COMMUNICATING A DANGEROUS MEMORY

SOUNDINGS IN POLITICAL THEOLOGY

edited by Fred Lawrence
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EDITOR'S NOTE

Our two-day symposium on Communicating Dangerous Memory was inspired by the semester-long presence as Visiting Lecturer at Boston College of Johann Baptist Metz. As he made so abundantly clear in his lecture and seminar courses, narrative and memory, especially the dangerous memory of Jesus Christ crucified and risen, have been central to his attempts to work out a new practical and political paradigm for theology. We thought it would be a good idea to share the excitement and vividness of Metz's teaching time here with participants at one of the Lonergan Workshop's mini-sessions. Baptist Metz indicated that he would prefer to do this in a collaborative way, so that three of the articles in this volume come from that occasion.

We at Boston College are fortunate to have as part of our permanent staff one who has surely devoted decades of productive existence precisely to communicating the dangerous memory of the suffering and risen One, Sebastian Moore. So we thought it fitting that Sebastian contribute a sliver of his prolific and profound meditation upon our dying and rising with Christ to this symposium.

The remaining speakers besides Baptist Metz were Matthew Lamb and I. We had agreed to cast our presentations in the mold of reflections upon our own dangerous memories. Matthew Lamb, surely the most well-known student of Metz here in the United States, gave a talk recalling his own sharing in Metz's envisioning of an integrally interdisciplinary university that included theology as an organ of critical reflection in the Church. Since Metz's withdrawal from practical engagement with establishing a Catholic faculty at the interdisciplinary university at Bielefeld, this dimension of the task of theology in a political paradigm has vanished from the forefront of his thinking—which Baptist Metz admitted with regret in his response to Matthew. Thus, his talk was a salutary and provocative reminder that the political paradigm's emphasis upon the narrative modes of emancipatory anamnesis in no way implies a dedifferentiation on the part of the theologian, but quite the contrary. Unfortunately, Matthew Lamb's talk—which Gregory Baum called the
clearest and most passionate he'd ever heard Matthew deliver—is not contained in this volume. But the tenor and implications of his comments may be found both in the immediate documentation of his collaboration with Metz during his German sojourn, History, Method, and Theology, and in his more recent Solidarity with Victims.

My own talk is a recollection of my biographical involvement with political theology, and of how several strands of experience have a possibility of integration on the basis of what turn out to be the quite practical and political implications of Lonergan's work.

Johann Baptist Metz's talk, so kindly transcribed for us by his graduate assistant for that semester, J. Michael Stebbins, begins with a moving narrative of Baptist's own biographical way to the breakthrough from Rahner's paradigm to his political one. It then elaborates the specifically apocalyptic orientation that Metz sees as characteristic of the new paradigm.

This volume opens with the first annual George Link Jr. Lecture, delivered in October 1986 to mark the opening of our Boston College Lonergan Center. The lecturer, most appropriately, was Frederick Crowe, long friend and mentor to students of Lonergan's thought. We are grateful both to the Link Foundation for sponsoring this lecture, and to Fred Crowe for sharing his observations on a very timely topic.

The other articles in this volume come not directly from the symposium with Johann Baptist Metz, but from other Lonergan Workshops. I have decided to include them here because they demonstrate the relevance of Lonergan's orientation to political and liberation theology/philosophy in a way that is not just theoretical and programmatic, but altogether concrete.

The piece by Patrick Byrne of Boston College's Philosophy Department and Richard Carroll Keeley, Director of the PULSE Program at BC, arises from their collaborative efforts to help students reflect concretely on values in relation to the good of order in cities like Boston. Perhaps no one shares Lonergan's nose for the concrete as much as Jane Jacobs, an author he esteemed most highly; and Byrne and Keeley avail themselves of her insights into the concrete in reflecting on the
relationship between horizon and orientation and the architectural conditioning of human spaces and times.

The bulk of this volume is taken up by the report of John Boyd Turner on the development project with which he was involved in the Philippines. It is an unusual gift to have on hand a person who is not an academic, who has been practically engaged in social transformation, and whose outlook has been profoundly affected by method in Lonergan's sense. As you will see, John's reflections take more the shape of soundings than of final and summary conclusions. We have accommodated ourselves to the extraordinary length of John's article both because their value lies in the interplay between theoretical and the concrete; and because, as Abby Warburg said of works of art, "The love of God resides in the details."

Our thanks go out to Michael Stebbins and Matthew Mullane for transcribing and reading proof, to Nancy Woodhouse and Sheila Kilcullen for wordprocessing, and to our manuscript and layout editor, Charles Hefling.

January, 1987

FRED LAWRENCE
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"THE ROLE OF A CATHOLIC UNIVERSITY IN THE MODERN WORLD"—
AN UPDATE

Frederick E. Crowe, S.J.
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A lecture series instituted in honor of Bernard Lonergan need hardly justify the choice of Catholic universities as the first topic to be treated, for Lonergan's whole career was dedicated to the university ideal in Catholic studies. Even when his work was carried on in a seminary milieu, it was designed to meet rigorous university standards and to raise seminary studies to the highest academic level.

Some explanation is needed, however, for the particular form of the title I chose. The main phrase is in quotation marks, the reference here being to an article Lonergan wrote many years ago in the Montreal Relations on "The Role of a Catholic University in the Modern World" (Lonergan, 1951). If I take the present occasion to try to update that article, I can claim a measure of justification in a simple accident of history. We are approaching the thirtieth anniversary of Lonergan's great work, Insight: A Study of Human Understanding (Lonergan, 1957a) and Boston College is already laying plans to celebrate the event in its annual workshop next June. Now it was during his work on Insight that Lonergan wrote "The Role of a Catholic University." The article was in many ways an epitome of the book and an index of its long-range purpose. It seemed to me therefore that, as Lonergan's article anticipated his book, I might use this lecture to update the thesis of the article and thus anticipate the anniversary that Boston College proposes to celebrate.

Naturally I look to Lonergan himself for help in this ambitious enterprise: the updating will be more his than mine. And I find help in a second monumental work he wrote: Method in Theology (Lonergan, 1972), which followed Insight fifteen years later. I would say, in a single-
sentence summary of those two works that, where \textit{Insight} set forth the
dynamism of human spirit in a structured set of operations, \textit{Method} used
that operational structure to create an organon for human development—
human development in its broadest scope: not just in theology, but in
the whole range of the human enterprise, including therefore the enter-
prise of academe and in particular of the Catholic university.

So much for an introduction to my topic: now to the topic itself.
It is a large one, a very large one indeed. I shall have to resort to
various limitations as I proceed, but at least I can get quickly to the
nub of my argument by putting it in the form of a thesis. The thesis is
twofold: first, the Catholic university is a specialized learning arm of
a learning church set in the midst of a learning human race; and, sec-
ondly, it is just in this sadly neglected learning function of the race,
of the church, of the university, that Lonergan's work can make a momen-
tous contribution.

There is no need to delay on the learning function of humankind.
Forty years ago Lonergan set forth a basic position on "human ignorance
and human progress" as he found it in Aristotle via Thomas Aquinas.
"The first philosophers," they claimed, "were babbling babes...No one
knows truth perfectly, and no one knows none at all; individual contri-
butions are inevitably small but the common sum is great" (Lonergan,
1967a: 38). With such a basis in his masters, Lonergan easily developed
his own position on the nature of progress—"the long, hard, uphill
climb" of "the creative process" by which the human race continues to
learn and to grow:

\textit{It is a matter of insight, not of one insight but of many, not
of isolated insights but of insights that coalesce, that comple-
ment and correct one another, that influence policies and
programs, that reveal their shortcomings in their concrete
results, that give rise to further correcting insights, cor-
rected policies, corrected programs, that gradually accumulate
into the all-round, balanced, smoothly functioning system that
from the start was needed but at the start was not yet known
("Healing and Creating in History," in Lonergan, 1985: 103).}

Now in this learning race of humankind is set the church of Jesus
Christ, not parachuted in from heaven to assume an angelic presence
among us, but incarnate in humankind as its founder was incarnate in a
human body he received from Mary. The church, then, finds its place in
this learning race and is itself a learning church. That is basic to my whole argument. It is a solid basis but it has to be uncovered and noticed and built upon, for it goes unnoticed most of the time and falls strangely on our Catholic ears when it is mentioned. But the thesis itself of a learning church is not at all novel. Why should it be novel to recognize the learning function of a church that had a learning founder? Jesus advanced, we know, in wisdom and age and grace. Not only that; he also learned obedience, and continued to do so right up to the last hours of his life on earth. The church too has in fact always been a learner; all through our long history we have been learning, though maybe without adverting sufficiently to the fact or giving it the attention it deserves.

What after all was the great controversy in the early church over imposing the law of Moses on the Gentiles—what was it but a struggle to learn our freedom from that law? Peter was so slow to learn this that he needed a vision from heaven, a great sheet let down with forbidden food that he was told to eat; we have no right to expect a revelation like that, but must learn through the ordinary means God has given us. What again was the two-hundred-year turmoil from around the year 180 to around the year 380 but a similar struggle to learn what we already vaguely believed but could not adequately express about the divinity of Son and Spirit? What once again was the long process from Charlemagne to Thomas Aquinas but a slow learning of the way our faith had to be understood if we were to meet the challenge of the new thinking making its way into Catholic Europe mostly through Arab philosophers and theologians?

The learning process did not reach its final term with Thomas Aquinas. We continue to learn. Hence, when Leo XIII determined to recover the contribution of Aquinas, it was not an effort to turn back the clock; on the contrary, while decrying wholesale abandonment of the past, he recognized the role of the new and coined a phrase that has become a kind of motto, "vetera novis augere et perficere"—cherish the old, yes, but also add to it and improve upon it (Leo XIII, 1879: 111). Neither did John XXIII think of standing pat as he inaugurated the second Vatican council and set forth its purpose. Of course, he spoke at length on fidelity to the tradition: no Catholic council will fault him for that. But then he went on to state his specific intention; the council was not called, he said, to reiterate old dogmas: we do not need
a council for that. No, we need a council because we need to take a step forward, to go beyond the past (John XXIII, 1962: 715). Later in that historic year of 1962 Pope John repeated this message; only the second time round he used the Italian language and his expression was more vivid: he did not speak in general terms of moving forward, "iter pergentes" in the Latin; instead he used the phrase: a "leap" forward, "un balzo innanzi" (John XXIII, 1963: 44). A "leap" forward—that does not sound like a mere rephrasing of present dogmas or a simple use of resources already traditional in the church. And it is not anything so facile as that at all. As the Pope explained, the forward leap involves study of modern methods of research and of the literary forms of modern thought (John XXIII, 1963: 44).

Hence it was in full accord with the human life of our founder, in accord too with our history through many centuries, and in accord with the position taken by Pope Leo and Pope John, when at the recent extraordinary synod Bishop Bernard Hubert gave it as his view that episcopal action then and there at the synod would be premature; the bishops, he said, should first bring themselves up-to-date, that is, go back home, discuss the themes of the synod locally in wide consultation, and then return to Rome to take them up in episcopal assembly (Hubert, 1985: 12).

The thesis of a learning church is not, therefore, novel. My proposal to talk about the learning church is novel, or may seem so, for the reason I have already suggested: the excessive and almost exclusive attention we have given our teaching function, to the great neglect of our learning function. We are like a biologist friend of mine who, as I remember it, spent long hours of his life looking with his right eye through a microscope, only to discover after several years that his left eye had ceased to function. Or we are like a bird that has had one wing hugely overdeveloped while the other has been allowed to atrophy. We can hardly take flight on wings of eagles in that condition.

May I repeat my point and try to put it in clear perspective. It is not that the church has failed to learn: I maintain, in fact, that we have learned steadily throughout our history. But we have learned slowly, laboriously, painfully, and reluctantly. That is the significant word—reluctantly, always reluctantly. Further, I have assigned a reason for the reluctance: it is basically a failure in the first step of all learning, attention to the data: we have attended to our teaching
function, we have not attended to our learning function. Let me raise and answer here an obvious but too facile objection; it will clarify my position. The objection would point to the evident concern of the church that believers should learn. After all, seminaries are set up in order that candidates for the priesthood may learn, and strict regulations determine what they must learn before they are pronounced ready for ministry; moreover, a major fruit of their ministry consists in what the larger circle of believers may learn from it. And what is true of priests, is true of deacons, catechists, and others. Yes, of course; all that the objection says is true—and misses my point entirely. For the learning the church insists on is mainly learning what is handed on, learning what was already in the storehouse of the church's wisdom, not the creative learning of Pope John's leap forward. Hence we have seen learning as mainly obedience to a word from on high coming to us out of the past through the ministry of qualified teachers, and not as a responsibility for the whole church, including its teachers, for exercising the creative potential given us by God. So we have not looked on learning in this sense as a special church problem, or studied its implications, or developed its criteria, or assumed responsibly the tasks it imposes. In short, no institution has a higher source for its mandate to teach than the church has, but by the same token no institution has a higher degree of responsibility for the correlative function of learning.

If I turn now to the role Catholic universities might play in the exercise of that responsibility and to the contribution Lonergan's ideas might make to the execution of their task, it is important to continue to see the matter in perspective. Neither Pope John nor Bishop Hubert appealed simply to academe for help in learning how to make our way forward; the bishop indeed spoke rather of wide-ranging consultation "with all the members of the people of God responsible for the mission of the church" (Hubert, ibid.)—I don't know any adult Catholic who would be excluded from that category. But the Catholic university has its own input to make as the academic specialization of the learning function, and it is that academic specialization that is in question now.

Proper perspective demands then that we set the Catholic university in the context of the life of the church, but it demands also that we set it in the context of universities in general. They too are
learning institutions—not just institutions of learning in the sense of achieved learning, but learning institutions in the active verbal sense of being called to learn, staffed by professors who need to learn. This will not correspond, perhaps, to the average view taxpayers take of a university; they would be surprised to hear that universities are funded so that professors may learn; people send sons and daughters there to learn, but professors, one imagines, already know and so are able to teach. Those of us, however, who have grown old in the teaching business may find my thesis somewhat more intelligible and acceptable; we know far better how little we knew when we started teaching, and how much we continued to learn through the years. We know right well that when we stop learning we are through in academe, and have become useless and unprofitable professors in the university.

But it is not just professors who must learn. The university itself as an institution must be open to learning and to revising its own estimate of its function. This has special relevance in our time to the secular university which makes such a to-do about dogmatism in the Catholic university and is often blind to the dogmatism that governs its own policies and programs. They have to learn that the age of innocence is over, for universities as for other institutions. It ended in the sixties when values came back into their own, invaded the universities as they did the marketplace, and brought with them not only new views and beliefs, but also the expose of the hidden beliefs and dogmas that had previously been operative. But not all institutions have realized this. Some universities, for example, have still to discover the role of values—the role of values, not as a subject for discussion, not as a division of the curriculum, but of values as a commitment of the institution. So they continue to deny values an intrinsic role in education, and to do so in the name of unacknowledged values they themselves chose in correspondence with unacknowledged dogmas they themselves hold, values and dogmas that exercise an intrinsic control therefore over their own educational programs.

The Catholic university has the potential to teach a great and sober lesson under this heading, and its secular counterpart has much it could learn from us, but the utterly universal condition for human teaching is learning, so let us put our own house in order first, exercise our own learning function, learn in fact the role of the learning
function, before we offer to teach others; the blind remain very poor guides for others who are blind.

I have been very slowly approaching my main topic. But in today's divided church the blessed work of peacemakers is more than ever a need and a duty. So I have felt a responsibility to speak not only to those who see the church the way I do, as also a learning church, but also to those whose attention may be fixed almost exclusively on its teaching function. To these I would address one more preliminary remark, in the form of a question: where has the contemporary Catholic university failed in comparison with the medieval university? This latter was thoroughly Catholic, and we know well enough its contribution to the life of the church and the culture of those times, but we know also that in our own times we are regarded as laggards, arriving on the scene, in a much quoted phrase of Lonergan's, "always...a little breathlessly and a little late" (Lonergan, 1957a: 733). So what happened between the middle ages and ours?

Many things, of course. But one obvious thing that happened was the work of people like Richard Simon, and Leopold von Ranke, and John Henry Newman. For the first two, since I am not familiar with their contributions, I simply adopt the general view of the experts; but for Newman, whom we all know a little better, we may think more specifically of the author of the essay on development of Christian doctrine. Now the work of all three occurred in the modern university, or at least in the context of the modern university, and could not have occurred outside that context. But it did not occur in the context of the Catholic university: von Ranke was a professor in the University of Berlin; Newman wrote his essay as an Anglican, though one on the way to Roman Catholicism; and Simon, though a Catholic and a member of the Oratory, got himself expelled from that order as a result of his work—he had denied that Moses wrote the Pentateuch.

These few soundings in history illustrate one aspect in the modern relation of the church and academe. There is surely a problem here. Thirty-five years ago Lonergan wrote in a general way of what he called the ambiguity of the Catholic university: "From the schools of Alexandria and Antioch, through the medieval universities, to Pascendi and Humani generis, Catholic intellectuals have been discounted as doubtful blessings" (Lonergan, 1967b: 118). But that general statement of thirty-five years ago needs updating in the present situation. The
present situation is that there have been two distinct advances in the university world. In each case our reluctance to learn with the rest of the world has involved us in a crisis—in one case in what I will call the crisis of scholarship, in the other in a crisis of creativity. Now it is my contention that Lonergan's transcendental method not only enables us to distinguish the two crises and see them in their distinct characters as well as in their relation, but also can contribute notably to the relief of both—the first phase of his method, the mediating specialties, to the relief of the crisis of scholarship, and the second phase, the mediated specialties, to the relief of the crisis of creativity.

This sounds like a thesis and a half instead of a subdivision of the thesis I originally announced, but it is essential to get an overall view of the present situation. In another famous phase of Insight, "In constructing a ship or a philosophy one has to go the whole way" (Lonergan, 1957a: xiii). I will not try to construct a whole philosophy, much less a whole university curriculum; I will speak only of theology, but even within these limits our view must be large enough to take in the whole as well as its parts.

The first crisis to consider is in what Lonergan calls the field of scholarship. Scholarship here can be most simply understood by mentioning once more the names of von Ranke, Simon, and Newman. If we put them in that order we can think of them as standing for research, interpretation, and history. Of course, all three were involved in all three pursuits, but we appropriate attributes to the divine Trinity, so maybe we can do likewise for this trinity of scholars. Now it is easy to see how the scholarship in question triggered a crisis in the church. To take the obvious example of Simon, he questioned a human belief that we had held peaceably for century after century, namely, that Moses was the author of the Pentateuch. I call it a human belief and not a Catholic doctrine, but it was so interwoven with Catholic doctrine that its denial seemed subversive of the faith, and so we had a crisis of scholarship.

That crisis is partly over, and partly with us still. It is over so far as we have learned, over then in regard to various pieces of erudition and the legitimacy of the procedures by which we arrived at them. Thus, we no longer hold that Moses wrote the Pentateuch, and we know why we may legitimately take that position. We no longer proclaim
the genuinity of the Johannine comma, and we are able to justify on the grounds of textual criticism its exclusion from scripture: it was just not part of John's first letter. We no longer hold that Athanasius wrote the creed we have called Athanasian, and we are able to show conclusively enough that this creed is to be located after Augustine. We have finally learned our lesson in these areas.

The crisis of scholarship is not over, however, in so far as there is lacking an integral view of human development that would relate research, interpretation, and history to one another and to the whole academic enterprise in the full scope of its potential. This is exactly where Lonergan's first phase of theology, the one he calls mediating, the phase that deals with scholarship, can come to our aid. First of all, it puts order into the various branches of scholarship. It enables us to see the work of von Ranke, Simon, and Newman as all of a piece, as integral parts of one achievement. In so far as they are doing research they are collecting data to be submitted to the questions of intelligence; in so far as their intelligence determines the meaning of a series of documents, they are preparing a judgment on what happened in earlier times; in so far as they are writing history, they are issuing such a judgment. Then their history prepares the next step, a study of the horizons within which our predecessors worked. We can see an organic unity in what they are doing. We can recognize the legitimacy of the limited objective that research sets itself, that of assembling the data, and we can accept the results of research with that limitation; similarly, we can recognize and accept the limited objective of determining an author's meaning, and relate it to the larger purpose of discovering what was going forward in a series of authors. The whole has room for parts, and the parts find their raison d'être in the whole.

But the trials of theology do not end there. We survive the crisis of scholarship only to be faced with the crisis of creativity. For neither scholarship as such, nor the whole mediating phase in that limited objective theology sets itself, deals directly with Catholic doctrines, still less with articles of faith. It is theology, Lonergan says, in oratione obliqua, theology as telling us what the data are, what they were meant to convey, what the sequence of meanings was. Concretely it puts us in possession of books like Merk's critical edition of the Greek New Testament, or C. H. Dodd's Interpretation of the Fourth Gospel, or Aloys Grillmeiers's Christ in Christian Tradition.
Now this tells us what Mark wrote, how John understood the tradition about Jesus, how the patristic church wrestled with Christology. Of course, this puts us in contact with the sources, but it is important also to realize that theology does not stop with reporting words and happenings from the past: there is a second phase of theology and it must be related to the first.

The difference between the first and second phases of theology is the difference between reporting someone else's affirmation and making that affirmation on my own, the difference between what we called in Latin grammar indirect and direct discourse, between "Caesar said, It's raining," and asserting on my own authority, "It's raining." In the second phase of mediated theology this makes all the difference in the world between those who believe and those who don't. Someone who doesn't believe a thing John wrote can still report and study his statement, In the beginning was the Word. But only believers will make that statement on their own, stand up as it were and be counted, affirm as true, Yes, in the beginning was the Word.

Now if our responsibilities were fulfilled by repeating what John said, or Mark, or Matthew, or Luke, then that would be the end of the matter: there would be no further problems once scholarship had done its work. But our responsibilities are not fulfilled by repeating John and Mark, Luke and Matthew. We need a restatement of our faith in our times and for our times. That restatement has to be creative; it must add to and improve on the old: vetera novis augere et perficere. Further, we must learn how to restate the faith creatively, and once again our reluctance to learn creates a crisis in church and university. We would like to stay with the status quo. Or, if we agree, reluctantly, to a measure of updating, we take half-measures. But, if theology mediates between a religion and a culture, and if the culture has been radically transformed, then theology cannot make do with half-measures.

All this seems absurdly simple, but clarity on the absurdly simple things is essential. Even if our business is heresy-hunting, we should not muddy the clear waters of the heresy. We should distinguish clearly between errors in doctrine and errors in scholarship, in the latter be able to say whether the error pertains to research, to interpretation, or to history, and in the former be able to discern and make allowance for the tentative gropings of creativity that are inseparable from the mediated theology of direct discourse.
Now it is the second phase of theology that presents the real crisis today. The crisis of scholarship is passing, but the crisis of creativity is just looming on the horizon, and the urgent need in theology now is to see the relation of the first phase to second, to make the transition from one to the other, and then to set out the procedures of the second phase in their unity and distinction. It is here that the real advance is now occurring, and it is here that the crisis in the church and the Catholic university is approaching a fever point.

I have proposed to call this new crisis the crisis of creativity, on the ground that we are dealing with a creative restatement of our faith. I would claim that that is exactly the point of Pope John's leap forward. It is the point also of Lonergan's effort from foundations through doctrines and systematics to communications: "There are real problems," he writes, "of communication in the twentieth century, and they are not solved by preaching to ancient Antioch, Corinth, or Rome" (Lonergan, 1972: 140). To speak to the people of Boston today in the year 1986 A.D. instead of to the people of Corinth in the year 56 A.D., to dialogue with the universities here and now in this city of the twentieth century, instead of with the philosophers on the Areopagus in the first century—that is the task of the Catholic university, the task to which Lonergan's second phase of theology would contribute. We are not then in this phase dealing simply with what Mark or Matthew or Nicea said, though we will wish to hold what they did, but with that creative formulation of the faith which is necessary if we are to speak to our contemporaries, and indeed if we are to make our faith clear to ourselves and the ancient dogmas nourishing for our spirits.

You may wish to distinguish two uses of creativity. If so, I have no objection. All creativity involves the exercise of understanding, but there is understanding that surges up from below, the creativity expressed in the invention of the wheel and in the idea of Esperanto, and there is understanding that, receiving meaning from above, endeavors to call up from below the adequate images and forms with which to express it. This latter type of understanding is as creative in theology as the invention of the wheel was in the progress of mechanics, and it would be simply suicidal to suppress it. This is the creativity we speak of in the second, mediated phase of Lonergan's theological method.
The method then pivots between past and future. There is a receiving and there is a handing on. But in a university the receiving is not passive and the handing on is not without increment. We do not receive the past without being attentive to data, or without exercising intelligence, reason and responsibility, that is, without bringing the past before the tribunal of human spirit. Similarly we do not hand on without adding our own input. We do not bury our talent fruitlessly in the ground. We make our contribution, be it ever so small, to the heritage of our race. To recall Lonergan on Aristotle: "No one knows truth perfectly, and no one knows none at all; individual contributions are inevitably small but the sum is great." And our contributions are made through the exercise of the same functions as were operative in receiving the past, only now in the reverse direction: being responsible, reasonable, and intelligent, as well as attentive to results in our experience. There is creativity with method all along the line, innovation with tradition, critical evaluation with grateful reception.

The whole is a package deal with an integrated resultant: we find a source of relevance and meaning in interiority, we are thereby enabled to restate the ancient truth and make it truth for our time, we give it the coherence in which alone single items can be understood, and we inculturate it through our preaching in every nation and every sub-culture. This is an extremely rapid overview of the enormous task that theologians face today and, although I cannot go into the matter this evening, I would be doing Lonergan a great disservice did I not point out the comprehensive nature of the goal he envisaged and the complexities of our process toward the goal. For one thing, the interiority that is source of our categories in doctrines is a shared interiority: we commit a serious oversight if we neglect the role of community which supplies the dynamism for the second phase as human intentionality supplies it for the first. For another the coherence that systematics aims at involves a relation to the whole universe and the whole network of sciences by which we try to dominate that universe and organize contemporary experience. In other words, we are not dealing solely and simply with documents from the past, or with truth in an ancient context.

Truth, of course, is part of the package, and so is the truth received in an ancient context. So in theology we have to wrestle with the veritas antecedens and the veritas consequens: the one is given us from the past, the other we have to formulate as faith seeks under-
standing and re-expresses itself (Lonergan, 1964: 19-32; see Lonergan, 1957b: 13-20). Now the transition from the veritas antecedens of scripture, creed, or council, to the veritas consequens of faith that has found understanding, is one of Lonergan's major contributions, one that so far has been almost totally neglected by his peers. He calls it transposition, a term that can be understood either from mathematics, where the formula for a point in one set of coordinates is transposed to the formula in another, or from music, where a melody is transposed from one key to another. Thus the Palestinian way of thinking about Christ was transposed by Paul and others into a new way, one that had meaning for the hellenic world in which they preached. Thus too the Pauline formulas in their turn were transposed at Nicea into the expressions that were needed to meet the Arian crisis. And now in 1986 an urgent need of further transposition awaits our study, one that will take a leap forward from Nicea and express the Nicene faith in our time and for our time.

The second phase is, then, a creative restatement, creative in its horizon-analysis of past exponents of the faith, creative in its self-study and analysis of our own horizons, creative in its transposition from the horizon of the past to the horizon of the present. As a creative experience it cannot avoid a measure of the tentative; if the tentative turns out to be wrong and is nevertheless adhered to it becomes theological error, but we need not take that route: there is the alternative route of the self-correcting process of growth. From that viewpoint Newman's famous Rambler essay was a bit unfair, or maybe we should say it has been unfairly used. It made the point, you remember, that in the Arian crisis it was the bishops who wavered and the laity who remained loyal to the faith. But that overlooks that fact that the bishops of that age were the theologians of that age, the ones who had to discover the formulation the age needed, the ones who took the initiative in the learning process. It was not that they wavered in the faith, though of course some may have done so, but that they struggled through the trials and tentative results of learning to find an adequate expression of their faith, a task to which the laity of the time were not equal.

It is axiomatic now that a time of crisis is also a time of opportunity, a kairos, a moment of responsibility. But an opportunity may be faced and it may be declined. The latter is the easier choice,
and there are easy slogans to rationalize it. For example, "The past has all the answers," when in fact a key lesson taught us by the past is that every present age must struggle to find its own answers. Or, for another example, The teaching church will give us the answers," when in fact the church needs to learn in order to have and teach the answers, and the Catholic university plays an indispensable role in the learning process. Or, again, "Vatican II learned what the needs of our time are and supplied the answers," when in fact Vatican II simply gave us a start in the learning process needed today, and a momentum we could easily lose by non-activity.

If we turn to more distant history, we find the same pattern, a kairos that some would ignore and others would seize. There were those once who would remain fixed in the law of Moses, but the church moved creatively forward with Paul. There were those after Nicea who would return to pre-Nicene times, but the church moved creatively forward with Athanasius. There were those in the middle ages who would shun Aristotle, and stick with what they had learned from Augustine, but the church moved creatively forward with Thomas.

If we see these three episodes as a single recurring pattern, it will not be hard to see our own time as a fourth member in the series, and one surely of equal or even greater moment. Personally I think the present crisis surpasses any that has occurred in the long history of the Judeo-Christian religion, and that far from being over it is only beginning. I find support for my view in a haunting remark of Jaspers: "For more than a hundred years it has been gradually realized that the history of scores of centuries is drawing to a close" (Jaspers, 1963: 22). If Jaspers is right, the crisis is great indeed and our time would be a second occurrence of that axial period that he discovered centuries before Christ in the several civilizations of the time.

If the crisis is great, so too is the responsibility of the church to our present members and to the generation that will succeed us. Now responsibility cannot by its nature be pessimistic. When Lonergan thirty-five years ago wrote on the role of a Catholic university in the modern world, he began his last section with the remark: "If our age is full of deep foreboding, still 'only with the fall of twilight does Minerva's owl take wing?"' (Lonergan, 1967b: 119). The proverb, I believe, goes back to Hegel, but we have now to add, in view of our quotation from Jaspers, that the twilight is long drawn-out. In other
words, we have time still. In matters of intellectual progress there is no Blitzkrieg. There is time, and so there is opportunity; there is kairos.

In this kairos I have turned to Bernard Lonergan for illumination on our problems. He was never a partisan of either left or right in church politics. Some on each side would claim him, but others on each side would repudiate him. He himself could take the measure of both sides: "There is bound to be formed," he wrote, "a solid right that is determined to live in a world that no longer exists. There is bound to be formed a scattered left, captivated by now this, now that new development, exploring now this and now that new possibility" (Lonergan, 1967b: 266-267). He was drawn to neither, for the reason, I think, that as Matthew Arnold said of Sophocles, he saw life steadily and saw it whole.

But whether we find in Lonergan the help we need to learn the lessons we need to learn, or choose to seek help elsewhere, that is not really the question for the Catholic university. The main question is whether the Catholic university is open to the challenge, will recognize the kairos, is ready to respond. I quote, if you will allow me one last sentence from Lonergan, a line he wrote in that essay of thirty-five years ago with which I began: we cannot suppose, he said, "that a second-rate Catholic university is any more acceptable to God in the new law than was in the old law the sacrifice of maimed or diseased beasts" (Lonergan, 1967b: 118). If we remember that he was at work on Insight as he wrote that essay, we will have some idea of the standards he would set for a firstrate Catholic university. May Boston College continue to rise to the challenge of those standards. May the center of research you instituted today in the name of Bernard Lonergan make its contribution to that task and thus respond to the initiatives of Pope Leo XIII, of Pope John XXIII, of the very Holy Spirit at work among us.
WORKS CONSULTED

Hubert, Bernard
1985

Jaspers, Karl
1963

John XXIII
1962

1963
Acta Apostolicae Sedis 55, pp. 43-45.

Leo XIII
1879

Lonergan, Bernard
1951

1957a

1957b

1964

1967a

1967b

1972

1985
Lonergan begins his treatment of sin in his philosophy of education lectures on the human good with a discussion of the two thinkers on the nineteenth century who may have exercised the greatest influence upon the twentieth century, Karl Marx and Friedrich Nietzsche. For Lonergan, Marx provides a "fundamental inspiration" in his "hatred and critique of the sins of the bourgeoisie of the nineteenth century" (1959: 50). In Nietzsche, Lonergan goes on to say, "there is a hatred and critique of the sins of the masses, of what is all too human: their resentment against human excellence of any kind, their desire to bring everything down to their own level" (50). Nietzsche's diagnosis of the withered corpse of humanity in the West is a real contribution to a grasp of the general foundational category of sin; and, we may presume, his unforgettable portrayal of the 'last man' produced by liberal democratic and socialist solutions to the political problem is also a description of the wages of sin.

In their hatred and critiques of sin, both Marx and Nietzsche have driven home the existence in the West of the universal hermeneutic crisis. They have made us realize that interpretation is first and foremost a practical issue. But until relatively recently, modern theology has not been quite clear about this crisis, to say the least. Academic theology has been increasingly under the sway of now conventional job descriptions that currently subcontract scholarly tasks of religious studies out to a set of subdisciplines that divide up the data on Christian religion for ever more minute and sophisticated study, on the one hand. And in so far as theology in a somewhat more traditional sense still exists, on the other, it has been dominated in Catholic circles by Rahner's sort of transcendental-metaphysical systematics; and in mainline Protestant enclaves by Process theology's out-and-out ontological approach, which has been growing in esteem among Roman Catholics.
who are attracted by its critique of classical theism. Under any of these auspices, Christian theology has not really come to terms with the universal hermeneutical crisis for its normative traditions, meanings, and values which is announced by the Marxist critique of ideology and by the Nietzschean attempts to surmount historical consciousness with the techniques of genealogy (Foucault) or deconstruction (Derrida).

In light of Marx and Nietzsche, the questions will not down: is theology in the fragmenting scholarly mode anything more than a species of intellectual history? Isn't theology in the totalizing ontological mode just a brand of academically domesticated speculation lacking any practical bearing or importance?

In rather astonishingly stark contrast with dominant approaches, however, the central role played by the structure of the human good in those 1959 lectures at Xavier University and carried on throughout the entire Method campaign indicates that the constitutive, effective, and communicative functions of meaning at the heart of interpretation as practice impelled Lonergan to make the functional specialties the culmination of a "philosophy of action" (1974: 223).

The following talk is a modest effort to locate Lonergan's methodical achievement in relation to my own quite circumstantially conditioned contact with what Johann Baptist Metz has characterized as the 'paradigm shift' within theology marked by the rise of political and liberation theologies.

I

My own encounter with the issues of political theology was mediated initially by the debate between Hans-Georg Gadamer and Jürgen Habermas which arose in Germany during the late sixties at the time I was doing my dissertation in Switzerland; and by the blow-by-blow accounts of Baptist Metz's break from Rahner which I received through the good offices of my friend and colleague from Roman years, Matthew Lamb, who was studying in Münster during those turbulent years. Habermas took what in actuality was a rehabilitation of Aristotelian practical and political philosophy made possible for Gadamer by Heidegger to be in effect a master cover-story for a specifically German form of Neoconservatism on the part of thinkers like Lubbe, Ritter, and
others of his school. At the time, I could not help but think that Habermas was wrong in ascribing this stance to Gadamer; and yet that he was quite correct in what he was opposing. Moreover, I believed that for all his readiness to elaborate the Frankfurt School's notion of the dialectic of the enlightenment under the umbrella of the classical distinction between practical wisdom and technical expertise, Habermas had not yet understood rightly either the import of phronesis for Gadamer's hermeneutic philosophy or its significance for practical and political philosophy and theology today.

Perhaps it would not be far from the mark to say that Baptist Metz was catching on to the fact that Karl Rahner's entire theology—which Metz now categorizes as transcendental-idealist—had missed the point of phronesis, too. But the relevance of this Aristotelian insight has not been something Metz has been able to pick up. Indeed, he probably would agree with Habermas's interpretation of Gadamer. Even now his reaction to Rahner is located under the head: idealist/post-idealist.

I would express Metz's point over against Rahner as follows. Rahner's basically epistemological (Why is doing that knowing?) and metaphysical (What do we know when we do it?) mediation of the transcendental, universal, and absolute horizon yields a lack of clarity with regard to both categorical revelation and historical time: how does it really do justice to the specificity, the contingency, and the concreteness of Christian meanings and values? Doesn't Rahner's transcendental horizon (both natural and supernatural) get noumenalized in a Kantian sense? That is to say, doesn't it get interiorized in the pejorative sense of an 'already-in-here-now'? existentialized in the pejorative sense of an account of attitudes whose concrete historical mediation is so vague, and for which so little is ever actually at stake, that that mediation concretely almost seems not to matter in the final analysis? privatized in the sense of being mystical in isolation from social, political, and cultural dimensions of human living? and hence, rendered ahistorical to the degree that it eliminates the need for existential history in Lonergan's sense of the condition for individual and social identity?

I find it helpful in formulating Metz's opposed, post-idealist approach to use ideas I have learned from Lonergan. Thus, I would argue that Metz's central category of memory is a recognition of existential
history as the knowledge of one's individual and collective past that makes social continuity possible. His emphasis on narrative is opposed to history as a feature of the culture of the museum or mausoleum in which past life is observed as an object so distantiated as to have practically no meaning whatsoever for our lives. Narrative as selectively and symbolically engaging rather than aiming at being exhaustive, then, highlights the crucial functions of memory for life: (1) It displays an ethical function, because it is not beyond good and evil, but praises and blames; and so, as Christian, it is history of suffering and of the losers. (2) The centrality of the theodicy question for Christian narrative entails an apologetic function. (3) As pointing out a direction for future action in light of its ethical, apologetic, and symbolic stance, it is prophetic in function. (4) And since we cannot operate individually and collectively without such a memory, it is constitutive and existential.

In the background of Metz's turn from Rahner's foundations are crucial concrete autobiographical factors. There was the scandal of German Catholic theology's silence about Auschwitz. There was his many years-long encounter and conversation with Ernst Bloch, which was accompanied by his gradual appropriation of the Marxist analyses of the Frankfurt School, especially concerning the mutual entanglement of knowledge and human interests and hence the end of scientific and scholarly innocence. And there was his absorption of what Habermas has called Walter Benjamin's Rettungskritik (saving or redeeming criticism) in contrast to the onesidedness of emancipatory critique in the Marxist style. In time, Metz's political theology has unfolded these motifs—most notably in the credal statement, Our Hope, whose first draft he composed for the German Synod of Bishops; and in the commentary on that document that has constituted the burden of his lectures here at Boston College this year.

One way of getting at what Metz has been up to might be to say that he is elaborating a radically negative (or apophatic) theology as a response to E.M. Forster's famous slur: "poor little talkative Christianity." This theology is not a natural or simply negatively mystical theology as we may be familiar with from the Christian tradition. As both mystical and political it takes up at once two aspects of negativity absolutely crucial to Christian, Jewish, and Islamic religion in the light of the theodicy question. For Metz the theodicy question
focuses upon the problem of moral evil in all its calamitous enormity as symbolized by Auschwitz, so that his is a theology done in the proximity of existential and narrative history as a history of suffering and of sufferers. He argues that the negativity of the radical unintelligibility of evil as an enormous and often catastrophic objective surd is to be faced not with theory, but with the saving narrative: the dangerous memory of Jesus who suffered, died, was buried and raised again on the third day.

The second negativity is the radical difference between God and everything else. Metz elaborates this difference ('than which none greater can be thought') in terms of the narrative resources provided by the 'incognito Jesus' of Nazareth, called a fool by Herod and a rebel by Pilate, who suffered, died, was buried, and rose again. In contrast with Jürgen Moltmann, who transposes the issue of unreconciled suffering into the Godhead via Luther's theology of the cross, Metz replaces Thomas's notorious agnosticism in relation to God by his own agnosticism centered upon Jesus. Striving to be poor in answers and rich in questions, he goes on to envisage what he calls an anthropological revolution:

[This revolution is not, in fact, concerned with liberating us from our poverty and misery, but rather from our wealth and our totally excessive prosperity. It is not a liberation from what we lack, but from our consumerism in which we are ultimately consuming our very selves. It is not a liberation from our state of oppression, but from the untransformed praxis of our own wishes and desires. It is not a liberation from our powerlessness, but from our own form of predominance. It frees us not from the state of being dominated but from that of dominating; not from our sufferings but from our apathy; not from our guilt but from our innocence, or rather from that delusion of innocence which the life of domination has long spread throughout our souls (1981: 42).

This is clearly neither a bourgeois nor a socialist revolution as these are ordinarily conceived under the auspices of modernity. Indeed, Metz speaks of grace itself as a capacity "not to see ourselves and evaluate ourselves with our own eyes but with the eyes of our victims, out of which, in the end—the Lord himself impressed this on us with unmistakable clarity—he himself looks upon us" (68).

In this way, then, Metz sublates the Frankfurt School's central insight concerning the dialectic of the enlightenment into a much more
profound context in which that dialectic itself gets relativized into
the pole of liberal democratic and socialist 'ideologies of winners' and
enters into tension with the pole of redemption with its radical gospel
challenge to solidarity with history's outcasts and victims.

II

Now most continental and North American political theologians are
preoccupied with the twentieth century's totalitarian revolutions of
right (Hitler, Mussolini, Franco) and left (Lenin, Stalin, Mao-tse-
Tung). A name that constantly pops up in this context in the talk of
Germans like Habermas and Metz is that of Carl Schmitt. He
was the
leading architect of the ideological foundations of the Third Reich.
Thus, Habermas's diatribes against 'decisionism'—whether in Karl Popper
or in versions of out-and-out positivism—are really also directed
against Schmitt. The same can perhaps be said of Metz's opposition to
what he calls Ordnungsethik (the ethics of 'law and order') in contrast
to an ethics of liberation or transformation. The name of Carl Schmitt,
and all he stands for, links our discussion of Johann Baptist Metz to
another type of political philosophy/theology with which my peculiar
circumstances have brought me into contact, that of Leo Strauss.

Strauss began his career as a political scientist in a context
dominated by Marxists on the one hand, and on the other by that con­
ergies of social theory-cum-Lebensphilosophie associated with Wilhelm
Dilthey, Georg Simmel, Max Scheler, and others. At first the towering
example for Strauss had been the great neo-Kantian social scientist who
made Nietzsche safe for academics in his fact/value distinction, Max
Weber.

Allow me to cite from Strauss's own autobiographical remarks:

I attended [Heidegger's] lecture course from time to time
without understanding a word, but sensed that he dealt with
something of utmost importance to man as man. I understood
something on one occasion: when he interpreted the beginning of
the Metaphysics. I had never heard nor seen such a thing—such
a thorough and intensive interpretation of a philosophic text.
On my way home I visited [Franz] Rosenzweig and said to him that
compared to Heidegger, Max Weber, till then regarded by me as
the incarnation of the spirit of science and scholarship, was an
orphan child (1970: 1).
Strauss got from Heidegger a hermeneutic challenge of the most radical sort. Gadamer has encapsulated the way Heidegger actually incarnated a new way of interpretation as follows:

to seek to make the interpretation of the interpreted text so convincing that one actually runs the risk of losing oneself in it. This was the way it went for us at Heidegger's lectures themselves: that through his interpretations the subject matter would become so incarnate that we could no longer tell: Is he presenting his own conviction or is he presenting the opinion of Aristotle? (Gadamer, 216).

The upshot of this challenge was that Strauss, like Gadamer, was struck by the possibility of a return to premodern authors through a process of delivering them from the encrustations that arise from being 'kept' within extrinsically or inauthentically authoritative traditions. Both Gadamer and Strauss agree that what Heidegger was on about was just what was at issue for the great founder of dialectical theology, Karl Barth, during the same period. In his preface to the first edition of his Epistle to the Romans, Barth proclaimed to those swamped by the sophistication of enlightened critical historical exegesis of Scripture: adequacy to the subject matter (Sache) of a classic text cannot be equated with historical critical interpretation! Note well two salients here. First, the subject matter, or what Strauss above called 'something of the utmost importance to man as man.' We need to apprehend this in context of the phenomenological movement's battle-cry: 'To the things themselves!' which was interpreted by Heidegger's hermeneutic phenomenology as: 'Back to the pragmata!' which is to say, 'Let's start with the things we deal with concretely and about which we are actually concerned' (Strauss, 1970). The second salient is careful, painstaking reading of the kind that, as Lonergan has put it, may require revolutions in our personal living tantamount to religious, moral, and intellectual conversion.

I would like to suggest, then, that these two salients became the keys to a strategy for the reorientation of philosophy and theology as comprehensive reflection on the human condition that went on to constitute the basso ostinato for the rise of political theology in the West. Moreover, they are also keys to any truly radical pedagogy of the oppressed.
In case you are wondering what all this has to do with Metz, the intrinsic connection becomes evident as soon as we realize that Strauss was able to point out not merely that for Schmitt the state alone could guarantee authority, since only it could protect its citizens from internal and external enemies; or that the state alone could be sufficient to ensure law and order in human affairs, because only it is supposedly guided by principles of leadership and loyalty; or that for Schmitt the entire legal order is based on sovereign decisions grounded in turn upon emergency decrees. No, Strauss was also able to show how Schmitt’s whole ideology of decisionism is itself grounded within the horizon of modernity as articulated in the philosophy of Thomas Hobbes. Further links with Metz also become transparent once one realizes (with or without the help of Strauss from which I personally have benefitted) that this horizon of modernity is also (a) the horizon of what Metz castigates as evolutionary time (as opposed to apocalyptic time); (b) the horizon of anthropodicy—the bourgeois or socialist self-made man or woman who worships his or her maker; and (c) the horizon from which have sprung the various ideologies of winners as criticized by Metz in his Benjaminian vein. What may not be quite so evident, however, is the link forged between Strauss and Metz by the fact that Strauss’s analysis of Schmitt was a result of ‘dangerous memory.’

In applying Metz’s term ‘dangerous memory’ to Strauss’s procedure, I mean that Strauss’s breakthrough beyond the horizon of modernity was made possible by his reading of premodern authors in the light of their own questions and concerns, of trying to understand them as they understood themselves, even if this was done precisely for the sake of answering his two lifelong questions—God and politics. Like Metz, Strauss brings out the tension between Christianity and Judaism, on the one hand, and both liberal and socialist forms of democracy, on the other. Whereas both Strauss and Metz are staunch advocates of what may be termed a democratic political culture in a serious sense irreducible to the vulgarity of the lowest common denominator, the great difference seems to me to lie in this: Strauss, or at least his followers, tend to render Christianity utterly apolitical in order to keep it from a vulgarized politicization. The temptation of liberation theology is to let itself be flattened out by the exigencies of Realpolitik into Marxism-Leninism; while that of Straussian political theory is to be content with the rather amazing feat of having Platonic or Aristotelian
reasons for espousing liberal democracy in such a way, indeed, that one may wonder if this is done at the cost of solidarity with the poor and the outcasts.

What I want to stress here, though, is how the impulses of political theology that have been most significant for me all converge on the practical and political and existential nature of interpretation. As Lonergan used to point out so often, mediating a tradition means laboring to carry it forward, to conserve it in the active sense of conserving, which involves being creative as a living embodiment of it, or at best even an articulate, intelligent, wise, and devoted embodiment; or else it means laboring to destroy it either by a passive conservatism, or by liquidating it, or by endeavoring to put a new tradition in its place (1962). Moreover, these options hold true not just for individuals, but for societies and cultures as well. Consequently, one of the key issues for a radical pedagogy of the oppressed would be the way 'dangerous memory' provides the imaginative and existential conditions for facing the general social and cultural problem of the overwhelming extent to which the predominant forms of our existence sap our ability to think about standards of excellence or comprehensive ends at all, in so far as they impose on standards in the light of which the human good is consistently felt and thought about in superficial, banal, or trivial terms. In other words, we are brought right back to the burning issue of political theology today, namely, the redemptive transformation of contemporary society and culture. These reflections on the role of 'dangerous memory' in Strauss and Metz, therefore, help us to raise the question about the specific concrete conditions that practically have to be fulfilled for such redemptive transformations to occur. The following comments arise in virtue of my own autobiographical circumstances in which some aspects rather different from those typically stressed by Metz are highlighted.

