition to avoid restricting one's consideration to beings and thereby forgetting being. (This is not, however, to suggest that what Heidegger means by "being" is just what Lonergan means.)
intending that constitutes the radical dynamism of my intentional consciousness on the fourth level.\textsuperscript{14}

Next, recall that in \textit{Insight} the basic heuristic perspective is established by the unrestricted intelligent and reasonable desire to know—or, in Lonergan’s later language, the transcendental intentions of intelligibility and reality. Proceeding within this perspective, Lonergan eventually comes to consider the concrete universe of being, the entirety of what-is, as an intelligible totality; and he articulates a number of real distinctions, each of which effectively divides that concrete totality in a certain way. For present purposes we may note three of these distinctions.\textsuperscript{15} The first is between primary and secondary intelligibles. The primary intelligible is \textit{ipsum intelligere}, the unrestricted act of understanding, that which both totally understands itself and thereby totally understands everything else; whereas secondary intelligibles are everything other than the primary intelligible. The second distinction is between proportionate and transcendent intelligibles. Intelligibles are proportionate if they are either constituted or conditioned (whether

\begin{center}
\textbf{Chart 1.}
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\begin{tabular}{|c|c|c|c|}
\hline
\textbf{THE CONCRETE UNIVERSE OF TRANSCENDENTAL INTELLIGIBILITY} \\
\hline
\textbf{the primary intelligible} & transcendent & intelligent & (divine) \\
\hline
\textbf{secondary intelligibles} & transcendent & intelligent & (angelic) \\
\hline
\textbf{proportionate} & intelligent & (human) \\
\textbf{non-intelligent} & (infra-human) \\
\hline
\end{tabular}
\end{center}

\textsuperscript{14} Parallel cautions regard the distinctions of transcendental intelligibility and reality from proportionate intelligibilities and realities respectively.

\textsuperscript{15} For what follows I am drawing mainly on Chapter 19 of \textit{Insight} (1957), especially such pages as 646-48, 674, 677; see also 516-20, 617-19 [1992: 669-71, 696-97, 700; 539-44, 640-42].
intrinsically or just extrinsically) by the “empirical residue,” namely, what our understanding abstracts from. They are transcendent if they are neither constituted nor conditioned by the empirical residue. The third distinction is between intelligibles that are intelligent and those that are non-intelligent, merely intelligible. Intelligibles are intelligent if they are able to understand; non-intelligent, if not.\(^{16}\) Taken together these three distinctions highlight four basic ranges within the concrete intelligible universe. The primary intelligible (God) is both transcendent and intelligent; some secondary intelligibles (angels) are transcendent and all these are intelligent; other secondary intelligibles (humans) are proportionate and intelligent; and still other secondary intelligibles (infra-human ones) are proportionate and non-intelligent.\(^{17}\) (See Chart 1.)

Next, recall that in *Method* the basic heuristic perspective is established by transcendental intentions not simply of intelligibility and reality but of value as well. I suggest that this perspective implies a refinement of the preceding account of the concrete universe, a refinement that the later Lonergan recognizes and even invokes from time to time but does not spell out with anything like the detail of his earlier account. On this largely just implied refinement, the concrete universe of being appears primarily not as intelligible totality, the universe of transcendental intelligibility, but rather as valuable totality, the universe of transcendent value—or, more exactly, valuability.\(^{18}\) And the three previously-noted distinctions dividing the concrete

\(^{16}\) I specify intelligent intelligibles broadly as “able to understand” rather than narrowly as “actually understanding” in order to include humans among them.

\(^{17}\) (a) My concern throughout is with concrete, not abstract, intelligibles. The latter are spiritual but not intelligent. See, for example, *Insight* (1957) 674 [1992:696]. (b) The philosophical orientation of *Insight* makes Lonergan prescind from any discussion of angels, since their existence is in no way a matter of natural knowledge but only of religious belief. This means that in *Insight* the sole transcendent intelligible is God, the primary intelligible. Technically, however, any intelligible that is not proportionate is transcendent; hence the more ample perspective of religious belief includes angels (both good and evil) as secondary intelligibles that are transcendent. For the sake of completeness, in the present essay I make explicit provision for the latter.

\(^{18}\) To some ears (including mine), the word “valuability” more clearly suggests a concrete content than does the word “value.” Moreover, in suggesting a content intrinsically fit to be responsibly valued, the word runs neatly parallel to “intelligibility,” which suggests a content intrinsically fit to be intelligently understood.
universe undergo similar transformations.\textsuperscript{19} Now the most basic distinction is between primary and secondary valuables. The primary valuable is \textit{ipsum velle}, the unrestricted act of choosing, that which both chooses itself and thereby exhaustively chooses\textsuperscript{20} everything else;\textsuperscript{21} whereas secondary valuables are everything other than the primary valuable. The second distinction is between proportionate and transcendent valuables. Proportionate valuables are either constituted or conditioned (whether intrinsically or just extrinsically) by the empirical residue. Transcendent valuables are not thus constituted or conditioned. The third distinction is between valuables that are responsible and those that are non-responsible, merely valuable. Valuables are responsible if they are able to evaluate and choose, and non-responsible if they are unable.\textsuperscript{22} These three distinctions collectively indicate four basic ranges within the concrete valuable universe. The

\textsuperscript{19} For what follows I am drawing on Chapters 2 and 4 of \textit{Method}, as well as making explicit certain extensions of Lonergan’s account in Chapter 19 of \textit{Insight} that I judge consonant with what he writes in \textit{Method}.

