The primary purpose in this chapter is to provide the background context for understanding the origins of Lonergan's notion of the dialectic of history. This requires two related tasks: we need to investigate the historical context which Lonergan addresses and we need to consider the foundational elements which inform his approach to the dialectic of history. Lonergan's own understanding of the three plateaus of history or three stages of meaning provides us with a valuable tool for approaching the first task. Fundamental to the second task is Lonergan's appropriation of the operational dynamics of human subject. These operational dynamics include his account of human cognition and its development, his understanding of the basic tensions, which constitute the human subject, the communal basis of the developing subject, and the structure of free choice. After considering these basic elements we are then properly prepared to consider the key heuristic notion of dialectic.

1.1 The Historical Situation

Eric Voegelin has maintained that the historical dynamic of human living is universally experienced in consciousness. Lonergan has spoken, in like manner, of the experience of the psychological present which "reaches into its past by memories and into its future by anticipations." If the experience of this dimension is universal, and it would be difficult to deny this, then at least at some level there has always been a consciousness of a historical dimension to human living. Still this elemental experience may be variously differentiated in human consciousness and so reflection on the movement and direction of history differs according to the degree of differentiation.

1MT, 177.
Voegelin addressed the question of the emergence of differentiated consciousness in his monumental work *Order and History*. In that work he noted "the fundamental advance from compact to differentiated consciousness and its distribution over a plurality of ethnic cultures." Based on the degree of differentiation, Lonergan has similarly argued for a typology of three distinct stages which function as ideal constructs for determining the stage of cultural and historical development. The source of development of the human meanings that produce the concrete historical situation is human collaboration. Changes in the stages or plateaus are determined by shifts in the fundamental control whereby meanings are grasped and accepted, and "changes in the control of meaning mark off the great epochs in human history."

Developments of common-sense intelligence whereby human communities evolve in their technical, economic, domestic, and political arrangements and cultural infrastructure characterize the age of myth or the first plateau. The control of meaning in this stage has its source in common-sense operations. Awareness of the movement and direction of history is compact; "little more than symbolic expression in the compact style of undifferentiated consciousness." The cosmological myths of pre-philosophic cultures are representative of this compact form of addressing questions about our genesis and destiny. The notion of dialectic of history is symbolized at this plateau as fate or destiny or divine providence.

The age of theory emerges with developments of speech and language typified by the Greek discovery of mind. Systematic thinking appears with the development of the more rigorous techniques of philosophy and later of

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3*The Ecumenic Age* (Baton Rouge: Louisiana State University Press, 1974), 58.

4For an elaboration of Lonergan’s historical stages see *MT*, p 85-99, and "Dimensions of Meaning." In NRHM Lonergan speaks of plateaus rather than stages.

5Thomas J. McPartland, in "Meaning, Mystery and the Speculative Philosophy of History," identifies the three plateaus as (1) the age of myth, (2) the age of theory, and (3) the age of interiority.

6See NRHM, p 176-77.


8See NRHM, p 176-77, and *MT*, 85.

9NRHM, 177.

10See *Ecumenic Age*, p 67-100, and Voegelin's *Israel and Revelation*, vol. 1 of Order and History (Baton Rouge, Louisiana: Louisiana State University Press, 1956), passim.

science. The control of meaning shifts from the here-and-now operations of common sense to the eternal ideals of classical culture. Theory and practice are differentiated. Theoretical meanings control practical activity as, for instance, when advancements in science are applied to the development and production of technologies.\textsuperscript{12} The dialectic of history receives a more differentiated formulation as, for instance, in Augustine’s contrast between the city of God and the city of man and in the dialectical theories of history developed by Hegel or Marx.\textsuperscript{13}

Yet while Augustine, Hegel, and Marx are all representatives of the second plateau there is considerable development in thought between the fifth century and the Enlightenment. Although Augustine’s understanding of history in De Civitate Dei clearly is a product of the philosophic differentiation, his work was not a speculative system of the kind we find in the scholastic theology of Thomas Aquinas.\textsuperscript{14} In medieval scholasticism there was only minimal advertence to historical process for, within the horizon of classical culture, its theology investigated what was permanent in human nature. Change was strictly an accidental feature. As a result, medieval thought did not add a systematic philosophy of history to its considerable achievements. Recognition of a specific historical type of understanding in the context of the second plateau emerges perhaps with the New Science of Vico in 1725. The development of a systematic analysis of historical process originates with the development of history as a distinct discipline of study. W.H. Dray, in a summary of "Philosophy of History" in the Encyclopedia of Philosophy, determines that "critical philosophy of history has developed chiefly over the last hundred years."\textsuperscript{15} Secular philosophies of history concerned with the development of historical process in general emerged with the Enlightenment in the eighteenth century but systematic efforts at this speculative philosophy of history do not appear until the nineteenth century.\textsuperscript{16}

It is important to note that the prior existence of systematic thinking

\textsuperscript{12}See NRHM, 177, and MT, 86-93, for a more detailed account of these developments. The problem of the consequences of the dominating control of practical activity by scientific methods insofar as it fails to take into account other relevant factors is the topic of a number of critiques of modern technological society. See, for example, Jacques Ellul, The Technological Society (New York: Alfred A. Knopf, 1970); Herbert Marcuse, One Dimensional Man (Boston: Beacon Press, 1966); and George Grant, Technology and Justice (Toronto: Anansi, 1986).

\textsuperscript{13}See NRHM, 177.


\textsuperscript{15}Encyclopedia of Philosophy, s.v "History, Philosophy of," by W.H. Dray.

conditions the emergence of this type of speculative philosophy of history. Its emergence as a distinct subject of inquiry follows the acknowledgement of the ontological character of human historicity. This is clear in Hegel. Basic to his conception of the issue was the speculative reconciliation of both human nature and human historicity. But Hegel attempted to order a dynamic consciousness in the framework of a philosophical synthesis oriented by the goals of classical culture. His effort was brilliant but ultimately inadequate, for it failed to appreciate both the nature of the breakthrough signaled by the scientific revolution and the true significance of praxis, which the breakthrough to historical consciousness implied. Hegel attempted to resolve in thought alone what was in actuality a twofold issue of theory and praxis. Lonergan notes: "Hegel's apriorist approach to history was the position successfully negated by the German Historical School." In this respect, though Hegel is thorough in his consideration of the historical question, he may be regarded as the last great philosopher of the classical culture. Marx was a student of Hegel and, to the extent that he uses Hegel's dialectic and logic, Marx's method proceeds according to the ideals of the second plateau. He was not satisfied, however, with an idealist philosophy oriented towards philosophic coherence but asked the further practical question: what are we going to do? This was the point of Marx's famous eleventh thesis on Feuerbach: "The philosophers have only interpreted the world, in various ways; the point, however, is to change it." Marx developed his dialectical materialism in terms of a necessitarian control of meaning appropriate to the second plateau. Yet insofar as he promoted the priority of praxis he intimated the third plateau.

The emergence of the third plateau is our contemporary concern. The prior development of the first two plateaus conditions its development. Of particular importance is the development of empirical science and the breakthrough to historical-mindedness. Both these developments shifted the emphasis from the deductive techniques and eternal truths of classical culture to the empirical, concrete, and historical. Efforts to resolve problems that cannot be handled in the context of the first two plateaus initiates the shift to the third plateau. Thus, while common sense and theory are capable in their own realms, "troubled consciousness emerges when an Eddington contrasts his two tables: the bulky, solid, colored desk at which he worked, and the manifold of colorless 'wavicles' so minute that the desk was mostly empty space." Similarly, while the consideration of human nature in the second plateau reveals its constant features, the investigation of human historicity reveals a human nature that was variable. There

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18"Questionnaire on Philosophy," 18.  
20MT, 84.
emerges the need for foundations that adequately differentiate the dynamic activities of common-sense intelligence and theoretical intelligence, and the need to account for both human nature and human historicity. So attention is shifted from developments in doing and speaking to developments generally. Whereas the exigencies of common-sense control meaning in the first plateau and the exigencies of systematic thinking control meanings of the second plateau, the source of the control for the third plateau, on Lonergan's account, lies in the ongoing development of a generalized empirical method "that underpins both scientific and historical method to supply philosophy with a basic cognitional theory, an epistemology, and by way of a corollary with a metaphysics of proportionate being." The self-appropriation of human interiority provides a basis for adequately differentiating the various plateaus of meaning and grounds such a generalized empirical method. For "man is to be known not only in his nature but also in his historicity, not only philosophically but also historically, not only abstractly but also concretely." Developed on a basis of the ideals of intellectual, moral, and affective self-transcendence, generalized empirical method provides an integral heuristic structure for collaboration in the context of the third plateau.

It is this transition from the second to the third plateau that constitutes the historical context within which we can appreciate Lonergan's efforts to develop an adequate account of the dialectic of history. Modern philosophies of history, because they have combined theoretic reflection and praxis, have had a dominating influence in shaping the contemporary world. They not only reflect on the patterns of the past; they also anticipate our future and therefore orientate social policy and practice. Thus, liberalism has informed social policy by anticipating an unending progress. Liberal states have encouraged the rapid development of various technologies and the relatively unfettered growth of capitalist economies. Associated with these developments is the elevation of individual and group interests above any account of the common good to the detriment of social order. Meanwhile, Marxism anticipates a utopian communist society effected through the dynamics of its dialectical materialism. Marxist states have encouraged revolution as a means of effecting world communism. They have fostered social control at the expense of human liberty and have tended to suppress creative initiative whenever it encroaches on the hegemony of state power.

The secular philosophies of history that have emerged since the

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21 NRHM, 177.
22 Ibid., 179.
23 Lonergan tends to use affective self-transcendence and conversion in his post-Method writings for religious self-transcendence and conversion.
24 For a study of liberalism and its promotion of individual rights as prior to any account of the human good see George Grant, English-Speaking Justice (Sackville, N.B.: Mount Allison University, 1974, repr., Notre Dame, IN: University of Notre Dame Press, 1985).
Enlightenment are for Lonergan inadequate to direct historical praxis. First, they are secular. Their emergence was explicitly in contrast to the prevailing Christian view of the goal of history and so they fail to consider, what for Lonergan is essential, the religious component in history. Secondly, they are inadequate in their account of human development and decline and so not only fail to acknowledge the religious component of history but also fail in their analysis of the non-religious dynamics of history. Liberalism fails to take seriously the fact of decline and so tends to believe that self-interest can actually result in an unhindered progress through technological advance, the "invisible hand" of the market, and a balancing of political powers. Marxism founds itself on the self-interest of class. It regards history as a progression towards an ideal stateless and classless society through the working out of the class conflict in revolution.

In Lonergan's view, rapid material progress under the dominance of secular philosophies of history has produced a crisis in modern culture evidenced in the abuses and horrors of the twentieth century. Loose from its spiritual moorings Western culture finds itself lacking in a sense of direction other than that provided by the competing interests of the powerful. Cultural roots have been relativized by the descent to historicism and an "existential" crisis follows. Technological progress proceeds relatively unhindered without adequate attention to the problems of its integration within intersubjective communities and human psyches. Christianity has struggled to meet adequately the challenge of these secular developments. Yet Christian thought, insofar as it operates within the ideals of classical culture, has been ill prepared to counter the prevailing trends.

From the beginning of his career, however, Lonergan was convinced that neither liberalism nor Marxism provided an adequate control for effecting the progress of humankind. In the earliest manuscript of Lonergan's to address the issues of modern culture, "Philosophy of History," Lonergan states this view. Moreover, he reaffirmed the same

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25In "Questionnaire on Philosophy," Lonergan writes: "Now both the liberal doctrine of progress and the communist doctrine of dialectical materialism stand in explicit disregard of otherworldliness. The liberal is a secularist who does not suspect that religion is a key vector in social dynamics. The Marxist is an avowed and militant atheist. This exclusion of religious otherworldliness is part of their this worldly efficiency, but it has the implication that, while their doctrines may be simply progressive, there may also be some mixture of progress and decline. In the latter case their abandonment of religion leaves them without remedy for overcoming decline" (16-17).

26Lonergan writes in I: "To ignore the fact of decline was the error of the old liberal views of automatic progress. The far more confusing error of Marx was to lump together both progress and the two principles of decline under the impressive name of dialectical materialism, to grasp that the minor principle of decline would correct itself more rapidly through class war, and then to leap gaily to the sweeping conclusion that class war would accelerate progress. What, in fact, was accelerated was major decline which in Russia and Germany leaped to fairly thorough brands of totalitarianism" (235).

27See, for instance, his "Absence of God in Modern Culture" in SC.

28Concerning liberalism Lonergan writes in PH: "For however successful liberalism may
position over forty years later.\textsuperscript{29} The challenge for Lonergan was to develop an understanding of the historical process that met the requirements of the shift to the third plateau yet affirmed the truths of the Christian tradition. Such an understanding would be scientific, empirical, and concrete; it would account for both human nature and historicity; it would affirm the core truths of Christianity; and it would address the fundamental issue of praxis.\textsuperscript{30} In this way Christian living could contribute to the modern cultural crisis by countering the false realities promoted by secular ideologies with effective thought and responsible praxis. These concerns are at the core of Lonergan's life-long interest in the dialectic of history. In the "Questionnaire on Philosophy" written in 1976 Lonergan indicates this clearly. Because of its importance for understanding Lonergan's conception of the task of understanding the dialectic of history I quote it at length.

The modern world has been dominated then by one and now by another theory of history. From the eighteenth century came the liberal doctrine of progress. From the nineteenth came the Marxian doctrine of dialectical materialism.

It has long been my conviction that if Catholics and in particular if Jesuits are to live and operate on the level of the times, they must not only know about theories of history but also must work out their own. The precepts of moral law while rich and detailed in prohibitions (\textit{malum ex quocumque defectu}) are of extreme generality in their positive content (\textit{bonum ex integra causa}). But what moves men is the good; the good is concrete; but what the concrete good of Christian living is, we shall come to know only by thematizing the dynamic of Christian living in this world in itself and in its relations to liberal progress and Marxist dialectic. To put it bluntly, until we move onto the level of historical dynamics, we shall face our secularist and atheist opponents, as the Red Indians, armed with bows and arrows.

\textsuperscript{29}See "Questionnaire on Philosophy," 14-18.

\textsuperscript{30}Lonergan's notion of praxis is nuanced. He distinguishes \textit{praxis} and \textit{poiesis}. \textit{Poiesis} refers to our making and it is guided by technique or know-how. Praxis is doing and it results from our deliberation and choosing under the guidance of practical wisdom, Aristotle's \textit{phronesis}. Thus, Lonergan means by praxis action that results from responsible freedom. It is not mere technique. See TC, p 184-85. Furthermore, praxis has a distinct function in generalized empirical method for "while empirical method moves, so to speak, from below upwards, praxis moves from above downwards." TC, 160.
arrows, faced European muskets.\textsuperscript{31}

Lonergan's exploration of the dialectic of history was fundamental to the task of theology as he conceived it as the mediator "between a cultural matrix and the significance and role of religion in that matrix."\textsuperscript{32} Moreover, an understanding of the dialectic of history was essential for an effective theology because theology not only mediates the past but also mediates the future.\textsuperscript{33} For this reason a number of authors have understood Lonergan's theology to be relevant, indeed central, to the task of political theology. Matthew Lamb writes: "The social and political dimensions of Lonergan's theology are hardly some ethical afterthoughts tacked onto positions already developed. They are intrinsic to the very doing of any theology involved in faith seeking understanding and understanding seeking faith."\textsuperscript{34} Frederick Lawrence echoes this view in his assessment that Lonergan's theology belongs not on the periphery of the development of political and liberation theologies but "squarely in the middle of it."\textsuperscript{35} Lonergan himself viewed the project of understanding the dialectic of history as a matter of developing a higher synthesis of liberalism and Marxism.\textsuperscript{36} This higher synthesis counters the alienation of secular ideologies of history with the fact of the Mystical Body of Christ.\textsuperscript{37} Accordingly, he understands his own view of the dialectic of history as fundamentally orientated towards the implementation of redemptive praxis. What is needed today is "an understanding of the dynamics of history and of the vital role that Christians are called upon to play."\textsuperscript{38}

\textsuperscript{31}"Questionnaire on Philosophy," 14-15.
\textsuperscript{32}MT, xi.
\textsuperscript{33}See MT, 133-34.
\textsuperscript{36}This self-assessment can be confirmed in Lonergan’s writings. In his "Letter to Fr. Keane (1935)" he writes of developing in a metaphysic of history a higher synthesis "that will throw Hegel and Marx, despite the enormity of their influence on this very account, into the shade" (5). In I Lonergan understands his notion of cosmopolis as "the higher synthesis of the liberal thesis and the Marxist antithesis" (241).
\textsuperscript{37}The significance of the Mystical Body for Lonergan’s view here will become clear as this essay unfolds.
\textsuperscript{38}"Questionnaire on Philosophy," 19.
1.1 Introduction to Foundations

The required understanding needs to be appropriate to the third plateau. The control of meaning appropriate to the third plateau anticipates an integration of human activity established through generalized empirical method. A generalized empirical method, embracing both the data of sense and the data of consciousness, could provide a base for the potential integration and adequate differentiation of all disciplines of study. This foundation could direct praxis. Such a foundation for the integration of human living is not, however, effectively operating in the contemporary world. In contrast the actual situation is one of fragmentation. This fragmentation is evident in the relationship between the intellectual disciplines and common-sense practice, in interdisciplinary relations in the academy and also within single disciplines. In theology, because of the nature and diversity of theological methods, the situation is acutely evident. This situation in contemporary theology motivated Lonergan’s quest to establish adequate foundations for third plateau meaning. An understanding of the dialectic of history can only emerge on such adequate foundations.

