Meeting Hegel Halfway

The Intimate Complexity of Lonergan’s Relationship with Hegel

Mark D. Morelli
Department of Philosophy
Loyola Marymount University

My aim in this essay is to provide a schematic account of Lonergan’s relationship with Hegel and so also of the relationship of his Critical Realism to Hegel’s Absolute Idealism. The relationship is intimate and, like most intimate relationships, it’s complicated by a variety of strains and stresses.¹ A more thorough investigation is needed to do justice to its complexity. But my hope is that this brief account is detailed enough to enable us to understand why Lonergan suggests, in the introduction to his foundational philosophic work, that those who wish to reach his Critical Realist standpoint should get to know and come to terms with Hegel.

As a first approximation to an understanding of the intimate complexity of Lonergan’s relationship with Hegel, I’ll draw your attention to four images Lonergan employs to depict it. From these, we’ll obtain a number of clues.²

¹ The relationship is also a long one. Ample evidence of Lonergan’s interest in Hegel in the 1930s, long before *Insight* was conceived, has been provided by Patrick Brown in his doctoral dissertation completed at Boston College. See his article, “System and History in Lonergan’s Early Historical and Economic Manuscripts,” *Journal of Macrodynemic Analysis* 1 (2001): 32-76. But, my concern here is not the origin and history of the relationship but its nature in its maturity.

² The standard set of geometrical diagrams Lonergan employs to promote identification of the experience of insight are given prominence by Lonergan; consequently, they have received plenty of attention. But, his use of imagery in other contexts, while still pedagogical, is obviously more casual, and it is largely ignored. As his choice of the words of Aristotle for the frontispiece of *Insight* suggests, Lonergan was well aware of the necessity and fecundity of imagery. Imagine the mathematician, as Lonergan suggested we do as we read his remarks on the necessity of imagery, working with pen and paper. But, images are required for all understanding, even for philosophical understanding of a bloodless ballet of metaphysical categories (*Insight: A Study of Human Understanding, Collected Works of Bernard Lonergan*, Vol. 3, eds. F. E. Crowe and Robert M. Doran [Toronto: University of

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approximation, I’ll draw your attention to the place of privilege Lonergan assigns to Hegel’s Dialectical Method in his critical discussion in Insight of the dialectic of philosophic methods leading up to his own Transcendental Method. Thirdly, I’ll turn to Lonergan’s more general account of this movement as the transition from the Order of Logic to the Order of Method. I’ll expose Hegel’s place in this transition and coin the phrase “Hegel’s halfwayness.” Fourthly, I’ll provide a sampling of Lonergan’s complaints about Hegel that place a limit on the closeness of their relationship. Fifthly, I’ll locate the root of Hegel’s halfwayness in the excessive determinateness of the determinate negation of the Order of Logic by which he mediates his transition to the Order of Method, and I’ll give four examples of its determining influence on his negation of that negation, his Absolute Idealism. I’ll conclude by returning to the most differentiated and thought provoking of Lonergan’s images, and I’ll elaborate it to depict the intimacy and some of the complexity of Lonergan’s relationship with Hegel.

1. Four Images

Lonergan uses four images to depict his relationship with Hegel. The first depiction is a vertical image of ascension by stages. It is the now familiar image of the idealist
halfway house at the midpoint between materialism and Critical Realism that appears in the Introduction to Insight.

For the appropriation of one’s own rational self-consciousness . . . is not an end in itself but rather a beginning. It is a necessary beginning, for unless one breaks the duality in one’s knowing, one doubts that understanding correctly is knowing. Under the pressure of that doubt, either one will sink into the bog of a knowing that is without understanding, or else one will cling to understanding but sacrifice knowing on the altar of an immanentism, an idealism, a relativism. From the horns of that dilemma one escapes only through the discovery – and one has not made it yet if one has no clear memory of its startling strangeness – that there are two quite different realisms, that there is an incoherent realism, half animal and half human, that poses as a halfway house between materialism and idealism, and on the other hand that there is an intelligent and reasonable realism between which and materialism the halfway house is idealism.

While Lonergan does not identify the idealism of the halfway house as Hegel’s, I have argued elsewhere that it must be Hegel’s Absolute Idealism that he has in mind. From a consideration of this image of the halfway house, then, we obtain two clues about Lonergan’s relationship with Hegel. One is that, despite obvious philosophical differences, Lonergan does not regard Hegel as a basically

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3 CWL3: 22. This quotation requires some unpacking. I have argued elsewhere that the halfway house to which Lonergan refers is not Kant's Critical Philosophy, and certainly not Berkeley's idealism, but Hegel's Absolute Idealism. I invite readers to consult the argument if they have any doubts about this conclusion. See my articles, “Going Beyond Idealism: Lonergan’s Relation to Hegel,” in ed. Fred Lawrence, Lonergan Workshop Journal 20 [2008]: 305-336, and “Lonergan’s Debt to Hegel, and the Appropriation of Critical Realism,” in ed. John D. Dadosky, Meaning and History in Systematic Theology: Essays in Honor of Robert M. Doran, SJ [Milwaukee: Marquette University Press, 2009], pp. 403-421 and in eds. Neil Ormerod, Robin Koning, and David Braithwaite, Fifty Years of Insight: Bernard Lonergan’s Contribution to Philosophy and Theology [Adelaide: ATF Theology, Australian Catholic University Series, 2011], pp. 1-16. Lonergan borrows the image of idealism as the halfway house between critical realism and materialism directly from Maréchal. See CWL 5: 276-77. The image also occurs in Leo W. Keeler’s The Problem of Error from Plato to Kant: A Historical and Critical Study [Rome: Pontifical Gregorian University, 1934], p. 6, which Lonergan reviewed in the 1935 volume of Gregorianum. However, the image is not Keeler’s but occurs in a quotation from A. E. Taylor’s Plato and is used with reference to the Eleatic doctrine. Why Lonergan did not identify Hegel as the idealist with whom we have to come to terms is an interesting question. One plausible answer is that, given the persistent resistance of ‘Thomists’ of his time, who remained naive realists despite their reading of Thomas, to taking even Kant seriously (e.g., Etienne Gilson), an explicit reference to Hegel in the Introduction to Insight would have been excessively off-putting. See the archival document 32610DTE070, www.bernardlonergan.com, where Lonergan observes, “My position does not escape the naïve realist’s equally naïve idea of idealism.”
counterpositional thinker. A halfway house lies on the path to our destination; a basically counterpositional philosophy \textit{qua} counterpositional diverts us from that path.\textsuperscript{4} The other clue is that to adopt Hegel’s Absolute Idealism is to be at the midpoint of the intellectual ascent to Lonergan’s Critical Realism. If we are to reach that standpoint, we must pass through, i.e., enter into, rest in, and then go beyond, Hegel’s Absolute Idealism.

The second depiction is the image of the \textit{parallel movements} of the argument of \textit{Insight}, on one side, and of Hegel’s thought, on the other, that appears in the final footnote in the chapter on the notion of being in \textit{Insight}.

It is not to be inferred that my attitude towards Hegel is merely negative. In fact, characteristic features in the very movement of his thought have their parallels in the present work. As his \textit{Aufhebung} both rejects and retains, so also in their own fashion do our higher viewpoints. As he repeatedly proceeds from \textit{an sich}, through \textit{für sich}, to \textit{an und für sich}, so our whole argument is a movement from the objects of mathematical, scientific, and commonsense understanding, through the acts of understanding themselves, to an understanding of understanding.\textsuperscript{5}

From this image, we obtain a few more clues. One is that the relation between Lonergan and Hegel is more methodological than conceptual. That is to say, what binds them lies, not in the contents of their philosophies and their conclusions, which are obviously very different, but in the dynamic structures of their philosophies. Another is that their methods, if parallel, are not identical; they move

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\item\textsuperscript{4} This is why it is a mistake to think it is Kant’s Critical Philosophy that is the halfway house. As Lonergan remarks in an archival note: “For two hundred years people have been swallowing the first sentence of the Transcendental Aesthetic of the First Critique” (2851D0E070, www.bernard-lonergan.com). That sentence reads: “In whatever way and through whatever means a cognition may relate to objects, that through which it relates immediately to them, and at which all thought as a means is directed as an end, is intuition.” \textit{Critique of Pure Reason}, trans. and eds. Paul Guyer and Allen W. Wood [Cambridge University Press, 1998]. In connection with Hegel’s quasi-positionality, see Thomas Cappelli’s discussion of two moments of intellectual conversion in his paper, “The Unfolding of Intellectual Conversion,” presented at the Lonergan on the Edge Conference at Marquette University, Sept. 16-17, 2011.
\item\textsuperscript{5} CWL3: 398 n 21
\end{itemize}
in the same direction, but they proceed, as it were, side by side. While the paths followed by Hegel and Lonergan may differ in length, in their specific points of origin, and in their specific points of termination, where they run in parallel we may expect characteristic features of the movement of Hegel’s thought to be isomorphic with characteristic features of the movement of Lonergan’s thought.

The third depiction of his relationship with Hegel appears in an image in archival notes [See Fig. 1]. It is a diagram of circular mediation. It is a diagram of the commonsense, theoretic, interior, and religious realms of meaning and their mediation by responses to the systematic, critical, and methodical exigences. In the accompanying key to the diagram, Lonergan assigns Hegel to the realm of interiority.

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Figure 1

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6 Archival document 54700D0L060, www.bernardlonergan.com. See Figure 1, the original, and Figure 2, the original redrawn and altered slightly to highlight Lonergan’s assignment of Hegel to the realm of interiority. For Lonergan’s account of the exigences, see Method in Theology [NY: Herder and Herder, 1972], pp. 81-85.
From this image we obtain still more clues. One is that Hegel's philosophy, like Lonergan's, is not a product of the realm of theory but is constructed in the realm of interiority. Another is that Hegel, like Lonergan, responds to the methodical exigence and, in doing so, sublates his prior responses to the systematic and critical exigences. Another is that Hegel's response to the methodical exigence, like Lonergan's, is a systematic integration that is informed and governed by a critical foundation in the realm of interiority.

The fourth and final image is a depiction by Lonergan of the dynamics of his relationship with Hegel as a process of eversion or turning-inside-out.