\textsuperscript{20} (a) I employ the word “choosing” as a verbally more manageable synonym of “deciding,” the later Lonergan’s usual label for the act that follows value judging. (b) I intend that word to cover both the passive willing or “complacent” acceptance of an actual valuable and the active willing or “concerned” seeking of an initially just possible valuable. (For a detailed discussion of this matter, including an indication of a potential confusion over the meaning of “possible value,” see Vertin, “Judgments of Value, for the Later Lonergan” 238-41.) Hence the unrestricted act of choosing both complacently accepts itself and creatively actualizes everything else. (c) Historically speaking, although the Latin word \textit{velle} more commonly refers to active willing (and thus is semantically parallel to \textit{intendere}), there is some evidence that it also can refer more generally to both active and passive willing (and thus semantically subsume \textit{complacere} as well). (See Crowe, “Complacency and Concern” 31-35, 219-222.) It is in the latter, broader sense that I intend it both here and throughout this essay.

\textsuperscript{21} Anticipating distinctions I will introduce shortly in the text, I would put this point more exactly as follows: the primary valuable (a) chooses \textit{non-responsible} and \textit{positively responsible} valuables, (b) does not choose \textit{simple non-valuables}, and (c) neither chooses nor does not choose \textit{privatively responsible} (i.e., \textit{irresponsible}) valuables but merely permits them. For the early Lonergan’s treatment of the trichotomy that I am expressing here in terms of my extension of the later Lonergan, see his \textit{Grace and Freedom} (London: Darton, Longman & Todd, 1971) 109-115. Compare Stebbins, \textit{The Divine Initiative}, 269-80.

\textsuperscript{22} I specify \textit{responsible} valuables broadly as “able to choose” rather than narrowly as “actually choosing” in order to include humans among them.
primary valuable (God) is both transcendent and responsible; some secondary valuables (angels) are transcendent and all these are responsible; other valuables (humans) are proportionate and responsible; and still other secondary valuables (infra-human ones) are proportionate and non-responsible. (See Chart 2.)

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Chart 2.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>THE CONCRETE UNIVERSE OF TRANSCENDENTAL VALUABILITY</th>
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<tbody>
<tr>
<td>the primary valuable</td>
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<td>transcendent - responsible - (divine)</td>
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<td>non-responsible - (infra-human)</td>
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2.2 Intelligibility, Affirmability, and Valuability

In the previous section of this paper I noted that one of the more distinctive features of Lonergan's philosophical approach is his characterization of the metaphysical in function of the conscious-intentional. I went on to suggest that the emergence of value as a distinct transcendental intention in Lonergan's later writings implies a corresponding refinement of his earlier account of the concrete universe. In my discussion of those matters, however, there is a particular issue I carefully avoided addressing directly; and now it is time to engage it. That issue is this: what exactly is the relation between the contents of my evaluating and deciding, on the one hand, and the contents of my experiencing, understanding, and judging, on the other?

The background of this issue is constituted by one aspect of Lonergan's general procedure of characterizing the metaphysical in function of the conscious-intentional, namely, what in Insight he calls the "isomorphism" of my cognitional structure and the structure of what I know. "If the knowing consists of a related set of acts and the known is
the related set of contents of these acts, then the pattern of the relations between the acts is similar in form to the pattern of the relations between the contents of the acts. 23 After offering an historical justification for employing adapted Thomist terminology, Lonergan goes on to label the content of my experiencing "potency," the content of my understanding "form," and the content of my judging "act." According to the principle of isomorphism, then, just as my experiencing, understanding, and judging differ from one another, so metaphysical potency, form, and act are really distinct from one another. 24

A problem emerges, however, once the later Lonergan posits evaluating and deciding as a fourth level of conscious-intentional operations. On the one hand, if the principle of isomorphism still obtains, then it would seem that there must be a really distinct metaphysical element beyond potency, form, and act. On the other hand, within the Thomist framework to which Lonergan continues to profess his essential adherence, it is not at all obvious that there could be a really distinct metaphysical element beyond act. At one point in a paper originally presented in 1974 at the very first annual Lonergan Workshop, Frederick Crowe posed the problem lucidly:

What becomes of the isomorphism of intending subject and intended object in the four-level structure of Method? In Insight the ontological structure of reality, potency-form-act, has as its counterpart in the knowing subject the three-leveled structure of cognitional activity, experience-understanding-reflection. And this isomorphism has its roots solidly in the doctrines and views of St. Thomas Aquinas. 25 At that stage the good presented no special problem; it is structured, as reality is, on three levels, so that the section entitled "The Ontology of the Good" speaks of potential, formal, and actual good.

Now, however, we have a problem. Value is not just an extension of the object of cognitional activity. It is a new notion; it adds a new level to intentional consciousness. So we

24 The distinctions of potency, form, and act, though real, are but minor. See Insight (1957) 490 [1992: 514].
25 See my article "St. Thomas and the Isomorphism of Human Knowing and Its Proper Object," Sciences ecclésiastiques 13 (1966) 167-90. [This note is Crowe's, provided at the point indicated in his text.]
have to ask: Does it correspondingly add a new level to reality? If so, what could that level be?

If isomorphism is still to be affirmed, or even if it is only to serve as a useful model for thought, what metaphysical element are we going to assign to the fourth level of reality?26

It seems that five years later the problem was still nettling Father Crowe, for at the 1979 Lonergan Workshop he was the person who posed the following query to Lonergan in the question session of Thursday, 21 June, and received the following response:

Question 5: You understand the terms and relations of cognitional theory as "isomorphic with the terms and relations denoting the ontological structure of any reality proportionate to human cognitional process" (Method, p. 21). However, if cognitional theory includes also such terms and relations as deliberation and the notion of value, what would you understand as the further terms and relations of the ontological structure of that particular domain of human reality proportionate to human cognitional process, not only as empirical, intelligent, and rational, but also as existential?

Lonergan: Well, the further terms and relations presuppose time and add possibility of change and especially change for the better. And if you know about change for the better you know about the good and the bad and so on and so forth; and they are all ontological terms. But the knowledge about yourself fundamentally is further knowledge about yourself and further knowledge about human life.27

Finally, the same issue emerges yet again in two exchanges at the 1982 Lonergan Workshop.28 The first exchange comes from the question session of Wednesday, 16 June.