III

For the last decade or so a small group of professors at Boston College have been engaged in a kind of night battle for the sake of a redemptive transformation of the university. We have tried to work out an integrally interdisciplinary alternative to the typical American
version of a dead-end for liberal education, that is, a 'core' whose only rationale is a recipe for distributing credits across department offerings. Surely, one of the most baneful effects of modernity on the university as far as liberal and liberating education is concerned is the stanglehold of departments even over undergraduate education. As an alternative the Perspectives Program we have gradually worked out offers the following: In four two-semester courses involving (I) philosophy and theology, (II) music, fine arts, and literature, (III) the human sciences of economics, sociology, political science, law, and (IV) mathematics and the exact or natural sciences, we "unfold and go through (books) together ... and if we see something good, we pick it out and regard it as great gain if we thus become useful to one another" (cited in Strauss, 1968a: 6). From what I have already said in previous sections, what Metz speaks of as dangerous memory is crucial to this alternative, because the heart of its strategy is the experience of clarification by contrast.

By this I mean that the aim is for at least some students to be led by these courses to recover in their experience how, as Strauss expressed it, "There are things which are admirable, or noble, by nature, intrinsically. It is characteristic of all or most of them that they contain no reference to one's selfish interests or that they imply freedom from calculation" (1954: 128). This freedom from calculation intrinsic to the "phenomenon of admiration of human excellence" so closely allied to memory as dangerous is, I believe, a pathway out of the dominant contemporary horizon of meanings and values, because it is something that cannot be explained on hedonistic or utilitarian grounds.

We have been sanguine enough to hope that we have stumbled across the fact that education for being Christians, human beings, and citizens—instead of just professionals with careers—requires a liberation from the peculiarly modern project of mastery and control of subhuman and human nature. Indeed, our experiences with this Perspectives Program suggest that the very condition for liberal education is cognate with the condition for practically and politically transforming contemporary culture, namely, "a genuine conversion," as Strauss put it, "from pre-moral if not immoral concern with worldly goods to concern with the goodness of the soul" as opposed to "the calculating transition from unenlightened to enlightened self-interest" (1968b: 21); or as Lonergan has phrased it, a moral conversion from satisfaction to values (1972: 240-243).
To shift to a rather different autobiographical circumstance, last year the Anglican Communion celebrated the sesquicentennial of the Oxford Movement. Since my wife is Episcopalian, I had the opportunity to be reminded how this movement was a reaction to Liberalism based essentially on the phenomenon of human and indeed more than just human excellence.

Why else did those young Oxford men flock to hear that homely young preacher with the high voice at St. Mary's? A clue to why they did came from a lecture by Owen Chadwick on the first historian of the Movement, Richard Church, which closed with these words:

So I have taken a single instance of a discipline of the Oxford Movement and shown that half a century later it still pained him to write about it, because the memories plucked at his heart. Here is a proof, if historical proof is possible in such an intangible quality, of the highest possible idealism, and its real effects, in individuals who came under its influence; an idealism that is the rational ground for celebration of this memory today (125).

Another reminder is the following perhaps romanticized depiction by Henry Scott Holland of the slum priests the Oxford Movement brought forth after it had lost its leader in Newman and had been routed from the university:

It offered itself to every kind of novel opportunity and risk. It plunged into the dark places of our awful cities. It spent itself, with sacrificial ardour, in the service of the Poor. It shirked nothing; it feared nothing. It took blows and insults with a smile. It went ahead. It went ahead in spite of menace and persecution. It spoke home to sinning souls and broken hearts, fast bound in misery and iron. It invaded the strongholds of Sin. It itself wore poverty as a cloak, and lived the life of the suffering and destitute. It was irresistible in its elan, in its pluck, in its thoroughness, in its buoyancy, in its self-abandonment, in its laughter, in its devotion. Nothing could hold it (cited by Holloway, 1984a: 37).

One of the greatest gifts I have received from the Roman Catholic Church is to have been befriended when I was young by two very different priests of whom these words could have been written.

By adducing these recollections, I do not mean to suggest a revival of enthusiasm in the rather pejorative sense of Ronald Knox as
the adequate response or propaedeutic to the issues of social and cultural transformation. But wouldn't the resemblance of what Richard Holloway calls "the heroic side of Christianity, ... [its] call to supernatural sanctity, to self-surrender, to costly yet joyous Christianity" (36) remind us that the central condition for cultural and social transformation is what Lonergan names religious conversion?

Insistence upon moral and religious conversion as prerequisites for the redemptive transformation of contemporary culture, oddly enough, constitutes a reappropriation or revitalization of the idea that the heart of the reflective mode of transformative practice is a process of ascent on the model of Aristotle's Ethics and Politics. Let us recall here Aristotle's method of practical and political philosophy: ascending from the chaos of ends people may happen to aim at, through the global anticipations and aspirations of those who have a habitual grasp of what is noble and just, to an explicitly reasoned grasp of that for the sake of which everything else is chosen. Our complicity in human suffering and evil makes it so that our practical reflection is conditioned in a manner not unlike what Socrates, Plato, and Aristotle confronted in the sophists. The crucial struggle for emancipation is not with some group of people outside us, but with the vulgar, or technically sophisticated—even philosophical—conventionalist inside us.

This is why I have stressed the experience of admiration for human or gracious excellence in respect to the pedagogy to moral and religious conversion. The genuinely relevant pedagogy of the oppressed would help each of us to realize just how little we can take for granted that performative and habitual grasp of what is just and what is noble which was Aristotle's starting point for his ascent from the pre-moral chaos of values to the rational apprehension of the highest good. As Voegelin has pointed out in regard to D'Alembert, we are likely to reduce justice, the social virtue par excellence, to the resentment and resistance aroused in us by the violation of a "reasonable" state of equality, thus operatively renouncing any religious or metaphysical foundation of morals (77). Similarly, we are likely to share the modern tendency to reduce spontaneous admiration to what Strauss termed "a kind of telescoped calculation of benefits for ourselves" (1953: 128). Such tendencies are evident both in the rights rhetoric of pro-life and pro-choice forces; or in the anti-nuclear movement's use of the image of
ourselves as future victims a spur to action. It is no easy thing to free ourselves of the whole modern compulsion to "understand the highest as nothing but the effect of the lowest" (129). So liable are we to be affected by such a climate of opinion that we need to be morally and religiously converted in order to attain what Newman would call a real apprehension of and assent to the fact that "the life of man does not exhaust its meaning on the level of utilitarian desires and needs, and that the life of contemplation, resulting in the understanding of man himself and of his place in the universe, is a fundamental spiritual obligation quite independent of its contribution to 'useful' activities" (Voegelin, 79).

We have barely begun to emphasize and explore dimensions of experiential liberation from utilitarian and pragmatic concern already at work within liberation and political theology. Thus, Ernesto Cardenal's realization that human liberation is something intrinsically aesthetic is a pathbreaking one. Surely, as Lonergan's analysis of patterns of experience and of human development (1978: 181-191, 469-479) implies, and his analysis of mystery and myth as well as of the problem of liberation (531-549, 619-633) makes explicit, the nexus between aesthetic liberation from merely biological or pragmatic finalities and the liberation of mankind in its dramatic pattern of living is a central political issue. It is also an elementary condition for the kind of ascent required by the redemptive transformation of political culture.

We also are indebted to Latin America liberation theology for its leadership in making Eucharistic table-fellowship a focal point of revolutionary practice. In order for properly religious and personal values not to be reductionistically politicized, won't we also have to stress the fuller liberating dimensions built into the pedagogy of the liturgy? The liturgical rhythm of contrition and thanksgiving draws one beyond the utilitarian 'snakes and ladders' approach to religion. Within this rhythm, we become increasingly aware that, in von Hügel's words, "the first and central act of religion is adoration, sense of God. His otherness though nearness, His distinctness from all finite beings, though not separateness—aloofness—from them" (cited in Holloway, 1984: 17). How could such a realization not have profound practical and political implications? And isn't this the epitome of what Metz calls the hallmark of genuine religion—interruption?
At a meeting held this semester to give the Boston College philosophy department opportunity to meet their distinguished guest lecturers, Jürgen Habermas and Hans-Georg Gadamer, a theme germane to a pedagogy of the oppressed as a process characterized by conversion and ascent emerged. After summarizing the various brands of what he styled totalizing critiques within the Discourse of Modernity (as his course and most recent book are titled), Habermas suggested his own alternative approach to rational discourse. Habermas's communicative theory of action adopts a linguistically oriented version of Kant's tripartition of cultural spheres: in the cognitive sphere, instrumental reason is appropriate and should hold sway; in the sphere of norms, procedures are governed by the universalization of interests; and in the aesthetic sphere, one should look to the authenticity of self-expression.

In his response, Gadamer proposed that a bifurcation was more true to the way we actually operate rationally. He pointed out that since Kant's imperative of generalizing maxims is only intended dialectically and as a kind of limit procedure counterbalancing spontaneously self-regarding feelings, the operations Aristotle thematized under the term phronesis actually are most adequate in the realm of ethical normativity. And as he claims to have shown, something very akin to phronesis is at work in the aesthetic sphere as well. But Gadamer, too, subscribes to the Cartesian-Baconian-Kantian view so dominant in European philosophy that the activity of science is exhaustively and adequately accounted for in terms of instrumental reason or technical reflection (techne).

In the ensuing discussion Joseph Flanagan and I pointed out, in the light of our common experience with Lonergan's work on science and of his and Patrick Byrne's work in connection with the section of the Perspectives Program devoted to mathematics and the natural sciences, that this reduction of science to technique would not do. Since, for instance, Laplace's at least implicit insights into the relationship between the classical intelligibility of laws and the statistical intelligibility of states and trends; and since the further explications along similar lines related to the operations performed by physicists on the part of Einstein and Heisenberg, it has become clear that the conditions once specified by Aristotle as rendering akribeia inapplicable to the knowing proper to practical and political philosophy also hold
true for physics and all the so-called exact sciences. Concretely and as a matter of fact, there is a phronesis-like dimension at work in every area of human knowing and acting.

In terms of our present discussion of the pedagogy of the oppressed, wouldn't it be a good idea to take this phronesis-dimension operative throughout the span of human knowing and acting as the point of departure for a contemporary reenactment practical and political philosophy or theology?

This kind of reenactment would require what Lonergan has spoken of as a painstaking act of explicit self-transcendence. My own mentor, Bernard Lonergan, has described this procedure as a "personal appropriation of one's rational self-consciousness" (1978: 748). Hence, as a third condition for adequately discriminating true from false and good from evil in modernity and the Enlightenment: a full-blown, explicit, and existential resolution of the cognitional theoretic (in contra-distinction to the epistemological and metaphysical) question as Lonergan helps us to formulate it: what are we doing when we think we are knowing in any area of human living?

This, too, I remain convinced, is an asses' bridge for a complete pedagogy of the oppressed.

In this connection I should point out something about Karl Rahner's appropriation of Thomas Aquinas's approach to human knowing as a 'dangerous memory.' Both in his reditions of Geist im Welt and Hörer des Wortes, and in his own independent elaborations, Baptist Metz initially formulated the sweep of Rahner's metaphysical epistemology, which begins from Aquinas's Summa question on the need for a conversio ad phantasmata and expands into the foundations of a philosophy of religion, quite positively in terms of a Christian anthropocentrism. Whereas Metz's recovery of Rahner's point highlighted the virtualities within the Christian incarnational philosophy for a sane modern control of meaning, later on Metz revised this assessment without, of course, utterly disavowing it. Metz now claims, in effect, that Rahner's retrieval of Aquinas was ultimately 'idealist' and under the aegis of the kind of Erkenntnistheorie plied by Kant in his Critique of Pure Reason. Note that the connotation of 'idealist' for Metz is not primarily related to the domain of the cognitional except in so far as that domain is kept isolated from Kant's vaunted primacy of practical reason as combined with Marx's insight into the ineluctable nexus
between knowledge and human interests. In general, Metz's lectures and public statements now tend to relegate all pre-Cartesian (that is, classical and medieval) thought, together with all post-Cartesian thought which starts from the problem of knowledge rather than the sociology of knowledge, to the category of 'idealist.' However, such an undifferentiated nomenclature—while suggestive and certainly commonly adopted by those discussing critical social theory—has disadvantages. It may lead the untutored to the mistaken assumption that the question of knowledge as met by Aquinas can no longer serve us as a 'dangerous memory.'

Nevertheless, as I had been convinced long before—and attending Metz's lectures has done nothing to dispel this conviction—it is actually Rahner's retrieval of Aquinas's gnoseology (along with those of the Thomistic revival at large) for which this derogatory implication holds true.

Fortunately, I have been able to work through Lonergan's various attempts at carrying out the Leonine program of *vetera npovis augere et perficere*, so that it is clear that Lonergan cannot be lumped together with those covered by what Metz calls the transcendental-idealist paradigm. As I believe all readers of this essay can also discover for themselves, the pains Lonergan took to find out what the *vetera* really were discloses Aquinas's Trinitarian thought—not to mention his theology of grace—to be a very dangerous memory indeed.

In his retrieval of Aquinas's hypothesis of intelligible emanations Lonergan did what Rahner failed to do: he distinguished precisely within Aquinas's work between psychological reasons and ontological causes in order to understand what Aquinas himself meant. And so later on in *Insight* he could enucleate the task of cognitional theory (which asks, What are we doing when we think we are knowing?). Grounded empirically within the conditioned and contingent operations of one's consciousness as experience, cognitional theory is prior to and the basis for the two later and derivative tasks of epistemology and metaphysics. Furthermore, we may speak of cognitional theory in modern terms as a praxis issue. Personally asking and answering the question about what I am doing when I am knowing in any and all areas of my living—which can only be done if one returns to the *Sache* as an empirically verifiable matter of psychological fact—also gets one into asking and answering for oneself the practical and political question about the most choiceworthy way to live. This is why Lonergan says in
the Introduction to Insight that "more than all else, the aim of the book is to issue an invitation to a personal, decisive act" (xix). Hence, he proposed the personal appropriation of one's rational self-consciousness (748) not as an idealist construction but as a practical and concrete program. And in what Lonergan, like Metz, has called "the end of the age of innocence" (1985: 156-157), a consciousness cultured enough to execute that program needs to be morally and religiously converted. In conclusion, we can formulate the issue of the pedagogy of the oppressed in terms of the unity of differentiated consciousness which is in love with God.
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I will not deny that I am very much honored to have the chance to talk to you today. You heard something about me yesterday; now you will hear something from me, and I hope that you'll not be too disappointed. Before I left this morning some of my colleagues at St. Mary's Hall asked me whether I wouldn't prefer to go to the football game today. I said no, but if it had been soccer—!

"Communicating a dangerous memory"—there may be two possible approaches to this topic: one, more systematically, and another one more autobiographically. So, as you know, we agreed with one another—Fred Lawrence and Matt Lamb and I, and Sebastian Moore, too, I think—that we'll do it autobiographically. But let me just mention a systematic approach to this question, communicating a dangerous memory. You probably know that "dangerous memory" is one of the basic categories of the new political theology, at least as far as I have developed it during the last eighteen or twenty years. So whenever I am explaining the background and position of political theology in today's theology, I am talking about at least three competing paradigms within today's Catholic theology. And Fred has already mentioned these paradigms: the neo-Scholastic one, which still prevails much more than we should accept; the so-called idealist or transcendental paradigm, very powerfully developed by my great teacher and friend, Karl Rahner; and another paradigm, which I call a post-idealist or political paradigm of doing theology, that includes this new type of political theology as well as most of liberation theology.

Whenever a new paradigm arises, this is due to certain criteria, and the most important criterion for a paradigm-shift within theology, at least as I understand it, is perceiving and dealing with new crises
stemming from the historical and socially rooted character of theology. This type of political theology understands today's theology as being faced with three crises or three challenges, three "end-phenomena." The first is the Marxist challenge, or theology faced with the end of its cognitive innocence and with the end of a dualistic understanding of history. The second is the Auschwitz challenge: theology faced with the end of idealism or of all systems of meaning which can prescind from historically identifiable subjects. And the third crisis is the Third World challenge: the challenge of the socially antagonistic and culturally polycentric world; that is, theology faced with the end of its so-called Eurocentricity. Political theology tries to deal with these crises, to face up to these challenges.

But I do not want to talk about political theology and dangerous memory in political theology in the perspective of this systematic approach. I would prefer, as we agreed, an autobiographical approach, which is not without systematic relevance. And this is true because, in spite of many prejudices, it is precisely this political type of doing theology and this political mysticism that at least taught me to say "I" in theology, to cease orienting myself towards concepts of the system and start orienting myself towards concepts of the subject, and to see through Christian theology's high content of apathy in so far as it is idealistic and without an identifiable subject. Theology, precisely as a politically sensitive theology, takes on the traits of biography; but the orientation towards the subject, towards the countenance, towards functioning-in-the-face-of, bestows on theology traits of narrative and memory. This does not make it subjectivist or serve to stylize theological individuality, but heightens its sensitivity to the concrete responsibility encountered in controversial talk about God. And I think it is imperative to learn this theological saying, "I," when confronting today's challenges, when confronting our history in its negativities. So this is one of the systematic reasons for talking biographically within theology.

The second reason is that I want to give an account of the dangerous memory, which was and is a basic category of my theology, in the face of my own experiences. And the third reason is that political theology is nothing but theology. And theology which does not deceive itself and others finally is nothing but theology, that is, the attempt to talk about God in the face of a great danger. Every authentic type
of theology must be political. That is one of the presuppositions of this way of doing theology. And thus "political theology" is a pleonastic or redundant phrase. I hope that I can show you something of that now in this reflection.

II

MY GOD-QUESTION

So I start with talking about my faith in God, or how I as a theologian understand this. The treatment of the God-question always contains biographical elements, because relevant speech about God always examines and calls into question our preconceived notions about life and existence, our interests, our memories, our experiences. And this means that theology cannot ignore the field of one's personal experiences when speaking about God. At the center of my theological speech about God lies the theological-political treatment of the so-called theodicy problem—the question of God in the face of human suffering, which since the Enlightenment has been turned into a question of anthropodicy—the question of justifying human beings who are now subjects of the process of history in the face of the misery and suffering of other people. This modern form of anthropodicy is nothing but a coded form of theodicy, but we will not talk about that here. That the theodicy problem stands at the center of my doing theology is due to my personal experiences. And I would like to use two more-or-less biographical events as examples to show you how memory functions as "dangerous memory" not only within the great realm of theology in the world, but within one's own life.

The first event occurred when I was sixteen years old, at the end of the Second World War. I was taken out of school and pressed into military service. It was in 1945. With barely any military training I was sent to the front, and at that time the Americans had already crossed the Rhine River. My whole company was made up of young soldiers of about the same age. One evening my company commander sent me back to the battalion headquarters with a message. Throughout the night I strayed through burning farms and villages. When I returned to my company the next morning, I found all my comrades dead. The company had been attacked by planes and tanks and was completely wiped out. I saw
only the lifeless faces of my comrades, those same comrades with whom I had but days before shared my childhood fears and my youthful laughter. I remember nothing but a soundless cry. I strayed for hours alone in the forest. Over and over again, just this silent cry! And up until today I see myself so. Behind this memory all my childhood dreams have vanished.

Perhaps in this way I can make clear to you why the so-called theodicy problem stands at the center of my theological considerations. Perhaps in this way I can also make clear why the theodicy problem must be posed, as far as I understand it, as a question of the suffering of others and as the personally experienced past suffering of others. For me the theodicy question, the basic theological question—and theology is a culture of questions, not of answers—is not "Who saves me?" but rather, "Who saves you?" And all those who attend my lectures know that I begin not with the question "What happens to me when I suffer, when I die?" but rather with, "What happens to you when you suffer, when you die?"

In order to show you that such a personal experience can also become a public consciousness within at least some regions of our church life and some communities, I would like to point to the following. A basic form of Christian hope is also determined by this memory. The question "What dare I hope?" is transformed for me into the question "What dare I hope for you and, in the end, also for me?" Fred has mentioned already the synod document "Our Hope," of the German bishops' conference of some years ago. I wrote the draft of that document, and if I may quote just a few phrases from it:

Relying only on ourselves? How could that possibly end except in melancholy, barely concealed despair or blind, selfish optimism? To dare to hope in God's Kingdom always means entertaining this hope for others and therefore also for oneself. Only when our hope is inseparable from hope for others, in other words, only when it automatically assumes the form and motion of love and communion, does it cease to be petty and fearful, a hopeless reflection of our egotism. 'We for our part have crossed over from death to life; this we know, because we love our brothers.'

I have met in the face of communities of the Third World—but not only there—persons in whose suffering, in whose struggle, in whose sorrow, and in whose courage I can identify the symbols of the kingdom of God. And I can make this identification more easily through them than through my own life. Through my experience of these persons and these communities I can relate the pictures and parables about the kingdom of God finally also to myself. You see, this is my personal approach to this question, which I consider to be the basic question of today's theology, the so-called theodicy question.

But of course there is also another biographical event which has to be mentioned and was mentioned earlier in this conference. For me, the German theologian, there is an event which I should never forget. I call it the Auschwitz challenge. It is one of the indications that Christian theology is not a type of faceless metaphysics. It is rather an appeal to and a witness of truth in history: "The Word became flesh." Historical situations are inherent in the logos of theology. Somewhere and somehow I have become aware of the situation in which I try to do theology. It took much time, and this is due to the fact that my great teacher, Karl Rahner, to whom I owe the greatest debt and the best that I have ever learned in theology, never spoke in his theology about this catastrophe. So it took a long time for me to think of that, and to become aware of this situation in which I try to do theology and outside of which I have no idea how to get my theological bearings. And this is for me, the German theologian, "after Auschwitz." Auschwitz represents here the crisis of so-called modernity, but above all a crisis of my Christian theology.

At the outset, one must take into account that the catastrophe of Auschwitz, precisely because of its uniqueness, acquires a provocative character. This catastrophe cannot be integrated into the history which we usually talk about in our different types of modern theological hermeneutics: universal-history hermeneutics, for example, of my friends like Wolfhart Pannenberg, Jurgen Moltmann, and others. They talk about the history as such. The catastrophe of Auschwitz directs theology away from the singular of "history" to the plural of "histories of sufferings" which cannot be idealistically explained but rather can only be remembered with a practical intention. Because of the way Auschwitz was or was not present in theology, I slowly became aware of the high content of apathy in theological idealism and its inability to confront
historical experience in spite of all its prolific talk about historicity. There was no theology in the whole world which talked so much about historicity as German theologies. Yet they only talked about historicity; they did not mention Auschwitz. Obviously there is no meaning of history one can save with one's back turned to Auschwitz; there is no truth of history which one can defend, and no God in history which one can worship, with one's back turned to Auschwitz. This was one of the starting points—not the only one, of course—of any theology as political theology: saying that theology must take seriously the negativity of history in its interruptive and catastrophic character (by which history is distinguished from nature and its anonymous evolutionary processes). The catastrophes must be remembered with a practical-political intention so that this historical experience does not turn to tragedy and thus bid the history of freedom farewell. That is a great seduction: to face these catastrophes and then end up with a kind of tragic consciousness. We are not allowed to do that. What I experienced was that we have a duty to face these catastrophes and remember them with a practical-political intention so that they might never be repeated. This shows that the political paradigm of theology is due neither to a foolish overactivity nor to the transparent attempt at duplicating the already existing political patterns. It is rather due to the struggle for history in its unfathomable histories of suffering, the struggle for history as the constitutionally threatened locus of theological truth-finding.

It is because we believe in a definite eschatological meaning of history that we can face the negativities, the catastrophes, without irrationally dividing or denying our responsibilities, without developing excuse-mechanisms. It is for that reason that I am upset about the use of the term "holocaust," for example, in my country today. I have many friends within the peace movement, but I criticize them for one thing, and that is the semantic confusion of the use of such a word. Today the word "holocaust" is very often mentioned in German newspapers, more or less every day, but no one would think of Auschwitz when he hears the word "holocaust." They all think of the nuclear holocaust. And why do they do it? What I tell them is that it is much easier to talk about the possible future catastrophe in which we are the victims, than to talk about a past catastrophe in which we were the actors. But
we will not overcome a catastrophe like the one which we call the nuclear "collapse" or "holocaust"—I never use the word "holocaust" for that—if we forget the catastrophe of our own history. That is teaching on the level of political theology, as I understand it.

This political theology formulates the God-question again in its oldest and most controversial form, namely, as the theodicy question, though naturally not in its existentialist but rather in its political version. It begins with the question of those who suffer unjustly, of the victims and the vanquished of our history. How can one ask, after Auschwitz, about one's own salvation outside of this perspective? That is my question. Political theology repeatedly injects this question into public consciousness and elucidates it as a question on which the fate of humanity depends. The memoria passionis, the memory of suffering, which is a radical biblical category, becomes a universal category, a category of rescue. And if I may indicate again how a personal theological experience can become a public experience, a communicative experience within the church, I would like to quote another passage from the synod document "Our Hope." It says:

But to forget or suppress this question ... is to behave in a profoundly inhuman way. For it means forgetting and suppressing the sufferings of the past and accepting without protest the pointlessness of this suffering. In the last resort, no happiness enjoyed by the children can make up for the pain suffered by the fathers, and no social progress can atone for the injustice done to the departed. If we persist too long in accepting the meaninglessness of death and in being indifferent to death, all we shall have left to offer even to the living will be banal promises. It is not only the growth of our economic resources which is limited, as we are often reminded today, but also the resources of meaning, and it is as if our reserves here are melting away and we are faced with the real danger that the impressive words we use to fuel our own history—words like freedom, liberation, justice, happiness—will in the end have all their meaning drained out of them (p. 70).

Without this memoria passionis, the life of humans as subjects becomes increasingly an anthropomorphism. The public advertisement for a successor to the human subject, a successor who has no memory of past suffering and is no longer tortured by catastrophes, has already begun. Time, for example, has recently placed a picture of this successor on one of its covers: the robot, a smoothly functioning machine, an intelligence without remembrance, without pathos, and without morals. And
thus, in the fight for history and historical consciousness, a new front has been opened for theology: the front of what I call the evolutionarily infected lassitude about history, the tending toward a so-called post-historicity in our late modernity. To speak critically about this evolutionistic mentality does not mean to favor a fundamentalist position with regard to the question of creation and evolution. It is much more the background of the question, "What is the basic symbol for understanding today's scientific life?" And for me it is very, very powerful, not just for scientists, but for popular thinking: the quasi-religious symbol of what you might call—though it can be misunderstood—evolutionary mentality.

But now, very briefly, I have a second remark to add to this Auschwitz-biography of my own. You should not forget that I come from a Bavarian village, a Catholic Bavarian village of about ten thousand people. I told you that at the end of the war I was about sixteen years old; and just thirty miles away from this village, from this little town, there was a concentration camp. And in this concentration camp Dietrich Bonhoeffer was murdered. We never talked about this. As a young child I never heard about it. You see, my father was already dead and my mother was afraid and a pious woman. Later on, when I talked to her about that event, she always denied having known anything about it, though she—well, it was a kind of suppressed knowing. That is why I am talking about this subject. After becoming theologically aware of my post-Holocaust situation, I also asked myself what sort of faith it must have been that allowed us to go on believing undisturbed during the Nazi time. Was it not in the end only a purely believed-in faith, as I call it; a faith without compassion but with a belief in compassion which, under the mantle of believing it was compassionate, cultivated the apathy that allowed us Christians to go on believing with our backs turned to such a catastrophe? I call this type of believing burgerliche Religion, bourgeois religion. Whatever may be the truth of the matter, the critical use of the concept "bourgeois religion" thus has a solidly theological and not primarily a sociological basis. That is what I want to point to.

Was it not a lack of politically sensitive spirituality which led us into our grievous error? If we had known more explicitly that we Christians are also responsible for emerging structures and processes, that we are not only responsible for what we do or omit, but what we do
or omit in regard to others; if we had known that more clearly and explicitly, would we then not have resisted in time? Resisted in time. You see, when I criticize this period of my history, I do not say that they all should have been heroes, because resisting against the Nazi regime in 1940 was already heroic. It always meant death. But if we had been sensitive to the danger, if theology had had that hermeneutics of danger, we might have resisted in time. You see, resistance is a question of the schedule, not of heroism, and it can be an expression of grace to resist in time. We were graceless. How did we understand our Christianity? In specific distinction to other great religions of the world, as a Christian, one can be too pious and too mystical! The one and undivided discipleship of Jesus contains always a mystical and a situational-political element. They mirror one another, and that is specifically Christian. I quote again the passage, mentioned yesterday, from the document "Our Hope":

Jesus was neither a fool nor a rebel: but He could obviously be mistaken for either. In the end he was derided by Herod as a fool and handed over by his own countrymen as a rebel to be crucified. Anyone who follows him ... must allow for the same possibility of being the victim of such confusion (p. 81).

Theology must not unveil but respect the "incognito of Jesus"; it belongs to the saving history of passion, and theology has to make clear that the present misery of our Christianity is not that we are considered as fools and rebels too often, but rather, practically never. This theology can reclaim, as far as I see it, the traditions of this dangerous Jesus in the history of the religious orders, and it can refer today to the new mystical and political experiences of the emerging churches, the basic community churches within the poor churches of the earth, and can learn from them.

This kind of talk can imply a kind of aesthetic radicalism, at least for the German theology professor, doing theology under very privileged conditions of working and living, and being at the same time obliged to talk about the poor and homeless and obedient Jesus and the Christian task to follow him. You very often are in a dilemma, you see. Many of my colleagues give up talking about this question; they just talk about scientific questions—what they call scientific, though mostly disregarded by those who are authentic scientists. Or they may
fall into the trap of what I call an aesthetic radicalism. In order to avoid that, I try to talk about those who really follow, to be close to them, and to participate with them. I started to talk about the subjective and the practical foundation of such a theology. That is what I meant when I began to talk about a statement which Matthew Lamb made yesterday about the church being an institution delivering a dangerous memory within the systems of our society, an institution of social-critical freedom.

III

THE DANGEROUS JESUS

Let me finally talk about this category, the dangerous Jesus. Where is it from? Some colleagues of mine would say, "You're talking about apocalyptic." In one of the last conversations I had with Karl Rahner he said, "Well, try to do it, but don't forget that you can't just talk about it, you have to convince people." I was very critical of his distinction between eschatology and apocalyptic, which he introduced very powerfully into Catholic theology.

"Who is close to me is close to the fire; who is far from me is far from the Kingdom." This is the word of Jesus delivered to us, outside the canon, by Origen. It is dangerous to be close to Jesus; it is to be inflammable, to risk catching fire. Yet only in the face of the danger does there shine the vision of the kingdom of God, which through him has come closer. "Danger" apparently is a basic category for the self-understanding of the "new life" in the New Testament. The lightening of danger illuminates the entire biblical landscape. Danger and peril are found everywhere in the New Testament. In the case of the synoptic gospels, the stories of discipleship are not entertaining stories and not educating ones. They are stories in the face of danger; in short, they are "dangerous stories." They invite us not to contemplate but to follow, and only in the adventure of this following do they reveal their saving truth. When Jesus says, "Come and see," a German answer to that, a German proverb, is "Wo kamen wir hin wenn alle sagten, 'Wo kamen wir hin?', und keiner ginge und schaue wohin man kam wann man ging?" Oh, I can't translate it! "Where would we get to if everyone would say, 'Where would we get to?', and no one would have a look at
Communicating a Dangerous Memory

where we would get if we went," or something like that! The proverb points to this dangerous character of the invitation of Jesus, of these small stories, these stories about a homeless, suffering man from Nazareth, which have built our understanding of world history.

And in John we read: "Remember the word I said unto you: the servant is not greater than his lord. If they have persecuted me they will also persecute you." Or in Paul: "We are troubled on every side, but not distressed; we are perplexed but not in despair; persecuted but not forsaken; cast down but not destroyed." This dialectics of danger, this experience of danger—every one of you knows these passages in liturgy, in what we call spirituality; but that is not due just to this division of labor, as if this is for spirituality and theology has nothing to do with it. We will not understand if we do not admit the category of danger into our theology. What do we know of the New Testament if in our understanding and interpreting the presence of danger is systematically disregarded in the name of enlightenment, in the name of demythologizing the New Testament, or whatever; if we erase the horizon of danger or paint over it—that horizon which holds together the whole New Testament panorama? What do we understand? I would say that one of the prophecies of the emerging church in the Third World and of liberation theology is that they understand that theology has to be done in the face of danger. Doing theology in the face of danger always implies a kind of simplification, a reduction: in the face of danger, mysticism returns to logic, praxis returns to theory, the experience of resistance and suffering returns into the experience of grace and spirit. These kinds of reductions are signs that Christianity is taking hold of its own roots. We in Germany also have a kind of reduction today. We talk about "short formulae of faith." That is the danger you now face. Because the core, the heart of Christianity cannot be concentrated in one dogma. It is between dogma and practice: that is Christianity; that is what the emerging churches understand, and that is why we have to learn from them.

What is behind our critique of the apocalyptic symbols? Is it the will towards enlightenment of the uncomprehended power of myth in these apocalyptic traditions, or is it perhaps the will to evade the dangerous Christ and so to contain the danger, or at least to push it aside into the practically extraterritorial realm of individual death?
Most likely both of these are at work. For we are talking about apocalyptic questions only, when the individual is placed with its own crisis of identity in the face of suffering and death. But this means to make death more meaningless than it had ever been in the old tradition of Christianity, because the apocalyptic traditions of the end of the world were always combined and connected with questions: Who is the Lord of our time? To whom belong the processes of the world? Who is the subject of history? But they are practically forgotten in theology. We have to remember that there is not a history of the world on the one side and a history of salvation on the other side; what we call the history of salvation, as I understand it, is that history of the world in which you have an indestructible hope for past sufferings. That implies worshipping a power for which the past is still accessible: God.

Above all, we cannot forget this evading, evading the dangerous Christ, and it is not for want of trying, for the whole of history *anno Domino*, after Christ, may be interpreted as a maneuver to evade the dangerous Christ. In the context of this evasion there arises a Christianity—and I say this not in a denouncing manner but rather with a touch of sadness and helplessness—fashioned after a bourgeois homeland religion, *eine burgerliche Heimatreligion*, rid of danger but also rid of consolation. For a Christianity which is not dangerous and which is unendangered also does not console. Or am I grossly mistaken? In some regions of Christianity I see emerging counter-images to such a placating bourgeois religion: for example, in those poor churches which understand their faithfulness to Christ also as liberation, and seek it as liberation in the face of danger. Is it presumptuous to accept that perhaps here, in these communities, a clearer concept breaks forth of what it means to be close to Jesus, close to him of whom it should be said, "Who is close to me is close to the fire"?

The fatal disease of religion and of theology is not naivete, but rather banality. And theology can become banal whenever its commentary on life serves only to repeat that which without it—and often against it—has already become part of the common modern consensus. The naivete of theology lies in ambush for these commonplaces. It does this, for example, by lingering with texts and images such as those in the apocalyptic traditions and by holding its own in the face of them at least a bit longer than the modern consensus and the anonymous pressure of modern civilization allow. At least a bit longer: that is naiveté—
not a second naïveté, but naïveté. You can not make a construction of language. That is a question of the reserves of meaning and the reserves of resistance in humankind; and if we had lost all naïveté, we would not have theologians telling us that there must be a second type or a second-order naïveté. No. Theology does not seek specifically to reconcile itself with its traditions by the use of thousands of subtle modifications, but rather to spell out its tradition as dangerous-subversive memory for the present. These thousands and thousands of modifications: are they not naïveté?

Just two brief examples in which this naïveté functions and of course can be heard, and you can laugh at it. Pointing to the apocalyptic symbol, religion wants to scandalize or (let me use the other term) to interrupt the dominant understanding of the human being in modernity, and to resist this understanding at least for a brief moment. It would be enough if we tried to do it for moments! It seeks to interrupt that understanding of the human being that is prevalent today within all blocs: the Faustian-Promethean human being. It seeks to interrupt that concept in which the coming human being is designed without the dark background of sorrow, suffering, guilt, and death. The rebellion of the apocalyptic symbols is turned against the human being empty of secrets, incapable of mourning and therefore incapable of being consoled; more and more unable to remember and so more easily manipulated than ever; more and more defenseless against the threatening apotheosis of banality and against the stretched-out death of boredom; a human being whose dreams of happiness finally are nothing but the dreams of an unhappiness free from suffering and longing. That is the front along which we are fighting when we recall the apocalyptic traditions.

Second, pointing to the apocalyptic symbols, theology wants to interrupt, to scandalize, the dominant understanding of time and history in modernity and to resist it at least for a moment. This resistance, this kind of interruption of our common consensus, is even more difficult to understand and practically cannot be freed from the suspicion of being deviant or being nonsense. I admit this because I am not sure about it; I tell you, because this is a communicative exchange here. No wonder that most theologians agree with the modern consensus, or that they see in these apocalyptic texts and symbols nothing but the projection of archaic fears.
Whenever religion hands down, passes on, these texts and symbols and perceives in them elements of a dangerous memory, it does not do it in order to comment on the course of world history with an apocalyptically infused gloating, but in order to discover the sources of our modern fears. It may be that the archaic human being was always endangered by the feeling of an imminent end of his life and world, and we can see something of this also in our present fear of the nuclear catastrophe. But that is ancient fear, archaic fear. In my opinion, in modern man there is not primarily a fear that everything will come to an end, but more deeply rooted a fear that there will be no end at all, that our life and our history is pulled into the surging of a faceless evolution which finally rolls over us all as over grains of sand on the beach. This makes us powerless. Do not forget that the process of modern civilization and of modern science did not make people powerful; it has been a process of the humiliation of the subject. Today's critique of religion is not pointing to religion as an underestimation of human beings but as an irrational overestimation of human identity. It was Freud who spoke of a threefold humiliation of the human being by the processes of modern civilization: the humiliation of the Copernican revolution, saying that man's earth is not at the center of the cosmos; the revolution of Darwin, saying that the history of the human race is not at the center of the processes in the world but is just a very small, irrational piece; and Freud's own discovery that our consciousness is just a small drop in the sea of unconsciousness. We have to be aware of that. That is why I am pointing to what I call the pathology of modern mentalities, and why theology has to be aware of what I call the lack of great visions today. There are no longer great visions in our societies, either Eastern or Western. And what I admire in your President is that he was able to tell people that his politics was guided by a vision. I do not think that it is, but people at least understand it that way. Or consider the Marxist countries. What happened to Marxism in the socialist countries? It came down to a totalitarian bureaucracy. But that is not inherent in any one particular political system; it is the late metaphysics of modernity, as I understand it. This is what I call the "ant-mentality" of human people: the lack of resistance, playing possum in the face of danger, which makes us spectators of our own downfall in the face of the nuclear threat. As far as I can see, the danger of the nuclear collapse of the world, of
our earth—it is not a collapse of the world, since even after a nuclear disaster the processes will go on (without human beings, of course). We know we are included in such a subjectless history, but it makes us powerless. We are no longer able to think of an end of history. And I would say that the nuclear threat as such is not the danger, but rather the attitudes with which we encounter it. Most of us are voyeurs, and it is very difficult to make people resist, to give them a mentality of resistance and to tell them that they should give up their mentality of being just helpless spectators of their own fate. It is a new kind of post-historicity. Short-term strategies rule our public life instead of long-term strategies. We cultivate the art of alibi, the development of excuse-mechanisms. Don't get involved too much! Think of yourself!

There is a cult today of the makeable: everything can be made. There is also a new cult of fate: everything can be replaced. The will to make is undermined by resignation. The cult of the omnipotent control of man's destiny on the one hand and the cult of apathy on the other belong together like two sides of the same coin. The human understanding of reality, which guides our scientific and technical control of nature and from which the cult of the makeable draws its strength, is marked by an idea of time as a continuous process which is empty, surprise-free, and evolving towards infinity and within which everything is enclosed without grace. This understanding of reality and time excludes all expectation and therefore produces that fatalism that eats away man's soul. Man therefore is already resigned even before society has been able to introduce him successfully to this resignation as a form of so-called pragmatic rationality. This understanding of time generates that secret fear of identity which can be deciphered only with great difficulty because it is successfully practiced under the ciphers of progress and development before we may, just for a fleeting moment, discover it at the base of our souls. This is what I call the hermeneutics of danger, on the basis of a kind of naivete.

The apocalyptic texts speak of the end of time and of history; they bring the cessation of these very near. But one has to look at these texts and images very carefully. They do not contain idle speculation about the date of a catastrophe, but rather a figurative commentary on the catastrophic and surprising nature of time itself. From the subversive viewpoint of the apocalyptic, time itself is full of hazard, danger, and surprise. It is not simply the evolutionarily
stretched and empty eternity without surprises, into which we can project our progress without opposition. Time belongs not to Prometheus or to Faust, but to God. For the apocalyptic perspective, God is the mystery not yet brought forth, the mystery-in-waiting, of time. God is not seen as the "beyond" of time, but rather as its pressing end, its border, its salvific cessation. That is so because time, from the viewpoint of the apocalyptic, is primarily a time of suffering—suffered time. The apocalyptic view subordinates without much ado natural time to the passiontide of humanity. For the apocalyptic, a knowledge of identity is announced in the experience of human suffering, an identity which fiercely resists being reduced to the trivial identity of continuance over natural time. The continuity of time for the apocalyptic is not the empty continuum of a modern understanding of time, but rather the trail of suffering. And the respect for the worth of suffering which accumulates in time impels the apocalyptic to understand natural time from the viewpoint of suffered time, and thus to understand evolution from the viewpoint of history and indeed not to ignore the billions of years of natural time in relation to the time of the suffering of humanity, but to assess those eons as a kind of "inflated time" (as my old Marxist friend, Ernst Bloch, said).

But do we not all live and feel this way? Who relates his lifetime to the billions of years of evolutionary time? Who judges or appraises his action accordingly? Are we, therefore, all trapped in a gracious illusion—some, because they refuse to give up an eschatological hope, as we do; others, because they will not vindicate their fears? Or is there an as yet undisclosed, surpressed truth in the apocalyptic images?

From Holderlin we have the often-quoted phrase, "Where the danger is, there also grows the possibility of rescue." ("Wo die Gefahr ist, wachst das Rettende auch.") The apocalyptic reversal of this phrase would be, "When the possibility of rescue is near, then the danger grows." (Wo die Rettung naht, wachst auch die Gefahr.) The vision of rescue or salvation as it shines from the biblical stories is not without an eschatological dialectic. This implies a final statement. Whenever Christianity becomes more and more domiciled and so more and more domesticated, whenever it becomes just the symbolic paraphrase of what would happen in any case, its messianic future becomes weak. Whenever Christianity seems hard to take, shrewish, and promising more
danger than security, more homelessness than safety, it is close to him
of whom it was said, "Who is close to me is close to the fire; who is
far from me is far from the Kingdom." Only if we recognize something of
the situation of our own Christian hope—our eschatological hope—in the
apocalyptic symbols of danger, of crises and downfall, the images and
symbols of the Kingdom will not decay like wishful thinking. Only when
we remain faithful to the symbols of the crisis can the symbols of pro-
mise and consolation remain faithful to us: the images and symbols of
the great peace, of the home, of the Father, and of the kingdom of free-
dom, justice, and reconciliation, the images of the tears wiped away,
and the images of the laughter of the children of God.
I suspect that not nearly enough thought has been given to the idea that Jesus had a consciousness greatly beyond the normal. I recall that J. G. Bennet discerned six levels of consciousness and placed Jesus, alone, at a seventh. But his approach is unusual—at least in theology departments!

The reason for our reluctance to go this route is probably the fear that it will lead to saying that Jesus is only more developed than others, not the unique person he is in Christian belief. But it is a curious way of thinking of Jesus' preeminence that dictates indifference to the factual impact of that preeminence on the ordinary run of humans—like asserting the presence of an earthquake not on the Richter scale. Christian belief depends entirely on what Johann Baptist Metz calls a dangerous memory. Its massive formulas embody centuries of reflection on that memory, that original impact of one life on a few other lives, that has quite changed the world.

It has been believed of Jesus since the beginning that he was without sin. The late Bishop Robinson, a scripture scholar, used to remark on the fact that there is no record of this belief ever having been contested. We are more vulnerable morally than in any other way, so that anyone's goodness can be to some extent impugned. Yet no one, it seems, was able to do this in the case of Jesus. Iris Murdoch says that Socrates is the only other historical figure famous mainly for goodness. Indeed his virtue was never impugned either. But then the claim to sinlessness was never made for him, a claim that asks for rebuttal, for someone to say "Don't give me that! What about ... ?" In the case of Jesus, we have the extremely provoking claim, and silence on the part of the critics.
Now since sin was the early, pre-psychological name for the negative, anti-life, anti-growth tendency in us, and since our many schools of psychology have recognized in this tendency a matter of crucial importance, one who believes today that Jesus was sinless is making an enormous psychological assertion. He or she is describing a human psyche unimpeded by that huge inertial force that operates below the level where we distinguish between sins and mistakes, that deep reluctance to understand, to change, and to grow, that instigation of the flight from understanding. We shall have to exercise our creative imagination to fill out the description of such a psyche.

For about ten years now, I have been basing my Christology on the sinlessness of Jesus. But it is only recently that I have been able, with the aid of this concept, to elucidate the central mystery of Christianity, the saving death itself. This has become possible because I have at last reached the beginning of an adequate concept of original or generic sin, of the root of that human tragedy that is enacted everywhere before our eyes, on our television screens, and in the silence of our hearts.

Sin is a deep-seated refusal to grow. This refusal arises out of that lack of full love of ourselves and of our lives which begins with a less-than-complete negotiation of the separation crisis and of the subsequent Oedipal crisis. Because we do not completely negotiate these socio-dramatic crises, we remain to some extent fixated on the social scene in which they are set, forever trying to finish the job with mother, with father, with family, with society, with culture. That is our original or generic sin: a state of arrested development.

Sin, being evil, never fully reveals itself, its manner of working. We think we have caught it when we call it self-centeredness. What we miss, by this description, is that self-centeredness is essentially dependent on others for its satisfaction. One thinks of Osmund in Henry James's "Portrait of a Lady," whose pride and disdain depend on the society he despises. Sin is in the implicit measure of the self by others, on which all the pretensions of the self are built. Sin is not a disregard for others: it is a misregard for others. It is a centering on myself on the beam of others. And the beam is not noticed—the failure to notice it being sin in action. Thus the socio-centrism, the anthropocentrism, of sin is never observed—until finally its effects reveal themselves in geocide in its many forms. What of course refuses,
in its own interest, to reveal itself to us, is the self-contradictoriness in "absolutizing myself in relation to others." Evil is self-contradiction.

Now this state of arrested development, initiated in a partially flunked growth crisis, means that instead of our basic sense of the goodness and greatness of our life directing us to look beyond the human to the all-embracing mystery, our reduced sense of our goodness continues forever to wrestle with the socio-dramatic context never transcended. In this way we create our own limit for desire, the human world with its endless history of injustice and revenge. Far beyond this limit, stands our real limit, death.

It is this gap, between our self-created limit and the death that truly limits us, that accounts for the impossibly ambivalent attitude we have to death. Who can make sense of the way we view death, of what death looks like to us? Who can find any coherence in this mixture of remoteness and unavoidableness?

Now a person without sin, a person free of our inbuilt self-contradiction, will not have this ambivalent attitude to death. This person's desire is powered by an unimpeded sense of his goodness, and so does not meander into the endless and immemorial human labyrinth. It reaches out to infinity, and acknowledges death as its only limit.