Marx was right in feeling that the Hegelian dialectic needed to be adjusted, but he was content to turn it upside down. What it needed, I should say, was to be turned inside out. Instead of endeavoring to insert movement within
logic, the relatively static operations of logic had to be inserted within the ever-ongoing context of methodical operations.\footnote{Philosophical and Theological Papers 1965-1980, Collected Works of Bernard Lonergan, Vol. 17, eds. Robert C. Croken and Robert M. Doran [Toronto: University of Toronto Press, 2004], p. 36 [Hereafter CWL.17]. What Marx actually said, in Kapital, was that Hegel’s idealism left his dialectic standing on its head, and that it must be turned right side up again if we are to discover the rational kernel in the mystical shell.}

From this image, we obtain the idea that Lonergan’s reservations about Hegel’s System have less to do with its constituent parts and their movement and more to do with the interior depth, as it were, of those parts and their movement. It suggests that Hegel’s response to the methodical exigence pivots on an interior foundation that is still only the exterior of the interior, so to speak.

All four of these images depict a relationship of considerable intimacy. But, even intimate relationships have their ups and downs. Hegel’s idealism may be halfway to Critical Realism, but it is not there yet. Hegel’s methodical path may run parallel to and in the same direction as Lonergan’s, but the two paths are not identical in points of origin or in length. Hegel may respond to the methodical exigence and fashion a systematic integration that rests upon an interior foundation, but Hegel’s Dialectic is not Lonergan’s Transcendental Method, and Hegel’s Absolute Knowledge is not Lonergan’s Explicit Metaphysics. Finally, if Hegel’s philosophy is woven of the same fabric as Lonergan’s, as Lonergan’s image of eversion implies, and so cannot be refuted and set aside in the manner in which a basic counterposition is reversed, it is nevertheless to be turned inside out.

Lonergan’s philosophy, then, does not stand to Hegel’s philosophy as a philosophy grounded in interiority stands to a philosophy grounded in the realm of theory, for Lonergan tells us that Hegel’s philosophy, like his own, is grounded in the
realm of interiority. Nor does Lonergan's philosophy stand to Hegel's philosophy as a basically positional interior philosophy stands to a basically counterpositional philosophy. As the image of the halfway house suggests, and as Lonergan states explicitly elsewhere, Hegel has broken with the counterposition.\textsuperscript{8} Lonergan's philosophy seems to stand to Hegel's as the more interior side of a basically positional philosophy stands to its less interior side. Hegel's philosophy, then, is only quasi-positional or transitional, his method is only relatively isomorphic with Lonergan's because it is displaced, his terminal integration rests upon an interior foundation, but that foundation lacks depth, and so the terminal integration is inadequate.

2. The Privileged Place of Hegel's Dialectical Method

We made a first approximation to an understanding of Lonergan's relationship with Hegel by considering four images employed by Lonergan. A second approximation can be made by considering the place Lonergan assigns to Hegel's dialectical method in the section of \textit{Insight} titled "The Dialectic of Method in Metaphysics."\textsuperscript{9} There, after exposing the limitations of deductive philosophic methods that "seek independence from the whims and fancies of the subject,"\textsuperscript{10} Lonergan turns to the directive

\textsuperscript{8} CWL3: 372: "Five hundred years separate Hegel from Scotus . . . [T]hat notable interval of time was devoted to working out in a variety of manners the possibilities of the assumption that knowing consists in taking a look. The ultimate conclusion was that it did not and could not. If the reader does not himself accept that conclusion as definitive, certainly Hegel did . . . ." Hegel's \textit{Phenomenology of Spirit} may be described as an account of Spirit's self-overcoming of this counterpositional presupposition (but, as we shall see in what follows, not its complete abandonment). See also, n 57 below. See \textit{Hegel's Philosophy of Mind}, trans. A. V. Miller [Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1971], p. 224: "Pure thinking knows that it alone, and not feeling or representation, is capable of grasping the truth of things, and that the assertion of Epicurus that the true is what is sensed, must be pronounced a complete perversion of the nature of mind."

\textsuperscript{9} CWL3: 426-455.

\textsuperscript{10} CWL3: 433.
philosophic methods that emerge once it is recognized that “deductive method alone is not enough” and that “it is not so easy to leave the subject outside one’s calculations.”

Directive methods admit that “the subject cannot be ignored.”

Lonergan proceeds to give critical accounts of the methods of universal doubt, empiricism, and commonsense eclecticism. In so doing, he recollects the historical experience of the displacement of one philosophic method by another. By this historical experience, says Lonergan, we are “forced to the conclusion that philosophic method must concern itself with the structure and aberrations of human cognitional process.” It is with this observation that Lonergan begins his critical discussion of Hegel’s Dialectical Method.

In response to the historical experience of one philosophic method supplanting and replacing another, Hegel rises to a higher level of philosophical reflection, to the level of reflection on method itself, and introduces a conception of that method as “the very process” by which one philosophic method supplants and replaces another. This, says Lonergan, was “approximately Hegel’s inspiration.”

That process is conceived by Hegel as one “that turns positions into their contradictories only to discover in such reversal a new position that begets its opposite to bring to birth a third position with similar consequences until through successive repetitions the totality of positions and opposites forms a dialectical

\[\text{\textsuperscript{11}} \text{CWL3: 433.} \]
\[\text{\textsuperscript{12}} \text{CWL3: 446.} \]
\[\text{\textsuperscript{13}} \text{CWL3: 446.} \]
\[\text{\textsuperscript{14}} \text{CWL3: 446.} \]
whole.”¹⁵ There is a gradual movement, temporal if not necessarily chronological, to be noted in Lonergan’s consideration of philosophic methods that terminates in a heightened reflexivity and a search for the method of all methods.¹⁶ By its placement at the end of this movement, Hegel’s Dialectical Method, which Hegel himself refers to as “the method,”¹⁷ is given pride of place.

Let us note that Lonergan’s entire treatment of the temporal sequence of philosophic methods, as its title “The Dialectic of Method in Metaphysics” suggests, not only terminates in a discussion of Hegelian Dialectic, but is itself a response to the historical experience of methods displacing methods that inspired Hegel’s ascent to reflection on method itself. But, Lonergan’s experience is enriched by the addition of Hegel’s inspired attempt to conceive “the method”¹⁸ that is “the very process.”¹⁹ From his consideration of Hegel’s method as the last in a now prolonged

¹⁵ CWL3: 446. See Phenomenology of Spirit, trans. A. V. Miller [Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1979], Preface, § 2: “The more conventional opinion gets fixated on the antithesis of truth and falsity, the more it tends to expect a given philosophical system to be either accepted or contradicted; and hence it finds only acceptance or rejection. It does not comprehend the diversity of philosophical systems as the progressive unfolding of truth, but rather sees in it simple disagreements.”

¹⁶ “The . . . shift to interiority was essayed in various manners from Descartes through Kant to the nineteenth-century German idealists,” Lonergan, Method in Theology, p. 316.

¹⁷ “For the method is nothing but the structure set forth in its pure essentiality. We should realize, however, that the system of ideas concerning philosophical method is yet another set of current beliefs that belongs to a bygone culture. If this comment sounds boastful or revolutionary – and I am far from adopting such a tone – it should be noted that current opinion itself has already come to view the scientific regime bequeathed by mathematics as quite old-fashioned – with its explanations, divisions, axioms, sets of theorems, its proofs, principles, deductions, and conclusions from them. Even if its unfitness is not clearly understood, little or no use is any longer made of it; and though not actually condemned outright, no one likes it very much.” Hegel, Phenomenology of Spirit, Preface, §48. See also, Lectures on Logic: Berlin, 1831, transcribed by Karl Hegel, trans. Clark Butler [Bloomington: Indiana University Press, 2001], p. 230.


¹⁹ Method in Theology, pp. 304-305: “. . . [T]here is the emergence of method. It consists in the transposition of systematic meaning from a static to an ongoing, dynamic context. . . Any given system, ancient or modern, is subject to logic. But the process from any given system to its successor is the concern of method.”
sequence of properly philosophic methods, Lonergan turns to his own method and its execution, i.e., to the task of making explicit the latent metaphysics of the human mind on the interior foundation afforded by his cognitional theory. It should come as no surprise, then, that Lonergan takes the trouble, in the footnote cited earlier, to caution his readers about inferring that his attitude towards Hegel is merely negative and to point out that “characteristic features of the very movement of his [Hegel’s] thought have their parallels” in Insight and, indeed, inform the structure of the entire work.

3. The Transition from the Order of Logic to the Order of Method

The movement of philosophic methods in which Lonergan assigns Hegel a place of privilege is what he refers to later, in Method in Theology, as the transition from a second, theoretic stage of meaning to a third, interior stage of meaning.

In the first stage conscious and intentional operations follow the mode of common sense. In a second stage besides the mode of common sense there is also the mode of theory, where the theory is controlled by a logic. In a third stage the modes of common sense and theory remain, science asserts its autonomy from philosophy, and there occur philosophies that leave theory to science and take their stand on interiority.

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20 One might object that, in fact, Lonergan’s preceding treatment of methods ends with an account of scientific method and philosophy. But, this is not properly speaking a consideration of a philosophic method. It is a critique of the attempt to transfer into philosophy and to substitute for philosophic method the method of natural science. It is, as it were, the critique of a disruptive aberration and derailment of the movement into interiority. The scientist concludes that “it is nonsense to talk about a philosophical method and ... the plain fact is that philosophy has no method at all.” CWL3: 450.

21 CWL3: Ch. 15.

22 CWL3: 398 n 21. The editors of the CWL report that Lonergan added this footnote at the proof stage.

23 Lonergan, Method in Theology, p. 85.
The transition from the second, theoretic stage to the third, interior stage is a shift from logical to methodical control of meaning. It is a structural change, a gradual reversal of priorities, rather than a change in content. It is a shift from the Order of Logic to the Order of Method.

In the Order of Logic, priority is given (a) to logical premises, (b) to metaphysics, (c) to faculty psychology in terms of potencies and habits, (d) to relations of acts to objects by efficient and final causality, and (e) to speculative rationality. In the Order of Method, the priority is reversed, and primacy is given (a) to the concrete operating subject, (b) to self-appropriation of the subject, (c) to intentionality analysis in terms of successive levels of conscious operation and their sublative relations, (d) to relations of acts to objects by intentionality, and (e) to the sublation of speculative rationality by practico-existential rationality.