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27 From the 1979 Annual Lonergan Workshop at Boston College, 18-22 June. Typewritten transcription of the question session for Thursday, 21 June, p. 28. (Available at the Lonergan Research Institute, Toronto.)
28 From the 1982 Annual Lonergan Workshop at Boston College, 14-18 June. The initial question of each exchange comes from a complete set of the written questions submitted at the question sessions. Lonergan's responses, together with any subsequent discussion, come from tape recordings of the 1982 question sessions. The (slightly edited) transcription from those recordings is my own work, done in
Question 14: Does your differentiation of a fourth (and perhaps a fifth) level of consciousness in post-Insight work force a modification of the triadic metaphysical structure of proportionate being which, in Insight, is isomorphic with the subject whose conscious operations take place at three levels of intentionality?

Lonergan: The triadic metaphysical structure of Insight corresponds to the triadic cognitional structure of Insight. Metaphysics is dealing with reality, and that by which you know the proportionate reality is this threefold structure. The fourfold structure in Method corresponds to the fourfold structure of religious consciousness. (And you could have a fourfold structure without religious consciousness if you had a moral consciousness, which [if you do have a religious consciousness] is included in the religious.)

The second pertinent exchange at the 1982 Workshop comes from the question session of Thursday, 17 June.

Question 2: What are the ontological correlatives of the distinct kinds of cognitional acts on the third, fourth, and fifth levels, respectively, of consciousness?29

Lonergan: The third, fourth, and fifth levels are judgments of fact, moral judgments, and religious judgments. (a) Judgments of fact, of possibility and probability, whatever exists or could exist. (b) Moral judgments. The reality of good men and the reality of bad men, and extending to all the different manners in which people can be good or bad morally. And (c) religious judgments. The existence of God, and theological issues. Moral judgments with a religious basis. Factual judgments with a religious basis.

Question 2 (continued): Would you say, in terms of the traditional distinction of potency, form, and act, that the achievement of judgments of fact, moral judgments, and religious judgments in each case is a kind of actus, a kind of act, and—if so—how would they differ?

July of 1992. (All of these materials are available at the Lonergan Research Institute, Toronto.)

29 I am the person who submitted this written question beforehand. I am also the questioner with whom Lonergan continues the exchange.
Lonergan: Well, they differ in their objects. They're all acts, eh? Any judgment is an act.

Question 2 (continued): I'm speaking of the content that the judgment achieves. If experience is correlative with potency, and understanding is correlative with form ....

Lonergan: Oh, I see. Well, the judgment is an act. It's insofar as that, that they're knowing acts, eh? The cognitional correspondent, the ontological correlative to an act is an act. The judgment's of fact, eh? Socrates existed. You can have an act in act of central form and act of accidental form. And in that case, what you know as corresponding to the judgment as distinct from understanding and experience gives you the distinction potency, form, and act.

Question 2 (continued): So, on the third, and the fourth, and the fifth level, those respective judgments all achieve or are correlative with act, as distinct from potency and form.

Lonergan: Right. If they're confined to an actuality.

Question 2 (continued): Now, is there any further distinction that can be drawn within the act which those judgments respectively achieve, by virtue of the fact that as judgments they differ as levels three, four, and five?

Lonergan: Well, yes. They regard a mere fact, or a moral fact, or a religious fact.

On my reading of the answers offered by Lonergan in the foregoing three exchanges, he asserts some seven points that bear on the problem we are pondering. (1) The metaphysical correlates of fourth-level operations include the possibility of change, especially change for the better. (2) Proportionate reality has a threefold structure of potency, form, and act. (3) The structure of intentional consciousness is fourfold, where the fourth level is merely moral in the case of some persons or religious (including moral) in the case of other persons. (4) One may distinguish factual judgments, moral judgments (namely, factual judgments with a moral basis), and religious judgments (namely, factual judgments and moral judgments with a religious basis). (5) The content of any judgment, whether a factual judgment or a moral judgment or a religious judgment, is an act. (6) There is no metaphysical element beyond act. (7) The difference in the contents of factual judgments,
moral judgments, and religious judgments parallels the difference among mere facts, moral facts, and religious facts.

How do these seven points hang together? What solution to our problem do they imply or at least help illuminate? I suggest that an answer is already implicit in the account, offered in the preceding section of this essay, of transcendental intelligibility, reality, and value. According to that professedly Lonerganian account, the objective of my second-level transcendental intending is transcendental intelligibility, the concrete actual universe viewed as intrinsically intelligible. The objective of my third-level transcendental intending is transcendental reality, the concrete actual universe viewed as intrinsically affirmable. And the objective of my fourth-level transcendental intending is transcendental value, the concrete actual universe viewed as intrinsically valuable. In other words, the goal of my transcendental intending on all three levels is nothing other than the one concrete actual universe—notionally distinguished now as actually intelligible, now as actually affirmable, now as actually valuable.

On the other hand, the contents of my categorial knowing and choosing never wholly match the fullness of what I transcendentally intend, but just converge on it incrementally instead. Moreover, there are important differences among the increments of that convergence. On the first level, through experiencing I merely approach the goal without in any way achieving it. The contents of my experiencing (mere potencies) as such in no way constitute my goal. On the second level, through explanatory understanding I further approach the goal but still without in any way achieving it. The distinctive contents of my explanatory understanding (intelligible forms) stand markedly closer to my goal than do the contents of my experiencing, but as such they still in no way constitute it. On the third level, a breakthrough occurs; for through judging I achieve the goal, albeit just partially. The distinctive contents of my judging (acts as intelligible and affirmable) constitute parts of the total goal of my transcendental intending, under its aspect of (intelligibility and) affirmability. And on the fourth level, the breakthrough is extended; for through evaluating and deciding I further
achieve and partly implement the goal.30 The distinctive contents of my evaluating and deciding (acts as intelligible, affirmable, and valuable) constitute parts of the total goal of my transcendental intending, under its aspect of (intelligibility and affirmability and) valuability.

