LONERGAN WORKSHOP

VOLUME I

Edited by Fred Lawrence
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EDITOR'S NOTE

The essays collected in this inaugural volume of Lonergan Workshop were contributions for the third meeting of the Workshop held in June, 1976 at Boston College. As a group they express the way the work of Bernard Lonergan, to the extent that it has generated something like a "movement," is open to the most diverse styles of thought and directions of research. As director of the Workshop and editor of this journal, I would like to take this opportunity to stress that the intent of the Workshop--alive and in print--is to provide a forum for communication and ongoing collaboration among persons who have found Lonergan's suggestions about self-appropriation helpful in venturing out "on their own."

Fred Lawrence
October, 1977
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DIALECTIC AND THE IGNATIAN SPIRITUAL EXERCISES

Frederick E. Crowe

This week of study has been advertised as a Lonergan Workshop, so my first step is to determine an approach to such a workshop and to see how my paper can be located in the project. This is not just a simple exercise in thought, for there has been developing in regard to Father Lonergan's ideas a certain polarization from which I for one wish to separate myself. It seems to me, then, that a sober approach is to apply the first four functional specialities of Method to the study of Lonergan himself and to settle, each of us for himself, which of the four tasks he is trying to perform. If one objects that this is begging the question, that we are endorsing the program of Method (see chap. 4) in order to study it, we can reduce the approach to simpler terms: assembling the data, determining their meaning, proceeding from meaning to what is going forward in the history of thought, and investigating the conflicts uncovered in this history with a view to taking a position of one's own. Surely no one will object to procedures described in these terms, or to our choosing any one of them as our interest at the moment. On that basis I would locate my own paper in the second area; it is an exercise in understanding, an attempt to discover what Lonergan means by dialectic. My plan is to put that notion to work as a tool of analysis in the Spiritual Exercises of St. Ignatius Loyola. In outward form, then, my paper is more directly a study of the Exercises; but I hope that in this application to a concrete case an idea of the nature and function of dialectic will appear. Insofar, of course, as the notion of dialectic is found helpful for an understanding of the Exercises, we will be providing an element for judging and evaluating Lonergan's Method, but that is a tentative by-product and
not my direct purpose. The paper is a study of dialectic as an idea, not an exercise in dialectic itself.

The subtitle of the Workshop is Theology as Public Discourse; I have to relate my paper to that heading as well. Two difficulties occur at once in proposing the Ignatian Exercises as a term of comparison with the public discourse of theology. First, the Exercises are a very private affair between the exercitant and God; their results may be manifest, but the dialectic of their process is not, and does not therefore seem to offer a good analogy for dialectic as public discourse. Secondly, theology is a highly specialized academic pursuit, and the Exercises are not academic at all; there is certainly a cognitive element involved in making them, and it is surely related to theology, but the two forms of knowledge are as remote from one another as the realms of common sense and theory.

I hope the paper will itself be an answer to these difficulties. In fact, one of my aims is to distinguish more clearly public and private factors in the Exercises, and I think this distinction will clarify also the study of theology as public discourse. Again, it is true that the Exercises are not theology, much less the highly specialized form of theology supposed by the functional specialties of Method. But there are striking similarities all the same. The Exercises head for a choice in life, as dialectic heads for a choice in theology. The choice they head for is a rather fundamental option involving a new religious horizon, much in the way that dialectic may involve a new horizon for the theologian. Both dialectic and the Exercises are initiated by an encounter with the past in the form of a person with a message. Both employ a technique in which self-searching is a central and crucial exercise. Both suppose the two phases of hearing and responding. We do seem to have at least a prima facie case for beginning our study; but, of course, to move our metaphor from lawcourt to kitchen, the proof of the pudding will be in the eating.
My plan is simple. I will make an analysis of the Exercises from a Thomist viewpoint, using the analytic tools of the Thomist organon. I will show how the notion of dialectic may be used to carry the analysis further. I will conclude with some suggestions on further avenues of investigation.

It is natural enough to begin an analysis of the Exercises from a Thomist viewpoint, for it was after his studies at the University of Paris, and to some extent under the influence of his Thomist studies there, that Ignatius made the final version of his little book /4/. To come to specifics, the election of the Exercises, which is so central to their purpose and structure /5/, is conceived in Thomist terms, as, for example, when Ignatius exhorts the exercitant not to adapt the end to the means but rather to make the means appropriate to the end (No. 169) /6/. This is clearly the language of St. Thomas, who analyzes the election or act of choice in terms of willing an end, deliberating on means to that end, and choosing the means accordingly. His stock example is that of a sick person who wants to get well,—the end therefore is the restoration of health—who takes counsel on how he may do so, and decides to call in the doctor (S.t. 1-2, q.8, a.3; q.9, a.4 and passim). The example is not very thrilling to us; maybe calling in a doctor was a bigger deal in the middle ages than it is now, or maybe St. Thomas considers that the stark simplicity of this example will serve better to outline the structure of the process.

What are the characteristics of the Thomist election? St. Thomas regularly describes it from the analogy of a syllogism. The end, he says, functions in matters of conduct the way a premise does in matters of understanding (S.t. 1-2, q.9, a.3). Again, the object of choice is conceived in syllogistic terms, for election of the object follows the practical judgment which is like the conclusion of a syllogism (S.t. 1-2, q.13, a.3). Further, one can arrange a chain of syllogisms in a hierarchical order
descending from the more universal premise to the less universal, and you can do the same for a series of ends, with one person taking as an end in life what someone else, seeking a higher end, will reduce to a means. Thus, the patient's health is an end for the doctor; he takes this for granted, and does not deliberate about it at all. But health is subordinate to the good of the soul, so the patient himself may deliberate about health, whether he ought to seek a cure or be content to remain ill, in effect turning it from an end into a means (S.t. 1-2, q.13, a.3). You can go back to higher and higher ends, but you cannot do this forever,—"non est procedere in infinitum," St. Thomas was fond of saying—so where do you stop? What is the ultimate end? It is bonum in communi, the good in general, which is the very object of the faculty of will (S.t. 1-2, q.9, a.1). Then the highest good becomes identified with the ultimate end (S.t. 1-2, q.1, a.4 ad 1m), and, within the all-encompassing range of this orientation, you can choose freely from the list of particular goods. Here too the analogy with intellect is carried through: as there are first principles which are the source of all syllogizing, so there is the fundamental orientation of the will to good, which is the source of all choice and human action (S.t. 1-2, q.90, a.2; q.94, a.2) /7/.

With this set of concepts functioning as an organon, one can conduct a helpful analysis of the Ignatian Exercises. What is the motive power under which the exercitant is led through two weeks of exercises and brought to the point of making his election, his choice of a state in life? It is the end set forth at the beginning of the Exercises in the Principle and Foundation, and repeated again when the time comes to make an election: to praise, reverence, and serve God, and by this means to save his soul (No. 23). The same paragraphs reduce everything else on earth to the level of means, to be chosen so far as they lead to the desired end. With this orientation restored and made operative by divine grace, the First Week
of the *Exercises* enters into their structure as a realization that the process to the goal has been frustrated by sin; the exercitant is therefore brought back from his wandering path in the triple step of shame, repentance, and purpose of amendment /8/. The Second Week functions positively as a pursuit of the end through a study of the means, or, in biblical language, through a search for the way which is Christ. That corresponds very closely to the structure of the Thomist *Summa theologiae*: *primo tractabimus de Deo; secundo, de motu rationalis creaturae in Deum; tertio, de Christo, qui, secundum quod homo, via est nobis tendendi in Deum* (1, q.2: prologus). There is no need here to accuse St. Thomas of reducing Christ to a mere means for men to use with a view to their salvation /9/; for present purposes, at least, we can take his language as merely translating what the scriptures say, for example, in the terms in which Luke reports Peter's sermon: "There is no salvation in anyone else at all, for there is no other name under heaven granted to men, by which we may receive salvation" (Acts 4:12).

So far we are solidary with a tradition that goes back to the *Didache* and its two ways of life and death, and before the *Didache* to the Old Testament. But Ignatius takes over a refinement that had grown up in the tradition—a division even within the way of life—and introduces it into the Second Week in his own quite characteristic way. It appears first, on the very threshold of this week, in the Kingdom meditation; under the figure of soldiery, so dear to St. Ignatius, we may say that the followers of Christ are divided into those who volunteer for the frontlines of battle, and those who are content to enlist and contribute their reasonable service (Nos. 96-97). But the option is brought out more sharply later when Ignatius puts in sequence for meditation these two topics: Christ obedient to his parents at home, and Christ leaving his parents at the age of twelve to be about his Father's work. This dialectically related pair of
meditations has a clearly symbolic value for Ignatius, as is seen not only in what he expressly says about them, but in the liberty he takes with scripture, inverting the order found in Luke in order to bring home his point (Nos. 134, 135; see 271-272).

Two Ignatian masterpieces must now be fitted into this pattern: the exercise on the Two Standards, and that on the Three Pairs of Men. From the Thomist viewpoint that we are adopting, the Two Standards (Nos. 135-148) can be taken as a special exercise in deliberation on means to the end. Specifically the exercitant is made to study the love of riches and is led to see how such a love may turn him away from the goal of life as proposed in the Principle and Foundation. We are dealing therefore with an exercise in knowledge, where the objective is to get behind facades and discover the real effect of love of riches, to get a sense of where we may be led unawares by means that seem innocent on the surface. Ignatius says in effect what the rat might say in the laboratory maze: Things are not always what they seem; the immediate direction of a path is no real clue to where it leads in the end. But the rat can have as many chances as he likes, and we cannot; hence the crucial importance of finding out in good time where riches and honors may take us.

The Three Pairs of Men (Nos. 149-157), in contrast, is more an exercise in decision. The route has been clarified, but I am not ready to follow it. I remain like a signpost, pointing in the right direction, but not taking a single step toward the goal. Or I cast about for an alternative route that will be less demanding than the one taught me by the Two Standards. If there is a knowledge involved in the exercise of the Three Pairs, it is not a knowledge of the objective routes laid out before us; rather, it is the self-knowledge that lays bare the dodges to which I resort in order to remain deaf to a clear call.
It is this bare skeleton of the first two parts of the *Exercises* to which I will presently apply the notion of dialectic. At the moment, however, there remains the question of the Third and Fourth Weeks. It would be a very truncated form of the *Exercises* which omitted these last two parts and their epilogue, the Contemplation to Gain Love. Nevertheless, it is clear that they represent a distinct new phase of the *Exercises*, as different from the First and Second Weeks as the farewell discourse in John's gospel is from the controversies of his chapters seven to ten. The Thomist end/means structure no longer applies to these two weeks, and neither will Lonergan's notion of dialectic. However, the contrast itself will be enlightening, so let us see how these final weeks relate to the earlier. I would say that, on Thomist analysis, they stand to the first two weeks as a good to be shared stands to a good to be acquired. That is, as long as we think in terms of means to an end, we are concerned with what we may do, or achieve, or acquire; we are concerned, in other words, with a *bonum acquirendum*. What we wish to acquire is, or may be, extremely precious and noble: the conquest of sin, a place in the frontlines of Christ's army, ultimately salvation; still, it is something we strive to acquire for ourselves. However, that is not the whole story. The Christian way offers possibilities of a different order; Ignatius presents them in the last two weeks of the *Exercises*, and Aquinas provides (rather marginally, it is true) a further tool for their analysis. The further tool is the concept of the good to be shared and communicated, the *bonum communiandum* (*S.t.* 1-2, q.1, a.4 ad 1m; q.28, a.4 ad 2m; 3, q.1, a.1). This is not something we reach out to grasp at; rather, it is a spontaneous overflow, a necessity that love has for sharing whatever we possess with those we love and for entering into their state to share with them what they experience or endure. And this notion naturally has its application among friends (*S.t.* 1-2, q.65, a.5; 2-2, q.25, a.3; q.26, a.2).
Now it is precisely this sharing, this union in condition and state and destiny with those we love, that is characteristic of the last two weeks of the *Exercises* (Nos. 193, 195, 206 in the Third Week; Nos. 221, 224, 229 in the Fourth Week). From this viewpoint it does not matter in the least that in the Third Week we share the passion of Christ the Lord and in the Fourth Week we share his resurrection. The determining factor in each week is that we share. We are with Christ, wherever he be: in suffering and sorrow, if he happens to be in suffering and sorrow; in peace and happiness, if he happens to be in peace and happiness. The end/means structure has given way to a friendship/sharing structure. One may think of the mother who sits with closed eyes by the cradle of her child. She does not open them to satisfy her curiosity on who is passing; she does not look in alarm when brakes squeal down the street. Why? because she is sharing the state of her child that was born blind. What good is she doing? What is she achieving? What purpose does she serve? The questions are all out of place, they belong in another context; the context now is that of the need which love has to share with the one who is loved /12/.

Let us return to the first two weeks and the exercises that lead up to the election, for it is here especially that we find a term for comparison with dialectic. Has the Thomist organon proved adequate for the analysis of this part of the *Exercises*? In the light of ideas available today, I have to say it has not. Briefly, and with a sweeping generalization to be corrected presently, I would say that Thomas puts the emphasis on the cognitive factor in decision, even to the extent of conceiving the process on the analogy of logic, where modern thought puts the emphasis on self-involvement in which logic is quite inadequate either as a tool for analysis or as an existential influence. The *Spiritual Exercises* show up this inadequacy. You do not go smoothly and directly from *bonum in communi* to the particular way of
life to which you may be called at a crucial time of
decision, not even if the orientation to good is a con-
crete and resourceful dynamism instead of an abstract
conception and general willing of the end. Neither do you
go smoothly and directly from the end as operative in the
Principle and Foundation to the standard of Christ as pre-
sented in the Second Week of the Exercises. You might as
well set a ship on its course and expect it to reach har-
bor two weeks later without further attention to the rud-
der. This surely is the lesson of history, and you can
verify it for yourselves in personal experience as you
grow older.

But I have to correct my too sweeping generalization
on St. Thomas, whose honest realism resists the strait-
ocket of logic and provides many points of contact with
more recent thought. I am not referring to his own use of
the term, dialectic. There has been some effort to estab-
lish a link here (see Isaac: 505-506, and Fessard, 1960:
14-15), but I think the effort is wasted: Thomist dialec-
tic is just too exclusively a cognitional category. The
place to look is rather on the periphery of his thought
where Thomas continually breaks out of the confines of his
own system. For example, there is the Aristotelian syl-
logism of four propositions which describes the person
struggling with temptation. There are two majors: one,
sin is to be avoided; the other, a pleasant thing is to be
enjoyed. Each would have its own minor: this is sin; al-
ternatively, this is pleasant. But in fact there can be
only one minor and only one conclusion; which is it to be?
(St. 1-2, q.77, a.2 ad 4m; In VII Eth., lect. 2, Nos.
1345-1347; De malo, q.3, a.9 ad 7m). Though cast in logi-
cal terms, this exposition clearly breaks out of logic
toward the sort of dialectic we are going to deal with.
Again, there is the knowledge that seems to lie outside
the ordinary process of the mind, a knowledge that is
gained through the affective connaturalty of the knower
with the object (St. 1, q.1, a.6 ad 3m; 2-2, q.45, a.2;
also 1-2, q.23, a.4; q.26, aa.1-2; 2-2, q.97, a.2 ad 2m; q.162, a.3 ad 1m) /13/. This is very close to what we might describe as an apprehension of values leading to a corresponding judgment. Thirdly, there is the substitution of a higher end for a lower, a substitution effected by divine grace (S.t. 1-2, q.9, a.6 ad 3m; q.111, a.2). This corresponds to the shift in horizons that is the goal of dialectic. And finally, to close this paragraph, there is the Thomist recognition that conduct does not follow premises with the clicking sequence of a logic-machine; we are dealing with contingent courses of action, Thomas says, and so reason has options, as it does in dialectical syllogisms or in rhetorical efforts to persuade another (S.t. 1, q.83, a.1) /14/. Though Thomas still speaks here in his habitual cognitional terms, he is not far from the remark Kierkegaard made apropos of Hamlet's shilly-shallying: "reflection can be halted only by means of a resolve" (105).

St. Thomas then breaks out of his system in various ways. But to say that is to suggest that we look elsewhere to bring into focus elements that were peripheral to his thought, so I turn to the notion of dialectic as set forth in Lonergan's Method. Here, at the outset, let me introduce two limitations. First, I am going to talk about the process from lower levels of human intentionality to higher, rather than about the reverse process. Father Lonergan has recently emphasized that "human development" is of two quite different kinds. There is "development from below upwards," and this will be my concern; it proceeds "from experience to growing understanding, from growing understanding to balanced judgment, from balanced judgment to fruitful courses of action." The other kind is "from above downwards," the result of "the transformation of falling in love" (1975:63). This would provide a term of comparison for the love of Christ which is a factor throughout the Exercises and especially in the last two weeks. I leave it aside, however, in this paper,
well aware that in so doing I may seem to commit the folly of those who build just half a ship.

Secondly, there is a distinction we may introduce within the context of the Exercises. The dialectical process in which the exercitant becomes engaged involves two moments or phases. There is the moment that regards the way of Christ as a set of truths and values to be adopted by anyone who chooses, and there is the moment that regards the exercitant's quite individual choice of a state of life in his own quite individual situation. I call them "moments or phases." It is important to find the right notion here, for we are probably not dealing with two stages of conversion undergone in a time sequence. I suspect that in the concrete decision of the exercitant the two moments are inseparably intertwined. But in thought we have to distinguish them, just as in psychological effect they differ and in the temporal sequence of the Exercises Ignatius has to propose them one after the other. At any rate I see the first as a matter for public discourse and therefore an appropriate topic for this Workshop, and the second as quite private, a matter entirely between the soul and God.

The first moment, then, is the encounter of the exercitant with the way of Christ as discovered in a series of meditations on his public life, but notably and decisively as discovered in the meditation on the Two Standards, to which I shall return. In this moment the dialectic of the Exercises has a clear objective reference. The way of Christ can be studied from public documents—the gospels, the reflections of a hundred saints, and the studies of a thousand masters of the spiritual life. It contains a doctrine which can be explained, and a set of values which can be exemplified and presented by one person to another. Further, this explanation and this presentation can be made before an actual or potential multitude, from the pulpit of a church, or from the pages of a printed book. All of which amounts to saying that it is
general, if not a universal, way; it is communicable; it belongs in the realm of public discourse.

Not so the second moment in the dialectic. This is rather a wrestling of the soul with God in the particular choice of a state in life. Ignatius clearly hopes that the choice will be made in accordance with the way of Christ presented in the Two Standards. But clearly also the election is utterly individual, not general or communicable, not a matter for public discourse. We are in the area of my own freedom and much more of the sovereign freedom of God, and there is just no way either to push God around or to learn from public sources what his particular will is for me. Ignatius therefore develops his elaborate set of variables: I am to lengthen or shorten the different weeks, I am to fast or not fast, to use light or darkness, to adopt this or that posture in prayer, to try in a score of ways to tune in to the message God is transmitting to me along private lines of communication. Above all, there are the rules for the discernment of spirits; they are my spirits, the movements of my soul; they are not someone else's, not even the director's; they are not some general Zeitgeist. They are individual. The Spirit breathes where he wills and when he wills, with what message he wills. One may emerge from the Exercises with a decision to be a hermit, to join an apostolic order, to enter politics—in every case the call lies in the mysterious depths of God's particular will for that person, even though the decision be to join others with a similar call.

It is clear then that my paper has to study directly only the moment of dialectic involved in encountering the way of Christ along with others in a general invitation, and not the moment involved in wrestling with the divine angel in the here and now of a personal decision.

We are turning from Thomist tools of analysis to those provided by Lonergan's dialectic, and the simplest way to effect the transition is through the concepts of horizontal and vertical liberty. What Thomas deals with
in his end/means structure is horizontal liberty; what Lonergan deals with in his dialectic is vertical liberty. The latter could be described in Thomist terms as the substitution of one end for another. In the language of *Method*, however, it is a shift in horizons, a dismantling of the old and the establishing of a new, with a sequence that is not just genetic but dialectical; that is, it is not just a matter of successive stages of development, but a matter of the radical transformation we call conversion (1972:235-237, 106).

To effect this shift in horizons is going to take time and effort; Ignatius certainly thought so, for he spread the *Exercises* over thirty days (No. 4). But to analyze the shift in cool detachment is shorter and easier, at least as long as we can maintain our detachment. I propose to start with three rather general headings. First, the motive power. In Thomist analysis this is supplied by the dynamism of spirit open to the intelligible, to the true, to the good; and we are not to forget that the openness is that of spirit graced by God. Dialectical analysis uses the same dynamism and follows its unfolding through experience, understanding, and judgment, leading to affective response. While the first three specialties of *Method* are out of place here, there is something analogous to them in the contemplation of scenes from the life of Christ (experience), the effort to realize what they mean (understanding), and the sense of what has taken place in salvific history and my own life (judgment). So far we are close enough to St. Thomas. But dialectic adds not only response to the good but the element of personal encounter. In the fourth specialty of theology this means "meeting persons, appreciating the values they represent, criticizing their defects, and allowing one's living to be challenged at its very roots by their words and by their deeds" (Lonergan, 1972:247). This list, with the exception of the third item, is verified *par excellence* in the encounter with Christ which we
I4
eexperience in the Exercises. From both sides, the accent 
falls on the interpersonal, whether we start with God and 
his goodness, or from myself and my relation to God. This 
is true even in the First Week where I ponder what the 
Savior has done for me and ask what I should do for my 
Savior (No. 53). The element of challenge to something 
better is already present here, and it becomes channeled 
more effectively throughout the Second Week; thus, ten 
times in the three exercises beginning with that on the 
Incarnation Ignatius tells me I am to reflect on the Sav-
ior and draw some fruitful application to my own life 

A second heading is the structure of the dialectic. 
Here there is a remarkable parallel between dialectic as a 
theological task and the structured process of the Igna-
tian exercise on the Two Standards. For to this exercise 
we certainly bring an assembly of materials from the life 
of Christ; there is certainly the completion of experience, 
understanding, and judgment by the factor of evaluation, 
though the four are not distinct tasks in the Exercises as 
they are in the specialties of theology. But there is 
more: the exercise on the Two Standards can be taken as 
the counterpart in prayer of Method's comparison, reduc-
tion, classification, and selection of positions. Christ 
and Satan are set in contrast; their ways of operating are 
reduced to fundamental patterns; the two conflicting pat-
terns offer alternative horizons to enable me to locate 
myself accurately in regard to the horizon of Christ. 
And, of course, in subsequent exercises I will develop the 
position I am expected to choose, the way of Christ, and 
will reverse the counterpositions through discovery and 
rejection of all that is incompatible with the position.

A third and very tentative heading is dialectic as 
method. Here Father Lonergan seems to distinguish encoun-
ter with the past and encounter with contemporaries who 
are engaged with us in study of the same past. Since 
method requires a collaborative effort, it is on the
second member that the emphasis falls, and he writes: "it is only through the movement towards cognitional and moral self-transcendence, in which the theologian overcomes his own conflicts, that he can hope to discern the ambivalence at work in others and the measure in which they resolved their problems." In a reciprocal action, "it is through knowledge and appreciation of others that we come to know ourselves and to fill out and refine our apprehension of values" (1972:252-253). Is there a counterpart to this collaborative effort of contemporaries in the making of the Exercises? The question could be made specific by asking about the value of making the Exercises in common with others and by adding spiritual socializing to one's private prayer. As far as I know, Ignatius never envisaged such a practice, but development in that direction might take place, and then the notion of dialectic might prove a useful tool to render the practice methodical. Remaining closer to the Ignatian idea, we could look on the saints as our collaborators, and in some sense contemporary with us, since we all study the same message from the past; then surely our encounter with them is illuminating for our self-knowledge, and perhaps we would also speak cautiously of discerning the ambivalence at work in them. With regard to the study of Christ himself, it is clear that this is our chief means of discovering our own inauthenticity and resolving our conflicts; we would not speak of inauthenticity in him, but a theological question might be raised on the relation of his understanding to intellectual conversion, and the theological question might have repercussions in prayer. We are far from the beaten path here, but these vague possibilities also serve to suggest the latent force of dialectic.

Now I wish to focus on a point of the highest interest for theology as public discourse: the question of doctrines. It seems to me that here the Exercises provide a concrete instance of dialectic at work, that the dialectical process is very similar in theology and in the
Exercises, and that there is reciprocal illumination, with
the theological notion enabling us to analyze better what
happens in the Exercises, and the concrete case-study of
the Exercises enabling us to understand better the nature
and role of dialectic.

Begin with dialectic as it operates in theology. In
Lonergan's presentation there is not only a clear path
from dialectic through foundations to doctrines; there
seems to be even a kind of natural unity in these three
tasks. At any rate he links them in the following way:
"There are theological doctrines reached by the applica-
tion of a method that distinguishes functional specialties
and uses the functional specialty, foundations, to select
doctrines from among the multiple choices presented by the
functional specialty, dialectic" (1972:298) /16/.

Now the Two Standards (I return always to that exer-
cise which is so central to my study) is directly con-
cerned with doctrines, if we take doctrines in the broad
sense of judgments of fact and of value, judgments of
human ways, of Christ's example, of God's guidance, etc.
The grace the exercitant asks for in this exercise is
knowledge of the deceits of the evil one, and knowledge
of the true life which the supreme and truthful Leader
makes visible (No. 149). This is a petition for doctrine,
and the doctrine turns out to be a rather remarkable one:
that love of wealth leads to desire for honors, which in
turn leads to pride and so to the whole gamut of sin, but
that Christ's way follows the exactly opposite course,
from love of poverty to desire for humble position and so
to humility and the whole range of virtues (Nos. 142,
146).

It is the very strangeness and unexpectedness of this
doctrine that makes it so useful as a case-study for gras-
ping what dialectic is and does. For the question arises:
How on earth does one ever arrive at such a doctrine and
make it his own? It is certainly not an element in the
patrimony of wisdom handed down in our schools. It is not
a doctrine operative in our everyday world of striving to make a living and get ahead a little, much less in the world of industry, commerce, and finance, not even in that of the professions, or of the arts and sciences. Of course, we know the answer, through either a real or a notional apprehension. We arrive at this doctrine in a dialectical process that simply dismantles one's old horizon, the one founded on the mentality of Horatio Alger stories, and establishes a new one that is learned from Christ with the help of the interpreting saints. I spoke of real or notional apprehension of this process, using Newman's terms. The apprehension is real if we have experienced the extraordinary light this exercise of the Two Standards throws on our past, revealing it, perhaps in its personal inauthenticity, but certainly in its profound conflict with the way of Christ. It is notional if we notice that it is the sort of thing the saints keep saying, and if, in our Catholic piety toward them, we recognize that they have got hold of something worthwhile.

I called this doctrine of the Two Standards a case-study. I had thought of calling it a paradigm. I hesitate over both words. The difficulty, very simply stated, is that, however public the case or paradigm, the efficacy with which it works depends entirely on the subject. We are moving inevitably, once we start using cases or paradigms, toward a dialectical involvement in which you and I as persons encounter one another face to face; that is, you and I here and now in this Workshop, I with my values and my degrees of authenticity and inauthenticity, you with yours. There is no way we can engage in theology, deploying the full potential of the first four steps of Method and avoid this kind of encounter; the only alternative is to retreat to the safe and guarded area of the first three tasks as practiced in religious studies.

If we understand dialectic as I have explained it (and so far my purpose has been simple exposition), a host of possibilities arises, first as questions, and then,
given certain answers, as proposals and policies in theology and the church. For example, the question of pluralism: There are many schools of spirituality, each fully dedicated to the study of the way of Christ, each, nevertheless, discovering its own distinctive understanding of that way. Will theology, even as fully public discourse, likewise admit of a number of schools of doctrine corresponding to different apprehensions of value? Which is a way of asking whether there will be a number of denominations each with its own grace from God given and accepted according to its own situation, psychological, social, cultural, etc. Again, there is the question of Christian conversion. We hear complaints that Method does not deal with it. This, perhaps, is a complaint that Method is not two books instead of one, but it nevertheless raises the question: How would Christian conversion be understood in the context and terms of Method? Intellectual conversion is such a self-appropriation as allows us to relate common sense and theory in a philosophy of knowing what knowing is; moral conversion is such a self-appropriation as allows us to relate satisfactions and values in a moral self-transcendence that evaluates our evaluations; religious conversion is first God's taking possession of us and then our taking possession of the whole self and the whole natural world and orienting it to God. What is left under the heading of conversion? An orientation does not automatically provide a way; is it the way that is left? so that Christian conversion is a conversion to a way? In the Lucan message, Christianity is very much a "way" (hodos, Acts 9:2; 19:9; and passim); in both Thomist theology and Ignatian spirituality the way of Christ is a key notion and a key factor. Would this also correspond to our view of Christian conversion as it affects a method? To put the question in other words: Does Christian conversion involve a new realm of transcendence, or, instead, a link between the everyday realm and that of transcendence? Finally, would "horizon" become analogous in another way
if applied both to the transcendent and to the way to the transcendent?

Questions multiply on the side of theology, but others are raised on the side of the subject. Take one example. Doctrines are truly objective when they proceed from an authentic subject involving himself existentially. Subjectivity is methodically involved when there is self-appropriation by the subject. Such appropriation is achieved by practice: "One has to produce in oneself the corresponding operation. One has to keep producing it until one gets beyond the object intended to the consciously operating subject" (Lonergan, 1977:15). But just here the fourth level of consciousness, on which dialectic is operative, presents a real problem. We can quite easily practice experiencing; we have only to open and close our eyes repeatedly. We can practice understanding, though not so easily; we have to make up problems and puzzles, or find them in a book. To practice judgment is still more difficult; in the nature of the case the judgmental process has to be slow and thorough, concerned with the real world instead of the fictitious one of artificial problems, and so cases for practice do not come readily to hand. But when we turn to decision it seems that cases for practice are excluded on principle. If it is a real decision, it involves me existentially, and then it is no mere "practice"; if it is a mere exercise, an example chosen for the practice, then it is no real decision, for it does not involve me existentially. The paradox: The practice of decision, by the very fact that it is merely practice, is no practice at all.

Of course, the situation is not desperate. I believe that in group dynamics they cook up artificial situations and give you a role to play which more or less successfully simulates an existential involvement. Besides, as a student to whom I explained this paradox said to me, we involve ourselves every day in every real decision we make, even the small ones. And one can advert to those
decisions later for purposes of self-appropriation. But I believe my paradox remains to block any formal exercises in dialectic, and I think it is worth pondering, for it brings home to us the demands that the fourth level is going to make on us, if ever we start doing theology on that level. As Philip McShane said apropos of some essays he edited: "What then is Lonergan getting at? The uncomfortable answer is that Lonergan is getting at you and me" (7). The discomfort can be acute in dialectic. Another way of putting it: Lonergan's Method can be conceived as an organon in the generic style of Aristotle's organon or Bacon's. But it is an organon with a difference. Those of Aristotle and Bacon are comparatively tame affairs, as impersonal almost as a slide-rule or a table of logarithms; Lonergan's, carried to the level of encounter, and it is integral only if you carry it to that level, becomes automatically a personal involvement with others.

I have been led to speak of using Method as an organon in doing theology, but now I wish to leave theology proper aside, to return to my starting-point, and speak again of the study of Method itself and, more generally, of the area of Lonergan studies. In my introduction I first suggested that a good way to approach these studies was to apply to Lonergan the first four specialties of his method, and I then stated that my own paper was to be an exercise in interpretation. I would like to repeat my suggestion of a general approach through the four tasks, insisting that I am raising a serious academic question, not just having a cozy chat with those who may form an in-group, or exercising diplomacy toward those who may feel like outsiders. For example, this year, as every year, hundreds of students will begin graduate dissertations in philosophy or theology. Would it bring a much-needed clarity to their work if they got hold of the four specialties and determined for themselves with the help of this set of concepts just what they are doing, and indeed what they are competent to do in their situation?
As for my own paper, I suspect that it is going to seem to you, because of the enthusiasm with which I applied the notion of dialectic to the *Exercises*, that I have gone considerably beyond interpretation, even beyond dialectic, and have been advancing a personal position. It is true that ideas tend to exercise their own persuasion, but then we have to reflect all the more carefully to assign them their proper role. We must make haste slowly. A danger I see in Lonergan studies at the moment, whether you are sympathetic or unsympathetic, is that of trying to move too fast, and I wish to reserve my inalienable right to lag behind. Let us reflect a little, therefore, on what I have done; it may indeed help us get a firmer grasp of what the four tasks really are. I do not deny that I made judgments, but they were judgments of the kind that belong to interpretation: that this is what Lonergan's dialectic means, and that this is the way it appears in the *Exercises*. I do not deny my enthusiasm for the notion of dialectic or even my opinion that it is where the action will be in theology. It is part of getting hold of an idea that it be a moving experience, but surely we know by now what is needed to add committed judgment and evaluation to the exhilaration of an idea or of an opinion. One could go on with this list of specifications, but it is simpler just to say that research, interpretation, and history in the field of Lonergan studies are really just beginning, and that we are far from ready to begin dialectic here. For my own part I am still trying to clarify what dialectic is. My analysis of the Ignatian *Exercises* gives some clue to its nature and to its application in one area, but I have not tested my work in the cross-light from other analyses /17/, or studied the modifications the notion might undergo in application to an Irenaeus, a Tertullian, or a modern Christian thinker. The more I realize the magnitude of the task before us, the more willing I become to limit my contribution to one small increment; that is all this paper is intended to be /18/. 
NOTES

/1/ In Lonergan's own view, "the eight specialties...would be relevant to any human studies that investigated a cultural past to guide its future" (1971:233). By a simple extension the specialties, especially the first four of them, may be applied to the study of any thinker in the cultural field.

/2/ By the phrase, spiritual exercises, Ignatius refers to examination of one's conscience, praying, preparing one's soul to find the divine will, etc. He arranged his set of exercises in four weeks, in which the object of reflection is successively: sin and its consequences, the public life of Christ, the passion of Christ, the resurrection and ascension of Christ. The four weeks are enclosed by a kind of prologue (Principle and Foundation) and a kind of epilogue (Contemplation to Gain Love). Certain key exercises are regarded as Ignatian specialties: those on the Kingdom of Christ, on the Two Standards, etc. The book also contains a great deal of ascetic advice, rules for the conduct of life, etc.

Editions of this little work are legion; a recent and authoritative one is found in Monumenta Historica Societatis Issu, vol. 100, Institutum Historicum Societatis Iesu, Rome, 1969. This gives four of the most ancient texts (including the autograph) in parallel columns, and adds the paragraph numbers that have become standard; I will use a manual edition with Fr. Roothaan's translation (Versio litteralis--from the autograph, Bruges, 1932), but will add the numbers found in the 1969 Monumenta edition.

/3/ One can complicate this issue as much as one pleases, according to his capacity for doing so; I shall return to it at the end of my paper.

/4/ The history of the book's emergence has been studied by H. Pinard de la Boullaye. The influence of St. Thomas may be estimated in a general way from the fact that Ignatius wrote it into his Constitutions (Quarta Pars, c. xiv, n. 1) that In theologia legetur Vetus et Novum Testamentum, et doctrina scholastica divi Thomae. See also note /6/ infra.

/5/ The centrality of the election, sometimes neglected in the past, is now accepted (see Fessard, 1956:32-33; and Rahner: 89).

/6/ Direct reference to St. Thomas appears in the Rules for the Discernment of Spirits (No. 330), where Ignatius added a note to an early Latin version, invoking the Prima secundae of St. Thomas, q.9, aa.1 & 6, and q.10, a.4 (see Fessard, 1956:261).
It is true that Thomas is more directly concerned with moral principles than with the will's orientation to good.

No. 48: *petere pudorem et confusionem*; No. 55: *petere magnum et intensum dolorem*; No. 61: *proponendo... emendationem*; and No. 65: *poscere intimum sensum poenae... ne in peccatum deveniam*.

The Christology of St. Thomas, especially its place in an integral theology, has come under attack in various manners which do not concern us here, and something analogous has happened to the Christ of Ignatius as presented by Fessard (1956). So, at least, G. Martelet, who makes the case that Christ has been reduced to a result of sin.

The Two Standards are those of Christ and Satan. It is not that the exercitant is to choose between the two as such, but between the apparently neutral first steps by which each would lead us his way.

Each of the Three Pairs is uneasy about a sum of money acquired, not dishonestly but not purely for the love of God either; they all want to set things straight; the differences lie in their readiness to take the means. (There is no agreed explanation why Ignatius chose pairs instead of individual persons to represent the three types.)

On this analysis, the exercise on the Three Degrees of Humility (Nos. 162-168) belongs with the Third and Fourth Weeks, for it clearly focuses on being with Christ with no "purpose" being served, no *bonum* to be acquired. Why then does it direct us to be with Christ suffering, instead of with Christ in glory, and why is it inserted here in the Second Week (before the election, Ignatius says, No. 164)? My surmise is that, whereas we will have eternity to rejoice with Christ, we have only a short life on earth to be with him in his sorrow and pain; the election should be made in accordance with this limitation.

A classic expositor of St. Thomas on this question was Jacques Maritain (chap. 3); a more recent one is John W. Glaser (see 746-751).

In his commentary on Aristotle, Thomas tends to speak of action following necessarily on the practical syllogism (*In VII Eth.*, lect. 3, Nos. 1345-1346); in his independent work he is more cautious (1-2, q.10, a.2).

I am thinking of Lonergan's remark in *Insight* (xiii): "In constructing a ship or a philosophy one has to go the whole way." Surely the same principle holds when
one proceeds in the opposite direction to perform an analysis. But the situation may be saved by an accurate anticipation of the omitted part; in any case, as Ignatius says in the *Exercises* (No. 18): "We just haven't time to do everything."

/L6/ See also 349: "to use foundations as a criterion for deciding between the alternatives offered by dialectic."

/L7/ There are many of these, which I have not had space or time to discuss. Among the most relevant would surely be those of Fessard and Rahner (see note /5/ supra). Fessard's work, however, differs from mine as much (at least) as Hegel's dialectic differs from Lonergan's, and that difference seems to produce results that leave us poles apart. Rahner's work, on the contrary (it is the third chapter: The Logic of Concrete Individual Knowledge in Ignatius Loyola), is much more directly related to what I have tried to do; except that I studied what I called the "public" moment in the dialectic of the *Exercises*, where Rahner studied the strictly individual moment.

/L8/ These paragraphs refine a bit my position at the Boston College Lonergan Workshop of 1974, but I would like to repeat one idea expressed there: that it is a part of a study of Lonergan's *Method* to test it in action; when are we going to begin that implementation in theology?
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THE PSYCHOLOGICAL PRESENT OF THE ACADEMIC COMMUNITY

Philip McShane

PREFACE

If there is to be a massive shift in public minding and kindliness and discourse in the next century, there must be a proportionate shift in the mind and heart of the academy and the arts at the end of this century, with consequent changes in operating schemes of recurrence from government to kindergarten. This two-part essay deals in preliminary fashion with elements of the academic shift /1/. The first part was written for a Halifax Lonergan Conference on Interdisciplinary Philosophy, October 1975. Distributed through that part there are seven sections (A-G) which were the original summary of that paper. That summary in fact indicated that the problem was larger than one of interdisciplinary philosophy, and so, the seventh section of the summary (see p. 44 below) leads naturally to the problems of the second part.

I append here immediately three texts from the writings of Fr. Lonergan which I selected as keynote texts for the three parts of the work. As the paper emerged, the texts turned out to be surprisingly more apt than I had originally envisaged.

Part I The Psychological Present of the Interdisciplinary Philosopher

"Philosophy is the flowering of the individual's rational consciousness in its coming to know and take possession of itself. To that event, its traditional schools, its treatises, and its history are but contributions; and without that event they are stripped of real significance. It is this aspect of personal development that the scientist turning to philosophy is, perhaps, most likely to overlook" (1957:429).
Part II The Psychological Present of the Contemporary Academic

"The goal of the method is the emergence of explicit metaphysics in the minds of particular men and women. It begins from them as they are, no matter what that might be. It involves a preliminary stage that can be methodical only in the sense in which a pedagogy is methodical, that is, the goal and the procedure are known and pursued by a teacher but not by the pupil. The preliminary stage ends when the subject reaches an intelligent and reasonable self-affirmation. Such self-affirmation is also self-knowledge" (1957:401).

Part III The Psychological Present of the Contemporary Theologian

"In both Barth and Bultmann, though in different manners, there is revealed the need for intellectual as well as moral and religious conversion. Only intellectual conversion can remedy Barth's fideism. Only intellectual conversion can remove the secularist notion of scientific exegesis represented by Bultmann. Still, intellectual conversion is not enough. It has to be made explicit in a philosophic and theological method, and such an explicit method has to include a critique both of the method of science and of the method of scholarship" (1972:318).

I. The Psychological Present of the Interdisciplinary Philosopher

A. A first context is the mood of Husserl's search for "intentional origins and unities of the formation of meaning," of Jasper's "standpoint of the encompassing," of Heidegger's stress on mindfulness of, care of, being.

In this first part I would like to share a mood of inquiry and also to indicate general and specific directions of solution to contemporary problems of methodology. The mood I wish to share is one which I find most sympathetically present in the German existentialist tradition. Insofar as one has shared that tradition, not merely in scholarly stance but in the resonance of carefilled
reading which Bachelard so well intimates (14, 21, 39, 47, 83), one needs no more than this hint. Insofar, however, as one fits into the general mood of the contemporary academy with its less than encompassing stance (see Knauss), not a hint but a horizon-shift is required. And if it is a horizon-shift that is required, I have no illusion about specifying it for and in a reader in the introductory remarks of a paper. Fichte's "Sun-clear statement to the Public at large concerning the true nature of the Newest Philosophy. An attempt to force the reader to an understanding," has the air of such an illusion. Sun-clarity in the present issue results only from a life-long self-attentive climb out of the present cultural cave. What is it to care for, to be mindful of, being? The answer is a mustard-seeded personal history of adult-growing anamnesis and prolepsis which may be mainly before one (see McShane: 1977). I recall here, as symbol, the recollected "man on giant stilts" at the conclusion of Proust's novel (1123). I recall, as model, Husserl's life work /2/. Husserl, in his last great incomplete work, specifies the problem with which my paper deals, that of the psychological present of the interdisciplinary philosopher, in terms of recollection as a strategy of reaching "the intentional origins and unities of the formation of meaning." "Recollection, above all, exercises the intentional function of forming the meaning of the past....Like-wise, in expectation or anticipatory recollection, again understood as an intentional modification of perception (the future is a present-to-come), is found the meaning-formation from which arises the ontic meaning of that which is in the future. And the deeper structure of this can be revealed in more detail. This represents the beginnings of new dimensions of temporalization...." (168-169).

Successfully incarnated, the new dimension of temporalization grounds what Jaspers would term a contemporary axial shift (1953: chap. 1), what Lonergan speaks of when
he discusses the two times of the temporal subject (1964a: 199). Therein is grounded the possibility and probability (see Lonergan, 1957:119-120) of an epochal shift in the control of meaning (see Lonergan, 1967b:255-256), and part of that probability is the concrete possibility of asking and answering with contemporary precision Jasper's basic question: "Beyond asking: 'what is Being?', he asks: 'How can we and must we think Being if we want to speak of Being?'" (Knauss: 167).

B. A second context is the Popper-Kuhn controversy regarding normal and revolutionary science, as paradigmatic of contemporary normal metascience. (See Lakatos and Musgrave [eds.], where Popper, Kuhn, Toulmin, etc., revisit Kuhn's The Structure of Scientific Revolutions).

The previous context, mounting to that final care-filled question, is remote from the controversy to which we now turn, and it is deeply foreign to most English-speaking philosophy. But I would note that this large community unavoidably speaks about being, and speaks about speaking about being, even as it rules out such speech. What Lonergan remarks about Leslie Dewart is a generally valid thesis. I quote at length because, I would suggest, it is an extremely good starting point for tackling the opaqueness regarding truth mentioned in the fifth section: Tarski too is strangely silent on judgments (see 53, where he indicates his primary interest in the notion of truth for sentences).

I have no doubt that concepts and judgments (on judgments I find Dewart strangely silent) are the expression of one's accumulated experience, developed understanding, acquired wisdom; and I quite agree that such expression is an objectification of one's self and of one's world.

I would urge, however, that this objectification is intentional. It consists in acts of meaning. We objectify the self by meaning the self, and we objectify the world by meaning the world. Such meaning of its nature is related to a meant, and what is meant may or may not correspond to what in fact is so. If it corresponds, the meaning is true. If it does not
correspond, the meaning is false. Such is the correspondence view of truth, and Dewart has managed to reject it without apparently advert-
ing to it. So eager has he been to impugn what he considers the Thomist theory of knowledge that he has overlooked the fact that he needed a correspondence view of truth to mean what he said.

Let me stress the point. Dewart has written a book on the future of belief. Does he mean the future of belief, or something else, or nothing at all? (1974a:15)

The question of a correspondence metaview of truth coterminous with a basic position on being (see Lonergan, 1957:388) will occupy us later. Immediately however I wish to note a more evident parallel. The contributors to the volume Criticism and the Growth of Knowledge have written a book about the past, present, and future of science and indeed of scientific belief. Do they mean the past, present and future of science? Or what do they mean? Of what, from what, do they speak? The questions point to the key implicit problem of the volume we are considering, and of the Kuhn-Popper tradition of the philosophy of science. That problem and these questions deserve detailed and lengthy treatment which I would hope to give later /3/. But here I will remain impressionistic.

Margaret Masterman, in an illuminating contribution to the volume in question, notes a certain aggressiveness in the various contributions, and permits herself "a little pro-Kuhn aggressiveness" (61). I too feel that I might indulge in what may be called a little honest aggressiveness.

I first came across Kuhn's The Structure of Scientific Revolutions when I was in Oxford in the mid-sixties. The book failed to impress me. The failure was related to the fact that I had come to it from a background of mathematical science and of a mode of metascientific reflection related to the third context. I could of course sympathize with Kuhn more than I could with Popper, and here I would echo Masterman's delightful aggressiveness: "the one thing working scientists are not going to do is to change their
ways of thinking, in doing science, *ex more philosophico*, because they have Popper and Feyerabend pontificating at them like eighteenth-century divines; particularly as both Popper and Feyerabend normally pontificate at even more than eighteenth-century length" (60). I sympathize with Kuhn because, as Masterman indicates, "Kuhn has really looked at actual science" (59) just as "Lakatos, in *Proofs and Refutations*, has introduced a new complexity and real- ism into our conception of mathematics, because he has taken a closer look at what mathematicians really do" (60). Yet my sympathy is limited to the degree that the manner of "looking at", "talking about", of this struggling tra- dition has the radical (see Lonergan, 1957:356-359; 1972, index, under Notions) limitations to be specified by rais- ing such questions as are already raised above: of what, from what, are they talking? in what sense are they look- ing?

Kuhn asserts that his and Popper's views of science "are very nearly identical. We are both concerned with the dynamic process by which scientific knowledge is ac- quired rather than with the logical structure of the pro- ducts of scientific research" (1). From the first context I would raise the issue of the measure of their concern; anticipating the third context I would question the seri- ousness of their focus on the dynamic process. One might perhaps describe their handicap as that of a deeply em- bedded tradition of detached conceptualism. Toulmin de- scribes well one facet of that limited care: "The term *concept* is one that everybody uses and nobody explains-- still less defines. On the one hand, the word has famil- iar currency in twentieth century history and sociology, psychology and philosophy alike. For many twentieth- century philosophers, indeed, concepts provide their cen- tral subject matter, their very bread and butter....Many of them would even describe the central task of philosophy itself as being that of conceptual analysis. Yet, despite all their scrupulous care in the actual practice of
conceptual analysis, the precise meaning of the terms "concept" and "conceptual" is rarely made explicit and frequently left quite obscure" (8).

The limitation runs deeply through European intellectual history by way of Plato, Neo-Platonism, and the pervasive influence of Scotus (see Lonergan, 1967c:25-26, note 122). Such an influence leads with a narrowing cogency to the mistaken identification of the task of philosophy as conceptual analysis. The struggling tradition I speak of is limited by the near-dogmatic presence of the mood of that mistake, but it is gradually bringing forth the possibility and probability of locating the task of philosophy as an elucidation, not of concept, but of process, not of "Whiteheadian" process, but of intellectual process (see Lonergan: 1964a, 1957, 1967c, 1972).

Lakatos describes his own development of interest in a manner that usefully intimates that emerging probability /4/, and so I quote the description at length.

The problem of continuity in science was raised by Popper and his followers long ago. When I proposed my theory of growth based on the idea of competing research programmes, I again followed, and tried to improve, Popperian tradition. Popper himself, in his (1934), had already stressed the heuristic importance of "influential metaphysics," and was regarded by some members of the Vienna Circle as a champion of dangerous metaphysics. When his interest in the role of metaphysics revived in the 1950's, he wrote a most interesting "metaphysical Epilogue" about "metaphysical research programmes" to his Postscript: After Twenty Years—in galleys since 1957. But Popper associated tenacity not with methodological irrefutability but rather with syntactical irrefutability. By "metaphysics" he meant syntactically specifiable statements like "all-some" statements and purely existential statements. No basic statements could conflict with them because of their logical form. For instance, "for all metals there is a solvent" would, in this sense, be "metaphysical," while Newton's theory of gravitation, taken in isolation, would not be. Popper, in the 1950's, also raised the problem of how to criticize metaphysical theories and suggested solutions. Agassi and Watkins published several interesting
papers on the role of this sort of "metaphysics" in science, which all connected "metaphysics" with the continuity of scientific progress. My treatment differs from theirs first because I go much further than they in blurring the demarcation between (Popper's) "science" and (Popper's) "metaphysics": I do not even use the term "metaphysical" any more. I only talk about scientific research programmes whose hard core is irrefutable not necessarily because of syntactical but possibly because of methodological reasons which have nothing to do with logical form. Secondly, separating sharply the descriptive problem of the psychologico-historical role of metaphysics from the normative problem of how to distinguish progressive from degenerating research programmes, I elaborate the latter problem further than they had done." (183-184)

Lakatos focuses his attention on the methodology of scientific research programs, such programs consisting of methodological rules: some tell us what paths of research to avoid (negative heuristic), and others what paths to pursue (positive heuristic)" (132). In such focusing, and in the wish to "only talk about research programmes whose hard core is irrefutable" there is certainly an advance. But there remains that central opaqueness which calls for the questions, of what, from what, does he talk and mean? What is his psychological present?

C. A third context is the emergence (1928-76) of the psychological present of Lonergan.

"Numberless experiences extending over several years are gradually co-ordinated...and the total synthetic whole finds expression, it may be, on some particular occasion. ...A genius may be defined as a man who is exceptionally rich in recoverable contexts" (Sullivan: 85).

I quote, not without purpose, from Sullivan's account of Beethoven's spiritual development: the quotation grounds an evident and fruitful parallel, but also a reaching for a less evident twist of meaning related to the twist of Jasper's axial period. The twist of meaning will be specified somewhat better in the next sections, but we must begin that specification immediately.
I speak in this section of a third context, and that third context has to do with the spiritual development of "a man who is exceptionally rich in recoverable contexts." But this third context cannot personally be glimpsed unless one seeks within oneself for "a needed clarification of the notion of the spiritual" (Lonergan, 1957:647). That clarification is reached by grasping that "the adjective, intelligible, may be employed in two quite different senses. Ordinarily it denotes what is or can be understood, and in that sense the content of every act of conceiving is intelligible. More profoundly, it denotes the primary component in an idea; it is what is grasped inasmuch as one is understanding; it is the intelligible ground or root or key from which results intelligibility in the ordinary sense. Moreover, there is a simple test for distinguishing between the ordinary and the profounder meaning of the name, intelligible. For the intelligible in the ordinary sense can be understood without understanding what it is to understand; but the intelligible in the profounder sense is identical with the understanding, and so it cannot be understood without understanding what understanding is" (Lonergan, 1957:646-647, 515-520). That clarification in turn gives rise to some little appreciation of the fact that while the spiritual development of Beethoven did not require, much less pivot on, the presence of a similar clarification in Beethoven, in Lonergan's spiritual development the reaching and ever-fuller reaching of that clarification was the centerpiece of that development.

I have used, in the previous sentence, the words "some little" in relation to our appreciation. In doing so I take a stand which puts me out of sympathy with the predominant mood of the contemporary academy. That mood would expect here a summary instead of a set of pointers. Whereas, indeed, I have no intention of giving a clear set of pointers here—they are available elsewhere /5/--my intention is to intimate, to raise the question of, a counter-mood. It is a counter-mood only secondarily relevant to
the study of Bernard Lonergan: primarily it is relevant to one's own adult growth. The incarnate questing of that counter-mood might well initially be focused, by student or professor alike, in such elementary existential questions as, what is a doctoral dissertation, a beginning or an end? Is contemplative intellectual growth an accelerating accretion of insight to habitual insight, mediated by an axial shift, so that grown wisdom's articulation is little more than an invitation to ascend, or is intellectual growth a matter of diminishing returns, the addition of grey-haired footnotes to a tired world view? /6/.

Sympathy with the counter-mood is easier to win in the field of music than in the field of mind: it seems easier to admit the feebleness of our resonance with a great composer than to admit it in relation to a great thinker /7/. Yet it is not foolish but human to make that admission in the second case. Is what Sullivan says of Beethoven in the realms of music only implausibly applied in the realms of mind? "The human mind may be likened to some kind of multiple plant, here in full bloom, there still in bud. Different minds have flowered in different ways. Beethoven had reached relative maturity in directions where those of us who respond to him are still in the stage of embryonic growth. And in some people, it is obvious, there is no germ of consciousness akin to the state of awareness manifested by the late Beethoven" (150) /8/.

I may usefully recall now some of my own earlier gropings towards what I would now name the psychological present of the elder interdisciplinary philosopher or theologian, normatively speaking. There is the fact that "all we know is somehow with us; it is present and operative within our knowing, but it lurks behind the scenes..." (Lonergan, 1957:278). There is the eccentric achievement of James Joyce: his friends of the 1930s recorded their impression of him at work and bore witness to the fact that "he held an incredibly complex form of the *Wake* in his mind
as a single image, and could move from one section to another with complete freedom" (Litz: 92-93). And, to return to the field of music, there is the manner in which a temporally structured composition challenges our "disposition to the present," to use a phrase of Schenker: "We know how difficult it is to grasp the meaning of the present if we are not aware of the temporal background. It is equally difficult for the student or performer to grasp the "present" of a composition if he does not include at the same time a knowledge of the background. Just as the demands of the day toss him to and fro, so does the foreground of a composition pull at him. Every change of sound and figuration, every chromatic shift, every neighbour note signifies something new to him. Every novelty leads him further away from the coherence which derives from the background" (Schenker: 180). I recall, further, that in the composition Method in Theology there is a Background and a Foreground, and that the Background is a set of instrumental acts of meaning inviting the theologian or philosopher towards a self-constitution which would redeem him or her from the trivialization of the novelty of the Foreground. Finally, to come full circle—in good Joycean Viconesque fashion!—I would recall F. E. Crowe's remark regarding the two parts of Insight, that the first part is liable to be neglected and the second part disputed (1957), and give that remark this new context.

