September 11, 2003, Part 1

I propose to take as my topic for today’s introductory lecture a statement from p. 7 of the preface to *Insight*, ‘My aim was … to seek a common ground on which [people] of intelligence might meet.’ And perhaps we might place that statement into a context provided by a longer passage at the end of chapter 16 (p. 552):

As there is a post-Cartesian affirmation of philosophy that rules theology out of court, so there is a post-Kantian affirmation of science that tosses overboard even Kant’s modest claims for philosophy, and there is a still later totalitarian violence that with equal impartiality brushes aside theology and philosophy and science. But at that empty conclusion to the sequence of ever less comprehensive syntheses, man still exists and man still is called upon to decide. Archaists urge him to imagine that he lives in an age of liberalism, or rationalism, or faith. Futurists paint for him a utopia that cannot disguise its own mythical features. But the plain fact is that the world lies in pieces before him and pleads to be put together again, to be put together not as it stood before on the careless foundation of assumptions that happened to be unquestioned but on the strong ground of the possibility of questioning and with full awareness of the range of possible answers.

Common to both statements is the word ‘ground’: a ‘common ground on which people of intelligence might meet,’ and ‘the strong ground of the possibility of questioning.’ And one ground is the other. The common ground on which we might meet is by identity the strong ground of the possibility of questioning. The urgency of uncovering that ground appears in the second statement, but it is not at all absent from the preface from which the first statement is taken. And what Lonergan could not have known while he was writing this book in search of a ground is how much more desperate is the exigence for such an open space for dialogue now than even then. The world lies in pieces before us both intellectually and physically. Intellectually, the fragmentation of knowledge has grown only more acute, and there are those who will tell us that there is no ground at all, that this is the way it is. These are called anti-foundationalists, and one of the major questions in any contemporary reading of Lonergan is whether his clear affirmation of foundational reality and of an articulation of that reality in ‘foundations’ is subject to the critique of the anti-foundationalists. Certainly, when the possibility of independent inquiry and open communication, the possibility of questioning, is stifled, the seeds of totalitarianism or of some other form of nihilism have already been sown. And then the world will lie in pieces before us not only intellectually but also physically and materially, like the collapsed towers in New York precisely two years ago today. And it may be that Lonergan means by ‘foundational reality’ simply the possibility of independent inquiry and open communication, and by ‘foundations’ the articulation of that possibility. I
would propose that this will be a major issue involved in a 2003-2004 reading of a book like *Insight*.

I once wrote that there is emerging a new period of Lonergan studies, where the major themes are community, dialogue, otherness, mediation, and plurality. Some characteristics of Lonergan’s early writings made some people regard him as only remotely concerned about such themes, perhaps intellectually concerned but not existentially so. And yet perhaps that is a misreading. To state upfront in a preface to a major work in philosophy, to a work that in effect attempts to redraw the map of the discipline and in my estimation largely succeeds in doing so, that one is seeking a common ground on which people can meet is to evince a concern for these themes – for community, dialogue, otherness, mediation, and plurality – that is more than simply intellectual.

However this might be, these two statements express at least something of what *Insight* is all about. And yet we cannot leave it there. For to leave it there could easily create the impression that the book is simply reactive, attempting however profoundly and compassionately to heal the effects of a crisis, but basically involved only in a kind of intellectual palliative care for a small community already convinced that civilization is over and seeking an enclave of peace and rationality while awaiting some apocalyptic conclusion. Lonergan did not exclude the possibility of an apocalypse, but he did not leave it there. He once wrote a wonderful short lecture entitled ‘Healing and Creating in History,’ and he made the point that healing without creating is like a soul without a body. The fact is that the crisis that affects us is at its roots a crisis of meaning, and as such it is a function of the fact that something very new is emerging. The discovery of the common ground, of the strong ground, would also be the uncovering of the possibility of a new stage or plateau in what Lonergan calls in several places the intellectual control of meaning. The word ‘control,’ of course, has to be understood as he intended it, to signify not some sort of totalitarian or bureaucratic or ecclesiastical suppression of questions and answers but rather a self-possessed intellectual and existential monitoring of just what is going forward in our time.

What, then, is going forward? Historians are far better at telling us what was going forward in previous times than contemporaries are in stating just what is going forward in their own time. Historians have not only historical experience but also historical knowledge, and their historical knowledge is far greater than that of contemporaries. We have a great deal of historical experience, but not much historical knowledge about our own time. Still, we can ask just what our historical experience is, and Lonergan makes a contribution to answering that question.

In *Method in Theology* there is talk of a ‘third stage of meaning.’ The notion of stages of meaning is a model or an ideal type, and a model or ideal type is not something that describes reality but a mental construction that it might be helpful to have around when one is describing reality. The key to this particular mental construction is the differentiation of consciousness, and that is more than a model. There is such a thing as the relative differentiation or nondifferentiation of consciousness. Thus, a first stage of meaning follows the mode of more or less developed common sense; a second stage adds
theory controlled by a logic; and a third stage takes its stand on what Lonergan calls interiority. In the third stage concern shifts from meanings to the acts of meaning, from products to sources, from objects to operations, and then to a synthesis of operations and objects in a higher viewpoint. What *Insight* conceived as a search for a common ground became a cumulative and progressive effort to articulate a normative source of meaning, a horizon that those who have accepted the invitation that begins to be issued in *Insight* might share. The major moments in Lonergan’s development are successive increments in the clearing of that common ground, that normative source of meaning. *Insight* is only the beginning of the attempt to clear the ground. But everything else builds upon it.

What, then, is the common ground, as Lonergan conceived it in this book? And how does his thinking on this issue develop?

It is in *Insight* that the common ground emerges, not as a set of contents of intellectual acts, but as a basic group of operations that constitute all human beings as human knowers. And the central operation is the one that he calls insight. In the course of the book, we will be asked to recognize in our own experience at least the following kinds of insight (and these are not all mutually exclusive; some of them overlap):

- the direct insight that grasps intelligibility in the presentations of sense and imagination, whether in science or in common sense;
- the inverse insight that grasps that, in a sense, there is no intelligibility to be grasped where I thought there was;
- the identifying insight that discovers a unity-identity-whole in data;
- the reflective insight that ascertains that the conditions for a prospective judgment have or have not been fulfilled;
- the introspective insight that grasps a structure in the data of consciousness;
- the basic philosophic insights that articulate the structure of knowing, the meaning of ‘being,’ and the elements of objectivity;
- the metaphysical insights that work out the implications of a basic isomorphism between knowing and known, that acknowledge that the truly known is being, and so that greet being as intrinsically intelligible;
- the genetic insights that specify the operators of development;
- the dialectical insights that press for coherence between performance and concept and so reverse what is incoherent with the basic positions on knowing, being, and objectivity;
- the practical insights that size up situations and, when moral, grasp what possibly it would be good for one to do;
- the limit insights that grasp one’s own incapacity for sustained development on the basis of one’s own resources;
- the religious insights that discern the gift of a higher integration;
- the theological insights that employ analogies to ground a few stuttering words about transcendent mystery.

As Lonergan will emphasize over and over again, in all of this the point is missed entirely if one concentrates exclusively on the content of the examples that he provides of these
insights. The common ground of these insights is exclusively the fact that they are all insights, they are all acts of understanding. In the one subject that common ground enables there to be derived an integration not only of the knower but also of the known. In many subjects, that common ground enables a certain level and quality of communication and collaboration, of ‘discourse ethics,’ if I may use Jürgen Habermas’s phrase. The fact that we all have insights, and so that we all share the common dynamic that the early chapters of the book unfold, is, when affirmed, the basic and radical move onto the common ground. And the fact that we are asked not only to acknowledge that common ground, but also to appropriate it by relating insight to its antecedent conditions and its results in human knowing and living marks that new and common ground as also a new plateau of meaning. The beginning of the articulation of the common ground, of what later he would call the normative source of meaning, has begun with insight into insight.

This insight into insight is also an owning of who one is. It is an appropriation. It is a claim upon a natural right that no one can take away from one. Furthermore, it is the acknowledgment of a task, a responsibility, an imperative or set of imperatives. All of these different types of insight occur in a common field named consciousness or self-presence, the ‘subject as subject.’ This field can never be fully objectified, since the human subject doing the objectifying is always and inescapably beyond the subject as objectified. The subject as subject will never coincide completely with the subject as object. That difference, I believe, is at the source of the deconstructive efforts of Jacques Derrida, and especially at the source of his notion of the trace, if I am understanding him correctly. This is not to say that Lonergan and Derrida draw the same conclusions from that difference – far from it. But at least to this extent they are acknowledging something similar. No less than Derrida, Lonergan does not acknowledge a ‘turn to the subject’ that would be a turn to the subject as an object of some controlling inner look. And I suspect that the difference between Derrida and Lonergan is that for Lonergan the field in which the turn occurs, consciousness, is not perception, not representation, not knowledge except in the limited sense of awareness, self-presence, and that Derrida might not be clear on this. That, however, is simply in the realm of hypothesis at the present time.

At any rate, for Lonergan the field is the field of the awareness of self, of the self-taste, that accompanies all conscious acts and states. The objectification of it that is possible can occur only through a humbling and purifying heightening of awareness itself, a heightening that enables not only an attending to, and insight into the relations of, the successive operations and states that occur in the unfolding of conscious dynamism, but also a personal judgment that this is what I am and a decision to be faithful to it.

*Insight* discloses other operations besides those of experience of data of sense and of consciousness and insight into those data. The link between these two ‘levels’ of consciousness is the question for intelligence: What? Why? How often? etc., and the insight itself is productive of the inner word or set of concepts that, when formulated in language, prompts a further question, this time for critical reflection, Is it so? This question is satisfied by the reflective insight that (1) grasps that the conditions for a judgment are or are not fulfilled, (2) grounds the inner word of yes or no, and so (3)
results in judgment. Holding the entire process together is the desire to know, which is spontaneous and unrestricted but not automatic. While it is never satisfied on any issue until the yes or no of reasonable judgment is reached, and while it then resumes the process by turning to other questions, its governance of conscious performance can be blocked by bias of different kinds. And so Lonergan’s uncovering of the various forms of bias is a further disclosure of the common ground, but this time of its darker elements.

September 11, 2003, Part 2

Next and related to this, in Insight Lonergan made an initial move toward clarifying what he would later acknowledge as a distinct level of consciousness, the level of decision. The language that Insight will use for the clearing of the common ground is ‘the self-appropriation of one’s rational self-consciousness.’ I will come back to this in a moment. And before he turns to decision and ethics, Lonergan draws out the implications of the self-affirmation of the empirically, intelligently, and rationally conscious knowing subject by outlining an integral heuristic structure of the known, a metaphysics, that constitutes a brilliant beginning upon overcoming the fragmentation of knowledge itself.

Now with the eventual recognition that decision names a fourth level of activity beyond those constituting us as knowers, Lonergan gradually shifts the language for the space of the common ground from ‘rational self-consciousness’ to ‘intentionality.’ The normative source of meaning consists of more than the acts of meaning that in Insight are called formal (conceptualization) and full (judgment). Meaning is effective and constitutive, and grounding its constitutive function is the world constitution and self-constitution, the making of being, that occurs in the existential moments in which we realize that it is up to ourselves to decide individually and communally what we are going to make of ourselves. Lonergan’s later reflections on these moments, for example in Method in Theology, go far beyond the limited and somewhat limiting analysis of decision in Insight, even as they preserve the latter’s essential grasp of the utter contingency of decision and action in relation to the knowledge that precedes it. On my own interpretation, in Insight Lonergan is offering an account of the operations entailed in decision that would correspond to what St Ignatius of Loyola calls the third time of election, that is, the time in which the subject deciding is in a state of equilibrium and so is free to use his or her powers of intelligence and rationality to arrive at the good decision. In Method in Theology the account shifts, and here the operations that are described and related to one another match more closely Ignatius’s second time of election, in which one must weigh the pulls and counter-pulls of affectivity and go with what leads to equilibrium and peace and self-transcendence. (The question remains, of course, as to what in Lonergan’s terms matches what Ignatius calls equilibrium; and I would suggest that it is the structure of self-transcendence in knowledge, decision, and religion, as that structure is permeated by feeling.)

At any rate, one of the new emphases in the unfolding of the common ground, or the normative source of meaning, is the role later accorded to feelings. Potential values are apprehended in intentional feelings, that is, in those feelings that respond to an apprehended object or course of action. The process of deliberation that follows is one in
which a person ascertains whether the possible value thus apprehended is truly or only apparently good. The truly good, while it may also be immediately satisfying, is not discerned on the basis of that criterion, for what is satisfying may also not be a genuine good. The truly good, rather, carries us to transcend ourselves, and on that basis Lonergan suggests a normative scale of values that, I believe, is of utmost importance for historical understanding and action. Values are vital, social, cultural, personal, and religious, in an ascending order of self-transcendence, and the levels of value are related in a complex fashion that I have attempted to spell out in greater detail in my book *Theology and the Dialectics of History*. For example, the collaborative and communicative process of open and honest conversation about what is most important for human living is what Lonergan would call a cultural value. But it arises upon and is conditioned by the infrastructural foundation of the social institutions that either encourage its occurrence or, in Habermas’s terms, more or less systematically distort communication. It depends upon the authenticity of the persons who engage in it and so on the extent and solidity of the processes of conversion they have undergone. And to the extent that it is effective it changes both these persons in their capacity as originating personal value and the social institutions that constitute part of its infrastructural base.

Thus, with the acknowledgment of decision as a distinct level of what he came to call intentional consciousness – an acknowledgment that was firmly in place by 1957 – Lonergan began to move to the articulation of a far richer notion of the human good than the purely cognitional foundations of *Insight* permitted. The grounds for its unfolding lie at least in part in the integration that deliberation effects of the knowing that *Insight* differentiated and of the feeling that is acknowledged in the later works as a distinct element in the normative source of meaning or common ground of communication and collaboration.

To this point, then, the common ground, when appropriated, is a distinct plateau consisting of four levels of intentional consciousness – in shorthand, experience, understanding, judgment, and decision – and of the feelings that are the mass and momentum of intentional consciousness and that must be submitted to a self-appropriation analogous to that which Lonergan’s analysis of intentionality enables with respect to operations.

The next step in the clearing of the common ground or in the ascent to a new plateau of meaning or in the articulation of the normative source of meaning in history – the three are now coterminous – is the revelation and appropriation of love as the supreme instance of personal value and the highest confluence of intentional operation with feeling. This theme emerges with particular poignancy in the late essays published in *A Third Collection* (1985). Love is total commitment, whether in intimacy, in the family, in interpersonal relations, in the civic community, or in relationship with Transcendent Mystery. It can be so powerful as to dismantle previous horizons, reveal new values that one could not previously have apprehended, and start one on a whole new course of living, transform one into a new creation. Its working, then, is often strangely independent of the upwardly moving creative dynamism that proceeds through knowledge to decision. It would seem that, if it proceeds from knowledge and decision,
the knowledge and decision are not ours but God’s. The kind of love that Lonergan is speaking about is a created participation in the passive spiration within the triune God that is the Holy Spirit, proceeding as love from the Father as Agape and the Father’s Word as Wisdom and Judgment of Value.

Love has a movement through the common ground that is inverse to the upward movement that has preoccupied us to this point. Love first reveals values in their splendor and efficacy, and transvalues our values as it shapes a new horizon. It then discloses, among values, the value of truth, and so strengthens us in the pursuit of intelligibility and truth through our cognitive operations. And usually ever so slowly, it transforms our very sensitive, dramatic, and intersubjective spontaneity, so that body joins psyche and spirit in one total loving commitment, one complete yes to existence in the cosmos and to our negotiated and discerned place within it.

It is my view, though, that the most important moment or step in Lonergan’s clearing of a common ground on which all men and women could, if they so wish, meet was formulated only after all of the above elements had been worked out in his major writings. In some of the essays that he wrote in the last ten years of his life, he portrays this four-tiered structure of intentional consciousness and concomitant feeling as open on both ends: open to what he variously calls (1) a tidal movement that precedes waking experience on one end and that goes beyond responsible decision on the other end, or (2) the passionateness of being that is the very upwardly and indeterminately directed universal dynamism that in Insight he called finality. Most significant of all is the assertion in ‘Natural Right and Historical Mindedness’ that the normative source of meaning consists of more than our intentional operations. It lies in an entire ongoing process of self-transcendence that embraces the levels of intentional operations in a more inclusive whole. Underpinning the subject as experientially, intelligently, rationally, morally conscious is a symbolic operator that through image and affect coordinates neural processes with the goals of intentionality. Accompanying that same subject, as we have seen, is the mass and momentum of feeling. And going beyond that subject is an operator of interpersonal relations, total commitment, and religious love. The latter elements are now located, not on the fourth level of intentional consciousness, but on a level or even levels beyond what intentionality analysis alone can disclose. And the former ingredients introduce a most elemental level of consciousness that can be called primordial psychic process.

My own way of articulating this development is as follows. If intentional consciousness, at least in its dramatic pattern of operations, can be called the search for direction in the movement of life, then this tidal wave or passionateness of being that underpins, accompanies, and overarches intentional operations is the very movement of life itself. It too calls for negotiation, as did the intentional operations whose working and interrelations Lonergan discloses. But negotiating the operations is distinct from negotiating the movement, however much each negotiation has to ‘Be Attentive, Be Intelligent, Be Reasonable, and Be Responsible.’ The normative source of meaning is, in the last analysis, more than intelligence and more than intentional operations. It is the dialectical interplay of these with an autonomous but related movement of life that begins
before intentional operations, in neural processes and psychic imagery and affect, and that reaches beyond intentional operations in a total being-in-love in families, in communities, and with God. The entire ongoing process of self-transcendence that is the normative source of meaning is more than intentional operations, and this ‘more’ is what Lonergan pointed to and began to articulate towards the end of his life, and what I have attempted to articulate in the notion of psychic conversion.

That very notion brings us to the latest step, if you will, in the articulation of the common ground or new plateau or normative source. For the first level of consciousness, the level called ‘experience,’ where the precept ‘Be attentive’ holds, is more than Lonergan was able to articulate it to be. It is a level of ‘reception,’ and among that data that are received are meanings and values themselves, the sort of thing that Heidegger is about in his talk of Verstehen and Wittgenstein in his talk of the public meaningfulness of language. This is the latest step to be proposed in the articulation of the normative structure, but more on that later. Our present focus is not the latest step, but the first one, the insight into insight on which the rest of this material is built.
Insight is an invitation to embark on a process that is called the self-appropriation of one’s rational self-consciousness. One begins this process by coming into reflective and explanatory possession of the operations that constitute oneself as a knower. For Kant the first question in philosophy was, What are the conditions of valid knowing? For Lonergan there is a more basic question: What am I doing when I am knowing? Kant’s question is the question for epistemology, but prior to epistemology is what Lonergan calls cognitional theory.

Central to the operations entailed in knowing is the frequently neglected act that he calls insight. The act of insight (to use the instance of the detective story) is ‘not the mere apprehension of any clue, not the mere memory of all, but a quite distinct activity of organizing intelligence that places the full set of clues in a unique explanatory perspective.’ It is not ‘any act of attention or advertence or memory but the supervening act of understanding’ (3). Cognitional theory begins with a description of the act of insight and an explanatory account that begins to relate that act to its antecedents and consequents. Comment on ‘organizing’ and epistemological problems in the Scholastic tradition. (One way of reading Insight is as an act of resistance vis-à-vis a good deal of this tradition.)

The act to which the book is calling attention receives, Lonergan says, little attention from philosophers, but ‘its function in cognitional activity is so central that to grasp it in its conditions, its working, and its results is to confer a basic yet startling unity on the whole field of human inquiry and human opinion’ (3). See 552: ‘... the world lies in pieces before us and pleads to be put together again, to be put together not as it stood before on the careless foundation of assumptions that happened to be unquestioned but on the strong ground of the possibility of questioning and with full awareness of the range of possible answers.’

The point to the book, then, is not understanding sets of elements, as in mathematics, or ranges of phenomena, as in physics, or concrete situations, as in common sense, but understanding understanding, insight into insight. The effort is to reach ‘the act of organizing intelligence that brings within a single perspective the insights of mathematicians, scientists, and [people] of common sense’ (4).

Why the order followed in chapters 1-7? 4: ‘... the precise nature of the act of understanding is to be seen most clearly in mathematical examples; the dynamic context in which understanding occurs can be studied to best advantage in an investigation of scientific methods; the disturbance of that dynamic context by alien concerns is thrust upon one’s attention by the manner in which various measures of common nonsense blend with common sense.’

Since ‘insight is not only a mental activity but also a constituent factor in human knowledge,’ insight into insight will yield a knowledge of knowledge that will go to the core of ‘a whole series of basic problems in philosophy’ (4). The first six of these are philosophical in the strictest traditional sense, that is, concerned, with issues of knowing and being. They can be listed as follows (and for the moment we will be content simply to list them).
What is the source of clear and distinct ideas (‘intellectualism’ versus ‘conceptualism’)?
What is the meaning of meaning (hermeneutical questions)?
What is the range of synthetic a priori components in knowing (the Kantian problem)?
How does one construct a philosophy?
How does one construct a metaphysics?
How does one verify a philosophy and a metaphysics? ‘... every statement in philosophy and metaphysics can be shown to imply statements regarding cognitional fact’ (5) and thus be verified.

7 Further philosophic implications are more existential. There is the contrast between the dynamic context (‘detached and disinterested inquiry,’ a phrase that would yield in Lonergan’s later works to ‘self-transcendence’) in which insights emerge and the contrary dynamic contexts of the flight from understanding; and so insight into insight must include an insight into the principal devices of the flight from understanding. Again, the principal form of the flight from understanding that will occupy present attention is its philosophic form, that is, the neglect of insight in philosophy itself. This neglect, Lonergan says, may seem harmless but can have long-standing consequences. (I would offer a theological example: if one neglects the emanation of word from understanding, one has no analogy for the divine procession of the eternal Word in God. Cf. Rahner, who for all his wonderful brilliance simply could not get the Thomist trinitarian theory of intelligible emanation; the reason lies back at the level of cognitional theory, where there is not an appreciation of insight generating an inner word.) At any rate, the consequences of each context can be traced, and a philosophy can be assembled that is at once methodical, critical, and comprehensive. This is the claim, and this explains the aim with which we began last week: ‘to seek a common ground on which [people] of intelligence might meet’ (7).

8 Lonergan claims as well that there are practical implications of this procedure. It reveals what activity is intelligent and what is not, and so what is the source of cumulative progress. Cumulative progress would be a course of events something like this: situations-insights-policies-actions-new situations-further insights-better policies-more effective action, etc., etc. Cumulative decline would look like this: situations-flight from understanding-blocking needed insights-unintelligent policies-inapt courses of action-deteriorating situation-still further insights blocked-more unintelligent policies-more inept action, etc., with absurd situations providing seeming evidence for bias. ‘So in ever increasing measure measure intelligence comes to be regarded as irrelevant to practical living. Human activity settles down to a decadent routine, and initiative becomes the privilege of violence’ (8).

9 There are world-historical concerns as well. See 8-9, beginning ‘Unfortunately ...’

September 18, 2003, Part 2

10 The introduction proceeds through five disjunctions, to set forth the aim of the book. The first is that the question is not whether knowledge exists but what precisely it is. More specifically, there is a duality in human knowing, there are two different kinds, two diverse forms. 12: ‘... the question of human knowledge is not whether it exists but what precisely are its two diverse forms and what are the relations between them.’ (He intersperses his comments on this question passim throughout the introduction, so we will address it as it arises there.)
11 Secondly, the emphasis will be not on cognitional contents but on cognitive acts, on the subject, on cognitional praxis: 12: ‘… our primary concern is not the known but the knowing. The known is extensive, but the knowing is a recurrent structure that can be investigated sufficiently in a series of strategically chosen instances … The known is incomplete and subject to revision, but our concern is the knower that will be the source of the future additions and revisions.’

So this is not a book on mathematics, science, common sense, metaphysics, theology, but on ‘the dynamic cognitional structure’ they exemplify, on ‘the personally appropriated structure of one’s own experiencing, one’s own intelligent inquiry and insights, one’s own critical reflection and judging and deciding.’ The crucial issue is experimental: one’s own ‘rational self-consciousness’ clearly and distinctly taking possession of itself as rational self-consciousness. This is a private act, in the sense that no one can do it for you. But it has public antecedents (e.g., this book, this class) and consequents (e.g. and primarily, the difference in you once you have done it: ‘Winter twilight cannot be mistaken for the summer noonday sun’ -- 13).

12 Thirdly, the book offers not a list of the abstract properties of human knowledge, but a personal appropriation of the concrete dynamic structure immanent and recurrently operative in one’s own cognitional activities. ‘… more than all else the aim of the book is to issue an invitation to a personal, decisive act’ (13). ‘… the point … is appropriation; the point is to discover, to identify, to become familiar with, the activities of one’s own intelligence’ (14) and to discriminate with ease and from personal conviction between the self-transcendence that manifests authenticity and the manifold of other concerns that can interfere with authentic emergence (to use later terminology that is perhaps more congenial).

13 Why, then, does he begin with mathematics and science? What is necessary from the first five chapters? If you look at the companion volume, Understanding and Being, where Lonergan is lecturing on Insight, you will see that it is not at all presumed that one be an expert in mathematics or physics in order to get started with the book. What is required is that one grasp (14) ‘the notion of insight, of the accumulation of insights, of higher viewpoints, and of their heuristic significance and implications.’ He found an advantage in illustrating these in mathematics and science, but the reader is urged to substitute his or her examples. And these elements are to be identified in one’s own personal experience. Mention is made also of the successive ‘levels’ of consciousness. Mathematics and science are appealed to because of their exactitude, because they exemplify the distinction of two kinds of knowing (see 15, first paragraph), and because they exhibit ‘concrete instances of the … larger, multiform dynamism that we are seeking to explore’ (16). 17: ‘… the hard fact is that the psychological problem exists, that there exist in [us] two diverse kinds of knowing, that they exist without differentiation and in an ambivalent confusion until they are distinguished explicitly and the implications of the distinction are drawn explicitly. The hard fact is that the personal psychological problem cannot be solved by the ordinary procedure of affirming the propositions that are true and denying the propositions that are false, for the true meaning of the true propositions always tends to be misapprehended by a consciousness that has not yet discovered its need of discovering what an Augustine took years and modern science centuries to discover.’ And what is this? 15: ‘St Augustine of Hippo narrates that it took him years to make the discovery that the name “real” might have a different connotation from the name “body.” Or, to bring the point nearer home, one might
say that it has taken modern science four centuries to make the discovery that the objects of its inquiry need not be imaginable entities moving through imaginable processes in an imaginable space-time.’ Again, in Lonergan’s later terms, what is at stake here is the distinction between knowing in the world of immediacy and knowing in the world mediated by meaning.

13 Fourthly, such an appropriation can occur only gradually, and so the book presents ‘a slow assembly of [the] elements, relations, alternatives, and implications’ of the dynamic structure. The book aids and encourages a development in you, and all development is painstaking and slow. So the book is written ‘from below upwards,’ from a moving viewpoint that successively sets up contexts only to go beyond them, until there is reached an ‘invariant upper context.’ See 19-20 on the invariant upper context that reaches ‘great concreteness on the side of the subject. Besides the noêma or intentio intenta or pensée pensée illustrated by the lower contexts P, Q, R, … and by the upper context that is Gödel’s theorem, there also is the noêsis or intentio intendens or pensée pensante that is constituted by the very activity of inquiring and reflecting, understanding and affirming, asking further questions and reaching further answers. Let us say that this noetic activity is engaged in a lower context when it is doing mathematics or following scientific method or exercising common sense. Then it will be moving toward an upper context when it scrutinizes mathematics or science or common sense in order to grasp the nature of noetic activity. And if it comes to understand and affirm what understanding is and what affirming is, then it has reached an upper context that logically is independent of the scaffolding of mathematics, science, and common sense. Moreover, if it can be shown that the upper context is invariant, that any attempt to revise it can be legitimate only if the hypothetical reviser refutes his own attempt by invoking experience, understanding, and reflection in an already prescribed manner, then it will appear that, while the noêma or intentio intenta or pensée pensée may always be expressed with greater accuracy and completeness, still the immanent and recurrently operative structure of the noêsis or intentio intendens or pensée pensante must always be one and the same.’ This will be the one major claim that is unique to this book. This will be the first judgment made in the book, and it occurs in chapter 11. Everything prior to it is leading up to it, and everything subsequent to it follows from it.

14 Fifthly, the order is governed not by abstract considerations of logical or metaphysical priority, but by concrete motives of pedagogical efficacy. The procedure is not a logical one of definition, postulation, and inference but ‘a prelogical and even preconceptual mode of communication’ (21) communicating insights in a manner analogous to evoking images or suggesting feelings. The illustrations are simple, and the point is not logical completeness but an insight into insight. Nor does the book begin from a presupposed and unexplained metaphysics but with ‘any sufficiently cultured consciousness.’ It ‘expands in virtue of the dynamic tendencies of that consciousness itself, and [it] heads through an understanding of all understanding to a basic understanding of all that can be understood’ (22). Thus: ‘Thoroughly understand what it is to understand, and not only will you understand the broad lines of all there is to be understood but also you will possess a fixed base, an invariant pattern, opening upon all further developments of understanding’ (22).
Appropriation will lead to the insight that *understanding correctly is knowing*. One will avoid the bog of a knowing that is without understanding (empiricism, positivism, etc.) and the immanentism, idealism, relativism that cling to understanding but sacrifice knowing (judging). ‘From the horns of that dilemma one escapes only through the discovery – and one has not made it yet if one has no clear memory of its startling strangeness – that there are two quite different realisms, that there is an incoherent realism, half animal and half human, that poses as a halfway house between materialism and idealism, and ... that there is an intelligent and reasonable realism between which and materialism the halfway house is idealism’ (22).

Conclude with the paragraph ‘The beginning ...’ (22, bottom), which offers an overview of the book to follow.
September 25, 2003, Part 1

1 Part 1 is on ‘Insight as Activity,’ and the first task is to attain familiarity with the act of insight. This can be done through very simple examples, and we should supply our own, whether in science or philosophy or in the more common domain of everyday problems and human relationships.

2 The insight of Archimedes (regarding the ratio of the weight of a given volume of one substance to that of an equal volume of another substance) reveals at least five characteristics of insight. This account is basically descriptive, but it will quickly yield to explanation. The first characteristic is that insight comes as a release to the tension of inquiry, it satisfies an antecedent desire, it is the fruit of an antecedent effort. 28: ‘Deep within us all, emergent when the noise of other appetites is stilled, there is a drive to know, to understand, to see why, to discover the reason, to find the cause, to explain ... The fact of inquiry is beyond all doubt. It can absorb a man. It can keep him for hours, day after day, year after year, in the narrow prison of his study or his laboratory. It can send him on dangerous voyages of exploration. It can withdraw him from other interests, other pursuits, other pleasures, other achievements. It can fill his waking thoughts, hide from him the world of ordinary affairs, invade the very fabric of his dreams. It can demand endless sacrifices that are made without regret though there is only the hope, never a certain promise, of success.’ Kekulé. ‘Insight’ thus understood is quite different from Heidegger’s Verstehen, which, I will maintain, is basically intelligent reception at the empirical level of consciousness. Verstehen is a matter of what Lonergan will later call ‘ordinary meaningfulness,’ which insight is ‘original meaningfulness.’

3 Second, insight comes suddenly and unexpectedly. It comes in a flash, on a trivial occasion, in a moment of relaxation, as when Archimedes was taking a bath. ‘... it is reached, in the last analysis, not by learning rules, not by following precepts, not by studying any methodology. Discovery is a new beginning. It is the origin of new rules that supplement or even supplant the old. Genius is creative. It is genius precisely because it disregards established routines, because it originates the novelties that will be the routines of the future.’ (29) There are no rules for discovery or precepts for genius (except the transcendental precepts). So too a teacher cannot make a pupil understand, but can only present the sensible elements in an issue in a suggestive order and with a proper distribution of emphasis.

4 Third, insight is a function, not of outer circumstances, but of inner conditions. This marks the ‘strange difference’ between insight and sensation. 29: ‘Unless one is deaf, one cannot avoid hearing. Unless one is blind, one has only to open one’s eyes to see. The occurrence and the content of sensation stand in some immediate correlation with outer circumstance. But with insight internal conditions are
paramount. Thus, insight depends upon native endowment … Again, insight depends upon a habitual orientation, upon a perpetual alertness ever asking the little question, Why? Finally, insight depends on the accurate presentation of definite problems.’ This last condition is related to the correct constellation of images.

5 Fourth, insight pivots between the concrete and the abstract or at least (in common sense) the general. In science the problem is concrete, and so is the solution, but the point of the intervening procedure involves abstract correlations and laws. 30: ‘... if insights arise from concrete problems, if they reveal their value in concrete applications, nonetheless they possess a significance greater than their origins and a relevance wider than their original applications. Because insights arise with reference to the concrete, geometers use diagrams, mathematicians need pen and paper, teachers need blackboards, pupils have to perform experiments for themselves, doctors have to see their patients, troubleshooters have to travel to the spot, people with a mechanical bent take things apart to see how they work. But because the significance and relevance of insight goes beyond any concrete problem or application, men formulate abstract sciences with their numbers and symbols, their technical terms and formulae, their definitions, postulates, and deductions. Thus by its very nature insight is the mediator, the hinge, the pivot. It is insight into the concrete world of sense and imagination. Yet what is known by insight, what insight adds to sensible and imagined presentations, finds its adequate expression only in the abstract and recondite formulations of the sciences.’ The latter holds, of course, for explanatory insight, not for common sense insight.

6 Fifth, insight passes into the habitual texture of one’s mind. 30-31: ‘Once one has understood, one has crossed a divide. What a moment ago was an insoluble problem now becomes incredibly simple and obvious. Moreover, it tends to remain simple and obvious. However laborious the first occurrence of an insight may be, subsequent repetitions occur almost at will. This ... constitutes the possibility of learning. For we can learn inasmuch as we can add insight to insight, inasmuch as the new does not extrude the old but complements and combines with it. Inversely, inasmuch as the subject to be learnt involves the acquisition of a whole series of insights, the process of learning is marked by an initial period of darkness in which one gropes about insecurely, in which one cannot see where one is going, in which one cannot grasp what all the fuss is about; and only gradually, as one begins to catch on, does the initial darkness yield to a subsequent period of increasing light, confidence, interest, absorption.’ This will be your experience in reading this book. RD: I think it is less true of insights in the commonsense realm, and especially in human relationships, that they pass into the habitual texture of one’s mind. People keep making the same mistakes, even after they have understood previous errors. We will see something of the reason for this: the insights have to penetrate the dramatic pattern of experience.
7 A second example is arriving at a definition of something or at the understanding of a definition. Lonergan uses the circle as an example, but if you have ever arrived at a definition use that definition as your example. In the definition of the circle you want the immanent reason or ground of the roundness of, say, a wheel, and so you don’t introduce other data (carts, carting, transportation, wheelwrights, tools); you simply consider the wheel. You try a suggestion: the wheel is round because its spokes are equal. That isn’t enough, but it gives you a clue, and the point is to push the clue for all it is worth. In this case you let the hub decrease to a point, the rim and spokes thin out into lines. Then you see that the wheel is round inasmuch as the distance from the center of the hub to the outside of the rim is always the same. Thus a circle is a locus of coplanar points equidistant from a center. In this case, insight grasps necessity and impossibility.

8 What has happened? First, the points and lines that you created cannot be imagined: all magnitude, all breadth and depth have disappeared.

9 Second, then, points and lines are not images, but concepts. They have been arrived at by thinking, by supposing; you begin with the clue (the equality of the spokes) and you push it until you have transcended imagination and moved into conception. Concepts, then, are constituted by the mere activity of supposing, thinking, considering, formulating, defining; and they do not occur at random, but in conjunction with an act of insight. Note that this relation between understanding and conceptualization is a major issue for Lonergan: insight into images is the ground of conceptualization. See Verbum chapter 1, regarding the first inner word. Still, there is a two-way process: knowing is discursive, we think in order to understand, we cannot think without concepts, and when we understand our thinking is clarified. (The issue is more complex, but for now we are doing well to grasp that there is a two-way process here: ordinary meaningfulness and original meaningfulness, received meanings and new meanings. Above all, grasp that Lonergan’s point is that new conceptualizations emerge from new insights.)

10 Third, the image was necessary for the insight. You have arrived at an insight that grasps necessity and impossibility. These cannot be imagined. The necessity and impossibility are not in the abstract but a necessity and impossibility resulting from these equal or unequal radii. If you eliminate the image of the center, the radii, and the curve, you lose the grasp of the necessary or the impossible roundness, and that grasp is what constitutes the insight. You have grasped necessity and impossibility in the concrete image, and that grasp constitutes your insight. ‘...the insight is the act of catching on to a connection between imagined equal radii and, on the other hand, a curve that is bound to look perfectly round’ (33, emphasis added).

11 Fourth, there is the question, the ‘Why?’, the psychological tension that has its release in the joy of discovery, the drive or desire to understand, the primordial ‘Why?’, alertness of mind, intellectual curiosity, the spirit of inquiry, active intelligence,
what the scholastics called agent intellect. It is the pure question that human consciousness in its authenticity is. 34: ‘It is prior to any insights, any concepts, any words; for insights, concepts, words have to do with answers, and before we look for answers we want them; such wanting is the pure question.’ (There is, of course, also a not wanting to understand; we will see a great deal about the flight from understanding in chapters 6 and 7.) And though the pure question is prior to insights, concepts, and words, in its every manifestation it presupposes experiences and images, data. We always wonder about something.

12 Fifth, then, the moments in the genesis of a definition, are the following: first, the emergence of the desire to understand; second, the hint, suggestion, clue, the beginning of insight; third, the cooperation of imagination with intellectual effort, running parallel to intelligent suppositions, and restraining supposition within some limits of approximation to the imaginable field; fourth, the achievement of a patterned set of concepts. 34-35: ‘By their cooperation, by successive adjustments, question and insight, image and concept present a solid front. The answer is a patterned set of concepts. The image strains to approximate to the concepts. The concepts, by added conceptual determinations, can express their differences from the merely approximate image. The pivot between images and concepts is the insight. And setting the standard which insight, images, and concepts must meet is the question, the desire to know, that could have kept the process in motion by further queries had its requirements not been satisfied.’

13 Sixth, there are different kinds of definitions. Nominal definitions merely tell us about the correct usage of names. A circle is a perfectly round plane curve. Explanatory definitions suppose a further insight into the immanent intelligibility of the object. A circle is a locus of coplanar points equidistant from a center. Implicit definitions consist in explanatory definition without nominal definition: ‘Two and only two points determine a straight line’ fixes the meaning of both point and line, but does not restrict ‘point’ to ‘position without magnitude’ or ‘line’ to ‘length without breadth or depth.’ One is not restricted to the objects about which one is first thinking; one can concentrate exclusively on the set of relationships in which the whole scientific significance consists. (This will be clearer later, in reference to terms implicitly defined by relations. But already on pp. 40-41: ‘Let numbers be defined implicitly by operations … Let operations be defined implicitly by rules …’)

14 Seventh, whence are the primitive terms of a definition derived? Every definition presupposes other terms; if these can be defined, their definitions will presuppose still other terms; are we to regress to infinity? Since we can’t, is our definition based on undefined terms, or are we defining terms in a circle? For Lonergan, every definition involves several terms, but no insight can be expressed by a single term, and it is not true that every insight presupposes previous insights. The point is insight, not concept. There are logical operations, but there are also nonlogical operations. 36: ‘... for every basic insight there is a circle of terms and relations, such that the terms fix the relations, the relations fix the terms, and the
**insight fixes both.** If one grasps the necessary and sufficient conditions for the perfect roundness of this imagined plane curve, then one grasps not only the circle but also the point, the line, the circumference, the radii, the plane, and equality. All the concepts tumble out together, because all are needed to express adequately a single insight. All are coherent, for coherence basically means that all hang together from a single insight.’ The point here is not to confuse insight and logic.

**September 25, 2003, Part 2**

15 **Section 3:** Insight develops, and the development may take the form of a homogeneous expansion or of a higher viewpoint. In a homogeneous expansion no change is involved in the notions and operations already employed: e.g., the move from addition and subtraction to multiplication and division, powers and roots, does not involve a change in the notions and operations of addition and subtraction. In a higher viewpoint there is such a change: e.g., the new set of rules governing operations that generate numbers when one allows the operations their full generality – rules for fractions, signs, equations, indices, etc., redefining the notions of addition, multiplication, powers, subtraction, division, roots. (Note the typo on p. 39, line 14: additional > addition.) In *Understanding and Being*, higher viewpoints are correlated with the transition to a further system, when a given system produces questions that cannot be answered in terms of the system (54).

16 There are successive higher viewpoints. 42: ‘At each stage of the process there exists a set of rules that govern operations which result in numbers. To each stage there corresponds a symbolic image of doing arithmetic, doing algebra, doing calculus. In each successive image there is the potentiality of grasping by insight a higher set of rules that will govern the operations and by them elicit the numbers or symbols of the next stage.’

17 Here as elsewhere an apt symbolism is important, indeed crucial. For ‘mathematical operations are not merely the logical expansion of conceptual premises. Image and question, insight and concepts all combine. The function of the symbolism is to supply the relevant image, and the symbolism is apt inasmuch as its immanent patterns as well as the dynamic patterns of its manipulation run parallel to the rules and operations that have been grasped by insight and formulated in concepts’ (42).

18 An apt symbolism (1) takes over a notable part of the solution of problems, (2) constitutes a heuristic technique, (3) offers clues, hints, suggestions, (4) endows the pattern of a mathematical expression with the totality of its meaning, so that as long as that symbolic pattern is unchanged, the mathematical meaning is invariant, and (5) provides the image in which may be grasped by insight the rules for the next stage.
19 One of the sources of higher viewpoints lies in inverse insights. Inverse insights also presuppose a positive object presented by sense or represented by imagination. But they grasp that in some fashion the point is that there is no point, the solution is to deny a solution; the inverse insight is that one is on the wrong track, asking the wrong question; inverse insights deny an expected intelligibility, not one already reached. They generally occur in the context of far larger developments of understanding, and later developments exploit their negative contribution. Lonergan gives as concrete examples in maths and science of irrational numbers or surds (the square root of 2 is not and cannot be the rational fraction that intelligence anticipates it to be); noncountable multitudes; Newton’s law that a body continues in its existing state of uniform motion in a straight line unless that state is changed by external force; relativity’s postulate that the mathematical expression of physical principles and laws is invariant under the transformation from one set of axes to another. Always there is some concomitant positive context and the dependence of inverse insight on concomitant direct insights. The index, under 'Insight, inverse,' indicates other places in the book where inverse insights are discussed. Perhaps the most notable for many of us involves the notion of the social surd; see, for example, pp. 711-12, where the existential significance is clear.

20 The three characteristics of inverse insight, then, are (a) a positive empirical object, (b) a negation of intelligibility, and (c) the negation runs counter to the spontaneous anticipations of human intelligence. It can be, but is not necessarily, connected with ideas or principles or methods or techniques of quite exceptional significance.

21 A distinct but related notion is the empirical residue. (Note: in Understanding and Being 57-58, L simply makes empirical residue a 'much more general instance' of inverse insight itself.) It is introduced to explore the significance of inverse insights (see p. 50). It consists in positive empirical data, but it is to be denied any immanent intelligibility of its own, and it is connected with some compensating higher intelligibility of notable importance. The difference from inverse insight is that no one expects it to have any immanent intelligibility of its own, and it is characterized by a connection with higher intelligibility in a way that inverse insight is not; (inverse insight is regularly connected with such higher intelligibility, but not characterized by it; see editorial note q).

22 Thus, particular places and times differ, and there is no immanent intelligibility to be grasped by direct insight into that fact. But then, they also involve no modification in the intelligibility of anything else. 52: 'It is not mere difference of place but something different in the places that gives rise to different observations or different experimental results in different places. Similarly, it is not mere difference in time but something different at the time that gives rise to different observations and different experimental results at different times ... Were that not so, every place and every time would have its own physics, its own chemistry, its own biology; and since a science cannot be worked out
instantaneously in a single place, there would be no physics, no chemistry, and no biology. Conversely, because the differences of particular places and particular times pertain to the empirical residue, there exists the powerful technique of scientific collaboration. Scientists of every place and every time can pool their results in a common fund, and there is no discrimination against any result merely because of the place or merely because of the time of its origin.’

23 Again, merely numerical difference means that, e.g., ‘every chemical element and every compound differs from every other kind of element or compound, and all the differences have to be explained. [But] every hydrogen atom differs from every other hydrogen atom, and no explanation is needed.’ This makes possible scientific generalization. ‘... when any set of data has been explained completely, another set of data similar in all respects would not call for a different explanation ... when any set of data has been explained completely, only an exhaustive tour of inspection could establish that there does not exist another set of data similar in all respects’ (53). Note: Lonergan is here talking about the expectations of what in the next chapter he will call classical empirical method; in fact, there is a different kind of intelligibility grounded in the empirical residue, statistical intelligibility, and it combines with classical intelligibility to give a rounded scientific worldview.

24 Abstraction is understood in these terms. To abstract is to grasp the essential and disregard the incidental, to see what is significant and set aside the irrelevant, to recognize the important as important and the negligible as negligible, either at some given stage of development or at the term of a given development. The empirical residue will always be incidental, irrelevant, negligible, left over without explanation even when a science reaches full development.
Chapter 2 makes a first move toward capturing the essential dynamism of human intelligence. The meaning that the terms have from implicit definitions is static. He now appeals to empirical natural science and its heuristic structures, i.e., the structures it uses to anticipate discovery and guide inquiry toward it. It would be well to supplement the reading of Insight here with Understanding and Being, Lecture 3, which will probably also give us an indication of just what must be grasped from this material in order for us to move on (this is mp3, August 6).

Section 1: Mathematical and Scientific Insights Compared. The chapter starts by outlining the similarities and dissimilarities of mathematical and scientific insights. The similarities with maths are: (1) in both cases, inquiry is restricted to immanent intelligibility (not final or material or efficient causes of, e.g., a free fall); (2) in both cases, inquiry starts from a supposition, e.g. in science, that there is some correlation between the measurable aspects of falling bodies, the distance covered and the time squared; (3) the products of scientific laws taken singly hold perfectly only in a vacuum (similar to moving into realm of nonimaginable in maths).