And how does this limit appear to our sinless one? Certainly not as the threat that death is to us who have defined ourselves short of it. It will not seem "tragic." It will not suggest the pompe funebre. On the contrary, it will signal the person's participation in a universe of death and birth. On the other hand, it certainly will not make the person's unlimited desire seem to no purpose. That message, of the ultimate hopelessness of it all, is the message of death to the sinful consciousness, a point that Shakespeare makes clear—though not to all—by having Macbeth, the man given over to evil, speak the famous nihilistic line "Tomorrow and tomorrow and tomorrow." Nihilism is the projection of the failure of our self-made, anthropocentric project onto death, charging the cosmos itself with our own failure. So great was the military self-esteem of the French that they would say, after every defeat, "Nous sommes trahis!" On the contrary, the sinless person for whom life is limitless desire will see death as the gateway to new life for desire, as death is the gateway to new life at every level of being. Death will be the process that desire, to be all of itself, wants to
surrender to. Desire, appropriated, finally intends a cosmic existence, to which death is the opening—but real death, not that weird spectral figure projected out of our sociocentrism, not the *fire éternelle* that Valery saw in the sunlight on his "Cimetiere marin." For the sinless person, death will be consummation.

But will this be a solitary consummation, something for himself alone? At the level of consciousness we are trying to envision, the concept is quite incoherent. The question "What will become of me?", asked in respect of death, comes from within the citadel of sociocentric consciousness, so it is asked not of death but of the blurred death that we thence envision. For it is the conspiratorilly willed remoteness of death that itself makes us strangers to each other and thus invites us to ask a solitary's question of death. The person for whom death, genuinely, feels to be consummation exists in a quite other relationship to all other persons. In this person the feeling whose damming up separates us from one another and from our death runs free. The same feeling that senses death as consummation runs out to others whom fear withholds from this consummation and each other. For the sinless one, death is the consummation of his passion for humanity.

The earliest Christian hymn, quoted by Paul in Philippians 2:6ff, the earliest liturgical evidence of the dangerous memory, sees Jesus not merely as accepting death on a cross but as choosing it, the point being that, being sinless ("in the form of God") he didn't have to die but chose to out of love. I have argued elsewhere that we can, and must, reject the anthropology implied here, a naive conjecture on the prelapsarian condition, while maintaining, and entering more deeply into, the basic insight, the dangerous memory, of the man who died atrociously out of love for us, the person whose embrace of death as consummation and whose embrace of us alienated humans was one embrace. I would say that "the loving choice of death by the immortal one" is an incorrect conceptualization of the basic insight into "the loving death of the sinless one" or better "the death of the sinless one as an act of love not of necessity."

But the worst has yet to be considered. The worst is that it is as alienated from death, as enclosed in our self-made human enclave, that we see disaster as simply incompatible with a loving creator. One thing our terrible century is forcing upon theologians is unanimity concerning theodicy—that there isn't an adequate one. As Vernon
Gregson puts it: "Ricoeur daringly but I believe truthfully suggests that only when we ourselves have achieved the capacity for offered suffering will the world not be too wicked for God to be good, and even then there will remain the little children ... " Thus the love of God cannot show itself in this world unless our fundamental numbness is thawed out. The thawing-out is effected by the resurrection encounters, the experienced divine endorsement of the compassionate death. The compassionate death is the human dimension of a mystery whose God­dimension is a self-identifying of God with the suffering of his creatures. The divine compassion shows itself in the raising from the grave of the one whom love for humankind drove to a horrendous death. It shows itself in this way as far more "pathetic" than any speculation can conceive.

The urgency for "recovering" the consciousness of Jesus is coming from the realization that only out of a new consciousness can a world on the brink of disaster be saved. I mean, that the search for the consciousness of Jesus is perforce a search within our consciousness. In its pursuit we are perforce hinting at a potential in our own consciousness. We are seeking within ourselves for that spark of reawakened compassion that blazed up in Jesus. In abandoning the Christological chimera that I have compared with an earthquake not on the Richter scale, we are engaged in spiritual self-searching. And now that the church, in its most visible form, is engaging in the quest for peace and justice, it is becoming clear that the basis for this labor, if it is not to be a mere dogmatic formula, must be an existentially embraced style of consciousness and cognate action, a burning human center such as Gandhi could have recognized.

That center has shown itself on earth. It has only been able to show itself because it is in all of us, so that we can recognize it. Shown to us in a dangerous memory, it awakes in us the power to live beyond the city and to die for the city.

The center is essential. We do not know how we are to save the world, but we do know that this is impossible save from this center whence sin is swallowed up in life. Even non-violence is not enough, albeit it is far beyond where most of us have yet reached. (How far we have to go is indicated by the fact that the recent national convention of the National Catholic Education Association did not devote one hour to it.) But even non-violence leaves death unappropriated and evil thus
still loose. For the non-violent person places the onus of his or her
death on the inflictor, unless he or she can take the further step, the
Jesus step, of appropriating his death in love for the inflictor and for
all people.

These reflections have some application to the menace of nuclear
annihilation. Robert J. Lifton, who has gone further than anyone in the
psychological analysis of this menace, speaks of it as producing a
psychic numbing. I would account for this numbing in the following way.
Our style of consciousness makes death remote, and our whole bias is to
keep it that way. Thus when new and strange historical circumstances
bring death right up close, the only way to "keep it that way" is to
become, ourselves, numb in regard to it. This numbness is an accen-
tuation of the lack of deepest feeling which is our "fallen" condition.
In its thrall, we are furthest from the redemptive, self-sacrificing
stance. But this means, conversely, that the self-sacrificing stance is
the only exorcism of the nuclear menace. The spectre and the sacrifice
are mutually exclusive possessors of the human soul. At this end-time,
in this twilight of "scores of centuries," the crucified Logos and the
deafening denial of all meaning confront one another in the fearful
soul. There is but one way to throw off the demon of a new, pervasive
nihilism. It is "to let that mind be in you which also was in Christ
Jesus." In that shared mind alone is eternal life—that eternal life
whose natural symbol in the continuity of generations is swallowed by
the image of mass-annihilation and planetary winter.

What we are about, in these reflections, is the recovery of a
subject for the saving death, a consciousness in which death consummates
a passion for humankind. This consciousness is beyond our rational
comprehension, because it is within us almost too deep for our recovery—
almost, but not quite, and the "not quite" is precisely that margin of
us where we awaken to the dangerous memory. I have tried to express
this in a poem, which I cite at the end. This consciousness, this sub-
ject of the new death in love, was at pains to impress itself onto that
memory; for not only did he undergo that death: he enacted it, breaking
the bread and saying "My body given!", and deepening the drama with the
cup of wine as the spilled blood.

Unfortunately, just when we need its healing symbolic communi-
cation, the Eucharist is in poor shape—the worse for wear after twenty
years of insensitive and uneducated experiment. We should be very open
to the Spirit to show us how to find again, in the breaking of bread, that mind and that memory.

Finally, let me try to state the version of Lonergan's "Law of the Cross" that is implicit in these reflections:

Sin subjects us to death by making of it the triumphant alien, the final meaning, agent of an ambiguous God. Sin is taken away, therefore, by the embrace of death in love for us its helpless subjects, whose hearts can thus open to the unambiguously compassionate one.

I find it necessary to break down Lonergan's opening statement: Sin leads to death. In the logic of Lonergan's whole life work, I have to see the drama of sin and death at the level of existential meaning rather than at the level of an ontology for which death came only with sin: the ontology of Paul and of that early hymn: an ontology whose abandonment does not make void, but invites us to deepen, the crucial insight to which it gave inadequate expression.

I have a deeper soul
that, to my surprise,
is not surprised at injury or wrong:
it prizes only life,
to it, right is dead.
Strive to live where life is:
leave chosen anxieties.

There is such room at this unvisited depth
that no one would leave it for the world of right:
strange castle, where the cells are liberty,
the furnished rooms our prison.
The view from above downward
LeCORBUSIER'S FINGER AND JACOBS'S THOUGHT:
THE LOSS AND RECOVERY OF THE SUBJECT IN THE CITY

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I
THE VIEW FROM ABOVE DOWNWARD

The picture with which we begin (LeCorbusier, 1967: 135) may seem innocuous; the photograph seems badly cropped—the arm is awkwardly truncated and the entire composition seems to distort the forms of the city model it presents. If we judge the image to be the result of amateurish camera technique or sloppy production work, it may be dismissed without a second look. But if we suspend these judgments or assume intention rather than accident at the source of the photograph, the image invites inspection and evokes startling associations.

The segment of the model which we see assures us that the unseen will follow an invariant order: grids anchored by cruciform monoliths will occasionally open on to seemingly blank open spaces. But the angle of the photograph betrays its real interest: the hand, not the scale model. The model exists at the wish of the hand: the casually splayed fingers draw the monoliths upward in a powerful thrust and dictate the order of the streets and the placement of the buildings. The hand descends to create order and does so without effort, with a flourish; it speaks of creation from above, achieved without hard labor or benefit of assistance. Its extension does not seek another hand, but only demonstrates its will and way.

Our last sentence summons up the ironic prototype for the hand: the arm of God outstretched to Adam on the ceiling of the Sistine Chapel. Nor is this evocation accidental. The hand belongs to LeCorbusier, who thought himself the equal of Michelangelo (Jencks, 1973: 45) and reserved for the architect and planner—both understood as artists—the role of creating the city of tomorrow.
This photograph served as one illustration for LeCorbusier's The Radiant City, but it may also be taken as a powerful illustration of the persistent themes and tone of LeCorbusier's writings about the city. A city can be best understood from above, where one has a commanding perspective on its form; the form results from the imposition of an order conceived by the architect-artiste where form is cast within the rigorous bounds of a Cartesian rational consciousness. Nor are these elements peculiar to LeCorbusier's writings and scale models. We shall argue that these same elements have dominated the actions of city planners for almost a century. In so doing, these innovators have translated the Cartesian-style texts of LeCorbusier into the actual textualities of contemporary cities. This act of interpretation and transmission has done not a little to unmake the city as a place where the human subject can dwell. First, however, an elaboration of the elements of this style.

II

CARTESIAN RATIONAL CONSCIOUSNESS

The elements of Cartesian rational consciousness deserve, of course, a long study. For the present purposes, however, we wish to focus upon the interrelationships among three of these elements: rectilinear simplicity, functional foreclosure, and domination over nature.

Descartes's stress on the importance of rectilinear simplicity in the project of a method based on self-evident clarity and certainty is familiar to most through his Discourse on Method. There he wrote:

> Considering that among all those who have previously sought truth in the sciences, mathematicians alone have been able to find some demonstrations, some certain and evident reasons, I had no doubt that I should begin where they did ... I thought I could understand [their principles] better singly as relationships between lines, because I could find nothing more simple or more easily pictured to my imagination and my senses (Descartes; LaFleur, trans., 1960: 16).

1. For examples of the continuing fascination with the aerial view, see Anselm Strauss, 1961.
It is notable that the simplicity which Descartes adopts as the paradigm for his new style of rationality appeals to the eye of sense or imagination as its criterion. The possibility that what is simple or confused for the eye may not be the same for thought, or that the style of consciousness in which the eye finds detached lines simple may involve a distortion—these are considerations to which Descartes did not advert. Suffice it to say that, from the outset, Cartesian-style consciousness is characterized as a consciousness to which nothing is more simple than definite, straight lines.

Descartes goes on to say that in a mere two or three months, and in accord with his third methodical rule of proceeding from the simple to the more complex, "I not only solved many problems which I had previously judged very difficult, but also it seemed to me that toward the end I could determine to what extent a still unsolved problem could be solved, and what procedures should be used in solving it" (17). One must turn to Descartes's Geometry, published as the first of three appendices intended to illustrate his Method, to discover that the principal problem "previously judged very difficult" turns out to be the Problem of Pappus.2 Descartes's solution of this problem required the construction of certain curves unknown and considered to be non-mathematical by the ancients. In this regard, Descartes wrote:

The ancients were familiar with the fact that the problems of geometry may be divided into three classes, namely, plane, solid and linear problems. This is equivalent to saying that some problems require only circles and straight lines for their construction, while others require a conic section and still

2. The "Problem of Pappus" is the problem of finding the locus (i.e., curve) which meets certain conditions. The conditions are determined by (a) specifying as "given" a set of straight lines, of any number, position and orientation on a plane one chooses, (b) a set of angles at which an equal number of movable lines intersect with the given lines, and (c) a set of proportionals among the products of the movable lines. Pappus was able to solve the problem only for a limited set of cases, but was unable to prove the validity of his solution of even this limited set.
others require more complex curves. I am surprised, however, that they did not go further, and distinguish between different degrees of these more complex curves, nor do I see why they called the latter mechanical rather than geometrical. If we say that they are called mechanical because some sort of instrument has to be used to describe them, then we must, to be consistent, reject circles and straight lines, since these cannot be described on paper without the use of compasses and a ruler, which may also be termed instruments (Descartes, 1954: 40-43; emphasis added).

To achieve this solution, Descartes developed what he regarded as among the greatest achievements of his Geometry, namely the orderly classification by degree of curves more complex than the conic sections (i.e., circle, ellipse, parabola, and hyperbola). More important still, however, was his reduction of all such curves to relations among straight lines. While this modern technique drastically expanded the set of curves available for rational, mathematical investigation, Descartes nevertheless retained the ancient distinction between geometric and mechanical curves:

I think the best way to group together all such curves and classify them in order, is by recognizing the fact that all points of those curves which we may call 'geometric,' that is, those which admit of precise and exact measurement, must bear a definite relation to all points of a straight line, and that this relation must be expressed by means of a single equation (48; emphasis added).

This last statement reveals how central linear simplicity was to Descartes's new mathematical rationality, which in turn served as the paradigm for his project of a method based on a new kind of consciousness. It simultaneously introduces the second element in this style of rationality, namely "functional foreclosure." The Cartesian style is not merely dependent upon a preference for the "simplicity" of straight lines; it is simultaneously dependent upon a preference for certain restricted types of functional relationships among those lines. In other words, Descartes foreclosed the range of functional relationships which could bear the qualities of exactness and precision, clarity and certitude to all save those which could be expressed "by means of a single equation." It was this foreclosure of more complicated types of functional relationships which led Descartes to believe his method was a matter of "following the correct order and stating precisely all the
circumstances of what we are investigating," and led him to say, "What pleased me most about this method was that it enabled me to reason in all things, if not perfectly, at least as was in my power" (17; emphasis added). Mathematicians and mathematical physicists would spend nearly two centuries debating whether "mechanical" or "transcendental" or "discontinuous" functions could be matters of rational investigation. But by the time the definitive "yes" of the scientific community had radically opened the meaning of "rational investigation," functional foreclosure had grown deep cultural roots. LaPlace, for example, used virtually the same expression to articulate his now classical formulation of determinism:

> We ought to regard the present state of the universe as the effect of its anterior state and as the cause of the one which is to follow. Given for one instant an intelligence which could comprehend all the forces by which nature is animated and the respective situation of the beings who compose it ... it would embrace in the same formula the movements of the greatest bodies of the universe and those of the lightest atom ... (LaPlace, 1952: 4).

This sense that the method would yield a total comprehension of all things, in turn, provided the underpinning for the third element in the Cartesian style of consciousness, namely domination over nature. This belief that the wondrous variety, complexity and number of circumstances in the universe could be completely comprehended through the use of restricted types of functional relationships provides the "metaphysical" grounding for the modern orientation of thought that all such circumstances can be ordered and shaped in accord with human ambitions and fears. Along with Francis Bacon (1974: 42), Descartes made mastery and possession of nature into a fundamental preoccupation of modern consciousness. Descartes's text is worth quoting in full:

> For these general notions show me that it is possible to arrive at knowledge that is very useful in life and that in place of the speculative philosophy taught in the Schools, one could find

3. Emphasis added. It should be noted that the work which contains this statement was intended to effect a revolution of political, cultural, moral and religious attitudes among the popular readership, and in this respect was profoundly different from his technical treatise on probabilities.
a practical one, by which, knowing the force and actions of fire, water, air, stars, the heavens, and all the other bodies that surround us, just as we understand the various skills of our craftsmen, we could in the same way use these objects for all the purposes for which they are appropriate, and thus make ourselves, as it were, masters and possessors of nature. This is desirable not only for the invention of an infinity of devices that enable us to enjoy without pain the fruits of the earth and all the goods one finds in it, but also principally for the maintenance of health, which unquestionably is the first good and the foundation of all the other goods in this life ...

(Descartes, 1980: 33; emphasis added).

In this third element, the more specific characteristics of Cartesian rational consciousness are linked with the more general concerns of the horizon of modernity. Fred Lawrence has discussed the ways in which the modern philosophical horizon has affected basic issues in moral, political and economic thought (Lawrence, 1978, 1984). As Lawrence has shown, that horizon has been fundamentally informed by a despair about the moral goodness of human nature. The modern philosophical horizon replaced the classical position that human consciousness is, by nature, rational, social, and possessed of a natural potentiality and orientation toward moral perfection. In its place were substituted the interpretation of human nature as fundamentally constituted by primeval desires for acquisition and fears of disease, bodily harm and death. In this context, human nature as such came to be thought of as irrational, pre-social and ultimately incapable of moral perfection. Human nature came to be thought of as irrational, because of the conviction that desires and fears, not reason, determine the ends of human life. Reason became understood, and still is for most, as useful only for calculating how to best achieve these ends, not as the intrinsic determinant of what those ends should be. This entails the conviction that human nature is not realized in society, as it is in classical thought. Rather these forces of human nature give rise to violent, pre-social conflicts which can be minimized, if not completely eliminated, through a calculated and managed set of social determinants. Finally, moral perfection requires the suppression, not the realization of human nature. Hence, the classical virtues, such as temperance, are not goods in themselves as in the classical context, but are important only for maintaining a modicum of order and a minimum of strife.

The solution proposed to the human situation as conceived in this horizon of modernity, therefore, is that the enlightened few who
"realistically" recognize this state of affairs must use their superior ability to calculate the conditions under which the minimum amount of misery will take place, and to manipulate those conditions for that end. Salvation in the modern horizon is, therefore, planning by a few about how the many will live for ends pre-determined by this modern horizon.

Planning in this horizon is a deliberate attempt to make individual intelligences, virtues and conversions irrelevant to the determination of social order. These are to be replaced, as Lonergan put it, by "the technician's utopia, when a succession of security plans will have made citizens into guinea-pigs for the grandscale experiments of commissars, under the laboratory conditions guaranteed by a secret police" (1943: 8). The sad truth is that the "grandscale experiments" of which Lonergan speaks are not limited to communist states. They have become the stock and trade of the planners of Western cities as well. City planning in this sense is the attempt to determine the architectural parameters—the kinds of places there are to be seen, what sorts of things are to be seen in those places—in order to completely control a society for its own good. In the case of city planners, the parameters to be manipulated are buildings and open spaces. Open spaces are particularly important, because they permit escape from the greatest threat to one's humanity—other people—and offer ever-available retreats to the "state of nature": the freedom of isolated individuality. As Jacobs puts it, this is not the real freedom which attracted people to cities in medieval times, but just "freedom from ordinary responsibility" (1961: 22).

The horizon of modernity—through its specifically Cartesian form in the combination of rectilinear simplicity, functional foreclosure and domination over nature—generated a style of rationality, of consciousness, which profoundly influenced the work of LeCorbusier and other architects and planners as they set about to redeem the city from its irrationalities, and make men the masters and possessors of the city. We now turn to show, more concretely, this connection.

III
THE LEGACY OF DESCARTES AND LeCORBUSIER

LeCorbusier trumpeted these themes in *Urbanisme* (in English translation, *The City of Tomorrow*), a work preceding *La Ville Radieuse*. Two comments on the role of form are representative. The first concerns the choice of forms appropriate to the task of urban planning, as LeCorbusier conceived it. These forms are not the accidental, if happy, choice of an artistic planner. They are foreordained to the task.

The forms we are discussing are the eternal forms of pure geometry and these will enshrine in us a rhythm which will in the end be our own, going far beyond the confines of formulae and charged with poetry, the implacable mechanism which will pulsate with it (LeCorbusier, 1971: 69; emphasis added).

There is perhaps no more telling symbol of LeCorbusier's reliance on the tradition of Cartesian rational consciousness for this ideal of pure geometrical form than this illustration taken from *The Radiant City*.
Le Corbusier's Finger and Jacobs's Thought

The Cartesian skyscraper:
steel and glass.\(^5\)

A second comment representative of the influences of the tradition of Cartesian rational consciousness upon Le Corbusier concern the kinds of functions appropriate for urban planning.

Wherever the line is broken, jolted irregular and constructed without rhythm, or the form is over acute or bristling, our senses are painfully and grievously afflicted ... the word barbarous comes at once to mind. But when the line is continuous and regular, and the forms are full and rounded without a break, and governed by a clear, guiding rule, then the senses are

\(^5\) Photo and caption both in the text, Lecorbusier, 132.
solaced, the mind is ravished, liberated, lifted out of chaos
and flooded with light. Then the word "mastery" comes to mind
... (LeCorbusier, 1971: 64)

He indicated his clear disdain for the kind of functional rhythm which
is an ordering of many "broken, jolted irregular" and unrelated branch­
ings, and his preference for Cartesian functional simplicity, in the
following illustration from The Radiant City (82):

![Diagram](image)

Note that the curve in the middle of the diagram is representative of an
exploratory path, whether of the child learning to walk, a casual
stroller discovering a new domain, a thinker in search of an insight, a
"diverse and lively" city's economic growth, or a culture forging new
directions. This is the process Descartes and LeCorbusier despised.

6. LeCorbusier—or his translator—is curiously insensitive to the
contrary play of meanings in this language: ordering intelligence
which "liberates," a solace that simultaneously "ravishes," a
chaos that yields to a "flood" of light.
Even allowing for the obscurities of the rhetoric, one can still detect a conviction that the artist-planner assumes a burden earlier charged to the state: relief of the estate of man. In particular, LeCorbusier carries Descartes' concern to make mahealth focal to the mastery and possession of nature to an extreme which borders on the morbid. He wrote, for example:

For the past several years, while pursuing step after new step the genuine goals of architecture ... I have realized that the key to life is the lung: a man who breathes well is an asset for society. I have arrived at the site of synthesis, the constructive idea, certainty: the need to provide exact air. And I have found the means to do it.

The Invention? The discovery that if architecture follows certain paths, it can provide city-dwellers with good, true God-given air, for the salvation of their lungs (1967: 40).

"Exact air," replacing current heating or refrigeration practices, is prepared in thermal power stations attached to each residence group. Outdoor air is there made dust-free, disinfected, brought to the desired temperature, given a suitable degree of humidity. It is pure and ready to be consumed by the lung (1967: 48).

The artistry of geometric form was to redeem the barbarous city from its medical as well as its social evils.

The practical consequences of this style of rationality appear throughout The City of Tomorrow. LeCorbusier raged against the web-work of ancient city streets—"a pack donkey's way"—and championed the linear and rectilinear form as an example of the "human" way (1971: 11). Indeed, with the encouragement of the Voisin automobile company, he fashioned a plan for uprooting the cluttered center of Paris and implanting a more orderly scheme.
This scale model of his plan for Paris (1967: 207)—the same model which provides the backdrop to his hand in our first illustration—reveals simultaneously the elements of his style, and the truncation of his aesthetic sensibility and judgment. While the world may be fortunate that LeCorbusier's plan for the rebuilding of the center of Paris was never undertaken, America's urban poor have not been as lucky. These elements of LeCorbusier's style became the cornerstone of that great American social experiment following World War II, namely, the public housing projects. Compare this photograph of New York public housing (Rowe and Koetter: 4) with LeCorbusier's Paris plan:
LeCorbusier pictured the urban scene as the site for the greatest of battles ("A city—it is the grip of man upon nature!") (1971: 1) and in seeing the city as the exercise of domination over nature, accorded power to an enlightened few: the architect and planner, of course, but also the enlightened businessman (Jencks: 18). Placing a premium on speed ("A city made for speed is made for success"; LeCorbusier, 1971: 179), he laced his model cities together with enormous boulevards to accommodate the automobile and frustrate the pedestrian. Speed and the primacy of the machine (even houses are "machines for living") the power of the enlightened few and rectilinear order are the political and ecological coordinates of LeCorbusier's geometric understanding of the city.

These tendencies to understand the city from above and as the triumph of an authoritative Cartesian rationalism over the brute forces
of nature (and the brutish instincts of a less-than-enlightened populace) are not peculiar to LeCorbusier; his self-proclaimed prominence and the influence of his architecture commend him as the representative of an important tradition. We find similar convictions in the Garden City plans articulated by Ebenezer Howard (1965) at the turn of the century. Geometry—here the simplicity of the circle replaces that of the rectilinear line—serves the separation of work, leisure, government, and family life which tend to a distressing muddle in the unplanned city. Howard argues that segregating the complicated functioning of this nexus into simpler functional components provides the promise of peace and health in town, country, and city. Daniel Burnham, another nineteenth-century planner, and his twentieth-century counterpart, James Rouse, both espouse the desirability of large-scale planning, orchestrated by a knowledgeable few, as the only check against the decline of the city. "Make no small plans, for they do not contain that magic that makes men's blood boil," argued Burnham. Rouse, the successful developer of Faneuil Hall (Boston), Harborplace (Baltimore), and Columbia, Maryland, seized those same words to describe the mission of the planner nearly a century later. He added that the total "human" plan offers "the new, compelling rational images of what the city might be," a vision inaccessible to those committed to a

7. "Men, in general, like the cogs of a wheel, appear to follow a path carefully marked for them ... His work goes on adding itself up uninterruptedly, the tiny grain or the mighty rock, and the curve climbs up its steep track. But it is his passions that make war, that destroy or enrapture in the frantic chase for happiness: here is struggle, recoil, disaster or domination" (LeCorbusier, 1971: 52). The poet and engineer are able to surmount "an imbroglio of mediocre destinies" and understand a plan for "man" (53).

8. Burnham, as quoted by Rouse and reported in The Boston Globe, September 26, 1980.

plurality of small, "piecemeal" plans. More recently still, Philip Johnson's plan for International Place in Boston reflects these same attitudes. The building is a massive affair, totally out of scale in relation to its locale. Its geometrical simplicity consists in the elementary shapes comprising its three towers: a circular cylinder, an elliptical cylinder, and a parallelepiped. The project has been characterized by architecture critic Robert Campbell as an example of "Parachute Architecture" for its attention to the aerial perspective and indifference to the web of human interactions it will impact. As Campbell put it, it is as if an architect such as Johnson flies over a city, triangulates the site, drops the building down onto the lot, and then flies on to do the same to some other city.

Johnson, Burnham, Howard, and LeCorbusier, we argue, represent a tradition which views the city as a disastrous mess, capable of being tidied up only by dint of massive reorganization along rational-geometric-artistic lines. This tradition also carries an implicit political judgment, a distrust of the people who inhabit cities: who, but they, could be responsible for the lack of grand vision, for unplanned and unadministered growth that disfigures the city?

In theory and practice, then, the tradition of LeCorbusier entails a banishment of the perspective, lifeworld and cares of the ordinary subject in thinking about and planning for the city. At best, the city will serve as an arena for the business and intellectual competition of an elite and for such an elite, the meaning of a city as home or dwelling place counts for little or nothing. And the fortunes of the less-than-elite? LeCorbusier provides modest accommodations to match their modest capabilities at the fringes of the great city.

Great men and our leaders install themselves in the city's center. There too we find their subordinate of every grade, whose presence there at certain hours is essential, though their destinies are circumscribed within the narrower bounds of family life. The family is badly housed in the city. Garden cities satisfy these needs better ... So a classification of city dwellers would give us three main divisions of population: the citizens who live in the city; the workers whose lives are passed half in the centre and half in the garden cities, and the great mass of workers who spend their lives between suburban factories and garden cities (LeCorbusier, 1971: 102).
The resulting configuration of the urban region—citadels of finance, politics, business at the core; at the edge, encampments of the socially and politically marginal; in the air, the quiet hum of speed and commerce—has been realized throughout the world. 10

IV
THE VIEW FROM BELOW UPWARD

There are signs that a tradition counter to that of LeCorbusier is beginning to develop. In the work of Kevin Lynch, Christian Norberg-Schulz, Anne Whiston Spirn, and especially Jane Jacobs 11 we find a markedly different approach to thinking about the cities, an approach which would restore the primacy of the subject who dwells in the city. In parallel fashion, in the intentionality analysis of consciousness and the human good by Bernard Lonergan we find the philosophical foundations for this new approach. This emerging tradition differs from the tradition of LeCorbusier in the following ways: (1) the view is from below upward; 12 (2) form arises within the context of a process of "emergent probability," meaning, among other things, that temporality and historicity are intrinsic to form; (3) the emergent processes of nature itself are understood as providing both the limits which must be respected, and the parameters which make possible these resultant urban forms; (4) this emergence of form, insofar as it is good, is conditioned by the attentive, intelligent, reasonable, responsible, and loving trial and error

10. See, for instance, Sternlieb and Hughes, 1980.


12. Our use of these phrases should not be confused with Lonergan's own discussion of "the movement from below upward and from above downward" in consciousness. See Lonergan, 1975.
of a collaborative effort among "people on the spot"; and (5) the norm for selecting or rejecting emerging forms is not Cartesian consciousness, but consciousness oriented "upward" toward a horizon of wonderment by symbols of order comprehensive of both the great and the small, both the successful and the suffering.

The shift from the aerial perspective to the street-level reflects a basic insight: although the visual panorama from above is more encompassing, such seeing is irrelevant to living in the city. The interaction of the subject with the environment—the streets walked, events witnessed, memories stirred, tasks undertaken—becomes the ground for understanding the meaning of the city. In this regard, the late Kevin Lynch made pioneering contributions. He is well-known for his careful and extensive interviews of hundreds of city inhabitants. Through these surveys he sought to empirically determine how people at the street-level experience the spatial and temporal features of their cities; how, concretely, they order these experienced extensions and durations; and what clues for spatial and temporal orientation they rely upon. From these surveys he constructed a variety of topographic maps and historiographic sequences which expressed the relationships between the city and its users.

The reciprocal interaction of subject and city focuses his or her project. In the introduction to *What Time is this Place?*, Lynch announced a concern with "the evidence of time which is embodied in the physical world, how those external signals fit (or fail to fit) our internal experience, and how that inside-to-outside relationship might become a life-enhancing one" (1972: 1). Lynch stresses that:

City design ... is a temporal art, but it can rarely use the controlled and limited sequence of other temporal arts like music ... At every instant, there is more than the eye can see, more than the ear can hear, a setting or a view waiting to be explored. Nothing is experienced by itself, but is always relative to its surroundings, the sequence of events leading up to it, the meaning of past experiences (1960: 1).

He attends both to the ways in which human awareness of natural temporal cycles and historical developments are enhanced, muted, or destroyed by architectural plans. Sensitivity to the concrete concerns of the inquiring, remembering subject, a being who finds himself within an
environment, either welcoming or alien, permeates his work. The city can nourish imagination, providing "the raw material for the symbols and collective memories of group communication" (1960: 4). Alternatively, a city may lose memory if planners ignore the signs of time and place which anchor a community in the natural universe and history. His studies of the felt experiences and attendant meanings of city life in Boston, Los Angeles, Jersey City, and elsewhere constituted a primary exploration of the \textit{Lebenswelt} of the ordinary city dweller.

The work of Christian Norberg-Schulz draws heavily upon Heidegger's reflections on the spatial and temporal ecstases of Dasein, and of his later writings on the meaning of "dwelling." Norberg-Schulz has deepened Lynch's exploration by way of his Heideggerian reading of city space. According to him, the architect strives to "visualize the genius loci [spirit of the place] and the task of the architect is to create meaningful places, whereby he helps man to dwell" (1980: 5).

Norberg-Schulz undertakes a "phenomenology of natural place" in which he gathers different characters of sky, water, terrain and vegetation into three basic types: Romantic, Cosmic, and Classical landscapes (42-48). Places formed by relationships among historically pre-existing human edifices can also be understood according to these basic types. He goes on to discuss the importance of respecting these basic types when undertaking any new architectural project. One citation in particular poignantly reveals what has happened when such norms, immanent and operative in the relationships between subject and place, were ignored by planners from the tradition of Cartesian rational consciousness:

Until quite recently Boston appeared as a dense cluster of relatively small houses on the peninsula between the harbour and the Charles River. The architectural quality was generally very high, and the environment characterized by significant local motifs. During the last decade large parts of the urban tissue have been erased, and scattered "superbuildings" erected instead. The development culminated with the John Hancock Tower by I.M. Pei, which completely destroys the scale of a major urban focus, Copley Square. As a result, Boston today appears a hybrid city; the old remains, such as Beacon Hill, make the new...

13. In addition to the works previously cited, see also (Lynch, 1982).
buildings look inhuman and ridiculous; and the new structures have a crushing effect on the old environment, not only because of scale, but because of their total lack of architectural character. Thus the place has lost its meaningful character between earth and sky (182).

This loss is vividly illustrated in the following photographic contrast of the present Boston skyline with that of 1950s (from Campbell and Vanderwarker).
Elsewhere Norberg-Schultz describes the necessarily subtle interplay between natural setting and human history in the conception and execution of architecture (23-77). This insistence upon interplay of subject and nature, rather than nature's subjugation, the awareness of "im-placed" spirit rather than idealized form, and the commitment to fostering "dwelling" space rather than realizing elite citadels testify to a powerful concern for human subjectivity.

But "dwelling" is not accomplished without effort. Man dwells when he is able to concretize the world in buildings and things. As we have mentioned above, 'concretization' is the function of the work of art, as opposed to the 'abstraction' of science ... But architecture is a difficult art. To make practical towns and villages is not enough. Architecture comes into being when a 'total environment is made visible' ... To belong to a place means to have an existential foothold, in a concrete everyday sense ... [to] know how it feels to walk on that particular ground, to be under that particular sky, or between those particular trees ...

Finally, the intimate relationships between the ecological functions of city order and the communication of meaning are explored by Anne Whiston Spirn in The Granite Garden (1984). Spirn, who describes herself as an "urban ecologist," is far from either LeCorbusier's morbid fantasies about architecture and health, or a Romanticist nostalgia for the Rousseauian "state of nature." Spirn empirically and intelligently explores the roles played by urban greenlands in the schemes of recurrence of air and water regeneration essential to sustain human life, in its social as well as biological schemes. Her book provides detailed analyses of the various ways urban construction complements or destroys the cycles which replenish air and water supplies. Nor do her reflections stop with biochemical concerns; aesthetic considerations are also included, since it is important to make visible the intrinsic connection between human and natural schemes of recurrence.

The manifold ways in which a community of subjects gains a "foot­hold" are the concern of Jane Jacobs. She enjoins the reader to become an immersed city subject: "please look closely at real cities. While you are looking, you might as well listen, linger and think about what you see" (1961: 376). Note the richness of Jacobs's endeavor: the looking is not an end in itself, but invites listening, lingering ("dwelling") and thought. More than anything else, it is the impressive
intelligence of her thought which uncovers complex interdependences among architecture and the solutions to a host of contemporary urban problems. From an aerial perspective, the only apparent forms will be Cartesian geometric, or violations of these; the detached observer lacks access to any other form. At street level, within and between subjects, however, a plurality of forms emerges. Paths, places, and edifices attract "eyes" to the urban scene only insofar as they are vehicles of the informal, complex functionings of spontaneous communication and cooperation, not because they obey abstract geometrical principles. The heuristic quality of her definition of a neighborhood is instructive:

A successful city neighborhood is a place that keeps sufficiently abreast of its problems so that it is not destroyed by them (112).

The aesthetic value of planned structures is directly correlated with their successes or failures in aiding groups of subjects to achieve group solutions to security, economic, political, cultural, educational, entertainment, and transportation problems. A retired man perched on his doorstep, a mere dot when observed from great height, becomes a custodian of tradition and a contributor to the keeping of peace. The apparently random movement of people across a public square or through intertwined streets and alleys of a quiet neighborhood generates the modicum of public trust and friendship which carry the "meaning of a

15. Lonergan once remarked, "If you want to know what an 'insight' is, read Jane Jacobs' The Death and Life of Great American Cities. There's 20 of them [insights] to a page! I call her 'Mrs. Insight!'"

16. More impressive still is the heuristic nature of the last chapter of Jacobs, 1961, entitled "The Kind of a Problem a City Is." There she makes explicit what has been implicit throughout the rest of the book: a city is intrinsically a developing entity, and any intelligent understanding and responsible action on its behalf requires the use of genetic method.

17. See Jacobs's treatment of public characters, the functions of sidewalks and eyes on the street (29-111).
place" and are basic to public life (55-68). In and through the patterns of living, working, learning, and socializing that occur on streets and in neighborhoods, the forms of the possibility of human cooperation take shape. The tradition of LeCorbusier suffers under the weight of environmental determinism: alter the streets and buildings, and the good life will result. The Jacobean tradition locates the source of the possibility of the good life within the community of subjects who, by their virtues, loyalties, friendships, sacrifices, and commitments, create the meanings of the city.

The very title of her book, The Death and Life of Great American Cities, conveys her understanding of the city as an organic—not a Cartesian geometric—entity. She explicitly challenges the misapprehension of the city by LeCorbusier and his descendants and faults them for most of the problems peculiar to the twentieth century city:

When city designers and planners try to find a design that will express, in clear and easy fashion, the "skeleton" of city structure ... they are on the wrong track. A city is not put together like a mammal or a steel-frame building ... a city's very structure consists of a mixture of uses, and we get closest to its structural secrets when we deal with conditions that generate diversity (379).

Conditionality, mixture of uses and diversity—what LeCorbusier sees as disorder—Jacobs understands as the potency from which intricate, successful and wonderful forms of order do in fact emerge. Jacobs offers the following metaphor to characterize the difference between the order of the city as conceived in the LeCorbusier tradition, and as it really is:

Under the seeming disorder of the old city, wherever the old city is working [functioning] successfully, is a marvellous order for maintaining the safety of the streets and the freedom of the city. It is a complex order. Its essence is intricacy of sidewalk use, bringing with it a constant succession of eyes. This order is all composed of movement and change, and although it is life, not art, we may liken it to the dance—not to a simple-minded precision dance with everyone kicking up at the same time, twirling in unison and bowing off en masse, but to an intricate ballet in which the individual dancers and ensembles all have distinctive parts which miraculously reinforce each other and compose an orderly whole. The ballet of the good city sidewalk never repeats itself from place to place, and in any one place it is always replete with new improvisations (50).
She then devotes four pages to the detailed description of such a "ballet" in one small section of New York City.

For Jacobs, Spirn, Lynch, and Norberg-Schulz, the return to the subject also produces a historically-minded consciousness that eludes the LeCorbusier tradition. For that tradition, history means the past, a catalogue of oversights and omissions that evaporates when brought under the strong light of the present. The authors of the new tradition, on the other hand, place a different value on the past. Jacobs emphasizes that time is required for intricate patterns of cooperation and communication—the city's "social capital"—to arise. Moreover, these patterns function both as ends in themselves, and as the potential for further growth and problem-solving. Perhaps her harshest comments concern the violent ways in which this "social capital" is swept away by the massive renovations of urban planning in the LeCorbusier tradition. One thing planners cannot provide with the opening of a new project is the concretely lived past time needed to rebuild these patterns.

A different context for thinking about the functional order of cities led to the massive construction of urban housing projects. Of the many anecdotes by means of which Jacobs criticizes the consequences LeCorbusier-style planning have had upon human living, the following may serve as an illustration:

To explain the troubling effect of strangers on the streets of city gray areas, I shall first point out, for purposes of analogy, the peculiarities of another and figurative kind of street—the corridors of high-rise public housing projects, those derivatives of Radiant City. The elevators and corridors of these projects are, in a sense, streets. They are streets piled up in the sky in order to eliminate streets on the ground and permit the ground to become deserted parks like the mall at Washington Houses where the [enormous Christmas] tree was stolen ... These interior streets, although completely accessible to public use, are closed to public view and they thus lack the checks and inhibitions exerted by eye-policed streets ... The housing police run up and down [these interior streets] after the malefactors—who behave barbarously and viciously in the blind-eyed, sixteen-story-high stairways,—and the malefactors elude them. It is easy to run the elevators up to a high floor, jam the doors so that the elevators cannot be brought down, and then play hell with a building and anyone you can catch (42-44).

For all four authors, the city is understood, seen, experienced, remembered, and loved by its people as an emergent completion of natural
history and as a product of human history—the temporally-complex human project of making of sense, commitments and decisions.

We have here given only a sketchy account of the contributions of these thinkers. Their real achievement consists in their attention and understanding of concrete details. We encourage the reader to turn to the works of these authors themselves to really appreciate the significance of their work for the discussion which follows.

V

CITIES AND THE CRISIS OF THE HUMAN GOOD

John Boyd Turner, in his lecture, "What Does it Mean to Ask the Question of the Human Good Today?" surveyed the challenges posed by the historically unprecedented rate of population growth in the world since World War II. In that presentation, Turner stated that one reason for this dramatic turn is that life expectancy has been increased, and infant mortality decreased, in Less Developed ("Third World") Countries because of the schemes of recurrence affecting sanitation and health maintenance in their cities. Moreover, Jane Jacobs has argued extensively that major technological, medical, educational, and economic breakthroughs happen only in cities. The reason for this, she claims, is that of the vast potency for such achievements which resides in the enormous diversity of talents, interests, knowledge, and skills of their large populations. Therefore, if Turner and Jacobs are correct (as we believe they are), then the topic of cities is most relevant to the question of the "Crisis of the Human Good." That relevance consists in this: if the crisis of the human good is to be met, it will largely be met through the mediation of cities.

The issue, then, concerns city planning. While Jacobs is especially critical of the kind of planning that spawned urban low-income housing projects, it should be noted that she is likewise


critical of any kind of "project planning," whether of middle- and luxury-income housing projects, cultural projects (such as Lincoln Center in New York), civic center projects, commercial projects (such as Copley Place in Boston), and expressways (see 1961: 3-25, and 163-171). Now while Jacobs rails against "project planning," she is not against planning per se. She herself proposes to introduce new principles of planning (3).

The question, then, is not whether or not to plan cities; the question is of the principles—or, as we would prefer to say, the philosophical horizon—of such planning. The human good is intrinsically a developing good. It is a good which is on the move, a good which changes. It changes by adding something different, either through accretion or replacement. If such change is to be both human and good, then as a minimal condition the change must be thought about—must be intelligent. The problem of how that thinking occurs, what gives it its orientation, is the problem Jacobs and the others begin to raise. The relationship, then, between philosophical orientation and human living may be put, schematically, in this fashion:

PHILOSOPHICAL HORIZON → SOCIAL THEORY → PLANNING → HUMAN LIVING

In the early sections of this paper, we indicated how a philosophical horizon derived from Descartes has informed planning and affected human living. Our concern has been to show the concrete implications of that horizon, and to make clear that, in the longer cycle, those implications are profoundly unacceptable. In our next section, we will explore the ways in which Lonergan offers an alternative horizon for thinking about cities.

20. The opening sentence of Jacobs, 1961 reads: "This book is an attack on current city planning and rebuilding" (3).
VI

THE OPEN HORIZON OF SELF-APPROPRIATED CONSCIOUSNESS

With the exception of Norberg-Schulz, the work of the thinkers in the new tradition of thinking about cities is not so much influenced by a philosophical horizon as it is in search of one. While the contributions of Lynch, Norberg-Schulz, Spirn, Jacobs, and others are impressive, the question of a philosophical foundation for their work remains. Where the methodological a prioris of Cartesian rational consciousness set the norms for LeCorbusier's selection of urban forms, what will provide normativity for this newly emerging tradition? We find the foundations for such a horizon in Lonergan's work.

The foundation of Lonergan's philosophical horizon resides in the achievement of self-appropriation. Such self-appropriation is thematized in an intentionality analysis which reveals that human consciousness as such is constituted by a pure desire to know and love oriented toward an unrestricted objective. One could summarize Lonergan's life work as the endeavor to identify this natural openness of consciousness, and to mediate God's liberation of that openness from the arbitrary restrictions placed upon it by human waywardness. This stands in marked contrast to the horizon of Cartesian rational consciousness which Hans-Georg Gadamer has criticized for taking an "artificial and hyperbolic doubt" (1975: 211) as the basis of its project.

For our present concerns, we would like to focus upon the relevance Lonergan's horizon of self-appropriated consciousness has for the question of the good. The problem of city planning is the problem of planning good cities. The horizon of Cartesian rational consciousness has controlled the meaning of "the good city" up to the present. How would Lonergan's work alter this situation?

A preliminary note regards the fact that the question, "What's the good of it?" is not the same as the question, "What's the human good

21. For a discussion of how one draws upon Lonergan's intentionality analysis to approach the question of the good in a methodical fashion, see Appendix.
of it?" For Lonergan the question of the good is not exhausted in his discussion of the "structure of the human good" (1972: 47-52). The question, "What's the good of it?" goes beyond "What's the human good of it?", and it does so in two ways.

In the first place, the question of the good goes beyond the question of the human good because it anticipates the transcendent goodness of God. The human good is good by participation, good insofar as it participates in the transcendent goodness of God (Lonergan, 1959: 22). The attempt to sever this intrinsic connection, an attempt characteristic of the horizon of modernity, leads to grotesque aberrations, such as the maladies of urban public housing projects. So our first observation concerns the importance of a horizon for thinking about the question of the good in its intrinsic relationship to the unrestricted objective of open consciousness, God.

There is a second way in which the question of the good goes beyond that of the human good. "What is the good of it?" entails not only the good transcendent to the human good; it also intends the prehuman good as well. The recurrent schemes of institutions and cultural meanings, the products of human achievement, are not the only finite goods. The natural neurological, biological, chemical, and physical schemes of recurrence which are the physiological and environmental conditions for the possibility of human higher integrations are also good. The opposition between this attitude, which represents the inherent goodness of the prehuman order, and a horizon which seeks "mastery and possession of nature," could not be more dramatic.

Lonergan's horizon of self-appropriated consciousness provides the possibility of a comprehensive and nuanced heuristic structure of the good as the control of the meaning of "the good city," because it takes the question about what is good as its qualifying norm. This comprehensive heuristic structure includes the heuristic structure of the human good found in Method in Theology, but situates the structure of the human good in relation to the goodness of the prehuman universe, as well as to the transcendent goodness of God. The following diagram provides a schematic representation of this more comprehensive heuristic structure:
HEURISTIC STRUCTURE OF THE GOOD

Transcendent Goodness of God

Structure of the Human Good

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Individual</th>
<th>Social</th>
<th>Ends</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Potentiality</td>
<td>Actuation</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>liberty</td>
<td>orientation, conversion</td>
<td>personal relations</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>plasticity, perfectibility</td>
<td>development, skill</td>
<td>institution, role, task</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>capacity, need</td>
<td>operation</td>
<td>cooperation</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Pre-Human Good

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Individual Human Body</th>
<th>Environment and &quot;Material Equipment&quot;</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Neural demand functions</td>
<td>(elements of spaces and times)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>(Neural schemes of recurrence)</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

- Biological SORs*

- Chemical SORs

- Physical SORs

* SOR abbreviates "scheme of recurrence."

DIAGRAM 1
VII

THE STRUCTURE OF THE GOOD AND CITY PLANNING

By means of this diagram, it is now possible to situate the work of Jacobs, Spirn, Lynch, Norberg-Schulz, and others. We hasten to emphasize that this effort at identifying the work of these thinkers with parts of the structure of the good is not merely an exercise in proper categorization. To situate these authors via the expanded Diagram 2 of the structure of the good does not merely put them into pigeon holes, a trivial task in itself and hardly worth the bother. Rather, its value consists in the way in which it would help achieve, in the context of the good, what Lonergan intended the integral heuristic structure of metaphysics to do for being, the real. That is, Diagram 2 shows the structure of the good "to underlie, penetrate, transform and integrate" the partial conceptions of the good city (1958: 390-399). Situating the work of these authors via the structures of the good has the value of: showing the complementarities of their works (integrating); reorienting their disoriented devaluations and overvaluations; and providing an explicit awareness of the challenge as a whole (underlying and penetrating).