On this analysis, the apparent need for a fourth level of metaphysical elements correlative with fourth-level intentional consciousness arises from overlooking the fact that the second, third, and fourth levels of intentional consciousness are radically characterized not by their categorial contents but rather by their transcendental intentions. What I transcendentally intend on all three levels, partly achieve on the third level, and partly achieve and implement under a notionally distinct aspect on the fourth level, is nothing other than act. Hence, though what I categorically achieve on the second level is only intelligible form, what I transcendentally intend is intelligible act—and the intention rather than the achievement is what radically defines the level. Again, what I transcendentally intend and categorically achieve on the third level is affirmable act—but here as well it is the intention rather than the achievement that radically defines the level. Finally, what I transcendentally intend and categorically achieve and implement on the fourth level is valuable act—but, once again, it is the intention rather than the achievement or implementation that radically defines the level. Now, the structure of the contents of my categorial knowing and choosing constitutes the structure of proportionate metaphysics. In this light, the aforementioned differences among the contents of my experiencing (potencies), the contents of my explanatory understanding (intelligible forms), and the contents of my judging (acts as intelligible and affirmable) imply at least three really distinct levels of proportionate metaphysical elements. On the other hand, since the contents of my judging (acts as intelligible and affirmable) and the contents of my evaluating and choosing (acts as intelligible, affirmable, and valuable) differ only notionally, there are no more than three really distinct levels of proportionate metaphysical elements.

What then of the principle of isomorphism? Does the later Lonergan in effect reject it? The answer to that question is no—provided

30 On the distinction between deciding or choosing to accept an actual valuable and deciding or choosing to actualize an initially just possible valuable, recall above, note 20.
that one understands that the word "level" in connection with isomorphism refers precisely to the structures of merely cognitional consciousness and its proportionate known contents, not to the more elaborate structures of intentional consciousness and its proportionate known and chosen contents, and surely not to the transformed structures of religious consciousness and its religious contents. Let me explain.

Elsewhere I have argued at some length that there is a certain flexibility in the later Lonergan's use of the word "level." As is well known, he occasionally speaks (and twice writes, both in the same work) of five "levels" of consciousness. I concluded that in such instances he is employing the word "level" in a broader sense than when, as is typical of his later period, he delineates four "levels" of intentional consciousness, levels radically correlative respectively with data of sense or consciousness and the three transcendental intentions. I now suggest that a careful reading shows that when the later Lonergan continues—as he surely does—to invoke the principle of isomorphism (though usually without retaining that expression), the word "level" insofar as it does or could appear in such discussions has a narrower sense than is typical of his later period. For what he asserts the structure of proportionate reality to be isomorphic with is nothing other than the structure of human cognition. And the structure of human cognition he deems pertinent to this isomorphism is the merely cognitional threetiered structure of experiencing, understanding, and judging, not the fourtiered structure that includes evaluating—an operation which, though indeed cognitional, is not merely cognitional but rather is already "a reality in the moral order." In other words, insofar as isomorphism is concerned, the word "level" designates what in the structure of its proportionate known contents there are three of, not what in the

32 Lonergan, Method, 37. (a) For some places where the later Lonergan continues to maintain the three-level isomorphism presented earlier in Insight, see Method 21-22, 24-25, 238-239; A Second Collection 79-80, 86, 203-204, 236-37. (b) I now judge as mistaken my own earlier affirmation of four really distinct levels of metaphysical elements. See Michael Vertin, "Lonergan's 'Three Basic Questions' and a Philosophy of Philosophies," Lonergan Workshop 8 (1990) 227-28 and note 11. Compare Vertin, "Lonergan on Consciousness" 21-23 and note 52.
structure of intentional consciousness and the corresponding structure of its proportionate known and chosen contents there are four of. Or, again, the "levels" relevant to isomorphism are radically correlate respectively with data of sense or consciousness and the transcendental intentions that are cognitional alone, namely, the first two.

2.3 Originating and Terminal Valuables and Disvaluables

It will be useful to illuminate the realm of responsible valuables more fully. Let us begin this task by noting a terminological ambiguity and proposing a terminological refinement. The ambiguity is that the word "responsible" has two different senses. In its first sense, it indicates the capability, activity, or result of choosing—namely, of performing the type of operation that falls under the norm of right choosing, whether or not it conforms to that norm. What is "responsible" in this first sense is what is bound up with the type of operation that deserves praise or blame, by contrast with what is "non-responsible," what is bound up with the type of operation that deserves neither praise nor blame. Thus, for example, the later Lonergan regularly speaks of the human subject on the fourth level of conscious intentionality as the "responsible" subject, by contrast with the "empirical," "intelligent," and "reasonable" subject on the prior levels. In its second sense, the word "responsible" indicates the capability, activity, or result of right choosing—namely, of performing the type of operation that not merely falls under but also conforms to the norm of right choosing. What is "responsible" in this second sense is what is bound up with the type of operation that deserves praise, by contrast with what is "irresponsible," what is bound up with the type of operation that deserves blame. Thus, for example, the later Lonergan regularly endorses deciding that is "responsible" rather than "irresponsible." My proposed refinement is to reserve the word "responsible" for valuables that are responsible in the first sense, and then to add the word "positive" for valuables that are responsible in the second sense as well, or the word "privative" for valuables that are

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33 (a) The ambiguity of the word "responsible" is not limited to its proportionate reference but extends to its transcendent reference as well. Hence I elaborate the following remarks with a generality sufficient to cover both realms. (b) Since the word "moral" often functions as a synonym of the word "responsible," the ambiguity affecting the latter can also affect the former. Hence the terminological refinement I shall propose for "responsible" can also be applied to "moral."
responsible in the first sense but not the second. On this convention, which I shall follow for the remainder of the present essay, the totality of valuables can be subdivided unambiguously into those that are non-responsible and responsible respectively, and the latter into valuables that are positive and privative (or irresponsible) respectively.