Dissimilarities are: (1) need of experimentation, not just images: e.g., the way bodies actually do fall; (2) data are discontinuous; e.g., a series of separate points plotted on a distance-time graph, where the drawn curve represents a presumption; there is never an infinity of measurements of distance and time; (3) not a grasp of necessity and impossibility, but of possibility; the possibility of some other law is not excluded; the insight is hypothetical; (4) data don’t conform to thinking the way a mathematician’s images do; (5) operations yielding higher viewpoints are not merely symbolic (deductions and calculations involving mathematical symbols) but experimental, directed by a hypothesis, and revealing hitherto neglected data. 59: ‘The circuit, then, of mathematical development may be named immanent: it moves from images through insights and conceptions to the production of symbolic images whence higher insights arise. But the circuit of scientific development includes action upon external things: it moves from observation and experiment to tabulations and graphs, from these to insights and formulations, from formulations to forecasts, from forecasts to operations, in which it obtains fresh evidence either for the confirmation or for the revision of existing views.’

Section 2: Classical Heuristic Structures. This is where the dynamic aspect comes to the fore. The process as brought to explicit structure is a heuristic structure. A heuristic is a principle of discovery. The first example is from algebra: Let $x$ be the unknown number. By making explicit the fact that you are heading towards some unknown, you make things more precise. But sciences like physics and chemistry employ two sets of heuristic structures: classical and statistical. To speak of a heuristic structure in classical science means that we can anticipate the unknown, name it, infer its properties and relations, grasp the possibility of combining these in a law, equation, correlation, and express the law or solve the equation. 68: ‘… how can means be ordered to an end when the end is knowledge and the knowledge is not yet acquired?’
5 Where did Galileo’s clue come from, the supposition that some correlation was to be found between the measurable aspects of falling bodies? In classical science, the desired unknown is first named something like the ‘nature’ of something, e.g., of a free fall. This ‘nature of’ will be universal, because similars are similarly understood: when one understands these data, then one will understand similar data in exactly the same fashion. But what do we mean by ‘similar?’ Here we come to what he later calls the bifurcation of understanding. Similarities are of two kinds: the similarities of things in their relations to us (similar in color, shape, sounds, etc.) and in their relations to one another (always found together, or apart; increase or decrease concomitantly; have similar antecedents or consequents; are similar in their proportions to one another, etc.) The second type is the point to measurement. Sensible similarities are known before the ‘nature of …’ has been discovered. They form the basis of preliminary classifications. It is the similarities of things in their relations to one another that are the proximate materials of insight into the ‘nature of.’ The ‘nature of’ is an unspecified correlation to be specified, an undetermined function to be determined. Modern science: one must proceed to relations that hold directly between things themselves. It presents us with a world we find extremely odd and strange, where the fundamental concepts are arrived at from the correlation of measurements: e.g., mass, temperature, etc., which are not conceived in terms of the relations of things to us. Is it the real world? That question will be treated later.

6 Besides the movement upwards from the data towards the determination of the formulæ, there is also a downward movement operative in the sciences. The idea that similars are similarly understood, the idea that the relevant similarities are similarities or things in relation to one another, pertain to that downward movement. But modern science also employs the techniques of the infinitesimal calculus to abstract from the noncountable infinity of the continuum and to arrive at its required functions by the use of differential equations. ‘Let some indeterminate function \( f(x,y,z, \ldots) \) be the required function.’ The empirical inquirer then moves towards the determination of the indeterminate function by writing down differential equations that it must satisfy. This element works ‘from above,’ once it has been discovered, functioning as anticipations of the formulæ that are to be discovered. The differential equation is an anticipation of the possible laws relevant to the formulation of what one is trying to understand. This also indicates that heuristic structures emerge in history.

7 The scientist also anticipates that laws, correlations, functions will be invariant. That is, they will always have the same intelligibility and meaning and also the same symbolic representation no matter what the place or time. This has caused physicists difficulty, for physics regards motions and so particular origins and orientations of reference frames, and there is a problem: how to keep changes in reference frames from changing the statement of a principle or law. Physicists have to express their principles and laws in equations that remain invariant under transformations of reference frames: no change in the form (64). This presupposes that physical principles and laws are the same for all observers, not because physical objects look the same for all observers but because physical principles and laws are simply and completely outside the range of seeing, hearing, touching, feeling, and all other acts of observing: equivalence. ‘It is, for example, not the appearance of colors but the general explanation in terms of wavelengths of light that is exactly the same no matter what may be the state of observers’ eyes, the lighting by which they see, or the speed with which they may happen to be in relative motion.’ See the summary of the entire section on p. 68. Note, too, the statement on p. 69 that all that is intended here is some grasp of the
genesis of insight. These general anticipations that guide investigation represent the dynamic aspect in coming to know in classical science.

October 2, 2003, Part 2

8 But there are limitations to such procedures. Classical heuristic structure anticipates systematic process: systematic relations of things to one another. A process is systematic if (1) some insight or some set of unified insights can grasp not only the process as a whole but also every event in the whole; (2) this single insight or set can be expressed in a corresponding combination of selected laws, and any situation can be deduced from any other without any explicit consideration of intervening situations; (3) all data will fall into a single perspective, sweeping yet accurate deductions will become possible, and subsequent exact predictions regularly will prove to have been correct. E.g., the astronomer’s ability to tell us the exact time of the next eclipse of the moon (‘other things being equal’).

9 But a quite different type of process can certainly be constructed and probably can be verified: a nonsystematic process. While classical procedures will feature in understanding these processes as well, they will not be sufficient. Consider the meteorologist's difficulty in telling us tomorrow’s weather. Here, the understanding will be, not one but multiple. 72: ‘There will be no single insight, or single set of unified insights, that masters at once the whole process and all its events. The only correct understanding will be either a set of different insights or else a set of different unified sets. In the former case the different insights will not be unified intelligibly, and so they will not be related to one another in any orderly series or progression or grouping whatever. In the latter case the different sets of unified insights will have no higher intelligible unity, and so they will not be related to one another in any orderly series or progression or grouping whatever. Finally, let us say that a series, progression, grouping is orderly if the relations between the elements of the series, progression, grouping either (1) can be grasped by an insight that can be expressed in general terms, or (2) can be concluded from any single insight or any single set of unified insights.’

10 A second characteristic of nonsystematic process is that, because different parts are understood differently, no single combination of selected laws holds for the whole process. Rather, there will be a different combination or selection of laws for every different insight or set of unified insights, and the different selections and combinations will not satisfy any orderly series or progression or grouping. It is the sequence precisely as a sequence that does not seem to come under classical law only. Accurate prediction could theoretically be had if sufficient information were available in each case; still a general determination, a general answer that applies to the sequence of cases, does not seem to be had from classical law. No scheme of recurrence is operative, and so the successive instances are not linked according to any rule or law or single combination of selected laws that holds for the entire process. If that is the case, we have an objective field for probability, where probability is an ideal proper fraction from which actual relative frequencies diverge but do not do so systematically. The difference between the probability and the actual relative frequency is random. These differences are not subject to any classical law.

11 Third, deduction of the events of the process will have to occur in piecemeal fashion. “… from the given situation the occurrence and the dimensions of the next significantly different situation can be deduced. Correct insights into the deduced data on this situation make it possible to deduce the occurrence and the
dimensions of the third significantly different situation. Finally, since this procedure can be repeated indefinitely, and since there are no restrictions on the amount of time to be devoted to the deduction, it makes no difference how many significantly different situations there are. In *Understanding and Being* Lonergan gives the example of the break in a game of pool. There is no general solution. The whole thing has to be followed through step by step. The problem involves an indefinite series of cases. Full knowledge of the laws would not enable one to predict in the general case exactly what is going to happen.

12 Fourth, then, the nonsystematic process exhibits *coincidental aggregates*. A coincidental aggregate is a unity based on spatial juxtaposition or temporal succession or both, but without a corresponding unity of the level of insight and intelligible relation. Coincidental aggregates are typical of nonsystematic processes in several ways. It obtains for the process as a whole, for the several insights by which the several parts of the process are understood, for the succession of different premises by which different stages of the process may be deduced, for the basic situation of nonsystematic process itself, and for the succession of different premises for a deduction from the basic situation. It would seem that accepted theories on the origin of planetary systems agree that a nonsystematic process happens to give rise to a systematic process. If this is the case, the basic situation of our universe was a random situation, a coincidental aggregate.

13 The basic characteristics of nonsystematic process are given on p. 74, in the paragraph ‘Fifthly’: ‘Data on one situation are not equivalent to data on the whole process but are relevant only to one of many parts of the whole. Again, the types of data significant in one part will not be significant in disparate parts, and so several different inquiries must be undertaken. Thirdly, reports on one situation ordinarily cannot be checked by comparing them with inferences from reports on other situations. Fourthly, there is no supreme moment when all data fall into a single perspective, for there is no single perspective to be had. Fifthly, even when the laws involved in the process are thoroughly understood, even when current and accurate reports from usually significant centers of information are available, still such slight differences in matters of fact can result in such large differences in the subsequent course of events that deductions have to be restricted to the short run, and predictions have to be content with indicating probabilities. So, perhaps, it is that astronomers can publish the exact times of the eclipses of past and future centuries, but meteorologists need a constant supply of fresh and accurate information to tell us about tomorrow’s weather.’

14 The two kinds of process are further compared on pp. 75-76. Systematic process is monotonous, ‘little more than a perpetual repetition of essentially the same story,’ whereas nonsystematic process can bring forth novelty. ‘… within a large nonsystematic process there can be built a pyramid of schemes resting on schemes in a splendid ascent of novelty and creativeness.’

15 Again, systematic process is reversible, ‘would work equally well if, so to speak, the future were the past and the process ran backwards.’ Nonsystematic process would seem to be irreversible. ‘… it is not the unfolding of some single idea, and successive situations are not related in accord with the dictates of any single insight or any single set of unified insights. What is in control is not intelligence but any random basic situation, and the resulting coincidental sequence of coincidental situations easily includes both the emergence and the destruction of systematic processes.’
16 Again, whether world process is systematic or nonsystematic is to be settled by empirical method. But if world process is nonsystematic, then it contains coincidental aggregates, and the word ‘random’ has an objective meaning, and statistical science has an objective referent and is not a mere cloak for ignorance (as was still held by some physicists at the time Lonergan wrote *Insight*).

17 Statistical heuristic structure, then, is concerned not with functions and their systematization, but with concrete situations, and more precisely with coincidental aggregates of events: the aggregate of events that has some unity by spatial juxtaposition or by temporal succession or by both but lacks unity on the level of insight and of intelligible relation. It is concerned with nonsystematic process. The intelligibility that it finds in nonsystematic process is probability. It attends not to the laws of mechanics in casting dice, for example, but to the probability of casting a seven. It does not measure and correlate variables, but directs attention to frequencies. Its heuristic question is something like, How often? Frequencies may be actual or ideal. The actual frequency is absolute if it indicates the actual number of events of a given kind within an area over an interval of time. Statisticians proceed from absolute actual frequencies to rates, say, per thousand of population, or to relative actual frequencies, which are sets of proper fractions, \( \frac{p}{n}, \frac{q}{n}, \frac{r}{n}, \ldots \) where \( n = p + q + r \ldots \) Frequencies may also be ideal, and that is what is meant by probability. A probability is a frequency from which differences will be merely random. As long as differences in frequency oscillate about some average, they are esteemed of no account; only when the average itself changes is further inquiry deemed relevant. This does not mean that the single events where divergence is found lack intelligibility: they may all be determinate and in principle deducible. For example, ‘one can acknowledge random differences in death rates without suggesting that single deaths were random or that doctors were unable to perform successful diagnoses.’ What are deemed insignificant are random departures from the ideal frequency in events as members of a group.

18 Probability gives a kind of general knowledge of events in nonsystematic process. States are defined by associating classes of events with corresponding probabilities. A representative sample is a set of relative actual frequencies that lead to a probability that can be verified. The probability lies concealed within the random oscillations of relative actual frequencies, and it is reached by abstracting from the random oscillations to discover a set of universally valid constants. In the sequences of tossing a coin differences between relative actual frequencies and one-half are merely coincidental or random. They oscillate about one-half. The regularity is found by abstracting from the random features and settling on the center about which they oscillate. Only in such ‘games of chance,’ of course, can there be discerned an antecedent symmetry in the set of possible combinations. In other instances probabilities have to be reached a posteriori, with the aid of a statistical heuristic structure.

19 The heuristic structure of statistical investigations, then, (1) seeks not the ‘nature of …’ but the ‘state of …’ (2) Such investigations begin by prescientific description of ‘ordinary and exceptional, normal and abnormal runs of events.’ (3) They link states with runs of events that, despite occasional lapses, are ordinary or normal, or with runs that are exceptional or abnormal though they contain a few ordinary or normal elements. The heuristic theorem (like ‘similars are similarly understood’ for classical method) is that ‘a notable regularity is compatible with random differences in runs of events.’ (4) The scientific ideal of statistical
science is the association of sets of classes of events with corresponding sets of probabilities. (5) Such science makes a move, then, from speaking of ‘ordinary, normal, exceptional, abnormal’ to actual counting of events and tabulating of rates of relative actual frequencies, borrowing exact classifications from classical science. (6) It finds guidance in a mathematical calculus of probabilities, (7) it develops specific techniques to aid in the transition to probabilities, and (8) it proceeds also ‘from above’ with operator equations yielding eigenfunctions and eigenvalues that serve to select classes of events and to determine the respective probabilities of the selected classes. (9) It finds probabilities through a leap of constructive intelligence beyond relative actual frequencies; it discovers states that are universal and constant even though relative actual frequencies are particular and subject to random differences from these states. It finds this statistical intelligibility in coincidental aggregates, by abstracting from merely random differences in relative actual frequencies. (10) Its discovery has to be verified, just as does a classical law. The leap of constructive intelligence is not the recognition of a fact nor the grasp of a necessity but just an insight into possibility. The possibility of exceptions also has to be acknowledged. And when predictions rest on a statistical axiomatic structure, as in quantum mechanics, the structure itself seems to involve a principle of indeterminacy or uncertainty.

20 But ‘probability’ in this sense (‘probably occurring’) is not the same as ‘probably true.’ It will be important to bring this up now, even though it is emphasized again later in the book. See p. 90.

21 The goal, again, is ‘… not any scientific object, any universal and necessary truth, any primary propositions … [but] the concrete, individual, existing subject that intelligently generates and critically evaluates and progressively revises every scientific object, every incautious statement, every rigorously logical resting place that offers prematurely a home for the restless dynamism of human understanding’ (91).
October 9, Part 1

Note: There are preliminary matters on the recording completing the discussion of chapter 2.

1 There are rules or canons that de facto govern the fruitful unfolding of the heuristic structures of empirical science. A study of insight helps to explain them. Lonergan specifies six. The aim is not ‘the history of the development of empirical method’ nor ‘descriptive accounts of what scientists do’ nor ‘an argument based on the authority of great names in science’ nor ‘a summary of directives, precepts, and recipes to guide … in the practice of scientific investigation’ but ‘insight into insight,’ ‘the intelligible unity that underlies and accounts for the diverse and apparently disconnected rules of empirical method,’ and that, if discovered, will unify method and exhibit the fact and nature of insight (94). RD: Note the unification of method in light of Gadamer’s well-intentioned but perhaps overstated divorce between truth and understanding, on the one hand, and ‘method,’ on the other hand, where ‘method’ is strictly scientific in the modern sense of the term. The issue is a major one for the potential convergence of relatively contemporary philosophical concerns: is there a procedure that cuts through and is found in all of the following, mutatis mutandis: natural science, human science, interpretation, history, common sense, etc.?

2 The first canon is the canon of selection. 93: ‘… the empirical inquirer is confined to insights into the data of sensible experience.’ Again (94), ‘If a correlation or hypothesis or law or probability expectation or theory or system pertains to empirical science, then (1) it involves sensible consequences, and (2) such consequences can be produced or at least observed. Inversely, empirical method prescinds from all questions and answers that do not involve distinctive sensible consequences; and it discards all that involve such consequences logically yet fail to be confirmed by the results of observation or experiment.’ Some selection is obviously needed, and this canon enables one to discard all correlations and theories that have been tried and found wanting in terms of sensible consequences and to direct one’s attention to issues that one can settle by the decisive evidence of observation and experiment.

3 Nonetheless, the sensible consequences may be very slight, demanding elaborate apparatus to detect them. And grasping how a correlation or law involves or implies sensible consequences ‘may suppose a profound mastery of a field, a capacity to follow recondite and intricate mathematical operations, and the audacity necessary to form new primitive concepts and to follow long chains of abstract reasoning’ (95).

4 Questions that do not satisfy the canon of selection may still be relevant elsewhere. For one thing, in addition to the data of sense, there are also the data of
consciousness. They will be appealed to in this book, to set up a cognitional theory. ‘If it is true that essentially the same method could be applied to the data of consciousness, then respect for ordinary usage would require that a method which only in its essentials is the same be named a generalized empirical method’ (96).

5 What are sensible data? In general, the contents of acts of seeing, hearing, touching, tasting, smelling. But all such contents emerge within a context determined by interests and preoccupations. Scientific observation is not ‘some mere passivity to sense impressions. It occurs within its own dynamic context,’ and that context is different from the orientation of concrete living. More precisely, ‘what differentiates the perceptual flow in one [person] from that of another is found in the pattern of interests and objectives, desires and fears, that emphasize elements and aspects of sensible presentations, enrich them with the individual’s associations and memories, and project them into future courses of possible fruitful activity … Hence to become a scientific observer is … to bring the raw materials of one’s sensations within a new context. The interests and hopes, desires and fears, of ordinary living have to slip into a background. In their place the detached and disinterested exigences of inquiring intelligence have to enter and assume control. Memories will continue to enrich sensations, but they will be memories of scientific significance. Imagination will continue to prolong the present by anticipating the future, but anticipations with a practical moment will give way to anticipations that bear on a scientific issue … the guiding orientation of the scientist is the orientation of inquiring intelligence, the orientation that of its nature is a pure, detached, disinterested desire simply to know. For there is an intellectual desire, an eros of the mind. Without it there would arise no questioning, no inquiry, no wonder. Without it there would be no real meaning for such phrases as scientific disinterestedness, scientific detachment, scientific impartiality. Inasmuch as this intellectual drive is dominant, inasmuch as the reinforcing or inhibiting tendencies of other drives are successfully excluded, in that measure the scientific observer becomes an incarnation of inquiring intelligence, and his percepts move into coincidence with what are named the data of sense.’ (96-97) This statement serves also as a kind of introduction of the notion of patterns of experience that will become very important in chapter 6.

7 The second canon is the canon of operations. The scientist ‘aims at an accumulation of … insights [into the data of sensible experience], and the accumulation is reached, not in the mathematical circuit through insights, formulations, and symbolic images, but in the fuller circuit that adds observations, experiments, and practical applications’ (93). Again (97-98), ‘Just as inquiry into the data of sense yields insights that are formulated in classical and statistical laws, so inversely the laws provide premises and rules for the guidance of human activity upon sensible objects. Such activity in its turn brings about sensible change, to bring to light fresh data, raise new questions, stimulate further insights, and so generate the revision or confirmation of existing laws and in due course the discovery of new
laws.’ RD: Note here a cautious statement of the role of the scientific observer in modifying the observed data, a position very prominent in contemporary philosophy of science.

(At this point, a question was raised that I did not answer well. The datum of consciousness in sense experience is the empirically conscious subject; the datum of sense is color, or sound, or whatever.)

October 9, 2003, Part 2

(Numbers 8-14 were skipped in class.)

8 This canon is a principle of cumulative expansion, of construction, of analysis, of cumulative verification, of the impartiality and accuracy of observations, of systematization, and of higher viewpoints. *Cumulative expansion:* ‘Laws guide activities, which bring forth new laws, which guide further activities, and so forth indefinitely’ (98).

9 *Construction:* We know best what we make for ourselves, and the development of science is followed by a technological expansion, a vast increase of the things we can make for ourselves and so can understand adequately because we have made them. As there is more artificial synthesis of natural products, ‘nature’ becomes understood in the same fashion as our own artifacts. RD: there is of course a distinct question regarding the limits placed by ‘nature’ on artificial synthesis.

10 *Analysis:* ‘… where operational control fails, theoretical knowledge can step in to account for the failure of control, to identify the uncontrolled factors, to determine and measure their activity and influence, to discount their perturbing effects, and so to extrapolate to the law that would hold did they not interfere’ (98).

11 *Cumulative verification:* ‘… insofar as laws and their implications in a vast variety of situations are repeatedly found successful guides of operations, their initial verification is cumulatively confirmed’ (98). Perhaps a word on the basic logic of scientific verification would helpful here. Let us call a hypothetical law *A*, and one set of its implications *B*. The basic logic, at the most fundamental level, is: ‘If *A*, then *B*; but *B*; therefore possibly *A*.’ The more that basic structure obtains (i.e., for implications *C*, *D*, *E*, etc., etc.), the more likely it is that *A* is an adequate hypothesis.

12 *Impartiality and accuracy of observations:* The canon of operations ‘sooner or later will exhibit on a grand scale in conspicuous failures even slight mistakes and oversights in observation’ (98).

13 *Systematization:* Simple laws are applicable only in pure cases, but operations do not occur in a vacuum. The canon is ‘a perpetual recall from the abstract realm of laws to the complexity of the concrete and so to the necessity of ever more laws’
and to the relations of each law to all the others, and so to a system. Here we have the first mention of 'system': ‘A mere congeries of laws will not suffice. For if one is to operate upon the concrete, one must be able to employ at once several laws. To employ several laws at once, one must know the relations of each law to all the others. But to know many laws, not as a mere congeries of distinct empirical generalizations, but in the network of interrelations of each to all the others, is to reach a system.’ Note the relation of ‘system’ to the concrete.

14 Higher viewpoints: ‘… the empirical scientist advances to higher viewpoints, not solely by the construction of symbolic images [as in mathematics], but more fundamentally by the expansiveness, the constructiveness, the analyses, the constant checking, and the systematizing tendencies of the canon of operations. In virtue of that canon, fresh data are ever being brought to light, to force upon scientific consciousness the inadequacies of existing hypotheses and theories, to provide the evidence for their revision, and in the limit, when minor corrections no longer are capable of meeting the issue, to demand the radical transformation of concepts and postulates that is named a higher viewpoint’ (99).

15 The third canon is the canon of relevance. While the canons of selection and operations are both concerned with the elementary fact that the empirical inquirer is out to understand, not what one may imagine, but what one actually ‘sees’ or has in some sensible apprehension, the canon of relevance states the type of understanding proper to empirical science. ‘… pure science aims immediately at reaching the immanent intelligibility of data and leaves to applied science the categories of final, material, instrumental, and efficient causality’ (93). The ‘inner constituents’ of science itself lie in the intelligibility immanent in the data of sense. The intelligibility immanent in the data of sense resides, for science, in the relations of things, not to our senses but to one another. This intelligibility is hypothetical, a possibility, what could be the relevant correlation, function, law. Hence it must be verified, and even then it is verified possibility. It is a species of formal causality, a technical term that ‘has long existed but also has long been misunderstood’ (101).

16 The fourth canon is the canon of parsimony. 93: ‘… the empirical investigator may add to the data of experience only the laws verified in the data; … [one] must content [oneself] with the laws and systems of laws … characterized generally by their verifiability.’ The difficulty lies in knowing exactly what one knows and does not know. At the most elementary level one cannot scientifically affirm statements that are not verified or that cannot be verified.

17 At this point some important notions and terms are introduced. The explication begins from the notion of verification. Verification is of formulations, and formulations state either the relations of things to our senses or the relations of things to one another. The terms of formulations that state the relations of things to our senses are called experiential conjugates, i.e., correlatives whose meaning is expressed by appealing to the content of some human experience (e.g., colors as seen,
sounds as heard, heat as felt, force as experienced). Clearly, these can be verified, and so they satisfy the canon of parsimony. But there are also formulations that state the relations of things to one another, and the terms of such formulations are called pure or explanatory conjugates. These are correlatives defined implicitly by empirically established correlations, functions, laws, theories, systems. Thus ‘masses’ are the correlatives implicit in Newton’s law of inverse squares, or again, ‘mass’ is defined in relation to the speed of light and energy in Einstein’s equation $E = mc^2$. And ‘heat’ (now as explanatory conjugate) is defined implicitly by the first law of thermodynamics. If the equations can be established empirically, then the pure conjugates satisfy the canon of parsimony, since ‘by definition pure conjugates mean no more than necessarily is implicit in the meaning of such verified equations’ (103).

18 In general, think of ‘conjugate’ as ‘correlative,’ so that a color is correlative to seeing, a sound to hearing, mass to energy and the speed of light, etc. Every ‘term’ is in a set of ‘relations,’ and the type of ‘relations’ that governs the use of the term determines whether the term is an experiential or an explanatory conjugate. And then there will be a difference in the mode of verifying the conjugates. An experiential conjugate is either the content of experience (seeing red) or a correlative to such a content (red as seen) or a derivative of such correlatives (the red that could be seen). A pure conjugate is not the content of experience or the actual or potential correlative of such a content. One might see a series of extensions, and alongside each a yardstick. But the continuous function that one arrives at is the result of a number of series of measurements and correlations, along with the leap of insight. One does not see the continuous function. ‘Pure conjugates’ are the minimal correlatives implicit in such functions; and their verification finds its ground, not in experience as such, but only in the combinations of combinations, etc., etc., etc., of experiences’ (103-104).

19 Cognitional theory is a form of explanation, too, but it correlates not contents but acts. ‘Either one’s terms are experiential conjugates, or else they are pure conjugates based on combining contents alone, or finally they are a special case of pure conjugates based on combining acts alone’ (104). Physicists move easily and, as it were, unconsciously back and forth between the first two. The book Insight is concerned with moving from the first to the third.

20 Besides pure and experiential conjugates, there are events, happenings, occurrences. The law of nature is one thing, the event of its illustration another. Events are subject to laws of a different type, namely, statistical laws. Events stand to conjugates as questions for reflection stand to questions for intelligence. Questions for intelligence, which lead to knowledge of conjugates, are questions that cannot be answered yes or no. ‘What is the correlation? What is the function?’ are questions that cannot be answered yes or no. Questions for reflection are questions that can be answered yes or no. ‘… for every answer to a question for intelligence, there is a corresponding question for reflection; and all questions for reflection have the peculiarity that they can be answered
appropriately simply by saying either yes or no. If I ask what a body is, I can also ask whether there are bodies. If I ask how bodies fall, I can also ask whether bodies fall. If I ask how bodies would fall in a vacuum, I can also ask whether any bodies ever fall in a vacuum. Generally, the enunciation of every law can be followed by the question for reflection that asks whether the law is verified, and the definition of every term can be followed by the question for reflection whether the defined exists or occurs. Inversely, whenever one asserts verification or existence or occurrence, one may be asked what is verified, what exists, what occurs. Thus questions for intelligence and questions for reflection are universally concomitant and complementary.’ (106). There is a parallel concomitance and complementarity between conjugates and events. ‘Without events, conjugates can be neither discovered nor verified. Without conjugates, events can be neither distinguished nor related.’ Such is the elementary scheme in which we can grasp by insight what is meant by the term ‘event.’ And formulations that concern events satisfy the canon of parsimony. Statistical laws formulate the answer to the question, How often? While that question is not itself a question that can be answered by yes or no, the answer to it assigns an ideal frequency of events, and that frequency can be verified by appealing to actual frequencies that diverge from the ideal frequency only nonsystematically.

21 The fifth canon is the canon of complete explanation. 93: ‘… ultimately science must account for all data, and the account must be scientific.’ 107: ‘The goal of empirical method is commonly stated to be the complete explanation of all phenomena or data.’ There is a specific implication. 93: ‘… the old philosophic opinion that extension is a real and objective primary quality cannot dispense one from the task of determining empirically the correct geometry of experienced extensions and durations.’ Galileo’s distinction of secondary and primary qualities and his notion that scientific progress lies in the reduction of the merely apparent secondary qualities to their real and objective source in the mathematical dimensions of matter in motion here gives way to the movement from experiential to pure conjugates, or from description to explanation. Secondary qualities were merely subjective appearances that arise in an animal’s senses as a result of the action of the primary qualities: color as seen, sounds as heard, heat as felt, tickling as experienced, etc. Primary qualities were the mathematical dimensions of the real and objective, of matter in motion. 107: ‘… while we would place scientific progress in the movement from experiential to pure conjugates, Galileo placed it in the reduction of the merely apparent secondary qualities to their real and objective source in primary qualities.’

22 This affects especially space and time. For Galileo these are primary qualities, whereas for Lonergan there is the same distinction between extension and duration as experiential and as pure conjugates as between the two formulations of colors or sound or heat or electric phenomena. 108: ‘… the space-time of relativity stands to the extensions and durations of experience in exactly the same relations as wave-lengths of light stand to experiences of color, as longitudinal waves in air stand to experience of sound, as the type of energy defined by the
first law of thermodynamics stands to experiences of heat, etc.’ As experiential conjugates, extensions and durations are defined as correlatives to certain familiar elements within our experience. As pure conjugates, they are defined implicitly by the postulate that the principles and laws of physics are invariant under inertial or, generally, under continuous transformations. Science must determine empirically the correct geometry of experienced extensions and durations. All data are to be explained, including extensions and durations. Moreover, since experiential conjugates can be verified, Galileo’s repudiation of them as mere appearance is a blunder. Nor did he base his affirmation of the reality and objectivity of primary qualities on a claim that they could be verified. So the claim is extrascientific.

23 The same considerations affect local movement. It has a preliminary definition in terms of experiential conjugates and an explanatory definition in terms of pure conjugates. The preliminary definition, of movement as related to us, determines a spatial trajectory and then correlates points on the path with instants of time; we see at once the whole distance that another traverses when crossing the street, but we apprehend the duration of his movement as concomitant with the duration of our watching. But the explanatory definition conceives a velocity, not as a function of three dimensions with time as a parameter, but as a function of four dimensions, of which three are spatial and the fourth temporal.

24 The sixth canon is the canon of statistical residues. (If time is short, a summary of the canon is quoted below in § 34.) It stipulates that not all data will be explained by laws of the classical type, that there are statistical residues, and their explanation is through statistical laws. 109: ‘The basic distinction is between abstract system and particular cases. Both are objects of insight. But the particular case is the typical instance, presented by sense or imagination and understood by insight into the presentation. In contrast, the abstract system is neither sensible nor imaginable; it is a conceptual object constituted by terms and relations that, at least in the last resort, are defined implicitly.’ Abstract system arises out of particular cases and is applied to them insofar as there occur also insights into the situations as sensibly given. The latter insight is needed if one is to select the relevant laws, to determine how they combine to fit this situation, and to substitute numerical values for the variables and undetermined constants of the general formulae. Full knowledge of all classical principles and laws would be full knowledge of abstract system. To apply this full knowledge of abstract system to the concrete universe, one will need a manifold of insights into particular cases. That manifold is enormous, and unless it can be cast into some ordered sequence the abstract system can be applied only to a limited range of particular cases, and statistical method must be employed to complement classical method in heading to an understanding of the concrete universe as a whole. But the manifold of particular cases does not, it seems, form any kind of ordered sequence. Even the recurrent particular cases such as the planetary system presuppose materials in a suitable constellation that the scheme did not bring about, and survive only as long as extraneous disrupting factors do not
intervene. There does not seem to be any universal scheme that controls their emergence and survival. 111: ‘… though all events are linked to one another by law, still the laws reveal only the abstract component in concrete relations; the further concrete component, though mastered by insight into particular cases, is involved in the empirical residue from which systematizing intelligence abstracts [particular places and times, merely numerical difference, coincidental aggregates of events, etc.]; it does not admit general treatment along classical lines; it is a residue, left over after classical method has been applied, and it calls for the implementation of statistical method.’ Such is the general argument.

25 Understanding the argument involves getting straight the idea of abstraction. In its essential moments the abstraction that leads to classical laws and their systematization is not an ‘impoverished replica’ of the concrete, but an enrichment; it adds an intelligibility to sensible data; but it omits the merely empirical residue, and because the empirical residue possesses the universal property of being what is abstracted from, it is the basis for a second set of heuristic procedures that take their stand on the simple premise that the nonsystematic cannot be systematized. Full and exact knowledge of the systems reached by abstraction by no means denies the existence of an empirical residue that is nonsystematic. In fact, because abstraction goes beyond the sensible field, the frontiers of the abstract are not coterminous with the frontiers of the experienced. Just as in abstraction we prescind from the empirical residue, so in the concrete application of abstract principles and laws we must take into account the nonsystematic conditions under which the systematic has its concrete realization.

26 The fact is that ‘world process in its concrete historical unfolding rather conspicuously makes a large and generous use of the statistical techniques of large numbers and long intervals of time; it exhibits not a rigid but a fluid stability; it brings forth novelty and development; it makes false starts and suffers breakdowns. It would seem, then, that an understanding of the concrete unfolding of world process will not be based exclusively on classical laws, however exactly and completely known, but in a fundamental manner will appeal to statistical laws’ (115).

27 There is a fundamental ambiguity in the argument from the systematic unification of laws to the denial of statistical residues; namely, it is one thing to attain a systematic unification, and it is another to reach an imaginative synthesis. Systematic unification is effected in the logical or conceptual order. It is attained when the totality of laws is reduced to minimum sets of defined terms and postulates, so that any law can be related to any other, and any aggregate of laws can be intelligibly combined and simultaneously employed. An imaginative synthesis is secured when images, informed by insight, are altered in accord with known laws. It goes beyond the abstract content of the laws and supposes, for instance, that certain bodies exist in certain relative positions with velocities less than the velocity of escape. But the ultimate attainment of a systematic unification of classical laws will not include such particular matters of fact, and so
it cannot include an imaginative synthesis. Moreover, it does not even guarantee the possibility of such a synthesis. But knowledge of all classical laws would be an understanding of the concrete only if it included a vast imaginative synthesis, and it does not. And only if the totality of classical laws provided an understanding of the concrete, would statistical laws be superfluous a priori. But the conspicuous use of statistical techniques in world process shows that statistical laws are not superfluous in an understanding of our universe.

28 A more precise attempt is then made to indicate the indeterminacy of abstract classical laws and the nature of the consequent statistical residues. The argument proceeds through three steps: (1) classical laws hold in concrete instances only inasmuch as conditions are fulfilled; (2) the conditions to be fulfilled form diverging series; and (3) in the general case the patterns of such diverging series are a nonsystematic aggregate.

29 First, then, classical laws hold in concrete instances only inasmuch as conditions are fulfilled. An event \( Z \) can be concluded from prior circumstances \( Y \), provided some \( P, Q, R, \ldots \) continue to occur and provided some \( U, V, W, \ldots \) do not intervene. The necessity of positing such conditions is universal, and the conditions must be fulfilled right up to the occurrence of the event.

30 Second, in the general case the conditions form a diverging series. 118: ‘Any event \( Z \) will occur on the fulfilment of a set of conditions. Each condition in the set will be fulfilled on the fulfilment of its additional set of conditions. Since there are no unconditioned events, there are no unconditioned fulfilments of conditions. Since there are no unconditioned fulfilments of conditions, the diverging series has as many removes as one cares to explore. Finally, since each event ordinarily has several conditions, the series ordinarily diverges.’ Note how different this is from the determinist assumption that we can in principle deduce all world situations from a single situation. This structure offers no more than the deduction of a converging series of events from as large a set of initial observations as one pleases. Moreover, the conditions of any event \( Z \), at any \( n \)th remove, are scattered in space and time. 119: ‘… this scattering of the conditions makes it imperative to know beforehand the aggregate of concrete patterns of diverging series of conditions for events of all kinds; otherwise, one would not know which observations to make, and it would be only by luck that one hit upon those that were relevant.

31 Third, the diverging series are a nonsystematic aggregate. Any event \( Z \) occurs if positive conditions occur and negative conditions do not occur. What is true of \( Z \) is true of all its conditions. Schemes hold only if other things are equal, and no schemes can guarantee their own survival or explain their own origin. To say that perhaps world process as a whole is systematic and that the total concrete pattern of diverging series of conditions is orderly is to utter an extremely doubtful hypothesis, for reasons we have seen regarding the use of statistical techniques in world process.
32 A general summary of the section on the existence of statistical residues is offered on p. 120: ‘… classical laws are indeterminate because they are abstract and so can become determinate premises for the deduction of determinate events only if sets of positive and negative conditions are fulfilled. Moreover, from this indeterminacy of the abstract there follows a canon of statistical residues, because in the general case such sets of conditions are coincidental aggregates, and coincidental aggregates can be investigated with scientific generality only by statistical methods.’

33 The statistical heuristic structure is further determined. First, statistical theories deal with events, occurrences, happenings. Second, statistical theories do not analyze processes, for the processes are nonsystematic, and the nonsystematic as such is not open to investigation. Third, the continuous functions of statistical theory express merely the continuity of the ideal norm from which any observable events diverge nonsystematically. Fourth, the objective reference of a statistical theory is only to isolated events and their probabilities. Fifth, scientifically significant statistical theory will define events by introducing the pure conjugates of classical laws. The event corresponds to the yes in answer to a question for reflection, and the question for reflection has its content from an answer to a question for intelligence; and verifiable answers to questions for intelligence are in terms of experiential or of pure conjugates, but statistical investigations in terms of experiential conjugates contain no promise of scientific significance. Sixth, the canon of parsimony excludes any problem concerning the picture of objects too small to be sensed; all that can be verified are certain equations and the terms implicitly defined by such equations. And seventh, an axiomatic structure for statistical laws will involve an uncertainty principle. Indeterminacy is a general characteristic of statistical investigations. The deduction of conclusions supposes systematic relations, so that if some relations are not systematic, the field of possible conclusions must be restricted.

34 The chapter ends with a note on indeterminacy and the nonsystematic. The proper answer to the old determinism in physics is not an indeterminism on the same imaginative level, but an affirmation of the indeterminacy of the abstract. The indeterminacy of the abstract means the nonsystematic character of the concrete. And the essence of probability is that it sets an ideal norm from which actual frequencies can diverge but not systematically. The canon of statistical residues is not a theory of physics, but a methodological doctrine that can be stated only in cognitional terms. 124: ‘The first element [in the canon] is the indeterminacy of the abstract: classical laws can be applied to concrete situations only by adding further determinations derived from the situations. The second element is the nonsystematic character of the further determinations. It does not mean that the further determinations are not related to one another by law; it means that the law is only an abstract part in a concrete relation of determinate numbers, magnitudes, relative positions, etc. It does not mean that these concrete relations cannot be mastered by insight into relevant presentations; it means that the concrete insight
has a fuller object than the abstract formulation. It does not mean that no attempt can be made at a conceptual account of the concrete relations; it means that such a conceptual account bogs down in an unmanageable infinity of cases. It does not mean that concrete relations are never recurrent or that accurate prediction is never possible: it means that schemes of recurrence do not fall under some overarching scheme, that they are merely instances in which law triumphs over the empirical residue, that such triumphs of law do not occur in accord with some further classical law. The third element, finally, is the inverse insight: if the intelligibility of abstract system is not to be had, still generality is not to be renounced; for there is the generality of the ideal frequency of events, and from such an ideal frequency the nonsystematic cannot diverge in any systematic fashion.’
The problem of chapter 4 is ‘whether classical and statistical inquiries are isolated or related procedures, whether they lead to isolated or related results’ (127). The answer falls into three parts: (1) classical and statistical investigations are complementary as types of knowing; (2) there is also a complementarity in the to-be-known, and a worldview implied by this twofold complementarity, the view that Lonergan calls emergent probability; (3) this view is contrasted with the views of Aristotle, Galileo, Darwin, and indeterminists. In class, we will not cover section 3 in any detail; but a couple of points made there must be emphasized.

First, then, there is a complementarity in the knowing. First, there is the complementarity of heuristic anticipations. 128: ‘… the relations between data must be either systematic or nonsystematic. It follows that in any given case either the classical or the statistical anticipation must be correct.’ There are two corollaries of this. First, empirical method is thus open: it does not determine in advance whether a range of data is to be reduced to system or shown to diverge concretely and nonsystematically from systematic expectations. Second, empirical method is a matter of trial and error: formulate both hypotheses, work out their implications, and test the implications against observed results.

Next, there is a complementarity in procedures. The two types of investigation separate systematically and nonsystematically related data, and the isolation of either type allows the determination of the other. The separation may occur physically or by thought. Physically one may isolate a definable conjunction of elements and exhibit their operations as they occur when uninfluenced by extraneous factors. Mentally, one may invoke known laws to seek the determination of the unknown. And such separation, whether physical or mental, is not confined to classical laws. One may invoke laws of probable errors and so eliminate a nonsystematic component in observations and measurements, or explain nonsystematic macroscopic phenomena by the statistical combination of classically conceived genes (Mendel). Moreover, knowledge of statistical laws enables one to separate mentally the nonsystematic component in the data, and so it leaves one free to investigate the remaining systematic component.

Next, classical and statistical formulations are complementary. 131: ‘… classical formulations regard conjugates, which are verified only in events. And statistical formulations regard events, which are defined only by conjugates.’ Again, 131: ‘… classical laws tell what would happen if conditions were fulfilled; statistical
laws tell how often conditions are fulfilled; and so the phrase “other things being equal” amounts to a vague reference to the statistical residues, which are the province of the complementary statistical laws. ‘Other things being equal’ refers to ‘any relevant pattern of a diverging series of conditions.’ Again, there is the inverse dependence of statistical upon classical formulations. 132: ‘… if statistical formulations are to be significant contributions to the advance of science, they will appeal to the experiential and pure conjugates of classical classifications and definitions. Inversely, the conjugates of classical formulations are verifiable only in statistically occurring events, and their immanence in statistical residues is revealed by the proviso “other things being equal.”’

5 Nor may we expect that events will generate their own definitions. 132: ‘The answer yes to a question for reflection obtains a determinate meaning only by reverting from the yes to the question and to its origin in the descriptive or explanatory answer to a question for intelligence. Now the event, the happening, the occurring corresponds to the bare yes. To say what happens, what occurs, one must raise a question that cannot be answered by a yes or a no. One must appeal either to the experiential conjugates of description or to the pure conjugates of explanation. On this showing, then, one cannot expect events to generate their own definitions any more than one can expect yes or no to settle what is affirmed or denied. Finally, if events cannot generate their own definitions, then frequencies of events cannot do so; for there seems no reason to expect that different types of events must have different numerical frequencies, or indeed that the numerical frequencies could serve to specify the kinds of events to which one wishes to refer.’

6 Next, there is a complementarity in modes of abstraction. 133: ‘In its first movement [the classical], inquiry aims at determining the systematic component in data; in its second movement, inquiry turns to the more concrete task of determining the manner in which the systematic component in data moderates the nonsystematic [by setting ideal limits from which the nonsystematic cannot diverge systematically]. The complete view results only from the combination of the two movements, and so the two are complementary.’

7 Again, classical and statistical laws are complementary in their verification. Roughly, 134: ‘… classical laws determine what would happen if conditions were fulfilled, while statistical laws determine how often one may expect conditions to be fulfilled.’ More fully, 134-35: ‘… the determination of either classical or statistical laws leaves room for the determination of the other … exact and complete knowledge of classical laws not merely can leave room for possible statistical investigation but also must do so. For such exact and complete knowledge would embrace all the systematic relations between determinate data; nonetheless, such knowledge would be abstract and so in need of further determinations to be applied to concrete instances; it follows that the further determinations cannot be systematically related to one another; and so there must be a field for statistical laws … [Inversely,] statistical laws are of no greater
scientific significance than the definitions of the events whose frequencies they determine; unless these definitions are determined scientifically [in classical formulations], statistical thought lapses into prescientific insignificance.’

8 Again, the two types of laws are complementary in their domains of data. 135: ‘By this is meant, not that some data are explained by classical laws and other data by statistical laws, but rather that certain aspects of all data receive the classical type of explanation while other aspects of the same data are explained along statistical lines.’ 136: ‘… to account for data as similar [classical laws] is not to account for data in all their aspects. Each datum is just this instance of the given. It emerges within a continuous place and at a particular time. It occurs rarely or frequently. Now these aspects of all data are disregarded in explanations of the classical type … Hence, explanations of the classical type have to be complemented by explanations of a further, different type.’ Statistical science would seem to be headed toward a statistical explanation of data in their numbers and in their spatiotemporal distribution. 137: ‘Why are there in the world of our experience such vast numbers and such enormous intervals of time? Because probabilities are low, numbers have to be large; because occasions are rare, time intervals have to be long.’ Thus statistical laws have a capacity to generate explanation. 137: The ‘incapacity for systematic divergence, when combined with large numbers and long intervals of time, is equivalent to a positive tendency, to an intelligible order, to an effective thrust, that is no less explanatory than the rigorous conclusions based on classical laws.’

9 Probability is thus one thing, and chance another. 137: ‘Probability is an ideal norm that, for all its ideality, is concretely successful in the long run. Chance is merely the nonsystematic divergence of actual frequencies from the ideal frequencies named probabilities. Chance explains nothing. It pertains irretrievably to the merely empirical residue, to the aspects of data from which intelligence always abstracts. But probability is an intelligibility; it is, as it were, rescued from the merely empirical residue by the roundabout device in which inquiring intelligence sets up the heuristic anticipations of the statistical type of investigation.’

10 It remains to settle a complementarity in what is to be known by these complementary cognitive procedures. 138: ‘… knowing and known, if they are not an identity, at least stand in some correspondence, and as the known is reached only through knowing, structural features of the one are bound to be reflected in the other.’ What worldview is involved by the affirmation of complementary classical and statistical laws?

11 In general: (1) the worldview will be concerned with the intelligibility immanent in the universe of our experience, for that is what empirical method is out to determine – thus, it will say nothing about the end or purpose of the universe, the materials from which it was fashioned, the agent or agents responsible for it; (2) the account will be generic, resting solely on the dynamic structure of inquiring intelligence; (3) it will be relatively invariant, that is, based in that invariant
structure, in scientific method, in the dynamic structure of inquiring intelligence (but only as that structure is here accounted for) and not in the variable content of the sciences; (4) it will be incomplete at this point, rendered more complete by the consideration later of the notion of things; (5) it does not claim to be deductive; it takes a clue from the nature of insight and develops it.