William Mathews has differentiated three principal components of that creative project: cognitional theory that resulted in Verbum and Insight; theological methodology, which produced Method in Theology; and economics, terminating in the unpublished Essay on Circulation Analysis. All three components are inter-related. This unitive and interdisciplinary thrust of Lonergan's thought is apparent from his self-understanding of the project. Lonergan remarked in Insight that: "In constructing a ship or a philosophy one has to go the whole way." Indeed, he conceived of philosophy as providing a base for interdisciplinary collaboration. In Method in Theology Lonergan developed a methodology adequate for

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39See TC, p 140-44.
40The term comes from Philip McShane, "Middle Man: Middle Kingdom," in Searching for Cultural Foundations, 1-43.
41See, for example, Gordon S. Kaufmann, An Essay on Theological Method (Missoula, Montana: Scholars Press, 1975). He comments: "That the contemporary theological scene has become chaotic is evident to anyone who attempts to work in theology. There appears to be no consensus on what the task of theology is or how it is to be pursued" (ix). The issue of the pluralism of methods is addressed at length in David Tracy's Blessed Rage for Order: The New Pluralism in Theology (New York: The Seabury Press, 1975).
43I, xiii.
44Michael Vertin has explored the possibility of a philosophy of philosophies based on Lonergan’s work in 'Lonergan’s Three Basic Questions and a Philosophy of Philosophies,” a paper delivered at the Lonergan Workshop, Boston College, 1986. This work is available from the Lonergan Research Institute, Toronto.
theology understood as a shifting towards system. Functional specialization is the result of his effort to conceive an adequately differentiated unity for the collaborative task of theology. Fundamental to this task is the exigency that "the use of the general theological categories occurs in any of the eight functional specialities." Integral to his understanding of the function of theology was the possibility of the integration of theological method with other methods. Finally, his interest in economics was "in the dynamic relations constitutive, not of a part but rather of the whole of the economy." It can be conceived as an essential part of implementing the good of order in our time. The relationship between his economics studies and his other studies has not been studied in depth but its influence can be clearly noted in Insight. As well we can ask to what extent did Lonergan's investigation of economics as a good of order enter into the development of his notion of the structure of the human good, a notion integral to the development of the notion of the dialectic of history.

Lonergan's exploration of the dialectic of history was integral to this overall effort. The notion of the dialectic of history provided foundational categories (both general and special) for his methodology. As we noted in the introduction the dialectic of history provided a thematic organization for Insight. Indeed, a case could be made that the exploration of the fundamental structures of the dialectic of history constitutes a legitimate fourth principal theme of Lonergan's quest.

Moreover, just as his understanding of the dialectic of history influenced

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45See MT: "Christian theology has been conceived as die Wendung zur Idee, the shift towards system, occurring within Christianity. It makes thematic what already is a part of Christian living" (144).
46MT, 292. Lonergan writes: "For general categories the base is the authentic or unauthentic man; attentive or inattentive, intelligent or slow-witted, reasonable or silly, responsible or irresponsible, with the consequent positions and counter-positions. For special categories the base is the authentic or unauthentic Christian, genuinely in love with God, or failing in that love, with a consequent Christian or unchristian outlook and style of living."
47See MT, 364-67.
49See McShane, Lonergan's Challenge to the University and the Economy, 92-103.
50See I, 209-10.
52See MT, 285-92.
53For instance, Robert M. Doran highlights the thematic significance of the dialectic of history for Lonergan in "Lonergan: An Appreciation," 7-13. As we suggested in the introduction the notion of the dialectic of history was central and enduring throughout his academic career.
the development of his achievements in cognitional theory, methodology, and economics, Lonergan's fundamental achievements in these areas were essential to his understanding of the dialectic of history. This becomes evident when we examine the manuscripts written between 1933 and 1938 on history. In these works we see how Lonergan's ideas develop on numerous fronts at the same time. Lonergan's advances in his self-understanding of cognitional theory operate to clarify his understanding of the dialectic of history, and perhaps his reflection on the process of history helped to clarify his understanding of cognitional process.54

Fundamental to Lonergan's development is his position on the subject. In the dynamics of the concrete human subject he discovers the foundations proper to the third plateau. The fruit of all Lonergan's intellectual achievement radiates from this centre. It would be impossible to appreciate Lonergan's understanding of the dialectic of history without a grasp of this. This basic position informs his earliest formulations of the dialectic of history. Advances in his understanding of the subject prompted a more developed view of the historical process. The position on the subject, therefore, has a special importance in an exposition of Lonergan's notion of the dialectic of history. Accordingly, we shall consider in the following Lonergan's notion of the subject, its development, its relationship to community. In the final section we shall introduce the important notion of dialectic.

1.2 The Notion of the Subject

From the very beginning attention to the concrete operations of the subject mediated Lonergan's intellectual effort. In this he followed the example of John Henry Newman.55 Evidence of Newman's influence is in work written for the Blandyke Papers, a student publication of Heythrop College, in 1928. In the essay "True Judgment and Science" Lonergan defends Newman against a well-known critic of the Grammar of Assent.56

54 This inter-relationship will become evident in our exposition of the manuscripts in chapters 4 and 5.

55 This point is made by both George Worgul, "The Ghost of Newman in the Lonergan Corpus," The Modern Schoolman 54 (1977), 317-32, and David M. Hammond, "The Influence of Newman's Doctrine of Assent on the Thought of Bernard Lonergan: A Genetic Study." Lonergan himself acknowledges Newman's influence in "Insight Revisited" in SC, 273, and in his 1979 essay "Reality, Myth, Symbol," in Myth, Symbol and Reality, ed. Alan M. Olsen (Notre Dame: University of Notre Dame Press, 1986), Lonergan wrote: "My fundamental mentor and guide has been John Henry Newman's Grammar of Assent. I read that in my third-year philosophy (at least the analytic parts) about five times and found solutions for my problems. I was not satisfied with the philosophy that was being taught and found Newman's presentation to be something that fitted in with the way I knew things. It was from that kernel that I went on to different authors" (34-35).

56 In the Blandyke Papers, a student journal, handwritten, Heythrop College, 291 (February, 1929). See David M. Hammond, The Influence of Newman's Doctrine of
Regarding an even earlier paper, Frederick Crowe comments: "'The Form of Mathematical Inference' ... shows a remarkable grasp already of the idea he would characterize nearly twenty years later as 'insight into phantasm.'"57 Lonergan’s appropriation of cognitional operations will become central to his life’s work. By identifying the contribution of the various cognitional acts and relating them to the process of knowing he will discover a normative pattern of related and recurrent operations, which provided the foundation for his methodology.58

Lonergan’s objectification of the concrete subject advanced through a series of stages. The objectification of the knowing subject constituted the initial breakthrough. His full account, however, would include a consideration of the existential and religious subject. Lonergan’s account of the dynamic structure of human knowing is perhaps the most well-known aspect of his work. The fruits of his attention to the concrete process of knowing are evident in his work in the 1920s and 1930s but a rigorous account of the theory emerges first in the context of his investigation of Thomas Aquinas in *Verbum*. In Insight Lonergan’s ideas emerge in the context of his own generalized empirical method.59 In Insight knowing is understood as a compound of three distinct conscious levels, experience, understanding, and judgment. In *Method in Theology* there emerges a distinct new existential level in his account, which sublates the context of Insight.60 In his post-*Method* writings Lonergan differentiates a fifth dimension of love.61

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57CW4, 256.

58By self-appropriation or introspection Lonergan means not a "peering" into the self in which the subject becomes another object of investigation, but the process of objectifying the primary conscious processes which are the condition of our asking questions at all. Lonergan writes: "However, 'introspection' may be understood to mean, not consciousness itself but the process of objectifying the contents of consciousness. Just as we move from the data of sense through inquiry, insight, reflection, judgment, to statements about sensible things, so too we move from the data of consciousness through inquiry, understanding, reflection, judgment, to statements about conscious subjects and their operations" (*MT*, 8-9). The use and meaning of the term primary process here originates with Robert M. Doran. See "Primary Process and the Spiritual Unconscious," in *LW* 5, 25-48.

59This shift out of the horizon of Aquinas and into a modern horizon is noted by Davis Tracy in his *The Achievement of Bernard Lonergan* (New York: Herder & Herder, 1970). See especially p 82-103.

60The emergence of a distinct level of value, which sublated the three prior levels of experience, understanding, and judgment, occurs explicitly in "The Subject" in *SC* written in 1968. For an account of the emergence of this fourth level see Frederick E. Crowe, "An Exploration of Lonergan’s New Notion of Value," *Science et esprit* 29 (1977), 123-43. Lonergan’s own reflection on the shift can be found in "Insight Revisited," *SC*, 227.

61See TC, passim. This fifth level is considered by Robert M. Doran in *Theology and the Dialectics of History*, 30-31. Note Fr. Doran’s comment that: "What is important, I believe, is not so much the question of an additional level, but of the increasing centrality..."
Lonergan argues that human knowing is the product of a dynamic process, which is normative, recurrent, cumulative, and progressive. The process moves by virtue of the pure desire to know; that motion comes to a rest when it reaches a satisfactory conclusion in a judgment of fact or value. Lonergan writes: "Now Aristotle defined a nature as an immanent principle of movement and of rest. In man such a principle is the human spirit as raising and answering questions."62 The process is the intentional operation of a conscious subject. The operations are intentional because they intend objects (what is to be known) and conscious because the subjects must be conscious for the operations to occur. None of the operations of the cognitional process can occur in a dreamless sleep or coma.63 Lonergan distinguishes conscious and intentional operations on four distinct levels of experience, understanding, judgment, and decision. Experience provides the data for questions. Understanding organizes the data into an intelligible unity. Judgment determines the truth or reality of the prior understanding. Decision determines what is to be responsibly done. These four levels are related, for understanding is of experience, judgment is of what is understood, and decision is about an actual reality. Knowledge of reality is therefore not just experience, or just understanding, or just judgment but a compound of acts of experience, understanding, and judgment. Responsible decisions are the product of acts of experience, understanding, judgment, and decision.

The cognitional process is a self-correcting process of learning. It is the product of recurrent acts which, when functioning according to the normative exigencies of the process, adjust to new data, correct incomplete insights, and correct incorrect judgments. The shortcomings of each insight provoke further questions to supply the complementary insights. Judgments provoke further questions and knowledge increases. A succession of related insights produces a viewpoint. Viewpoints expand to their full generality revealing the need for higher viewpoints; lower viewpoints lead to a succession of higher viewpoints.64 Because the process is self-corrective there is evidence that "intelligence contains its own immanent norms and ... these norms are equipped with sanctions which man does not have to invent or impose."65

The cognitional process functions according to the rules of what Lonergan calls emergent probability. Emergent probability represents Lonergan's notion of world order.66 It is an explanatory notion derived from

62 NRHM, 172.
63 See MT, 7.
64 See I, 13-25.
65 I, 234.
66 Our account of emergent probability will be brief. Its essentials can be found in I, pp 125-28. An account of Lonergan's notion can be found in Philip McShane, Randomness, Statistics and Emergence (Dublin: Gill and MacMillan, 1970). For the application of emergent probability to ethics and history see Kenneth Melchin, History, Ethics and
a consideration of the complementarity of classical and statistical methods.\textsuperscript{67} Classical methods anticipate a constant system to be discovered while statistical methods anticipate that there will be data that will not conform to system. Under the world-view of emergent probability world process is an open-ended yet directed process in which there is the emergence, survival, and breakdown of a conditioned series of schemes of recurrence according to certain schedules of probability. Prior schemes condition the probability of the emergence and survival of later schemes. Moreover, schemes function in successive intelligible levels, higher levels sublating lower ones. The significance of the notion of emergent probability resides in its ability to provide a heuristic context for our understanding of world process. Lonergan understands world process neither as necessitarian, as for instance in Hegel, nor as simply random as in Darwin's evolutionary theory. Emergent probability is a function of the operation of both classical and statistical laws such that both randomness and classical laws operate in an ongoing process. As it applies to cognitional process we note: (1) a recurrent process of acts; (2) the element of randomness in the emergence of questions and the occurrence of insights which emerge, not of necessity, according to certain schedules of probability; and (3) the combination of the two in the actual functioning of the process whereby questions and insights emerge in the context of the recurrent schemes of the process to contribute to ongoing intellectual development. What is unique about the operation of emergent probability in human affairs derives from the fact that human intellect is not only intelligible but intelligent. Not only does human intellect function according to laws but, by operating intelligently, it creates its own laws. This is evident, for instance, in the creation of social and cultural order, which is integral to the functioning of the dialectic of history.\textsuperscript{68}

Furthermore, the cognitional process is self-transcending. The source for the transcending movement is the pure desire to know. Questions for intelligence take us beyond the spontaneous flow of sensitive data to wonder; we grasp in an insight or series of insights an intelligible unity in the data. Not satisfied with insight we want to know whether or not our insight into the data is correct. So questions for reflection take us beyond understanding to determine by means of reflection whether or not our understanding is correct. Questions for reflection demand sufficient reason or sufficient evidence. We realize such sufficiency when through reflective insight we grasp a virtually unconditioned and there are no more further relevant questions. When we have correctly understood our experience then we know what is true. Though we arrive at our goal through a subjective process, in the act of affirming the correctness of our understanding of the data, we go beyond ourselves to reach a truth that is independent of our

\textit{Emergent Probability: Ethics, Society and History in the Work of Bernard Lonergan.}

\textsuperscript{67}On classical and statistical methods see I, chapter 2.

\textsuperscript{68}This will be dealt with in some detail below.
knowing it.

But our living is more than knowing facts. The problem of living concerns the anxious process of determining what to do and how to do it. Feelings reveal the values that orientate our living. Thus, our knowing facts is but a prelude to the far deeper, if messy, business of living with its various concerns, its practical, interpersonal, and existential dimensions. Questions for deliberation take us beyond fact to determine value. We must consider whether the intentional feelings we have reveal true value or only apparent value. We must decide what is the responsible action in the particular situation. This movement comes to rest only when we determine what really matters. At times such decisions challenge our fundamental orientation in life. Then we must decide what our commitments are to be. If we not only decide what is of value but act according to its demands our decision takes us beyond ourselves to create actual value in the world. Such commitment serves to direct the prior three levels, for if questions emerge from below to culminate in the commitment, the commitment itself operates from above to redirect the process. Inasmuch as we can change the world by our decisions so we, too, are changed by our decisions.

The Eros of the human spirit, insofar as it functions in accord with its own principles, takes us beyond mere experiencing through a series of acts on four levels so that we become originators of value in the world. Its goal is transcendent. The process is normative for the exigencies of the process determine the norms of its operation. Each level of operation has its own exigencies. Experience requires attention to the data. Understanding requires that we ask intelligent questions, have the patience to wait for insights, formulate ideas intelligently. Good judgment requires that we be thorough in checking the data, be reasonable in our assessments, and make the judgment when all relevant conditions are satisfied. Responsible decision-making requires the consideration of alternatives, possibilities, proper assessment of our concerns and feelings, and commitment to responsible courses of action. In a nutshell the normative action of the process requires that we be attentive, intelligent, reasonable, and responsible. If we follow these demands we shall know and act authentically. The alternative would be inattention, stupidity, unreasonableness, and irresponsibility. Following authentically the Eros

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69 In *MT* Lonergan distinguishes between feelings that are intentional responses and feelings that are non-intentional states and trends. Feelings that are intentional responses answer to what is represented, intended, or apprehended. The word "home" evokes feelings that respond to the value we apprehend in the symbol. Intentional feelings are relevant to determining value. Non-intentional states and trends, on the other hand, are related to causes and goals respectively but the relationship to the cause or goal "is simply that of effect to cause, of trend to goal" (*MT*, 30). Non-intentional states and trends are not relevant to determining value.