What I am touching on here is the concrete possibility of absentmindedness or presentmindedness, the meaning of both these depending on the meaning of "psychological present". What, then, is the psychological present?

The psychological present "is not an instant, a mathematical point, but a time-span, so that our experience of time is, not a raceway of instances, but a now leisurely, a now rapid succession of overlapping time-spans...whether slow and broad or rapid and short, the psychological present reaches into its past by memories
and into its future by anticipations" (Lonergan, 1972:177). Such is Lonergan's indication of the nature of the psychological present. One may recall here my earlier quotation from Husserl. Yet the psychological present achieved by Lonergan leaves clearly behind the opaqueness concerning fact that haunted the mind of Husserl. Constitutive of the spiritual that is the kernel of mind is understanding, and in particular that reflective understanding by which we grasp the unconditioned, "and inasmuch as we are grasping the unconditioned, we are attaining the lucid, fully rational factualness that contrasts so violently with the brute factualness with which instances similar in all respects still are different instances, with which the multiplicity of the continuum is non-countable because non-ordinable, with which actual frequencies diverge from ideal frequencies in any manner provided it is non-systematic. But if insight and grasp of the unconditioned are constituted quite differently from the empirical residue, so also are the inquiry and critical reflection that lead to them and the conception and judgment that result from them and express them" (1957:517). But the lucidity, the constitution, the psychological present, and the spiritual development related to it, which are our concern here, are of a different order. It is a lucidity for which and from which the content of the previous quotation is habitually lucid. It is a lucidity, a psychological present, which emerges from the slow shift from presence to self to knowledge of self. It emerges from the habituation, with incarnate resonances, of the conception, affirmation and implementation of the heuristic that is the kernel spiritual self. Through that development the "position on being" becomes a present, serene and care-filled answer in the interweaving of questions and answers which is an actual context /9/.

There is more to be said in regard to such a psychological present, whether in regard to Fr. Lonergan's spiral /10/, or in regard to the vortex of its genesis in
ourselves /11/. But perhaps enough initial indication has been given. I may note in conclusion that the lucid reaching into the past by memories and into the future by anticipation of the human subject may take on all the subtlety of complexly differentiated consciousness (see Lonergan, 1972:252-262, 273-276, 303-305) and of functional specialization (see Lonergan, 1972: chap. 5 and Part Two).

D. The three contexts are related dialectically by a speaking of, and from, an actual context (see Lonergan, 1972:163) regarding actual contexts. This relating and speaking is identified as meaning, with third stage meaning (see Lonergan, 1972:94-99), a psychological present of the interdisciplinary philosopher.

How can one relate these three contexts? Obviously this is the question of the present section. Yet I would note that if I indicated a twist of meaning in the previous section, I move forward now in the actual context of that twist of meaning. The question of the present section is not one of actually relating but of the context and strategy of relating. The twist is most neatly indicated by the fact that I identify the metaunderstanding of context as the central issue of the relating of the contexts.

But what precisely is meant by the word, context? There are two meanings. There is the heuristic meaning the word has at the beginning of an investigation, and it tells one where to look to find the context. There is the actual meaning the word acquires as one moves out of one's initial horizon and moves to a fuller horizon that includes a significant part of the author's.

Heuristically, then, the context of the word is the sentence. The context of the sentence is the paragraph. The context of the paragraph is the chapter. The context of the chapter is the book. The context of the book is the author's opera omnia, his life and times, the state of the question in his day, his problems, prospective readers, scope, and aim.

Actually, context is the interweaving of questions and answers in limited groups." (Lonergan, 1972:163)
Actual context is in a mind, and the relevant actual context here must be one from which comes forth adequate dialectically-related speech regarding all contexts. Nor do we have here some shadow of the problem of the class of all classes. We have, not the problem of avoiding with Russell the semblance of conceptual self-inclusion, but the much deeper issue of reaching asymptotically towards intentional lumiosity, of achieving a dynamic perspective (see Lonergan, 1972: index under Perspectivism; 1973: index under Viewpoint) on science, scientists, and perspectives on science in the weave of history. It is the issue of context raised and heuristically contextualized by the author of the book Insight: "There is the noésis or intention intendens of pensée pensante that is constituted by the very activity of inquiring and reflecting, understanding and affirming, asking further questions and reaching further answers. Let us say that this noetic activity is engaged in a lower context when it is doing mathematics or following scientific method or exercising common sense. Then it will be moving towards an upper context when it scrutinizes mathematics or science or common sense in order to grasp the nature of noetic activity. And if it comes to understand and affirm what understanding is and what affirming is, then it has reached an upper context that logically is independent of the scaffolding of mathematics, science, and common sense. Moreover, it can be shown that the upper context is invariant...." (xxv-xxvi).

We may recall Lakatos's "focusing of attention" on method and his desire to "talk about" research programs. I may now specify my claim regarding the limitations of his project briefly and accurately as an absence in Lakatos of the adequate actual context, a context which can be mediated only by a serious admission of generalized empirical method (Lonergan, 1957:72, 243) /12/ as the strategy of attention-focusing and the source of more than descriptive "talk about". "Philosophy finds its proper data in intentional consciousness. Its primary function is to promote
the self-appropriation that cuts to the root of philosophic differences and incomprehensions. It has further, secondary functions in distinguishing, relating, grounding the several realms of meaning and, no less, in grounding the methods of the sciences and so promoting their unification" (Lonergan, 1972:95).

Yet not "it", not "philosophy", but you and I and the tradition struggling with the history and method of science must focus on that data, so that later generations may emerge, in a developed third stage meaning, to mean and speak with adequate presentmindedness of the past and future of science in history.

E. Issues relating to the truncated (see Lonergan, 1974b: 73) interdisciplinary philosophers' neglect of meaning and of the anthropological turn in the higher sciences are left to the other speakers. Essential elements in the genesis of the adequate psychological present of any interdisciplinary philosopher are indicated by reference to the two lower and the two middle sciences. Such essential elements are contrasted with contemporary metascientific opaqueness regarding truth, hierarchy theory, statistical science and the heuristics of evolution.

I can be legitimately brief here, for my indications are, fairly literally, by reference. What is at issue is a genetico-dialectic specification of the life of the interdisciplinary philosopher, and the mediation of his or her adult growth through the appropriation of the lower and middle sciences, and these are topics I have already dealt with at some length (see McShane: 1971; 1977: chap. 1).

Still, I would like to lay further emphasis on the "necessary beginning" (Lonergan, 1957:xxviii), however long it may take one /13/, which is the personal reaching of a coherent position on truth. Kuhn (265-266) sees Popper's acceptance of Tarski's semantic conception of truth as a fundamental difficulty, and rightly so. That fundamental difficulty lies at the heart not only of the Kuhn-Popper tradition's discussion of verification and
proof, but also of the main stream of contemporary theological, philosophical, and scientific confusion. One does not easily move out of that main stream.

The opaqueness regarding truth clouds all other metascientific issues, in particular those mentioned in the summary statement above. The most obvious way of handling the problem of the evident hierarchy of sciences and things is to deny through reductionism its ultimate relevance. But one may not be willing to settle for that cluster of errors. Then one joins forces with such system theorists as Ludwig von Bertalanffy (see Pattee). Evidently there are layers of systems corresponding to levels of science: but the metaevidence is as opaque as the systems theorists' view of truth. How, they may ask, are these layers linked? "Although the world appears to function as a whole, our best representations come out piecemeal. If the world is a whole there should be some complex, multilevel representation possible. The design of such a multilevel construct depends on a methodology for the valid organization of systems into suprasystems. Whereas the inverse problem of analytic resolution of a system into subsystems is readily treated by such top-down approaches as deduction, and single level systems are amenable through induction or statistical procedures, there is no corresponding technique for vertical bottom-up organization. This lacuna is a task for a new epistemology" (Wilson: 125-126). But the new epistemology requires as center the conception and affirmation of the isomorphism of knowing (with its term truth) and being. Only from this center can one think and speak with metaprecision of things, real things, entities, aggregates of entities, and the manner in which "a concrete plurality of lower entities may be the material cause from which a higher form is educed" (Lonergan, 1967a:20): clearheaded non-reductionism (see McShane, 1971: chap. 10). And only on the basis of that heuristic clarity can one build a precise and powerful principle of evolution.
F. Against this background one may move to a more precise specification of the adequate psychological present of the interdisciplinary philosopher, and the community of interdisciplinary philosophers, in the third stage of meaning.

If the reader is to some extent with me at this stage the meaning of the phrase "against this background one may move" will not be lost. The precise specification in question is the term of a decade and more of adult philosophical growth. Undoubtedly the basic possibility of the specification is rooted in the solitary searcher's anamnesis and prolepsis. But the more than random recurrence of successful search requires the linkage of community, and the basic shift in schedules of probability of adult philosophic growth requires the emergence of complex supporting schemes of recurrence (McShane, 1971: chap. 10). Such schemes are remote from present schemes. The scattered community of interdisciplinary philosophers in this immature period of the third stage of meaning is in the main characterizable by what Lonergan says of "undifferentiated consciousness in the later stages" of meaning (1972:97-99). As Berger remarks in his recent book, "it is, in principle, impossible to 'raise the consciousness' of anyone, because all of us are stumbling around on the same level of consciousness--a pretty dim level" (xii). His book, with the seventh section of the summary with which I presently conclude, provides an indicative context for the issues to be dealt with in part 2 of this essay. The book is a "Political ethics--in quest of a method" (the title of its final chapter), but the quest lacks basic strategy, and the method does not emerge. He does, however, focus attention on the need for intermediate structures: "The paramount task, as Durkheim saw, is the quest for intermediate structures as solutions to this dilemma of modern society--structures which will be intermediate between the atomized individual and the order of the state" (213).

Undoubtedly, in the short run, various partially adequate intermediate structures of living may emerge. But
for the long run, the longer cycle (Lonergan, 1957:226-242), the task and the quest must be itself incarnate in intermediate structures. That paramount task is not one for some community of interdisciplinary philosophers: it is the evident task, it seems to me, of the academy. It is a task of academic self-definition and self-constitution /14/. What is involved is a sophisticated functionally-differentiated Wendung zur Idee that, quite precisely, goes beyond present dreams.

G. At this stage interest is shifted to the community of academics, in their commitment to, and pursuit of, their particular disciplines. There emerges the suggestion that a personal and communal cultivation of the third context, above, in the mood of the first context, is vital to the countering of evident academic decay, vital to 21st century adult growth. Without that cultivation by the professionally non-philosophers, normal science and scholarship will remain under the muddled influence of a personal consciousness which is relatively compact, and of a normal metascience which is paradigmatically determined by a long-surviving tradition of what may be precisely defined as an absent-mindedness of professional philosophers.

II. The Psychological Present of the Contemporary Academic

"The emancipation of the methods of the other sciences and philosophies from trivialization or fanaticization is not done by any direct intervention in their methods by theology. Rather it is done indirectly and heuristically inasmuch as political theology would succeed in interrelating the intellectual praxis of science with the moral praxis of political social life and the religious praxis of ecclesial institutions. Theology would thereby be an instance of socio-critical concern within the academic world just as the church should be one within the political world. For it would oppose any conceptualism that would separate theory from praxis" (Lamb: 42).

The quotation from Fr. Lamb's work gives a tone to our present enterprise and also adds a further problematic context. One might shift from the sciences to the arts to
add further contexts: neither literary criticism nor music criticism are in good health (/15/). But I must leave such additions to the interests of different readers. The broad issue is the psychological present of academics.

Moreover, that broad issue increasingly manifests itself as an issue, not just of knowledge, but of values. As Joseph Haberer remarks, "For science, the age of innocence is over. That innocence to which J. Robert Oppenheimer alluded in his famous, if somewhat enigmatic, remark that 'scientists have known sin' (Oppenheimer: 88), began to disintegrate some decades before the blinding flash of Alamogordo..." (713). Peter Berger's book, already cited, makes the point with factual vigor, and his final thesis gives us yet another point of departure: "We need a new method to deal with questions of political ethics and social change (including those of development policy). This will require bringing together two attitudes that are usually separate--the attitudes of 'hard-nosed' analysis and of utopian imagination" (xiv). What I wish to do in this part is to add two more interlocking ongoing methodological contexts of Fr. Lonergan, under the titles "Generalized Empirical Method" and "From Implementation to Praxis." These contexts add a new precision to the meaning of "the growth of knowledge," but more particularly to the meaning of "criticism," and so we move in a brief penultimate section to a discussion of criticism. It is in that section that we spiral back into metatheological discussion, but perhaps the topic deserves a word here.

I do not think that a high percentage of contemporary theologians are psychologically present in the twentieth century. The same, of course, could be said of a large number of other academic subgroups such as generalist historians or students of literature. Herbert Butterfield is of the view that the scientific revolution of the sixteenth and seventeenth centuries "outshines everything since the rise of Christianity and reduces the Renaissance and
Reformation to the rank of mere episodes, more internal displacements, within the system of medieval Christianity" (vii and chap. X). Lonergan repeatedly draws attention to the mediation by science of adequate interiority: "The Greek achievement was needed to expand the capacities of commonsense knowledge and language before Augustine, Descartes, Pascal, Newman could make their commonsense contributions to our self-knowledge. The history of mathematics, natural science, and philosophy and, as well, one's personal engagement in all three are needed if both common sense and theory are to construct a scaffolding for an entry into the world of interiority" (1972:261-262). Below I note the possibility of a growing respect for empiricity, a respect which mediates a growing incarnate authentic nescience. I think that such adult growth is normally greatly mediated by the type of prolonged inquiry one has to do, say, in the most elementary science, physics, to arrive at the limited contemporary understanding of the electron. The contemporary theological community may not have both time and talent for such footholds on modernity, but surely there might be fostered some shift in statistics of educational schemes of recurrence of later generations of theologians.

A. Generalized Empirical Method

In *Insight*, generalized empirical method stands to the data of consciousness as empirical method stands to the data of sense (71, 243). In "Aquinas Today: Tradition and Innovation," Lonergan remarks that "*Insight* sets forth a generalized empirical method that operates principally on the data of consciousness to work out a cognitional theory, an epistemology and a metaphysics" (173). A little further on, he speaks of method's reversal of the priorities of logic: "Method reverses such priorities. Its principles are not logical propositions but concrete realities, namely, sensitively, intellectually, rationally, morally conscious subjects" (174).
In the three lectures, Religion, Theology, and Religious Studies, Lonergan returns at greater length to the topic of generalized empirical method. In the first lecture, it is defined as a method, "a normative pattern of related and recurrent operations that yield ongoing and cumulative results" and one may recall the slightly different definition of method in Method in Theology (4). But now "generalized empirical method operates on a combination of both the data of sense and the data of consciousness: it does not treat of objects without taking into account the corresponding operations of the subject; it does not treat of the subject's operations without taking into account the corresponding objects" (1976). It is a generalization of the notion of method, going behind the diverse methods of natural sciences and of history and hermeneutics, to discover the ground of their harmonious combination in human studies. Its appeal is "not to the individual subjectivity that is correlative to the world of immediacy but to the individual subjectivity that is correlative to the world mediated by meaning and motivated by value" (1976). And finally, in the context of a discussion of authentic and inauthentic traditions, Lonergan points out that "since disintegration and decay are not a private event, even generalized empirical method is experimental. But the experiment is conducted not by any individual, not by any generation, but by the historical process itself" (1976).

Now what seems to be going forward here is a growing respect and care, together with a thematization of that respect, for adequate and balanced empiricity. It is a many faceted growth and respect and its tracing in the thought of Lonergan is a task beyond our present effort. Fr. Crowe remarked in 1970, in an article very relevant to the present issue of ongoing learning, "there is no doubt that Lonergan's thinking has undergone a profound reorientation in the last five years, and that in a way which bears directly on the present question. If we take his
De Deo Trino to mark a kind of term in the prior phase and compare it with some of his later work, we find extremely significant differences. In the trinitarian treatise we read the assertion, like a kind of refrain, that theology rests on truths not data..." (26). In his reply to Fr. Crowe, Fr. Lonergan acknowledges a shift from truths to data, adding "this raises a complex issue that cannot be treated fully at once" (1971:224) and spelling out some aspects of the shift. The reorientation of Fr. Lonergan's thinking of the last five years would seem to be no less remarkable /17/. A casual following up of indices of recent volumes (1972; 1973; 1974c) reveals a growing emphasis on the relevance of method over that of static, though essential, logic. Again, there is the regular recalling, with growing detail (1975; 1976), of the shift from the Aristotelian notion of science to the modern notion: and here too I would note the difficulty of a serious appreciation of that shift without some personal involvement in the modern activity. "One may easily use the phrase 'Newtonian mood' but to enter into serious metadiscussion of the topic requires as a minimum some familiarity, e.g., with the integration of the Newtonian equations of motion" (McShane, 1975:96) /18/.

But now I would note an inverse difficulty: serious involvement with the equations of physics, or with any endeavor of science, scholarship or art, requires, in the modern problematic context, a personal thematization of the grounds of the shift. And both these difficulties are related, it seems to me, to what I have called Lonergan's growing respect for adequate balanced empiricity.

There are two aspects to this respect, the first being contextual to the second, and both being contextualized, as we shall see, by Praxis.

The first aspect is very much like a thematization of Aquinas's "It is all straw." What alone is invariant in mind is the concrete structure of intentionality in human subjects (Lonergan, 1972:19). The suprastructure that is
the ongoing and cumulative result of that dynamic structure, despite its present popular titleing as an explosion of knowledge and technology, is predominantly a frail network of elementary suspicions the most palatable of which are overhastily objectified in history's constructs and schemes of recurrence. In the article by Fr. Crowe already cited he puts forward a useful metaphor: "The dogmas are not a continent but a beachhead, not the sea of infinity but little islands scattered on the sea" (1971: 29). But the respect I am noting goes beyond the theological zone into all realms of human knowing and doing: we are each of us vortices of quest of very finite achievement in an infinite ocean.

The second aspect emerges when one considers that the respect is for an adequate and balanced empiricity. The respect is a subtle methodological respect, whose thematization expresses a strategy relevant to the "cultivation of the third context, above, in the mood of the first context" (see p. 44, above) by the community of academics.

Generalized empirical method, one might say, is academic method for the twenty-first century. How else can science and common sense be reoriented and transformed by metaphysics? (Lonergan, 1957:393). How else can there emerge a harmonious interlocking of the searchings and findings of sciences, scholarship, and the arts in human studies?

The problems of such reorientation, transformation and interweaving are enormous, but let me note here just one small aspect of them, which is present below the level of study of meaning as well as within it: the aspect of aggreformic expression, an expression to be born of clear-headed non-reductionism or aggreformism (see Pattee; Wilson; Lonergan: 1967b). I have indicated this problematic aspect of expression previously in some detail in sample areas of botany (McShane, 1977: chap. 1 at note 75), zoology (chap. 3, note 50) and musicology (chap. 2, text after note 65, especially quotation at note 80). Present
language there is in the main reductionist, mechanist, even cybernetic. Are we to expect a transformation of such language /21/ ab extrinseco, by encyclopedists of a new enlightenment? Or should we not hope that the academic be at the level of his time?

At all events, generalized empirical method invites him or her to be thus at the level of the times /22/. "It does not treat of objects without taking into account the corresponding operations of the subject; it does not treat of the subject's operations without taking into account the corresponding objects." It requires a balanced adequacy of empirical interest: otherwise one is, so to speak, walking through modernity with one overgrown leg in a cultural gutter /23/. That requirement and strategy grounds the cultivation of the mediation of interiority by science, scholarship, art; and vice versa. It is a strategy generative of Jasper's "standpoint of the encompassing," and of a more radical care.

But the question of the care of being leads us to our next topic, the pragmatic thematization of communal care.

B. From Implementation to Praxis

The book Insight was an implementation of a conception of metaphysics: "I would contend that the conception of metaphysics that has been implemented in the present work yields unique results" (735). The conception was constitutive, to a certain level of development /24/, of the writing subject. Moreover, the conception included a conception of implementation: "Explicit metaphysics is the conception, affirmation, and implementation of the integral heuristic structure of proportionate being" (391) /25/, features of that implementation being the transformation of common sense and science (392-395), of theology (Epilogue), indeed of history both written (530-531) and lived (227). Moreover, the conception of implementation included all the heuristic complexity of schedules of probabilities ranging over actual, probable, and possible schemes of recurrence,
things, environments, some of which possible schemes and environments included things that conceived of such implementation (209-211, 226-227, 698). Neither the implementation, however, nor the conception of implementation, were as fully mediated, rendered luminous, by the heuristic conception of the notion of value as they are by Lonergan now /26/.

In the Epilogue to The Shaping of the Foundations, I took up briefly this issue of the inclusion of implementation within metaphysics and noted that, since the metaphysical enterprise was sublated in the new enterprise of Method in Theology, there would be a refinement of the task of implementation. Indeed, the second phase of theology seemed likely enough to involve a distribution of labor ranging from categories of implementation to strategies of communication and execution. But I do not think that this does justice to Lonergan's ongoing methodological context. I suspect, indeed, that there is an altogether more profound shift involved, and I will attempt here to trace out lines of this shift.

The pure notion of value /27/ puts us in open indeterminate harmony within the passionate finality /28/ of the universe. "The levels of consciousness are united by a single transcendent intension" (Lonergan, 1974b:81) and the intending of the good sublates all other intendings. Also "just as the notion of being intends, but, of itself, does not know being, so too the notion of value intends, but does not know value. Again, as the notion of being is the dynamic principle that keeps us moving toward ever fuller knowledge of being, so the notion of value is the fuller flowering of that same dynamic principle that now keeps us moving toward ever fuller realization of the good" (Lonergan, 1974b:82). Furthermore, let us recall the previous section on generalized empirical method, where there emerged some leads on the appreciation of just how limited our knowledge of being is, and recall that such limited knowledge is itself an instance of the limited
achieved good. Insofar as one labors over, spirals round, these clues, I think there comes forth a new context which I call conveniently Praxis-Weltanschauung.

The finite functioning of our notion of being, a segment of our dynamism, generates in itself a puny limited knowledge. Reflection on that reach and its limited achievement indeed grounds a heuristic notion of being, but it is a dwarf achievement. The fuller truth is beyond, the fullness of truth infinitely remote, and what counts is, not so much the notion of being as the notion of value, what counts is not so much Thomas's natural desire to know God as Augustine's restless heart (Crowe: 1974). And what counts is the praxis-thematization of what counts.

Let us return here to Insight's discussion of metaphysics: "Just as the notion of being underlies and penetrates and goes beyond all other notions, so also metaphysics is the department of human knowledge that underlies, penetrates, transforms and unifies all other departments" (390). But now what underlies and penetrates and goes beyond all other notions would seem to be the notion of value. What then becomes of metaphysics?

We are not here dealing with a deductive system. What becomes of metaphysics is an ongoing discovery, with Method in Theology expressing a stage in its genesis.

But there is an ambiguity here. As "metaphysics is something in a mind" (Lonergan, 1957:396), so one may say that method in theology is in a mind such as Lonergan's. But more properly one has to say that method in theology is in a community. And just as one can note the gap between adequate metaphysics as in an implementing mind and its implementation in others' minds and lives, so one may note the gap between Method in Theology as adequately conceived and its realization in community.

But the gaps are different, and related to that difference is a discontinuity in statistics of emergence and survival.
We are speaking here of the concrete process of the meshing of the history of ideas with history, but the envisagement of details of that process must be left to the reader /29/. In popular terms, Insight is an invitation to modernity and intellectual self-transcendence which can be, has been, too easily dodged, or reduced. Its strategy might be adequate for an age of innocence which does not exist: the restless heart has its mix of stone. But with Method in Theology there emerges such an ongoing praxis-thematization of the mix of restlessness and stone in human hearts as can twist, with a new statistics /30/, the actual selection from the manifold of series (Lonergan, 1957:119) in the probable seriation of schemes of recurrence towards the fuller realization of the impossible dream.

In place, then, of the optimism of an invitation to intellectual self-appropriation and of "implementation," there is an unavoidable "use": "the use of the general theological categories occurs in any of the eight functional specialties"; and there is the spiralling interplay (see Lamb: 180-193 note 1; 514 on a functional feedback model) of the specializations contributing to a genetic and dialectic development of categories and their use. That spiralling is, normatively, shot through with the new heuristic notion of value and a genetic-eschatological view of man's development. The entire set of operations is praxis, and foundations is Praxisweltanschauung /31/.

C. Criticism

Praxis is critical, and continually brings forth a new definition of criticism. Underpinning it is "the transcendental principle of all appraisal and criticism, the intention of the good" (Lonergan, 1974b:83). The direction of development here is given in some detail by Lonergan in reply to a question from David Tracy--is the functional specialty foundations dogmatic or critical? Lonergan replies that foundations consist in a decision,
an operation of the level on which consciousness becomes conscience.

Operations on this level are critically motivated when the deliberation has been sufficiently comprehensive and when the values chosen and the disvalues rejected really are values and disvalues respectively. But the sufficiently comprehensive deliberation is secured through the functional specialties of research, interpretation, history, and dialectic. The value-judgements are correct when they occur in a duly enlightened and truly virtuous man and leave him with a good conscience. Due enlightenment and true virtue are the goals towards which intellectual and moral conversion move. Conscience, finally, is the key, and its use by humble men does not encourage dogmatism in the pejorative sense of that word.

Is this critical? On views I consider counterpositions it is not critical. On views I consider positions it is critical. (1971:230-231)

Just as in *Insight*, so in *Method in Theology*, Loner- gan takes his stand on the dynamism of the human spirit. Just as in *Insight*, he presents a strategy which can facilitate the subject's ongoing thematization of the subject's cognitive dynamism, so in *Method in Theology* a strategy emerges which facilitates the community's ongoing objectification of authenticity. The latter strategy broadens the meaning of criticism just as the notion of value goes beyond the notion of being (see Crowe: 1974 on the analogy of questioning and of criticism). The strategy is intrinsically critical, and the criticism is grounded in the open dynamism of the human spirit. Tracy recognizes the strategy as methodological, facilitating collaboration. But he maintains that "it does not, however, provide critical grounds for the enterprise itself--more precisely, for the truth value of the claims to ultimacy of religious and explicitly theological language" (214).

I would make two brief points. First, the enterprise itself is grounded in the concrete critical (in the wider sense noted above) spirit within the sublating dynamism of religious experience: the critical spirit "cannot
criticize itself" (Lonergan, 1957:332) /32/; the sublating
dynamism finds in itself "its own justification" (Lonergan,
1972:283-284) /33/. Secondly, the previous statement ex-
presses a foundational claim, a complex component in a
Praxisweltanschauung, intrinsic to that claim being a
claim to its truth and value.

D. Conclusion

The new view of criticism places the Lakatos volume
on criticism, and the Kuhn/Popper debate in a new context.
The history of science finds itself bracketed between
other functional specialties, and the use of inadequate
categories spiral into a context of a hermeneutics of a
deeper suspicion and a more vigorous recovery.

The new view of praxis would seem to locate more pre-
cisely Lamb's discussion of the role of political theology
and to meet Berger's quest for a method meshing "hard-
nosed" analysis and utopian imagination: an invariantly
structured critical multivortexed /34/ praxisanamnesis
blossoming into a strategy of ongoing policy-making,
planning and execution umbrellaed by a Praxisweltanschau-
ung that includes concrete finite fantasy /35/ and an
Eschaton /36/.

The new view of generalized empirical method places
a burden of modernity on academics.

That burden should be most evident to theologians:
"A theology mediates between a cultural matrix and the
significance and role of a religion in that matrix" (Lon-
ergan, 1972:xi). For this "the theologian needs the alli-
ance of fully enlightened scientists" (Lonergan, 1957:
747) /37/ and of fully enlightened scholars and artists.
But such an alliance cannot remain at the level of common-
sense exchange: indeed the only level of exchange adequate
to our times is an exchange within interiority mediated by
strategic insights and incarnation /38/ in the relevant
area.
The fundamental issue for the academic is being in the world but not of it: the issue of psychological absence.

I come finally to comment on, to sublate, the text from *Insight* which I selected for this part:

The goal of the method is the emergence of explicit metaphysics in the minds of particular men and women. It begins from them as they are, no matter what that may be. It involves a preliminary stage that can be methodical only in the sense in which a pedagogy is methodical, that is, the goal and the procedure are known and pursued explicitly by a teacher but not by the pupil. The preliminary stage ends when the subject reaches an intelligent and reasonable self-affirmation. Such self-affirmation is also self-knowledge. (401)

We have reached, perhaps, some glimpse of a new meaning of "men and women as they are," for we have noted a larger and more concrete pedagogy than was involved, invited to, in *Insight*.

But that larger pedagogy includes and sublates the strategy of *Insight*. It contextualizes the invitation to modernity and cycles its fruits through eight specialists in an ongoing genesis of the psychological present. But far from removing the need to reach the end of the preliminary stage of intellectual self-transcendence, it places that need in an epiphanal context as a circulating opaqueness (see Lakatos and Musgrave: 265-266; Pattee), a recurrent topic (Lonergan, 1972:253), a focal feature of public academic discourse. That need was noted as a problem of conversion as early as 1951 /39/, not alluded to as such in *Insight*, and more recently spoken of by Lonergan as intellectual self-transcendence: "Intellectual self-transcendence is taking possession of one's own mind" (1974d). The opaqueness for those who never investigate their adult cognitional procedures is asserted with a new vigor of metaphor: "What goes on between the input from sense and the output in language, that is obscure, vague, unconvincing. To them the human mind is just a black box."
The input is clear enough. The output is clear enough. But the inner working is a mystery." The core strategy of achievement remains the same, but insofar as the attempt is not made the character of one's cultural input and output is left in no doubt:

For intellectual self-transcendence a price must be paid. My little book, Insight, provides a set of exercises for those that wish to find out what goes on in their own black boxes. But it is only a set of exercises. What counts is doing them.

Should one attempt to do them? As long as one is content to be guided by one's common sense, to disregard the pundits of every class whether scientific or cultural or religious, one need not learn what goes on in one's black box. But when one moves beyond the limits of commonsense competence, when one wishes to have an opinion of one's own on larger issues, then one had best know just what one is doing. Otherwise one too easily will be duped and too readily be exploited. Then explicit intellectual self-transcendence becomes a real need.

(1974d)
NOTES

/1/ Originally the essay was three-part. The third part will appear (1977) in a volume of essays in honor of Fr. F. E. Crowe, edited by Frs. T. Dunne and J.-M. Laporte S.J. I have retained references to that part throughout the present article.

/2/ My emphasis here is more on attitude than achievement. For the same point in a complementary context, see McShane (1975: Epilogue).

/3/ Still some years away, with the title The Structure of an Academic Revolution.

/4/ See Lonergan, 1957:119-120. There is an underlying theory of history involved here which is a filling out, through the inclusion of concrete details of actual, probable and possible significant shifts of meaning—schemes, in the complexity of globe-netting statistical distributions, within the basic viewpoint of generalized emergent probability. See Lonergan, 1957: index under Emergent Probability; 1972:286-288.

/5/ Obviously the basic pointers are the works of Lonergan themselves. Helpful points of entry are 1967b and 1974a. I would refer forward here, however, to my comments in the text on background, foreground and the parts of Insight. Method in Theology, Lonergan's two collections, and other works are too easily and erroneously grafted into contemporary theological and philosophical debate if the challenge of part one of Insight is not met. See 1972:260.

/6/ "...as though his mind had become dull, or his brain exhausted, or his judgment had lapsed into the error of those that forgot man to be potency in the realm of intelligence" (Lonergan, 1957:740).

/7/ I recall here Friedrich Schlegel's remark (quoted in Gadamer, 1960:274 note 2): "A classic is a writing that is never fully understood. But those that are educated and educate themselves must always want to learn more from it."

/8/ I would like to quote at length here from a more recent biography of Beethoven. It serves to bring out rather concretely some of the points I have been trying to make regarding growth and the relative inaccessibility of classics:

The works which occupied him almost exclusively in the last years were the final five string quartets. These late-harvest products
are unique for Beethoven, unique in all music. The quartets carry music to a summit of exaltation and to the deepest depth of feeling. There is no "message" in these works, no "philosophy." They are beyond definition in words. To probe their variety of mood, sweetness, power, intensity, humor, compassion, assertion of life, a book by itself is needed, one which it would be beyond my ability to write. Yet we may let the music speak—without a preliminary word. Each of the five quartets is an experience which makes one break out in perspiring superlatives. (I think that the slow movement of Opus 135 is the most beautiful piece of music ever written.) Each is peerless. They have a reputation for being difficult, and some listeners shy away from them. Difficult they may be, as The Tempest or Faust or The Idiot is difficult; but not abstract, not severe, not inaccessible, save possibly the Great Fugue (Op. 133).

All great artists travel the road upward. For some the climb is not a steep one, and the level they reach lies near the level at which they started. Others ascend continuously from youth to age, and reach so high a plateau that they leave their early works far in the valley. Raphael and Mendelssohn were accomplished artists almost from the start, and while their work shows development, it is not a startling development. (Both died young, however.) Beethoven is like Rembrandt: a world separates "The Anatomy Lesson," painted when Rembrandt was twenty-six, from the "Self Portrait" in the Frick museum, painted at the age of fifty-two. When Beethoven was twenty-six, he worked on the Piano Sonata, Op. 7, a charming piece known in his lifetime as "The Maiden in Love"; when he was fifty-two he was thinking of the first of the last quartets. It was an immense journey. (Marek: 602)

/9/ The next section deals with actual context. The "position on being" is that to which the first XXX+388 pages of Insight invites the reader. We are discussing here something more remote, more refined, more incarnate than that preliminary achievement, but the dimensions of the preliminary achievement should not be minimized: "Unfortunately, some people have the impression that while Tertullian and others of his time may have made such a mistake, no one repeats it today. Nothing could be further from the truth. For until a person has made the personal discovery that he is making Tertullian's mistake all along the line, until he has gone through the crisis involved in overcoming one's spontaneous estimate of the real, and the fear of idealism involved in it, he is still thinking just as Tertullian did. It is not a sign that
one is dumb or backward. St. Augustine was one of the most intelligent men in the whole Western tradition and one of the best proofs of his intelligence is in the fact that he himself discovered that for years he was unable to distinguish between what is a body and what is real" (Lonergan: 1964b).

"To strike out on a new line and become more than a weekend celebrity calls for years in which one's living is more or less constantly absorbed in the effort to understand, in which one's understanding gradually works round and up a spiral of viewpoints with each complementing its predecessor and only the last embracing the whole field to be mastered" (Lonergan, 1957:186).

I recall here the aspirations of the Vorticist movement, to digest and bring forth the past (see Kenner: 238-239).

See Part II of this study for a more developed view.

See note /9/.

What is said here, and spelled out in Part II, will be placed in a larger context in Part III. Clearly, one may, with Lonergan, "speak of the church as a process of self-constitution occurring within worldwide human society" (1972:363).

On literary criticism, R. P. Blackmur remarks: "Every critic like every theologian and every philosopher is a casuist in spite of himself" (316). For a useful survey of different English language views, see Scott. On music criticism, see "Metamusical and Self-Meaning" in McShane (1977: chap. 2).

This point is central in dealing with Schubert Ogden's "Subjectivist Principle" (see Part III).

I recall the parallel drawn in Part I between Beethoven's development and Lonergan's. Present occasional lectures delivered by Lonergan, like the last quartets, may be expected to go far beyond earlier symphonic volumes.

The remark is made in the context of a discussion of "the menace of experiential conjugation" (see Lonergan, 1957:542).

See Lonergan (1957:227) for an immediate context. The larger context is an understanding of the types of bias meshed into a grasp of the flow of meanings in history (see 1972:178).
I cannot enter here into the intricacies of its entry into the realms of feelings. "The principle of dynamic correspondence calls for a harmonious orientation on the psychic level, and from the nature of the case such an orientation would have to consist in some cosmic dimension, in some intimation of unplumbed depths that accrue to man's feelings, emotions, sentiments" (Lonergan, 1957: 532). And there is the ongoing mediation of sophistication in such intimations. See also in this Part notes /21/ and /35/; and in Part III (Crowe Festschrift) notes 3, 34.

There is a problem here of concrete expectation: like suspecting that Finnegans Wake would emerge from the tail of Ulysses, or more precisely from the tail of "The Oxen of the Sun" episode. Not that Finnegans Wake is aggregformic expression, though it does open various win-d-ohs! There is the wider problem of linguistic feedback in the third stage of meaning; see Lonergan (1972:88 note 34). See also in this Part notes /20/, /35/; and in Part III (Crowe Festschrift) notes 3, 34.

I recall here the basic text from Insight, selected for this Part, and quoted in the Preface. We are gradually recontextualizing the text and will return to it at the conclusion to Part II.

"The culture becomes a slum" (Lonergan, 1972: 99): the comment occurs in a discussion of undifferentiated consciousness in the later stages of meaning.

See note /20/, above, and the citation there from Insight. Note the ambiguity of the phrase "the conception was constitutive," and consider the meaning, within later actual contexts, of the statement "self-transcendence is the eagerly sought goal not only of our sensitivity, not only of our intelligent and rational knowing, not only of our freedom and responsibility, but first of all of our flesh and blood that through nerves and brains have come spontaneously to live out symbolic meanings and to carry out symbolic demands" (Lonergan: 1976).

It is perhaps significant that in the sublation of Insight into foundations Lonergan does not include the word implementation. Embracing all heuristic structures is "the integral heuristic structure which is what I mean by a metaphysics." This section can be seen as a case for its non-inclusion there.

I am being both precise and cautious here. Fr. Crowe remarks, at the beginning of a paper to which I refer, and to which I am deeply indebted, "it is possible that in some respects we are dealing, not with a development of Lonergan's thought, but with a further stage of its manifestation" (1974). It is all too easy to latch on
to such statements of Lonergan as "In Insight the good was the intelligent and reasonable. In Method the good is a distinct notion" (1974c:263) (Lonergan of 1972) as if Insight, the fruit of twenty-eight years of philosophy, had a fatal flaw. Needless to say, the shift in the notion of value merges with the more evidently illuminating shift to functional specialization. The latter shift, and its interplay with the former, is a matter for detailed research.

/27/ A distinction is not a separation. What operates is the subject which I elsewhere speak of as a notion of survival, "you at core and in kilos" (1975: chap. 10).

/28/ Lonergan's view on finality has undergone an enrichment which parallels the development indicated. In "Mission and Spirit" (1974e), he speaks of the passionate-ness of being as underpinning, accompanying, reaching beyond the subject as experientially, intelligently, rationally, morally conscious. For Lonergan's classic treatments of finality, see 1967a and 1957:442-451. I recall, however, my cautionary comment in note /25/.

/29/ One might think of the meshing primarily in terms of failure--the failure of Mandarinism--but one can also think of it in terms of ripening times, with hope and fantasy within the Praxis mediation of which we are speaking. See note /35/ below.

/30/ "The concrete possibility of a scheme beginning to function shifts the probability of the combination from the product of pqr,..., to the sum of p+q+r..." (Lonergan, 1957:121). I have discussed and illustrated this in Randomness, Statistics and Emergence (chap. 11), "Probability-schedules of Emergence of Schemes." In the present instance, a useful imaginative crutch is the vortex. The structure of Praxis is a large vortex bringing together sets of previously unintegrated ranges of macro- and micro-vortex movements, with resultant discontinuities in angular velocities and accelerations. Since the vortices involve human subjects and communities, the velocities and accelerations involve six levels of change. See further indications in notes /20/, /24/, /35/ and /38/ of this Part.

/31/ In Religion, Theology, and Religious Studies, Lonergan speaks of method as praxis and of praxis becoming an academic subject with the passing of the age of innocence. One cannot do brief justice to such points. A helpful illustration that Lonergan cites of the dynamic orientation in question is Heiler's view of the mission of the history of religions to lie in a preparation of the cooperation of religions.

/32/ This is the rock of Method in Theology (19).
This is "the more important part of the rock" of Method in Theology (19 note 5).

See Lonergan, 1957:72, 243 and note /30/.
I refer here also to the large vortex of the interplay of functional specialties and to the set of turns of the subject involved in the practice of Method in Theology (250, 11, 15ff.).

"Without fantasy, all philosophic knowledge remains in the grip of the present or the past and severed from the future, which is the only link between philosophy and the real history of mankind" (Marcuse: 155). See also here Part II (notes /20/, /21/) and Part III (Crowe Festival: notes 3, 34). In the third stage of meaning one must expect, hope for, envisage imaginatively, work to, new levels of humor, music, prayer, public kindliness and discourse.

The foundational theologian is committed to conceive of the invariants of progress and decline and of "our future destiny" (Method in Theology: 291).

I may permit myself a valuable anecdotal aside here. Lonergan's work in economics in the 30s and 40s is quite extraordinary. I recall now correspondence from him in the late 60s raising the question of collaborators with him in economics. None "fully enlightened" emerged (see my comments on A. Lowe's On Economic Knowledge in Wealth of Self and Wealth of Nations, chap. 10). That "full enlightenment" is of course related to the issue of generalized empirical method.

Three points. First of all, academic meaning ranges through all the types and functions of meaning outlined in Method in Theology (chap. 3). Secondly, one should note that adult growth in general heuristics involves an epiphanous reading stance towards words and things. "Incarnation" is more and more fully read in the clarity of the heuristic conception of the six-levelled hierarchy of aggregates which is man: \( f(p_1, c_j, b_k, z_1, u_m, r_n) \), where for instance \( c_j \) connotes a subset of chemical conjugates. Other complexities emerge when one considers the heuristics of nerve and muscle, eye and brain. Thirdly, the above two points serve very clearly to bring out the need for generalized empirical method in human studies.

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TRANSCENDENTAL DIALECTIC OF DESIRE AND FEAR

Joseph Flanagan

The field of literary criticism has always tended to find itself in the same situation which the field of ethics has recently come to occupy. Ethics once had a universal normative basis for moral judgments but with the emergence of the immanentist, existentialist and historicist contexts it seems to have lost its normative grounding and begun to drift like certain forms of literary criticism. Literary critics have frequently tended to consider their judgments somewhat subjective and relative, even to the point of priding themselves on the unscientific nature of their subject matter. Frye in his Anatomy of Criticism proposes to put an end to these recurrent, subject evaluations and to establish the field of literary criticism on a scientific and systematic basis that would eliminate such practices as ranking poets major or minor, or hierarchically arranging the different genres of poetry on a scale that values epics and tragedy as superior to comedies and stories, or that would judge novels of the nineteenth century as superior to medieval romances because these novels tend to be more realistic.

Frye's solution to this problem is to attempt a basic, inductive leap that would stop thinking of literature as aggregate of discrete compositions and assume that there is within the field of literature as a whole a basic order or unifying perspective. It seems to me that Frye's success in this venture offers moralists an interesting model for solving some of the difficulties that relativism and historicism have brought about in the field of ethics. In this paper I propose to describe Frye's theory of literature, and then, to suggest some ways it might be used in the area of morality.
I

We might compare Frye's problem to that of Darwin who found himself with a vast array of plants and animals but without any systematic way of connecting them to one another. Linnaeus had provided a classifying scheme by which biologists could specify plants and animals according to certain visible structural qualities that allowed them to be named and interconnected. But it did not explain the basis of these interconnections. Darwin discovered a basic plot in the story of the plants and animals that would serve as an explanatory principle—the struggle for survival. Frye has evolved a similar unifying perspective for all the different types of literary species.

In a systematic theory one can usually find certain basic terms along with a fundamental orientation that interconnects these terms. In Frye's theory the basic terms are character, symbol and plot. The basic orientation is a dialectic of fear and desire. This dialectic, as we shall see, determines the meaning that is to be given to the different types of characters, plots and symbols. We shall turn to the meaning of character first.

In the first of four essays in Anatomy of Criticism Frye develops his theory of "modes" as a way of specifying characters; the "mode" refers to the characters' way of acting. If we consider how much power a literary character has in relation to his or her environment we can specify five different modes of acting. If the character can totally control his or her social and physical environment, then, the character is divine and the story surrounding this character's deeds is a mythic narrative. If the mode of acting is in some degree superior to that of ordinary people and the way that they relate to their environment, then, the character is a hero or heroine and the story is typically a romance or legend in which prodigious feats of valor and daring may be expected, but not as prodigious as those of a god or goddess. When the character is capable of rising above other members of the
society but lacks the ability to control the physical environment we have the type of hero called a leader—a king or general. In this case the story is an epic or tragedy. Then there are characters with whom we all identify and who seem to suffer the same sort of ups and downs in life that we do. This is the fictional mode of comedy. Finally there are characters that seem to have lost the normal powers of acting, and we find ourselves looking down on them as being incapable of ordinary achievements. The mode in this case is ironic or satiric.

The advantage of this scheme is that it extends the literary universe to include such stories as myths, legends and folk tales, and it allows Frye, as we shall see, to interconnect them in a chronological series. Recall that Frye's problem was to find a "unifying perspective" within the literary universe that would connect various literary works within some comprehensive scheme. We can now take the first step towards solving this problem. Having specified literary characters according to their mode of acting Frye examines the history of Western literature and finds there is a general tendency in representing characters to move from the highest fictional mode of operating found in myths to the lowest types of behavior found in satires. Examining the period of late Classical culture down to the present, Frye notes the strong influence of Christian, Classical, Celtic and Teutonic myths within the characters of premedieval stories. Moving to the medieval period we find two types of romances, secular and sacred, with their corresponding heroes, saints and knights; these exemplify the second mode of acting. With the emergence of the Renaissance court we find literature turning to the high fictional mode of tragic kings and nationalistic epics. With Defoe we have the shift to more realistic types of characters, and finally, during the last hundred years the ironic and satiric modes of expression have tended to dominate. The same chronological cycle from high to low fictional modes can be found in the successive periods of Greek and Roman
culture. Obviously this is a general tendency but it gives Frye a principle of continuity for establishing important connections between successive literary works. If we turn now to the question of "plot" we can see much more clearly how Frye develops his "unifying perspective."

In a cycle the last phase tends to provide the setting for recommencing the sequence. Thus the late stages of day merge into night so that the final phase of day may be thought of a bringing forth the night. The repetition of this daily cycle in turn establishes the yearly sequence of the seasons. Fall fades into winter only to have spring rise up and flower into summer which inevitably sinks back down again into fall. It is this seasonal cycle that sets the stage for great drama of life and death--the spring of being born, the summer of growing up, the fall from the triumphs of summer, and the cold winter of death. As a culture shifts from nomadic to agrarian modes of living so their rituals and stories tend to imitate and express these seasonal cycles. This provides Frye with his basic classification of plots. In addition to thinking of a story as having a beginning, middle and end, Frye proposes that the end of the story can be thought of as setting up the conditions for the next phase of story telling. There are four basic plots--comic, romantic, tragic, and satiric. The comic plot structures the spring story of life, romance comes in the summer while fall and winter characterize the tragic and ironic plots. If we now turn to the connections between these plots we can begin to perceive the subtlety of Frye's analysis.

The four basic plots are further divided into opposing pairs; comic and tragic on the one side, and ironic and romantic on the other. The oppositions between the two pairs is based on a dialectic of desire and fear with desire overbalancing fear, in comedy and romance, while fear tends to dominate desire in tragedy and satire. This dialectic can also be correlated with the types of characters.
To fix this connection we can ask the question: Does the plot control the characters or do the characters determine the development and outcome of the plot? Does the dialectic of fear and desire that drives and governs the pattern of events come under control of the characters, or is it the outer events that determines and governs what happens to the characters? Frye distinguishes the plots on this question, placing the plots of romance and tragedy more or less under the control of the characters while in satire and comedy the characters move under the direction of fate and fortune respectively. The ironic characters appear under some inexorable laws of fate that in the limiting case offers no meaning to the absurd situations in which the characters are found or thrown. In comedy, on the other hand, some unexpected and crazy twist of the plot can transform the most absurd situations into the most delightful set of circumstances. If we turn back to romance and tragedy and examine the dialectic that governs the plot and characters we can find the source of the uncontrollableness of actions and outcomes in comedy and satire.

The dialectic found in the tragic plot is that the character usually desires too much or reaches too high. It is the excessive ambition of MacBeth or Oedipus's overwhelming desire for self-knowledge that drives them to their doom. In romance, on the other hand, we find a type of desire that drives out fear as it does battle with the most fearful enemies. No matter how dreadful the dragon, it can be slain, while the ugliest beast can be made into the most beautiful princess. The romantic dialectic of desire and fear reveals desires that reach to heaven in their aspirations, and down into unquenchable fires of hell in their fears. While the dialectic that drives the tragic character continually exceeds his or her capabilities, the romantic characters govern the dialectic, employing, if needed, divine-like or legendary powers.
The dialectic that binds the plot and characters together also refers back to the five modes that we have already described, with the mythic mode manifesting unlimited power; while at the opposite extreme the characters in an ironic mode find themselves imprisoned in impenetrable darkness. The same "up and down" set of relations in characters and plots can be seen again if we move to the question of literary symbols and their meaning.

To explain the five different meanings—sign, motif, image, archetype and monad—that Frye gives to the term symbol, it might be helpful if we place them in a historic context. The meaning of the term symbol as "image" is the traditional or classic meaning of symbol. In this context the poem or play was presumed to have a literal and figurative meaning; the task of the classic critic was to discover the literal meaning by determining the way in which the poem formed and contained an image of nature. "Nature" in this context was equivalent to the whole of the physical and human world as it was structured and governed by divine providence. The poet was reflecting the order that nature had been given by God. The figurative meaning of the poem was the form of the poem as contained in the rhymes, metaphors and other literary devices that the poet used to decorate and beautify the literal meaning. Once the poet or painter was thought of as a genius who originated the poem without any need for nature's norms, then the stage was set for a new meaning of symbol as "motif."

The contemporary critic would insist that the poet does not want to communicate meaning but to constitute or create meaning. In this context the poem does not point to some other reality for its meaning but rather forms its own meaning through an interlocking set of motifs. Just as a "non-objective" painting does not refer to any object—natural or human—so the poem's only referent is the poem itself. Or, even if the poem does refer to reality, this referential meaning is not the essential or significant meaning. The poet withdraws from nature or
reality deliberately making any reference to real characters and events highly ambiguous and paradoxical. Thus the poet does not imitate nature but creates it. The problem for Frye is to enlarge the meaning of symbol so that it contains the classical meaning of symbol as image and the contemporary meaning of symbol as "motif." Frye does this in two stages--archetypal and anagogic.

In the first stage he shows that the poem not only has a nature as the classical critic held but it also has a history. As Frye puts it, Virgil may have imitated nature but he certainly imitated Homer, who, in turn, imitated other and earlier cycles of poets. Poets are, by profession, plagiarists. This would seem a partial support of the contemporary critic's claim that a poem's basic reference is inward, if not to its own motifs, then, at least, to the motifs of other poems, and not to nature. But Frye will not allow this claim for he introduces an older and more archaic meaning of "nature" that the poet imitates--the archetypal or cyclical forms of nature.

There are certain common experiences that all people share--being born, growing, marrying, working, eating, getting sick and dying. And not only people share such experiences but all of nature--the sun is born, grows and dies in darkness. Metals pass from glowing jewels to cold dark substances that need to be buried and regenerated by mother earth. Plants, animals and even gods follow this same cycle of events--birth, growth, death and rebirth. It is the recurrence of these events shared by all people with all parts of nature that is the basis of civilization. Every human society ritualizes in bodily gestures, paintings, statues, buildings, stories, spectacles, processes, songs and dances, the cycle of desires and fears associated with living, dying and reproducing. Anthropologists, folklorists, historians of religion and similar scholars tell us that you can go from culture to culture, from archaic to contemporary people, and you will find many of the same jokes, songs, proverbs, stories, marrying
and dying rituals that bind people together. There is a deep continuum of common cycles that flow back and forth in the human psyche generating a transcultural dialectic of desires and fears that is articulated in songs, stories and rituals that are celebrated and re-celebrated throughout the course of history. These are the archetypal experiences, and the characters, plots, scenes and rhythms that embody them are archetypal symbols. In some stories and songs the archetypes are easy to spot, in others they are carefully disguised, and may be there quite inadvertently. But try, as the poet may, he will be incorporating to some extent these ancient characters and plots within his supposedly completely original story. And, in so doing, the poet will also be imaging in his story the transcultural cycles of desires and fears that people have always experienced and articulated in songs, dances and stories. This would seem to make "archetypal nature" the ultimate referent of poetry and art which would seem to undermine the contemporary critic's claim that the poem or song is a pattern of interlocking motifs that are self-referential, and not representative of some outside world or incident. To give art and literature a final context of meaning that will not only be transcultural but also trans-worldly, super-natural and self-referential, Frye posits a final meaning of symbol as anagogic.

To establish a transition from the archetypal to the anagogic, Frye uses the dream. At the archetypal level the dream manifests the same dialectic of fear and desire in the inner world of self as one finds in the outer world of public rituals. In the rituals of birth, work, sickness and death we find among archaic people the desire to work closely with the cycles of nature even to the point of magically transforming these cycles according to the people's desires and simultaneously to overcome their fears of such things as drought, sickness and murder. The ability to control nature and the outcome of life's plot were Frye's means of classifying the basic types of
characters and plots, and now this same relation becomes the way to specify the basic meaning of symbol.

In the dream that features desire as fulfilled we find that nature cycles upward to satisfy the most extravagant and wish-filled desires of the dreamer. In the dream that turns into a nightmare the desires are frustrated and fears are realized as nature in the form of witches, wild beasts, dark forests and mighty waves engulf the dreamer. In both cases nature succumbs to the dreamer's dialectic of desire and fear. In both cases the dreamer determines the course of nature, and not the other way around. Just as the dream makes nature according to the dreamer's desires and fears, so the poet may make nature be contained by the poem. At this level the poet is the divine-like character that commands the winds and waters to do what the character desires so that the plot will come out as the character fears or desires. Such anagogic meanings of symbols are most easily exemplified in stories of miraculous births or apocalyptic destructions, but the symbol as anagogic pervades the history of literature and can be found in any poem. Not only can it be found but from Frye's point of view it is this context that gives art and literature its inner essence, its orienting center. The ultimate direction of the meaning of the poem is not given to it by nature but is established by desires and fears that not only transcend nature but can shape nature to their way of being. It is in shaping nature to the demands of literature that artistic desires and fears show their unlimited quality, and clearly establish that the reality of art is beyond the reality of nature. This point needs to be stressed.

In the archetypal phase the imaginative structure of the single story is placed within the context of all stories and the general cycle is within the various cycles of reality or nature. In the anagogic phase the cycle of nature falls within the world or mind of the poet--the world of possibility encompasses the world of actuality.
Turning to tactile metaphors we can speak of the transition from the archetypal to anagogic phases as a thickening of meaning. If the natural image of a mountain or sea radiates out of the second phase of the symbol to an archetypal mountain or sea in the third phase, if the dialectic of desire and fear of Macbeth and his wife reverberate and cycle back to the serpentine seduction of an archetypal Adam and Eve, then, in the anagogic phase of meaning, a single symbol can become so concentrated in meaning as to contain within itself an unlimited feeling of desire or dread. The classical example of this in the Western literary universe are the symbols of Christ and Satan.