The complementary relationships among their works need to be drawn explicitly. In the first place, the decisions which constitute the human good are a vast manifold. In any large city, this manifold is comprised of thousands of decisions by hundreds of thousands or even millions of people. The need to coordinate and interrelate these decisions is evident, and the heuristic structure of the good provides a basis for such coordinating and interrelating. It can do so because this heuristic structure is not imposed from without like the plans of LeCorbusier. Rather, this structure articulates the relationships already inherent in every moment of human deciding (see Appendix).
HEURISTIC STRUCTURE OF THE GOOD

Transcendent Goodness of God

Structure of the Human Good

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Individual</th>
<th>Social</th>
<th>Ends</th>
</tr>
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<tbody>
<tr>
<td><strong>Potentiality</strong></td>
<td><strong>Actuation</strong></td>
<td><strong>Terminal Value</strong></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>liberty</td>
<td>orientation, conversion</td>
<td>personal relations</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>plasticity, perfectibility</td>
<td>development, skill</td>
<td>institution, role, task</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>capacity, need</td>
<td>operation</td>
<td>cooperation, particular good</td>
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Pre-Human Good

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<td>Neural demand functions</td>
<td>(elements of spaces and times)</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Neural schemes of recurrence

Biological SORs

Chemical SORs

Physical SORs

** Norberg-Schulz focuses on aesthetic, cultural and religious terminal values. Lynch focuses on aesthetic, social and cultural terminal values. Whyte focuses on social terminal values. Spirn focuses on vital and aesthetic terminal values. Jacobs focuses on the good of order.

** Norberg-Schulz focuses on aesthetic, cultural and religious terminal values. Lynch focuses on aesthetic, social and cultural terminal values. Whyte focuses on social terminal values. Spirn focuses on vital and aesthetic terminal values. Jacobs focuses on the good of order.
Furthermore, because of the human misery wrought by the Cartesian aestheticism of city planners, Jacobs tends to devote relatively little attention to the role of good architecture in the good city. On the other hand, Norberg-Schulz emphasizes the relationships of human routines and building endeavors to religious and aesthetic values. He does not explore in any depth Jacobs's forte, the relationships of routines and architectural structures to economic and social schemes of recurrence. Again, while Spiri relates the disposition of plantlife, soil, and water simultaneously to aesthetic values and biological schemes of recurrence, there is scant attention to Jacobs's observations on the social and economic benefits and hazards of different kinds of parks in cities.

Their work also needs to be reoriented. Jacobs draws attention to the concrete practices of virtues which make for safe, friendly, and "lively" neighborhoods, and to the essential requirement of sustained economic development through intelligent import replacement for the common good of cities. And while she is clearly aware of the importance of the experience of mystery for good city life, there is no explicit discussion of the need for conversion, grace, and authentic religion as the source and sustenance of the requisite virtues in individuals.

Finally, their work needs explicit awareness of the good which underlies and penetrates their partial contributions. Making such awareness explicit would have the function of keeping their horizon genuinely open. Insofar as the heuristic structure of the good is understood, appropriated and practiced, it would restrain any one set of analyses from rising to totalitarian pretensions.

Situating the work of these authors in terms of the expanded structure of the good should also reveal how massive and complicated the task of city planning really is, and how unlikely it is that anything less than a broad-based collaboration could ever hope to achieve it. There are needed, first of all, the contributions of the foundational philosophers/theologians who, through the difficult movement of self-appropriation, have grasped the significance of this structure, who can communicate it to others, and who can use it to guide the making of connections and the criticizing of counterpositions in the ideas and proposals of others. Likewise are needed the contributions of practitioners of the other functional specialties of theology, with their term in a "Communications" which succeeds in concretely helping individuals
identify moments of grace in their lives, and the moments of decision to renounce old ways and begin new ones. There are needed the highly developed aesthetic judgments of architectural theorists like Norberg-Schulz, judgments made on the basis of hard-won systematic inter-relations of architectural elements. There are needed the insightful, detailed, nuanced, and concrete interconnections among social and economic functions of a Jacobs-style thinker. There are needed the scientific and comprehensive understandings of the complex web of schemes of recurrence which connect human physiology and neurology to natural and industrial processes.

Finally, but most importantly, there are the common sense insights and prudential judgments of the "person on the spot" (1958: 234). Lonergan, Jacobs, and Lynch in particular stress that the kind of information, flexibility, and coordination of decisions which are required to produce a good city are intrinsically beyond the capacity of any small group of human beings. Nor is their emphasis a Romantic appeal to some sort of populism. LeCorbusier, Burnham, and Rouse correctly recognized and abhorred the terrible "piecemeal sprawl" which had resulted from "unplanned" urban development. A populism which would leave things totally up to individual inclination, it would seem, must inevitably lead to such results.

However, not all urban "sprawl" is bad; some is bad only from the viewpoint of a Cartesian ideal of simplicity. The horizon of self-appropriated consciousness anticipates types of order which stand as higher viewpoints to the Cartesian understanding of function. And the most surprising discovery in such higher viewpoints is that the kind of "sprawl" which is truly abhorrent is not due to the fact that it was unplanned! Rather, its miseries are due to the kind of "planning" inherent in one aspect of the "first wave" of the modern horizon (Leo Strauss, 1975: 83-89)—namely its "free market" aspect. Early modernity looked to the "rational" calculating mechanism of the market as the way to achieve the greatest possible balance between conflicting desires and fears of individuals. "Planning" in this context became a matter of controlling external influences (principally king and church) which might interfere with the market mechanism. Thus everyone's property became theirs to do with as they desired, provided they caused no harm to the body or property of any one else.
Lonergan's account of the good, on the other hand, is antithetical to the spirit of this first wave of modernity. It counterposes the centrality of collaboration to the reliance on calculated pursuit of individualistic desires. In thematizing the structure of the good, Lonergan identified the element of intelligent collaboration immanent in virtually every realization of the human good, including those of "first wave" institutions which attempt to deny it. He has pointed out the weakness of the first-wave view, and the inevitability of its replacement in the dialectic of the longer cycle of decline:

The disagreement among reason's representatives made it clear that, while each must follow the dictates of reason as he sees them, he must also practise the virtue of tolerance to the equally reasonable views and actions of others. The helplessness of tolerance to provide coherent solutions to social problems called forth the totalitarian who takes the narrow and complacent practicality of common sense and elevates it to the role of a complete and exclusive viewpoint (1958: 231).

Leo Strauss and his students have analyzed in detail this trend toward a totalitarian viewpoint as the shift to the "second wave of modernity" in the history of political theory from Rousseau to Marx. In this article we have tried to show how that shift (symbolized in Burnham's "Make no small plans!") manifested itself in the widespread disorder of twentieth century urban project planning.

The injunction which prefaces Jacobs's The Death and Life of Great American Cities is in truth an invitation to a difficult task. Understanding means more than seeing; looking must be surpassed by listening, lingering, dwelling, and thinking; and the subject performing these activities must be the subject of a consciousness oriented beyond the restrictions of Cartesian rationality toward the horizon of wonderment about the good. This is the credo of a subject immersed in the city.

We would like to express our gratitude to Michael H. Byrne for preparing the photographs used in this essay.
APPENDIX

INTENTIONALITY ANALYSIS AND THE STRUCTURE OF THE GOOD

Much has been said about the significance of Lonergan's post-*Insight* discovery of an independent and higher "transcendental notion of value." Most of the discussion to the present has tended to focus upon the significance of the relationship of this independent transcendental notion to his treatment of the apprehension of values in intentional feelings. Yet to the best of our knowledge, no one, including Lonergan himself, has as yet made explicit the ways in which this discovery would affect his earlier claims: "just as the dynamic structure of our knowing grounds a [method in] metaphysics, so the prolongation of that structure into human doing grounds [a method in] ethics" (1958: 602). In order to explicitly link Lonergan's treatment of the question of the good with the horizon of self-appropriated consciousness—that is, with Lonergan's intentionality analysis of consciousness—we would like to very briefly indicate what seem to be the consequences for a method in ethics of the discovery of a transcendental notion of value.

A.1

THE ANALOGUE OF METHOD IN METAPHYSICS

Since Lonergan conceived of the method in ethics through analogy with the method in metaphysics, let us first briefly summarize how his approach to method in metaphysics follows from the appropriation of cognitional structure. Lonergan claimed that affirmation of the structure of cognitional consciousness opened up the possibility of a verifiable metaphysics (xi). This possibility rested on the fact that "just as every statement in theoretical science can be shown to imply statements regarding sensible fact, so every statement in philosophy and metaphysics can be shown to imply statements regarding cognitional fact" (xi). Hence, the possibility of indirectly verifying metaphysical statements is linked with the possibility of directly verifying cognitional statements in the data of consciousness.
Following this methodical approach, Lonergan gradually works out his sequence of metaphysical "positions." The highlights of this sequence may be briefly outlined as follows: (1) The most fundamental consequence is that being, the real, is what is anticipated by the unrestricted, questioning, desire to know. (2) Cognitional analysis reveals that this desire is to be met in the answering of all questions; that any question answered in an intelligent act of understanding only gives rise to the further question, "Is it so?"; and that such further questions are answered in judgments. Such judgments, in turn, are grounded in reasonable grasp of sufficient reason, a second kind of understanding which grasps what insight had grasped as virtually unconditioned. All this leads to the basic metaphysical conclusions, namely: (3) that the real is exactly and only what reasonable judgment can affirm; (4) that there is an "isomorphism" between the dynamic structure of cognitional consciousness and the dynamic structure of the realm of being proportionate to human knowing; and (5) that the real is intrinsically and completely intelligible.

The conclusion that the real is exactly what is to be grasped by reasonable affirmation sweeps aside the restricted viewpoints of all other metaphysical contenders—for example, that the real is only what can be seen or felt; or that the concerns of practicality, concerns ultimately dictated to the strongest and most irrepressible of crude desires and fears, are the ultimate arbiters of what is really real. Again, the isomorphism of the dynamism of human knowing and proportionate being implies that no investigation can be complete if it ignores the developmental or evolutionary context of its subject matter. Finally, because the real is known through affirmative judgment, it is completely intelligible since, as intentionality analysis reveals, every judgment comes as a judgment about what intelligent understanding has grasped, namely, intelligibility. Personal conviction of this fact is "intellectual conversion," and is the only effective antidote to the haunting suspicion that "the universe of being is as unreal as Plato's noetic heaven" (385). Hence, the discovery and affirmation of the structure of human cognitional consciousness puts the self-affirmed subject into a world in which being, the real, which is as open as the unrestrictedness of the unrestricted desire to know.

Once the human subject comes to recognize these basic metaphysical positions as consequences of his or her achievement of self-
appropriation, these positions in turn become the sources of a methodical metaphysics. Lonergan conceived such a metaphysics as one which would which "underlies, penetrates, transforms, and unifies all other departments" of human knowledge. In so doing, metaphysics performs the services of revealing the limitations of any particular inquiry, pointing out its connections with complementary fields, and liberating its "discoveries from the shackles in which, at first, they were formulated" (390). Conceiving of metaphysics in this heuristic, methodological fashion focuses the goal of doing metaphysics. As Lonergan put it, metaphysics practiced in accord with the heuristic structure he has outlined "moves to the total answer [to the total question, 'What is being?'] by transforming and putting together all other answers" (392). In so doing, methodical metaphysics opens all knowledge up simultaneously to the complementary discoveries of other fields and to the open horizon of being.

A.2

METHOD IN ETHICS

In an analogous fashion, the method in ethics is grounded in an appropriation of the structure of consciousness of the subject, now considered not just in its three strictly cognitional levels of activity, but in the full sweep of all its operating. In Insight Lonergan conceived of this expanded range of self-appropriation in terms of "rational self-consciousness," which is to say in terms of "an exigence for self-consistency in knowing and doing" (599). However, the discovery of a higher and independent transcendental notion of value has displaced that way of approaching the issue. In Insight the conscious act of deciding was conceived in relation to a prolongation of reasoning on the third level of consciousness, ("What can I do?" and "Do I have reasonable grounds for doing so?"); about later deciding was recognized as a terminal act on its own level of consciousness, responding to explicitly deliberative questions ("What shall I do?" and "What's the good of doing so?"). Hence, the methodical investigation of the meaning of "good" must be approached through an intentionality analysis of the relations among acts and questions on this fourth level.
In view of this shift, "the good" might be defined as the objective of all questioning—of the unrestricted desire to know and love. On this basis, one might say that "the good" is the totality of all that is chosen and remains to be chosen in authentic, responsible decisions, just as Lonergan showed that being is all that is known and remains to be known in the totality of reasonable true affirmations. 22

A methodical ethics would exploit this starting point by discovering what is entailed in concrete acts of deciding, just as Lonergan was able to arrive at basic metaphysical conclusions by concretely investigating what was entailed acts of judgment. So, in a very sketchy outline, some of the "basic ethical positions" which proceed from this methodical approach are:

(1) The Good-in-Itself (Summum Bonum) is the objective of an unrestricted desire (id quod omnia appetunt) which is to be satisfied in the totality of all authentic decisions. Lonergan drew attention to this meaning of "good" in his lectures of the philosophy of education:

"You will recall the passage in the gospel where the young man said to Our Lord, "Good Master." And Our Lord answered: "Why do you call me good? One alone is good." There is a pregnant sense of the word 'good' in which one alone is good. According

22. The shift in the intentional context of the acts of deciding draws our attention to a curiosity in the way Lonergan composed Chapter 18 of Insight. In that chapter, analysis of the structure of deliberative consciousness comes in the Section 2, after the discussion of the meaning of the good in Section 1. Lonergan introduced the analysis of deliberative consciousness only as a basis for clarifying the meaning of freedom, not the good. By the time of the writing of Method in Theology, on the other hand, the analysis (albeit a cursory one) of deliberative consciousness and its relationship to cognitive consciousness in Chapter 1 precede the discussion of the good in Chapter 2. The reason for this, I think, is that in Insight Lonergan thought that decision was a matter of the prolongation of that rational consciousness to a further set of issues, and that the basis in the structure of consciousness for discussing issues of the good had already been laid in the treatment of rational consciousness in Chapters 9-11.
to St. Thomas there is a strong sense of the Aristotelian *ti esti*, *Quid sit* (what it is) that refers to a full understanding of the object. When you ask 'what is the good' in that sense, you are asking what is good by its essence. And 'what is good' 'quid sit' asks for the essence. There is only one thing that is good by its essence, and that is God. Everything else is good by participation (1979: 35).

The human good, therefore, is good by participation, good insofar as it participates in the goodness of God. The attempt to sever this intrinsic connection, as has been characteristic of the horizon of modernity, leads to grotesque aberrations.

Natural human apprehension of this good (in "the way from below upward") would be analogous, since there is no natural human deciding which has as its content this unlimited good. Supernaturally gifted human willing of this good is another matter. Elaboration of these two consequences is the theological reflection on the mysterious goodness of God.

(2) In addition to the mysterious goodness of God, there is also the good realized in finite human decisions, "the human good." Because intentionality analysis reveals that natural decisions ("the way from below upward") are motivated by value judgments, there is a level of goods ("what decision chooses") that is designated "value." Again, since in "the way from above downward" decisions are also motivated by finite as well as transcendent loving (operative and cooperative grace), there are values which are "reasons which the love of reason knows not." Elaboration of the differences and relations among these values, scales of preference with regard to them, the role of intentional feeling in their adequate apprehension, and distortions of them is the task for a theory of values.

(3) Since judgments of value either proceed from judgments of facts, understandings, and experiences ("way up") or commit one to undertaking such judgments of fact, understandings and experiences ("way down"), choosing values implies other kinds of goods. That is to say, when one decides for a value, one implicitly also decides in favor of the intelligible components (one example of which is goods of order) and the experiential components (particular goods) presupposed in and conditioning judgments of value. Elaboration of this realm will involve the work of political, economic and social theorist insofar as they are able to articulate the ranges and genetic/dialectical sequences of
schemes of recurrence which constitute goods of order. But it is primarily elaborated by attentive, intelligent and reasonable "persons on the spot" through their insights and judgments into concrete situations.

(3a) An individual human subject's acts of deciding do not occur only in relationship to other intentional acts in the consciousness of that individual subject alone. The words and deeds of others contribute overwhelmingly to the content of our experiencings. Our intersubjective resonances (1958: 215) with the experiencings of others color and orient the patterns of our experiences. Again, our decisions determine our operations, but such operations are almost always simultaneously cooperative acts in institutional schemes of recurrence. These institutional schemes of recurrence, in turn, stand in the dialectically developing series constituted by human history. Hence, a truly concrete analysis of human decisions explores the relationship of the human good realized a human decision in relationship to the goods implicit in this rich interpersonal context. As Lonergan put it,

The definition of the good that has been current since Aristotle is 'id quod omnia appetunt', what everything seeks, runs after. However, it is not only what is desired, that is good. The capacity to desire is also good; and the desiring is good; and having the concrete situation in which the desire can go on to operations to get the good—that is also good; and having the cooperation necessary to get there is also good. So one can see that not only what is sought is good, but the seeking, the capacity to seek, the skills that go into the process of fulfillment, the fulfillment itself—they are all good too. So that definition of the good as what everything seeks does not exhaust the notion of the good. What everyone seeks is certainly good, but there is a whole set of other things that tie in with that, and they are good too (1979: 33).

Lonergan has elaborated the heuristic structure of this "whole set of other things that tie in" in his discussion of the "structure of the human good" (1972: 47-52). This schematic "structure of the human

23. See also (1979: 33-97) for a more concrete clarification of this heuristic structure. It should be noted that the structure implicit in the 1959 lectures is not exactly the same as his eventual formulation in Method in Theology.
"good" is not a conceptual systematic ordering of all goods. It is a heuristic structure to be employed by philosophers and theologians, practitioners of theoretical and applied human sciences, policy makers, and concrete subjects living their daily lives in collaborative venture to realize the good that "everything runs after."

(3b) Among the intelligible goods chosen are the pre-human goods which condition the realization of human decisions. The human good is the good intrinsically constituted by human apprehension and decision. (1979: 38). But human goods do not occur in isolation in this universe. Their constitution is a higher integration of natural events, things, and schemes of recurrence into the world mediated and constituted by meaning. Hence, choice of a humanly constituted object as good simultaneously involves an endorsement of its pre-human conditions as good, although we all too frequently do not advert to the fact. Lonergan made this point forcefully in Insight:

If objects of desire are instances of the good because of the satisfactions they yield, then the rest of the manifold of existents and events are also a good, because desires are satisfied not in some dreamland but only in the concrete universe. Again, the intelligible orders that are invented, implemented, adjusted and improved by men, are but further exploitations of prehuman, intelligible orders; moreover, they fall within the universal order of generalized emergent probability, both as consequents of its fertility, and as ruled by its more inclusive sweep. If the intelligible orders of human invention are a good because they systematically assure the satisfaction of desires, then so are the intelligible orders that underlie, condition, precede, and include man’s invention. Finally, intelligible orders and their contents as possible objects of rational choice, are values; but the universal order, which is generalized emergent probability, conditions and penetrates, corrects and develops, every particular order; and rational self-consciousness cannot consistently choose the conditioned and reject the condition, choose the part and reject the whole, choose the consequent and reject the antecedent. Accordingly, since man is involved in choosing and since every consistent choice, at least implicitly, is a choice of universal order, the realization of universal order is a true value (605).

(4) One final clarification concerns the transposition of the traditional division between general and special ethics which is effected by a methodical ethics conceived as above. The older style of ethics used syllogistic reasoning as its model. General moral principles were general categorical propositions ("All evil acts must have
three elements ..."). General ethics pertained to general moral principles, their logical clarification ("In every act of murder, three elements are present ...") and their deductive ordering ("Any evil act has three elements, murder has those three elements, therefore ...").

Special ethics was also deductive, only now particular principles were supplied, presumably through the experiences of the particular situations ("Turning off the respirator in this situation is (or is not) murder because ...").

However, the situation is radically changed in the context opened up by Lonergan. He was fond of saying "A principle is whatever is 'first' in an ordered set." The ordered set in ethics is the set of human decisions. What is 'first' in that set? It is not a proposition, either general or specific; nor is it the conscious activity of judgment which is expressed in such propositions; it is not even some 'first' decision, or any other chronologically 'first' conscious activity. It is the subject as such, as the originating value of all decisions, all conscious activities, of all conditionally limited moral propositions.

Hence the principle, what is 'first,' in general ethics in this new sense is the subject him or herself. It is the same principle as in special ethics. But there is a difference. General ethics now consists in the heuristic elaboration by the self-appropriated subject of all that is entailed in being a decider. The outline given above is a sketch of what general ethics would mean. Special ethics, on the other hand, draws on the massive array of experiences, insights, judgments and values which pertain to any concrete decision a subject recurrently finds himself or herself confronted with.

Now certain types of ethical questions can be answered strictly on the basis of the heuristic thematization of self-appropriated consciousness—questions such as "Is there a good in itself?", "Is human free will fact or delusion?", "Is pleasure the only good and pain the only evil?" But the host of concrete questions for decision in the special fields (for example, city planning, or medicine and its multiplicity of subspecialties) are not to be met by deductive inference from general and particular premises. They are to be met by concrete subjects in their intelligent understandings of what's entailed in their concrete setting, in their highly developed apprehensions of values, and their converted commitments to do what they ultimately desire—the good. General ethics is of relevance to them insofar as it opens up intel-
ligent alternatives, enhances their apprehension of values, and invites them to conversion and deepened development in their orientation toward doing the good.

(5) The foregoing may sound terribly vague, and therefore disappointing to many readers. Commonly when people pick up a book on ethics, they are looking for answers. Often they are faced with a difficult situation and want some guidance. All too often, the urgency and uncertainty they find themselves in means that, even in spite of themselves, they want someone to tell them what to do. They want a list of dos and don'ts, and the traditional approach to general and special ethics eagerly provided just that. There was a value in such books, and it was that in reading them people got insights—they came to understand possibilities and consequences which hadn't occurred to them. And the more one understands, the better one's decisions will be. But traditional books of this sort had two very negative effects. First, their categories hardened into absolutes, and effectively eliminated the important, ongoing creativity in which insight goes beyond what has been previously considered. Second, their illusion of systematic totality led in the dangerous direction of following rules rather than assuming authentic moral responsibility. Their day is finished. And while there will always be a need for good books and courses of instruction in ethical matters, the intelligent and responsible contributions of concrete subjects will always be needed to fill in the indeterminacies in any such book or course. The notion that a few, whether policy makers or pronouncers of general propositions, can determine how the many shall live is the supremely unethical attitude.
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<table>
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LONERGAN'S PRACTICAL POLITICAL TRANSFORMATIVE UNDERSTANDING: 
THE EXAMPLE OF DEVELOPMENT IN 
THE PHILIPPINE PROVINCE OF NORTHERN SAMAR

John Boyd Turner

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Lonergan's writings are a climax in the turn to the subject, that withdrawing from busy practicality in order to save practicality and its progeny history. It is appropriate to continue Lonergan's work, carrying it forward into concrete historical situations, returning to our world yearning for liberation and development. Our work in a development project in Northern Samar was enlivened by seeing how manifestly what Lonergan says in his books, *Insight* and *Method in Theology*, actually does occur among peoples.

Such correspondence is not surprising. After all the province is a group of families, and it is their actions, for better or worse, richer or poorer, in justice or oppression, in love or hating, wisely or stupidly, that makes the province what it is. The Northern Samareños were constituting the province long before any specific rural development project began or foreign consultants came, and they will continue to do so after the project is over and the foreigners have long gone. The Samareños are women and men. See, they love and laugh, talk as a favorite pastime, raise questions and seek answers, work hard in field and home and school, play with their children, rejoice over good and gentleness, are saddened over poverty and oppression. If Lonergan has indeed thematized the basic recurrent operations of human feeling, knowing, doing, not just as in himself, but as found in each and every human being, and if we understand and accept his invitation to discover and affirm these in ourselves, then of course we expect every event of our lives, every situation in which we find ourselves, to reveal blazingly the 'normative set of recurrent and related operations' of conscious intentionality 'yielding cumulative and progressive results.'
If we are striving to be authentic, that is. This note is a simple report on the mutual revelation of the development project and Lonergan's categories. It is a marshalling of evidence towards judgment on Lonergan's work.

Northern Samar (NS) is a province in the Republic of the Philippines. An Integrated Rural Development (IRD) is being implemented there. This NSIRDP is a ten-year project, begun in 1979, financed jointly by the Government of the Philippines (GOP) and the Government of Australia (GOA), costing some US$18 million a year. The GOP has set up the Samar Island Rural Development Project group, reporting directly to the GOP Cabinet, responsible for the development of Samar's three provinces. NSIRDP is managed by the Filipino Deputy Director of this group. The GOA, which operates through its foreign aid body, the Australian Development Assistance Bureau (ADAB). It contracted Australian private companies to investigate Northern Samar's possibilities and needs, to design and cost a project, and to implement the design, all in association with Filipino groups and government agencies. There is an Australian as joint manager of NSIRDP. An Australian engineering firm was selected as the company contracting with ADAB to do the project. As the engineering firm knows nothing outside engineering, nothing of rural development, it contracted an agricultural consulting firm to do the agricultural side of the project. As this agricultural consulting firm knows nothing other than technical agriculture, it contracted a second agricultural firm well known both for its knowledge of technical agriculture and fundamental understanding of social process in villagers. Laurie Sewell, of whom I speak below, is a member of this second agricultural consulting firm, MWA International, Agricultural Consultants, of Sydney, Australia. By some oddity I was contracted as Community Development Consultant through the engineering firm. Road construction was the most expensive item in the project, farm development came next, and farmer development ran a distant third. The first five-year phase of the project has just finished, in January 1984. A second five-year commitment has been drawn up between the two governments and the project is scheduled to end, which is not the same as being completed, in January 1989.
Some preliminary comments

This note is simply a report, perhaps merely a list: this occurred in the province, this is the link to Lonergan. It serves to illustrate Lonergan's practicality. Again, all I say is just at the level of possibly relevant understanding. It awaits judgment. My understanding of Lonergan's writings and invitation needs checking by those familiar with his writings and in their own self-appropriation. Again, several sets of understandings about how to do and achieve development and liberation are spoken of by academics and theologians, found in development studies literature, and implicit in the way development is planned and done by governments and national and multinational companies. Some of these understandings Lonergan would find unverified and quite repugnant, neither factual nor of value. To understand Lonergan's work as it is applied in concrete situations of exploitation is to grasp that it cannot be used to set up a conflict or class model of development. Clearly the poor as well as the rich suffer from dramatic bias, that individual, group, and general biases of common sense are not distributed according to socio-economic class. Clearly mere change of power does not put a new human nature in the saddle. States, western and eastern, poor and rich, abound with examples of revolution that put another group in power, which, in turn, becomes as bourgeois and dictatorial as the ousted group. Besides conflict, however, there is challenge and dialectic. Challenge is not synonymous with conflict, for one can move from good to higher good as well as, through dialectic and conversion, from bad to good. Challenge always goes with tension. The tensions of limitation and transcendence, of spirit and psyche, are built into being human. The type of development that is occurring in Northern Samar does involve much tension and conflict, including armed struggle. The political and economic roots of this conflict are not hidden. On the other hand, the sort of development that some of the Filipinos and some of the Australian consultants, in collaboration with Northern Samareos, seek to bring about in the province was and is not based on conflict. Latin American experience and experience in the Philippines and Northern Samar have manifold similarities, both in heritage and in current national and international relations.
Again, the word barangay occurs daily in speech in Northern Samar and I shall use it frequently. In fifteenth-century, pre-Spanish times, Filipinos occupied villages along the southern Luzon coast, fishing, hunting, doing some agriculture. The boats used in fishing were named barangay. Sailing these boats required the joint effort of several persons. The word became transferred to the people, with connotations of strong family ties and community strength. It has been taken over by the New Society Movement, Kilusang Bagong Lipunan, of President Marcos to replace the Spanish word barrio. Finally, just as Lonergan drew on his knowledge of mathematics and the sciences, on his long studies of Thomas Aquinas and other authors, to pin down insight, judgment, and evaluation, so in order to speak about the human good we need chunks of data, actual occurrences of women and men acting, to give flesh to whatever heuristic structures we may know about. A further purpose of presenting data on the province of Northern Samar is to show how ordinary is the situation in which one is able to verify those operations and their consequences uncovered by Lonergan.

An extraordinary man

I arrived in Northern Samar in April 1983, on a one-year contract, when the project was in its fifth year and completing its first phase. Already active in the province, working in close collaboration with and through the local Philippine Ministry of Agriculture was Laurie Sewell, an agricultural extension agent (in United States Department of Agriculture terms, a county agent) in whose work both he and I could read off what Lonergan is saying. After receiving in Australia a diploma in agriculture, a practical more than a theoretic course, Laurie spent seventeen years as an agricultural patrol officer in Papua New Guinea, living in villages, working with the people, when those people were a UN Trusteeship territory under Australian rule. Since Papua New Guinea became independent in 1975 Laurie has worked in Australia, Timor, and several Pacific island countries. On his desk he has a copy of Machiavelli's The Prince. His correct hypothesis is that most consultants in development projects and most government officials in Australia and Third World states are covert or overt Machiavellians. To ensure the well being of the people, he listens in meeting, reads The Prince,
and does the opposite. I gave Laurie copies of Insight and Method and we used to discuss many matters in their horizon, such as how the Farmers Associations set up in the province represent concrete instances of the structure of the human good. It was Laurie who pointed out that it is next to impossible to budget commonsense social situations, as if they were engineering designs, as if constitutive meaning had nothing to do with human becoming. Without his work and discussion I would not have seen the eminent practicality of what Lonergan is saying. Together we are a good example of the interaction of a very practical person and one more theoretically oriented, a combination Lonergan speaks of in the context of physics. In fact much of what follows is his story as it is the story of the Northern Samarefios.

Procedure

Let us proceed in four steps. First, there are three images are helpful in linking Lonergan’s writings and practical affairs. Next comes a description of the province of Northern Samar, setting out the context of development activities. Third is the tremendous reorientation a people undergo when they commit themselves to doing development. This touches the dilemma of historicism. In the fourth place, and as the main point, we show in detail how various development activities in the provinces illustrate what Lonergan is saying, while at the same time, there are instances where we used Insight and Method to identify proposed activities. All comments are with reference to the Philippines and Northern Samar in particular. Other countries and other Filipino provinces may be different.

1. THREE IMAGES

A. Seiving

My good teacher, Joe Johnston, SJ, originally of New Jersey, then a teacher in the Philippines and now in Australia, in speaking of the images underlying words, has told me that the originating image in
krinein, "to judge," is to sieve. Such an image makes sense. The full answer to the question for judgment is Yes or No—A is B, or A is not B; there is conjunction and disjunction. In *Verbum*, Lonergan discusses Aquinas on the *compositio vel divisio* of judgment. I have a picture, then, of the basic set of operations of knowing and doing, accompanied by feeling, constituting the mesh of a sieve. Born into a particular society, with its history and institutions and friendships, I have the task of sieving what is not in harmony with the basic structure of being human from what really and truly is in harmony, discarding the former and keeping the latter. As a sieving person I desire to constitute my particular character, my subjectivity, in order bring about a self worth being with, a society worth living in, and a history worth inheriting. The image of sieving can be expanded. What puts holes in the mesh? Imagine a series of sieves, one above the other, with the mesh becoming finer and finer. If the first mesh is coarse, often blocked, or often broken by misuse, refinement of the matter of life is not likely to occur. The image of my being a sieve in each human situation is fraught with feeling and so can discipline my action and understanding.

B. Play

To shift to a different image, a football team exists, knows itself as a football team, and learns how good it is, only in playing another football team. Neither team can exist properly outside the play. When not playing, the team is a passive potency. Neither team can play unless there is an invariant set of rules defining and delineating the game. The rules are structured into the players, not as persons, but as football players. Rules written in a book do not make the game. Both teams are part of the game. Neither part provides a fixed basis with reference to which the other is known. It is the relation between parts that makes the game, and the basic relation is constituted by the invariant set of rules. When one team plays dirty a random element enters the game and the actual relation between teams varies non-systematically from the basic constitutive relation. In the interplay of the teams, one team knows itself in its difference from the other team. From the point of view of one team in the interplay, however, the other team represents not itself but the game context in which the first team is playing. For the one team is playing against the
conference of teams that happens to be concretized here and now by some other team. Accordingly, it is more accurate to say that one team knows itself in its difference from the game in which it irrevocably is; that the game is revealed in its difference from the team; and that both team and game are product of, yet distinct from, the invariant set of rules constituting the horizon of the game. Further, as a result of dirty or violent play, the game may have an actual tradition, in part revealing the basic invariant rules, in part obscuring them, thus presenting an ambiguous heritage. Since a team knows itself as a football team insofar as it coheres with the basic invariant set of rules of the game, when the actual game diverges ambiguously from this set, the probability diminishes of one team's being able to identify itself as a team in its difference over against the game. One team, faithful to the ambiguous tradition, may believe it is playing football. Puzzled, perhaps, over a tradition that permits violence or builds violence into the game, a team may pause and question whether it is in fact playing football or some other game. To check what it is doing it needs to get hold of the invariant set of rules, and to ask whether actual occurrences cohere with or are incoherent with this basic set. But this checking cannot be done outside identifying differences between the team and the game while actually playing. Discussion of changes is merely formal clarification. Accordingly progressive purification of the game can occur, but only within the concrete play space. It is through this image that I translate Lawrence's study of Gadamer in Language, Truth and Meaning.

Moving to the level on which human life is operative prior to the differentiation of subject and object ... Gadamer has emphasised a primacy of the relation vis-a-vis the members...of the subject-object relationship. By reason of the concretely conditioned prestructures of the subject, actuation with respect to an object represents an inter-'play' between the two in which neither member provides the fixed basis. Rather, the subject matter (object) is hit off precisely in the mediation of its identity with the difference of the present context of the subject; and, reciprocally, the knowing subject is authentically actuated in a movement of self-transcendence by which his prestructures are put into play through intercourse with the subject matter. The abstract relation of subject-object, therefore, is subsumed into the mediation of the concrete prestructures of the understanding consciousness with the subject matter being understood—the mediation by which history progressively unfolds. ... The primacy which in other vocabularies is accorded either subject or object is here translated to the dynamic Spielraum of history or tradition of which the subject is part.
And in its aspect of constituting the horizon of the subject, this Spielraum is seen by Gadamer to have the structure of a concrete (versus formal as was the case for Schleiermacher) hermeneutic circle. ... the actuation of the subject is a finite mediation of the present with the past. (LTM 184-185: emphasis in text)

C. Conversation

Lonergan has uncovered the basic invariant structure of conscious intentionality, not in any product of human acting, but as it is in women and men prior to their acting. The structure is a set of invariant operations by enacting which we make ourselves, our society, our history. The usual image of conversation is persons talking together. It is not difficult to expand the notion of conversation to embrace that communication between people where the first word is the work of art that they themselves are, in body and in spirit as one. This artistic communication is prior to spoken words. Most fundamental, however, and most fascinating and most painful, is the conversation of authenticity. Her desire to become artistically, to speak, to act, so that who she is, her subjectivity, is wholly consonant with the basic set of operations. Because the basic operations of conscious intentionality are common to all men and women, in the measure that she acts in consonance with this set, she constitutes herself, contributes to her society, generates a history, that in nothing is alien to any other human being, whether those in the past, those now living, or those yet to be born. So to act is to become an authentic human being. Her authenticity is not neutral toward other women and men. Ironically it is demanding, for her person becomes enormously attractive. Since her character (subjectivity) is translucent to her self (subject) as this instance of humanity, since the basic structure is the same in other individuals, her authenticity reveals to them the difference between who they are and as they would be were they living in harmony with their basic humanness. Authenticity is the ground of authority. Her authority authorizes the creativity, the authorship, of the others. Her authoritative translucent person manifests itself across wide differences of religion and culture and polity. The ultimate conversation is between persons whose authority is lucent to each other. There is a resting in such conversation.
2. THE PHILIPPINES AND NORTHERN SAMAR

A. Material for vital values and other values

Geography and geology

The Philippines is an archipelago of some 7100 islands, stretching roughly 1850 kilometers north to south and 1000 kilometers east to west. Only 154 of these islands have areas exceeding 14 square kilometres (5 square miles). Eleven islands account for 95% of the total land area and population. Luzon in the north is the largest island, Mindanao in the south is second, and Samar on the eastern Pacific side of the middle group of islands, collectively known as the Visayas, is third largest. The Philippines is separated from Taiwan on the north, and from Malaysia and Indonesia on the south, by straits a few kilometers wide; and from Vietnam and China on the west by some 950 kilometers of the South China Sea. To the east is the Pacific Ocean with only a few small, low-lying islands between the Philippines and Central America. The country lies on the western edge of the EurAsian tectonic plate, separated from the Philippine plate by the Mindanao Trough some 10430 metres deep. The Caroline plate pushes from the southeast. The mountains, products of meeting plates and volcanic activity, are steep, running south to north and forming convoluted blocks that are very difficult to traverse. The larger islands are mountainous and uplands make up 65% of the total land area. Most have narrow coastal lowlands, and some have extensive lowland areas between mountain ranges. As expected in this Pacific rim fire-belt, seismic disturbances are common and several volcanoes are still active. My soup cleanly jumped out of the bowl as one quake flicked our house. There are no volcanoes in Northern Samar. Active, quietly smoking volcanoes on southern Luzon can be seen from our house in the province across the San Bernadino strait.

Northern Samar is somewhat rectangular with an added triangle of mountains in the southwest corner. Roughly 32 km. wide and 100 km. long, its area is 320,000 hectares. Apart from a narrow coastal plain,
two to three kilometers wide, and the large plain of the Catubig valley, the province is mountainous. The mountains form a massive bloc right across the southern border of the province, and come to the sea in the northeast and northwest. I have the impression that upland and mountain areas are more than 65% of province area. The small area (9%) planted to rice supports this impression. The Catubig River flows north through a plain of 17000 hectares, and the Gamay River flowing east into the Pacific drains a smaller plain. Other major rivers are the Catarman and the Pambujan, flowing north in steep valleys, draining large mountainous watersheds.

**Climate and land use**

The archipelago lies in the tropics. Lowland areas have a year-long warm and humid climate, with only slight variation, four or five degrees, in the average mean temperature of 27°C (80°F). Daylength varies by about thirty minutes over the year, with approximately equal hours of night and day. The Philippines lies across the typhoon belt. Rainfall in Northern Samar is heavy, varying from three metres at Catarman, located on the northern coast of the province, to six metres at Gamay on the exposed Pacific coast. In Northern Samar six cyclonic storms are expected each year, with heavy rainfall, and winds varying from 120 kilometers per hour (70 mph) in a moderate storm to a devastating 250 kph. Rainfall is often torrential, so dense that one cannot see. Flooding is common. During typhoons, when rain plunges down steep mountains into the narrow river valleys and wind-driven sea surges up the shallow rivers, four meters of flood is common. Destruction of crops and houses occurs each year. Soil erosion is a hazard. Heavy cloud cover during the rainy season blocks sunlight, inhibiting plant growth. Lowland soils derived from volcanic material are suitable for growing rice. Upland soils are not arable, are thinner and are suited for tree crops, notably coconut, and for corn and vegetables. Sandier soils along coastlines are not suitable for rice production. With torrential type rain a distinction is made between quantity falling each month and the number of rainy days each month. Heavy quantities on one or two days a month can be a drought situation, where the same quantity spread over more days, as in English rain, would be ideal for some crops. Although in Northern Samar it rains throughout the year, the
distinct wet season is May to November (as far as I remember), when rains are sufficient to grow non-irrigated rice. In the other months quantity and number of rainy days per month are not sufficient to grow rice. There is no need to detail the vegetation, species of land animals, or species of fish.

Some 25% of Northern Samar is under dense virgin forest, 43% under coconut plantation, 20% is used in shifting slash-and-burn agriculture, and 9% goes under rice cultivation. Most people are engaged in rice growing. Irrigated area is quite small. Most important crops are coconut, rice, abaca (a fibre), sweet potato (camote), banana, cassava, and corn. Seventy percent of farms are less than five hectares, each being a small piece lowland rice field plus steep non-arable plantation hillside. Livestock are mainly carabao (water buffalo), used for plowing and carting and food. Chicken and pigs are widely raised for meat. Coastal swamps and coastal seas supply fish, crustaceans, and molluscs.

Resources

As for material resources, the Philippines has enough land to feed its population, if land is used productively, and political options directing production put food for home consumption before export crops. In Northern Samar, likewise, the area of good rice land is sufficient to feed all province families and to export considerable quantities, if farmed productively. Rice production is sufficient to meet Filipino needs. Distribution is not equitable. Vegetable and animal-derived food production is not sufficient. In Northern Samar eggs are from Cebu and vegetables mainly from northern Luzon. Agriculture is quite undiversified in the province. Minerals are common in the country, especially copper. Small quantities of oil are mined on the island of Palawan, less than 2% of domestic oil used in 1981. Coal and cement materials are plentiful, although mining capacity has yet to catch up with domestic demand. Hydel (hydroelectricity) and geothermal power sources are plentiful. Small-scale hydel plants are economical for supplying small towns. Filipino research has produced a system to add gas from charcoal to diesel engines, reducing diesel use by up to 80%. Wood-fired electricity production is economical, though not yet in action. Steam-powered, wood-fired (coconut residue) engines, once the
mainstay of western industry, are not now available: it seems the technology has died. Northern Samar has no electricity supply and is awaiting completion of a geothermal plant on the island of Leyte. (Rich individual families have their own generators.) Nor are there coal deposits in the province. The province of Western Samar has a coal-fired electricity power station. Whether it lacks surplus capacity to feed Northern Samar, or whether NorSamEl-Co has yet to organise available supply, I do not know. I did not see coal for sale in the province. Petroleum-derived fuels and liquid natural gas are delivered to the province, the former by sea and the latter by truck. During the wet season, often the sea is too rough and roads too muddy for deliveries. These fossil fuel sources are too expensive for nearly all families in the province. Wood is used for cooking. Trade in wood is extensive. Collecting wood consumes much time. Use of fuel wood is quite inefficient: most use only stones or bricks on which to balance pots, and much heat is lost. Designs for simple, effective, efficient wood-burning stoves are available, to be constructed out of mud. (Getting sufficient fuel for cooking is becoming a major problem in developing countries, in dry Africa and in areas that have had populations living and cooking for thousands of years. This lack affects nutrition levels.) Control of Northern Samar rivers, to tap water resources for domestic and irrigation use, has not yet been achieved. The Japanese have done extensive studies of flood flows in the Catubig River, investigating flood control and looking for a possible hydel site.

Population

The population of the Philippines in 1982 was estimated at 50.6 million people, an increase of 150% since 1950. The population is still youthful, with 57% under the age of 20. (In 1984 President Marcos had been in power for 19 years. So at least 60% of the population have known no other political form.) Population density for the country in 1980 was 164 persons per square kilometer (433 per square mile). But 54% of the population lives on Luzon, which is mountainous and has only 35% of the land area. Almost one quarter of the Filipino population lives in the National Capital Region around Metro Manila. (By comparison, the United States had a population density of 25 persons per square kilometer in 1980.) Birth rate is declining. Health is improving, and so
the death rate is declining. More people are living and living longer. Since the population is so young, even if each couple marries at the current Filipino mean age of marriage, 24 years, and has only 2.3 children, thus replacing themselves, still the population of the Philippines will increase rapidly. Also it will age rapidly as large families yield to smaller families. The Philippine population of 1981 is projected to double in 29 years. Life expectancy at birth in 1981 was 60 years for men and 64 for women, an increase from 45 and 48 years respectively in the years 1950–55. Life expectancy is projected to increase to some 70 years as water supply, sanitation, public health, and nutrition improve in the slums surrounding cities and in still undeveloped, unserviced (water, sanitation) areas such as Northern Samar. In sum, since 1945 the Philippines has had a lot more people living longer. Northern Samar is much the same, although with a shorter life expectancy. In 1983 our province had some 60,000 families with a total population of 410,000. Catarman, the capital, is the largest town, with 20,000 people. Most families are clustered along the coastal plain between Laoang in the east and Lavazares in the west, and in the Catubig valley. Smaller clusters are along the west coast, including the town of Allen, and on the Pacific coast at Gamay. Ethnically most are Filipino. A few families are of Chinese descent. Some Americans remained in the province after the Phil-Am war of 1896–98.

Water supplies and housing

The only houses in the province that as a group have piped water supply are those built for and occupied by the Australian consultants and the Filipino Deputy Project Director. Houses of well-off Filipinos in Northern Samar have tube wells, often with electric pumps (powered by private generators) delivering into overhead tanks. In towns such as Catarman, the capital, and San Jose, the home town of the governor, water is piped to taps at intervals along the streets. The town of Rosario on the northern coast of the province runs water from a hillside spring some three kilometers outside the town. So slow is the trickle through this old system that women queue for up to five hours a day to get a bucket of water. The barangay outside the towns collect water from tube wells with hand pumps, from open wells, or from rivers and streams. Maintenance of pumps is a problem, not from lack of know-
ledge, but from lack of tools to repair them. Sanitation as removal of excreta is by individual septic tank, by pit latrine, or absent. Keeping water supplies uncontaminated is a task. Tidal flows move inland several kilometers up the shallow rivers, limiting rivers as a source of fresh water, either for human consumption or for irrigation.

There is little construction stone in the province. Material for road construction is usually from coral pits. Gravel for concrete is difficult to find; usually crushed river pebbles are used. Commercial and government buildings in the towns are substantially constructed, mainly of wood, some of cement-sand bricks, some of concrete slab, older ones of coral blocks rendered with cement. Roofing is corrugated galvanized iron in towns on commercial and government buildings and on homes of wealthier people. In villages outside towns, and on homes of poorer families within towns, roofing is usually coconut palm, nipa palm, or anahaw palm thatch. The village house of many Northern Samar families is raised off the ground on log stumps, has wooden plank sides, a wooden floor, a nipa palm roof, shutters instead of glass in windows, and perhaps three rooms. It is, as far as my faltering memory reads, some eighteen feet square, for a family of six persons. The kitchen is a lean-to at the back with a skillion roof. Houses are raised off the ground to permit cooling air flow under them, to keep out crawling bugs, and as precaution against floods. Modern houses in the province have a clean inside kitchen, usually with a gas stove, as well as the dirty wood- or charcoal-fired kitchen outside in the back. Less well-off persons use masonite (compressed hard board), and those who are poorer still have walls also out of nipa or straw. House size too diminishes as money is not available, and sawn timber framing gives way to bamboo. During the typhoons extensive damage to some 30% of province housing is not uncommon. Houses do not have electricity. Kerosene is becoming too expensive: pressure lamps [Petromax] are expensive to buy and use much fuel. The majority of families use candles or a small tin with a wick burning small amounts of kerosene. There is not enough light after 1830 hours in summer or 1800 hours in 'winter' to read and to study. Using a candle is hot in the already humid environment and, after a couple of hours, a strain.
Transport and communication

Transport around the province is by foot, bicycle, jeepney, or bus. Few people own their own cars. Travel is down valleys to the coast, and along the coast. No roads cross the mountains, except one that runs from Catarman southwest across center of the province to Calbayog on the west coast of Samar. Pacific coast towns are accessible only by boat or by walking several days across the mountain trails. Small outrigger canoes, some powered by inboard engines, are common on the rivers. All-weather roads and all-weather bridges are slowly being built. Travel takes much time, all the more in the rainy season. Flood washways are common. Wooden and old concrete bridges are often damaged by floods. The main road up the Catubig valley, 20 km long, is so rough it takes a couple of hours. In major towns, Catarman, Catubig, Bobon, San Jose, and Allen, main streets are concreted or of crushed coral rock; other streets are unsealed. Catarman has a reliable air service to Manila. Laoang and San Jose on the north coast, and Allen on the west coast, are ports. Bus services link the province to other parts of Samar and other islands. A ferry runs from Allen to Luzon. A telephone system operates in some major towns. It is being improved. There is no television. Several movie houses operate in major towns. A local radio station produces and relays programs in Tagalog, Cebuano, and Waray-waray. A postal system functions well throughout the province. Newspapers come into Catarman three times a week by air. They are too expensive for a person on daily labor wages. Still-developing transport and communications systems in the province make organization of anything a time-consuming and uncertain task. When roads are impassable, food shortages and higher food prices occur in the province.