In still more general terms, the shift from the Order of Logic to the Order of Method is a shift in the very notion of science and, consequently, in the understanding of philosophy and its function. Prior to this transition the sciences

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25 Ibid., p. 46.

26 Method in Theology, p. 261: “From within the world of interiority, then, mental acts as experienced and as systematically conceived are a logical first. From them one can proceed to epistemology and metaphysics.”


28 A Third Collection, p. 41. See the archival document 49200DTE050, www.bernard-lonergan.com. “Philosophy is conceived differently as a science depending on how science itself is conceived. It is conceived differently as philosophy where attention is paid to the history of notions and to human historicity. This is especially true ever since Hegel.”
form “a single block under philosophic hegemony,” as they did for Aristotle. With this transition, philosophy relinquishes to the natural sciences the task of explaining the data of sense, grants the sciences their autonomy, and takes its stand on the data of intentional consciousness. But, the new autonomy of the natural sciences is not absolute; while the natural sciences are no longer under the control of a theoretic metaphysics, they remain “under the control of method.”

Those familiar with both Lonergan and Hegel might be inclined to object to the placement of Hegel firmly in the world of interiority. A host of characteristics of Hegel’s philosophy seems to invite the assignment to him of a place in Lonergan’s second, theoretic stage. They will recall Hegel’s characterization of his method as “dialectical deduction,” his monumental *Science of Logic* with its metaphysical starting-point in a minimal concept of being, his bare sketch of a gnoseology in his *Encyclopaedia*, the prominence and sublative role of organic teleology in his philosophy, the primacy he gives to speculative thought and to the comprehensive and coherent system of systems that it generates, and his apparently hegemonic philosophy of nature.

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29 Ibid., p. 43.
30 Ibid., pp. 46-47. See *Method in Theology*, p. 316: “Now the natural and human sciences aim at accounting for all the data of sense. Accordingly, if there is to be any general science [of being], its data will have to be the data of consciousness. So there is effected the turn to interiority. The general science is, first, cognitional theory ..., secondly, epistemology ..., and thirdly metaphysics ... Such general science will be the general case of the methods of the special sciences and not, as in Aristotelianism, the general case of the content of the special sciences.”
31 See Hegel’s discussion of “theoretical mind” in *Hegel’s Philosophy of Mind*, pp. 188-228, where he provides his account of “the formal course of the development of intelligence to cognition” (p. 192) in three stages: (a) intuition (attention, sensation, intuition proper), (b) representation (recollection, imagination, memory), (c) thought (understanding, judgment, reason).
32 *Science of Logic*, pp. 734 ff.
But, one might object in return, as I think Hegel himself would, that this is a one-sided view of his philosophy. In fact, in the Preface to the first edition of his *Science of Logic*, Hegel states explicitly that he intends to transform logic to bring it into conformity with “the new spirit which has arisen both in Learning and in Life.”

Moreover, the ‘smaller’ *Logic* of the *Encyclopaedia* opens with a dialectical critique of three attitudes of thought to objectivity that functions to set the stage for his new position, just as Lonergan’s critical discussion in his “Dialectic of Method in Metaphysics” functions to set the stage for his. If Hegel’s philosophy displays prominent characteristics of the Order of Logic, it also displays prominent characteristics of a philosophy in transition to the Order of Method, although these are often expressed, as in the title of the *Science of Logic* itself, in language borrowed from the world of theory or from what Hegel calls the standpoint of the Understanding.

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33 *Science of Logic*, Preface, p. 34: “... [T]here are no traces in Logic of the new spirit which has arisen both in Learning and in Life. It is, however (let us say it once for all), quite vain to try to retain the forms of an earlier stage of development when the inner structure of spirit has become transformed; these earlier forms are like withered leaves which are pushed off by the new buds already being generated at the roots.”


35 See Hegel’s *Lectures on Logic: Berlin, 1831*, p. 6: The object of our study in these lectures [on logic] is to gain knowledge of thinking, to know what we as thinking beings are. A human being is spirit, and to come to know what lies therein is our highest achievement.” P. 7: “Thinking, having concepts, seems far removed from us, but it is in fact what is closest at hand. In thinking I remain absolutely at home with myself. I am myself this thinking. We represent thinking to ourselves as separable from the I, but it is in fact what is most present in it.” *The Encyclopaedia Logic*, §14: “The same development of thinking that is presented in the history of philosophy is presented in philosophy itself, but freed from that historical outwardness, i.e., purely in the element of thinking.”

36 Hegel consistently employs terms drawn from the indigenous language of the realm of theory when he is speaking from the standpoint of Reason, e.g., concept, logic, system, deduction. This poses problems for theoretic interpreters of Hegel; for example, as Lonergan observes, “For the man who knows his logic and does not think of method, the term ‘system’ will have only one meaning. Systems are either true or false. True system is the realization of the deductivist ideal that happens to be true, and in each department of human knowledge, there is only one true system.” Lonergan, *Philosophy of God and Theology* [London: Darton, Longman & Todd, 1973], p. 49.
The principle of philosophy, says Hegel, is contained in meditative thinking \([\text{Nachdenken}]\).\(^{37}\) (a) He emphatically rejects the priority of merely logical premises, while retaining them in a subordinate position, and gives priority to the dynamism of the self-unfolding subject that he identifies with the \textit{Begriff} or Concept.\(^{38}\) (b) He rejects the priority of traditional metaphysics and its abstract objectivism,\(^{39}\) and so (c) he also rejects the faculty psychological account of the subject-as-object,\(^{40}\) and gives priority to the phenomenological narration of the path of the natural consciousness in his \textit{Phenomenology of Spirit},\(^{41}\) to thought’s thinking itself in his

\(^{37}\) \textit{The Encyclopaedia Logic}, § 17, pp. 30-31.

\(^{38}\) As Beatrice Longuenesse notes, Hegel’s starting-point in the \textit{Science of Logic} is being; but the fact that it is not a strictly logical starting-point is illustrated almost immediately by its collapse into nothing. See \textit{Hegel’s Critique of Metaphysics}, trans. Nicole J. Simek [Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2007]: p. 11. Hegel’s ideal of comprehensive coherence reveals both his sublation of logic (the ideal of coherence) and his concern with method (the ideal of comprehensiveness).

\(^{39}\) \textit{The Encyclopaedia Logic}, pp. 70-71.

\(^{40}\) \textit{The Encyclopaedia Logic}, pp. 71-72. See \textit{Hegel’s Philosophy of Mind}, p. 189: “A favorite reflectional form is that of powers and faculties of soul, intelligence, or mind. Faculty, like power or force, is the fixed quality of any object of thought, conceived as reflected into self. Force is no doubt the infinity of form – of the inward and the outward: but its essential finitude involves the indifference of content to form. In this lies the want of organic unity which by this reflectional form, treating mind as a ‘lot’ of forces, is brought into mind, as it is by the same method brought into nature. Any aspect which can be distinguished in mental action is stereotyped as an independent entity, and the mind thus made a skeleton-like mechanical collection. It makes absolutely no difference if we substitute the expression ‘activities’ for powers and faculties. Isolate the activities and you similarly make the mind a mere aggregate, and treat their essential correlation as an external incident.” See also, \textit{Lectures on Logic: Berlin, 1831}, p. 6: “Thinking is called a mental power, a faculty. Embracing feeling, representation, imagination, the faculty of thinking taken as a whole is known as theoretical mind. Beyond theoretical mind lies the will, the faculty of desire. Thinking at once falls to intelligence, to which representation and intuition also belong. Thinking is said to be one mental activity, one activity – one \textit{among} others. Each power is taken to be independent, and the soul is imagined to be what holds such and such faculties within itself. The soul is taken to be a kind of external medium in which every faculty independently operates for itself on its own account. When such representations are used we speak of mental \textit{powers}, and relate them to one another through determining each to be tacked on as \textit{also} present. What we have here is an only external compounding. Our immediate consciousness is held within such categories.”

*Science of Logic,*\(^{42}\) and to the analysis of shapes of consciousness and their sublative relations throughout his works. But, because the self-unfolding *Begriff* is not quite the subject-as-subject, but rather *substance*-as-subject, his dialectical logic is simultaneously and fundamentally a dynamic ontology.\(^{43}\) (d) He rejects the priority of relations of acts to their objects by efficient and final causality, while retaining them in a subordinate position, and he gives priority to a series of intentional relations of acts to their objects, but that series terminates in the overcoming of this intentional difference in the self-conscious identity of thought and being. The mechanism of the Concept-in-itself and the teleology of the Concept-for-itself are superseded by the Idea of the Concept-in-and-for-itself.\(^{44}\) (e) Hegel does insist repeatedly on the priority of speculative rationality. But, it cannot be speculative rationality in the traditional sense, as one faculty whose operations are isolated from those of the faculty of will, because Hegel rejects faculty psychology’s mere aggregation of isolated powers. Moreover, there are clear indications of an overriding concern for the extension, implementation, and fulfillment of speculative rationality in spiritual community.\(^{45}\)

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\(^{42}\) *The Encyclopaedia Logic,* § 24, p. 58.

\(^{43}\) Hegel at once rejects and retains the priority of metaphysics, but the priority he retains differs from the one he rejects. Beatrice Longuenesse describes Hegel’s *Science of Logic* as a “critique of metaphysics,” but not in the Kantian sense. Hegel’s way of proceeding in his *Science of Logic* “does not consist in asking under what conditions metaphysics is possible. Rather, it consists in investigating what metaphysics is about, and how the project of metaphysics needs to be redefined if one is to come to any satisfactory accomplishment of its self-set goal.” Hegel’s *Logic,* she writes, “is inseparably a *metaphysical* and a *transcendental* deduction of the categories of metaphysics.” *Hegel’s Critique of Metaphysics,* p. 5.

\(^{44}\) *Science of Logic,* pp. 755 ff.