Following Frye's method of specifying the archetypal literary universe in terms of animal, mineral, vegetable, human and divine we can think of archetypal symbols in each of these classes--the archetypal minerals, animals, humans, etc. Further subdividing, we can think of the various mineral archetypes grouped around earth, air, fire, and water. Thus the field of archetypes broadens into more and more complex connections, but we can reverse this procedure. Think of Christ who is at once the archetypal God-man, the archetypal animal--the sacrificial lamb, the archetypal plant--the living vine, the archetypal mineral--the cornerstone, etc. The image of Christ thickens until it seems to concentrate within itself unlimited meaning, the core and sum of all other meanings. At the opposite pole is the figure of Satan--the archetypal beast, the Lord of the Flies, the power of darkness, the image that concentrates in itself all the fear-filled meanings like some "black hole" in the heavens sucks into itself all the light particles of the universe. A single image then can condense within itself the meaning of an entire poem. Thus one may analyze Moby Dick in terms of its imaginative structure and find the central form or shaping power of the whole poem in the image of the whale. The whale in turn can be transformed into an archetypal beast and finally the archetype can become a "monad" that
concentrates within itself an unlimited image of darkness and dread. In the fourth anagogic phase the significance or meaning of a symbol is no longer limited to this world, but reverses the relation of art and reality bringing reality under the power of art. Nature and the poem are no longer similar but the poem achieves its own likeness—an identity with itself and nature. The poem is no longer comparable to anything but itself; it is unique, incomparable and infinitely desirable or dreadful.

Before turning to an "application" of Frye's literary theory to moral questions it is important to underline what the pivotal factor will be, namely, the transformation of the successive meaning contexts. The crucial transformation is the shift from the third to the fourth phases of meaning. It is here that one discovers the intrinsic nature of literature, poetry, or art, since it is in this shift that the basic relation between nature and art is reversed. Reversal does not, however, mean denial. The poem still has a literal, allegorical and archetypal structuring of its content. The first three contents still stand, but they do so in a further context of meaning which is open-ended and which forms the orienting center of meaning for the prior three limited contexts. Take away the "limits" of the three prior phases of meaning and the poem or novel will disappear into an unlimited viewpoint of meaning. On the other hand, if the critic limits the literary structure to the first three contexts of meaning he loses the inner grounding and ultimate uniqueness of the poem or play. The model that I am proposing, then, is that the poem is, like the person, a fundamental tension between limited contexts of desires and fears and an unlimited, intrinsically experienced dialectic of emotional extremes. The comparison is more concrete if we think of literature in terms of characters and the context of desires and fears within which they plot and pattern the directions of their lives. This is the task of the next section.
II

In following out our attempt to establish Frye's theory of literature as a model for developing a transcultural norm of morality we may summarize our account of his theory as follows: Frye proposes a basic structure for identifying the five modes of a character's way of acting, the four basic plots or dynamic schemes and four fundamental contexts of meaning in which we may understand the thematic significance of these characters and plots. The four basic plots may be further specified in terms of a fundamental dialectic of desire and dread, with each plot revealing a basic proportioning of desire and fear. At the romantic extreme we find characters and sequences in which desire seems to completely overcome fear while at the satiric extreme, desire finds itself mastered and almost obliterated as monsters and demons reverse the results of romantic triumphs. In between are the tragic and comic blends of these two dialectical forces. These two dialectical extremes also exhibit the ultimate poles of freedom of action with romantic schemes showing forth characters with prodigious, divine-like powers for satisfying desires while ironic actors find themselves gripped by the implacable powers of a cruel and demonic fate. The next step is to transform this theory into its moral counterparts.

The traditional natural law theory in morality was an attempt to provide an intrinsic, universal norm for arriving at appropriate moral conclusions. I am now proposing that Frye's theory provides an intrinsic, transcultural norm for specifying any piece of literature and, as such, serves as a basis for doing the same in a moral context. Following Frye's model I will substitute Kierkegaard's characters--Don Juan and Judge William as two examples of basic moral counterpositions with their corresponding plots and themes.

For Kierkegaard the Don Juan character represents the attempt of a person to remain uncommitted and irresponsible.
Living always in the immediate and refusing to consider the consequences, Don Juan attempts to remain indifferent to the highs and lows of life, and refuses to decide whether one alternative is more or less worthwhile. Behind this facade of moral neutrality and emotional indifference there is in fact a decision—a very basic and controlling decision—Don Juan has chosen not to choose. But this alternative is in fact impossible since not choosing is itself a choice. It is this inescapable dilemma that Judge William tries to point out to Don Juan.

Judge William represents a shift in perspective. Don Juan carries within himself the possibility of becoming a Judge William type of person, but his present way of life blocks that possibility since Judge William is the reverse and repressed side of Don Juan's irresponsibility. Judge William is a person who accepts the paradox of his need to commit himself if he is to achieve peace and freedom. He preaches that it is only the committed, responsible person who is truly free. Judge William accepts responsibility for his past misdeeds; he accepts his guilt and the need for compensatory justice in his dealings with other people. In other words Judge William realizes that present experiences always include past conditions and consequences. But for Don Juan to shift to Judge William's position and take on responsibility for what he has done means that Don Juan must choose to accept the consequences of his prior way of life. The only way to shift to a new mode of life is to use the present, existing self as the chooser, but the actual, existing Don Juan has gone to the dogs. There is no way Don Juan can jump out of his character into that of Judge William without dragging Don Juan, the guilty reprobate, with him. Don Juan may put off his old way of life but he cannot make it disappear. Furthermore, the new perspective is only a possibility and, because it is only possible it may ever remain such. There is considerable risk, then, for Don Juan in shifting his basic position. Judge William, on the other hand,
assures him that it is well worth the effort since his perspective includes both his own way of living and that of Don Juan. Judge William is the embodiment of Kant's ethical position since he not only prizes duty and responsibility, but his moral viewpoint is truly universally free of all subjectively limited viewpoints such as the deceits that Don Juan has incorporated into his character. Judge William is the omniscient moralist always performing in universally consistent ways.

We can now place these characters into the setting of a plot locating Judge William in a romantic context while fixing Don Juan with a satiric setting. Recall that in the romantic orientation the characters seem to act out the height of their passions in their quest whether for glory, goodness or truth. Romance bestows the ultimate in freedom, while in satire there lurks in the background of the plot the assumption that there is no freedom but only a cruel and inescapable fate that is governing the flow of events. Missing in the romantic characters and plots is the tragic side of a life that balances in various paradoxical forms the freedom of the actors and actresses within the larger deterministic structure of history. Missing in the satiric sequence of situations is the comic assumption that the ironic, implacable, dominatrix may turn out to be the comic mistress of good fortune, and, instead of leaving our hero in tragic and demonic isolation, she may let him marry his heart's desire and become the basis for a new society of lovers. There is another feature of Frye's theory which I have not yet described which needs to be introduced at this point.

In addition to specifying literature in terms of four basic plots, Frye subdivides the plots into six different phases which succeed one another as the recurrent tensions of desire and fear generate different character, and plotting blends. For example, in tragedy the six stages show a gradual deepening of the tragic themes and characters; the plot gets more shocking and the hero or heroine less and
less admirable until they turn into satirical characters. We pass in six phases from romantic tragedy to ironic tragedy. Similarly in irony we pass from tragic irony to comic irony. This means that tragic irony and ironic tragedy are going to be very similar in tone but not so similar as to be identical. The important point here is that Frye has given us a literary specification of that interesting, mathematical phenomenon called "taking a limit." There comes a point in tragedy when it is no longer tragic but ironic. There comes a point in comedy when it passes over from comedy into romance. Just what or where is that point? The person who asks this question is like the moralist who wants to know—at what point does a venial sin turn into a mortal sin. The way to answer the question is to shift attention to the basic orientation that governs the direction of the plot through the six phases of the comic, tragic, romantic and ironic orientations. We can do this by combining Kierkegaard's emphasis on choice (either/or) with Frye's analysis of the four basic plots.

Rephrasing the dialectic between Don Juan and Judge William which we described above we can characterize their respective positions as involving a basic assumption about the way to solve the problem of human fears and desires. Judge William resolves his problem by choosing the romantic assumption and orientation, while Don Juan operates within the ironic orientation. The two characters can shift their horizons only by shifting their basic orientation. In each of the four orientations there are the six phases that lead to the limiting situation where the only choice left is a basic reversal of attitudes towards life. Frye, then, distinguishes between changes of perspectives within a basic horizon, and the transformation of the orientation itself. However, neither character can transform his basic assumptions because both are operating, not only within two different orientations, but within the same hidden assumption and orientation namely that their
life-style and plotting direction are not just one horizon among four but the all-inclusive and universal orientation.

From Kierkegaard's perspective Judge William is as self-deceived as Don Juan, and for the same reason. Don Juan thinks you can live in the immediate without a past and future. Judge William, on the other hand, thinks you must recover and redeem the past by acknowledging your faults and consequent guilt. Only by being responsive to the past as "yours" can you live freely in the present. Both characters are trying to transpose the present into a non-temporal experience that will not slip away from them. Both are trying to overcome the radical temporality and contingency of human existence by choosing to live a life-style that is limited but which they try to think of as unlimited and timeless. Both are trying to transcend the successive limitations that the various stages of life impose upon us. To illustrate this we can correlate the four plotting movements with four stages of life.

In the first phase, childhood, we have the least experience of the future as under our control, and so, we can compare this stage to the comic plots that are so full of innocent and unexpected joys and setbacks. In the second stage or adolescence we have a period where the plotting orientations or romance and adventure thrive. In middle and approaching old age we have the sense of failing powers, and loss of freedom that typify tragic orientations, while in satire we feel the full force of the inescapable burden and bitterness of senility and inevitable loss of life. Since each of us must live through these four successive phases with their differing orientations, one might argue that a balanced and mature person should try to keep all four perspectives in some integrated form at each stage of their life. This means that we cannot limit the meaning of life to any one perspective but should attempt to integrate completely all four viewpoints at each stage of our development. However, this is exactly
what Kierkegaard claims cannot be done by either Judge William or Don Juan since both exclude the other's realization of romantic desires or ironic fears. Only by accepting the ironic dread of death together with the romantic desires for unlimited success can either character achieve a fully mature horizon. Such a choice involves a religious orientation that would transform and reorient the life-styles of both characters. In Frye's categories this would mean a shift from an archetypal to an anagogic perspective.

In the archetypal context the plot, symbols and characters follow the life-death cycles of nature through ritual and myth. At this level the events of nature come much closer to the dialectic of desires and fears, but still nature is not yet overcome and transcended. Only in the anagogic state does nature succumb and let itself be shaped and formed in whatever way the poet desires or fears. Similarly, only if Judge William and Don Juan allow themselves to be completely transformed can they achieve the perfect integration of the four stages of life. Such a total surrender of self would involve suffering the quality of existential dread that Kierkegaard describes in *Fear and Trembling*. It is not necessary to recount this description but it is interesting to note that in this treatise Kierkegaard gives a series of variations of the biblical story of Abraham sacrificing his son Isaac. Each version of the story represents a different perspective on the problem of the religious orientation. It is analogous to the six perspectival phases that Frye associates with each of his four plots. In each phase the tension rises as it moves toward the limiting situation in which Abraham achieves the perfect state of faith and self-surrender. It is the religious orientation that gives the moral orientation its real meaning. Similarly, in Frye it is the anagogic meaning of the poem that orients and provides the final direction for the poem.
Thus far we have described the possibility of using Frye's literary theory as a model for developing a transcultural basis for specifying various moral orientations as they may develop within the life of an individual. This same model can be applied to a group of individuals, as they come together to form a moral and religious society, and beyond that, to a series of societies as they form the history of one or more civilizations. For a first example of how this structure might operate I will focus on some recent cultural histories of America.

In 1950 Henry Nash Smith published a study of American history in terms of its myths and symbols entitled *The Virgin Land*. The book proposes the thesis that there has been a long series of conflicts in American history stemming from the basic conflict that came to be embodied in the dominant American myth—the myth of the garden. According to this myth it was the destiny of the American people to set sail from the shores of Europe, leaving behind the deteriorating and corrupt European institutions, and to reach the shores of North America where they would found a new community of free men and women destined to bring moral and religious liberty to all people. There were severe obstacles to test the virtues of these pilgrims—the dense, dark forests inhabited by pagan savages and wild beasts had to be tamed and subdued before the vast land could be transformed into a garden of happiness. A finished version of this myth took over a hundred years to form, and in the process the symbols and characters underwent a gradual and cumulative clarification and condensation until they reach their mature form in the Daniel Boone romance. The Boone myth, however, was not just a literary composition but found itself formed by and formative of the political rhetoric that in turn provided the basic motivating forces for significant and far-reaching political decisions. For example, Smith proposes that not only did central elements of this myth weave their way into the theoretical arguments of the American constitution
but also the Civil War was fought over the Northern and Southern variations of how this myth was to be interpreted and structured. By transforming this cultural history of America into the context we have established we can evaluate it as follows.

The American myth that provided the central meaning and motivating context for the development of the major institutional structures of American society was a romantic, quest myth that represented the political and moral freedom of people in terms of an agrarian revolution that would find in western expansion the unlimited, natural resources, allowing and encouraging the romantic destiny of a free people. The basic plot of the American drama was adventurous and romantic; it oriented Americans to an agrarian society with each family having its own simple and honest garden of delights within the great heartland of America. Such a vision was ripe for tragedy and Leo Marx in his study, *Machine in the Garden*, carries Smith's analysis further and focuses on four major artists of the nineteenth century America who "discovered" the tragic underside of this romantic quest.

The thesis that Marx suggests is that while popular American writing and political decisions continued to form the American experience within the context of the garden myth, the more sensitive and penetrating artists mined and articulated that side of the American experience that had been covered over and blocked out by the characters and symbols of the romantic version of the American dream. Marx is like Kierkegaard exposing the hidden assumption and orientation of Judge William. Marx focuses on two central cultural images—the machine vs. the garden. The thesis he argues proceeds along these lines. He accepts Smith's hypothesis of the garden myth, namely that the character and basic orientation of the American people was structured along the lines of a romantic plot of turning the vast American heartland of forests, deserts, and savage beasts (animal and human) into a great garden within which
a new society would be formed. This was the destiny projected, but what happened in fact was that the garden turned into a concrete jungle with an impenetrable tangle of technological undergrowth out of which powerful and demonic machines suddenly appeared, threatening to destroy the society. Such a tragic dialectic of high desires and hidden dread sets the conditions for the satiric plots and characters so frequent in recent American literature.

From this quick sketch of American cultural history we might characterize the moral character and maturity of Americans as overemphasizing the comic and romantic orientations to the meaning of life with an immature and irresponsible attitude toward the tragic and satiric side of human experience. This in turn resulted in a disproportionate and distorted emphasis on the tragic and satiric contexts of meaning that we have recently witnessed. The sudden shift in the American evaluation of history from a benign romantic one of the fifties to the more tragic, depressing and somewhat despairing one of the late sixties reflects the same moral immaturity. Here we have an example of how the two hundred year American cultural cycle can condition the personal, moral attitudes formed in single life-cycles. In the fifties the dialectic between Americans and the forces of history were still being experienced under the "governance" of our traditional national epic--the Boone myth. This was especially the case when Americans alone possessed the technology of nuclear warfare. With such technological power Americans felt confident that they could still master both nature and the demonic forces of history. The sudden reversal of our national will that so many young people experienced in the late sixties has its dark underside in the disappearance of our national desires and hopes. The discovery of the "sins of our fathers" has undermined the basic trust that had been established during our American "infancy". In its bicentennial celebration American was occasionally able to muster the energy and creativity to satirize and
parody itself, but seems incapable and "unwilling" to stage a convincing "spectacle" and genuine celebration. In Frye's context, spectacle and celebration are parts of a comic orientation of meaning. The "transcultural" plot of comedy is in overcoming some limiting situation or character who is blocking the successful marriage of young lovers. The tension is resolved either in successfully integrating their "intimacy" within the present social structure or in the establishment of a new society of lovers. The ability of a society to celebrate itself in sacred rituals and comic spectacles, then, is closely related to its beliefs and hopes about itself and its destiny as a community of lovers.

As a final illustration of Frye's categories we can observe how the American literary cycle and cultural history is related to the longer cycle of Western literature and culture. Recall that Frye, in delineating the form of literature through the modes of action of the characters, sketched the trend in western literature from the high fictional modes of myth and romance to the low fictional mode of satire and irony with premedieval epics giving way to medieval romances, while Renaissance tragedies and comedies shifted toward contemporary satiric plots and anti-heroes that seem less than human. The same cycle can be found with the Greek and Roman cultural cycles and it can be seen in the American cycle we have just sketched. Naturally the cycles don't mesh perfectly, nor do they characterize the entire literary traditions but they do point to tendencies or orientations that cover larger and shorter cultural periods.

The American cycle, then, joins into and becomes part of the longer western, cultural cycle. We can speak of three different cycles. The individual cycle of birth, growth and death, the same cycle on a national level, and the longer, historical, civilizational cycle. The moral life of any given person, then, can be seen as a vector that combines these three forces in different ways but which ultimately reinforces or dialectically opposes the
more general direction of history. The same line of argument could be followed out in analysing the religious orientation of an individual, a society or history, but perhaps enough has been presented to show that Frye's theory not only offers a rich context for analyzing literary works but also offers an interesting model for developing moral and religious perspectives on an individual, national and historical scale.

In concluding, I wish to draw attention to what I consider the three major perspectives of the paper. It seems to me that Frye's theory provides us, first, with an interesting way to specify the difference between a decision grounded in a basic moral orientation and one that involves shifting the basic horizon and its orienting assumptions. Second, the contrast between two opposed moral positions can be placed within Frye's context of the four plotting orientations which ultimately encompass the extremes of the basic human dialectic of desire and fear. Third, the correlations between the four meaning contexts of a symbol exemplify the dialectical struggle of a finite context of meaning expanding into an infinite context that grounds and orients the movement through the four successive phases. It is this dialectic between infinite and finite desires and fears which keeps driving the poet beyond the limits of nature into an anagogic context but, at the same time, forcing the poet to operate with the limits of the three earlier contexts. It is this dialectic that offers an interesting analogue to Kierkegaard's dialectic of a moral and religious orientation in which the religious orientation forces the discovery of the hidden and false assumption of the supposedly universal moral axis. The combination of these three perspectives reveals some interesting ways that Frye's literary theory could be developed into a transcultural moral theory which could, on the one hand, ground an invariant moral axis, and, on the other, reveal its limits in a context of concrete, human beings acting within real, personal, social and historical situations.
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The need for a dialectical and metascientific critique of the thought of C. G. Jung and, perhaps even more, of the praxis of Jungian analysis, can hardly be overestimated. The need becomes even more apparent when we recognize that Jung seems now to be beginning to be visited by the fate that awaits all more or less comprehensive genius: that of giving rise to diverse and even dialectically opposed interpretations (cf. Kelsey: 1968, 1972 and Sanford, with Hillman: 1972, 1975). The dialectical reflection I have in mind would be similar in scope, purpose, and depth of insight to Paul Ricoeur's all but definitive philosophical interpretation of Freudian psychoanalysis. Obviously, the present paper is no place for so massive an enterprise, yet I hope it conveys the general contours I would think such a critical interpretation would take. But more immediately, my concern is the function that a reconstructed depth psychology can play in theology.

Jung has by no means been ignored by the theological community. A recent bibliographical essay lists 442 books and articles devoted at least in part to the relations between archetypal psychology and theology (see Heisig). In an even more recent study it has been claimed not without reason that "Jung's work promises to prove as reliable a handmaid for doing theology today as more metaphysical schemes proved in the past" (Burrell: 232). As for myself, I have argued elsewhere that the generalized empirical method of Bernard Lonergan provides the horizon needed for the critical reinterpretation of the Jungian maieutic and for its critical employment on the part of the theologian, and that such a critical engagement with Jung will help the theologian construct a part of theology's
foundations (Doran: 1977a). I have also suggested how a
dialectical critique of Jung will modify his psychology's
interpretation of the symbolic significance of the person
of Jesus Christ and of the Trinity and his convictions
regarding what constitutes adequate symbolization of the
deity (1977c). In the present paper I wish to expand on
my previous methodological considerations, to suggest more
explicitly the ontological referents of a revised notion
of the unconscious, and to show how a theory of elemental
symbolism can be developed from the articulation of psyche
and intentionality to fill a vacuum left in those notions
of psychic symbolism such as Jung's that lack an adequate
explicit or even implicit grounding in basic assumptions
about intentionality. In the course of the paper, I shall
attempt an initial reconstruction of a central paper of
Jung's.

I. Method and Psyche
A. Psyche and the Functional Specialty, Foundations

I assume a familiarity on the part of the reader with
Lonergan's thought on generalized empirical method and on
the place of foundations among the eight functional spe-
cialties of theology. Foundations has the twofold task of
objectifying the horizon within which theological doc-
trines are presented, systematic theology is developed,
and religious communication is engaged in; and of generat-
ing the appropriate general and special categories for
this mediated phase of theology /1/. The general categor-
ies are those shared by theology with other disciplines,
while the special categories are those proper to theology.
As a methodologist, Lonergan restricts himself to "indi-
cating what qualities are desirable in theological cate-
gories, what measure of validity is to be demanded of them,
and how are categories with the desired qualities and
validity to be obtained" (1972a:282). The base of interi-
orly and religiously differentiated consciousness will
provide theology with categories that are in some measure
transcultural, not in their explicit formulation, but in the realities formulated. These categories will possess the utility of models "built up from basic terms and relations that refer to (these) transcultural components in human living and operation and, accordingly, at their roots they will possess quite exceptional validity" (285). Their derivation, finally, will flow from the explicit objectification of the basic terms and relations of the structure of the self-transcending intentionality of the theologian and from the articulation of the same theologian's dynamic state of religious and Christian subjectivity. There will be five sets of special theological categories, which we may roughly list as: religion, the religious community in history, divinity, revelation and redemption (290f.).

Now the claim that Jung's interpretation of Christian symbols is a matter of both positive and critical concern for the theologian concerned with generating or deriving categories that will be operative in systematic theology raises fundamental methodological difficulties which we must confront head-on, albeit initially and heuristically, at the outset of our investigation. For systematics is properly conceived by Lonergan as an explanatory discipline rather than as a descriptive exercise (1957: Index under "Description-Explanation")/2/. That is to say, the basic terms and relations of systematic theology will aim to propose hypotheses as to the relations of things to one another rather than more or less sophisticated descriptions of things in their relations to us /3/. Now, the basic terms and relations of the systematic theology that took its stand on a faculty psychology were metaphysical. But metaphysical terms and relations are not basic but derived sets of categories for a systematics based on intentionality analysis. Here the basic terms and relations will be psychological, and the psychological base is described as follows: "General basic terms name conscious and intentional operations. General basic relations name elements in the dynamic structure linking operations and
generating states. Special basic terms name God's gift of his love and Christian witness." Derived terms and relations, on the other hand, "name the objects known in operations and correlative to states" (Lonergan, 1972a: 343). But Jung's interpretation of Christian symbols, on this account, would seem to be pertinent neither for basic nor for derived terms and relations. For Jung's psychological concern is not that of Lonergan's intentionality analysis. That is, he is not engaged in naming conscious and intentional operations, nor is he concerned with the links among these operations that generate the states of intelligence in act, reason in act, originating value in act. Furthermore, Jung is frequent and insistent that his interpretation of Christian symbols does not claim to name the objects correlative to the psychological states which these symbols reflect (see 1969b:360-362, pars. 554-557). How can we claim, then, that there is a pertinence of archetypal psychology, however critically modified it may be, for the functional specialty, foundations? Moreover, even if such a pertinence could be established, how could it claim to be anything more than descriptive, to say rather than to show? Is it not the intrinsic limitation of symbolic consciousness that it is incapable of explanatory power? Does not explanation ensue only when insight into the images produces formulations which prescind from imaginative representation? Does not explanation depend upon freedom from the vagaries of imagination? Is it not true, for example, that the Athanasian rule regarding the divinity of the Son and his consubstantiality with the Father possesses implicit explanatory significance only because it is a proposition about propositions and thus a proposition that has freed itself from the imaginative representations of earlier and more primitive Christologies? /4/.

Such is the problem, and our answer will be that Jung's maieutic of the psyche can be critically modified by Lonergan's intentionality analysis in such a way as to
provide access to an explanatory account of symbolic consciousness. It is this account, this reflection of a self-appropriation of one's own symbolic consciousness, that will allow the derivation of categories that are at one and the same time symbolic yet invested with explanatory significance. In psychic self-appropriation, symbolic terms and relations themselves are derived which fix one another in an explanatory way, just as in the self-appropriation of intentionality general basic terms (operations) and relations linking the operations and generating states come to fix one another in the elaboration of a transcendental or generalized empirical method. The theological pertinence of Jung's psychology is that, when transposed and transformed into an element within generalized empirical method, it complements intentionality analysis by mediating in explanatory fashion the dramatic or aesthetic component of the pursuit of intelligibility, truth, and value, and it thus enables the derivation of explanatory categories which, even while explanatory, nonetheless are symbolic.

But what happens to archetypal psychology in the light of the transposition it undergoes when it becomes a portion of the self-appropriation that is generalized empirical method? It will be decisively changed by this transposition in that the worldview or myth issuing from Jung's writings will be corrected on certain fundamental accounts. Nonetheless, this change will be nothing other than a reversal of the counter-position in Jungian writings, and a consequent development and enrichment of Jung's very real discoveries into a horizon which, it would seem, he may have at times intended without ever achieving or being given it, or, if he was brought to it, without ever formulating it satisfactorily. What is this horizon?
B. Converted Subjectivity

Foundations articulates the basic horizon from which the theologian engages in doctrines, systematics and communications. It does so by objectifying the three conversions which constitute the basic horizon or foundational reality. These three conversions are religious, moral and intellectual (see Lonergan, 1972a:267-269, 142). Religious conversion, the fruit of God's gift of his love, generally precedes moral conversion, while intellectual conversion is generally the fruit of both religious and moral conversion (267f.) /5/. Nevertheless, intellectual conversion is then sublated into a higher unity by moral conversion and both intellectual and moral conversion are sublated into the higher integration provided by religious conversion. Thus:

Because intellectual, moral, and religious conversions all have to do with self-transcendence, it is possible, when all three occur within a single consciousness, to conceive their relations in terms of sublation. I would use this notion in Karl Rahner's sense rather than Hegel's to mean that what sublates goes beyond what is sublated, introduces something new and distinct, puts everything on a new basis, yet so far from interfering with the sublated or destroying it, on the contrary needs it, includes it, preserves all its proper features and properties, and carries them forward to a fuller realization within a richer context.

So moral conversion goes beyond the value, truth, to values generally. It promotes the subject from cognitional to moral self-transcendence. It sets him on a new, existential level of consciousness and establishes him as an originating value. But this in no way interferes with or weakens his devotion to truth. He still needs truth, for he must apprehend reality and real potentiality before he can deliberately respond to value. The truth he needs is still the truth attained in accord with the exigencies of rational consciousness. But now his pursuit of it is all the more secure because he has been armed against bias, and it is all the more meaningful and significant because it occurs within, and plays an essential role in, the far richer context of the pursuit of all values.
Similarly, religious conversion goes beyond moral. Questions for intelligence, for reflection, for deliberation reveal the eros of the human spirit, its capacity and its desire for self-transcendence. But that capacity meets fulfilment, that desire turns to joy, when religious conversion transforms the existential subject into a subject in love, a subject held, grasped, possessed, owned through a total and so an other-worldly love. Then there is a new basis for all valuing and all doing good. In no way are fruits of intellectual or moral conversion negated or diminished. On the contrary, all human pursuit of the true and the good is included within and furthered by a cosmic context and purpose and, as well, there now accrues to man the power of love to enable him to accept the suffering involved in undoing the effects of decline. (Lonergan, 1972a:241f.)

There would seem to be one profound and far-reaching difference between intellectual conversion on the one hand and moral and religious conversion on the other. For intellectual conversion, in the technical sense in which Lonergan uses this term, seems to be coextensive with the self-appropriation of one's cognitive being. It is not identical with intellectual or cognitive self-transcendence, for, if it were, not only intellectual conversion but knowing itself would be very rare. Intellectual conversion affects directly, not knowing, but the objectification of what I am doing when I am knowing, why that is knowing, and what I know when I do that (25). Thus:

Intellectual conversion is a radical clarification and, consequently, the elimination of an exceedingly stubborn and misleading myth concerning reality, objectivity, and human knowledge. The myth is that knowing is like looking, that objectivity is seeing what is there to be seen and not seeing what is not there, and that the real is what is out there now to be looked at. ...To be liberated from that blunder, to discover the self-transcendence proper to the human process of coming to know, is to break often long-ingrained habits of thought and speech. It is to acquire the mastery in one's own house that is to be had only when one knows precisely what one is doing when one is knowing. It is a conversion, a new beginning, a fresh start. It opens the way to ever further clarifications and developments. (238-240)
Moral and religious conversion, on the contrary, are coextensive with a state of moral and religious self-transcendence, but not with moral and religious self-appropriation. Moral conversion "changes the criterion of one's decisions and choices from satisfactions to values," whereas religious conversion "is being grasped by ultimate concern. It is other-worldly falling in love. It is total and permanent self-surrender without conditions, qualifications, reservations" (240). Such decisive transformations can be effected without the subtle capacity for detailing what has occurred that accompanies intellectual conversion. Intellectual conversion marks initiation into a distinct realm of meaning, the realm of interiorly differentiated consciousness (81-85, 272). Moral and religious conversion generally occur without such differentiation. They are self-transcendence at the fourth level of intentional consciousness, but without self-appropriation at this fourth level (see 1972a: chap. 1). Intellectual conversion, however, is more than self-transcendence at the first three levels of intentional consciousness. It is the understanding of understanding that is reflectively grasped as virtually unconditioned and then affirmed in the judgment, "I am a knower" (1957: chap. 11). It is not knowing, but the position on knowing that constitutes a part of the explicit base of a critically verified philosophy (385-390). It is properly referred to by Lonergan as a conversion that may be called a personal philosophic experience (see 1974:79).

Now initiation through intellectual conversion into interiorly differentiated consciousness as a realm of meaning distinct from common sense and theory is also an introduction to a third historical stage of meaning in the Western tradition. "In the first stage conscious and intentional operations follow the mode of common sense. In a second stage besides the mode of common sense there is also the mode of theory, where the theory is controlled by a logic. In a third stage the modes of common sense and
theory remain, science asserts its autonomy from philosophy, and there occur philosophies that leave theory to science and take their stand on interiority" (1972a:85). This initiation occurs through a basic clarification of operations that had occurred also in the first two stages of meaning, namely the operations involved in knowing. This clarification in the mode of interiority is simultaneously intellectual conversion. But also among the operations that occurred in the first two stages of meaning are the operations of morally and religiously converted subjects. As we have seen, these operations occurred in actu exercito and may have given rise to the kinds of clarification that issue from common sense and theoretical objectifications, but they were not objectified by interiorly differentiated consciousness. As occurring but not objectified, they did not in fact need, include or sublate intellectual conversion. What needs, includes, and sublates intellectual conversion is self-appropriating moral and religious consciousness. The question arises, then, as to whether an objectification characteristic of the third stage of meaning is possible regarding the operations of existential subjectivity. What would constitute moral and religious self-appropriation as distinct from moral and religious conversion? The key to our answer is to be found, I believe, in a fourth conversion. I call it psychic conversion. Psychic conversion, when joined with the three conversions specified by Lonergan, enables us to locate the foundational role of a transformed archetypal psychology.

First, then, I must specify what I mean by psychic conversion. Then I must show why it is the key to moral and religious self-appropriation, and briefly indicate its role in the sublation of intellectual conversion by moral conversion and of intellectual and moral conversion by religious conversion.
C. Psychic Conversion

Like intellectual conversion, psychic conversion is an entrance into the third stage of meaning. It can occur before or after intellectual conversion, but its correct objectification depends on intellectual conversion. What then is psychic conversion and what does it effect in and for the subject?

The movement into interiorly differentiated consciousness occurs through an objectification of the data of consciousness. Consciousness is the subject's presence to himself or herself in all the operations of which he or she is the subject. But there are two interlocking modalities to the data of consciousness: a cognitive modality and an affective or dramatic modality. Cognitional analysis mediates the first, whereas what we might call imaginal analysis mediates the second. Imaginal analysis can take many forms, and in our own day one of its principal manifestations occurs in those forms of psychotherapy which link affective or dramatic subjectivity with the spontaneous images and symbols originating from the psychic depths in dreams and in various states of hypnagogic experience. One way, then, to the mediation of the affective or dramatic component of the data of consciousness is through the interpretation of dreams.

Beyond cognitional analysis, however, there is intentionality analysis. The concern of intentionality analysis is not limited to the cognitive moments of our conscious being but extends beyond the levels of experience, understanding, and judgment to a fourth level of consciousness, the level of evaluation, deliberation, decision and action or praxis. Lonergan refers to consciousness at this fourth level as existential subjectivity. Moral and religious conversion refer to such subjectivity. Thus it is more accurate to speak of the first component of the data of consciousness as an intentional component, the component which intends self-transcendence in both knowing and doing.
Furthermore, the affective or dramatic or aesthetic component is best understood as psychic, for it is this component that is illuminated when we understand our dreams correctly. There is a drama to insight, to the further questions that intend truth, and to the process of evaluation, deliberation and decision that seeks to discriminate what is truly worth while from what is only apparently good. The dramatic or psychic component, while pertinent for and attending every aspect of intentionality, becomes particularly central and crucial at the level of existential subjectivity, for such subjectivity is concerned with value, and values are apprehended in feelings which themselves are certified by symbols. Thus:

Intermediate between judgments of fact and judgments of value lie apprehensions of value. Such apprehensions are given in feelings. The feelings in question are not the...non-intentional states, trends, urges, that are related to efficient and final causes but not to objects. Again, they are not intentional responses to such objects as the agreeable or disagreeable, the pleasant or painful, the satisfying or dissatisfying. For, while these are objects, still they are ambiguous objects that may prove to be truly good or bad or only apparently good or bad. Apprehensions of value occur in a further category of intentional response which greets either the ontic value of a person or the qualitative value of beauty, of understanding, of truth, of noble deeds, of virtuous acts, of great achievements. For we are so endowed that we not only ask questions leading to self-transcendence, not only can recognize correct answers constitutive of intentional self-transcendence, but also respond with the stirring of our very being when we glimpse the possibility or the actuality of moral self-transcendence. (37f.)

And:

Not only do feelings respond to values. They do so in accord with some scale of preference. So we may distinguish vital, social, cultural, personal, and religious values in an ascending order. Vital values, such as health and strength, grace and vigor, normally are preferred to avoiding the work, privations, pains involved in acquiring, maintaining, restoring
them. Social values, such as the good of order which conditions the vital values of the whole community, have to be preferred to the vital values of individual members of the community. Cultural values do not exist without the underpinning of vital and social values, but none the less they rank higher. Not on bread alone doth man live. Over and above mere living and operating, men have to find a meaning and value in their living and operating. It is the function of culture to discover, express, validate, criticize, correct, develop, improve such meaning and value. Personal value is the person in his self-transcendence, as loving and being loved, as originator of values in himself and in his milieu, as an inspiration and invitation to others to do likewise. Religious values, finally, are at the heart of the meaning and value of man's living and man's world. (31f.)

Further:

A symbol is an image of a real or imaginary object that evokes a feeling or is evoked by a feeling. . . . There is in the human being an affective development that may suffer aberrations. It is the history of that process that terminates in the person with a determinate orientation in life and with determinate affective capacities, dispositions, and habits. What such affective capacities, dispositions, habits are in a given individual can be specified by the symbols that awaken determinate affects and, inversely, by the affects that evoke determinate symbols. . . .

Affective development, or aberration, involves a transvaluation and transformation of symbols. What before was moving no longer moves; what before did not move now is moving. So the symbols themselves change to express the new affective capacities and dispositions. . . . Inversely, symbols that do not submit to transvaluation and transformation seem to point to a block in development. (64-66)

Symbols, moreover, fulfill a need that logic cannot satisfy, the need for internal communication.

Organic and psychic vitality have to reveal themselves to intentional consciousness and, inversely, intentional consciousness has to secure the collaboration of organism and psyche.
Again, our apprehensions of values occur in intentional responses, in feelings: here too it is necessary for feelings to reveal their objects and, inversely, for objects to awaken feelings. It is through symbols that mind and body, mind and heart, heart and body communicate.

In that communication symbols have their proper meaning. It is an elemental meaning, not yet objectified....It is a meaning that fulfils its function in the imagining or perceiving subject as his conscious intentionality develops or goes astray or both, as he takes his stance to nature, with his fellow men, and before God. It is a meaning that has its proper context in the process of internal communication in which it occurs, and it is to that context with its associated images and feelings, memories and tendencies that the interpreter has to appeal if he would explain the symbol. (66f.)

I have quoted so extensively from Lonergan in order to demonstrate that he provides most of the material for indicating what I mean by psychic conversion. Psychic conversion is the release of the capacity for the internal communication of symbolic consciousness. It is effected when one gains the habit of negotiating one's dreams as ciphers of the dramatic component that attends one's intentional operations as a knowing and acting subject. Its progressive and cumulative result is an integrated affectivity which expresses itself as a complementarity of intentionality and psyche, the conscription of psyche into intentionality's orientation toward intelligibility, truth and value, and at the same time the synchronizing of intentionality's projects with the potentialities of one's developing affectivity. The development of affectivity, and especially its increasing capacity for objectivity or detachment, is reflected in the movement from the permeation of one's dreams by the bizarre to their bearing the aesthetic qualities and directness that reflect increasing individuation (see p. 65).

I have argued elsewhere that psychic conversion meets all the specifications for conversion laid down by Lonergan, and yet that it is different from the religious, moral and intellectual conversions which he has treated
(see Doran, 1977a:240-246). In the same work, I have indicated that psychic conversion extends the relations of sublation that obtain among the levels of consciousness to include the sublation of dreaming consciousness and its imaginal sphere of being by empirical, intelligent, rational and existential consciousness. Rather than repeat these arguments here, I will proceed to the argument that psychic conversion is the key to moral and religious self-appropriation.

D. Existential Self-appropriation

The basis of my position is clear already. Briefly the argument may be summarized in the following five steps:

1) aesthetic subjectivity is the basis of moral and religious subjectivity;

2) our affective responses to symbols and, inversely, the symbolic images evoked by our feelings are what form and structure aesthetic subjectivity;

3) this reciprocal relationship of affectivity and symbol manifests itself in elemental fashion in our dreams;

4) the capacity for negotiating these elemental symbols is the fruit of psychic conversion;

5) psychic conversion thus enables the appropriation of the aesthetic base of our moral and religious responses. This aesthetic base enables in turn an explicit reading of the intentionality of the heart that is existential subjectivity. The capacity for this reading is moral and religious self-appropriation.

Since a detailed presentation of each of these steps would involve a great deal of repetition, let me simply build on what we have already seen.

Attendant upon the component of intentionality moving toward self-transcendence in our raising of questions for intelligence, truth and deliberation, there is a dramatic component to the data of consciousness that is revealed in feelings. The conflict between the desire to know and the flight from understanding, and between making values or
satisfactions the criterion of our decisions, constitutes a drama of the emergence or failure of emergence of the authentic subject. The desire to know, Lonergan tells us, can invade the very fabric of our dreams (1957:4), that is, it affects not only the intentionality of the intelligent intelligibility that is spirit, but also the psychic and bodily undertow that conditions all incarnate spirit. The dreams of an intelligent spirit will be permeated with intelligence and meaning. That our dreams are ciphers of our intentionality is due to the psychic component that attends intentionality in its pursuit of meaning, truth and value. For we pursue or fail to pursue the objectives of intentionality, not as pure spirits, but as spiritual, psychic and bodily subjects. What discloses itself in dreams is the status of our desire, and our desire is not pure instinct, but the polymorphic desire of an incarnate spirit. The drama of our intentionality is the drama of the conflict between detachment and disinterestedness in our desire to know and in our constitution of ourselves and the world, on the one hand, and the attached and interfering desire of our sensitivity, our individual and group bias, and our flight from further theoretical and philosophic questions that Lonergan calls general bias, on the other hand. It is this dialectic of desire that reveals itself in our dreams /6/. The dialectic of desire as affectively experienced is aesthetic subjectivity.

While the dialectic of desire attends and is pertinent to every level of intentional consciousness, its specific importance reveals itself only when we come to consider the fourth level, existential subjectivity, where the issue is value, and where what is at stake is character. In fact, it may be said that the dialectic of desire attends the pursuit of meaning and truth precisely because meaning and truth are themselves values and because their realization calls for a decision on the part of the existential subject for self-transcendence in one's cognitive being. It is for existential subjectivity that values as
such are the issue, and, as we have seen, the base of the value experience lies in an affectivity structured in terms of and certified by symbolic consciousness. This aesthetic subjectivity, the dialectic of desire, is the base of our moral and religious being (see Doran: 1977d, 1977e). Thus the access to the dialectic of desire provided by psychic conversion will enable us to appropriate our subjectivity at this fourth level of its intentional consciousness.

If psychic conversion is the key to moral and religious self-appropriation, then the sublation of intellectual conversion by moral conversion and of intellectual and moral conversion by religious conversion is greatly aided and facilitated by psychic conversion. As we have seen, intellectual conversion is attendant upon intellectual self-appropriation, whereas moral and religious conversion are independent of and prior to moral and religious self-appropriation. In fact, there would seem to be a dynamic moving the subject from intellectual self-appropriation to moral and religious self-appropriation, if indeed Lonergan is correct about the relations of sublation that obtain among the three conversions that for him constitute foundational reality. For self-appropriation at the level of one's cognitive being, it would seem, can be securely sublated into existential (moral and religious) consciousness only to the extent that such consciousness has been subjected to as rigorous a maieutic as intelligent and reasonable consciousness. If I am correct in emphasizing the aesthetic base of existential consciousness, then the key to this maieutic is psychic conversion. Thus, while psychic conversion, in its occurrence, is at least in principle independent of any of the three conversions specified by Lonergan, being simply the release of the capacity for the internal communication of symbolic consciousness, its role in foundational reality is specified by the aid it provides in the task of sublating intellectual conversion into one's
commitment to all value and both of these commitments into the surrender of cognitive and affective being into the hands of God.

E. The Three Orders of Elemental Symbols

There are three different kinds of dream symbols: personal, archetypal, and anagogic. The differences and relations among these three orders of symbols are best approached from a discussion of the unconscious.

The unconscious is one of the most ambiguously employed notions in the human sciences. I believe that the key to the precise and legitimate employment of the terminology of the unconscious lies in a careful discrimination of the notion of energy.

As Lonergan has indicated, frequently the expression, the unconscious, is used to refer to what is or has been, in fact, conscious but not objectified /7/. This aspect of subjectivity, I believe, would better be called "the undifferentiated." But what is truly unconscious is all energy in the universe that is not present to itself, the energy that emerges into new forms and laws in accord with emergent probability but not in accord with potentially intelligent emergent probability (see Lonergan, 1957:123-128, 209-211). Proximately to consciousness, this energy takes the form of neural-physiological process in the body. More remotely, it is universal energy, the entire non-conscious cosmos.

Now energy begins to become conscious when it becomes psychic energy, and psychic energy emerges in the dream. With Jung, we may distinguish between the ego of the conscious subject and the totality of subjectivity, conscious and unconscious, that Jung calls the self (see inter alia Jung, 1972:123-241). But in terms of our discussion of energy, when neural-physiological energy enters into consciousness through the dream, a portion or aspect of the unconscious dimension of the self has become conscious. On our analysis, these dream symbols are personal. They
come from the personal unconscious, which includes all that is forgotten and repressed by consciousness as well as elements that have never before been conscious in either a differentiated or undifferentiated fashion. But other dreams reflect more universal and generalizable motifs of development and decline. These dreams, as well as those that are either synchronistic with or prophetic of outer events, are the products of the emergence into consciousness of energy that is not only ego-transcendent but self-transcendent. Their images imitate nature in their reflection of generic motifs of life, death, and rebirth. They are archetypal images, and the energy that is their ground corresponds to what Jung calls the collective or impersonal unconscious or, less happily, the objective psyche. Finally, there are certain dreams, recorded in the annals of all the great world religions, that can be said to originate with an experienced directness from the realm, not of ego-transcendent energy nor even of self-transcendent energy, but of absolute transcendence, from the absolute limit of the process of going beyond that is God. Such dreams are hermeneutic of the divine call. In them, the energy that is the cosmic and then the personal unconscious, is the transparent medium of creative and redemptive power. The symbols of such dreams are properly called anagogic, in that they are not so much mimetically expressive of nature or even of history as the whole meaning of nature and history is contained or summed up within them and offered in a revelatory fashion to the consciousness of the dreaming subject as his or her ultimate dramatic context of existence. These dreams are no longer a commentary on life or an imitation of nature, but the context or system of relationships that constitutes the ineffable mystery that is the final meaning of existence, the context within which all of life is contained and which now offers itself to the subject in the form of a concrete call. There is a totality about such symbols that reflects the final limit of the dialectic of human desire, the
dialectic of unconditional love and cosmic hate that is at once the final and basic option of every human subject. Thus Joseph Flanagan correctly remarks that "in the anagogic phase of meaning, a single symbol can become so concentrated in meaning as to contain within itself an unlimited feeling of desire or dread. The classical example of this in the Western literary universe are the symbols of Christ and Satan" (1977:78) /8/. If we may still speak of anagogic symbols as the emergence of the unconscious into consciousness, we do so only improperly, i.e., with reference to the psychoid medium of these dreams and to our own absolutely spiritual unconscious, and not with reference to the first and quite personal agent of such dreams /9/.

II. Jung and Method

A. The Way of Individuation: Jung

Individuation, the process of becoming one's own self (see Jung, 1972:173), can be set within the context set by the incorporation of psychic conversion into the foundational reality proposed by Lonergan. It then becomes the psychic and aesthetic correlative of the self-appropriation of intentionality.

In 1946 Jung wrote an essay that has since come to be regarded as programmatic for the future developments of archetypal psychology. This essay is entitled, "On the Nature of the Psyche" (1969a:159-234). A recent survey of the development of the notion of the archetypes since Jung's own work spotlights this essay as the springboard of the later refinements (see Goldenberg, 1975:199-220) /10/. In the present section I propose to employ this essay to demonstrate in a very initial fashion how Jungian psychology can be reconstructed from the horizon established by generalized empirical method.

Jung presents the process of individuation as a progressive and cumulative reconciliation of opposites. The opposites are named spirit and matter or instinct. The
operator of their ongoing integration is the psyche. The integration or reconciliation of the opposites is portrayed in the dramatic form of psychic images and symbols.

"On the Nature of the Psyche" begins by refuting the contention of some turn-of-the-century psychologists that only what is conscious is the proper concern of the psychologist. For example, Wilhelm Wundt objected to the hypothesis of the unconscious on the grounds that the notion of unconscious representations without a subject is an anomaly. For Jung this objection is easily met by speaking, not of representations, but of complexes or contents. These are to be thought of, not as inborn ideas but as patterns of behavior, not as perceptions but as forms of behavior, as "sketches, plans, or images which, though not actually 'presented' to the ego, are yet just as real as Kant's hundred thalers." Jung calls them archetypes (1969a:165f.; and Frey-Rohn, 1974:34f.) /11/. They are "fundamentally analogous forms of perception that are to be found everywhere" (Jung, 1969a:165).

These impersonal complexes constitute at least for the moment the hypothesis of the unconscious psychic which forms a matrix or background to (ego-)consciousness. This background Jung characteristically refers to as "a pre-consciousness" (168) /12/. In this context he introduces the notion of threshold. A threshold divides ego-consciousness from the entire psychic background. "The indispensable raw material of all knowledge--namely psychic reactions--and perhaps even unconscious 'thoughts' and 'insights' lie close beside, above, or below consciousness, separated from us by the merest 'threshold' and yet apparently unattainable." This psychic system "may possibly have everything that consciousness has, including perception,apperception, memory, imagination, will, affectivity, feeling, reflection, judgment, etc., all in subliminal form" (Jung, 1969a:172) /13/. In this sense, "the possibility of an unconscious subject becomes a serious question" (165).
A less reified and inchoatively more differentiated hypothesis would speak, however, not of an unconscious subject, but of the dissociation or dissociability of the psyche into complexes. Dissociation can result from one of two quite different occasions: the repression of originally conscious contents because of their incompatibility with ego-consciousness, and (more often for Jung) the functioning of processes that never entered into ego-consciousness at all because the ego could not assimilate them. In either case, the complexes may possess the energy to cross the threshold, and if so they do affect ego-consciousness and are reflected in the symptoms known to psychopathology (175).

The notion of the threshold is a metaphor originally used in physiological studies of sensation. When introduced into psychology it raises the possibility that "there is a lower as well as an upper threshold for psychic events, and that consciousness, the perceptual system par excellence, may therefore be compared with the perceptible scale of sound or light, having like them a lower and upper limit" (176). Moreover, it may be that we can extend this notion of threshold to the outer limits, not of ego-consciousness alone but of the psyche in general, so that there are "'psychoid' processes at both ends of the psychic state" (176).

The hypothesis of the unconscious can be verified only if there are unconscious contents that can be integrated into consciousness by an interpretative method. The dream has been one of the principal mediators of this integration, but whereas for Freud dream contents are exclusively linked with the instinctual sphere, for Jung their specifically psychic component has lost the compulsive character of instinct and can be applied in different ways by "the will." It can even function, under the direction of "the will," in ways "contrary to the original instinct" (181) /14/. The psychic, then, is "an emancipation of function from its instinctual form and so from the
compulsiveness which, as a sole determinant of the function, causes it to harden into a mechanism. The psychic condition or quality begins where the function loses its outer and inner determinism and becomes capable of more extensive and freer application, that is, where it begins to show itself accessible to a will motivated from other sources" (181f.).

So much for the lower limits of the psyche. What about the upper limit of these psychic phenomena emancipated from physiological compulsion? Jung is reticent on the issue. "With increasing freedom from sheer instinct," Jung says, "the partie supérieure (the psychic) will ultimately reach a point at which the intrinsic energy of the function ceases altogether to be oriented by instinct in the original sense, and attains a so-called 'spiritual' form" (182). This would seem to be due to the fact that the instinct in question is human instinct, which "may easily mask a sense of direction other than biological, which only becomes apparent in the course of development" (182).

The psychic, then, for Jung is a sphere of disposable energy, intermediate between physiological determinism and spirit. The psychic is intrinsically linked with both of these extra-psychic spheres, reaches ever further into each of them, and links them with one another under the guidance of "the will," which is familiar with other goals besides the instinctual.

Is the unconscious for Jung, then, psychic at all, or is it psychoid? Is not the psyche even for Jung coextensive with consciousness? Does not the term, the unconscious, refer to those physiological processes which have not entered, and in some cases cannot and will not enter, into the sphere of disposable energy where energy becomes at once psychic and conscious? Jung is forced to deal with this question, but in doing so he sets up a model which includes in the unconscious the personalistic fringes of consciousness, the Freudian findings and the psychoid functions.
The first two sets of "contents" of the unconscious, so conceived, are psychic, but in a manner quite different from the contents of ego-consciousness. They include undifferentiated and unintegrated feeling-toned complexes which can recede ever further from ego-consciousness. As they do so, they assume an ever more archaic, mythological, and even at times numinous character. With increasing dissociation, they seem "to sink back to a more primitive (archaic-mythological) level, to approximate in character to the underlying instinctual pattern, and to assume the qualities which are the hallmark of instinct: automatism, nonsusceptibility to influence, all-or-none reaction, and so forth" (187). Yet they are not psychoid but psychic. They are little luminosities endowed with an "approximative consciousness" (189f.). They correspond, in fact, to "tiny conscious phenomena" (199). Thus the psyche is after all consciousness, but its contents are, says Jung, partly conscious and partly unconscious. The psyche is a "conscious-unconscious whole" whose lower reaches begin with emancipation from instinct.

But now further clarifications are in order, for Jung distinguishes between the personal and the collective unconscious. The collective unconscious consists of vestiges of biological evolution and heredity closely connected with instinct. There is an image with fixed qualities that corresponds to every instinct. Insofar as the human animal functions instinctively, he or she is equipped with such instinct-types or instinctually related imaginal patterns. But, says Jung, these types or archetypes "are not just relics or vestiges of earlier modes of functioning; they are the ever-present and biologically necessary regulators of the instinctual sphere" and represent "the meaning of the instincts" (201). Jung claims to have found at least an indirect access to these instinctual patterns in human activity through the gradual discovery of certain well-defined themes in the dreams and fantasies of his patients. These themes manifest and
render capable of conscious recovery the process which Jung named individuation. Among the most salient characteristics of these images are the following: "chaotic multiplicity and order; duality; the opposition of the light and dark, upper and lower, right and left; the union of opposites in a third; the quaternity (square, cross); rotation (circle, sphere); and finally the centring process and a radial arrangement that usually followed some quaternary system.... The centring process is, in my experience, the never-to-be surpassed climax of the whole development, and is characterized as such by the fact that it brings with it the greatest possible therapeutic effect" (203). These fantasies and dreams guided by unconscious regulators "coincide with the records of man's mental activity as known to us from tradition and ethnography" (203). Furthermore, the whole centering process seems ruled by "a dim foreknowledge not only of the pattern but of its meaning" (204). On the basis of such experience, Jung postulated that "there are certain collective unconscious conditions which act as regulators and stimulators of creative fantasy-activity and call forth corresponding formations by availing themselves of the existing conscious material" (204). The regulators are the archetypes which, Jung says, may be in the end identical with the human instinctual patterns (205). Yet when they appear in imaginal form, they are endowed with an element of spirit, in that their character is numinous or spiritual or mystical. They can mobilize religious convictions and draw the subject under a spell from which he cannot and would not break free, so deep and full is the experience of meaningfulness he enjoys (205).

Nonetheless one is not to draw the conclusion that the effects of archetypal experience are always positive. Such experience can be healing or destructive, since spirit, as represented in the archetypal image, has as such no moral significance. Spirit and instinct "belong together as correspondences,...subsist side by side as reflections
in our own minds of the opposition that underlies all psychic energy" (206), but "instinct is not in itself bad any more than spirit is good. Both can be both" (206).