Education

The University of the Eastern Philippines (UEP), a state financed institution, is near Catarman. It has 3000 students. It was severely damaged by winds of 200-plus miles per hour, during Typhoon Dinang in December, 1981, losing 80% of its library when the roof of the library building blew off. It has no electricity. It is difficult for students to study at night. Primary schools are found in most barangay, but not those high in the mountains where the insurgency is restless. Several
high schools and some technical schools exist in the towns. State-run schools, private and church schools operate. Getting books and equipment, especially for the sciences, is difficult at all levels. Three further difficulties are worth mentioning. Long delays in getting a school repaired often occur after a typhoon. Given the complex political and cultural history of the Philippines, curricula are overloaded, tend to be academic, and have set subjects to build student awareness of and adherence to the New Society Movement, the new political and cultural vision for the Philippines initiated by President Marcos. More fundamental is the dilemma of language. During United States occupation, a beneficial policy of providing universal elementary education was implemented, with many teachers coming from the United States. On the other hand, all education was in English, giving an education derived from and directed to a culture quite other than the Filipino. Such imposition and orientation is common among colonial powers. In the New Society Movement, established by Marcos, Pilipino (derived from Tagalog) is pushed as the national language. The quality of English teaching and learning declined. In Northern Samar, children learn Pilipino at school, speak Waray-waray at home, and are taught in English. University studies are in English, a language students are not used to thinking in. Inversely, and ironically, their teachers have done their own studies, of social sciences, engineering, natural sciences, veterinary science, education, agriculture in English. The teachers speak excellent English, yet perhaps have not yet translated their courses into Pilipino or Waray-waray. These two languages are quite different. All, however, use roman script. Teachers in primary and secondary schools speak of the need for curriculum reform. Poverty keeps many children away from school. Several teachers reported lower attendance as the 1982-83 drought persisted in the province.

Health care

Medical tasks in the province come more from the need for public health and sanitation measures and from inadequate levels of nutrition than from individual biological or psychological problems as is common in Western countries. Government research in the mid-1970s found that the average Filipino diet lacked sufficient nutrients, such as calories, proteins, several vitamins and metals connected with bone and eye
development and anemia. Operation Timbang, a program of weighing five million pre-school children carried out by the Ministry of Social Security and Development (MSSD), revealed that 5.8% suffered from severe (third-degree) malnutrition, another 24.8% from second-degree malnutrition, and another 45% from mild undernourishment, which means they often go to bed hungry. Pregnant and nursing mothers also are often malnourished, which affects fetal and neonatal growth. Prolonged third- and second-degree malnutrition, such as is occurring in many parts of Africa, produces irreversible brain damage. Intellectual capacity becomes, and throughout the person's life remains, diminished. The MSSD office in Northern Samar estimates that 10% of pre-school children have severe (third-degree) malnutrition, and a further 30% have second-degree malnutrition. Around 45% of children suffer undernourishment. Malnutrition is primarily a lack of enough food, rather than the result of a diet that does not have the right balance of foods. Even with a right balance, until 80% of calorie requirements are met, protein is metabolized for energy (N excretion is high) and not for its main function of yielding elements for making human protein. Simple lack of quantity, that is, of calories, often manifests itself also as protein deficiency. Poverty can make the right balance of foods too expensive. In Catarman, the capital of the province, primary schools have feeding programs, as do schools in some other towns and barangay. MSSD feeding centers for pre-school children and expectant and nursing mothers operate in some 325 of the province's some 550 barangay. MSSD is staffed almost entirely by women, who hold all executive positions. The Minister is a woman; the ministry is well known for its effectiveness and efficiency. The Food and Nutrition Research Institute of the Philippines has estimated that up to 40% of all deaths in recent years have been caused by malnutrition. Often poor health due to malnutrition leaves the body unable to fight off dysentery, which is common as the province has no secure sanitation systems yet. Bilharzia (schistosomiasis) parasitism is common and debilitating, connected with poor sanitation and sluggish drainage in swamps and streams used as toilets.

Catarman has a general hospital and smaller units are found in other towns. Rural health units are being established in central barangay to serve clusters of barangay. There are teams of Public Health nurses. Private doctors practice in the province. In all cases, shortage of equipment, supplies, medicine, and transport limits medical care.
And then there is the question of whether people can afford treatment. Popcom, the government's population commission, tries to spread family planning and contraceptives. More success, with far fewer medical problems, is had by Natural Family Planning methods, which stresses cooperation of wife and husband and respect for each other. Natural Family Planning groups were beginning in the province. In several countries I have found Natural Family Planning far more successful and acceptable to families than other methods.

The province as a sequence of sets of schemes of recurrence

In the above comments on the Philippines and the province of Northern Samar I am not reporting single instances, but schemes of recurrence. The rains come each year, not always at the same time, not always with the same intensity. Farmers are aware of this and distinguish the fact of rain (its chemistry and physics known by classical law) and probabilities of its occurrence (known only over the long term by statistical law). They also grasp, because they talk about it, the difference between expected rainfall and what actually occurs. Moreover they do not expect an explanation as to why actual rainfall in one season pivots around the long-term average, yet never quite is that average. To this extent they understand randomness, the absence of intelligibility in the non-systematic variation of actual events from probabilities. In the case of child malnutrition, families note actual occurrences and the probability of a child born into a tenant family in such and such a barangay suffering acute and prolonged hunger. But farmers in the province do more. They are able to project the schemes of recurrence of technologies involved in food production, the schemes of recurrence of financial and economic changes, and the schemes of recurrence of social change. They are able to give an estimate of the likelihood of these changes occurring. I am not imposing Lonergan's categories on Samareños farmers. "The kids in our barangay are hungry, MSSD is feeding them, thank God. Now, in that barangay over there they are growing a lot more rice on their land: we can do the same. It requires more work and we have to learn things we don't know yet; we need agricultural inputs regularly and on time, and we'll need loans to buy them. Then we must consider what the landlord is going to do with our efforts." Thus the farmers talk.
Note that farmers speak of and anticipate a sequence of sets of schemes of recurrence. Growing rice is part of achieving vital values. Taking on new technology, new loans, and maybe new relations with the landlord are part of social values qua technological, economic, political. Changing relations between landlord and tenant also involve cultural values. If the successive systems are intelligibly related, genetic method is used to understand them. If they are not directly intelligible, dialectical method is needed. Farmers can identify elements relating the levels intelligibly, such as conscientious agricultural extension agents who understand linkages and cooperate with farmers in achieving them. Inversely farmers know elements connected with incoherence, such as nepotism and persons whose whole horizon seems to be ripping off maximum profit in the short term. Different barangay come to the same assessment of what needs to be done to ensure a decent standard of living and similar estimates of the likelihood of change. Not all barangay, however, respond similarly. Some communities, so long oppressed, look at the probabilities of change from within their cramped, confined horizon and say no change is possible. Elsewhere, though, a high school graduate farmer near Salhag, member of a basic Christian community, also long oppressed, says: enough is enough, the odds are stacked against us, but we can change them. And so he did. His shy wife and three children smile now. They have fruit trees planted behind their house.

This gentle farmer also knows suffering. An honest man, he was elected leader of the Farmers Association. One day while in the next town shopping, his enemies, led by a government employee, deposed him from the Farmers Association. He remains the best farmer in the area. Although without formal position in the FA, farmers still turn to him for cooperation, advice, help. The distinction between power and authority is evident here. His authority is lucent, as one who lives in harmony with his basic operations. It is enchanting to be with him.

B. Social values as economic and technological

Economy and income distribution

The Philippines remains a poor country. Wealth is unevenly distributed, with a purported group of 90 exceedingly wealthy families controlling the economy and financial system. The wealthy live mainly
in Manila, the less wealthy live also in Manila and in other cities, notably Cebu. The poor live in slums around the big cities and in rural areas. Industrial development is producing an increasing share of GDP, although in 1983 and 1984 a recession was evident. Agriculture's share of GDP has declined 11 percentage points between 1960 and 1981. Most industrial development is concentrated around Metro Manila and southern Luzon, with a small center around the city of Cebu in the western Visayas. In 1981 manufacturing contributed a 24.5% share of GDP, mining 3.2%, utilities 1.2%, and construction 8.5%, a total for the industrial sector of 37.3%. Services, again mainly concentrated around Metro Manila, contributed 40.2% (commerce 23.6%). Agriculture, forestry, and fishing produced 22.5% of GDP. In the fourth quarter of 1978, 16.7 millions of people were employed: 52% in agriculture, fishing, and forestry; 0.4% in mining; 11.5% in manufacturing; 10.5% in commerce; 4.1% in transportation and communications; and the remainder in other occupations.

'Trickle down' is the theory of development employed by the government, which believes that expansion of private investment and profits would generate wellbeing for all. Those implementing this theory studied overseas. Their professors, who failed to grasp the difference between hypothesis and judgment, put forward their merely possibly relevant ideas. Their students believed that this theory actually explained the way economies function. Intent on being rational, they design the economies of their countries around this mere hypothesis. The theory just does not work, anywhere, as the following figures indicate. Some one-third of the labor force are unemployed or underemployed. For all the Philippines around 45% of households live in absolute poverty and the percentage of households in absolute poverty increased between 1975 and 1980. Rural poverty is more severe than urban poverty, with some 48% of rural households poor in 1975 compared with 41% in 1971. The incidence of poverty in the Philippines in 1975 and 1980 is given in Figure 1. Northern Samar, in the Eastern Visayas, is considered one of the poorest provinces in the country. Philippine real income and real purchasing power of income have declined in the 1980s. Northern Samar poverty also has deepened over the past four years. Farmers and town dwellers complain of this. In 1980 the official exchange rate of the peso was P7.51 per US $1.00. Exchange rate and actual purchasing power of a currency differ: P7.51 buys a bigger basket
Figure 1.

PHILIPPINES
Annual Household Income, 1975 and 1980
Incidence of Poverty by Region, 1975

of essential goods in the Philippines than does US $1.00 in the United States, by a factor (as our research into this difference in 1974 shows) of around 2.7. Exchange rates, however, have been held at an artificial level while inflation and economic decline gnaw at real values. The daily wage for unskilled labor—such as rice transplanting—in Northern Samar in 1983 is P10.00 plus one meal at midday.

Financially the Philippines is in difficulty. Total external debt rose from 22.7% of GNP in 1972 to 34.5% of GNP in 1982, a total of US $17.1 billion. Some US $13 billion was in fixed-term debt, some 93% of which had a maturity of five years of more. Interest payments on this debt in 1982 were US $1.8 billion. Debt service ratio—the ratio of long-term debt repayments of interest and principal to total export earnings in a given year—was at 25% in 1982, in a declining economy. The Philippines is living off roll-over credits. This indicates a very unstable economic financial situation. Rumors abound of a high percentage of international loans, taken for development projects, being diverted into personal accounts.

Income distribution is given in the following tables. The rich are getting richer. While the poor may have maintained their percentage share of national income, the actual number of households living in bloody poverty has increased. In this context note the distinctions between a country not having enough natural material resources (this is not the case in the Philippines), a country not yet having developed its resources (this is partly the case in the Philippines), and a country that lacks policies to connect production and equitable distribution. Again, according to government estimates in the third quarter of 1980, annual income per household was distributed over the country's eight million households, as in the second table, which also gives the proportion of wealthy persons living in Metro Manila. The data are too coarse. Among the 4.2% (340,000) of wealthiest households a group of maybe 200 families has income comparable to the wealthiest in Europe, Arabia, and the United States. An elite of some 90 families living in Metro Manila are business and political oligarchs, forming interlocking directorates and directing national policies.
Let me do some calculations on these income distribution figures. For the majority of Filipino households, at the exchange rate of P7.51/US $1.00, P12000 becomes $1600 for a family of six people. So in 1980 some 70% of the Filipino population got a per capita income of P2000 or $267. Between 1980 and 1984, real income declined, the peso declined against Western currencies, and food prices increased. In 1982 per capita income for the country as a whole was US $792, three times the upper income limit of over two thirds of Filipino families. The conclusion is simple. Some persons, other than 70% of the Filipino population, are raking in very large incomes. Clearly in the Philippines disparities in income are very large and distribution is very skewed, with 70% of households getting only some (?)35% of GDP.

### Household income in Northern Samar

In Northern Samar very few of the 60,000 households would earn P12,000 a year. Take the case of Boy Durens, who works for NSIRD as a tractor and car driver. It is a government job: pay is regular, although payments from Treasury to NSIRD are sometimes delayed and so Boy is paid late. He earns P650 a month, which after taxation and obligatory social security deductions, leaves a take-home pay of around P575, some P6900 a year (US $104 per capita at the 1983 exchange rate). Boy has a gentle wife and four young children. Medium quality polished

<table>
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<tr>
<th>Annual income level (1980 pesos)</th>
<th>% of national income taken</th>
<th>% of group living in Metro Manila</th>
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<tr>
<td>% of national income taken</td>
<td>1970 - 71</td>
<td>1980</td>
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<tr>
<td>wealthiest 20% of households</td>
<td>54</td>
<td>59.2</td>
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<tr>
<td>poorest 40% of households</td>
<td>14.2</td>
<td>14.6</td>
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<th>annual income level (1980 pesos)</th>
<th>% households in income group</th>
<th>% of group living in Metro Manila</th>
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<tr>
<td>40,000+</td>
<td>4.2</td>
<td>48</td>
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<tr>
<td>20,000 - 40,000</td>
<td>10.1 &gt; 29.8</td>
<td>31</td>
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<tr>
<td>12,000 - 20,000</td>
<td>15.5</td>
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<td>less than 12,000</td>
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rice costs P3.75 a kilogram, a government controlled price. Boy's annual income translates into 1840 kg. of rice, which is 840 grams per family member per day. But his family has other expenses besides rice: clothes, cooking oil, firewood, matches, pots, medicine, school fees and notebooks for the two eldest, the occasional beer which as hospitality is central to Filipino life, and so on. Serious illness is devastating as monies spent on medical care literally take food from other members of the household. Boy's family cannot afford to eat well, certainly not one kilo of rice a day. Since vegetables come from outside the province, they are expensive. Eggs are beyond his income. After the government, in an effort to control animal diseases, prohibited the movement of carabao (water buffalo) between provinces, cara-beef became next to impossible to get. Goats are not eaten. Pork, the staple meat of the province, also disappeared from the Northern Samar markets: I believe high Manila prices took all output, this being permitted in order to keep civil servants and that volatile civil population placid. Fish is a major source of protein in Northern Samar, but fish yields are declining and prices rocketing. A treaty of friendship between the Philippines and Japan permits the latter to fish heavily in Filipino domestic waters. Most of the catch is taken to Japan for processing and tinning and exported back to the Philippines. Imported tinned fish is too expensive for Boy's family. Seemingly remote policies of the government—enacted without Boy's consent or representation, in response to situations he did not make and for purposes he does not discern—batter his family. His income, however, is considered very good in the province. Few tenant farmers earn this much either in cash terms or in the non-cash equivalent of their own-grown, home-consumed production of rice and other commodities. Also Boy has a steady job. Seasonal employment (on farms, as loggers, in town maintenance) and bouts of underemployment lead to hunger.

Compared with Western societies generally, though paralleling Western loan sharking practices, interest rates in the province are stupendous. One official (not in NSIRD), already moderately wealthy, charges fellow workers a mere 10% a week when the Treasury check for salaries is late and households face unavoidable expenses, like eating. This is a milder rate than the five/six system: you borrow five pesos now and repay six at the end of the week. Inflation affects money lenders too, as this five/six has risen to five/eight. Evidently, once
a poor family gets caught in borrowing, it is only by some amazing grace that they will ever escape being the money lender's property. Money lenders and landlords tend to be the same families. Farmers' interest rates are discussed below.

The Australian Embassy asked for some estimate of per capita income and income distribution within Northern Samar in order to assess food aid needs. Using income survey data from Leyte and other Visayan islands (at the time I could find none for Northern Samar) daily per capita income in Northern Samar was estimated to be sufficient to purchase 450 grams of polished rice per person. This is below subsistence. Colin Clark and Margaret Haswell in their book The Economics of Subsistence Agriculture detail methods of estimating and provide data on subsistence levels of human living. Boy Duren's income was 840 grams of rice per day per family member. But by province standards he has a good job. Many are not as well off; many are unemployed; at least 50% of province households live in absolute poverty. My estimate of 450 grams of rice per day per capita shows this poverty. The figure of 40% of preschool children suffering third- and second-degree malnutrition confirms the very low average income, and destitution, of many province families. Food Aid from the Australian Embassy to MSSD was tinned meat, cooking oil (very high calorie content and an element in all UNICEF and FAO subsistence rations), and a third item which I forget (not milk powder or grain), all of which were in surplus production in Australia. When the tinned meat, distributed free to poor families through MSSD, appeared on market shelves, various parties were involved in some learning: they learned not to get upset but to acknowledge instead that farm families who sold the tins in order to buy rice understand the priorities of their own needs. It is a further matter to convince the bureaucrats in the country of origin of such goods and the journeying mass media people that corruption is not involved in these instances. Of course corruption does occur, in every state.

Development from below and development from above

Northern Samar, as it was and as it is striving to be, is an instance of the two contrary flows of developing human good. In constructing schemes of recurrence of human good, such as an economy, development from below and development from above are complementary.
Constitutive meaning directs these schemes of men and women making themselves and their society by their acting. These contrary yet complementary flows of development are understood in relation to the five levels of values. In an ascending order of self-transcendence the values are: vital, social (as technological, economic, political), cultural, personal and religious. These five levels of value are structured into each human being. They are already whole in potency in each person. They constitute 'the intelligible unity that already is teleologically what eventually it is to become.' As an intelligible unity the levels are intrinsically related to each other. Even when a person concentrates on achieving one value, the other values are also affected because the person is a whole. The values are ordered according to the level of self-transcendence that the subject moves to in striving to attain human good. The values are not ordered according to their emergence. In the development of human good it is not true that vital values emerge first and are satisfied, and then, but only then, do social values emerge. The five levels of human good operate simultaneously. For an integral person, a worthwhile society, and a heritage worth inheriting, all five levels must be developing, and more or less coherently so. Now there is reciprocity of development between the levels. Higher levels of human good can be put in place in communities before the lower levels are developed as befits human dignity. Religious, personal, cultural values can develop before social values are working humanly and adequate vital values are achieved. The more the higher levels of human good are operating the more is the stage being set for a more proper emergence of lower level values. And reciprocally, the more vital values and social order are developed the more there emerges strong demand for revaluation of cultural, personal, and religious levels. Conversely, restriction of the lower levels does limit higher level development and expression, but cannot preclude or eradicate higher levels. Just as this may be named restriction from below upwards, so restriction from above downwards occurs. Inadequate or distorted development of religious, personal, or cultural values can inhibit the flowering of social order and vital values proper to women and men. These restrictions arise from lack of opportunities for development as well as from deliberate refusal to do good on any of the levels.
Liberty is a cultural value. Liberty under law is a political achievement. Liberty under law liberates economic growth. Economic growth leads to more people living and living longer. When population increases and economic growth generates a proper standard of living for all (or it can), both the finite achievement of current political forms and wide potency of the political domain are revealed. Beyond social value as politics, the tension of achievement and potency within cultural values is felt. Liberty needs revaluing. Again, valuing men and women merely verbally is a cultural disvalue. Politics becomes a dual system of privilege and law. Economic growth is distorted since such a society cannot operate rationally.

Human good is also an instance of emergent probability. As schemes of recurrence are engaged in developing and sustaining human good, so the notion of development from above downwards and development from below upwards, and the parallel notion of upward and downward restrictions, can be cast in terms of probabilities. Understanding how each of these levels operates is known through classical laws; understanding how they are related is a genetic insight, understanding the probability of the whole good and of the good occurring on any level requires statistical law; understanding how good is distorted is the task of dialectical method. In other terms, one can introduce new technology into the province, get it going, and let its effect impinge on other social values, rippling throughout the province. The lower level manifold of social values qua technological alters by releasing new potency: possibilities for new higher level integrations are created. Technological possibilities alter economic probabilities, which in turn alter political probabilities. Soon changes in cultural horizons are made possible or even demanded. This is development from below. Alternatively, one can project cultural, political, economic, and financial changes that, when they begin to operate, raise the probability of new technologies becoming accepted and operative. This is complementary development from above. When either development from above or development from below is attempted alone, usually people suffer. Neither direction of development is complete without the other.

The above section on economy and income distribution tells one story. Productivity throughout the country is low. Most families in Northern Samar earn very low family incomes, suffer malnutrition, and have a poor, undignified standard of living. Some families, on the
other hand, are well off, well fed and housed, with more than adequate incomes, and with ample standard of living. The wealthy are so at the expense of the poor. The wealthy are usually landlords, the poor are mostly tenants. Landlords get their income from tenants living on land inherited by landlords, worked and developed by the labor of tenants. Now a true judgment of value is that poverty and oppression in the province are no longer to be tolerated. Letting this unjust situation remain is collusion in a flight from authenticity. Action is necessary. This will involve introducing new technologies, into an existing, to be questioned, social context.

**Intelligibility in situations of oppression and poverty**

Before looking at this action, a prior question, one that illuminates the way to action, asks how this situation of oppression and poverty came about. A further question is whether this concentration of wealth in the hands of landlords did have and perhaps still does possess a direct intelligibility. Thirdly we ask what new elements, if any, have entered the scene in Northern Samar, making this social structure obsolete.

How did the poverty and oppression in Northern Samar originate? An economy is that ordered set of activities turning natural resources into a flow of goods and services that makes a standard of living. Technology transforms resources into goods and services. Economy orders technology to ensure the recurrence of required goods and services. Resources are needed. So the lack of any one of three elements can limit a society's standard of living: resources can be insufficient in a location in relation to the number of people seeking a dignified standard of living in that location; technology available in that place may not be capable of using resources to serve that number of people; the financial, managerial, legal ordering of the economy may not be developed and differentiated enough to make use of the technology and resources that are known and available. Without resources, technology has nothing to transform. Without technology, economy has nothing to order. The drought famine areas of Ethiopia are groups of people without resources: they possess rudimentary technology, sufficient for survival if they had resources; but they have no resources, and so no economy.
Northern Samar is a different case. In the province resources are not lacking. Until recently, however, the technology available and used in Northern Samar has not been productive enough to turn the province's ample resources into goods and services so that all families could enjoy a proper standard of living. Deficiencies are also evident in the province's economic patterns. But, to date, unproductive technology has been the more limiting factor. When productivities are low, poverty is a fact. For poverty is not a something: it is an absence; it is understood by an inverse insight that says simply, poverty is development not yet done. Productivity, that is, net output of goods and services per person, can be measured against the levels of productivity found in other countries or against family needs. In the province productivity is low in both senses. (What a family needs for dignified living can be estimated: food, clothing, housing, and so on; quantity, quality, price.) When aggregate productivity is low, if aggregate output actually achieved were spread equally among all families, all would be poor, living barely above subsistence levels. When a group of families is living at subsistence level, sickness, fire, drought, a plague of locusts, can topple the community into starvation and extinction. Accordingly, women and men act intelligently by devising economic, political and cultural orderings that minimize the affects of those swings of fate and circumstance. Lonergan writes of 'defensive circles' complementing schemes of recurrences, to offset deviation from the scheme, returning the scheme to its original path (Insight 118).

Is there any direct intelligibility in what is now described as the oppression of landlords over tenants? The economic dominance of landlords and poverty of tenants may perhaps be named a feudal structure. I suggest that this social structure once contained a large measure of intelligibility, that it was a reasonable answer to the question of surviving, that the differences in family income now occurring in the province had a positive function in society. In a poor society the cultural value of hospitality, the large non-monetary economic sector of favors received and favors owed (utang na loob), and the extended family were essential survival methods. In traditional landlord-tenant relationships in the province, which to some extent are still operating, when crops fail, or a family falls sick, or expenses are incurred for a marriage or funeral, tenants expect the landlord to provide money, merely adding it to the sum already owed by tenants, merely continuing
the landlord's ownership of the tenant's family. If tenants receive from landlords, so also they have obligations to them, to repay the debt, if not in material goods or money, then by service and deference. For some landlords deference is more important than money. Debt and deference often go together. This difference of landlord and tenant becomes institutionalized in social values, and feelings supporting this unequal relation become set. This difference can become so much part of the society and its heritage, that a landlord's identity is bound up with being master of tenant families, wealthy in relation to their poverty. Tenants also may believe their subjugation to be a proper social and cultural value: throughout their lives they have known debt, and remain dependent on and are protected by the landlord's social (not legal) obligations. Thus some measure of social security, although very modest, is available in this subsistence society. By taking a small share of crop and animal from each tenant, the landlord is able to build up reserves so that in times of crisis tenants do not become destitute. It is a function parallel to taxation in a modern state. When development has not yet been done, when levels of productivity and income are very low because the technologies to raise productivity and income are not yet known, this social structure—that is, with large disparities in income, and having few rich and many poor families—may be in fact a rational and efficient means of holding in being society's minimal, fragile schemes of recurrence. When landlords are good and benign, when profligacy is not a virtue, when the variety of goods on which to spend income is limited, when population is not growing rapidly, this minimal arrangement of society works well. Note that the rationale for the landlord's dominance is inseparably connected with low-productivity technologies. As these technologies lead to a minimal standard of living, so the landlord-tenant relation is a minimal social form.

The point here is that cultural values have been set in place to maintain an order in society. In turn this economic order makes sure that goods needed for vital values are more or less available to families in the province. Higher-level values sustain society despite the undeveloped lower-level values, despite low productivity of technology. What happens in this society when lack of technology is no longer a major limiting factor? Is a correlative change in social forms also expected?
In Northern Samar the feudal relation of landlord and tenant, once a reasonable survival structure, is now obsolete. The landlord-tenant relation was a valid social form under conditions of low productivity. It depended on an economy that lacked the technology to increase production above subsistence. Social relationship and technological level are linked so that when one changes the other cannot remain the same. When highly productive technology is available and used, the landlord-tenant relation loses validity as a reasonable social form. Over the last three decades new technologies have been discovered and developed, making possible remarkable increases in productivity. Simply stated, it is now technically possible to eliminate poverty, hunger, most disease, and other material deficiencies that inhibit human dignity. Highly productive agricultural technologies that can be taken step by step, that do not require massive investment, that rapidly pay for themselves, are now available. As these are taken up in Northern Samar, the social fabric begins to tear. Radical change in lower-level values, in the potency of lower levels, in lower schemes of recurrence opens the way for radical change in higher-level values, potency, and schemes. Previously, the prime limitation on achieving a dignified standard of living for all was lack of technology, but now that the required technologies are available, the main limitation is transposed to higher levels. Limitations are now shifted out of the technological into the economic and political and cultural spheres. There occurs an expected, but largely unprepared for, revelation of the ambiguities of and limitations hidden in the economic and financial, the political and legal, the cultural patterns in the province.

Introducing new technology as part of development from below

To alter this situation of poverty and oppression in the province, to create conditions for reforming its obsolete social relations, it is necessary to introduce new agricultural technologies. Rice technologies are well known. The International Rice Research Institute at Los Baños, south of Manila, has developed new, prolific rice varieties and explained how to grow them. How to teach farmers is also well worked out, this time by the World Bank, with its Training and Visit system. Rice experts teach leader farmers, selected by the farmers themselves, who in turn teach other farmers. When these new technol-
ologies are taken up, farm output and so farm income at least doubles and possibly triples over five years. A simple central question arises: who benefits from this new technology? Who benefits depends on how the technology is introduced into the province. How this technology is introduced is a decision made both at the level of social values as economic and political and at the level of cultural values.

These technologies can be introduced in two ways, and the consequences of each way are quite different, since increasing output and ensuring equitable distribution of that output are distinct yet correlated tasks. If all emphasis is on technology, usually the landlord reaps all the benefits and the gap between wealthy landlord and impoverished tenant becomes an abyss. On the other hand if the technology is part of changes occurring at several levels of values, and these changes are made intelligently and cooperatively, then both landlord and tenant are better persons and better off. The percentage difference between landlord and tenant declines, the tenant's income increases proportionately more than the landlord's, but no one is worse off either spiritually or materially.

In many countries, introducing new agricultural technologies without raising further, social questions has impoverished farm communities. This is common where transnational agribusiness companies take over an area, throw tenants off the land, destroy the society, and use machine and chemical intensive methods that require little labor. These firms have none of the traditional ties and mutual obligations that mark landlord-tenant relationships. When agribusiness firms take over, the actual quantity of food produced in a locality often declines drastically, since production from their plantations is for export to rich states. Landlords who receive shares in the agribusiness firms in exchange for their land get richer. Displaced families either die, trek to more marginal lands and eke out a living, or migrate to the slums surrounding Asia's burgeoning cities. Such a method is not suitable for Northern Samar. Agribusiness firms are not yet operating in the province. In other parts of the Philippines these firms have reduced farmers to slavery.

Usually a range of technologies is available and selection is necessary, as is the case in Northern Samar. In emphasizing output alone often a combination of leading-edge technologies is chosen, each with a low probability of occurrence, yet giving spectacular increases
in output when all in fact work together. In using such technology farmers have to concentrate wholly on technique and management. Their investment is high, their risk is high, and they have little inclination to be concerned about who, aside from themselves, benefits from this newly introduced technology. Whether the high investment in their farming is taking away investment opportunities for others is not questioned. Here technology seems to take on an imperative of its own and little attention is paid to its societal consequences. Alternatively, in emphasizing both output and social consequences, one can select a combination of technologies that are, to be sure, productive, yet are chosen because the aim of this set of technological changes is to create conditions for economic and political change, as well as, or perhaps more than, attaining more material output. This alternative set usually is composed of middle-of-the-road technologies. Because several technologies are introduced together (improved seeds plus fertilizer plus weeding), the probability of the set is raised if each element selected has a high individual probability of operating successfully. Such tried and proven technology does not put excessive financial or managerial burdens on the farmer, or bind the farmer's imagination and mind to worrying about the technology working. Since this technology has a high probability of functioning as planned, the farmer can concentrate more on the higher-level economic and social consequences of increased output—more to eat and more to sell, possibly more independence from the landlord. Moreover, middle-of-the-road technology has more flexibility of achieving the farmer's purposes, since a wide band of conditions is suitable for occurrence, than leading-edge technology where combinations of technologies usually have lower probabilities of occurrence. Choosing technologies is part of development from below.

Options in development from above

Development from above is equally important. Options selected at cultural, political, and economic levels influence who benefits from the increase in rice production and the probabilities of farmers taking up and persisting with these new technologies. Development from above is
necessary: development from below cannot operate without it. For gener-
ations now the ways and means of acting, the ways of feeling and rela-
ting, have been pretty steady and assured. Cultural and social
relations, and associated feelings, form the horizon within which old
ways of agriculture functioned. Usually feelings are not identified.
One's identity is mated to the way things more or less are. When one is
busy growing rice, the stability of social relations and feelings is
assumed. To break into new ways of doing agriculture is to break into
new feelings. To move rapidly to new ways of doing things, new rela-
tions, new feelings, is not an easy task. Coming to a new personal and
societal identity is not an overnight matter. Often conversions are
involved. The role of higher levels of values is to become so fine in
their being and operation in each woman and man that enormous flexi-
bility is introduced into lower levels. Correlative feelings become
finer, more differentiated, less dependent on fixed exterior circum-
stances. When higher-level values and feelings are espoused, feelings
are able to discipline men and women operating within vital and social
values. Refined higher-level values both discipline and increase the
probability of lower-level values operating for the well being of the
whole community, not for a rich few.

Just as two choices are found in relation to technology in doing
development from below, so also two choices are found in turning to the
question of economic and political justice in doing development from
above. These choices determine the method of doing development. On the
one hand are those with large compassion for the poor, hungry,
oppressed, prisoners, unemployed. Working within the confines of the
group bias of common sense, some men and women operate with a conflict
model of development, assuming that the past is to be excised, that
landlords are evil, that their rapaciousness holds down productivity,
that revolution is the path of liberty. They have no understanding that
the landlord-tenant structure once was intrinsic to social survival. In
their ignorance they believe that cooperation between tenants and land-
lords is not possible. They rush to do good, seeking the well being of
the oppressed and hungry alone, dismissing the landlords without ques-
tioning. They are correct in their description of abominable oppression
and poverty, but they are mistaken in their diagnosis and remedy. So
sure are they of their way in tearing down social structures that when
police and military intervene, to sustain some order without which all
lose out, such intervention is taken as a sign of the righteousness of their method. Because they have not analyzed social patterns beyond a naive us-them dichotomy, this naivete leads them to believe that merely changing those in power eradicates oppression and that a good dose of modern technology is sufficient to eradicate poverty. For all their talk about social concern they appear to be technological determinists, operating only with development from below. It is not a very complex or subtle approach. It does not escape historicism. Those who adopt it seem aware of the level of social values and vital values, but are undifferentiated concerning cultural, personal, and religious values. Their tendency to instrumentalize higher-level values is common. Perhaps their method implies that vital values, being alive and living well, are the criterion of good. Most fundamentally, however, and most dangerously, they believe that the universe is chaos and that their group is the source of order in that part of the universe called Northern Samar. Whether any groups in the province or in other parts of the Philippines operate this way is a question we may leave to one side. This approach cannot generate freedom.

The other approach to the need for economic and political justice is equally compassionate, but uses this feeling as energy in questioning, in the hope of learning about and then seeking the better good of all. This second way seeks to overcome both group and general bias. It is predicated on the fact that men and women can be intelligent and good, can learn new ways, will take up new ways so that the well being of all may be achieved, even if this limits individual possession of material goods. To some, busy with the world's needs, this second way seems excessively intellectualistic, ever asking questions. To those who are in fact eminently practical, such incessant questioning and analysis is foundation of their practicality. Their model of development stresses cooperation, not conflict. They are aware of higher levels of values. They seek to do development from above with all the refinement necessary. They are farmers, landlords and tenants, loggers and fisherfolk. They are government officials and persons elected to councils. They are churchpeople and teachers, and consultants from outside the province. Ironically, even at their current inadequate standard of living, persons operating within this subtle method of doing development are aware that amassing material goods is not an end in itself.
To develop a human society, such as Northern Samar, it is necessary to do development from below and development from above at the same time. Highly productive technology is needed to eradicate poverty. Yet technology by itself is not sufficient. Development from above is needed to eradicate oppression, to provide the context for fuller expression of technological possibilities. Neither development can be done without the other.

**Horizontal and vertical finality and selecting new technologies**

As an instance of selecting a new technology, consider an animal development program initiated in the province. It was an attempt at doing development from below. The animal project failed to ask two questions and so failed. The two questions are about schemes of recurrence or, rather, about sequences of systems of schemes. Let me pause for a moment to bring in Lonergan’s notion of finality, to help us to understand the vagaries of getting cows pregnant and of farmers using cows in farming. Lonergan writes of finality in his essay “Mission and the Spirit”:

By “finality” I would name not the end itself but relation to the end, and I would distinguish absolute finality, horizontal finality, and vertical finality.

Absolute finality is to God. For every end is an instance of the good, and every instance of the good has its ground and goal in absolute goodness.

Horizontal finality is to the proportionate end, the end that results from what the thing is, what follows from it, and what it may exact.

Vertical finality is to an end higher than the proportionate end. It supposes a hierarchy of entities and ends. It supposes a subordination of the lower to the higher. Such subordination may be merely instrumental, or participative, or both, inasmuch as the lower merely serves the higher, or enters into its being and functioning, or under one aspect serves and under another participates.

Let me hypothesize that the first animal program did not ask all pertinent questions pertaining to the schemes of recurrence forming horizontal finality, while the second got those questions more or less right but did not see, and so did not question, the schemes of recurrence as forming the vertical finality of the role of the carabao program in the changing order and history of the barangay.
The animal program involves a revolving capital fund of appreciating assets, where the capital is animals and not money. Farmers use carabao for plowing, for towing sleds (there are no native wheeled carts in the province), and for eating; the uses tend to be mutually exclusive. From an original stock, a carabao cow is allotted to a farmer, who signs an agreement to return the first two progeny to the program as repayment of principal and interest. Two progeny are required in order to ensure that at least one female is returned. From memory I believe that if the first was female, that sufficed as payment. The cow is made pregnant either by a happy bull or through artificial insemination. The farmer's use of the cow is monitored so that it is not overworked or eaten, and so that feeding and care are adequate. And then the waiting occurs: first to see if the animal gets pregnant and then if the cow carries its calf to term. The idea is good and works in many places. The advantage of dealing in cattle, and not in money, is that biological systems can be an appreciating asset: one cow can have several progeny, and as long as the herd is not eaten or decimated by disease or raiding, it can expand. This cow-bank program did not work in Northern Samar. In its design it failed to make the distinction between classical and statistical laws. It assumed schemes of classical laws can be applied directly into concrete situations. It did not assess the probabilities of the plan's actually occurring. The mistake is simple to identify. Carabao cows do have progeny; otherwise there would be no carabao. Farmers honor contracts; otherwise there would be no society. But disease levels in the animals and infection levels in the barangay were high. The conception rate was only 20% and spontaneous abortion was a further obstacle. Probabilities of conception and gestation were too low to allow the program to operate. The classical elements in this scheme of recurrence had been identified accurately, no questions were asked about probabilities of recurrence. So slow was repayment of progeny that, far from having an increasing asset, the program simply ran out of animals. End of that program. If one understood the distinction between classical and statistical laws, and the horizontal finality of being a cow, simply reading the program outline was sufficient to know it would not work.

The program then shifted its focus entirely to management and disease control, a necessary step indeed, concentrating on the probabilities of getting the animals well, pregnant, and producing a bonny calf.
--in other words, getting horizontal finality working. The persons involved were competent veterinarians. But this attempt also faltered, since the further question of vertical finality was not asked. The reoriented program sought to do its own thing, quite independently of other farming or social activities going forward in the barangay. Ironically, in this second attempt, while conditions to be fulfilled were identified, namely, animal health and management, and probabilities were made more favorable, schemes of recurrence of the farmers using these animals were quite overlooked. Questions were not asked about the social schemes, about the place of this new technology in the overall economic activity of farmers farming. This second attempt got bogged down (carabao love a good mud wallow) in the technology, without asking, what is the purpose of this technology? Emphasis was on producing a beast. Quite absent was Laurie's vision of choosing middle-of-the-road technology and of integrating all elements in the barangay, so that technological changes aimed at economic benefits and in turn new economic possibilities could serve a still higher end. The pre-occupation with material change as an end in itself Laurie spoke of as pure Machiavellian.

Moreover, the designers of these animal programs worked often with the richer families in the barangay, many of whom had tenants living in utter poverty. Questions for evaluating the program to see if it served liberation of both tenant and landlords were not asked. Biased judgments of value were made. Laurie's criterion that only tenants and small owner tillers can be members of Farmers Associations was not emulated. Tensions were felt within NSIRD and within barangay between the Farmers Associations and these animal programs.

Finally, I suggest that once one has firmly glued in one's imagination the image of schemes of recurrence, of sequences of schemes of recurrence, of horizontal and vertical finality, of the functional relations between different, specialized types of questions, and of the structure of the human good, a wonderful restlessness invades one until all the pertinent questions are asked. Lonergan's categories weave into a set of interacting matrices whose prime function is not producing easy answers. Answers require data on the province. The matrices can be written on a chart and used directly as a check list to help in seeing that all pertinent questions demanded by the actual practical situation are asked. In accepting Lonergan's invitation to self-appropriation one
is driven to be practical, one is less and less liable to escape being practical, less able to refuse to ask and answer all the pertinent questions, since one becomes authentic in doing so. If Lonergan's invitation liberates, so does it bind. As Lonergan is practical, so also he is political. We now move on to politics, also well known for liberating and binding.

C. Social values as political

Polity and government

The Philippines became an independent state in 1946 after some 330 years of Spanish and 48 years of United States colonial rule. Like any state, the Philippines needs a form of government and a pattern of political process. Like the 98 new states that have gained political independence from colonial rule since 1945, the Philippines has had a checkered political history, changing its form of government several times.

The Philippine state is a republic, with separation of executive, legislative, and judicial branches of government. As a former United States colony, the Philippines took over the governmental form of its former rulers. Whether or not this form is suited to conditions in the Philippines is a moot point. The conditions surrounding the emergence of the United States and those surrounding its continuance are not found in the Philippines and its milieux. Several presidents were elected in the first two decades of Philippine independence. President Marcos was elected in 1965, re-elected in 1969, declared martial law in 1972 in response to what he stated was a deteriorating situation of law and order, lifted martial law in 1981, and still rules. Why law and order was seen as deteriorating is a further question which I do go into here. Whether elections at any level and particularly those at the national level meet standards of integrity is also a further question. Foreign intervention stymied moves towards a Westminster parliamentary system of government, with a prime minister and cabinet from elected members, with the presidency assuming a symbolic role, with the civil service having far fewer positions dispensed by patronage. Many Filipinos regard this suggested new form of government as more in tune with their family-
oriented and personal alliance cultural values. Central to the governmental and political evolution of the Philippines and to maintaining the Marcos regime is the action of the United States. The Subic Bay naval base in Zambales province and the Clark Field airforce base in Pampanga province are the two largest United States overseas bases, key to United States strategy in the Pacific and Indian Oceans.

Political representation and variations

Politically the country is divided into seventy-three provinces. For administration the provinces are aggregated into twelve regions and the National Capital Region, the Metro Manila urban conglomerate which is on Luzon. Northern Samar is in Region 8 and is listed as Province 47. Provinces are divided into barangay. A barangay is first a group of families, sharing a common area of land. Each barangay has between 80 and 200 families. Rural barangay tend to have fewer families than urban barangay. In rural areas, within a barangay, families tend to group in small units called sitios. Each barangay has an elected barangay council and an elected barangay captain, the foundational political unit of election and representation in the country, as stated in the 1983 Local Government Code. A number of barangay form a municipality. Each municipality has an elected mayor and council. The committee of barangay captains in a municipality meets regularly with the mayor, to discuss municipal development, to settle disputes, and to act as a means of communication of government information. A number of municipalities form a province. In Northern Samar there are twenty-four municipalities and some 550 barangay. Each province has an elected governor and elected members of the province council. Representatives are elected from each province to the House of Representatives (Batasang Pambansa) in Manila. The President also appoints unelected members to this assembly. Thus a clear line of elected political representation exists in Philippine society, from barangay council and its captain through the municipal council and mayor through provincial council and governor through the assembly person representing her province at the National level. This structure is in place, though how it operates is a further question. Again, using terms from Lonergan's structure of the human good, the distinction needs to be made between a structure in place (here, institutions of political representation) and the actual use to
which it is put, the resulting good of order.

Martial Law was declared in 1972 and lifted nominally in 1981. Under martial law obedience to directives from a central power is the prime political virtue. Martial law takes away from groups of people their effective freedom to constitute the whole political domain; it takes away responsibility, making it impossible for groups to act on their own judgments of value to form their own community. Silence on political matters was and is common in barangay. Where a wasting silence is, no community is possible. Of course political decisions are made in barangay and municipalities; otherwise the society would collapse. These decisions happen again and again. But perhaps it is not correct to call this network of decisions a system or a scheme of recurrence, since in this instance political decisions are responses to satisfactions, not to values. That political form is predicated on flight from understanding and value.

During the nine years of martial law all political parties and all elected councils were suppressed. With the centralization of power that accompanies martial law, expression of leadership and authority at barangay and municipal level was curtailed. Existing councils were frozen in place and council members were told what to do, through decrees administered by government ministries. During martial law farmers in a barangay needed permission from police or military to meet in groups of five persons or more for any discussion, except when attending mass and other religious ceremonies. During those military years barrio fiestas did not occur. Although I have not directly asked, it would be surprising if fear of informants did not enter people's imaginations during this period. Now no new political leadership has emerged in the past twenty years, particularly at the national level. Some persons with capacity to exercise leadership serving the well being of all Filipinos, such as Senator Aquino, for instance, left society in various ways. Current attempts to form political parties in opposition to the Marcos regime and its New Society Movement (Kilusang Bagong Lipunan) rely almost solely on pre-martial-law opposition leadership. Somewhat like the current Marcos regime, this old leadership has horizons that reflect little of Filipino needs. Replacing ideological obedience with the re-emergence of representative political process at barangay and municipal levels and at national levels is a contemporary Filipino task. Much learning is involved.
Following the lifting of martial law in 1981 (the regime still retains as many options to do as it will), permission was granted for new elections at barangay and municipal and national levels. However, the President as executive is not subject to the House of Representatives (there is no Senate). He is able to rule by decree, letter of instruction, advisement. Ruling by decree leaves probabilities of government schemes of recurrence dependent on the whim of an individual and his cronies. (The term 'cronies' often appears in the Manila press to describe those wealthy families surrounding Marcos.) But statistics cannot consider or assess an individual instance. Where rule is by decree and not by process of argued legislation, whatever schemes of recurrence can be devised contain a factor with uncertain probabilities, which may flip without warning. At times it seems that proposed and actual schemes have a random element built into their 'intelligibility.' Grace Goodell of John Hopkins University, an anthropologist who has done extensive studies in the Philippines, has written of the need for accountability and stability in government operations, which is another way of speaking of probabilities of ranges of schemes of recurrence. Regaining representative political process is a far harder task when the destabilizing, irrational, and irresponsible element of rule by decree still is a fact.

Relearning representative political process

Now 50% of the Filipino population are under 20 years of age. In 1984 Marcos had been in power for 19 years. If we assume that children around the age of twelve years begin to have some idea of politics, of barangay groups constituting barangay life as wise and worthwhile, then as a rough estimate 65% of the Filipino population (all Filipinos under the age of 30) have known only that political activity permitted by the Marcos regime. Their task of learning free political process would be formidable—for who would teach them?—were it not for two factors. First, women and men are naturally social and political: this critical point is considered below. In the second place, political process can be bracketed by development from below—improving the economic well being of peoples, and by development from above—initiating revaluation of cultural identity. Besides the youngsters, there are elders in the barangay. While they have memories of engaging in representative poli-
tical process, they too need to regain the skills of conversation, decision, action. But these elders also remember the vast viciousness of the second world war in their country. They know what violence does and so are unlikely to take the easy, violent path out of their oppression. As someone remarked, Marcos is lucky that elder Filipinos know the suffering of violence. He added: oppression by one's own government is worse than colonial or military occupation, since the state wraps itself in a cloak of legitimacy and other states join the charade.

In sum, then, most Filipinos have grown up in a society where political process was dead. They have had no opportunity to learn how to do politics, or to raise political questions. Now communities change slowly, if they are to remain human. They are common fields of experience, common modes of understanding, common measures of judgment, common evaluations, and common consents to action. The commonalities develop slowly. Much learning and much experimenting is required. So the question is, what are the probabilities of Filipinos learning political process in barangay and at municipal level, now that permission has been given for the re-emergence of politics? South African blacks have a similar task.

I suggest that a direct attempt to act at the political level is a fragile approach. Many families in barangay are tenants or landless workers who inevitably are in debt to the landlords and are obliged by Filipino cultural values to defer to the landlord's 'suggestions,' even in political matters, such as voting. But understanding the five levels of human values and how schemes of recurrence stack up gives one flexibility. Beginning with development from below, in a situation where economic units are still small, as in village-level farming, in doing a development program one can select middle-of-the-road technology that increases economic well being. Tenant farmers learn the ways and means of organizing their Farmers Association, doing their purchasing and marketing, keeping bank accounts, engaging in conversation concerning their common technological and economic tasks. The learning involved in doing this prepares the way for politics. Add now a further factor, made possible because one understands that development from above is possible. Take the same situation and note that most farmers in a barangay are tenants. To increase economic output may merely increase the landlord's wealth and power. But in a well ordered society higher cultural values are the horizon of the political order. Accordingly,
with the five levels of values in mind, make a projected judgment of value, at the level of cultural values, that more good is achievable if tenants can group so that they begin to achieve a technological and economic capacity independent of, but not in conflict with, the landlord. Through becoming a group with their own identity formed by their own responsibility, tenants would undergo a cultural change. We saw clearly this flowering into dignity as tenants, through their own decisions, radically transformed their control of their lives. The point here is that a double effort is being made to alter and increase the probabilities of free political process—from below through the technological and economic changes, from above through the cultural transformation of tenants' own self-image which is no longer just an ascribed or imposed image. The Farmers Associations thus emerge as symbols of increasing possibility. Solidarity in Poland may be a parallel instance.