70 Robert Doran in *Theology and the Dialectics of History* notes that this dynamic is fundamental to a reconstruction of Lonergan’s notion of the subject. See 31–33.

71 This basic contrast between authentic and unauthentic operation lies at the core of
of the human spirit results in the cumulative development of persons. The achievements of the past become part of our habitual knowledge and character. This becomes the base in the subject, which conditions any further development of the subject.

Lonergan’s discovery and objectification of the normative and progressive process of human knowing and moral development through a process of heightening interiority in concrete subjects provides the basis for a solution to the apparent paradox between human historicity and human nature. It is normative because it is self-correcting and so generates its own norms; progressive because it produces not only incremental knowledge but a succession of higher viewpoints. Consequently, there is a dynamic human nature whose normative exigencies operate concretely in historical process. As we shall see Lonergan’s account of the operation of the dynamic process of human intelligence supplies the foundations for the element of progress in the dialectic of history.

The Eros of the human spirit fuels the cumulative and progressive process whereby we come to know and create ourselves and our world. The whole movement is an ongoing process of self-transcendence. But wherein lies the final fulfillment of the process as a whole? What in the final analysis is really worthwhile? What is the source and goal of the process? Lonergan finds the ground and goal of the process to be not in right action per se but in love. We discover such love when we fall in love and most completely when we experience the gift of God’s love. This love expresses itself in the love that binds family, in the community, and in the love of God, which binds the community of faith. He writes: For self-transcendence reaches its term not in righteousness but in love and, when we fall in love, then life begins anew. A new principle takes over and, as long as it lasts, we are lifted above ourselves and carried along as parts within an ever more intimate yet ever more liberating dynamic whole”.72 Such is the fruit of religious conversion and it sublates the entire Eros of the human spirit into a higher supernatural reality. This higher reality supplies the foundations for the element of redemption in the dialectic of history.

For Lonergan, then, the human subject is at once a knowing subject, an existential subject, and a religious subject. This subject advances ideally through the authentic operation of the Eros of the human spirit to be finally integrated into a higher reality beyond the reach of human achievement. The vector of human striving is matched by the healing vector of God’s love, which sustains our authentic striving and transforms our living.

Lonergan’s defence of his account of cognitional process as normative. He writes: ”In brief, conscious and intentional operations exist and anyone that cares to deny their existence is merely disqualifying himself as a non-responsible, non-reasonable, non-intelligent somnambulist” (MT, 17). See also the argument in Chapter XI of I.

72 NRHM, 175.
1.2 The Subject as a Compound-in-Tension

The Eros of the spirit that moves human beings toward self-transcendence is, however, only one of many human desires. The human subject is both a unity and a duality. We are one for "man is individual by his central potency, one in nature by his central form, existent by his central act." It is this unity that is expressed in the "I" which survives various changes and developments in the person. Besides being an individually existing unity we are also differentiated by a hierarchy of conjugates in which lower level conjugates provide the coincidental manifold for higher-level organization. Each level is a series of events occurring in flexible ranges of schemes of recurrence that have their own laws and conjugate forms. Coincidental occurrences from lower levels provide the materials to be integrated into higher levels. Thus, organization on the atomic level integrates sub-atomic events; organic process integrates chemical processes; psychic conjugates integrate organic neural demands; and intelligible conjugates are the higher system for the integration of psychic processes. Consequently, an adequate explanation of human nature would include the fact that we are a unity differentiated by a hierarchy of levels of conjugate forms, those systems being physical, chemical, biological, psychic, and intelligent.

Within this hierarchy psychic and intelligent levels are conscious levels. Neural demands, though unconscious, seek psychic representation and

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73I, 515.
74See I: "All development is development inasmuch as it goes beyond the initial subject, but in man this 'going beyond' is anticipated immanently by the detachment and disinterestedness of the pure desire. Again, all development is development inasmuch as it possesses a point of departure, a concrete material to be transmuted, but in man this concrete material is permanent in the self-centred sensitive psyche content to orientate itself within its visible and palpable environment and to deal with it successfully. Nor are the pure desire and the sensitive psyche two things, one of them 'I' and the other 'It'. They are the unfolding on different levels of a single, individual unity, identity, whole. Both are I and neither is merely It" (474).
75This is but the tersest sketch of a complex component of Lonergan's metaphysics. An adequate account would include Lonergan's account of emergent probability, the notion of a thing, and his conception of metaphysics. See I, 514-20. The successive levels are sketched in Philip McShane's Wealth of Self and Wealth of Nations: Self-Axis of the Great Assent (Hicksville, New York: Exposition Press, 1975).
76For Lonergan, unlike Freud and Jung, the psychic level is conscious. Jung refers to the contents of the psyche as unconscious. For Jung, inner activities are conscious only when they are products of reflective consciousness. Lonergan's own position is clear. There are levels of consciousness. These levels are progressively fuller. At the lower levels are dream states. From Ludwig Binswanger, Lonergan adopts the distinction between dreams of the night and dreams of the morning. In these dream states we are not awake but we are conscious, if only fragmentary. Thus in MT Lonergan writes: "The twilight of what is conscious but not objectified seems to be the meaning of what some psychiatrists call the unconscious" (34, note 5). By consciousness Lonergan means not exclusively reflexive consciousness but self-presence. See I, 320-21. For Lonergan's assessment of Jung's meaning see, for instance, "Religious Experience," in TC, 117.
integration in sensitive consciousness, but we are conscious of organic processes only when they are upset from their normal routines. For instance, we become aware of digestive processes when we have indigestion. Psychic representation occurs both in dreams and in the contents of the conscious flow of internal experience. We must be conscious to be intelligent. Human intellectual activity constitutes a higher integration of human sensitive living and therefore occurs on higher conscious levels of understanding, judgment, and decision.

Our living, then, takes place both consciously and unconsciously. Human beings are both spiritual and material and, whereas the Eros of human spirit is a product of our spiritual reality, no less are there other desires originating in the biological and represented and integrated in psychic components of humankind. There is a tension between the demands of sensitive living and the Eros of the human spirit. This tension, consciously experienced, constitutes the human subject. It is a permanent feature of human living; we cannot live (and therefore think) without a body but we cannot be human without a mind and will. Lonergan locates the root of the dialectic of history in this conscious tension.

1.2 Human Development and the Duality of Consciousness

Human beings develop. The operators of human development can emerge from organic, psychic, or intelligent levels. All the levels are interlocked yet each level has its own organization with its laws and flexible ranges of schemes of recurrence. The intellectual provides the higher integration of the psychic while the psychic provides the higher level of integration for the organic.

As we have indicated, intellect develops by means of the self-correcting process of learning. Contents provided by human sensitivity provide the materials to be integrated by the exercise of intellectual operation. These contents include the data provided by senses, psychic contents and representations, and the primary processes of the conscious stream itself. It is the act of direct insight that organizes the data into a unity.

While lower levels are intelligible only human intellect is intelligent. Human intellect not only obeys laws; it has a legislative function operating

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77Lonergan writes in I: "As in the animal, so also in man, there exist the exigencies of underlying materials, and the pattern of experience has to meet these exigencies by granting them psychic representation and conscious integration. The biological cannot be ignored and yet, in man, it can be transformed" (187).

78In NRHM Lonergan writes: "In any case the dialectic of history, as we are conceiving it, has its origin in the tensions of adult human consciousness" (178). The basic duality of consciousness and its significance for the dialectic of history has been clarified by Robert M. Doran, most recently in his book Theology and the Dialectics of History.

79A complete view of development in terms of total world process would include the operation of supernatural conjugates in human living. See I, 698–700.
with a degree of freedom unknown in lower levels of conjugate forms. As a result intellect integrates psychic contents, which present themselves to consciousness as material for questions. The result is the development of human meaning, which though it goes beyond the demands of human sensitive living also demands a corresponding adaption by sensitive living. In other words, the desires of the human spirit initiate a development for which there must be a corresponding integration at lower levels.

The demands of sensitive living and the exigencies of intellectual development create in the human being a conscious tension, which requires negotiation. Though the materials provided by human sensitivity are necessary for the functioning of the intellect, still the demands of sensitivity can interfere with the proper functioning of the intellect. Understanding requires the sustained attention to work out the problem and the patience to wait for the requisite insights. Feelings should not interfere unduly. Good judgment requires the suppression of desires that would influence the outcome of the process. While decisions require attention to feelings, still that attention is a reasonable attention that is neither inaccurate in its assessment of what the feelings mean nor overwhelmed by unreasonable desires, which might prevent responsible determination of value. It is the undue interference of sensitivity with the operation of the pure desire to know that results in the distortion of this process and which ends in the distortion of counter-positions. Authentic intellectual development, on the other hand, occurs as a result of the dominance of a detached and disinterested desire to know. Under the dominance of the pure desire to know, human sensitivity in the intellectual pattern of experience becomes a collaborator in the spirit of inquiry.

Just as the sensitive psyche evokes a higher integration in human intelligence, so the results of the operation of human intelligence demand a

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80 See I, 617-18.

81 Lonergan calls this exigency the law of integration. He writes: "The initiative of development may be organic, psychic, intellectual, or external, but the development remains fragmentary until the principle of correspondence between different levels is satisfied" (I, 471).

82 Lonergan distinguishes philosophic positions and counter-positions. Positions are statements that are coherent with the basic positions on the real, on knowing, and on objectivity. Counter-positions are not. While basic positions invite development, counter-positions invite reversal. He writes: "It will be a basic position,

   (1) if the real is the concrete universe of being and not a subdivision of the `already out there now';

   (2) if the subject becomes known when it affirms itself intelligently and reasonably and so is not known in any prior `existential' state; and

   (3) if objectivity is conceived as a consequence of intelligent inquiry and critical reflection, and not as a property of vital anticipation, extroversive, and satisfaction. On the other hand, it will be a basic counter-position, if it contradicts one or more of the basic positions" (I, 388).

83 On the control of sensitivity in the intellectual pattern see I, 185-86.
corresponding integration at the level of psyche.\textsuperscript{84} Lonergan writes: Generally speaking, such an initiation of intelligence invites complementary adjustments and advances, and unless they are effected, either the initiated development recedes and atrophies in favour of the dynamic unity of the subject, or else that unity is sacrificed and deformed to make man a mere dumping ground for unrelated, unintegrated schemes of recurrence and modes of behaviour.\textsuperscript{85} There are in human development exigencies both for intellectual development and for sensitive integration. On the one hand, the detached and disinterested desire invites us to become intelligent and reasonable in our knowing and responsible in our living. It reveals to us a universe of being in which we are but an item in a universal order. On the other hand, there is the self-centred world of our sensitive living with its stimuli and responses, desires and fears, joys and sorrows, where we are as an animal in a habitat.

Lonergan writes: "It is this heightened tension that in human development supplies the compound, antithetical law of limitation and transcendence."\textsuperscript{86} All human development requires a point of departure in the concrete material of sensitive living (limitation), but development goes beyond this initial material limitation (transcendence). The tension is a permanent feature of human living because both elements are part of what constitutes our human nature. No matter how successful our intellectual development, the sensitive psyche still exists and intellectual achievement does not eliminate the tension between the detachment of the pure desire to know and the self-centred psyche. The negotiation of this compound-intension constitutes a fundamental dynamic of human development and so of human progress. Successful negotiation is subject to the law of genuineness.\textsuperscript{87} Genuineness would seek to avoid conflict between the conscious and unconscious components of development by admitting the tension between them into consciousness. Once admitted into consciousness genuineness would ideally foster development through the respectful negotiation of the demands of both the pure desire and sensitivity. This negotiation is definitive for the authentic development of the subject and for Lonergan it becomes the model from which he derives the notion of progress in the dialectic of history.

1.2 The Dramatic Subject and the Duality of Consciousness

In \textit{Insight} Lonergan differentiates at least seven patterns of experience, which dynamically organize our conscious presentations and interests. They are the biological, aesthetic, artistic, dramatic, practical, intellectual,
and mystical.\textsuperscript{88} The dramatic pattern of experience is the pattern in which the subject negotiates the fundamental duality of consciousness for practical living. As such it discloses most clearly the elements of the compound-in-tension as lived.

The features of the duality of consciousness as it functions in the practical business of living Lonergan elaborates in his account of the dramatic subject in chapter six of \textit{Insight}.\textsuperscript{89} Lonergan’s account of the dramatic pattern and its relevance to the matter of practical living is of importance to the dialectic of history. While the products of theoretical and philosophical activity have a relevance to the course of human history, especially in exercising a higher-level control in the direction of human activities, the making of history occurs at the existential level of consciousness.\textsuperscript{90} Ideas alone do not make history because history is the cumulative product of knowing and doing. Because the task of world-constitution occurs in the dramatic pattern Lonergan grants a primacy to the dramatic pattern at the existential level.\textsuperscript{91} We turn now to an account of the basic compound-in-tension as it functions in the dramatic pattern.

The dramatic pattern organizes the presentations and interests of consciousness in such a way as to direct human activity to the practical task of getting things done. It does so by subordinating neural demands to the higher task of making an art out of our living. There is a dramatic component to our living that is integral to the process of our getting things done. We are not just living to survive but living in a drama in which we learn roles, develop a style, and express a character. The drama of life moulds us: "Out of the plasticity and exuberance of childhood through the discipline and the play of education there gradually is formed the character of the man."\textsuperscript{92} But prior to learning life’s roles there is the pre-consciously formed organization of the pattern: "The materials that emerge in consciousness are already patterned, and the pattern is already charged emotionally and conatively."\textsuperscript{93} Thus, our dramatic living is constituted by both pre-conscious materials and the operation of the exigencies of intelligence.

The elements that make possible this drama of practical living are (1)

\textsuperscript{88}These seven are noted by Matthew Lamb in "The Social and Political Dimensions of Lonergan's Theology," 259. See I, p 181-206; 385. There is no indication that Lonergan regarded this list of patterns as exhaustive. With increased differentiation of consciousness there emerges the possibility of refinements and the emergence of new patterns.

\textsuperscript{89}I, 173-206.

\textsuperscript{90}The function of the theoretic and philosophic differentiations of consciousness as they concern the dialectic of history will be elaborated below. We have indicated some elements already in our discussion of the three plateaus above.

\textsuperscript{91}See I, p 187-89. For a defence of this interpretation of Lonergan see Robert Doran, "Dramatic Artistry in the Third Stage of Meaning," in LW 2, 147-99.

\textsuperscript{92}I, 188.

\textsuperscript{93}Ibid., 189.
the subordination of neural processes to psychic determinations; (2) the demands of neural patterns and processes for psychic representation and conscious integration (demand functions); and (3) the functioning of the censor to control and select what is allowed into consciousness. Prior to the emergence of contents into consciousness, there are the demand functions which seek representation and conscious integration and there is the operation of the censor exercised by the dramatically patterned intelligence and imagination which selects and controls the demand functions, either constructively to allow the demand function representation or negatively to repress the demand function. Thus, the dramatically patterned censor acts positively to select the insights that would assist the process of living. In turn the education of the subject and the exercise of intelligence by the subject serve to inform the dramatically patterned censor. For the art of our living to thrive both neural demands and the exigencies of dramatically patterned intelligence must be honoured.

Lonergan indicates in his account of dramatic bias in Insight how the tension of consciousness in the dramatic pattern becomes part of a distinctly dialectical process. Although we will discuss later in greater detail our understanding of Lonergan’s use of dialectic, it would be helpful at this point to consider the manner in which the duality of consciousness operating in the dramatic pattern conditions the operation of dialectic. Lonergan understands dialectic as a combination of the concrete, the dynamic, and the contradictory: "A dialectic is a concrete unfolding of linked but opposed principles of change." As a concrete unfolding it is not simply a logical or heuristic principle but actual process. Furthermore, because it is a process of change it is dynamic, not static. Finally, because its principles are opposed it involves the contradictory. It is important to note that contradictory here does not preclude the possibility of the negotiation of the contradictory principles. For the dialectic is a concrete unfolding of both linked and opposed principles. The fact that there is a concrete unfolding of the principles indicates that by contradictory Lonergan does not mean mutual exclusion in the logical sense. Indeed, it is a function of higher-level conjugates to sublate lower-level processes and this could not be accomplished if the opposing principles were mutually exclusive.