B. Individuation and Generalized Empirical Method

It seems to me necessary to introduce here the distinctions we have already established in our methodological comments, so as to make clear the relation of Jung's presentation to our own formulations. What Jung encourages us to suggest is, first, that there is an upper and a lower threshold dividing ego-consciousness from the undifferentiated, and a further upper and lower threshold dividing the whole of consciousness (understood in terms of self-presence and including both ego-consciousness and the whole realm of the undifferentiated) from processes that, to use Jung's terms, are psychoid, that is, non-psychic but understood by analogy with the psyche. The upper threshold divides psyche from spirit, the lower psyche from matter. Our terminology would alter Jung's formulation to the following: perhaps beyond the structure of consciousness, at both ends of the spectrum that stretches from the dream to the highest reaches of existential consciousness in agapic love and in the mystic's cloud of unknowing, there are processes that, at the lower end, are literally and entirely unconscious and, at the upper end, are purely spiritual. Our "spectrum of the structure of consciousness" is Jung's "psyche in general," our "unconscious" is Jung's lower psychoid aspect, while his higher psychoid aspect would refer to what I would call spiritual processes that originate independently of the conscious subject they may affect. These spiritual processes are the domain referred to by what Christian spirituality has come to call the discernment of spirits. The "psyche in general" for Jung means what we, following Lonergan, would call the subject.

Thus when Jung speaks of the unconscious he means sometimes what we also mean by the unconscious, sometimes
what we have chosen to call the undifferentiated, and sometimes the upper psychoid realm that is spirit. In failing to distinguish these realms as sharply as they should be discriminated, Jung posits a notion of the totality of subjectivity or the self that is inflationary, that extends beyond what our stricter terminology would allow: so much so that in one place Jung refers to the self as "a borderline concept, expressing a reality to which no limits can be set" (1968c:355). Such a description may hold for the self's reachings into the upper and lower psychoid spheres, but should not, strictly speaking, be used of the self, which is "just this" 16/. For Jung, moreover, the hypothesis of the unconscious seems to refer in part to an aspect of the psyche, whereas for us the psyche is the beginning of consciousness, and the unconscious is both extrapsychic and, except for the personal unconscious, even extra-subjective. For Jung's psychic unconscious, I substitute the term, the undifferentiated, or what Lonergan calls the "twilight of what is conscious but not objectified" (1972a:34), and I reserve the term, the unconscious, for what is altogether beyond the lower reaches of the disposable psychic energy at any point in time, i.e., for what Jung calls the psychoid in its lower or physico-chemical dimensions. The introduction of the directing power of will, moreover, approaches our notion of the dialectic of desire. Psyche then becomes "essentially conflict between blind instinct and will (freedom of choice)" (Jung, 1969a:183). The dialectic of desire is more complicated than this, but this conflict would represent at least one of its dimensions.

As we can see, Jung understands the process of individuation as a progressive and cumulative reconciliation of the opposites of spirit and matter or instinct. The operator of their reconciliation is psychic energy. Spirit and matter are, as such, both psychoid. The archetype is an intrinsic constituent of spirit, but it is at the same time the meaning of the instinctual counterpole. It
displays this meaning through the archetypal images released in the psyche of the dreaming subject. These images will display the process of the reconciliation in the form of a story or narrative whose intelligent recapitulation constitutes the recovery of individuation through meaning. The images seem to reflect a foreknowledge of the goal or of certain steps along the way to the goal. And yet the coincidence of spirit and matter can be destructive as well as therapeutic, even morally evil as well as good. Clearly we are opened upon intellectual difficulties of great proportions which cannot be resolved within the framework of scientific psychology alone. We seem to be led by the very process of discovery to a standpoint that is beyond psychology, beyond the scientific disengagement of a purely immanent process of subjective psychological development. The context seems to be set by this analysis for integrating psychology not only with intentionality analysis but also with spirituality, and especially with the tradition of the discernment of spirits.

But can we be more precise on the notions of the collective unconscious and the archetypes? I believe we can again draw upon the methodological considerations of the first portions of this paper for a more satisfactory formulation of the discoveries of Jung than Jung himself was able to provide for them.

The collective unconscious, then, like the personal unconscious, should be considered as psychoid, not as psychic. Whereas the personal unconscious is all energy in the neural-physiological bodily process of the subject that is not present to itself, the collective unconscious is all energy beyond these neural-physiological processes that is not present to itself. The collective or, better, impersonal or cosmic unconscious is at bottom all energy in the universe that is neither psychic energy and thus at least inchoatively conscious, nor non-conscious energy in the bodies of conscious subjects. Impersonal energy, as
well as that which constitutes the personal unconscious, can come into consciousness by becoming psychic energy, i.e., by emerging into the dream. In the dream's images there are revealed not only the repressed and forgotten meanings and evaluations that often show themselves in the displaced fashion highlighted by Freud and accounted for by the processes of neural interaction, but also at times variations on a ground theme of the emergence of the authentic subject. These variations are transpersonal and thematic in their impact and meaning and, since the ground theme is a cross-cultural one, the variations on the theme and even at times the symbols through which the variations will be narrated are found cross-culturally and are discovered to have been operative in other ages and perhaps even at times in quite archaic cultures.

Furthermore, Jung's work shows us that the emergence of the authentic subject is a matter of the concrete reconciliation and integration of the opposites of spirit and matter. Spirit in the subject is intelligent, reasonable, and responsible consciousness, the single transcendent intention of intelligibility, truth and value, the unrestricted desire to know and the capacity for a universal willingness. Matter is limitation. Spirit in the subject is a participant, I suggest, in purely spiritual processes that transcend the subject's individuality but that, through this participation, affect the subject's emergence or failure of emergence into authenticity. The images released in the psyche through the reconciliation, not of spirit in the subject and matter in the subject, but of spirit and matter that both transcend the subject and involve the subject as a participant in their interaction, are Jung's archetypal images. On our account, though, it would be more accurate to speak of some of these images as archetypal and of others as anagogic. Archetypal images are the recurrent and often cyclical symbols taken from nature that enable the communication of the human drama to take place; they are the associative
clusters that refer to and evoke human action as a whole and especially as it displays the story of a conflict between desire and reality. Anagogic symbols are no longer parts of a whole, however associative, as are archetypal images, but the containers of the whole of human action, symbols that seem to be or reflect or negate the Logos, the shaping word of the universe and of history (see Frye: 95-128) /17/. Again, as Joseph Flanagan has indicated, Christ and Satan function symbolically in an anagogic rather than archetypal fashion for the Christian psyche and even for the secular psyche of Western people /18/.

C. Individuation and the Problem of Evil

Jung does not treat the symbolic significance of Christ and of Satan in Christian tradition as anagogic symbols, but makes of them archetypal symbols on the same plane as, e.g., the royal king and queen of alchemical lore who symbolize for Jung the androgynous nature of the psyche (see 1969b), or the golden flower of Taoist literature which Jung interprets as symbolizing the wholeness of individuated life (see 1967:1-56, esp. 22-25). Such symbols are taken from nature and imitate nature, albeit in a generic and highly associative manner, which allows them to reflect a wholeness in nature. If Christ and Satan are considered as archetypal rather than anagogic, however, they are necessarily incomplete, for one is light and the other darkness. Neither reflects a wholeness in nature such as is symbolized in the nuptial coniunctio or even in the golden flower. On the archetypal level, only a conjunction of Christ and Satan would seem to reflect the wholeness of nature that the associative clusters that are archetypes symbolize. And this is precisely how Jung treats these two symbols, as needing one another if they are adequately to represent the self, the wholeness, that is the goal of individuation. Christ for Jung is necessarily inadequate as a symbol of the self, for he is without sin and darkness. Only the reconciliation of God's
two sons, of the hostile divine brothers, will provide for Jung the symbolization of individuated totality that will satisfy his postulate of a progressive reconciliation of opposites cumulatively heading toward the realization of the self (see 1968b).

Implicit in this conceptual scheme, of course, is the arrangement of good and evil among the opposites to be reconciled by the imaginal processes of the psyche. In a sense, then, it may be said that Jung is not faithful to the insight expressed in "On the Nature of the Psyche," where spirit and matter, both in the subject and beyond the subject but involving the subject as a participant in their interaction, were seen best to represent or summarize the understanding of the opposites reconciled by psychic energy /19/, and where it is clearly stated that neither of the opposites so conceived is in itself good or bad. "Both can be both" (1969a:206). More precisely, we can make several further criticisms. First, and somewhat ad hominem, the postulate of the reconciliation of spirit and matter necessarily moves Jung into specifically metaphysical and theological territory where he is not at home. Secondly, there is a quite definite distinction between "good and bad" on the one hand, and "good and evil" on the other. And thirdly, the adequate treatment of the problem of evil calls for several distinctions which never seem to have been recognized by Jung. I have in mind the sort of distinctions Lonergan draws among moral impotence (1957: 627-630), basic sin and moral evil (666-668). At the root of all these criticisms, though, is the need for clarification of the notion of the self, and I limit myself to this task in the present context.

D. What is the Self?

Jung has much to say about symbols of the self, but tells us not enough about what it is that these symbols symbolize. What, from the standpoint of generalized empirical method, is the self? Is it not the subject? Do
not the symbols of wholeness which for Jung symbolize the self reflect the totality of subjectivity in its concern for receptive attentiveness to the data of sense and of consciousness, for meaning, for truth, for value and for the absolutely transcendent origin and goal of nature and of history? This will be my option, that the self, under the aspect of totality, is the subject as the latter has been disengaged by Lonergan, and as Lonergan's analysis is complemented by the additional sublation effected by psychic conversion. And the most notable thing about this self or subject is that it can be authentic or inauthentic; that its authenticity consists in self-transcendence in knowing, in doing, and in religion; and that it truly knows itself only when it reflectively recognizes that it is authentically itself solely in the self-transcending intention of intelligibility, truth, and value /20/. This total self or subject transcends the limits of differentiated consciousness or ego and reveals its ego-transcendence in dreams that originate from the personal unconscious. But beyond the personal unconscious and thus beyond the self, there extends the vast, indeed cosmic, reach of the collective or objective unconscious which is not only ego-transcendent but self-transcendent. The self, then, finds its lower limit at the threshold that divides the personal from the collective unconscious. The upper limit of the self is constituted by another and quite different threshold, one which marks the boundary between the highest intention of agapic love on the part of existential subjectivity and the spiritual processes that can be divined only by religious discernment. Nonetheless, despite the thresholds which limit the self or subject to being "just this," its lower and upper self-transcendent reachings make of it a tension of limitation and transcendence, and its genuineness consists in negotiating this tension (see Lonergan, 1957:469-479).

Generalized empirical method, then, allows us to substitute the intentionality categories of limitation and
transcendence for Jung's characterization of the intra-subjective opposites as matter and spirit. Let us keep matter and spirit as our formulation for the self-transcendent opposites in whose interaction the self is an intrinsic participant, in fact, an instrumental operator of integration or of disintegration, but let us speak of limitation and transcendence as articulating the way matter and spirit become the opposites in the intentional subject or self.

Psyche, then, becomes one dimension of this totality of subjectivity, a dimension which is manifest at each level of intentional consciousness in the dramatic and affective component of all empirical or inattentive, intelligent or stupid, reasonable or silly, responsible and constructive or irresponsible and sociopathic consciousness. But what qualifies the subject as subject is intentionality, the orientation to self-transcendence at each level, and the successive sublations of lower levels by higher ones in the pursuit of authenticity. And what qualifies the psychic component of this intentional striving as authentic or inauthentic is the manner in which it participates in the negotiation of the tension of limitation and transcendence, and the extent to which it shares in the detachment and disinterestedness, the universality and cosmic context, of the single transcendental intending of the intelligible, the real and true, and the good. The self, the totality of subjectivity, is both genuine and authentic to the extent to which the organic, psychic and intentional systems are operating, first, in harmony with one another; second, in the interests of cognitive, real and religious self-transcendence; and third, for the promotion of the religiously discerned integration of spirit and matter as this integration is issued into being by world- and self-constituting projects on the part of the developing, self-transcending subject.

This transposition of the Jungian notion of the self into the categories of an intentionality analysis
complemented by the maieutic of the psyche which such an analysis renders possible, highlights the most important fact about the self: that it can be self-transcending cognitively, existentially, and religiously, or that it can flee understanding and shun truth in the name of any one or some or all of the counter-philosophies which deny its capacity for meaning and objectivity; that it can allow its action in the world to be governed by dramatic, egoistic, group or general bias; and that it can hide from and eventually come to hate the call to holiness which alone reveals its ulterior finality. This dialectic of the self-transcendence and the self-containment of the self is not properly emphasized by Jung; nor does he pay sufficient attention to the fact that symbols which open up upon the authentic self are visited upon subjects whose intentional orientation is away from meaning, truth and value, only for the sake of calling them to radical conversion. This latter fact may not completely escape Jung, but it is not brought to the center and core of his articulation of the process of rendering conscious the individuation that is the psychic meaning of total human development. By bringing this fact to its proper place in a theory of individuation, we provide the only adequate context for discussing the problem of evil. This discussion would show us clearly, I believe, that good and evil cannot be among the opposites generally qualified as transcendence and limitation, the opposites whose progressive reconciliation constitutes the process of individuation. To place them among the opposites involves a category mistake on the part of Jung, and, insofar as understanding is central to human development and misunderstanding an obstacle to such development, Jung's category mistake is also an obstruction to the individuation process which he labored so diligently to understand, formulate and promote, and which he correctly judged to be, not only a psychological but indeed a moral and religious imperative of our time.
III. Conclusion

Lonergan's intentionality analysis and Jung's psychology take on an explicitly dialectical relation to one another when the subject must negotiate the evil he avows of himself. But the underlying dynamics which come to the fore in the area of moral and religious authenticity are present in either case from the very beginning, so that the entire relation of these two conceptions of human development and transformation may be considered dialectical. Lonergan describes and explains throughout his work the exigencies of what in his later writings is called self-transcendence. These exigencies, which constitute the law of the subject as intentional, are less consistently glimpsed and even less heartily affirmed by Jung, despite the access he provides the subject to trustworthy ciphers in their regard. There is, I submit, operative in Jung's thought a less than adequate notion of what makes for wholeness, despite his correct insistence on the centrality of the issue.

The further and mysterious outposts of Jungian thought constellate a number of problems for the theologian: the problem of method; the question of the relation between psychology and religion; the proper way to speak about good and evil; the relation of symbols of the self to images of God; the nature of wholeness; and the contribution of psychic deliverances to a theological doctrine of God. The theologian is not helped by the fact that Jung's forays into explicitly theological territory most evidence the need for a dialectical critique of Jung's entire corpus. I have no desire to deny or undermine the extraordinary significance of Jung for theology, and I share, though perhaps for other reasons, the frequent complaints of Jungians that theology has yet to appreciate this significance (see von Franz: 188ff.). I share, too, the assessment of David Burrell, already cited, that "Jung's work promises to prove as reliable a handmaid for doing theology today as more metaphysical schemes proved
in the past" (232). But, Burrell adds, "Every such inter-
pretative scheme must be carefully monitored and critical-
ly employed, yet that defines the theologian's task" (232).
The beginning of this critical monitoring must focus on
the religious significance of the process of individuation
which is simultaneously lived and discovered under the
auspices of a Jungian analysis. For, as Burrell says, in
this journey one will not fail to meet God (221). But one
will also meet much that is not God and that even is
against God. The crux of the matter is the negotiation of
evil, and so the ultimate monitoring of the theologian is
existential and religious before and even while it is
speculative or intellectual. In terms of the tradition
that is my own, the Roman Catholic and Ignatian tradition,
it is best conceived as discernment of spirits.

One further statement of Burrell's deserves mention
and approval: "Rather than Jung's explicit statements
about God, it is his language conveying the pursuit of
individualization which offers the most fruitful model for
discovering a religious way of speaking" (184). The re-
sources of this model need to be carefully disengaged by
the religious thinker equipped with sharper tools of
philosophical analysis than those enjoyed by Jung. Easy
adaptation of religion to analytical psychology--a tempta-
tion encouraged by Jung's religious suggestiveness--is to
be disparaged on both religious and psychological grounds,
to say nothing of method. It is here, again, that the
theologian's monitoring of Jung's work and praxis both
begins and ends: what is the relation between the process
of individuation as articulated in analytical psychology
and that of religious development and transformation as
objectified in that portion of theological foundations
dealing with religious and moral conversion? The relation
is intimate, yet it is clearly not one of identity. That
genuine religious conversion, as this is understood by
Christian theology, can and I dare say does sometimes oc-
cur within the course of a Jungian analysis, I do not wish
to deny. But my focus in this paper has been on the respective formulations of an analytical psychology of individuation and a foundational-theological objectification of conversion. The languages depart over the issue of evil, and, before this, over the notion of the self. For Christian faith, Jung's articulation of the problem of evil—and so his formulations of the self and of wholeness—are unacceptable. This, I find, is an inescapable conclusion, one I have wanted to avoid but have not been able to while still remaining faithful to my understanding of what Christianity, as a religion proclaiming redemption from evil, means. For analytical psychology this conviction probably remains hopelessly tied to the "Old King" of a declining age, to the splitting of opposites symbolized by the astrological sign of Pisces, and to that portion of Christianity which must be relinquished as we move toward a new and more universal religion (von Franz: chap. 9). But I find that to relinquish this portion of Christianity in favor of Jung's apocatastasis model of the integration of evil and good is not only to relinquish Christianity in toto but to regress, to pursue avenues previously traveled in the history of religions, avenues which from our present vantage point can only be termed blind alleys in the evolution of religious consciousness. So many of Jung's insights into the psychological aberrations of some Christian spirituality are unfortunately attended by a recommended alternative that is no less an aberration, and that perhaps even exceeds in illusion the mistake it was intended to replace. The ultimate relation of the Christian religion to Jung's myth is irretrievably dialectical. One cannot entertain both in their respective totalities without internal self-contradiction. No final resolution is possible except through dialectic.

There are, nonetheless, definite parallels between individuation and the self-appropriation to which Loner- gan's work invites us. The principal similarity is of course that both are processes of self-knowledge and
self-transformation. Jung's writings no more than Loner- 
gan's can be understood without a change being effected 
in the subject studying them. "The only test available 
for Jung's science is that to which we put a road map: 
does it succeed in getting us there? A working meaning 
for the term individuation is reserved for those who allow 
themselves to submit to its demands" (Burrell: 185). But 
despite the relative lack of attention paid to the posi-
tive significance of symbolic consciousness in Lonergan's 
formulations, he is working from and promoting a more ac-
curate understanding of the totality that is the self than 
is Jung. What Jung provides to a subjectivity tutored by 
Lonergan is access to the symbolic ciphers of the psyche 
regarding the economy of the subject's pursuit of the au-
thenticity of self-transcendence. Lonergan offers the 
theologian essentially what he offers anyone who reads 
him: an avenue to the intentionality that, among other 
things, founds theology. Jung presents to such a subject 
a complementary access to symbolic ciphers of personal 
development and transformation. The contribution is not 
only not negligible but serves to offset the one bias that 
Lonergan may not purge us of, the intellectualist bias 
that would regard the intellectual pattern of experience 
as somehow a privileged domain of self-transcending 
activity /21/. 

The relationship is further complicated, however, by 
the fact that Jung's model of wholeness, one of ego-
transcendence, is not also one of self-transcendence but 
ultimately one of self-enclosure. Jung fails to appreci-
ate how significant it is to the process of becoming, 
or living our way into the self, that the self is an in-
tentional self, intent on and capable of affirming true 
meanings and making good decisions--where "true" and 
"good" denote self-transcendence as the criterion of one's 
genuineness as a knower and as a moral agent. Philosophi-
cally, Jung is a Kantian, and an amateur one at that. 
Furthermore, his remarkably thorough knowledge of the
human psyche is not matched by a sufficiently penetrating knowledge of the spirit which psyche mediates with the body in the movement toward wholeness. Thus the self-transcending dynamism of the psyche is only inconsistently glimpsed and affirmed by Jung. This dynamism is an orientation toward intentionality, a potential readiness for conscription into the *eros* of the pure quest intent on meaning, truth and value. But an explicit conscription cannot take place without psychic conversion, and this conversion is neither identical with nor unrelated to the intellectual, moral and religious conversions which condition authenticity. The lines between psyche and spirit are not clearly drawn by Jung, nor does his articulation of their dialectic completely escape a romanticist resolution in the capitulation of intentionality to nature's rhythms. Such romanticism, however, is not conversion and consequently falls short of authenticity.

The relation of psyche and spirit or transcendence can be put very succinctly: psyche is the whole realm of the imaginal, while spirit or transcendence is the domain of operations intent on intelligibility, truth and value. Ultimately only the intentionality of spirit is responsible for authenticity or inauthenticity, for it is this intentionality which qualifies a person as good or evil. Again we find the focus for the most important bit of monitoring that must be done by the theologian if Jung's work is to realize its theological fruitfulness. I am inauthentic when I am not what the very constitution of my intentionality prompts me to be: contemplatively attentive, intelligent in my inquiry for meaning, reasonable in my exigence for truth and responsibly self-transcending in my decisions. Psyche's images are the most accurate ciphers of my relative self-transcendence or self-enclosure. They are, as such, utterly trustworthy, humbling, demanding and evocative. But to pursue them for their own sake is to lose one's very self. A romanticist conception of individuation is a hopeless cul-de-sac. It dooms one to
the endless treadmill of self-analysis that is psychology (see Progoff: 258). Psychology is not life—a fact recognized in all depth psychological analyses of the transference phenomenon, yet missed in the theoretical or meta-psychological constructions of all the leading depth psychologists save Otto Rank /22/. Ultimately it must be said that Jung does not provide a road map for getting us there, if "there" is individuated life, and the reason lies in the problems constellation at those furthest outposts of his thought that he has pointed us to in his paper, "On the Nature of the Psyche."
NOTES

/1/ In a book I am writing on the foundations of Christian theology, I will attempt to indicate more precisely the role of foundations in the work of interpretation, history, and dialectic. For our present purposes, it is sufficient that we work with Lonergan's notion of an indirect influence of foundations on interpretation, history, and dialectic, and a direct influence on doctrines, systematics, and communications (see Lonergan, 1972a:268).

/2/ Strictly speaking, Lonergan leaves it to the theologian to determine the explanatory status of his categories (1972a:285). It is obvious, however, that Lonergan judges that the theologian whose subjectivity has been tutored through the cognitional and existential analysis of Insight and Method in Theology will be in possession of more than a model with exceptional foundational validity.

/3/ The argument that such is Lonergan's conception of an ideal for systematic theology is bolstered by his recent and persuasive suggestion that such a philosophy of God as that proposed in chap. 19 of Insight be included within systematics (see 1973).

/4/ "Terminalis denique ratio non solum omnem transcendit imaginem sed etiam quodammodo omnem intelligibilitatem in imagine perspectam. Sicut enim equationes campi electromagnetici a Maxwell inventae ita ex imaginibus ortae sunt ut tamen nulla sit imago quae iis corrispondeat, ita etiam regula ab Athanasio posita nisi conceptus et iudicia non respicit. Eadem enim de Filio quae de Patre dicitur, excepto Patris nomine. Quod non solum ab imaginibus prae-scindit sed etiam in nullo imaginabili vel perspici vel intelligi potest" (Lonergan, 1964:86).

/5/ "I should urge that religious conversion, moral conversion, and intellectual conversion are three quite different things. In an order of exposition I would prefer to explain first intellectual, then moral, then religious conversion. In the order of occurrence I would expect religious commonly but not necessarily to precede moral and both religious and moral to precede intellectual. Intellectual conversion, I think, is very rare" (Lonergan, 1972b: 233f.).

/6/ Paul Ricoeur distinguishes three levels of creativity of symbols and relegates dreams to the lowest, that of "sedimented symbolism: here we find various stereotyped and fragmented remains of symbols, symbols so commonplace and worn with use that they have nothing but a past. This is the level of dream-symbolism, and also of fairy tales and legends; here the work of symbolization is no longer operative. At a second level we come upon the symbols
that function in everyday life; these are the symbols that are useful and are actually utilized, that have a past and a present, and that in the clockwork of a given society serve as a token for the nexus of social pacts; structural anthropology operates at this level. At a higher level come the prospective symbols; these are creations of meaning that take up the traditional symbols with their multiple significations and serve as the vehicles of new meanings. This creation of meaning reflects the living substrate of symbolism, a substrate that is not the result of social sedimentation....This creation of meaning is at the same time a recapture of archaic fantasies and a living interpretation of this fantasy substrate. Dreams provide a key only for the symbolism of the first level; the 'typical' dreams Freud appeals to in developing his theory of symbolism do not reveal the canonical form of symbols but merely their vestiges on the plane of sedimented expressions. The true task, therefore, is to grasp symbols in their creative moment, and not when they arrive at the end of their course and are revived in dreams, like stenographic grammalogues with their 'permanently fixed meaning'" (504-506). Ricoeur here undervalues the symbolization of the dream, which, when attended to and cultivated, more often responds as a critic of Ricoeur's second level symbols and as an agent of his third level symbols than as a dumping ground for his first level symbols. Dreams both tell and promote a story, and the story they tell and promote is the story of the dramatic component of the life of the intentional subject. Had Ricoeur turned to Jung rather than to Hegel for the teleological counterpart to the Freudian archeology of the subject, he would have discovered this to be the case. It is Jung's lasting significance to have discovered and at least begun to precise a teleology of the subject working from the data of dreaming consciousness (see Adler: 1961).

/7/ "It is much better to take full cognizance of one's feelings, however deplorable they may be, than to brush them aside, overrule them, ignore them. To take cognizance of them makes it possible for one to know oneself, to uncover the inattention, obtuseness, silliness, irresponsibility that gave rise to the feeling one does not want, and to correct the aberrant attitude. On the other hand, not to take cognizance of them is to leave them in the twilight of what is conscious but not objectified. In the long run there results a conflict between the self as conscious and, on the other hand, the self as objectified" (Lonergan, 1972a:32f.). Lonergan adds: "This twilight of what is conscious but not objectified seems to be the meaning of what some psychiatrists call the unconscious" (34, footnote). He then gives references to books by or about Jung, Karen Horney and Wilhelm Stekel. The implications in regard to Jung are, we shall see, partly correct but incomplete. For Jung, consciousness is not self-presence in intentional operations, but the ego, i.e., a complex characterized by relative differentiation and the
capacity for objectification and control. The unconscious includes what Lonergan would call what is conscious but not objectified, but it includes much else besides.

/8/ I am indebted to Fr. Flanagan for introducing me to Northrop Frye's distinction of archetypal and anagogic meaning, which I have transposed into the context of my own concerns in this paper (see Frye, especially the second essay, "Ethical Criticism: Theory of Symbols," pp. 95-128).

/9/ On the spiritual unconscious and its relation to the collective and personal unconscious, see Woolger (256-272). Woolger's concern is not with anagogic images, but with the condition beyond all imagery, the condition of the mystic's cloud of unknowing. For the transition from imaginal negotiation to the *via negativa*, there is demanded the stretching of the psyche to harmony with a cosmic or universal willingness. I hope to show in a future work that the final imaginal cluster to be negotiated before this transition concerns the figure of the father, an image that is not developed with any sophistication in Jungian psychology.

/10/ Ms. Goldenberg says of the new generation of Jungians: "Their psychology stems mainly from the direction Jung took in 'On the Nature of the Psyche,' in which the relations among psyche, spirit and matter are explored" (212).

/11/ In the 1946 essay, Jung's concern is almost exclusively with the impersonal complexes or the collective unconscious.

/12/ Jung consistently rejects the exclusive use of the term "subconscious" or "subconsciousness" (see, e.g., Jung, 1968a:239).

/13/ Obviously the unconscious is being considered here as one system, with as yet no differentiation having been introduced among what we have named the undifferentiated and the personal and collective unconscious in the strict sense in which we have distinguished these three aspects of the background.

/14/ In a footnote Jung tells us that his reference to the will "is purely psychological and has nothing to do with the philosophical problem of indeterminism" (1969a: 181, footnote 44). Here we see Jung a victim of the strictures of the second stage of meaning, where theory is the supreme differentiation of cognitional consciousness. In the stage marked by interiorly differentiated consciousness, the Aristotelian division of the sciences presupposed by this remark of Jung's no longer obtains. Now philosophy has given way to method; and method's task is the ongoing
unification of the sciences. Philosophy becomes method "is
neither a theory in the manner of science nor a somewhat
technical form of common sense, nor even a reversal to
Presocratic wisdom. Philosophy finds its proper data in
intentional consciousness. Its primary function is to
promote the self-appropriation that cuts to the root of
philosophic differences and incomprehensions. It has fur-
ther, secondary functions in distinguishing, relating,
grounding the several realms of meaning and, no less, in
grounding the methods of the sciences and so promoting
their unification" (Lonergan, 1972a:95). On such a sup-
position, Jung's statement may be reformulated as follows:
The psychic, as opposed to the physiological or purely
instinctual, marks the entrance of previously compulsive
drives into the sphere of conscious intentionality, where
what has so become conscious can be understood intelli-
gently, affirmed reasonably and negotiated freely and
responsibly. This relationship to intentionality charac-
terizes the psychic as opposed to the physiological or
organic.

It is obvious that Jung has a quite non-
reductionistic notion of instinct, in contrast with, e.g.,
Freud. James Hillman has capitalized on this notion of
instinct in his development of the notion of soul-making.
For Jung there are five basic instinctual groups: hunger,
sexuality, the drive to activity, reflection and crea-
tivity. "The first four are comparable to Konrad Lorenz' 
major groups: feeding, reproduction, aggression, and
flight....Lorenz does not mention the fifth instinct, cre-
ativity; but then he speaks from observations of animal
behavior, while Jung speaks from the study of people.

"If we accept the hypothesis of a creative
instinct, then this instinct, too, must be subject to
psychization. Like other drives, it can be modified by
the psyche and be subject to interrelation and conta-
tion with sexuality, say, or activity. (But neither one's
sexual drive, nor productive activity in the world, nor
reflective consciousness, nor contentious ambition is the
ground or manifestation of one's creativity.) Moreover,
as an instinct, the creative is able to produce images of
its goal and to orient behavior toward its satiation. As
an instinct, the creative is a necessity of life, and the
satisfaction of its needs a requirement for life. In the
human being, creativity, like the other instinct, requires
fulfillment. According to Jung's view of man, activity
and reflection are not enough; there is a fifth component,
as basic in man as hunger and sexuality, the quintessentia
of creativity....(Jung's) major concern in both his ther-
apy and his writing was with the manifestations and vicis-
situdes of the creative instinct and with disentangling it
from the other four" (Hillman, 1972:33f.). That the crea-
tive instinct is coextensive with the process that leads
to individuation is obvious from Hillman's list of the
conceptions Jung uses to deal with it: "the urge to whole-
ness, the urge toward individuation or personality
development, the spiritual drive, the symbol-making trans-cendent function, the natural religious function, or, in short, the drive of the self to be realized" (34). To employ the word, instinct, in this regard is to highlight the physiological and biological dimensions of an incarnate spirit.

/16/ One is reminded here of Paul Ricoeur's complaint about the impreciseness of Jung's language: "Psychoanalysis is limited by what justifies it, namely, its decision to recognize in the phenomena of culture only what falls under an economics of desire and resistances. I must admit that this firmness and rigor makes me prefer Freud to Jung. With Freud I know where I am and where I am going; with Jung everything risks being confused: the psychism, the soul, the archetypes, the sacred" (1970:176).

/17/ I am suggesting that some such distinction as Frye's between archetypal and anagogic symbols is crucial for understanding the domain of reality upon which we are opened by Jung's discoveries.

/18/ See /8/ above. The pertinence of the distinction of anagogic and archetypal symbols for our present discussion appears precisely here. I have discussed the implications of the distinction in 1977c.

/19/ "Opposites are extreme qualities in any state, by virtue of which that state is perceived to be real, for they form a potential. The psyche is made up of processes whose energy springs from the equilibration of all kinds of opposites. The spirit/instinct antithesis is only one of the commonest formulations, but it has the advantage of reducing the greatest number of the most important and most complex psychic processes to a common denominator" (1969a:207). In treating the opposites, the logical distinction of contraries and contradictories escapes Jung. Spirit and matter are contraries, good and evil contradictories.

/20/ Besides the aspect of totality, Jung includes under the notion of the self also the aspect of the center. The self is simultaneously the wholeness of subjectivity and the center of subjectivity. This latter aspect is, I believe, most profoundly treated in Jung (1967). Our transposition of the notion of the self into the context of generalized empirical method does not neglect this second aspect. I have called attention to Lonergan's contribution to the shift to this center by speaking of the therapeutic function of intellectual conversion in Doran (1977a). In a similar vein, my colleague Vernon Gregson speaks of Lonergan's work as intentionality therapy (see 1975). Intellectual conversion joined with and complemented and sublated by psychic conversion will orient the subject toward this center.
Lonergan's recent emphasis on healing as a development from above downwards, foreshadowed in the relationship between loving and knowing discussed in Method in Theology, represents a clear breakthrough on his part beyond this possible bias (see Lonergan, 1975:55-68).

"Man is born beyond psychology and he dies beyond it but he can live beyond it only through vital experience of his own—in religious terms, through revelation, conversion or rebirth" (Rank, 1958:16).
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ON THE POSSIBILITY AND DESIRABILITY
OF A CHRISTIAN PSYCHOTHERAPY

Bernard J. Tyrrell

INTRODUCTION

This paper will attempt to consider the functional specialties, foundations and dialectic in the context of today's social, cultural and political problem areas. In my estimation the issue of a "Christian psychotherapy" involves key elements pertaining to foundations and dialectic and is highly relevant to the contemporary social, cultural and political scene.

The question of the possibility and desirability of a Christian psychotherapy pertains to the functional specialty, systematics, but it depends in a unique manner on foundations for its proper thematization and on dialectic for its further clarification through a contrast of various positions and counter-positions. It is true that every question for systematics derives its general and special theological categories from foundations but because of the specific nature of psychopathology and of psychic maturation the question regarding a Christian psychotherapy depends for its adequate handling in a very direct fashion on the authentic thematization of the conversions as carried out in foundations. It follows that dialectic is also closely involved because it is through dialectic that the unauthentic is eliminated and the various categories are purified.

Systematics is an attempt to arrive at a richer, fuller understanding of doctrines through a consideration of their inner coherence and the use of analogies provided by more familiar human experience. I situate the question of the possibility and desirability of a Christian psychotherapy within systematics because I believe the question directly arises when certain doctrines are viewed in the
light or through the prism of key contemporary psychotherapeutic insights.

My procedure in this paper will be (1) to consider briefly certain doctrines concerning the healing dimension of Christ's redemptive activity; (2) to offer the suggestion, based in part on the use of insights derived from some contemporary psychotherapies, that there is at least implicit in Christian revelation a "Christian psychotherapy"; (3) to explore the issue of a Christian psychotherapy in the light of the special and general categories of foundations; (4) to suggest in very summary fashion some questions of a dialectical nature and (5) overall to provide an example of an initial attempt to do theological work in terms of the functional specialties.

I. Christian Revelation, Doctrines and Healing

Doctrines, as a functional specialty, presupposes research, interpretation, history, dialectic, and foundations. The theologian engaged in the functional specialty, doctrines, uses the functional specialty, foundations, to select doctrines from among the many choices presented by the functional specialty, dialectic. In what immediately follows I will try to indicate certain doctrines (see Lonergan, 1972:295-298) which seem most crucial for the working out of a Christian psychotherapy within systematics and with the aid of the categories of foundations.

A. Jesus as Healer

In scripture Jesus is portrayed as the effective bearer to man of a total and complete eschatological healing. The resurrection of Jesus Christ is the pledge and promise to the believer of an ultimate total healing and salvation in body, mind and spirit. Jesus' healing mission, however, has a present or realized eschatological dimension as well as an ultimate or trans-temporal one. During his lifetime Jesus healed individuals of all their
diseases, and his healing presence continues to be operative in the Church and everywhere in the hearts of women and men of good will.

Scriptural doctrines indicate an intrinsic connection between Jesus' announcing of the Good News of the Kingdom and his healings. Scripture recounts that Jesus appealed to his healings as a sign to John the Baptist that he was the promised one (Matt 11:4-6). Jesus is manifested in Scripture as one whose mission it was to announce Good News and to oppose evil in all of its forms. Scripture depicts Jesus as seeking to heal the whole person and it is clear, especially in the light of our contemporary understanding of physical and mental diseases, that Jesus brought healing to the psyche and body of man as well as to his spirit.

B. The Sacraments and Healing

Jesus, through the gifts of his Spirit and the sacraments, continues his realized eschatological healing mission. Through all of the sacraments Jesus brings spiritual healing, and since man is a unity the gift of spiritual healing has an effect on the psychic and somatic dimensions of man as well. Through the anointing, as it is spoken of in the epistle of James (5:14-16) and as the sacrament is currently understood in the Church, Jesus brings physical healing in a very direct and special fashion. Theologians today affirm that the ordinary effect of the sacrament of the anointing should be the restoration or strengthening of bodily health as well as spiritual invigoration (see McClain; Palmer). Through the sacrament of penance or reconciliation spiritual soundness is given and often enough psychological healing and even at times physical restoration as well. Through the Eucharist healing is offered to individuals on all the levels of their being. One need only study the various liturgical prayers to see that from very ancient times Christ was beseeched during the Eucharistic sacrifice for deliverance from every evil,
from anxieties and torments of the mind and illnesses of the body as well as from spiritual difficulties.

C. Key Affirmations Concerning Healing

My aim in briefly considering various teachings or doctrines of Scripture and of the Church about the nature of Jesus' healing role in his lifetime and afterwards in his Church has been to provide grounds for certain basic theological affirmations which I consider vital. These basic affirmations about the significance of Jesus' healing role are the following: (1) Jesus' healings of the whole person were not and are not an incidental or extrinsic element of his mission but as intrinsic to it as is the proclamation of the Good News of the Kingdom of God; (2) Jesus' mission to heal the whole person is not simply eschatological in the final, trans-temporal sense but it has an essential realized eschatological dimension as well; (3) Jesus' realized eschatological healing mission in the Church is not something extraordinary but rather an ordinary and essential dimension of his everyday operation through his Spirit in human hearts; (4) Jesus' exercise in the Church of his healing power extends to the whole person, to the body and psyche as well as to the spirit.

It is most important, I believe, to emphasize the ordinary character of Jesus' healing mission as it extends to the whole person. It is not, in other words, an extraordinary occurrence for Jesus to heal an individual in his spirit, psyche or body but the ordinary exercise of his healing mission. Thus, whenever an individual becomes seriously ill spiritually he should seek and expect spiritual restoration through the sacrament of reconciliation. Likewise, whenever a person becomes seriously ill physically he should receive the sacrament of the anointing and should hope strongly for physical recovery or strengthening as the ordinary effect of the sacrament. Finally, though I must develop this point more at length in my systematic and foundational considerations, it seems clear to
me that whenever an individual suffers grievously from some mental or emotional disorder he should be able to seek and find a healing for his illness in Christ. In scripture Jesus is portrayed as healer of the whole man. Jesus wills that his healing mission should be carried on through the power of his Spirit in the Church. In the light of Jesus' holistic healing intention it makes no sense, as far as I can see, to say that Christ is available in a very special way for the healing of those who are spiritually or physically ill but not in a special way for those who are psychically ill. It is for this and other reasons as well that I will argue throughout this paper that there is such a thing as a Christian psychotherapy through which an emotionally disturbed individual may receive the gift of psychic wholeness.

II. Systematics and the Question of a Psychotherapy Implicit in Revelation

The question for systematics, Is there a psychotherapy at least implicit in Christian revelation?, can only be fruitfully explored by first considering the ordinary meaning of psychotherapy as it is understood today. Systematics in its attempt to reach a fuller understanding of theological doctrines has been aided in the past through the development of such notions as nature and person, and more recently through such ideas as those of history and evolution. I believe that modern and contemporary insights into the areas of psychotherapy and human maturation can greatly enrich systematics in its attempt to understand more profoundly the meaning, scope and implications of theological doctrines regarding the healing mission of Jesus Christ as it is operative in the Church and world today.

A. What is Psychotherapy?

A first question, then, is: What is psychotherapy? Robert A. Harper defines psychotherapy as "the use of any
psychological technique in the treatment of mental dis-
order or social and emotional maladjustment" (168). I
prefer to define psychotherapy more broadly as the spe-
cific form of aid through which an individual suffering
from a psychic or emotional or psychosomatic disturbance
is enabled to overcome or move beyond or transcend the
disturbance in question and to exist in a more whole or
integrated state. This definition takes no position on
the exact nature or meaning of the psychic or emotional or
psychosomatic disturbance, is completely open to the par-
ticular type of aid used in the healing or integrating
process, and takes into account the movement toward a more
positive, integral state as well as the freeing from nega-
tive factors. A number of psychotherapeutic approaches
today challenge the application of disease nomenclature in
the area of psychic and emotional disturbances. There is,
moreover, an increasing emphasis on the role of the posi-
tive in the psychotherapeutic process. Also, the "means"
for aiding in the process of healing or integration differ
widely and involve anything from a strict chemotherapy to
an intensified manifestation of loving concern and accep-
tance.

B. The Minimal Sense of a Psychotherapy Implicit in
Revelation

Now in accord with the broad definition of psycho-
therapy which I have just given I believe it is easily
shown that there is at least in a minimal sense a certain
psychotherapy implicit in revelation. Scripture scholars,
for example, tend to agree that although Jesus in his
healings did not employ a psychotherapeutic method as such
(it would be an anachronism to speak of Jesus as explicit-
ly practicing a psychotherapy), nonetheless he did, in
fact, employ a variety of means to heal individuals from
what we today would describe as mental or emotional dis-
turbances (see McKenzie). Likewise, most psychotherapists
and men of common sense who are not in principle opposed
to the Christian religion would acknowledge that there is a certain general psychotherapeutic healing power available to emotionally troubled individuals in the teachings of Jesus and in his sacramental actions in the Churches. Carl Jung, for example, viewed all the religions as "forms of psychotherapy which treat and heal the sufferings of the soul, and the suffering of the body caused by the soul" and he stated that "in treating devout Catholics, I always refer them to the Church's confessional and its means of grace" (1954a:16). It is not, then, I believe, difficult to establish that in a minimal, very generalized sense there are implicit psychotherapeutic elements present in the Christian revelational event and its proclamation and manifestation in the Churches. What I hope to indicate, however, in a heuristic fashion in the present paper is that an authentic formal Christian psychotherapy may be worked out on the basis of Christian revelation as illuminated by certain contemporary psychotherapeutic insights.

C. Psychotherapeutic Pluralism

To one who ponders the contemporary scene in psychotherapy it is at once evident that there exists a wide-ranging pluralism in psychotherapeutic theories and practices. Robert A. Harper in his *Psychoanalysis and Psychotherapy* lists thirty-six systems of psychoanalysis and psychotherapy and there are many more (Harper's work is useful for an overview of the major forms of psychotherapy practiced up to 1960). Theodore Millon in his more recent *Theories of Psychopathology* lists four major divisions in theories of psychopathology but there are many contemporary theories and approaches which do not fit neatly under the general classifications of either biophysical, intra-physic, behavioral or phenomenological theories of psychopathology. In the face of the plethora of psychotherapeutic theories and practices which presently war with one another or at best enjoy a certain uneasy state of
coexistence, the principles of selection range from dogmatism to a facile eclecticism.

D. Personal Options

In my own case personal experience and reflection have established a distinct preference for the more phenomenologically oriented psychotherapies. Dr. Thomas Hora, New York existential psychotherapist and author of many articles, has been the major psychotherapeutic influence in my life both personally and from the viewpoint of theory. Also, the diverse approaches of Viktor Frankl, William Glasser, Kazimierz Dabrowski, Albert Ellis, Harold Greenwald and others have in varying degrees exercised an influence on my thinking in this area. I have inclined toward those psychotherapies which I find either explicitly or at least in principle open to a symbiotic or preferably much closer relationship to religion and specifically to the Roman Catholic Christian form of religion. As a believing, practicing Christian I operate out of the a priori assumption that any psychotherapy which is intrinsically opposed either in theory or practice to the authentic Roman Catholic Christian world view is to that extent unauthentic as a psychotherapy and inevitably harmful to the development of psychic integration and wholeness. I believe that it is most important to acknowledge, as far as possible, one's presuppositions. For everyone, whether he admits it or not, has presuppositions; and, as Jung noted, the therapist's philosophy of life "guides the life of the therapist and shapes the spirit of his therapy" (1954b:79).

Robert Harper, after surveying all of the major and a good number of the minor psychotherapeutic theories and practices, concludes that none of them has even remotely been definitively established as the approach. He suggests that "many therapists and their patients are likely to profit from a flexible repertoire of therapeutic techniques, rather than from a rigid adherence to a single
system of psychotherapy" (149). A number of elements guided me in my therapy-options and led to the thesis of the present paper. Briefly, they were as follows: (1) I began with the therapy of Dr. Thomas Hora, which I found personally quite helpful; (2) I expanded my psychotherapeutic horizon by assimilating practically and theoretically a number of approaches which were germane or in some way complementary to that of Hora; (3) I sought to deepen my understanding of Christ as healer in the light of my psychotherapeutic experiences and insights; (4) I made the personal discovery that Christianity at least implicitly contains a most powerful and effective psychotherapeutic dimension; (5) my discovery of a psychotherapy implicit in Christian revelation helped to confirm the validity and excellence of the therapies or aspects of the therapies through which I was led to a richer and deeper understanding of the mystery of the healing Christ; (6) presently, I am trying to work out the lines of what I term Christotherapy or the Way of Healing through Enlightenment (see Tyrrell). I am attempting to articulate in heuristic fashion a certain formal Christian psychotherapy which may be of some aid to Christian psychotherapists, psychologists, and counselors in their work with fellow Christians.

E. The Issue of a Christian Psychotherapy and Functional Specialization

Bernard Lonergan's thematization of the various conversions and his stress on the transformative power of meaning and value tend to complement and corroborate—at least in certain vital respects—my view of a Christian psychotherapy. Further, I see no better framework in which to situate the working out of the heuristics of a Christian psychotherapy than that of functional specialization. In turn, I think that the attempt to work out such a problematic within the context of functional specialization serves to highlight the meaning, import and significance of functional specialization in general and
specifically of systematics, doctrines, foundations and dialectic. I realize, of course, that the issues of a Christian psychotherapy and of functional specialization are highly complex, and that the attempt to interrelate them adds still further complexity. I have no doubt, accordingly, that what I write must of necessity be subject to challenge, emendation and correction.

III. The Process of Explicating the Psychotherapy Implicit in Revelation

I would like now to indicate through some concrete examples the process through which I make explicit various psychotherapeutic dimensions of Christian revelation.

As I have indicated it is the task of systematics to seek an ever richer understanding of doctrines. Systematics frequently makes use of natural analogies to illuminate the deeper meaning of doctrines. I intend to raise some questions for understanding regarding the more profound meaning of various doctrines by utilizing a number of contemporary psychotherapeutic insights. I will engage in a type of "scissors action" in which the lower blade will be certain psychotherapies that are currently being practiced and enjoy a measure of empirical success and the upper blade will be those Christian doctrines which express the mystery of Christ as healer. The basic question operative throughout will be: Does the particular therapy I am considering help to make explicit or draw attention to a psychotherapeutic healing dimension somehow contained in Christian doctrines? My aim is the gradual heuristic unfolding of a sketch of key features of a Christian psychotherapy. This psychotherapy will reflect various features of the psychotherapies which help to make explicit this Christian psychotherapy. At the same time it will involve a higher viewpoint in which the initially unrelated insights of the diverse psychotherapies will appear as integral elements of the psychotherapy implicit in Christian revelation.
A. Viktor Frankl's Logotherapy

First, I will examine Viktor Frankl's Logotherapy or existential analysis. Frankl's thesis is that man is basically motivated not so much by a Freudian "will to pleasure" or an Adlerian "will to power" but by a desire to find and fulfill meaning in his life. Frankl stresses that man is called to a self-transcendence in which he reaches out beyond himself to find meaning and purpose in life. Frankl insists that meaning and value are not mere subjective phenomena but something objective and stemming "from a sphere beyond and over man" (1967a:64). Frankl speaks of a "super-meaning" which transcends man and his world and of an existential act of commitment on man's part which consists in a certain "Urvertrauen zum Dasein" or a "basic trust in Being" (1967b:57). Frankl argues that the frustration of the will to meaning leads to noogenic neurosis, often enough a despair over the meaninglessness of life and a floundering about in an "existential vacuum." The results of this collective or mass neurosis of our time are, according to Frankl, depression, aggression and addiction; and the way out is self-transcendence through the discovery of meaning and value in life. Frankl claims that through the application of the dynamics of logotherapy existential frustration is overcome, the noogenic neurosis is healed, and even those suffering from psychogenic or conventional neuroses are indirectly aided. Frankl's approach has been criticized as speculative and difficult to verify empirically (McConnell: 51-60). Yet, in a recent lecture Frankl noted that his basic thesis about man's will to meaning has been confirmed by some ninety research projects and more than thirty dissertations (1974).

Now if Frankl is correct about the existence of noogenic neuroses and of the healing power of meaning and value, it is evidence to the believing Christian that Christ, as incarnate meaning and value, is available as healer of the noogenic neurosis to all who open themselves
to him as the truth that sets men free (John 8:32). A very brief consideration of logotherapy leads the Christian to discover in Christ the Logotherapist par excellence. Through meditation on Christ in the light of logotherapy the Christian is brought to an understanding of the great psychotherapeutic power available in the Christ. In turn Christian revelation confirms the authenticity of Frankl's grounding insight that the human person is one who seeks self-transcendence through the will to meaning and value.

B. William Glasser's Reality Therapy

A second therapy I utilize in my attempt to make explicit therapeutic dimensions in Christian revelation is William Glasser's Reality Therapy (see 1965). Glasser, like Frankl, envisages the human being as one who must fulfill certain natural exigencies if he is to be whole and mature. But instead of speaking of the will to meaning, Glasser describes the human person as characterized by two basic psychological needs: "The need to love and be loved and the need to feel that we are worthwhile to ourselves and to others" (9). In Glasser's analysis it is the failure to fulfill these basic needs and to do so in such a way that one does not deprive others of the ability to fulfill their needs that lies at the root of so-called mental or emotional disturbances and leads to various forms of irresponsible action and either a partial or total denial of reality.

Glasser's basic position is illuminated by contrasting it with the classical Freudian approach. In conventional psychotherapy, for example, the terminology of "mental illness" is employed. Glasser, however, rejects as inaccurate and misleading the classical "mental illness" nomenclature with its various classifications and speaks instead of irresponsible activity and reality denial. Again, conventional psychotherapy stresses reconstructive exploration of the past in therapy. On the contrary,
Glasser emphasizes working with the patient in the present toward the future. Again, conventional psychotherapy avoids the problems of morality and is basically non-directive. Glasser, however, makes right and wrong and responsible behavior central elements in his therapy and as a therapist he disapproves of irresponsible, reality-denying behavior and teaches his patients through the exercise of a loving discipline authentic ways to fulfill their basic needs in a responsible fashion and in accord with reality as it actually is.

In Glasser's view the prerequisite for being an effective agent for healing is that a person have his needs fulfilled and be in basic contact with reality. The therapist is then able to aid the patient to fulfill his basic needs by: (1) accepting and loving the patient for himself and so acknowledging his worth as a person; (2) stressing responsible activity, activity in accord with reality, and firmly but lovingly rejecting all forms of irresponsible activity; and (3) indicating to the patient authentic ways in which he can fulfill his needs within the world as it actually is and without interfering with the need fulfillment of others.

Glasser's Reality Therapy has been widely applied not only in the treatment of the mentally disturbed but also in work with juvenile delinquents, the socially deprived and in education. Despite Glasser's fundamental break with the classical approaches in psychotherapy--Glasser himself would say that it is precisely because of the break--his Reality Therapy has proven highly effective in quite a variety of areas.

If Glasser is correct that individuals can be healed of what have classically been termed neuroses and psychoses by being helped through a loving acceptance and firm guidance to fulfill their basic psychological needs in a responsible fashion and in accord with reality, then most certainly there is a psychotherapy contained in principle in Christian revelation. Jesus Christ himself had
his own basic needs fulfilled and spent his life trying to help others to fulfill their basic and authentic needs. In many different ways Jesus constantly affirmed the worth of the human person and affirmed his need to be worthwhile to others. Likewise, the core teaching of Jesus was that the human person is loved and called to love others. And the need for responsible action, action in accord with reality as it really is, was a constant teaching of Jesus.

It follows that insofar as Reality Therapy may be said to be a true therapy, Christianity may also be said to contain an authentic therapy in itself, since key principles of reality therapy are clearly present in Christian revelation. All that is needed is that these Christian "reality principles" be viewed within a specifically therapeutic context and creatively applied in a proper fashion.

C. Albert Ellis's Rational-Emotive Psychotherapy

The third contemporary therapy which I find useful in the present context is Dr. Albert Ellis's Rational-Emotive psychotherapy. Ellis is popularly known through his book Sex Without Guilt—not, in my opinion, one of his finer achievements. But his foundational psychotherapeutic insights as expressed in his Reason and Emotion in Psychotherapy are helpful and significant in the articulation of the heuristics of a Christian psychotherapy.

Ellis's basic theory is that man's emotional and psychological disturbances are largely a result of his thinking illogically or irrationally, and that the individual can be cured of most of his mental or emotional disturbances by learning to minimize his irrational and maximize his rational thinking. Ellis avers that disturbances of an emotional nature arise when individuals mentally reiterate negative, illogical, self-defeating unrealistic thoughts and ideas to themselves. In Ellis's view it is the task of the psychotherapist (1) to help the patient unmask his irrational ideas and self-defeating beliefs; (2) to show him how these illogical ideas are at the basis
of his emotional disturbance; and (3) to endeavor to bring him to internalize more realistic, rational ideas and to engage in positive reflections and self-talk.

In *Reason and Emotion in Psychotherapy* Ellis lists a number of irrational ideas which he says are ubiquitous in Western civilization and lead to widespread neurosis. Among the ideas he lists are the following: (1) it is a dire necessity for an adult human being to be loved and approved by virtually every significant other person in his community; (2) one should be thoroughly competent, adequate, and achieving in all possible respects if one is to consider oneself worthwhile; (3) it is awful and catastrophic when things are not the way one would very much like them to be; (4) if something is or may be dangerous or fearsome one should be terribly concerned about it and should keep dwelling on the possibility of its occurring; (5) it is easier to avoid than to face certain life difficulties and self-responsibilities; and (6) one's past history is an all-important determinant of one's present behavior and because something once strongly affected one's life, it should indefinitely have a similar effect. Ellis subjects each of these ideas to careful analysis, shows how the idea in question in unrealistic and irrational and indicates what the proper idea should be.