Now, limiting our consideration for the moment to the realm of proportionate responsible valuables, the distinctively human realm, a distinction may be drawn between originating and terminal valuables. An originating valuable is a choice and, more fundamentally, a chooser; whereas a terminal valuable is what is chosen. 34

Again, a complementary distinction may be drawn between complacent and concerned valuables. A complacent originating valuable is a choice to accept some initially actual terminal valuable; and by extension that corresponding terminal valuable may also be called "complacent." By contrast, a concerned originating valuable is a choice to actualize some initially just possible terminal valuable; and by extension that corresponding terminal valuable may also be called "concerned." 35

Finally, a further complementary distinction may be drawn between positive and privative valuables. A positive originating valuable is a choice that follows immediately from a value-judgment that is self-transcending and mediately from a value apprehension (or deliberative insight) that is self-transcending. Hence ultimately it is faithful to the self-transcending transcendental intention of (transcendental) valuability, the fundamental conscious-intentional criterion of the valuable. By extension the corresponding terminal valuable may also be labeled "positive." On the other hand, a privative originating valuable is a choice that does not follow immediately from a value judgment that is self-transcending and mediately from a value apprehension (or deliberative insight) that is self-transcending. Hence ultimately it is unfaithful to the self-transcending transcendental intention of

34 What one chooses can, of course, be one's own choice—and, more fundamentally, oneself as chooser; in which case originating and terminal valuables coincide. (See, for example, Lonergan, Method 51. Compare Crowe, "Complacency and Concern" 224.)

35 On the Lonerganian background of this distinction, recall above, note 20.
(transcendental) valuability. By extension the corresponding terminal valuable may also be labeled "privative." (See Chart 3.)

Next, the responsibility-embodying character of terminal valuables merits emphasis. For the chosen is not a mere given, product, or deed. Rather, it is a given, a product, or a deed that in being chosen is invested with responsibility. The chosen becomes an expression of the responsibility exercised by the chooser in choosing it. Hence, just as originating valuables are positively or privatively responsible originatively—originating moral goods or evils, so also terminal valuables are positively or privatively responsible terminally—terminal moral goods or evils.

The human social character of proportionate originating and terminal valuables merits emphasis as well. For although human acts and terms of choosing are radically personal, they are by no means wholly private. On the contrary, they are the dominant stuff of interpersonal relations. Human choices and chosens occur in patterns and sets. The patterns and sets occur in schemes. And the recurrent

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36 On two modes of "hatred" as what I am labeling the "privative" correlatives of "positive" complacency and concern, see Crowe, "Complacency and Concern" 218, note 52.

37 For Lonergan’s own amplification of the distinctions I am discussing here, see Method 47-52.
schemes are the culminating constituents of the ordinary human social order—and, as such, the proper object of ordinary moral explanation.\(^{38}\)

Insofar as such acts and terms are positively responsible, morally good, they constitute sets and foster schemes that enhance communal self-transcendence and progress; but insofar as they are privatively responsible, morally evil, they constitute sets and foster schemes that enhance communal self-centeredness and decline.

Again, while the acts and terms of choosing most obvious to us are the human ones, the latter are neither the sole nor the most basic moral elements in the cosmos. For religious believers affirm secondary transcendent valuables that are responsible—some positively responsible, some privatively.\(^{39}\) More fundamentally, both natural knowers and religious believers affirm the primary valuable, \textit{ipsum velle}, transcendent unrestricted positive responsibility. The primary valuable eternally exercises its responsibility positively, choosing\(^{40}\) self-immanently to accept itself and self-transcendingly to actualize everything else.\(^{41}\) That is to say, the primary term of the primary valuable as originating is nothing other than the primary valuable itself; and the secondary term of the primary valuable as originating is the totality of secondary valuables—transcendent and proportionate, responsible and non-responsible. In this light, the entirety of being is a divine terminal valuable; and the ultimate object of ordinary moral explanation is the whole of cosmic history as the scheme of morally good and evil interactions among divine, angelic, and human persons.\(^{42}\)

A concluding observation is in order regarding “disvalues” (on our terminology, “disvaluables”)—or, more commonly, “evils.” Within the Lonerganian framework disvaluables are nothing other than choices (and, more fundamentally, choosers) and chosens that are privatively responsible—originating and terminal valuables that are irresponsible.

\(^{38}\) For a wonderfully concrete elaboration of this point, including a lucid account of the automobile traffic system as an example, see Kenneth Melchin, “Moral Knowledge and the Structure of Cooperative Living,” \textit{Theological Studies} \textbf{52} (1991) 495-523.

\(^{39}\) On angels, recall above, note 17.

\(^{40}\) Recall above, note 20.

\(^{41}\) Recall above, 21.

\(^{42}\) The latter point is an extension of Melchin’s suggestion. See above, note 38.
That is to say, what is restricted or finite is not thereby disvaluable. Again, what is material—constituted or intrinsically conditioned by the empirical residue—is not thereby disvaluable. In more familiar language, the word "evil" in its strict Lonerganian sense applies solely to moral aberrations, originating and terminal. Properly speaking, neither finitude as such, nor material finitude (with its characteristic "physical evils"), is evil.43

3.1 Transcendental Lovability, Primary and Secondary Lovables, Transcendent and Proportionate Lovables, Loving and Non-Loving Lovables

Let us begin this section with a Lonerganian sketch of unrestricted love.44 Unrestricted love is a datum that is identical with religious experience, a datum that is the root of the difference between ordinary living and religious living. It is a datum not of sense but of consciousness. It appears within the horizon of conscious intentionality as an intrinsic enrichment of the transcendental notions in their conscious dimension, first the notion of valuability (value) and then the notions of affirmability (reality) and intelligibility. In their conscious dimension, it is the correlative of the notions' intentionally possessing the primary component of their total fulfillment, even though such intentional possession is not yet realized.45 By virtue of religious experience