As the duality of consciousness operates in the dramatic subject it functions dialectically. The contents and affects, which enter consciousness, originate from two principles, neural demand functions and censorship. These two principles are opposed, for inasmuch as the censor allows psychic representation of demand functions by selecting appropriate images it can also repress them. The effect of either allowing or neglecting demand functions cumulatively changes the subject, for allowing psychic representations of certain demand functions would lead to development

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94See I, 191-206; 217.
95I, 217.
along a particular line while repression would prevent its developing: "For the orientation of the censorship at any time and the neural demands to be met both depend on the past history of the stream of consciousness." By way of example, our manner of handling stressful situations is the cumulative effect of past habit. Those that handle stressful situations well generally have access to the requisite insights at the time they are required so that the stress is handled in a constructive manner. This is so because helpful images are allowed to enter consciousness while unhelpful contents are repressed. Some, however, have bad habits resulting from the cumulative effects of a censor, which represses the required images. The result is the poor management of stress-related situations, not because the person desires to fail but because the dramatically patterned censor is so orientated as to prevent the emergence of the required insights. In both instances the current orientation is the result of the cumulative effects of past operations. But the cumulative effect of a constructive orientation was to allow for the intelligent management of stress while the cumulative effect of the repression of the requisite is psychic discomfort.

In summary, then, in the drama of everyday life there is apparent a duality between unconscious neural demands and a dramatically patterned consciousness which is given. This duality is experienced as a conscious tension. It is the conscious lived form of a conscious tension in humankind between the elements of intelligence and the elements of lower-level conjugates, that is, those elements that are peculiar to humankind (intelligence) and those elements humankind shares with other animals (sensitive psyche). The tension as functioning in the concrete business of living is the basis for dialectic, for its functioning is at once concrete, dynamic, and contradictory. Finally, the dialectic of the dramatic subject provides a concrete instance of the working out of the basic tension between human sensitivity and intelligence.

1.2 Subjects in Community

So far we have treated the subject in relative isolation but the subject is part of a larger organization, which is the community. The community constitutes the prior condition for the process whereby individuals negotiate the dialectic of the subject and so constitute themselves as authentic persons. Lonergan writes: “Accordingly, one might say that a single dialectic of community is related to a manifold of individual sets of neural demand functions through a manifold of individual dialectics. In this relationship, the dialectic of community holds the dominant position, for it gives rise to the situations that stimulate neural demands and it moulds the

96Ibid.
97The elements for negotiating the duality in human development are indicated by Lonergan in his exposition of the law of genuineness in chapter fifteen of I. See 475-79.
orientation of intelligence that preconsciously exercises the censorship.”88 The prior conditions that stimulate neural demands and set problems for intelligence are in large measure set by communities. We are born into communities. A common language structures the daily world we inhabit.99 The community teaches the meanings and values through which we communicate with others and constitute ourselves as persons.100 Lonergan remarks: "Without a large measure of community, human society and sovereign states cannot function."101 This priority of community is evident in the role belief has in the ongoing development of both persons and communities.102 Most of what we know is a product of belief rather than immanently generated knowledge. It is the function of belief to permit collaboration; therefore, without belief human communities could not advance.103 Lonergan writes: “Human knowledge, then, is not some individual possession but rather a common fund, from which each may draw by believing, to which each may contribute in the measure that he performs his cognitional operations properly and reports their results accurately.”104

Human beings are social creatures and therefore are part of the creation and maintenance of an ongoing good of order. The good of order ensures the regular recurrence of particular goods.105 Human intersubjectivity serves to bond members into groups and to create the material for the development of a way of life or culture. The recurrent intervention of intelligence creates the tools, the exchange patterns, and the institutions, which create the desired good of order. Necessity is the mother of invention and the challenges of living in a particular environment provoke creative responses. Technologies develop which necessitate the development of new economic arrangements. New economies require the development of a polity, which can order the developing differentiation of role and social classes. The process as a whole is mediated by the developments of culture, which integrate the process of everyday living. These elements taken together constitute the infrastructure of society. Lonergan further distinguishes a cultural infrastructure and a cultural superstructure.106 The cultural infrastructure operates at the spontaneous everyday level of life. The superstructure develops with the emergence of the reflexive techniques

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88I, 218.
99On the communal basis of language see MT, 71.
101MT, 361.
102See I, 703-18.
103For an analysis of Lonergan’s understanding of belief see I, 292-93; 703-13.
104MT, 43.
105See MT, 47-52, for Lonergan’s account of the structure of the human good.
of the second plateau. It is the product of the reflection of human beings on the meaning of living mediated by reflexive intelligence. The social and cultural infrastructure conditions the self-development of persons. Finally, in personal relationships the values, which orientate human cooperation, are discovered, communicated, and fostered.

This representation of human living as normatively cooperative distinguishes Lonergan's position from both Marxism and classical liberalism. Liberalism stresses the role of the autonomous individual while Marxism, though it recognizes the need for collective power, stresses the conflictual character of social progress. For Lonergan, it is the liberty of the individual that ensures the progress of the social order but the personal growth which liberty promotes occurs in the context of the social cooperation. Intersubjective groups work together for the attainment of particular goods. The social organization of the division of labour ensures the recurrent provision of particular goods through the concretely operating good of order. Through authentic personal relationships persons cooperate in accord with human liberty to foster each other as principles of benevolence and beneficence.

As already indicated, intelligence is the operator in the creation of the social order and its meanings. As intelligence operates according to a certain dynamic structure so also does the creation of the good of order and the cultural meaning that would mediate and constitute that order. The creation of the order as indicated above is in accord with emergent probability. Lonergan writes: "For the advent of man does not abrogate the rule of emergent probability. Human actions are recurrent; the recurrence is regular, and the regularity is the functioning of a scheme." Human beings, then, cooperate in a dynamic structured way in the creation and maintenance of the good of order. Human beings are conditioned, not determined, by the environment. Intelligence operates on the basis of these prior schemes of its environment to seek solutions to particular problems. Insights emerge and practical solutions follow to modify the prior schemes of the environment. The new situation is itself a recurrent scheme, which presents problems and opportunities for human intelligence. So the cycle repeats itself. Thus, the material progress of humankind is a progression of emergent ideas made effective in the social structure. Material progress evokes a corresponding economic, political, and cultural progress.

Cooperation is accomplished through the mediation of practical intelligence operating on the base provided by intersubjective living. It is the function of a compound-in-tension analogous to the compound-in-tension of the human subject. Just as material and spiritual components make up the subject so they also constitute the community. In the social living of humankind there is both a unity and a duality to be grasped. There is practical common sense operating in a community that is not found entirely in the mind of a single person but which serves to provide its

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107 I, 209.
organic unity and identity. The tasks of communal living are divided up in a division of labour such that each has his own role and task to perform. Still it is a common sense and there is unity "that organically binds together the endlessly varied pieces of an enormous jig-saw puzzle."\textsuperscript{108} With this in mind, Lonergan recommends in \textit{Philosophy of Education} Dawson's notion of regional cultures as the basic unit for the conception of general history. The regional culture is "the simplest realization of a way of life."\textsuperscript{109} It is a unity but not one we would achieve through intellectual synthesis but rather "it is the coming together in vital, organic unity of percepts, images and affects, of insights and judgments, of decisions and choices. They all form part of a total flow."\textsuperscript{110}

The social unity is also a function of both the intelligent operation of common sense by which human beings cooperate to produce the good of order and a prior intersubjectivity that identifies the good with the objects of desire.\textsuperscript{111} The schemes of recurrence of intersubjective living are "simply prolongations of prehuman attainment."\textsuperscript{112} They are bonds that tie together families, clans, and communities. Lonergan speaks of "a sense of belonging together [that] provides the dynamic premise for common enterprise, for mutual aid and succour, for the sympathy that augments joys and divides sorrows."\textsuperscript{113} This prolongation of prehuman attainment pursues living artistically. Such artistic living transforms biological needs. The basic intersubjectivity, which underlies primitive living, survives the advent of civilization. It is evident in the continuation of the family, the fact of regional cultures, and the symbolic bonds of nationhood.

Besides the basic intersubjectivity that binds human groups in communities, there is the ongoing intervention of practical intelligence, which produces a good of order. Its object is the intelligently conceived good of order, not the particular object of desires of individuals in the context of their intersubjective schemes of recurrence. The intervention of practical intelligence moves human living out of the context of primitive living and into the new context of civil community. Civil community is the achievement of practical intelligence that transforms human living. It integrates the new developments of technology and economy and the consequent division of labour, which results. It is no longer possible to identify the good with the object of desire. There is now a good of order which consists of new sets of schemes of recurrence conditioning human desires and fears in the measure that individuals contribute both to the fulfillment of others' desires and the protection of other individuals from the object of fears. Institutions develop to order human cooperation in

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\textsuperscript{108}\textemdash\textit{Ibid.}, 211.\\
\textsuperscript{109}\textit{PE}, 343.\\
\textsuperscript{110}\textit{Ibid.}, 344.\\
\textsuperscript{111}Lonergan notes that "this desire is not to be confused either with animal impulse or with egoist scheming" (\textit{I}, 212).\\
\textsuperscript{112}\textit{Ibid.}\\
\textsuperscript{113}\textit{Ibid.}
\end{flushright}
much more complex ways than that evident in the bonds of intersubjective cooperation. Human communities develop within this order and so are therefore transformed by civil order itself. The developments of practical intelligence become an indispensable part of human living. Technological advance and capital formation produce improved standards of living. The return of human community to simpler arrangements of the primitive community becomes an undesirable option.

Civil society results from intelligently devised social order while primitive community is a product of intersubjective spontaneity. The emergence of civil society, however, does not eliminate intersubjectivity, for "intersubjective spontaneity and intelligently derived social order have their ground in a duality immanent in man himself." That duality is the same duality that produces the compound-in-tension that is the human subject. As intersubjective, human beings cooperate spontaneously for fulfilling particular desires and for warding off particular fears. Each person has his or her own desires and fears and these desires and fears have an insistence that another person's desire does not have. Still, the bonds of intersubjectivity "make the experience of each resonate to the experience of others." Thus, basic human empathy yields the sharing of community. As intelligent, human beings create and maintain a concrete social order, which organizes human cooperation to the task of regularly providing particular goods. The concretely operating good of order regards particular instances of the good "not singly and as related to the individual they satisfy, but all together and as recurrent." Human desire and fear is subsumed under a higher viewpoint whose criterion of success is not the fulfillment of particular desires and fears but the proper function of the order.

For Lonergan this tension between the tendencies and properties of inter-subjective community and those of intelligently devised social order informs the basic structure of society. Consequently, the cooperative character of human beings mediated by human intelligence is the basis of intelligent social order; society is not simply a matter of the social restraint of basic human desires as we would find in the psychoanalytic view of Freud and the social contract theorists. Human beings, by their very nature, are committed to both their spontaneous intersubjectivity and to their intelligence. Individuals subsume their spontaneous feelings to the intelligent rules that guide them. Yet spontaneity is at home in the intersubjective group and not in the detached world of intelligent rules. Thus, in the history of human societies, there are times when there is a certain relaxed tension between the felt feeling of intersubjective groups

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114 Ibid., 214.
115 Ibid., 215.
116 MT, 49.
and the larger pattern of social order. The dictates of intelligence are relatively attuned to the desires and fears of groups. But there are also times of uneasy alliances and outright hostilities when the harmony between intersubjective feeling and the social order no longer operates. Then there are the social conflicts and constraints, which provide the evidence for conflictual theories of society.

Finally, as the concrete unfolding of the duality of the subject becomes a dialectic process so, too, does the concrete unfolding of the tension of the community. Thus, just as there is a dialectic of dramatic subject so, too, there is a larger dialectic of community. Social events can be traced to either the principle of intersubjectivity or to the principle of practical intelligence. The principles are linked, for intersubjective spontaneity desires intelligent operation while practical intelligence requires material on which to work. The principles are opposed as is clear from the basic tension in community between the spontaneous demands of intersubjective desires and fears and the exigencies of the good of order. The contrary principles require negotiation and are consequently modified by the changes that result. Practical intelligence provides the further questions and insights by which new situations arise while intersubjectivity adapts to the changes brought about by the operations of practical intelligence.

### 1.2 The Structure of Choice

So far we have presented an account of Lonergan's notion of the subject and its fundamental duality experienced as a compound-in-tension. We have indicated the social basis of human living and the compound-in-tension, which is fundamental to its dynamic. We have considered the role of human intelligence in the creation and maintenance of the human good. We have also noted the existential element in human living. Because Lonergan's understanding of human choice is crucial to the formation of his notion of the dialectic of history we need to consider further the existential component.

In our discussion of the notion of the human subject we considered human knowing as a dynamic process occurring on four distinct but related levels. By minding the exigencies of this process we can achieve knowledge of both facts and values. Still the Eros of the human spirit is not complete in just knowing. This is clear when we consider the type of question that initially orientates operations on the fourth level: what is to be done? Furthermore, we not only imagine possible courses of action but we must also determine whether what is to be done is worthwhile. We want to know value because it is on its basis that we determine what we are to do. Human beings think and choose; the activities of human intellect are incomplete if it fails to move beyond thinking to doing. There is, then, an exigency in the human subject for self-consistency between what we know and what we do that, when executed, we call moral living. Lonergan writes: “Man is not only
a knower but also a doer; the same intelligent and rational consciousness grounds the doing as well as the knowing; and from that identity of consciousness there springs inevitably an exigency for self-consistency in knowing and doing.” Responsible acting is intelligent and reasonable; what is added is this demand for self-consistency between knowing value and what we actually do. To do this is to obey our conscience.

It is in choosing that human beings constitute the world. For human living and, therefore, human history are under the aegis of emergent probability. We grasp in insight possible schemes of recurrence and by our decisions we bring about the material and social conditions that over time make possible schemes actually existing schemes. Thus, the underlying sensitive flow is open to the possibility of the higher integration of its coincidental manifolds by virtue of the operation of human intelligence and existential agency.

Our choosing, however, does not necessarily follow from the exigencies of a responsible conscience. It is free. We can choose to follow or not to follow the exigencies of the Eros of our spirit. We can grasp possible schemes that meet the exigencies of our conscious intentionality yet fail to make the decisions that would produce the concrete conditions required for their probable or actual occurrence. There is the demand for the conforming of our actions to our knowing; there is the possibility that we may not choose to respect the demand and do what our conscience demands.

Unlike Kant, there is for Lonergan an intelligible and knowable link between knowledge and freedom. Freedom and knowledge are not separate; authentic choosing follows from our knowing. The relationship between knowing and doing, however, is contingent, not necessary. Whereas a judgment of fact follows if all the conditions are met, it does not follow that once a judgment of value is made there will be the appropriate action. For rational judgments regard what actually exists while decisions regard the actuality that is possible. Thus, while the exigency to act follows from the assessments of intellect and reason still it is an exigency and not a necessity. For the intelligent, reasonable, and responsible course of action may or may not be actually followed. There is a further contingency resulting from the fact that we do not have to follow our conscience. Thus, while human beings may determine a responsible course of action they do not have to follow that determination. It follows from this that while our

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118I, 599.

119See Immanuel Kant, *Groundwork of the Metaphysic of Morals*, 3d. ed., trans. H.J. Paton (New York: Harper & Row, 1964). Lonergan’s criticism of Kant can be found in I. An excellent dialectical comparison of the epistemological positions of Lonergan and Kant can be found in Giovanni Sala, "The A Priori in Human Knowledge: Kant's Critique of Pure Reason and Lonergan's Insight," *Thomist* 40 (1976), 179-221. Of particular interest especially with regard to Lonergan’s assessment of Kant’s moral theory is a series of notes written by Lonergan on an Italian edition of Kant’s *Groundwork*, which are available at the Lonergan Research Institute Archives. See the handwritten notes on "Kant's Fondamenti della Metaphysica dei Costumi."
choice is essentially free to follow the dictates of reason effectively we may not.

This structure of human choice is at the root of Lonergan's dialectical theory of history. In a comment on the problem of transposing from a social to an individual context found in a note written in 1949 Lonergan comments that the "structure of dialectic is identical with the structure of individual free choice." In other words, we may discover in an appropriation of the dynamics of human choice the structure of dialectic; in election there is the option of following good or allowing evil to reign, and the options acted on modify the subsequent course of the individual and the community. We now turn to the form of dialectic.