\(^{45}\) See the *Hegel’s Phenomenology of Spirit,* (BB) *Spirit,* pp. 263 ff.
Finally, as Alison Stone has shown in her recent book *Petrified Intelligence*, in Hegel’s *Philosophy of Nature* the textual evidence available to determine once and for all Hegel’s position on the autonomy of the natural sciences is inconsistent and equivocal. 46 Hegel claims in his *Philosophy of Nature* that he is taking a new approach that sublates and goes beyond the extremes of absolute philosophic hegemony and absolute natural scientific autonomy, and grants the natural sciences

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46 See Alison Stone, *Petrified Intelligence: Nature in Hegel’s Philosophy* [NY: SUNY Press, 2005], Chapter 2. In his Introduction to his Philosophy of Nature, Hegel likens his philosophy of nature to Aristotle’s which deprived the natural sciences of their autonomy from metaphysics, but his motivation for doing so is to combat the modern claim that they are absolutely autonomous. At the same time, his reason for denying them absolute autonomy is his abandonment of faculty psychology which isolates the empirical scientific manner of thinking from thoughtful manner of philosophy: “The Philosophy of Nature may perhaps be regarded prima facie as a new science; this is certainly correct in one sense, but in another sense it is not. For it is ancient, as ancient as any study of Nature at all; it is not distinct from the latter and it is, in fact, older than physics; Aristotelian physics, for example, is far more a Philosophy of Nature than it is physics. It is only in modern times that the two have been separated. . . . In connection with this distinction between physics and the Philosophy of Nature, and of the specific character of each as contrasted with the other, it must be noted, right from the start, that the two do not lie so far apart as is at first assumed. Physics and natural history are called empirical sciences *par excellence*, and they profess to belong entirely to the sphere of perception and experience, and in this way to be opposed to the Philosophy of Nature, i.e. to a knowledge of Nature from thought. The fact is, however, that the principal charge to be brought against physics is that it contains much more thought than it admits and is aware of, and that it is better than it supposes itself to be; or if, perhaps, all thought in physics is to be counted a defect, then it is worse than it supposes itself to be. Physics and Philosophy of Nature, therefore, are not distinguished from each other as perception and thought, but only by the kind and manner of their thought; they are both a thinking apprehension of Nature.” See *Hegel’s Philosophy of Nature*, trans. A. V. Miller [Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1970], pp. 2-3. Again: “The science of philosophy is a circle in which each member has an antecedent and a successor, but in the philosophical encyclopaedia, the Philosophy of Nature appears as only one circle in the whole . . . .” (p. 2); “What distinguishes the Philosophy of Nature from physics is, more precisely, the kind of metaphysics used by them both; for metaphysics is nothing else but the entire range of the universal determinations of thought, as it were, the diamond net into which everything is brought and thereby first made intelligible. Every educated consciousness has its metaphysics, an instinctive way of thinking, the absolute power within us of which we become master only when we made it in turn the object of our knowledge” (p. 11); “The difference of the philosophically systematic mode of treatment from the empirical is that it does not treat levels of concrete existences in Nature as totalities, but as levels of characteristic determinations. . . . This is precisely the case with the relationships here. The hierarchy of these relationships and their inter-relatedness is one thing, but the consideration of a concrete, individual body as such is another” (p. 235). In other words, Hegel is clearly rethinking the relation and, as Stone argues, one can conclude neither that he grants the natural sciences absolute autonomy nor that he grants philosophy absolute hegemony over them. He seems to be granting them relative autonomy under the control of his dialectical method. The issue is whether or not “the method” which controls them in fact permits the relative autonomy he wants to preserve.
a relative autonomy under the control, not of logic, but of the transformed logic that he names "the method."\textsuperscript{47}

The apparent equivocation and inconsistency that Stone finds in Hegel’s \textit{Philosophy of Nature} on an issue that Lonergan, for his part, regards as unequivocally settled by the movement from the Order of Logic to the Order of Method, is not limited to that single work. It is to be found, I think, at every point in Hegel’s writings where the hallmarks of the transition from the realm of theory to the realm of interiority appear. In every case, of course, Hegel would deny that he is involved in either equivocation or inconsistency by appealing to the very nature of dialectical speculative system and its propositions,\textsuperscript{48} and he would argue that the charge of equivocation and inconsistency itself is a predictable product of Understanding’s adherence to merely logical controls and a merely logical conception of system.\textsuperscript{49} In short, he would argue that "everything is inherently

\begin{footnotes}
\item[47] Heidi L. Lassen, \textit{Meeting Hegel Halfway}, p. 18.
\item[48] Phenomenology of Spirit, Preface, § 66.
\item[49] Encyclopaedia Logic, Section 14: “The term system is often misunderstood. It does not denote a philosophy, the principle of which is narrow and to be distinguished from others. On the contrary, a genuine philosophy makes it a principle to include every particular principle.”
\end{footnotes}
contradictory." Lonergan, for his part, would maintain that the dialectical tension of Hegel’s speculative propositions and of his speculative system as a whole, that Hegel takes to be necessary and ineradicable, is in fact an unnecessary and problematic instability to be superseded. He would attribute the instability of Hegel’s System to Hegel’s having barely crossed the border separating the realm of interiority from the realm of theory and to his being immersed, consequently, in the admixture of languages and meanings typical of most border cultures. He would attribute it to what we may name “Hegel’s halfwayness,” and he would regard its ubiquity as massive evidence of the need to deepen Hegel’s interiority by adopting the unusual strategy of eversion.

4. Lonergan’s Objections to Hegel

Let us turn our attention to the strains and stresses Hegel’s halfwayness imposes on Lonergan’s relationship with Hegel and so to Lonergan’s account of some of the differences that, despite the intimacy of their relationship, still keep them apart.

First, while Hegel rightly rejects the confrontationist ideal of knowing as looking, there is still operative in his philosophy a prolongation of spontaneous tendencies to extroversion. He regards extroverted consciousness, not as a permanent and unsublateable competitor with human knowing, but as a stage of human knowing to be dialectically retained and superseded. In his philosophy,
then, there are operative both an explicit rejection and a deliberate prolongation of spontaneous tendencies to extroversion. As a consequence, Hegel’s shift to interiority is attenuated by a residual concentration on metaphysics and a neglect of gnoseology.

consciousness is extroverted, there is no operative intention of being. Sublation requires a unitary thread of intention, common to the sublated and the sublating. Hegel places the pure desire in the confronted object as much as in the confronting subject. Consequently, extroverted consciousness can be, and given the inexorable intention of comprehensiveness, must be sublated.

This is amply illustrated by the very structure and progression of Hegel’s PG in which the standpoint of consciousness, with its presupposition of a subject/object dichotomy is sublated without residue by self-consciousness and reason. Hegelian supersession leaves nothing behind. Hegel’s ‘rejection’ of the standpoint of extroversion is also its sublation by subsequent standpoints. Accordingly, while Hegel’s rejection of empiricist confrontationism is emphatic, his ideal of comprehensiveness requires that it also be retained as an earlier stage in the development of consciousness; it is, in this sense, prolonged. In other words, while this prolongation closely resembles the prolongation of extroversion Lonergan attributes to ‘conceptualists’, it is not properly speaking due to an absence of intellectual conversion. Hegel is unequivocal when it comes to the necessity of thoughtful mediation for the attainment of knowledge, and he does not fit the description Lonergan provides in “The Subject” of the conceptualist who, as a “truncated subject,” not only does not know himself but also is unaware of his ignorance and so, in one way or another, concludes that what he does not know does not exist” (The self exists, for Hegel, it’s the Concept), “cannot account for the development of concepts” (Hegel’s philosophy is precisely an attempt to account for their development), and is committed to “an anti-historical immobilism” (The very field of data to be explained, for Hegel, is the dynamic conceptual field). See A Second Collection, pp. 73-74. See also, in this connection, The Ontological and Psychological Constitution of Christ, Collected Works of Bernard Lonergan, Vol. 7, trans. Michael Shield [Toronto: University of Toronto Press, 2002], p. 29. “There are many different intermediate stages between the extremes of a coherent sensism and an equally coherent intellectualism. And one must not think that each individual lives consistently at one fixed stage but rather that we more or less go back and forth between stages. Just as the surface of the ocean is disturbed now by smaller and now by larger waves, and just as the water level falls and rises with the ebb and flow of the tides, so ought we to think of the various levels of perfection at which persons may ‘exist’.”

54 This is amply illustrated by the very structure and progression of Hegel’s PG in which the standpoint of consciousness, with its presupposition of a subject/object dichotomy is sublated without residue by self-consciousness and reason. Hegelian supersession leaves nothing behind. Hegel’s ‘rejection’ of the standpoint of extroversion is also its sublation by subsequent standpoints. Accordingly, while Hegel’s rejection of empiricist confrontationism is emphatic, his ideal of comprehensiveness requires that it also be retained as an earlier stage in the development of consciousness; it is, in this sense, prolonged. In other words, while this prolongation closely resembles the prolongation of extroversion Lonergan attributes to ‘conceptualists’, it is not properly speaking due to an absence of intellectual conversion. Hegel is unequivocal when it comes to the necessity of thoughtful mediation for the attainment of knowledge, and he does not fit the description Lonergan provides in “The Subject” of the conceptualist who, as a “truncated subject,” not only does not know himself but also is unaware of his ignorance and so, in one way or another, concludes that what he does not know does not exist” (The self exists, for Hegel, it’s the Concept), “cannot account for the development of concepts” (Hegel’s philosophy is precisely an attempt to account for their development), and is committed to “an anti-historical immobilism” (The very field of data to be explained, for Hegel, is the dynamic conceptual field). See A Second Collection, pp. 73-74. See also, in this connection, The Ontological and Psychological Constitution of Christ, Collected Works of Bernard Lonergan, Vol. 7, trans. Michael Shield [Toronto: University of Toronto Press, 2002], p. 29. “There are many different intermediate stages between the extremes of a coherent sensism and an equally coherent intellectualism. And one must not think that each individual lives consistently at one fixed stage but rather that we more or less go back and forth between stages. Just as the surface of the ocean is disturbed now by smaller and now by larger waves, and just as the water level falls and rises with the ebb and flow of the tides, so ought we to think of the various levels of perfection at which persons may ‘exist’.”