43 See Lonergan, Insight (1957) 666-68 [1992: 689-91]. It remains that often—perhaps even always—the "physical evils" we suffer do in fact embody terminal moral evils. This point is familiar to both traditional theology (under the rubric "original sin") and present-day environmental ethics.
44 For detailed references to places where I think Lonergan's own works support the interpretation of the character and effects of unrestricted love that I am offering here, see Vertin, "Lonergan on Consciousness."
45 (a) This is what I take Lonergan to mean when he approvingly cites Karl Rahner's depiction of religious experience as having a content but not an object. See Method 106, note 4. (b) Lonergan's broader approach here is worth stressing. He does not begin with some supposedly common understanding of what the word "love" means, remove all limitations from that understanding in order to establish the meaning of "unrestricted love," and then use the latter label to denote a datum he wishes to highlight. On the contrary, what Lonergan means by "unrestricted love" is fundamentally what he characterizes functionally as the incipient total satisfaction of the transcendental intentions. How far that notion incorporates common understandings of "love" is a further and largely just secondary issue. (For a parallel regarding the meaning of the word "God," see Method 341, 350.) This approach, in
specifically in its cognitive aspect, which is what Lonergan means by "faith," my transcendental notions of valuability, affirmability, and intelligibility become notions of lovability. In turn, my subsequent operations of understanding, making judgments of fact, and evaluating and choosing are not ordinary operations but religious ones, operations proximately both motivated and oriented and normed by my notions of lovable intelligibility, lovable affirmability, and lovable valuability. And what I know and choose by means of those operations is manifest as not simply the intelligible, the affirmable, and the valuable but—more amply—the lovable.

Secondly, although unrestricted love is similar to the transcendental notions in its methodical priority to particular acts of knowing and choosing, it also is importantly different. The difference is that the transcendental notions as such are purely heuristic yearnings presupposing nothing, mere anticipations of intentional fulfillment, absolutely a priori dynamic structures that remotely motivate, orient, and norm my operations of knowing and choosing. Unrestricted love, by contrast, presupposes the transcendental notions, is the consciousness (though not yet knowledge) of the primary component of their exhaustive fulfillment, and reconstitutes them as notions of lovability, relatively a priori dynamic structures that proximately motivate, orient, and norm my all operations of knowing and choosing.

Turn, implies a Lonerganian suggestion to persons involved in interreligious dialogue. Insofar as such persons aspire to elucidate genuine religious commonalities, they ought to focus initially on concrete functional characterizations, avoiding the premature introduction of such words as "love." Even such a seemingly transcultural notion as "love" (let alone "holiness" or "God") is apt in fact to be culturally conditioned; hence, premature introduction of the word is likely to impede the dialogue. (For making explicit this suggestion I am grateful to Prof. Patrick Byrne and, indirectly, to Prof. Charles Hefling.)

46 For example, Lonergan, Method 115-18, 123-24.


48 Let me put this paragraph's main point in another way. Without necessarily asserting it to be total, I posit a certain parallel between (a) the transcendental
Thirdly, if the notion of lovability, unlike the notions of intelligibility, affirmability, and valuability, is only comparatively heuristic, only relatively *a priori*, not purely heuristic, not absolutely *a priori*, then it is not "transcendental" in the *Kantian* sense. On the other hand, I propose that it is congruent with Lonergan's perspective to maintain that the notion of lovability, as transcategorial, is indeed "transcendental" in the *scholastic* sense.\(^{49}\)

The introduction of lovability as a notion that is transcendental (albeit only in the scholastic sense) implies, I suggest, a refinement of the last-mentioned account of the concrete universe, a refinement that the later Lonergan affirms and employs on occasion but does not articulate in detail. On this refinement, the concrete universe of being appears primarily not as valuable totality, the universe of transcendental valuablity, but rather as lovable totality, the universe of transcendental love—or, more exactly, lovability. And the three last-mentioned distinctions dividing the concrete universe undergo similar transformations. Now the most basic distinction is between primary and secondary lovables. The primary lovable is *ipsam amare*, the unrestricted act of loving, that which both exhaustively loves itself and thereby exhaustively loves everything else;\(^{50}\) whereas secondary

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\(^{49}\) See Vertin, "Lonergan on Consciousness" 26, note 55. In that note and generally in that essay, I spoke of a notion of holiness rather than a notion of *lovability*. While the latter label is less precise it is both more suggestive and closer to Lonergan's own terminology—hence my change to it in the present essay. My intended meaning remains the same.

\(^{50}\) Anticipating distinctions I will introduce shortly in the text, I would put this point more exactly as follows: the primary lovable (a) loves *non-loving* and *positively loving lovables*, (b) does not love *simple non-lovables*, and (c) neither loves nor does
lovlables are everything other than the primary lovable. The second distinction is between transcendent and proportionate lovables.

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<th>Chart 4.</th>
<th>THE CONCRETE UNIVERSE OF TRANSCENDENTAL LOVABILITY</th>
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<tr>
<td>the primary lovable</td>
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<td>secondary lovables</td>
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<td>non-loving</td>
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Proportionate lovables are either constituted or conditioned (whether intrinsically or just extrinsically) by the empirical residue. Transcendent lovables are not thus constituted or conditioned. The third distinction is between lovables that are loving and those that are non-loving, merely lovable. Lovables are loving if they are able to love, and non-loving if they are unable. These three distinctions collectively indicate four basic ranges within the concrete lovable universe. The primary lovable (God) is both transcendent and loving; some secondary lovables (angels) are transcendent and all these are loving; other lovables (humans) are proportionate and loving; and still other secondary lovables (infra-human ones) are proportionate and non-loving. (See Chart 4.)

not love privatively loving (i.e., unloving) lovables but merely permits them. (Compare above, note 21.)

51 It is crucial to remember that this characterization, along with the subsequent ones, proceeds in function of my religious experience. It is precisely in this respect that what I mean by "lovable" is more than what I mean by "valuable."