Ellis says that his rational therapy is in reality more depth-centered and intensive than classical psychoanalysis because it seeks to reveal and attack the irrational ideas and beliefs which ultimately underlie most neuroses and psychoses. Ellis holds that such psychodynamic theorists as Sigmund Freud have been emphasizing secondary causes or results of emotional illness rather than prime causes. Clearly, Ellis's theory of psychotherapy is open to serious challenge. There is, however, a growing body of research which lends support to his view; and his psychotherapy as practiced by professional psychotherapists has proved remarkably successful. Also, though Ellis himself is not a theist, his approach is currently being applied in the area of pastoral counseling (see Hauck).
If Ellis is even partially correct in his view that internalized and mentally reiterated irrational ideas are the prime source of neuroses and to a great extent of psychoses, it is not difficult to see how Christian revelation may be envisaged as at least seminally containing certain healing principles of rational-emotive psychotherapeutic nature. Jesus himself constantly preached the need for a conversion of mind and heart, and he made it clear how certain beliefs and ideas are a source of suffering and death, whereas others are the source of joy, peace and life. Likewise, a basic thrust of the Pauline preaching is the need for individuals to put off the old self with its false, illusory ideas and desires and to put on the mind of Christ and the attitudes of mind and heart which properly belong to the Christ-consciousness.

It does not appear difficult to me to discern in scripture the equivalents of many of the irrational ideas which Ellis has described as well as their positive rational alternatives. Scripture, in fact, in many instances adds an enrichment and, where necessary, a corrective to Ellis's articulation of the various irrational ideas and their rational alternatives. Finally, I believe that a Christian psychotherapist could and should endeavor to work out in the light of revelation a yet fuller and more accurate--from a Christian point of view--set of irrational ideas and their positive alternatives for utilization within a Christian psychotherapeutic context.

D. Thomas Hora's Existential Psychotherapy

The final therapy I utilize in this segment of the paper is the existential psychotherapy of Dr. Thomas Hora, the New York psychiatrist. As I remarked earlier, it is the approach of Hora, more than any other, which has led me to the viewpoint I am expressing in this paper.

Hora began as a strict Freudian analyst but his search for a richer and more effective psychotherapy led him through Carl Jung, Ludwig Binswanger, Martin Heidegger
and other European existential thinkers to Zen and the study of various Eastern "existential" approaches and finally to the teachings of Jesus. Hora discovered in the life and teachings of Jesus psychotherapeutic dimensions of the very highest order.

It is not possible here to develop Hora's position at length. My book Christotherapy: Healing through Enlightenment utilizes throughout various psychotherapeutic insights of Hora in the process of working out in a popular fashion a Christian psychotherapy. Here I can only adumbrate certain key features of Hora's therapeutic approach insofar as they cast light on the issue presently under discussion.

Hora's existential psychotherapy involves a basic view of man, as do the other therapies we have considered. Hora's understanding of man is explicitly religious. Hora sees man as an image and likeness of God. Man's most fundamental reason for existing is to be in the world as one who bears witness to Existence or the Love-Intelligence that is God by understanding the truth and manifesting love.

In Hora's understanding man is whole, healthy and authentic when he is in harmony with Existence and lets the qualities of the Transcendent shine through him by being a medium of goodness, intelligence, creativity, and love. Man is whole and holy to the extent that his feeling and thinking reflect a harmony with the highest level of human existence in-the-world which is an enlightened, wise, loving state of consciousness. In the enlightened individual--one who has realized through God's gift a high level of self-transcendence--feeling, doing, and having flow from an authentic being-in-the-world as a loving beneficent presence.

Illness for Hora results when man is in disharmony in some sense with Existence. Illness, accordingly, is inadequately viewed when it is treated as just a matter of pain or feeling bad or a disbalance of affectivity or a being hampered in one's functioning. For Hora these conceptions
of illness are only partial. From Hora's existential psychotherapeutic point of view illness or dis-ease results when the lower levels of consciousness are in conflict with authentic self-transcendence or, more specifically, when the individual's mode of being-in-the-world is fragmented by misdirected concerns, false beliefs, values, assumptions, attitudes. Hora does not hold that an individual is necessarily culpably ignorant of authen-tic meaning and value and hence responsible for his di-sease. But the individual must take responsibility for overcoming his inauthentic mode of thinking and desiring-in-the-world once he becomes cognizant of it as inauthen-tic.

Hora's existential psychotherapy has as its goal the realization in the individual of a highly self-transcendent, enlightened state of consciousness. Hora, of course, attempts to come to terms with the negative but the focal emphasis is on the positive. The existential psychotherapeutic process involves various stages of self-transcendence and enlightenment. The modes of self-transcendence and enlightenment range from the understand-ing and consequent rejection of the inauthentic as inau-thentic to a certain experience of God as Love-Intelligence, an experience which is beyond the subject-object distinction.

Throughout his therapy Hora stresses the need for attitudes of openness, wakeful receptivity, and "letting-be" as existential conditions of possibility for receiving the gift of enlightenment in any of its forms.

A key emphasis of Hora is on "mind-fasting," an ex-pression Hora borrows from the Taoist, Chuang Tzu. Hora envisages the process of mind-fasting as a form of cognitive prayer through which the devils of negativity and inauthenticity--false thoughts, beliefs, affects, desires, images, assumptions--are discerned for what they really are and cast out and a cognitive integration or loving mode of consciousness is realized. The process of
mind-fasting culminates in what Hora terms existential worship. This latter is a reverential, responsive, loving abiding in the God who is Love-Intelligence. The individual whose state of consciousness is that of existential worship manifests himself in the world as a loving, intelligent, beneficent, and creative presence.

Hora's stress on healing through an enlightened understanding within a climate of love of one's mode of being-in-the-world differentiates his psychotherapy from the more classical approaches. Hora emphasizes that his approach is not causalistic, historical, genetic, etiological, or teleological. Hora instead refers to it as "epistemologic in its focus, which means that it seeks to benefit man through the optimal unfolding of his cognitive capacities" (180). Hora does indicate, however, that in the course of the existential therapeutic the causal, the historical, the genetic, and the teleological aspects of human existence "tend to emerge into consciousness spontaneously and be cognized implicitly rather than explicitly" (180). Hora sums up this point of view by citing a statement of a French psychotherapist: *On ne guerit pas en se souvenant mais on se souvient en guérissant* (180).

Finally, Hora's existential psychotherapy has conversion as its core. Through the practice of mind-fasting, which Hora refers to as epistemological prayer, the individual is freed from inauthentic thoughts and desires and turned toward existentially wholesome concerns. Healing takes place in a shift in the world view of the individual (189) and, in Hora's words, "this means 'conversion' to the loving mode of being-in-the-world and participation in Existence as a beneficial presence" (102). The existential psychotherapeutic process begins in mind-fasting and culminates in existential worship. Hora speaks of the whole process of mind-fasting and existential worship as "ceaseless prayer." In his words:

The term "ceaseless prayer"...connotes abiding; it implies something continuous, a way of life, a mode of being. We could define ceaseless
prayer as a persistent endeavor to actualize the loving mode of being-in-the-world. It is a continuous process of mental purification based on a desire to correct false assumptions and misdirected orientations... Meditation can be considered a cognitive form of prayer preparatory to existential worship. For meditation is a process of mental purification ('mind-fasting') which consists of turning away from a set mental attitude to reach a realization of the presence of God as harmony, peace, and love-intelligence. (91-92)

Now, obviously, if the basic thrust of Hora's existential psychotherapy is valid, there is most certainly a powerful psychotherapeutic dimension present in Christian revelation. Hora, in fact, may be said to be practicing a Christian psychotherapy as long as one also acknowledges other influences in his approach as well. It is also significant that the Christian Counseling Service of Garden Grove, California bases its fundamental approach on Holy Scripture and the psychotherapeutic principles of Thomas Hora.

However, Hora's approach is not from within the horizon of Roman Catholic Christianity and, certain of his views on illness, especially physical illness and its meaning and on the nature of the human self and of God are not, I believe, as they stand completely acceptable from a Roman Catholic Christian point of view. Nonetheless, I am quite convinced that Hora's existential psychotherapy is one of the most excellent approaches to the healing of mental and emotional difficulties presently available. It likewise provides a clear example not only of the possibility and desirability of a Christian psychotherapy but of its actuality.

IV. Foundations and a Christian Psychotherapy

Up to this point in my paper I have looked at certain doctrinal foundations for Christian healing, and I have also attempted to show how a number of contemporary psychotherapies help to make explicit various psychotherapeutic principles at least implicit in Christian revelation. It
remains to envisage the issue of a Christian psychotherapy in the terms of foundations and dialectic.

My procedure will be, employing some special and general categories of foundations, to show in a developmental fashion that there is a connection between the conversions of foundations and the events of psychological healing and maturation; that the relationship between the conversions and the psychotherapeutic process is intimate; and, that there is, indeed, a certain identification of the conversions of foundations with the "conversion" involved in psychological healing, while there is also a certain difference. Hopefully, the cumulative effect of these varied considerations will be to provide both a basic confirmation of my thesis that there is such a thing as a Christian psychotherapy at least implicit in Christian revelation, and also a heuristic indication of what the key features of such a Christian psychotherapy might be.

A. Healing: The Common Goal of the Conversions of Foundations and Psychotherapy

Foundations concerns itself with the articulation or objectification of foundational reality—religious, moral and intellectual conversion—and with the derivation of general and special theological categories based on foundational reality, which may be employed in other functional specialties. Each of the conversions which foundations seeks to objectify involves a fundamental healing in one or other dimension of human consciousness. It follows that the conversions of foundations and the psychotherapeutic process share a common goal: the healing of the individual in one or other aspect of his being. Also, since healing on one level of the human person has an impact on all the other levels, there is necessarily an existential connection between the healing effected through religious, moral and intellectual conversion and the healing of the psyche which takes place in the psychotherapeutic process.
1. Conversion as Basic to Foundations and Psychotherapy

If Lonergan is correct that religious conversion involves the overcoming of a radical lovelessness, and if Glasser and others are right that the fulfillment of a basic need to be loved and to love is in part the goal of psychotherapy, then a conversion from lovelessness to love is central both to foundations and to psychotherapy. Again, if Lonergan is right that moral conversion involves the overcoming of the distortions of bias, and if Ellis, Glasser, Hora and others are right that the freeing of the individual from the irrational is a key aim of psychotherapy, then a conversion from a subjective and biased optic to the rational and the real is basic both to foundations and psychotherapy. Finally, if Lonergan is correct that intellectual conversion enables an individual to negate false philosophies of life, and if Hora is right that the psychotherapeutic event involves a basic shift in world view or perspective, then a certain intellectual conversion is a core concern both of foundations and at least of Hora's psychotherapy. If the preceding suggestions are shown to be correct it follows there is a connection between the conversions of foundations and the psychotherapeutic process, and that this relationship is a most intimate one. It likewise follows that the theologian who engages in the foundational task of objectifying conversion is also, whether he realizes it or not, contributing in a very dynamic fashion to the unfolding of a heuristic of a Christian psychotherapy.

2. Religious Conversion and Psychological Healing

The intimate relationship which exists between the conversions of foundations and "psychological conversion" can be further indicated by focusing attention on religious conversion and its relationship to key elements in the psychotherapeutic process. It is appropriate to begin with religious conversion since the three conversions of foundations stand in a particular existential relationship
to one another, so that normally religious conversion occurs first and is the efficacious ground of moral and intellectual conversion.

a. The Primacy of Love in Religion and Psychotherapy

The core of religious conversion is the gift of God's love poured forth into our hearts by the Holy Spirit (Rom 5:5). This gift has a transcultural aspect because it is offered to all women and men and hence is manifested in some sense at all times in the diverse religions and cultures of mankind. Religious conversion, however, involves not only an inward transcultural aspect but an outward counterpart in the revelational events culminating in Jesus Christ through which God disclosed to the world his love for all mankind and his definitive saving action. Further, on Lonergan's analysis, there is a knowledge born of the gift of God's love which is faith or the "eye of love." Faith is an interior apprehension of transcendent value, and in the light of faith an individual is enabled to make the value judgment that it is worthwhile to believe and the consequent decision to believe as well as the act of belief itself. Beliefs in a Christian context are rooted in the revealed word of God; in a non-Christian context they are specific religious-symbolic objectifications of the inner religious experience of the members of the diverse non-Christian religions.

Brief reflection reveals that there is a striking affinity—if not, at a profound level, a real identity—between key elements of religious conversion, as thematized in the special theological categories of foundations, and the psychological healing process as described in various contemporary psychotherapies.

It is commonly acknowledged by psychotherapists that the experience of love and acceptance on the part of the individual seeking healing is a necessary and central element in the psychotherapeutic process. Harper, for example, indicates that in all therapies the patient first
experiences the concern of the therapist and is thus enabled to say to himself in some fashion: "He [the self-respecting therapist] likes and accepts and gives attention to and cares for and is concerned about me. I, therefore, must be better, more worthwhile, less hopeless, etc., than I had thought" (152). Likewise, for Glasser precisely the lack of the fulfillment of the basic needs to be loved and to love and to feel worthwhile to oneself and to others are at the roots of the psychic disturbances. For this reason the therapist must first bestow the gift of love and acceptance on the patient if he is to have his basic needs for love and a sense of worthwhileness fulfilled and hence become capable of loving others, seeking the good of others, and thus having his own needs to love and feel worthwhile to others fulfilled. In like manner, Thomas Hora and other psychotherapists emphasize that healing insights only take place within a climate of love. The experience on the part of the patient of being loved, of being affirmed and understood, first frees him to understand the truth and to embrace those values which free him from his psychic prison. Clearly, there is at the very least a most striking parallel between the psychic healing process as described by various psychotherapists and religious conversion as thematized in foundations. In both instances a gift of love is absolutely primary, and without it the process does not advance. Likewise, in both psychological and religious conversion or healing there is dynamically present a knowledge born of love.

b. The Patient, the Therapist and the Conversions of Foundations

There is much more than a mere striking parallel or similarity between the processes involved in religious conversion and the healing of the psyche. From a Christian perspective I believe it can be established that the existence of religious conversion in the patient and generally in the therapist also is a required de facto
existential condition of possibility for the occurrence of at least certain forms of lasting psychological healing. I believe my point can be established by looking at some existential factors involved in the processes of religious and psychological healing from the viewpoints of patient and therapist respectively.

(1) The Patient. As far as the patient in the psychotherapeutic process is concerned, an occurrence or transformation on one level of the psyche or human consciousness affects all the other levels. Concretely, this means that the presence or absence of religious conversion in the individual will be an existential factor in the psychological healing process. Moreover, on Lonergan's analysis, religious conversion alone provides the efficacious grounds for a deep and lasting moral conversion. But it is only the morally converted individual who can love others in a perduring, self-sacrificing and deep fashion. This means that religious conversion must be present or become present in an individual who can only be healed deeply in his psyche to the extent that he shifts from a basically self-centered to a fundamentally loving mode of being-in-the-world. From this perspective it would seem that the type of psychological healing Glasser and Hora envisage—at least in its deeper levels—is, in terms of the foundational analysis of religious and moral conversion, only existentially realizable in an individual to the extent that he is operating out of the gift of God's love dwelling in his heart. Likewise, if Dr. O. Hobart Mowrer is correct in his view that mental illness is a result of an individual's violating his own systems of values and conscience, it follows that the healing of the psyche is impossible apart from a profound spiritual transformation.

(2) The Therapist. As far as the therapist is concerned, the deep existential relationship which must exist between the conversions of foundations and psychological conversion if the latter is to be effective—at
least in certain instances—can also be shown. Thus, the therapist should be an individual who is highly self-transcendent, mature and enlightened. Hora insists that the authentic therapist should have achieved high levels of self-transcendence and authenticity and Glasser says that the therapist should be an individual whose basic needs are fulfilled and who is in contact with reality in a deep and rich fashion. If we transpose into foundational terms Hora's and Glasser's existential requirements for an effective therapist, the therapist should be an individual who has the gift of God's love dwelling in his heart and is morally converted.

Further, it is not sufficient for the psychotherapist simply to be religiously and morally converted. The psychotherapist should also be one who has profound reflexive self-knowledge, and has thematized the foundational and psychic reality of the converted subject, who understands the relationship between the basic conversions and the psychotherapeutic process. Grace and sin, for example, are from the Christian and foundational viewpoint de facto existential elements operating in the human situation and they are respectively a help or a hindrance on all the levels of human consciousness. The therapist, then, if he is to be able to deal with the individual as he actually is and in an integral fashion should not only be converted and psychologically mature but should also have a thematized understanding of converted, mature subjectivity.

(a) The Therapist and the Religious Apologist.

An analogy might be drawn between the role of the therapist and the role of the religious apologist. Lonergan indicates that the role of the apologist is "to aid others in integrating God's gift with the rest of their living" (1972:55). Analogously, the role of the therapist and most especially the Christian therapist dealing with a Christian patient should be to aid the patient to come to a liberating type of self-understanding within a climate
of love through which he will be able to integrate the religious, moral, intellectual, and psychological dimensions of his consciousness in a much richer fashion than he has previously been able to do.

(b) *The Therapist and the Interpreter of the Classics.* A further analogy obtains between the existential requirements of an authentic interpreter of the great classics and those of an authentic psychotherapist. Dorothy Sayers, the Dante translator and interpreter, has pointed out that only an individual who is religiously and morally converted and who has a Christian philosophy can interpret the *Divine Comedy* in a truly authentic and adequate holistic fashion (49-50). Likewise, Lonergan has indicated that an existential requirement of the interpreter of any great classic is the existence in the individual of religious, moral and intellectual conversion. In a fashion analogous to the work of the interpreter of the classic the psychotherapist is called to engage in an existential interpretation both of himself and of his patients and of the authentic and inauthentic modes of being-in-the-world. Since religious, moral and intellectual conversion--the latter at least in a seminal form--pertain to the very core of authentic existing in the world, above all the converted psychotherapist will understand the nature of converted subjectivity, and will be the best interpreter of the individual patient's authentic and inauthentic modes of being-in-the-world. This analysis of the existential requirements of the fully effective psychotherapist demonstrates, I believe, the radical existential connection which exists between the conversions of foundations and the psychological healing process. It also strikingly indicates both the possibility and the desirability of a distinctively Christian psychotherapeutic approach.
3. The Conversions of Foundations and Psychological or Psycho-Religious Conversion

There is not only a connection most intimate, vital and dynamic between the conversions and the process of psychological healing. There is also a certain identification of the conversions of foundations with the event of psychological healing. I do not mean by this, however, that psychological conversion or healing is simply to be identified with the process of religious, moral, and perhaps intellectual conversion. Most certainly examples are available of instances where the simple occurrence of a religious or moral conversion was enough to bring about the healing of an emotionally disturbed individual. Ordinarily, however, the healing of psychological disorders involves a specific type of growth in self-knowledge and a certain integration of the self on diverse levels as well as a certain religious, moral, and perhaps intellectual conversion or transformation. While acknowledging, accordingly, that religious, moral, and at least seminally, intellectual conversion very often constitute elements intrinsic to the very process of psychological healing, I wish to add that ordinarily psychological healing and maturation involve a growth in self-knowledge and personal reflective integration within a climate of love. This integration expresses itself in new decisions and actions as well as in a transformation in sensibility.

The observations I have just made regarding the conversions of foundations and the process of psychological healing lead me to distinguish between the conversions of foundations—religious, moral and intellectual—and what I term "psychological conversion" or, in a fully explicit Christian context, "psycho-religious conversion." As I just indicated, the foundational reality of religious, moral, and, in its roots, intellectual conversion is intrinsic to the total event of psycho-religious conversion; but the latter is not simply identifiable with the former. The notion of psycho-religious conversion or, if you will,
the process of psycho-religious self-appropriation, adds to religious and moral conversion a self-understanding or self-objectification which is analogous to the performance involved in intellectual conversion in the full sense of this term. The self-understanding, however, involved in psycho-religious conversion or the process of psycho-religious self-appropriation, only takes place within an ambience of love and requires for its existential completion the free decision to live one's life in the light of the gift of the new self-understanding. In the terminology of John Henry Newman, the type of self-understanding involved in psycho-religious conversion must be a real and not a notional knowledge. Also, the self-understanding involved in the process of psycho-religious self-appropriation brings about a revolution in sensibility, a radical transformation in one's feelings as intentional responses to values. I hope the exact significance of the distinction I draw between the conversions of foundations and psycho-religious conversion will emerge as I continue to explore the issue within the special and general categories of foundations.

4. The Transcendental Precepts and Certain Contemporary Psychotherapies

A consideration of certain general theological categories of foundations in their relationship to some contemporary psychotherapies further confirms the thesis that there is a certain identity of the conversions of foundations with the healing event of psychological conversion.

The general theological categories of foundations are derived most basically from reflection on the operating subject. Thus, the cognitive self-appropriation of the self as knower, deliberator, and decider reveals the human subject as that being who operates on four levels of consciousness. Intellectual conversion, or man's cognitive self-appropriation of himself as a knower, reveals the human subject as one who experiences, understands, and judges in order to know what is. The extension of the
process of cognitive self-appropriation into the highest level of human consciousness reveals man as one who not only experiences, understands and judges but also deliberates, decides, and acts.

In thematizing the spiritual exigencies which cognitive self-appropriation reveals as belonging to or, more properly, constituting respectively the four levels of consciousness, Lonergan articulates four transcendental precepts. They are: Be attentive! Be intelligent or understanding! Be reasonable! Be responsible! Lonergan indicates that obedience to the transcendental precepts leads to self-transcendence but that the failure to obey the exigencies of the spirit leads to basic alienation. "The term alienation is used in many different senses. But in the present analysis the basic form of alienation is man's disregard of the transcendental precepts" (1972: 55). Again, "a man is his true self inasmuch as he is self-transcending. Conversion is the way to self-transcendence. Inversely, man is alienated from his true self inasmuch as he refuses self-transcendence" (1972:357).

In what immediately follows I shall envisage the transcendental imperatives in their relationship to certain contemporary psychotherapeutic approaches. Basically, I wish to show that obedience to the various transcendental precepts is, in fact, a constitutive moment in certain diverse psychotherapies and that there is consequently a certain identity between the conversion realities of foundations and psychological conversion.

a. "Be Attentive!"

There is first the precept, Be attentive! This precept is a basic expression of the need of man to be open. Lonergan, indeed, has defined man in terms of openness as fact, openness as achievement, and openness as gift. Man is by nature dynamically open to the realms of the intelligible, the true, the real and the worthwhile. He is also open to receiving God's gracious gift of Himself to man if this gift is offered. But man must freely foster
and encourage his natural openness and not impede it. To impede the natural desire for the intelligible, the true, the real and the good leads to ignorance, bias, and fundamental alienation. And this is precisely why Thomas Hora, for example, makes the cultivation of openness of mind and heart the rock foundation of his therapy. Openness, attentiveness, listening, choiceless awareness, letting—be—all of these existential attitudes are at once the expression of primal foundational reality and are therapeutic in the highest degree. Here there is a clear identity between a basic precept of foundations and a psychotherapeutic principle.

b. "Be Intelligent and Be Reasonable!"

The second and third transcendental precepts are, Be intelligent! and Be reasonable! In Lonergan's analysis, failure to obey these precepts leads to every type of bias, scotosis, and alienation. On the contrary, obedience to these precepts of the spirit leads to self-transcendence and religious, moral, and intellectual conversion. It is not difficult to see how obedience to these precepts is central to such therapies as those of Frankl, Ellis and Hora. Frankl, for example, makes the search for meaning the defining characteristic of his therapy and he sees the absence of meaning in the lives of individuals as a principal source of existential anxiety and noogenic neurosis. Again, Ellis's Rational Emotive Therapy is based on the premise that irrational ideas constantly reiterated to oneself are the key source of most neuroses and even graver mental disorders. The precepts, Be intelligent! and Be reasonable! are clearly constitutive of the therapy of Ellis. Finally, for Hora ignorance of authentic meaning and value is the chief source of man's emotional and other disorders; and precisely through enlightenment or understanding as it occurs within a climate of love, ignorance and alienation are overcome and healing takes place. Once again, there is a clear identity
between the second and third transcendental precepts of foundations and key therapeutic emphases.

c. "Be Responsible!"

The fourth transcendental precept is, Be responsible! The human person is called not only to grasp intelligently and affirm reasonably but also to decide and act responsibly. Even in the area of religious conversion, in which the first moment is the gift of love poured forth into one's heart, a free response and decision is required if the gift is to be accepted and lived out in one's life. Now I believe it is rather obvious that obedience to the fourth precept is as central to the process of psychological conversion--at least as described in such therapies as those of Frankl, Glasser, Ellis and Hora--as it is to the conversions of foundations. Indeed, the precept, Be responsible!, might be said to epitomize the key thrust of William Glasser's Reality Therapy. Here I might also briefly refer to the Decision Therapy of Dr. Harry Greenwald. The basic insight of Greenwald's therapy is that personal decision is all-important in the psychotherapeutic process. Thus, after twenty years of work as a therapist it became clear to Greenwald that "the only thing that happens in therapy--regardless of the methods or techniques used--is that the person you're working with is helped to make a decision to change, and then is helped to carry out the decision" (5). Without entering further into a discussion of the therapy of Greenwald, it is clear that his stress on decision as the core of therapy coincides at least in certain respects with the foundational stress on decision as a key element in the total process of religious, moral and, in an indirect but vital fashion, intellectual conversion.

The aim in briefly relating the four transcendental precepts of foundations to the constitutive moments of a number of therapies has been to further substantiate the thesis that there is not only a connection and in fact a very intimate connection between the foundational realities
thematized in the general theological categories and the event of psychological conversion, but also an identity.

5. Integrated Consciousness and a Christian Psychotherapy

A key concern of both foundations and psychotherapy is the notion of an integrated consciousness. Above all by focusing on the issue of integrated consciousness one can best determine the exact relationship of the conversions of foundations to psychological conversion or psycho-religious conversion; and one can most clearly show the possibility and desirability of a Christian psychotherapy.

a. The Role of Self-Knowledge in Psychological Conversion

The analysis of foundations reveals that human consciousness and its development involve four fundamental levels, three basic conversions, a variety of patterns of experience and an increasing number of differentiations and integrations. Religious conversion takes place on the fourth level of consciousness—deliberation and decision—and is the highest transformation of human consciousness and generally the sublator and efficacious ground of the other conversions. The mere occurrence, however, of religious conversion does not guarantee its full and proper integration with the other conversions, the diverse patterns of experience, and the various differentiations of consciousness. Lonergan indicates, for example, that toward the end of his life Thomas Aquinas experienced an intense form of religious differentiation of consciousness—the mystical—and that it interfered with his theological reflectivity. Lonergan suggests that if Aquinas had lived longer he might have learned to integrate prayer and theology just as Teresa of Avila had combined prayer and business (1971:19). The point is that the occurrence of religious and, for that matter, of moral and intellectual conversion, does not ipso facto guarantee a fully integrated consciousness on the part of the individual. Besides the occurrence of the conversions, a profound growth
in self-knowledge is required if a high level of integration of consciousness is to occur. Thus, it is one thing to have the gift of God's love dwelling in one's heart. It is quite another to integrate this gift into one's total living. As Lonergan puts it: "If we would know what is going on within us, if we would learn to integrate it with the rest of our living, we have to inquire, investigate, seek counsel" (1972:22-33).

b. A Definition of Psychological and Psycho-Religious Conversion

It is now possible to indicate more clearly in what fashion the conversions of foundations are in one aspect identical with and yet in another aspect distinct from psychological or psycho-religious conversion. Religious, moral and, in a certain sense, intellectual conversion are constitutive elements in the total process of psychological or psycho-religious conversion because, as I indicated earlier, a deep and lasting psychological transformation is existentially impossible apart from the operative presence in one of the gift of God's love, a moral commitment to the truly worthwhile and an acknowledgement of the primacy of the rational and the real. Indeed, by way of exception, the mere occurrence of moral conversion in an individual may suffice for psychological healing. As a general rule, however, the presence or occurrence of religious, moral, and seminally intellectual conversion in an individual is a necessary but not sufficient condition for the event of radical psychological healing to take place. The added factor which must, as a rule, be present for psychological or psycho-religious conversion to take place is a significant deepening in self-knowledge which transpires within a love-filled ambience and involves a concrete decision to live out the new self-understanding which has been gained. As distinguished, therefore, from religious, moral, and intellectual conversion, psychological or psycho-religious conversion involves as its central moment the achievement of an integrated self-understanding which
is born of the experience of love; it involves expressly a shift to the loving mode of being-in-the-world, and a decision to live according to one's new knowledge of the self. Clearly, the definition I give of the process of psychological healing would not be acceptable to many psychotherapists. My definition is valid, however, to the extent that certain key insights in the therapies of Frankl, Glasser, Ellis, Hora, Greenwald and others are proven to be correct.

c. Kazimierz Dabrowski and Psychological Integration

In the present discussion of the role of integration of consciousness in the psychotherapeutic process, the position of psychiatrist Kazimierz Dabrowski is especially useful and illuminating. Dr. Dabrowski has, in a number of books and various articles, developed the theory of mental growth through positive disintegration. Basically, Dabrowski sees a high-level, psychic integration as the goal of the process of psychological healing and maturation. This high-level integration is a dynamic integration of all the mental functions—cognitive, moral, social, aesthetic, etc.—into a hierarchy in accordance with one's own authentic ideal of personality. This high-level integration involves a self-chosen, self-confirmed, and self-educating mental structure. It involves a cohesive integration of the emotional and instinctive functions in a harmonious accord with the highest mental functions. It is the fruit of profound self-understanding in a critical, objective sense and involves the acceptance of an authentic hierarchy of values after critical examination and autonomous choice. To reach the ideal of high-level integration one must undergo a disintegration of a more primitive integration which previously had been achieved. The positive disintegration of the lower level, primitive integration (the latter is characterized by biological determinism, automatism, rigidity, stereotypy and a lack or low degree of consciousness) is effected through the
psychic dynamism of growing insight into oneself and understanding of oneself and others together with a conscious and deliberate choice based on multi-level, multi-sided, highly integrating insights. In terms of his theory of personality shaping through positive disintegration, Dabrowski sees psychoneuroses not as diseases but rather as expressions of the need for an individual to abandon his primitive integration and to move toward high-level, secondary integration.

Dabrowski's view of the goal of the psychotherapeutic process as a profound personality integration achieved in large measure through a high degree of personal integrating insights and consequent decisions regarding authentic values lends support to the thesis of this paper that the highest and most integral form of psychotherapy would be one which would explicitly take into account, be informed and governed by, religious values and meanings and, in a Christian context, specifically Christian values and meanings. Dabrowski's theory thus tends to confirm the view of this paper that psychological conversion or, in an explicit Christian context, psycho-religious conversion involves religious, moral and seminal intellectual conversion but that it also includes a very high level of reflective, critical and evaluative self-understanding.

Dabrowski's stress on the crucial role of self-examination, self-understanding, and decision in the psychotherapeutic process is in profound accord with the stress of Jesus in the Gospels on the primacy of thought and desire in the conversion process. It is likewise in harmony with the Pauline stress on the need to dispel illusions, ignorant and false desires, and to put on a new mind and a new heart. Further, Dabrowski's position upholds the insights of the various contemporary psychotherapies which we have utilized throughout this paper in order to make explicit the psychotherapeutic principles which are at least implicit in Christian revelation. Thus, Dabrowski's stress on the crucial role of self-understanding
and decision in the psychotherapeutic process complements the emphasis of Frankl on meaning, of Ellis on rationality, of Hora on understanding the existential significance of one's mode of being-in-the-world, and of Greenwald on decision. Finally, Dabrowski's thesis supports Lonergan's contention that it is necessary to scrutinize one's feelings or intentional responses to value if one is to avoid alienation in its diverse forms and grow toward psychic and ontic maturity. "It is much better to take full cognizance of one's feelings, however deplorable they may be, than to brush them aside, overrule them, ignore them. To take cognizance of them makes it possible for one to know oneself, to uncover the inattention, obtuseness, silliness, irresponsibility that gave rise to the feeling one does not want, and to correct the aberrant attitude" (1972:33). Here Lonergan is urging obedience to the transcendental precepts in terms of an authentic understanding and judgment about the meaning of one's feelings as the route to psychological health and maturation.

Now, if an integrated state of consciousness at a very high level is the goal of the psychotherapeutic process, then the possibility and desirability of a Christian psychotherapy is clearly indicated. For foundations reveals that religious conversion is the highest actualization of human consciousness and that it exercises a profound transformative effect on all the other levels of consciousness. It follows that an adequate self-knowledge must take explicit cognizance of the religious and moral actualizations of consciousness and grasp their integral relationship to all the other dimensions of human consciousness. A Christian psychotherapy, then, is called for—at least in an explicitly Christian context and ambience—which has as its goal a high-level integration of consciousness in which the operative presence in the individual of religious, moral, and seminally intellectual conversion is complemented by a profound and critical self-understanding. It is the task of this Christian
psychotherapy to work out its basic categories, techniques and goals both through foundational reflections and a scissors-like action through which it either (1) derives psychotherapeutic healing principles from revelation by envisaging the latter in the light of diverse contemporary therapies; or (2) tests the genuineness and viability of the diverse therapies in the critical light of revelation. In this perspective, then, a Christian psychotherapy is not only possible and desirable but a necessity if there is to be a psychotherapy capable of coming to grips in an adequate fashion with the troubled human psyche as it actually exists and functions in the triple existential spheres of nature, sin, and grace. Indeed, only an explicit Christian psychotherapy can be fully existential in dealing with man as he truly is in the present scheme of things.

V. Dialectic

The main thrust of the present paper has been to present a basic viewpoint on the possibility and desirability of a Christian psychotherapy in the terms of the functional specialties doctrines, systematics and foundations. There are, of course, conflicting views regarding each of the positions I have espoused in my doctrinal, systematic, and foundational considerations. No doubt, some of the conflicts are merely perspectival but others are rooted in a fundamental difference in religious, moral and/or basic intellectual horizon.

The aim of dialectic is to deal with conflicts arising in the other functional specialties, to seek the grounds, both apparent and real, of the conflicts, to eliminate superfluous oppositions, and in an indirect fashion to prepare the grounds for conversion. Dialectic performs a purifying function by allowing and encouraging the manifold positions and counterpositions to come to light concretely in all their suppositions and consequences. Dialectic, as a generalized apologetic, prepares
the way for the foundational decision which selects one basic horizon and rejects others.

It would be most profitable to envisage each of the major positions I have articulated in my doctrinal, systematic, and foundational considerations in terms of dialectic where my own views could be scrutinized in the light of various opposing stances. Such an operation, however, is outside the scope of the present paper. What I would like to do, however, is to conclude by enumerating certain questions—either implicitly or explicitly suggested in this paper—which could and should be envisaged within a dialectical framework. I have, of course, already proposed my own answers to most of these questions and am inclined to view my answers as positions rather than counterpositions. It is up to the reader, however, to envisage my answers within the manifold of dialectical possibilities and perhaps to take a stand in the light of his own religious, moral, and intellectual horizons, and the judgments of fact and of value which occur within these horizons.

Questions for Dialectic

First, Is there a psychotherapy at least implicit in Christian revelation and the doctrines which express this revelation?

Second, Is it legitimate to speak of a Christian psychotherapy or is it a misnomer or even a contradiction in terms to do so?

Third, Is there a certain identity and yet at the same time a certain difference between religious, moral, intellectual conversion, and psychological healing and maturation?

Fourth, Is it only the converted, highly self-transcendent and self-reflective Christian psychotherapist who can adequately thematize the total process of psychological healing and maturation?

Fifth, Is there a certain analogy between the issue of a Christian psychotherapy and a Christian philosophy?

Sixth, What are the criteria for distinguishing an authentic Christian psychotherapy from inauthentic forms of such a psychotherapy?
Seventh, What is the proper relationship between an authentic Christian psychotherapy and other psychotherapies which do not explicitly take the religious dimension of man into account?

Eighth, What is the relevance of the following statement of Lonergan to the basic issue of the possibility and desirability of a Christian psychotherapy? "The converted have a self to understand what is quite different from the self that the unconverted have to understand" (1972:271).
NOTE

/1/ It is interesting to note that McClain considers the effect absolutely proper to the Sacrament of the Anointing to be bodily well-being (572). Palmer concludes his article by stating that "we believe that, if the prayers of the ritual are recited with confidence in the recovery of the sick person, more often than not, 'the prayer of faith will save the sick person and the Lord will raise him up'" (344). Finally, a citation of Palmer from the Catechism of Trent is worth quoting: "And if in our day the sick obtain this effect less frequently (the effect referred to here is bodily recovery of health), this is to be attributed not to any defect of this sacrament but rather to the weaker faith of a great part of those who are anointed with the sacred oil, or by whom it is administered; for the Evangelist bears witness that the Lord 'wrought not many miracles among his own, because of their unbelief'" (339).
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Frankl, Viktor

Glasser, William

Greenwald, Harold

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Sayers, Dorothy  

Tyrrell, Bernard  
CHRISTIAN SELF-DISCOVERY
Sebastian Moore

This paper is written from the perspective of what Lonergan calls self-appropriation at the fourth level, the level of the existential subject. Section I is an attempt to understand the central Christian mystery of reconciliation. Section II tries to zero in on the act of self-appropriation itself. Section III expands an understanding of the image of the Crucified (already necessarily touched in the first section) that focuses the psychic dimension of fourth-level self-appropriation.

I

The thought of Bernard Lonergan, as I understand it and am enriched by it, centers on the most important fact about the human subject. Among the continually expanding number of facts about this most complex and intriguing being, the most important is, that he is self-transcending. All the writing of Lonergan is, in one way or another, heading the reader towards the recognition of this fact about himself. Self-transcendence is personally discovered to be the case, or it is not properly understood. And into this discovery one is dragged, protesting, kicking, and screaming. For on the journey inward towards this recognition—for which the Augustinian word confession is the most appropriate—one travels through all sorts of subsidiary systems of oneself, each deploying its own characteristic distracting virtuosity and complaining against a threatened takeover. The struggle is similar to the Ignatian journey towards a devastatingly honest and grace-enabled self-appraisal, which also is a journey through protests—styles of living, slowly assembled and established to meet life's challenges as best one could, protest that life on any terms other than theirs is
simply impossible. At the end of both journeys—or better, of both modalities of the one journey—the self that is revealed as *my* self, and that can no more be doubted than I can doubt that I exist, is a lover, is generous, finds peace in the other, lives in a limitless universe, is self-transcending.

Self-transcendence, then, is not a property to be attributed to a being called "man". It is something to be discovered about myself. It is something that *is* discovered insofar as I discover myself. The discovery of the self carries the discovery of self-transcendence within it. Thus while the correct assertion "man is self-transcending" invites us first to conceive, somehow, of a being called man, and then to *add*, as a notion distinct from the notion of this being, that it is self-transcending, the discovery I am speaking of works differently. In it, the notion of self-transcendence is not *added*, but grows out of the self as freshly appropriated and acknowledged—grows out of it as the only way I can henceforth understand or speak about myself. What is absolutely essential to the discovery is that the intimacy, the I-ness, of the self, has self-transcendence as its structure: that the realization "that is I," with all its undeniable sense of homecoming and huge familiarity, invokes love as its meaning. "I am" equals "I love." "I love" is the only way to say "I am."

But this discovery is not made by "going into oneself." St. Teresa does talk sometimes about "going into oneself," but for her this phrase is only a sometimes appropriate shorthand for what she does in contemplative prayer. It is only the self as realized in some great and mysterious adventure that reveals, as its deepest secret, that it is lover. The obstacles to true self-discovery are many, formidable, tortuous and perverse. They are only cleared through some unaccountable generosity that can occur in the very thick of our total involvement with others and with the God who queers our pitch with others
and with ourselves until we accept the grace to let him speak. In what follows, I want to examine the most intense and crucial of all our involvements: the situation of offense, of hurt, of forgiveness, of reconciliation, and, finally, of that human guilt which, beyond the reach of even the most loving and patient of friends, eats away the self and challenges an infinite love to dissolve it. In a true and accurate assessment of this situation above all we may hope to discern that the human subject is indeed lover. The battle-scarred being who in this most human of all situations eventually opens his eyes and smiles, is a self-entangled lover. The skilled love that seeks him out seeks that in him: for that is who he is. A forgiveness that does not believe that of him is no forgiveness and will only compound the misery.

I have been led to choose this theme by a classroom experience of the last semester. Teaching theology to freshmen and sophomores who only come to me in the fetters of "the Theology Requirement," I found that an extensive and sophisticated analysis of the structure of forgiveness between people awoke much interest and solicited some remarkable end-of-term papers. From this I came to two conclusions: that forgiveness, and all that it involves and all that involves it, are the things that interest God most; and that the things that interest God most are the things people are most interested in. The first conclusion comes as the end of a persistent, meandering study of the gospel that has to be measured in decades. The second, though crashingly obvious, has taken and is taking courage to implement.

This main section falls into five subsections:
1. A human forgiveness situation. Its implication is: that the hurt we deliver is at root our self-hatred, the suppression of the lover in us. So forgiveness is only received through, or in, or as fostering, self-acceptance.
2. Having considered the interpersonal situation of forgiveness, I zero in on the forgiven subject. How does he
stand in relation to his fault? I find that, integral to his reception of forgiveness, integral to his revival as lover, is a very accurate, free and full admission of his fault. And for this to be possible to a person, he must have an extraordinary confidence in being accepted. Jesus understands this structure operative between people as the very structure of the soul and involved in its ultimate healing. So the theme of this section is Jesus' treatment of sinners as described in the gospel.

3. I find that what grounds and profoundly enriches the gospel concept of sinfulness is the concept, wrestled with by Paul, of enmity with God. So correspondingly, grounding and profoundly enriching the gospel concept of forgiveness, is the Pauline concept of reconciliation. This is the full meaning of our acceptance: the release from enmity, the release of the lover.

4. I ask the deepest question: what is it in us that radically inhibits the belief that we are accepted? This brings us to a guilt that precedes and exceeds the moral sphere. The theme of this section is the full and final confrontation between Jesus and the sinner: the cross and the resurrection.

5. Finally I discern a need to correlate this generio guilt, from which the gospel exonerates us, with the sins of which we are justly ashamed.

A. The Structure of Forgiveness

What happens when Mary, who loves John, forgives him for an injury he has done her? What is involved, in her and in him, in this transaction?

On her side, she continues to love him and to let him know it, not primarily in words but in the wordless way that is open to lovers.

On his side, he "hears" from her that she still loves him. So he "hears" from her that he is still lovable, still of value. But at the same time, he is experiencing
himself not as of value, but as "having treated someone badly."

Thus her love is setting up a contradiction in him between "I am good" and "I am bad."

The only resolution of this contradiction is for him to see that in hurting her he is hurting himself. This does resolve the contradiction, for it makes John's badness consist in attacking, striking at, his own goodness. I can be, at one and the same time, good and bad, if my badness consists in the suppression of my goodness.

Now this is precisely what her love is telling him: that what he takes to be badness in himself is the suppression of his goodness. It is that, and it is not that he is "no good."

This brings us to the most important thing about true forgiveness; namely, it is the opposite of what we normally think forgiveness is. The normal understanding of "being forgiven" is "I am bad, but you forgive me." I am no good, but even so, you're so good that you forgive me. Whereas true forgiveness means Mary reawakening John's sense of his own goodness which has taken a big knock from the way he's treated Mary. True forgiveness is love in action awakening the offender to the good he suppressed in himself in hitting out at the offended one.

The point is that when I have hurt someone the easy and natural way for me to level with that fact is to regard myself as a lousy no-good person. My pride prefers to keep it that way. That is why it so often happens, when someone has hurt another, that he keeps repeating "I'm just a selfish bastard, what else can you expect?" This sounds as though he's admitting his fault, being very humble, taking the blame. But really he's using these words in order to stop her forgiving love from getting to him. He doesn't want to hear that he is good in this situation that he can only level with by thinking of himself as bad. He prefers not to face the full situation, which is that he has hurt another person by shrinking
himself. When you hurt another person, your true self, the lover in you, goes into hiding and uses every possible ruse to stay in hiding. Even abject apology!

So the full experience of being forgiven is, first of all, the experience of a sharp contrast between "being an offender" (being offensive) and "failing myself," and then the invitation to move from the first self-description (as offensive) to the second (as failing myself). Above all the experience is a poignant sense of the love (Mary's) that is enabling one to make this rather amazing move. For Mary's love is essential here. If John, without considering her at all, says "all that's happened is that I failed to live up to my full potential," he is an impossibly smug person.

In sum, true forgiveness does not merely "forgive the offender." It awakens him to his true being that he rejected in being an offender. It restores to the offender the dignity of being a self-forgetful lover. Forgiveness is a restoration to the self, and is the climate in which the meaning of the self has its clearest radiance.

B. Concentrating on the Subject of Forgiveness, the Forgiven Subject

When we concentrate on the forgiven subject, we encounter, straight off, a paradox. While it is an obsession with how bad he has been that inhibits his reception of forgiveness, it is also the case that a person can only fully confess to his fault when he is certain of receiving it. I cannot admit that I have done wrong; I cannot admit that I have made a huge mistake, except to someone who I know accepts me. The person who cannot admit that he is wrong is desperately insecure. At root he does not feel accepted, and so he represses his guilt, he covers his tracks. And so we get the paradox: confession of fault means a good self-concept. Repression of fault means a bad self-concept.
Jesus understood, as no one else has at such depth and with such simplicity, that this fact between people manifests something in the very structure of the soul. He knew that a person's deepest insecurity is caused by a sense of guilt accompanied with no sense of being accepted. He found a way to open people's eyes to themselves as accepted by God, so that they could, in the serene confidence of this acceptance, confess their sins. He went further, in that he brought people to an act of confession that was itself the supreme act of confidence in God's acceptance. In this way he brought about the greatest spiritual revolution that ever occurred. Religious man had done everything with guilt except totally acknowledge it. Jesus enabled man to do just this. He made this possible by enabling him to feel accepted in his very being. At a hitherto unknown level of acceptance and confession, he lifted definitively the burden of guilt that, at every other level, man can only shift around. He actualized, between man and his Maker, the structure of admission-in-acceptance that we discover between ourselves. We have yet to bring this structure down to its deepest level of operation. This must wait until we consider "generic guilt."

This is the logic of the gospel concept of sin and forgiveness. The consciousness of sin that Jesus awakens in people is something completely new in the history of religion. The newness consists in being enabled to say "I have sinned" in the way a man can sometimes say "I am sorry" to his wife or his friend: namely, in a way that gives expression to his utter certainty of being accepted. The gospel confession of sin is the most generous, secure, adventurous expression of the human heart. It is the risk that is only taken in the certainty of being acceptable and accepted. It is the full and final expression of that confidence. Only to your lover do you expose your worst. To an amazed world, Jesus presents a God who calls for this confession only so that he may reveal himself in a
person's depths as his lover. This confession in a context of divine acceptance releases the deepest energies of the human spirit and constitutes the gospel revolution in its essence.

The most important characters in the gospel drama are those "publicans and sinners" we have heard about since our Christian childhood. They are important because they most clearly illustrate that consciousness of sin which cripples the spirit. They are the people whom society has told they are bad. Their sense of guilt has eaten into their very identity therefore and made them unacceptable to themselves or to anybody else. Jesus awakens in them a sense of acceptance, so that they can acknowledge their sin in the certainty of being accepted. He does not say "society says you are doing wrong but I say you are not." Prostitution and the rip-off of the tax-collectors is a destructive way of life, and Jesus knows this. What he says is "you can acknowledge your wrongdoing in a way that exposes you to the acceptance of God."

"It was said to them of old 'Thou shalt not commit adultery,' but I say that anyone who looks on a woman with lust has already committed adultery with her in his heart." The intention behind this statement is to bring good people who would stop short of adultery to recognize the sin that is in us all and that now at last can find confession and acceptance. It is to promote good people to the status of sinners, who can then be promoted to the status of unfaithful lovers. Robert Frost has expressed this well.

Christ came to introduce a break with logic
That made all other outrage seem as child's play:
The Mercy on the Sin against the Sermon.
Strange no one ever thought of it before Him.
'Twas lovely and its origin was love.

He goes on to explain that curious phrase "The Mercy on the Sin against the Sermon."

Paul's constant theme. The Sermon on the Mount
Is just a frame-up to insure the failure
Of all of us, so all of us will be
Thrown prostrate at the Mercy Seat for Mercy. (630)
This is perhaps the place to remark that the gospel exposure of the roots of sin in the heart is ruinous outside the context of divine acceptance in which alone Jesus makes this exposure. You then get what François Mauriac, in "La Pharisienne," called "the Furies of the New Covenant."

Let us now return to the basic logic of the gospel of forgiveness. It is paradoxical. The paradox may be expressed thus:

Admission of fault = a good self-concept  
Repression of fault = a bad self-concept

Unfortunately, the Christian tradition has screwed up this paradox. By the way in which teachers talk about sin, the equals signs have got misplaced thus:

Admission of fault = a bad self-concept  
Repression of fault = a good self-concept

Thus the admission of fault runs "I am a miserable sinner, a no-good bastard." And conversely, the only "good self-concept" that the teachers recognized and correctly upbraided is the smug self-satisfaction obtained by repressing fault.

The task of rectifying this error is immense. It means learning to read the gospel without hearing its words on the "tapes" of centuries of Christian programming. "God will forgive you, but first you must confess your sin." Isn't that what the gospel says? Yes, but the meaning is "confess your sin so that God can reveal himself to your heart as your lover and friend and so your heart can come alive again, the lover in you can be reborn."

It has taken me thirty years to understand that the admission and forgiveness of sin is the essence of the New Testament.
C. Enmity with God and Reconciliation

Paul enjoins: be reconciled to God (2 Cor 5:20). He says this reconciliation is through Christ. And he proclaims it with his own life, as an "odor" of Christ that the hearer of his words may be captivated by.

In what way is Paul's concept of reconciliation in advance of the concept of forgiveness? In what way does it take us further into the mystery of our saving? In that it sees the initiative of God as liberating the person from a state of enmity towards him. Do we need to be reminded that to describe a person as an enemy of God is to speak not of God's attitude to him but of his attitude to God? If I say "X is my enemy" I equivalently say "X strongly dislikes me." So "an enemy of God" is someone who strongly dislikes God. The grace of conversion "reconciles" such a person to the God he had feared, mistrusted, fled. It releases the lover that the person essentially is.

Next we have to ask: why does a person mistrust God? The basic reason is that he does not see himself as acceptable. Because he does not see himself as acceptable he is bound to see God as the One whose favor he must somehow win. The whole history of religion is penetrated with this idea of who God is. And the more refined and insightful religion becomes, as it does under the Hebrew prophetic touch, the more a sense of radical impurity is tacitly allowed to endorse this notion of God.

The contrast between the holiness, the sublimity, the purity of God and our human wretchedness is a frequent prophetic theme. However, God is being "removed" from human evil not simply through this sense of contrast but through our sense of not being acceptable. At the heart of this high prophetic religion, with all its genuine exaltation of the divine majesty, is the unavowed attitude that makes God the one who does not accept, that is, the enemy. I may--indeed I shall--say that the failure is all on my side, not on his. But this failure is the
extraordinarily complex experience of the lover who, for a reason he does not understand, is not "coming off." At the religious level, it will only be through a radical change in the human heart that God will be seen as the friend. To experience God as my friend is, equivalently, to have my radical love potential released from a captivity whose source we have yet to explore.

The religious style of Jesus cuts through the sublimity of the prophets to the real and never noticed cause of man's sublime notion of God--his sense of being unacceptable. Once a person has responded under the prompting of the Spirit to this message, his idea of God changes. He is now a God who is known primarily not through a sense of awe that separates holiness from defilement but through the coming-to-life of the heart in the knowledge of being accepted.

It is through the liberation of our deepest potential that the God of Jesus reveals himself. We come to know him through a fundamental total generosity that is released in us by the realization that we are accepted. The best image we have for Christian conversion is what happens to a woman or a man in love. Anxieties hitherto not even acknowledged are dispelled. *Incipit vita nova*.

D. Generic Guilt

Do I dare
Disturb the universe? (Eliot: 1952a)

I need to get a *generic* notion of guilt, some idea of its general shape before it enters into all the distinctions such as that between neurotic guilt and reasonably acknowledged guilt. What is guilt, most generally conceived? What, generically, occasions it?

It is very closely associated with freedom. The girl who decides to leave home feels guilt mainly perhaps because of her mother. The child who plays with another child of whom his parents do not approve, or who even *thinks* otherwise than his parents about this matter of
friends, feels guilty. And the great myth of the Fall that dominates the Christian tradition presents guilt as arising automatically and in the nature of things, when the man and the woman make a bid for independent judgment, for making the world their world, its good and evil their good and evil.

In other words guilt seems to be the accusation of some enclosing whole or order against one who breaks out from it. "How could you do this to us?" asks the family, or the religious order, or--more radically--the psychic womb. Guilt is the accusation that freedom draws from the psychic womb whence it breaks out. It grows with consciousness itself. More accurately, it grows with self-consciousness. That independent self which begins to sally forth in this world carries from the very start a baggage of accusations from the blissful world of unconscious childhood. "You're on your own now!"

Thus guilt, in its most radical form, is not generated by the non-conformity of my action with the relevant social mores. It inheres in my action precisely as a free, as opposed to a "being-part-of" action. Its gravamen is not non-conformity but independence. It is hardly distinguishable from loneliness (see Fromm: 150-151 for a vivid account of loneliness-guilt equation).

Now the next thing to consider is how we handle this inbuilt accusation. We are not, and it seems we cannot be, untouched by it. I think we allow the accusation its description of what we are doing, and say, "Hell, I'm going ahead in any case." We consent to be guiltily on our own, guiltily about our own business. We accept the psychic womb's description of our independence as "filthy." For yes, I believe that the note of defilement that Ricoeour finds to be absolutely fundamental to the notion of evil, arises precisely at this point. The contrast between what ridiculous, pretentious, independent little "I" generates and this huge enclosing world of earth and sky is one in which I appear dirty. With my individual mark I deface
the universe. Whence, for instance, came the idea, so easily ridiculed by liberals, that sex was "dirty"? Was it simply the geographical proximity and partial identity between its organs and the organs of excretion? Surely, not. The "dirty" bit got in with the "mine alone" bit, and inextricably mixed up with it. A man or a woman, in almost every known culture, hides his or her sex organs not, I suspect, because they are sex organs but because they are his or hers. They are even called "private parts." And it may be that of all areas of human experience and experiment sexuality is the most guilt-ridden precisely because here we have the most dramatic conjunction of the universal life-force (the psychic womb bit) with the mine and the yours of the self-conscious, self-emancipating individual. Human sexuality is the dramatic breach with the life-force, the defacement of the universe by conscious people. It is a use of the impersonal life-force that is highly personal, original, adventurous, bizarre, perverse, beautiful. Etc.

Guilt, then, is "the human animal persisting in what the psychic womb accuses him of: accepting the latter's description of what he is doing, and doing it none the less." We see then how closely guilt is involved with these two elements: the acceptance by our freedom of our earlier world's disapproving description of it, and the persistence in our independence under this description, form, with the accusation itself, the structure of guilt. We carry into our new world of freedom the accusations of the old world that bore and nurtured us. The structure of accusation, acknowledgment and persistence constitutes the synchronic dimension.