55 CWL3: 194. As Hegel’s conceptualism differs from Lonergan’s ideal type (see preceding note), so Hegel’s neglect of gnoseology is not absolute neglect. As he writes in the Philosophy of Right [Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2000], p. 21: “…[A]s I have said in the Encyclopaedia, scarcely any philosophical science is so neglected and so ill off as the theory of mind, usually called ‘psychology’.” It is true, on the other hand, that Hegel does, like the ideal conceptualist, “conceive human intellect only in terms of what it does” to the “neglect of what intellect is, prior to what it does,” and so he doesn’t “advert to the act of understanding.” See CWL2: 186. But, his conception of intellect is not of an isolated faculty of which the activities are inferred. He actually attends to what ‘intellect’ does, and he vaguely discerns what ‘intellect’ is (the act of understanding) through conceptual doing, the dynamic conceptual field, darkly. Consequently, he virtually discerns the act of understanding: For a sign of this discernment, see his Lectures on Logic: Berlin, 1831, p. 10: “The chief characteristic of representation is that the references which two things bear to each other in representation lies within a third thing. The understanding posits essential referential relations, referring to terms such as cause and effect, but has no insight into the necessity of the relation. … Any insight into such necessity is lost on representation as such. Thinking is simply something else than representing. To thinking as such belongs whatever is universal. The forms merely lying upon our representations are
Secondly, while Hegel rightly acknowledges a pure desire with an unrestricted objective, he ignores the constitutive component in the act of judgment. As a consequence, he does not identify that objective with a realm of factual existents and occurrences but with a universe of all-inclusive concreteness that is devoid of the factual, the existential, the virtually unconditioned.\(^{56}\) Hegel identifies the objective of the pure desire with the Absolute Idea that is the comprehensive and coherent objective of complete systematic understanding.

Thirdly, while Hegel rightly aimed to rehabilitate rational consciousness after Kant, he failed to do so. To rehabilitate rational consciousness, it must be shown that the unconditioned is a constitutive component of judgment, but Hegel did not do this. As a consequence, the Hegelian system is an incomplete viewpoint that views everything as it would be if there were no facts.\(^{57}\)

Fourthly, while Hegel rightly recognizes the psychological fact that the pure desire or intention of being underpins and penetrates all conceptual contents and that it is a common factor in all conceptual contents, it is neither identified with conceptual contents nor distinguished from them. As a consequence, Hegel’s notion of being is indistinguishable from the notion of nothing.\(^{58}\) Of his own notion or intention of being Lonergan says that it underpins, penetrates, and goes beyond all

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\(^{56}\) See CWL3: Ch. 10, on grasp of the virtually unconditioned and judgment.

\(^{57}\) See the archival document 10500DTE050, www.bernardlonergan.com: “Idealism: denial of confrontationist thing-in-itself; failure to reach unrestricted, unconditioned, absolute, transcendent in reflection and judgment. But ‘being’ is attained in judgment; therefore ‘being’ merely means ‘being known.’”

\(^{58}\) See the archival document 28150DTE070, www.bernardlonergan.com, where Lonergan describes Hegel’s notion of being as “so poor that nothing really is, and so being flops over into nothing.”
conventional contents. Noteworthy here is Lonergan's deliberate and rather glaring omission from his description of Hegel's intention of being of the phrase “goes beyond.”

Fifthly, while Hegel rightly rejects the notion of the unity of substance as a hidden phenomenon standing under and supporting other phenomena, he also denies that external phenomena can be brought together into the intelligible unity of a substantial object and that internal phenomena can be brought together into the intelligible unity of a substantial subject. As a consequence, in Hegel's philosophy there is no thing that appears and no one who understands or judges. There is only the self-unfolding Beg riff that is the emergent identity of being and thought.

Sixthly, Hegel rightly affirms the diversity of phenomena and the understanding of phenomena as such. He also rightly affirms a cosmic reality that is infinitely truer and more real than all other substances. But, by throwing out the baby of intelligible substantial unity with the bathwater of substance as a hidden phenomenon supporting other phenomena, Hegel abolishes all major distinction. As a consequence, there is only an absolute process whose unity is a dialectical law of development.

59 CWL3: 384.
61 Ibid.
62 Ibid. In the Phenomenology of Spirit, Preface, § 2, Hegel provides the following image: “The bud disappears in the bursting-forth of the blossom, and one might say that the former is refuted by the latter; similarly, when the fruit appears, the blossom is shown up in its turn as a false manifestation of the plant, and the fruit now emerges as the truth of it instead. These forms are not just distinguished from one another, they also supplant one another as mutually incompatible. Yet at the same time their fluid nature makes them moments of an organic unity in which they not only do not conflict, but in which each is as necessary as the other; and this mutual necessity alone constitutes the life of the whole.” Compare the image Lonergan provides in “The Subject” in A Second
Finally, we have Lonergan’s summary account of the deficiencies of Hegel’s Dialectical Method. It is conceptualist, closed, necessitarian, and immanental. Because it deals, not with the heuristically defined anticipations that inform and guide cognitional operations, but with determinate conceptual contents produced by those operations, it is not intellectualist but conceptualist. Because it fixes or determines the concepts that will meet the anticipations, the triadic sets of concepts are complete. Consequently, the dialectical movement is not open but closed. Because the fixed, conceptual solutions are bound by necessary relations inhering in a single self-unfolding Begriff, the dialectic follows a unique or single, necessary, and uniformly progressive path toward ever more comprehensive coherence. Consequently, the dialectic is not factual but necessitarian. Further, inasmuch as the entire dialectical field is defined by the concepts and their necessary relations, it does not include pre-conceptual acts of understanding that rise upon experience and are controlled by critical reflection. Consequently, the dialectic is restricted to the conceptual field and is not normative and capable of discriminating between advance and aberration but immanental; it is only capable of discriminating between one-sided moments or half-truths to be incorporated in the self-unfolding of a single comprehensive and coherent, and therefore closed, system of systems.\footnote{Collection, p. 71: “The fruit of truth must grow and mature on the tree of the subject, before it can be plucked and placed in its absolute realm.” Note the Hegelian echo in Lonergan’s image; but, notice as well that what is “the plant” in Hegel’s image is “the subject” in Lonergan’s, and that in Hegel’s image the fruit is not plucked.} 

\footnote{CWL3: 446-447. It is this restriction to the conceptual field, I think, rather than Hegel’s hubris, gnosticism, or hermeticism which gives rise to his startling remark in the Phenomenology of Spirit, Preface, § 5: “To help bring philosophy closer to the form of Science, to the goal where it can lay aside the title ‘love of knowing’ and be actual knowing – that is what I have set myself to do.” On Hegel’s supposed hermeticism, see Glenn Magee, Hegel and the Hermetic Tradition [Ithaca: Cornell University Press, 2001]. Consider Hegel’s comments on arrogance in his Lectures on Logic: Berlin, 1831, p. 14:}
While Hegel has made the transition into the realm of interiority, Lonergan’s criticisms suggest that Hegel has not yet succeeded at making himself fully and comfortably at home there. So it is that Lonergan describes his own treatment of Hegel, not as the reversal of yet another counterposition, but as an eversion – a turning inside out – of a basically positional but still incomplete or unfinished philosophy. Hegel’s philosophy stands to Lonergan’s philosophy as progressive conceptual change stands to developing understanding. Hegel, Lonergan remarks, “endeavors to pour everything into the concept,” including the operational dynamism that generates it. Accordingly, Hegel’s Begriff is the source of its own dynamic movement and development. The conceptual side, as it were, of the intimate relationship of unfolding understanding to conceptual expansion is totalized, and the interior priority of operations to concepts is reversed without eliminating the dynamism attributable to operations. Accordingly, Hegel’s Dialectical Method is fundamentally a conceptual expansion that is identical with a self-active, self-unfolding Begriff.

“Arrogance lies in holding on to something peculiar to oneself. Modesty consists in receiving for oneself the matter itself which lies before oneself. True modesty consists in not insisting on what is one’s own, in not insisting on one’s peculiarity, in not remaining stuck in one’s own idiosyncratic ideas, but instead in willing only the matter itself. As we look only at the matter itself, nothing peculiar is present. Feeble-minded modesty holds itself clear of the matter itself, and such modesty directly passes into arrogance again. Conscious of its own merit, modesty then forgets to forget itself, while when we hold ourselves within the matter itself we forget our peculiarity. In knowing [Wissen] we are free, we remain firmly lodged in thinking. In philosophy we have to do with the matter itself, and with the surrender of self-conceit. Aristotle held that we ought to make ourselves worthy of knowing the matter at hand. This matter, this substance, God, truth, has being in and for itself. We must make ourselves worthy of raising ourselves up to the level of that matter. We make ourselves worthy when we leave our peculiarities behind. We enjoy dignity by taking up residence in the content of knowledge, in what is substantial, and such dignity is quite the contrary of arrogance.”

64 CWL3: 447.
65 See CWL17: 248. “The successive sublations of which I speak are, not at all the mysterious surmounting of contradictions in a Hegelian dialectic, but the inner dynamic structure of our conscious living.”
Lonergan, on the other hand, subordinates conceptual formulation to the operation of understanding that not only generates concepts but also finds them inadequately determinate and then revises them. Accordingly, his method is fundamentally the structured operational dynamism and only secondarily the structured process of conceptual expansion. In Hegel, it seems, the self-active flowing intention is compacted into and absorbed by conceptual formulation and expansion. In Lonergan, the flowing intention that generates ideas to be formulated and brings about their revision is distinguished from conceptual formulation and expansion. Hegel describes the determined and immanental life of a single, dynamic Concept, but Lonergan describes the indeterminately directed and self-transcending life that is the preconceptual dynamism.

At the root of this difference is Hegel’s philosophical absorption, as it were, of the operational by the conceptual field, a move which in fact mimics the absorption and carrying forward of grasped intelligibility that occurs every time the content of

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66 Lonergan’s determination of the actual relationship of the operation of understanding to conceptual formulation is the fundamental and somewhat under-appreciated achievement of his transposition of Aquinas’s rational psychology in CWL 2.

67 This difference may be related to different interpretations by Lonergan and Hegel of Aristotle’s use of energeia in the De anima. See the discussion of Hegel’s use of energeia by Alfredo Ferrarin, Hegel and Aristotle [Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2001], pp. 7 ff. “Hegel interprets energeia as the self-referential activity that he finds at work in its several manifestations: from the self-grounding of essence to the Concept, from the teleological process to natural life, from the essence of man to the forms of knowing and acting down to its most obviously free and self-determining dimension, absolute thinking that has itself as its object” (p. 7). See Lonergan’s discussion of energeia and poiesis, in The Triune God: Systematics, Collected Works of Bernard Lonergan, Vol. 12, trans. Michael Shields, eds. Robert M. Doran and H. Daniel Monsour [Toronto: University of Toronto Press, 2007], pp. 535 ff. [Hereafter CWL12]. See also, CWL2: 119 ff. on the meaning of actus perfecti in Aquinas and Aristotle’s use of energeia in the De anima.