12 That clue has to do with schemes of recurrence. 140-41: ‘On the one hand, the world of our experience is full of continuities, oscillations, rhythms, routines, alternations, circulations, regularities. On the other hand, the scheme of recurrence not only squares with this broad fact but also is related intimately both to classical and to statistical laws. For the notion of the scheme emerges in the very formulation of the canons of empirical method. Abstractly, the scheme itself is a combination of classical laws. Concretely, schemes begin, continue, and cease to function in accord with statistical probabilities. Such is our clue, our incipient insight.’

13 There is a scheme of recurrence when a series of events $A, B, C, \ldots$ is so related that the fulfilment of the conditions for each would be the occurrence of the others: If $A$ occurs, $B$ will occur; if $B$ occurs, $C$ will occur; if $C$ occurs, $\ldots$ $A$ will recur. The scheme could be such that none of the arrangements could function alone, yet all would function if conjoined in an interdependent combination. A scheme can be complemented by a defensive circle that would eliminate events that tend to upset the scheme. See the examples on pp. 141-42.

14 Our concern, though, is not with single schemes but with a conditioned series of schemes. Consider, for example, chemical, biological, and sensitive-psychological schemes as a conditioned series. 142: ‘… the schemes $P, Q, R, \ldots$ form a conditioned series if all prior members of the series must be functioning actually for any later member to become a concrete possibility.’ The actual seriation of schemes is unique: it consists of the schemes that actually were, are, will be functioning in our universe, precisely specified as to places, durations, and relations to one another. The probable seriation is manifold: at each stage there is a set of probable next stages, of which some are more probable than others; the probable seriation includes all that would occur without systematic divergence from the probabilities. The possible seriation includes all the schemes of recurrence that could be devised from the classical laws of our universe, no matter how negligible their probability. 143: ‘… the possible exhibits the greatest complexity and variety. It depends solely on a consideration of classical laws. It suffers from the indeterminacy of the abstract, and so exhibits the process of any universe with laws similar to ours. The probable seriation depends on statistical as well as classical laws, and indeed on the statistical laws that arise from the initial or basic situation of our world. Still, if it is not as abstract as the possible seriation, nonetheless it is ideal. For each moment of world history it assigns a most probable future course. But it also assigns a series of less probable courses, and it has to acknowledge that any of these may prove to be the fact. Finally, the actual seriation is unique, but it purchases its uniqueness by going beyond the
field of all laws, classical and statistical, and entering the field of observation, in which alone nonsystematic divergences from probability are determinate.’

October 16, 2003, Part 2

15 Not only events but also schemes have a probability. More precisely, there is a probability to the emergence and a distinct probability to the survival of a scheme of recurrence. Emergence: when the prior conditions for the functioning of a scheme of recurrence are satisfied, the probability of the combination of events constitutive of the scheme leaps [from a product of fractions to a sum of fractions]. The probability of emergence for a scheme of recurrence consists in the sum of the respective probabilities of all the events included in the scheme, and it arises as soon as the prior conditions for the functioning of the scheme are satisfied. Survival: a scheme tends to assure its own perpetuity, but the perpetuity is not necessary; the probability of survival of a scheme of recurrence is the probability of the nonoccurrence of any of the events that would disrupt the scheme.

16 The general notion of emergent probability is thus outlined. 145: ‘… the actual functioning of earlier schemes in the series fulfils the conditions for the possibility of the functioning of later schemes. As such conditions are fulfilled, the probability of the combination of the component events in a scheme jumps … But what is probable, sooner or later occurs. When it occurs, a probability of emergence is replaced by a probability of survival; and as long as the scheme survives, it is in its turn fulfilling conditions for the possibility of still later schemes in the series.’ The potentialities of explanation contained in this notion are outlined through considerations of the significance of spatial concentration and distribution, absolute numbers, long intervals of time, selection, stability, and development.

17 Spatial concentrations and distributions: each later set of schemes becomes possible in the places where earlier schemes are already functioning. The most elementary schemes can occur anywhere, the second batch only where the first have occurred, etc. Not all possibilities will be actuated. Elementary schemes will not be as frequent as they could be, thus narrowing the possible basis for the second batch, etc. There is a succession of constrictions of the volumes of space in which later schemes will be found. Since the latest have the most conditions to be fulfilled, their occurrence is limited to a relatively small number of places. (Think of the conditions that must be satisfied for the emergence of life.)

18 Absolute numbers: large numbers offset low probabilities. What occurs once on a million occasions is to be expected a million times on a million million occasions. The minimum probability pertains to the latest schemes, and the lower the probability of the last schemes of the conditioned series, the greater must be the initial absolute numbers in which elementary schemes can be realized. The size
of the universe is inversely proportionate to the probability of its ultimate schemes of recurrence.

19 Long intervals of time: even the initial benefit of large numbers is lost by the successive narrowing of the basis for further developments. But long intervals of time compensate. 146: ‘Just as a million million simultaneous possibilities yield a million probable realizations whose probability is one in a million, so also a million million successive possibilities yield a million probable realizations under the same expectation.’

20 Selection: if the probability both of emergence and of survival is low, occurrence of schemes will be rare and fleeting; if both are high, occurrences will be common and enduring. If the probability of emergence is low and that of endurance high, the scheme is rare but enduring. If the probability of emergence is high and that of endurance low, the scheme is common but fleeting.

21 Stability: the line of maximum stability would be of common and enduring schemes, the line of minimum stability of rare and fleeting schemes.

22 Development can conflict with stability. Schemes with high probabilities of survival tend to imprison materials in their own routines. They provide a highly stable basis for later schemes, but they also tend to prevent later schemes from emerging. This is resolved when the earlier, conditioning schemes have a high probability of emergence but a low probability of survival.

23 Summary, 147: ‘The point we are endeavoring to make, within the limits of our narrow premise, is that the notion of emergent probability is explanatory. Intelligent inquiry aims at insight. But classical laws alone offer no insight into numbers, distributions, concentrations, time intervals, selectivity, uncertain stability, or development. On the contrary, they abstract from the instance, the place, the time, and the concrete conditions of actual functioning. Again, statistical laws, as a mere aggregate, affirm in various cases the ideal frequency of the occurrence of events. They make no pretence of explaining why there are so many kinds of events, or why each kind has the frequency attributed to it. To reach explanation on this level, it is necessary to effect the concrete synthesis of classical laws into a conditioned series of schemes of recurrence, to establish that such schemes, as combinations of events, acquire first a probability of emergence and then a probability of survival through the realization of the conditioned series, and finally to grasp that, if such a series of schemes is being realized in accord with probabilities, then there is available a general principle that promises answers to questions about the reason for numbers and distributions, concentrations and time intervals, selectivity and uncertain stability, development and breakdowns. To work out the answers pertains to the natural sciences. To grasp that emergent probability is an explanatory idea is to know what is meant when our objective was characterized as a generic, relatively invariant, and
24 The generic properties of a world process in which the order is constituted by emergent probability are best treated by taking each of the points made on pp. 148-51. Since these have been covered one by one already, we will not go through this section in class.

25 From section 3 we will take only the following points. Galileo did not recognize the abstractness of the laws of nature, and so for him these laws stand in the field of imaginable elements. The universality and necessity of the laws are attached immediately to imaginable particles moving in an imaginable ether. There follows a mechanistic view of the universe. “There is some vast aggregate of discrete or continuous but imaginable elements; they are subject to universal and necessary laws; and the business of the scientist is the hard task of determining those laws and so predicting what cannot but occur … the universe implicit in Galilean methodology is an aggregate of imaginable parts, and each is related systematically to all the others.” Apart from the universe of imaginable elements there can arise no further imaginable interventions, and so the mechanism is also a determinism. For Lonergan “abstraction is not impoverishing but enriching … in the sense of enriching abstraction classical laws are abstract … a systematic unification of classical laws does not imply the possibility of imaginative synthesis … the concentration of systematic relationships in the abstract field leaves the further determinations needed for concrete applications nonsystematically related to one another.”

26 Our discussion of chapter 5 will touch only on a few essentials. Because all mathematical principles and all natural laws of the classical type are abstract, their appropriate expression must be invariant with variations of the place or time of the speaker. But physics investigates local movements, and cannot state their laws without some reference to places and times. But then the laws contain an element that can vary with variations of the speaker’s place and time, unless the physicist finds spatiotemporal invariants that enable invariant expressions of the laws of local motion. The key is to find transformation equations that enable expressions that do not change their meaning with shifts of reference frames. Then the expressions will be invariant, because they stand for abstract and generally valid propositions. These expressions will constitute a geometry, and the abstract intelligibility of space and time will be found in the geometry whose spatial and temporal principles and laws will remain invariant under transformations of reference frames. This will be the geometry or geometries verified by physicists in establishing the invariant formulation of their abstract principles and laws. In stating this, Lonergan is intent on correcting the Newtonian presumption that the absolute lies on the level of sensible particulars.

27 On the other hand, there is also a concrete intelligibility grasped in the totality of concrete extensions and durations that also is identical for all spatiotemporal
viewpoints. The concrete intelligibility of Space is that it grounds the possibility of the simultaneous multiplicities that constitute a situation. The concrete intelligibility of Time is that it grounds the possibility of successive realizations in accord with probabilities. Concrete extensions and concrete durations are the field or matter or potency in which emergent probability is the immanent form or intelligibility.
October 30, 2003, Part 1

Recording begins with the page on ‘Transition from chapters 1-5 to chapters 6-7.’

1 Chapter 6 moves to the study of insight in everyday life: common sense. At the end of chapter 7 (p. 268), Lonergan will say that the two chapters are an attempt at ‘hitting off the thought of the average man, the problem of his affects, and the dialectic of his history.’ And note k on p. 793 reveals how that passage read in an earlier manuscript: ‘hitting off the thought of the average man, as would Newman, the problem of his affects, as would Freud, and the dialectic of his history, as would a higher synthesis of liberal and Marxist thought.’

2 The spirit of inquiry is a native endowment, and it manifests itself in spontaneous inquiry, the spontaneous accumulation of related insights, and the spontaneous process of learning. These three together as they function in a community yield the notion of common sense as an intellectual development (197-98).

3 Thus we are ‘born into a community that possesses a common fund of tested answers, and from that fund each may draw [one’s] variable share, measured by [one’s] capacity, [one’s] interests, and [one’s] energy. Not only does the self-correcting process of learning unfold within the private consciousness of the individual; for by speech, and still more by example, there is effected a sustained communication that at once disseminates and tests and improves every advance, to make the achievement of each successive generation the starting point of the next’ (198).

4 Common sense differs markedly from scientific knowledge. It is a specialization in the particular and the concrete. It is common but not general. It consists in a set of insights that remains incomplete until there is added further insight into the situation in hand. Once that situation has passed, the added insight is no longer relevant, so common sense reverts to its incompleteness. Its analogies are not logically formulated: in correspondence with the similarities of situations it appeals to an incomplete set of insights, and in correspondence with the differences in situations it adds the different relevant insights. Its generalizations are not premises for deductions, but just pointers that it is well to keep in mind, as in proverbs. It does not aspire to universally valid knowledge nor attempt exhaustive communication. It is out only to negotiate each situation as it arises by adding a relevant set of insights to its accumulated store. It does not try to formulate its incomplete set of insights in definitions and postulates or in a systematic fashion. It does not employ a technical language or a formal mode of speech. Its expressions are nuanced, depending on the exigences of concrete communication; they are a work of art, not of formal logic; they draw on tone, volume, facial expression, gestures, pauses, etc., as well as language. Common sense follows no general rules.
5 So too, it envisages a different plane of reality from that of science: things as related to us, without the ulterior purpose of theory that is found in scientific description. It restricts further questions to the concrete and particular, the immediate and practical. It brushes aside other questions. 201: ‘… the supreme canon of common sense is the restriction of further questions to the realm of the concrete and particular, the immediate and practical. To advance in common sense is to restrain the omnivorous drive of inquiring intelligence and to brush aside as irrelevant, if not silly, any question whose answer would not make an immediately palpable difference.’

6 Still, common sense is complementary to science. For one thing, ‘… scientists need common sense to apply methods properly in executing the concrete tasks of particular investigations, just as logicians need common sense if they are to grasp what is meant in each concrete act of human utterance’ (202). In general: ‘It has been argued that there exists a complementarity between classical and statistical investigations; perhaps it now is evident that the whole of science, with logic thrown in, is a development of intelligence that is complementary to the development named common sense. Rational choice is not between science and common sense; it is a choice of both, of science to master the universal, and of common sense to deal with the particular’ (202-203).

7 Common sense is divided in specialized departments or ‘brands’ determined by place, occupation, social arrangements, and so on. 203: ‘At once, it adapts individuals in every walk of life to the work they have chosen or the lot that has befallen them, and no less, it generates all those minute differences of viewpoint and mentality that separate men and women, old and young, town and country, until in the limit one reaches the cumulative differences and mutual incomprehension of different strata of society, different nations, different civilizations, and different epochs of human history.’

8 Part 2: The Subjective Field of Common Sense. The bulk of the chapter is concerned with the subject to whom the objects of common sense are related and who is related to those objects. Who are we? Do we not change? Is not the acquisition of common sense itself a change in us? It changes the subjective term in the object-to-subject relations that it knows. (In chapter 7, we will see not it also changes the object term.) To understand the subjective developments, we begin with the notion of patterns of experience. We will distinguish biological, aesthetic, intellectual, and dramatic patterns, will contrast patterns of consciousness with unconscious patterns of neural process, and will indicate the connection between a flight from insight and some of the matters discussed in depth psychology.

9 A pattern of experience is a particular ordering of sensations, memories, images, emotions, conscious bodily movements, and spontaneous intersubjective responses, where the ordering is determined by one’s interests, purposes, or
direction. It is (206) ‘a set of intelligible relations that link together sequences of sensations, memories, images, conations, emotions, and bodily movements.’ Sensations, acts of seeing, hearing, touching, tasting, smelling, do not occur in isolation from one another and from other events. They have a bodily basis, are functionally related to bodily movements, and occur in some dynamic context that unifies a manifold of sensed contents and of acts of sensing. But above all, they are organized by the direction of the stream, and that organization is what makes for a pattern, the intelligible relations that link the elements together.

10 In the biological pattern the sequences of these activities converge upon such terminal activities as intussusception, reproduction, and self-preservation. Consciousness in the biological pattern is extroverted, concerned with the external conditions and opportunities of living, confrontational. Human consciousness would slip into the biological pattern under conditions of danger, hunger, thirst, etc. 207: ‘Conation, emotion, and bodily movement are a response to stimulus; but the stimulus is over against the response; it is a presentation through sense and memory and imagination of what is responded to, of what is to be dealt with. The stimulating elements are the elementary object; the responding elements are the elementary subject.’ The extroversion and confrontation aspects can perdure in dramatic living and well into cognitional theory, causing upset in both areas.

11 In the aesthetic pattern experience is liberated from such biological purposiveness. Experience can occur for the sake of experiencing, and this liberation is a spontaneous, self-justifying joy. In *Topics in Education* Lonergan will link art with noninstrumentalized experience. The artist is a specialist in the aesthetic pattern, discovering ever novel forms to unify and relate the contents and acts of such experience. But art is a twofold freedom. For art also liberates intelligence from ‘the wearying constraints of mathematical proofs, scientific verifications, and commonsense factualness’ (208). It *embodies* insights in colors, shapes, sounds, movements, the situations and actions of fiction. (See the later definition, based on Langer: the objectification of a purely experiential pattern.) It seeks to convey something that can be reached through a participation, and in some fashion a reenactment of the artist’s inspiration and intention. It obscurely symbolizes the deep-set wonder in its elemental sweep and the possible answers to the questions we are for ourselves, by communicating the moods in which the questions arise, and the tones in which they may be answered or ignored. Some of the material foreshadows the later discussion of mystery, in chapter 17.

12 Art and aesthetic experience also generate in experience a flexibility that makes it a ready tool of the spirit of inquiry that dominates the intellectual pattern. In this pattern sensitive process cooperates in many ways with intellectual desire. 209: ‘… in the seasoned mathematician, sensitive process easily contracts to an unruffled sequence of symbolic notations and schematic images. In the trained observer, outer sense forgets its primitive biological functions to take on a selective alertness that keeps pace with the refinements of elaborate and subtle classifications. In the theorist intent upon a problem, even the subconscious goes
to work to yield at unexpected moments the suggestive images of clues and missing links, of patterns and perspectives, that evoke the desiderated insight and the delighted cry “Eureka!” In reflection, there arises a passionless calm. Memory ferrets out instances that would run counter to the prospective judgment. Imagination anticipates the shape of possibilities that would prove the judgment wrong. So deep is the penetration, so firm the dominance, so strange the transformation of sensitive spontaneity, that memories and anticipations rise above the threshold of consciousness only if they possess at least a plausible relevance to the decision to be made. For the stream of sensitive experience is a chameleon; and as its pattern can be biological or artistic, so too it can become the automatic instrument, or rather the vitally adaptive collaborator, of the spirit of inquiry.’ Even with its cooperation, one takes years to learn a field thoroughly enough that one can set out on one’s own. RD: It seems clear that in these instances the level of ‘experience’ is more than the flow of sensations, memories, images, emotions, etc. There is a link here to the received meanings and values that allow for the connection of Lonergan to Heidegger and Wittgenstein. This will be even more the case with the dramatic pattern.

October 30, 2003, Part 2

13 The principal concern of this chapter, though, is with the dramatic pattern of everyday living, with its concern not only to get things done but also to stamp one’s living with a style that itself is a work of art. The dramatic pattern is a function of (1) the underlying exigencies of neural process in the subject for expression and conscious representation, and (2) the situation of the subject’s life as it influences a prior capacity and willingness for receiving materials into consciousness.

14 (1) The underlying neural materials in one’s body have their own exigencies, and these are met by granting them psychic representation and conscious integration and transformation. These exigencies are understood differently in different psychological systems: consider the differences between Freud and Jung on psychic energy. Nonetheless, both of these systems as well as others will grant the fact of an exigence for psychic representation and conscious integration. That conscious representation is in part a transformation of the biological under the guidance and direction of a kind of artistic motivation, to give dignity to one’s existence. The category of ‘dramatic artistry,’ artistry in the creation of one’s own life in the company of others, is a key notion. Our social relationships are grounded in ‘aesthetic liberation and artistic creativity, where the artistry is limited by biological exigence, inspired by example and emulation, confirmed by admiration and approval, sustained by respect and affection’ (211).

15 (2) The drama into which one is born molds one’s character partly beyond one’s own choice, and influences a prior collaboration of imagination and intelligence that provides the possibilities for one’s own reflection and evaluation. 211-12: ‘As other insights emerge and accumulate, so too do the insights that govern the imaginative projects of dramatic living. As other insights are corrected through
the trial and error that give rise to further questions and yield still further complementary insights, so too does each individual discover and develop the possible roles [one] might play, and under the pressure of artistic and affective criteria, work out [one’s] own selection and adaptation. Out of the plasticity and exuberance of childhood through the discipline and the play of education there gradually is formed the character of the [person]. It is a process in which rational consciousness with its reflection and criticism, its deliberation and choice, exerts a decisive influence. Still, there is no deliberation or choice about becoming stamped with some character; there is no deliberation about the fact that our past behavior determines our present habitual attitudes; nor is there any appreciable effect from our present good resolutions upon our future spontaneity. Before there can be reflection or criticism, evaluation or deliberation, our imaginations and intelligence must collaborate in representing the projected course of action that is to be submitted to reflection and criticism, to evaluation and decision. Already in the prior collaboration of imagination and intelligence, the dramatic pattern is operative, outlining how we might behave before others and charging the outline with an artistic transformation of a more elementary aggressivity and affectivity. Ordinary living is not ordinary drama. It is not learning a role and developing in oneself the feelings appropriate to its performance. It is not the prior task of assembling materials and through insight imposing upon them an artistic pattern. For in ordinary living there are not first the materials and then the pattern, nor first the role and then the feelings. On the contrary, the materials that emerge in consciousness are already patterned, and the pattern is already charged emotionally and conatively.

16 Dramatic artistry is possible only because there is a certain subordination of neural process to psychic determinations, an initial detachment of our bodily movements from the directing sensitive and emotive elements, so that a variety of movements becomes possible through complex correlations between the psychic and the neural. Nonetheless, there are neural demands for psychic representation and conscious integration, and these demands are met in the patterned experience in which the elements enter consciousness. The elements are somehow preconsciously selected and arranged, as the dramatic pattern ‘penetrates below the surface of consciousness to exercise its own domination and control, and to effect, prior to conscious discrimination, its own selections and arrangements’ (213-14) and to exclude other selections and arrangements. This is the meaning that Lonergan gives to Freud’s notion of the censor. Neural demands or neural demand functions ‘call for some psychic representation and some conscious integration, but their specific requirements can be met in a variety of different manners.’ Still, there are limits to this versatility and flexibility, and they cannot be neglected without a heavy price being paid. (RD: Cf. dreams of flying.)

17 That prior selecting and arranging can be dominated by a bias, so that the materials for needed insight are prevented from ever emerging into consciousness. Insight can be unwanted. The long-term results are described on 214-15: ‘To exclude an insight is also to exclude the further questions that would arise from it, and the
complementary insights that would carry it towards a rounded and balanced viewpoint. To lack that fuller view results in behavior that generates misunderstanding both in ourselves and in others. To suffer such incomprehension favors a withdrawal from the outer drama of human living into the inner drama of fantasy. This introversion, which overcomes the extroversion native to the biological pattern of experience, generates a differentiation of the persona that appears before others and the more intimate ego that in the daydream is at once the main actor and the sole spectator. Finally, the incomprehension, isolation, and duality rob the development of one’s common sense of some part, greater or less, of the corrections and the assurance that result from learning accurately the tested insights of others and from submitting one’s own insights to the criticism based on others’ experience and development.

18 The aberration of intelligence that exercises the repressive censor is called by Lonergan a scotosis, and the blind spot a scotoma. The scotosis is fundamentally but not exclusively unconscious. It shows itself in the censorship we are patterned to exercise over the emergence of images and their concomitant affects. 216: ‘Just as wanting an insight penetrates below the surface to bring forth schematic images that give rise to the insight, so not wanting an insight has the opposite effect of repressing from consciousness a scheme that would suggest the insight. Now this aberration of the censorship is inverse to it. Primarily, the censorship is constructive; it selects and arranges materials that emerge in consciousness in a perspective that gives rise to an insight; this positive activity has by implication a negative aspect, for other materials are left behind, and other perspectives are not brought to light; still, this negative aspect of positive activity does not introduce any arrangement or perspective into the unconscious demand functions of neural patterns and processes. In contrast, the aberration of the censorship is primarily repressive; its positive activity is to prevent the emergence into consciousness of perspectives that would give rise to unwanted insights; it introduces, so to speak, the exclusion of arrangements into the field of the unconscious; it dictates the manner in which neural demand functions are not to be met; and the negative aspect of its positive activity is the admission to consciousness of any materials in any other arrangement or perspective. Finally, both the censorship and its aberration differ from conscious advertence to a possible mode of behavior and conscious refusal to behave in that fashion. For the censorship and its aberration are operative prior to conscious advertence, and they regard directly not how we are to behave but what we are to understand. A refusal to behave in a given manner is not a refusal to understand; so far from preventing conscious advertence, the refusal intensifies it and makes its recurrence more likely; and, finally, while it is true that conscious refusal is connected with a cessation of the conscious advertence, still this connection rests, not on an obnubilation of intelligence, but on a shift of effort, interest, preoccupation. Accordingly, we are led to restrict the name “repression” to the exercise of the aberrant censorship that is engaged in preventing insight.’ RD: Lonergan claims that the censorship is exercised by a ‘prior collaboration’ of intelligence and imagination; ‘imagination’ here suggests a psychic as well as an
intellectual component, and the notion of ‘psychic conversion’ entails a release of the psychic component into the freedom to ‘let be’ what is available to come into consciousness. The scotosis is really a function of both intelligence and psyche collaborating to keep certain data out, as Lonergan says at the bottom of p. 215: ‘The scotosis is an aberration, not only of the understanding, but also of the censorship.’ Still, as he says on p. 223, ‘… the scope of our work leaves no room for an account of the existence, on the level of the sensitive psyche, of an initiating factor that operates in a parallel fashion to the flight from understanding.’ In chapter 17, we will see some mention of a sensitive operator, but the matter is left undeveloped in Insight.

19 Thus neural demand functions are inhibited from achieving psychic representation and conscious integration, and the inhibition is different with respect to images from what it is with respect to affects. 216-17: ‘… insights arise, not from the experience of affects, but rather from imaginative presentations. Hence, to prevent insights, repression will have to inhibit demands for images. On the other hand, it need inhibit demands for affects only if they are coupled with the undesired images. Accordingly, the repression will not inhibit a demand for affects if that demand becomes detached from its apprehensive component [image or images], slips along some association path, and attaches itself to some other apprehensive component [image or images]. Inversely, when there emerges into consciousness an affect coupled with an incongruous object, then one can investigate association paths, argue from the incongruous to the initial object of the affect, and conclude that this combination of initial object and affect had been inhibited by a repression.’

20 The resultant division defeats one’s efforts at a smooth performance in the drama of living. Dreams can be helpful here, for they can introduce images for insight that waking life represses. (Lonergan’s later treatment of dreams is more existential, and in my view more satisfactory; a more complete treatment that incorporates Freudian, Jungian, and existential emphases is found in chapter 9 of Doran, Theology and the Dialectics of History.)

21 The whole argument in this section is not presenting a causal account of the origin of psychic trouble and of healing, but a functional correlation between the flight from understanding and neurosis, and between a sudden burst of insight and psychic healing. The cure involves ‘the occurrence of at least the principal insights that were blocked,’ and their occurrence, not in the intellectual pattern but in the dramatic pattern.

22 Finally, Freud’s discoveries of psychogenic disease often were expressed in the mechanist determinist language of the science of his day. This does not remove the fact that he did discover psychogenic disease, and the present chapter may be viewed as pointing toward a methodologically more sound expression of this discovery. 229-30: ‘… an acknowledgment of the nonsystematic leads to an affirmation of successive levels of scientific inquiry. If the nonsystematic exists
on the level of physics, then on that level there are coincidental manifolds that can be systematized by a higher chemical level without violating any physical law. If the nonsystematic exists on the level of chemistry, then on that level there are coincidental manifolds that can be systematized by a higher biological level without violating any chemical law. If the nonsystematic exists on the level of biology, then on that level there are coincidental manifolds that can be systematized by a higher psychic level without violating any biological law. If the nonsystematic exists on the level of the psyche, then on that level there are coincidental manifolds that can be systematized by a higher level of insight and reflection, deliberation and choice, without violating any law of the psyche. In brief, an acknowledgment of the nonsystematic makes it possible to conceive (1) psychic health as a harmonious unfolding of a process that moves at once on distinct yet related levels, (2) psychic aberration as an orientation of the stream of consciousness in conflict with its function of systematizing underlying manifolds, and (3) analytic treatment as an effort to reorientate an aberrant stream of consciousness and to effect a release from unconscious obstructions with a psychic origin.

‘Again, an acknowledgment that the real is the verified makes it possible to affirm the reality no less of the higher system than of the underlying manifold. The chemical is as real as the physical; the biological as real as the chemical; the psychic as real as the biological; and insight as real as the psychic. At once the psychogenic ceases to be merely a name, for the psychic becomes a real source of organization that controls underlying manifolds in a manner beyond the reach of their laws.’
November 6, 2003, Part 1

After a few announcements, the class began with a summary of chapter 6 and a further development of some items in that chapter. See p. 60 in these notes, and the notes of chapter 6 beginning with §19.

November 6, 2003, Part 2

1 Chapter 6 studied the changes in us brought about by the fact that things are related to us by commonsense insight and lack of insight. Chapter 7 studies the changes in the things that are related to us because of the same commonsense insight and lack of insight. Commonsense knowledge is for the sake of making and doing, and making and doing involve a transformation of us and of our environment. Of us: the common sense of one civilization is not the common sense of another. Of our environment: the practicality of common sense engenders and maintains enormous structures of technology, economics, politics, and culture, that not only separate us from nature but also add a series of new levels of dimensions in the network of human relationships.

2 The study of this aspect begins by discussing three recurrent interventions of commonsense intelligence in human affairs (Section 1, ‘Practical Common Sense’). The first is the mechanical arts and technology, capital formation, whether basic or quite complex. Common sense is practical, and ‘for practical intelligence desires are recurrent, labor is recurrent, and the comparatively brief time spent making [e.g.] spears or nets is amply compensated by the greater ease with which more game or fish is taken on an indefinite series of occasions’ (233). Such technical interventions of common sense are themselves recurrent. Inventions accumulate, setting new problems calling for more inventions, etc., etc. 233: ‘… in correspondence with each stage in the development of practical intelligence, there is a measure and structure of capital formation, that is, of things produced and arranged not because they themselves are desired but because they expedite and accelerate the process of supplying the goods and services that are wanted by consumers.’ This will translate into the basic and surplus phases of the economy in Lonergan’s economics.

3 Next, economics. The succession of new practical ideas demands a division of labor, specialization, and calls forth an economic system: ‘some procedure that sets the balance between the production of consumer goods and new capital formation, some method that settles what quantities of what goods and services are to be supplied, some device for assigning tasks to individuals and for distributing among them the common product’ (234).

4 The economy in turn evokes a political order. ‘Each step in the process of technological and economic development is an occasion on which minds differ,
new insights have to be communicated, enthusiasm has to be roused, and a common decision must be reached … there is the political specialization of common sense’ and its task is persuasion and communication (234). There is a recurrent problem of effective agreement, and the political specialization meets that problem.

5 Section 2, ‘The Dynamic Structure,’ begins by outlining how emergent probability rules human affairs. It is not in the same way as in physics, chemistry, and biology. 235, emergent probability: ‘Human actions are recurrent; their recurrence is regular; and the regularity is the functioning of a scheme, of a patterned set of relations that yields conclusions of the type: If an X occurs, then an X will recur … Clearly, schemes of recurrence exist and function. No less clearly, their functioning is not inevitable.’ 236, the difference: ‘Less and less importance attaches to the probabilities of appropriate constellations of circumstances. More and more importance attaches to the probabilities of the occurrence of insight, communication, persuasion, agreement, decision … The advance of technology, the formation of capital, the development of the economy, the evolution of the state are not only intelligible but also intelligent. Because they are intelligible, they can be understood as are the workings of emergent probability in the fields of physics, chemistry, and biology. But because they also are increasingly intelligent, increasingly the fruit of insight and decision, the analogy of merely natural process becomes less and less relevant. What possesses a high probability in one country or period or civilization may possess no probability in another; and the ground of the difference may lie only slightly in outward and palpable material factors and almost entirely in the set of insights that are accessible, persuasive, and potentially operative in the community.’ And that accessibility is various. To understand the working of any social structure, one has to inquire of many people in many walks of life, for the common sense of a people is parceled out among many and will never be expressed in a set of definitions, postulates, and deductions accessible to all.

6 Section 3, ‘Intersubjectivity and Social Order.’ The functional unity or dysfunctional breakdown of a social way of life is a function of the interaction of the two principles constitutive of social order: spontaneous intersubjectivity and practical intelligence. The primordial basis of human community is and always will be intersubjective, not the discovery of an idea. But civil community is not just intersubjective. Practical intelligence creates vast structures of interdependence in the interests of the good of order. The good of order is (238) ‘an intelligible pattern of relationships that condition the fulfilment of each [person’s] desires by [one’s] contributions to the fulfilment of the desires of others, and similarly protect each from the object of [one’s] fears in the measure [one] contributes to warding off the objects feared by others.’ The good of order is not an optional adjunct but an indispensable constituent of human living. It changes with developments in technological, economic, and political arrangements, and can spread from one society to another as ideas are communicated.
7 Section 4, ‘The Tension of Community.’ These two principles of social life are grounded in a duality in us, giving rise to a radical tension of community. Intersubjective spontaneity and intelligently devised social order possess different properties and different tendencies. Yet to both by [our] very nature [we are] committed. Intelligence cannot but devise general solutions and general rules. The individual is intelligent, and so [one] cannot enjoy peace of mind unless [one] subsumes [one’s] own feelings and actions under the general rules that [one] regards as intelligent. Yet feeling and spontaneous action have their home in the intersubjective group, and it is only with an effort and then only in favored times that the intersubjective groups fit harmoniously within the larger pattern of social order’ (241). Times are peaceful when the good of order comes to terms with intersubjective groups, whereas troubled times demand the discovery and dissemination of new insights and the consequent adaptation of spontaneous attitudes. This can be prolonged and extremely difficult.

8 Section 5, ‘The Dialectic of Community.’ The tension is actually a dialectic. ‘… a dialectic is a concrete unfolding of linked but opposed principles of change. Thus there will be a dialectic if (1) there is an aggregate of events of a determinate character, (2) the events may be traced to either or both of two principles, (3) the principles are opposed yet bound together, and (4) they are modified by the changes that successively result from them’ (242). There is a dialectic in the subject between neural demands and the censorship, and there is an analogous dialectic in the community between intersubjectivity and practical intelligence. 243: ‘Social events can be traced to the two principles of human intersubjectivity and practical common sense. The two principles are linked, for the spontaneous, intersubjective individual strives to understand and wants to behave intelligently; and inversely, intelligence would have nothing to put in order were there not the desires and fears, labors and satisfactions, of individuals. Again, these linked principles are opposed, for it is their opposition that accounts for the tension of community. Finally, these linked and opposed principles are modified by the changes that results from them; the development of common sense consists in the further questions and insights that arise from the situations produced by previous operations of practical common sense; and the alternations of social tranquility and social crisis mark successive stages in the adaptation of human spontaneity and sensibility to the demands of developing intelligence.’

9 The dialectic of community differs in extent and in the level of activity from the dialectic of the subject. 243: ‘… a single dialectic of community is related to a manifold of individual dialectics. In this relationship the dialectic of community holds the dominant position, for it gives rise to the situations that stimulate neural demands, and it molds the orientation of intelligence that preconsciously exercises the censorship.’ The key to a healthy society lies in the mutual functional interdependence of the two linked but opposed principles of change. See 258: ‘… dialectic rests on the concrete unity of opposed principles; the dominance of either principle results in a distortion, and the distortion both weakens the dominance and strengthens the opposed principle to restore an equilibrium.’
November 13, Part One

10 What prevents the concrete unity of opposed principles is bias. In addition to the dramatic bias discussed in chapter 6, there are here discussed individual boas, group bias, and general bias. Individual bias (section 6) is an interference of self-centered spontaneity both with the intelligence that sponsors the good of order and with the intersubjective spontaneity that leads us to help others in the attainment of their satisfaction. 245: ‘With remarkable acumen one solves one’s own problems. With startling modesty one does not venture to raise the relevant further questions, Can one’s solution be generalized? Is it compatible with the social order that exists? Is it compatible with any social order that proximately or even remotely is possible?’ The egoist uses intelligence, but restrains inquiry to the field determined by self-centered desires and fears. One thus excludes correct understanding of oneself and of situations, since it is only ‘through the cumulative process of further questions and further insights that an adequate understanding is reached’ (246). The egoist is not unaware of self-deception, because it is by a conscious self-orientation that one devotes one’s energies to playing the social order to one’s own advantage. 247: ‘The egoist’s uneasy conscience is [one’s] awareness of [one’s] sin against the light. Operative within [us] there is the eros of the mind, the desire and drive to understand; [the egoist] knows its value, for he gives it free rein where his own interests are concerned; yet he also repudiates its mastery, for he will not grant serious consideration to its further relevant questions.’

11 Group bias is an interference of narrow intersubjectivity with the development of practical intelligence. Individual bias leads to attitudes that conflict with ordinary common sense, but group bias operates in the very genesis of the commonsense views of different groups. 248: ‘… social progress is a succession of changes. Each new idea gradually modifies the social situation to call forth further new ideas and bring about still further modifications. Moreover, the new ideas are practical; they are applicable to concrete situations; they occur to those engaged in the situations to which they are to be applied. However, while the practical common sense of a community may be a single whole, its parts reside separately in the minds of members of social groups, and its development occurs as each group intelligently responds to the succession of situations with which it immediately deals. Were all the responses made by pure intelligences, continuous progress might be inevitable. In fact, responses are made by intelligences that are coupled with the ethos and the interests of groups, and while intelligence heads for change, group spontaneity does not regard all changes in the same cold light of the general good of society. Just as the individual egoist puts further questions up to a point, but desists before reaching conclusions incompatible with his egoism, so also the group is prone to have a blind spot for the insights that reveal its well-being to be excessive or its usefulness at an end.’
12 Group bias thus leads to a bias in the generative principle of a developing social order. Because of group bias, even truly practical ideas have to be divided into operative and inoperative ideas. Ideas are operative only when they either meet with no group resistance or else find favor with powerful groups. The resultant bias in social development is described on 249: ‘The bias of development involves a distortion. The advantage of one group commonly is disadvantageous to another, and so some part of the energies of all groups is diverted to the supererogatory activity of devising and implementing offensive and defensive mechanisms. Groups differ in their possession of native talent, opportunities, initiative, and resources; those in favored circumstances find success the key to still further success; those unable to make operative the new ideas that are to their advantage fall behind in the process of social development. Society becomes stratified; its flower is far in advance of average attainment; its roots appear to be the survival of the rude achievement of a forgotten age. Classes become distinguished, not merely by social function, but also by social success; and the new differentiation finds expression not only in conceptual labels but also in deep feelings of frustration, resentment, bitterness, and hatred.

‘Moreover the course of development has been twisted. The social order that has been realized does not correspond to any coherently developed set of practical ideas. It represents the fraction of practical ideas that were made operative by their conjunction with power, the mutilated remnants of once excellent schemes that issued from the mill of compromise, the otiose structures that equip groups for their offensive and defensive activities. Again, ideas are general, but the stratification of society has blocked their realization in their proper generality. Ideas possess retinues of complementary ideas that add further adjustments and improvements; but these needed complements were submitted to the sifting of group interests and to the alterations of compromise.’

13 Group bias creates the principles for the reversal of aberration. 250: ‘… what originally was a neglected possibility in time becomes a grotesquely distorted reality … and the sentiments of the unsuccessful can be crystallized into militant force by the crusading of a reformer or a revolutionary.’ The conflict depends on the attitude of the dominant groups, more or less reactionary or progressive.

14 More serious still is the role of general bias. We are all prone to it. It affects even a common sense that is free of dramatic, individual, and group bias. It is the propensity of common sense to extend its legitimate concern for the concrete and the immediately practical into disregard of larger issues and indifference to long-term results. 251: ‘Common sense … is incapable of analyzing itself, incapable of making the discovery that it too is a specialized development of human knowledge, incapable of coming to grasp that its peculiar danger is to extend its legitimate concern for the concrete and the immediately practical into disregard of larger issues and indifference to long-term results.’

15 Section 8.1, The Longer Cycle. There are shorter cycles generated by group bias, and they turn upon ideas that are neglected by dominant groups only to be
championed later by oppressed groups. These ideas have to do basically with material well-being. But there are longer cycles characterized by neglect of ideas to which all groups are rendered indifferent by general bias. 252-53: ‘... [w]e can discover emergent probability; [w]e can work out the manner in which prior insights and decisions determine the possibilities and probabilities of later insights and decisions; [w]e can guide [o]ur present decisions in the light of their influence on future insights and decisions; finally, this control of the emergent probability of the future can be exercised not only by the individual in choosing [a] career and in forming [one’s] character, not only by adults in educating the younger generation, but also by [humankind] in its consciousness of its responsibility to the future of [humankind].’ But this means that common sense is not enough. Of itself, it cannot guide human history. It has to aim at being subordinated to a human science that thinks on the level of history. It cannot realize ideas that suppose a long view or set up a higher integration or involve the solution of intricate and disputed issues. 253: ‘The challenge of history is for [us] progressively to restrict the realm of chance or fate or destiny and progressively to enlarge the realm of conscious grasp and deliberate choice. Common sense accepts the challenge, but it does so only partially. It needs to be guided but it is incompetent to choose its guide. It becomes involved in incoherent enterprises. It is subjected to disasters that no one expects, that remain unexplained even after their occurrence, that can be explained only on the level of scientific or philosophic thought, that even when explained can be prevented from recurring only by subordinating common sense to a higher specialization of human intelligence.’

16 Section 8.2, Implications of the Longer Cycle. 254: ‘... the general bias of common sense involves the disregard of timely and fruitful ideas; and this disregard not only excludes their implementation but also deprives subsequent stages of the further ideas to which they would give rise and of the correction that they and their retinue would bring to the ideas that are implemented.’ The result is a sequence of ever less comprehensive viewpoints and integrations of human living. Three consequences follow: (a) a cumulative deterioration of the social situation (254); (b) the mounting irrelevance of culture, religion, and philosophy because of the social surd, ‘an increasingly significant residue that (1) is immanent in the social facts, (2) is not intelligible, yet (3) cannot be abstracted from if one is to consider the facts as in fact they are’ (254-55); and (c) the surrender of intelligence, both on the level of common sense and on the speculative or superstructural level, where it becomes radically uncritical, non-normative, non-dialectical, and in the limit totalitarian. 256-57: ‘On the totalitarian view every type of intellectual independence, whether personal, cultural, scientific, philosophic, or religious, has no better basis than non-conscious myth. The time has come for the conscious myth that will secure [o]ur total subordination to the requirements of reality. Reality is the economic development, the military equipment, and the political dominance of the all-inclusive state. Its ends justify all means. Its means include not merely every technique of indoctrination and propaganda, every tactic of economic and diplomatic pressure, every device for
breaking down the moral conscience and exploiting the secret affects of civilized man, but also the terrorism of a political police, of prisons and torture, of concentration camps, of transported or extirpated minorities, and of total war. The succession of less comprehensive viewpoints has been a succession of adaptations of theory to practice. In the limit, practice becomes a theoretically unified whole, and theory is reduced to the status of a myth that lingers on to represent the frustrated aspirations of detached and disinterested intelligence.

17 The result, if the bias remains effective, is complete disintegration and decay, described on 257-58 in a manner that is strikingly relevant to the contemporary situation. But this is not inevitable. 258: ‘… the essential logic of the distorted dialectic is a reversal. For dialectic rests on the concrete unity of opposed principles; the dominance of either principle results in a distortion, and the distortion both weakens the dominance and strengthens the opposed principle to restore an equilibrium.’ The alternative involves the attainment of a higher viewpoint in our understanding and making of ourselves (and of a higher integration in our being, as will be evidenced in later chapters). For the moment this ‘higher viewpoint’ is described as ‘the discovery, the logical expansion, and the recognition of the principle that intelligence contains its own immanent norms and that these norms are equipped with sanctions which [we do] not have to invent or impose’ (259). What this would mean entails at least the following: acknowledging that the principle of progress is liberty, and the principle of decline is bias; human science must be not only empirical but also critical, normative, and dialectical; culture must be granted an autonomous place in the structure of society, ‘an independent factor that passes a detached yet effective judgment upon capital formation and technology, upon economy and polity’ (262) and not a tool that serves these. The mentality that supports, sustains, and promotes this higher viewpoint Lonergan calls ‘a cosmopolis that is neither class nor state, that stands above all their claims, that cuts them down to size, that is founded on the native detachment and disinterestedness of every intelligence, that commands [our] first allegiance, that implements itself primarily through that allegiance, that is too universal to be bribed, too impalpable to be forced, too effective to be ignored’ (263). Cosmopolis ‘is concerned to make operative the timely and fruitful ideas that otherwise are inoperative. So far from employing power or pressure or force, it has to witness to the possibility of ideas being operative without such backing’ (264).

November 13, Part Two

The second part completed the discussion of chapter 7 before moving on to chapter 8, with a discussion of the possibility of the integrity that Lonergan is calling for.

18 We conclude with the ‘final observation’ on method (268-69).
We begin by recalling some pertinent comments in the Introduction. 11-12: ‘… in each of us there exist two different kinds of knowledge … the question of human knowledge is not whether it exists but what precisely are its two diverse forms and what are the relations between them.’ 15: ‘St Augustine of Hippo narrates that it took him years to make the discovery that the name “real” might have a different connotation from the name “body.” Or, to bring the point nearer home, one might say that it has taken modern science four centuries to make the discovery that the objects of its inquiry need not be imaginable entities moving through imaginable processes in an imaginable space-time.’ 17: ‘… the hard fact is that the psychological problem exists, that there exist in [us] two diverse kinds of knowing, that they exist without differentiation and in an ambivalent confusion until they are distinguished explicitly and the implications of the distinction are drawn explicitly. The hard fact is that the personal psychological problem cannot be solved by the ordinary procedure of affirming the propositions that are true and denying the propositions that are false, for the true meaning of the true propositions always tends to be misapprehended by a consciousness that has not yet discovered its need of discovering what an Augustine took years and modern science centuries to discover.’ 22: ‘… unless one breaks the duality in one’s knowing, one doubts that understanding correctly is knowing. Under the pressure of that doubt, either one will sink into the bog of a knowing that is without understanding, or else one will cling to understanding but sacrifice knowing on the altar of an immanentism, an idealism, a relativism. From the horns of that dilemma one escapes only through the discovery … that there are two quite different realisms, that there is an incoherent realism, half animal and half human, that poses as a halfway house between materialism and idealism, and on the other hand that there is an intelligent and reasonable realism between which and materialism the halfway house is idealism.’

Chapter 8 is one of the most important sections of the book, bringing to a close the concentrated attention to the second level of cognitional activity. The notion of a thing involves yet another kind of insight, one that grasps, not relations between data, but a unity, identity, whole in data in their concrete individuality and in the totality of their aspects. A thing is a unity to which there belongs every aspect of every datum within the unity. The clearest examples are living things: plants, animals, and human beings. 278-79: ‘By a thing is meant an intelligible concrete unity. As differentiated by experiential conjugates and commonsense expectations, it is a thing for us, a thing as described. As differentiated by explanatory conjugates and scientifically determined probabilities, it is a thing itself, a thing as explained.’