1.2 The Form of Dialectic

Lonergan's understanding of history is dialectical. Lonergan derives the form of dialectic from his understanding of the human subject as a compound-in-tension and from his objectification of the structure of human choice. The fact that the human subject is a duality results in two contrary tendencies in conscious human activity. The ability of intellect to ask questions and to grasp unities allows for the shaping of our sensitive psyche (the lower-order manifold) by a higher-order intelligence. Still, the integration of the stream of sensitive consciousness by the activity of intellect is not a necessary result of the activity of the higher order. For one thing, intellect functions to sublate the lower order, meaning that the integrity of the lower order must be maintained within the higher order. So not only must intellect grasp the solution but the solution must be integrated into the recurrent patterns of the sensitive psyche. But because of the existential character of the human spirit, persons have the option of rejecting what has been grasped by intellect in favour of patterns already established by the sensitive psyche. Questions can be avoided, insight refused, reason ignored, and responsibilities can be left unacknowledged. Accordingly, we do not necessarily follow the rational exigency that would promote the integration of the two centres of human consciousness. The situation offers the objective possibility of different courses of action; intellect grasps these possibilities and then proceeds to select one of them. The particular choice (or failure to choose) results in actions (or inactions) that change the objective situation. If we follow the exigencies of empirical, intelligent, rational, and responsible consciousness then the situation respects the integrity of our conscious duality. If, however, we do not, then there is a corresponding disruption of the integrity. We note that our free choice is in the context of the duality of consciousness; the fact of two different loci for consciousness, one orientated towards being and the other

orientated towards self-satisfaction, situates our choice. The basic dynamic of human decision-making, as it is constituted in the duality of human consciousness, provides Lonergan with the basis in the concrete subject for developing the form of the dialectic, which in heuristic fashion applies to the general movement of history. In Insight he writes: "Dialectic is a pure form with general implications; it is applicable to any concrete unfolding of linked but opposed principles that are modified cumulatively by the unfolding."121 This constitutes an accurate account of the form of the process of human choosing. The process of decision-making involves a concrete process of change that negotiates the demands of two opposed centres of human consciousness such that the results of decisions function to cumulatively modify the recurrent patterns of the conscious flow. If, as we are arguing, Lonergan derives his pure formulation of dialectic from the form of the process of human decision-making, then it is clear that the form is applicable to any distinctly human activity. As long as the process in question involves the activities of human intellect and the integration of that activity into a prior flow of activity then the form is applicable.

Dialectic, then, is fundamental to a consideration of human activity because all human activity involves choice and all choice involves the actual selection of options. Lonergan is able to apply dialectic in quite a variety of contexts. Lonergan writes: "Dialectic provides no more than the general form of a critical attitude. Each department has to work out its own specialized criteria."122 Lonergan on different occasions has applied dialectic to the interpretation of texts and historical analysis,123 the notion of authority,124 to metaphysics,125 ethics,126 as a functional specialty in theological method,127 with special application in the heuristic structure for the solution to the problem of evil,128 and, of particular relevance here, to the general dynamics of history.129 The common feature to all the applications of dialectic is its function as a heuristic form for the critical analysis of human thoughts or deeds. Lonergan confirms this in Insight in the comparison of his use of dialectic with Hegel’s use. He writes: “Our dialectic is a restricted and differentiated tool: it is relevant to human

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121I, 244.
122Ibid.
124"The Dialectic of Authority," in TC, p 5-12.
125I, p 530-95.
126Ibid., 595-633, especially 607.
127See MT, chapter 5, especially p 129-30, and chapter 10, 235-66.
128Lonergan writes: "But when this problem of evil is met by a supernatural solution, human perfection itself becomes a limit to be transcended, and then, the dialectic is transformed from a bipolar to a tri-polar conjunction and opposition" (I, 728).
129I, chapters VII, XVIII, and XX.
knowledge and to human activities that depend upon knowledge; it admits separate application to psychoneural problems, to the historical expansion of practical common sense, to the diversity of philosophic methods and systems; but it does not lie within logic but rather regards the movement from one logically formalized position to another; and it has no relevance to purely natural process."\textsuperscript{130} Because the human subject is an existential subject and because of the fundamental duality of human consciousness our understanding of human activity has to be dialectical. Reflection on both features clarifies some confusion that has arisen concerning Lonergan’s use of the notion of dialectic.\textsuperscript{131} First, there is a duality that functions by virtue of the duality of human nature. This duality produces a conscious tension in the human subject. Still the tension cannot be eliminated by ignoring one of the two poles for there is a link between the two poles as pattern to what is patterned. In human affairs intellect advances only if the integrity of sensitive consciousness is respected. The unity of the subject is promoted only insofar as there is both operation and integration. Second, human change involves free choice. This, as well, invokes a duality but of a different kind. The relevant duality is of possible courses of action. In this instance it is not a matter of sublating one choice through the choice of the other; it is a case of either the one or the other. For instance, if the choice is between the responsible integration of a new idea and ignoring the consequences of the new idea it is possible to determine the responsible choice. Now the process of change in human affairs involves both the given duality of the subject and the presentation of alternative courses of action for choice. Therefore, the notion of dialectic must invoke both features if it is to be adequate to the process of the human constitution of humankind. Human nature is both a unity and a duality; hence, human choice is part of a dialectical process. Our examination of Lonergan’s account of the dialectic process confirms this view. When Lonergan applies dialectic to philosophic positions, for instance, there is an emphasis on the existential element of the process. Judgments are made concerning the correctness of positions. In case of judgments, whether they are of fact or of value, the choice is a matter of yes or no, rights or wrong, better or worse. Furthermore, judgment involves existential engagement. In making judgments of fact we must affirm personally that this is our judgment. When we judge something to be true we are committed to a position. Similarly when we make a judgment of value we are committing to a course of action.

Dialectic is a concrete unfolding of linked but opposed principles of change. They are linked by virtue of the unity of the subject or subjects, opposed by virtue of the two centres of consciousness. But it is a concrete unfolding and this occurs by virtue of human existential agency supported by the intellectual process. Thus the duality is negotiated by choosing from alternative courses of action. Choices alter the history of the principles, \textsuperscript{130}\textsuperscript{130}I, 422.

\textsuperscript{131}We discuss this in chapter six below.
which constitute human duality; there is potential development at both psychic and intellectual levels. Finally, because dialectic is derived from the compound-in-tension that is human consciousness it provides a heuristic framework for dealing with all contexts that involve more than one consciousness, that involve intelligence, and that involve change. Dialectic is applicable to any human process involving intelligence. Thus, the form is applicable to the dynamics of human history, for human history involves all these elements.

1.1 Summary

We began this chapter by indicating the situation, which Lonergan addressed. This was an occasion to indicate Lonergan's own division of history into three plateaus and to locate the question of general history as understood by Lonergan as properly belonging in the context of the third plateau. We then sketched Lonergan's basic position notion of the subject. This included the basic pattern of the knowing subject and its expansion to embrace existential and religious levels. We then discussed the basic compound-in-tension of the subject and its operation in the dramatic pattern of practical living. We placed our discussion of the subject and its basic tension in its larger social context. An explication of the structure of human choice followed. This provided the final link required for introducing the form of the dialectic. This account of the notion of the subject and its basic tensions, the community, the structure of choice, and the form of dialectic introduces the foundations for the analysis of the dialectic of history. We now turn to a discussion of that analysis.
Lonergan's understanding of the human subject, both in its normative operation and as a compound-in-tension, provides a base for the application of dialectic to the process of history. We shall now consider that application. First, we shall regard the object of investigation, which is historical process in general. Next, we shall clarify Lonergan's use of the method of approximation. Finally, we shall proceed with an account of the elements of Lonergan's analysis of the dialectic of history.

1.1 Historical Process

On a number of occasions Lonergan has indicated that two quite different things can be meant by the word history.\textsuperscript{132} "There is history (1) that is written about, and there is history (2) that is written. History (2) aims at expressing knowledge of history (1)."\textsuperscript{133} History (2), the history that is written, is the subject area of the historian and it is marked by its own common meanings and methods. Philosophical reflection on history (2) would primarily pertain to a consideration of the methods of the historian, that is, how the historian and the community of historians investigates and expresses knowledge of history (1). Lonergan himself examined this subject matter in chapters 8 and 9 of his Method in Theology.\textsuperscript{134} History (1), the history that is written about, however, is the proper subject matter of the notion of dialectic of history. History in this sense is materially the total aggregate of the succession of human events or, as Lonergan has on one occasion expressed, "the total field of human development."\textsuperscript{135} The total

\textsuperscript{132}The distinction first appears in the unpublished manuscripts from the 1930s that are the primary materials of this work. See ACH(1), p. 2, ACH(2) p. 4, and OACH, p. 2. It can also be found in MT, p. 175, and LPH, p. 1.
\textsuperscript{133}MT, p. 175.
\textsuperscript{134}Ibid, pp. 175-234.
\textsuperscript{135}LPH, p. 12.
field of human development includes individual development, communal development, and development in general. In a common-sense way we refer to this sense of history when we speak of history as a judge of our collective actions. If we were to study the dynamics of human development in general as they produce historical change then we would be concerned with an investigation of history (1). Philosophical and theological reflection on history in this sense is the proper subject matter of the dialectic of history.

The "material" of the dialectic of history is that succession or flow of events both internal and external that constitute the stream in which human activity occurs. The material of specialized histories (of art, of chemistry, of mathematics), for example, occurs in this flow. They have, however, material available to them, which allows them to proceed quite competently once systematic reflection on the subject exists. In specialized histories there will be problems with those periods of origin when such systematic thinking did not exist. "The problem of general history is that it moves throughout on this pre-systematic level."136 To appropriate the dynamics of general history requires an appropriation of pre-reflective elements of human living. This activity bears a marked similarity to the problem of getting at the pre-reflective elements of consciousness that constitute the dynamic patterns of human intentionality which occupied Lonergan in the development of his position on the human subject. Lonergan's appropriation of this pre-reflective conscious process was the key to his objectification of that consciousness articulated in Insight. Similarly, it is the appropriation of this pre-reflective historical flow that constitutes a material base for Lonergan's account of the structure of history. While Lonergan's notion of the subject concerns primarily the dynamics between conscious and pre-conscious elements of the subject, the dialectic of history concerns these dynamics as they function in the total ongoing process of humankind. Human meaning develops in collaboration and the process of individuals is integrated into the collaborative process of the whole. This involves the total ongoing interaction of persons in the past, in the present, and in the future.

I. **A Scientific Approach**

In Insight Lonergan understands metaphysics to be a science; similarly he understands the fundamental procedures of his approach to general history to be scientific.137 It is scientific because of the methods and aims of the procedures. Whereas common-sense intelligence aims at getting things done in the concrete world of living, science aims to understand the relationship of things to one another.138 Lonergan's effort was to develop a

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136 PE, p. 342.
137 See I, chapter XVI "Metaphysics as Science."
138 See , pp. 175-81.
general heuristic model that would provide the a priori concrete dynamics of history including its theological component. Because it is philosophy of history in the manner of Hegel or Marx, concerned with the history that is written about rather than the history that is written, it does not initially depend on the a posteriori results of written history but rather constitutes the general form for the critical investigation of history grounded in an investigation of the dynamics of human consciousness. \(^{139}\)

In his Philosophy of Education lectures, Lonergan remarks that "the scientific approach to general history has to be of the same type as the specialized history."\(^{140}\) All science can be understood to function like a pair of scissors. The lower blade constitutes the data while the upper blade constitutes the principles that orientate the research. Science needs both blades; the lower blade without the upper blade is mere data without any significance, while the upper blade without the lower blade lacks reality. The problem of a scientific theory of history is to determine what constitutes its a priori, that is, its upper blade. The evidence indicates that Lonergan took this scientific approach to the problem of general history from the beginning. In his earliest account of the dialectic of history Lonergan specifies the need for discovering the differentials of the flow and "the differentials of flow are something beyond the elements, the individuals in the flow."\(^{141}\) A few years later in the introduction to his dissertation on Aquinas' thought on *gratia operans* Lonergan writes:

> It remains that history can follow a middle course, neither projecting into the past the categories of the present, nor pretending that historical inquiry is conducted without a use of human intelligence. The middle course consists in constructing an a priori scheme that is capable of synthesizing any possible set of historical data irrespective of their time and place, just as the science of mathematics constructs a generic scheme capable of synthesizing any possible set of quantitative phenomena.\(^{142}\)

The problem of a scientific theory of general history, then, is to determine the appropriate upper blade for investigating the complete succession of events, which constitutes the flow of history. The total flow of

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\(^{139}\)See *I*, pp. 243-44. The organization of the heuristic component for grasping the dialectic is a priori. As we apply our understanding of the dialectic in the praxis of human living, however, the data of the lower blade constitutes the source of feedback. In a complete view of the dialectic of history the differentiation of the heuristic constitutes an element, which then can affect the overall flow. The specific relevance of the emergence of the dialectic to human praxis will be touched on in a later section.

\(^{140}\)PE, p. 342.

\(^{141}\)PH, p. 99.

events of historical process constitutes the lower blade. Lonergan derives the heuristic structure of the upper blade from three fundamental differentials and their dialectical relationships. First, there is the effect of authentic activity on the flow. Second, there is the adjustment to the first differential due to unauthentic activity. Third, there is the projection of what is required to restore the flow of history to its natural process through supernatural acts of grace.

1 Method of Approximation

Lonergan organizes the basic elements of the upper blade for his scientific theory of dialectic of history on the model of the threefold approximation. The organization of the material of the dialectic of history according to this method was, as we hope to demonstrate, the fundamental breakthrough that Lonergan achieved in the early manuscripts. Once he had organised the material in this manner a stable pattern of terms and relations was established from which all further developments in his theory could expand. This basic pattern for the dialectic of history constituted a constant theme throughout his writing, emerging in a variety of contexts and remaining essentially the same even in his latest writings, where it is frequently found. Considering that Lonergan was a thinker whose thought exhibited quite remarkable developments, the durability of the initial model indicates how fundamental an idea it was for him.

Lonergan derived the basic model from Newton’s model for understanding planetary motion. The law of motion establishes that bodies move with constant velocity unless another force intervenes. This is a first approximation to the actual movement of the planets. The addition of the law of gravity between the sun and the planets yields an elliptical orbit for the planet. The influence of the gravity of one planet on another reveals the perturbed ellipses in which planets actually move. Each approximation is an intellectual construct that on its own cannot account for the actually occurring perturbed ellipses. But the final model arrived at through a consideration of all three ideal constructs yields a scientific theory that can account for the actual theory and is verified in the empirical investigation of planetary motion. Lonergan developed his theory of history in the same way.

Lonergan determines the three approximations for anticipating an understanding of historical process by asking three questions. We reach the first approximation by asking what would human history be if in every instance human beings always did what was attentive, intelligent, reasonable, and responsible. We arrive at the second approximation by considering how human history changes because human beings do not act attentively, intelligently, reasonably, and responsibly. The third approximation results from asking how the historical situation that results
from both authentic and unauthentic actions can be returned to conformity to a life according to the exigencies of authenticity.

The First Approximation: Progress

The first approximation, grounded in the dynamic, cumulative, and progressive nature of human intelligence, is to project what it would be like if human beings always followed the transcendental precepts, that is, they always did what was attentive, intelligent, reasonable, and responsible. As a result of the observance of the transcendental precepts, problems would be noticed, previously unrealised possibilities would be grasped, unworkable proposals would be rejected while workable ones would be embraced, and decisions would be based on an unbiased evaluation of the situation. The implication is an ever-increasing progress or ideal line. Situations would arise which require concrete insights both into what is occurring and what is to be done about it. But intelligent inquiry gains insight into the situation, verifies what in fact is going on, and proposes alternatives producing policies and concrete courses of action, which in turn transform the existing situation. The new situation, in turn, produces further insights and better policies and courses of action. The result is an ever-progressive cycle of development.

Not only does the cumulative and progressive nature of intellect result in development of the concrete situation, it also leads to a succession of higher viewpoints with successive foundations for the control of meaning.\textsuperscript{143} There is a common-sense development, which expands humankind’s practical skills. The development of theory considers in a systematic manner the nature of things and their relations with each other. Thirdly, there is the appropriation of interiority, which establishes a ground for the adequate differentiation of common sense, the various developments of theory, and philosophy.