52 I specify loving lovables broadly as "able to love" rather than narrowly as "actually loving" in order to include humans among them.
3.2 Valuability and Lovability

Earlier I argued that the distinction between transcendental affirmability and transcendental valuability is not real but just notional, and, in consequence, that the distinction between the proportionate metaphysical correlatives of the third and fourth levels of intentional consciousness is not real but just notional. What are the additional conclusions that emerge in these two lines when one takes explicit account of unrestricted being-in-love?

First, let me reiterate and extend what I have said about the metaphysical correlatives of transcendental intending. The goal of my transcendental intending on levels two, three, and four is nothing other than the one concrete actual universe—notionally distinguished now as actually intelligible, now as actually affirmable, now as actually valuable. But my unrestricted being-in-love, my consciousness (though not yet knowledge) of the primary component of the three intentions' exhaustive fulfillment, combines with those intentions to constitute a new set of intentions that are more than strictly heuristic. Absolutely \textit{a priori} yearnings plus inchoative total satisfaction constitute relatively \textit{a priori} yearnings. My transcendental notions of intelligibility, affirmability, and valuability become notions of lovability—lovable intelligibility, lovable affirmability, lovable valuability. The goal of the new intentions remains the same as the goal of the original intentions, namely, the one concrete actual universe. However, a further feature of that concrete actual universe now stands forth explicitly: transcendental (in the scholastic sense) lovability. In other words, transcendental lovability is the metaphysical correlative of the religiously transformed transcendental intentions of intelligibility, affirmability, and valuability; but like the distinctions of transcendental intelligibility, affirmability, and valuability from one another, transcendental lovability's distinction from them is not real but just notional.

Second, let me reiterate and extend what I have said about the metaphysical correlatives of categorial knowing and choosing. The structure of the contents of my categorial knowing and choosing constitutes the structure of proportionate metaphysics. The differences among the distinctive contents of my experiencing (potencies), of my understanding (intelligible forms), and of my judging (acts as intelligible
and affirmable) imply at least three really distinct levels of proportionate metaphysical elements. On the other hand, since the contents of my judging (acts as intelligible and affirmable) and the contents of my evaluating and choosing (acts as intelligible, affirmable, and valuable) differ only notionally, there are no more than three really distinct levels of proportionate metaphysical elements. Now, the light of the relatively a priori intentions of transcendental lovability manifests these proportionate potencies, forms, and acts as intrinsically lovable. However, just as transcendental lovability is not really but just notionally distinct from transcendental valuability, affirmability, and intelligibility, so the distinction between the proportionate metaphysical correlates of ordinary and religiously transformed intentional consciousness is not real but just notional.

It remains that such notional distinctions should by no means be disdained. Although the intrinsic lovability of the concrete actual universe is not really distinct from its intrinsic intelligibility, affirmability, or valuability, to make that lovability explicit is importantly to refine our intending, knowing, and choosing. For example, it amplifies our grasp of why the person of religious experience deems the concrete universe as redolent of love: everything bespeaks the unrestrictedly lovable beloved.\(^53\) It provides a genuinely ultimate context within which to situate and address the most diverse and seemingly intractable interpersonal and intercultural disagreements.\(^54\) And it gives us the highest possible warrant for approving and appropriating present-day ecologists' caring concern for the material world.\(^55\)

### 3.3 Originating and Terminal Lovables and Unlovables

The transformation of intentional consciousness by religious experience implies a transformation of our previous account of the realm of responsible valuables. In order to sketch the latter transformation.

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\(^53\) One thinks of the commonalities in the claims made by mystics.

\(^54\) As I write these lines, the conflicts in Northern Ireland, Bosnia, and the Near East spring to mind.

\(^55\) For a magisterial and beautifully illustrated (albeit not explicitly Lonerganian) elaboration of this point, see Elizabeth Johnson, "Turn to the Heavens and the Earth: Retrieval of the Cosmos in Theology," *Catholic Theological Society of America Proceedings* 51 (1996) 1-14.
clearly, however, we must first deal with an important ambiguity in the word "loving." The ambiguity is parallel to that already noted in the word "responsible." In one sense, "loving" can indicate the capability, activity, or result of religiously-aware choosing—namely, choosing that falls under a norm at least partly constituted by the presence of unrestricted love, whether or not the choosing conforms to that norm. What is "loving" in this first sense is what is bound up with choosing that deserves religious approbation or religious condemnation, by contrast with what is "non-loving," what is bound up with choosing that deserves neither religious approbation nor religious condemnation. So, for example, the later Lonergan (at least theoretically, if not existentially) envisages human subjects who are "loving" in the sense that they have been offered religious conversion, by contrast with those who are "non-loving" in the sense that they have not been offered it. In another sense, "loving" can indicate the capability, activity, or result of religiously-shaped choosing—namely, choosing that not merely falls under but also conforms to a norm at least partly constituted by the presence of unrestricted love. What is "loving" in this second sense is what is bound up with choosing that deserves religious approbation, by contrast with what is "unloving," what is bound up choosing that deserves religious condemnation. So, for example, the later Lonergan envisages human subjects who are "loving" in the sense that they have accepted religious conversion, by contrast with those who are "unloving" in the sense that they have rejected it. In line with my earlier strategy, I propose reserving the word "loving" for lovables that are loving in the

56 Moreover, as with the word "responsible," so with the word "loving": its ambiguity is not limited to its proportionate reference but extends to its transcendent reference as well. Hence I elaborate the following remarks with a generality sufficient to cover both realms.

57 Religious awareness surely affects a subject's knowing, but its ultimate influence is on what is at least notionally subsequent to knowing, namely, choosing. For the sake of simplicity, in the present section I frame my remarks in terms of how religious experience affects choosing, intending those remarks to cover—by inclusion—its effects on knowing as well.