From this grasp of unity in a concrete totality of data there follow the various characteristics of things. (1) They are extended in space: spatially distinct data
pertain to the unity at any given instant. (2) They are permanent in time: temporally distinct data pertain to the same unity. (3) They are subject to change: there is a difference between the aggregate of data at one instant and at another. (4) They possess properties and are subject to laws and probabilities: the conjugates are properties of the thing, and the probabilities regard the occurrence of changes in the thing. The conjugates are related to the thing by attribution. (5) The notion of the thing is necessary for the notion of change. ‘… a change is not just a newly observed datum, nor the substitution of one datum for another, nor the creation of a datum that previously did not exist. Moreover, there are no changes in the realm of abstractions, for every abstraction is eternally whatever it is defined to be. If there is change, there has to be a concrete unity of concrete data extending over some interval of time, there has to be some difference between the data at the beginning and at the end of the interval, and this difference can be only partial, for otherwise there would occur not a change but an annihilation and a new creation’ (272). (6) The notion of the thing is also necessary for the continuity of scientific thought and development. The thing is ‘the basic synthetic construct of scientific thought and development’ (see 273). (7) Things are said to exist: ‘… existence stands to the thing as event or occurrence stands to the conjugate. For the existence of the thing is known by verifying the notion of the thing, as the occurrence is known by verifying the conjugate … [and] general knowledge of existence, like knowledge of occurrence, is obtained through statistical laws’ (273-74).

4 While all existing things are particular, we can abstract from their particularity and speak both of things in general and of things of determinate kinds specified by their conjugates or properties. The conjugates may be experiential or explanatory, but ‘there are data on things only inasmuch as they are related to our senses; it follows that there can be no appeal to data as long as one considers things themselves, things as explained, things as related to one another, things as equivalent for all observers inasmuch as one prescinds from all observers … when there is no possibility of observation, there is no possibility of a verifiable image; for the imagined as imagined can be verified only when what is imagined also can be sensed. Accordingly, there are no verifiable images for subatomic elements. But if subatomic elements cannot be imagined, then atoms cannot be imagined, for one cannot imagine a whole as made up of nonimaginable parts. It follows that no thing itself, no thing as explained, can be imagined. If atoms cannot be imagined, then by parity of reasoning, molecules cannot be imagined. If molecules cannot be imagined, then neither can cells. If cells cannot be imagined, then neither can plants. Once one enters upon the way of explanation by relating things to one another, one has stepped out of the path that yields valid representative images’ (274-75).

November 20, Part One

5 Contrasted with the notion of the thing in this precise sense is the notion of ‘body’ as an ‘already out there now real.’ ‘Already’ refers to the orientation and dynamic anticipation of biological consciousness; such consciousness does not create but finds its environment; it finds it as already constituted, already offering opportunities, already issuing challenges. ‘Out’ refers to the extroversion of a consciousness that is aware, not of its own ground, but of objects distinct from itself. ‘There’ and ‘now’ indicate the spatial and temporal determinations of extroverted consciousness. ‘Real,’ finally, is a subdivision within the field of the ‘already out there now’: part of that is mere appearance; but part is real; and its reality consists in its relevance to biological success or failure, pleasure or pain’ (276-77). 279: ‘By a “body” is meant primarily a focal point of extroverted biological anticipation and attention. It is an “already out there now real,” where these terms have their meaning fixed solely by elements within sensitive experience and so without any use of intelligent and reasonable questions and answers.’

6 Knowledge of ‘bodies’ is not intelligent or conceptual. It is not a grasp by insight of an intelligible unity grasped in data as individual. But it can subtly invade scientific and philosophical thinking. ‘When Galileo pronounced secondary qualities to be merely subjective, he meant that they were not “already out there now real.”’ When the decadent Aristotelians and, generally, people that rely on good common sense insist that secondary qualities obviously are objective, they mean that they are “already out there now real.” When Descartes maintained that material substance must be identical with spatial extension, his material substance was the “already out there now real.” When Kant argued that primary and secondary qualities are merely phenomena, he meant that for him the reality of the “already out there now real” was mere appearance. Our own position, as contained in the canon of parsimony, was that the real is the verified; it is what is to be known by the knowing constituted by experience and inquiry, insight and hypothesis, reflection and verification. Our present point is that, besides knowing in that rather complex sense, there is also “knowing” in the elementary sense in which kittens know the “reality” of milk’ (277).

7 The differences between the two types of knowing are: ‘The elementary type is constituted completely on the level of experience; neither questions for intelligence nor questions for reflection have any part in its genesis; and as questions do not give rise to it, neither can they undo it; essentially, it is unquestionable. On the other hand, in fully human knowing experience supplies no more than materials for questions; questions are essential to its genesis; through questions for intelligence it moves to accumulations of related insights which are expressed or formulated in concepts, suppositions, definitions, postulates, hypotheses, theories; through questions for reflection it attains a further component …’ (277-78).
8 Each type is valid, and the problem is not one of elimination but of critical
distinction. ‘… the difficulty lies, not in either type of knowing by itself, but in
the confusion that arises when one shifts unconsciously from one type to the
other. Animals have no epistemological problems. Neither do scientists, as long
as they stick to their task of observing, forming hypotheses, and verifying. The
perennial source of nonsense is that, after the scientist has verified his hypothesis,
he is likely to go a little further and tell the layman what, approximately, scientific
reality looks like!’ (278)

9 Again we are dealing with a dialectic, but in a different sense of the term. ‘There are
two types of knowing. Each is modified by its own development. They are
opposed, for one arises through intelligent and reasonable questions and answers,
and the other does not. They are linked together in [the human person], who at
once is an animal, intelligent, and reasonable. Unless they are distinguished
sharply by a critical theory of knowledge, they become confused, to generate
aberrations that afflict not only scientific thought but far more conspicuously the
thought of philosophers’ (278).

November 20, Part Two

10 When things are posited as instances of the already out there now, and when every
event is thought to be completely determined by classical laws, there is no room
for a succession of ever higher systems. All things are conceived as of a single
kind – mechanist determinism. But the notion of the thing as an intelligible
concrete unity differentiated by experiential and explanatory conjugates allows
for the possibility of different kinds of things and distinct sets of explanatory
conjugates. There arises the notion of genus as an explanatory category.
‘Consider a genus of things $T_i$, with explanatory conjugates $C_i$, and a second
genus of things $T_j$, with explanatory conjugates $C_i$ and $C_j$, such that all conjugates
of the type $C_i$ are defined by their relations to one another, and similarly, all
conjugates of the type $C_j$ are defined by their relations to one another. Then, since
$C_i$ and $C_j$ differ, there will be two different systems of terms and relations; as the
basic terms and relations differ, all logically derived terms and relations will
differ, so that by logical operations alone there is no transition from one system to
the other’ (280). Thus: ‘The laws of physics hold for subatomic elements; the
laws of physics and chemistry hold for chemical elements and compounds; the
laws of physics, chemistry, and biology hold for plants; the laws of physics,
chemistry, biology, and sensitive psychology hold for animals; the laws of
physics, chemistry, biology, sensitive psychology, and rational psychology hold
for [human beings]. As one moves from one genus to the next, there is added a
new set of laws which defines its own basic terms by its own empirically
established correlations. When one turns from physics and chemistry to
astronomy, one employs the same basic terms and correlations; but when one
turns from physics and chemistry to biology, one is confronted with an entirely
new set of basic concepts and laws.
'… Consider, then, a genus of things $T_i$, with explanatory conjugates $C_i$, and a consequent list of possible schemes of recurrence $S_i$. Suppose there occurs an aggregate of events $E_{ij}$ that is merely coincidental when considered in the light of the laws of the things $T_i$ and of all their possible schemes of recurrence $S_i$. Then, if the aggregate of events $E_{ij}$ occurs regularly, it is necessary to advance to the higher viewpoint of some genus of things $T_j$, with conjugates $C_i$ and $C_j$, and with schemes of recurrence $S_j$. The lower viewpoint is insufficient, for it has to regard as merely coincidental what in fact is regular. The higher viewpoint is justified, for the conjugates $C_j$ and the schemes $S_j$ constitute a higher system that makes regular what otherwise would be merely coincidental.' (280-81).

11 How does the possibility of new genera arise? 281: ‘… if the laws of subatomic elements have to regard the regular behavior of atoms as mere patterns of happy coincidences, then there is an autonomous science of chemistry. If the laws of chemistry have to regard the metabolism and division of cells as mere patterns of happy coincidences, then there is an autonomous science of biology. If the laws of biology have to regard the behavior of animals as mere patterns of happy coincidences, then there is an autonomous science of sensitive psychology. If the laws of sensitive psychology have to regard the operations of mathematicians and scientists as mere patterns of happy coincidences, then there is an autonomous science of rational psychology. Nor does the introduction of the higher autonomous science interfere with the autonomy of the lower; for the higher enters into the field of the lower only insofar as it makes systematic on the lower level what otherwise would be merely coincidental.’

The succession of sciences corresponding to the succession of higher genera does not admit any purely logical transition. But logical operations are confined to the field of concepts and definitions, hypotheses and theories, affirmations and negations. ‘This field is only part of the larger domain that includes as well sensitive presentations and imaginative representations, inquiry and insight, reflection and critical understanding. Within this larger domain, the successive departments of science are related, for the laws of the lower order yield images in which insight grasps clues to laws of the higher order.’

We are dealing here with successive higher viewpoints. If the real is the verified, then the transition images are merely heuristic, not pictures of reality. Since there is no verifiable image of the subatomic, there can be no verifiable image of objects composed of subatomic elements. The verifiably imagined is restricted to the sensibly given. One has to be content with reasonable affirmations of intelligently conceived terms and relations. The transition images represent, perhaps only symbolically, the coincidental manifold that becomes systematic when subsumed within the higher genus.

12 The fact of successive levels of things, however, does not mean that electrons are things within atoms, atoms things within compounds, compounds things within cells, cells things within animals, animals things within human beings. ‘… if any datum pertains to a thing, every aspect of the datum pertains to that thing. Hence, no datum can pertain to two or more things, for if in all its aspects it pertains to
one thing, there is no respect in which it can pertain to any other’ (283). ‘… the conjugates of the lower order exist in things of the higher genus … To arrive at conjugates, abstractive procedures are normal … But to arrive at a thing, one must consider all data within a totality, and one must take into account all their aspects’ (283-84). ‘… in an object of a higher order, there is an intelligible, concrete unity differentiated by conjugates of both the lower and the higher order, but there is no further intelligible concrete unity to be discerned in the same data and to be differentiated solely by conjugates of some lower order’ (284).

13 There is an emergent probability of things as well as of schemes of recurrence. This affirmation is grounded in the following postulates: (1) if there exist conjugates of a higher order, there will exist things of that same order; (2) if there exist things of a lower order differentiated by conjugates of that same order and functioning in schemes of that order, there exists the possibility and some probability of a nonsystematic occurrence of an aggregate of events that would occur regularly only if things of a higher order existed; (3) if nonsystemically there occur suitable aggregates of events of that higher order, then there will emerge conjugates of that order, to make the recurrence of the aggregates systematic; there will follow the existence of things of that higher order; (4) thus the notion of emergent probability is to be extended to things: there is possible a conditioned series of both things and schemes of recurrence realized cumulatively in accord with successive schedules of probabilities. Emergent probability thus regards the differentiation, numbers, distribution, development, survival, and disintegration of things as well as of schemes of recurrence.

14 The classifications of things in their relations to one another imply not only explanatory genera but also explanatory species. The key notion is that ‘any lower species of things $T_i$, with their conjugates $C_i$ and their schemes $S_i$, admit a series of coincidental aggregates of events, say $E_{ijm}, E_{ijn}, E_{ijo}, \ldots$ which stand in correspondence with a series of conjugates $C_{jm}, C_{jn}, C_{jo}, \ldots$ of a higher genus of things $T_j$.’ E.g., the series of chemical elements defined in the periodic table, the series of chemical compounds, or at a higher level the series of biological species and at a still higher level the series of animal species. In any of these instances, minor changes in the underlying aggregates yield variations within the species; major changes that are surmounted successfully yield new types of solution and so new species. Moreover, what Lonergan calls immanent intelligibility or constitutive design increases in systematizing significance as one mounts from higher to still higher systems. Thus an explanatory account of animal species will differentiate animals not by their organic but by their psychic differences. The animal belongs to an explanatory genus beyond that of the plant; that genus turns on sensibility; its specific differences are differences of sensibility; and it is in differences of sensibility that are to be found the basis for differences of organic structure, since that structure possesses a degree of freedom that is limited but not controlled by underlying materials and outer circumstances. And in human beings we reach the inquiry and insight that are not so much a higher system as a perennial source of higher systems, and so human being is at once explanatory
genus (as a higher system beyond sensibility) and explanatory species (as a source of higher systems). Such is the transition from the intelligible to the intelligent.
November 20, Part 2 (continued)

1 Chapters 9 and 10 treat a third level of cognitional activity: judgment and its ground in reflective understanding. The yes or no of judgment is a second inner word, following upon a second act of understanding, in which there is grasped the sufficiency of evidence for a prospective judgment.

2 A first determination of judgment is reached when we distinguish two attitudes that one may take toward propositions: one may merely consider them, or one may agree or disagree with them. In the first case, the proposition is the content of an act of thinking; in the second, it is the content of an act of judging.

3 A second determination is reached by distinguishing questions for intelligence from questions for reflection. Judging is answering yes or no to a question for reflection.

4 A third determination is that judgment involves a personal commitment. The question for reflection can be answered not only by yes or no but also by ‘I don’t know,’ ‘maybe,’ ‘probably,’ etc. A judgment is the responsibility of the one that judges.

5 Judgment has its own relation to the structure of cognitional process. The level of intelligence with which we have been concerned so far presupposes and complements a level of presentations that supplies the raw materials on which intelligence operates. But the level of intelligence also is presupposed and complemented by a third level, the level of reflection. 298: ‘Every answer to a question for intelligence raises a further question for reflection,’ Is it so? revealing the ‘ulterior motive’ of conceiving and defining, thinking and considering, etc.: ‘We conceive in order to judge.’ Here ‘there emerge the notions of truth and falsity, of certitude and of the probability that is not a frequency but a quality of judgment … [and] the personal commitment that makes one responsible for one’s judgments.’ See the schema on 299.

6 The three levels of cognitional process operate in two modes: on the data of sense and on the data of consciousness. 299-300: ‘Data include data of sense and data of consciousness. Data of sense include colors, shapes, sounds, odors, tastes, the hard and soft, rough and smooth, hot and cold, wet and dry, and so forth. The direct mode of cognitional process begins from data of sense, advances through insights and formulations, to reach reflection and judgment. Thus, empirical science pertains to the direct mode of cognitional process. On the other hand, the data of consciousness consist of acts of seeing, hearing, tasting, smelling,
touching, perceiving, imagining, inquiring, understanding, formulating, reflecting, judging, and so forth. As data, such acts are experienced; but as experienced, they are not described, distinguished, compared, related, defined, for all such activities are the work of inquiry, insight, and formulation. Finally, such formulations are, of themselves, just hypotheses; they may be accurate or inaccurate, correct or mistaken; and to pronounce upon them is the work of reflection and judgment. Thus the three levels of the direct mode of cognitional process provide the data for the introspective mode; and as the direct mode, so also the introspective unfolds on the three levels: an initial level of data, a second level of understanding and formulation, and a third level of reflection and judgment. Thus one can experience one’s experiencing, understanding, and judging; understand the relations that obtain among one’s experiencing, understanding, and judging; and judge that one has correctly understood the relations that obtain among one’s experiencing, understanding, and judging. In the language of intentionality analysis, one can bring the operations as intentional to bear upon the operations as conscious.

November 27, Part 1

The lecture begins with a repetition of what has been seen already regarding judgment.

7 This analysis yields to synthesis. The contents of several acts are unified into a single known content. 300: ‘Contents of different acts come together inasmuch as the earlier are incomplete without the later while the later have nothing to complete without the earlier. Questions for intelligence presuppose something to be understood, and that something is supplied by the initial level. Understanding grasps in given or imagined presentations an intelligible form emergent in the presentations. Conception formulates the grasped idea along with what is essential to the idea in the presentations. Reflection asks whether such understanding and formulation are correct. Judgment answers that they are or are not.’ On the sentence here beginning ‘Conception,’ see Understanding and Being 42: ‘Conception … expresses generally what is essential to having the insight, and that is a matter of abstraction. You pick out from these particular radii and this particular case of perfect roundness everything that is necessary, and nothing that is not necessary, to have the insight again. In other words, you select what is essential and omit what is incidental; you select what is relevant and omit what is irrelevant; you select what is significant and omit what is negligible … It makes no difference if the background is green or white or black. It makes no difference what the color of the chalk is or how big the circle is. But there has to be a center, a perimeter, and equal radii of any size, in any position, and the center, the perimeter, and the radii have to be in the same plane.’

8 The judgment has both a proper content (the answers yes or no) and a borrowed content (directly in the question to which one answers yes or no, indirectly in the reflective act that claims the yes or no to be certainly or probably true.) 301: ‘Thus, the direct borrowed content of the judgment, I am writing, is the question,
Am I writing? The proper content of that judgment is the answer, Yes, I am. The indirect borrowed content of the same judgment is the implicit meaning ‘It certainly is true that I am writing.’

9 The judgment is the total increment in cognitional process, the last act, the act that brings to a close one whole step in the development of knowledge. 301: ‘Every element in that process is at least a partial increment. It makes some contribution to knowing. But the judgment is the last act in the series that begins from presentations and advances through understanding and formulation ultimately to reach reflection and affirmation or denial. Thus, the proper content of judgment, the yes or no, is the final partial increment in the process. But this proper content is meaningless apart from the question it answers. With the question it forms an integrated whole. But the question takes over a formulation from the level of intelligence, and that formulation draws upon both insight and presentation. It follows that the judgment as a whole is a total increment in cognitional process, that it brings to a close one whole step in the development of knowledge.’

10 The most general aspects of the context in which judgments occur are logic and dialectic (better, method). Logic is the effort of knowledge to attain the coherence and organization proper to any stage of its development; dialectic (method) rests on the breakdown of efforts to attain coherence and organization at a given stage, and consists in bringing to birth a new stage in which logic again will endeavor to attain coherence and organization. Such revision has its limits, since there is no revision of revisers themselves. For revisers are subject to the general conditions of beginning from presentations, advancing through insights and formulations, to terminate with reflections and judgments. ‘The simple fact of the uniformity of nature in revisers provides both logic and dialectic with an immutable ultimacy’ (302).

11 Within these schemes, the contextual aspect of judgment appears in three ways: in the relation of the present to the past, in relations within the present, and in the relations of the present to the future. The relation of the present to the past: past judgments remain with us, forming a habitual orientation that is operative from behind the scenes, and governing the direction of our attention, evaluate insights, guide formulations, and influence the acceptance or rejection of new judgments. Previous insights also remain with us. Thus, ‘when a new judgment is made, there is within us a habitual context of insights and other judgments, and it stands ready to elucidate the judgment just made, to complement it, to balance it, to draw distinctions, to add qualifications, to provide defense, to offer evidence or proof, to attempt persuasion’ (302). Relations within the present: ‘Existing judgments may be found to conflict, and so they release the dialectical process. Again, though they do not conflict, they may not be completely independent of each other, and so they stimulate the logical effort for organized coherence’ (302). Relations of the present to the future: ‘The questions we answer are few compared to the questions that await an answer. Knowing is a dynamic structure. If each judgment is a total increment consisting of many parts, still it is only a minute
contribution towards the whole of knowledge. But further, our knowing is dynamic in another sense. It is irretrievably habitual. For we can make but one judgment at a time, and one judgment cannot bring all we know into the full light of actual knowing. A judgment may be very comprehensive and so bear witness to the depth and breadth of our perspectives. It may be very concrete and so reveal our grasp of nuance and detail. But it cannot be both comprehensive and concrete. All we know is somehow with us; it is present and operative within our knowing; but it lurks behind the scenes, and it reveals itself only in the exactitude with which each minor increment to our knowing is effected. The business of the human mind in this life seems to be, not contemplation of what we know, but relentless devotion to the task of adding increments to a merely habitual knowledge.'

November 27, Part 2

12 The bridge from the second level to the third is complex: questions for reflection, ‘marshaling and weighing the evidence,’ and reflective insight grasping the sufficiency of the evidence for a prospective judgment, for saying yes or no. The proximate ground of judgment, then, is another kind of insight, the reflective insight that grasps the sufficiency of the evidence for a prospective judgment. To pronounce judgment without that reflective grasp is merely to guess. But once that grasp has occurred, to refuse to judge is just silly.

13 What is ‘sufficient evidence’? What is it to grasp the sufficiency of evidence? What are the scales on which evidence is weighed? What weight must evidence have if one is to pronounce a yes or a no? The general statement is that ‘to grasp evidence as sufficient for a prospective judgment is to grasp the prospective judgment as virtually [or, perhaps better, contingently] unconditioned’ (305). The formally unconditioned has no conditions whatever. In the ontological order, we are all conditioned: each one of us exists if … The only reality with no conditions whatsoever is God, who is formally unconditioned. But all of the conditions for our existence are fulfilled; and so, while our existence is conditioned, it is also virtually or contingently unconditioned. There are conditions, but they are fulfilled. So too in the epistemological order. The virtually or contingently unconditioned has conditions, but its conditions are known, and they are grasped as fulfilled. 305: ‘… a virtually unconditioned involves three elements, namely, (1) a conditioned, (2) a link between the conditioned and its conditions, and (3) the fulfilment of the conditions. Hence a prospective judgment will be virtually unconditioned if (1) it is the conditioned, (2) its conditions are known, and (3) the conditions are fulfilled. By the mere fact that a question for reflection has been put, the prospective judgment is a conditioned: it stands in need of evidence sufficient for reasonable pronouncement. The function of reflective understanding is to meet the question for reflection by transforming the prospective judgment from the status of a conditioned to the status of a virtually unconditioned; and reflective understanding effects this transformation by
grasping the conditions of the conditioned and their fulfilment.’ It is reflective understanding that grasps the conditions and their fulfilment.

14 While the form of deductive inference (If A, then B; But A; Therefore B) reveals the way in which a conclusion is exhibited as virtually unconditioned, the way in which reflective insight grasps the pattern, and the way in which by rational compulsion there follows the judgment, deductive inference cannot be the basic case of judgment. Logical inference does not answer the question, What is it to grasp sufficient evidence? for it presupposes other judgments to be true. The form of reflective insight lies in the fact that the link between conditioned and conditions and the fulfilment of conditions exist and are grasped in a more rudimentary state within cognitional process itself before ever they are articulated in judgments. The ‘remarkable fact’ about reflective insight is that it can make use of those more rudimentary elements to reach the virtually unconditioned. The remainder of the chapter shows how this is done in various cases.

15 Prior to statements or judgments, there are unanalyzed structures or procedures immanent and operative in cognitional process, that link the conditioned with the fulfilling conditions. Thus in the concrete judgment of fact, ‘Something happened,’ the fulfilling conditions are two sets of data, one remembered and the other currently experienced, and so they are found on the level of presentations. The link between the conditioned judgment and the fulfilling conditions depends on the direct insight that relates the two sets of data to the same set of things, and so in the addition of a second level. This unanalyzed, spontaneous, pre-propositional structure of ‘knowing change’ is what links the conditioned with its fulfilling conditions. 307-308: ‘The link between the conditioned and the fulfilling conditions is a structure immanent and operative within cognitional process. It is not a judgment. It is not a formulated set of concepts, such as a definition. It is simply a way of doing things, a procedure within the cognitional field … The three elements have been assembled. On the level of presentations there are two sets of data. On the level of intelligence there is an insight referring both sets to the same things. When both levels are taken together, there is involved the notion of knowing change. Reflective understanding grasps all three as a virtually unconditioned to ground the judgment “Something happened.”’

16 But how does one know whether the insight that is the pivot of this structure is correct? ‘Insights are vulnerable when there are further questions to be asked on the same issue … But when there are no further questions, the insight is invulnerable … the conditions for the prospective judgment are fulfilled when there are no further pertinent questions’ (309). It may be, of course, that I fail to allow the further questions to arise. Or it may be that I remain indecisive even when in fact there are no further pertinent questions. But then what is at stake is not the laws of cognitive authenticity but my fidelity to them. One has to give the further questions a chance to arise; good judgment on any insight has to rest on the previous acquisition of a large number of other, related, correct insights; there is the self-correcting process of learning that tends to the limit of familiarity in
particular domains; I can deal with my temperament if it happens to be either rash or indecisive. The general form of the virtually unconditioned is the following (312): ‘There occurs a reflective insight in which at once one grasps (1) a conditioned, the prospective judgment that a given direct or introspective insight is correct, (2) a link between the conditioned and its conditions, and this on introspective analysis proves to be that an insight is correct if it is invulnerable and it is invulnerable if there are no further pertinent questions, and (3) the fulfilment of the conditions, namely, that the given insight does put an end to further pertinent questioning and that this occurs in a mind that is alert, familiar with the concrete situation, and intellectually master of it.’ See Method in Theology 254: ‘… the basic idea of the method we are trying to develop takes its stand on discovering what human authenticity is and showing how to appeal to it. It is not an infallible method, for [we are] easily unauthentic, but it is a powerful method, for [our] deepest need and most prized achievement is authenticity.’ What is at stake when there is rashness or indecision is not the laws of cognitive authenticity but my fidelity to them. Some of the elements in such fidelity are treated on pp. 310-12: (1) One has to give the further questions a chance to arise; (2) good judgment on any insight has to rest on the previous acquisition of a large number of other, related, correct insights; (3) there is the self-correcting process of learning that tends to the limit of familiarity in particular domains; (4) I can deal with my temperament if it happens to be either rash or indecisive; (5) in commonsense matters, I can consult others who may be more familiar with the particular situation than I am, and in scientific matters of philosophic matters or theological matters, I can consult those who know what they are talking about; these social components are emphasized in the sections on commonsense judgments and scientific judgments, and again on pp. 573-75; in the work of William Rehg, the social components are made an intrinsic part of the immanent law of cognitional process, or the absolutely a priori cognitional dynamism, and I believe that he is correct, offering a higher synthesis, if you want, of Habermas and Lonergan: taking from Habermas the social component of the movement to truth, and from Lonergan a more satisfactory account of truth itself than Habermas’s reliance on consensus. Consensus theories of truth, many of them arising out of German idealism, should always be reminded that consensus is what put Hitler in power. An entire culture can be wrong, deadly wrong, in its most important judgments. The responsibility remains with you and me. (To anticipate a bit: the intelligent person who is not reasonable is attuned to, is in love with, has an eros for, his or her own intelligence; the intelligent and reasonable person is attuned to, is in love with, has an eros for, being.)

17 Although analogy and generalization are essentially valid procedures, nonetheless when their basis is an insight into a concrete situation, their use is very precarious. Insight into that situation presupposes a process of learning and the attainment of familiarity and mastery. Further, the so-called analogous situation must really be similar, and how do we determine which differences are significant? But the precariousness of analogy and generalization is compensated for by that collaboration in the process of learning known as common sense, provided that
the latter remains within its limited domain and is not affected by bias. 317: ‘There exists … a determinate field or domain of ordinary description. Its defining or formal viewpoint is the thing as related to us, as it enters into the concerns of man. Its object is what is to be known by concrete judgments of fact, by judgments on the correctness of insights into concrete situations, by concrete analogies and generalizations, and by the collaboration of common sense. It is as much an object of knowledge as any other, for it is reached by beginning from the level of presentations, by advancing through inquiry, insights, and formulation, by culminating in the critical inquiry of reflective understanding, the grasp of the unconditioned, and the rationally compelled pronouncement of judgment.’ That collaboration includes belief, and the analysis of belief is another topic that will be treated later.

18 In principle common sense and science cannot conflict, though in fact they do. The point is to recognize the difference of domains and procedure but also their complementarity. ‘… they are the functionally related parts within a single knowledge of a single world’ (323).

19 What, then, of scientific judgments? In the field of empirical science, as at times elsewhere, judgments are probable. They converge upon true judgments as on a limit. (Note, again, the two senses of the words ‘probable’ and ‘probability.’) 325: ‘We seek the truth because we do not know it. But though we do not know it, still we can recognize it when we reach it. In like manner we also are able to recognize when we are getting near it … the self-correcting process of learning consists in a sequence of questions, insights, further questions, and further insights that moves towards a limit in which no further pertinent questions arise. When we are well beyond that limit, judgments are obviously certain. When we are well short of that limit, judgments are at best probable. When we are on the borderline, the rash are completely certain and the indecisive full of doubts. In brief, because the self-correcting process of learning is an approach to a limit of no further pertinent questions, there are probable judgments that are probably true in the sense that they approximate to a truth that as yet is not known.’

20 In science, ‘the generalization of classical laws … is no more than probable because the application of single laws raises further questions that lead towards the systematization of a whole field. In turn, such systematization is no more than probable until the limit of no further pertinent questions is reached. But that limit is not reached, first, if there may be further, unknown facts that would raise further questions to force a revision, or secondly, if there may be further, unknown facts whose capacity to raise such further questions is not grasped’ (327).

21 The generalization of statistical laws is also no more than probable, since they presuppose some classification of events, and definitive classification cannot be had if classical generalizations are only probable.
22 Nonetheless, empirical science is truly probable. It converges upon truth. It is approaching a limit.

23 Some judgments are analytic. Lonergan discusses analytic propositions and analytic principles. In analytic propositions, ‘A formal term of meaning provides the conditioned. The definitions of its partial terms provide the fulfilling conditions. And the rules of meaning provide the link between the conditions and the conditioned’ (330). An analytic principle is an analytic proposition whose partial terms are existential, that is, occur in their defined sense in judgments of fact. Their significance is best postponed until we actually come across one in the course of the book, when we get to isomorphism.
Part 2 moves to insight, not as activity but as knowledge. And so it begins with the act of making a correct judgment: the self-affirmation of the knower, that is, of an instance (mine) of cognitional process precisely as cognitional. The ‘self’ in question is the concrete and intelligible unity-identity-whole that I am. In a self-affirmation I am both affirmer and affirmed. And in a self-affirmation of the knower I affirm myself as ‘characterized by such occurrences as sensing, perceiving, imagining, inquiring, understanding, formulating, reflecting, grasping the unconditioned, and affirming’ (343-44).

The affirmation is a judgment of fact, not of necessity: in fact I exist, not necessarily, and in fact I am a knower, not necessarily. In fact I perform these operations, and by ‘knowing’ I mean no more than such performance.

The judgment is a virtually unconditioned. The link between the conditioned ‘I am a knower’ and its conditions may be cast in a proposition: ‘I am a knower, if I am a concrete and intelligible unity-identity-whole, characterized by acts of sensing, etc.’ But the fulfilment of the conditions is not a logical conclusion based on propositions, but is given in consciousness. If there is a problematic element it lies in the fulfilment of the conditions.

What, then, is consciousness? It is not some sort of inward look. That conception is based on the conception that consciousness is some sort of knowing, and that knowing is a matter of taking a good look; consciousness, then, must be taking a look inside. Consciousness is rather an awareness immanent in (among other things) cognitional acts. These acts ‘differ radically from such unconscious acts as the metabolism of one’s cells, the maintenance of one’s organs, the multitudinous biological processes that one learns about through the study of contemporary medical science’ (345); and the difference is that cognitional acts occur within consciousness. (Note on the three kinds of presence, and on conscientia-experientia.)

By the conscious act is not meant a deliberate act nor an act to which one attends nor an act somehow isolated for inspection or grasped in its function or assigned a name, etc. ‘… one cannot deny that, within the cognitional act as it occurs, there is a factor or element or component over and above its content, and that this factor is what differentiates cognitional acts from unconscious occurrences’ (346).

Cognitional acts differ in kind, and so does the awareness immanent in different kinds of acts. 346: ‘There is an empirical consciousness characteristic of sensing, perceiving, imagining. As the content of these acts is merely presented or
represented, so the awareness immanent in the acts is the mere givenness of the acts. But there is an intelligent consciousness characteristic of inquiry, insight, and formulation. On this level cognitional process not merely strives for and reaches the intelligible, but in doing so it exhibits its intelligence; it operates intelligently. The awareness is present but it is the awareness of intelligence, of what strives to understand, of what is satisfied by understanding, of what formulates the understood … Finally, on the third level, of reflection, grasp of the unconditioned, and judgment, there is rational consciousness. It is the emergence and the effective operation of a single law of utmost generality, the law of sufficient reason, where the sufficient reason is the unconditioned. It emerges as a demand for the unconditioned and a refusal to assent unreservedly on any lesser ground. It advances to grasp of the unconditioned. It terminates in the rational compulsion by which grasp of the unconditioned commands assent.’

7 On the second level, 347: ‘Intelligence and intelligibility are the obverse and reverse of the second level of knowing: intelligence looks for intelligible patterns in presentations and representations; it grasps such patterns in its moments of insight; it exploits such grasp in its formulations and in further operations equally guided by insight.’ I do have conscious states and conscious acts that are intelligent, and that is all that is claimed here: intelligence pertains to the proceeding of my consciousness. 348: ‘I want to understand, to grasp intelligible unities and relations, to know what’s up and where I stand. Praise of the scientific spirit that inquires, that masters, that controls, is not without an echo, a deep resonance within me, for in my more modest way I too inquire and catch on, see the thing to do and see that it is properly done. But what are these but variations on the more basic expression that I am intelligently conscious, that the awareness characteristic of cognitional acts on the second level is an active contributing to the intelligibility of its products?’

8 On the third level, 347: ‘… reasonableness and groundedness are the obverse and reverse of the third level of knowing. Reasonableness is reflection inasmuch as it seeks groundedness for objects of thought; reasonableness discovers groundedness in its reflective grasp of the unconditioned; reasonableness exploits groundedness when it affirms objects because they are grounded.’ So reasonableness, too, pertains to the proceeding of my consciousness. 348: ‘It is repugnant to me to place astrology and astronomy, alchemy and chemistry, legend and history, hypothesis and fact, on exactly the same footing. I am not content with theorems, however brilliantly coherent, but insist on raising the further question, Are they true? What is that repugnance, that discontent, that insistence? They are just so many variations on the more basic expression that I am rationally conscious, that I demand sufficient reason, that I find it in the unconditioned, that I assent unreservedly to nothing less, that such demanding, find, self-committing occur, not like the growth of my hair, but within a field of consciousness or awareness.’
9 To talk about a single field of consciousness and draw a distinction between conscious acts occurring within the field and unconscious acts occurring outside it is to affirm a unity of consciousness despite a multiplicity of acts. ‘… many acts coalesce into a single knowing …’ Not only is the perceiver inquired about, understood, formulated, reflected on, grasped as unconditioned, and affirmed, but also there is an identity involved in perceiving, inquiring, understanding, formulating, reflecting, grasping the unconditioned, and affirming’ (349). In fact, consciousness is much more obviously of this unity in diverse acts than of the diverse acts, for it is within the unity that the acts are found and distinguished, and it is to the unity that we appeal when we talk about a single field of consciousness. Not only do the contents of the acts coalesce into unities, but also many acts coalesce into a single knowing. This unity of consciousness is given: ‘… a single agent is involved in many acts … it is an abstraction to speak of the acts as conscious … concretely, consciousness pertains to the acting agent’ (350).

10 This account of consciousness is not itself consciousness. Consciousness is given independently of its being formulated or affirmed. And it is here, in this rudimentary state, that one finds the experiential fulfilment of the conditions for the judgment of self-affirmation. 351-52: ‘… just as [in science] there is reversal to what is given sensibly, so [here] there is reversal to what is given consciously. Just as the former reversal is away from the understood as understood, the formulated as formulated, the affirmed as affirmed, and to the merely sensed, so also the latter reversal is from the understood, formulated, affirmed as such, to the merely given … The conditions as formulated are the unity-identity-whole to be grasped in data as individual and the kinds of acts to be grasped in data as similar. But the fulfilment of the conditions in consciousness is to be had by reverting from such formulations to the more rudimentary state of the formulated, where there is no formulation but merely experience.’

11 Section 5 invites one to this reversal. We must consider it in its totality, since it is here that Lonergan intends the reader to make the judgment of fact that he/she is a knower. See 352-53.

12 The section (6) on ‘Self-affirmation as Immanent Law’ explores the performative consistency of the answer yes to the question, Am I am knower? and the performative contradiction to a negative answer to the same question. There is a conditional necessity to the affirmative answer. The answer yes to the question, Am I a knower? is coherent, for if I am a knower, I can know that fact, while the answer no is incoherent, for if I am not a knower how could the question be raised and answered by me; and the answer ‘I don’t know’ is also incoherent, for if I know that I do not know, then I am a knower; and if I do not know that I do not know, then I should not answer the question. Moreover, if I am not a knower, then I know nothing. My only course is silence, the complete silence of the animal that is complacently absorbed in merely sensitive routines, without excuses. If I know nothing, I know no excuses for not knowing, and I cannot know the explanation of my ignorance.
December 4, Part 2

13 But the efficacy of the argument is not merely logical, but derives also from the natural spontaneities and inevitabilities that we are here affirming. On this we can do no better than read sentence by sentence the seven paragraphs beginning at the top of p. 354 and extending to the end of this section, to get hold of the fact that ‘in the last resort … one [cannot] reach a deeper foundation than [one’s] pragmatic engagement’ in the process’ (356).

14 Is this self-affirmation descriptive of the thing-for-us or explanatory of the thing-itself? Human science contains an element not to be found in natural science. While both begin from inquiry and insight into sensible data, human science also enjoys through consciousness an immediate access to its object. Lonergan’s initial use of this access was descriptive, but ‘the initial procedure of description gradually yielded to definition by relation; and the defining relations obtained immediately between different kinds of cognitional state or act. But definition by this type of relation is explanatory, and so descriptive procedure was superseded by explanatory’ (358).

15 Moreover, there is an important difference between explanation on the basis of sense and explanation on the basis of consciousness. 358: ‘… explanation on the basis of sense can reduce the element of hypothesis to a minimum but it cannot eliminate it entirely. But explanation on the basis of consciousness can escape entirely the merely supposed, the merely postulated, the merely inferred.’ Where the first cannot eliminate it entirely is in the set of primitive terms and relations that the system employs in formulating all its laws. 359: ‘… its concepts as systematically significant, as ultimate or derived, as preferred to other concepts that might be empirically reached, do involve an element of mere supposition. For the selection of certain concepts as ultimate occurs in the work of systematization, and that work is provisional. At any time a system is accepted because it provides the simplest account of all the known facts. But at the same time it is acknowledged that there may be unknown yet relevant facts, that they might give rise to further questions that would lead to further insights, and that the further insights might involve a radical revision of the accepted system.’ But explanation on the basis of consciousness excludes ‘the radical revision that involves a shift in the fundamental terms and relations of the explanatory account of the human knowledge underlying existing common sense, mathematics, and empirical science’ (359).

16 Section 8, then, discusses the impossibility of this fundamental or radical revision. 359-60: ‘The impossibility of such revision appears from the very notion of revision. A revision appeals to data. It contends that previous theory does not satisfactorily account for all the data. It claims to have reached complementary insights that lead to more accurate statements. It shows that these new statements either are unconditioned or more closely approximate to the unconditioned than
previous statements. Now, if in fact revision is as described, then it presupposes that cognitional process falls on the three levels of presentation, intelligence, and reflection; it presupposes that insights are cumulative and complementary; it presupposes that they head towards a limit described by the adjective “satisfactory”; it presupposes a reflective grasp of the unconditioned or of what approximates to the unconditioned. Clearly, revision cannot revise its own presuppositions. A reviser cannot appeal to data to deny data, to his new insights to deny insights, to his new formulation to deny formulation, to his reflective grasp to deny reflective grasp.’

17 Section 9 arrives at the same conclusion by setting forth the a priori conditions of any possible judgment of fact. 362: ‘… if there is any judgment of fact, no matter what its content, there also is a concrete unity-identity-whole that experiences some given, that inquires, understands, and formulates, that reflects, grasps the unconditioned, and so affirms or denies … such a concrete unity-identity-whole is a thing-itself, for it is defined by an internally related set of operations, and the relations may be experientially validated in the conscious and dynamic states (1) of inquiry leading from the given to insight, (2) of insight leading to formulation, (3) of reflection leading from formulation to grasp of the unconditioned, and (4) of that grasp leading to affirmation or denial.’ Again, ‘other theory reaches its thing-itself by turning away from the thing as related to us by sense or by consciousness, but cognitional theory reaches its thing-itself by understanding itself and affirming itself as concrete unity in a process that is conscious empirically, intelligently, and rationally.’

18 And because this is similar to what a Kantian would name a transcendental deduction, section 10 contrasts the position with that of Kantian analysis. The chapter concludes with a contrast of the same position with that of relativism (section 11).
Chapter 12 is the second of the pivotal chapters in the book. It presents the second of the ‘basic positions.’ It treats being and the notion of being. While it can be argued that the position put forward here is in harmony with the position of Aquinas, I think it can and must be claimed that it is original with Lonergan. He did not have this notion of being, expressed this way, even when he wrote the *verb* *um* articles, on knowing and inner word in Aquinas. He arrived at it sometime between 1949, when he started writing *Insight*, and 1953, when for all practical purposes he finished the book.

Being is the objective of the pure desire to know, and so the pure desire itself is the intelligent and reasonable notion of being, where the word ‘notion’ is used to mean, not concept or idea but ‘intelligently and reasonably conscious anticipation.’ The dynamic orientation manifested in our questions for intelligence and for reflection, the prior and enveloping drive that carries cognitional process from sense and imagination to understanding, from understanding to judgment, and from judgment to the complete context of correct judgments – that is the notion of being. It is described precisely as pure desire to know on pp. 372-73. It has an objective, and that is treated beginning on 373. The pure desire is identified precisely as notion of being in second 3, beginning on p. 377.

The objective of the pure desire is the content of knowing rather than the satisfaction of performing the acts. What is it that the pure desire to know heads for, anticipates, wants to know? The answer to that question is ‘being.’ That objective at any time includes both all that is already known and all that remains to be known. ‘Initially in each individual, the pure desire is a dynamic orientation to a totally unknown. As knowledge develops, the objective becomes less and less unknown, more and more known’ (373). ‘Being … is (1) all that is known, and (2) all that remains to be known. Again, since a complete increment of knowing occurs only in judgment, being is what is to be known by the totality of true judgments. What … is that totality? It is the complete set of answers to the complete set of questions.’ What the answers are remains to be seen. What the questions are awaits their emergence. Meaningless or incoherent or illegitimate questions may be possible, but how they are to be defined is a further question. The affirmation in hand is that there exists a pure desire to know, an inquiring and critical spirit, that follows up questions with further questions, that heads for some objective which has been named being’ (374).

What kind of definition of being is this? I will give an answer first from *Insight*, and then from *Understanding and Being*, and will complement the latter with further
material from *Insight*. *Insight*: the definition ‘is of the second order. Other definitions determine what is meant. But this definition is more remote for it assigns, not what is meant by being, but how that meaning is to be determined. It asserts that if you know, then you know being; it asserts that if you wish to know, then you wish to know being; but it does not settle whether you know or what you know, whether your wish will be fulfilled or what you will know when it is fulfilled’ (374).

5 *Understanding and Being* (this is August 9 mp3, the very beginning of lecture 2, on the second mp3). To put the question, ‘Knowing what?’ is to ask about the object of knowledge in a linguistic or grammatical sense, as the object of the transitive verb ‘to know.’ The question of objectivity has not arisen yet, Is the knowing objective? Is being the real? As far as this chapter is concerned, the ‘being’ that is the objective of the desire to know might be the real or it might be the ideal, or whatever. The chapter on objectivity is what leads on to the further question. *Insight* expresses the same point on 373-74: ‘What is this objective? Is it limited or unlimited? Is it one or many? Is it material or ideal? Is it phenomenal or real? Is it an immanent content or a transcendent object? Is it a realm of experience, or of thought, or of essences, or of existents? Answers to these and to any other questions have but a single source. They cannot be had without the functioning of the pure desire. They cannot be had from the pure desire alone. They are to be had inasmuch as the pure desire initiates and sustains cognitional process. Thus, if it is true that A is, that A is one, and that there is only A, then the objective of the pure desire is one. But if it is true that A is, that B is, that A is not B, then the objective is many. Which, you ask, is true? The fact that you ask results from the pure desire. But to reach the answer, desiring is not enough; answers come only from inquiring and reflecting.’ When you reach the true answer, you will have added an increment in your knowing of being.

6 But the definition does determine at least some characteristics of being. If being is what is to be known by the totality of true judgments, then ‘being … is all-inclusive. Apart from being there is nothing. Again, being is completely concrete and completely universal. It is completely concrete: over and above the being of any thing, there is nothing more of that thing. It is completely universal: apart from the realm of being, there is simply nothing’ (374-75).