Recovery of free political process is likely to occur more readily at barangay level than at national level, because villagers know each other. The role of feelings in pushing a person to question and, one hopes, to learn is more dominant in the societally compact situation characteristic of the barangay, than at the more differentiated aggregate level of the state. However, the state also needs and uses symbols to generate feelings as part of questioning and learning or as part of repression at the national level. It is a major obstacle when a regime has imposed on its people symbols that have become discredited or are satirized. A profound question then arises: whence does a state get its symbols of well being? Its symbols of liberation? I have yet to figure out how feelings generating and evoked by differentiated symbols permeate the five levels of values, each one and the whole.

Ministries of government

In its efforts to cooperate in bringing about the well being of its people, the government of the Philippines has established several ministries and departments to execute government policy. Together the Ministry of Finance and the Office of the Budget and Management look after the monies needed to pay for the government's programs. Monies are raised by taxation, foreign aid, and borrowing on international financial markets. The following is a list of other GOP Ministries:
agrarian reform (MAR) for distributing large estates to tenants; agriculture (MOA); education, culture, and sport (MECS); energy (MOE); health (MOH); human settlements (MHS), concerned with housing, quality of life, and women's small-scale, income-generating projects, and headed by Imelda Marcos, governor of Manila, wife of the President; justice, labor and employment (MOLE); local government (MLG); national defense; natural resources (MNR); public works and highways (MPWH); social security and development (MSSD); tourism (MOT); trade and industry (MTI); transportation and communication (MTC). These ministries are directed from offices in Manila, through twelve regional offices, then to the provincial level. Some ministries have offices in some municipalities. Supervising all ministries is the National Economic Development Authority (NEDA), responsible for determining nationwide plans, costs, and priorities. Data on resources and needs is fed into NEDA from provinces and regions.

Government activity in agriculture has recently undergone major reorganization. Formerly it was several distinct bureaus and departments (plant industry, animal industry, extension, research, regulation, irrigation, soil conservation, economics and marketing, home economics); each with its own staff, organization, and field personnel. The bureaus and departments were independent and tended to compete. This multitude of competing interests has been amalgamated into one group and this one group of many parts is still learning how to operate as one ministry. Cooperative development was shifted from the Ministry of Local Government, which operates through the mayor's office, to the reformed Ministry of Agriculture. The MOA has field extension officers, Farm Management Technicians, at a ratio of one FMT for every 250 farmers, who assist farmers in barangay to learn new techniques. The hierarchy of MOA operation from central office to the FMT in the barangay is clearly delineated.

Private non-government groups, organizations, companies

Besides these two hierarchies of ministerial operation and of political representation, private citizens in the Philippines also may aggregate to form cooperatives, companies, or corporations, which legally may operate within a barangay, within and across municipalities, within and across provinces. Commercial, corporate, financial legislation has been enacted in the Philippines.
The politicization of ministries and planning

In a state whose people have a large public space in which to act freely and responsibly, the political process of representation sets policies and plans at barangay, town, municipal, provincial, and federal levels. In agreeing on policy and plans there is interaction of the federal level and particular provinces, which may promote social values and vital values: "Social values, such as the good of order which conditions the vital values of the whole community, have to be preferred to the vital values of individual members of the community" (Method, 31). Besides designing policies and plans, there is the task of implementation, done usually through government ministries or in part by private enterprise.

But not all states possess such a public space of free discussion and policy formation. Where little distinction exists in practice between executive and legislative branches of government and a president can rule by decree, ministries acting from the top down as executors of these decrees can compete with and in some instances replace the bottom-up structure of elected political representation. Where ministries work directly into barangay without reference to municipal government or in some cases provincial government, a crucial stage in a people's self-expression is bypassed. Besides carrying out policy, ministries then can become politicized and start determining policy at provincial, municipal, and barangay levels. Such distortion of ministries' roles and tasks is intensified by differences between political parties. Again, where the political horizons of a province governor and of effective municipal mayors differ, it is probable that ministries will be directed more to bypass and substitute for the legal representative political structures.

This politicization of civil service is common in many states, both old and new, particularly in those where a large number of elected posts within the civil service are subject to patronage. The Philippines inherited a political and civil service with this deficiency. When ministries are politicized tension and fighting among them becomes common, and this lessens their efficiency. Families in barangay suffer the consequences. But such politicization of ministries is difficult to curtail, because many senior provincial officers usually are themselves landlords and members of the politically and economically influential province families.
Again, when a country sets out to do development, to root out the poverty of its people, the economic, financial, and technological changes needed are often far beyond the current horizon of villagers. Accordingly the government sets up a planning body, such as NEDA, with necessary element of top-down design and implementation to introduce these society-reorienting changes. It remains difficult for a government to refrain from using this development process for patronage and political ends, especially in a culture that has heretofore operated on personal alliance systems—an explicitly patronal culture.

Now this overt politicization is connected with the horizon of planning used to design development projects. Planning the development of a province cannot proceed in ignorance of what is going on in the province and what resources it has, so information is needed. How these data are collected and used illuminates two further aspects of doing development. Besides the tension of top-down and bottom-up planning, distinguish material development—roads, water supply, electricity, agricultural inputs and marketing, food distribution—from human development. In the former, effective meaning is the key; in the latter, constitutive meaning. When material development is the prime concern, usually data are collected by government ministries, most often without any consultation with barangay families or local elected councils, because it is thought that plans for material development can be done by and large without consulting villagers. At the provincial level, ministries of the federal government design plans, budget and prioritize them. These documents are sent to regional headquarters, where plans from the various provinces within the region are collated, consolidated, justified, costed, and then sent to Manila for approval. Plans and budgets are sent back from the central office to regions and through regions to provinces. Provincial and field officers are meant to implement plans that finally come down from central office—almost, it seems, irrespective of what actually is suited to village needs or desired by the families. Barangay are recipients of a process initiated by others. Passivity and gratitude are expected of them. To date little decision-making and initiative is delegated by ministries to field-level staff. Such top-down planning and implementation has had many years to consolidate its ways and means during the Marcos years. 'Material top-down' planning and implementation is consistent with the 'trickle down' theory of development. When they attended universities in Western coun-
tries, Third World planners were taught this theory and the hidden value agenda that material development is always first. However, as ministries become more skillful in actually doing these plans, discrepancies between plan and local probabilities are uncovered.

One unpleasant consequence of this materialist, top-down planning often occurs. Persons doing this materialist development, planning, and implementation have an implicit grasp of the difference between classical and statistical laws. In their plans they draw up schemes of recurrence and they know from long experience that these plans do not operate in the concrete unless all disturbing and countervening factors are controlled or counterbalanced. They are aware that other things must be more or less stable or constant, that probabilities of schemes must be known and in some measure maneuverable, if plans are to work in the concrete. With their emphasis on getting material development functioning they recognize that perhaps the most uncertain element in society is what people will do with their freedom when new material and spiritual opportunities open up. Accordingly, where the criterion of worth is bodily survival, where the whole emphasis is on getting a good standard of living, where the government controls people's freedoms and expression. With one unruly element curtailed, probabilities favor material development—well, at least for some people. Given the initial assumption that material development is the criterion of being human, controlling freedom becomes 'rational' policy.

Ministry operation within barangay

Now look at how ministries operate from the point of view of families constituting a barangay. Take a barrio in Northern Samar with around 80 families, living in several groups. They live their common and family lives as a unity of intent and fact. Most are farmers growing rice and coconuts, some corn and vegetables. A primary school teacher, some shopkeepers, and a few artisans are also barangay members. There seems to be little distance between families and their daily tasks: living is a single, fine-woven cloth; farming is a way of life and a means of livelihood before it is merely an income generating business. Into this rather undifferentiated community come field workers of the different ministries, each claiming time, each wanting to set up a small committee, each wanting a meeting house. The ministries of agri-
culture, health, and social security and development, between them had sixteen or so different groups to form in barangay, each with the advice of their respective ministries—sometimes conflicting advice, often advice generated in the central office and not cognizant of the specific conditions of the barangay, but still advice that the field officer has no authority to modify. Moreover, much advice is simply words, lacking field demonstration and proffered without anybody's having actually worked through tasks with farmers. Government field workers are aware of this lack: getting resources for systematic demonstration is difficult. It is left to the families in the barangay to weave all these bits of advice into a whole, not to let them tear apart their living. This is a formidable task of integration. Barangay folk are invariably polite, receive the field workers, often are overwhelmed by the quantity and cost in money and time of the suggestions, and so let the matter drop once the field worker has left.

Farmers are aware of the need for prior schemes of recurrence so that a new one may operate: genetically improved rice seeds need fertilizer; buying fertilizer requires finance; finance requires a financial system, either traditional or contemporary. Moreover, farmers know that this scheme of recurrence is not worth doing if it does not lead to the establishment of a later scheme of recurrence: taking the risk in using high-tech inputs to grow more rice is not worth doing unless the marketing, now controlled by usurious middle men, can in some measure come under tenant farmers' control, so that the profits return to the farmer for his own work. Often the field worker, even if she is aware of these linkages, does not speak of them, since maybe it is not politic to do so.

In sum, then, what needs to be discovered is some way of not overwhelming farmers with advice, numbers of field workers, and numbers of groups. That is, those changes needed for liberation into a dignified standard of living have to be brought to farmers already integrated, yet not as an imposition.

This tension between the unity of the life farmers lead and the multifarious persons and advices from various ministries is dealt with by the functional specialty Communications. What the Farm Management Technicians of the MOA want to communicate is correct and, as far as technical production of rice is concerned, all parts are systematically related. The communication falters on two points. First, in the sys-
tematic elaboration of what to teach farmers, the fact that farmers and farming are part of a broader social, financial, and political pattern apparently is not questioned. Accordingly, distortion occurs. Secondly, the FMTs and the farmers differ in their learning, their horizon of practical interest, and their life style. Communication with farmers requires that FMTs move into the farmers' milieu, rather than that farmers have to journey to other horizons. But inadequate Systematics and Communications are grounded in the inadequate foundational attitude that material development is the principal of human development.

Because living conditions in towns are better than in villages in Northern Samar, field workers of ministries, often single people and not from that location, find it difficult to live in the rural barangay and prefer to live in town. Social life, friendships and evening relaxing activities are very limited for outsiders in the barangay. Their salaries (P450 a month) are insufficient to pay for room and board in a village. Transportation is difficult in most of Northern Samar. In sum, unless the field person is very dedicated, as many are, the amount of time spent in a village assisting farmers to absorb and correlate advices is limited. Farm families tend to be left on their own after a short visit by the field worker.

While field workers from different ministries cooperate informally, planned cooperation at the supervisory and provincial level is in its infancy. The Philippines has a major advantage over many other emerging countries in that it has high literacy and numeracy. However, paper notebooks are scarce and expensive. Usually farmers have to memorize advice, rather than having either a document to refer to or an actual change in the way a demonstration crop is growing. Field workers of the ministries are also frustrated, realizing that they are making little impact. The NSIRD P employs Filipino and Australian consultants to work in association with government agencies. These consultants are specialized. Severally, they all want to approach the same barangay, thus adding to the confusion.

The dedication of Farm Management Technicians increased very much when NSIRD P made resources available to FMTs through the MOA to demonstrate new rice production. Motor bikes were provided. The probabilities of actually getting farming schemes of recurrence operating were thus raised significantly. But getting consultants to understand the need for considering the barangay as a whole group of families was a further task which could not be solved merely through getting more material items.
The depoliticization of government ministries

The Philippine government recognized elements of this dilemma of overburdening village time, patience, capacity to learn, with a variety of seemingly unrelated messages. Further, GOP recognized a tension between the Governor's responsibility for province development and various ministries going their merry way without reference to the Governor, since the ministries were responsible to regional and central command and budget. This was particularly the case in the Ministry of Agriculture with its extension workers spread out through the barangay, at a ratio of one officer for every 250 families. It was recognized also that one extension field worker could not give detailed advice to each family individually. So President Marcos issued Executive Order 803, setting up a Provincial Agricultural Action Committee under the chairmanship of the Governor: all agricultural activity in the province was placed under his direction. Further committees were to be established at municipal level with the mayor as chairman. The purpose of this move is to present to farmers an already integrated set of advice, thus facilitating farmers' learning and doing, thus raising agricultural output in the country. Organization and integration of the material inputs needed for lifting agricultural output and of marketing are also part of EO 803.

EO 803 is technically sound, a boon to farmers, and, when implemented well, a contribution to social development. However, EO 803 contains no items dealing with the question of equity or distributive justice; and so it does not yet go beyond the materialist notion of development. Much land in Northern Samar is held by landlords, who will benefit much by this government assistance; how much tenants also benefit is a further important question. I discussed this EO 803 document with those who wrote it and raised this matter of equity. The framers of this document are not at all mean women and men, nor are they unaware of the question of distributive justice. Perhaps it is a matter of proceeding step by step, with this first step needed welcome.

Social service ministries, such as Social Security and Development, Human Settlements, Health, Education, also operate in barangay. To date no cooperative approach has been conceived for these ministries, although Social Security and Development is aware of the need to cooperate with Health.
One step has been taken towards making the ministries answerable to local elected political representatives. In Northern Samar this shift is helped by the fact that many ministry personnel and local elected representatives are often members of some thirty families that constitute the influential group in the province and know each other well.

To understand what shifts are required of ministries in order to become more responsive to local needs, imagine three columns showing the relations between ministries, the political, and private groups. First is a column showing the groupings of Filipinos as private citizens: the barangay as a social and economic group, its organizations within barangay, between barangay, and so on, producing a hierarchy of more complex and differentiated groupings, which are directed to economic or cultural or religious ends. All these groups are supposedly free under the liberty of law. Parallelizing this are specifically political groups, with elected representatives: barangay council, municipal council, province council, national assembly. Now the third column, representing the structure of ministries set up by the government, would be placed ideally so that activities of the various ministries are integrated at provincial, municipal, and barangay level, implementing plans within the horizon of policies formed by the politico-economic consultation of elected representatives and private groups. The political column ideally is central and mediating. In the measure that this is done the three groups can interact, communicate, and local people have some purchase on what is occurring in their lives, instead of being passive recipients of what government is doing to them. Of course this triple concerto would be fragile and not always in concert.

Currently, as we have been saying, the ideal is not realized. Policy is primarily made by a President who rules by decree. Village groups are being approached from two sides. On one side is the overtly political; on the other side are politicized ministries as implementers of a government policy often determined without reference to the well being of the people. But the well being of Filipino people is served in the measure that coherence is strong between what elected representatives are striving to do and what the ministries are striving to do. The task is to shift the operation of the ministries back to their true position of working within and as part of province and municipal development. Executive Order 803 is part of the attempt to have the ministries operating in an integrated way.
The Philippine government also has recognized the need to make planning more flexible so that general plans can be tailored to the particularities of the province, but with emphasis still on material development. To do this more flexible planning, more needs to be known about the province. It is slowly emerging in practice that planning and budgeting now begin with consultation at the barangay and municipal level, are aggregated and prioritized at provincial and regional level, and are then submitted to central offices in Manila, where national priorities are ordered. The new vision of planning sets guidelines permitting provincial and municipal groups to modify plans as local circumstances change and require. More decision-making responsibility is being given to local-level officials. This whole process of consultation takes a long time and, given the fact that the Philippine civil service is still geared to receiving directives rather than to initiating plans, the process is not overly efficient. Barangay consultations are not well developed, stable schemes of recurrence yet. Considerable reorientation of horizons is needed to get the process functioning, not least as regards the feeling that it is now safe to speak out. While the bottom-up consultation, planning, budgeting, is slowly being established, top-down directives have had many years to consolidate. Some tension and conflict arise between the two directions of development, especially where an official, whether in the Philippine government or an Australian foreign aid official, has a blueprint mentality concerning human development. These barangay consultations are a necessary, albeit still minor, step away from conceiving development wholly in materialist terms.

The final step yet to be taken in the depoliticization of government ministries that is to revise the current understanding that material development in principle has priority over human development. This attitude assumes that once material elements are in place, economic and political and cultural relations between human beings right themselves almost automatically. There has been a failure to ask either the value question whether the order being set up in society is in fact that conducive to human well being; or the factual question whether the order of values inherent in onesidedly materialist development is in accord with the integral scale of values. This final step, however, demands the utterly radical emergence of representative political process and an acknowledgment that men and women are at once individual and social.
Now a small step has been taken in this liberation by the genius of Laurie Sewell who designed a heuristic for Farmers Associations. With initial help from the project, FAs were able to make the best of this new EO 803 integration of agricultural advice and inputs. In the same movement the question of distributive justice was faced: the level of tenant well being increased in a manner that served both tenants and the landlords remarkably well.

Through the FAs farmers began taking new responsibility for their own lives, as labor, as managers of technology and economy, as members of a political process; farmers began to put their human development before material acquisition. Though they were very poor and knew their urgent need for more material goods, they still made the shift to new and more human horizons of doing development. In turn, new life was breathed into farm advisers, the Farm Management Technicians, as their work began to have effects.

Farmers Associations are a first step in a more complete process. They are not conflict groups, challenging, liberating, foundational, in raising productivity and in altering social relations. The Farmers Associations were income-generating, producing cash flow to finance next season's activities.

Lonergan's categories once more are evident in practice. EO 803's rearrangement of the Ministry of Agriculture's activities in the province are probability shifts in elements in schemes of recurrence. The Farmers Associations are concretizations of the structure of the human good. After all, farmers are women and men cooperating freely through their work to bring about good. Much more will be said about the Farmers Associations below, and about the higher-level ordering of Farmers Associations by the farmers' own Area Marketing Cooperative.

At the end of the section on economics and income we spoke of a new potency in society once sufficient technologies are available to eliminate hunger and poverty. This challenges prior ordering on the level of the economy and polity. As I have mentioned, Sewell chose middle-level farm technologies for use in the Farmers Associations, since his primary intent was the economic and cultural change impinging on the political from both directions. This indicates that he is operating with the integral scale of values and implicitly linking it with the structure of the human good at each level.
D. Cultural values

Here we look at several cultural values as they constitute the horizon of social organization. The Philippines continues to be a rural society. The family remains the prime unit of social awareness. In the barangays of Northern Samar there are acute feelings constituting the fundamental class distinction: 'little people, big people', self-esteem (amour propre), i.e., hiya, tiwala, pakikasama, utang na loob. One person I worked with considered himself a third-class little person and it permeated his demeanor. He comes from a very poor family, had worked his way through school and university, and now was learning to regard himself as himself, outside of this littleness that he had imbibed as a member of a tenant family and at school. As a child and youth he saw his family over and over subject to the whim of the landlord. Patron and client, landlord and tenant relationships, rely on internalization of this 'big people, little people' feeling. It is a major element in the Farmers Associations that this feeling is challenged, not in hate, but rather with some compassion as the patron too is bound and diminished in this relation.

The whole culture is directed to a minimum of conflict. Social acceptance remains a central Filipino value and this is based on self-esteem. Anything that impinges on one's self-esteem or the self-esteem of others is to be avoided, lest personal relations be voided. Persons conscious of this need are said to possess hiya, a sense of shame and embarrassment that has become the principle sanction against improper behavior. Jaime Bulatao, SJ, psychologist and noted Philippine scholar at the Ateneo de Manila (he taught us psychology and group dynamics at the East Asian Pastoral Institute at the Ateneo), says hiya is 'a fear of being left exposed, unprotected, unaccepted.' To be without shame, walang hiya, is an accusation that hurts. This valuable attitude also can be used to distort personal relations for power and domination. Tiwala is trust in another. It is common throughout Asia and is the foundation of that togetherness, that camaraderie, that may seem naïve to westerners. Tiwala is a relationship at the cultural level, which flows down to influence political and economic activity. In the West relationships are primarily in vital and social values, with culture inordinately subordinate to these lower levels. Tiwala assumes that people are intrinsically good. Trust is expected of kin and friends but not of all acquaintances.
Pakikisama is the value of smooth interpersonal relations, often sustained and mended by the use of go-betweens. Whereas in the West the predominant relations usually are only functional, as with the bus driver, the clerk in the bookstore, and so on, in Asia generally and in the Philippines particularly, all relations are drawn into personal relations. This often puzzles, disturbs, and infuriates the impatient westerner who, as a truncated and alienated subject, has very few personal relations. Utang na loob means the debt correlative with receiving a gift, a goodness (loob). If a senior elected official arranges a good job in a Ministry for a young person, that young person is obligated to respond to requests from the official. If the senior person has integrity the little person is drawn into integrity. Defective spirit on the part of the big person is very hard to resist. Utang na loob has its excellent side, but like any finite good can be misused. For Christians, utang na loob has religious dimensions. In the West, this value also commonly operates in political circles, in the phrase 'he owes me one,' following a favor done for him. The combination of self-esteem, hiya, tiwala, pakikisama, utang na loob in persons lets them live flexibly within personal relations. They will be successful in developing strong personal alliance systems.

Language as cultural

A foreigner to Asia is often struck by the circumlocutions built into the language, and by the steady use of euphemisms and indirect speech. Fr. Parisi, SJ, an Italian clinical psychologist who had worked in Italy, Thailand, Taiwan, and the Philippines has proposed a distinction between physical space available to an individual and psychological space in which the person lives. He noted also what Lonergan refers to as intersubjectivity, that rapport with other human beings shot through with feeling. In Asia little physical space is available to each individual; people stand much closer, and touch each other more often. In many Western countries one can withdraw physically when feelings are agitated or when one is just plain tired, often to one's own room. But this is not possible in Asia; there is no space, most houses having only two or three rooms for the six people. Fr. Parisi suggested that since they lack physical space people construct a strong sense of private psychological that others enter only gently, slowly, by invitation.
Unlike the abrupt battering of Western speech, speech in Asia gets the point across by going round and round, all the time sensitive to the other's self-esteem. Smooth interpersonal relations are maintained. In some Indian languages there are no words for 'yes' or 'no.' This may be an instance where limitation in a lower manifold, namely the lack of physical space as a vital value, is transcended by being ordered from a higher-level cultural value.

Social consequences of cultural values

Social organization in the Philippines and equally in Northern Samar continues to be marked by personal alliance systems, that is, groupings composed of kin (real and ritual), granters and recipients of favors, friends, and regular exchange partners. Primary reference is always to family kinship: nuclear family first; then the family extended by marriage; then family extended further through ritual ties of church and the important ceremonial transitional times of life—birth and baptism, confirmation, betrothal and marriage. As far as I remember there are no merely functional relations in the province of Northern Samar. Every relation of granting and receiving a favor is personal, creating and remaining in the context of utang na loob. These personal alliances build up within the barangay, between barangay and upwards through the province into the upper political, economic, cultural echelons in Manila. Failure to understand these alliances inhibits getting technical jobs done, besides leading to appalling social blunders. Personal alliances affect the probabilities to be taken into account when endeavoring to set up schemes of recurrence. Personal alliances can be translated as a profound sensitivity to constitutive meaning, which Filipinos, far more than Westerners, both are aware of and give high priority to in making their own society and character. Note that I write society before character: Filipinos know themselves as persons, not simply as normative individuals (see below on Dumont). Sukí is a term meaning market exchange relationships. These too are brought within personal relations, where regular buyers are given better quality, reduced prices, and often credit. Such a rich human value used to exist in neighborhoods of Western cities and in country towns.
Festivity resurrected

During the martial law years, free meeting within barangay communities was suspended. A silence descended on the community. As the silence prolonged, the community withered and the barrio fiestas, so central to Filipino identity, did not happen. Camus and Osip Mandelstam write of a dying when one cannot speak of matters of spirit. I am told that Durkheim writes on the relation between community and festivity. Fiesta is memory in action, affirming that life indeed is good. Memory and ritual are central to liberty, which is a key term in thinking out structure of the human good. Unveiling the sources of festivity and its intrinsic ritual in a society yields a key insight into the quality of freedom in that society. Far more than modernity's sad individuals—solipsists incorporated—Filipinos are a festive people. A smart dictator will replace traditional rituals and symbols with his own and, using the silence, will set out to generate a memory of the revolution's necessary and innocent origins. Villagers in Northern Samar spoke of experiencing an immense liberation when once again they began to celebrate their fiesta, not the regime's rituals. In terms of the levels of values, this return of fiesta within the lives of people is a recovery of right ordering in the values, once more placing cultural values superior to social qua political values. Celebration and ritual and memory formed by political fiat are dismissed as aberration. In Josef Pieper's small excellent work, named revealingly In Tune with the World: A Theory of Festivity, main criticism of the French Revolution and those movements wedded to it is that they instituted state rituals as religious.

E. Religious values

Over 90% of Filipinos are Roman Catholics. The church still bears the mark of its Spanish origins, beginning in 1571. In the 1980s religious practice remains a blend of official doctrine and folk observances. In the later years of martial law, and increasingly since 1982, the official church, the priests, and many lay persons are speaking out against the inequities in Filipino society, demanding that laws be administered justly and that government programs ask 'Who benefits?' as
well as 'How much more is produced?' There is a tendency, bolstered by teaching in some seminaries, to equate being a good Christian with energetic action against injustice, even to the point of organized violence against landlords, not-so-honest politicians, and military personnel who are supporting current law and order patterns that favor oligarchs in the province. In Northern Samar, however, the bishop has a finely differentiated understanding of the interaction of religious values and social values. He is encouraging basic Christian communities in each barangay. These BCCs generate a sensitivity to injustice, and equally a sensitivity that violence only plants more injustice. The bishop is well aware of the poverty and injustice suffered by people in the province. He sees the BCC as forming persons whose authenticity constitutes the cultural horizon of meanings and value that are to order barangay political and economic life. He insists that his priests do priestly work. Others can man the barricades, run relief agencies, operate agricultural programs. But if the priests are wholly immersed in these social tasks, no one remains to be priest. A society without ever more refined religious values soon goes into general decline and dies.

Perhaps a preoccupation among many priests to operate themselves on the level of social values is a function of the general bias of common sense, and a temptation to forget what Lonergan says when discussing the supernatural solution to the problem of evil:

the supernatural solution involves a transcendence of humanism, and the imperfect realization of the supernatural solution is apt to oscillate between an emphasis on the supernatural and an emphasis on the solution. Imperfect faith can insist on believing to the neglect of the understanding that makes faith an effective factor in human living and human history; and an even less perfect faith can endanger the general collaboration in its hurry to show forth its social and cultural fruits (Insight, 727).

I believe our bishop might be applying Lonergan's ideas of this tension to his situation by praising his priests for their concern and compassion but asking them to recall more profoundly the role and task they have specifically as priests. It would be devastating consequence of priests' preoccupation with operating on the level of social values to forget the Christian belief that the solution to the problem of evil is
absolutely supernatural. For then the real solution to problem of evil would be dismissed as a relic of a bygone age, the full scope of dialectic as a method remain unused, any need for the functional specialties overlooked, and the drift towards using the ways and means of oppressors to fight oppression steady and undetected—until the people are weary of priest and devil alike. I am aware this is only a provisional and possibly relevant interpretation. What follows are some of its presuppositions.

Let us recall Lonergan’s differentials in the unfolding of the historical human good. First, the human being is a source of higher systems, constituted by meanings that integrate the five levels of values more or less well. Good is always concrete, and the five levels of value are a concrete matrix constitutive of human endeavor. As we have said, all values are operating at once in a more or less developed way. Doing development from below and doing development from above are two phases of one movement intrinsic to being human. But there is also, secondly, the fact of evil in history, which so obfuscates understanding and evaluating that the probability of actually doing development from below in a manner which always is authentic and so serves human well being, is terribly low. Equally low is the probability of doing development from above solely by human effort, beginning at the level of personal values. Thirdly, however, besides the fact of evil, there is the solution to the problem of evil, not merely as a heuristic structure, but rather as it has occurred. This solution is absolutely supernatural.

Perhaps we can suppose, then, that all find in their lives that call to dreaded holiness, but that in the specialization of tasks proper to human community there will emerge groups of persons who specialize in being at home with, speaking about, and leading others into religious values.

Whatever the division of labor, it seems terribly important that Christians not only realize that the solution to the problem of evil is a gift, but that without this gift, human attempts at development are distorted. Hence doing one's utmost to clear the way in oneself for the operation of this gift is a high human calling; and, as the gift constitutes personal relations of being in love, so the little lover is ever willing to be at the disposal of the greater Lover. Accordingly,
priests will minister to the Christian appreciation of the fact and consequence of this gift, and not forget that the liberation of social values is radically made possible and sustained by this gift from above.

Perhaps those who do not understand this are walang hiya, those who lack the Greek virtue of that Gadamer translates as 'a shy respect for the gods.'

Changing symbols

In the still somewhat undifferentiated society of the Philippines, symbols are especially needed to express religious values. Current religious symbols quite expectedly reveal much of their Spanish origin along with an American veneer. As the basic Christian communities uncover the subtle interaction of their being both religious and just or their failure to be so in their daily practical life, so new symbols are needed, both to reveal this new linkage and to manifest becoming Filipino. In culture as empirical symbols always point to becoming. The Marcos regime set up its own static symbols of what a Filipino is, seeking to determine culture. If the Marcos regime ends, however, and the distorted order of values is corrected in accord with the integral scale of values, so new symbols will need to emerge within culture.

As historical, any particular culture is a consequence of human choice and so cannot be an ultimate source of symbol. Trying to reduce the source of symbols to personal values also does not work adequately because persons are also historical. In the measure that women and men forget religious values as a possibly profoundly liberating source of symbols, do they prepare the way for the state to become the prime source of symbols, generating and imposing symbols always containing totalitarian elements?

Symbols discipline feelings. Could it be that unless symbols derive ultimately from religious values, everything becomes mere flux, and feelings left ever merely relative and historicist?

To consider this issue from the viewpoint of an adequate methodical framework for doing development, note that the pivot from the indirect discourse of the first phase of a functionally specialized method into the direct discourse of the second phase demands conversion. In other words, adequately knowing the past in order to construct a more
human future cannot be done without conversion. Grounding the set of conversions that ground a man's or a woman's authenticity in every act of knowing and feeling—an awesome person who teaches with authority—is religious conversion. Since religious conversion is being utterly in love with the Beloved, as the Beloved has loved first, one who is so in love does not and cannot instrumentalize religion as a means in political liberation; but holiness is eminently political and practical.

However, a legitimate fear crops up among those who would be in love without reservation or restriction and who find themselves thrust into the hurly-burly of development, which is to say, of bringing about those vital, technological, economic, political, cultural changes in value, aimed at human well being. Overwhelming practical demands of family and society seem to push religious concerns aside. This pressure is felt most acutely in persons who are as yet undifferentiated and have not learned that there can be such an occurrence as differentiation of consciousness. I have found that, as preparatory to differentiating, when an image of what differentiation of consciousness means is grasped, there is a release of tension and then a dawning of a double fear. Release comes as one realizes that the horizon of being in love affects each act and that being practical, being religious, being artistic, being scholarly, being scientific, have common origins yet are not common in their operations, procedures, and expressions. The first new fear arises in understanding that one can no longer be cradled by one's culture in one's accustomed manner, that now one is responsible for what is going forward in society's history in addition to the perhaps already acknowledged responsibility for one's family, oneself, and one's proximate community. The second new fear is fear of historicism. If everything each woman and each man does is historical, if it has antecedents, conditions, occasions, and consequences, then where do we find a standpoint, a foundation, a Fragestellung, to give a sense of direction to the unending turning of the wheel of fortune? Even bullock carts with their ornate wheels are going somewhere.

3. THE DILEMMA OF HISTORICISM

A. Province development and cultural change

The notion of doing development involves a double shift in horizons. The first is from past horizons as determining, to future
horizons as to be formed. It is a complete turn-around. A fixed society or one bound by colonial occupation tends to look to the past as the paradigmatic golden age when society took shape, when the colonial dominators had not arrived; whereas in doing development the society will take up a vision of itself not just as rooted in the past, but as it will be through its own efforts some day in the future. Heritage, instead of being the exclusive horizon to be lived within, becomes merely one element from the past to be blended with contemporary elements, such as recently discovered new technologies taken in from other countries (e.g. financial institutions, educational means, and perhaps forms of government). Villagers are fascinated by the new lease on life they feel and discern in themselves as they go through this reorientation. The question is, what pattern of culture shall this development society aim at?

The second horizon shift is presupposed by the first. It is more radical since it utterly removes human beings from the context of being just another element in the range of natural elements. Women and men have a certain distance from the subhuman world, which is used by human beings. This cannot be done without an increasing understanding of how the natural world operates. Yet for the last 10,000 years most groups in our world were compact societies. They lived within the turning seasons, having little competence for and indeed little expectation of being able to order the natural resources of the earth to human good, so that all families could be at least fed. Even those ancient high civilizations in Egypt, China, India, Europe, and Central America, separated themselves only slowly and briefly from their feeling of being part of the earth and the seasons. Only in the last century, and specifically since 1945, have all nations turned to doing development, believing that it is now possible to order the world of nature to ensure both sufficient production and distribution of material goods so that no one goes hungry, dies early, is unhoused, lives in poverty, is without human dignity. There is now plenty of supporting evidence for the belief that there is no technological obstacle to eradicating world poverty and hunger. It can be done; since the obstacles to realizing this human dream are now within the political and economic and not the technological sphere. Philippine history over the last forty years is evidence for this.
Culture as empirical

Some 330 years of Spanish and 48 years of United States colonial domination and oppression have left Filipinos with a major question regarding the set of meanings and values that give them their cultural identity. There are attempts to reach back into pre-Spanish times to discover specifically Filipino feelings and symbols. Many of the values mentioned above are Filipino, affected but not dominated by Spanish and American influence. Another way is to define anew what it is to be a Filipino. The New Society Movement initiated and controlled by former President Marcos set out to define who the modern Filipino is, delineating symbols, meanings, values, to unify the nation. Several books written by President Marcos on this theme were published. His cultural vision, however, was classicist, for he defined and delineated a fundamentally unchanging culture within which Filipinos would be at home, free, and would be called to act creatively, but within those limits. This is not surprising, since by and large the cultures of every other nation in the world are classicist.

However, while it was a classicist cultural horizon that the New Society proposed, the culture that was and is actually operating in the Philippines is empirical. Just as technologies are chosen and discarded in pursuit of productivity, just as the economy is changed over and over again to attain a higher standard of living, just as political parties group and regroup and the form of government is reformed, so too Filipino culture is evolving and unstable; and partially because it is not well thematized (whose culture is?) it is unsure where it is going. On the one hand the New Society vision is not accepted by the majority of people. On the other, because all cultures are finite goods and mixed products of human wisdom and human flight from understanding, reaching back to pre-colonial times does not work. Then, too, historians have made that period too uncertain, and anthropologists have shown that supposedly pure Filipino values are common to other groups. For these and many other reasons, merely to plunge ahead in unquestioned optimism is known and felt to be silly. Needless to say, the church in its cultural expression is also in transition. Accordingly, in doing development, culture has become one more variable in planning and performance. As Filipino families get smaller, as children are more edu-
cated, as basic barangay life differentiates, and as technological and economic progress alters the way people live, so a variety of cultural possibilities face the people of the Philippines.

In sum, doing development relativizes one's culture and, since culture is a finite good, may entail repudiation of major elements of one's heritage. The heritage as such is not sufficient to human living: a dignified standard of living for all has not yet been achieved, and inherited poverty and oppression are no longer wanted. Society's present task is to constitute a richer future. That is what it means to be historical and to do development. But this repudiation may land us in the drifting of historicism.

Doing development is a task that aims at bringing about human good intelligently and methodically, not on a hit or miss basis. There is no doubt that development is needed, since poverty is rife and oppression is ubiquitous. New technologies are needed to increase material output. Economic and financial schemes of recurrence have to be set up to order the available technologies. Representative processes and legal structures, forms of government and administration, are political schemes of recurrence needed to order economic options.

But implicit in the task of ordering are principles of ordering. Concretely, culture is the horizon and source of order in a society because the symbols, meanings, values constituting culture work as ordering principles. The culture too consists of schemes of recurrence that constitute the everyday horizon of people.

Now a wide range of cultural possibilities is on display throughout the world. Likewise many political forms are exhibited in the world, each proclamation itself as paradigmatic. Again, there are different economic systems. Technology is a long shopping list. The problem of selection is fraught with peril. If culture, polity, economy, technology are not operating coherently the society is in jeopardy. Besides the tensions that occur when some levels of good are more developed and more differentiated than others, there can be contradictions within and between levels. Not all the cultural, political, economic, technological examples in existing states and not all the possibilities known are coherent with human good; indeed many are antithetical to it and besides there is plenty of bias in our societal and personal horizons.
If merely repeating and so compounding the mixture of bias and goodness in so many contemporary situations is to be avoided, dialectical method is needed to sort out the mess, to reveal what is worth selecting. Moreover, this selection among cultural and social possibilities calls for an adequate understanding of the human good, so that one does not make a new society more oppressive than the current situation, in spite of a higher material standard of living. Mere feeling, which in fact is a mere continuation of one’s mixed heritage, is not sufficient. Similarly, to pluck some actual societal form and some proclaimed theory of human good out of its historical context and to elevate these to normative status does not eradicate the ambiguities built into the selected form and theory.

Human making and achieving are always finite goods, concretely conditioned in their emergence, maintenance, restoration, and often burdened with ambiguity as a result of flight from understanding and choosing satisfaction rather than value as the criterion of good. So, beyond all these inadequate positions, a foundational standpoint is needed so that we can methodically affirm what is intelligent, what is the human good. If it is to discriminate among the ambiguities of our history, this standpoint will be transhistorical and transcultural.

Historicism arises in practice when people and leaders of a country believe that this transhistorical foundation does not exist. Accordingly, they say, “There is no ultimately coherent way of choosing among cultural, political, economic, technological possibilities; development cannot be done methodically; there is no way of knowing what is human good. The best one can do is to give development a go and see what happens. The practical political question—What is the best way to live?—has no answer. All assertions of ultimate ends or values are relative.” As a relativist Australian might say: “Geez, I dunno, mate, jus’ give it a go.”

In contrast, as religious persons we affirm that women and men can know what the proper way to live is. When cultural values and expressions are changing, when culture is to be transformed empirically, then religion has to have recourse to foundations in the conversation of God and human spirit that is prior and not completely reducible to any particular cultural expression. To be sure, religious values permeate the lives of men and women and so always have some cultural expression. But being religious in a foundational manner will involve a transhis-
torical dimension. For being religious does not absolve one from the task of understanding how history is made; or from appropriating the human and natural sciences or scholarship and art. As Lonergan has made clear, religious conversion and being able to come to true judgment in the complex matters of development are distinct though related things.

I know of no country that has truly escaped historicism, that is facing the question of how societies are to be made so that human well being in all its dimensions may be understood, acknowledged, sought. Many overlook the dilemma either by denying that they are historical societies or by setting up their particular way of life as the normative way to bring about a golden age in the future. These denials can be played out by many societies each proclaiming different answers.

International conflict is almost certain, especially where the state's legitimate security intentions and the illegitimate normativity of what is merely historical are confused. In the Philippines and Northern Samar there is a smouldering guerrilla insurgency mired in historicism. Nor have Australian consultants on the project escaped historicism, since few of these 'Down Under blokes' have reflected on their culture, its suppositions and expectations, its virtues and vices. Such a blunt, impatient, functional culture, where individuals are used to doing things themselves not surprisingly regards itself as pretty normative. With all parties unable to escape historicism, factual differences between the Samareños and Australian cultures topple into oversimplified evaluative differences. Australians regard Australia's economic plenty as the criterion of cultural worth—the means are productive, so they must be good. So in project design and implementation consultants spontaneously and naively attempt to impose Australian cultural ways on a much more subtle and gentle people. Historicism imprisons; and fortunately Laurie Sewell was one Australian who escaped from this bondage.

For Lonergan, foundations for escaping historicism are found not in any historical product of women and men acting, but in the transhistorical, transcultural normativity of the invariant, recurrent and related set of operations yielding cumulative and progressive results—the structure of the conscious intentionality which makes history. Only by explicitly appropriating this structure is historicism adequately overcome and laid to rest.
B. Historicism and Dumont's understanding of individual

Before exhibiting Lonergan's way out of historicism, I want to discuss what an individual is. Now the question 'What is the province of Northern Samar?' seems innocent enough. But two quite distinct answers emerge depending on who is answering. Although in each case content is more or less the same, the priority of each inverts that of the other. Filipinos put families and personal relations first, working down always to include material elements; while foreigners, put material elements first and work up to people, often forgetting that people are responsible adults. Note the different horizons involved. Were one to ask, 'What is a barangay?' the Samareños would reply that a barangay is a group of families constituting a neighborhood, cooperating in common tasks, and that if they are farmers, usually their land is contiguous. The foreigner would say a barangay is an administrative statistical area of land on which a certain number of individuals live.

For the Samareños, the province of Northern Samar is 60,000 families, numbering 400,000 persons, constituting some 550 barangay and several towns (the largest being the capital, Catarman, with a population of around 20,000) scattered across the province, mainly along the northern and western coasts, and up the main valley of the Catubig River. Most families are farmers, most are tenant farmers, while some own small plots. Landless families work as day labor for landlords or are kaingeros engaged in slash-and-burn agriculture in the mountains. A smaller group are fisherfolk. Some are loggers. The people in the province go on to speak of the religious and cultural values by which they live, of political structures, of the barangay council, the municipalities, the governor and assemblyman, and the activities of the various ministries. They speak, not in theoretical terms, but with numerous examples from daily life, of crops planted and yields obtained, of benefits gleaned from and the continuing burden imposed by landlords, of sending children to school and college, of their hopes and sicknesses, of their desire to do development. A few mention the large military group in the province, counterpart to insurgents in the hills. Of course mention is made of the physical resources of the province, yet
discussion soon shifts to 'Who owns the resources? Who does most of the work? And who benefits?' Physically the province is a tough place to live in. But for them Northern Samar is home.

The foreigners, especially the Australian consultants operating in the province, begin with location, geology, geography, climate, soils, plants, animals. Population numbers, housing and water, transport, levels of nutrition, range of technologies, scope of economic activities, variety of political forms—these may rate a reference. Occasionally cultural values are alluded to in so far as they enter directly into economic activity. Religion is given a passing word. Only lastly, if at all, does the foreigner's description of the province get round to talking about men and women, and then only as individuals. For the foreigners there are seemingly no families in the province. More fundamentally, however, what is overlooked is that the main actors doing development in the province are the Northern Samareños themselves.

Two different notions of how to do development result. On the one hand, from the foreigners' perspective, an integrated rural development project is designed and implemented solely as a task of putting material elements in place. It regards individuals, not communities. Design and implementation are done without consulting responsible adults in barangay and imposed on barangay. The community is regarded merely as passive recipients. Such a project assumes that when material elements are put in place—irrigation schemes, roads, better seeds and agrochemicals—then almost automatically social relations, in economy and polity, change for the better. Human beings and changes in social relations are peripheral. Moreover, this sort of project tends to be divisive: it emphasizes the individual, and mainly the individual out for himself, and so in conflict with others. When this orientation is mixed with materialist project design, it is no surprise that some development workers seek to divide barangay, pitting individual against individual. That a people like the Samareños are the main actors of their own development and that they learn the complex and differentiated task of doing development by being in on the planning, implementation, and evaluation from the beginning is usually not programmed into project design. Evidently, in such a design the critical role of women and men as responsible human beings is overlooked or perhaps dismissed. But this only promotes bias.
On the other hand, not unexpectedly, the Northern Samareños begin from the fact that they are adult men and women, already living in the province, constituting communities and families, aware of barangay and other needs, desirous of attaining a standard of living with dignity. Because it is their province, their participation in all matters pertaining to their lives is part of their human dignity. As we have seen above, in recent years this dignity has not always been called into creative play. Rather poverty and oppression have bound them. Any project wishing to operate in the province ought to be sensitive to this human desire for dignity.

Now this difference in conceiving what Northern Samar is has its roots in a change that occurred in Europe some 400 years ago, but has been much slower to occur in Asia. The French anthropologist Louis Dumont, whose main work is on India, has written a series of articles on the notion of the individual in the journal Contributions to Indian Sociology. Dumont distinguishes an empirical and a normative notion of individual. The empirical notion is simply the numerical difference between human beings, as instances of one: Alma is not Juanita; Linda and Sendro have no difficulty in discerning their children from those of Julio and Elbie, nor do I have difficulty in distinguishing their children. This notion of the empirical individual is found throughout all countries: no society can exist without it. There is nothing to be understood in the mere empirically residual differences of individuality.

The normative notion of individual involves both human understanding and a value judgment. The normative notion of individual is found only in European societies and societies derived from Europe: in Canada, the United States, white South Africa, New Zealand, and Australia. (I am inclined to exclude Spain and Portugal from this statement, as well as Latin America.) The normative notion of individual denotes an (empirical) individual, whether in state of war or state of blissful nature, prior to civil society, who contracts to join, and thus constitute, civil society. All modernity's writings on how the individual is human prior to civil society, how civil society is formed, whether freedom is gained or lost in entering civil society, assume this
normative notion. Clamor about rights without correlative social responsibility, of 'justice' for me rather than common good, also follows from this normative horizon.

Now if we distinguish between understanding and judging, we can say this normative notion is not stupid, although it is mistaken. When a compact society begins to break apart (as is occurring in Northern Samar), when its different elements of religion, culture, polity, economy, technology, seem to begin operating at cross purposes, there arises the need to get some idea of being human together that does not rely on everyone's living the same style of life. Women and men do not have to be understanding and saying and doing the same things if there is an invariant human nature underlying differences as described by Lonergan in his essay "Natural Right and Historical Mindedness." In Northern Samar a desire to find a way of doing development that does not build conflict into its method calls for such a notion of common humanity.

Indeed, the crisis of modernity has brought to light the need to find an invariance in being human, which permits men and women to move beyond classicist horizons of culture into being historically minded. Lonergan has located this invariance in a set of operations generating horizons and history. But we may suppose that the normative notion of individual, with its emphasis on rights, represents a first stab at understanding this invariance. It is a response to the need in the understanding of being human that does not rely on a metaphysics, that is aware of the achievements of natural sciences and so tries to develop social sciences, that tries to take the concrete differences between human beings and between their societies as serious matter for theoretic understanding.

Implicit in Lonergan's explanation of transhistorical, history-forming invariance is the realization that human beings are able to construct a variety of cultures, polities, economies, and family forms, which, although they differ markedly from each other, nonetheless, are not necessarily in conflict if they are generated by a common, invariant structure constituting the human nature of all women and men. Nor must such cultures be contraries. Rather they may be simply different orderings of common human possibilities. Contradictions and conflicts arise only as a consequence of flight from understanding.
Modernity has mistakenly placed this invariance in a product constituted by the action of women and men. Every such product is historically conditioned. In the measure the European and North American stand on the invariance in human nature strives to implement the normative notion of individual, social values and the state dominate cultural values and the nation. The modern normative notion of individual inhibits the passage to adulthood of women and men, because it pits the empirical individual against his society and history. It spawns conflict; the normative individual only contracts to join civil society in order to safeguard the normativity of the individual.

So there is an opposition between modernity's intention of uncovering the invariant foundation of being human that permits historical mindedness, and its normative notion of the individual which turns out to be as classicist and premodern as the horizons it criticizes by modernity. But once adequate invariant grounds are discovered, modernity's attempt to locate normativity is seen through, though its intention is praised. And if the normative notion of individual and patterns of civil society that follow from it are inadequate to the human venture of doing development, they are to be discarded.

But foreigners from the West either take this mistaken normative notion of the individual for granted; or in the measure that they have not reflected on their culture and its suppositions, they tend to be historicist. If these typical mistaken notions of modernity are built into project design, they harm the peoples of the Philippines, whatever improvement in material standards of living they may accomplish. Of course rulers of Asian countries, sustained by the praise of their teachers and the strong advice of their Western bankers, can also imbibe these mistaken assumptions and build them into regimes.