68 See, CWL12: 607: “There is, however, another difficulty, one that is metaphysical rather than psychological, in fact, more semantic than metaphysical. For understanding is an act or operation in one sense, whereas defining or uttering an inner word is an act or operation in another sense. Understanding is an act, second act, an act of what is complete (actus perfecti), energeia, like seeing and hearing and willing. But defining is a kind of making; when we utter interiorly we form and produce an inner word, either a simple inner word, such as a definition, or a compound inner word, a proposition.”
an act of understanding is conceived and formulated. Inasmuch as there are no interior operations without their interior contents, there are no acts of understanding without ideas to be formulated in concepts. But, the ideas and concepts move, when they do move, on the noetic side of subjectivity or interior life, whereas the acts of understanding are the source, on the noematic side of subjectivity or interior life, of their movement. Hegel’s appropriation of the realm of interiority, then, attends to the dynamic, operational side of subjectivity but the purely dynamic object of that attention is obscured by conceptual determination on the noematic side of subjectivity.69 Lonergan’s appropriation of the realm of interiority affords him an understanding of the dynamic, operational side of subjectivity unobscured by Hegel’s preoccupation with the conceptual field. From this difference of emphasis and its consequences arises the requirement to turn Hegel inside out.70

5. The Root of Hegel’s Halfwayness: Overdetermined Negation

Let us turn now to a closer consideration of Hegel’s immature interiority and its relationship to his halfwayness. That immaturity is most tellingly displayed, I think, by Hegel’s determinate negation of the logically controlled metaphysics of the Understanding. It is this determinate negation that sets the stage for his own more

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69 So it is that Hegel thinks in terms of the relations of universals to particulars, whereas Lonergan thinks in terms of the relations of insights to the concrete and particular.

70 So, for example, in his article “A Post-Hegelian Philosophy of Religion,” Lonergan means by “post-Hegelian” the following: (a) a rejection of Hegel’s a priorism, (b) a retention of Hegel’s ideal of comprehensiveness as revealed in his concern with method, (c) a shift from dialectical to generalized empirical method, and (d) a conception of “philosophy of . . .” as the objectification of “the methodological component present in the consciousness” that the practitioner of the science reflected upon “has of his own performance.” See A Third Collection, 202 ff. See the article by Elizabeth Murray, “Post-Hegelian Elements in Lonergan’s Philosophy of Religion,” Method: Journal of Lonergan Studies, Vol. 12 (1994): 215-238.
comprehensive and coherent metaphysics controlled by what he names “the method.” That moment of determinate negation may be conceived as a moment of abstraction from the abstract formalism that characterizes philosophy prior to its retroactive mediation by foundational achievement in the realm of interiority.

Hegel’s objection to the standpoint of the Understanding, which is approximately what Lonergan means by the Order of Logic, is that its categories are merely formal and, therefore, both empty of content and static or fixed and isolated from one another, as illustrated, for example, by the empty and fixed categories of the mind that Kant critiqued. Not only does this formalism conflict with the concrete historical experience of a series of different and conflicting philosophical conceptualities, but also it renders the metaphysics of the Understanding incapable of overcoming the problem of philosophic difference and multiplicity that naturally afflicts philosophy governed by the Order of Logic.

As a first step toward meeting the problem of philosophic difference, then, Hegel undertakes to go beyond the Order of Logic by abstracting from the abstract formalism of the standpoint of the Understanding, thereby not only infusing the categories with life and filling them with content but also making them their own content. In this way, he sets the stage for the sublation of a multiplicity of

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71 Encyclopaedia Logic, § 28, p. 67: The thinking of the old metaphysical system was finite. Its whole mode of action was regulated by categories, the limits of which it believed to be permanently fixed and not subject to any further negation.” § 34: “It is wrong therefore to take the mind for a processless ens, as did the old metaphysic which divided the processless inward life of the mind from its outward life. The mind, of all things, must be looked at in its concrete actuality, in its energy; and in such a way that its manifestations are seen to be determined by its inward force.”

72 See Science of Logic, Introduction, p. 48: “The truth is rather that the unsubstantial nature of logical forms originates solely in the way in which they are considered and dealt with. When they are taken as fixed determinations and consequently in their separation from each other and not as held together in an organic unity, then they are dead forms and the spirit which is their living, concrete
metaphysical conceptualities in a comprehensive and coherent metaphysical conceptuality that is dynamic and takes the changing field of conceptualities as its content. But, it must be noted that, by his single moment of abstraction from the formalism of the standpoint of the Understanding, Hegel does not escape the conceptual field itself but only the emptiness, fixity, and isolation from one another of categories and thought-forms or conceptualities. In one stroke, therefore, Hegel animates the conceptual field and renders its dynamism conceptual. Accordingly, not only must the explanation for conceptual change and expansion reside in the conceptual field itself, but the conceptual field must also itself conceive that explanation. It is for this reason, it seems, that his synthetic result is a dynamic metaphysics that is identical with a logic of a self-moving and self-grounding field of conceptual contents, instead of a dynamic metaphysics that rests upon a dynamic unity does not dwell in them. As thus taken, they lack a substantial content – a matter which would be substantial in itself. The content which is missing in the logical forms is nothing else than a solid foundation and a concretion of these abstract determinations; and such a substantial being for them is usually sought outside them. But logical reason itself is the substantial or real being which holds together within itself every abstract determination and is their substantial, absolutely concrete unity. One need not therefore look far for what is commonly called a matter; if logic is supposed to lack substantial content, then the fault does not lie with its subject matter but solely with the way in which this subject matter is grasped. This reflection leads up to the statement of the point of view from which logic is to be considered, how it differs from previous modes of treatment of this science which in future must always be based on this, the only true standpoint." See also, Phenomenology of Spirit, Preface, § 33: “Thoughts become fluid when pure thinking, this inner immediacy, recognizes itself as a moment, or when the pure certainty of self abstracts from itself—not by leaving itself out, or setting itself aside, but by giving up the fixity of its self-positing, by giving up not only the fixity of the pure concrete, which the 'I' itself is, in contrast with its differentiated content, but also the fixity of the differentiated moments which, posited in the element of pure thinking, share the unconditioned nature of the 'I'.”

73 The Phenomenology of Spirit is a narration of the unfolding of thought-forms, i.e., of the categories filled with content, whereas the Science of Logic is the more abstract narration of the unfolding categories themselves, taken as their own content.
epistemology, both of which are grounded in a cognitional theoretic account of the
dynamic structure of preconceptual operations.\textsuperscript{74}

Hegel's transition into the realm of interiority from the realm of theory is
inspired by the historical experience of a series of conflicting philosophies, and it is
thought to be accomplished by a negation of abstract formalism or a deliberate
abstraction from formalism's abstraction from both dynamism and content.
Lonergan shares Hegel's inspiration, but it is augmented by the experience of
Hegel's reflective, meta-philosophical attempt to overcome philosophic difference.
Accordingly, while Hegel is inspired to carry out a single abstraction, Lonergan is
inspired to carry out a double abstraction.

Hegel abstracts from formalism's abstraction and, thereby, enriches
categories with content, infuses them with life and, with a now heightened
reflexivity, turns them on themselves as their own object. Lonergan follows Hegel by
(1) abstracting from formalism's abstraction from dynamism and content,\textsuperscript{75} but he

\textsuperscript{74} The differences between Lonergan's and Hegel's solutions to the problem of integration are
discussed in a paper by Matthew Peters, "Lonergan, Hegel, and the Point About Viewpoints,"
presented at WCFI 2011, Loyola Marymount University, Los Angeles, April, 2011.

\textsuperscript{75} See Lonergan's description of logic's abstraction from both content and dynamism and
applied logic's abstraction from dynamism at CWL3: 599-600: "However, while logic as a science is
quite well established, it owes its universality and its rigor to the simple fact that it deals with
unspecified concepts and problems. Hence it differs in an essential fashion from logic as an applied
technique for, as an applied technique, logic deals not with indeterminate acts and contents of
conceiving and judging but with the more or less accurately determined contents of some
department of human knowledge at some stage of its development. On the supposition that the
knowledge of that department at that stage is both fully determinate and completely coherent, logic
as a technique can be applied successfully. But in fact human knowledge commonly is in process of
development, and to a notable extent the objects of human knowledge are also in process of
development. As long as they are developing, they are heading for the determinacy and coherence
that will legitimate the application of logic as a technique; but until that legitimacy becomes a fact,
the utility of the technique consists simply in its capacity to demonstrate the commonly admitted
view that progress remains to be made." See also, CWL3: 613-614: "Now from the viewpoint of the
electronic computer, which coincides with the viewpoint of logic as a technique . . . [s]ystem has to
be static system. System on the move has to be outlawed. The dynamism of life and of intelligence
may be facts but the facts are not to be recognized."
goes beyond Hegel by (2) abstracting from the entire dynamic field of categories.\textsuperscript{76} The first moment of abstraction is a shift of philosophical attention to the dynamic and expanding field of conceptual content that results in the greater concreteness of Hegel’s narration of unfolding thought-forms in his \textit{Phenomenology of Spirit} and his thinking of thought in his dynamic \textit{Logic}. But, it is only the first moment of abstraction. If that initial shift is regarded as terminal, the dynamic principle must be located in the only place available, and that is the expanding conceptual field itself.\textsuperscript{77} But, Lonergan regards that first moment of abstraction as transitional and, in a second moment of abstraction, he turns from the field of dynamic and expanding conceptual content to the field of operations and makes the operating subject its own object. He makes a move to still greater concreteness. Accordingly, he is able to locate the dynamic principle of the conceptual field, not in the conceptual field itself, but in the field of preconceptual operations that generate and move it. From Lonergan’s standpoint, Hegel’s negation of the Order of Logic, inasmuch as it is thought to be accomplished by a single moment of abstraction from formalism, is excessively determinate.

Again, Hegel is careful to distinguish his dialectical negation from indeterminate negation, the latter being equivalent to a blanket skepticism. His insistence on the determinacy of negation is motivated by his discernment of the

\textsuperscript{76}It is this second moment of abstraction that Lonergan promotes when he recommends “applying the operations as intentional to the operations as conscious” in \textit{Method in Theology}, p. 14, and ‘self-appropriation’ or “experiencing, understanding, and judging experiencing, understanding, and judging” in \textit{Understanding and Being, Collected Works of Bernard Lonergan}, Vol. 5, eds. E. Morelli and M. D. Morelli [Toronto: University of Toronto Press, 1990], Ch. 1 and in CWL3: Ch. 11. See also, \textit{Method in Theology}, p. 11, on the difference between the categorial and transcendental modes of intending.