7 Some objections may be brought against the claim that being is all-inclusive, but they are self-defeating: ‘… at the root of all that can be affirmed, at the root of all that can be conceived, is the pure desire to know; and it is the pure desire, underlying all judgment and formulation, underlying all questioning and all desire to question, that defines its all-inclusive objective’ (375). Some possible objections follow. (1) There is much that we do not know. But in response, we know that fact by raising questions that we do not answer, and being is defined not only by the answers we give but also by the questions we ask. (2) There is much that it would be futile for us to try to learn. In response, being is defined not only by the questions we can hope to answer, but also by the questions whose answer we have
to postpone. (3) Some may say they have no desire to know everything about everything. In response, well, they know that they do not already know everything about everything because so many questions remain unanswered, and being is defined partly by those questions. (4) From the opposite side, one might claim that the definition is too inclusive, for there are mistaken questions that lead nowhere. In response, being is defined not as the objective of formulated questions but as the objective of the pure desire to know, which is prior to any formulated question and is not itself a formulation. ‘... the pure desire to know, whose objective is being, is the source not only of answers but also of their criteria, and not only of questions but also of the grounds on which they are screened. For it is intelligent inquiry and critical reflection that just as much yield the right questions as the right answers.’ (5) Is being really what is to be known through the totality of true judgments? Might it not be something entirely different? If these questions are valid, they put the misgivings to rest, for the being that might be totally different turns out to be exactly what we are talking about; for if we ask whether it might be, we ask; and the being we are talking about is whatever we ask about. (6) Might there not be something beyond the range of the pure desire? The very fact that you ask proves that X lies within its range, and being is the anything and everything that is the objective of that desire. (376)

8 The desire to know, then, is a spontaneously operative notion of being. The notion of being is invariant, common to all people, and functions in the same way no matter what theoretical account of it one may accept. We must distinguish between the spontaneously operative notion and theoretical accounts of its genesis and content. The latter will vary with philosophical contexts, and so on. Lonergan’s own theoretical account identifies the notion with the desire, and the reasons are given on pp. 377-78: ‘... first of all, [we] are apt to agree that things are, whether or not we know them, and moreover that there are many things that are known only incompletely or even not at all. The notion of being, then, extends beyond the known. Secondly, being is known in judgment. It is in judgment that we affirm or deny, and until we are ready to affirm or deny, we do not yet know whether or not any X happens to be. Still, though being is known only in judging, the notion of being is prior to judging. For prior to any judgment there is reflection, and reflection is formulated in the question, Is it? That question supposes some notion of being, and strangely enough, it is prior to each instance of our knowing being ... Thirdly, there are objects of thought ... In one sense, they are all equivalent, for as long as one is merely thinking, merely considering, merely supposing, one deals merely with the conditioned, and it makes no difference whether or not its conditions are fulfilled. Thinking, then, prescinds from existing. But if it prescinds from existing, does it not prescind from being? And if it prescinds from being, is not all thinking about nothing? The trouble with this argument is that thinking also prescinds from not existing ... [But] in another sense, thinking does not prescind from existing and not existing, for thinking is purposive; we think to get our concepts straight; we wish to get our concepts straight that we may be able to judge; so far from prescinding from existing and
not existing, thinking is for the purpose of determining whether or not what is thought does exist.

‘It follows that the notion of being goes beyond the merely thought, for we ask whether or not the merely thought exists. No less, it follows that the notion of being is prior to thinking, for were it not, then thinking could not be for the purpose of judging, for the purpose of determining whether or not the merely thought exists. The notion of being, then, is prior to conception and goes beyond it; and it is prior to judgment and goes beyond it. That notion must be the immanent, dynamic orientation of cognitional process. It must be the detached and unrestricted desire to know as operative in cognitional process. Desiring to know is desiring to know being; but it is merely the desire and not yet the knowing. Thinking is thinking being; it is not thinking nothing; but thinking being is not yet knowing it. Judging is a complete increment in knowing; if correct, it is a knowing of being; but it is not yet knowing being, for that is attained only through the totality of correct judgments.’

January 8, 2004, Part 2

9 How can a desire or orientation be named a notion? 379: ‘The desire to know is conscious intelligently and rationally; it is inquiring intelligence and reflecting reasonableness. Simply as desire, it is orientation, without as yet involving any cognitional content or notion. Still, intelligence as obverse heads for the intelligible as reverse. Reasonableness as obverse looks for the grounded as reverse. More fundamentally, the looking for, the desiring, the inquiring-and-reflecting is an obverse that intelligently and rationally heads for an unrestricted objective named being. Were that heading unconscious, there would be an orientation towards being but there would be no desire to know being and no notion of being. Were that heading empirically conscious, there would be an orientation towards being and a felt desire to know being, but there would be no notion of being. In fact, the heading is intelligent and rational, and so there is not only an orientation towards being, not only a pure desire to know being, but also a notion of being.’

10 The notion of being is all-pervasive. It underpins and penetrates all cognitional contents and constitutes them as cognitional. (1) It underpins them: ‘Without the pure desire to know, sensitive living would remain in its routine of perception and conation, instinct and habit, emotion and action. What breaks that circuit and releases intellectual activity is the wonder Aristotle described as the beginning of all science and philosophy. But that wonder is intelligent inquiry. It selects data for insight, and by that selecting it underpins even the empirical component in our knowing. Still more obviously, all ideas and all concepts are responses to the desire to understand, and all judgments are responses to the demand for the unconditioned.’ (2) It penetrates them: ‘It is the supreme heuristic notion. Prior to every content, it is the notion of the to-be-known through that content. As each content emerges, the “to-be-known through that content” passes without residue into the “known through that content.” Some blank in universal anticipation is
filled in, not merely to end that element of anticipation, but also to make the filler a part of the anticipated. Hence, prior to all answers, the notion of being is the notion of the totality to be known through all answers. But once all answers are reached, the notion of being becomes the notion of the totality known through all answers.’ (3) It constitutes them as cognitional: ‘Experience is for inquiring into being. Intelligence is for thinking out being. But by judgment being is known, and in judgment what is known is known as being. Hence knowing is knowing being, yet the known is never mere being, just as judgment is never a mere yes apart from any question that “yes” answers’ (380-81).

11 Next, and consequently, the notion of being is the core of meaning. This section is an important introduction to Lonergan’s theory of meaning, and we should take one by one what he means by sources, acts, and terms of meaning. Note, too, that in Method in Theology he adds potential, effective, and constitutive acts. It is because the all-inclusive term of meaning is being – apart from being there it nothing to be meant – that the core of all acts of meaning is the intention of being. On pp. 382-83 he fills this out with respect to full acts (judgments), formal acts (conception), and instrumental acts. Again, we can take each of these in detail by studying these pages. I pull together the discussions on Insight and Method in Theology in Theology and the Dialectics of History 572-76, which is reproduced here for our consideration in class. (At this point the class turned to these pages.)

12 Section 6 considers some of the ‘puzzles’ that have arisen around the notion of being. They are all rooted in the mistake that the notion of being is a concept. First, it does not result from the expression or formulation of an act of understanding. Rather, ‘it is present in the formulation of every concept. It cannot result from an insight into being, for such an insight would be an understanding of everything about everything, and such understanding we have not attained’ (384).

13 Secondly, it is not the notion of some essence. It ‘does not result from an understanding of being; it does not rest on the grasp of what from some point of view is essential; and so the notion of being is not the notion of some essence. Further [unlike essences], the notion of being remains incomplete on the level of intelligence; it moves conception forward to questions for reflection; it moves beyond single judgments to the totality of correct judgments; and so it does not prescind from existence and actuality’ (384).

14 Third, it cannot be defined in the ordinary manner, for it penetrates and goes beyond the content of every definition. But it does possess some definite characteristics; it regards the unrestricted objective that is the totality of all that is, it can be defined by saying that it refers to all that can be known by intelligent grasp and reasonable affirmation; but such a definition is still open to all possible determinations.

15 Fourth, it can have such diverse meanings because it is determinate only at a second remove. It does not of itself determine whether materialism, empiricism,
idealism, realism, etc., is correct, but only that the intelligently grasped and reasonably affirmed is being.

16 Fifth, it becomes determined only as correct judgments are made, and it reaches its full determination only when the totality of correct judgments are made. So it does not have presuppositions and implications the way concepts do. Still, the making of judgments is a determinate process that can be grasped, and from that grasp, as we will see, there follows a determination of the general structure of the concrete universe.

17 Sixth, in a sense it is univocal, in another sense analogous, and in yet another sense neither. It is univocal, in that it underpins all other contents as the one desire to know that regards one unrestricted objective. It is analogous: it penetrates all other contents, and its meaning varies as one moves from one field to another. It is neither: the distinction regards concepts. But ‘what frequently enough is meant by the analogy of being is precisely what we mean by saying that the notion of being underpins, penetrates, and goes beyond other contents’ (386).

18 It is not abstract. It abstracts from nothing whatever. It is all-inclusive. Still, there is possible a determination of the general character of the concrete universe, and this will be an abstract view of being.

19 Inasmuch as it anticipates, penetrates, and includes all other contents, it differs from a genus, which is a determinate content distinct from the content of its differences.

20 We will treat the final section of the chapter only by dealing with the questions of individual students.
The Notion of Objectivity

The third pivotal chapter treats objectivity. It is a complex matter. First, the chapter treats the principal notion of objectivity. To reach the notion of objectivity in its principal meaning, Lonergan considers "a patterned context of judgments which serve as implicit definitions of the terms "object," "subject."" (399). But there are partial aspects that need to be considered as well: the experiential aspect, the normative aspect, and the absolute aspect.

To reach the principle notion of objectivity, one needs to consider three judgments: (1) a judgment that affirms the existence of some object, say, A; (2) a judgment of self-affirmation; and (3) a judgment that I, the self-affirming knower, am not the object A. Note: This does not mean that one has to have made an explanatory judgment of self-affirmation to be objective! It means that one comes to articulate the notion of objectivity in dependence on this judgment. 400: 'The bare essentials of this notion of objectivity are reached if we add to the judgments already discussed – I am a knower, This is a typewriter – the further judgment that I am not this typewriter. An indefinite number of further objects may be added by making the additional appropriate positive and negative judgments. Finally, insofar as one can intelligently grasp and reasonably affirm the existence of other knowers besides oneself, one can add to the list the objects that also are subjects.'

Lonergan lists six properties of this principal notion of objectivity. **First**, it can emerge only within such a patterned context of judgments.

**Second**, it is not found in any single judgment or in the experiential or normative factors that occur in cognitional process prior to judgment.

**Third**, its validity is that of the set of judgments that define it. If these are correct, then there are objects and subjects in the sense defined.

**Fourth**, judgments in this appropriate pattern are common, so people do know objects and subjects; but they will not be able to give a lucid account of this knowledge. They will assume that the existence of objects and subjects rests on the experiential aspect of objectivity. ‘… they will say that the typewriter is an object because they see it or feel it; on the other hand, … they will admit they would not consider the typewriter an object if they knew it to be true either that there was no typewriter at all or that what they named a typewriter was identical with everything else.’

**Fifth**, this notion is closely related to the notion of being. 401: ‘Being is what is to be known through the totality of correct judgments. Objectivity in its principal sense
is what is known through any set of judgments satisfying a determinate pattern. In brief, there is objectivity if there are distinct beings, some of which both know themselves and know others as others. Moreover, the notion of being explains why objectivity in its principal sense is to be reached only through a pattern of judgments. For the notion of being becomes determinate only insofar as judgments are made; prior to judgment, one can think of being but one cannot know it; and any single judgment is but a minute increment in the process towards knowing it. Again, being is divided from within; apart from being there is nothing; it follows that there cannot be a subject that stands outside being and looks at it; the subject has to be before [he/she] can look; and once [one] is, then [one] is not outside being but either the whole of it or some part. If [one] is the whole of it, then [one] is the sole object. If [one] is only a part, then [one] has to begin by knowing a multiplicity of parts (A is; B is; A is not B) and add that one part knows others (“I” am A).’

8 Sixth, the principal notion of objectivity solves the problem of transcendence. 401-402: ‘How does the knower get beyond [himself/herself] to a known? The question is, we suggest, misleading. It supposes the knower to know [oneself] and asks how [one] can know anything else. Our answer involves two elements. On the one hand, we contend that, while the knower may experience [oneself] or think about [oneself] without judging, still [one] cannot know [oneself] until [one] make the correct affirmation, “I am,” and then [one] knows [oneself] as being and as object. On the other hand, we contend that other judgments are equally possible and reasonable, so that through experience, inquiry, and reflection there arises knowledge of other objects both as beings and as being other than the knower. Hence we place transcendence, not in going beyond a known knower, but in heading for being, within which there are positive differences and, among such differences, the difference between object and subject. Inasmuch as such judgments occur, there are in fact objectivity and transcendence; and whether or not such judgments are correct is a distinct question to be resolved along the lines reached in the analysis of judgment.’

January 15, 2004, Part 2

9 The first of the partial aspects of objectivity to be considered is the absolute aspect. 402: ‘The ground of absolute objectivity is the virtually unconditioned that is grasped by reflective understanding and posited in judgment. The formally unconditioned, which has no conditions at all, stands outside the interlocked field of conditioning and conditioned terms; it is intrinsically absolute. The virtually unconditioned stands within that field; it has conditions; it itself is among the conditions of other instances of the conditioned; still its conditions are fulfilled; it is a de facto absolute.’

10 The absoluteness of the content of a correct judgment withdraws it from relativity to the subject that utters it, the place in which he/she utters it, the time at which
he/she utters it. It gives knowing a public character: it is ‘accessible not only to the knower that utters it but also to any other knower’ (402).

11 Absolute objectivity pertains to single judgments as single. 403: ‘… each judgment in [the constellation forming the principal notion] is an absolute, and moreover, it is an absolute in virtue of its own affirmation of the unconditioned. The validity of the principal notion is a derived validity resting on the set of absolutes it involves. But the absolute aspect of objectivity has its ground in the single judgment to which it pertains. It is quite compatible with the affirmation that there is but one being, that there is no object except the affirming subject; accordingly, the absolute aspect of objectivity does not imply any subject-object relation; it constitutes the entry of our knowing into the realm of being, but by itself it does not suffice to posit, distinguish, and relate beings. However, this insufficiency arises, not from some defect of absolute objectivity, nor because the posited beings, their distinction, and their relations are not all unconditioned, but because several judgments are needed to posit, to distinguish, and to relate.’

12 The absolute objectivity of any correct judgment is not to be confused with the invariance proper to the expression of universal judgments. 403: ‘Both universal and particular judgments, if correct, are absolutely objective. But the former are expressed invariantly because the expression is independent of variations in spatiotemporal reference frames, while the latter are expressed relatively because their expression does not enjoy such independence. However, the variation of the expression presupposes and reveals the absolute objectivity of what is expressed. Because “I am here now” has absolute objectivity, there is an identical truth to be repeated only by employing the different words, “He was there then.”’

13 Absolute objectivity has no implications of an absolute space or of an absolute time. 403: ‘If it is true that space is, then what is absolute is the truth and not the space. Whether the space is absolute or relative is a further question. If it is true that space consists of an infinite set of immovable and empty places, then space is absolute. If it is true that space is not such a set, then space is relative.’ The same is true of time. 403-404: ‘… Further …’ 404: ‘Interpretations of being or of absolute objectivity in terms of space and time are mere intrusions of imagination. Absolute objectivity is simply a property of the unconditioned; and the unconditioned, as such, says nothing about space or time. If one’s imagination makes the use of the preposition “within” imperative, then one may say that every judgment is within a context of other judgments and that every unconditioned is within a universe of being. Then “space is” by being within the universe of being, and “time is” by being within the universe of being, where “to be within the universe of being” is “to be unconditioned along with other instances of the unconditioned.”

14 A second partial aspect of objectivity is the normative: ‘… objectivity as opposed to the subjectivity of wishful thinking, of rash or excessively cautious judgments, of allowing joy or sadness, hope or fear, love or detestation, to interfere’ (404) with
cognitional process. The ground of the normative aspect of objectivity lies in the unfolding of the unrestricted, detached, disinterested desire to know. Or in Lonergan’s later terms, ‘Genuine objectivity is the fruit of authentic subjectivity’ (Method in Theology 292). Again, Insight 404: ‘Because it is unrestricted, it opposes the obscurantism that hides truth or blocks access to it in whole or in part. Because it is detached, it is opposed to the inhibitions of cognitional process that arise from other human desires and drives. Because it is disinterested, it is opposed to the well-meaning but disastrous reinforcement that other desires lend cognitional process only to twist its orientation into the narrow confines of their limited range.’ Again, 404-405: ‘… to be objective, in the normative sense of the term, is to give free rein to the pure desire, to its questions for intelligence, and to its questions for reflection. Further, it is to distinguish between questions for intelligence that admit proximate solutions and other questions of the same type that, at present, cannot be solved. Similarly, it is to distinguish between sound questions and, on the other hand, questions that are meaningless or incoherent or illegitimate. For the pure desire not only desires; it desires intelligently and reasonably; it desires to understand because it is intelligent, and it desires to grasp the unconditioned because it desires to be reasonable.’

15 The third partial aspect of objectivity is the experiential. 405-406: ‘It is the given as given. It is the field of materials about which one inquires, in which one finds the fulfilment of conditions for the unconditioned, to which cognitional process repeatedly returns to generate the series of inquiries and reflections that yield the contextual manifold of judgments.’ The given is unquestionable and indubitable, lying outside the cognitional levels constituted by questioning and answering. Its differences are not yet assigned. It is equally valid in all its parts but differently significant in different parts, with some parts significant for some departments of knowing and others for other departments. 406: ‘The physicist has to disregard what [he/she] merely imagines, merely dreams, merely derives from [his/her] personal equation. The psychologist has to explain imagination, dreaming, the personal equations.’ Thus the term ‘given’ ‘includes not only the veridical deliverances of outer sense but also images, dreams, illusions, hallucinations, personal equations, subjective bias, and so forth, … not only the materials into which natural science inquires but also the materials into which the psychologist or methodologist or cultural historian inquires.’ But these determinations demand further elements in cognitional process before they can be made.

16 Perhaps we can read together in class the final section of the chapter, 407-409.
Summary of the first section of chapter 14 (1-15 here): Lonergan wants to propose a philosophic method that would enable all philosophies to make a contribution to the understanding of the polymorphic possibilities of human consciousness, while also enabling philosophers to sort out positions from counterpositions and to disengage genuine discoveries at times from counterpositional formulation. On this basis he proposes that the basis of any philosophy lies in its implicit or explicit cognitional theory, which itself necessarily includes some stand on the basic philosophical issues of the real, the subject, and objectivity. 412-13 present his own basic positions on these three issues.

1 Chapter 14 introduces the discussion of metaphysics. But metaphysics is first discussed as part of a far larger program set out in the first section of the chapter: a philosophy of philosophies, a clarification of philosophic pluralism, a resolution of antitheses (and an anticipation of the later notion of dialectic as functional specialty, with its complementary, genetic, and dialectical horizons). Chapter 17 will come full circle on this proposal. The proposal governs the rest of the book.

2 Metaphysics is the science that sets forth the general structure of the objective of the process of inquiry, that is, the general structure of being, and that directs the reorientation and integration of the scientific and commonsense knowledge of any age on the basis of that general structure. In this sense, metaphysics is a praxis of meaning (RD). 22: ‘Thoroughly understand …’ The broad lines are given by metaphysics, and among the ‘further developments’ are the reorientation and integration of the sciences and of common sense.

3 Metaphysics, ethics, and theology are derivative from the three basic positions put forth in chapters 11, 12, 13. (Ethics and theology, of course, have other bases or foundations as well, but, in Lonergan’s later terms, ‘intellectual conversion’ is part of their foundational reality.) Metaphysics, and in part ethics and theology, are derivative from cognitional theory – what am I doing when I am knowing? – and from epistemology – why is doing that knowing? Metaphysics asks and answers the question, What do I know when I do that? And the question – not made explicit here, but definitely latent – what do I do when I know that, i.e., when I have answered the three basic questions? This is the praxis element of metaphysics: what I do is implement what I have come to know, by engaging in interdisciplinary collaboration to reorient, integrate, and develop contemporary science and the various forms of common sense. (This is a task that has barely begun, a program set out by Lonergan that it is time to begin.) In this sense, metaphysics provides, as Lonergan sometimes remarks, a basic or general semantics.
4 The chapter begins by discussing an ‘underlying problem’ which is peculiar to all philosophy, ethics, and theology, and for that matter human science, namely, that disagreement in these fields does not go away. This is because of the existential engagement of the knowing subject in a way that is not the case in mathematics and empirical science. *What kind of self are you going to affirm?* is a question implicit in all these disciplines. Among the objects of these sciences is the subject himself or herself, and positions taken in these sciences always have an existential significance for the subject doing the science. In many instances we settle for too little. Lonergan makes this crucial question explicit. More generically, the underlying problem is the problem of the polymorphism of human consciousness. That polymorphism is a complex function of several factors: the radical duality of human knowing, the uncritical survival of the first kind of knowing even in relatively cultured consciousness, the various patterns of experience, and the presence and absence of authenticity on the part of the knowing subject. The latter, of course, is the most serious underlying problem. The others can be dealt with in less drastic fashion. Why are the philosophies so disparate? Because consciousness is polymorphic: it flows in different patterns, the patterns alternate, blend, mix; they can interfere with each other, conflict, lose their way, break down; and above all because there are radical dialectical differences on the questions of knowing, being, and objectivity, because there are radical dialectical differences in ethical stances, and because there are radical dialectical differences in religious orientations. And so to go to the root of philosophic differences one must penetrate to these levels. The three basic positions are adopted in the intellectual pattern, and that pattern is articulated in a manner that flows from Lonergan’s own religious and ethical stances. But no one lives in that pattern, and other patterns will introduce radically different views on the self, on being, and on objectivity, especially if they are governed by radically different religious and ethical stances. The religious and ethical components, of course, are not being discussed yet, since Lonergan is writing ‘from below upwards.’

5 The main block to authentic *philosophic* performance, considered precisely within the philosophic framework and independently of the religious and ethical bases, is the duality of human knowledge itself, which we may now speak of in terms of ‘the unquestioning orientation of extroverted biological consciousness’ vitally anticipating ‘an already out there now,’ and objectivity as the fruit of intelligent inquiry and reasonable reflection. But this is something of an extreme contrast. The problem is more nuanced: the ‘uncritical survival’ of remnants of extroverted biological consciousness in dramatic and practical living and in much of philosophic thought.

6 The duality makes it possible that, in contrast to each of his basic positions Lonergan can set sharp antitheses that result from the perduring influence of the ‘already out there now’ mentality. *Objectivity*: ‘Against the objectivity that is based on intelligent inquiry and critical reflection, there stands the unquestioning orientation of extroverted biological consciousness and its uncritical survival not
only in dramatic and practical living but also in much of philosophic thought.’

Being: ‘Against the concrete universe of being, of all that can be intelligently grasped and reasonably affirmed, there stands in a prior completeness the world of sense, in which the “real” and the “apparent” are subdivisions within a vitally anticipated “already out there now.” (Note: This begins a set of vitally important identifications of the real with being, that is, with whatever can be intelligently grasped and reasonably affirmed.) The subject: ‘Against the self-affirmation of a consciousness that at once is empirical, intellectual, and rational, there stands the native bewilderment of the existential subject, revolted by mere animality, unsure of his way through the maze of philosophies, trying to live without a known purpose, suffering despite an unmotivated will, threatened with inevitable death and, before death, with disease and even insanity’ (410). Again, the ground of the antitheses is the polymorphism of consciousness. One must be in the intellectual pattern, or influenced by it, to affirm the basic positions. The antitheses reflect the Sorge of other patterns not yet transformed to match the reach of the notion of being. In Topics in Education, Lonergan says that the transformation in the other patterns is given only by way of the supernatural gift of charity. 91: ‘…. it is by charity that we can move into the practical pattern of experience without contracting our horizon.’

7 The philosophies, then, are many, contradictory, and disparate, because the ground of philosophy is the human mind, the mind of the philosopher, and the human mind is a polymorphic reality, a manifold of patterns and tendencies, a blend of two forms of knowing, a bewildering fact prior to all clear antitheses, and a struggle between authenticity and inauthenticity. The clear antitheses could be formulated only on the basis of the turn to the subject, but the mind can now gain some mastery of its own manifold and ‘determine what utterance is [outer word], or what is uttered [insight and judgment issuing into inner word], or what is the relation between the two’ (411). Thus the complexity of the mind is at the root of antithetical solutions, and the many, contradictory, disparate philosophies all can be contributions to the clarification of the basic but polymorphic fact of the human mind. This clarification now becomes part of the systematic goal of philosophy. In chapter 17 it will issue in an ontology of philosophic meaning. All philosophers and all philosophies are instances and products of inquiring intelligence and reflecting reasonableness, as either correctly or incorrectly engaged in. So there is a unity of origin and a unity of goal that enables us to find in any given philosophy a significance that the philosopher might not have suspected, a permanent contribution to our self-understanding. This is why all philosophies can be viewed as contributions, however contradictory, to a single goal, the clarification of the polymorphic fact.

8 The method of philosophy so conceived will entail in part tracing the utterances of other philosophers (outer word) to what is uttered (insight and judgment issuing into inner word), and discovering whether that inner word is or is not compatible with the activities of grasping it intelligently and affirming it reasonably.
9 Such a dialectical program is in the service of an ecumenical goal: to discover a unity of origin and of goal in philosophic activities. The unity of origin is the polymorphic human consciousness, and the unity of goal is the clarification of that polymorphic fact. In this way every philosophy will be discovered to have ‘a significance that can extend beyond the philosopher’s horizon and, even in a manner he did not expect, pertain to the permanent development of the human mind’ (412). Thus contradictory contributions can be made to a single goal: an illumination of the polymorphic orientations of human consciousness and their implications for our thinking, our living, and our world.

10 The achievement of that complex goal depends on both direct and inverse insights. Inverse insight in philosophy is a matter of grasping that a given position is incompatible with the activities of grasping it intelligently and affirming it reasonably, and consequently that it invites reversal. Such a position is really a counterposition, because it runs counter to the spontaneities through which it would be intelligently grasped and reasonably affirmed. It originates somewhere other than in the notion of being, other than in intelligent and reasonable anticipation of what is, from some other dimension that does not have a criterion for ascertaining what is true. Direct insight, on the other hand, will grasp that there are also positions: utterances (outer words) that are compatible with the activities of intelligent grasp and reasonable affirmation.

11 The heuristic principle through which philosophy develops and approaches the goal of grasping the fact and implications of the polymorphism of human consciousness is that positions invite developments and counterpositions invite reversal. Even the reversal of counterpositions will contribute to the ulterior goal of clarifying the polymorphism of interiority. This principle is explained on 412-13, and it marks a turning point in the book, the culmination of the three chapters on the basic positions and the beginning of the implementation of these positions in the construction of a consistent world view. We will begin by discussing the six points on 412-13 starting with ‘First, in any philosophy’ on 412.

12 These paragraphs may be summarized as follows: (1) Distinguish in any philosophy between its basis in cognitional theory and the expansion in metaphysics, ethics, and theology. (2) Distinguish two aspects to the basis: (a) what can be determined by an appeal to the data of consciousness, and (b) some stand on basic issues in philosophy, without which ‘the formulation of cognitional theory cannot be complete’ (413). (3) Those basic issues have to do with the real, the subject, and objectivity. (4) Formulate the basic positions and counterpositions (see 413, ‘Thirdly.’) (5) Root the derived positions and counterpositions in the basis (413, ‘Fourthly.’) The problem of basic and derived terms and relations is ultimately not a logical problem.) (6) What makes a statement a counterposition? It is incoherent with the activities of grasping it intelligently and affirming it reasonably, for those activities contain the basic positions. (7) So all positions invite development, since they are coherent with intelligence and reasonableness; and all counterpositions invite reversal, because they are not coherent with those
activities. (8) What would result? You would be able to find significant discoveries even in counterpositions, to separate the discovery from its accompanying bias or mistake, to reverse the counterposition and develop the discovery, and to develop the sequence of discoveries expressed by positions into a unified cumulative structure, adding the positions initially expressed in counterpositional terms. Such is an overall program for philosophy being introduced by Lonergan in this chapter (in addition, of course, to philosophy’s perennial metaphysical, ethical, and theological tasks).

13 To say that the three positions articulated here are the basic positions is to say that all other positions in philosophy are derivative from them. The other positions will be indeed positions if they are coherent with the basic positions, and counterpositions if they are coherent with one or more of the basic counterpositions. These derivative matters concern metaphysics, ethics, and theology. Counterpositions, whether basic or derived, invite reversal because they are incoherent, not necessarily with one another, but with the praxis of grasping them intelligently and affirming them reasonably. For those activities ‘contain’ the basic positions in act, and this praxis needs only to be objectified to reveal its inconsistency with the counterpositions. Positions invite development because they are consistent with the activities of inquiring intelligence and reflecting reasonableness, which, though, will always be incomplete and so subject to further completion.

14 This means that significant discoveries can be expressed as counterpositions. The discovery can be separated out from the philosopher’s bias, reformulated, and in this way contribute to the clarification of the basic but polymorphic fact and its implications. (Recall what Lonergan did with Freud and Marx earlier on.)

January 22, 2004, Part 2

15 Section 2: A Definition of Metaphysics. Next, the presupposition of what he is proposing has to be worked out, namely, that cognitional theory really does exercise such a fundamental influence. To this end he begins with metaphysics. Later he will move on to ethics and to at least some theological questions.

16 The first of the derivative philosophic disciplines to be discussed is metaphysics, the science that sets forth the general nature of the goal of knowledge. 426: ‘The only question to be settled in metaphysics is the general nature of the goal of knowledge, for all questions of detail have to be met by the sciences and by common sense.’ If the notion of being, as structured desire to know, underlies and penetrates and goes beyond all other notions, if its structure determines an objective, being, as whatever can be intelligently grasped and reasonably affirmed, there must be a science of that objective that can be heuristically specified, that would underlie, penetrate, transform, and unite all other departments. That science is metaphysics. See 415-16. What do I know when I do that? Being. But is there more about this objective that can be specified? The
specification would still have to be heuristic, at a second remove, with the
determination that arises from the procedures by which we move to the objective.
We are now at the point of spelling out ‘the broad lines of all there is to be
understood.’ That is the task of metaphysics.

17 Is this not a preposterous notion? Where is there a science that underlies, penetrates,
transforms, and integrates all other sciences? What would have to happen for
such a science to exist? The notion of being that underlies, penetrates, and goes
beyond all other notions would have to conceive and affirm correctly its own
implications regarding what is to be known. The notion of being is an
anticipation of an objective. The objective is whatever can be intelligently
grasped and reasonably affirmed. So that notion certainly underlies, penetrates,
goes beyond other notions, and being faithful to it would lead one to transform
one’s knowing in different departments. So if one can work out explicitly the
implications of the notion of being for what is to be known, one would have
articulated an explicit metaphysics.

18 This means that the notion of being is itself a latent metaphysics of the human mind,
present and operative in all of us. As long as it is not grasped with clarity and
precision, its efforts at transformative dialectic and integration are random, spotty,
ad hoc, coincidental, haphazard, spasmodic. But even as latent, as long as it is
given free rein to operate, it underlies, penetrates, transforms, unifies all our
knowledge. Making it into a science or department of knowledge that underlies,
penetrates, transforms, unifies other departments is a matter of the latent
metaphysics conceiving itself, working out its implications and techniques, and
affirming the conception, the implications, and the techniques.

19 More fully: (1) There is a latent metaphysics of the human mind in the notion of
being, the dynamic anticipation of whatever can be intelligently grasped and
reasonably affirmed. 416: ‘Empirical, intellectual, and rational consciousness are
immanent and operative in all human knowing; from them spring both the various
departments of knowledge and the attempts that are made to reverse
counterpositions and to attain coherence and unity; but the common source of all
knowledge is not grasped with sufficient clarity and precision; the dialectical
principle of transformation is not a developed technique; and efforts at unification
are haphazard and spasmodic.’ Even as latent, this spontaneous metaphysics
underlies, penetrates, transforms, and unifies other departments of knowledge, but
not from the ground of self-appropriation. (2) Metaphysics becomes problematic
when ‘the need of a systematic effort for unification is felt’ (416), when there is a
desire for unification of the sciences, and in particular insofar as there is a desire
for a satisfactory method for the human sciences. (3) Explicit metaphysics
emerges when ‘latent metaphysics, which always is operative, succeeds in
conceiving itself, in working out its implications and techniques, and in affirming
the conception, the implications, and the techniques.’ Explicit metaphysics is ‘the
conception, affirmation, and implementation of the integral heuristic structure of
proportionate being’ (416).
20 Meaning of the definition: ‘Proportionate being’ prescinds from the question of world-transcendence or God. It is whatever can be known by the sciences and common sense, by (a) ordinary presentations of sense and consciousness, (b) understanding, and (c) judgment. But metaphysics is not that knowledge. It is not science in the usual sense nor is it common sense. But science is methodically heuristic, and there is even a certain heuristic (dialectic) for directing common sense. And ‘while the content of a future cognitional act is unknown, the general characteristic of the act itself not only can be known but also can supply a premise that leads to the act. A heuristic notion, then, is the notion of an unknown content, and is determined by anticipating the type of act through which the unknown would become known. A heuristic structure is an ordered set of heuristic notions. Finally, an integral heuristic structure is the ordered set of all heuristic notions’ (417). An integral heuristic structure would anticipate the complete understanding of all phenomena, and as heuristic structures are developed they are added to the set of anticipatory structures. As methods develop, metaphysics progresses by adding these discoveries to its account of the integral heuristic structure of proportionate being. *Insight* treats four such heuristic structures: classical, statistical, genetic, and dialectical. But explicit metaphysics is by no means complete in this state. *Insight* gives us a fixed base, an invariant pattern opening on all further developments of understanding. But the integral heuristic structure will continue to be assembled as long as there are new methods to be discovered for understanding the data of the concrete universe of proportionate being. (E.g., in *Method in Theology* Lonergan adds at least elements of a scholarly heuristic structure for exegetical and historical studies.) ‘Integral heuristic structure’ is a limit notion. Metaphysics will progressively fill out the ‘notion of being’ by the addition, not of content, but of more specific heuristic structures as these are developed in the course of the development of human knowledge. It most likely will never be completed.

21 Implications of the definition: (1) explicit metaphysics will be progressive. 417-18: ‘… heuristic notions and structures are not discovered by some Platonic recall of a prior state of contemplative bliss. They result from the resourcefulness of human intelligence in operation. They are to be known only by an analysis of operations that have become familiar and are submitted to examination. Just as the other departments of knowledge advance by discovering new methods, so metaphysics advances by adding these discoveries to its account of the integral heuristic structure of proportionate being.’

22 (2) Explicit metaphysics is also nuanced, that is, more established in some parts than in others. (3) It is factual, that is, it treats not the merely possible, nor the absolutely necessary, but what in fact is, just as do the empirical sciences and the instances of common sense that it unifies. (4) Its relation to the sciences and common sense is complex: it does not discover or teach science, nor develop or impart common sense, nor know the formal intelligibilities of the universe of proportionate being independently of science and common sense; but as latent it
generates science and common sense, and as explicit it takes over their results, works them into coherence, reverses their counterpositions, knits them into a unity.

23 (5) It is relatively stable, not subject to revolutionary upheaval. 418-19: ‘... a science is open to revolutionary change inasmuch as it is possible to reach a higher viewpoint and consequently to alter the content of its primitive terms and relations. But it is possible to reach a higher viewpoint only within the framework of inquiring and critical intelligence; there is not, in human knowledge, any possible higher viewpoint that goes beyond that framework itself and replaces intelligent inquiry and critical reflection by some surrogate; and the viewpoint of metaphysics is constituted by nothing less than inquiring intelligence and critical reflection. Moreover, a higher viewpoint can alter the content of primitive terms and relations only if that content is some determinate object of thought or affirmation ... A merely heuristic notion is not open to revision ... [it] is both antecedent to each determinate account and ... subsequent to each and the principle of the revision of each ... since metaphysics is the integral heuristic structure of proportionate being ... [it] is not open to revolutionary change.’

24 (6) It regards being primarily as explained, but also, insofar as descriptive relations must be identical with some explanatory relations, it regards secondarily being as described. And (7) from the preface, p. 5, it will be verifiable: See sixthly, p. 5. And for a summary see the paragraph ‘Perhaps’ on 420-21.

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25 Section 3 treats method in metaphysics: how does one reach such an explicit metaphysics? what directives can guide one toward it? (1) The starting point is people as they are, and more specifically myself as I am. Explicit metaphysics can exist only in the empirical, intellectual, and rational consciousness of the self-affirming subject. It does not exist in a book but in a mind, and it is produced only by the mind in which it exists. It begins in minds that exist, and it proceeds from their actual texture and complexion.

26 (2) But as I am I cannot avoid experience, or put off my intelligence, or renounce my reasonableness. But what I need to do is advert to these inevitabilities, distinguish between them sharply, discern the immanent order that binds them together, find in them the dynamic structure that generates science and common sense, acknowledge in that structure a normative principle that governs the outcome of inquiry, discover equally powerful but distorting dynamic structures, and acknowledge the polymorphism of my own consciousness. That is, I need to undertake a process to self-knowledge. I begin with the desire to know as existing and operative; I move to the self-affirmation of the subject and the notions of being and objectivity.
27 (3) I see by now that changes have to be made in the fields of my common sense and my scientific knowledge, insofar as they are not purely and simply the product of experience, intelligent grasp, and reasonable affirmation. And from there I move to an integration of what is known and to be known of the universe of proportionate being. It is in this integration that metaphysics becomes explicit, as we will see in the next chapter.

28 (4) The integration takes place on the basis of the isomorphism that obtains between the structure of knowing and the structure of the known. 424: ‘If the knowing consists of a related set of acts and the known is the related set of contents of these acts, then the pattern of the relations between the acts is similar in form to the pattern of the relations between the contents of the acts.’ This is an example of an analytic principle. If every instance of knowing proportionate being consists of a unification of experience, understanding, and judgment, then every instance of known proportionate being involves a parallel unification of a content of experience, a content of understanding, and a content of judgment. This is the simplest of the structures. Reoriented science and common sense are integrated in light of these principles, as we will begin to see in the next chapter.

29 Again, every instance of knowing proportionate being is a unification of experiencing, understanding, and judging, and so every instance of known proportionate being will be a parallel unification of a content of experience, a content of understanding, and a content of judgment. This provides the integrating structure. Reoriented science and common sense provide the materials to be integrated. The actual integration gives rise to explicit metaphysics. ‘To recapitulate, the goal of the method is the emergence of explicit metaphysics in the minds of particular men and women. It begins from them as they are, no matter what that may be. It involves a preliminary stage that can be methodical only in the sense in which a pedagogy is methodical, that is, the goal and the procedure are known and pursued explicitly by a teacher but not by the pupil. The preliminary stage ends when the subject reaches an intelligent and reasonable self-affirmation. Such self-affirmation is also self-knowledge. It makes explicit the pursuit of the goal that has been implicit in the pure desire to know. From that explicit pursuit there follow the directives, first, of reorientating one’s scientific knowledge and one’s common sense, and secondly, of integrating what one knows and can know of proportionate being through the known structures of one’s cognitional activities’ (426). This actual integration will relate physics, chemistry, botany, zoology, psychology, and intentionality analysis (and sociology, economics, political science, etc.) to one another. And this is the social praxis of meaning that metaphysics is. Metaphysics is a praxis of meaning; its elements are unpacked in the next chapter, which also adds genetic method to those already discussed.
The problem of chapter 15 is to work out the basic structure of the known that is isomorphic with the structure of knowing, to make explicit the latent metaphysics of the human mind (456). Chapter 14 outlined the program, and chapter 15 turns to its execution. This will lead to the integration of the cognitional object (the broad lines of all that can be understood), as chapter 11 led to an integration of the cognitional subject (thoroughly understand what it is to understand). Explicit metaphysics will integrate reoriented science and common sense. The basic elements in terms of which reoriented science and common sense will be integrated are derived from the isomorphism of the structure of knowing and the structure of the known.

2 Metaphysics, as the integral heuristic structure of proportionate being, envisages an indefinitely remote future when the whole of proportionate being will be understood. It asks what can be known here and now of that future explanation. It answers that the structure of that full explanatory knowledge can be known now.

3 More specifically and precisely: Proportionate being is whatever is to be known by presentation, intelligent grasp, and reasonable affirmation. What can be known now of that future explanation of everything? Only one of those components is an unknown: the content of intelligent explanatory grasp of proportionate being remains unknown (hypothetical, subject to revision, with the possibility of new basic terms, etc.) until full explanation, the idea of being, is reached. But we already know the determination added by reasonable affirmation: a virtually unconditioned yes, the content of judgment. And we already know that the content of experience that will survive in fully explanatory knowledge is the intellectually patterned experience of the empirical residue: the individuality, continuity, coincidental conjunctions and successions, and nonsystematic divergence from intelligible norms that is to be known by experiencing and only by experiencing.

4 The term ‘potency’ designates the component to be known by intellectually patterned experience of the empirical residue. The term ‘form’ denotes the component of proportionate being to be known by explanation, by understanding things fully in their relations to one another. The term ‘act’ denotes the component of proportionate being to be known by uttering the virtually unconditioned yes of reasonable judgment. It follows that potency, form, and act constitute a unity, for they are the contents of three levels of cognitional activity, and the three levels of cognitional activity yield a single knowing: what is experienced is what is understood, and what is understood is what is affirmed. The three components unite in a single proportionate being. The specification of their unity derives from knowing form. ‘… experience neither defines nor specifies; it merely presents. Again, judgment neither defines nor specifies; it merely affirms or denies what has
been defined or specified already. All defining and specifying occur on the level of understanding, and so the unity constituted by potency, form, and act has but a single definition or specification that is reached in knowing form’ (457-58).

January 29, 2004, Part 2

5 This account of potency, form, and act covers any possible scientific explanation, and so it fits the understanding of science presented earlier in the book. For a scientific explanation is a theory verified in instances. As verified it refers to act. As theory it refers to form. As in instances it refers to potency. We have treated or will treat three kinds of scientific theory: classical theory refers to form as form; statistical theory refers to form as setting ideal frequencies from which acts do not diverge systematically; genetic theory, to be discussed in this chapter, refers to conditions of the emergence of form from potency. (Dialectical heuristic structure pertains to the ontology of meaning.)

6 Two general cases of potency, form, and act can be distinguished. For the use of heuristic techniques reveals that there are (at least) two kinds of form, and if so there must be two kinds of potency and two kinds of act. The first kind of form lies in the terms implicitly defined by verified correlations: what before have been called explanatory or pure conjugates. It is now called conjugate form. But then there will also be conjugate potency and conjugate act: potency to conjugate form, and act of conjugate form. For such forms are verified (act) in the empirical residue (potency). Explanatory conjugates (conjugate forms) are reached by considering data as similar and prescinding from their similarities to our senses in favor of their similarities in relation to one another. Affirming them says yes to their occurrence, event, functioning (conjugate act). They occur and are verified in spatiotemporal continua, conjunctions, successions, coincidental manifolds of occurrences, and so these constitute conjugate potency.

7 The same data are also concrete and individual, and in this respect they are understood by grasping in them a concrete and intelligible unity, identity, whole, a thing. But if a concrete and intelligible unity is known by understanding, it too must be form, but another kind of form from that known by understanding explanatory relations: central form. And so there must be, too, a central potency and a central act. Central potency is individuality, and central act is existence.

8 Again, central act is existence, for what exists is the intelligible unity. Conjugate act is occurrence, for what occurs is defined by appealing to conjugate forms. Central potency is the individuality of the empirical residue. Conjugate form is verified in spatiotemporal continua, conjunctions, and successions, and so these constitute conjugate potency. 462-63: ‘… let us suppose that mass-velocity is a notion that survives in fully explanatory science. Then the mass-velocity will be a conjugate act; the mass, defined by its intelligible relations to other masses, will be a conjugate form; the space-time continuum of the trajectory will be a conjugate
Section 3 begins to show how this outline will enable an integration of the sciences. It recasts what chapter 8 said about genera and species in terms of conjugate and central potency, form, and act. Thus: different combinations of subatomic conjugate forms define explanatorily subatomic things. These may differ specifically, since the forms systematize differently the occurrence of acts, but they all belong to the same genus, subatomic. Different combinations of the verified correlations yield a range of schemes of recurrence, which systematize the conjugate acts at this level of generic differentiation. But there may be occurrences (chemical) that are not in these schemes, and so are random, coincidental, potency. These, however, may become systematic, but not in such a way as to be accounted for by the previous subatomic schemes. Then a new set of conjugate forms, chemical, to be known by the science of chemistry, has emerged, defining a new genus of things, the chemical elements and later the chemical compounds, and yielding a new range of schemes of recurrence that make systematic the new type of acts. This can continue. Random occurrences (conjugate act) of life are potency for form (scheme, system) not accounted for by chemical schemes, defining a new genus and yielding a new range of schemes making systematic the new acts. Random occurrences (conjugate act) of consciousness are potency for form not accounted for by botanical schemes, defining a new genus, animal, and yielding a new range of schemes systematizing the new acts. A random manifold of conjugate acts thus becomes the conjugate potency (succession, conjunction) for a higher systematization by form yielding new things of new genera.

The lower things do not survive in the higher things, but the lower conjugate potencies, forms, and acts do, systematized by the higher forms. 464: ‘… the same data under the totality of their aspects cannot be the data for different things. If any datum under all its aspects pertains to one thing, then it does not pertain to any other thing; hence, if there is a higher thing, there are data for affirming it; and the same data are not data for any other thing. It is to be noted, however, that we are speaking not of “bodies” but of things. Within the “body” of an animal, there can be many different things; but these different things are not the animal, nor parts of it; they may be foreign “bodies”; they may live in symbiosis with the animal; but they do not pertain to the animal as do its eyes and other organs.’

Pertaining to the successive genera, there will be distinct and autonomous sciences, without any logical process from one to the other, so that one could be reduced to the other or deduced from the other. They are related, rather, as successive higher viewpoints, where the symbolic denotation of the coincidental manifolds of lower conjugate acts are images for insight into laws relating higher forms. These images are merely heuristic, facilitating the transition from one science to another; they are not representations of things as they are, as though the real were a subdivision of the already out there now. If they were, the successive higher viewpoints would be merely subjective additions by intelligence, and the reality of each higher genus
would be emptied into the lower until one reached the image of the lowest genus, whether this be material particles floating in an imaginable space-time, or even less, namely too small to be seen, and so unverifiable images as one’s only account of reality. Reductionism involves basic counterpositions.