Finally, for Lonergan finding an adequate invariant in being human goes hand in hand with a recognition that differentiation of consciousness is necessary if historically minded women and men are to be able methodically to construct their societies as worth living in and their histories as worth inheriting. Any placing of invariance in a particular human achievement sidesteps the need for differentiation of consciousness. Were modernity's cognitional theory correct, the individual would be known as one instance of an intelligible unity and so as intrinsically social; accordingly, the normative notion of individual would be discarded; and states founded on this counterposition would be faced with the task of revising their political form.
In Africa and Asia, and so in Northern Samar, the mistaken normative notion of individual is not taken for granted. The empirical individual always knows herself within society and its history as at once individual and social, and senses that the human good is at once individual and social. Measured against the integral scale of values, the Asian position on human nature is more correct. It is conducive to women and men thinking of themselves as born into and becoming adults within, and as adults then originators of their society. Here cultural values and nation dominate social values and the state. This Asian position, however, is quite undifferentiated. It possesses what Lonergan would term first-stage control of meaning through symbol and authenticity.

Now attempts at development in many Asian countries are beginning to break apart these compact societies through the repudiation of the Asian heritage of poverty and oppression. As compactly resisting the breaking apart of their compactness, Asian societies want to remain within the first stage of the control of meaning. But doing development entails a critical judgment of value about the goodness of what is not yet and is to be done as well as what is. It entails a distinction between person and society, an acknowledgement that no person is wholly formed by his or her society. Critical cleansing of one’s heritage demands highly differentiated theory. But a compact society has no domain of theory and is not able to make this judgment and distinction with adequate delicacy. It can methodically criticize neither its own heritage nor elements brought into this society from elsewhere.

Moreover, as Lonergan has shown, an adequately grounded theory requires our differentiation of the realm of interiority. In compact society, interiority is not thematized. I doubt that development of societies can be done without moving to the third stage in the control of meaning as described by Lonergan in his "Ongoing Genesis of Methods."

In sum, on the one hand, remaining undifferentiated pushes a society into a classicism in which a dictator manipulates symbols to serve the state. On the other hand, as Dumont’s work confirms, neither the Western nor Asian understanding of the individual is suited for doing development. A third way, sublating both, is required. So I have turned to Lonergan.
4. LONERGAN AS FOUNDATIONAL, PRACTICAL, POLITICAL, TRANSFORMING

In lectures on the philosophy of education Lonergan writes that "development is measured not so much by the external objects with respect to which one operates" as it is by "the organisation of one's operations." The whole thrust of his work is to thematize the basic operations of knowing and doing that are found in any woman and any man. These operations form an invariant structure and are prior to one's character, prior to society, prior to history. By putting these operations into act women and men make their characters, their society, and history. That there is a basic set of operations which are prior to and revealed in the making of history is the condition of possibility of history. That these operations are conscious is the condition of possibility of human responsibility for history. That these operations are intentional is the condition of possibility of emerging and developing, rather than static, women and men in history. That these operations are invariant, conscious, intentional is the condition of possibility of being in love. The invariant foundation as the only way out of the ravages of historicism is found by thematizing these operations and affirming them as operative in oneself, and bringing one's living into line with their normativity.

Development is a practical task. Being practical is acting intelligently in each concrete situation. In his gentle book *Insight* Lonergan invites us to understand what it is to understand, that is, to grasp what being intelligent in every situation means. Understanding understanding is not primarily a theory. Lonergan invites us not to understand and affirm a theory, but to take on the task of self-appropriation, to understand and affirm that one is a knower and doer. Making that affirmation has a moral moment. Once one understands oneself as a knower, able to know the truth, one grasps that an imperative to live the truth is entailed in the affirmation of self-appropriation (John 3:21). Appropriation of oneself as a knower and doer is the foundation of practicality. Being practical has a moral ground.

Development is a political task. The report on Northern Samar above shows that a major task of development is, first, to answer the recurring questions: What is the best way to live? What is the best regime? What order of values and meanings is needed to order the finan-
cial and material elements of society so that all may have a dignified standard of living? Then, beyond answering questions, the task is to put the answers into practice. These are political questions and tasks. In Lonergan's Method in Theology what is at stake on the fourth level of conscious intentionality is each woman and each man constituting their character and society. Doing development is more a refashioning of women and men in their relations and characters than a reshaping of the material natural world. Lonergan uncovers the roots of being political in so far as political pivots on operating within an adequate horizon of constitutive meaning.

Development is a transformative task. When a person discovers in herself the basic operations of knowing and doing, she discovers herself as unfinished, in via, historical. It is a discovery that the human task is ever to understand how human beings and other things function, and ever to alter probabilities towards human good, so that the-to-be-known and the-to-be-done are isomorphic with herself as self-transcendent. In this discovery and its isomorphic doing, she becomes her own authority and originator of value in that society. In acting she is transformed and is engaged in transforming. She holds in subtle tension the task of being an adult person, always in but never merely of her society. As intentional, therefore, the transhistorical and transcultural foundation revealed in Lonergan's analysis is transformative.

Besides being foundational, practical, political, transforming, what Lonergan uncovers is also directly operative. He does not propose a theory that leaves one wondering how to operationalize it. His writings are the invitation to self-appropriation not of a theoretical object (as in facultative psychologies), but as this performing subject. In identifying the basic set of operations and inviting us to get hold of these operating in ourselves, Lonergan asks us to continue doing, but now deliberately, differentiatedly, methodically, the operations we have been doing since as young children we asked our first question.

Farmers Associations of Northern Samar and Lonergan's categories

Now the formation and operation of the Farmers Associations exhibit what Lonergan is saying. The women and men in Northern Samar also ask questions, strive to answer them, constitute their own society
and their own characters, exist within Filipino history, feel for each other, play together, and fall in love. Lonergan is not writing solely about Europeans or North Americans, but about all human beings. Four elements from Lonergan's work fascinated me in seeing the Farmers Associations: schemes of recurrence, the structure of the human good, the integral scale of values, and the functional specialties. Categories selected from Method of course presuppose Insight, because as the first chapter of Method makes clear, without understanding Insight the whole of Method is "about as illuminating as a blind man finds a lecture on color" (Method 7).

A Farmers Association is a group of men and women rice farmers in one barangay, who have banded together to take on new technology, to learn from the Farm Management Technician (FMT) of the Ministry of Agriculture, to produce more rice, in order to improve their standard of living. Each barangay has its own Farmers Association. Thus the social coherence of the barangay is respected. Elements in the barangay which are not good are not respected. As designed by Laurie Sewell, the key to these Farmers Associations is that only tenants and small owner-tillers without tenants can be members. Landlords, usually not tillers themselves, own large tracts of land and use tenants and hired wage labor for growing crops. In the FAs a new element has entered barangay life, because tenants are grouping independently of their relationship to the landlord. In the measure that the activities of a Farmers Association are fruitful, tenants are gaining the beginnings of an economic independence of the landlord. Economic independence can soon be translated into political and cultural independence. These Farmers Associations did not spring up ready-made: they are constituted by the actions of women and men. They bear all the glory and fallibility of men and women acting.

Farmers Associations and Schemes of Recurrence

The notion of the scheme of recurrence arose when it was noted that the diverging series of positive conditions for an event might coil around in a circle. In that case, a series of events, A, B, C, ... would be so related that the fulfilment of the conditions for each would be the occurrence of the others. Schematically, then, the scheme might be represented by a series of conditionals, If A occurs, then B will occur; if B
occurs, then C will occur; if C occurs, ... A will recur. Such a circular arrangement may involve any number of terms, the possibility of alternative routes, and in general any degree of complexity.

Two instances of greater complexity may be noted. On the one hand, a scheme might consist of a set of almost complete circular arrangements, of which none could function alone yet all would function if conjoined in an interdependent combination. On the other hand, schemes might be complemented by defensive circles, so that if some event, F, tended to upset the scheme, there would be some such sequence of conditions as, If F occurs, then G occurs; if G occurs, then H occurs; if H occurs, then F is eliminated (Insight, 118).

Setting up the FAs involved the interlocking of shifting sets of schemes of recurrence. A prior task is to analyze into schemes the task of increasing rice production, noting that the increase is to be achieved not only this year, but each year, and not only with the initial assistance of NSIRDP and the MOA, but also maintained season by season by the farmers themselves. Once the classical elements of the schemes are outlined, once the function of rice growing is delineated (i.e., seeds, soil, nutrients, water by quantity and control of levels, sunlight, labor, plowing, planting, weeding, crop protection, harvesting, post-harvest drying and storing, marketing, and so on) then the probabilities of each element being in place as and when required may be estimated. When the classical and statistical components of the scheme of recurrence are identified, the next task is to mark the critical elements. When critical elements are in place the rest of the scheme can begin to function: no seeds, no rice crop. When the probability of recurrence of critical elements is raised, the probability of the scheme is lifted markedly. Often small shifts in probability of critical elements liberate the probability of a whole scheme of recurrence. Identifying critical elements is the task of a development consultant.

Supply schemes

Now, in our example, new inputs were used: high yielding variety HYV rice seeds, chemical fertilizers, insecticides, sprayers, steel plows. HYV seeds were sometimes available through the Ministry of Agriculture. The other items were not available in the province and had to be organized by the agriculture section of NSIRDP. It is easy for these
organizations to rely on their own schemes of recurrence, their own expertise and linkages, to get these inputs each year. But it is not the purpose of MOA to be a commercial input-supply organization. And NSIRD is a temporary body. No private commercial groups delivered these inputs, and tenant farmers did not have their own supply schemes. Accordingly, unless farmers set up their own schemes of recurrence for providing inputs or have reliable access to private suppliers—unless schemes that have been tested are assuredly functioning—then when NSIRD goes and the MOA no longer is a supplier, farmers will stop using modern agricultural inputs, not out of ignorance or risk or expense, but simply because no scheme of supply is functioning. No supply leads to no production and so farmers revert to poverty, and in their poverty submit once more to landlords or to the modern landlords called banks. Numerous examples are cited in the development literature on collapsed projects, where project designers and implementers forgot to assist farmers in setting up their own schemes of recurrence for supply of inputs. Often such reports speak of dumb lazy locals who do not want to be modernized.

Financial schemes

Besides getting inputs, there is the task of paying for them. When a family or community lives at subsistence level, its scope of risk-taking is small. Quite reasonably, then, farmers are wary of suggestions and advice that promise to raise rice production by a factor of three or four, if only they will purchase these resources and use these technologies. Not having any savings—that is what subsistence level living means—farmers would have to take more loans. Should the promise not be fulfilled, the farmer is sold into further penury. Understanding this nest of factors, NSIRD through the MOA provided to farmers the initial batch of material inputs as a grant. The expectation is that farmers, using these new inputs, would produce a much larger crop, enough for more food and more income, and enough to sell for cash in order to buy inputs next season.
Defensive circles

But what is expected does not always occur: that is the heart of the statistical. Two countervailing ways or defensive schemes were built into the rice program to overcome initial failures. First it was asked whether the failure was due to the farmer's laziness. No such case was found. When failure was due to abnormal weather conditions, the project was able to grant a second lot of inputs. Project schemes of recurrence thus meshed with farmer's schemes of recurrence to eliminate the deviation from the plan within the farmer's schemes. The second countervailing way was to use the Philippine Crop Insurance Corporation plans. Farmers filled in policies, specifying areas, crops grown, technologies used, whether or not under the direction of an FMT, and so on. The policy covered one season. Initial payment to the PCIC for farmers was made by the project as part of its input grant. Insurance is a defensive circle, based on probabilities. Given provinces where drought and typhoon manage to squeeze into one season, crop insurance is a way of maintaining farmers on the road of development.

Teaching and Learning

Besides financing and getting inputs, and protecting against their loss, there is the task of learning how to use the inputs to produce an abundant crop. The children are happy when they have enough to eat. Both FMT and farmers have to learn. So a way of learning has to be established. The purpose of this learning is eminently practical. It involves actually growing rice. For the FMTs a theoretical component is important for knowing why, as well as how, the various elements go together. In addition to FMTs working in the field with farmers, they had classes in the MOA once a month, when the tasks of the coming month were outlined, discussed, agreed upon. Farmers also had classes in the barangay, in which the FMT delineated the coming month's tasks, fielded questions about the work and problems, helped organize the flow of inputs, and occasionally introduced a subject-matter specialist, since the FMT is a generalist in practical agriculture. All these routines had to be understood, programmed, established, monitored, evaluated, criticized, improved. A key element is to get the notion of recurrence into the minds of planners.
Starting schemes—keeping probabilities high

Distinguish FAs starting to operate from already functioning FAs. In the latter, conditions of occurrence and recurrence have been established and need to be maintained. In the former they have yet to be established. Now, as we have said, farmers at subsistence levels of living do not have much scope for risk. Many farmers are willing to take on new ways if they can see that these ways work in their barangay—not merely in a demonstration plot given special expensive care by an FMT and hired labor, but when one of the farmers does so within all the limitations of labor and cost and expertise common among themselves. This is a quite reasonable position. The farmers are bringing to bear the distinction between a social experiment and a technical material experiment. If the FMT just wants to show that HYV rice can be grown in the barangay she can easily do so if she disregards costs. Maximum levels of production thus may be demonstrated. The farmers argue, however, that technical demonstration and social transformation are distinct yet not separate tasks, that their taking on new ways is also a social transformation. Because they grow rice not just for technical demonstration, but as part and parcel of their barangay lives, the purpose of these new ways is to liberate tenants and small owner-tillers from poverty and oppression. Combining the technical and the social in one experiment calls for fine understanding and gentle flexibility on the part of the one organizing. Laurie Sewell had those qualities. Accordingly, in the first year of the FA program, in order (1) to give very high probability to the learning on the part of both the FMT and the farmers, (2) to lessen the risk of participation, and (3) to ensure that the fledgling FA would learn how to fly, for a whole season one FMT worked with one farmer, instead of the usual ratio of one FMT per 250 farmers. The cooperating farmer was chosen by fellow farmers in the barangay. Quality FMTs were selected by extension personnel within the MOA. The FA program began with twenty farmers and twenty FMTs in twenty barangay in different parts of the province. During this first year participating farmers from around the province gathered several times to discuss their common and divergent experiences. Such meetings were financed by NSIRDTP. Likewise the participating FMTs gathered monthly at the MOA. MOA supervisors of the FMTs and personnel from the agriculture section of NSIRDTP visited participating barangay regularly.
Of course the 'one-on-one' of farmer and FMT was not done in isolation. Other farmers in the same barangay and from contiguous barangay were invited throughout the season to see what was going on. So massive is the difference between high-yielding, fertilized, cared-for rice production and traditional methods that this technical and social experiment became a conversation piece in each location. During this initial year leader farmers from two contiguous barangay, from and chosen by the tenants and small owner-tillers, made special efforts to attend group discussion surrounding this 'one-on-one' situation, because they were to become leader farmers in their own barangay. In the second year the FMT continued with the original leader farmer and also with new leader farmers, working with them on their land. In turn these leader farmers became sources of advice and information about these new rice production methods to their fellow FA members. Initial grants of inputs to new participating farmers continued to come from NSIRDP. Calling the initial supply of inputs to farmers 'grants' is not quite accurate. However, this does not affect the point being made here about schemes of recurrence. To discuss it leads to analyzing the sufficiency or otherwise of the horizons of agencies involved in international development assistance.

In sum, then, in three years of relying on the high probabilities of learning and input supply and social organization built into the system, the number of operating Farmers Associations increased to around 120. Of the some 550 barangay in the province, about 350 are directly engaged in rice production as their main source of livelihood and income. A 30% penetration is high, probably high enough to allow the system to roll over on its own momentum.

On the social side of this experiment in development, distinguish three matters. While individual farmers work the land and use the inputs, what social advantages accrue if the initial grant is to the FA and not to the individual farmer? Only tenants and small owner-tillers may be members of a Farmers Association. But tenants are living and working on the landlord's land. What are landlords doing while FAs are emerging and consolidating? A rapid increase in the number of FAs does not imply that all are working with equal quality. What steps can be taken to ensure the quality of FAs? To ensure that their relation to each other is not random? Randomness would undermine the social dimensions of this experiment in development.
Technological changes impinge on all values in a barangay

Inputs given to farmers belonged to the Farmers Association. To own material items the FAs have to have legal identity, a management committee, and a bank account. What seemed a simple change in the techniques of growing rice suddenly is ramifying into social values as both economic and political, and is initiating changes in cultural values. Tenants previously had legal and cultural identity only as tenants of this landlord. The Farmers Association cuts right through that obsolete social and cultural structure. Tenants in their poverty and indebtedness to the landlord had economic identity only as serfs of the landlord. But, while FA tenants remain tenants and still in debt, the Farmers Association puts alongside this a new source of income that gives the tenant a beginning of economic independence, instead of mere dependence. Living at subsistence level means no savings, and so no need for a bank account. Living within the horizon of serfdom means obeying and so no need for a committee to discuss common actions.Achieving a measure of economic independence as a group leads to a legal, financial, and ministerial separateness from the landlord. It is easy to see that these changes work upwards to call farmers' cultural subordination into question. All these changes entail learning. Those which are agricultural the FMT handles. Other matters to be learned are differently technical and cultural. Who is going to teach about these matters? This is discussed below in the section on FAs and the integral scale of values.

Inputs given to farmers belong to the Farmers Association, not to the individual farmer. Each farmer borrows inputs from her Association and is obliged to repay. A small interest rate of 10% for the season is charged. Social pressure from other farmers enhances the likelihood of repayment. FAs are granted or buy inputs at wholesale prices and allocate them to members at retail prices. In this and in other ways the FA is able slowly to build up some capital. There are two reasons for granting inputs to the FA and not to the individual. First, there is the cultural insight that community and family are prior to the individual. (Consultants, who were mired in their normative notion of individual, and associated with another part of the NSIRDGP agricultural program, sought to approach individuals in barangay, splitting the
barangay. Farmers complained of these attempts.) The second reason is that the Farmers Association is also a social experiment and so rice production is a lower level manifold put in place to raise the probability of emergence and operation of new, higher-level social schemes of recurrence. This point will become clearer in discussion of the structure of the human good and levels of value.

**Expansion of farmers associations**

The problem of expanding the FA to include all tenant and small farmers in the barangay was not addressed sufficiently by NSIRDLP or the MOA. As the FA built up capital it was in the position to invite one more farm family to join the FA and to provide that family with an initial set of inputs. The cost of doing this is not as great as the initial grant from the project to FA farmers. Several items needed in rice production are held in common: steel plows, sprayers, hand tools, a thresher, a godown (warehouse), and a cement slab for grain drying. These items were rented to each farmer at a nominal fee covering repair, replacement, and a small profit. Some discussions occurred of the possibility of the FA or maybe a group of landless families who would be part of the FA being granted several carabao, which they would rent to other FA members for plowing. Within several months of their formation, the social cohesion of some FAs was already strong enough to permit discussion of differentiation of roles and tasks within the FA. As far as I remember, this carabao scheme foundered in the tensions arising out of the other animal schemes mentioned above. Probabilities were against this scheme on account of a lack located more in persons than in technical, non-human, material factors.

**Landlords, tenants, and interest rates—moving towards cooperation**

The activity of the Farmers Associations was not carried on in conflict with landlords. Their cooperation was sought and acquired, chiefly because they too benefit. Land, labor, seed, and carabao-power for land preparation are the four traditional elements in Northern Samar rice growing and any production is split four ways, one portion for each input.
Some measure of the traditional bondage of tenant can be seen from the following figures. In an old-style landlord-tenant situation, the landlord owns the land, often supplying the carabao and sometimes the inputs. When a tenant does not have seed, the landlord supplies one bag against repayment of three bags when harvest is taken four months later. If the tenant needs cash, ever in short supply, for food, weddings, medicine, or the like, the landlord will lend at a modest 200% interest. When a tenant provides labor and seed, and the landlord provides land and carabao, at harvest time the yield is divided fifty-fifty. In most cases the landlord has inherited his assets, while the tenants inherited their poverty. When yield is only 25 cavans (1250 kg. per hectare) and the average rice field area per family is 2.0 ha. (the remainder being upland, usually under coconuts), this leaves a tenant family of six persons with 1250 Kg. of unmilled rice, which is 570 g. of unmilled or 456 g. of milled rice per person per day. This is subsistence level. But some of the tenant's portion has to be sold for cash, to repay landlords for other loans, to buy other necessary and household items. Some income is derived from copra, also to be shared with the landlord. In 1983-84 rainfall was inadequate in Northern Samar and rice yields went down to 14 cavans in many barangay. The landlord took his half. Tenant farmers cannot believe that loans can be had for a mere 20% per annum. A 1982 World Bank study shows that loans taken from banks had an effective interest rate of 36%. To get bank loans collateral is needed. The tenant, landless and ever in debt, has no collateral.

Landlords are aware of low productivity in province rice production and that large increases are possible. However, quite reasonably, they will not jeopardize the well being of their own families, lest everyone will live in poverty. New technology is needed. The technology is introduced through the FA, which, besides aiming at increased rice production, also and more basically aims at social amelioration. When modern technology is used, rice output is projected to increase from 25 cavans to 75 cavans per hectare. These high levels are obtained
by farmers in their FAs. These increased yields are divided as follows. In the barangay the average of what each field yields traditionally, before using modern agriculture, is well known. This amount continues to be divided fifty-fifty, while the increase is divided so that 25% goes to the landlord and 75% to the tenant. Such division of extra yield is within traditional expectations, since it is the tenant who is supplying three of the four major production factors. Written agreements were obtained by each FA from respective landlords and were posted in the barangay. The expected yield of 75 cavans thus divides into two lots: the traditional 25 cavans and an extra 50 cavans. In this new situation the landlord gets 12.5 plus 12.5, while the tenant gets 12.5 plus 37.5 cavans per hectare. The landlord is happy since his income doubles at no risk to him. The tenant is ecstatic since he can now feed his family. The tenant also has more cash to spend at the local sari-sari store, often owned by a poorer family, and at the stores in town, usually owned by wealthier families. The economy of the area begins to shift a little and new work can be added to meet this extra demand. Some landlords, upon seeing the extra yields, wanted to renege on their agreements. Pressure from adamant tenants and fellow landlords, causing loss of face, led these walang hiya people to honor their commitments. At root there is cooperation between tenant and landlord, because the legitimate claims of both groups were met. A negative context of poverty and oppression has, in part, been turned round. Had a conflict method been used, landlords probably would have come down heavily on farmers. The security problem in the province lends easy credence to any action repressing attempts to bring about change through conflict. Probabilities were built into the system to increase mutual benefit, cooperation, and eventual interdependence of all persons in barangay, since Laurie Sewell had analyzed well all the elements constituting the classical intelligibility of the schemes. By setting up schemes to give tenants purchase over their own lives at the level of vital values (more to eat), and at the level of social values as technological and economic, conditions are being set for a further emergence of tenants as responsible members of their barangay.

The changes brought about by the Farmers Associations are substantial both for tenant and landlord. However, these changes are only a beginning. Landlords remain landlords and tenants remain tenants. Landlords and moneylenders still charge usurious interest rates. Land-
lords base their identity on being lords of many tenants. Cultural horizons remain compact, although perhaps showing a few signs of differentiation. Were the tenants not tenants but small landowners, then through using modern rice technology they would be able to produce enough to repay the loan to their FA, pay some debts to the money lenders, live a little better, and still have enough cash next season to purchase inputs directly, without taking a loan. Farmers Associations would then have sufficient capital to invite other eligible families in the barangay to join the FA and supply them with a loan for the initial batch of inputs. Economic activity in the province would expand more quickly.

Note that I am not proposing the obsolete view that economic development originates in rural areas before it does in cities, a view well demolished by Jane Jacobs. All the items farmers need to get rice production up are derived from city industries or basic research. All of their schemes of recurrence involve cities as commercial and industrial centers. A combination of city and rural development is needed in Northern Samar. City development would be financed by the wealthier families in the province. They could raise money by selling off some of their land to tenants. But the probabilities of the landlords selling their lands to tenants are minimal indeed. Land reform legislation exists but has not yet been implemented in Northern Samar. Landlords alienating their land to tenants, as required by this legislation, can get the whole value of their land in one amount through a government bank's assuming the loan with tenants repaying the bank. But while this is possible, it is not probable, for many obstacles remain. Neither landlords nor NSIRD can alter the general feeling towards the instability of the Philippine state and economy. While that instability continues, the wise person hangs on to a piece of farm land. If schemes of recurrence break down through political chaos or war, cities become human deserts, and so at least one can move back to the land. Also the peso can lose value rapidly as the economy falters and the IMF imposes devaluation on the country. Again, with underdeveloped transport and communication, alternative investments are hard to find for capital gained from transferring land to tenants. Further major obstacles remain outside the control of any groups in the province. They are part of current Filipino history.
Several points pertaining to understanding landlords should be made. To begin with, the Farmers Associations are schemes of recurrence set within broader, more complex, less immediately controllable contexts of schemes of recurrence. Hence there is a limit to what the FAs can achieve. But that limit is known only in surpassing current operations and activities, as discussed in the next section on emergent probability. Again, landlords too have limited options. But they can do far more for more rapid economic development than any other groups in the province. The well being of all, as both limited and capable of doing more, is achieved by the cooperation of landlords with other groups. There is still the task of assisting the landlord to see new possibilities, within their limits, just as the FAs assist farmers to see their new possibilities. Finally, NSIRDP did not identify all the pertinent schemes of recurrence bearing upon the rural development. Several consultants, Filipino and Australian, did not understand the social transforming dimensions of the FAs. Again, none of us understood Jane Jacobs' point about the primacy of city development as preparatory for rural development. Furthermore, some designers of NSIRDP were perhaps motivated by a naïve option of working with poor people, coupled with a rejection of rich persons as somewhat inhuman; but this rejection is partly based on the failure to understand that the social structures now oppressive in the province might once have been a reasonable solution to a problem of very low productivity.

But all learning is a self-correcting process, and obviously much learning is involved both in understanding all the pertinent schemes of recurrence involved in province development and in implementing projects and associated programs. To assist others to learn is to teach. Who are they to be the teachers in these matters? The human good is always concrete and so composed of schemes of recurrence. When one understands that these schemes of recurrence are operating at different levels of values, it may be that different teachers are required for different particular ends.

FAs, the Area Marketing Cooperative, and emergent probability

When the number of Farmers Associations increased rapidly it was expected that some would operate better than others. Here I am concerned with interaction between FAs. If contact between FAs is random
or infrequent, the probability of survival of an FA becomes quite low. In general, any small number of newly emerged entities will find the environment not overly conducive to their survival. As the number of these entities increases, their presence and operation alters the probabilities of the environment in favor of the survival of these entities as a group. Probability normally applies to series or groups rather than to individual instances. Accordingly, we do not speak of the probability of survival and development of a single FA, but point to the characteristic sorts of activities, needed if a new FA is to emerge, develop, survive, and generate others. The probability of groups of FAs surviving and operating well is enhanced if a supervening, sublating organization can order some of the elements in the environment surrounding the FAs in their favor.

If I remember correctly, Laurie Sewell was initiating the Farmers Associations in the province in 1980 and 1981. While other consultants lived in Manila and commuted a couple of days a week to the province, he lived alone in the province. During 1982 Laurie was elsewhere and the work was continued by his colleague, Bob Middleton, of MWA International, also an old Papua New Guinea hand. Whereas Laurie carefully kept probabilities high by proceeding slowly, building up each FA and their FMT, Bob proceeded more swiftly, perhaps somewhat more roughly, lowering by a fair margin the probabilities of Farmers Associations really taking off. Bob expanded the numbers of FAs rapidly. When Laurie returned in May 1983 it was pretty clear that consolidation of existing FAs, as well as initiating new ones, was needed. In particular the schemes of recurrence connected with the supply of inputs was underdeveloped. Unless farmers get inputs on time, the scheme collapses, since the weather is reluctant to wait. A first step towards consolidation was to ensure that the FMTs understood clearly both the technical and the social aspects of the program. More attention was paid to regular FMT classes. Often, given the overall state of the country's economy, FMTs' salaries were late. Part of keeping the FMTs capable of being interested in their work was to have discussion at the regional level (there are twelve regions in the Philippines), seeking more regular remittance of Treasury checks to the province. An addition to FMT income from NSIRD funds was considered. I do not know what happened there. A second step was the allocation of motor bikes to FMTs so that they could get round their barangay more quickly, easily,
and regularly. Most barangay are not accessible by car. (Of course schemes of maintenance and repair of motor bikes had to be set up.) A third step was to bring members of Farmers Associations from three or four municipalities together in their own districts, so that they could swap information. At each of these four-day sessions speakers were invited to teach farmers on specific issues: crops, cooperatives, bank accounts, legal matters. Farmer leaders also spoke. Besides formal sessions and informal chatting, evening celebrations were important. Fiesta and festivity are integral to farmers' liberation. Underlying all such meetings is the intention of shifting probabilities in favor of tenants and small owner tillers gaining a corporate identity, as well as being productive farmers. As these FAs operate and improve, so they change the environment of their respective barangay and of the province collectively. Perhaps a number of quality FAs form a critical mass as they begin desiring to act, acting, questioning, and finding some answers that call for a higher level of sublating organization. So in Northern Samar farmers wanted to do things beyond the scope of individual Farmers Associations.

A fourth critical step

Besides raising the probability of (numerically) individual FAs operating efficiently both technically and socially, the task remains of raising probabilities of FAs as a movement in the province acting wisely for good and for the well being of all province communities. As the farmers discuss their various hopes, tasks, and problems, they begin to ask questions that from the viewpoint of Farmer Associations are merely coincidental. 'Wouldn't it be good if we farmers could have a reliable supply of inputs!' This aspiration is beyond the competence of the farmer's FA. The scheme of recurrence constituting the FA briefly impinges on, but does not make, the scheme of recurrence constituting the input supply for the overall agricultural process. One Farmers Association cannot set up the scheme of recurrence needed to ensure a supply of inputs for its own farming. Likewise a single FA cannot set up schemes to ensure that the marketing of their crop returns more money to those who grew the crop, rather than to the middleman (who is often related to the landlord and the moneylender). When a number of FAs begin to raise these questions a lower level coincidental manifold of
intent arises that needs a higher principle of organization to make its realization probable. Given the moribund state of Cooperatives in the province, it is unlikely that farmers would conceive of structure permitting them to get this higher level organization as a joint venture. Given the fact that farmers in FAs are still bound by the cultural value of considering themselves merely as little people, it is unlikely farmers will muster the expertise to set up and manage an agricultural supply and marketing organization. Nor can they finance the required infrastructure—warehouse, office, truck. Without such a scheme to supply inputs and to market the crop the FAs cannot continue to function. From the viewpoint of FAs, the situation is unresolvable.

According to the heuristic structure of operator and integrator in development, a number of points can be made about the needed higher-level organization before it is specified. This higher level is not to take over the functions that are proper to the FAs within the FAs in individual barangay, such as deciding when to plant, how to plant, what patterns of cooperation within the FA are chosen, and what activities besides rice production the FA may engage in. One super province-wide Farmers Association would destroy the main strength of the FAs: that each is grounded in the natural community of the barangay. In practice, such a province-wide organization would become a super-landlord. Those who design such super groupings tend to be individuals who themselves think only in terms of so-called normative individuals. Nor do they understand the notion of sublation by which a higher principle provides a more richly ordered context for the operation of lower-level elements without interfering in the operations proper to that lower level (e.g., individual cells in a multicellular organism). As the richer context provided by the higher level of ordering is exploited by distinct lower-level associations, development and differentiation of the lower distinct associations occur in a manner that cannot occur without the environing operation of the higher context (e.g., organs differentiated within an animal). As the lower distinct associations develop and differentiate they raise questions and perform activities that from the viewpoint of a particular lower association are purely coincidental and so set the possibility of modification of the higher principle of ordering. To get a higher principle of order functioning, prior proportionate development of lower levels is needed. This is development from below.
Because we are considering systems set up by acting women and men, however, there is also development from above. In terms of the integral scale of values, refined authentic development may occur at religious, personal, and cultural levels, so that in fact the upper level context has potentialities of enriching lower level operations, although these may also remain potential for want of proportionate lower-level development. Once lower-level probabilities are shifted and raised, a swift, desired, accepted, welcomed change for the good in society can occur rapidly. Potency has been actualized. In the interaction of development from above and development from below, and especially where the absolutely supernatural solution to the problem of evil is operating well, perhaps it is lower level development that is most limiting.

The initial expansion of lower-level associations may seem to be merely quantitative, but such expansion may also be a condition for the emergence of the higher principle. For one who understands the interaction between operator and integrator, however, the horizontal and vertical functions of careful (i.e., ever attentive to quality of association) quantitative expansion of associations, can be quite clear, while to others it remains a confusing process.

Besides identifying positive elements to be put in place, negative elements in the current situation needed to be identified by inverse insight and displaced—either (1) directly, by implementing positive elements where the negative is primarily something not yet done, or else simply a matter of underdevelopment; or (2) indirectly, by establishing defensive circles where the negative element is development blocked by oppression.

An Area Marketing Cooperative (AMC), owned by farmers for farmers in their FAs is such a higher-level principle of order sublating Farmers Associations. This higher principle is not and cannot be independent of the underlying manifolds. Accordingly, by specifying those tasks to be fulfilled beyond the scope of, but necessary for the continued operation of individual FAs, the needed form of the higher-level organization can be delineated. To permit the technical rice production of the Farmers Associations to keep functioning, organizing the supply of input is necessary. Moreover, the AMC needs income to cover the cost of its operations, to purchase inputs, to organize other activities on behalf of farmers (such as provincial Farmers Associations Conferences) and to
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initiate new Associations, now funded by NSIRDIP. Only a small, insufficient income can be made from dues paid by the FAs and through an input supply charge; to get sufficient income the AMC needs to operate as a marketing agency for FA crops.

Major benefits accrue to farmers if marketing can be organized in their favor. Traditionally, at harvest time, the tenant piles the crop on the drying floor, and together landlord and tenant split the bagged rice into their shares. Often present at this division, cash in hand, is the marketing middleman. Always short of cash, the tenant usually takes the low price offered for some bags of the undried, unmilled rice. The middleman carts away the crop, the landlord makes off with his or her lot, the tenants pay some cash debts at the local store, pay the landlord, and have a few pesos and a few bags of rice left, insufficient for their own home consumption during the year. Kadiwa is now the government controlled rice collection, drying, milling, and marketing organization. It pays a premium of P10 (I believe) per cavan (50 kg.) of rice, if farmers dry the rice (which has to be dried so it does not rot in storage) instead of Kadiwa having to do this task. If the AMC purchases undried rice from FAs at a price above the middleman’s, dries it at the AMC warehouse before selling it to Kadiwa, and deals in several thousand cavans per season, considerable income is possible. As a bonus, in order to facilitate its own work, Kadiwa would loan the AMC drying equipment and expertise. Once started, tested, and functioning, the AMC would generate considerable investment funds and share dividends for member FAs. The problem is how to get this started—how to ensure supply of inputs and to organize marketing on behalf of farmers. Opposition comes, of course, from current marketing middlemen, who usually are part of the landlord/moneylender complex. Strong social and financial pressure can be applied indirectly to individual tenants. To maintain the social cohesion and corporate identity as strength against such pressure, it is essential that the AMC should sublate rather than take over the FAs.

When farmers from the FAs got together they raised questions about the need for something like an AMC, without being clear as to what form it would take. The clarity of the need and the uncertainty about the form of higher principle are expected, for the lower context as lower does not have the horizon to specify something that is intrinsically more comprehensive than its horizon. But the identity of
farmers as women and men is more comprehensive than their identity as members of FAs. Accordingly, they have the potential to conceive, design, form, and operate a higher-level sublating organization such as an AMC. Doing so, however, requires skills and resources that farmers currently do not have. Moreover, if a private company were to set up input supply and marketing, certain tasks necessary to the continuing functioning of the FAs would be done, but that organization would not belong to the farmers and would not necessarily always work on their behalf. Indeed, persons with the resources to set up such a private company probably are members of the landlord, moneylender, politically influential group, who only very slowly are learning to shift probabilities to serve the well being of tenants and small owner-tillers, as well as themselves. To assist a private company to emerge and operate may be to treat the FAs merely as a technical rice producing experiment. It would forget, deny, or dismiss the equally fundamental social dimension constructed into the Farmers Associations.

Laurie Sewell understood these points well. Especially this point: were the AMC to take over rather than sublate the FAs, farmers would relate individually to the AMC and all social cohesion and social strength in barangay would be lost. The probabilities of escaping poverty and oppression are stacked against the individual as individual. A cohesive group has a far better potential. So Laurie contacted the Center for Small Scale Business at the Divine Word University at Tacloban on Leyte Island (some twelve hours' driving and sixteen hours' busing from Catarman, when the roads are good). Bien and Roy are respectively the director and deputy director of the CSSI. They were charged with and contracted for the task of setting up, in consultation with farmers, the FA farmers' AMC to supply farmers with inputs; to get into marketing and drying of crops, rice first, and then others; to train farmers in what to expect of the AMC and what their responsibilities would be to and for the AMC; and to form a management cadre that after five years could take over the running of the AMC. The Board of Directors included representatives chosen by farmers from among FA members, with CSSI, Ministry of Agriculture, local friendly businessmen, and an attorney as advisers.

In short, financed initially through NSIRD, a higher-level organization was set up, somewhat improbably since the probabilities of FAs themselves actually setting up the AMC were negligible. By having
an outside group, such as NSIRDIP, lift probabilities high enough for the thing actually to occur, the great numbers and long times associated with development from below were circumvented. If the probability of emergence of the AMC was low, once it is in place and has been tutored to function well by Bien and Roy, its probability of survival rises as FAs learn to use and sustain their own higher-level organization.

Creative tension between the operation of the AMC and the operation of individual FAs remains. Such creative tension is intrinsic to sublation. The notions of horizontal finality and vertical finality are pertinent here. Each FA has its own horizontal finality. Once the AMC is operating, each FA also has a vertical finality as a member of the AMC. Both the AMC and the FA would be destroyed if the AMC were to take over the horizontal finality roles of the FA. It is essential to the AMC that it remains in a vertical finality tension with each FA. 4

Understanding the meaning of statistical law has a liberating dimension. A key insight in statistics is that, in the absence of any identifiable systematic intervention, nothing is to be understood in the divergence of actual situations from estimated probabilities. Accordingly, in our project work we have an expectation that the actual situation will not always go as planned. So despair does not enter when the probable and the actual seem distant relations. When it does not rain and the crop withers or when floods sweep rice seedlings out to sea, one is disappointed since hard work has not borne fruit. One shrugs and plants again, using a quicker-maturing rice variety on the supposition that the season will tend back to its average. Again, when the planned and the actual are pretty much the same one is pleased but not proud, since the insight is spelled out in the probabilities and not in any one concrete situation.

Many (some consultants and aid administrators come to mind) do not understand the nature of statistical law. Unless everything occurs exactly as planned a project is said to be failing. Such an attitude is more common among engineers, especially civil engineers, who are trained to work with sub-biological tools in pre-social situations: that is, with systems that do not develop. Reading Lonergan on things (Insight, 264) and on development (451 f.) leads one to anticipate such an attitude among some people.

In summary, development of the province of Northern Samar cannot be done well without understanding schemes of recurrence. When they are
understood, one may oscillate between asking classical questions and statistical questions, about existing and projected situations. The 'What is going on here?' question is ever wedded to the 'How often does it occur?' question. In planning, one first outlines the classical elements of schemes and the hierarchy of schemes as they emerge. Next is the task of ascertaining probabilities of occurrence of each element and of the scheme as a whole and of sets of schemes; then to identify critical changes in probabilities that take hold of whole sets of other probabilities, lifting them high, so that certain schemes become most likely. Following Lonergan, we distinguish between probabilities of emergence and probabilities of survival. In the province itself, probabilities of emergence may be quite low, but once begun a scheme may function well. An outside body, such as the bilateral government project of NSIRDP, can enter the province and lift the probability of emergence of otherwise improbable yet desirable schemes, which, once functioning, will have a high probability of survival. Lower-level schemes tend to stagnate unless sublated by higher levels of order. Lower level schemes, being small in compass, are often easier to establish. It is higher-level, more comprehensive schemes of recurrence that often have lower probabilities of emergence. In considering schemes of recurrence in the province, three matters are kept in mind: (1) it is the families and communities of the province who are the prime agents and consultors in development, not foreign consultants; (2) human freedom is authorized most in situations of cooperation, not of conflict; (3) while the foreigners in a temporary project are operating a scheme, a project may have a high probability of emergence, but it may also have zero probability of survival.

C. Farmers Associations and the Structure of the Human Good

It is good that all families and communities in the province of Northern Samar should become free from poverty and oppression, that disease and hunger, conflict and human brutality should disappear except as ancestral memories. Farmers Associations have the double function of eliminating these material and spiritual ills. Doing good is shifting probabilities in favor of schemes more conducive to the well being of communities. Understanding Lonergan's structure of the human good may
help us order schemes and set up probabilities. The following diagram of the structure of the human good is from *Method in Theology*, page 48.

### Structure of the Human Good

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Potentiality</th>
<th>Actuation</th>
<th>Social</th>
<th>Ends</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>capacity, need</td>
<td>operation</td>
<td>cooperation</td>
<td>particular good</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>plasticity,</td>
<td>development,</td>
<td>institution,</td>
<td>good of order</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>perfectibility</td>
<td>skill</td>
<td>role, task</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>liberty</td>
<td>orientation,</td>
<td>personal</td>
<td>terminal value</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>conversion</td>
<td>relations</td>
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</table>

A few preliminary points are in order. The two middle columns, the actuation of individual social good, are acts. Human good is always both concrete and at once individual and social. Operations of the individual are almost always cooperations. By development is primarily meant intellectual, not biological, development. Here development means persons moving from the world of immediacy into the world mediated by meaning and motivated by value. Within the latter world one asks and answers questions, attains higher viewpoints; one becomes differentiated, forms individual habits of mind and of body. Skills are those achievements of women and men that are not directly moral: how to use a hoe, ride a motor bike, bathe the baby. Institutions are already understood and agreed upon ways of acting. In his education lectures, Lonergan speaks of institutions as public habits, paralleling individual habits. The role of being a farmer divides into many tasks. Roles are always in society and related to each other: a farmer is related to the shopkeeper is related to the banker is related to the agrochemical industry. Tasks may be the common ones: plowing, planting, weeding, harvesting, record keeping, etc. Personal relations may have all the nuances and complexity found in Filipino values as discussed above, embracing all patterns of friendship. The fourth column lists ends, or results, brought about by the acts of individuals together, making society a place of values or disvalues. What values are active in society is known only through the good of order actually manifest in
that society. In turn, the good of order is known by insight into how particular goods are related to each other, not just technologically, but as products of human choice. The first column considers the possibilities, out of which acts are done, found in individual women and men of the society. Liberty is included because all human good is finite. Liberty is human potency. Plasticity and perfectibility are potencies for ordering groups of capacities that have to come into act to fulfill a need. Needs exist only in the context of capacities. Without a prior capacity needs can not be met.

The diagram can also be read horizontally, as Lonergan does in Method in Theology. Because individuals have needs, they activate capacities by operating in a context of cooperation, to attain particular goods that satisfy the need. Groups of capacities can be developed so that individual and collective ways of acting become habitual—filling the roles and doing the tasks, generating institutions that correctly yield the good of order that is required to ensure the recurrence of those particular goods. Any particular good of order is finite, subject to criticism, and so the individual is essentially, albeit not always effectively, free. Within this liberty the individual can continue to develop the way she is, since this orientation is good, or undergo conversion because she has been freed and made capable of turning to more human ways. When development and skills are sustained in the same orientation, or modified in conversion, the individual moves beyond cooperation, beyond the routines of institutions, into the restfulness of personal relations, the friendships that result in a society possessing and manifesting these or those values. Northern Samar is made by men and women acting. It will possess the intelligibility and goodness that they put into it, no more and no less.

The structure of the human good is transhistorical and transcultural. It is found in groups of men and women, whatever their level of development. One does not assemble the elements in the human good one by one. Thus, one does not operate and then add cooperation: operations occur in the context of cooperations, since it is next to impossible to act without using something or some knowledge formed by someone else. The elements in the structure of the human good are related internally. Take one away and the structure collapses. Wrongly minimize one element and the structure is distorted. Each element virtually includes all the others. The structure of the human good is a set of functional relations.
Moreover, the human good is always concrete. In the structure of the human good, the bottom row of the diagram correlates with judgments of value, the middle row with understandings of value, and the top row of capacity to particular good with experience of value. The bottom row correlates with the level of cultural values; the middle row with social values, as political, economic, technological goods of orders; and the top row with vital values.

**Producing rice is an instance of doing human good**

Farmers in Northern Samar need more food. Ample evidence of this need has been presented above. As the Northern Samareños are adult women and men they have the capacity to act. So a farmer plants rice: that is an operation. She does so with other farmers who are her fellow workers. She does not work her fields alone, but in a group who work each other's fields in rotation. This is a more efficient method. If the weather cooperates and the farmers work diligently they get the particular good desired: the need is fulfilled by harvesting rice. Working together is not a set of routines they have to learn every year. As children, the boys and girls of the barangay worked in the fields alongside their parents, slowly shaping and refining their undifferentiated capacities until they became expert at handling carabao, planting rice, and in understanding what to do when, as each season wandered around its mean of wetness and dryness. Among the adults, the routines are already understood and agreed upon. Growing rice traditionally has its institutional ways and means. Men and women have different roles and tasks in this process. When the rains come, men drive a mob of carabao round and round the field using the traditional payatak method, for pushing weeds into the mud and making a slurry for the seedlings. The women carry seedlings to the field and plant them in a random pattern. How all this fits together in each season produces the good of order. The institutions are the same in many barangay: what actually happens, the actual good of order, differs markedly among barangay. Traditionally that was all that was done to achieve their particular good. The community waited for harvest. No HYV seeds were used, no weeding was done, no fertilizer added, no insect control attempted. Water control was minimal. Weeds and rice heads were separated at harvest time. Traditional yields are low. So only part of the need is
satisfied. Families lose weight between seasons. Moreover, alternative actuations of the human good, that is, alternative means of getting income, are not plentiful in rural barangay.

Now, because we know the structure of the human good, we know what to attend to in striving to bring about a richer version of the human good. When new HYV and associated technologies for growing rice are being introduced, the social steps are clear. Part of the need is recurrent: to get enough rice output. A new dimension of need is opened up: the possibility of social liberation from oppression by landlords. The human capacities are always there, but now new ones are called forth. Besides the capacity to operate and cooperate in growing rice, as a Farmers Association is formed in each barangay, the capacity for self-determination, for decision, for boldness, for a new vision of themselves as women and men, is elicited. Further capacities are demanded and revealed as the Area Marketing Cooperative sublates the FAs. Again, when new technologies are introduced, new operations and cooperations are required. Plowing in place of payatak, straight-line planting instead of random spacing, weeding, placement of fertilizer near but not on plants, spraying against bugs, accurate water control, and so on—all of these many operations and cooperations have not done before, and all of them the farmers must learn.

The FMT is their teacher. (Social teaching is another task, not done by the FMT.) The purpose is practical, to get the particular good of more rice. Learning and teaching will be both theoretical and practical, the former as ground of the latter. So farmers' capacities are molded and developed as they get the needed skills and come to understand what they are doing. The new ways of growing rice demand new routines. Cooperation cannot be on a hit-or-miss basis if the particular good is to be achieved. The new development and new skills in a context of cooperation become public habits, that is, they are institutionalized. The roles and tasks are also new. Men do the plowing, the spraying, some of the weeding. Women continue to do the transplanting of seedlings (but now in straight lines) and they distribute fertilizer. Some in the FA are responsible for making sure that inputs are on time, others for making sure the sprayers work and the plow gets cleaned so it does not rust. An instance of institutionalized and demanded cooperation is in spraying the bugs. Wise bugs are willing to vacation on a neighboring field while their own is sprayed, but always ready to return
home well fed and vigorous. Wise human beings beat smart bugs by spraying each field systematically so that no haven remains. Any farmer who reneges on insect control risks the wrath of his fellow FA members. A second instance of institutionalization of new tasks and cooperation is the maintaining and regulating of water flows from field to field, necessary because rain falls intermittently. Rice needs different levels of standing, yet flowing, water at different stages of its growth. If farmers do not get together on this, and cannot trust each other to adhere to their agreement, some rice fields will be badly damaged.