\textsuperscript{77}In a question session, Lonergan remarks: “As for Hegel’s \textit{Phenomenology}, well, as someone said, ‘Hegel is fine if you omit the system!’” See CWL17: 137.
workings of a normative dynamism in conceptual expansion that skepticism rejects. But, he negates the fixity of the conceptual field without negating the conceptual field itself, and this leaves the conceptual field as the only possible locus of the normative dynamism. Thus, Hegel’s conceptual field is animated by its own normative principle, every one of its movements must be normative, and its dialectical process leaves no unsublated conceptual residue. But, to negate the emptiness and fixity of categories without negating as well their very conceptuality is to leave unsublated a positive residue of preconceptual operations upon which both the normative generation of a series of ever-truer conceptualities and the aberrant generation of just plain false conceptualities depend.

The difference between Hegel’s procedure and Lonergan’s may be described differently and in more purely Hegelian terms. The first moment of abstraction is the moment of determinate negation in the dialectical process. Lonergan’s second moment of abstraction corresponds to the third moment, the negation of that determinate negation. The original position is that of the formalism of the Understanding; it is the conceptual field of fixed, isolated, and empty categories. The negation of that original position is the conceptual field of dynamic, interrelated, and filled categories. The negation of that determinate negation is the operational field. But, Hegel doesn’t make this third move and negate that determinate negation.

78 Lectures on Logic: Berlin, 1831, p. 231: “The method is not the form as it comes to be explicated upon any particular empirically given material. The method rather is the universal inner life of every self-concept [Begriff], it is the dialectical process of development as subjectively re-enacted.”

Accordingly, what I've referred to as the excessive determinacy of Hegel's determinate negation of formalism can also be described as a determinate negation that still awaits dialectical sublation and completion in a negation of that determinate negation. We should not be surprised to find, therefore, that Hegel’s synthetic System does not successfully supersede the determinate negation of the formalism of the Understanding, but is rather the thorough and unrelenting working-out and implementation of that determinate negation in all its un-negated determinateness. Hegel’s negation of the Order of Logic, then, turns out to be a thorough concretization of the standpoint of the Understanding's ideal of comprehensive and coherent understanding of all phenomena, rather than the thorough supersession of the Order of Logic.80

The consequences of Hegel’s excessively determinate negation – of his failure to negate his determinate negation of formalism – are manifested, I believe, in his System as a whole and in every part. I shall provide just four strategically important examples here.

First, Hegel's vaunted transition from substance to subject takes him just halfway to Lonergan's subject-as-subject. His negation of the externality of theoretic

80 I have put the issue in more purely Hegelian fashion, in terms of the distinction of three moments of dialectical process. But, it remains that Hegel's dialectic is a conceptual dialectic. The relationship of the second moment to the third here, inasmuch as the third is a negation of the conceptual field and a transition to the operational field, does not conform to Hegel's dialectical procedure which is restricted to the conceptual field. Lonergan's negation of the negation is not a conceptual transition but an operational transition from the field of conceptual transitions to the field of operational transitions. Hegel's System is a conceptual synthesis of the consequences of his determinate negation of formalism. But, conceptual integration – even a conceptual integration that is said to integrate itself – is not the supersession of the standpoint afforded by Hegel's determinate negation. It is a completion and systematic integration of the standpoint of determinate negation, and is dependent upon and still afflicted by formalism as its determinate object. Precisely because of its conceptual completeness, Hegel's System evokes a sweeping negation of the entire conceptual field and the supersession of the most enriched and enlivened and integrated form of conceptualism.
metaphysics’ conception of the subject-as-an-object among other objects terminates in the affirmation, not of the subject-as-subject, but of substance-as-subject or substance as the conscious Begriff.\footnote{Lectures on Logic: Berlin, 1831, p. 7: “I am the thinking subject. The I illustrates the self-concept [Begriff] by existing through itself alone, merely on its own account. Thinking is the universal taken as active. The universal is first what is abstract. By a ‘concept’ we usually understand a determinate representation of the imagination. But in the science of logic the concept is something completely different, of which the I provides an example. This singular subject is immediately united with the I.” Note also Hegel’s tendency to identify the ‘subject’ more with ‘life’ than with consciousness in Hegel’s Philosophy of Nature, p. 275: “[L]ife, as Idea, is the movement of itself whereby it first constitutes itself subject, it converts itself into its other, into its own obverse; it gives itself the form of object in order to return into itself and to be the accomplished return-into-self.”} Hegel’s subject, to the extent there can be said to be a subject in Hegel, is not the one who operates to produce conceptual results, but is rather itself a self-producing result.

Secondly, Hegel’s negation of the merely formal logic of abstract identity takes him just halfway to method. His negation of the staticity of formal logic terminates in the affirmation, not of a dynamic structure of prelogical operations,\footnote{See Lonergan on method as general dynamics in “A Post-Hegelian Philosophy of Religion,” A Third Collection, 204-215.} but of a logic-in-motion.\footnote{See CWL17: 394. “Hegel rightly felt that logic was too static to deal with a universe in movement. But the solution to that problem, we feel, does not consist in the invention of a logic of movement. Rather we would leave logic to its traditional tasks, which are essential to working out the coherence of any system and thereby bringing to light its shortcomings. But we would confine the relevance of logic to single stages in the process of developing thought, and we would assign to method the guidance of thought from each less satisfactory stage to each successive more satisfactory stage. In brief, the relevance of logic is at the instant, when things are still. The guide of philosophy and science over time is method.”}

Thirdly, Hegel’s negation of a multiplicity of incommensurable closed metaphysical systems takes him just halfway to Lonergan’s “system on the move.”\footnote{CWL3: 613, for example. The phrase is used throughout CWL3.} It terminates, not in an open operational system isomorphic with a circle of linked,
composed, and complementary operations, but in a dynamic closed system of systems identical with the Absolute Idea. Hegel’s “System of Science” is a self-moving circle of self-moving circles of self-moving conceptual results.

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85 See Lonergan’s discussion of three “manners in which systematic thinking has been carried out,” in *Philosophy of God and Theology*, pp. 5-8. He distinguishes (1) the Aristotelian type based on a metaphysics, (2) a second type found in modern science, and (3) a third type whose basic terms and relations are cognitional, whose terms and relations are not given to sense but to consciousness, and whose basic truths are not necessities but verified possibilities. The third is what Lonergan refers to elsewhere as “operational system” which is a system of works isomorphic with a circle of operations. See his discussion in the archival document A488, www.bernardlonergan.com, “The Circle of Operations,” trans. Robert Doran, SJ, where Lonergan introduces the notion of an “operatory habit,” distinguishes it from the faculty psychological notion of an “operative habit,” and distinguishes and relates operatory habits, operational circles, and operational systems.

86 Hegel’s image of circles occurs throughout his works. For example: *Encyclopaedia Logic*, § 15: “Each of the parts of philosophy is a philosophical whole, a circle rounded and complete in itself. In each of these parts, however, the philosophical Idea is found in a particular specificity or medium. The single circle, because it is a real totality, bursts through the limits imposed by its special medium, and gives rise to a wider circle. The whole of philosophy in this way resembles a circle of circles. The Idea appears in each single circle, but, at the same time, the whole Idea is constituted by the system of these peculiar phases, and each is a necessary member of the organization.” Again: “Every such form in which the Idea is expressed is at the same time a passing or fleeting stage; and hence each of these subdivisions has not only to know its contents as an object which has been for the time, but also in the same act to expound how these contents pass into their higher circle.” Also, *Hegel’s Philosophy of Nature*, Zusatz, p. 2: “The science of philosophy is a circle in which each member has an antecedent and a successor, but in the philosophical encyclopaedia, the Philosophy of Nature appears as only one circle in the whole . . . .” Also, *Lectures on Logic: Berlin, 1831*, p. 231: “The self-activation of the absolute idea occurs within all of its moments, in the logic of being as within that of essence. Each of these two circles is within itself a circle of circles, each such circle contains the whole larger circle imprinted upon itself.”

87 See the archival document 20600D0EG50, “The Circle of Operations,” where Lonergan asks, “Do the operations of Hegelian dialectic form a circle?” and answers, “There is no doubt that his dialectic tends towards circles of circles. See the diagram in H. Leisegang, Denkformen, 2nd Edition [Berlin: W. de Gruyter, 1951] 164-66. These circles of circles, however, regard the works more than the operations themselves. But that these operations form a circle is quite clear both from the result, since it supposes the circulation of operations of the circle produced, and from the operations considered in themselves, since counterposing is thought to emerge necessarily from the operation of positing, and from these two with equal necessity Erheben results, which is equivalent to a new position and so gives rise to another counterposition, and so on, until logic, nature, and spirit are constituted.” [My emphasis] He then asks, “Are there other circles of operation beside those of Hegel?” and answers, “Clearly, there are many other circles of operations that neither were devised nor are reducible to Hegel’s. Take for example . . . the circle of operations of experiencing, understanding, and judging and its development as outlined in the book *Insight.*” [My emphasis] See also *Phenomenology and Logic, Collected Works of Bernard Lonergan*, Vol. 18, ed. Philip McShane [Toronto: University of Toronto Press, 2001], pp. 300-301, where Lonergan writes: “Hegel, in his *Phenomenology of Spirit*, is constantly using such a technique. He starts off from a very simple notion and raises the obvious difficulties that involve a deepening of the notion. Then he goes further, and finally by the time we are around the circle he has given us a fully nuanced notion. That is an excellent device in teaching as well as in writing.” *Method in Theology*, p. 6: “. . . [M]odern science derives its distinctive character from this grouping together of logical and non-logical operations. The logical tend to consolidate
Finally, Hegel’s negation of the controlling deductivism of the metaphysics of the Understanding takes him just halfway to Transcendental Method. It terminates, not in an invariant, fundamental circle of preconceptual operations generative of and isomorphic with circles of conceptual results, but in a dialectical deduction that is identical with expanding circles of conceptual results [See Figs. 3 and 4 below]. It terminates in thought thinking itself, but not in understanding understanding itself.

what has been achieved. The non-logical keep all achievement open to further advance. The conjunction of the two results in an open, ongoing, progressive and cumulative process. This process contrasts sharply not only with the static fixity that resulted from Aristotle’s concentration on the necessary and immutable but also with Hegel’s dialectic which is a movement enclosed within a complete system.”