12 This account of the sciences has a high (‘unique’) probability, and that is sufficient for a metaphysics that will be nuanced: ‘it may have no doubt about central and conjugate potencies, forms, and acts; yet it can be content with unique probability when it comes to differentiating the explanatory genera and species of forms’ (467). ‘… a conception is uniquely probable if it meets an issue fairly and squarely and there are no available alternative views’ (466). ‘The notion of the succession of higher viewpoints would seem to be the one and only manner in which logically unrelated sciences can be unified. The notion that lower coincidental manifolds of occurrences are systematized by higher forms would seem to be the one and only way in which higher orders of reality can be immanent in lower orders without violating lower classical laws’ (465). 467 treats the question of fact: ‘Are there in this universe things that differ specifically and generically, where these differences are conceived not descriptively but explanatorily? … if [one] is to revise that or any other affirmation, [one] must appeal to experience, understanding, and judgment, and so [one] will be a concrete and intelligible unity of empirical, intelligent, and rational consciousness. Moreover, [one] must make [one’s] pronouncement, not while [one] is conscious within the biological, the aesthetic, the artistic, the dramatic, or the practical patterns of experience, but while [one] is conscious within the intellectual pattern. Still, [one] will be capable of experience in those other patterns or in some blend or alternation of them, for otherwise [one] would not be a [human being]. It follows that the hypothetical reviser, if [he/she] is a [human being], will be more than a concrete and intelligible unity of empirical, intelligent, and rational consciousness. What else will [he/she] be? One has to invoke at least one other genus of conjugate forms to account for the concrete possibility of other patterns of experience, to account for preconscious and subconscious influences upon consciousness, to account for the fact that the hypothetical reviser eats and breathes and walks on other things besides [human beings]. On the other hand, if one’s hypothetical reviser is not a [human being], then one is rather hard put to it to conceive a manner in which the existence of different explanatory genera can be denied.’

13 Potency is the principle of limitation. Each higher genus is limited by the preceding lower genus. For example, on the one hand, I cannot interfere with the autonomy of my animal functions or I would destroy the very foundations of my being as a human being; yet on the other hand, the higher forms that make me human are a higher systematization of manifolds that would be coincidental on the animal level (insights, judgments, decisions, etc.), and so are limited by the materials they organize. If each higher genus is limited by the preceding lower genus, the lowest genus, whatever it is, provides a principle of limitation for the whole universe of proportionate being. This universal principle of limitation is the potency of the lowest genus, which we may name prime potency. Prime potency has something to
do with energy. More precisely, what is needed is a theory such that ‘prime potency would be conceived as a ground of quantitative limitation and general heuristic considerations would relate quantitative limitation to the properties that science verifies in the quantity it names energy’ (469). (This is another example of the nuanced nature of Lonergan’s metaphysics; this assertion, while it makes a great deal of sense, is not as firmly established as, for example, the general structure in terms of potency, form, and act.)

14 Potency and finality: Finality is a notion that is reciprocal to the heuristic notion of being, and of equal significance. 470: ‘... it is not only our notion of being that is heuristic, that heads for an objective that can be defined only in terms of the process of knowing it, but also the reality of proportionate being itself exhibits a similar incompleteness and a similar dynamic orientation towards a completeness that becomes determinate only in the process of completion.’ This incompleteness and dynamism are parallel or isomorphic to the heuristic notion of being. ‘Just as intellectually patterned experience heads towards insights and judgments, so potency heads towards forms and acts. Just as cognitional activity mounts through accumulations of insights to higher viewpoints, so objective process involves the information and actuation of prime potency only to uncover a residue of coincidental manifolds and so mount through successive levels of higher systematization. Just as cognitional activity does not know in advance what being is and so has to define it heuristically as whatever is to be known by intelligent grasp and reasonable affirmation, so objective process is not the realization of some blueprint but the cumulation of a conditioned series of things and schemes of recurrence in accord with successive schedules of probabilities. Just as cognitional process is the becoming known of being, so objective process is the becoming of proportionate being. Indeed, since cognitional activity is itself but a part of this universe, so its heading to being is but the particular instance in which universal striving towards being becomes conscious and intelligent and reasonable.

‘Such is the meaning we would attach to the name “finality.”’

15 Finality is ‘a theorem of the same generality as the notion of being. This theorem affirms a parallelism between the dynamism of the mind and the dynamism of proportionate being’ (470). Finality, then, is not some pull exerted by the future on the present. It is the process, the restlessness, the fluidity, the tension, the passionateness of being (‘Mission and the Spirit’). ‘As [the theorem] regards present reality in its dynamic aspect, so it affirms this dynamism to be open. As what is to be known becomes determinate only through knowing, so what is to be becomes determinate only through its own becoming. But as present knowing is not just present knowing but also a moment in process towards fuller knowing, so also present reality is not just present reality but also a moment in process to fuller reality’ (470-71).

16 Elsewhere Lonergan distinguishes horizontal, vertical, and absolute finality.
Horizontal finality is to the completion of a thing or a dimension by its proportionate end, the end that results from what a thing is. Vertical finality is to
an end higher than this, such as the supernatural end of the human person. Potency to that end is obediential, since that end is absolutely supernatural. Absolute finality is a theological notion, to be treated later. There is an open dynamism in the universe of proportionate being. Its ground is potency, what is known by the intellectually patterned experience of the empirical residue. It is the dynamic aspect of the real. The universe is not inert, static, finished, complete. 471: ‘The objective ground of this open dynamism is potency. For potency is what is to be known by intellectually patterned experience of the empirical residue. But intellectually patterned experience is dynamic; it is experience under some heuristic structure that is derived from the detached and disinterested desire to know; it is experience dominated by that desire. And the dynamic orientation of such experience no less than the experience itself has its counterpart in proportionate being. Indeed, since cognitional activity is itself but a part of this universe, its striving to know being is but the intelligent and reasonable part of a universal striving towards being.’

17 Finality, then is the dynamic aspect of the real. And it is directed dynamism. 472: ‘It neither denies nor minimizes such facts as entropy, cataclysm, the death that follows every birth, the extinction that threatens every survival. It offers no opinion on the ultimate fate of the universe. But it insists that the negative picture is not the whole picture. For it knows proportionate being as constituted by explanatory genera and species of central and conjugate potencies, forms, and acts. It knows that potency stands in some dynamic direction towards form, that form stands in some dynamic direction to act, that coincidental manifolds of act stand in some connection with potency to higher forms. Just what that dynamic direction may prove to be is a further question. But at least in some sense dynamic direction is to be affirmed.’ That is, ‘some directing of potency towards form and of form towards act’ (472).

18 While directed, finality is not determinately directed, that is, not headed to some determinate individual or species or genus of proportionate being. It heads beyond all these: beyond the myriad individualities of the lowest genus to the fewer individualities of higher genera, and beyond these again to higher forms in perpetual cycles of change. 473: ‘Finality goes beyond lower genera and species to higher genera and species, and if it is halted at some genus, the halt reveals not finality but the limitations which it endeavors to transcend. Even if one cares to assert that finality can go no higher than [human beings], it is clear enough that [our] unrestricted desire to know provides concrete evidence that the alleged maximum of possibility is not the maximum of aspiration.’ This directed but indeterminate dynamism is precisely what we saw in the first five chapters to be an effectively probable realization of possibilities. 473: ‘.. potency is an objective possibility of form; form is an objective possibility of act; acts are an objective possibility of higher forms and higher acts. The realization of these possibilities is effectively probable, for on the supposition of sufficient numbers and sufficiently long intervals of time, the realization of any possibility can be assured.’ It is the unfolding of the immanent implications of the concrete universe, and so is realistic
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(`Sixthly,’ 473-74). It is also universal, since it involves both success and failure. It is ‘an immanent intelligibility operating through the effective probability of possibility … in human affairs finality does not undertake to run the world along the lines of a kindergarten; it does undertake to enlighten [us] by allowing [our] actions to have their consequences, that by this cumulative heaping of evidence [we] may learn.’

19 This finality is both nuanced and flexible. It is nuanced: that is, it is concrete, differentiated, various, since different beings have different limitations, tensions, dynamisms, thrusts toward a fuller future. 474: ‘Just as the notion of being underlies all other contents and penetrates them and goes beyond them, so too does finality underlie and penetrate and head beyond each being that in fact is.’ And it is flexible: it operates by changes of state, with new probabilities setting up emergent trends for the verification of new classical laws. Even the emergent trend is flexible. It may follow different routes, with later compensations making up for earlier distortions. There is also a major flexibility whereby new coincidental combinations provide the materials for new species and new genera of higher systematization.

20 Potency, then, is the ground of both limitation and finality. 476: ‘… the real is dynamic inasmuch as it is incomplete, inasmuch as it is less than it can be. But act constitutes its achievement; form determines what that achievement is; only in potency can one discern the principle that refers determinate achievement to some indeterminate betterment.’ Potency, then, is a tension of opposites. But these opposites are not contradictory, nor is finality a contradictory notion. ‘… contradiction arises only when mutually exclusive predicates are attributed to the same object under the same aspect’ (476). But there are two aspects to potency: its proper contribution to the universe of proportionate being is limitation, and its relation to form and act is that of finality. Theology and the Dialectics of History distinguishes opposites that are contraries and opposites that are contradictories.

21 This finality is not ‘final causality,’ which is a matter of external causality. Finality is rather a dimension of the immanent constitution of proportionate being. It is Aristotle’s physis, nature, as immanent principle of movement and rest. See ‘Natural Right and Historical Mindedness’ (in A Third Collection).
February 5, 2004, Part 1

1 The remainder of chapter 15 is concerned with development and genetic method. The section on development can be divided into three parts (not Lonergan’s divisions): principles of development, a definition of development, and examples of development. Development will require yet a new set of heuristic structures: genetic. For reasons that will become apparent, Lonergan judged that the study of development and genetic method would best be done after he had introduced the elements of metaphysics.

2 Lonergan presents seven principles of development. The first is the principle of emergence, which is said to be ‘already familiar’: ‘Otherwise coincidental manifolds of lower conjugate acts invite the higher integration effected by higher conjugate forms’ (477). The examples given are indeed already familiar, because they are the kinds of things spoken about in the treatment of explanatory genera: ‘chemical elements and compounds are higher integrations of otherwise coincidental manifolds of subatomic events; organisms are higher integrations of otherwise coincidental manifolds of chemical processes; sensitive consciousness is a higher integration of otherwise coincidental manifolds of changes in neural tissues; and accumulating insights are higher integrations of otherwise coincidental manifolds of images or of data’ (477). But besides these, other examples could be given that highlight more properly development within unities-identities-wholes, and especially in human persons: the emergence of higher viewpoints and new paradigms in the intellectual order, the emergence of new habits, the emergence of new feelings, and so on.

3 Next is the principle of correspondence, which is correlative to the principle of emergence. ‘Significantly different underlying manifolds require different higher integrations’ (477). Examples: ‘the chemical elements differ by atomic numbers and atomic weights, and these differences are grounded in the underlying manifold. Different aggregates of aggregates of chemical processes involve different organisms. Neural events in the eye and in the ear call forth different conscious experiences. Different data lead to different theories’ (477). The principle of correspondence enjoys a measure of flexibility: within limits the same higher integration will systematize differing manifolds: ‘the same kind of atom can have subatomic components at different energy levels; the same kind of organism admits differences of size, shape, weight; similarities of character and temperament are compatible, probably enough, with neural differences; and the same theory can be reached from different data.’ But the limits do exist, and to transgress them (or to overlook them, as in the development of habits) is to eliminate the higher integration.

4 The third principle is the principle of finality. ‘The underlying manifold is an upwardly but indeterminately directed dynamism towards ever fuller realization of being’ (477). Every limitation is a barrier to be transcended. Thus we may distinguish static and dynamic higher integrations. The higher integration is ‘static when it dominates the lower manifold with complete success and thereby brings about a notable imperviousness to change. Thus, the inert gases lock coincidental manifolds of subatomic events in remarkably permanent routines.'
On the other hand, the higher integration is dynamic when it is not content to systematize the underlying manifold but keeps adding to it and modifying it until, by the principle of correspondence, the existing integration is eliminated and, by the principle of emergence, a new integration is introduced’ (477-78).

5 The fourth principle is the principle of **development** itself. The principle indicates that there will be ‘the linked sequence of dynamic higher integrations. An initial coincidental manifold is systematized and modified by a higher integration so as to call forth a second; the second leads to a third; the third to a fourth; and so on, until the possibilities of development along a given line are exhausted and the relative stability of maturity is reached’ (478). Cf. Piaget’s study of cognitive development in children: this is precisely what happens.

6 A fifth principle is the principle of **increasing explanatory differentiation**. It means that our understanding of genera and species is in terms, not of initial and generic integrations in initial manifolds, but of the specific intelligible differentiations generated in the process from the initial stages; and these come only in and through the process of development.

7 A sixth principle is the principle of **minor flexibility**: the same ultimate goal can be reached by different routes; there can be ‘a set of alternative linked sequences’ that will lead to the ultimate goal. ‘… a normal sea urchin can result from an embryo subjected to distorting pressures; psychic health can be due to untutored spontaneity or to the ministrations of the psychiatrist; the same science can be taught successfully in accord with different methods; and the same discovery can be made in different manners.’

8 A seventh principle is the principle of **major flexibility**: the ultimate objective itself can shift or be modified. Adaptation, sublimation, shift from one problem to another, etc. The two flexibilities do not conflict in any ultimate manner, since they are rooted in the tension of potency itself as principle of both limitation and finality: ‘In minor flexibility, there is at work the determination of the development that rests on the initial manifold. This determination exhibits potency as the ground of limitation. But potency is also the ground of finality, and from this viewpoint it heads to ever fuller realizations. Moreover, a higher integration is characterized only partially by its systematization of an underlying manifold; on an adequate account, it is the emergence of a solution to the compound problem of systematizing a coincidental manifold in a given milieu or context; and this solution consists in a set of conjugate forms that are related not only to one another within the integration but also to other instances of the same type outside the integration’ (479).

9 Thus a development is **defined** as ‘a flexible, linked sequence of dynamic and increasingly differentiated higher integrations that meet the tension of successively transformed underlying manifolds through successive applications of the principles of correspondence and emergence’ (479).

10 **Examples** are given on 479-84. The initial instance is the division of the cell, where there is growth (as opposed to reproduction). Growth is an increase in differentiation. This is **organic** development, and it is described on 480.
11 The next instance is psychic development, a sequence of increasingly complex forms of sensitive consciousness in the animal, but most richly diverse and highly integrated in the human person (just as it is in an animal, not a plant, that fuller potentialities of organic diversity are realized). Neural development is its underlying manifold, conditioning it. But psychic development ‘consists neither in neural tissues nor in neural configurations nor in neural events but in a sequence of increasingly differentiated and integrated sets of capacities for perceptiveness, for aggressive or affective response, for memory, for imaginative projects, and for skilfully and economically executed performance’ (481). That they (neural and psychic) are different is most clearly seen in the case of multiple personality, ‘in which a single individual exhibits at different times quite different integrations of different perceptive, associative, emotive, conative, and operative characteristics. Just as the single cell is so integrated as to head towards a duplication of its dynamic patterns and a consequent division, so in a fashion not altogether different the higher integration of sensitive consciousness can so interact with its neural basis as to generate different and incompatible integrations’ (481).

12 The greatest diversities of sensitive consciousness, of perceptiveness, imaginative power, nuanced affects, and acquired skills, occurs in the human person. Depth psychology throws a great deal of light on the subject, and Lonergan believes that his definition of development supplies a single scheme that unites Freud’s wish fulfilment, his sublimation, and Jung’s archetypal symbols. ‘The unconscious neural basis neither means nor wishes in the proper senses of those terms, for both meaning and wishing are conscious activities. But the unconscious neural basis is an upwardly directed dynamism seeking fuller realization, first, on the proximate sensitive level, and secondly, beyond its limitations, on higher artistic, dramatic, philosophic, cultural, and religious levels. Hence it is that insight into dream symbols and associated images and affects reveals to the psychologist a grasp of the anticipations and virtualities of higher activities immanent in the underlying unconscious manifold’ (482). Freud’s superego is explained in a similar way, as both an anticipation and a caricature of the judgments of rational consciousness on the conduct of a rational being. The censor is a law governing the interrelations between successive levels of integration. Elements of the manifold either can or cannot enter the integration. Analysis is engaged in enlarging one’s potentialities for integration, and resistance is a reflection of the present integration twisting what it can assimilate and circumventing what it cannot. And regarding the central role of sexual development highlighted by Freud, from Lonergan’s perspective it will move from the generic to the specific, it must divide into stages imposed by somatic development, the successive higher integrations must meet increasingly determinate neural demands, and to do so involves attending to ever larger fields of data on these demands, ever more nuanced ways of negotiating them in the context of committed interpersonal relations.

13 Finally (for now) there is intellectual development: ‘the principal illustration of the notion of development ... An otherwise coincidental manifold of data or images is integrated by insights; the effort to formulate systematically what is grasped by insight, or alternatively the effort to act upon it, gives rise to further questions, directs attention to further data, leads to the emergence of further insights, and so the cycle of development begins another turn.’
14 Genetic method is the set of heuristic structures for the study of development. It is part of the integral heuristic structure of proportionate being. The basic heuristic notion of genetic method is the notion of development just outlined. In plants there is a single development, organic; in animals a twofold development, organic and psychic; and in human beings the threefold development of the organism, the psyche, and intelligence (so far).

15 The general notions of genetic method are the following: (1) in any of these things, there is to be affirmed an individual, existing unity: individual by central potency, a unity by central form, existent by central act; (2) there are also conjugate potencies, forms, and acts, but since central potency, form, and act are constants throughout development, development is to be formulated in terms of conjugate potency, form, and act; (3) conjugate acts are occurrences or events – intussusception, assimilation, excretion (organic), perception, conation, response (psychic), insight, formulation, reflective understanding, judgment (intellectual) – and these acts are recurrent, with a regularity that establishes schemes of recurrence; but the regularity is not fixed in some single scheme; rather there is a flexible circle of ranges of schemes, so that the same organism, the same psychic habits and dispositions, the same intellectual developments result in widely different operations (conjugate acts) under different conditions and in accord with different circumstances; (4) conjugate forms of the organism, psyche, and intelligence are discovered by proceeding from the schemes of organic, psychic, and intellectual recurrence to underlying correlations; inversely, once these are known, one can work out lists of possible schemes of recurrence, as Lonergan did in setting up the procedures of mathematicians, empirical scientists, and people of common sense; (5) there are conspicuous differences between physics and chemistry, on the one hand, and biology, psychology, and intellectual theory, on the other hand, not only in the flexibility of circles of ranges of schemes but also in the development itself, the advance of conjugate forms from generic indeterminacy to specific perfection, so that the flexible circle of schemes of recurrence shifts and expands; (6) thus while classical method is concerned to reduce regular events to laws, genetic method is concerned with sequences in which correlations and regularities change; its objective is to grasp the sequence itself, to proceed from the correlations and regularities of one stage to those of the next, “… a sequence of operators that successively generate further functions from an initial function”; (7) the heuristic assumption of genetic method is the notion of development itself, and it determines the course of a development by the scissors-like action of both particular and general procedures (as classical method).

16 The general procedures (from above) are three: (1) the general direction of development is from generic potentiality to specific determination; (2) the general mode of operation is that the sequence of conjugate forms is a sequence of higher integrations of otherwise coincidental lower manifolds of events, in a circular interaction of potency, form, and act; (3) the field in which development occurs is that of the finality, the upwardly directed dynamism, of proportionate being, or again, a generalized emergent probability.

17 The more specialized directives ‘from below’ will differ according to the simple development of the organism, the twofold development of the animal, and the (at least) threefold development in the human person. In all of these, measuring loses its significance and efficacy as one mounts to higher integrations. 488: ‘It loses in
significance, for the higher integration is, within limits, independent of the exact quantities of the lower manifold it systematizes. Moreover, the higher the integration, the greater the independence of lower quantities, so that the meaning of one’s dreams is not a function of one’s weight, and one’s ability in mathematics does not vary with one’s height. Besides this loss in significance, there is also a loss in efficacy. Classical method can select among the functions that solve differential equations by appealing to measurements and empirically established curves. What the differential equation is to classical method, the general notion of development is to genetic method. But while the differential equation is mathematical, the general notion of development is not. It follows that, while measurement is an efficacious technique for finding boundary conditions that restrict differential equations, it possesses no assignable efficacy when it comes to particularizing the general notion of development.’

18 Regarding the organism, one will start from the thing-for-us as exhibited to our senses (anatomy); relate by insight the described parts to organic events, occurrences, operations, grasp the parts as organs, grasp intelligibilities immanent in the several parts, refer each part to what it can and will do, and relate the capacity of each part to the capacities of the other parts (physiology); move to explanation, from parts as organs to conjugate forms systematizing otherwise coincidental manifolds of chemical and physical processes, thus linking physiology with biochemistry and biophysics. These three steps reveal the higher system as integrator of an underlying manifold of cells, chemical processes, and physical changes. But the higher system is also an operator; ‘it so integrates the underlying manifold as to call forth, by the principles of correspondence and emergence, its own replacement by a more specific and effective integrator’ (490). In general, the operator is the upwardly directed dynamism named finality, but the relevant heuristic directive in genetic method is to specify this operator, specify how the higher system is the source of the differences that appear in the next stage, determine how it is the source of the concrete differences.

19 The same heuristic structure is involved in the study of psychic and intellectual development, but the developments themselves are more complex. In the animal there is a twofold development, and in the human person (for now) a threefold development. And there is a difference in the accessibility of the data. ‘In the organism both the underlying manifold and the higher system are unconscious. In intellectual development both the underlying manifold of sensible presentations and the higher system of insights and formulations are conscious. In psychic development the underlying neural manifold is unconscious and the supervening higher system is conscious. Finally, the higher the level of integration, the greater the freedom from material limitation, the more dominant the dynamic and expansive aspect of the operator, the more significant are the laws of development itself, and consequently the fuller is the development not only on the higher level but also on subordinate levels. Thus, organic differentiation reaches its maximum in animals, and psychic differentiation reaches its maximum in [human persons]’ (492).

20 Psychic development in the animal is the higher integration on the move of conscious perceptions and coordinated responses as these integrate the underlying manifold of neural events. There is a lateral movement to an increasing differentiation of the psychic events in correspondence with particular afferent and efferent nerves. And there is an ascending movement to an increasing integration of perception and coordination of response. Comparative study of
successive stages, of normal and abnormal successions, of similarities and differences of successions in different subspecies, species, and genera, and of the general economy of increasing psychic differentiation is what would provide the materials to be understood in specifying the higher system as operator.

21 In intellectual development the underlying manifold lies in sensible presentations and imaginative representations. In accord with the principle of correspondence, insights emerge to unify and correlate, to ground the formulation of unifications and correlations in concepts, thoughts, etc., and to give rise sooner or later to further questions. The conceptual construction itself is the higher system as integrator, while the emergence of further questions effects its transition into the operator.

22 Intellectual development enjoys an exceptional freedom from limitation and an exceptional control. Freedom from limitation, 494: ‘The higher system of the organism or of the psyche develops in an underlying material manifold of physical, chemical, cytological events that are subject to their own laws. The higher system of intelligence develops not in a material manifold but in the psychic representation of material manifolds. Hence the higher system of intellectual development is primarily the higher integration, not of the [person] in whom the development occurs, but of the universe that [he/she] inspects.’ Freedom from control, ibid.: ‘The organism or the psyche justifies the higher system it becomes by its pragmatic success. While the pragmatic criterion is employed by intelligence as well, still its availability commonly is confined to the short run and to superficial issues. The proper criterion of intelligence lies in its own capacity for critical reflection, for grasping the unconditioned, for determining the norms of investigations that are headed towards the unconditioned and therefore probable.’

23 In the human person, organic, psychic, and intellectual development are not three independent processes, but are interlocked. The intellectual provides a higher integration of the psychic, and the psychic a higher integration of the organic. Each level involves its own laws, its flexible circle of schemes of recurrence, its interlocked set of conjugate forms. Each set of forms stands in an emergent correspondence to otherwise coincidental manifolds on the lower levels. A single human action involves a series of components – physical, chemical, organic, neural, psychic, intellectual – and the components occur in accord with the laws and realized schemes of their appropriate levels. However, while physical and chemical laws are static, higher correlations pertain to system on the move. The heuristic structure of the study of this triply compounded development is complex. 495: ‘What the existentialist discovers and talks about, what the ascetic attempts to achieve in [himself/herself], what the psychiatrist endeavors to foster in another, what the psychologist aims at understanding completely, the metaphysician outlines in heuristic categories.’ There are six steps.

24 First, at any stage one is an individual, existing unity differentiated by physical, chemical, organic, psychic, and intellectual conjugates. The last three exhibit respective flexible circles of ranges of schemes of recurrence exhibited in one’s spontaneous and effective behavior, bodily movements, dealings with persons and things, the content of one’s speech and writing, etc. Experience shifts into diverse patterns depending on one’s interest, and the patterns ground differing relations among the levels of conjugates. See 495.
25 Second. this individual unity develops. Neural, psychic, and intellectual conjugates pertain to system on the move. Higher functioning changes lower manifolds, and changing manifolds evoke modified higher integrations. Development occurs along the line of least resistance, where it succeeds (the law of effect), but there is also an anticipated law of effect, so that one can guide one’s own development by judging that certain acts will set up the potency for higher integrations and other acts will inhibit that potency. 495-96: ‘… unless one asks the further questions, one remains with the insights one has already, and so intelligence does not develop; inversely, because one wants to develop, one can frequent the lectures and read the books that put the further questions and help one to learn. Again, one develops through functioning, and until one has developed, one’s functioning has the lack of poise, of economy, of effectiveness, that betrays as yet undifferentiated potentialities. Unless one is encouraged out of shyness, timidity, pretended indifference, to zest and risk and doing, to humility and laughter, one will not develop but merely foster the objective grounds for one’s feeling of inferiority. Rather, one will not develop along a certain more common line; one will seek and find less common fields in which to excel; and there one will be apt to overcompensate for deficiencies elsewhere.’

26 Third, there is a law of integration. The initiative of any given development may be organic, psychic, intellectual, or external, but it remains fragmentary unless the various levels correspond. This law of integration specifies what is meant by human development. Human development is no more than initiated when a new scheme of recurrence is established in one’s outward behavior, or one’s thinking and willing, or one’s perceptiveness and feeling, or in the organic and neural basis of one’s action. Complementary adjustments must take place on other levels. ‘… unless they are effected, either the initiated development recedes and atrophies in favor of the dynamic unity of the subject, or else that unity is sacrificed and deformed to make [one] a dumping ground for unrelated, unintegrated schemes of recurrence and modes of behavior’ (497).

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The class begins with a review of the first three laws of development (see p. 123 below, entitled ‘Laws of Human Development (review of 1-3).’)

27 Fourth, there is a law of limitation and transcendence. ‘On the one hand, development is in the subject and of the subject; on the other hand, it is from the subject as [one] is and towards the subject as [one] is to be’ (497). The subject as one is is a unity of laws, spontaneities, habits, schemes. Finality involves a change in the law, the spontaneity, the habit, the scheme. It introduces a new law, spontaneity, habit, scheme. Its direction is against our remaining as we are. While such a tension is inherent in the finality of all proportionate being, in us it becomes conscious, and quite complex. See 497-99, where there is introduced for the first time the theme of potential vicious circles in development, a theme that will become a symphonic emphasis by the end of chapter 18, where the dominant expression is ‘moral impotence.’ ‘Present perceptiveness is to be enlarged, and the enlargement is not perceptible to present perceptiveness. Present desires and fears have to be transmuted, and the transmutation is not desirable to present desire but fearful to present fear’ (497). ‘Because psychic development is so much more extensive and intricate in [us] than in other animals, it is involved in a more prolonged tension, and it is open to more acute and diversified crises’ (498). At a deeper level, the pure desire ‘reveals to [one] a universe of being in which
[one] is but an item, and a universal order in which [one’s] desires and fears, [one’s] delight and anguish are but infinitesimal components in the history of humankind. It invites [one] to become intelligent and reasonable not only in [one’s] knowledge but also in [one’s] living, to guide [one’s] actions by referring them, not as an animal to a habitat, but as an intelligent being to the intelligible context of some universal order that is or is to be. Still, it is difficult for [us], even in knowing, to be dominated simply by the pure desire, and it is far more difficult for [us] to permit that detachment and disinterestedness to dominate [one’s] whole way of life. For the self as perceiving and feeling, as enjoying and suffering, functions as an animal in an environment, as a self-attached and self-interested center within its own narrow world of stimuli and responses. But the same self as inquiring and reflecting, as conceiving intelligently and judging reasonably, is carried by its own higher spontaneity to quite a different mode of operation with the opposite attributes of detachment and disinterestedness. It is confronted with a universe of being in which it finds itself, not the center of reference, but an object coordinated with other objects and, with them, subordinated to some destiny to be discovered or invented, approved or disdained, accepted or repudiated’ (498). There is, then, on the side of the object, ‘the opposition between the world of sense of man [sic] the animal and, on the other hand, the universe of being to be known by intelligent grasp and reasonable affirmation.’ And on the side of the subject there is ‘the opposition between a center in the world of sense operating self-centeredly and, on the other hand, an entry into an intelligibly ordered universe of being to which one can belong, and in which one can function, only through detachment and disinterestedness’ (498). There is no way out of this tension and opposition. Neither pole can be neglected, at any point in one’s development, even though the content of each pole will change as one develops.

28 Fifth, there is a law of genuineness. It is a conditional and analogous requirement: conditional in that it arises only inasmuch as development occurs through consciousness; analogous, in that it may vary from the spontaneity of the simple and honest person to the genuineness that has to be won back from illusion and pretence. Leading up to discussing it, we may say the following: Every development involves a starting point in the subject as one is, a term in the subject as one is to be, and a process from the starting point to the term. The law of genuineness states first that conscious development involves some apprehension of the starting point, the term, and the process; these apprehensions may be correct or mistaken; and if they are correct, then all systems, conscious and unconscious, are operating from the same base along the same route to the same goal; but if they are mistaken, conscious and unconscious systems are at cross-purposes. So if a development is conscious, its success depends on correct apprehensions of the starting point, the process, and the goal. Now these apprehensions may be minimal or extensive. They are minimal when they involve little more than the succession of fragmentary and separate acts needed to carry out successive steps of the development with advertence, intelligence, and reasonableness. They become more extensive as one delves into the background, the context, the premises, the interrelations of the minimal series of conscious acts and subsumes them under empirical laws and philosophic theories of development. Moreover, these complex explorations themselves can go astray, and then things become even worse. Incorrect apprehensions, whether minimal or extensive, displace the tension of limitation and transcendence. The tension in its integrity is described on 501-502: ‘On the one hand, there is the subject as [one] is functioning more or less successfully in a flexible circle of ranges of schemes of recurrence. On the other hand, there is the subject as a higher system on the
move. One and the same reality is both integrator and operator; but the operator
is relentless in transforming the integrator. The integrator resides in successive
levels of interrelated conjugate forms that are more familiar under the name of
acquired habits. But habits are inertial. The whole tendency of present
perceptiveness, of present affectivity and aggressivity, of present ways of
understanding and judging, deliberating and choosing, speaking and doing is for
them to remain as they are. Against this solid and salutary conservatism,
however, there operate the same principles that gave rise to the acquired habits
and now persist in attempting to transform them. Unconsciously operative is the
finality that consists in the upwardly but indeterminately directed dynamism of all
proportionate being. Consciously operative is the detached and disinterested
desire raising ever further questions. Among the topics for questioning are one’s
own unconscious initiatives, their subsumption under the general order
intelligence discovers in the universe of being, their integration in the fabric of
one’s habitual living. So there emerges into consciousness a concrete
apprehension of an obviously practicable and proximate ideal self; but along with
it there also emerges the tension between limitation and transcendence; and it is
no vague tension between limitation and transcendence in general, but an
unwelcome invasion of consciousness by opposed apprehensions of oneself as
one concretely is and as one concretely is to be.’

29 Genuineness is the admission of that tension in its integrity into consciousness. Then
the conscious and unconscious components will be more apt to cooperate
harmoniously. 502: Genuineness ‘does not brush questions aside, smother
doctors, push problems down, escape to activity, to chatter, to passive
entertainment, to sleep, to narcotics. It confronts issues, inspects them, studies
their many aspects, works out their various implications, contemplates their
concrete consequences in one’s own life and in the lives of others. If it respects
inertial tendencies as necessary conservative forces, it does not conclude that a
defective routine is to be maintained because one has grown accustomed to it.
Though it fears the cold plunge into becoming other than one is, it does not dodge
the issue, nor pretend bravery, nor act out of bravado. It is capable of assurance
and confidence, not only in what has been tried and found successful, but also in
what is yet to be tried. It grows weary with the perpetual renewal of further
questions to be faced, it longs for rest, it falters and it fails, but it knows its
weakness and its failures, and it does not try to rationalize them’ or perpetuate
them.

29 Note that on 502-503 there appears again the theme that will emerge with increasing
importance: the ‘vicious circle’ that is broken by an emergent leap: ‘we cannot
become wise and discriminating without concentrating on the right questions, and
we cannot select those questions unless we already are wise and discriminating.’
The emergent leap is a creative response that meets the requirements of moral
precepts, of inner impulses, and of external circumstances. Eventually, we will
see the need for a source of detachment beyond the pure desire to know, an
existential source that underpins and sustains even the notion of being. This is the
first approximation to universal willingness, establishing the tension in a kind of
integrity prior to and conditioning correct apprehensions, to charity as the
condition of the integral dialectic of limitation and transcendence.

30 Sixth, there is the sanction of genuineness. ‘To fail in genuineness is not to escape
but only to displace the tension between limitation and transcendence. Such a
displacement is the root of the dialectical phenomena of scotosis in the individual,
of the bias of common sense, of basic philosophical differences, and of their prolongation in natural and human science, in morals and religion, in educational theory and history.’ Note that the displacement can occur in two directions (RD).
Chapter 16
Metaphysics as Science
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February 12, 2004, Part 2

Many of these individual points were skipped in class exposition.

1 Chapter 16 treats a series of questions raised by the six metaphysical elements. It does not offer a full metaphysics, but attempts to show the power of a method in a few areas. We will select the particular emphases that are most significant for the remainder of the book, while only touching on others.

2 The first item treated is the notion of distinction. The principal point that Lonergan is making here is that knowledge of any distinction is reached only in judgment, in the negative comparative judgment. ‘… any \( P \) and \( Q \) are distinct if it is true that \( P \) is not \( Q \).’ But that this is true is known only in judgment. It is not known by the prior occurrence of different acts of looking that, it seems, cannot be referred to the same object, for these components of knowledge prior to judgment are not complete as knowledge. ‘… before one denies that \( P \) is \( Q \), one must have evidence for denying; but having the evidence is one thing, grasping its sufficiency is another, and assenting to the denial is a third. Only in the act of judgment itself does one posit the absolute; only in positing the absolute does one know being’ (513).

3 Distinctions may be divided into notional, problematic, real, and mixed. Notional: \( P \) is not \( Q \), where \( P \) is merely an object of thought and \( Q \) is merely an object of thought – a centaur is not a unicorn. Problematic: \( P \) is not \( Q \), either or both have not been explained definitively, either or both may turn out to be mere objects of thought or both may prove to refer to the same reality. Real: \( P \) is not \( Q \), and both \( P \) and \( Q \) are real. Mixed: \( P \) is not \( Q \), one of them is real and the other notional.

4 Real distinctions are divided into major and minor. Minor: between the metaphysical elements of proportionate being. The issue here is on the disputed but essential question of the real distinction of essence and existence (Aquinas versus Suarez). Major: between things. Major real distinctions are divided into (1) numerical: different individuals of the same species; (2) generic: pertain to different genera; (3) specific: pertain to different species of the same genus. Real distinctions are also divided into (1) adequate: Peter and Paul, Peter’s left hand and right hand; (2) inadequate: Peter and his hands.

5 The second topic is relations. Here Lonergan’s principal point is that the relative component of any concrete relation (for example, quantitative proportion) is inseparable from its base in the conjugate form which it implicitly defines; and the secondary components (for example, the variable nonsystematic determinations, such as ‘twice’) are also explained by the metaphysical elements. The reality of a real relation is not distinct from the reality of its base; it is not
something added on as yet another metaphysical element. The whole structure of proportionate being is itself relational. Points 6 through 8 simply expand on this point.

6 Thus, in any pair of correlatives there is a relation $R$, its base $P$, its term $Q$, the converse relation $R'$, its base $Q$, and its term $P$. E.g., father-son. Relations may be (1) notional: merely objects of thought; (2) problematic: their affirmation occurs in a description or provisional explanation; (3) real: their affirmation would survive in a definitive explanatory account of the universe; (4) mixed: one correlative is real and the other notional.

7 The problem is to determine which relations would survive in a definitive explanation. Such relations involve two components: a primary relativity and secondary determinations. This distinction separates the systematic and the nonsystematic. The primary relativity of two quantitative things is a proportion. The secondary determinations are a numerical ratio (e.g., ‘twice’) and the two observable sizes. The primary relativity (such as proportion) is systematic. The secondary determinations (such as ‘twice’) are nonsystematic; what a proportion will be at any given time ‘will depend on the manifold of factors that form the nonsystematic pattern of a diverging series of conditions’ (515).

8 The distinction of primary relativity and secondary determinations also separates the relative from its absolute determinations. The primary relativity contains all the relativity of the relation. It is necessary and permanent, inseparable from its base in a thing of a determinate kind. The secondary determinations are contingent and subject to variation in accord with probabilities, where the variations change, not the primary relativity but the secondary determinations, not the relative but the absolute.

9 The primary relativity is contained in the general scientific law, and is inseparable from its base in the conjugate form which implicitly it defines. But to reach the concrete relation that holds at a given place and time, one must add further determinations that are contingent and drawn from a nonsystematic manifold. And metaphysically, as conjugate forms are defined by their relations to one another, so central forms are unités differentiated by their conjugate forms; and central and conjugate potency and act stand to central and conjugate forms as experience and judgment stand to understanding. The whole structure is relational: one cannot conceive the terms without the relations nor the relations without the terms. We have here a basic framework to be filled out, first, by the advance of the sciences, and secondly, by full information on concrete situations.

10 The relative component of a concrete relation, then, lies entirely within the list of metaphysical elements. Scientific laws and systems are successive approximations to the relations between conjugate forms. Scientific probabilities are approximations to the relations between forms and acts of existence and occurrence. The emergent processes investigated by genetic and dialectical
method contain the relations of successive levels of conjugate forms and the sequences of relations between successive stages in the development of conjugate forms.

11 There follows also the distinction of internal and external relations. 517: ‘Relations are said to be internal when the concept of the relation is intrinsic to the concept of its base; they are external when the base remains essentially the same whether or not the relation accrues to it.’ Thus not only do the relations reached in classical systems reveal the primary relativity, but also that primary relativity yields the internal relations. The component of contingent secondary determinations, that is, the external relations, will also survive in a definitive explanatory account of the universe. 519: ‘… concrete relations such as equality and similarity lie in the field of descriptive knowledge. Their metaphysical analysis supposes their transference to the explanatory field. Through such transference it appears that such relations are not simple entities but composite. They involve a component of primary relativity and a component of secondary determinations. The primary relativity is inseparable from its base, and for that reason all change is change in the base and only incidentally and consequently in the relativity. The secondary determinations are constitutive neither of the relation nor of its reality as relation but simply of the differentiation of concrete relations; and because that differentiation depends, not on the base alone but on the base and term together, it can vary without variation in the base.’

12 Finally, on this analysis the reality of a real relation is not distinct from the reality of its base. Whatever is grasped intelligently is never a term without relations or a relation without terms. What cannot be conceived cannot be affirmed, what cannot be affirmed cannot be. Moreover, ‘… the reality of proportionate being is embraced in its entirety by central and conjugate potencies, forms, and acts, so that there is no further really distinct element named relation’ (520). Rather, the structure is itself entirely relational.

13 Next there is the question of the nature of the metaphysical elements (§ 3.1). What are they? They do not possess any ‘What is it?’ of their own, but express the structure in which one knows what proportionate being is, the mold in which an understanding of proportionate being will flow. They regard proportionate being, not as understood, but only as to be understood. Thus, a corollary: If one wants to know just what forms are, one must turn to the sciences. But metaphysics works out for scientists the dynamic structure of their inquiries and of the universe they seek to know. Cognitional theory and metaphysics work on a second level, to work out the general structure of the contents of other results. Just as the metaphysician should not try to say just what various forms are, so the scientist should grasp the limitations of his/her competence.

14 Next, are the metaphysical elements cognitional or real, the structure in which proportionate being is known or the structure immanent in the reality of proportionate being? Are they notionally or really distinct? What is the relation
between knowing and reality? Begin by affirming the intrinsic intelligibility of being: being is what is to be known by understanding correctly, so that being is known completely when there are no further questions to be answered. Only on the counterposition is intelligibility said to be extrinsic to being.

15 Next, recognize that intelligibility is of different kinds: formal intelligibility is known inasmuch as one is understanding, the content of insight; potential intelligibility accrues to the materials for inquiry which the idea unifies and relates; actual intelligibility is known inasmuch as one grasps the virtually unconditioned, what in fact is. These differences of intelligibility are also intrinsic to being. Proportionate being is what is to be known by experience, understanding, and judgment. It is a compound of three distinct kinds of intelligibility. Thus potency, form, and act assign not merely the structure in which being is known but also the structure immanent in the very reality of proportionate being. Moreover, because there are conjugate and central formal intelligibilities, there are conjugate and central potency and act. In fact, now we may say that our knowledge begins with presentations, mounts to inquiry, understanding, and formulation, and ends with critical reflection and judgment, because its proportionate object is constituted by combining different types of intelligibility.

16 The same material may be put in the following steps:
   a. Being is what is to be known by understanding correctly, and so being is known completely when there are no further questions to be asked or answered.

   b. The materials for inquiry, then, are potentially intelligible.

   c. Understanding yields a formal intelligibility.

   d. Affirmation of that formal intelligibility, where being is known, yields an actual intelligibility.

   e. If proportionate being is what is to be known by experience, understanding, and judgment, then proportionate being is constituted by potential, formal, and actual intelligibility.

   f. So potency, form, and act are the structure immanent in proportionate being. Potency is potency for form, act is act of form. In fact, our knowledge begins with presentations, mounts to inquiry, understanding, and formulation, and ends with critical reflection and judgment, precisely because its proportionate object is constituted by combining different types of intelligibility.

   g. Again, if you accept that being is the objective of the pure desire to know, what is known by intelligent grasp and critical reflection, what is known by the totality of true judgments, you have already committed yourself at least implicitly to the immanent (and complete) intelligibility of being.
h. And if the real is being, then the real is completely intelligible.

17 Next, there is the question of metaphysical equivalence (3.3 and 3.4). **What are the relations between the metaphysical elements and the objects of true propositions?** Those relations are not grammatical or logical. Grammar and logic are considerations of the end products of cognitional process, i.e., of definitions and affirmations/negations, whereas metaphysical analysis, as concerned with the dynamic structure of cognitional process, is concerned not with nouns and verbs, subjects and predicates, or even terms and relations, but with the empirical residue from which understanding abstracts, with the content of the act of understanding itself, and with the virtually unconditioned grasped in the act that grounds and leads to judgment.

18 A first rule or canon of equivalence has to do with concreteness. It states (1) the reference of ‘potency,’ ‘form,’ and ‘act’ is exclusively to concrete potencies, forms, and acts, and so (2) true propositions, if abstract, must be transposed into concrete propositions, if we are to assign their metaphysical equivalent.

19 A second rule of equivalence has to do with explanatory formulation. It states (1) the metaphysical elements are defined through the anticipation of explanatory knowledge, and so (2) to assign the metaphysical equivalence of descriptive propositions, these propositions must be transposed into an explanatory form.

20 A third rule of equivalence has to do with structural transposition from logic to metaphysics, the recognition of the difference between them, and a readiness to face that difference if required to do so. True propositions contain affirmations and negations about subjects, and these have to be transposed into statements that present positions, distinctions, and relations in the universe of being. Logical analysis of a true proposition will not alone give its metaphysical equivalents.

21 Next is the question of the unity of the universe of proportionate being. Again, the metaphysical elements allow us to distinguish potential, formal, and actual unity. Actual: the immanent intelligible order of generalized emergent probability. Formal: the successive levels of conjugate forms setting up successive intelligible fields. Potential: grounded in conjugate prime potency, the merely coincidental conjunctions and successions brought under intelligible control through the successive levels of forms and schemes.

22 Next is the question of the unity of a concrete being. The real problem here is that the concrete being is one and its metaphysical constituents are many. The metaphysical elements are distinct, but they are also one: potency is potency to form, and form is the form of act; potency is capacity to come under law, form is being under law, and act is according to law; just as one and the same reality is known by experience, understanding, and judgment, so one and the same reality is constituted by potency, form, and act. Moreover, central and conjugate form (and so potency and act) are equally the many components of a single reality.
23 If potency, form, and act exist, are unities, are individual, and can be defined, why is it not true that each of them also is composed of potency, form, and act, and so on indefinitely? Because potency is known by experience, form by understanding, and act by judgment; it is not the case that potency is known by experience, understanding, and judgment; that form is known by experience, understanding, and judgment; that act is known by experience, understanding, and judgment.

24 Our images of potency, form, and act are merely symbolic. Explaining and explained do not lie within the field of the imaginable, but imaginable and imagining lie within the field of explaining and explained. Moreover, to be cannot mean to be in space or time. It is just to be. This shift helps us get beyond the pseudo problems connected with imagination.

25 Next there is the problem of the unity of the human person. We are one yet both material and spiritual. One: individual by central potency, one in nature by central form, existing by central act. From the physical through the chemical, biological, and psychological to the intellectual, otherwise coincidental manifolds of lower conjugate acts are rendered systematic by conjugate forms on a higher level. But while intellectual conjugate forms are the higher system of sensitive living, they are so both unreflectively (through grounding the patterns of sensitive experience) and reflectively by grasping the intelligible systems relevant not only to sensitive living but also to the universe and attaining knowledge of ourselves within our knowledge of the universe and willing the execution of our function in that universe. This duality of control gives rise to the contrast between the intelligible and the intelligent. Intelligibility that is not intelligent is material, while intelligibility that is intelligent is spiritual. Inasmuch as we are material, we are constituted by otherwise coincidental manifolds of conjugate acts that spontaneously are reduced to system by higher conjugate forms, but inasmuch as we are spiritual we are oriented to the universe of being, know ourselves within that universe, and guide our living by that knowledge.