The community's protest and the resultant painful interchange constitute the diachronic dimension. "What are you doing?" says the universe to this upstart man. "Why did you do that?" asks the nun of the child. "Because I wanted to." "Do you always do what you want to?" Into the very heart of individual conscious action there
is injected that note of privacy, of theft, of cornering something off for oneself, which is sounded off by "the whole." And when the family or the religious community accuses the one who leaves it, it is this archetypal structure that is operating.

"It goes a good deal deeper than what people call their conscience" says Harry in Eliot's play The Family Reunion. "It is rather the canker that eats away the self" (1952b). The guilt with which the human race has to deal is far more than the memory of heinous deeds. It is the coloration of human self-conscious activity by an indignant cosmos. And whether or not a person does things that can rationally be judged to be bad, his primal sense of guilt precedes and itself colors these doings. Thus another may forgive him for them. But his forgiveness will come up against the core sense of guilt and there founder.

This last consideration takes us an important step further on our enquiry. If I, conscious I, am somehow against the whole: if I am my own doing; if I am stolen from the whole; if I am this private thing of my own inventing; if I am a defilement, a defacing mark, how can I be acceptable? How can I be welcomed into the whole whence I have cut myself off, whence I am the cutting-off? The problem of the forgiveness of sin is at root the problem of the acceptance of the forgiveness of sin, which is what Tillich calls the acceptance of acceptance. It is terribly hard to accept the embrace in a heart that has grown solitary. The difficulty of a middle-aged bachelor in coming into love is one diachronic enactment of the synchronic structure that we have now built up into a fourfold structure: accusation, acknowledgment, persistence and non-expectation of acceptance.

Christian belief places at the climax of its story a man without sin. Does this mean that Jesus was without guilt, without that generic guilt of which I have spoken, which seems to be an inalienable part of the coming of
individual consciousness? And if so, what are we to make of the consciousness of Jesus? On my showing at least, human consciousness without guilt is hardly conceivable. At least we may not draw on any examples from our experience or from history or from literature. (And least of all, be it noted, the experience of saints.) But then this mystifying quality in Jesus of consciousness without guilt is balanced or complemented by another quality, equally mystifying, of intimacy with the Absolute which appears to differ qualitatively from the religious experience of all the other great religious leaders. In other words the absence in Jesus of self-securing against the whole is one side of a coin of which the other is a total certainty of acceptance by the whole. And this, it hardly needs saying, is not in the manner of the happy pre-conscious animal. Jesus is not pre-Adamic man. He belongs to the future rather than to the past.

Out of this consciousness Jesus proclaims, and cannot but proclaim, the universal forgiveness of sin. In a consciousness that knows nothing of "acknowledged rejection," he knows a God who accepts. He proclaims this God as one who always forgives. The source and matrix of the Christian conviction of God's forgiving love is the guiltless consciousness of Jesus. Thus "the God and Father of our Lord Jesus Christ" and "the Lover of all" are conceptually identical. God's unique presence to Jesus is the ground of his proclamation of God's forgiveness.

But the interaction between people and the phenomenon of one guiltlessly accepting of acceptance would be complex. For one who is free of guilt altogether, free even of the generic guilt, will be a terrible accusation to me. He will make me conscious of the guilt in my whole build-up as a person. In his presence, my life is undone. Layer by layer, the assemblage in guilty independence is exposed. I am bewildered by the terrible presence of an alternative to what has seemed to me and to everyone else to be the only way to live, the only way to become. And yet the
whole message of this presence is, that the accusation of
the psychic womb against my freedom has no claim on me,
that the self-conscious life which contracted this stigma
is in reality the most beautiful thing in the cosmos and
most acceptable to God and accepted by him. This dis-
mantling of my life effected by the presence of Jesus is
only produced by the searching fingers of love. But can
I feel it this way? Can I sense the fingers of love? No,
at first it is the threat that I feel.

And so we get a paradox. The presence of the guilt-
less one accuses my guilt, awakens guilt long forgotten
and indeed hardly perceived as guilt, while the message of
the guiltless one is precisely that I am not guilty, that
the charge against my freedom was falsely pressed and mis-
takenly accepted.

There is no resolution of this paradox at the level
at which it occurs. For guilt, as I have analyzed it, is
the very cement of my building. Totally without it,
totally deprived of my private self-affirming, I would
fall apart, I would die. The only resolution is for him
to undergo the death that I would die if I could accept
his message of acceptance by God. He must die the death
of the old world. He must fall apart. The love with
which he offers man the sinner God's acceptance must turn
back on him as death.

And thus we begin to understand those features of the
Pauline soteriology that are the deepest, the hardest, and
the hardest to understand. These are: (1) Jesus' death as
substitutionary; (2) the strong statement that "God made
him to be sin for us"; (3) the image of Jesus as embodi-
ment of the old Israel that had to die for God to appear.

We seem to have grasped the crucial point at which
our guilt is transferred to Jesus. It is the logic that
makes the bearer of the Good News its first victim: the
victim in whom we find our peace.

It is in the death of Jesus that our perception of
him as accusation dissolves into the true perception of
him as the sign of our acceptance. For, as we have seen, it is his death that resolves the paradox which held his message of acceptance trapped in the form of accusation.

But it is only in the experience of Jesus as risen that this new perception can come to us. For the risen life of Jesus means this: that the death that is the only way out from the paradox of divine acceptance of man the acceptance-repeller leads into the true life of man as the accepted of God.

It is not just death that is crowned with resurrection. It is the death of the old man. It is the death that God's acceptance seems to involve to the guilty freedom of man, and that is accepted by the proclaimer of this acceptance. It is the violent death that is the second name of the sinless proclaimer of God's acceptance of sinners. For it should not need saying that the synchronic structure that entails the transfer of death-inviting guilt from us to Jesus is worked out diachronically as the violence that comes from the interpretation of love as accusation. We kill "our accuser." In the resurrection we encounter "our lover."

It begins to be clear to me that the blood of the cross flows, symbolically, from a life assembled with guilt, that guilt which is the oldest ingredient in what we know as self-conscious man. For it is at the level that the structure of "accusation, acknowledgment, persistence, non-expectation of acceptance" is assembled: whose dismantling is the Passion and Death of the Lord: whose total alternative is the Resurrection.

Note
The main contention of this section is that moral guilt is not the adequate category for understanding the gospel of redemption. For this understanding we need to consider that more radical guilt which virtually equates with loneliness or forlornness and which excludes, or rather repels, divine acceptance. It is something very under-attended to. I can only recall a few haunting sentences in Kierkegaard,
and some fine observation in Eric Neumann's *The Origins and History of Consciousness*. It also occurs to me that Scheler's *ressentiment*, surely the most horrible observation ever achieved by a philosopher, is the reaction of generic guilt to the freedom of another....

E. Guilt and Sin

It is really harder to believe in murder
Than to believe in cancer. Cancer is here:
The lump, the dull pain, the occasional sickness:
Murder a reversal of sleep and waking.
Murder was there. Your ordinary murderer
Regards himself as an innocent victim.
To himself he is still what he used to be
Or what he would be. He cannot realize
That everything is irrevocable,
The past unredeemable. But cancer, now,
That is something real. (Eliot: 1952b)

I have spoken of our "generic guilt" as something that comes into being with our freedom: a heard accusation on the part of the psychic womb as it parts to let us out. I have said that this has to be distinguished from sin, in that it is characterized by independence rather than by transgression. But now we have to see how this generic guilt, while distinct from sin, relates to it.

First let us define sin. This is an exercise of our independence in a way that injures another person or society. Now the relationship between generic guilt and sin consists in this: that the already present sense of being guiltily on my own makes the sinful act something that "comes naturally" to me. I am already this private being: so why not go all the way with this "me-for-me" condition? The act of sin does not appear to me in its stark destructiveness. I do not see it primarily in the context of the order with which it breaks. I feel it as a natural emanation of my privacy. Its context is my atmosphere as a private being in which it fits, not the order that it disrupts. Or--what comes to the same thing--the order itself is seen rather as that primitive enclosing order, the psychic womb, with which I have to break in order to realize my freedom at all.
Van Breemen, in *As Bread that is Broken*, has a brilliant analysis of the sin of David over Bathsheba. The affair starts with David, extroverted warrior, who is hot and can't sleep. There's nothing wrong with that, says van Breemen. Of course there isn't. It is ordinary consciousness. And it is the sense of me-for-me. It is the guilty privacy of an ordinary man. But it will be the justifying base for all that follows. For next comes the sight of the girl bathing. (Well, I'm a man aren't I? and a king to boot!) And so one thing leads to another. The adultery is beautiful. In David's consciousness, it represents the original "me-for-me" now broadened out into a river of delight. Thus the original justifying context is enlarged. So enlarged, so beautiful, so engulfing, that it makes natural the summoning of Uriah back from the front to give David a first-hand account of how the campaign is going. Then the attempt to get Uriah to sleep with his wife, and, when this fails, the expanded plot of David's inner drama makes natural the plan to eliminate Uriah, involving Joab and an unwarranted tactical risk. Joab foresees that the soldier in David will be angry at this needless risk until he hears that Uriah has been killed. And so it turns out.

So enmeshed is David's whole act, for David, in the original self-justifying context, that the prophet Nathan has to use an indirect method to fish it out from this subjective sea and present it in all its enormity as getting a man killed in order to get his wife. He tells the story of the rich man plundering the poor man of his one lamb. In that figure, David is presented with an act of sin without its subjective justifying context, and he shakes with moral indignation. Then he is caught, for Nathan has only to say "that man is you."

What I want to emphasize here is David's justifying context. And what I want to suggest is that this justifying context justifies because it is itself a guilty state in the generic sense of guilty. Somewhere inside is the
little voice that says, "Well, you're on your own, you know...." It is this sense of being somehow originally outlawed that, albeit very inexplicit, grounds our evil deeds, and, when they come, gives them growth and beauty in our eyes. The self that I consult when I proceed to what is possibly a very wicked deed is already "offside and content to be so." Thus is the generic guilt that, contrasted with adultery and murder, must be judged innocent, drawn into consultation to become a principal actor in the drama.

Moralists have always been intrigued and puzzled by the small beginnings of big sins. But they easily miss the point here, and describe the small beginnings as a "proneness to evil," and warn us to watch out for "our sinful nature" in its very earliest stirrings. There is of course practical common sense at work here. Still, the point is missed. For the point is only grasped by attending to the puzzling character of the process. The point is that we do find ourselves doing harm, rather than initiate the harmful act in a clear way. St. Paul says precisely this, in one passage that everyone remembers because it is so astonishingly rare of its kind in moral literature (Rom 7:14-25). And we puzzle ourselves in doing harm because of that peculiar base in consciousness from which we operate: precisely because while there's no harm in the base itself, yet it has limitless power to justify evil actions, or at least to keep them soft in our eyes. It's really got us foxed, this bipolar structure of "innocent guilt" and sinful act.

Nor is this to mitigate or to soften the evil in sin. Quite the contrary, it is to bring our attention to the real nature of sin, which lies not in "rebellion against God" but in the peculiar dialogue of alienated man with himself. Sin is the sealing of alienation, its total normalizing. Hannah Arendt's phrase, "the banality of evil," fearlessly used in connection with the concentration camps which less morally perceptive people can only
describe with superlatives of malevolence, is entirely ap-
posite here. The Godlessness of man is not rebellion
against God but just what the word says, God-less-ness.
It is that peculiar me-for-me condition alone in which
freedom can get going. It is the human beginning-without-
God, the consideration of which generates the paradox of a
God who apparently creates man to fall and be redeemed.

The error of the "moralists" referred to consists in
understanding the base (generic guilt) in terms of the
evil deed, instead of the other way round. They stretch
the evil deed back, back, back, to a sort of mini-evil-
deed, a homunculus of evil, instead of grappling with the
puzzling nature of the base, that tantalizing quasi-
equation of guilt with loneliness. Of course this way
round is much more difficult to handle. But only so can
we open up the ethical picture to its theological dimen-
sion.

But there is a vital further step to this argument.
That very guilt which lets sin come easily and which legiti-
mates it in our consciousness, is what generates the feeling
that there can be no radical forgiveness. The very on-my-
own-ness that I consult to ease my way into sin will be my
unavowed reason for hoping for no forgiveness. I may say,
"How can I be forgiven for this murder?," but what I am
really saying is, "How can I, for whom this sort of thing
is normal, be forgiven?" What I am really looking at is
not simply the murder but the murder colored by my guilty
self-awareness. A person's sins become for him an en-
larged version of an original loneliness. Originally, the
sin hid in the generic guilt. Now the generic guilt hides
in the sin and makes of the latter a typical manifestation
of my lonely, estranged self. Thus the original justifier
of sin becomes its accuser.

But generic guilt becomes sin's accuser in a half-
hearted way. For as long as I feel unforgivable I am
still clinging to my sin as a typical manifestation of my-
self. I am still coloring it with my lonely selfhood.
And that means that I am not fully acknowledging my sin. Strange as it may seem, there is a difference between saying "Good God, I did that" and saying "Of course I did that, what else can you expect?" What is strange is that the former is the real confession of sin and not the latter, in spite of the latter's apparently greater humility. The latter way of speaking is not a confession of sin but a posturing of "the sinner." And the real intention of this posturing is to maintain, as a kind of last-ditch defense, some of the justifying force of the generic guilt. People do this. They confess their sins orgiastically in order to maintain themselves in their proud and frightened solitude. And the capital point here is that the self is being kept in a state of osmosis with the original self-sense that is pervaded with the generic guilt. And this because the thing above all feared is the exposure of the self to the love that is the self's true climate.

That's what the gospel is about. What Jesus seeks in each of us is the frightened, shivering creature which, before any of us can remember, huddled into the garment of guilt which the psychic womb wove for it as its only protection against the rude wind of an unknown love. The psychic womb is the God who sewed those leaves together to hide our first identity. The gospel is going back to that beginning of us, and calling us out into our end.

In short, the source of sin in us is not a homunculus of evil in us. It is a lonely frightened being whom the cosmos has chased into the isolation that we know as man.

Thus our analysis brings us to the most radical understanding of the self, to the confession of what Eliot calls, "the essential sickness and strength of the human soul" (1972). I am, in my deepest identity, self-transcending. In saying that I am on my own, I deny myself and therefore God. This denial is the human guilt that only an incomprehensible love can dissolve. It is done incomprehensibly on a gibbet. Imprisoned by guilt, I am liberated by love. Guilt is imprisonment. I am that
extraordinary creature, of whom love, coming to me and awoken in me, is the purging. And only a relentlessly prosecuted understanding of the self as self-transcending can do justice to the existential identity of "coming to me" and "awoken in me" and to the labor of this redeeming.

I close this section with the description of a prayer in which this whole drama of the self is enacted. It is taken from *The Last Western* by Thomas S. Klise, being the description of "The Listening Prayer" as practiced by The Silent Servants of the Used, Abused, and Utterly Screwed-up.

It is of the essence of the listening prayer that the listener put himself away from the pleas and suggestions of the normal self, especially when a life-giving action seems the recommended course, for the normal self will suggest many false deeds for the sake of pride or guilt removal or vengeance or for the satisfaction of desires that go back to the time before love spoke.

In all true listening the listener opens his spirit to the Loving One, the Power and the Strength as some call Him-Her, the YOU, who is wholly Other and yet also wedded to the true self. And it is of the essence and perfection of true listening that once the demands of the normal self have been completely put aside, the voice of the self wedded to Truth and Love speak in such a way to the heart of the listener that he is assured it is no other than the voice of the Loving One Him-Herself. And the listener knows this with the exact same degree of certainty that he knows that he exists.

Gloss of Marion Byrne: Has nothing to do with the lying and insanity of hearing voices, as the Fools of Spain believed. Entirely a matter of opening self completely to Other so that Other might enter and be joined to self so that when self speaks, it is the Other speaking in true wedlock, with utter clarity even though the language may be obscure to the normal self and even unknown to the mental workings of the normal self.

In any situation where the sacrifice of one's own life is required, one realizes it with a serene joy and absolute confidence because the road is so clearly marked, and there is never any doubt. If there is hesitation or confusion, the purest listening is required. (332-333)
II

Some definition of "the lover" is called for. I would suggest: the lover is one whose well-being consists and is experienced as consisting in willing the well-being of another. Now there are many experiences to which normal usage would accord the name of love that do not answer to the above definition. The heavily romantic form of love, for instance. Nevertheless, these experiences, though they don't fit my definition, are judged by it and found wanting. The romantic lover has not yet discovered what love is all about. And this means he has not yet discovered how he loves. "How I love" and "who I am" are one identical discovery. He has not yet discovered himself in the act of loving. For him the act of loving is an act of self-forgetfulness, of inattention, of chosen dreaming. In other words, the condition of willing another's flourishing is precisely a condition in which I am newly in touch with myself.

Charles Goldsmith has conceived of a progression through the five stages of affectivity ending with the agapic /1/. It maps out the progress of myself as lover through the necessary confusions and dead-ends to clarity. In the same way, according to Abbot Chapman, progress in prayer passes through desiring to will what God wills to willing what God wills /2/. The desire is already controlled, confusedly (and how confusedly! almost imperceptibly) by the emergent will whose "successful" operation, it is already very dimly perceived, is to move in harmony with the transcendent and all-controlling will.

There is a section-heading in Austin Farrer's difficult book Finite and Infinite called "Will, the clue to the nature of desire." This has always fascinated me. I felt that I knew and did not know what it meant. That meaning is now clear. Desire cannot make ultimate sense as "desire for something." It is desire for a subjective condition. The subjective condition is "willing"; and willing, unlike desire which is for that which is not, is
of that which is independently of myself. To that happy condition, desire tends. From that happy condition, desire gets its nature and meaning.

Ignatius describes a condition of "consolation without a cause." It is for him an experience of grace. He says it can only come from God. My analysis of this condition would be, that in it I experience myself as happy precisely in my willing. I experience my willing as the term or end of desire. In the customary order, desire explains willing, motivates the will, and happiness consists in having got, by willing, what I desired. In the deeper order that is here operative, happy willing seeks and can receive no explanation outside itself, no explanation in terms of something desired. Nor is this a question of some inner well-being or well-functioning in isolation. On the contrary, it is precisely the oneness of willing attunement to an independent reality that is the substance of the delight. In this delight, will is identified as willing that which independently is, I am identified as willing that which is. In this experience I know myself as self-transcendent: and this is not a knowing something about myself; it is knowing myself.

In the experience of maturely loving another person I am in touch with myself. But I cannot then say that apart from this experience I have no self, no being. There is still, for me, a substantial self, a principle of continuity that would continue to support me were this love to be no more. Whereas in the experience described by Ignatius, I know that "outside this, I am nothing. Outside this, I am not." In those privileged moments when the essence of willing is laid bare, I know that all-controlling, independent will, outside of which I have no being.

I would say that Lonergan would have the reader of Insight arrive, in his or her own time and cutting no corners, at the judgment, "I am a knower," whereas I am trying to operate around the fourth-level judgment, "I am a lover."
But, as Frederick Crowe told us in his paper, fourth-level appropriation is the toughest of all. I was consoled by his reminder. At this deepest level of self-discovery, one stumbles upon the truth only after gross practical errors, only after decades of distraction, only after hurting and being hurt. This is why Christian self-discovery is necessarily a story of sin and forgiveness.

The meaning of the turbulence, what is going on in it, is that God's love is seeking to touch and quicken the lover that I am. And the reluctance with which I meet this searching grace is the reluctance to be loved and the reluctance to love. These are one reluctance because my deepest identity, in which I dread to be found and cherished, is the lover that I am.

Consider that famous passage in Dag Hammarskjöld's *Markings* that has smiled upon us in that enigmatic way that banners have: "I don't know Who—or what—put the question, I don't know when it was put. I don't even remember answering. But at some moment I did answer Yes to Someone—or Something—and from that hour I was certain that existence is meaningful and that, therefore, my life, in self-surrender, had a goal" (205).

It is indeed the story of a soul. Now what I want to emphasize is that it expresses the sense of being mysteriously cherished and sent. And at least sometimes, in flashes of unusual self-knowledge, I see that really there is no difference between "cherished" and "sent." I sometimes think that God is not capable of making the distinctions we make, and that sometimes he envelops us and involves us in this cunning incompetence. In those moments, our true self, loved and loving, cherished and sent, awakened and committed, is upon us. And in the process of the Spiritual Exercises of Ignatius, assimilation to Christ's mission grows, in an inexorable logic of grace, out of the experience of conversion.

This identity of "cherished" with "sent," which is a person's ultimate identity (if you'll excuse a bit of
léger de main with that word "identity"), finds its radiant symbol, its authoritative statement, in Jesus, the beloved one, sent into the world. He is who you ultimately are. He is who I ultimately am. He is the authoritative statement of who you are in the universe.

The root identity between the loved and the loving shows itself in personal relationships in all sorts of ways. I have hinted at it above where I analyze the forgiveness situation between a man and a woman. And at the pleasanter and mercifully more superficial levels, when people are getting to know each other, it is about the likes and dislikes of each other that they enquire. The search for the person, we obscurely sense, is the search for the lover. That is why one does not say to a casual acquaintance at a party what really turns one on, still less what one really dreads.

It emerges from Bernard Tyrrell's paper how widespread is the psychological discovery in our time that a person's capacity to relate stems from a fundamental sense of being loved, affirmed, valued, cherished. I believe the deepest reason for this is that "to love," to relate positively, is my identity, is who I am; and if I have not been discovered, valued, affirmed, by another, the resultant lack of identity in me is an inability to love.

Now I am in a position to speak more accurately about the style of self-understanding that I am drawing on. For if loving, if regarding another person positively and with joy, stems from a sense of lovedness and is the flowering of this graced, embraced identity, then a primary source for understanding what loving is will be a sense of myself as loved. And I think a person approaches this grounding sense of lovedness when he reaches some psychic self-appropriation. For in psychic self-appropriation a person moves out from the compulsive, striving area of the ego, into the extended play area of his total psychic existence. By far the most useful initial clue I know to dream-interpretation is the entreaty to befriend one's dreams.
The notion that one's dreams contain one's deeper life heavily coded is correct provided we do not think of this code as something for one's ingenuity to crack. No, I have to listen to what the dream itself is saying, I have to come into its language, to accept citizenship in its realm. And for this I have to befriend it, embrace it as my very self in a form disturbingly unfamiliar to me. I am those elephants clad in shining armour towing great automobiles under the sea—to lift the veil on my own dream country. In other words, dream-interpretation and the many other dodges we can use, take us out of the self as time- and anxiety-ridden into the self as delightful.

Now this was not a digression. For I believe that the meaning of the self as delightful, the meaning of our inner resources of hedonism, is the cherishedness of our total life by God. Psyche is the place where we may meet ourselves as delightful and lovable. And not surprisingly, its messages often insinuate a subtle, logically strange way of self-presentation that does not compete with others, does not anxiously seek to upstage rather than be upstaged, does not play those games that can make the modern academe an exceedingly unpleasant place.

I do not say, however—and this is of incalculable importance—that this psychic self-discovery is the discovery of one's life as God-cherished. It is, rather, a most precious gift of God which, like all God's gifts except the grace of conversion, can be taken without acknowledgment. But also, I would say in this case, with a blindness as to its meaning.

I want to stress this last point. While it is only by a further decision, a further response of a most fateful kind, that a person knows his wider and deeper psychic life as a cherishedness, a gracedness, by God, in turning this corner he will be allowing the language of his psyche to speak with its full eloquence. He will in fact have a new and much more intimate access to that world of symbol and archetype that has ever been the preferred language of
religion. The psyche, with its riches, contains a certain way of speaking to oneself and to others of God's love that is not otherwise available. (Incidentally I would very much like to hear of anyone who, already matured in psychic self-appropriation, then received a religious conversion. His witness would be a very important text for the making of theology in our time.)

It is this psychic way of thinking and speaking of God's love that is the sort of theology I now want to make. When I speak of my theology as centering on a dialogue with the Crucified, it is in this world of discourse that I now situate this dialogue. My dialogue with Jesus on his cross has this essential property of a dialogue with a befriended dream figure: that it solicits surprising answers. It is a dialogue with one who draws all my life—my shadow, my suppressed femininity, my extended story, my recovered childhood, my mortality—together, and speaks to me with the voice of "the self" addressing the ego. It is with these accents that he tells me I am loved. It is with these accents that he tells me how on the cross he represents God's love to me and for me and through me. And in these accents he can say much more about that love, its subtlety, its strange strategy, than has been said in the language of Christian piety. In these accents, above all, he can go a lot further than reason will allow him to go in the direction of taking my guilt into himself. Thus while the notion of a substitutionary death, expressed in the language of reason and the ego, is a barbaric perversion of Christian belief, it appears, in the more ample context of the faithfully appropriated psyche, as the most precious symbol we have of the love that embraces us beyond all reason and, beyond all reason, sends us along uncharted ways and into the darkest places.
The Psychically Appropriated Vision of the Crucified: The Source for a New Soteriology

My first section climaxed, at subsection 4, with the confrontation of generically guilty man with Jesus, the beloved, the guiltless one. I have now to push this confrontation to death and beyond in the experience of the believing soul.

Only Jesus can physically die the death that would be our spiritual dissolution. By our spiritual dissolution I mean the dissolving of a spiritual edifice cemented with guilt. I mean that dissolution with which a totally free, loving, all-connected consciousness threatens the ordinary alienated consciousness that pervades our life and looks at us out of the windows of our cities. This element of "threat by the excellent" is a vital ingredient, though only one ingredient, a vital moment, though only one moment, in soteriology. When Bernard Levin, an astringent British journalist, said that the only thing to do with Solzhenitsyn was what we did with Socrates and Jesus, he touched this element in the total soteriological picture. Behind the ease with which Time Magazine dismisses Solzhenitsyn's politics, there is the felt, but of course not acknowledged, need to stop his being shining on our spiritual triviality. Jesus, I am saying, constitutes this threat. The most delicate moment in soteriology comes after the presentation of this threat. It is the moment in which, on our side, rather than admit our life to be without meaning beside his—that is, rather than be dissolved—we eliminate him; and in which, on his side, he understands death as the mysterious mission that love imposes in these unique circumstances. He enters through love into our desperate murder of him. That is why I said that the death that comes to him is spiritual: though a physical event, it is the enactment of this love-dictated resolution of the Jesus/guilty man confrontation. Never had death served that purpose, never had death had that
meaning before. For never before had a man represented physically the spiritual dissolution that threatens our fragile alienated consciousness.

We are touching here the heart of the matter: the transfer of our guilt-condition to Jesus: the constituting of him, in his physicality, as the representative of our guilt-weakened and threatened life: the making him to be sin for our sakes that we might become the righteousness of God in him.

With his acceptance, at our hands, of the dissolution with which his guiltless freedom threatens us, the message of love, at first heard as threat, comes across. Which means that the lover in us revives and finds in Christ its identity and healing mission in this world. And is the idea of the lover accepting the guilt of the beloved and dying in it so recondite? Is there not, and does there not have to be, a moment in the process of Mary's forgiveness of John, a last moment before John's revival, when Mary "dies"?

The connection which death has, in the death of Jesus, with the sin whose guilt-foundation it destroys is the primary and normative connection of death with sin. The only reason why to die with Christ in baptism is to be freed from sin is that his death is the death of sin. Before death can be, in a sacramental economy, a spiritual passage, it is, as the physical death of Jesus, a spiritual liberation of the cross-envisioning believer. In the Crucified we see the liberation that we are to undergo.

Is not this representation of the guilt-assembled life of man by Jesus crucified an exact paraphrase of Paul's robust language about God, in the case of Jesus, "condemning sin in the flesh"?

No soteriology will stand up for which the death of Jesus is not the death of sin in the flesh, with the implication of a transfer to Jesus of the alienated condition, making him the representative of sin.

But most important of all, this transfer is something that can only be understood in the context of a psychically
conscious dialogue between the believer and Jesus. Everything in soteriology heads towards, converges on, this transfer. But to understand it itself, "imaginal" contemplation is required. The peculiar logic of a love that enters so deeply and intimately into our complex defilement can only be crystallized in this personal vision of the Crucified. Short of this vision, the transfer is merely an ingenious arrangement and solution. It is what the inflated ego picks up, without proper acknowledgment, from the psyche. The true context of the transfer is love; and the intelligentia amoris is only had in the awakening to psyche. Psyche, anima, is love's logic, love's way of thinking.

This is the theological ratio of a recovery of that full-bodied liberation of feeling through Christian belief and prayer /3/, which once did happen confusedly in Catholic culture and now is lost in a maze of rationalizations. We have to recover at this new depth the Catholic life that once, in a fine phrase I once read of it, dyed our lives in the love of God.

EPILOGUE

In 1959 I was in Rome doing a sabbatical under Bernard Lonergan. I went on a picnic in the campagna with some students. After one of those beautiful orgies of pasta and cheap wine, we wandered into a church. The canons were just beginning the First Vespers of the Sacred Heart, and I heard the familiar words: "Unus militum lancea latus eius aperuit, et continuo exivit sanguis et aqua." One of the soldiers opened his side with a spear, and immediately there came out blood and water. Quietly I knew that the whole thing was there; that everything I would ever want to say, in the meandering but persistent prosecution of an interest that has been mine for thirty years, would stem from that image. It is extraordinary how one's psychic life, on the rare occasions that it gets our ear, can programmatize decades of persistent and
curious enquiry. For in that image I experienced the vital conjunction, the vital meet-up, of our bitter and desperate aggression with the grace and love that embraces it and reveals itself in, and only in, that embrace. That vital conjunction is what nearly two millennia of soteriology have sought, with widely varying success, to explain. The psyche knows nothing of all this necessary intellectual fussing. It draws on a privileged source of meaning, the heart. Something got to my heart, in that moment in the musty church, as surely as the soldier's spear found its mark.
NOTES

/1/ This scheme of human development, so far unpublished, is the best that I know. Its stages are: the systemic (total dependence), the narcissistic (with the other as admirer), the amoric (with the other as admired), the erotic (with the other as friend), the agapic (with the other as anyone). The cycle has to be gone through many times in one's life besides the first time with the systemic corresponding to early infancy, etc. And one could be, at one time, at the systemic stage with relationship A (e.g., with the head of a department), at the narcissistic stage with relationship B, etc. The creator of this scheme, and of many others, whose publication would dissipate much confusion, is Charles Goldsmith, a (predominantly) Jungian therapist who works in Milwaukee.

/2/ As far as I am concerned, Chapman's is the best spiritual book there is. No one has tackled with such ruthless clarity, freedom, and humor, the crisis of the birth of contemplative prayer, or the normality of this critical event in a person's life. The book has proved a turning-point in the lives of a few people I know.

/3/ This is the meaning-controlling context in which I see Kelsey's idea that in the crucifixion of Jesus an archetype, of all human evil seeking purgation in the death of a victim, became historically operative, the synchronic myth spinning out a diachronic sequence (14-34). Without this context of Personal psychic self-appropriation, the archetypal explanation becomes the gnosticism that Jung always is when he is not therapeutic.
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POLITICAL THEOLOGY AND "THE LONGER CYCLE OF DECLINE"
Frederick Lawrence

I

Two years ago I wrote a paper for the Lonergan Workshop under the rubric, What time is it? It was about the implications of the movement by which what Lonergan has called "the modern philosophic differentiation of consciousness" has passed from its cognitive phase (Scientific Revolution in the Seventeenth Century to Kant's first Critique) into its affective-evaluative phase (Kant's second Critique through the post-Hegelian reaction down to our own day). While a good deal of attention was devoted in that paper to the debate between the critique-of-ideology orientation in philosophy represented by K.-O. Apel and Jürgen Habermas and the hermeneutic orientation of H.-G. Gadamer, the point was the way Lonergan's thought has developed to acknowledge the primacy of practical reason or what today we like to name praxis. At that time I called the focus of contemporary philosophic and theological labor the Second Enlightenment.

At the Lonergan Workshop last year I delivered myself of a non-paper under the rubric, What's the story? It situated itself in the problematic of the Second Enlightenment and reflected my experience in two courses, one an interdisciplinary discussion of the multinational corporations, and the other an interdisciplinary and experimental course which concentrates upon the forgotten art of reading great old books and of trying to understand them as their authors understood them. My remarks were an attempt to correlate the current high profile of the multinational corporation with all its attendant abuses with the transformation of the university into a multiversity, this huge new entity dedicated "to the useful as defined by society's demands"...and joined to "...what appeared to be its enemy,
the passion for commitment and the sweeping social change which was the child of the late sixties" (Bloom: 59).

I argued at that time that the social and political plight symbolized by the multinational corporations as the latest instance of Toynbee's "merely dominant minority" was not unconnected with what is less and less jokingly called "the vertical invasion of the barbarians" into the universities. A revealing description of what happens when the university is dominated by either vulgar or refined barbarians has been given by Allan Bloom:

...(Y)oung Americans no longer like to read, and they do not do so. There are no fundamental books which form them, through which they see the world and educate their vision. To the extent they use books, it is because school requires them to do so, or it is for the sake of information. Books are not a source of pleasure, nor would many students imagine that old books could contain answers to the problems that most concern them. The university does not represent a community of bonds which are constituted by a shared literary heritage, and friendships are not formed by the common study of the important issues. (59)

If the story of egalitarian democracy features the rather utilitarian concern for maximized satisfactions and so fosters an exclusively mercenary use of the mind, it is not so surprising that the liberal democratic hope that self-regarding passions can be manipulated to ensure not only political consensus but the advantages of equal justice has more than a little to do with the sort of crisis symbolized by the multinational corporations. The low but solid basis of vital values enshrined by modern democratic society's vaunted pluralism can at best muster a half-hearted protest against multinational corporations that appear to be the denouement to a story in which happiness is not distinguished from the achievements wrought by enlightened self-interest.

One burden of last year's non-paper, therefore, was that this course devoted to carefully reading great books had the salutary effect of not only allowing the student
to locate the story behind our contemporary political economy, but to contemplate that story in the glaring light of alternative stories. Similarly (after nearly a decade of work of Gadamer and Lonergan), it had occurred to me that the fertility of Lonergan's foundational work was due in no small measure to his having spent a good deal of his life expanding his common sense and theoretic horizons to encompass what was meant and esteemed not only by Thomas Aquinas but by people like Thucydides as well. Lonergan's exemplary sense for the special permanence of what he has termed "genuine achievements of the human spirit" (1972:352) is surely a key to his own project of *vetera novis augere et perficere*.

I have said that last year's question, What's the story? has its most direct relevance whenever the questions, What is to be done? and Is it to be done? give rise to the further question, Is it worthwhile? In relation to the structure of the human good that constitutes the form of any society the question, What's the story? becomes especially pertinent as we shift our attention from the level of (the terms and relations of) the good of order to that of terminal values. For by story is meant the narrative that gives a unity and goal to our orientations and so guidance to free deliberations, evaluations, decisions, and actions. What's the story? stands for the praxis question *par excellence*.

But this same question is also the religious question, when "religious" is taken to mean the overarching meaning and value that bestows coherence on the whole of human living. We might recall here Lonergan's invocation of Newman's theorem (1974:141-142) and its phenomenological transposition into Husserl's "horizon," Heidegger's "world," and the analytic tradition's "blik." Story, then, is the symbolic, proverbial, metaphorical expression of the basic horizon of a person, a society, a culture, a regime.
Depending on how "converted" one's horizon happens to be, the question, What's the story? will imply that life should add up to something more than "a tale told by an idiot." Again, depending on the radicality and relative permanence of one's convertedness, this question anticipates the comprehensive meaning and value of what Fr. Crowe has termed a "cosmic word" expressed in the totality of cosmogenesis, biological evolution, and historical process and epitomized in the mission of the Word Incarnate in Christ Jesus. Once again, depending on whether or not one is religiously converted, the question, What's the story? would seem to be empowered in its intentionality beyond the world by the mission of the Spirit as the subjective-objective correlative of the mission of the Word.

To the extent that the question, What's the story? arises from the state of being in love, it is the operator of praxis in the sense of what Lonergan has recently been speaking of as "development from above downward." Cognitive development proceeds from experience of data, through inquiry and understanding, to verification and judgment. But when one's being in the world is a being in love, Lonergan tells us, "there has begun a life in which the heart has reasons which reason does not know. There has been opened up a new world in which the old adage, nihil amatum nisi prius cognitum, yields to a new truth, nihil vere cognitum nisi prius amatum" (1977:48).

By story, then, is meant an eminently practical answer to the question of existence. Each story stems from an inseparable combination of faith (internal word as a vector of transcendence, an unnamed undertow) and beliefs (the external words of publicly mediated knowledge disclosing both what is to be done and what is of value). While any story is always relative to determinate psychological, social, cultural, and political contexts, it always implies a normative stance regarding truth and falsehood, good and evil. Theology does not tell stories.
Rather it reflects on stories to elaborate and subsequently to refine the assumptions which shape and frame our view of the main issues of human living.

Depending on the stage of meaning within which it operates and hence on the differentiatedness of the theologian, theology may be rhetorical; it may be theoretical and systematic; it may be critical or methodical, and so praxis-oriented without giving up differentiatedness. As rhetorical, it adds a literate and refined art of persuasiveness to the raw story. As theoretical, it shifts out of the quasi-operative matrix of myths and symbols disclosive/transformative of the world of faith to enter the world of explanation: a world of literal, and indeed systematic and technical meaning. As critical, it becomes able to pass from either the symbolic world or the theoretic world to the world of cognitive interiority. Finally, as methodical or praxis-oriented it expands the hermeneutics of interiority to explore the dynamics of affectivity, the implications of the end of innocence, and the transcendent exigence for the sake of explicating a completely generalized empirical method and of revealing not only the upper blade for the analysis of the social process and situation but the fundamental horizon of human being in the universe.

To pass now from the jejune suggestions of last year to my topic for this year, I would like to begin by drawing your attention to the dissertation of Matthew Lamb entitled, History, Method, and Theology, and completed for the University of Münster under the thesis director, Johannes B. Metz, in 1974. My interest now is not Lamb's contextualizing and dialectical retrieval of Dilthey's achievement, but rather the way he links Metz's version of political theology to the foundational efforts of Lonergan. Despite his pioneering breakthroughs in the direction of a critique of historical reason, Dilthey was ultimately unable to match up to the praxis-oriented problematic of the Second Enlightenment because his work
is yet another exemplification of Peguy's apt remark that "Kantianism has clean hands, because it has no hands."
There is more than a mild suggestion that theologians of Metz's persuasion would do well to turn away from the Kant-ridden possibilities of even the best of continental foundational reflection and towards the potential afforded by the work of Lonergan. Indeed Lamb repeatedly and creatively sketches out ways Lonergan's method can be exploited to meet the issues of a theology oriented towards praxis. And these ways are well worth the thoughtful consideration of the theological community at this time.

Now I would like to add to the central proposal of Lamb: Metz's program of a political theology will have to find an utterly non-Kantian basis in order to realize its interdisciplinary and critical-theological intentions. For on the basis of my own grasp of Metz's achievements to date and of my own sense of the benefits his program could win from an appropriation of Lonergan's generalized empirical method, I don't think there can be much doubt that Lamb's elaboration of Metz's ownmost concerns through the mediation of Lonerganian foundations is not merely a striking execution of the Socratic imperative of making one's interlocutors' argument stronger but it also represents--however tactfully and silently--an indication of the profound shortcomings of Metz's theology.

II

Metz's political theology arises out of a crucial internal shift from the Rahnerian standpoint of "hearers of the Word" to a standpoint very much under the auspices of representatives of the critique of ideology school like Ernst Bloch, Herbert Marcuse, Jürgen Habermas, Theodor W. Adorno, Max Horkheimer, and Walter Benjamin: the standpoint of "doers of the Word." Just as the critique of ideology school has sought to make good the challenge of Marx's eleventh Thesis on Feuerbach by elaborating a philosophy oriented towards praxis, so Metz reacts to the
abstract generality and lack of differentiation of his early Rahnerian-Heideggerian transcendental anthropology by trying to work out a theology oriented towards praxis.

The Rahnerian approach was the most radical and influential response of continental Catholic theology to the modern philosophic differentiation of consciousness in its first or cognitively oriented phase. And so it is reasonable that its inadequacies with respect to the modern philosophic differentiation in its second or praxis-oriented phase should be noticed by his leading disciple, Johannes B. Metz. With the aid of Maréchal and Heidegger, Rahner had managed to write a Catholic answer to Kant's Critique of Pure Reason; but he has never adverted to the need for an equally comprehensive response to Kant's Critique of Practical Reason. But Metz has not failed to notice that Rahner's shortcomings in regard to the problematic of praxis were not simply due to being limited in scope to the issues of the first Critique (1970).

No, the flaw in Rahner's point of departure was more deeply rooted in the fact that what he thematized was neither a cognitional theory nor even a transcendental philosophy transformed by phenomenology but an Erkenntnis-metaphysik. Rahner's problematic was primarily metaphysical and epistemological and so, even when it began to meet the demand for an Aufhebung of philosophy by theology in the transition from Geist in Welt to Hörer des Wortes, it failed to explicate the horizon of the incarnate inquirer that, in Lonergan's words, "develops in a development that is social and historical, that stamps the stages of scientific and philosophic progress with dates, that is open to a theology..." and that is "liable to mythic consciousness, in need of a critique that reveals where the counterpositions come from" (1967:219). As Habermas and Apel objected to Heidegger and Gadamer, so Metz objected against Rahner that his foundations were lacking in the critical and factual basis that would ensure a genuine relevance to praxis. Just as Habermas and Apel broke from the idealist
tradition in the tradition of Dilthey (as represented by men like Erich Rothacker, Theodor Litt, and Eduard Spranger) by adopting the model of critical reflection worked out by Horkheimer and Adorno, so, too, Metz moved towards a similar model of critical reflection.

Now the focus of this new orientation—and the key issue in the face of which Rahner and his school had to maintain either an embarrassed silence or a rather flimsy acknowledgement of pluralism—is the problematic known as "the dialectic of the enlightenment" (see Adorno and Horkheimer) or "the critique of instrumental reason" (see Horkheimer). This is as close as Metz's critique of knowledge ever comes to what Lonergan had called a "transcendental doctrine of methods with the method of metaphysics just one among many and so considered from a total viewpoint", or to "the method of performing (latent in the performance of the incarnate inquirer) which, thematized and made explicit, reveals the subjective pole in its full and proper stature" (1967:219-220). But it did initiate a real advance beyond the horizon of Rahner. And indeed the more Metz moves as well beyond Bloch, Marcuse, Horkheimer, and Adorno to appropriate the more differentiated program of the mediation of theory and praxis as ever more complicatedly envisaged by Habermas, the closer to an adequate viewpoint he comes.

The entire Frankfurt School's dialectical critique of the enlightenment's suffocation by the dominance and one-dimensionality of instrumental reason is not fundamentally grounded in what one familiar with Lonergan's generalized empirical method might recognize as an immanent critique of the limits of scientific knowledge. All these thinkers rely on a characterization of the natural, "hard," or "exact" sciences as exclusively technical: i.e., manipulative in their basic intent, being cast utterly in terms of a means-ends rationale in which the ends themselves are not considered susceptible of rational determination except insofar as they are reducible to the terms of
mathematical controls and mundanely technical interests. In other words, what they criticize is "positivist" or "scientistic" science rather than the most genuine praxis of natural science. I do not see anything in Metz's writings to suggest that he does not simply go along with this conventional critique of science.

Now thinkers within the Frankfurt School have made several proposals for reversing the ever mounting mechanization and standardization of human life which has been going forward under the aegis of scientistic or positivist science. One suggestion goes in the direction of "dangerous memory": a rebirth of a sane attitude towards nature as expressed in the ancient myths (Horkheimer and Adorno); or the process of Jew-like remembrance that, in his recent appreciation of Walter Benjamin, Jürgen Habermas has named "Rettungskritik." This option has been taken up by Metz, first, in his thesis on the biblical tradition and the dogmas as "dangerous memories" and on the purgative and salutary effects of Christianity's central memory of the passion, death, and resurrection of Jesus; and secondly, in his defense of narrative theology (see Metz: 1969a, 1971b, 1972, 1973a, 1973b, 1973c).

Habermas and Apel, though they share the positivist or Cartesian notion of the natural sciences common among continental philosophers and theologians, remain more ambiguous about science as a whole than Marcuse, Horkheimer, and Adorno. They are openly dissatisfied with the Schellingian nature mysticism underlying the latter pair and justly skeptical about the simple liberation of the "polymorphous perverse" fantasy envisioned by Marcuse. They sense that if the crisis brought about by the dialectic of the enlightenment is to be resolved, science needs to be liberated from sheerly technical interests and deflected by an interdisciplinary and metascientific type of critical reflection towards a more humane making of history. Metz clearly joins them in this concern in his recognition that besides the preservation of the dangerous memory of Jesus
through a renewed narrative theology, a theology oriented
toward praxis in the contemporary world must be not only
present in the academe but differentially so in a spe-
cifically interdisciplinary context (1971a). Manifesting
a sort of toughmindedness all too rare in continental hu-
anist or especially theological circles, Metz adopts no
merely simplitc antj.-science stance; but a viewpoint
that at least inchoately demands an intra-scientific
therapy in accord with what might be called the immanent
reasonableness of the human mind.

Now the critically reflective framework out of which
members of the Frankfurt School carry out their mediation
of theory and praxis--indeed the core of their response to
Marx's call for a theory that would not merely interpret
history but realize the conditions for change--is basic-al-
ly a (more or less adequate) rendition of the ancient and
classical distinction between techne as the knowledge
oriented toward poiesis and phronesis as the knowledge
oriented toward praxis. The main point of this distinc-
tion between technical expertise and practical enlighten-
ment concerns the sort of knowledge involved in either of
the two contexts. Technical expertise is the knowledge of
the skilled artisan who knows before he begins to work
just exactly what it is he wishes to produce as well as
how and by what means he will proceed to make a given
house or bed or digital computer. It is a knowledge that
carries with it the capability of manipulative control of
all the factors involved in the production. In contrast,
the knowledge requisite for praxis has to it an ineluct-
able indeterminacy, since what is at stake in any choice
and any action is not simply a particular good but some
overriding good (of order or of value) as well: what Aris-
totle called the that-for-the-sake-of-which any intermedi-
ate good is chosen. The human knowledge of the highest
good has to it the note of a docta ignorantia or a Socratic
nescience rather than anything like what Scheler has char-
acterized as Herrschaftswissen. This is the cognitive
openness that provides the contrast with instrumental reason; it underpins Horkheimer's negative theology, Adorno's negative dialectics, and Metz's earlier philosophical anthropology. Metz the political theologian, however, thematizes a like openness theologically in terms of his notion of the eschatological proviso (see 1968, 1973c). His disallowal of any immanentizing of the eschaton, therefore, pits his political theology against absolutizing and totalizing of Marxist, liberal, and positivist or structuralist visions of social and political reality; and it becomes pivotal for his explication of the practical relationship of the Church as the eschatological community with the world in its legitimate autonomy (1968, 1969b, 1973c).

Whether as the core of an ecclesiology which sees the Church as oriented eschatologically towards its own sublation into the Kingdom of God or as the mainspring of the long-term critical reflection exercised by the Church on its social, cultural, and political matrix, the eschatological proviso is a powerful reminder of the dehumanizing consequences of any answer to the question, What's the story? that does not take account of what Lonergan has formulated as "the law of the cross." The practical implications of this interpretation of the Christian story are explosive for every one of modernity's versions of utilitarianism and for any legitimating "civil religions" as well. Moreover, the eschatological proviso imbues Metz's political theology with rather Augustinian hues (see Fortin: 1972c). This comes out in the way Metz has studiously avoided any immanentizing secular utopianism as well as any taint of programmatic violence, while at the same time never sacrificing a deeply felt and profoundly Christian "Parteilichkeit" with those who suffer injustice in our world. Indeed, Metz's opposition to ideas of progress based on enlightened self-interest (Ideologie der Sieger; Ideologie der Apathie) arises from an identification with the suffering Christ and with sufferers throughout
all of history. The searing critical effect of this identification pervades his critique of both radical and conservative ideologies and finds its most moving expression in his recent confessional text entitled "Our Hope: The Power of the Gospel for Shaping the Future" (1975) (a document from which I believe the framers of the recent Boston Affirmations could learn a good deal).

The at once jarring yet oddly refreshing character of Metz's critique of the abstract ideal of a total emancipation and of either the bourgeois or the radical rejection of both suffering and sorrow stems from his obvious commitment as a theologian to doing full justice to the symbols, the narratives, and the collective memories of the Christian Church (1974). As a teaching theologian he tries, he says, "to make the people of the Church become ever more the subjects of the symbolic world in the light of which they are already living out their lives." The ecclesial role of the praxis-oriented theologian is to help mediate the transition from the substance in Christ Jesus to the subject in Christ Jesus (Lonergan, 1967:249-251). As political theologian, he tries to pay and to encourage others to pay the high price of orthodoxy in a social climate so antagonistic to the Christian story of living and suffering; or again, in a Church many of whose "pillars" may have misconstrued and so abused the Christian story by perhaps tacitly subordinating it to quite alien and alienating stories. So we see how Metz's political theology concentrates on the stories of the people and concerns itself principally with the constitutive and then with the effective functions of the meaning of those stories. In this critical role, this political theology explicitly invokes theological foundations for the sake of discriminating between positions and counterpositions in society and state and Church (Lonergan, 1972:365).

I would say that Metz's political theology (as far as I understand it) has some serious limitations. How inadequate is his grasp of the way community as the ideal basis
of society has its form in the manifold structure of the human good. Nor does it possess a full-bodied dialectical method for meeting at a fundamental level the general issues of historical progress and decline. Perhaps these deficiencies might be indicated more efficiently by recalling Lonergan's distinctions between a social ethics that would add to the study of social science the value judgments expressive of the effective morality of any given place and time; and a social philosophy that would provide the social, cultural, and political sciences not only with fundamental terms and relations but with a fundamental orientation as well (1974:189-192). For as long as these terms and relations are not understood and clearly and precisely defined and as long as this orientation is not made thematic within an adequate philosophy, dialectical criticism cannot lay bare the individual, group, and general bias that spawns both alienation and ideology and sets up the shorter and the longer cycles of decline.

And so my sense is that the dangerous memory in the light of which a "new" people is constituted--"called forth," to an "exodus" and a "conversion of the heart" and to "discipleship" as the "acceptance" of a life and destiny of suffering in expectation nevertheless of the fulfillment of a great promise--begs to be supplemented by an adequate social or political philosophy.

III

Anyone who like me spent most or all the years of the sixties as a student understands social criticism like Metz's easily, quickly, and with a certain degree of pleasure: it has been in a sense the conventional wisdom and the fateful dispensation of our age. It grew out of an era stirred by the exploits of the Berrigans, impressed by the activism of Groppi, at once fascinated and terrified perhaps by that volcanic presence south of the border with the improbable name of Ivan Illich. If one had a nose for
the Neo-Marxist critiques of late capitalist society emanating from the likes of Marcuse, Adorno, Friere (not to mention Carl Oglesby, Eldridge Cleaver, and Angela Davis), one had no trouble empathizing with Metz's criticisms as well. Moreover, since what passes for critical reason for Metz had its context in a Neo-Marxist trajectory habituated to reading Marx on the one hand and Kant on the other very much in the light of Hegel, Fichte, and Schelling, Metz's perspective seems to be undertaking its analysis of the historical process under the aspect of the axial shift in modern times from substance to subject. One might even argue that its emancipatory interest is rather compatible with the interest of Lonergan in the later sections of Insight in the increase of man's effective freedom. It has after all the merit not shared by those proclaiming an "end of ideology" in the name of a rather paltry pluralism of taking alienation and ideology seriously.

In my involvement with the course, Perspectives in Western Civilization, I have had an opportunity to appreciate more clearly the shortcomings of the Neo-Marxist model of critical reason for the task of dialectical analysis of the development and decline of the civil and cultural community. My new understanding has basically to do with a redigestion of Lonergan's sketch of the "succession of lower syntheses characteristic of socio-cultural decline" (1967:116). You are perhaps familiar with the line of thought to which I am referring:

Protestantism rejected the Church but kept revealed religion. Rationalism rejected revealed religion but acknowledged the supremacy of reason. Liberalism despaired of rational agreement but respected the individual conscience. Totalitarianism ridicules the bourgeois conscience to conquer and organize mankind on an artificial intersubjective level. (1967:117 paralleling 1957:231-233)

I have chanced upon a powerful confirmation of Lonergan's hypothesis concerning "the successive lower viewpoints of the longer cycle" (1957:231) under the influence of the
late political philosopher Leo Strauss and his students, especially my colleagues, Ernest Fortin, Brian Benestad and those who have come to BC to instruct the teachers in this course on the art of reading. Partially on account of the success of American civil religion in my case, I had hitherto not been altogether prepared to assent more than notionally to the suggestion that the American form of liberal democracy is a product of the longer cycle of decline. Still less, perhaps, had I been prepared to perceive how deeply the Neo-Marxist framework for criticism of liberal political economy was also caught up in the longer cycle of decline. I do not mean that I had any illusions about the validity of the epistemologies of either Hobbes, Locke, Hume, and Mill on the one side or of those of Kant, Hegel, and Marx on the other. It is just that I had not known enough to grasp the political cor-relatives of their various counterpositions in cognitional theory. To put this another way, I had no understanding of Liberalism and Marxism as political philosophies. Prizing the respect of the former for individual conscience, I did not grasp the practical and political implications of its "despair of rational agreement" or its utilitarianism about the most fundamental issues of life, with the only exceptions being at the level of the lowest common denominator of vital values. Again, in my admiration for Marx's communitarian approach to freedom over against the liberal insistence on the separation of politics and society, I tended to overlook its "artificial intersubjective" basis. In the realm of social and political philosophy, therefore, I never realized how my personal horizon in matters political has been too much confined to a certain oscillating between what are in reality the penultimate and ultimate stages in Lonergan's sketch of the longer cycle of decline.

What has until lately been true in my case may well be true of the vast majority of those working in the field of political theology at the present time. Like me, those working in this field seem to be falling short of the
demand for a painstaking elaboration and subsequent refinement of the assumptions which shape and frame our view of the main issues of human living. And so it has been unable to lay the groundwork for putting the practical-political question concerning, in Stuart Hampshire's phrase, "the ultimate grounds for preferring one way of life to another."

So what the Straussian impulse behind this course devoted to "listening to the conversation between the greatest minds" (see Strauss: 1968) through the reading of classical texts has forced me to do is to begin to work out in my own mind and in regard to the area of political thinking the historical and factual meaning of the tension between common sense and theory at the root of the general bias. I have come to something of a realization that if political theology is to elucidate a standpoint from which a reasonable and responsible assessment and evaluation of the human predicament can be made, it cannot avoid the job of coming to a firsthand knowledge of the basic alternative standards of political judgment. It is a matter in part of releasing the pure and unrestricted desire to know from the climate of opinion--liberal or radical--that, in concealing alternative views, stifles wonder.