Again, how all this newly institutionalized cooperation actually pans out is the good of order as produced by women and men in that barangay. Where the good of order in an FA was the careful product of operation, development, skills, cooperation, institutions, roles, tasks, there the quantity of rice produced increased three or four times. A gentle farmer near Salhag got still higher yields.

The third row in the structure of the human good was evident in many barangay, more in the social dimension of the FAs than in their technical efforts at rice production. After the day's work, and after finishing their technical, task-oriented conversation with the FMT and an occasional subject-matter specialist, the farmers used to remain in a group, no longer caught up technically, but now as friends resting, chatting, celebrating together. In their friendships they expressed the new values the FA was putting into the barangay: cooperation in place of oppression, a better standard of living for all in place of poverty, concern rather than disregard. Their personal relations became a judgment on and disciplining of the way they cooperated institutionally. Conversation at these get-togethers ranged far and wide, rarely (given the local situation) on political matters, frequently on their desire for the education and further well-being of their families. Not that they were always serious; jokes and playfulness were common, and coconut wine, a potent brew, added to quiet festivity. At this level of personal relations, any member of the FA who was finding difficulty with the institutionalized discipline of collaboration, would be drawn into the camaraderie, which would orient him into friendship, and through friendship into an acceptance of the discipline of the FA, thus promoting a good of order that serves them all. Landlords were welcome at these meetings. Nothing was kept secret—why do so? There was nothing
to keep secret. And anyway the politico-military situation in the province made any such attempts quite inadvisable. At root, the farmers are essentially free, and through the intervention of Laurie Sewell in NSIRD and the formation of the FAs, probabilities of their effective freedom were raised. As free they were able to venture on the new ways opened by the FAs and new technology. As free they are less bound by the horizon of the landlord.

As farmers celebrated together, it became evident that memory and ritual are central to liberty. Farmers began to speak of years past, of hurt done them, of hurt they had done, of aspirations and expectations. Under martial law and while the farmers were still bonded within a cultural horizon set up by landlords, it was not safe to speak of one's thirst for justice. In their emerging rituals, FAs are setting forth new symbols of their identity. The rituals are their rituals, not imposed by the state or ambiguous culture. It seems to me that the 'Dangerous Memory' to which Johann Baptist Metz has been drawing our attention ties into the structure of human good through the potentiality, liberty. As a friend remarked, however, the good Metz has not yet linked his project with the other two rows of the structure of the human good.

**Good of order is different from institutions**

The difference between institutions and the good of order is brought out clearly in four instances. Each FA has the same structure and the same twofold technical and social purpose. President, secretary, treasurer, and committee members in each FA are elected. All FA members are entitled to and do attend any FA meeting. Each barangay has its own FA, so there is no cross-barangay tension within an FA. All have the same institutional form. All are composed of tenants and small owner-tillers. How each group used this common form is a different story. Some took the common structure and went boldly ahead, using it as a holding company for many enterprises. Others seemed not to use even the rice producing capacities of the FA institution. At Makiwalo, just down the road from our house near the University of the Eastern Philippines, FA members worked in the soda-pop warehouse each Saturday morning, pooling their wages in the FA bank account, in order to build up reserves to buy more inputs, so that they could take new families
Lonergan and Philippine Development

into their group. Again, towns on the eastern Pacific coast can be reached only by small boats from northern coastal towns, as there are no roads across the mountains to Gamay. One Pacific-side FA, besides growing rice, also collected abaca fibre and copra, which they shipped (in narrow twenty-foot outriggers with inboard engines) to warehouses in Laoang on the northern coast, and back-loaded milled rice, which they sold through their FA store, building up capital, self-reliance, dignity. Another FA on the west coast of the province had an FMT who, himself a landlord in another part of the province, was using the FA's money as a personal loan. This FA put up with this offence until, led through a discussion of what FAs are for, matters of justice and injustice, and other technical and value questions, they became timidly bold, and demanded their own FA bank book, which they received. In this example, the actual good of order generated by the FA as an institution and the values by which it operated changed for the better. A fourth instance is an FA in the Catubig valley with an excellent FMT, in this case a woman (many of the excellent FMTs are women), and a landlord not overly harsh. When, however, the floods came and washed away their crops, although new seeds and new inputs were available through NSIRDJP, an aura of hopelessness seemed to bind the farmers. It seemed to me they were poorer than other barangay. Perhaps their long experience of poverty is extenuating.

Differentiation of the human good

Farmers engaged in growing rice are related to the process in three ways and so three distinct levels of institution emerge. First, farmers are labor, part of the scheme of recurrence of seed, rainfall, soil, plant nutrients, weeding, and so on; and to produce rice they submit to their labor role in this scheme. Second, they are selectors of technology, making decisions concerning, for instance, what quantities of different fertilizers to use, in light of their assessment of local risks. They know there are limits on the technologies and the range within technologies that can be selected, if rice production is to proceed for all farmers in the FA. Third, they are economic managers, for the purpose of the FA and of growing rice, besides being an expression of cultural vision, is to make money in order to live with dignity. Each FA has its bank account. Cooperation between farmers is expected
regarding payment into the common account. Three elements in the structure of the human good—cooperation, institution, good of order—interplay at the levels of production, technology, economy. As each FA became more coherent, so each became a new element in the barangay to be noted and considered in barangay affairs.

In sum, the emergence of Farmers Associations altered the good of order at the level of social values. In some cases, having learned the skills of organization in the FA, and at rest in their friendships, and having gained a new vision of themselves as responsible human beings who can effectively and in liberty create their emerging well being, members of the FA stood for election to and became members of the barangay council. The council now could serve the well being of all barangay members, not merely the economically and politically influential. The same institutional form of the barangay council was now taken into a new political good of order. Differentiation of the human good at productive, technological, and economic levels was preparatory for political change.

The structure of the human good also illuminates the distinction between "programs" for change and a "movement" of change. While efforts at doing human good involve both institutions and personal relations, there can be varying degrees of reliance on different elements in the structure of the human good. Hence, I would say that "programs" arise out of the normative notion of individuals, while "movements" operate with persons. Let me spell out this contrast.

A program emphasizes the public, the formal, the institutional. Individuals cooperate through the institution to achieve the desired good of order. Frequent meetings are held to make sure that all are on track towards that order and the particular goods desired. If persons are also friends, that helps the program go forward, but it is not central. A program stresses bylaws, rules of membership, deadlines to meet. All ways and means are specified in advance. Flexibility is found in programs but only as planned from the beginning. Being single-minded with single intent, a program usually requires support of environing institutions and a space of action in the public sphere. When a regime removes a program's space of public action, curtailing its institutional form, the program usually collapses. Its welcoming environment is gone. Above we said that in the middle row in the structure of the human good (plasticity to institution and good of order)
correlates with the level of social values in the integral scale of values. Programs focus on the level of social values in their method.

Movements, on the other hand, are a basic exercise of liberty. When the personal relations of friendships are strong, women and men share common values. There is an element of resting (complacencia) in these shared values. Precisely because there is rest as a foundation, friends are able to live out utmost concern, operating very flexibly in all spheres of society. When institutional forms are needed and possible, they are taken up. The combination of strong personal relations and explicit institutional form is powerful for good in society, when the friendship is good or authentic. The very publicity of institutions is communicative meaning, teaching good. When institutional forms are not possible, under various regimes, the friends are more liable to continue their good work, because they implicitly maintain probabilities of cooperation in an everready state, awaiting better times. Friends in their movements are forgiving but have no delusions of innocence. Above we said that the row in the structure of the human good (liberty to terminal values) correlates with the level of cultural values in the integral scale of values. Movements focus the level of cultural values in their method; their content may come from any level of value.

Whereas programs are primarily social-political actions, movements are cultural actions. When a regime clamps down on the institutional structure of an authentic program, the men and women of the program are able to withdraw from the institutional form as a social public phenomenon into their personal relations as a cultural fact, recasting themselves as a movement. The regime is not able to curtail the goodness of these people, except by moving rapidly towards totalitarianism. But authentic movements are a bulwark against corrupting regimes. When in 1972 the Marcos regime cracked down on the Federation of Free Farmers, most leaders and farmer groups gave up their institutional structure, becoming a movement that still stirs minds and hearts into action. A couple of leaders sided with the regime in order to save the institutional form, hoping that it could be a public force for good. Not all hopes are realised.

Linking this distinction of program and movement with the integral scale of values exposes a dilemma found in Western countries. Movements are grounded in personal relations. Friendships need to be authentic if the movement is to spread quietly, enrapturing persons by
fire-full values. In societies where the highest value is vital values, the probability is very high that any movement will be based on a type of rapport between individuals that takes on a certain manic visage. Because these movements cannot last, individuals soon turn to programs. Programs in societies with only this criterion of value try to set up institutions so all-embracing that the people constituting the institution do not have to be good, do not have to be friends. Supposedly order can go ahead without basic consideration of values. But friendship cannot be sustained on this kind of rapport as based on sensitivity alone. Practical tasks keeping society functioning ever call individuals away from romantic movements.

My point is that programs within the horizon of all-embracing institutions are mistaken Western inventions that assume the erroneous normative notion of individual. They just will not work in Asia and Northern Samar where community and family and friendship are horizontal principles and the normative notion of individual has not taken hold. Perhaps, at root, the NSIRD program has this Western horizon. Countries in Asia, with fluid, subtle, and unspecified institutional forms relying more on word and honor than on contract, may have far more cultural and political flexibility than Western countries. This is what attorney-laden Westerners find when they try to do business in Japan and China. On the other hand, Asian nations have the added task of differentiating, moving out of their compactness, without upsetting the integral order of values as did Western states. In striving to bring about human good for all their peoples and to attain the differentiations pertinent to doing development, strong personal relations will be Asia's motivating strength.

Finally, in this section on Farmers Associations and the structure of the human good, is comment will be appropriate on the need to move from description to explanation if one is to understand and then do the human good. Lonergan's structure of the human good is an explanatory matrix. If it were merely descriptive it would not be transhistorical, transcultural, or a structure implicitly defined by internal relations. Any society is ambiguous, and Northern Samar too is experienced as a mixture of freedom and oppression, of well being and poverty, of good and bad, of wise elements and crazy elements. Sometimes one thinks that even the gods must be crazy. Understanding and responding to the mixture of good and evil in society and in oneself
will remain confused or in error, unless one moves to explanation. The inverse insights leading to statistical method and dialectical method are needed to understand the ambiguous heritage and contemporary scene of societies. For example, persons operating in descriptive horizons do not understand inverse insight. In their passionate concern for the well being of people they will ask questions such as: 'What are the causes of poverty and oppression?' As Jane Jacobs has pointed out, poverty has no cause. Poverty is development not yet done. Likewise oppression has no cause. Oppression is good not yet done. Inverse insights grasp that poverty and oppression are at root absences of reality. Thus, the oppressor is a divided (or as Lonergan would say, dialectical) reality, a coincidental manifold of contradictions. Since good and evil as contradictions cannot be grasped in one direct act of understanding, an understanding of either society or oneself is not possible unless it is complemented by inverse insights.

Persons operating in exclusively descriptive horizons tend to reify evil in their talk about systems of evil and evil people. If conflict is considered intrinsic to being human, conflicts between good and evil within the individual and between individuals becomes irreconcilable in principle. It follows that because it is good to fight evil, the oppressor or landlord or whatever may be killed with impunity. But who says who is an oppressor? The arbitrariness of power soon takes over. 'All pigs are equal, but some pigs are more equal than others.' Raw power is guaranteed to increase poverty and oppression. If people are reified into coincidental manifolds of good and evil, cooperation, either in the sense of harmony with oneself or in the sense of intelligently coordinated operations together with others, is impossible. By the same token, since power trying to dominate opaque situations comprised by coincidental manifolds of good and evil is the order of the day, true understandings of the goods of order and true judgments of value are deemed ever more irrelevant; and if this is so, the whole structure of the human good breaks down. Then a methodical way of doing good and overcoming evil gets increasingly improbable.

We have a hard time believing that persons who can explain rather than merely describe what is needed for the well being of their people may be grounded in a far profounder compassion than those who act only out of immediate passion. In reaching an explanatory understanding, both discipline of and reflection on one's feelings are required, so
that one can make true judgments of value arising from one's orientation to serve the welfare of others and not just to satisfy one's own desires.

Falling into the trap of reifying evil, I asked the bishop in the province if a certain landlord of some 200 tenants, whose conversation, parties, and cold beer I had enjoyed, was a bad man. No, replied the bishop; he understands the poverty of the tenants, but he knows no way of liberating them from being tenants that does not at the same time put his own family in jeopardy. The landlord is willing to change if someone will show him the way. The bishop understands this landlord's well-known oppression as good not yet done. Because evil involves a lack of intelligibility, new cooperation is still possible. I am as human as the landlord.

In no way are the consequences of good not yet done minimized by moving into the dispassionateness of explanation. Indeed the consequences of evil are understood more thoroughly and so can be felt with more horror. Lamentations over evil as intrinsic to human being soon end, since nothing can be done, and give way to cynicism or apathy. But to taste the absurdity of evil as good refused deepens lamentation. As Metz has said so often, a dangerous memory that remembers and laments over injustices done, and of justice not done to previous generations is exercise of human liberty. Actually, that one laments is a sign one is perhaps open to an explanatory understanding of the structure of the human good. Dealing with evil in the light of statistical law (Insight, 693) liberates one to ask the right questions about doing human good.

In short, Lonergan's structure of the human good is a question-generating matrix. Using it helps us generate questions that, as they are answered, let us get a practical handle on development of human good in places like Northern Samar.

D. The Integral Scale of Values and Levels of Learning

The men and women of Northern Samar live together in communities and families. Together they celebrate their fiestas. They worship together. In the Farmers Associations they are engaged in a technical and social experiment. Northern Samar is an existing society. It is a changing society. In his paper, 'The Human Good and Christian Conver-
Now to change one's standard of living in any notable fashion is to live in a different fashion. It presupposes a grasp of new ideas. If the ideas are to be above the level of currently successful advertising, serious education must be undertaken. Finally, coming to grasp what serious education realizes, and, nonetheless, coming to accept that challenge constitute the greatest challenge to the modern economy.

As we have seen above in various contexts, the farmers have much to learn about being and using their Farmers Associations to achieve a higher standard of living. An integral scale of values would help us sort out the types of serious learning that serve to bring about human good in the province. In *Method in Theology* Lonergan names five levels of values:

we may distinguish vital, social, cultural, personal, and religious values in an ascending order. Vital values, such as health and strength, grace and vigor, normally are preferred to avoiding the work, privations, pains, involved in acquiring, maintaining, restoring them. Social values, such as the good of order which conditions the vital values of the whole community, have to be preferred to the vital values of individual members of the community. Cultural values do not exist without the underpinning of vital and social values, but none the less they rank higher. Not on bread alone doth man live. Over and above mere living and operating, men have to find a meaning and value in their living and operating. It is the function of culture to discover, express, validate, criticize, correct, develop, improve such meaning and value. Personal value is the person in his self-transcendence, as loving and being loved, as originator of values in himself and in his milieu, as an inspiration and invitation to others to do likewise. Religious values, finally, are at the heart of the meaning and value of man's living and man's world... (pp. 31-32).

Now the serious learning demanded of women and men as they seek to live in friendship with dignity encompasses all five levels of values. To distinguish carefully which value is sought in a particular situation means avoiding enormous confusion. To find the right teachers for different values leaves teachers free to concentrate on their proper competence. When the priest is teaching farming and the Farm Management Technician is teaching religious values barangay folk may be getting second best in each case. What is to be known and how it
is taught and learned differs at each level of this integral scale of values. Learning how to plant rice is quite different from learning how to organize FA meetings. Both of these are social values. In turn they both differ from learning the cultural values forming the horizon of friendships among the Northern Samarenos. How we used this integral scale of values in the province to serve the emergence of human good is set out in the following diagram.
Each of the groups, the BCC, NSDF, CSSI, VICTO, and the FMTs, are engaged directly in current practical province activity, as part of province change. The Institute of Philippine Culture is a research group within the Ateneo de Manila University at Quezon City in Metro Manila. IPC formed a consultative group having the task of caring for the integral scale of values as one set. Its role is to stand back from practicality in order to ensure good praxis by acting as consultor for the long-term coherence of province development.

Learning FA management

The role of the FMT in farmers learning agricultural technology has already been explained. Besides learning technology, farmers also needed to learn how to manage their Farmers Association as a business: record keeping, both technical and financial, banking, budgeting, purchasing, marketing—all activities quite distinct from the technical
aspects of farming. The Cooperative section within the Ministry of Agriculture had only recently been formed, when that function was transferred to MOA from the Ministry of Local Government. Moreover, some unhappy attempts at cooperatives in past years made farmers wary of the official cooperative movement. Again, the intended legal and financial structure of Farmers Associations was different from that permitted under current legislation. Cooperative legislation did not permit a special interest group in a barangay, such as tenants and small owner-tillers, to form their own special cooperative. Cooperatives were meant to be open to all comers. Were this done, however, landlords and money-lenders would have been members of the Farmers Associations. Certainly the social transformation sought and in some measure attained through the FAs would not have occurred; probably also the increase in rice output would have gone mainly to the landlords. Understanding this nest of factors led Laurie Sewell to approach VICTO to teach in the province, in a series of seminars and follow-up visits. Groups of seventy farmers from different sections of the province spent four days together in each of three seminars. Of course VICTO's teaching was done in cooperation with the Cooperative Section of the MOA. Bien and Roy of CCSI also attended these VICTO seminars, so that as they established the Area Marketing Cooperative they understood the horizon of the farmers. They also spoke at these seminars or, rather, led a common discussion of farmers and government personnel on the advantages and requirements of the AMC. All this activity engaged the level of social values.

Politics was not an appropriate topic. Moreover, Northern Samar Integrated Rural Development Project being a bilateral government venture, it is inappropriate for Australian consultants to engage in seminars for political teaching.

Learning about meanings and values—a cultural task

As Lonergan says, "Over and above mere living and operating, men [and women] have to find a meaning and value in their living and operating." Like any community of men and women, the farmers of Northern Samar have not reflected much on the set of meanings and values that constitute their everyday culture, the horizon out of which they act when they go about their daily tasks. Now the technical and social changes generated by the activity of the Farmers Associations began to
push against this cultural horizon. In particular the farmers began to see themselves outside of the 'big people/little people' dyadic structure. They began to speak of themselves as persons with new understandings and new visions, having new expectations of what is worthwhile—not so much materially, as in their relations with each other. What sort of teachers could assist farmers in clarifying their cultural horizons now under pressure?

We came to understand that a need exists in the province for a competent, non-governmental group to work at the level of cultural values to assist farmers in discovering, expressing, validating, criticizing, correcting, developing, improving their meanings and values, with the very practical intent of making sure the horizon of their culture supported and in no way inhibited the social values of authentic political, economic, technological development. This social horizon analysis is a function that ministries of a government cannot do, because they are defined by the level of social values. Unless this analysis is done, the horizon of political, economic, technological options and choices remains ambiguous.

To assist province farmers in clarifying their everyday cultural horizons, the Asian Social Institute in Manila was approached. ASI's forte is operating at the everyday level of cultural values. ASI was invited to spend several years in the province, working directly with Farmers Associations, so that each FA might become a movement, grounded in friendship. A key element in this is that farmers learn to reflect on their culture, in Lonergan's use of that word, in order to monitor their own meanings and values. ASI was invited to have more than a consultant role. In their working together, ASI and the FAs become part of province activity, directly engaged in province change at the everyday cultural level.

ASI is a private, educational, social-science and social-work college. In order to carry out its task ASI operates out of the reflexive level of culture, which is the horizon of ASI's learning and praxis. But perhaps ASI had not gone to the next step of analyzing the horizon of culture—which after all was not its task. It has taken over inadequate methods common in the social sciences. Fortunately, its performance disciplines this lack in its foundations. It has long field experience of working with oppressed groups (fishermen mainly, some farmers) in uncovering the values and meanings by which they are opera-
ting in questioning whether these meanings and values are good, and slowly but surely helping these groups forge a coherent vision, based in personal relations, that allows the group to take the necessary cultural, political, economic, technical steps to gain a just standard of living. ASI forms movements, not programs. That is what attracted me to them. People with whom ASI works do engage in programs, but these flow out of the people's being a movement.

ASI's method is development from above. We arrived at the need for a group like ASI by working from below. As far as I remember, until this invitation was extended to ASI to visit Northern Samar, they had not cooperated with a group which had the expertise and finance to initiate development from below, and which also could see the need for development from above. Since I left Northern Samar, though, I have learned that after several trips to the province and long consideration ASI has decided not to work in the province. One element in ASI's decision was that they would be directly contracted to NSIRD. Since NSIRD is a government project, issues and circumstances arise on which project personnel are silent. Also the Government of the Philippines has ministries with which NSIRD is to cooperate in implementing GOP policies. It is a further question whether or not these policies always serve the well being of poor and oppressed families. Inasmuch as NSIRD is directly connected only with ministry activity, a given project is bound to operate solely at the level of social values, of establishing order within existing horizons. But for ASI, from its cultural vantage point, in many cases the authenticity of social horizons is the issue. ASI's fear was that, as contracted by NSIRD, it would be confined within a program, unable to invest insight and time flexibly, as is required in forming a movement. Another fear was that ASI might find itself in a position of value conflict between its own horizon of what is just, and what its contractual obligations might become as external factors unavoidably changed NSIRD.

Caring for cultural values—a personal reflexive task

That ASI decided not to work in the province does not remove the need. Farmers remained aware of the need for some non-governmental group like ASI to join with them in sorting out the meanings and values
constituting their culture. This sorting out is necessary so that the farmers can discipline the way ministries and landlords act among and with them in barangay.

Now if we distinguish between performance and theory, and call to mind the three stages of control of meaning, it is possible to have a group of women and men whose performance might reveal a splendid differentiation of cultural sensibilities, but whose theoretic understanding of what they are doing is undeveloped? Symbols would be central to their cultural expression, and they would be disciplined, not through theory as in some form of scholarly exegesis, but by the resonance of the symbols with the basic foundation of interiority as experienced, rather than thematized, in each member of the group. That group, seeking to live from interiority through symbols in common, both orchestrates and refines the symbols. Robert Doran has long insisted that being artistic is the paradigm of being human. These men and women, in their artistic performance, are able at least partially to monitor the horizon of the culture of their province. Such a group might have the vision to employ a group like ASI and be able to provide the horizon of ASI's work. Still guided by the integral scale of values, we saw a need for such a cultural group as this. None existed in the province, so the Northern Samar Development Foundation was established.

The Northern Samar Development Foundation has been set up by the Diocese of Catarman as an independent cultural organization to monitor the meanings and values constituting province communities. The Foundation is well aware that poverty and oppression are common in the province. It wants to do something about it. It wants to cooperate with ministries of the government, with local elected representatives and officials, with anyone concerned to bring about a dignified standard of living for all in the province. But it is the Foundation's intention not to mount its own projects but to identify needs, to identify groups that have a contribution to make in the province, such as ASI or the Institute of Philippine Culture, and then to see how a suitable project may be designed and funding obtained. The Foundation is intended to have a creative coordinating role. But more than this, the quality of its members is intended to create a milieu of authority, attractive to all, safe for all, rejecting no one. The Foundation comes upon needs by the sensitivity of its members to human hurt and desire as much as through analysis of situations. If one may say the government ministries are responsible for being of assistance at the level of social
values, the Foundation is intended to have a parallel responsibility at the level of cultural values. Although this structure is now in place in the province, and has or can readily call upon competence to form projects, as far as I know NSIRDP has not yet channeled any funds through the Northern Samar Development Foundation. ASI was willing, I believe, to be contracted by such a cultural group. Perhaps there is still a need for development assistance agencies to learn more flexibility and subtlety in project design and operation.

The question arises whether the NSDF is likely to serve the well being of communities in the province. What makes it more likely to be a source of good than any other body operating in the province, such as the local Mayor with the Barangay Captains’ committee? Here is where values are decisive. Just as the operations of government ministries and Farmers Associations, in so far as they are at the level of social values, generate questions that can only be met within the context of cultural values, so too operating within the level of cultural values generates questions that demand a higher context for their answer. Primarily these are questions dealing with the sources of meaning and of value, questions of how history is made, of how one overcomes the horror and banality of historicism. The NSDF understands itself sublated into a richer context of personal value.

Teaching personal value—how is it done?
Performatively in religious values

The next higher context takes us to the level of personal value. In the above diagram no group corresponds to personal value; that is, no group in the province has personal value as its field of expertise. I do not know of any better way of teaching directly about personal value, as Lonergan means it, than reading his works and accepting his invitation to a personal decisive act of understanding and affirming oneself as a knower. Art must also be an entry into the consciousness of interiority. A milieu of learning and leisure is required in order to read, understand, and appropriate one’s rational self-consciousness. Certainly, in the poverty and hard life of the province, leisure is not an abundant resource and the learning required is not common. On this level, one is aware of the enormous potentiality women and men have for making a human society worth living in and a heritage worth inheriting.
One is also aware of the problem of evil in one's own ambiguous experience. Were one left on this level with the understanding that the probabilities of good being done in the face of the problem of evil, are next to zero, then, except for the unquenchable desire to know and to be in love, despair and its companion, violence, may seem reasonable options. Accordingly, on the level of personal value there arise dilemmas that can be solved only by operating on the religious level. In Northern Samar, Basic Christian Communities are active, with men and women being formed in their religious horizon of radical being in love, which disciplines their personal value. Several FAs were in barangay where BCC were active and women and men were members of both.

E. Reading down the scale of values—religious to vital

Now the preceding comments have been about development from below, where actual situations in the province generated wonder and questions that led to a call for the next higher level of value. One can see emergent probability at work here. Besides development from below, however, there is development from above. If we begin with a barangay that has many poor and oppressed tenants and small tillers, and a Basic Christian Community is operating there, we may expect such a group, if they have the learning and leisure, eventually to see the implications in personal, cultural, social, vital domains of being religious. Reading down the values, then: someone who is in love, because she is in love, wants her whole person in each and every instance to be authentic. As authentic, she knows she will contribute to a cultural horizon that in no way limits the meanings and values liberating of her people. As her community has an authentic horizon of meaning and value, so they will order their society to ensure the production and equitable distribution of all goods and services required for dignified human living. As her authentic culture calls forth certain participative, representative political forms, so her polity wants an economy to organize the transformation of resources into a standard of living. Technology is needed for this transformation. Where technology is not present, it is obtained. Finally, that love permeates her vitality, making it bold and gentle. Development from below and development from above are complementary. The implications of religious values call forth development from below. I do not expect,
however, a ready correlation between religious values and social values qua economic. I do not expect a liberation theology—for which in fact Lonergan's writings are foundational—to translate easily, in one step, into political and economic praxis. The integral scale of values reveals such attempts to be based on misunderstanding.

Caring for history—differentiation of consciousness

As we have said above, the two flows of development, from below and from above, are complementary. Both are needed. Both can be attempted. One's comprehension needs to be delicate enough, however, to realize that methods appropriate to one level are not appropriate to another. In other words, the very attempt to do development in Northern Samar has built into it the demand for differentiation of consciousness. Some attempt was made to deal indirectly with the issue of differentiation of consciousness, by introducing a higher viewpoint into project operations. As we have often mentioned, development of Northern Samar is a task for the Samareños. They are the main agents of their own development. The Filipino and Australian consultants in NSIRDP are ancillary. Presumably they know something about doing development, at least about bits of it, such as getting carabaos healthy and constructing roads. But the Filipino and Australian consultants are a temporary group. When NSIRDP ends and the Filipino and Australian consultants go, groups in the province still need contact with development consultants; not with foreigners, but with their own Filipino experts. For, besides performance, there is theory. As well as the active groups mentioned above, there is need for a group with a sound, theoretic understanding of what doing development is.

Accordingly, the Institute of Philippine Culture was called on. They had done the sociology survey in another Filipino-Australian project in Mindanao. I knew their work from discussion at IPC in the late sixties and when vacationing in Manila. One attraction of IPC and of the Director, Dr. Willy Acre, is their recognition of the value of non-quantitative data, including data on desire for justice. IPC goes beyond assessing human achievement by the quantity of material goods produced and acquired. Their task in Northern Samar was not to do another sociology survey; it was to set up a Consultative Group of Filipino development experts who would act as advisers to groups in the
province and to NSIRDP. A first purpose of the Consultative Group is to bring province persons, government and church, political and private, cultural and technical, into conversation with Filipino development experts. While NSIRDP is there, the Consultative Group and the Project work together, with the Project having the more remote role. A second purpose is the Consultative Group to act as the overall coordinator of the various groups operating at each of the levels of human good. (Values in the integral scale of values are about human good.) Whereas each of the groups on specific levels of values usually operates practically within somewhat unthematized horizons, the function of the Consultative Group is to have quite explicit horizons and method: to view the integral scale of values as a whole, and to coordinate the interplay on each level with reference to that whole. Whereas those acting specifically on one level tend to have short-term practical purposes, the function of the Consultative Group is to keep the short-term acts in step with long-term movements and the authentic emergence of human good.

The IPC and Consultative Group were asked to care for the historicity of the province, in the sense of a group of women and men constituting their communities and families, generating their history. Although IPC was asked to care for the historicity of the province, as an institution it does not act directly at the level of personal and religious values but at the reflexive level of cultural values. In order to care for historicity, however, the IPC members need to and sometimes do recognize in themselves personal value as being made authentic by the gift of love from the domain of religious value; and so they are more likely to recognize the function of religious and personal values in the well being of the province and to encourage the development of these values.

So it is that our request made demands of conversion on IPC. As an institute with no familiarity with analyses like Lonergan's, IPC had to think through the deeper foundations of what it does. In terms of the categories Lonergan has developed, IPC goes beyond the general bias of common sense, because its members do have a theoretical grasp of their task. But our request really asked them to move further, since our preliminary discussions with them indicated no awareness on their part of the dilemmas of historicism. They needed to move beyond both
common sense and theory to interiority as Lonergan has made so clear in his "Theory and Praxis" section of A Third Collection. (It was only after I had left the province that IPC formed the Consultative Group and held its first seminar. I do not know what transpired.)

In summary, then, in the province called Northern Samar the practical issues of eliminating poverty and oppression and of doing development lead us step by step towards 1) discerning different levels of action and value, 2) asking what learning is required at each level of values, 3) pondering which groups can assist with that learning, and 4) querying who can supervise the whole process. Development from below reveals a need for development from above. The flows of development are complementary. Because we want to have a development project that will truly serve the real human good of families in the province, and because we understand that being practical has its grounds in good theory, we ask that each group operating at different levels of values have a differentiated apprehension of what they are doing. Because the practical task is to bring about good not just once, but over and over again, we become aware that the task is historical, history-making, and that the development being done now sets the conditions of life and order and culture for the children yet to be born. Accordingly, in order to be practical, we ask what the grounds of historicity are—what are the grounds of authentic project design and implementation? Just as we seek sound theory from those who teach and care at each level of value, so we seek thematized interiority from those who would oversee the historicity of the province. Thematized interiority involves intellectual conversion, which discovers that historicity emerges out of and always returns into mystery. Because symbols always remain to translate the mystery of this caring into practice, psychic conversion is also part of caring for historicity; and being faithful in this caring requires moral conversion as well. Finally, caring for historicity means the being at home in mystery which is the being-in-love of religious conversion. So being practical has its climax and origin in mysticism; and mysticism is profoundly political.
Only tenants and small owner-tillers may belong to Farmers Associations. In making this rule, Laurie Sewell put into effect a value judgment he had made. Laurie had plenty of data on barangay because he spends most of his time in the field with farmers and FMTs. He assessed what is going forward in the barangay. Landlords have tenants; landlords are rich, tenants are poor; the wealth of landlords is increasing, the well being of tenants is declining. The tenants are questioning this bondage. Seemingly beyond the control or intention of anyone, the good of order in the province is deteriorating. At the same time, in a manner not planned or organized, tenant farmers are coming to understand that new technologies are available to lift rice production to levels far above traditional yields. If tenants can get some of this extra yield, their effective liberty to dispose of their own lives will increase. Laurie judged that tenants live in a bondage is not good. He judged that the social values of landlords dominating tenants, the cultural values of 'big people' and 'little people,' the personal value allowing both landlord and tenant to rest, albeit tossing and turning, within this oppression, are variously not good. All happenings in the province concerning tenants, he took back to their origins in understanding and value or, conversely, as following from flight from understanding and rejection of value.

Laurie Sewell understood that poverty and oppression are actual privations in reality. He made value judgments about all activities relating to tenants. Those elements in the past that are products of insight having been distinguished from those consequent on flight from understanding: selection is needed. The grounds for selection are within the authenticity of each person, not in external circumstances. By establishing the Farmers Associations, Laurie proceeded to put the barangay on an entirely new value basis. The Farmers Associations are first an authentic vision of being human which issues forth as this actual Association. He specified practical new doctrines or policies (a set of judgments) that only tenants and small owner-tillers may be members of FAs. He spelled out the ramifications of this new grouping, namely that a new cultural horizon would emerge with new values, new meanings, new symbols, whereby tenants no longer regard themselves as little people, no longer regard their identity so completely within the
landlord's shadow. In fact tenants became proud of their identity as members of their FA, producing T-shirts with their individual Association logo. The consequence of this new understanding is that the social order relating landlord and tenant is altered.

When communicating with different groups, landlords, tenants, NSIRDIP, administrators and consultants, Laurie has had to speak in different ways. He did not try to do all eight functional specialities; nor did he operate frequently or methodically in the intellectual pattern of experience. But his sense of the dramatic pattern of experience (in some ways an artistic differentiation) was so refined that his performance approximates as closely as possible that of one who had worked through the intellectual pattern of experience. Authentic practicality and drama will correspond to the findings of normative theory, since, after all, theoretic insight arises from insight into the practical data. Laurie is engaged in the four levels of conscious intentionality (i.e., the operations of experiencing and imagining, inquiring and understanding and conceiving, reflecting and judging, evaluating and deciding). He used these operations in the task of understanding and evaluating the province's past (the phase of confronting the past) and in the task of working out what to do now in the present (the phase of facing the future). Both phases aim at making society better.

In our discussions, Laurie often spoke of understanding and evaluating the past in order to constitute a present that leaves behind the hurts and hungers of the past. He spoke of requiring a certain quality of spirit in persons (not individuals) lest they fall into the error, with however much good faith, of bringing forward the pain and oppression, while discarding what is good and true in the past. Understanding that order is prior to what is ordered, he outlined a series of shifts to be made from identified and assessed elements in the past to more desirable orderings of those elements now. The past, as Laurie used the term, is not some 'already-out-there-way-back-when'; not a distant shadow age, specified by years and days, or by some a priori independent matrix of time. Rather the past is the mixed set of understandings, evaluations, decisions, actions of women and men, and of natural occurrences (rainfall, typhoons, and so on), which, whenever they have happened, are present in feeling through memory now and more or less intelligible to people now. For there is a past only in relation to a present. As past this mixed set can remain within the horizon
influencing the way persons act now either explicitly through understanding and choice or implicitly as unthematized. The bearing of this mixed set can be modified by current action. In this connection, note the quotation from Collingwood in Lonergan's "Post-Hegelian Philosophy of Religion."

As Laurie identified which elements of past landlord-tenant relations need to be modified in constituting the present, it became evident to me that this corresponds implicitly to using the first phase of the functional specialties to get a purchase on what is occurring in the province, and to using the second phase to project what could be done to serve the well being of tenant, small owner-tiller, and landlord.

**Functional specialties as projective**

Firstly, the functional specialties serve to understand and evaluate any data made by acting men and women which involve meaning. They are a basic heuristic for any social science and any explanatory history. Secondly, although crucially engaging the intellectual pattern of experience, the functional specialties interact with other dimensions of being human: notably, through Communications and Research with the dramatic and practical patterns of experience, in which we spend most of our lives. Thirdly, the functional specialties investigate schemes of recurrence because all human activity is actually or in potency to some scheme or, through flight from understanding, breaking down some scheme. Fourthly, the functional specialties together can be used to investigate distinctly each of the five levels of human good comprised in the integral scale of values, as well as the unity of those five levels. Fifthly, doing development asks how to bring about human good, and answers by designing development projects. Implicit in designing development projects is a more or less adequate understanding and evaluation of the past being sieved by persons as foundational to new ways of living. My hypothesis is that the understanding and evaluation will be made more adequate by applying the functional specialties.

For instance, in a situation of tenant farmers with landlords, currently using agricultural techniques of low productivity, Dialectic can be used when future evaluation is done:
Dialectic has to do with the concrete, the dynamic, the contradictory ... dialectic aims at a comprehensive viewpoint. It seeks some single base or some single set of related bases from which it can proceed to an understanding of the character, the oppositions, and the relations of the many viewpoints exhibited in conflicting ... movements, their conflicting histories, and their conflicting interpretations. ...the study of these viewpoints takes one beyond the fact to the reasons for conflict (Method 129).

Conflict is common in Northern Samar. An investigation of its vital, technological, economic, political, cultural, personal, and religious roots is not an overwhelming task. We have been doing something of that here. Once we have adequately uncovered the reasons for conflict, we could be in more of a position to move beyond conflict and build all development activities around consensus and cooperation. We held seminars to complement the new practice in the rice fields and rural health centers, discussing how social relations that once were quite functional in a society with low material productivity are now obsolete. Some of these seminars could be held for the thirty or so influential families that dominate the province, in order to raise questions about their long-term interests and the province's; drawing on Lonergan's categories to get across the notion of differentiation of societies; applying the insights of Jane Jacobs to the process of economic growth in cities and consequently in rural areas. Suppose, as one writer suggests, conversion became a topic of conversation.

Finally, if one believes that all men and women are primarily good and that they desire to understand—and if I do believe this of myself but not of others, on what foundation do I separate myself?—then the obligation to search for a sound pedagogy of cooperation cannot but be felt. Such learning is welcome in the province since communities and families there, perhaps even more than in Western countries, have an acute sense of their historicity, because they are actively engaged in transforming their society.

One simple example of Dialectic concerns a Farmers Association and a landlord. The landlord had many tenants and worked some land himself. He demanded of his tenants that he be admitted to the FA. His being a member became divisive, for his role was a double one, that of tiller and that of landlord of other FA members. Eventually, over several months, valid FA members came to understand the abdication of
their own personhood by allowing him to remain, and gently told the landlord that he could not continue to be a member of the Association. I gather that some tenant farmers spoke so clearly of human dignity and self-determination, that although acute embarrassment colored the meeting for all, the landlord left without animosity. Both valid FA members and the invasive landlord recognized that they had a conflict, and took that conflict to its roots in contrary judgments of value, rather than analyzing the matter solely in terms of feelings or economic or political categories. In brief, the farmers achieved dialectical clarification from a transcultural base.

G. Metaphysics and the Basic Operations of Conscious Intentionality

In setting up the Farmers Associations, Laurie Sewell was using the integral heuristic structure which is now what is meant by metaphysics. He operates on the basis, learned from his long, feeling immersion in and reflection on the practicalities of doing development in Asian and Pacific countries, that what is in harmony with the structure of his own self-transcending will also resonate well with the farmers, no matter how great the cultural and economic differences between himself and them. Implicit and crucial in this is his authenticity. His grasp of the invariant foundation that is intrinsic to being human, was not thematized: it seemed to come from psychic awareness.

Again, agriculture is a prime example of schemes of recurrence, for which Laurie makes a fundamental distinction between the classical and statistical. He realizes that knowing how to grow rice, as a scientist does, is one thing and actually growing it is another. He selects among technologies to raise the probability of increased rice output. He orders the relations between tenant and FMT to enhance the probabilities of the farmer learning well and adapting more easily to the new tasks of rice production.

A key realization throughout all these operations of farmers is this: one cannot plan the particular. Only what has sheerly classical intelligibility can be planned. Farmers understand compactly the probabilistic structure of their profession. Again, growing rice is a genetic system or an instance of emergence and genetic intelligibility,
since there is no single set of classical and statistical laws that accounts for this process, and so a series of sets is needed (Insight, p. 485). The emergence of the Area Marketing Cooperative, discussed above, also exhibits genetic method. Farmers Associations meeting together form a coincidental manifold. Perhaps with an oblique suggestion from one of the FMTs, farmers begin to discuss the idea of forming an Area Marketing Cooperative that, from a higher level, would order as one effort the rice marketing of each Farmers Association, while not directing or interfering in the operation of each FA. The AMC is to sublate, not take over, Farmers Associations.

Laurie Sewell and his associate, Bob Middleton, stress that it should be the technicians and farmers themselves who determine their own training needs, which will thus be related to village needs. Farmers know their barangay needs; FMTs know new agricultural methods. Conversation and cooperation yields the training program. The whole designing of Farmers Associations has a heuristic and transcultural basis. The form they have comes from human beings, as involved in schemes of recurrence, within the structure of the human good. Laurie or Bob were able to condition but not determine farmers' responses. They act as consultants. Both operate to set conditions that call into play farmers' own responsible use of their own basic operations of knowing and choosing. In acting this way the integral scale of values is affirmed. Personal value, the farmers' capacity to ask and answer questions of meaning and value (achieving self-transcendence) is placed above cultural values and social values, and cultural values are placed above the social. The notion of authority was mentioned above, with the elliptical phrase 'authority authorizes authorship.' In authority, character and invariant foundation are translucent. In the measure that persons act totally in accord with their basic set of operations they become attractive to others, and that attractiveness lies mainly in the revelation to the other, in feeling first and then perhaps in word, of the other's own basic operations. No matter how far one is from being in accord with the basic structure of being human oneself, when that foundation is revealed it is always felt as attractive, unless one is riddled by resentment. Now in treating farmers as adults, as responsible decision-makers capable of identifying their needs, then, even though the discussion, choosing, and acting are about growing rice, the farmers are being drawn out of their confined past and are gaining expertise in their own
operations. They are becoming attractive to each other. They are becoming authorities to each other, as was midday clear in several Associations. And this attractiveness, this authority, is the core of personal relations in the structure of the human good. Through authentic personal relations farmers are able to move freely and harmoniously through the integral scale of values.

5. A BEGINNING WORD

The seemingly remote questions of cognitional theory, epistemology, and metaphysics in Insight are at the core of understanding what is real. The seemingly abstruse categories of functional specialties in Method in Theology are at the core of doing good methodically. Unless the real is understood one does not know what is good and cannot develop projects for good. Development from above, from a love flooding one's heart, may so discipline one's performance that one is in fact doing good. But being in love and doing good cannot substitute for, but rather should motivate understanding how cultures, polities, economies, technologies, and families operate. The historical task now is to do human good and to do it methodically. Human good is always concrete. Human good is always a practical task. And that practical task is to choose wisely and methodically for good among the many cultural, political, economic, technological options now available in our world. To escape historicism and relativism, an invariant transhistorical and transcultural foundation of understanding the real and doing good is needed. The practical political question, "What is the best regime? What is the best way to live?" has resurfaced with bewildering insistence. Without an invariant foundation, one just wanders. Most states and development agencies have no thematized foundation: they have little light to shed on this practical political question. So they potter ahead, having a go here and there, in optimism or pessimism rather than hope.

Intellectual conversion is a key to being practical and political. Lonergan has made it quite clear that intellectual conversion is not only for the smart few. Such conversion has become a common human need. Likewise moral conversion is a practical historical necessity in order to do good methodically. In his writings Lonergan issues that
radical invitation to the reader to undergo intellectual conversion and moral conversion. The sole purpose of this note is to show that Lonergan's work is foundational, practical, political, transformative. I hope it continues the movement of exhibiting the foundations of the subject as subject, so that each woman and man may operate from that invariant foundation in constituting a delightful character, a vibrant society, and a rich history as a heritage for the wonderment of our children. Always we finish with the children.

These comments were written from memory, before President Ferdinand Marcos was deposed. They probably contain some factual errors. Again, they are quite provisional, and need checking against Lonergan's work.
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NOTES

1. See Insight, 123 for how emergent probability remains open and more creative when elements at any one level are not tied tightly.

2. See Insight on statisticial method.

3. Local money lenders apply the five on six interest rate: five pesos now for food and the borrower repays six pesos at the end of the week. Often tenants and wage workers are in dire straits when landlords and moneylenders do not pay due wages on time. It is easy to see that the tenant can never escape the landlord's domination on his own. Also clear is the church's opposition to usury in the Middle Ages.

4. In the Algerian steppe redevelopment project at Ksar Chellala on the plateau between the Atlas Tellien and Atlas Saharien ranges I found similar interaction of levels of schemes. In the Islamic Hadith (in Christian terms, the Patristic writings), it is affirmed that land, grazing, and water are communally owned and that a grain crop is owned by the family planting it. Sheep are owned by individual families. All these affirmations are quite reasonable among a nomadic people. As human population and sheep numbers increased, as some families became sedentary, so the sparse herbage and shallow soils of the steppe were destroyed, until 80% of the area had a plant density of less than two plants per square meter. To corner some grazing, many farmers planted strips of wheat in a circle enclosing herbage, and then grazed the lot into the ground. Torrential rains cause massive erosion. The smart operator mines as much herbage and crop as rapidly as possible off the area before its ecological collapse. Restraining one's flock so as to allow herbage to recover is only leaving the way open for other flocks to graze. No structures were in place for long term resource development and use. The laws of Algeria, derived from the French European tradition, are rooted in the normative notion of individual. Individual ownership of grazing land and water, as is common in Western countries, would run up against tradition rooted in Islamic codes - not politically wise in times when Islamic fundamentalism is in power. So it was suggested that the steppe be divided into legal units more or less along traditional boundaries and that the hundred or so families in each unit have control of grazing and cropping within the Unit. It remains to the Unit Group to determine in each instance what nomads are welcomed and for how long. When the whole steppe is so ordered, a Steppe Council is able to help Unit Groups to learn that long-term development better serves the well being of all than short-term exploitation. Putting in upper level boundaries, the Unit, by communal discussion and consensus, permits reorganization of grazing, cropping, and water use, to achieve long-term stability of the ecology.

New technology and cooperation of climate is needed to resurrect the ecology: fertilizers, new seeds, techniques for controlling run off of rainfall, reforestation of slopes. All this technology is useless if use of the steppe remains uncontrolled. The suggested
legal Unit is an upper-level control. The International Commission of Jurists has developed legal forms for community ownership of resources, in contrast with the individual ownership common in Western law.

Again, in Thailand several agricultural scientists and government development officials at Chainat and Phitsanulok with whom I had discussions spoke of the heightened individualism of Thai people that made cooperation on nearly any matter quite a task, thus impeding development efforts. They suggested that this individualism arose in Buddhism's stress on solitary escape from suffering. When lower-level values are inadequate, development from above can be initiated by development of higher-level values. When the inadequacy is in the highest level of value, further differentiation within that value is required. In expressions of Buddhism other than the Thai, a social dimension has developed as the follower of the ox prints returns to the market place, as the vision of the Bodhisattva emerged.

5. Hannah Arendt has commented on program's need for public space with reference to the feeling of loss among French Resistance fighters when they no longer had a distinct public space and social role.

6. Mina, the director of ASI, and several of us were in an outrigger canoe up the Catubig River among the mountains visiting a barangay, when word came over the radio that Senator Aquino had been assassinated. Fear and bewilderment took over. Would the country collapse into civil war and the insurgents come down out of the hills? We might say that for several days all probabilities associated with schemes of recurrence were shifted. Everything stopped, and we waited. Mina and the other ASI persons went back to Manila as quickly as possible. That ended their first visit to the province, during which they attended one of the VICTO seminars.

7. I wish I could insert an excursus on sociology surveys and the way their use in projects manifests an urgent need for a more basic method, such as that set out in Lonergan's notion of functional specialties.