26 Such a grasp is descriptive. To move to explanation: Besides the correspondence between the material intelligibility that is understood and the spiritual intelligibility that is understanding, there is a difference, and it lies in the fact that spiritual intelligibility abstracts from, and so is apart from, the empirical residue, while material intelligibility is not without the empirical residue. And since the metaphysical equivalent of the empirical residue is prime potency and the empirical residue is the ground of materiality, prime potency is also prime matter. Matter is what does not and cannot occur or exist apart from the empirical residue, what is constituted by or conditioned intrinsically by the empirical residue. Thus conjugate potencies, forms, and acts on the physical, chemical, organic, and psychic levels are material, and since central forms are differentiated by their conjugates, the corresponding central forms are material, as are the corresponding central acts. But the spiritual is neither constituted nor conditioned intrinsically by the empirical residue. Not constituted: insofar as we are
understanding, we are abstracting from the empirical residue; insofar as we are
judging, we attain the rational factualness that is quite other than the brute
factualness of experience of the empirical residue. Not conditioned intrinsically:
the conditioning is extrinsic, since understanding abstracts from the empirical
residue and reflective understanding grasps the unconditioned in the conditioned
fulfilment of conditions for a prospective judgment.

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27 We are material, then, by physical, chemical, biological, and psychological
conjugates, and spiritual by intellectual conjugates. But we are intelligibly one,
where the unity is grounded in central form. From a descriptive point of view,
our central form seems to be the point of transition from the material to the
spiritual. But in the explanatory view, where the question is whether our central
form is conditioned intrinsically by the empirical residue, we can see that if it
were it could not be the intelligent center and ground of inquiry and insight,
reflection and judgment. But if it were spiritual, it could still be the center and
ground of physical, chemical, organic, and sensitive conjugates, for if it can
embrace the universe, it surely can provide the center and ground of unity in the
material conjugates of a single person. And if it is spiritual, it could be separated
from prime potency without ceasing to ground an existing unity and identity.

28 The conclusions at which Lonergan has arrived rest on a strategy of breakthrough,
encirclement, and confinement. Breakthrough: inquiry, insight, formulation,
reflection, grasp of the unconditioned, and judgment are necessary conditions of
our knowing, without which we can be neither intelligent nor reasonable, and to
which we have a positive and effective inclination. Encirclement: latent and
operative prior to all determinations of being there is the objective of the desire to
know, an objective to be reached only through intelligent grasp and reasonable
affirmation, the notion of which objective is assumed in all our inquiry and
reflection, is implicit in the breakthrough, and embraces all views. Confinement:
unless I identify the real with this objective, my statements will be
counterpositions destined for reversal.

29 See the last several paragraphs of the chapter for a clue to much of what lies behind
Lonergan’s motivation in working out such a method for metaphysics.
February 26, 2004, Part 1 (continued)

1 Chapter 17 comes full circle on chapter 14. Recall that there the basic problem in philosophy was said to be the multiplicity of views. Recall, too, that any philosophy can contribute to a clarification of the basic fact of the polymorphism of human consciousness. Now Lonergan adds that philosophers after Hegel must have a method that accounts not only for their own views but also for those of others. We must develop a philosophy of philosophies. The two statements are related: so Lonergan will account for the views of others by setting up a genetic and dialectical process from the notion of being to the potential totality of ordered viewpoints and successive expressions, a process that is rendered possible because of the polymorphism of consciousness. The chapter will offer an alternative to Hegel’s ‘process from the concept of being to the Absolute Idea’ (242). What for Hegel is a process from the concept of being (a concept that Hegel had) to the Absolute Idea alienating and then realizing itself is for Lonergan a process from the notion of being that we all are to the ‘universal viewpoint,’ which is a potential and thoroughly heuristic totality of genetically and dialectically related viewpoints. Note that the first and last sentences of the chapter refer to Hegel: the questions that he set are the questions being addressed in this chapter. (RD: It is my view that the chapter is a landmark statement in hermeneutics whose importance and meaning has yet to be appreciated even by most Lonergan students.)

2 The basic statement is the following: ‘... any philosophy, whether actual or possible, will rest upon the dynamic structure of cognitional activity either as correctly conceived or as distorted by oversights and by mistaken orientations’ (553). This theorem will not only allow a view of a general similarity of structure between assumptions regarding knowledge and assumptions regarding the known, but also, when it is coupled with appropriate scholarly techniques of interpretation and history, it will yield specific understanding of precise problems peculiar to particular places and times, and of the responses particular philosophers have made to them. This combination is what Lonergan will call the scissors action of an upper and a lower blade. His concern here is with the upper blade. His claim is that his cognitional analysis provides ‘a single base of operations from which any philosophy can be interpreted correctly’ (554). The combination of the two ‘blades’ transposes the issue of act and content from abstract deduction (isomorphism) to concrete historical process. And it does this as a part of metaphysics, its ‘dialectical aspect’ (554). Hegel’s philosophy is a metaphysics of the alleged Absolute Idea; Lonergan’s alternative is a metaphysics that includes an ontology of meaning: see chapter 19 of Theology and the Dialectics of History, an extended reflection on the chapter title ‘Metaphysics as Dialectic.’ For one instance of the ontology of meaning, for which Lonergan was still groping here, see 558, on finality in the realm of meaning.
First, then, there is offered a genetic and dialectical account of the prephilosophic utterances of symbolic thought, here called mystery and myth, and of the necessary survival, even after explicit metaphysics has been achieved, of symbols of the known unknown. (Later ‘myth’ would be rephrased as ‘symbolic expressions of counterpositions’ and ‘mystery’ as ‘symbolic expressions of positions.’) To grasp the significance of such expression, begin with the experience of the known unknown and the sense of the unknown (555): because our questions outnumber our answers, we know of an unknown through our unanswered questions. By the principle of correspondence relate otherwise coincidental manifolds on the psychic level to higher integrations on the intellectual level, acknowledging that because each level is system on the move, it is not only an integrator but also an operator; thus there must be a correspondence between their respective operators. If the intellectual operator is the desire to know oriented into the known unknown, the corresponding psychic operator must be ‘some cosmic dimension, some intimation of unplumbed depths,’ some psychic sense of being that accrues to our feelings, emotions, sentiments.

Next, by the same principle of correspondence, there will be on the psychic level two spheres of variable content, namely, the familiar and the strange. ‘Mystery’ and ‘myth’ find their primary field in the affect-laden images of the unexplored and strange, in the image as symbol linked with the known unknown and as sign linking the image with some interpretation.

Such interpretations are a manifold: religious, antireligious, humanistic, naturalistic, neurotic, psychotic. The issue is, Where is finality heading? since the sense of the unknown is a psychic resonance to the upwardly but indeterminately directed dynamism of proportionate being of which the psychic and intellectual operators are particular dimensions. The answers to this question are countless. Lonergan does not treat them yet, since they demand the introduction of the question as to whether all being is proportionate being. But a philosophy that has reached explicit self-knowledge and metaphysics should be able to comment on mystery and myth as present realities associated with finality, and especially on their relation to the finality exhibited in the very emergence of explicit metaphysics.

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There is a long history to the genesis of both self-knowledge and explicit metaphysics. Mystery and myth belong to it. Do they vanish with this achievement? Do they belong only to the time of latent and problematic metaphysics, where there are lacking (1) ‘the appropriate set of conceptual definitions and linguistic expressions in which the triply conscious subject could convey to himself and to others what it is to be a human knower and what such knowing implies in the known’; (2) ‘the cultural milieu habituated to the use of abstract concepts and trained in the techniques that safeguard their employment’; (3) ‘a critical awareness of the polymorphism of human consciousness, of the
alternative formulations of discoveries as positions or as counterpositions, of the
momentum of positions for development and of the goal of counterpositions in
reversal”; (4) ‘knowledge of all that is lacking’? (559) Or are they permanent
possibilities?

7 The absence of adequate self-knowledge, in the limit, is mythic consciousness, and
myth is a consequence of mythic consciousness just as metaphysics is a corollary
of self-knowledge. ‘Mythic consciousness experiences and imagines, understands
and judges, but it does not distinguish between these activities, and so it is
incapable of guiding itself by the rule that the impalpable act of rational assent is
the necessary and sufficient condition for knowledge of reality. For it, the real is
the object of a sufficiently integrated and a sufficiently intense flow of sensitive
representations, feelings, words, and actions’ (561). That was real, man! This is
especially true when ‘unanalyzed consciousness is orientated into the strange
realm of the “known unknown.”’ Then for mythic consciousness what is real in
this realm is known by the vividness of images and the intensity of feeling.

8 Thus, without a distinction between insight and presentations, one is apt to attribute
explanatory power to presentations and their associated feelings and emotions.
We do the same in our own anthropomorphic projections onto nature (563) and
subjective projections onto other people (563-64). And without a firm grasp of
the heuristic character of human intelligence, anticipation of insight can pass for
insight itself, and partial insight for mastery.

9 Myth and metaphysics, then, are opposites, with myth receding and metaphysics
advancing as self-knowledge advances. They are related dialectically. But myth
has a permanent basis in polymorphic consciousness, and so there is a permanent
task of overcoming it by metaphysics. See 567: ‘... outside the field of
philosophy, there is the problem of human development that arises with each new
generation. Because [people] do not develop intellectually or, if they do, because
they become involved in counterpositions, they cannot be dealt with on the basis
of intelligence and reason; but this makes it all the easier to deal with them on the
sensitive level, to capture their imaginations, to whip up their emotions, to lead
them to action. Power in its highest form is power over [people], and the
successful maker of myths has that power within his reach and grasp. But,
clearly, if an adequate metaphysics can do something to overcome philosophic
misinterpretations of the notion of myth, it needs to be extended into a philosophy
of education, and the education has to be made effective before there can be
exorcized the risk of adventurers climbing to power through sagacious
mythmaking.’

10 There is, however, a correspondence on the psychic level to the known unknown on
the intellectual level. Lonergan calls it ‘mystery.’ It cannot be eliminated from
human living, both because there always is the further question and because
explanation does not give us a home: our ‘explanatory self-knowledge can
become effective in [our] concrete living only if the content of systematic
insights, the direction of judgments, the dynamism of decisions can be embodied in images that release feeling and emotion and flow spontaneously into deeds no less than words’ (570). Even the achievement of full understanding and the attainment of the totality of correct judgments would not free us from the necessity of dynamic images that partly are symbols and partly are signs: mysteries. For the contemporary relevance of the compound category of mystery and myth (and a summary of what has been said thus far in the chapter) see 571-72: ‘Because human understanding and judgment, decision and belief, are the higher integration of sensitive contents and activities, the origin, the expression, and the application of intelligent and rational contents and directives lie in the sensitive field. Because the integrating activities of the intellectual level and the integrated activities of the sensitive level form a dialectical unity in tension, it follows (1) that the intellectual activities are either the proper unfolding of the detached and disinterested desire to know or else a distorted unfolding due to the interference of other desire, and (2) that the sensitive activities from which intellectual contents emerge, and in which they are represented, expressed, and applied, either are involved in the mysteries of the proper unfolding or distort these mysteries into myths. Because [we develop] in self-knowledge, [we distinguish] between [our] sensitive and intellectual activities with increasing sharpness and exactitude and [grasp] with ever greater precision their interrelations and interdependence; and so [our] advance in self-knowledge implies an increasing consciousness and deliberateness and effectiveness in [our] choice and use of dynamic images, of mottos and slogans. Finally, this advance implies, not any rationalist sublation of both mystery and myth, but simply a displacement of the sensitive representation of spiritual issues. Because counterpositions head to their own reversal and myths are grounded in counterpositions, sooner or later every myth is discredited. Because [we] cannot renounce intelligence or repudiate reasonableness, every occasion on which a myth is discredited is also an opportunity for [us] to advance towards a profounder self-knowledge, a more exact grasp of science and metaphysics, and a more conscious use of mystery purified of myth. Because the union of sensitive and intellectual activities is a unity of opposites in tension, because the dominion of the detached and disinterested desire constantly is challenged, the elimination of one myth tends to coincide with the genesis of another, and the advance of science and philosophy implies merely that the later myths will be complemented and defended by appropriate philosophies and made effective through the discoveries of science and the inventions of technology.

‘So we are brought to the profound disillusionment of [modernity] and to the focal point of [its] horror. [We] had hoped through knowledge to ensure a development that was always progress and never decline. [We have] discovered that the advance of human knowledge is ambivalent, that it places in [our] hands stupendous power without necessarily adding proportionate wisdom and virtue, that the fact of advance and the evidence of power are not guarantees of truth, that myth is the permanent alternative to mystery and mystery is what [our] hybris rejected.’
March 4, 2004, Part 1 begins with the introductory page below (138). Then the class moved to 12 andc 15 here.

11 The key issue in this discussion is truth, so Lonergan moves on to a discussion of the criterion of truth, the definition of truth, the ontology of truth, the relation between truth and expression, and the appropriation of truth. The next section (for next week) will treat the truth of interpretation.

12 Regarding the criterion of truth, distinguish the proximate and remote criterion. The proximate criterion is reflective grasp of the unconditioned, which yields an absolute objectivity that establishes a public or common terrain through which different subjects can and do communicate and agree. The remote criterion, necessitated by the inevitable context of other acts and contents, is the proper unfolding of the pure, detached, and disinterested desire to know. Negatively, this means the absence of interference from other desires. The positive discussion entails distinguishing the following: infallibility and certitude, certainty and probability, ideal and actual frequency. Lonergan begins with the last of these distinctions.

13 Actual frequency is reached by counting occurrences and occasions. Ideal frequency is a numerical ratio from which actual frequencies diverge only non-systematically. Both may be affirmed, and the affirmation may be certain or probable. Thus, while judgments are occurrences with actual frequencies and while their ideal frequencies can be determined, the ideal frequency of a judgment is one thing and its probability another. The probability and certainty of judgments pertain to their content. If it coincides with what is grasped as virtually unconditioned, it is a certainty. But what is grasped as virtually unconditioned may be that a content heads toward the virtually unconditioned, and then the content is a probability. Thus every judgment rests on a grasp of the virtually unconditioned, and the probability of a probable judgment is a certainty.

14 There also is a sense of probability reached by contrasting infallibility with a certitude that admits degrees. Have I been genuine in my inquiry and reflection, or is my grasp of the virtually unconditioned vitiated by bias? I place myself in doubt, and every effort to remove the doubt proceeds from the same suspect source. At this point I am concerned with the remote criterion. Am I fleeing the personal commitment involved in judgment? Am I just temperamentally inclined to anxiety? Do I enjoy a habitual and actual disinterestedness and detachment in my cognitional activities? Am I willing to call upon the judgments of others? ‘...certitude may be strengthened by the agreement of others, and this strengthening will vary with the numbers of those that agree, the diversity of their circumstances, the consequent virtual elimination of individual and group bias, and the absence of any ground for suspecting general bias’ (574). There are limiting structures that carry their own guarantee, and to call them into question is self-defeating. Thus I have some foothold against general bias. But only if the
remote criterion were to become completely clarified, either in fact or more radically in principle, would certitude reach infallibility.

15 The definition of truth: If knowing is true by its relation to being, then truth is either the identity of knower and known or the correspondence of my affirmations and negations to what is and is not.

16 The ontology of truth: Conversely, the intrinsic intelligibility of being, its conformity to the conditions of its being known through intelligent inquiry and critical reflection, is the truth of being, ontological truth. Intrinsic intelligibility = being = unity = ontological truth = the good (next chapter).

17 What is the relation between truth and expression? Four points: (1) There is an isomorphism of knowledge and expression. ‘... as affirmative or negative utterance, the expression corresponds to reflection and judgment. As a significant combination of words, the expression corresponds to insight and conception. As an instrumental multiplicity, the expression corresponds to the material multiplicity of experience and imagination’ (576). (2) But this isomorphism is not an identity. ‘It is one thing to assert and another to judge, for men can lie. It is one thing to understand experience and another to hit upon the happy and effective combination of phrases and sentences. It is one thing to be rich in experience and another to be fluent with words’ (577). (3) Nonetheless, knowledge and expression interpenetrate, for at each stage in cognitional process it helps to formulate both what has been reached and what remains to be sought. Expression enters into the process of learning, and the attainment of knowledge tends to coincide with the attainment of the ability to express it. There is, then, a solidarity, almost a fusion, of the development of knowledge and the development of language. (4) Yet communication between people with different habitual accumulations of insights and so different intellectual development emphasizes the distinction between knowledge and expression. Properly speaking, expression is not true or false but instrumental, related to the truth of knowledge and to the moral truth of the will to communicate. Properly speaking, expressions are merely adequate or inadequate. Their adequacy is a function not only of their correspondence with the knowledge to be communicated but also of the contexts and deficiencies of those to whom the knowledge is to be communicated. And it varies with the complexity of the knowledge and of these contexts and deficiencies. ‘... human expression is never complete expression. It keeps its eye on the central meaning; it expedites subordinate and peripheral meanings by lowering standards of adequacy to a sufficient approximation to the purpose in hand’ (580). See 580-81 regarding counterpositions; they are quite basic, and still prevalent (e.g., ‘cultural-linguistic’ approaches, which are nothing but contemporary Scotism). This section comes closest, perhaps, to Lonergan’s treatment of what Habermas calls communicative competence.

18 Appropriation of truth, making it one’s own, is cognitional, volitional, and sensitive. Cognitional: this is the essential appropriation of truth, and it sets us the threefold
problem of (1) learning, gradually acquiring the accumulation of habitual insights that constitute a viewpoint, and moving from lower to ever higher viewpoints; (2) identification of the elements to be unified or related by insight, so that one possesses the insight as one’s own and is assured in one’s use of it and familiar with the range of its relevance, and so able to teach; and (3) orientation, fidelity to the desire to know and its criteria of reality and objectivity, grasping ‘(1) that every issue closes when we can say definitively, “It is so,” or “It is not so,”’ (2) that the objective of knowing is being, (3) that, while being is a protean notion, still its content is determined by intelligent grasp and reasonable affirmation and, after affirmation, by nothing else’ (583). These three problems run parallel, respectively, to understanding, experience, and reflection. And they are solidary: see 584, ‘One cannot go far’ to end of paragraph.

19 Volitional appropriation of truth is our willingness to live up to it, and sensitive appropriation is an adaptation of our sensibility to the requirements of our knowledge and our decisions. Cognitional appropriation of truth is solidary with volitional and sensitive appropriation. See 584-85. And note that Lonergan is here playing again the theme of a vicious circle in our development that will become so important in chapters 18 and 20.
March 4, 2004, Part 1 (continued)

1 What, then, is truth in interpretation? Is it possible? How is it determined? What are its criteria? How does the historical sense avoid individual, group, and general bias? How does it avoid relativism? The basic problem of interpretation is put both simply and in a more complex fashion on pp. 585-87. Simply, the problem is that, while any simple interpretation may be correct, while it may hit off for a contemporary audience the principal insight communicated by the original document, and while the interpreter may know the interpretation is correct, still the historical sense is open to individual, group, and general bias (and dramatic as well), and also is not capable of assigning exact and convincing reasons for its verdicts. But ‘… if interpretation is to be scientific, then the grounds for the interpretation have to be assignable; if interpretation is to be scientific, then there will not be a range of different interpretations due to the individual, group, and general bias of the historical sense of different experts; if interpretation is to be scientific, then it has to discover some method of conceiving and determining the habitual development of all audiences, and it has to invent some technique by which its expression escapes relativity to particular and incidental audiences’ (587).

2 Note the difference between the hermeneutic and historical theory offered here and the positions on interpretation and history presented in Method in Theology. In Insight it is more or less taken for granted that scholars, by long familiarity with the documents and monuments of another age and by an increasing accumulation of complementary insights, can arrive at a participation of the common sense of another period, and know how the men and women of that time would or would not speak or act, and what they would do, in certain types of situation. The emphasis in Insight is on ‘scientific interpretation’ as described above in § 1, that is, on assigning a method that would enable an account that explains how and to what extent an interpretation escapes complete relativity to time and place. In Method in Theology, the emphasis is just the reverse. In the chapters on both interpretation and history, Lonergan is concerned with the dynamics of grasping or approaching the virtually unconditioned in these ‘functional specialties,’ and not with the more transcendental considerations that are offered in Insight. In my own view, both emphases are necessary.

3 The key to ‘scientific interpretation’ lies in (1) the notion of a universal viewpoint and (2) the levels and sequences of expression. A universal viewpoint is the ‘method of conceiving and determining the habitual development of all audiences,’ the ‘technique by which … expression escapes relativity to particular and incidental audiences.’ The universal viewpoint is ‘a potential totality of genetically and dialectically ordered viewpoints’ (587). First, it is a potential totality. ‘A universal viewpoint is not universal history. It is not a Hegelian dialectic that is complete apart from matters of fact. It is not a Kantian a priori that in itself is determinate and merely awaits imposition upon the raw materials of vicarious experience. It is simply a heuristic structure that contains virtually all the various ranges of possible alternatives of interpretations; it can list its own contents only through the stimulus of documents and historical inquiries; it can select between alternatives and differentiate its generalities only by appealing to the accepted norms of historical investigation’ (588).
Secondly, it is a totality of viewpoints, i.e., of habitual accumulations of insights. Its concern is with meaning, not with expression: the principal acts of meaning that lie in the insights and judgments of others. (Focus on expression is found in such disciplines as phonetics, comparative grammar, lexicography, linguistic and stylistic analysis.) How does it reach the principal acts of meaning, the insights and judgments of others? By directing attention not to the ‘external sources of historical interpretation,’ to ‘spatially ordered marks on paper or parchment,’ but to the experience, the understanding, and the critical reflection of the interpreter ... there are ... sources of interpretation immanent in the historiographer ..., in [one’s] ability to work backwards from contemporary to earlier accumulations of insights in human development, in [one’s] ability to envisage the protean possibilities of the notion of being, the core of all meaning, which varies in content with the experience, the insights, the judgments, and the habitual orientation of each individual’ (588). What does this mean? Jump for a moment to 590: ‘... in the measure that one grasps the structure of this protean notion of being, one possesses the base and ground from which one can proceed to the content and context of every meaning. In the measure that one explores human experience, human insights, human reflection, and human polymorphic consciousness, one becomes capable, when provided with the appropriate data, of approximating to the content and context of the meaning of any given expression.’

Thirdly, it is an ordered totality, and its order is both genetic and dialectical. ‘It [the universal viewpoint] has its base in an adequate self-knowledge and in the consequent metaphysics. It has a retrospective expansion in the various genetic series of discoveries through which [we] could advance to [our] present knowledge. [RD: cf. F. Crowe’s major sweep of the differentiation of consciousness: Plato-Aristotle (second level), Aquinas (third level), Kierkegaard (fourth level), Lonergan (uniting the levels).] It has a dialectical expansion in the many formulations of discoveries due to ... polymorphic consciousness ..., in the invitation issued by positions to further development, and in the implication in counterpositions of their own reversal. Finally, it can reach a concrete presentation of any formulation of any discovery through the identification in personal experience of the elements that, as confused or as distinguished and related, as related under this or that orientation of polymorphic consciousness, could combine to make the position or counterposition humanly convincing’ (589). RD: compare how we try to locate through ‘identification in personal experience’ what Lonergan himself is talking about.

Yet the ordering of viewpoints is also potential in the universal viewpoint, and what is ordered becomes more specific, more differentiated, more precise, and more under the monitoring of an explicit method, as one’s own development goes forward and as history reaches some degree of cultural advance. The developments are nuanced: ‘... the dialectical oppositions are not simply the clear-cut identifications of the real either with being or with the “already out there now,” of the objective either with the intelligent and reasonable or with elementary extroversion, of knowledge either with inquiry and critical reflection or with the look that is prior to all questions; on the contrary, such extremes tend to merge in the ambivalence of the aesthetic, the dramatic, and the practical patterns of experience, to give rise to questions that not only are unsolved but also inadequately conceived, to make their clearest appearance not in the field of knowledge but rather in the volitional tension between moral aspiration and practical living’ (589).
7 The universal viewpoint is universal not by abstractness but by a potential completeness that arises from the ‘underlying necessities’ of the interpreting subject. 590: ‘There are no interpretations without interpreters. There are no interpreters without polymorphic unities of empirical, intelligent, and rational consciousness. There are no expressions to be interpreted without other similar unities of consciousness. Nor has the work of interpreting anything more than a material determinant in the spatially ordered set of marks in documents and monuments. If the interpreter assigns any meaning to the marks, then the experiential component in that meaning will be derived from [his/her] experience, the intellectual component will be derived from [his/her] intelligence, the rational component will be derived from [his/her] critical reflection on the critical reflection of another. Such are the underlying necessities, and from them springs the potential completeness that makes the universal viewpoint universal’ (590).

8 590: ‘To approach the same issue from another angle, the core of meaning is the notion of being, and that notion is protean. Being is (or is thought to be) whatever is (or is thought to be) grasped intelligently and affirmed reasonably. There is, then, a universe of meanings, and its four dimensions are the full range of possible combinations (1) of experiences and lack of experience, (2) of insights and lack of insight, (3) of judgments and of failures to judge, and (4) of the various orientations of the polymorphic consciousness of [human beings]. Now in the measure that one grasps the structure of this protean notion of being, one possesses the base and ground from which one can proceed to the content and context of every meaning. In the measure that one explores human experience, human insights, human reflection, and human polymorphic consciousness, one becomes capable, when provided with the appropriate data, of approximating to the content and context of the meaning of any given expression.’

9 Obviously, then, Lonergan is proposing that his own cognitional theory can ground this potential totality of genetically and dialectically related viewpoints that he names a universal viewpoint. 591: ‘... a universal viewpoint is the potential totality of all viewpoints; the potential totality of all viewpoints lies in the dynamic structure of cognitional activity; and the dynamic structure of cognitional activity is the basis of the particular philosophy in question.’ It is not, of course, a universal language, nor is it immune from even vast improvements. But they will not entail any radical revision. 591: ‘... more refined accounts of the elements in the structure modify, not the potential totality, but the accuracy and completeness with which one can proceed from the universal viewpoint to the reconstruction of particular contents and contexts of meaning.’

10 Besides the universal viewpoint, a theory of interpretation needs an account of levels and sequences of expression, not in terms of language or style, but in terms of meanings. Different levels of expression are rooted in different sources of meaning in the speaker or writer and in the hearer or reader. 592: ‘the expression may have its source (1) simply in the experience of the speaker, as in an exclamation, or (2) in artistically ordered experiential elements, as in a song, or (3) in a reflectively tested intelligent ordering of experiential elements, as in a statement of fact, or (4) in the addition of acts of will, such as wishes and commands, to intellectual and rational knowledge. In turn, the hearer or reader may be intended to respond (1) simply on the experiential level in an intersubjective reproduction of the speaker’s feelings, mood, sentiments, images, associations, or (2) both on the level of experience and on the level of insight and consideration, or (3) on the three levels of experience, insight, and judgment, or
(4) not only on the three cognitional levels but also in the practical manner that includes an act of will.’ As expression becomes specialized, the intended response becomes more manifest. See 592-93: ‘Advertisers and propaganda ministries aim at psychological conditioning; they desire neither adequate insight nor detached reflection nor rational choices but simply the establishment of types of habituation, familiarity, association, automatism, that will dispense with further questions. In contrast, literary writing would convey insights and stimulate reflection, but its mode of operation is indirect … if there is no frontal attack on the reader’s intelligence, there is the insinuation of insights through the images from which they subtly emerge. If there is no methodical summing up of the pros and cons of a judgment, there is an unhurried, almost incidental, display of the evidence without, perhaps, even a suggested question.

‘Direct concern with the reader’s understanding appears in scientific writing … Direct concern with the reader’s judgments emerges in philosophic writing.’

11 This distinction of levels of expression grounds not an actual but a potential classification of expressions. Further differentiations and nuances are possible, and the interpreter remains free to exercise subtlety in determining a writer’s sources of meaning and intention. Yet it does prevent one from assuming that all expression originates from and is directed to a single level.

12 Expressions also exhibit sequences, in which development moves from the undifferentiated to the differentiated, from the generic to the specific, from the global and awkward to the expert and precise. Specialized modes of expression have evolved. Working out types of expression is a matter, not of assigning static classifications, but of determining the operators that relate the classifications relevant to one level of development to the classifications relevant to the next. (In Theology and the Dialectics of History, I speculated that the most pertinent operators are the exigences that establish distinct realms of meaning: systematic, critical, methodical: see Method in Theology 81-85.) Realize, too, the difficulty experienced by an artistic, scientific, or philosophical innovator. Established modes of expression are insufficient, yet the new mode has not yet evolved. Then ‘the type of expression, so far from providing a sure index to the level of meaning, originally was an impediment which the writer’s thought could not shake off, and now easily can become a misleading signpost for the unwary interpreter’ (595).

March 4, 2004, Part 2

13 In the method of interpretation, the potential totality of meanings and the potential totality of modes of expression constitute the upper blade of generalities that are determined in their specificity by the lower-blade techniques of scholars. (RD: Another way of putting a point made earlier is that in Insight Lonergan is more concerned with the upper blade, and in Method with the methods of the lower blade.) The upper blade ‘has two components, which respectively regard meaning and expression. Both components are concretely universal, for they regard the potential totality of meanings and the potential totality of modes of expression. For the totality of meanings, the upper blade is the assertion that the protean notion of being is differentiated by a series of genetically and dialectically related unknowns. For the totality of modes of expression, the upper blade is the assertion that there is a genetic process in which modes of expression move towards their specialization and differentiation on sharply distinguishable levels’ (600-601). 601: ‘… if a correct interpretation is possible,
it has to be possible (1) for interpreters to proceed from their own experience, understanding, and judgment to the range of possible meanings of documents, and (2) for them to determine which of the possible meanings are to be assigned to each of the documents. Unless they can envisage the range of possible meanings, they will exclude a priori some meanings that are possible; and such exclusion runs counter to the possibility of correct interpretation. Again, unless they can connect possible meanings with actual documents, interpretation again becomes impossible. But the possibility of envisaging the full range of possible meaning lies in the universal viewpoint, and the possibility of connecting possible meanings with particular documents lies in the genetic sequence that extrapolates from present to past correlations between meaning and mode of expression.'

14 What are the ultimate results that may be anticipated from proceeding in this way? There are immanent sources of meaning in each of us: (1) approximately reproducible human experience on all levels, (2) orientated under approximately reproducible blends and mixtures of the biological, aesthetic, dramatic, practical, intellectual, and mystical patterns of experience, (3) informed by the unities, distinctions, and relations grasped by accumulations of insights, and (4) actuated by sets of certain and probable acts of assent and dissent’ (602). From the immanent sources of meaning in oneself the interpreter proceeds to assign the materials a determinate differentiation of the notion of being, whether in the contents of single judgments or in the contexts constituted by more or less coherent aggregates of judgments. These are ‘pure formulations,’ though, that then need to be transposed into the equivalent content that would proceed from the viewpoint of the author one is studying: the ‘hypothetical expression.’ For example, if a pure formulation of Aristotelian documents would state that the core insights have to do with intelligibility in the material, the hypothetical expression would transpose that pure formulation, which is given in terms of the first two levels of consciousness, into an approximate expression that would envision how Aristotle himself in his own situation would formulate his positions. The hypothetical expression must square with the actual expression, the totality of assumptions regarding resources of expression has to satisfy the genetic sequence of modes of expression, and the totality of pure formulations of contexts has to satisfy a genetic and dialectical unfolding of intelligence. For ‘interpretation aims at differentiating the protean notion of being by a set of genetically and dialectically related determinations ... if [one’s] understanding is correct, it will provide a differentiation of the protean notion of being, and it will provide no more’ (604). ‘... a methodical hermeneutics demands an open acknowledgment by the interpreter of his immanent sources of interpretation, of his formulation from a universal viewpoint of his hypothesis on the context and content of another’s meaning, of his process from that pure formulation to the hypothetical expression, and of the introduction of multiple controls that check interpretations not only individually against documents but also as members of a totality with common or interrelated assumptions’ (606-607). A pure instance of what Lonergan is talking about would probably be the movement from Plato (differentiation of the second level of consciousness from the first) through Aristotle (clarification of the second level) to Aquinas (differentiation of the third level) to Kierkegaard (differentiation of the fourth level). All four levels, of course, are operative all along the line, but differentiation takes place in accord with the emergent probability of meaning.

15 The counterpositions here will envision ‘as close an approximation as possible to a reconstruction of the cinema of what was done, of the soundtrack of what was said, and even of the Huxleyan “feelie” of the emotions and sentiments of the
participants in the drama of the past ... there is no verifiable cinema of the past nor any verifiable soundtrack of its speech. The available evidence lies in spatially ordered marks in documents and on monuments, and the interpreter’s business is not to create nonexistent evidence but to understand the evidence that exists. Finally, if [one’s] understanding is correct, it will provide a differentiation of the protean notion of being, and it will provide no more. The artist and the teacher, no doubt, will endeavor to reconstitute the sights and sounds, the feelings and sentiments, that help us to recapture the past; but such recapture is educative; it makes ascent to the universal viewpoint possible; it prepares us for an understanding, an appreciation, an execution, of scientific interpretation; but in itself it is not science’ (604).

16 Again, the counterpositions will regard not only the marks but also the meanings to be ‘out there,’ ‘… there is nothing “out there” except spatially ordered marks; to appeal to dictionaries and to grammars, to linguistic and stylistic studies, is to appeal to more marks. The proximate source of the whole experiential component in the meaning of both objective and subjective interpreters lies in their own experience; the proximate source of the whole intellectual component lies in their own insights, the proximate source of the whole reflective component lies in their own critical reflection’ (605).

17 The canons of a methodical hermeneutics summarize the position already put forth. First, there is a canon of relevance: begin from the universal viewpoint and determine some specific differentiation of the notion of being. Second, there is a canon of explanation: relate to one another the contents and contexts of the totality of documents and interpretations, genetically, dialectically, and in terms of levels and sequences of expression. Third, there is a canon of successive approximations: there must be a division of labor, and the labor must be cumulative, and we can judge the satisfactoriness of others’ contributions to the extent that we are in possession of the universal viewpoint, know ourselves, grasp genetic and dialectical links in development, grasp as well the genetic sequence of modes of expression and the recurrent gap between meaning and expression, and rely on the virtually unconditioned as the criterion of truth: ‘… The question … is not how many people say [an interpretation] is obvious, nor how great is their authority and renown, but simply what is the evidence’ (612). Fourth, there is a canon of parsimony: (1) exclude from consideration the unverifiable; (2) grasp and invoke the resources of critical reflection, to ascertain the sufficiency or insufficiency of the evidence and nuance your judgments accordingly. Fifth, there is a canon of residues: ‘Just as the field of physics contains a nonsystematic component, so also do the fields of meaning, of expression as related to meaning, of expression as grounded in dynamic constellations of the writer’s psyche, and of documents in their origins, their production, and their survival’ (613).

18 What is the meaning of the last two sentences of the chapter, the significance of bounding the chapter by references to Hegel? How is this chapter metaphysics? It is an ontology of meaning.
March 11, 2004, Part 1 (continued)

Before getting into these notes, treatment was given to the difference between the treatment of ethics in *Insight* and that of *Method in Theology*.

1 Can ethics too be conceived as an implementation of the integral heuristic structure of proportionate being, that is, of the structure affirmed in chapter 11? This is the ‘fundamental question of the present chapter’ (618). Three steps are needed to answer such a question: (1) an account of the good, will, value, obligation — through § 8 in these notes; (2) an account of freedom and responsibility as grounding the possibility of ethics (§§ 9-19); and (3) the need for moral liberation if we are to be effectively free. The chapter does not propose to offer a code of ethics, a set of precepts, but the general form of such codes.

2 The account of the good, will, value, obligation yields a method of ethics that parallels the method of metaphysics; it yields also a cosmic or ontological account of the good. Being, then, is not only intelligible and one but also good. This becomes clear by extending our concerns beyond intellectual activity to deliberation, decision, choice, will, and thus grasping another isomorphism of structures. Thus the good can be located on the three levels of (1) the object of desire, corresponding to experience, (2) the good of order, corresponding to insight and intellectual development, and (3) value, corresponding to reflection and judgment, deliberation and choice. (1) The good that is the object of desire, when attained, is experienced as pleasant, enjoyable, satisfying, and is coupled with the object of aversion, the bad. (2) But the desire to know is not content with satisfaction. Its criterion is an unconditioned that is independent of the individual’s likes and dislikes. The good of order that it generates is not the object of any single desire, for it orders single desires, restricts them, yet secures an otherwise unattainable abundance of satisfactions. The good of order is system on the move, with a normative line of development: insight—proposal—agreement—execution—new situation—new insight, etc. This development is marred by the biases, which introduce countermoves, etc., that divert our energies and display the need for the attainment of the higher viewpoint, beyond common sense, of culture and morality. (3) The question of value arises when the social constructions of intelligence are in competition and force us to single out some possibilities and reject others. To understand these activities we must consider ‘the conjugate potency, form, and act of will, willingness, and willing’ (621). (These together constitute what soon after *Insight* was to be called a fourth level.)

3 Will is spiritual appetite, a *capacity* to respond to objects presented by intellect. It is informed by a habitual inclination, specialized in certain directions, called willingness. This *form* (will, as capacity, is potency) antecedently disposes us to decisions and choices of determinate kinds. ‘... a person that has not acquired
willingness needs to be persuaded before [he/she] will will, yet once willingness is acquired leaps to willing without any need of persuasion’ (621-22). The act of willing is the event revealed directly: ‘To know willingness, one must study the frequencies with which various objects are chosen by a given individual over a given period; and to know will, one must study the changes in such frequencies over a lifetime’ (622).

4 Willing, the act, is based on our intelligent grasp of practical possibilities for transforming our environment and our own spontaneous living. Our living ‘exhibits an otherwise coincidental manifold into which [we] can introduce a higher system by [our] own understanding of [ourselves] and [our] own deliberate choices. So it is that the detached and disinterested desire extends its sphere of influence from the field of cognitional activities through the field of knowledge into the field of deliberate human acts. So it is that the empirically, intelligently, rationally conscious subject of self-affirmation becomes a morally self-conscious subject’ (622). Thus willing is both rational and moral. We are not only knowers but also doers, and because the same intelligent and rational consciousness grounds the doing and the knowing, there is an inevitable exigence for self-consistency in knowing and doing. This exigence is the meaning of the word ‘ought.’

5 It is difficult to meet this exigence, to allow detachment and disinterestedness not only to govern knowing but also to permeate living. We try to avoid this exigence by (1) avoiding self-knowledge, (2) revising our knowing into harmony with our doing — rationalization, and (3) moral renunciation. Yet the exigence to extend detachment into living remains, and it is in this ‘rational self-consciousness’ that we discover the good as value, that is, the good of order precisely as the possible object of rational choice. Values are: (1) true or false: true insofar as the possible choice is rational, false insofar as it results from one of the ways of avoiding the moral exigence; (2) terminal or originating: terminal insofar as they are objects for possible choices, originating insofar as choosing them changes us, our habitual willingness and orientation, our contribution to the dialectical process of progress or decline; and (3) actual, in process, or in prospect insofar as they are realized, in the course of being realized, or merely under consideration. They also are ordered by a scale (see 624-25 and compare the far more elaborate scheme presented in Method and developed into a theory of society in Theology and the Dialectics of History.)

6 The exigence for self-consistency unfolds into a body of ethical precepts as human beings ask what that exigence concretely entails in particular situations. The parallel and interpenetration of metaphysics and ethics follows. 626: ‘... just as the dynamic structure of our knowing grounds a metaphysics, so the prolongation of that structure into human doing grounds an ethics. Just as the universe of proportionate being is a compound of potency, form, and act, because it is to be known through experience, understanding, and judgment, so the universe of [our] proportionate good is a compound of objects of desire, intelligible orders, and
values, because the good that [we do] intelligently and rationally is a manifold in the field of experience, ordered by intelligence, and rationally chosen. Just as metaphysics is a set of positions opposed by sets of counterpositions that arise from the incomplete domination in knowing of the detached and disinterested desire to know, so also values are true and false, orders are troubled by disorders, and desires are unnecessarily frustrated, because the detachment and disinterestedness of the pure desire easily fails to develop into fully rational self-consciousness. Just as the counterpositions of metaphysics invite their own reversal by their inconsistency with intelligent and reasonable affirmation, so the basically similar counterpositions of the ethical order, through the shorter and longer cycles of the dialectic of progress and decline, either enforce their own reversal or destroy their carriers. Just as the heuristic structure of our knowing couples with the generalized emergent probability of the proportionate universe, to reveal an upwardly directed dynamism of finality towards ever fuller being, so the obligatory structure of our rational self-consciousness (1) finds its materials and its basis in the products of universal finality, (2) is itself finality on the level of intelligent and rational consciousness, and (3) is finality confronted with the alternative of choosing either development and progress or decline and extinction.' Again, (627-28): ‘... ethical method, as metaphysical, can take subjects as they are; it can correct any aberration in their views by a dialectical criticism; and it can apply these corrected views to the totality of concrete objects of choice. Such a method not only sets forth precepts but also bases them on their real principles, which are not propositions or judgments but existing persons; it not only sets forth correct precepts but also provides a radical criticism for mistaken precepts; it is not content to appeal to logic for the application of precepts, for it can criticize situations as well as subjects, and it can invoke dialectical analysis to reveal how situations are to be corrected; finally, because such a method clearly grasps an unchanging dynamic structure immanent in developing subjects that deal with changing situations in correspondingly changing manners, it can steer a sane course between the relativism of mere concreteness and the legalism of remote and static generalities; and it can do so, not by good luck nor by vaguely postulating prudence, but methodically, because it takes its stand on the ever recurrent dynamic generality that is the structure of rational self-consciousness.’

7 These relations between metaphysics and ethics enable us to conceive the good as identical with the intelligibility intrinsic to being. ‘... the potential good is identical with potential intelligibility and so includes but also extends beyond objects of desire, ... the formal good is identical with formal intelligibility and so includes but also extends beyond human intelligible orders, ... the actual good is identical with actual intelligibilities and so includes but also may extend beyond human values’ (628, and see the next paragraph for the extension beyond the human order).

8 The claim is made on 629-30 that the identification of the good and the intelligible is not an easy optimism that minimizes pain and suffering. We should note,
however, the still narrow role accorded to feelings in the moral order; this is an area of major change in the later work. And see the main paragraph on 630 for the discussion.

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9 If such is the structure that explains the notions of will and choice, it remains that the structure is an abstraction if people are not free. The discussion of freedom moves the possibility of ethics towards concreteness, in two steps: (1) we are essentially free (section 2), and (2) our effective freedom is more or less limited, and so we are in need of liberation (section 3).

10 Essential freedom is established in several steps. First, if the canon of statistical residues is in fact true, it makes possible an account of the autonomy of successive departments of science that excludes a determinism of the higher by the lower, and it excludes a deductive determinism in either the higher or the lower. Thus, while it does not imply the freedom of our choices, at least it disposes of some arguments against the possibility of freedom.

11 Still, the positive account of freedom arises from examining the act of will and its cognitional antecedents. Only if these antecedents do not determine the act of will is this act free. (This was essentially the problem of freedom for Aquinas.) The first element to be considered is the underlying sensitive flow. There are acts that occur through mere sensitive routine. Only insofar as the possibility of imposing higher integrations upon lower coincidental manifolds has been realized does there arise the question of any free choice.

12 Next, there is the practical insight. It differs from the speculative or factual insight in that the latter is followed by the question whether the unity exists or the correlation governs events, while the practical insight is followed by the question whether the unity is going to be made to exist or the correlation is going to be made to govern events. Speculative and factual insights lead to knowledge of being, practical insights to the making of being. Their objective is not what is but what is to be done. This means that the reflective understanding following upon a practical insight does not grasp a virtually unconditioned (at least in the same sense as what we have considered up to now: Lonergan is inconsistent in his language here), for then the content of the insight would be already a fact.

13 Next, then, there is the nature of practical reflection. Examples are given on 633-34: One may raise questions about the object and its alternatives and consequences, about motives for the course of action, about whether it fits into the given order and if not, why not, about one’s habitual willingness. Corollaries are: (1) the reflection is an actuation of rational self-consciousness, i.e., I am concerned with reasons for my own acts as I scrutinize the object and investigate the motives. (2) While it heads beyond knowing to doing, still in itself it is still knowing. ‘... it is one thing to know exactly what could be done and all the reasons for doing it. It
is quite another for such knowledge to issue in doing’ (634). (3) As practical, it has no internal term, no capacity of its own to come to an end, for the end is beyond the knowing, since it is a knowing that leads to doing. Its term is external: the reflection is just knowing, but the term is an ulterior deciding and doing. (4) Thus the reflection can expand more or less indefinitely. (5) But I can also advert to this possibility and know that I have to get on with the business of living. Still, even this is still just knowledge. ‘... it is one thing to know what I should do, and it is another to do it’ (635). (6) Only decision will enforce the norm for the duration of the reflection. The normal duration of reflection is inverse to my antecedent knowledge and willingness, and once these are satisfied, only decision will end the reflection. ‘... once I have decided and as long as I remain decided, the reflection is over and done with. The proposed course of action has ceased to be a mere possibility; it has begun to be an actuality’ (635).

14 Decision is an act of willing, with the internal alternatives of either consenting or refusing. It resembles judgment in that (1) it selects one member of a pair of contradictories, (2) it is concerned with actuality (though in a different way), and (3) it is rational, in that it deals with objects apprehended by insight and it occurs because of a reflective grasp of reasons. But decision’s concern is to confer actuality on a course of action that does not yet exist.

15 Thus the rationality of decision differs radically from that of judgment. ‘Judgment is an act of rational consciousness, but decision is an act of rational self-consciousness. The rationality of judgment emerges in the unfolding of the detached and disinterested desire to know in the process towards knowledge of the universe of being. But the rationality of decision emerges in the demand of the rationally conscious subject for consistency between [one’s] knowing and [one’s] deciding and doing. Again, the rationality of judgment emerges if in fact a reasonable judgment occurs, but the rationality of decision emerges if in fact a reasonable decision occurs. Finally, the effective rationality of the subject of rational consciousness is radically negative, for then the subject is effectively rational if [one] does not allow other desire to interfere with the functioning of the pure desire to know; but the effective rationality of the subject of rational self-consciousness is radically positive, for then the subject is effectively rational only if [one’s] demand for consistency between knowing and doing is followed by [one’s] deciding and doing in a manner consistent with [one’s] knowing.’

16 Decision, then, is yet a further enlargement of consciousness, where the already empirically, intelligently, and rationally conscious subject demands conformity of doing to knowing and accedes to that demand. Only in this enlargement beyond judgment does practical reflection come to an end. (This is the closest Lonergan comes in Insight to implying a fourth level.)