Now what, from my standpoint, makes Strauss as a political philosopher so different from those who have hitherto been influencing political theologians like Meil, Moltmann, Pannenberg, and the Latin Americans in the area of reflection on praxis and what to my mind makes him so important to anyone concerned with reversing or countering the longer cycle of decline is the way he goes back to its beginnings. After his first major scholarly work on one of the greatest proponents of liberal democracy, Spinoza (1965b), Strauss resumed a more serious study of Maimonides which led him back through the Arab philosophers and a rediscovery of esotericism to the inventor of political philosophy, Socrates. It was from a horizon already broadened by a reading of the ancient philosophers
in the light of their own questions and concerns that, in 1932, Strauss confronted the work of that earlier reviver of "political theology," Carl Schmitt (1965a). Schmitt is considered the man most responsible for laying the ideological foundations for the Third Reich. Strauss saw that Schmitt's critique of liberalism stood itself within the framework of one of the great founders of liberalism, Thomas Hobbes. Indeed, Schmitt was only following Hobbes' principles in contending that the state alone could guarantee social justice, since it alone could protect its citizens from internal and external enemies; that the state alone could suffice to ensure law and order in the community, for it alone is guided by the principles of leadership and loyalty. As Strauss put it: "The critique of liberalism that Schmitt has initiated can therefore be completed only when we succeed in gaining a horizon beyond liberalism. Within such a horizon Hobbes achieved the foundation of liberalism" (1965a:351). Now in his relentless push back to the origins of modern political thought within a horizon beyond modernity, Strauss went on to reveal how both Hobbes and his chief modifier, Locke, turn out in fact to have been disciples of Machiavelli.

The initiator of the shift from the medieval synthesis into that succession of lower synthesises characteristic of socio-cultural decline was Machiavelli who, in the fifteenth chapter of his odd little book, The Prince, wrote the fateful words:

...many have imagined republics and principalities which have never been seen or known to exist in reality; for how we live is so far removed from how we ought to live, that he who abandons what is done for what ought to be done will rather learn to bring about his own ruin than his preservation. A man who wishes to make a profession of goodness in everything must necessarily come to grief among so many who are not good. Therefore it is necessary for a prince who wishes to maintain himself to learn how not to be good, and to use this knowledge and not use it according to the necessity of the case.
Isn't it a shock to discover that the trajectory of political thought stretching in one wave from Machiavelli through Hobbes, Locke, Smith, and in a second wave from Rousseau through Kant, Hegel, and Marx (see Strauss: 1975a, 1975b) is rooted in the Machiavellian option to, in Lonergan's formulation, "develop 'realist' views in which theory is adjusted to practice and practice means whatever happens to be done"? (1967:116).

From the point of view of the questions central to the modern philosophic differentiation of consciousness in its cognitive phase, one can not but subscribe to Butterfield's view on the relative importance of the scientific revolution in the sixteenth and seventeenth centuries over against the reformation and the renaissance. But from the standpoint of the second enlightenment's concern with the question of the mediation of theory and praxis, there looms as perhaps even more important this other offshoot of the "new" science's concern for utility, its demand for autonomy from philosophic hegemony, and its exclusion of questions unresolvable by an appeal to observation or experiment: namely, the plausibility it lends to the Machiavellian argument that true answers to the question how we ought to live are so far removed from how we do in fact live as to be practically or politically irrelevant; and to the consequence of completely separating politics and morality.

This originative dissociation of ethics and politics by Machiavelli set in train the tendency towards the privatization of human ends and the breakdown of the common or public good as the raison d'être of the political order. As a result, what Aristotle (Politics, III, v, 1280a25-1281a9) held to be but an apolitical precondition of politics is posited by Hobbes as the sole reasonable motive for politics:

The passions that incline men to peace are fear of death; desire of such things as are necessary to commodious living; and a hope by their industry to obtain them. And reason suggesteth
convenient articles of peace, upon which men may be drawn to agreement. These articles are they, which otherwise are called the laws of nature.... (chap. 13, 102)

Furthermore, while the renowned grandfather of liberal democracy in the United States, John Locke, can be seen to quote "the judicious Hooker," he actually followed Hobbes in the view that the purpose of polity is neither "eternal life" nor "the good life," but mere life. Locke's reduction of political concern to the protection and security of the privatized individual is precisely expressed in his A Letter Concerning Toleration:

The commonwealth seems to me to be a society of men constituted only for the procuring, preserving, and advancing their own civil interests. Civil interests I call life, liberty, health, and indolency of body; and the possession of outward things, such as money, lands, houses, furniture, and the like. (17)

The bias towards considering human activity as essentially a matter of maximizing privately defined pleasure or minimizing privately defined pain is so central to the liberal tradition that the concern for the common good of order and value is subverted to the interests of private advantage, whether of individuals or of groups.

The radically Machiavellian reorientation also inspires the scientistic or Cartesian or manipulative derailment of modern science. Thus Bacon's admission that he is "much beholden to Machiavel and others, that write what men do and not what they ought to do" (Strauss, 1952a: 88, note 5) while proclaiming that the sole purpose of science was "the relief of man's estate," since scientific knowledge is power. So, too, the Baconian motto of parendo vincere may be seen to be more at the heart of Descartes' Discourse on Method, if one lays due emphasis upon his own expression of intent in Part Six, than even the vaunted cogito and the hyperbolic doubt.

That Rousseau was the first to see bourgeois politics for what it was is evident from his statement in The First
"Ancient politicians incessantly talked about morals and virtue, those of our time talk only of business and money" (1964:51). But there was a disequilibrium between his desire to restore the nonutilitarian virtue of the classical republics, on the one hand, and his typically modern question about the reconciliation of the needs and desires of the individual with the authority and constraints of society as a whole on the other:

Man is born free, and everywhere he is in chains....How did this change happen? I do not know. What can make it legitimate? I think I can resolve that question. (1947:240)

Hence the question of politics in terms of the common good was displaced in Rousseau by that in terms of political legitimacy in a context where the assumption was that human beings in civil society have nothing in common but the joint pursuit of individually determined goals. Rousseau's general will propped up on a civil religion was picked up by Kant in his avowal of the primacy of practical reason. And yet despite the democracy of "good will" in Kant, he does not for a moment seem to have entertained the idea that most men and women are capable of more than "a wide range of self-regarding responses to the carrot and the stick" (Kendall: 456). Like Rousseau he pinned his hopes for a political solution to the problem of reconciling universal autonomy with the anarchy of self-interest on the creation of proper institutions. Because of the complete split between personal morality and efficient institutional planning, Kant envisioned the emergence on the basis of enlightened self-interest of a perfectly just state composed entirely of devils.

After Hegel's abortive attempt to patch up the rift between political institutions and morality, Karl Marx went on to criticize the liberal view of political economy in the name of a complete liberation from illegitimate bondage. But he does not ever suggest a motivation for revolution other than the maximization of satisfactions, as is clear from the famous slogan, "from each according
to his capacities and to each according to his needs" (Marx: 119). The utopian communist society that "makes it possible for me to do one thing today and another tomorrow, to hunt in the morning, fish in the afternoon, breed cattle in the evening, criticize after dinner, just as I like..." (Marx and Engels: 254) does not decisively reject the Lockean primacy of economic man. In both liberal and communist political thought, the classical political orientation which judged the desire for wealth, glory, and freedom to do what one pleased utterly subordinate to the requirements of the good life is turned upside down. The political order is governed strictly in the light of the standards of security, comfort, and disoriented freedom. For what use is the good life if you are not alive? And what does it avail a man to live well if he is not well off?

So Strauss as a political philosopher challenges the political theologian to vastly widen the range of dangerous memory to political philosophies that elucidate "a genuine conversion from premoral if not immoral concern with worldly goods to the concern with the goodness of the soul" instead of merely those that pivot on "the calculating transition from unenlightened to enlightened self-interest" (1968:21).

IV

In its antique pagan and Christian forms, the solution to the political problem was transpolitical (cf. The Republic) or otherworldly in a rather nuanced fashion (cf. The City of God, esp. Bk. XIX). The heart of the former solution was what Lonergan has termed "the normative significance of detached and disinterested intelligence" (1957:230); and this in the radical sense that the dedication of one's life to the quest for knowledge of the good, according to Strauss' interpretation of Socrates and Aristotle as I understand it, is not intrinsically related to moral virtue, since the latter "is only the condition or
by-product of that quest" (1967; Klein and Strauss). My question here over against Strauss is simply whether this interpretation of the relationship between the moral and intellectual virtues is correct. Whereas I no longer hesitate to accept his interpretation as being closer to the thought of Plato and Aristotle than that of either Prof. Gadamer (1976:278-289, 479-499; 1967a; 1967b; 1971; 1972a; 1972b) or Prof. Voegelin (1966a, 1966b) /1/, I wonder if the Socratic view that the perfect society is possible in the utterly unlikely event of the coincidence of political power and philosophy (1967) does not imply a wrong judgment about man's moral impotence. Is philosophy in the substantive sense of Socrates, Plato, and Aristotle possible without the gift of God's grace?

The Christian form of the political solution takes place in the context of the inner word of God's gift of his love and of the outer word of revelation and beliefs. Strauss makes us notice that while Machiavelli took Aristotle's observation that "most men will what is noble but choose what is advantageous" (Nic. Ethics, VIII, xv, 1162b 35) as a premise for a "low view" of man, Aristotle left room for exceptions to the general rule of moral impotence, thus defending a "high view" of man in which the factual gap between most of human performance and the ideals conceived and affirmed by reason maintains an abiding political and practical relevance. But the secularizing modern and the ancient pagan alternatives only serve to make the Christian position stand out in sharper contrast. On the one hand, Paul's teaching in Rom 3:23 leaves no room for exceptions: "all have sinned and fall short of the glory of God." On the other hand, the standards are not lowered. Still, if man is to get out of "the disequilibrium of fallen nature, with lower spontaneity taking care of itself, with reason apt to be misled by the historical aberrations of the civitas terrena, with the wisdom of God appearing folly to man" (Lonergan, 1967:52) more than merely human help is needed.
With respect to the sense of the corruptness of human nature, Christians seem to stand closer to the moderns than to the ancients. With regard to the need to discriminate between good and evil in the light of a horizon that is not subject to arbitrary human control, they stand closer to the ancient pagans than to the moderns.

For the Christian thinker, Lonergan, the problem of man's radical incapacity for sustained development is not to be solved by the discovery or the rediscovery of a correct philosophy, ethics, or human science.

The correct philosophy can be but one of many philosophies, the correct ethics one of many ethical systems, the correct human science an old or new view among many views. But precisely because they are correct, they will not appear correct to minds disorientated by the conflict between positions and counterpositions. Precisely because they are correct, they will not appear workable to wills with restricted ranges of effective freedom. Precisely because they are correct, they will be weak competitors for serious attention in the realm of practical affairs. (1957:632)

Nor is the problem of recovery political—especially in the modern sense of enforcing a solution to the "familiar opposition between the idealism of human aspiration and the sorry facts of human performance" (Lonergan, 1967:25).

(The) appeal to force is a counsel of despair. So far from solving the problem, it regards the problem as insoluble....For the general bias of common sense is the bias of all men and, to a notable extent, it consists in the notion that ideas are negligible unless they are reinforced by sensitive desires and fears. Is everyone to use force against everyone to convince everyone that force is beside the point? (Lonergan, 1957:632)

What then does the recovery from human waywardness demand? On the one hand, says Lonergan, "the longer cycle is to be met not by any idea or set of ideas on the level of technology, economics, or politics, but only by the attainment of a higher viewpoint in man's understanding and making of man" (1957:233). On the other, this
solution can not be merely a conception and affirmation of speculative intellect but a matter of praxis: a higher integration of human living. And while Lonergan apprehends the possibility of either a merely natural or a relatively supernatural solution, he affirms—within the context of a gracious participation of God's view, of course—the existence of an absolutely supernatural solution:

To pierce the darkness of such ideology the divine Logos came into the world; to sap its root in weak human will he sent his spirit of love into our hearts; and in this redemption we are justified, rectified, renewed, yet never in this life to the point where greater justification, rectification, and renewal are not possible. (1967:26)

And again:

(T)he process of divine grace contrasts with the characteristics both of nature and of reason. Of itself it is neither repetitive as nature nor progressive as reason but eternal and definitive. It is not the statistical spontaneity of nature, nor the incoherent liberty of man, but the gratuitous action of God. It is the trans-rational spontaneity of revelation and faith and intuition, the trans-organistic efficacy of the mystical body of Christ, the uniqueness of eternal achievement: God with us in the hypostatic union, God holding us by the theological virtues, God and ourselves face to face, in the beatific vision. (1967:40)

Just as Augustine had faulted ancient philosophy with not facing the problem of the just society at the level of "a common agreement as to the objects of their love" (City of God, Bk. XIX, 24) and hence with not facing up to the problem of disoriented loving while never giving up essential elements of their political idealism (see Portin: 1972a, 1972c); and just as Aquinas' understanding of human moral impotence and of actual grace led him not to abandon but to radically transform (even to the point of distortion) many doctrines of Aristotle's Ethics /2/; so, too, Lonergan affirms the primacy of praxis in a manner I find to be consonant with if more explicit than Augustine's
stress on loving and the restless heart and Thomas' 1) explicitation of the way the objective lovableness of the virtuous man involves an absolute good; 2) correction of the Arabs' view of the agent intellect that is perhaps the more probably Aristotelian view; 3) addition of the idea of the promulgation of first principles of morality in the human mind; 4) reestimation of the importance of morality "because," in Prof. Jaffa's words, "the addition of the theological virtues, dedicated to that perfection which has its fruition in another world, makes intellectual virtue without moral virtue impossible" (Jaffa: 31 and the reference there to 199, note 15 as well as the discussion at 200, note 20).

From this perspective, therefore, I have nothing but praise for the political theology of Metz insofar as it correlates the primacy of praxis with the dangerous memory of Jesus' passion, death, and resurrection. But what Lonergan takes seriously in a way Metz does not is that if the religiously converted political theologian is "to mount" as Lonergan put it, "from an affective to an effective determination to discover and to implement in all things the intelligibility of universal order that is God's concept and choice" (1957:726), that religious person is going to have to undergo not only a moral but an intellectual conversion ex umbris et imaginibus in veritatem. What Metz and the rest of continental and Latin American political theology generally have not yet come to appreciate--since the horizon of modern political thinking does not consider it to be relevant--is that what Lonergan has called "explicit intellectual self-transcendence" is a practical issue in the contemporary world.

So it is that I have nothing but praise for the tough-minded intellectuality of the political philosophy of someone like Strauss: It is simply the only example of thought I have encountered outside Lonergan's which relentlessly seeks non-conventional grounds for criticism without quite giving way to a doctrinaire rationalism.
But what Lonergan takes seriously in a way that to my knowledge Strauss did not, is that practical philosophy today is faced with either an absorption or a rejection of a gracious participation in God's view in a manner that is un-Greek. If, on the basis of quite determinate questions of concrete cognitional fact, both Aristotle and the Arabs can be shown to be wrong about human intellect and Lonergan correct; and if it is true that moral impotence is "not an incidental waywardness that provides the exceptions to prove a rule of goodness," but rather "a statistical rule" that leaves man's essential freedom intact, while frustrating man's rational self-consciousness "with the burden of responsibility for sins it could avoid but does not" (1957:693-694); then the question of human existence is intrinsically bound up with the acceptance or rejection of God's solution to the human problem.

...On the...supposition of a supernatural solution, to be just a man is what man cannot be. If he would be truly a man, he would submit to the unrestricted desire and discover the problem of evil and affirm the existence of a solution and accept the solution that exists. But if he would be only a man, he has to be less. (1957:729)

But what can be meant by "intellectual conversion" or "explicit intellectual transcendence" when praxis becomes primary and faith becomes the context of philosophy? Would it not make philosophy just a propagator of an arbitrary Weltanschauung? Would it not involve accepting Nietzsche's belief that "man has no permanent horizon," that "man's fundamental assumptions about things are unacceptable, unsupported, historically variable, and historically determined" (Dannhauser: 145) in the sense of a radical historicism and relativism?

For Lonergan, at any rate, these Nietzschean doctrines are demolished in virtue of one's having personally undergone a unique anagoge: that is, the asking and answering of three key questions: What are we doing when we are knowing? Why is doing that (i.e., the answer to the first
question) knowing? What do we know when we do it? To
undergo this personal experiment is to have revealed to
oneself and to submit oneself to a normative horizon pat-
terned according to natural and inevitable spontaneities
which furnish the criteria by which free projects are
judged noble or ignoble, authentic or unauthentic. Si-
multaneously, the fuller deepening of this conversion
process brings to light the normative structure covering
the learning process of common sense, the procedures of
empirical sciences, the ways of historical scholarship,
and the grounding for the objectivity of human knowledge,
and hence the more proximate possibility of interaction
and collaboration. A praxis directed by explicit intel-
lectual transcendence would implement rationality and
responsibility in concrete situations through self-
appropriated human being rather than through experimental
science.
NOTES

/1/ I take it that the interpretation of Gadamer and of Voegelin would come closer to being a more correct account of the subject matter, especially from the point of view of a Christian undertaking a total reflection upon the human condition. I suspect, too, that with respect to their interpretations of political justice and of the intellectual virtue of phronesis taken as they singly stand in Aristotle's *Ethics*, the interpretation of Strauss tends to converge with theirs; it is in coming to terms with the special status and role of theory and of theoretic wisdom that Strauss differs rather widely from them.

/2/ For a balanced view of the differences between Aristotle and Thomas, see Fortin (1972b). A work which compares and contrasts the two with much more emphasis on the differences is Jaffa (1952).
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A surprising call for interdisciplinary collaboration recently issued from Prof. Jay W. Forrester of the Massachusetts Institute of Technology. The unusual character of his call was his claim that theologians should play a crucial role in redirecting the socio-economic priorities in the decades ahead (337-353). Since the studies of Max Weber and R. H. Tawney it has generally been recognized that religious values have been significant in the emergence of capitalist modes of production. There is little doubt, however, that modern economists feel any collaborative attitude towards theology. Indeed, from Karl Marx to John Galbraith, economic theorists have frequently used the term "theology" in reference to what they consider unverified opinions of their colleagues /1/.

What accounts, then, for Forrester's closely argued call for interdisciplinary collaboration among "the best minds from theology, law, philosophy, economics, and science"? Perhaps it results from the realization that economic values have not been as "neutral" vis-à-vis other values as was previously thought. There is a complex interaction of systems and values within world process, and any specialized science or discipline can ignore that interaction in the long run only at the world's peril. This fundamental realization can be found, not only in the work of Forrester and the Club of Rome, but in a growing amount of economic writing since 1970 (Heilbroner: 1974; Schumacher; Weisskopf: 1971).

The present study explores the significance of Fr. Bernard Lonergan's work in transcendental method for articulating some of the major methodological presuppositions
of the relation between socio-economic processes and theolo-

gy as reflection upon religious values. The first sec-
tion delineates certain basic categories for understanding just how his approach handles the relation between econom-
ics and theology. The second section sketches the con-
temporary problem of productivity and exponential growth curves and then examines the validity of Forrester's claim that "Christianity is the religion of exponential growth" (347; and White). The final section indicates that the transformations required by the new control of meaning and value in socio-economics were Lonergan's interdisciplinary philosophy to become operative.

I. Rationality, Religion, and Economics

A commonplace of all histories of economic theory and practice is the constitutive role of rationality in the emergence and maintenance of industrial production. Max Weber sees rationality as intrinsic to capitalism:

In the last resort the factor which produced capitalism is the rational permanent enterprise, rational accounting, rational technology and rational law, but again not these alone. Necessary complementary factors were the rational spirit, the rationalization of the conduct of life in general, and a rationalistic economic ethic. (1927:354; 1958)

Similarly, Karl Marx sees in scientific socialism the optimal development of mankind's freedom from nature: "Freedom in this field can only consist in socialized man, the associated producers, rationally regulating their interchange with Nature..." (1967:820). Not only in regard to nature, but especially in the relation of men to social conditions, Marx believed in an "invariable rationality" (Ollman: 238-242; Schmidt; Wellmer: 69-127).

But what is the rationality at the heart of industrial production? Lonergan has distinguished three horizons controlling the meaning of rationality (1967a: 252-267; 1975; and Tracy: 82-103). The distinctions are
crucial for an understanding of the significance of Lonergan's method for interdisciplinary collaboration between economics and theology. First, I shall outline the three horizons, and then indicate how they control the understanding of economic and religious values respectively.

A. Three Horizons of Rationality

There are three preliminary points to discuss before getting into the horizons of rationality. First, there is Lonergan's notion of horizon. Visually, a horizon "is a maximum field of vision from a determinate standpoint" (1967a:213). The field shifts with our standpoints; some objects are very distinct, others rather vague, while still others are totally beyond our visual horizon. Similarly, the scope of our knowledge and interest can be designated as a horizon. What we familiarly know and are interested in is clearly within our mental horizon, other realities are less distinctly present, and many things are beyond the horizon of our knowledge and interest. Any mental horizon is specified, then, by an objective and a subjective pole which mutually condition one another. The subjective pole is the knowing and being interested in; the objective pole is what is known and what is found interesting.

Second, Lonergan distinguishes between consciousness and knowledge. When we are not in a deep and dreamless sleep, we are in some fashion conscious. Awake, our consciousness is some blend and interaction of the operations of experiencing, understanding, judging, deciding. We do not have to know these operations in order to be conscious. They spontaneously occur in our sensing, perceiving, imagining, feeling, remembering, inquiring, getting an insight, conceptualizing, weighing the evidence, grasping the evidence as sufficient, formulating a judgment, deliberating, deciding, loving, acting. Knowledge results only insofar as the first three conscious generic operations occur: experiencing, understanding, judging. Such
knowledge may be our own immanently discovered and verified knowledge; far more preponderant is our acceptance of the knowledge of others through belief (1958:3-32, 271-347, 703-718; 1972:6-13, 41-47, 335-336; 1967a:221-239). Thus we are always consciously operating in some horizon of knowledge and interest, but we need not know that horizon.

Third, Karl Popper has recently formulated what he calls the three world distinction. The three worlds comprise everything that exists in our concrete universe. World One is the world of matter and energy including everything from subatomic particles to galaxies, from chemicals to human brains, from pens to skyscrapers. World Two is the world of consciousness embracing all of our conscious activities from dreaming to evaluating. World Three is the world of objective knowledge, the world of language, culture, civilization, including all the expressions of human creativity and perversity that have been preserved and encoded in $W_1$ objects such as books, paintings, film, buildings, etc. (Popper; Magee: 54-69). Lonergan has provided an analysis of $W_2$ capable of methodologically grounding $W_3$, and through the physical sciences and technologies of $W_3$, our relations with $W_1$.

With these preliminaries in mind we shall briefly discuss the three horizons of rationality. We are using "horizon" here in the broad, generic sense of epochal controls of meaning (Lonergan, 1967a:255-256). The three horizons might be termed the classical, the modern and the contemporary.

The classical horizon of rationality can be defined with reference to any horizon within which the subjective pole is a normative, canonized construct of $W_3$ to which the objective pole (inclusive of other non-normative constructs of $W_3$ along with $W_2$ and $W_1$) must conform. The prime examples of such a classical horizon can be found in Hellenic and Medieval cultures. Thus Aristotle set the ideal of rationality according to how any knowledge would
most closely approximate the certain, immutable, necessary and true knowledge of material, formal, efficient and final causes (Lonergan, 1967a:255-261; 1975:171). The static, hierarchical character of this horizon of rationality was reflected both in the organizations of societies in the Greco-Roman and Medieval civilizations and in their cosmologies. \( W_1 \) was seen as corresponding with the canonical conceptions of \( W_3 \) in terms of the composition and movements of the perfect heavenly bodies. \( W_2 \) was similarly investigated in terms of the psychological, biological and physical statements presupposing metaphysical categories of \( W_3 \) (Lonergan, 1967b:vii-xv; 1974a:47-49, 231-238; and Litt: 1963).

The modern horizon of rationality can be defined with reference to any horizon within which the subjective pole rejects any canonized constructs of \( W_3 \) and insists that all such constructs (whether of meaning or value) must be controlled by verification in \( W_1 \). Thus modern, empirical science began by displacing the Ptolemaic universe, refuting the Aristotelian metaphysics of motion, and elaborating sophisticated instruments of observation and verification. Empirical rationality found its greatest success in the physical sciences: nature as \( W_1 \) became the controlling test-ground for proving or disproving the hypothetical constructs within \( W_3 \). Geographical discoveries led to discoveries of cultures empirically divergent from classical culture. When the latter was rebelled against in the American and French Revolutions, this occurred in the name of a "reason" and "natural rights" patterned on \( W_1 \) as the datum of the new science (Macpherson: 1962, 1973; Strauss). The human sciences modelled their methods on the empirical natural sciences, so that the activities of \( W_2 \) and the constructs of \( W_3 \) were increasingly reduced to processes in \( W_1 \). Historical scholarship further accelerated these developments by determining the empirical conditioning of all \( W_3 \) constructs. Enormous positive gains of empirical
rationality in the physical sciences were accompanied by a proliferating reductionism, materialism, positivism, relativism and historicism in \( W_3 \). These latter developments have finally led to the capability of actually reducing \( W_3 \) and \( W_2 \) to the level of \( W_1 \) through a nuclear holocaust.

The contemporary horizon of rationality can be defined with reference to any horizon within which the subjective pole appropriates the a priori structures of \( W_2 \) and thereby seeks to correlate all the knowledge and action of \( W_3 \) and \( W_1 \) as the objective pole of the horizon. Just as the operations of \( W_2 \) cannot be reduced to \( W_1 \) so a genuine a priori rationality does not attempt to reduce \( W_3 \) to \( W_2 \).

That mistake was made by German Idealism's elucidation of a priori rationality as a conceptual form of \( W_3 \) (Lamb, 1977: 55-61, 150-166; Sala). Empirical methods in the natural, human and historical disciplines are fully encouraged specializations of the a priori imperatives of attentiveness, intelligence, reasonableness and responsibility (Lonergan, 1972: 20-23). A priori rationality seeks to disengage the many empirical methods from the customary reductions to \( W_1 \) by indicating how those reductions, as constructs in \( W_3 \), are at variance with the factual processes going on in \( W_2 \).

With these three horizons of rationality in mind, it is now possible to sketch how they affect the understanding of economic and religious values.

B. Horizontal Differences in the Notions of Economic Values

Within the horizon of classical rationality it was scarcely possible for any extended analysis of economic values to emerge. For the knowledge and interest defining the classical horizon in accord with canonical constructs of \( W_3 \) (whether metaphysical or theological), could not be too seriously concerned with the contingencies involved in economic values. So Aristotle's discussion of economic values, i.e., the relation of exchange-values to
use-values, occurs in the context of a thematization of ethical excellence in which just commodity values were determined by a society of reasonable men (Schumpeter, 1954:60-65). These men were in turn defined in terms of the polis of that time and, more importantly, of moral virtues as subordinated to the dianoetic or intellectual virtues (Nicomachean Ethics, Books V and VI: Voegelin, 1957:315-357). "Economics" for Aristotle meant the art of household management; but trade for trade's sake, termed chrematistike, was severely criticized as catering to the lower faculties of the soul. So also, Aristotle could justify slavery as a result of the natural inequality of men, and deprecate the life of craftsmen and traders as "devoid of nobility and hostile to the perfection of character" (Heilbroner, 1972:36-37).

While craftsmen received a more propitious place in the medieval hierarchies of value, Aquinas still adopted an Aristotelian attitude towards the exchange-value of commerce: negotiatio secundum se considerata quandam turpitudinem habet (Summa theologiae 2-2, q.77, a.4). Interest in the form of usury was condemned as a sin. Of the periods in which the classical horizon of rationality prevailed, Joseph Schumpeter has written that "The How and Why of economic mechanisms were then of no interest either to its leaders or to its writers" (1954:30ff.); while R. H. Tawney has observed:

...the specific contributions of medieval writers to the technique of economic theory were less significant than their premises. Their fundamental assumptions, both of which were to leave a deep imprint on social thought of the sixteenth and seventeenth centuries, were two: that economic interests are subordinate to the real business of life, which is salvation; and that economic conduct is one aspect of personal conduct, upon which, as on other parts of it, the rules of morality are binding. (31)

For classical rationality, economic values mediate the necessities of W₁ to W₂, within ethical, metaphysical or theological constructions of W₃.
Within the horizon of modern empirical rationality, economics assumes an increasingly dominant role in defining the relationship between $W_3$ and $W_1$. The growing dominance of economics could be traced through (1) the transition period of economic theory grounded on natural rights, where classical rationality was undermined by the political philosophy from Hobbes through Locke to Hume; (2) the so-called classical period (not to be confused with my use of classical above) of Political Economy, where economic theory in the proper sense was based on the supposed natural instincts ($W_2$ reduced to $W_1$) of man, for the sake of free enterprise within $W_3$; to (3) the modern critiques of Political Economy. These critiques are either in terms of the Marxist reduction of $W_3$ as an ideological superstructure to the materialist infrastructure of $W_1$ interpreted in an economic framework, or in terms of an analytic economics interested only in the development of empirically verifiable instruments of research into economic processes (Schumpeter, 1954:1140-1145; Nove and Nuti). That analytic economics is not free from a reductionism to $W_1$ is clear from the planning techniques of the New Industrial State and from the indifference of political systems to the Global Reach of the multinational corporations (Galbraith: 1967; Barnet and Müller).

What Schumpeter terms scientific or analytic economics has achieved the ever more sophisticated quantification of specifically economic values through a growing specialization in which the notion of economic value passed from the labor-theory of value in Political Economy through the varieties of the marginal utility theories of value to the quantified indifference-curves of equilibrium analysis (Schumpeter, 1954:588-624, 825-839, 909-919; Samuelson: 441ff.). But insofar as empirical rationality assumed that all rational analysis of value relied only on matrix calculus or functional equations, i.e., as long as reason became synonymous with quantification, then the real problems could easily be overlooked, as Joan
Robinson has indicated with regard to equilibrium analysis (1973).

Within the horizon of *apriori rationality* as appropriated, economic values, as mediating the interchange between $W_1$ and $W_3$, are determined through genuinely scientific economics. The contribution of an appropriated apriori rationality consists in promoting the relative (because interdependent) autonomy of the scientific analysis of economic values in two ways: negatively, by exposing the folly of deforming empirical rationality by erecting the procedures of quantitative analysis into the sole criteria for reason; positively, by providing a completely open yet critical correlation between various methods of knowing and thereby indicating, at least heuristically, the scientific analysis of economic values within the emergent probability immanent within all the relations between $W_1$, $W_2$ and $W_3$ (Lonergan, 1958:103-139, 385-430). This amounts to a methodological framework within which to work out the interrelations between economic values and natural, technological, human, political, cultural and religious values (Lamb: 1965; 1974:390-399, 421-432).

C. Horizonal Differences in the Notions of Religious Values

Within the horizon of *classical rationality*, canonized constructs of $W_3$ took on a religious or sacral value. As Voegelin has shown, classical rationality, no less for the Greeks than for the medieval theologians, involved a divine unveiling. The metaphysical speculations of Plato and Aristotle had their ground, as did all of history, in the Metaxy (the ontological In-Between) of the Divine Unlimited (*Apeiron*) and the limited (*peras*) (1974:183-192). In Judaeo-Christian traditions the transcendence of this immanent unveiling was further emphasized by revelation; and medieval theological theory could find the potentiality for the gift of divine faith in the *lumen intellectus agentis* as a *participatio luminis divini* (Lonergan,
1967b:66-96). Within the Hellenic, Roman, and Medieval cultures religious meanings and values were interwoven with other elements of the culture to form an undifferentiated sacral cultural matrix—what Lonergan has referred to as a "sacralized construct of man and his world" (1974b: 21-25). The canonized classical constructs of W₁ may, therefore, be typified as examples of sacralization.

Within the horizon of modern empirical rationality, on the other hand, the control of meaning and value through verification in W₁ led increasingly to a secularist reduction of religious values. We may distinguish three stages: (1) the breakdown of a unified, sacral cultural matrix in the wars of religion leading to rival, dialectically opposed sacral constructions of W₃ and to the retreat of thoughtful men into forms of natural-rational religiosity, as in Deism; (2) empirical rationality discovered that it did not need the "God-hypothesis" in order to understand W₁; and (3) the modern secularist reduction of religious values, either overt as in the Freudian or Marxian view of religion as projections of collective neurosis or of socio-economic alienations, or more covert as in secularist claims that religious values have meaning only in terms of empirical investigations of an historical, psychological or sociological kind. The result was an undifferentiated secularist cultural matrix in which no true judgments about religious values can be made except in reference to the observable phenomena of W₁.

Within the horizon of a priori rationality, the full legitimacy of empirically oriented historical, psychological, and sociological studies of religious values is affirmed. But these are relieved of the task of completely reducing the truth of religious values to merely external-empirical observations. The exigencies of W₂ give rise to the differentiation of theoretical-technical discourse from common sense discourse, and to the differentiation of the inner W₂ from the external W₁; but those exigencies
also ground the transcendent differentiation of $W_1, 2, 3$ as legitimately secular from the sacred as beyond those worlds (Lonergan, 1972:82f., 96, 101-107; Lamb, 1974:151-180). The process of questioning the dynamism of $W_2$ reveals its ability to transcend the limitations it has through $W_1$ and $W_3$. Moreover, the discovery by a priori rationality of emergent probability as an intelligibility immanent in $W_1, 2, 3$ indicates how meaning and value cannot reductively be limited to "closed" worlds, and that religious values as true would not disrupt the emergently probable patterns of those worlds (Lonergan, 1958:115-127, 259-262, 462, 698; 1972:101ff., 288). Thus the task that a priori rationality sets itself is the twofold one of promoting a differentiated secular-sacred cultural matrix. Against those who, in the name of a canonized sacralization, condemn the very idea of a legitimate secular domain, not to mention the validity of empirical studies of religious values, a fully appropriated a priori rationality would insist upon the necessity of secularization. On the other hand, against the secularist denial of the ultimate truth of religious values, a priori rationality works toward a differentiated re-sacralization (Lonergan: 1974b).

With these distinctions between the horizons of rationality and their respective stances toward economic and religious values in mind, I now turn to a closer examination of the historical development of the production process.

II. The Production Process and Exponential Growth: Central Stages in the Development of a Crisis

In their recent study of multinational corporations, Global Reach, R. Barnet and R. Müller remark that "the transcendent debate of the 70's concerns not socialism, but growth" (334). The initial shock about limits to growth came in response to the population explosion. But this was compounded when the reports to the Club of Rome, an international society of scholars and businessmen,
indicated that production growth also had to be drastically reduced if catastrophe was to be avoided. The reports stirred lively debates among both market and socialist economists which have been compared to the debates between Galileo and the seventeenth-century Aristotelians (Henry and Fowler) /4/.

Using computer nonlinear multiple-loop-feedback models originally applied to world growth by Prof. Jay Forrester in his World Dynamics, a research team at M.I.T. studied level and rate variables in the interrelations between natural resources, pollution, food production, industrial production and population growth. The initial studies were published by Dr. Dennis L. Meadows (1972, 1973, 1974a). By feeding in data on the five variables drawn from the years 1900 to 1970, the computer printed out the probable consequences of applied policy changes in the present with regard to any of the variables up to the year 2100. The crucial variables were population and industrial production, because the growth of both showed an exponential growth curve. Unless such a curve could be halted, pollution would reach dangerous proportions while the natural resources and food supply would diminish. The growth-rate of population and production was termed exponential because they are not globally increasing by a constant amount in a constant time period (linear growth), but are increasing by a constant percentage of the whole in a constant time period, thereby describing an exponential growth curve (Meadows, 1972:26ff.) /5/.

Of interest to the present study are the following conclusions of these studies:

1. Exponential growth in population and material output is the dominant force in socioeconomic change in most contemporary societies.

2. Current growth rates of population and material output cannot be sustained indefinitely. Present growth trends would almost certainly overreach important physical limits if continued for another 50 or 100 years.
3. Growth may come to an end either through an orderly accommodation to global limits (a deliberate transition to equilibrium) or through an overshoot of those limits followed by uncontrolled decline.

4. The overshoot behavior mode is the dominant mode of the world system as long as the implicit value system continues to promote physical growth. (Meadows, 1973:42-43)

While subsequent studies confirm these findings, they also emphasized: (1) the transition is not to be from exponential growth to zero growth, but from undifferentiated (exponential) growth to a more differentiated or organic growth; and (2) the latter type of growth would allow the more underdeveloped geoeconomic regions of the world to meet the real crises they face (Mesarovic and Pestel: 55; Meadows, 1972:194).

Professor Forrester has ranked the Christian religious values among the "implicit value systems" promoting physical growth (347; White; Cobb). His Dynamic Systems analysis of societies has indicated how the type of change required in shifting from an exponential growth curve requires that the goals of highly industrialized societies not be determined only by more immediate past accomplishments or by short-term projects. Although the magnitude of the change requires the rediscovery and implementation of long-term values, the past hundred years or so has witnessed a growing disregard for long-term values. Nonetheless, Forrester has argued that religious institutions have historically been the guardian and proponent of those long-term values:

The institution with the longest time horizon is in the best tactical position to lead in exploring the nature of the social system; the churches should establish that distant horizon. Long-term values are closely tied to what society is to be one hundred, two hundred, or one thousand years hence. If not the churches, who is to look that far ahead? But the churches are in the predicament of undergoing a shortening time horizon when they should be leaving the near-term to other institutions and should be turning their attention to a horizon beyond that of any other unit in the society. (350)
In the light of the above analysis of the horizontal differences regarding rationality, I shall briefly trace the development of the industrial production process. I will show that the values promoting unlimited material growth have originated not in the undifferentiated sacral cultures of classical rationality, but rather in the mounting secularism of empirical rationality. I distinguish within the shift away from classical rationality three main stages, each of which has two phases.

A. Stage One: Classical Rationality and the Seeds of a New Order

First Phase: Late Medieval Catholicism had an openness to a radical shift in values toward capitalist accumulation. Referring to Aristotle's distinction between natural wealth (means of sustenance, shelter, etc.) and artificial wealth (monetary means of exchange), Thomas Aquinas noted how the desire for the former always has limits (e.g., we can only eat so much), but that the desire for the latter was unlimited as a result of disordered concupiscence perverting the unlimited scope of reason into the acquisition of material goods (Summa theologiae 1-2, q.30, a.4). He also remarked how the plasticity of the human hands linked to the unlimited potentiality of the human mind as potens omnia fieri et facere provided the possibility of producing an infinity of tools (Summa theologiae 1, q.76, a.5 ad 4; q.91, a.3 ad 1). But these were only marginal insights into the powers of \( W_2 \) which would eventually disrupt the sacral construct of classical rationality. In the fourteenth and fifteenth centuries "disordered concupiscence" was more and more in evidence in the seemingly insatiable appetites of ecclesial and social institutions for the accumulation of wealth. Vincent of Beauvais extended the idea to the people, exhorting them to work, "not just for a living, but for the sake of accumulation, thereby leading to the further production of wealth" (Mumford: 160). The canon and civil lawyers...
of the time shared in such exhortations to a work ethic. At the same time, agrarian technology was improving crops and livestock yields and trade markets were extending their influence into more sectors of society, bringing with them the expanding use of money as exchange medium (Nelson).

Second Phase: Luther's attacks against the manifold corruptions of medieval Catholicism tended to despair of ever effectively checking concupiscence, while Calvin both criticized the Patristic and Scholastic prohibitions against usury; and some of his followers are said to have worked out a sacralized interpretation of industriousness. Calvinism is often credited with having inspired sufficient transvaluation of previous values; accumulation in itself was the fruit of industriousness and was good when it did not lead to luxurious or wanton living. Max Weber's interpretation:

Man could not hope to atone for hours of weakness or thoughtlessness by increased good will at other times....There was no place for the very human Catholic cycle of sin, repentance, atonement, release, followed by renewed sin....The moral conduct of the average man was thus deprived of its planless and unsystematic character....Only a life guided by constant thought could achieve conquest over a state of nature. It was this rationalization which gave the reformed faith its peculiar ascetic tendency. ...[Almost as if] drudgery itself was a means of attaining the certainty of grace. (Bendix: 60, 64; Weisskopf, 1971:47-51)

Lewis Mumford agrees with Schumpeter that the beginnings of capitalism go back into medieval Catholicism; but he also concedes that the conceptual rigor of Calvinist ethics

removed the golden serpent only to replace it with a more formidable monster, less tempting to the eye, whose very ugliness and inhumanity the Calvinist misinterpreted as a mark of moral value. That monster was the machine....It is no accident that the theorists and practical inventors of the machine, in its initial stages, came so often from protestant and particularly Calvinist circles. (194; Schumpeter, 1954:115-112)
The various forms of the Protestant work ethic transformed the sacral W3 construction of classical rationality into a justification for the expanding agricultural productivity, Renaissance mercantilism, and industry. Puritanism would transplant that religious value system to America, where it would linger under various metamorphoses as civil religion (Strout; Walzer; Bellah).

B. Stage Two: The Emergence and Spread of Empirical Rationality

As long as the new tendencies were contained within a context of religious values, there were restraints to their implementation. Both Catholic and Protestant theologies emphasized the moral and religious responsibilities toward human and non-human nature as being God's creation and under his divine providence. But the rise of new horizon of rationality in the seventeenth and eighteenth centuries removed those restraints.

First Phase: The Late Renaissance and Baroque periods witnessed the breakdown of any previous sacral constructions. The spoils were there to be taken, and various state-church alliances fought each other for their possession. The earlier Renaissance had seen the development of capitalist accumulation and bankers (e.g., the Fuggers and Medicis) to whom princes of the church and state would go for funds to carry on their wars. By the seventeenth century, with the struggles between the state and the estates, this function was taken over by the emerging nation states and large banks, like the Bank of Amsterdam (1690). Mercantilism, in tandem with the state power (Cardinal Richelieu, Wallenstein, Gustavus Adolphus, Cromwell), helped finance expanding armies and hierarchical bureaucracies. As Colbert put it at the time, "Trade is the source of public finance, and public finance is the vital nerve of war" (Friedrich: 13). The Jesuit, G. Botero, elaborated the theory for state centralism in his Della Ragione di Stato; the practice came in the Thirty Years War (Friedrich: 15-16).
Power struggles in the pragmatic order were less important in the long run than the emergence of empirical rationality in geniuses like Copernicus, Kepler, Galileo, Descartes, Bacon, Hobbes, Locke, Newton, Pascal, Boyle, and Leibniz. The development of mathematics provided hypothetical frameworks within which to measure empirical data. No longer could \( W_1 \) be explained in Aristotelian metaphysical categories. Galileo's mechanical laws marked the first major success in empirically mediating the explanatory meaning of \( W_1 \) events. As more precise measuring devices were constructed, empirical rationality increasingly refined natural scientific procedures for verifying mathematized hypothetical constructs through ever more accurate observations of \( W_1 \). Newton's *Principia* and *Opticks* consolidated and extended these new methods. A *mathesis universalis* was extrapolated from the natural sciences to become ever more normative for all knowing, e.g., Spinoza's *Ethica more Geometrico*. From Hobbes to Locke, theories of natural right were slowly articulated for society, which ambiguously asserted an equality of all men while also maintaining that society is composed "of two classes differentiated by their level of rationality—those who were 'industrious and rational' and had property, and those who were not, who laboured indeed, but only to live, not to accumulate" (Macpherson, 1962:243). Locke removed any limitations on the acquisition of property (203ff.). The "value" of individuals would be measured by how much they possessed. Hobbes's *homo homini lupus* was proleptic, as was Boyle's reference to "these living automata, human bodies."

As Prof. Butterfield has noted, empirical rationality's emergence in the seventeenth century in the guise of the new natural science "outshines everything since the rise of Christianity" (7 and 175-190). To be sure, the thinkers of the period often strived to accommodate the old sacral constructs to their new-found methods (Nussbaum: 1-27) /7/. But in that effort they received little
or no encouragement from theologians who were too busy shoring up the crumbling certitudes of the former sacralizations (Lonergan, 1974a:55-67). Religious experience and its values began a long retreat into an interiority incapable of any critical mediation to the intellectual, moral, economic, and political upheavals and transformations of the time (e.g., Jansenism, Quietism, Pietism, Quakerism, etc.).

Second Phase: In the Enlightenment, autonomous Political Economics was joined to an outright attack on the religious values of the old order. The attack was carried on by the philosophes who began assembling the categories of a secularist empirical understanding of self and world. If Voltaire remained a Deist, Holbach and Hume were convinced their agnostic non-theism was the only consistently enlightened position. The encyclopedists sought to apply the empirical methods of research to all phenomena of \( \mathbb{W}_2 \) and \( \mathbb{W}_3 \). The reductions of the materialists and perceptualists assured the success of a mechanistic conceptualism in absorbing the sacred into the secular, mind into matter-in-motion, society into bureaucracy and culture into industry (Horkheimer and Adorno; Jay: 173-218, 253-280). Although the goal of the Enlightenment was to enhance the autonomy and dignity of man, the chief means to that goal was an empirical rationality whose canons would exclude from the composition of man any dignity or autonomy. The critique of religious values had the short-term effect of freeing rationality from the restraints of the ancien regime, but the long-term effect was to enthrone materialist economic values. What began as a project to better mankind through the empirically rational control and manipulation of non-human nature would end in the control and manipulation of men lost in the lonely crowd. Rousseau's aesthetic genius glimpsed this, but his alternative of setting up the "natural condition and will of man" as a norm only seemed to reinforce the reduction of \( \mathbb{W}_{2,3} \) to \( \mathbb{W}_1 \) (Voegelin: 1975; Gay).
Adam Smith's *Wealth of Nations* (1776) was a major breakthrough of empirical rationality in the determination of economic values. It provided a blueprint for the growth of national industrial production in accordance with the "natural propensities" of individuals and the "natural inclinations" of societies. By presupposing the common interest of individuals and societies in increasing production through a disciplined division of labor, Smith tried to show how this would not only avoid the uncertainties of mercantilism, but also be a means to the unlimited acquisition of money, riches, and possessions (Schumpeter, 1954:181-194). The division of labor was not based on "any human wisdom" but is the necessary consequence of a certain propensity in human nature...to truck, barter and exchange one thing for another" (Smith: 11). By rationalizing such a division through the introduction of machines, themselves a product of the division of labor, productivity is vastly increased "which occasions, in a well-governed society, that universal opulence which extends itself to the lowest ranks of the people" (Smith: 8; Foley). From Smith through the Econometricians, the quest for a proper quantification of automatic Wz-like mechanisms was pursued, as the classical Political economists adopted the labor theory of value as norm over either the earlier natural price or later market theory of value:

Labor represented a force or energy, setting matter into motion. By making labor the "foundation, cause, and measure" of economic value, the classical economists thus chose a symbol which, with one stroke, combined and unified the major preoccupations of their time. (Weisskopf, 1971:61; Schumpeter, 1954:223-378)

C. Stage Three: The Dominance of Secularist Empirical Rationality

First Phase: The Industrial Revolution of the nineteenth century coincided with both the further development of economic theory as patterned on the methods of the
natural sciences, and the explicit formulations which replaced religious with economic values in France and Germany. In England, urbanization and industrialization tempered the enthusiasm, if not the liberal reductionism, of the classical economists. Malthus's *Essay on the Principle of Population* called attention to different growth rates of population and subsistence, while his other writings contributed to monetary and investment analysis. Ricardo refined Smith by elaborating a labor-quantity theory of economic value. Schumpeter has shown how the nineteenth century economists invariably thought of themselves as extracting economic values out of the unscientific morass of the common prejudice of the time, and how their empirically valid analytic discoveries were often clothed in reductionist epistemologies and philosophies (1954:407-751, esp. 534-541). As Prof. Weisskopf has indicated, this style of economics had the increasingly devastating effect of reifying human labor into a commodity:

> Labor services are interpreted as output, produced by the input of food and necessaries; labor bestowed on these wage goods produces the commodity labor and determines its value....This interpretation reflects the general tendency of political economy to reify social interrelationships. Labor services are nothing but a link in the chain of production; they produce exchangeable commodities, but they are, in turn, "produced" by exchangeable commodities. The laborer consumes commodities in order to be able to produce commodities. *People's purpose in life is production for the market.* The economic value complex is reflected in this theory—work and production are ultimate ends. Thus the mechanistic and the ethical outlook are welded into a unified world picture. (1955:66-67, emphasis added)

Mill's utilitarianism also contributed to this enthronement of economic values as ultimate ends.

The expansion of modern industry and science throughout the West found the European Churches caught in the twilight of the old order. Their hierarchies joined with the privileged aristocracies in reaction against the mounting liberalism and incipient socialism. The
development of critical historical methods, capable of appealing to empirical data in order to show the historically conditioned character of \( W_3 \) constructs, seemed to undermine the very foundations of faith (Reardon; Harvey). Wherever industrialism spread it compounded the intellectual problems with pastoral problems of massive proportions. Religious indifferentism spread among the impoverished workers—as a church census in England during 1851 concluded, they were "as utter strangers to religious ordinances as the people of a heathen country." Some of the best minds of Europe and America were grappling with theological issues and their socio-historical implications, but the only immediate effect they had was often to provoke ecclesiastical sanction. As W. Langer described the situation:

Indifference and unbelief remained widespread and deeply rooted throughout the lower classes and anticlericalism was rampant among the middle classes, especially in France. The churches had barely made a start in facing the problems raised by the forces of democracy and socialism when they were called upon to combat the destructive criticism of historical theology and the equally threatening impact of scientific discoveries. (534)

Established religious institutions were unable to distinguish the positive advances of empirical rationality from its reductionist pretensions, and so they usually condemned the autonomy of the secular movements en bloc. It was hardly possible for the natural sciences, historical scholarship, economics, politics and philosophy to avoid an out-and-out secularism.

It was in France that the first full-blooded secularist theory of industrial production was articulated. Auguste Comte's positivist philosophy effected a systematic reduction and transvaluation of horizons. The Law of the Three Stages showed the progress in man's knowledge and social organization from the theological stage, when men view everything as animated by will and in which military organization predominates, through the metaphysical
stage, where inquiry seeks absolutely certain and necessary abstract forces and causes and legal forms of organization predominate, to the final, positive stage wherein empirically verifiable correlations are scientifically investigated and the social organization is industrial (Schumpeter, 1954:415ff., 442ff.; delubac: 75-104). Comte's sociology envisaged an asymptomatic development of scientific laws educing a universal consensus from the people and so stabilizing society. On this view, then, the French Revolution, as based on an abstract metaphysical negation of the feudal theological order, was necessary since the latter could not create consensus on account of its inability to assimilate the progress of the empirical sciences. In his later writings Comte developed a positive religion of scientific reason which was a secularist inversion of Catholicism with its feast-days celebrating great empirical discoveries, its scientist-saints, and a hierarchy composed of the scientific and industrial elite. The latter would assure a peaceful transition to a socialist economic order (mixed with private property) since both the proletarian workers and the industrialists would accept the promulgations of the scientific hierarchy (delubac: 128-159).

In Germany a more thoroughgoing secularism of empirical reason and industrial production was elaborated in the writings of Karl Marx. L. Feuerbach's *Das Wesen des Christentums* appeared in 1842 and was immediately received as a master work by the young left-wing Hegelians. Feuerbach's atheism was not the denial of God-as-Object, but the denial of God-as-Subject, i.e., mankind as a whole is in the process of becoming the Subject of all those objective divine predicates falsely attributed to God (infinite wisdom, power, goodness, etc.) (deLubac: 7-17; Xhaufflaire). In accepting this process as the epochal task of the historical moment, Marx nonetheless criticized Feuerbach's incomplete turn to the subject:
The chief defect of all previous materialism (including that of Feuerbach) is that things (Gegenstand), reality, the sensible world, are conceived only in the form of objects of abstraction, but not as human sense activity, not as practical activity, not subjectively. (Marx, 1959:243)

By "materializing" (in the sense of a reductive $W_1-W_2$ relation) the Hegelian dialectical framework of internal relations, Marx constructed an empirio-critical perspective from which to criticize the capitalist mode of production. The humanization of nature and the naturalization of man, as mediated by the production process, was considered by Marx from an inverted materialist "transcendental" viewpoint in which all of the constructs of $W_3$ would be freed through the material praxis of $W_2$ from their alienated existence by being revealed as manifestations of economic relations in $W_1$.

Hence, the basic form of alienation for Marx was the alienation of the workers from the appropriation of the production process in feudal and capitalist economic orders. Presupposing the reductionist tendencies of nineteenth century science (since for Marx the only alternative was Idealism), he held that a socialist appropriation of the means of production would restore the surplus-value of production to the workers who created it and so do away with their alienation not only from their productive activity and its products, but also from other men together with all the potentialities of the species (Ollman: 75-130). An enforced division of labor based on domination would give way to an active cooperation. The return of the use-value of labor's surplus-value to its worker-creators would do away with the reification of value within the fetishism of commodities. The segregation of man into classes based on wealth would eventually vanish, and with it the state (as opposed to society) whose political bureaucracies were created in order to regulate the competing interests of classes hostile to--yet interdependent on--one another. This communist society would
then be "the consummative oneness in substance of man and
nature--the true resurrection of nature" (Ollman: 131-221).

As Professor Ollman has written:

God emerges from all this as the estranged power
of a socialized humanity; or the most advanced
statement of what it means to be a man, a social
being who, in cooperation with his fellows,
rules over nature. It is in this sense that
Marx declares, "Christ is the intermediary to
whom man attributes all his own divinity." (224)

Marx did not see that by investing the production process
with such transcendental value, he was radicalizing the
very alienation of empirical rationality he so staunchly
opposed in capitalism. Indeed, in his efforts to locate
man's essential nature in the production process and to
ground man's value-creating activity in terms of his theo-
ry of surplus-value, he not only failed to understand ade-
quately the production process itself, but also provided
an ideology capable of justifying the most inhumane sacri-
fices in the name of liberation. When the Weltgeist is
"set on its feet" in the material process of production,
its boots may trample with impunity (Adorno: 293-351).

Second Phase: The contemporary crisis has resulted
from our inability to distinguish the positive gains of
empirical rationality from scientistic and technocratic
reductivism. The more theoretic secularism of the previ-
ous phase has now been translated into a practical secular-
ism, either overtly as in Communism and National Socialism,
or covertly as in the absolutizing of the Capitalist market
economy to the detriment of all non-quantifiable meanings
and values.