Higher viewpoints emerge as a result of a development of intellect, which grasps difficulties which methods of the prior stage are not competent to understand.\textsuperscript{144} Common sense is not omni-competent; its concern is the particular and concrete and so entertains no aspiration to understand abstract and universal laws. Questions concerning abstract, universal laws and long-range issues go beyond the competence of common sense.\textsuperscript{145} The theoretical mode of operation, grounded in advances in linguistic competence, emerges to explore the nature of abstract and universal laws. It proposes theoretical ideals, which orientate and control the pursuit of truth. At this second stage there is a differentiation of common-sense operations and theoretical operations. Developments in science originating under the control of second-stage ideals, however, lead to issues that cannot

\textsuperscript{143}See I, pp. 15-17.
\textsuperscript{144}On the need for higher viewpoints see I, pp. 16-17; 233-34.
\textsuperscript{145}See I, pp. 207-209, 226, on the competence of common sense.
be controlled by second-stage meaning. Empirical science operates by investigating empirical data to advance through successive approximations of understanding. With the autonomous development of the sciences there emerge questions concerning the relationship of the various specializations of the sciences to each other and to common sense and philosophy. Empirical investigation expands to consider not only the data of sense but also the data of science, not only the ideals of truth but also the concrete succession of concrete history. There arises the need for a higher viewpoint, which can orientate efforts to understand and adequately differentiate these various elements. That higher viewpoint would constitute a third stage in which the control of meaning is in the context of a generalized empirical method.

From stages of the intellectual development Lonergan derives three stages or plateaus which function as ideal constructs for the analysis of historical process. Each stage represents a development of understanding concretely effected in progressive cycles. First, there is the development, expansion, and application of concrete and practical arts. This expansion leads eventually to the emergence of a systematic exigency and the "leap in being" which inaugurates the second stage. Second, there is the development of scientific theory, which proposes theories to account for material and cultural phenomena and which directs the application of theory to practice. The progressive cycle advances to the level of theoretical control; developments of theory direct practice. The expansion of the theoretical cycle leads to the emergence of the modern philosophic

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146The plateaus of historical development are comparable to the three stages of history elaborated in *MT*, pp. 85-99. We have already discussed the three plateaus in our discussion of the historical situation.

147The notion of the stages of history consisting of three progressive cycles occurs explicitly in DRC. Lonergan writes: "Praeterea, animadvertendum est hanc progressivam intellectus actionem per circulum quendam effici. Nam actio humana per cognitionem humanam dirigitur et informatur; cognition autem a sensibilibus incipit, ad eorum intelligentiam progreditur, in consilia practica ducit quae, cum per electionem voluntatis exsecutioni mandantur, nova et commutata 'data' sensibilia producunt. Unde omnis nova rerum intelligentia ipsam rerum situationem concretam immutare solet; et vicissim omnis immutatio situationis concretae ad novas questiones et ad pleniorem rerum intelligentiam ducit.

Qui circulus progressivus tripliciter evolvitur. Primo modo, ut perficientur artes mechanicae et liberales et virtus prudentiae; et sic omnis homo per experientiam addiscere solet. Altero modo, inquantum idem circulus per reflectionem perspectus in methodum scientificam elevatur ... terto denique modo, idem circulus sive ordinarius sive methodicus a philosopho examinatur; et ita prevenitur ad analysim generalem omnis entis proportionati" (pp. 6-7).

148The term "leap in being" comes from Eric Voegelin. It refers to conversion from the cosmological ordering to a more differentiated ordering. Voegelin refers to both the leap to soteriological order in Israel and the leap to anthropological order in Greece. On the "leap in being" in Israel see *Israel and Revelation* (Baton Rouge: Louisiana State University Press, 1956). On the "leap in being" in Greece see *The World of the Polis* (Baton Rouge: Louisiana State University Press, 1957).
differentiation that inaugurates the third stage. Third, there is the potential for the general analysis of interiority grounded in self-appropriation, which could account for the whole realm of proportionate being. The resulting generalized empirical method would direct the progressive cycle such as to integrate the prior two cycles in its higher viewpoint.

A posteriori we can affirm some manner of human progress in history. The creation of technological, economic, political, cultural products is evidence for the effective and intelligent use of human intelligence and the response of human beings to intrinsic value. We can affirm a succession of viewpoints insofar as we acknowledge both the development of theory and the emerging efforts toward a scientific appropriation of interiority.

In summary, the first approximation proposes that if human beings always acted authentically there would be a continuous development of intellect and a consequent historical progress. Its principle is liberty, which empowers persons to act to correct the situation as the need arises. The progress that ensued would follow through a succession of higher viewpoints that would constitute specific stages in the progress of human history.

I. The Second Approximation: Decline

The first approximation is an ideal representation of human operation: it is what would happen if all choices were intelligent, reasonable, and responsible. To understand the actual historical situation, however, it is necessary to recognize that human choice results in the failure of persons to observe the transcendental precepts, that is, the absence of intelligence, rationality, and responsibility in human acts. The second approximation takes this into account; where an intelligent situation could be there is a situation that reflects in varying degrees both authentic and unauthentic components. Lonergan analyses the unauthentic components in his account of bias.

A. Bias

The violation of the transcendental precepts can occur in a number of ways. First, there is the pre-conscious dramatic bias of the subject resulting from a scotosis, or blind spot, in the individual psyche. A scotosis is a

149 For an account of the progressive cycle in terms of practical, scientific, and philosophic development see DRC, pp. 7-8. The issue is treated at much greater length in I especially chapter six but passim.
150 See I, pp. 191-206, where it is treated as dramatic bias. Especially valuable on the question of psychic distortion is Robert Doran’s work. See Psychic Conversion and Theological Foundations: Toward a Reorientation of the Human Sciences (Chico, California: Scholars Press, 1981) and more recently "From Psychic
primarily unconscious aberration that disrupts the normal operation of the dialectic or compound-in-tension of the dramatic subject. As a result of the scotosis the operation of the pre-conscious censor, which normatively operates constructively to permit appropriate psychic material into consciousness, prevents the emergence into consciousness of those helpful images that might lead to the requisite insight in the concrete situation. The undesired insights and repressed neural demands are re-routed in the psyche to emerge attached to incongruous objects. There can result an incorrect assessment of the situation. In varying degrees there occur patterns of repression, inhibition, neurosis, and in the extreme psychosis. Because the repression is pre-conscious the person affected may be unaware of the source of the difficulty though the result is a distortion in personal development. Because the bias occurs in the dramatic pattern it affects the communication of particular needs and desires and consequently it affects the development of the artistry required for the successful performance of tasks. Dramatic bias constitutes a weakening of the development of common sense and, accordingly, it affects the flow of acts that would recognize and promote successfully the human cooperation, which produces the good of order.

Second, there is the egoism of the individual, which subverts the higher good of order in favour of individual gratification. Whereas dramatic bias disrupts the functioning of the dramatic subject, egoism or individual bias disrupts the normal functioning of the dialectic of community. As we have already indicated, the dialectic of community functions through the negotiation of two contrary tendencies in social living. On the one hand, there is the spontaneous cooperation of human intersubjectivity orientated towards the satisfaction of particular goods. On the other hand, there is the operation of practical intelligence orientated towards the good of order. The individual bias of egoism has its roots in the disruption of the integrity of this basic tension. Egoism is the interference of spontaneity with the development of practical intelligence. Egoists exploit both intelligence and

Conversion to the Dialectic of Community,” in LW 6, 85-107.

15 Lonergan writes in I: "Inasmuch as the scotosis grounds the conscious, affective attitudes of the ego performing in his own private theatre, it also involves the repression of opposite combinations of neural demand functions; and in like manner these demands make their way into consciousness with the affect detached from its initial object and attached to some other more or less incongruous object" (pp. 193-94).

15 Regarding the claim that dramatic bias weakens the development of common sense see I, p. 197.

15 See I, pp. 218-22.

15 See I, pp. 216-17, for Lonergan’s account of the dialectic of community.

15 In I Lonergan writes: "Man does not live exclusively either on the level of intersubjectivity or on the level of detached intelligence. On the contrary, his living is a dialectical resultant springing from those opposed but linked principles; and in the tension of that union of opposites, the root of egoism is readily to be discerned" (p. 219).
intersubjective feeling for their own ends. They ignore that which questions the compatibility of their particular desires with the social order. The interference is not one, which prevents the exercise of a detached, disinterested, practical intelligence; egoists can be quite skillful when their own interests are at stake. Individual bias, however, represents an incomplete development of practical intelligence because it allows individual desires and fears to interfere with the free play of the process.

The actions of egoists are in conflict with the development and operation of the good of order. The greater the distortion the more difficult it is for the order to counteract the effect of egoistic action. The law can handle incidental aberration, but when egoism becomes generally prevalent there is bound to be a deterioration in the effective operation of good of order.

Third, there is group bias. Like egoism, group bias is a disruption of the dialectic tension between intersubjective spontaneity and the development of practical intelligence. Nevertheless, in the egoism of individual bias the desires and fears of the individual disrupt the development of practical intelligence contrary to the demands of intersubjective feeling, while in group bias it is intersubjective feeling which props up the distortion. Group bias, then, is the egoism of the group.

The dialectic of the community functions both through the operation of practical intelligence to produce a good of order and through the adaptation of intersubjective groups to that order. Practical intelligence initiates new ideas to which intersubjective groups adapt. Ideally, there would be a continuous series of new ideas calling forth continuous adaptations in the various intersubjective groups in society. While practical common sense may be of the whole community, responses to its new ideas may differ from group to group. Just as egoists ignore the further questions concerning the compatibility of their desires and fears to the good of order, various groups can resist ideas that promote the good of order rather than their particular group interest.

The development of a social order depends upon the cycle of successive new ideas and the successive adaptation within social groups. Group bias alters this scheme because not all good ideas are operative. Some are inoperative because they will be resisted by some groups. Some ideas will be operative because they receive the support of dominant groups to whom they are advantageous. A distortion in the course of development emerges. Generally, it is the advantaged groups that have the necessary power to win the day, and so there emerge class distinctions based not simply on the division of labour but upon privileged social status. Furthermore, the social order that emerges as a result of group bias is fragmented. Advantaged
groups develop ideologies to rationalize their controlling position in the social order and so become blind to the real situation, which needs correction. Only some of the ideas necessary to development are put in place. The advantaged group directs the distribution of goods to its own advantage at the expense of the less advantaged. Necessary correctives are deemed impractical; because the development is one-sided disadvantaged groups plot their revenge. The degree of distortion will condition the character of their challenge.  

Fourth, there is the general bias of common sense that systematically ignores long-term considerations in favour of short-term practical advantage, that prevents the emergence of further questions beyond its competence on the grounds that they are irrelevant and unpractical, and that constantly adjusts what ought to be to concur with what happens to be done. As we have indicated above, the emergence and survival of the schemes of human activity are in accord with emergent probability. Human beings, however, not only follow the laws of emergent probability but, because of human intellect and choice, "man becomes for man the executor of the emergent probability of human affairs." Accordingly, humankind is able progressively to increase the capacity to realise courses of action. Humankind expands control over the artifacts of their material and social production. Furthermore, besides executing emergent probability human beings can also discover the rule of emergent probability and the manner in which it operates in human affairs. Therefore, "just as technical, economic, and political development gives man a dominion over nature, so also the advance of knowledge creates and demands a human contribution to the control of human history." A consequence of this knowledge is the subordination of common sense to "a human science that is concerned ... not only with knowing history but also with directing it." Thinking on the level of history means being able to go beyond the dramatic bias of the subject and the individual and group biases that distort the dialectic of community to consider in a detached and disinterested way the long-range view.

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guided by the light and darkness of dialectic, the resulting situation is not some intelligible whole but rather a set of misshapen, poorly proportioned, and incoherent fragments" (p. 358). The fragmentation is made worse when combined with general bias discussed below.

159In I Lonergan writes: "Now to a great extent the attitude of the dominant groups determines the attitude of the depressed groups. Reactionaries are opposed by revolutionaries. Progressives are met by liberals. In the former case the situation heads towards violence. In the latter case there is a general agreement about ends with disagreement about the pace of change and the mode and measure of its execution" (p. 225).
161I, p. 227.
162Ibid.
163Ibid.
The concern of common sense, however, is with the practical task of getting things done. It is not equal to the task of thinking on the level of history and therefore cannot choose what higher view might guide it. Insofar as our common sense considers itself omni-competent in its operation it stands in the way of the effective realization of the directives of a human science that would control the course of history according to an understanding of emergent probability. It does this by dismissing the further relevant but non-practical questions which might be addressed by higher specializations of human intelligence. The result of this general bias of common sense is a cumulative succession of increasingly restricted situations in which humankind relinquishes intelligent, rational, and responsible control over the course of history. Human living is increasingly at the mercy of the social surd and under the rule of power.

A. The Cycles of Decline

As a consequence of the cumulative effect of this fourfold bias there occurs a regressive cycle of decline. It is initiated by a flight from understanding. By virtue of the decreasing effectiveness of authenticity in human living it leads in the extreme to the corruption of the social situation, the complete compromise of authentic scientific investigation, and suppression of all further questions relevant to the long-range point of view.164

Human history is in accord with emergent probability: intellect grasps possible schemes of recurrence and these become actual in accord with successive schedules of probability. Accordingly, in the ideal line of progress there is a cumulative and progressive cycle. At each stage of development intelligence grasps the possible alternatives which human choice makes effective. The result is a succession of improved situations and higher viewpoints. The existence of bias results in a social situation in which there occur both authentic elements arising from the normative exercise of human intelligence and choice and elements that originate from the effect of individual, group, and general bias. There results a significant residue.

Lonergan introduces the notion of the empirical residue in Insight.165 The empirical residue is positive empirical data that, although lacking any immanent intelligibility of its own, is connected to a higher intelligibility. It is that from which understanding abstracts. The existence of elements in the social situation resulting from bias produces a residue, which Lonergan calls the social surd.166 The social surd is a residue that is immanent in the

164 See DRC, p. 7.
165 I, pp. 25-32.
166 The term social surd Lonergan derives from the characteristics it shares with the mathematical surd. Lonergan writes in I: "A surd is a surd because it is not the rational fraction that intelligence anticipates it to be" (p. 21).
social situation but it is not intelligible and from it we cannot intelligently abstract.\textsuperscript{167} We can imagine the resulting social situation to be like the complex variable in mathematics.

The existence of unintelligible elements in the social situation prevents the development along the course of an ideal line of progress. The situation at each stage of the historical process is a product of practical intelligence and intersubjectivity. The combination of group and general bias produces a distorted dialectic of community.\textsuperscript{168} With the introduction of the social surd, at each stage of the process there is a disregard of ideas that would contribute to the solution of difficulties. There follow schemes of recurrence composed of the now complex situation, the exercise of practical intelligence, and the biases of the group and common sense. These basic schemes result in a cycle of decline in which the social situation deteriorates cumulatively.

Lonergan distinguishes two cycles of decline, a shorter cycle and a longer cycle. The shorter cycle is a consequence of group bias. The operation of group bias favours the introduction of certain ideas because they are less likely to meet resistance, especially of the dominant groups who might veto them. For example, technical changes are more easily introduced than changes in the economic and political order. Though the dominant group exercises power it must do so in the face of an expanding social surd and the increasing demands of the depressed classes.\textsuperscript{169} Those ideas rejected by the dominant groups are taken up by depressed groups.\textsuperscript{170} Conflict ensues. As the dominant group loses its ability or will to control the situation it is replaced by the representatives of the depressed classes, who now attempt to implement the previously neglected ideas. Thus, the shorter cycle tends to reverse itself as the depressed groups over time wrest power from the dominant minorities whose day is done.\textsuperscript{171}

\textsuperscript{167}See I, p. 230.
\textsuperscript{168}See I, p. 226.
\textsuperscript{170}Ibid., p. 226.
\textsuperscript{171}Lonergan writes in I: "There is the minor principle of group bias which tends to generate its own corrective" (p. 235). The term dominant minorities comes from Toynbee who distinguishes creative and dominant minorities. Creative minorities are responsible for the period of progress while dominant minorities represent that period when creativity has stopped and the desire to consolidate power has become the primary end of the group. See A Study of History, vol. 1, pp. 244-46; 371-75. Lonergan refers to these categories on a number of occasions in his post-Method writings. For example, in the article "Dialectic of Authority" in TC he writes: "The creative minority are the representatives of progress. They are the leaders that gain the adhesion of the masses by successfully meeting the challenge of each successive situation. The dominant minority are the representatives of decline. They inherit the power of the creative minority, but they are unable to solve the problems that continuously multiply" (p. 10).
The longer cycle of decline is a consequence of the general bias of common sense.\textsuperscript{172} It is the failure by all groups to take up the task of the long-range point of view, on the grounds that it is impractical; instead of increasing the human contribution to the intelligible control of human history it is diminished.