17 The meaning of obligation emerges once I judge that I ought to act in a certain way, that I cannot both be reasonable and act otherwise, that my reasonableness is bound to the act by a link of necessity.
Yet this necessity turns out to be *contingence* because of a change in context. In the context of rational consciousness it is a necessity, but in the context of rational self-consciousness it is an exigence. ‘... one cannot be a rational knower and deny the obligation, and one cannot be a rational doer and not fulfil the obligation. But one can be a rational knower without an act of willing, and one cannot be a rational doer without an act of willing. It is the addition of the further constitutive requirement of an act of will that (1) marks the shift from rational consciousness to rational self-consciousness, and (2) changes what is rational necessity in the field of knowing into rational exigence in the larger field of both knowing and doing’ (638).

Freedom is bound up with this contingence of the act of will. Freedom is a special kind of contingence. It ‘arises, not from the empirical residue that grounds materiality and the nonsystematic, but in the order of spirit, of intelligent grasp, rational reflection, and morally guided will. It has the twofold basis that its object is merely a possibility and that its agent is contingent not only in existence but also in the extension of ... rational consciousness into rational self-consciousness’ (642). Freedom, negatively, excludes necessity, but positively it imposes responsibility. ‘... though the act of will is a contingent emergence, it also is an act of the subject; the measure of the freedom with which the act occurs also is the measure of [one’s] responsibility for it’ (642).

Talk about the measure of one’s freedom introduces the issue of the operational range of this essential freedom. We are *effectively* free in the measure that our dynamic structure is *open* to grasping, motivating, and executing a broad or a narrow range of otherwise possible courses of action. Our effective freedom may be limited by (1) external circumstance, (2) the subject’s psychoneural state, (3) limitations of the subject’s intellectual development, and (4) the subject’s antecedent willingness. Lonergan is not yet sufficiently aware of the power of psychic interference. But on (3) and (4): ‘... the function of willingness runs parallel to the function of the habitual accumulation of insights. What one does not understand yet, one can learn; but learning takes time, and until that time is devoted to learning, otherwise possible courses of action are excluded. Similarly, when antecedent willingness is lacking, persuasion can be invoked; but persuasion takes time, and until that time is devoted to persuading oneself or to being persuaded by others, one remains closed to otherwise possible courses of action’ (646). Moreover, ‘unless one’s antecedent willingness has the height and breadth and depth of the unrestricted desire to know, the emergence of rational self-consciousness involves the addition of a restriction upon one’s effective freedom’ (646). Essential freedom is given. Effective freedom has to be won. ‘The key point is to reach a willingness to persuade oneself and to submit to the persuasion of others. For then one can be persuaded to a universal willingness; so one becomes antecedently willing to learn all there is to be learnt about willing and learning and about the enlargement of one’s freedom from external constraints and psychoneural interferences. But to reach the universal willingness
that matches the unrestricted desire to know is indeed a high achievement, for it
consists not in the mere recognition of an ideal norm but in the adoption of an
attitude towards the universe of being, not in the adoption of an affective attitude
that would desire but not perform but in the adoption of an effective attitude in
which performance matches aspiration’ (646-47). And also the key question (cf.
our discussion of vicious circles in development), How is one to be persuaded to
genuineness and openness, when one is not yet open to persuasion? (647)

21 The restrictions that arise on effective freedom from incomplete intellectual and
volitional [and affective] development constitute moral impotence. One’s moral
impotence is measured by the gap between the effective freedom one actually
possesses and the effective freedom one would possess if these conditions of
intellectual and volitional development were fulfilled. It is not grasped with
perfect clarity, but it is also not totally unconscious. 650: ‘… if one were to
represent a [person’s] field of freedom as a circular area, then one would
distinguish a luminous central region in which [the person] was effectively free, a
surrounding penumbra in which [the person’s] uneasy conscience keeps
suggesting that [one] could do better if only [one] would make up [one’s] mind,
and finally an outer shadow to which [the person] barely if ever adverts. Further,
these areas are not fixed; as [one] develops, the penumbra penetrates into the
shadow and the luminous area into the penumbra while, inversely, moral decline
is a contraction of the luminous area and of the penumbra.’ Wrongly interpreted,
consciousness of moral impotence can lead one to moral renunciation. Correctly
interpreted, it heightens the tension between limitation and transcendence: our
living is a developing, we are not to be discouraged by our failures, but profit
from them, etc.

22 This inner tension and ambivalence are reflected and heightened in the social sphere,
where there is the same demand for consistency, but where group and general bias
will vitiate common decisions and lead to conflicts. The most significant
opposition is that set up by general bias between intelligent and reasonable
decisions and those actually made. 651-52: ‘… the social situation is the
cumulative product of individual and group decisions, and as these decisions
depart from the demands of intelligence and reasonableness, so the social
situation becomes, like the complex number, a compound of the rational and
irrational. Then if it is to be understood, it must be met by a parallel compound of
direct and inverse insights, of direct insights that grasp its intelligibility and of
inverse insights that grasp its lack of intelligibility. Nor is it enough to understand
the situation; it must also be managed. Its intelligible components have to be
couraged towards fuller development; and its unintelligible components have to be
hurried to their reversal.’

23 The essential problem is an incapacity for sustained development. It is radical,
located in the very dynamic structure of cognitional, volitional, and social
activity; it is permanent, since development and tension pertain to human nature;
it is independent of the underlying manifolds for it lies in the structure of the
higher integration; its root is not social, nor is the answer a correct philosophy, ethics, or human science, nor the ‘counsel of despair’ (654) of force. The solution has to be a higher integration of human living (not just in the mind) that takes people just as they are and works through their intelligence and reasonableness and freedom. Has it emerged? Does it exist? The question of transcendent knowledge must be raised before we investigate our ulterior finality, the extension of the upwardly but indeterminately directed dynamism of emergent probability.
The question of God arises in *Insight* from the fact of evil. There are no resources in the realm of proportionate being to meet our incapacity for sustained development. There are needed further conjugate forms that are given by a reality that transcends the realm of proportionate being. And if there is such a higher integration of human living, it will be known only through a knowledge that goes beyond the types of knowledge that we have seen thus far in the book, but also continuous with the other forms in its basic characteristics. One of those characteristics is the distinction between a heuristic structure and its determinations. Here that would mean first determining what we can and do know about transcendent being prior to the attainment of an act of understanding that grasps what transcendent being is. (Lonergan said later that he should have begun here with religious experience.)

The problem of evil thus gives rise to the question of transcendence. Transcendence is going beyond, raising further questions. We have been doing it all along, but now we need to raise the question of the absolute limit of the process of going beyond. 658: ‘… inquiry, insight, and formulation … go beyond [the content of sensible experience] … reflection, grasp of the unconditioned, and judgment … go beyond [objects of supposing, defining, considering] to the universe of facts, of being … one can go beyond [knowing things as related to us] to join the scientists in searching for knowledge of things as related to one another. One can go beyond both common sense and present science, to grasp the dynamic structure of our rational knowing and doing, and then formulate a metaphysics and an ethics. Finally, one can ask whether human knowledge is confined to the universe of proportionate being or goes beyond it to the realm of transcendent being; and this transcendent realm may be conceived either relatively or absolutely, either as beyond [us] or as the ultimate in the whole process of going beyond.’

Within the context of cognition, that ultimate limit in the process of going beyond would be the idea of being. Thus the first step in the philosophy of God is a mental exercise whereby we extrapolate from proportionate being to think about the unrestricted act of understanding and the idea of being that is its content. Extrapolation is common in mathematics (infinity, limit) and physics (absolute zero of temperature), so there is no reason to call it per se peculiar. Moreover, we do it in everyday living when we extrapolate from our past through the present to the alternative ranges of the future in order to grasp and affirm, accept and execute our own developing; we can extrapolate not only to future recurrences of past events, but also to future higher integrations of contemporary unsystematized manifolds, of which there will always be some.
4 If the ultimate limit in the process of going beyond is the idea of being, the immanent source of cognitive transcendence is the pure desire to know. This desire is unrestricted. This does not mean that our understanding is unrestricted or that the correctness of our understanding is unrestricted. Nor does it mean that the attainment of understanding will ever be unrestricted. Nor does it mean that in a wisely ordered universe the attainment of understanding even *ought* to be unrestricted. Desire for attainment does not entail exigence for attainment unless our universe is one of static horizontal strata, where tendencies and desires natural and spontaneous on any level have to be confined to that level. To say that the desire is unrestricted is simply to say that we want to understand completely. No question whatever is to be met arbitrarily. Every question is to be submitted to the process of intelligent grasp and critical reflection. Moreover, the objective of the desire is itself unrestricted. For that objective is being, and apart from being there is nothing. And a desire with an unrestricted objective is an unrestricted desire.

5 We are concerned now with human knowledge of transcendent being, that is, of being that does not lie within the domain of our outer and inner experience. Before we can grasp transcendent being intelligently, we have to extrapolate from proportionate being. The extrapolation is concerned with concepts about transcendent being, with objects of supposing, defining, considering, and so as yet no question of existence arises. The question that leads to the extrapolation is, What is being? Distinguish: (1) the pure notion of being, (2) the heuristic notion of being, (3) restricted acts of understanding, conceiving, and affirming being, and (4) the unrestricted act of understanding being.

6 (1) The pure notion of being is the detached, disinterested, unrestricted desire to know. (2) The heuristic notion of being is ‘whatever is to be grasped intelligently and affirmed reasonably.’ (3) The pure desire, precisely as intelligent and reasonable, restricts itself to one question at a time, and so there are restricted inquiries, restricted acts of understanding and conceiving, reflection on such conceptions, and judgments about particular beings and particular domains of being. (4) But only an unrestricted act of understanding can meet the issue, What is being? Knowledge of what being is cannot be had in anything less than an act of understanding everything about everything. Only the content of an unrestricted act of understanding can be the idea of being. The idea of being is the content of an unrestricted act of understanding. And the idea of being is absolutely, not relatively, transcendent, assigning the ultimate limit in the process of going beyond.

7 All we can do to answer the question, What is the idea of being? is to set up heuristic procedures whereby we can say what we would know if we did grasp it. This is the extrapolation, proceeding on the side of the subject from restricted to unrestricted understanding, and on the side of the object from the structure of proportionate being to the transcendent idea of being.
8 First, then, since an idea is the content of an act of understanding, and since being is the objective of the unrestricted desire to know, the idea of being is the content of an unrestricted act of understanding.

9 Apart from being, there is nothing, so the idea of being is the content of an act of understanding that leaves nothing to be understood, no further questions to be asked; and so it is absolutely transcendent, the absolute limit in the process of going beyond.

10 Being is completely universal and completely concrete, and so the idea of being is the content of an act of understanding that grasps everything about everything, with nothing implicit or obscure or indistinct (for then there would be further questions).

11 Being is intrinsically intelligible, what can be intelligently grasped and reasonably affirmed, and so the idea of being is the idea of the total range of intelligibility.

12 The good is identical with intelligibility, and so the idea of being is the idea of the good.

13 The unrestricted act is one act. Otherwise it would be an aggregate or succession of acts. If none of these was the understanding of everything about everything, then the denial of unity would be the denial of unrestricted understanding. If any was the understanding of everything about everything, at least that unrestricted act would be a single act, and there would be no need for another act.

14 The idea of being is one idea. If it were many, they would be related intelligibly or not. If so, they would be intelligibly one, and so one idea. If not, there would not be one act but many. But we have seen that the unrestricted act is one act.

15 The idea of being is (1) one, but of many, (2) immaterial, for intrinsically independent of the empirical residue, but of the material, for it is unrestricted. Similarly, it is nontemporal (not developing) but of the temporal, and nonspatial but of the spatial.

16 A distinction can be drawn between a primary and a secondary component in the idea of being, for the one is not identical with the many, the immaterial with the material, the nontemporal with the temporal, the nonspatial with the spatial. So, because in the one idea there are grasped many beings, because in the immaterial, nontemporal, nonspatial idea there are grasped the material, the temporal, and the spatial, there must be a primary component grasped inasmuch as there is a single act, and a secondary component grasped inasmuch as the primary component is understood. 669: ‘... the total range of beings is understood inasmuch as the one idea of being is grasped.’
17 Again, approach the question from the standpoint of the notion of ‘intelligible.’

‘Intelligible’ denotes (1) what is or can be understood, and (2) more profoundly, the primary component in an idea, as root or ground of (1). (1) can be understood without understanding understanding, but (2) is identical with the understanding, and so cannot be understood without understanding understanding. Therefore, the primary component in the idea of being is the unrestricted act of understanding. For if an unrestricted act is unrestricted, it understands understanding. It understands not only restricted acts but also the unrestricted act; understanding the unrestricted act, it must understand its content, or otherwise its understanding would be restricted; but its content is the idea of being, and so if the unrestricted act understands itself (primary component), it thereby understands everything else (secondary component).

18 Instead of the primary and secondary components, then, distinguish a primary and secondary intelligible. The primary intelligible is the unrestricted act of understanding, the secondary intelligibles are what also are grasped inasmuch as the unrestricted act understands itself, namely, everything else.

19 The existence of the nonsystematic does not render this impossible, because from the viewpoint of unrestricted understanding, the nonsystematic vanishes; it would vanish for us, too, if we had an unlimited period of time to determine all the many diverging sets of conditions, for concrete patterns of diverging series of scattering conditions are each intelligible; but the unrestricted act is nontemporal, yet knows all the temporal conditions, for it understands everything about everything.

20 Does the unrestricted act of understanding exist? The answer emerges by adding to what we have already seen an understanding of causality. Causes are either external or internal. Internal causes are central and conjugate potency, form, and act. External causes are efficient, final, and exemplary. If these principles of external causality have a general validity in being, we will be led sooner or later to affirm a first agent, a last end, and a primary exemplar of the universe of proportionate being, and to identify the efficient and final cause with the unrestricted act of understanding, and the exemplary cause with the idea of being that is the content of the unrestricted act.

21 The principles of external causality are of general validity. This can be argued in four steps. (1) Being is intelligible, what is to be known by intelligent grasp and reasonable affirmation. (2) What is apart from being is nothing, and so what is apart from intelligibility is nothing. (3) Thus there can be no mere matters of fact without explanation; if existence is mere matter of fact, it is nothing; if occurrence is mere matter of fact, it is nothing; if it is a mere matter of fact that we know and that there are to be known classical and statistical laws, genetic operators and their dialectical perturbations, explanatory genera and species, emergent probability and upward finalistic dynamism, then both the knowing and the known are nothing. (4) One cannot confine human knowledge within the domain of proportionate being without condemning it to mere matters of fact without
explanation, and so stripping it of knowledge not only of transcendent but also of proportionate being. For we do not know until we judge, our judgments rest on a grasp of the virtually unconditioned, and the virtually unconditioned is a conditioned that happens to have its conditions fulfilled; if that happening is not to be mere matter of fact without explanation, and so nothing, a further question arises. So, too, every proportionate being is in its every aspect a virtually unconditioned. Its conditions happen to be fulfilled. If that happening is ultimate, it is a mere matter of fact without explanation, and so either it is not being and so nothing, or being is not intelligible. (5) Thus knowledge of transcendent being cannot be excluded if there is proportionate being, and if being is intelligible. This transcendent being must not be contingent in any respect, for again there would be mere matter of fact without explanation. And this transcendent being must be able to ground the explanation of everything about everything, or else it would leave unsolved the problem of contingency in proportionate being.

22 It is in such grounding that we grasp the general validity of external causality. Efficient causality does not consist simply in the necessity that conditioned being becomes virtually unconditioned only if its conditions are fulfilled. The real requirement is that, if conditioned being is, it has to be intelligible, and cannot be or exist or occur merely as matter of fact without explanation. Infinite regress and schemes of recurrence do not meet this requirement, for they are aggregates of mere matters of fact, and so do not assign an efficient cause for intelligible but conditioned being. Only a being without any conditions that can ground the fulfilment of conditions for everything else will do. If proportionate being exists, and if it is intelligible, there must be such an unconditioned being.

23 Exemplary causality: if there are conditioned beings, there also is the fulfilling of their conditions, and if there are no mere matters of fact without explanation, conditions cannot be fulfilled simply at random. All must be fulfilled in accord with some exemplar; the exemplar of the universal fulfilment of conditions is the idea of being; the idea of being is the content of an unrestricted act of understanding; the unrestricted act is itself the primary intelligible in the idea of being; so there must be an exemplary cause that as idea of being can ground the intelligibility of the pattern in which the conditions are or would be fulfilled. But the idea of being is the content of an unrestricted act of understanding, which itself is the primary component in the idea of being. Therefore the unrestricted act of understanding must exist. Complete intelligibility thus exists, the intelligibility that is the root or ground or key of intelligibility in the ordinary sense – that act of understanding that, in this case, understands everything about everything.

24 Final causality: if there is one actual order of the universe, and if it stands within being and so is intelligible and not mere matter of fact, it is a value, and so the object of a rational and free choice. Here, in the acknowledgment that the universe emerges from a rational and free choice on the part of the unrestricted act
of understanding, contingency and arbitrariness are overcome at their deepest level.

25 To summarize: if the real is being, and if being is completely intelligible, there must exist a transcendent being not contingent in any respect, and capable of grounding the explanation of everything about everything. But the unrestricted act of understanding alone meets these specifications, and so it must exist.

March 18, 2004, Part 2

26 Further properties of the unrestricted act of understanding are deduced in section 9, linking the unrestricted act with the Thomist notion of God. Et hoc est quod omnes vocant Deum. We can list several points here, but must leave other details to your questions, since we cannot cover everything. So: the unrestricted act is by identity the primary intelligible. It is invulnerable as understanding, and it knows itself as such, grasping itself as unconditioned, correct, and true, and so is the primary truth. Because being is what is known by correct understanding, the unrestricted act knows itself as being, and as primary intelligible is also the primary being. That primary being is, as unrestricted, perfect in being, and the primary good, identical with the primary intelligible. It perfectly understands itself as unrestricted understanding and primary intelligible; it perfectly affirms itself as primary truth; and it perfectly loves itself as primary good. And all of these are one act, since the primary being, as in act, does not need further acts to complete itself. It is at once unrestricted understanding and primary intelligible, reflective understanding and unconditioned, perfect affirming and the primary truth, perfect loving and the primary good. As not dependent on anything else, it is self-explanatory and unconditioned, and so, if it exists, it is necessary, not contingent. There can be only one, and it is simple, and does not admit the compositeness of central and conjugate forms, or of potency and form, or of form and act. It is timeless, eternal. The secondary intelligibles, as what is to be understood if the primary intelligible is understood, are conditioned, and so distinct from the primary intelligible. They may be mere objects of thought, or they may exist. The primary being is the omnipotent efficient cause, the omniscient exemplary cause, and free: if contingent beings exist, they exist in virtue of the freedom of unrestricted understanding and perfect affirming and perfect loving. The primary being does not develop, and so the unrestricted act understands and affirms and wills contingent beings to be, without any increment or change in its own reality. Every contingent predication concerning God also is an extrinsic denomination: God is intrinsically the same whether or not God understands, affirms, wills, causes this or that universe to be. And though the extrinsic denominator is temporal, the contingent predication concerning God can be eternal. If it is true that God understands, affirms, wills the existence of any contingent reality, the metaphysical conditions of the truth are the existence of God and the existence of the contingent reality in question; moreover, though the contingent reality in question is temporal, still God eternally understands, affirms, and wills that contingent reality to exist for that period of time. God would be the
creator. Even the empirical residue of individuality, of the continuum, of particular places and times, and of the nonsystematic divergence of actual frequencies, while unexplained by the particular sciences, partly are understood in cognitional theory and metaphysics and ultimately are accounted for by God’s creative decision. God would also be the conserver, the first agent of every event, every development, every emergent, the ultimate final cause of any universe, the ground of its value, and the ultimate objective of all finalistic striving. There follows a transformation of metaphysics, where the metaphysics of proportionate being becomes a subordinate part of a more general metaphysics that envisages the transcendent idea of being. And there follows a transformation of ethics, for now our doing is our cooperation with God in the realization of the order of the universe. Error becomes a deviation not only from truth but from God, and wrongdoing takes on the character of sin against God.

27 Basic sin is the failure of free will to choose a morally obligatory course of action or to reject a morally reprehensible course. That failure is the root of the obligatory course not being executed, and of the disregard of the incomplete intelligibility and incoherence of the moral counterpositions. That failure, far from being an enlargement of consciousness, is a contraction of consciousness. In that contraction there occurs the wrong action, and the moral evils that are the consequence of basic sin: moral evils of omission and the heightening of temptation in oneself or others to further basic sins. ‘From the basic sin of not setting aside illicit proposals, there follows their execution and a more positive heightening of tension and temptation in oneself or in one’s social milieu’ (689). Basic sin is itself unintelligible, irrational. It is not an occurrence but a failure of occurrence. It has no cause, for causality is intelligible dependence, but basic sin has no intelligibility. It is a lack, a failure, period. And so God cannot be held responsible for it, for it has no cause.

28 The notion of God at which the chapter arrives is the notion of a personal reality: a rational self-consciousness that is, as unrestricted act, what we are through unrestricted desire. That unrestricted act is a subject, a person, with an intelligence, reasonableness, and willing that are its own. So too, the universe is to be understood in a personalist way, not as a blueprint or plan analogous to social engineering, but as an intelligibility grasped through the combination of classical, statistical, genetic, and dialectical methods, an intelligibility with its own exigences and so precepts, an intelligibility in which free persons are allowed without interference to exercise their freedom, even when that exercise entails basic sin and moral evil.

29 Section 10 presents the point and general form of every argument, and especially of this one (which, note, has already taken place, in section 8): God exists, if the real is being and if being is completely intelligible. These identifications are the ground of the validity of any other valid arguments for God’s existence, including those of Aquinas. There is no way of arguing validly to God’s existence apart from these prior identifications. Aquinas’s proofs are valid if, and only if, being
is what can be intelligently grasped and reasonably affirmed, and so if, apart from what can be intelligently grasped and reasonably affirmed, there is nothing. If the real is something other than this, there is no valid argument for God’s existence, for then mere matters of fact without explanation could be real. But if being is what can be intelligently grasped and reasonably affirmed, and if the real is being, then being and the real are completely intelligible, for outside of intelligibility there would be nothing. If there is nothing outside of intelligibility, there are no mere matters of fact without explanation. And if being is completely intelligible, God exists. For if the real is completely intelligible, then complete intelligibility exists. If complete intelligibility exists, the idea of being exists. If the idea of being exists, then God exists. Therefore, if the real is completely intelligible, God exists. The formal component in every valid argument for God’s existence is the intelligibility of being: If the real is completely intelligible, God exists; but the real is completely intelligible; therefore, God exists. The conditions, then, for a valid argument were affirmed earlier in the book: in the epistemology of chapter 12 and in the identification of being as intelligible in chapter 16.

30 Is Lonergan here presenting a new argument for the existence of God? His argument states the conditions of the possibility of any valid argument for God’s existence. Those conditions lie in the epistemology affirmed in the core chapters of the book on being and objectivity. In this sense we might call the present argument a transcendental argument, but in this sense, too, it is the inevitable conclusion of what has already been said about understanding, judgment, being, and the real. For this reason, Lonergan is able to write. ‘If one is genuine in denouncing obscurantism and in demanding the unconditioned, either one already adores God without naming [God] or else one has not far to go to reach [God]’ (706).

31 Finally, what we grasp in this chapter is not the unrestricted act, but our own extrapolation to the unrestricted act. Section 8 argues that what we have extrapolated to is a reality. Section 10 is not another proof, but the general form of any valid argument for God’s existence.
March 25, 2004, Part 1

The class began with some further comments on chapter 18.

1 Chapter 20 moves to the heuristic structure of the solution to the problem of evil. What is God doing, what has God been doing, about the fact of evil? The first section of the chapter repeats and sums up what Lonergan has said earlier in different contexts, contributing to his position on the problem of evil. The basic statement, at least for the purposes of this chapter, is on 715: ‘The reign of sin, then, is the expectation of sin. On a primary level, it is the priority of living to learning how to live, to acquiring the willingness to live rightly, to developing the adaptation that makes right living habitual [note: cognitional, volitional, psychic]. On a second level, it is [our] awareness of [our] plight and [our] self-surrender to it; on each occasion, [we] could reflect and through reflection avoid sinning; but [we] cannot bear the burden of perpetual reflection; and long before that burden has mounted to the limit of physical impossibility, [we choose] the easy way out. On both the primary and the second levels, there is the transposition of the inner issue into the outer social milieu; concrete situations become infected with the social surd; they are intractable without dialectical analysis; and the intractability is taken as evidence that only in an increasingly limited fashion can intelligence and reasonableness and good will have any real bearing upon the conduct of human affairs. Finally, dialectical analysis can transpose the issue, but it cannot do so effectively. It goes beyond common sense to a critical human science that supposes a correct and accepted philosophy; but a correct philosophy will be but one of many philosophies, and precisely because it is correct it will be too complicated to be commonly accessible and too alien to sinful [human beings] to be widely accepted.’

2 The fact of evil is a statistical rule. We cannot postpone our living until we have developed cognitively and in willingness and sensitive adaptation. And to the extent that we choose courses of action that reflect our ignorance or bad will or lack of self-control, there results a social surd. To understand our concrete situation, we then have to rely not only on direct insights but also on the inverse insights that reveal that there is nothing to be understood. But until we learn to do that, we tend rather to take our situation as it exists as proof that integrity is irrelevant to concrete living. Every adjustment we make along these lines simply systematizes sin. The social surd expands. The expansion demands a further adjustment, etc., etc. A correct philosophy and human science are not enough. There is needed an antecedent universal willingness to self-transcendence. Until that is reached, effective freedom is limited by ignorance, bad will, and lack of sensitive adaptation. Essential freedom remains intact, but the acts that can be expected to occur are not the acts that could occur were we antecedently willing.
3 The fact of evil becomes a problem of evil when we acknowledge the existence of God and if we attempt to reconcile the fact of evil with the goodness of God. But if God is truly good, then there is not only a problem of evil but also a solution. If God is unrestricted understanding, God knows our plight; if God is unlimited power, God can remedy it; and if God is complete goodness, God wills to do so. There is a problem of evil because there is a further intelligibility to be grasped, a further component in the actual universe, precisely because God exists. Nor is it the case that the problem exists first, and the solution is an afterthought. The book may have been written this way, but both are together at all times. There is a further component in the universe, and it is always present, not just as a solution to a problem that necessitates the emergence of the solution.

4 How are we to acknowledge this further component? This is the point of the heuristic structure of the solution. 718: ‘... there is a heuristic structure whenever the object of an inquiry admits antecedent determinations; and the solution that we are seeking is an object of inquiry that satisfies the intelligible unity of the actual world order and that solves the problem ...’ It helps to settle which of the alternative possibilities is correct or on the way to being correct. 718: ‘... even when such a structure fails to determine a single answer, at least it offers a set of alternative answers; and then through an appeal to the facts it becomes possible to settle which of the alternatives is correct.’

5 Prior to the basic presentation of the solution, there is a list of cosmic or metaphysical elements presented in the heuristic structure of the solution: (1) The solution will be one, for there is one God, one world order, and one problem simultaneously individual and social. (2) The solution will be universally accessible and permanent; for the problem is universal and permanent. Thus all exclusivism is ruled out in a single stroke. (3) The solution will be a harmonious continuation of the actual order of the universe. All extrinsicism is thus ruled out. (4) The solution does not lie in the addition of central forms of a new genus or species. The problem is human, and the solution has to lie within human life. (5) But the solution can consist in new conjugate forms in human intelligence, will, and sensitivity — new habits. 719: ‘... [the] intellect is an unrestricted potency, and so it can receive habits of any kind; [the] will is good insofar as it follows intellect, and so it can receive habits that correspond to the habits received in intellect; finally, [our] sensitivity is a lower manifold under the higher integration of intellectual and volitional acts, and so it can be adapted habitually to the acts that occur.’ (6) The solution will involve the introduction of such conjugate forms, for this is the way the priority of living over learning and being persuaded can be reversed, by habits that are operative throughout living. (7) The relevant conjugate forms will be in some sense supernatural, that is, not arising from nature, not the result of accumulated insights, not suffering from the fourfold bias and the counterpositions. (8) As harmonious with the actual order of the universe, with its higher integrations systematizing the non-systematic residues, these forms will constitute a new and higher integration of human activity, controlling elements that otherwise are non-systematic or irrational. (9) These forms, like all
other dynamic conjugate forms, pertain to system on the move, they develop, they adapt to different circumstances. (10) Like other forms, these will leave intact natures and laws of underlying manifolds, and in this case the natures and laws of intelligence and freedom, and so will come to us through our apprehension and consent. (11) As harmonious with the actual order of the universe, the emergence, development, and propagation of these forms will be in accord with emergent probability. (12) The relevant probabilities regard the occurrence of our apprehension of the gift and our consent to it. We must distinguish the realization of the full solution through apprehension and consent and an emergent trend in which the full solution becomes effectively probable. So much for the cosmic and metaphysical aspects of the solution.

6 (13) Regarding the conjugate forms themselves, first, the appropriate willingness will be some type or species of charity, a willingness that matches the unrestricted desire for complete understanding and so for God, and so that makes the will will God, love God, prompted only by God’s goodness; and that makes the will will every other good because of the order of the universe, and the order of the universe because of God, and to love all persons in the universe because of one’s love of God. And because the order of the universe is an emergent probability, we can expect and will that things and persons grow and develop. And we can acknowledge the social surd as a problem, and embrace its solution, by adopting a dialectical attitude that parallels the dialectical method of intelligence, i.e., by returning good for evil, loving our enemies, praying for those that persecute and calumniate us, thus making the social surd into a potential good. There are corollaries to this position. First, such love is repentant. Our rational self-consciousness develops, becomes good, and so has been less good, has been perhaps evil. Such love regrets the scotosis of dramatic bias and involvement in individual, group, and general bias; repents its flight from self-knowledge, rationalization, surrender to evil; detests its commitment to the counterpositions, its contribution to decline, its share in the genesis and propagation of myths. This repentance is not just a sensitive feeling of guilt, which may or may not be appropriate, but an act of good will able to systematize feelings. Because of the personal relation to God established by charity it becomes sorrow. Yet this good will in love with God is also joyful. Love is joy; repentance and sorrow regard the past, and present sacrifices look to the future, but it is at one with the universe in being in love with God, and shares the dynamic resilience and expectancy of the universe. 722: ‘As emergent probability, it ever rises above past achievement. As genetic process, it develops generic potentiality to its specific perfection. As dialectic, it overcomes evil both by meeting it with good and by using it to reinforce the good. But good will wills the order of the universe, and so it wills with that order’s dynamic joy and zeal.’

7 (14) Next, hope is a conjugate form by which the will makes intelligence good, sustaining the pure desire in its purity over against attachment and self-interest and rationalization. Hope is a habitual determination in the will that has as its object the objective of the pure desire, God; hope enables a decision against the
despair that allows us to surrender the aspirations of the pure desire, and against
the presumption that elevates present attainment to the pinnacle of perfection and
that maintains that we can reach the objective on our own. The pure desire now is
reinforced by a hope that God will bring us to a knowledge, participation,
possession of the unrestricted act of understanding.

8 (15) The relevant conjugate form in intelligence is a knowledge born of religious love
(the language of Method.) This knowledge is both faith and consequent beliefs
that supply hope with an object, and charity with motives, and that are accessible
and effective ways of pulling our minds out of the counterpositions, fixing them
in the positions, securing for them a certitude regarding God’s existence and the
existence of the solution. We can reach truth not only by immanently generated
knowledge, but also by belief in reliable knowledge communicated by others.
(There are developments in Method: the distinction of faith and beliefs, of inner
and outer word, but still the insistence that the outer word is constitutive.)

March 25, 2004, Part 2 was not recorded. But it is picked up on April 1, 2004, Part 1,
the notes for which follow. A review of some of the major points is given. Refer
to p. 171 below.

9 At this point there occurs an excursus regarding faith and belief. Its point is that
belief itself is an intelligent and reasonable procedure. The general context of
belief is human collaboration in the advancement and dissemination of
knowledge. Belief is the reception of reliably communicated knowledge. Such
collaboration exists. Without it each successive generation would have to begin
at the beginning, and could never advance beyond the most primitive levels. It is
inevitable, and it spreads into a highly differentiated network of interdependent
specialties. The mentality of any one of us is a composite product in which it is
impossible to separate immanently generated knowledge and belief. In the
habitual background of our minds, our beliefs are just as operative as our
immanently generated knowledge. They exist in a symbiosis: every belief
involves some element of immanently generated knowledge, and almost every
item of immanently generated knowledge involves beliefs. Five steps are outlined
as constituting the process of belief: ‘(1) preliminary judgments on the value of
belief in general, on the reliability of the source for this belief, and on the
accuracy of the communication from the source, (2) a reflective act of
understanding that, in virtue of the preliminary judgments, grasps as virtually
unconditioned the value of deciding to believe some particular proposition, (3) the
consequent judgment of value, (4) the consequent decision of the will, and (5) the
assent that is the act of believing’ (729-30). There is also outlined the process of
critiquing mistaken beliefs and the mistaken believer. (How much detail we can
go into depends on how much time we have.)

10 (16) The solution will include in its cognitional aspect a new and higher collaboration
of human beings in the pursuit of truth, higher because of the higher integration in
which it is grounded. It will be a religiously and theologically transformed cosmopolis.

11 (17) This new and higher collaboration will be, not simply a collaboration of human beings with one another, but our cooperation with God in solving our problem of evil. It is principally the work of God.

12 (18) Our entry into the collaboration and participation in its fruits is by faith, a conjugate form for intelligence, a transcendent belief making us participants in a new and higher collaboration in which God is initiator and principal agent.

13 (19) There are stages in the transformation of intelligence by faith: (1) an emergent trend and introductory faith and collaboration in the emergent trend; (2) a full faith and collaboration in the full realization of the solution; (3) a final stage where knowledge supplants faith and realizes the object of hope.

14 (20) The act of faith is an assent of intellect to truths transmitted through the collaboration, an assent motivated by our reliance on the truthfulness of God, on God’s omniscience, omnipotence, and goodness.

15 (21) The act of faith will include an affirmation of the spirituality of the human person, of our freedom, responsibility, and sinfulness, of God’s existence and nature, of the solution that God provides.

16 (22) We will be intelligent and reasonable in our acknowledgment of the solution by (a) grasping the existence of the problem and our own inability to cope with it; (b) inferring that God’s wisdom knows many possible solutions, God’s power can effect any of them, and God’s goodness has effected some one; (c) recognizing the emergent trend and the full realization of the solution with the characteristics of this heuristic structure.

17 (23) Also we will be intelligent and reasonable in accepting the solution by grasping as unconditioned the value of deciding to assent to the truths of the new and higher collaboration because of the truthfulness of God.

18 (24) The collaboration entails making known to others the good news of the solution and its nature, transmitting it from each generation to the next, recasting the expression for different audiences, expressing it theologically in terms of the universal viewpoint.

19 (25) The solution will leave human freedom intact. Thus our collaboration itself will be marked by deficiencies of our own origin, from our own biases.

20 (26) Error will not eliminate the solution, for the solution is principally God’s work. It is to be expected that God’s work through human channels will involve some appropriate institutional organization with some guarantee of God’s assistance.
(What he says here has to be supplemented by the later work ‘Dialectic of Authority.’)

21 (27) Though the solution will be implemented principally in our intelligence and freedom through faith, hope, and charity, it must penetrate to the sense level and envelop it, capturing our sensitivity and intersubjectivity and providing sensitive and imaginative representations, images charged with affects to guide and propel action. 744–45: ‘… besides the image that is a sign of intelligible and rational contents and the image that is a psychic force, there is the image that symbolizes man’s orientation into the known unknown; and since faith gives more truth than understanding comprehends, since hope reinforces the detached, disinterested, unrestricted desire to know, [our] sensitivity needs symbols that unlock its transforming dynamism and bring it into harmony with the vast but impalpable pressures of the pure desire, of hope, and of self-sacrificing charity.

‘It follows that the solution will be not only a renovation of will that matches intellectual detachment and aspiration, not only a new and higher collaboration of intellects through faith in God, but also a mystery that is at once symbol of the uncomprehended and sign of what is grasped and psychic force that sweeps living human bodies, linked in charity, to the joyful, courageous, wholehearted, yet intelligently controlled performance of the tasks set by a world order in which the problem of evil is not suppressed but transcended.

‘… the mystery that is the solution as sensible must be not fiction but fact, not a story but history.’

22 (28) The solution meets the problem not by suppressing the consequences of sin, but by introducing a higher integration (of holiness) that enables us, if we will, to rise above the consequences, to halt and reverse the sequence of ever less comprehensive syntheses, to provide a new and more solid base on which our intellectual and social development can rise to heights undreamed of, and perpetually to overcome the surd of social situations by meeting abundant evils with a more generous good.

23 (29) Despite the approach here taken (sin-grace) the solution is not just an answer to a problem, but a new and higher integration (nature-grace), a new level on which human living develops and rejoices, with its own nature and content and meaning and power.

24 (30) To the extent that it goes beyond the minimal essentials of every solution, the new and higher integration will reveal truths we could never discover for ourselves and will be grounded in the absolutely transcendent excellence of the unrestricted act. Natural solutions would not do this. Relatively supernatural solutions would go beyond human limits but not necessarily beyond all creaturely limits. Absolutely supernatural solutions are not natural for any creature, their sole ground being the divine nature itself. Then faith will include objects beyond the natural reach of any finite understanding, hope will be for a vision of God that exhausts our unrestricted desire, charity will be the transport, ecstasy and
unbounded intimacy that results from the communication of the absolute love that is God and alone can respond to the vision of God.

25 (31) To the extent that it is supernatural, the solution only heightens the tension of limitation and transcendence. The heightened tension will be conscious as opposition and struggle, and objectified socially and culturally in the community that would collaborate with God. The vagaries and oscillations of the tension are described on pages 748-49, followed by the description of the manner in which the twofold dialectic of limitation and transcendence becomes a threefold dialectic, in conflict with humanism.

26 (32) It is not the point of this book to identify the solution that exists. That task is not the same for all. The realization of the solution and its development in each of us is principally the work of God.
The epilogue does not provide a summary. The book was written from a moving viewpoint. 753: ‘Successive contexts have been formed only to provide the base and the need for forming a further, fuller context,’ and the process is not ended yet. We ended with ‘a question at once too basic and too detailed to admit a brief answer,’ and could provide only the heuristic structure for answering it. The answer would be a doctrinal theology, *intellectus quaerens fidem*, and a systematic theology, *fides quaerens intellectum*. So where are we then? 754: ‘From a succession of lower contexts there was gradually to emerge an upper context. The lower contexts were to be subject to further additions and to indefinite revision. The upper context was to be constituted (1) by the invariant structures of experiencing, inquiring, and reflecting, (2) by the isomorphic structures of all there is to be known of the universe of proportionate being, (3) by the fuller invariant structure that adds reasonable choice and action to intelligent and reasonable knowing, (4) by the profounder structure of knowing and known to be reached by acknowledging the full significance of the detached, disinterested, unrestricted desire to know, and (5) by the structure of the process in which the existential situation sets human intelligence the problem of rising above its native resources and seeking the divine solution to [our] incapacity for sustained development.’ That is the invariant upper context that was promised at the beginning. It has now emerged.

Does this process offer any contribution to the higher collaboration which it envisages? That is the topic of the epilogue: what is the contribution of *Insight* to theology? Five major divisions structure the response. We will discuss these first as Lonergan here envisages them. But we must keep in mind that his entire conception of theology underwent a sea change in 1965, and that the contribution of *Insight* is, if anything, even more important from that standpoint.

First, there is a contribution to the introduction to theology, to apologetics, in that it offers a synthesis of reason and faith and gives evidence of their successful symbiosis. The difficulty in the disputes between religion and scientific reason are to be traced by and large to an ‘insufficiently supple and detailed cognitional theory’ (755). The cognitional theory of this book enables us to accept ‘the positive element in rationalism’, while reversing the opposition between the exigences of the mind and the claims of religion. It also enables us to acknowledge the de facto limitations of human development without succumbing to an irrationalist religiosity. For the self-transcendence of faith has the same type of structure as empirical science. Finally, the balance of initiative in alleged conflicts between science and the metaphysical tradition is somewhat redressed if metaphysics is the invariant form for which the sciences provide the variable matter, and if dialectical analysis enables us to distinguish genuine scientific discoveries from their counterpositional formulation.

Second, there is a ‘remote’ (far less remote than Lonergan then realized) but fruitful contribution to the method of theology. Here there are a number of points made in *Insight*: (1) The opposition between positions and counterpositions lays bare the roots of pietist and modernist revolt against dogma: as philosophic counterpositions appeal to experience generally against the yes of rational
consciousness, so pietists and modernists appeal to religious experience against the yes of articulate faith. (2) The same dialectical technique that cuts short the disputed questions of metaphysics can contribute to the demise of some disputed questions in theology. (3) The clarification of the role of understanding will promote the limited but fruitful understanding of the mysteries of faith applauded by Vatican I. (4) The metaphysics of proportionate being precisely as proportionate allows the theologian to understand this world without offering an explanatory account of other possible worlds, and frees theology from the necessity of reducing to the metaphysical elements the supernatural realities of the incarnation, indwelling of the Holy Spirit, and beatific vision. (5) A reasoned answer is provided for the question of whether there can be more than one true metaphysics. The conception of metaphysics implemented here yields unique results because of the isomorphism between knowing and known. The fact that knowing consists in experience, understanding, and judgment is not open to radical revision, nor is the analytic principle of isomorphism. (6) A basis for an adequate solution to the question of changeless concepts has been provided. We may have to go into detail here (759-60), but the summary on 760-61 will be at least our starting point: ‘... concepts change inasmuch as things change, inasmuch as human understanding develops, and inasmuch as that development is formulated coherently or incoherently. But behind every change there is an underlying unity, and that unity may be formulated explicitly on the level of heuristic anticipation or of consciously adopted method or of a dialectical metaphysics. Hence it follows that changes in conceptualization do not imply any ultimate multiplicity and that behind any conceptual variation there is a conceptual constant that can be formulated from a universal viewpoint.’

5 Third, Vatican I’s affirmation of identity of doctrinal meaning not only in difference but also in development confers a theological relevance on the book’s analysis of development and its discussion of the truth of interpretation. *Interpretation:* Just as true interpretation, so church teaching and/or theology can present the same doctrine and the same meaning through a diversity of conceptualizations and expressions. Theology can expand its metaphysics into systematic theology, and the church can distinguish degrees of authoritateness in its pronouncements. And with the universal viewpoint the theologian can work out an adequate interpretation of past utterances. *Development:* (a) In the individual, the advent of the absolutely supernatural solution to our problem of evil adds to the biological, psychic, and intellectual levels of development a fourth level that includes the higher conjugate forms of faith, hope, and charity. In themselves these constitute an absolutely supernatural living that advances toward an absolutely supernatural goal under the action of grace. But in relation to other human intellectual and volitional activities, they are anticipated inasmuch as rational self-consciousness advert to its need for the divine solution; and they constitute a dialectical higher integration by making possible the sustained development of rational self-consciousness, reversing counterpositions, and overcoming evil; and they call forth their own development by giving rise to an advance in understanding, knowledge, and wisdom by which we grasp and apply the solution to human living in all its aspects. And in relation to human sensitivity and intersubjectivity, they are announced through signs that communicate the Gospel, they constitute a new psychic integration through affective contemplation of the mystery of Christ and the church, and they call forth their own development by intensifying our intersubjective awareness of human suffering and need. This transformation of sensitivity and intersubjectivity penetrates to the physiological level, where the clearest instances appear in mystical experience. The four-leveled integration here envisaged must be harmonious, but of course can be laden with conflict. (b)
In history: there is also a cumulative historical development, in the emergent trend and in the church, both in themselves and in the order of the universe. In addition to liberal, Hegelian, Marxist, etc., theories of history, there is needed a theory of humankind in the concrete and cumulative consequences of the acceptance or rejection of the Gospel. Such a theory would form perhaps the formal element in the systematics of the church as mystical body of Christ. It would envisage not only natural and intelligent progress but also sinful decline, and not only progress and decline but also supernatural recovery.

6 Fourth, the book makes a contribution to the relation of theology to the other sciences, especially the human sciences, whose development has created a fundamentally new problem. Insofar as these sciences consider human beings in their concrete performance, they treat manifestations not only of human nature but also of human sin, of our de facto need of grace, of the reception of grace, and of its acceptance or rejection. So empirical human science cannot analyze successfully the elements in its object without appealing to theology; inversely, theologians must take a professional interest in the human sciences and make a positive contribution to their methodology. The same holds for the relation of theology to philosophy insofar as philosophy becomes existentialist. In large measure these are the problems that have dictated the structure of the book. Theology has a universal relevance, yet there are independent inquiries that can reach valid conclusions from their own resources. For this reason the first eighteen chapters proceed with no indication of theological components, and the last two reveal the inevitability with which the affirmation of God and the search of intelligence for faith arise out of a sincere acceptance of scientific presuppositions and precepts. Theology, in fact, possesses a threefold relevance to empirical human science. First, there is a relevance for the scientist as scientist, insofar as the unrestricted desire to understand correctly is open to a variety of interferences that ultimately can be surmounted only by accepting the ultimate implications of the unrestricted desire. Secondly, there is a relevance to the correct interpretation of empirical human science, by adding the manner in which we can remedy the evil in our situation. The systematic treatment in empirical human science can become practical only through theology, and the relentless modern drift to social engineering and totalitarian controls is the fruit of human effort to make human science practical without God and the divine solution to the problem of evil. Third, because of the theologian’s grasp of the desire to know as a desire for God, theology can encourage scientists to complete fidelity to their calling and teach nonscientists the high office of the scientific spirit; and it can encourage science out of mechanist determinism into a genetic method based on universally valid principles, and a dialectical method to enlighten people regarding the constituents of reasonable living.

5 Finally, the book makes a contribution to the program of Leo XIII, _vetera novis augere et perficere_. See 768-70.

6 Add an overview of functional specialties.