The phenomenal successes of the natural sciences
seemed to promise the efficient solution to any and all
problems if only the proper formalization or equation
could be found. Since the turn of the century, mass pro-
duction has become large-scale under the impetus of the
military demands of World War. Economists from A. Mar-
shall through V. Pareto and A. C. Pigou discovered ever
more sophisticated quantitative methods of economic
analysis. Marginal utility theories of economic value were refined from the Cardinal to the Ordinal type (Schumpeter, 1954:1060-1069). The theory of maximizing behavior, although not fully articulated till P. Samuelson's *Foundations of Economic Analysis* in 1947, was nonetheless implicitly operative (Schumpeter, 1954:912, note 11). The maximization of monetary and consumption gains became a driving force in Western economies. The United States assumed leadership in applying the new industrial technology and "rational" maximalization. But, as Professor C. B. Macpherson has pointed out, the maximization-of-powers claim had a defect:

The powers which liberal-democratic society actually and necessarily maximizes are different from the powers it claims to maximize, and the maximization it achieves is inconsistent with the maximization that is claimed. The powers which it claims to maximize are every man's potential of using and developing his human capacities; the powers it does maximize are some men's means of obtaining gratifications by acquiring some of the powers of other men as a continued net transfer. (12-13)

Socio-economically, the marginal utility theory of value and theory of equilibrium price assumed that all buyers and sellers "had perfect knowledge of each other's intentions" (Weisskopf, 1971:121). But, in actuality, this became increasingly impossible as corporate mergers proliferated and public access to corporate policy making was prohibited under the rubric of "private free enterprise." Antitrust legislation only inhibited monopolization resulting from the combination of corporations and could do nothing to impede the monopoly of large businesses enjoying decisive advantages in finance, merchandising, and research. Unable to control the "private" accumulation of surplus income, the maximization process suffered a temporary breakdown in the great depression (Schumpeter, 1942:396ff.; Lundberg).

In Russia the communist leadership was initially unsuccessful in its application of Marxist economics to the
production process. The socialization of the means of production led to a 14% drop in productivity by 1920 over pre-WW I levels. The threat of collapse led Lenin to initiate a New Economic Policy in 1921 which partially restored the market system. The great Soviet industrialization debate was ended by Stalin's ruthless decision to coerce the peasants to collectivize. Some five million kulaks were executed or sent off to labor camps (Heilbroner, 1974:181-191). Urban workers were refused the right to strike and forcibly regimented. A series of five-year plans forced a fantastic growth-rate in the name of Soviet Socialist Progress. At present Soviet economists are using profit-motivations and other market mechanisms to maximize efficiency and rationality (Heilbroner, 1974:189ff.; Nove and Nuti: 9-16, 399-489).

In Europe the emergence of Fascism and Nazism was originally hailed by many as a solution to an increasing social unrest and economic disintegration. As in Russia, so in Italy and Germany, the model of military regimentation and command was applied to the production process and ramified out to the entire social system. Anything could be justified by the values of increased productivity and a sound, stable efficiency. The same cool, calculating, formal rationality was put at the service of a pathological resentment in the Second World War and the "final solution" of the Jewish Question. As Professor Weisskopf has put it:

The real question--far transcending economics and even the Nazi atrocities--is inherent in the Western abandonment of objective reason and in the cutting off of value-judgments from reason...If formal, maximalizing rationality is "good" regardless of its context, and if rationality exhausts itself in the efficient pursuit of any goal regardless of its origin and content, there is no principle from which one could deduce the duty to examine the goal itself. (1971:91ff.)

Unfortunately, neither governments nor scientists nor business learned this lesson from the fire and ashes of the great war. In the very act of gearing productivity to
defeat the symptoms of formalized technocratic rationality in Nazism, they became all the more infected with the disease itself. As Prof. S. Melman contends in The Permanent War Economy, the maximization of cost and expenditure in the military sector has reduced efficient production in the civil sector of large world economies—as he can document so thoroughly in the case of the United States.

Post-war America and Europe saw the expansion of analytic economics and the development of Keynesian Economics which could account for the widespread introduction of compensatory government spending "as a permanent stabilizing and growth-producing agency for the market economy as a whole" (Heilbroner, 1974:157-169; Galbraith, 1975: 235-267). Keynesian economics laid out the formal rationale for government intervention and deficit-financing predicated on the continued growth of production. In the United States from 1950 to 1973 the total income increased 345%, while at the same time the total debt in the country increased 415%. At the end of 1973 total deposits in all banks, mutual savings banks, and savings and loans totaled some 1,007 billion dollars, while the total debt was 2,526 billions. As Professor John Galbraith has recently written:

The Great Depression did not, in fact, end. It was swept away by World War II. This was, in a grim sense, the triumph of the Keynesian policy. But the problem it posed was not employment and output; it was inflation. And for this, as was to be learned again a quarter-century on, the Keynesian system did not answer. (1975:234)

Some of the many other interrelated problems which the Keynesian system could not answer are well described in R. Goodwin's The American Condition.

Goodwin has detailed the way the very rationality of productive expansion behind our exchange-economy geared toward individual consumer needs maximizes not the consumer's gratification but the corporate power to determine those needs, even as it destroys in the process the community bonds needed to meet group needs. Increasingly
centralized bureaucracies in both government and business are entrusted with communal decisions which they reach in purely formalist, calculative ways. Inefficiency results in the long run inasmuch as non-economic factors are ignored or underestimated. The titanic irony of purely secularist empirical rationalist is suggested as the data from fields as widely divergent as Quantum Mechanics, Neurophysics, Biology, Psychology, Sociology, Analytic Economics and Ecology cumulatively warn us to abandon the Promethean maximization flaunted up till now.

Perhaps the greatest long-term achievement in theology in our century has been to thematize the critical potential of a priori rationality. It is the basis for a demystification of the secularist perversion of empirical rationality. The secularism of Communism is obvious. The secularism of Capitalism is no less dangerous for man's development; no matter how pious individual executives and politicians may be in private, insofar as the expansion of productivity and unlimited growth are the ultimate concerns, the unchallengeable assumptions of the corporate structures are secularist. The crypto-deification of the production process leaves mankind with the choice between a state-controlled monopoly or a monopoly-controlled state, as the global reach of Communist and Capitalist corporations heed the age-old invitation: "All this I will give you if falling down you adore me."

III. Toward New Foundations:
From Secularism to Secularization

The interdisciplinary collaboration between "some of the best minds from theology, law, philosophy, economics and science" for which Dr. Forrester calls would do well to attend to not only the presuppositions of quantified empirical approaches but to the "minds" (W₂) themselves. Theologians cannot possibly envisage the changes and events which will occur in W₁ and W₃ over the next thousand years. But insofar as they appropriate the related and
recurrent operations of \( W_2 \) (a priori rationality), they lay hold of, in Lonergan's phrase, "a fixed base, an invariant pattern, opening upon all further developments of understanding" (1958:xxviii). This is all the more needed when the dialectical differences in horizons discussed above suggest that either the neglect of precisely those \( W_2 \) patterns or their reduction to \( W_1 \) mechanisms have been behind the tendency to absolutize the production process itself.

As Weisskopf has recently expressed our plight:

What was thought to be the greatest strength of Western civilization, science, technology and economic progress, turned out to be Pandora's boxes that threaten this society with destruction....Western civilization suffers from a gigantic repression of important dimensions of human existence. The term repression is related to what theologians call estrangement, and Marxists (and many others today) call alienation. The common link between these concepts is that something that is vital and essential for human life and existence is left out, neglected, suppressed and repressed. Alienation, estrangement and repression imply that human existence is split, that man has been reduced to a part of man, to a part of what he could be. (1971:15-16)

The need, then, is to overcome what Lonergan has termed man's basic alienation: the estrangement from the related and recurrent operations of one's freedom as attentiveness, intelligence, reasonableness and responsibility (1972:55, 357-359, 34). As we have already seen in section I, fully appropriated a priori rationality in no way minimizes or restricts the full development of empirical rationality: The latter cumulatively and progressively extends our knowledge of everything in \( W_1 \) and \( W_3 \). A priori rationality is not out to promote the construction of a new sacral "Christendom" in \( W_3 \); it strives rather to overcome the undifferentiated sacral cultural matrix of the past, and the undifferentiated secularist cultural matrix of the present, by calling attention to the need to differentiate the secular and the sacred in terms of the exigencies of \( W_2 \). Hence, religious symbols and values are
submitted to the same long-term criteria as scientific or economic theories and practice: to what extent do they promote or hold back human attention, intelligence, reasonableness, and responsibility? (Lamb: 1977).

In the light of Lonergan's thematization of a priori rationality I shall now briefly discuss some of the key issues in the areas of growth, intelligence and economics respectively.

A. Socio-Economic and Cultural Growth

The dialectical-horizontal analysis of the central stages in the development of the industrial production process indicates that it is wrong to make Christianity the scapegoat for the contemporary crisis. A study of the growth-rates of population and industrial production in the late medieval period or in Calvin's Geneva would find those rates establishing a linear pattern. W. W. Rostow, W. G. Hoffmann, and W. O. Henderson have shown that the "take-off" period essential to industrial productivity requires a simultaneous occurrence of population growth, a rate of investment rise from five to ten percent, and advances in production techniques; and that these three factors happened in Britain from 1783-1802, in France and Belgium from 1830-1860, and in Germany from 1850-1873 (Henderson: 3ff.).

Moreover, the religious values of Christianity hardly exercised any decisive influence on the major social and economic decisions during these periods. Rather, immediately before and during those periods the secularist inversion of empirical rationality emerged and spread its dominance throughout the cultures in question. Both empirical research as well as horizontal analysis grounds the conclusion that the phenomenon of exponential growth curves in industrial production arose within socio-cultural horizons predominantly influenced by secularism rather than the religious values of Christianity.
In terms of Lonergan's study of the a priori dynamism of conscious intentionality, exponential growth-curves in industrial production may have resulted primarily from the perversion of W₂'s vertical finality away from its adequate goal (which is the question of God) toward the production and accumulation of a potentially infinite number of material finite objects—which production would then become its ultimate concern (Lonergan, 1958:634-641; 1972:101ff.; Tyrrell; McShane). This perversion or alienation of vertical finality within W₂ accounts for the explosion of what the reports to the Club of Rome call "an undifferentiated cancerous growth" in industrial productivity.

There are significant similarities between Lonergan's analysis of general bias and the longer cycle of decline (1958:224-226) and the central stages in the development of a crisis outlined above. The cumulative deterioration of the social situation within the longer cycle of decline arises inasmuch as the general bias of common sense leads to the disregard of long-term meanings and values in favor of immediate short-term gains. This is exactly what Dr. Forrester has spoken of as the contraction of horizons to short-sighted policies (343-348; Lonergan, 1958:225-226). This contraction causes some social enterprises to atrophy, while, as Lonergan has written:

others grow like tumours; the objective situation becomes penetrated with anomalies; it loses its power to suggest new ideas and, once they are implemented, to respond with still further and better suggestions. The dynamic of progress is replaced by sluggishness and then by stagnation. In the limit, the only discernible intelligibility in the objective facts is an equilibrium of economic pressures and a balance of national powers. (1958:229)

As the vertical finality of W₂, what Lonergan in In-sight has called the disinterested and detached desire to know, becomes irrelevant to the objective situation of W₃, it gives rise to a "social surd." Intelligence is rendered
unlabeled unable to link "culture, religion, philosophy to the realm of concrete being," so that "men of practical common sense become warped by the situation in which they live and regard as starry-eyed idealism and silly unpracticality any proposal that would lay the axe to the root of the social surd." (229-230). Lonergan has acknowledged that the development of Western civilization from the schools founded by Charlemagne to contemporary universities has witnessed a prestigious "flowering of human intelligence in every department of its activity." But coupled with the advance of empirical rationality has been a succession of lower viewpoints characteristic of the longer cycle of decline.

The medieval synthesis through the conflict of Church and State shattered into the several religions of the reformation. The wars of religion provided the evidence that man has to live not by revelation but by reason. The disagreement of reason's representatives made it clear that, while each must follow the dictates of reason as he sees them, he must also practise the virtue of tolerance to the equally reasonable views and actions of others. The helplessness of tolerance to provide coherent solutions to social problems called forth the totalitarian who takes the narrow and complacent practicality of common sense and elevates it to the role of a complete and exclusive viewpoint. On the totalitarian view, every type of intellectual independence whether personal, cultural, scientific, philosophic, or religious, has no better basis than non-conscious myth. The time has come for the conscious myth that will secure man's total subordination to the requirements of reality. Reality is the economic development, the military equipment, and the political dominance of the all-inclusive State. Its ends justify all means. Its means include not merely every technique of indoctrination and propaganda, every tactic of economic and diplomatic pressure, every device for breaking down the moral conscience and exploiting the secret affects of civilized man, but also the terrorism of a political police, of prisons and torture, or concentration camps, of transported and extirpated minorities, and of total war. (231-232)

This process is not over and finished. Robert Heilbroner's *An Inquiry into the Human Prospect* more than hints that the
tendency to totalitarian control is increasing rather than decreasing.

The reversal of the longer cycle of decline will not consist in efforts to re-establish "the medieval synthesis." As Lonergan has recently shown, the sacralization of that synthesis meant that the legitimate and praise-worthy efforts of empirical rationality to establish the autonomy of the secular only met with hostility and rejection on the part of those whose power status was threatened by any differentiation of secular and sacred (Lonergan: 1974b). The emergence and advance of the secularist alienations of empirical rationality can be laid in no small part at the door of the ecclesiastical representatives. Apriori rationality does not maintain that attention to the vertical finality of \( W_2 \) should lead to a flight from the cares and concerns of empirical rationality with \( W_{1,3} \) into an interior repose in the quest for God. Besides the vertical finality of \( W_2 \) there is also its horizontal finality of experiencing, understanding, judging, deciding and acting—including the empirical scientific specializations of these operations in observations, hypothesis formation, verification, and technological application methods. Vertical finality may include the dynamics of intellectual conversion, as well as of moral and religious conversion.

Hence, appropriated apriori rationality realizes that, to the extent that vertical finality is neglected or truncated, the horizontal development of \( W_2 \) becomes increasingly one-dimensional, and the full existential needs of mankind are not met. When growth is directed away from the cultural and spiritual values, it becomes cancerous quest for satisfaction in the mere accumulation of material goods.

Western man has thus become alienated from important "parts" of himself because the multi-dimensionality of his existence has been reduced to the dimension of technology and economy. Western society requires the individual to choose without values (repression of the
normative); to work without meaning (repression of the spiritual); to integrate without community (repression of the communal dimension). One could add: to think without feeling (repression of the affective) and to live without faith, hope, myth, utopia (repression of the transcendental dimension). (Weisskopf, 1971:190-191)

Weisskopf has argued for an apprehension of existential needs and existential scarcity which will not permit one-dimensional growth along purely technical and economic lines.

The first contribution, then, of appropriated a priori rationality to the needed interdisciplinary collaboration would be to correct Forrester's judgment about what kind of growth the religious values of Christianity actually promote. It would provide a critical and normative context within which to fully accept the pluralism of values in the many diverse societies of today, and it would promote a serious collaboration by aiding all parties to undertake a serious evaluation of their own values in the light of the commonly shared and experienced imperatives: Be Attentive, Be Intelligent, Be Reasonable, and Be Responsible. A collaborative effort using the dialectical method described by Lonergan (1972:235-266) would reveal complementarities, genetic relations, and dialectical oppositions among the different horizons of value. Dialectically opposed horizons have a court of appeal insofar as they are committed to attentiveness, intelligence, reasonableness and responsibility, and insofar as they are willing to recognize the inherent demands of human understanding. Horizons unable to accept the fundamental thrust of a priori rationality must face the challenge presented by the manifold results revealed by the many empirical investigations of the contemporary crisis.

B. The Relation of Intelligence and Nature

The previous pages have outlined how an apriori rationality can go to the root of the contemporary crisis by checking all W3 phenomenon in terms of the dynamics of W2.
But some may argue that the very distinction between $W_1$ and $W_2$ is what has led to the exploitation of nature by scientific technology. On this view, the command of Genesis to fill the earth and subdue it is only implemented by Descartes' dualistic dichotomy between mind (*res cogitans*) and matter (*res extensa*). Have not science and technology developed within the Christian West rather than in the Buddhist or Hindu East? Can the need for non-manipulative value systems be met by a thoroughgoing fidelity to the demands of a priori rationality?

Regarding the statement from Genesis, Fr. Audet has shown that the Hebrew apprehension of man's relation to nature, far from being cast in the form of a Promethean defiance of the gods and a domination of nature, accentuates the gift-quality of material creation and man's responsibility to garden it. While the nature myths and nature religions abound in symbols expressing their "terror of nature" (Blumenberg: 11-66), Judaeo-Christianity has effected a denuminization of nature. A retreat from what M. Eliade has termed "the terror of history" back into the arms of nature is indeed a dubious strategy.

What Lonergan writes of as "the ongoing discovery of mind in history" in no way implies that, from the perspective of a priori rationality, man and nature are two "things" standing over against one another in a relation of domination. All the realms of being ($W_1, W_2, W_3$) share the same immanent structures of emergent probability as a conditioned series of schemes of recurrence. The distinctions between nature ($W_1$) and mind ($W_2$) and culture ($W_3$) are not separations or dichotomies. The different worlds comprise a unity of identity and non-identity expressed by the distinctions. They are identical by their sharing the immanent intelligibility of emergent probability, and inasmuch as any later schemes of recurrence presuppose and depend on the earlier. They are not identical inasmuch as none of the three worlds can be reduced to the others (Lonergan, 1958:115-125).
Moreover, a priori rationality as elucidated by Lonergan pinpoints how the modern tendency to create various dichotomies between mind (W₂) and nature (W₁) is rooted not in an understanding and appreciation of empirical scientific rationality but in an unawareness of precisely its own functioning. From Galileo onwards there has been consistent misinterpretation of knowing as taking a good look, and of objectivity as seeing "the already-out-there-now-real." As long as this type of empiricist misunderstanding prevails, it is inevitable that science would continually slip into scientism with its vacillations between reductionism and domination in science, and between romanticism and heroism in culture (Lonergan, 1958:236-238, 245-254). P. Heelan has demonstrated that the cultural imperialism of scientism—not genuine scientific rationality—has led to the inordinate exploitation of nature as an already-out-there-now-real material reservoir to be technocratically ingested by an ever expanding industrialism.

From the perspective of a priori rationality the reduction by both capitalism and communism of intelligence to naturalistically conceived mechanisms necessarily leads to an exploitation of nature, because mankind has been attempting to use industrial production to compensate for its oblivion of vertical finality. Unaware of the pre-given dynamic structures of one's own freedom to be either attentive or inattentive, intelligent or stupid, rational or irrational, responsible or irresponsible, one is likewise unaware that W₁ natural processes are structured in accord with emergent probability and with the inherent limitations of any series of schemes of recurrence. In trying to reduce oneself totally to nature as W₁, one not only suffers from a scotosis regarding one's own nature as W₂, but one also embarks in that very blindness on the destruction of nature as W₁. Thus another reason why industrialization has led to the contemporary crisis is the scientific misunderstanding of empirical rationality whereby the legitimate advances of science have been increasingly
reduced into materialist, positivist, empiricist rationales. These perversions affect both economic policy and industrial implementations of that policy. Not only has theory tried to reduce \( W_2 \) to directly measurable quantities in \( W_1 \), but such theory has become the unquestioned premise of industrial policies. Then \( W_1 \) is presumed to possess all the resiliency and plasticity of \( W_2 \) provided the correct engineering equations can be found which would enable industry to exploit unlimited secrets of \( W_1 \). Such a "naturalization of man and humanization of nature," far from leading to a "true resurrection of nature," has led instead to the growing specter of ecological pollution and dwindling natural resources.

C. Economics and Emergent Probability

Appropriated a priori rationality provides indirect aid to economics insofar as it relieves economics of many of its false philosophic presuppositions. One thinks, for instance, of the immense labor spent in trying to correct the misconceptions of utility, whose originators had claimed that utility was both a psychic reality discernible by introspection \( \text{and} \) a directly measurable quantity (Schumpeter, 1954:1057-1060); or of the reductionist presupposition of mechanistic "laws of human nature" which, if discovered, would yield "iron laws of economic growth and production" that haunted economic analysis from the seventeenth to the last century (115-142, 209-248, 435-446, 534-541, 588-605, 651-662).

The reductionism of empirical rationality's attempt to erect a control of meaning in terms of \( W_1 \) into a normative criterion for all meaning and value, still affects both socialist and market economic analysts. It leads them to exclude any serious consideration of non-quantifiable values as capable of sublating empirically observable quantifiable values. The scotosis involved here becomes even more acute when economists abandon more
long-term investigations of the major schemes of recurrence in favor of short-term prognosis, so that as Barraclough has put it: "Anything that looks beyond next month's fluctuations of the Dow Jones Index smacks, to them, more of theology than of economics" (15). If the present day crisis is leading more economists to once again devote more attention to long-term analysis, then, as Professor Galbraith argues in Economics and the Public Purpose, they might come closer to understanding just how the economic mechanisms actually do function (1973). If one's attention is riveted upon short-term random variations, one will naturally come up with a theory which will miss the random character of the events one is attending to. Long-term economic analysis could use a thematization of a priori rationality to show how the cyclical character of economic schemes of recurrence are not "iron clad laws" which function automatically, but are rather a conditioned scheme or series of schemes that are only probable; and to indicate how there are correlations and values which are random or unintelligible from the perspective of economic analysis alone, yet are highly intelligible and intelligent from the perspective of other specifically social, political or moral perspectives (Lamb: 1965; 1977). These further perspectives must enter into a collaborative effort at industrial planning and policy since such planning would have more than purely economic consequences.

Schumpeter has claimed that "if a socialist society is defined as the perfectly planned society, then we may further say that modern [economic] theory is building the foundations of a truly 'scientific' socialism" (1954:1145); Marxist economists generally have claimed that socialist planning is the only "scientific" avenue open to truly progressive development. But such claims issue from the reductionist myth that \( W_{2,3} \) may eventually be reduced to the determinisms of \( W_1 \), rather than from an apprehension of the actual performance of the empirical sciences. Since the discoveries of quantum mechanics, even the
notion that \( W_1 \) is governed by rigid determinism has been refuted. As one can understand from the vantage of emergent probability, if the project of "perfect planning" is nonsense in relation to such relatively simple phenomena as subatomic particles, then "a perfectly planned society" is not even a remote possibility.

One can also see the manner in which reductionism has affected both socialist and market economics in respect to profits and savings. Marx attempted to establish labor as the universal criterion for value, so that as Habermas and Wellmer have pointed out, the values of social interaction were reduced to labor which Marx interpreted as a natural process:

Labour is, in the first place, a process in which both man and Nature participate....He opposes himself to Nature as one of her own forces...
(Marx, 1967:177; Wellmer: 69-127; Habermas: 9-47; Boehler)

On this basis, Marx developed his notions of absolute and relative surplus-value to account for capitalist profit and all the other values protected by capitalism in order to safeguard those profits (Marx, 1967:71-83, 177-534, 761-764). But, as W. Becker argues in his Kritik der Marxschen Wertlehre (140), Marx's surplus-value theory confuses his own distinction between the quantifiable use-value of commodities and the actual process of using those commodities, so that the surplus-value theory does not maintain the dialectical internal relation between a quantifiable labor-power and labor as a specifically human activity. The reduction of the latter to the former in his surplus-value theory means that in spite of his intention, Marx legitimates rather than criticizes the fetish character of the labor commodity in capitalism. Moreover, a tendency towards abstract absolutizing within Marx's foundational work in economics has haunted Marxist economists ever since (Becker: 119). Thus, the orthodox Stalin vetoed the serious use of mathematical analysis in economics as bourgeois on the one hand, and on the other, later...
introduction of mathematical techniques has been hailed as genuinely Marxist (Nove and Nuti: 9-18, 399ff., 491-510).

If Marx's surplus-theory of value has actually reinforced the fetishism of commodities, a similar reductionist tendency can be found among the market economists. Before Keynes it was generally held that savings would normally be invested. The novelty of Keynes's theory of saving was that, put simply, those who save do so primarily for saving itself rather than investment (Keynes: 165ff.). This is what actually happens in depressions. Yet too little analytic attention has been given to what Lonergan has referred to as pure surplus income or the net aggregate of savings in their functional relation to the rates of new fixed investment. As Lonergan has observed:

The complaint is that there exists, in the mentality of our culture, no ideas, and in the procedures of our economies, no mechanisms, directed to smoothly and equitably bringing about the reversal of net aggregate savings to zero as the basic expansion proceeds. Just as there is an anti-egalitarian shift to the surplus expansion, so also there is an egalitarian shift in the distribution of income in the basic expansion. But while we can effect the anti-egalitarian shift with some measure of success, in fact the egalitarian shift is achieved only through the contractions, the liquidations, the blind stresses and strains of a prolonged depression. (1940:98f.)

This blind spot in our culture and our economics is deeply rooted in our notions of success as measurable by material accumulation. It sets up mechanisms of relative invulnerability whereby "such instances of pure surplus income are the last to feel the 'squeeze', and, what is more important, that the pressure of the 'squeeze' is all the stronger and more relentless on other instances" (Lonergan, 1940: 99; Lundberg: 249-294).

As Galbraith reminds us, we really have not come to terms economically and culturally with the Depression. Lonergan has shown how this failure lies at the very nerve center of our economic system. A priori rationality as
appropriated would make its greatest contribution to economics by showing how economic values are related, through emergent probability, to moral and religious values. As Weisskopf has remarked:

The striving for economic justice will require that intellectuals concern themselves not only with the common good but with the good itself, with what is right and wrong. Instrumental, formalized, value-empty reasoning has corrupted intellectuals, academicians, scientists and made it difficult for them to use reason in the search for a new morality. This was (and to a large extent still is) especially true of economists. (1971:147)

Only the appropriation of the related and recurrent operations of a priori rationality can enable economists to pinpoint the divergences between all previous economic theories and the ongoing series of schemes of recurrence which those theories tried both to understand and to direct (Lowe: 165-246).

CONCLUSION

An adequate response to the crisis of exponential growth-curves in industrial production—and to the concomitant economic and social crises—demands that interdisciplinary collaboration be critically based on a recognition of the limits of empirical rationality. The root of the problem of exponential growth lies not in the value-system of Christianity but in an absolutized empirical rationality. The classical horizon of rationality cannot admit of the rich pluralism of meanings and values among the cultural diversity of today's world. The empirical horizon of rationality only confronts us with the diversity of those pluralist cultures. When erected into an absolute, empirical rationality falls prey to the very reductionisms which have precipitated the crises we are now confronting. Ever fuller appropriation of the a priori horizon of rationality would allow us to bring human attentiveness, intelligence, reasonableness and
responsibility more efficaciously to bear upon the development of empirical rationality in the sciences.
NOTES

/1/ Theologians have tended to respond with indifference to the economic dimensions of the social issues they discuss. For example, one of the chief defects of the Latin American liberation theology is its lack of a critical economic theory. There are, however, signs that this is changing; cf. van Leeuwen.

/2/ Note that the use of the three worlds here differs from Popper's in an essential aspect. He gives priority to W3, whereas I see a new control of meaning and value in terms of W2 inasmuch as Lonergan's work has provided us with a verifiable articulation of the related and recurrent operations of conscious intentionality.

/3/ Galbraith writes, "As noted, I am led to the conclusion, which I trust others will find persuasive, that we are becoming the servants in thought, as in action, of the machine we have created to serve us...we will allow economic goals to have an undue monopoly of our lives and at the expense of other and more valuable goals." Barnet and Müller's book shows the extent to which the reductive socio-economic "machine" of the multinational corporation is de facto controlling our lives (Galbraith, 1967:19).

/4/ On the continental reactions, see Meadows (1974b); on the inherent exponential growth-curve in Soviet industrial production, see Nove and Nuti (149-172).

/5/ Unlike the algebraic power function with a constant rational exponent, the transcendental exponential function is defined as a constant or variable with a variable exponent, so that it has the property: \( a^x \cdot a^x = a^{x+x} \).

/6/ Professor John F. McGovern of the University of Wisconsin at Milwaukee has recently been engaged in research into the advocacy of the work ethic in the medieval lawyers. He has found substantial evidence to support the thesis that they presaged later developments of the work ethic.

/7/ "Descartes and Malebranche avowed that their sole purpose was to verify the truths of the Christian religion. Pascal regarded his interest in physical phenomena as a derogation from his religious contemplations. Newton put the bulk of his effort, not into the Principia and the Opticks, but into his studies of the Trinity and the prophetic books of the Bible, especially the Book of Daniel and the Apocalypse. Boyle was thoroughly devout. In his Christian Virtuoso (1690) he formulated his personal reconciliation of science and religion. When he died, he left fifty pounds a year to the establishment of a lectureship defending the Christian religion against the infidels."
Richard Bentley, the first lecturer on this foundation, received considerable aid from Newton, who was at the same time sympathetically promoting John Craig's proposed *Principia Mathematica* of Christianity. Leibniz was also to attempt a defense of Christianity through geometric notions. This effort to verify and apply only accentuated the frailty of the old order" (Nussbaum: 8).
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RELIGIOUS KNOWLEDGE

Bernard Lonergan

Three questions may be put regarding religious knowledge. First, there is a question of fact. Second, there is a question of philosophic possibility. Third, there is a practical question.

The question of fact is whether religious people know anything that non-religious people do not know. With the question of fact we are not concerned tonight, and we shall not be concerned tomorrow. It is an enormously complicated and intricate issue that must be left to departments of religious studies and/or theology.

The question of philosophic possibility is our concern tonight. It asks what could be meant by affirming the validity or objectivity of religious knowledge. Our answer will be in terms of the inner conviction that men and women of any time or place may attain. To an account of such inner conviction there will be added a survey of the many ways in which such conviction is formulated as human cultures advance in self-understanding and self-knowledge.

The third practical question adverts to the conditions and requirements of setting up an academic discipline. It confronts the issue whether or not religious conviction at the present time and in the present state of scientific knowledge has to be regarded as at best a private affair. Alternatively it envisages the conditions under which the study of religion and/or theology might become an academic subject of specialization and investigation. This third practical question will concern us in our third and final lecture tomorrow.

I have been blocking off our present topic by contrasting it with a question of fact and a question of academic appropriateness. The question of academic
appropriateness we leave to tomorrow. The question of the factual validity of this or that religion we leave to religious authorities and academic experts with more than three lectures at their disposal for the communication of their views.

It remains that something be said about the connection between yesterday's topic and today's. Yesterday we began by noting a distinction between single elements that are merely an infrastructure within human experience and the larger context within which they may flourish, or intermittently recur, or tend to vanish. We went on to consider the cultivation of religious experience. There was considered the sacralization of man's world in preliterate societies when religious thought and affect penetrated the organization of man's apprehension of his world, the structure of his social arrangements, the content of his cultural and moral aspirations. There was contrasted the emergence of religious specialists, of ascetics and mystics, of seers and prophets, of priests and ministers; of their role as the religious leaven in human experience; of the formation of religious groups and the genesis of their rituals, their beliefs, their ideals, their precepts. There was raised the question of authenticity in its two-fold form: the authenticity of the individual in his appropriation of his religious tradition; and the authenticity of that tradition itself which becomes questionable when the failures of individuals become the rule rather than the exception, when vital reinterpretation is corrupted by rationalization, when heartfelt allegiance more and more gives way to alienation. Finally, we raised the question of religious commitment, illustrated its nature from the precept of loving God above all found in both the book of Deuteronomy and the gospel according to Mark, but postponed the agonizing question that arises in such a time as our own, namely, how can one tell whether one's appropriation of religion is genuine or unauthentic and,
more radically, how can one tell one is not appropriating a religious tradition that has become unauthentic.

To that question, yesterday postponed, we now turn. Our remarks will fall under two main headings. First, we shall attempt to describe the experience of authenticity in terms of self-transcendence. Secondly, we shall attempt to relate the inner conviction of authenticity, generated by self-transcendence, with the various notions of validity or objectivity entertained in successive stages of man's cultural development.

I. Self-transcendence

In various ways clinical psychologists have revealed in man's preconscious activity a preformation, as it were, and an orientation towards the self-transcendence that becomes increasingly more explicit as we envisage successive levels of consciousness.

Perhaps most revealing in this respect is a distinction drawn by the existential analyst, Ludwig Binswanger, between dreams of the night and dreams of the morning. He conceives dreams of the night as largely influenced by somatic determinants such as the state of one's digestion. But in dreams of the morning the subject is anticipating his waking state. However fragmentary the dream and however symbolic its content, he is anticipating his world and taking his own stance within it.

It remains that it is on awaking that we begin to be pushed or pulled beyond ourselves. Our felt needs and our multiform sensations, our memories of satisfactions and our anticipations of their repetition, engage us irrevocably in an ongoing interplay with our immediate environment.

A further level of self-transcendence emerges from the exercise of intelligence, the learning of language, the construction of a world mediated by meaning. Thereby man moves out of the habitat of an animal and into the universe that adds the distant to what is near, the past
and future to what is present, the possible and the probable to what is actual. By unifying and relating, by constructing, by discovering seriations, by extrapolating and generalizing, there are gradually pieced together the remarks of parents and the lore of one’s peers, the tales of travellers and the stories of great deeds, the revelations of literature, the achievements of science, the meditations of holy men and women, the reflections of philosophers and even perhaps theologians.

But the constructions of intelligence without the control of reasonableness yield not philosophy but myth, not science but magic, not astronomy but astrology, not chemistry but alchemy, not history but legend. Besides the questions of intelligence, such as why and what and how and what for and how often, there are the further questions of reflection that arch the eyebrows and ask whether this or that really is so. Then the issue is, not more bright ideas, not further insights, but marshalling and weighing the evidence and presenting the sufficient reason that makes doubting unreasonable just as its absence would make assenting merely rash. Only in virtue of this further level of consciousness can we set aside myth and magic and astrology and alchemy and legend and begin to live by philosophy and science and astronomy and chemistry and history. It is a decisive stage in the process of self-transcendence when we not merely think of the universe but begin to know what the universe really is. In other words, man always lives in his world, for his being is a being-in-the-world. But it is far from always true that the world in which he is is a world that really exists.

Beyond the data of experience, beyond questions for intelligence and the answers to them, beyond questions for reflection concerned with evidence, truth, certitude, reality, there are the questions for deliberation. By them we ask what is to be done and whether it is up to us to do it. By them is effected the transition from consciousness to conscience, from moral feelings to the exercise of
responsibility, from the push of fear and the pull of desire to the decisions of human freedom. So it is that on the level of deliberating there emerges a still further dimension to self-transcendence. On previous levels there stood in the foreground the self-transcendence of coming to know. But deliberation confronts us with the challenge of self-direction, self-actualization, self-mastery, even self-sacrifice.

Already I have spoken of consciousness as a polyphony with different themes at different intensities sung simultaneously. Now I would draw attention to the different qualities, to what Gerard Manley Hopkins might call the different self-taste, on the successive levels. The spontaneous vitality of our sensitivity, the shrewd intelligence of our inquiring, the detached rationality of our demand for evidence, the peace of a good conscience and the disquiet released by memory of words wrongly said or deeds wrongly done. Yet together they form a single stream, and we live its unity long before we have the leisure, the training, the patience to discern in our own lives its several strands.

The basic unity of consciousness reaches down into the unconscious. It is true that conflicts do arise, as the psychiatrists have insisted. But this truth must not be allowed to distract us from a far more profound and far more marvellous harmony. In man, the symbolic animal, there is an all but endless plasticity that permits the whole of our bodily reality to be finely tuned to the beck and call of symbolic constellations. The agility of the acrobat, the endurance of the athlete, the fingers of the concert pianist, the tongue of those that speak and the ears of those that listen and the eyes of those that read, the formation of images that call forth insights, the recall of evidence that qualifies judgments, the empathy that sets our own feelings in resonance with the feelings of others—all bear convincing testimony that self-transcendence is the eagerly sought goal not only of our sensitivity, not only of our intelligent and rational
knowing, not only of our freedom and responsibility, but first of all of our flesh and blood that through nerves and brain have come spontaneously to live out symbolic meanings and to carry out symbolic demands.

As self-transcendence is the meaning of each of the many levels of human reality, so too it is the meaning of the whole. But that meaning of the whole, when realized concretely, is falling in love. So the experience of being-in-love is an experience of fulfillment, of complete integration, of a self-actualization that is an unbounded source of good will and good deeds. Such is the loyalty of fellow citizens to their commonwealth. Such is the faith that has its fount in the love with which God floods our hearts through the Holy Spirit he has given us.

Love, loyalty and faith can all be questioned. When they are authentic, readily, I feel, they are esteemed beyond price. But so easily they are unauthentic, whether from the failures of the individual or, tragically, from the individual's authentic appropriation of an unauthentic tradition.

Still, even if only in principle they can be authen-
tic, then at least in principle they point to an answer to our question. For the man or woman intent on achieving self-transcendence is ever aware of shortcomings, while those that are evading the issue of self-realization are kept busy concealing the fact from themselves. But our question has been the grounds of the inner conviction that informs religious living, and the answer we have come up with is that self-transcendence is so radically and so completely the inner dynamism of human reality that one cannot but be aware when one is moving towards it and, on the other hand, one cannot but feel constrained to conceal the fact when one is evading the abiding imperative of what it is to be human.
II. Inner Conviction and Objective Truth

At first blush, inner conviction and objective truth stand at opposite poles. Inner conviction is subjective. Objective truth is the truth about what is already-out-there—now for everyone to see and grasp and handle. It is public truth, and the publicity is spatial. Precisely because it is spatial, because in principle it can be tested by anyone, it is beyond doubt or question.

Still questions do arise. One can distinguish between the world of immediacy and the world mediated by meaning. The world of immediacy includes all the data of sense and all the data of consciousness. It consists of two parts: the totality of the data of sense is the sphere of objectivity that is spatial, public, in principle open to anyone's inspection; and the totality of the data of consciousness is an aggregate of distinct and segregated subjectivities, none of which can inspect what is going on in any of the others.

To be contrasted with this world of immediacy there is the world mediated by meaning. It consists of all that is to be known by asking questions and arriving at correct answers. It is a world unknown to infants but gradually introduced to children as they learn to speak, to boys and girls as they study in school, to students and scholars in centers of learning.

Man the symbolic animal lives in both of these worlds. As animal, he lives in the world of immediacy and, like Macbeth, is liberated from his fantasies when he adverts to the sure and firm-set earth on which he treads. As symbolic, he both suffers from the fantasies and brings about his liberation, for that consists not merely in the pressure on the soles of his treading feet but also in his certainty that the earth is firm-set and will not give way under his tread.

Still man the symbolic animal has long been a puzzle to man the philosopher. Insofar as philosophers search for simplicity and coherence, they opt for one of the two
worlds and attempt to get along without the other. Empiricists opt for the world of immediacy and proceed to empty out from the world mediated by meaning everything that is not immediately given. Rationalists take their stand on demonstrative argument and, if they go along with the ancient Eleatics, will argue that there cannot be more than one being and that that one being cannot undergo any change.

But both of these are extreme positions. Empiricists usually find it convenient to take an occasional excursion into the world mediated by meaning, at the very least to expound and prove their own position. Rationalists can advert to the fact that questions are raised with respect to the data of experience and that answers are confirmed by pointing to data that show what they say. So they are led to supplement the apodictic power of demonstration with the intuitions of sense and/or consciousness. But both empiricist excursions into meaning and rationalist appeals to intuition are compromises. They renege on their initial premise of simplicity and coherence. They point the way to a new starting point that acknowledges the complexity of man the symbolic animal.

The so-called "new" starting point is, of course, very old. It goes back to Plato and Aristotle. It reaches crises in the medieval controversy between Augustinians and Aristotelians and in the later victory of modern science over Aristotelian constructions. It heads into a quite different starting point in the twentieth century in which the notion of method aspires to a foundational role.

In search, then, of the meaning of the phrase, objective truth, I propose to speak, first, of the limitations of the Aristotelian notion of science, secondly, of the shift in the sciences that conceives necessity, truth, certitude more as remote ideals than proximate achievements, and thirdly, of the ascendancy of method and the partial eclipse of logic in contemporary investigations.
III. From Aristotle's *Posterior Analytics* to
 to Newton's *Principia*

In his study of *The Origins of Modern Science: 1300-1800*, Herbert Butterfield has argued, convincingly I feel, that from the beginning of the fourteenth century onwards many elements of modern science were discovered by experimenters, but the experimenters themselves were unable to break loose from Aristotelian preconceptions and set up an appropriate conceptual framework of their own.

Now the achievement of Newton's *Principia* was precisely that it established such a framework and did so in a manner that stood its ground for the next two centuries. It remains, however, that the very title of Newton's masterpiece, *Philosophiae naturalis principia mathematica*, bears an Aristotelian imprint. For the title suggests that Newton's mechanics is not an autonomous science standing in its own right but a set of mathematical principles for the department of philosophy called natural philosophy. In this respect the title is misleading. What Newton achieved was the vindication of mechanics as an autonomous science. But what he could not bring about was that total refashioning of the Aristotelian ideal that became possible between two and three centuries later.

I must begin by noting that the *Posterior Analytics* never were normative for Aristotle's own philosophic thinking or scientific work. They represent one of his great discoveries. They express it under the grave limitations of the science of his day. It was their unhappy fate to provide glib talkers with ready answers and serious thinkers with baffling problems until the reality of scientific achievement brought to light a more solidly grounded notion of scientific knowledge.

With the first stage of that transformation we are now concerned. If its triumph was Newton, still its goal was not Aristotelian theoretical knowledge but the practical utility praised by Francis Bacon in his *Novum Organum*. Its conceptual framework took its inspiration not from
Aristotle's metaphysics but from Galileo's program of mathematizing nature. Its field of inquiry was defined not by Aristotle's intellect, capable of fashioning and becoming all, but by the cautious rule of the Royal Society that excluded questions that neither observation nor experiment could solve.

In that movement there were two chief complaints against the Aristotelians. It was urged that they were concerned not with real things but with words. It was felt that the Aristotelian priority of metaphysics constituted an insuperable barrier to the development of experimental science. The validity of both complaints can, I think, be argued from a consideration of the Posterior Analytics.

In the second chapter of the first book of that work one is aware that Aristotle's basic concern is with causal necessity. We think we understand, he notes, when we know the cause, know that it is the cause, and know that the effect cannot be other than it is. But straightaway this concern with things and their causes is transposed into syllogistic theory. We are told how knowledge of causal necessity is expressed in appropriate subjects and predicates, premises and conclusions, and thereby manifests its nature as science. We are told how one science can find its principles in the conclusions of another more general science. But when at the end of the second book it is asked how the initial premises are obtained on which the whole deductive structure has to rest, we are told about a rout followed by a rally. The line breaks. Sauve qui peut! But as the fleeing line scatters in every direction, somewhere someone will turn and make a stand. Another will join him, and then another. The rally begins. The pursuing enemy now is scattered. Victory may be snatched from the jaws of defeat. I think this military analogy is sound enough. For it represents the chance accumulation of clues that can combine into a discovery. But it is not at all clear that a necessary truth will be discovered and
not a mere hypothesis, a mere possibility that has to be verified if it is to merit the name not of truth but of probability. If the only premises the *Posterior Analytics* can provide are just hypotheses, verifiable possibilities, then we have many words about causal necessity but no knowledge of the reality.

Further, the syllogistic approach distinguished philosophy and science simply as the more and the less general. It followed that together they formed a seamless robe with the basic terms and basic relations of philosophy ramifying through the less general fields and robbing them of their autonomy. But experimental science has to be autonomous. For experiment yields correlations. Correlations consist in relations between terms. The terms and relations determined experimentally were the mass-velocities and mass-accelerations of Newton's mechanics; they were to be the electric and magnetic field vectors of Maxwell's equations; and the *corpus Aristotelicum* knew nothing about them.

**IV. From Logic to Method**

The Aristotelian hegemony had been broken, but Aristotelian notions not directly challenged by the new science lived on in quiet possession of the field of common assumptions. Among them was the view that science consisted in true and certain knowledge of causal necessity. Indeed, Newton's deduction of the orbits of the moon and of the planets was regarded as a stunning confirmation of that view. Laplace's proof that a planetary system periodically returned to an initial situation went hand and hand with his assurance that, in principle, any situation in the universe could be deduced from any other earlier or later situation. Right into the twentieth century it was common to speak of the necessary laws of nature and even of the iron laws of economics. Even in our own day there have been loud complaints that Thomas Kuhn's work on *The Structure of Scientific Revolutions* was an advocacy of irrationalism.
But the logic of the matter is simple. Verification is not proof. For verification is an affirmation of what follows from the scientific hypothesis, theory, system. But to affirm the consequent of an hypothesis, settles nothing about the truth of the antecedent from which the consequent follows. A logical conclusion is to be had only when the attempt to verify turns up contrary instances; for then one denies the consequent and from that denial there follows the denial of the antecedent. Accordingly, the principles and laws of an empirical science, no matter how frequently they are verified, may be esteemed ever more probable but may not be considered to be definitively established.

Moreover, the progress of modern science points in the same direction. Newton was acclaimed because he was considered to have done for mechanics what Euclid had done for geometry. But in the nineteenth century it became clear that Euclidean geometry could no longer be considered the one and only possible geometry. In the twentieth, the repeated verification of Einstein's special relativity made it probable that a non-Euclidean geometry was the appropriate conceptualization in physics.

Similarly, Laplace's determinism was found to have shaky foundations. For Heisenberg's relations of indeterminacy (or uncertainty) reveal a knowledge that is not less but greater than the knowledge offered by classical laws. Formerly, indeed, probability was thought to be no more than a cloak for our ignorance. But now the tables are turned. For classical laws hold only under the blanket proviso, other things being equal. So it is that classical predictions can be notably mistaken because they fail to foresee the interference of some alien factor. But further the verification of classical laws is never exact: no more is demanded than that actual measurements fall within the limits set by a theory of probable errors of observation. In brief, classical theory consists of two parts: there is the classical law, and it sets an
ideal norm from which actual measurements do not diverge systematically; there is the theory of measurement and it sets the limits within which errors of observation may be considered probable. But as Patrick Heelan has pointed out, the same two aspects are contained within the single formalism proposed by quantum mechanics. For the single formalism admits two interpretations: one interpretation yields an ideal norm from which actual measurements do not diverge systematically; the other interpretation of the same formalism informs us of the distribution of the divergence from the norm.

But quantum mechanics is not some limiting case or isolated instance. Thermodynamics had already drawn upon statistical theory. Darwinian thought easily moved from chance variations to probabilities of emergence and from the survival of the fittest to probabilities of survival. A statistical view of the emergence, distribution and survival of the forms of plant and animal life naturally suggests a similar approach in the investigation of the emergence and distribution of the chemical elements and compounds. Finally, what seems true of nature seems also to hold for man's knowledge of nature: as natural forms evolve in accord with schedules of probabilities, so too man's grasp of natural forms and of their evolution develops in accord with the probabilities of new discoveries.

There has occurred, then, a transition from logic to method. It has occurred in the field of natural science. It does not, by any means, involve an elimination of logic, for it still is logic that cares for the clarity of terms, the coherence of propositions, the rigor of inferences. But it does involve a shift in the significance of logic. For Aristotle in his *Posterior Analytics* made his demonstrative syllogism the central piece in his construction both of the nature of science and of the relations between sciences. That construction has turned out to be a procrustean bed on which science cannot lie. So far from providing the key to the whole nature of science,
logic has to be content with the task of promoting clarity, coherence, and rigor in the formulation and application of hypotheses and theories. Further, while it is essential that this task be properly performed, still the significance of that performance is measured not by logic itself but by method. For an empirical science is not confined to logical operations with respect to terms, propositions, inferences. It includes observation, description, the formulation of problems, discovery, processes of experimentation, verification, revision. Within that larger whole logic ensures the clarity of terms, the coherence of propositions, the rigor of inferences. And the more successfully it performs that task, the more readily will there come to light not the definitive immutability but the defects of current views and the need to seek more probable opinions.

V. Generalized Empirical Method

We were dissatisfied with mere inner conviction and so we asked whether it bore any relation to objective truth. We have been pondering successive stages in the liquidation of the brave view presented in Aristotle's *Posterior Analytics*. We have come up with a science that yields not objective truth, but the best available opinion of the day.

But if science does not give us objective truth, where are we to go? At this point each man has to become his own philosopher, and so I have no more to offer than my own solution to the issue. I have called it a generalized empirical method.

Generalized empirical method is a method. It is a normative pattern of related and recurrent operations that yield ongoing and cumulative results. It regards operations, and so it is not just a list of materials to be combined in a cake or a medicine. It regards recurrent operations, and so the same method can be employed over and over again. It yields ongoing and cumulative results,
and so it differs from the New Method Laundry which keeps on repeating the same result whenever it is used. Such cumulative results set a standard, and because the standard is met, the pattern of related operations is normative: it is the right way to do the job.

Generalized empirical method envisages all data. The natural sciences confine themselves to the data of sense. Hermeneutic and historical studies turn mainly to data that are expressions of meaning. Clinical psychology finds in meanings the symptoms of conflicts between conscious and preconscious or unconscious activities. Generalized empirical method operates on a combination of both the data of sense and the data of consciousness: it does not treat of objects without taking into account the corresponding operations of the subject; it does not treat of the subject's operations without taking into account the corresponding objects.

As generalized empirical method generalizes the notion of data to include the data of consciousness, so too it generalizes the notion of method. It wants to go behind the diversity that separates the experimental method of the natural sciences and the quite diverse procedures of hermeneutics and of history. It would discover their common core and thereby prepare the way for their harmonious combination in human studies. From various viewpoints man has been named the logical animal, the symbolic animal, the self-completing animal. But in each of these definitions, man is regarded as an animal, and so he is an object for the natural sciences. At the same time, he is regarded as logical or symbolic or self-completing; he lives his life in a world mediated by meaning; and so he is a proper object for hermeneutic and historical studies. What, then, is the common core of related and recurrent operations that may be discerned both in natural science and in human studies.

In the natural sciences the key event is discovery. Whether we recall Archimedes' *Eureka* or the legend of Newton associating a falling apple with a falling moon, whether
we turn from epoch-making discoveries to the larger field of less surprising but no less essential contributions, we ever find ourselves at the point where natural science has made a quantum leap. Something new has emerged.

Again, in hermeneutics the key event is understanding: for the theorist of hermeneutics was Schleiermacher, and he got beyond the various rules-of-thumb of classical scholars and biblical exegetes by expounding a discipline based on the avoidance of misunderstanding and thereby the avoidance of misinterpretation.

In history, again, the key operation is understanding, and so it was that Johann Gustav Droysen extended the procedures of hermeneutics to the whole of history by observing that not only individuals but also families, peoples, states, religions express themselves.

Nor is understanding alien to common sense. It is the everyday experience of seeing what you mean, getting the point, catching on, seeing how things hang together. Indeed, when we esteem people for their intelligence, it is because of the ease and frequency with which they understand; and when we suspect that they may be a bit retarded, it is because they understand only rarely and then slowly.

However, understanding is only one of the many components that have to be combined to constitute an instance of human knowledge. It presupposes data, whether given to sense or given in consciousness: for our understanding always is an insight, a grasp of intelligible unity or intelligible relationship; and a grasp of unity presupposes the presentation of what needs unification, as a grasp of intelligible relationship presupposes the presentation of what can be related. Again, such insight or grasp presupposes inquiry, that search, hunt, chase for the way to piece together the merely given into an intelligible unity or innerly related whole. Nor is it enough to discover the solution. One also must express it adequately. Otherwise one will have had the mere experience
of the occurrence of a bright idea, but one will not have the power to recall it, use it, apply it. There is a further point to such expression whether in word or deed. Insights are a dime a dozen. For the most part they occur, not with respect to data in all their complexity, but with respect to merely schematic images. Dozens of such images are needed to approximate to what actually is given, and so it is that the expression of insight has to be followed by a very cool and detached process of reflection that marshals the relevant evidence and submits it to appropriate tests before laying claim to any discovery or invention.

Such in briefest outline is the normative pattern of recurrent and related operations that yield ongoing and cumulative results in natural science, in hermeneutics, in history, in common sense. It will be noted that the operations involved occur consciously: in dreamless sleep one does not experience or inquire or understand or formulate or reflect or check or pass judgment. Not only are the operations conscious. There also is a dynamism that moves one along from one operation to the next. There is the spontaneity of sense. There is the intelligence with which we inquire in order to understand and, once we have understood, there is the intelligence with which we formulate what we have grasped. There is the reasonableness with which we reflect on our formulations, check them out, pronounce in the light of the evidence we have brought to light. Such spontaneity, intelligence, reasonableness are themselves conscious. So it is that both the operations and the relations that unite them in a normative pattern are given in consciousness.

But their givenness, of itself, is only infrastructure. It is not yet human knowledge but only one component within an item of knowledge of which the remainder as yet is only potential. To make that remainder actual one has to attend to one's attending, note how spontaneously it fixes upon what gives delight, promises pleasure,
threatens danger, recall the long years at school when teachers labored to sublimate our animal spirits and harness them to different, allegedly higher pursuits, so that now without too much pain one can sit through a whole lecture and even listen to most of it. One has to advert to one's own intelligence, its awareness when one is failing to understand, its dissatisfaction with explanations that do not quite explain, its puzzled search for the further question that would clear the matter up, its joy when a solution comes to light, its care to find the exact expression to convey precisely what understanding has grasped. In brief, attending to one's own intelligence brings to light a primitive and basic meaning of the word, normative, for the intelligence in each of us prompts us to seek understanding, to be dissatisfied with a mere glimmer, to keep probing for an ever fuller grasp, to pin down in accurate expression just what we so far have attained. In similar fashion, attending to one's own reasonableness reveals an equally primitive and basic but complementary type of normativeness. Ideas are fine, but no matter how bright, they are not enough. The practical man wants to know whether they will work. The theoretical man will wonder whether they are true: he will test their inner coherence, compare them with what he otherwise considers established, work out their implications, devise experiments to see whether the implications are verifiable, and if no flaw can be found, he will grant, not that they are true, but only that they seem probable. Our reasonableness demands sufficient evidence, marshals and weighs all it can find, is bound to assent when evidence is sufficient, and may not assent when it is insufficient. Finally, there is the normativeness of our deliberations. Between necessity and impossibility lies the realm of freedom and responsibility. Because we are free, we also are responsible, and in our responsibility we may discern another primitive and basic instance of normativeness. It is, so to speak, the reasonableness of action. Just as we
cannot be reasonable and pass judgment beyond or against the evidence, so too we cannot be responsible without advertising to what is right and what is wrong, without enjoying the peace of a good conscience when we choose what is right, without suffering the disquiet of an unhappy conscience when we choose what is wrong.

It is time to conclude. We have been asking whether there is any connection between inner conviction and objective truth. By inner conviction we have meant not passion, not stubbornness, not willful blindness, but the very opposite; we have meant the fruit of self-transcendence, of being attentive, intelligent, reasonable, responsible; in brief, of being ruled by the inner norms that constitute the exigences for authenticity in the human person. But for objectivity we have distinguished two interpretations. There is the objectivity of the world of immediacy, of the already-out-there-now, of the earth that is firm-set only in the sense that at each moment it has happened to resist my treading feet and bear my weight. But there also is the objectivity of the world mediated by meaning; and that objectivity is the fruit of authentic subjectivity, of being attentive, intelligent, reasonable, responsible.

In my opinion, then, inner conviction is the conviction that the norms of attentiveness, intelligence, reasonableness, responsibility have been satisfied. And satisfying those norms is the high road to the objectivity to be attained in the world mediated by meaning and motivated by values.