88 See the archival document 49700DTE50, www.bernardlonergan.com: “(3) the fundamental circle (a) is a natural habit of principles that does not have to be discovered, understood, judged; it is had from the very dynamic structure of the mind; thus it operates naturally in every human being and is inevitably employed by them; (b) nonetheless, it is not an explicit habit . . . (c) nor is the habit explicitly acknowledged as fundamental unless there has occurred a philosophic conversion; . . . Philosophic conversion is the transference of the foundation from the circle of sensory-motor operations to a circle of experience, understanding, and judging. (d) also given the explicit knowledge and rational acknowledgement of the fundamental circle, there is further required a scientific development so that the properties and differentiations can be clearly illumined; . . . (f) therefore we must say that (a) the fundamental circle as a natural habit always is operative and is somehow naturally acknowledged; (b) with the development of the human spirit it is ever more clearly and fully known and acknowledged; (c) in itself it is inevitable and irreversible, and can be known with certainty as such, with that degree of clarity that corresponds to the development that has been attained; (d) it escapes the revisability that belongs to the law of gravity and the periodic table because (1) consciousness of oneself as experiencing, understanding, judging is not an indirectly verified hypothesis; (2) the circle is presupposed in every revision of any theory whatsoever.” See also, the archival document 49600DTE050, www.bernardlonergan.com: “The fundamental human cognitive circle of operations consists of three operations: experience . . . understand . . .; reflective understanding, affirmation or negation. These make up a circle. They mutually need one another . . . They mutually complete one another . . . And once the three are posited, the circle is closed.”
As these four examples show, Hegel has indeed gone beyond the unwholesome standpoint of the Understanding, but he has not shaken off its influence. His critical and dialectical overcoming of the logical control of meaning mediated by the systematic exigence is excessively determinate. Inasmuch as the life he attributes to the conceptual field is not in fact internal to the field itself but resides in the operations that generate it, his “dialectical deduction” moves with the halting gait and shuffling inexorability of Dr. Frankenstein’s galvanized monster. It is the determined punctuated movement of a series of fixed conceptualities, each of which, externally vivified, remains intrinsically alienated from the life within it.

It is by thinking at the level of and with this substance-as-subject, this Begriff, that the finite subject is at home with itself [bei sich]. It is in this movement that Hegel invites

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89 Hans Leisegang, *Denkformen*, 2nd Edition [Berlin: de Gruyter, 1951], pp. 164-66. These images illustrate well the absorption and capture of operational dynamism by the conceptual field that results from Hegel’s excessively determinate negation of the Order of Logic. See the note above.
90 See the archival document, 49600DTE050, bernardlonergan.com: “We do not say speculative intellect. In the simplified Greek sense, this is abstract, eternal, necessary. In the Hegelian sense (and almost always in non-Catholic writings), it is the restoration of deductivism through another logical technique, namely, dialectic.”
us to be at home. But, in virtue of the excessive determinateness of Hegel's second moment of negation, in this movement we are, in fact, only halfway home.

In this section, I have been carrying out, in an extremely abbreviated form, an exercise in Lonerganian dialectic. Let’s take a moment to note its difference from Hegelian dialectic, because the difference is reducible to the difference between Hegel's single abstraction and Lonergan's double abstraction and so to Hegel's excessively determinate negation or to his incomplete mediation of the Order of Method. Hegel's dialectic undertakes to exploit and reconcile oppositions in the conceptual field. The source of his dialectical movement is a tension between concepts or conceptualities in the single field defined by the self-unfolding *Begriff*. But, Lonergan's dialectic exploits and reconciles oppositions *between* the conceptual field and the field of preconceptual operations. The source of his dialectical movement is a tension between concepts or conceptualities, on the one hand, and the performance that generates and maintains those concepts or conceptualities, and even attempts to enclose them in the unique conceptual field of a single unfolding *Begriff*, on the other. So it is that Hegel's dialectical argumentation is a sublative supersession of conceptual opposition without conceptual residue, whereas Lonergan's dialectical argumentation is correction by the elimination of disparity between concept or conceptuality, on the one hand, and the preconceptual performance upon which it depends, on the other.\(^91\) The performance upon which it

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\(^91\) Lonergan's exercise of dialectic is fundamentally the exhibition of performative self-contradiction. See the archival document 61800DTEG60/A618, www.bernardlonergan.com: "And there you have a fundamental opposition between what I call positions and counter-positions. Positions express the dynamic structure of the subject qua intelligent and qua reasonable. Counter-positions contradict that structure. Whenever a person is explicitly affirming – presenting or
depends is, in every case, what Lonergan calls, perhaps inaptly,\textsuperscript{92} “Transcendental Method.”

6. A Consolidating Image

In this essay I have attempted to explain why Lonergan invites those who wish to reach his standpoint of Critical Realism to get to know Hegel and come to terms with him. The explanation lies in Hegel’s inside-out interiority or what I have referred to as Hegel’s halfwayness. Let us return now to the archival image in which Lonergan assigns Hegel to the realm of interiority, but now elaborated to reflect the intimate complexity of his relationship with Hegel. Despite the augmentations, however, this image, like the more schematic images with which we began, remains heuristically anticipatory rather than representative of determinate and firmly established results.

\textsuperscript{92} See \textit{Method in Theology}, pp. 13 n 2 where Lonergan acknowledges misunderstandings and distinguishes his meaning of ‘transcendental’ from the Scholastic and Kantian meanings. It appears that the border-culture extends well into the interior. Insofar as Hegel has made the transition from the realm of theory to the realm of interiority, he has added his voice to the border culture. Accordingly, Lonergan’s use of ‘dialectic’ is also an appropriation of the language of the border culture.
Response to the systematic exigence mediates a movement out of the realm of common sense, organized around experiential operations (Lonergan) or around being as the object of ‘intuition’ (Hegel), into a realm of theoretic meaning, organized around intellectual operations (Lonergan) or around essence as the object of ‘representation’ (Hegel), and the development of a multiplicity of systems of scientific and philosophic thought. The historical experience of the multiplicity and of systems supplanting and replacing one another gives rise to the critical exigence and the movement into the realm of interiority, organized around rational operations (Lonergan) or around the Concept as the object of ‘thought’ (Hegel). The Lonerganian transition into the realm of
interiority, mediated by a thoroughgoing double abstraction, is from subject-as-object to subject-as-subject; the Hegelian transition, mediated by excessively determinate negation by a single abstraction, is from subject-as-substance to substance-as-subject. Lonergan establishes his interior foundation, a fundamental circle of operations [Experience—Understanding—Judgment], by means of self-appropriation and cognitional theoretic understanding of understanding in Insight; Hegel establishes his interior foundation, a fundamental circle of results [Being—Essence—Concept], by means of his narration of the experience of consciousness in his Phenomenology of Spirit and his logical thought thinking thought in his Science of Logic. From their respective and parallel interior foundations, each responds to the methodical exigence and addresses the problem of integration set by philosophic multiplicity and difference: Lonergan, by implementing his Transcendental Method; Hegel, by implementing his Dialectical Method. Their different and parallel responses to the methodical exigence mediate different systematic integrations in the realm of theory, grounded in their different critical achievements in the realm of interiority. Lonergan’s integration is Explicit Metaphysics and the doctrine of the isomorphism of knowing and known; Hegel’s integration is his System, or Absolute Knowledge and the doctrine of the identity of thought and being. The former is Lonergan’s Critical Realism; the latter, Hegel’s Absolute Idealism. Their parallel responses to the methodical exigence and their different solutions to the
problem of integration mediate, in turn, different post-critical systematic
theologies.93

93 The halfwayness of Hegel, that is revealed by Lonergan’s reading, might explain the seeming
intractability of the polarizing and enduring controversies in Hegel interpretation, the existence and
persistence of the so-called myths and legends about Hegel debunked in The Hegel Myths and
Legends, ed. Jon Stewart [Evanston: Northwestern U. Press, 1996], and both the hermeneutic
exasperation that motivates the search by some readers of Hegel for “the Hegelian middle” (See Emil
Fackenheim, The Religious Dimension in Hegel’s Thought [Beacon Press, 1970], Ch. 4) and their
disappointment at the outcome of their efforts. My own suspicion is that in the absence of a
Lonerganian-type eversion of Hegel’s philosophy, these controversies cannot be resolved, the
legends cannot be put to rest, and the elusiveness of the “Hegelian middle” cannot be explained. In
Method in Theology, p. 264, Lonergan provides an example of the implications of Hegel’s halfwayness:
“The absolute idealist, Hegel, brilliantly explores whole realms of meaning; he gives poor marks to
naive realist; but he fails to advance to a critical realism, so that Kierkegaard can complain that what
is logical also is static, that movement cannot be inserted into a logic, that Hegel’s system has room
not for existence (self-determining freedom) but only for the idea of existence.” Elsewhere, at CWL3:
398, Lonergan alludes to the “toppling” of Hegelianism into the left-wing factualness of Marx and the
right-wing factualness of Kierkegaard. For every dispute about Hegel, it seems, if one can find textual
evidence for one reading, one can also find textual evidence for its opposite. Some say he’s really this,
and others say he’s really that. But, it seems that he’s always really both. This, I have argued in this
eyss, is a function of his halfwayness, rooted in excessively determinate negation of the Order of
Logic. He negates the staticity, emptiness, and isolation of the categories by Understanding’s logic of
abstract identity, but he doesn’t negate the conceptual field itself. He doesn’t peel the obscuring
dynamic field of conceptual content off of the field of operations and set it aside. Accordingly, he has
no choice but to locate the source of dynamism in the conceptual field through which the operational
field is indeed discerned, but only darkly. From this move, I believe, the intractable controversies
naturally follow. Lonergan, on the other hand, performs a thoroughgoing “conceptual negation.” He
negates the staticity, emptiness, and isolation of categories, and then peels off the conceptual field
with its punctuated dynamics, sets it aside, and locates the source of dynamism in the fluid dynamics
of the operational field. With this move, I believe, the tension of Hegel’s speculative propositions can
be relieved and the interpretative opposition superseded.