In the first place, the longer cycle of decline produces a social situation, which deteriorates cumulatively. While progress meets each successive situation to produce new ideas, general bias neglects further relevant questions resulting instead in a cumulative departure from coherence. The result is increased fragmentation and conflict. Anomalies penetrate the objective situation. Sluggishness and stagnation replace the dynamism of progress. Lonergan writes: "In the limit, the only discernible intelligibility in the objective facts is an equilibrium of economic pressures and a balance of national powers."\textsuperscript{173}

In the second place, the longer cycle reveals the diminishing relevance of a detached and disinterested desire to know. In particular the cultural superstructure, whose role it is to consider the long-range point of view, becomes increasingly irrelevant to daily living, for though intelligence can link the cultural superstructure and infrastructure it can do so only if concrete living is intelligible. As we have seen, in the longer cycle this is not the case.

In the third place, there is eventually a surrender of the detached and disinterested desire to know. There is a minor surrender of common sense in which a fragmented common sense sets the standard to which common sense must conform. There is also a major surrender of speculative thought as ideologies, which take their stand on things as they are, set this standard against the norms based on the exigencies of our conscious intentionality. The result is radically uncritical ideologies, which cannot distinguish progress from decline. Moreover, the cumulative expansion of the social surd provides the rationale for dropping previously held principles in favour of conformity to "the way things are." In this way there occur the successive lower viewpoints in which each theory adjusts to an increasingly fragmented practice.\textsuperscript{174} In the long run "human activity settles down to a decadent routine, and initiative becomes the privilege of violence."\textsuperscript{175} For though we are essentially free the range of our effective freedom, limited by the objective situation and our own incapacities and bias, reduces the probabilities of altering the situation.\textsuperscript{176}

\textsuperscript{172}I, p. 226.
\textsuperscript{173}Ibid., p. 229.
\textsuperscript{174}Lonergan gives as his example of the longer cycle the historical movement in the west from the medieval synthesis to the modern balance of powers. An excellent application of this can be found in an article by John Dunne, "Realpolitik in the Decline of the West," \textit{Review of Politics} 21 (1959), 131-50.
\textsuperscript{175}I, p. xiv.
\textsuperscript{176}In \textit{I} Lonergan writes: "The difference between essential freedom and effective freedom is the difference between a dynamic structure and its operational
Finally, a word must be said about the relationship between the shorter and the longer cycles of decline. Clearly the shorter cycle can occur in conjunction with the longer cycle, for general bias does not exclude the possibility of group bias. But general bias constitutes the major principle of decline while group bias constitutes a minor principle of decline.\textsuperscript{177} Group bias tends to correct itself with the demise of the dominant minority and the emergence of new leadership. Although general bias can reverse itself "it does so only by confronting human intelligence with the alternative of adopting a higher viewpoint or perishing."\textsuperscript{178} It is Lonergan's view that Marx made the error of failing to distinguish the minor and the major principle of decline. He grasped that the minor principle would correct itself more quickly through class war and concluded from this that a proletariat revolution would accelerate progress. In fact, the class war accelerated the longer cycle and resulted quite quickly in totalitarian rule.\textsuperscript{179}

A. Cosmopolis and the Problem of Reversal

Lonergan's understanding of the dialectic of progress and decline challenges basic assumptions of both the liberal and Marxist theories of history. On the one hand, the liberal theory of automatic progress fails to take into account the fact of bias and, therefore, cannot grasp the cycle of decline. The result is the inability to understand both the social situation that in fact emerges and the consequent need for reversal of the cycle. On the other hand, though the Marxist view takes bias into account, it fails to differentiate group bias and general bias and, therefore, misconstrues the effect of class war on the overall cycle. Furthermore, it assumes the possibility of eliminating the division of labour and the eventual withering away of the state. In Lonergan's view, because intelligence and intersubjectivity are permanent features of humankind, the dialectic of community must continue to function. The elimination of the division of labour and the withering away of the state would indicate the collapse of civilization rather than the achievement of its ultimate goal.

Lonergan does not subscribe to either the liberal or Marxist anticipations range. Man is free essentially inasmuch as possible courses of action are grasped by practical insight, motivated by reflection, and executed by decision. But man is free effectively to a greater or less extent inasmuch as this dynamic structure is open to grasping, motivating, and executing a broad or a narrow range of otherwise possible courses of action. Thus, one may be essentially but not effectively free to give up smoking.\textsuperscript{177-20}

\textsuperscript{177}See I, p. 235.
\textsuperscript{178}Ibid.
\textsuperscript{179}Ibid. Also see Robert Doran, \textit{Theology and the Dialectics of History}, pp. 387-417, for a thorough critical analysis of Marx's dialectical materialism based on Lonergan's understanding of the dialectic of history.
of the future course of history. What, then, are the prospects for reversing the decline that might guide present practice? The implications of the longer cycle for human history would seem to indicate an inevitable slide into either total destruction or a single world empire based on totalitarian rule in which "the objective social surd will be matched by a disunity of minds all warped but each in its private way." It is general bias, which generates the longer cycle of decline. Common sense deals with the particular; it cannot assume responsibility for the long-range point of view. Lacking such a viewpoint common sense is incapable of reversing the slide.

On the basis of Lonergan's assumption of the rule of emergent probability, nothing is inevitable in the course of history. What is needed is a higher viewpoint. Lonergan writes:

There is a convergence of evidence for the assertion that the longer cycle is to be met, not by any idea or set of ideas on the level of technology, economics, or politics, but only by the attainment of a higher viewpoint in man's understanding and making of man. The needed higher viewpoint would be an expansion of the basic principle that human conscious intentionality has immanent in its operation a set of norms, which we do not have to invent or impose. There is both progress and decline. But progress produces the possibility of successive higher viewpoints, which could produce a critical science of humankind that could distinguish the liberty that generates progress from the bias that generates decline. Such a viewpoint could anticipate the possible course of history. It would function, not on the level of the social infrastructure, but at the level of culture. Culture operates in the same compound-in-tension as operates in the dialectic of the subject and the dialectic of the community. It represents our capacity to pursue and sustain common meanings, which could orientate our practical living. It is not a technology, an economy, nor a political system but the meaning that we attach to these systems. Lonergan writes:

Now if men are to meet the challenge set by major decline and its longer cycle, it will be through their culture that they do so. Were man a pure intelligence, the products of philosophy and human science would be enough to sway him. But as the dialectic in the individual and in society reveals, man is a compound-in-tension of intelligence and intersubjectivity, and it is only through the parallel compound of a culture that his tendencies to aberration can be offset proximately and effectively.

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180 Ibid., p. 233.
181 Ibid.
182 Ibid., pp. 236-37. Lonergan does not elaborate on the particular structure of the dialectic of culture, but an account of the dialectic of culture based on Lonergan's
The key to the function of culture as a higher viewpoint is the observance of the exigencies of the detached and disinterested desire to know. Lonergan writes:

The general bias of common sense has to be counterbalanced by a representative of detached intelligence that both appreciates and criticizes, that identifies the good neither with the new nor with the old, that, above all else, neither will be forced into an ivory tower of ineffectualness by the social surd nor, on the other hand, will capitulate to its absurdity.  

That representative of detached intelligence operating at the level of culture, which constitutes a higher viewpoint for the reversal of the longer cycle Lonergan calls cosmopolis.

Cosmopolis is a possibility that can be anticipated heuristically on the basis of the features of human authenticity operating at the level of culture at the third plateau. Cosmopolis promotes historical progress. Its job is to "prevent practicality from being short-sightedly practical and so destroying itself." Because it operates at the level of culture it is above law and politics. It rests on a critical theory of human history that can distinguish progress and decline. Cosmopolis would make operative the timely and fruitful ideas that otherwise are inoperative. It is a withdrawal from practicality for the purpose of saving practicality. That withdrawal is "a dimension of consciousness, a heightened grasp of historical origins, a discovery of historical responsibilities." It would produce a culture that would promote progress and resist the sources of decline. It is the higher synthesis of the liberal thesis, which asserts automatic progress, and the Marxist antithesis of dialectical materialism. As such, it serves a critical function with respect to group and general bias and with respect to theories of history that would contribute to the longer cycle. Finally, Lonergan’s understanding of the dialectic of history would itself be a basis for the fuller determination of cosmopolis.

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work can be found in Robert Doran’s Theology and the Dialectics of History, pp. 473-558.

183 I, p. 237.

184 In I Lonergan writes: "Still, what is cosmopolis? Like every other object of human intelligence, it is in the first instance an X, what is to be known when one understands. Like every other X, it possesses some known properties and aspects that lead to its fuller determination" (p. 238).

185 Ibid., p. 239.

186 Ibid.

187 Ibid., p. 241.
The Third Approximation: Redemption

The persistence of the general bias results in the succession of lower viewpoints that is the longer cycle of decline. The notion of cosmopolis represents a higher cultural viewpoint that would direct the reversal of the longer cycle. There is, nevertheless, a great difficulty to be met. If we want recovery from the longer cycle we have to deal with the problems of moral impotence.

Moral impotence follows from incomplete intellectual and existential development. When development is incomplete we do not take the time to discover necessary practical insights and we are unwilling to be persuaded to choose courses of action. The result is a gap between the essential freedom we might have and the effective freedom we actually do possess. We fail to sustain the willingness that would adhere to the exigencies of authentic knowing and living. The consequence of this is that our knowing, individually and collectively, is subject to the cumulative effects of bias. Lonergan writes: "Essentially the problem lies in an incapacity for sustained development."188 It is a permanent feature of human living because it derives from the fundamental tension that constitutes humankind. Our detached and disinterested desire to know stands in permanent opposition and tension with the attachments and interests of our sensitivity and intersubjectivity.

Accordingly, there is the problem of successfully communicating the higher viewpoint of cosmopolis to a culture suffering the effects of the social surd. Even if the ideal of cosmopolis is communicated, those under the sway of group and general bias must be persuaded to give up their distorted interests and allegiances to embrace the ideals of the higher viewpoint. Even those committed to the task of cosmopolis will discover the many obstacles to a sustained commitment in the face of the social surd. For, in fact, the reach of our desire is greater than our attainment. Good intentions and moral precepts are fine but they do not of themselves produce the concrete good of order. An effective number of persons must be persuaded to act for the common good but most would rather someone else made the sacrifice. We must possess the sustained effort of mind to come up with solutions and the endless patience to effect real human collaboration. Hence, Plato's Republic and More's Utopia are blueprints for societies that never were while Machiavelli's The Prince has its influence in political practice.

Furthermore, the nature of the social surd is such that human intelligence cannot in principle make sense of what in fact has no immanent intelligibility. Though we know things are not the way they should be, we lack the resources to reverse the situation. The problem is radical and permanent, for we cannot solve the problem based on our own intelligence, reasonableness, and responsibility. Even if we were to develop a philosophy that correctly assessed the situation and proposed a proper course of action

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188I, p. 630.
for its reversal, could we, ourselves, translate our knowing consistently into action? Would such a proposal be amenable to those who controlled and benefitted from the actual situation? The problem is radical and permanent because it is rooted in the dynamic tension of our own consciousness that is the basis for each and every human act. The problem is real as is abundantly illustrated in human history. The problem is a problem because the unrestricted reach of our desire to know demands an intelligibility beyond the mere fact of the social surd. The problem demands a solution that in principle cannot be a function of our effort alone, for the problem originates with us. In short, we have need of redemption.

Human beings seek out a further intelligibility as the existence of the problem leads to questions regarding its solution. Thus Lonergan writes:

The facts of good and evil, of progress and decline, raise questions about the character of the universe. Such questions have been put in very many ways, and the answers given have been ever more numerous. But behind this multiplicity there is a basic unity that comes to light in the exercise of transcendental method. We can inquire into the possibility of fruitful inquiry. We can reflect on the nature of reflection. We can deliberate whether our deliberation is worthwhile. In each case there arises the question of God.189

The fact of evil is a problem; because it is a problem it raises questions about the nature of God. In Insight Lonergan argues that this universe in all its aspects and details is "the product of unrestricted understanding, of unlimited power, of complete goodness."190 If this is the case then God, who is omnipotent, knows our situation and therefore can solve it. Because God is all good God wills the solution. Therefore, the existence of God indicates that there is a further intelligibility, beyond that of proportionate being, to be grasped. Accordingly, we add a supernatural dimension to the compound of progress and decline. There is a fact of evil, there is a reign of sin, and if the universe is ultimately intelligible then there must be an appropriate supernatural solution to the problem.191

Lonergan identifies the appropriate solution as a higher integration of human living. As a higher viewpoint it would promote and sustain the efforts of cosmopolis to transform the longer cycle. It would constitute a call to persons and communities to reverse the present course and transform their living. This changed living would alter the probabilities inherent in the twofold dialectic of progress and decline. For Lonergan, the source of the

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189MT, p. 101.
190I, p. 694.
191Lonergan's argument for the existence of transcendental knowledge beyond proportionate being can be found in chapter nineteen of I. Lonergan was to revise his approach to the question in MT but his argument in I remains a valid one. For Lonergan's comments on this issue see "Insight Revisited," SC, p. 277.
solution is the redemptive process. It is God's gift of grace to individuals and communities through conversion and by the kerygma of authentic religious revelation. Given the fact of decline the explication of how supernatural grace functions in the recovery of humankind to its progress course constitutes the third approximation of Lonergan's theory of history.

The divine solution to the problem of evil introduces supernatural conjugates into human intentional process. Just as psychic conjugates order the coincidental manifolds of lower organic process, just as intelligent conjugates order the data of the sensitive psyche, so the supernatural conjugates will constitute a higher integration of human activity. The higher integration of the supernatural conjugates solves the problem of human living by controlling elements that otherwise are non-systematic or irrational. It integrates the lower order conjugates of authentic human operation into the higher order. It transforms those elements of the social surd by turning evil into good. The operation of the supernatural conjugates is in accord with emergent probability; therefore, the integrity of the lower orders is maintained, just as in the case of the sublation of the sensitive psyche to intellect. It causes a shift in the probabilities of emergence and of survival of healthy schemes of recurrence in the dialectic of history.

The relevant supernatural conjugates are faith, hope, charity, and mystery. "Faith is the knowledge born of religious love." It follows upon religious conversion, the experienced fulfillment of our unrestricted drive to self-transcendence. Through it there is an apprehension of transcendent value. It makes human beings aware of the existence of a solution to the problem and aware of the need of humankind to collaborate with God in that solution. The apprehension of transcendent value provides hope where, under the domination of the longer cycle of decline, there appeared to be none. Such hope sustains concrete living in the effort to collaborate in the divine solution. Charity is a love that can convert the "heart of stone" into "the heart of flesh" and so transform evil into good. Charity transforms human willingness to cooperate with the divine solution. Finally, mystery functions to transform the human psyche. Human sensitivity needs symbols, and supernatural mystery provides humankind with symbols appropriate to the transformation brought about by faith, hope, and charity. True mystery replaces the distorting myths that rationalized the operation of a distorted dialectic of community.

As a result of the operation of the higher conjugate forms the twofold dialectic of progress and decline is transformed from a bi-polar conjunction and opposition to a tri-polar one. There occurs a heightened tension, objectified in the concrete and dialectic succession of historical events, which alters the dynamics of the dialectic of progress and decline. Religious faith is linked with the cognitional and moral self-transcendence that produces progress. It constitutes a fulfillment of that self-

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192 MT, p. 115.
193 See I, p. 728.
transcendence. Furthermore, faith cooperates with progress in the effort to undo decline: to promote faith is to promote progress and to promote progress is to promote faith. It reveals that the universe is ultimately friendly and by doing so it "will liberate human reasonableness from its ideological prisons." Most importantly, it calls us to repentance and initiates a process of conversion that in its fullest manifestation is not only religious but also moral, intellectual, and psychic.