58 See, for example, Method 243, 267-68, 282-83.

59 See, for example, Method 115-16; compare 110-112, 240-44. My distinctions among (a) "non-loving," (b) "loving" in the first sense, and (c) "loving" in the second sense correspond respectively to scholastic theology's distinctions among (a) the absence of operative grace, (b) the presence of operative grace, and (c) the presence of cooperative grace. See Method 107, 240-41.
first sense, and then adding the word "positive" for lovables that are loving in the second sense as well, or the word "privative" for lovables that are loving in the first sense but not the second. On this convention, which I shall follow for the rest of this essay, the totality of lovables can be subdivided unambiguously into those that are non-loving and loving respectively, and the latter into lovables that are positive and privative (or unloving) respectively.

Next, limiting our consideration for the moment to the realm of proportionate loving lovables, the distinctively human realm, a distinction may be drawn between originating and terminal lovables. An originating lovable is a religiously-aware choice and, more fundamentally, a religiously-aware chooser; whereas a terminal lovable is what is thus chosen.60

Again, a complementary distinction may be drawn between complacent and concerned lovables. A complacent originating lovable is a religiously-aware choice to accept some initially actual terminal lovable; and by extension that corresponding terminal lovable may also be called "complacent." By contrast, a concerned originating lovable is a religiously-aware choice to actualize some initially just possible terminal lovable; and by extension that corresponding terminal lovable may also be called "concerned."61

Finally, a further complementary distinction may be drawn between positive and privative lovables. A positive originating lovable is a religiously-aware choice that follows immediately from a religiously-shaped value judgment and mediately from a religiously-shaped value apprehension (or deliberative insight), where "religiously shaped" bespeaks conformity to a norm at least partly constituted by the presence of unrestricted love. That is to say, a positive originating lovable ultimately is faithful to the religiously transformed transcendental intention of valuability, namely, the relatively a priori notion of transcendental (in the scholastic sense) lovability, the notion that is the fundamental conscious-intentional norm of the lovable. By extension the corresponding terminal lovable may also be labeled

60 What one loves can, of course, be one's own loving—and, more fundamentally, oneself as lover; in which case originating and terminal lovables coincide. (Compare above, note 34.)
61 On the Lonerganian background of this distinction, recall above, note 20.
“positive.” On the other hand, a privative originating lovable is a religiously-aware choice that does not follow immediately from a religiously-shaped value judgment and mediately from a religiously-shaped value apprehension (or deliberative insight). That is to say, a

Chart 5.

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<th>PROPORTIONATE LOVABLES</th>
<th>originating</th>
<th>complacent</th>
<th>positive</th>
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privative originating lovable ultimately is unfaithful to the notion of transcendental lovability. By extension the corresponding terminal lovable may also be labeled “privative.” (See Chart 5.)

The meaning-embodying character of terminal lovables deserves to be underscored. For the religiously chosen is not a mere given, product, or deed. Rather, it is a given, a product, or a deed that in being chosen is invested with religious meaning. It becomes an expression of the kind of loving exercised by the religiously-aware chooser in choosing it. Hence, just as originating lovables are positively or privatively loving originatively—holy or sinful choices (and, more basically, choosers), so also terminal lovables are positively or privatively loving terminally—holy or sinful choosers.

Further, the human social character of proportionate originating and terminal lovables deserves to be underscored as well. For the acts and terms of human religious choosing are radically personal, but they surely are not wholly private. On the contrary, they occur in patterns

and sets; the patterns and sets occur in schemes; and the recurrent schemes are the crowning elements of the religiously conditioned order of human society—and, as such, the proper object of religiously illuminated moral explanation. This is a further extension of Melchin’s suggestion. It is a matter of utmost communal significance whether the acts and terms of our religious choosing occur within a horizon distinguished by our acceptance of the offer of unrestricted love, or by our rejection of that offer. Insofar as the former situation obtains, communal holiness is nourished; but insofar as the latter situation obtains, communal sinfulness is promoted.

Again, while the acts and terms of loving choice most obvious to us are the human ones, the latter are neither the sole nor the most basic loving lovables in the cosmos. For theology affirms secondary transcendent lovables that are loving—some positively, some privatively. More fundamentally, both theology and “newer” philosophy affirm the primary lovable, ipsum amare, transcendent unrestricted positive loving. The primary lovable eternally loves positively, choosing self-immanently to accept itself and self-transcendingly to actualize everything else. That is to say, the primary term of the primary lovable as originating is nothing other than the primary lovable itself; and the secondary term of the primary lovable as originating is the totality of secondary lovables—transcendent and proportionate, loving and non-loving. The entirety of being is a divine terminal lovable. And the ultimate object of religiously illuminated moral explanation is the whole of cosmic history as the scheme of holy and sinful interactions among divine, angelic, and human persons.

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63 See above, note 38.
64 On angels, recall above, note 17.
65 “Newer” philosophy is not just logical; more fundamentally, it is methodical. As such, it takes religious experience and conversion into account. For the distinction between “older” and “newer” philosophy in general and philosophy of God in particular, see Lonergan, Philosophy of God, and Theology (London: Darton, Longman & Todd, 1973) ch. 1, esp. 13-14.
66 Recall above, note 20.
67 Recall above, note 50.
68 This is a still further extension of Melchin’s suggestion. See above, note 38.
4. Conclusion

At one point in a detailed study that involves the drawing of many distinctions, Lonergan observes, “The alternative to distinguishing is confusion.”69 I recall that observation by way of excusing myself for an essay that has been lengthy, highly schematic, and almost totally lacking in concrete examples. My sole purpose here has been to draw distinctions, with the hope of assisting myself and others to avoid confusion. More exactly, I have been concerned exclusively with proposing certain clarifications and elaborations of the Lonerganian metaphysics of value and love, since the magnitude of the confusion likely to follow on obscurity in this area seems difficult to exaggerate. I recognize that treating metaphysical categories is not sufficient for a rounded account of value and love, but perhaps discerning readers will agree that it is necessary. Moreover, I hope that at least some of those readers will find the present treatment helpful.

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