The self-communication of God of the relevant higher conjugates occurs in time and according to divine wisdom. Thus, there is the Incarnation of the Son, his life, death, and resurrection. Specifically, there is the communication of the law of the cross that indicates the way in which evil can be transformed into good. The law of the cross constitutes the specific theological component of Lonergan's theory of history. The law specifies the intelligibility of redemptive action of the birth, death, and resurrection of Jesus Christ. That intelligibility is embodied in the mystery of his self-sacrifice on the cross. In De Verbo Incarnato Lonergan writes: "Scilicet, redemptio fit, non auferendo mala per potentiam, sed ipsa mala subuendo atque per Dei gratiam et bonam voluntatem in bona transformando." We are enjoined by this self-communication to follow the example set by Christ; to live a life informed by divine charity that goes beyond human justice to transform injustice not by evening out the scales but by transforming the injustice through acts of charity. Finally, the movement initiated by Christ introduces to human history a higher order with which we can cooperate. The understanding of this higher order Lonergan locates in the theology of the Mystical Body. In a theology of the Mystical Body we can grasp what we can of the part human history plays in the ongoing missions of the Trinity. Lonergan's theory of history is ultimately Trinitarian.

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194 MT, p. 117.
195 On religious, moral, and intellectual conversion and their relation to each other see MT, pp. 122-24; 240-44. The term psychic conversion originates with Robert Doran. See Psychic Conversion and Theological Foundations: Toward a Reorientation of the Human Sciences. Lonergan agreed with the expansion of the threefold conversion to include a position on psychic conversion. See "Questionnaire on Philosophy," p. 31, and "Reality, Myth, and Symbol."
196 Lonergan explores the connection between the dialectic of history and the Incarnation in DRC.
197 Lonergan writes in De Verbo Incarnato (1960 ed.): "Intelligentia quae quæritur non est vel mera non-repugnantia vel necessitas absoluta vel necessitas conditionata sed positiva illa conveniencia quae de facto in revelatis et traditis inventur" (p. 676). Also in De Verbo Incarnato (1960 ed.), p. 553.
199 See I, pp. 742-43.
200 Relevant would be his discussion of the missions of the divine persons. See especially chapter six of Divinarum Personarum Conceptionem Analogicam (Rome: Gregorian University, 1959), pp. 196-240, or in English translation De Deo Trino II, pars systematica seu Divinarum Personarum Conceptio Analogica,
Thus, the redemptive action of God accomplished through the Incarnation, experienced concretely in the religious encounter and the experience of conversion, known by means of the message of salvation communicated by the religious community, and discerned through the interior action of the spirit, improves the probabilities for real progress in human history. The redemptive action of God operates to convert human hearts so they may cooperate with the divine solution to the problem of evil. By our cooperation we help transform evil into good by means of the just and mysterious law of the cross. Furthermore, we are brought into the divine order in history by our elevation into the Mystical Body.

I. Dialectic of History and Praxis

Lonergan did not intend his analysis of the dialectic of history to be simply an exercise in pure theory. The scissors analogy includes both an upper and a lower blade. While the upper blade provides the general viewpoint for analysis, the lower blade provides the material to be analyzed. We can apply the upper blade to the concrete historical situation. Accordingly, the analysis of the dialectic of history is meant as a tool for ongoing praxis appropriate to the third plateau. In his earliest essay devoted to the question Lonergan indicates the important function of a theory of history for reversing the longer cycle of decline. We find the same emphasis in Insight. In Method in Theology Lonergan expands the
context with the development of functional specialization, which divides theology into mediated and mediating phases. Dialectic, aiming at a comprehensive viewpoint, functions to critically mediate differences in viewpoints. Foundations, on the basis of religious, moral, and intellectual conversion, establishes basic positions which then operate in the functional specialties doctrines, systematics, and communication to mediate future praxis.

In his essay "Natural Right and Historical Mindedness" Lonergan outlines an expansion of his theory of history that clarifies its critical and practical functions. He sets forth the dialectic of history under six headings. First, human meaning develops as a result of human collaboration. Second, this human meaning develops and expands in a succession of plateaus. Third, Lonergan indicates the specific ideals proper to the third plateau. These are: (1) the ideals of self-knowledge such that the similarities and differences between common sense, science, and history are grasped in interiority; (2) beyond such knowledge of knowledge there are the ideals grasped through a knowledge of affectivity manifested in the threefold love of the family, community, and God; (3) the ideals originating in the self-transcendence of intellectual, moral, and religious conversion. Fourth, Lonergan indicates the need of a critique of our historicity. This critique proceeds from the categories derived from the three preceding headings. The critique will be dialectical. It will distinguish the meanings appropriate to each level. It will critically analyze the development that is going forward. Fifth, Lonergan notes the ambiguity of first- and second-plateau minds living in third-plateau contexts. Thus, first-plateau minds criticize the third-plateau context for a lack of action while a second-plateau mind criticizes the "neglect of Aristotle or Hegel." Sixth, Lonergan notes that beyond dialectic there is dialogue in which issues can be transposed amongst willing participants from "a conflict of statements to an encounter of persons." In this transposition the ambiguity of the fifth point can work towards resolution by virtue of the authentic operation of human self-transcendence.

This expansion of Lonergan's conception of the dialectic of history indicates that Lonergan understands the dialectic of history as a praxis. Lonergan's interest in the dialectic of history ultimately concerned the possibilities for redemptive praxis in the context of the third plateau. Not only does it provide a critique of praxis, it suggests that through the liberty of personal relationships incomplete positions can be overcome and the beginning of the redemptive process of reversing the longer cycle of decline

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interferences that favour oversight, what finally, do the answers to such questions imply for the guidance of human thought and action" (p. xiv-xv). The emphasis is mine.

203NRHM, p. 179.
204Ibid, p. 181.
205Ibid, p. 182.
can begin. Ultimately, the liberty of personal relationships is understood within the redemptive order of the Mystical Body and sustained by the healing action of God's grace, both operative and cooperative. Accordingly, because of its importance in the development of persons and personal relationships, conversion holds special significance for the dialectic of history. It is by means of religiously transformed persons that the community of redemption plays its part in the historical mission of the church.

I. Summary

Lonergan arrives at an understanding of the structure of history by applying the model of threefold approximation. The three fundamental differentials are progress, decline, and redemption or recovery. There are three differentials because human beings are intelligent and can exercise free choice. Because of free choice human beings can either follow intelligent dictates or not follow them. This fact identifies the dynamic structure of history as a dialectic, for dialectic is a concrete unfolding of linked but opposed principles of change. In this case progress and decline constitute two opposed principles, opposed as evil is to good and right is to wrong, which in each case when acted upon changes the flow of historical events constituted by human acts. Furthermore, the fact of unintelligent choice results in the social surd which intelligence cannot resolve. This situation constitutes the basic problem of evil. The supernatural solution corrects and alters the basic form of the dialectic to include the corrective of redemptive action. Thus, the form of the general theory includes the three differentials and the pure form of the dialectic that constitutes the relation among them. Derived from the notion of progress are the three plateaus or stages of history. Decline introduces us to the individual bias of egoism, group bias, and general bias. This basic form provides the upper blade for a theory of history that includes not only the natural component but also the supernatural component. Relevant to this component are the supernatural conjugate forms and the law of the cross.

Furthermore, there is a lower blade, and consequently the dialectical theory of history in its full application is not simply theory but a guide to praxis. As such it functions as a basic form from which we can develop a critical attitude. Its analysis can provide the basis for sorting out differences and mediating the development of the human sciences. Finally, the basic form of dialectic of history can be employed in orientating redemptive praxis so that in personal relationships the reversal of the reign of sin that

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206 Lonergan indicates this more complex context in the epilogue of I. See pp. 731; 742-43. See also "Mystical Body of Christ," a domestic exhortation given at the Jesuit Seminary, Toronto, 1951.
is the longer cycle of decline can begin.
THE ORDER AND DATING OF THE MANUSCRIPTS

Just as an artist might first sketch the general form of a painting before attending to the details, up to now we have been involved with the broad strokes of our study. The first two chapters presented the historical context for approaching Lonergan’s work, sketched the foundations for his notion of the dialectic of history, and indicated its elements. The purpose of this was to provide the background for the main task of presenting and interpreting the documents under study. We need now to begin the process of attending to those details which can either affirm the acumen of the initial sketch, lead to its modification, or perhaps even assign it to the dustbin.

The plan for this chapter is to consider the dating and order of the manuscripts. This requires a shift in our focus to the tasks of the functional specialty "research" whose job it is to make available the relevant data. Consequently, we must determine what is relevant among the manuscripts under study for the purposes of our ultimate aim which is to understand the origins of Lonergan’s notion of the dialectic of history. We need to reach some tentative assessment, based on the evidence in the manuscripts, of when they were written. Additionally, in the process of reading and re-reading the manuscripts I noticed a pattern of development in Lonergan’s thought. Moreover, it became clear to me, that this development could effectively be divided into two stages based on a shift in Lonergan’s understanding of the issue. Although the proof of this claim can only be established in the presentation of the documents, in this chapter the initial hypothesis is presented.

1.1 The Manuscripts of File 713

Manuscripts discovered among Lonergan’s personal papers after his death in November of 1984 in a folder marked "History," subsequently housed in the archives of the Lonergan Research Institute in Toronto, provide us with the primary data for our study. Their discovery was unusually exciting because there is little primary material available from
Lonergan's student years in Rome. The manuscripts would, therefore, be of great relevance to anyone interested in Lonergan's development because they fill this major lacuna in the material we have for study. They have the added attraction of being an early expression of an important element of his mature thought, which reveals that even during his student days in the 1930s Lonergan was on to something original. They are, as we shall see, the principal source for the data on the origins of Lonergan's notion of the dialectic of history.

The list of the contents of the file indicates twelve separate items. Of the twelve items, seven essays or sketches primarily concern our study. These are as follows: item 2, "Analytic Concept of History" [hereafter ACH(2)]; item 3, "Pantôn Anakephalaiósis" [hereafter PA(1)]; item 6, "Sketch for a Metaphysic of Human Solidarity" [hereafter SMHS]; and "Pantôn Anakephalaiósis - A Theory of Human Solidarity" [hereafter PA(1)]; item 7, "Analytic Concept of History, In Blurred Outline" [hereafter ACH(1)]; item 9, "Philosophy of History" [hereafter PH]; item 11, "A Theory of History" [hereafter TH]; and item 12, "Outline of an Analytic Conception of History" [hereafter OACH]. Items 8 and 10, although not essays, are relevant to our study. Item 8 is a single page titled "Essay in Fundamental Sociology" followed by a transcription in Greek from Plato's *Republic*. It is highly probable that this is the title page to a larger essay of which "Philosophy of History" is a part. Item 10 contains two pages of handwritten comments on an essay by Lonergan written by an unnamed professor. An examination of the notes indicates that they concern the first twelve pages of "Pantôn Anakephalaiósis - A Theory of Human Solidarity." There is, as well, a final comment which might concern the "Sketch for a Metaphysic of Human Solidarity." The remaining three items contain Lonergan's notes on readings and comments on the subject of history.

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207 John Hochban of the Lonergan Research Institute catalogued the material of File 713.

208 The note reads: "Your Sketch - one or two criticisms to give. But it is excellent."

209 The remaining items from the file are of interest in that they reveal something of what Lonergan read on the subject in the 1930s and 1940s. Item 1 contains a summary of the first six chapters of *A Study of History* by Toynbee; a handwritten page titled "Heard, Gerald: The Ascent of Humanity (London 1929 [indecipherable]) p. 260"; one handwritten page titled "Society"; a handwritten page titled "Berdyaev, Nicolas, The Meaning of History"; and one handwritten page and one typewritten page each titled "Historical Analysis." We know that Lonergan read *A Study of History* after his return to Canada in 1940. So, although his notes on Toynbee are of great interest, they are not among the documents relevant to his development prior to 1940. Item 4 contains comments on Emile Bréhier's article "The Formation of Our History of Philosophy" from *Philosophy and History: Essays Presented to Ernest Cassirer*, edited by Raymond Klibansky and H.J. Paton (New York: Harper and Row, [1935] 1963) and a bibliography from the article. Item 5 contains comments on J. Huizinga's article "Definition of the Concept of History" from the same volume.
1.1 Division of the Manuscripts

The relevant manuscripts can be conveniently divided into two groups which we will call batch A and batch B. The division is based on a tentative assessment of the date of composition for each of the manuscripts and the evidence that there are two clear phases in Lonergan's development on the question. The evidence for the dating will be presented in the next section below. As for the question of Lonergan's development, the evidence for the claim is assembled in the exposition of the manuscripts in chapters 4 and 5 to follow. This evidence will be explicitly considered in chapter 6. For the present this tentative division is indicated without detailed proof.

The first group, batch A, consists of four manuscripts. I tentatively suggest the maximum range for the date of composition of these manuscripts to be in the period from 1933 to 1936. The four manuscripts are: PA(1), which is twenty-five pages in length, dated 1935, and signed by the author; PA (2), which is five pages; (3) SMHS, which is five pages; and PH, a section from a larger work, probably the "Essay in Fundamental Sociology," which is thirty-five pages long. The main focus of the first three manuscripts is not the question of history. Lonergan intends to develop in these manuscripts a theory of human solidarity relevant to the theology of the Mystical Body of Christ. The question of history, however, proves to be an essential element of this theory. There is discussion by Lonergan of "dialectic" and "history" drawn from his work in the PH. There is an investigation into what Lonergan calls "the historical determination of the intellect," which considers, in the context of an analysis of human intellect, elements of the dialectic of history. The overall effort is directed towards establishing the formal or "metaphysical" element for the theology of the Mystical Body. For these reasons these essays are relevant to our study. PH is the only remaining part of a longer essay of at least 130 pages. It deals specifically with the philosophy of history and it is probably the earliest evidence we have of Lonergan’s thinking on the question. We include this essay with the three essays on human solidarity because it dates from the same time period, Lonergan's thinking on the dialectic of history is at a comparable level of development with the rest of the documents in batch A, and Lonergan has not yet explicitly presented the material in the context of the threefold approximation characteristic of the second set of documents.

The documents of batch B deal specifically with the theory of history, based on the model of the threefold approximation, which Lonergan referred to in "Insight Revisited." It is most likely that he wrote this group

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210 The document that we have ends on page 130. It is impossible to determine if this also represents the end of the original manuscript though it is clearly the end of the section.
in 1937-38, during his tertianship. The dates concur with Lonergan's own statement concerning the time he worked on the theory of history.\footnote{211}{See p. xiii–iv, note 36 above.} It is possible that he could have continued the work during the summer of 1938, prior to the beginning of his assigned biennium, while doing pastoral work in Ireland and England.\footnote{212}{See Frederick Crowe, "A Note on Lonergan's Dissertation," p. 1. As all the manuscripts of both batch A and B are typed on what appears to be the same machine, whether or not Lonergan brought it with him to Ireland and England would limit the possible dates of composition.} Batch B consists of four essays: TH, which is nine pages; ACH(1), which is nineteen pages; ACH(2), which is fifteen pages; and OACH, which is nineteen pages. In three of the four manuscripts he refers to his theory as "the analytic conception of history." These three exhibit a common pattern of exposition with some minor variations. The manuscripts are more in the nature of sketches than essays. They are, however, very suggestive, rich in content, and indicate clearly the basic elements and structure of his theory. They show a marked development beyond the manuscripts of batch A with regard to the question of the dialectic of history. "A Theory of History," on the other hand, is somewhat less developed and so would have been written earlier. It does not refer to the "analytic conception of history," though the fundamental elements of the theory are present. It marks an intermediary stage between the work in the first set of manuscripts and those explicitly dealing with the "analytic conception of history." In his treatment of the basic form of the dialectic, it concurs with the latter manuscripts and so, although we will relate its contents separately, we include it among the documents of batch B.

These manuscripts, both batch A and batch B, are more in the nature of drafts than finished products and were not intended for publication. Lonergan writes at the beginning of the manuscript "Pantôn Anakephalaiôsis - A Theory of Human Solidarity":

> I trust the reader will be more inclined to be satisfied with suggestive ideas than to be exigent in the matter of logical development, exhaustive citation, careful exposition. The former is to some extent within the range of possibility for a student; the latter is not.\footnote{213}{PA(1), p. i.} They are, however, part of Lonergan's effort to work on fundamental questions and to give expression to ideas that were emerging with great rapidity at this time. Frederick Crowe, commenting on this period of Lonergan's development, writes: "Not only are the sources on Lonergan's early years accumulating but also there is a fascination, difficult to resist, in that now nearly legendary time so fertile in ideas, so charged with enthusiasm, so bright with possibility."\footnote{214}{Frederick E. Crowe, "A Note on Lonergan's Dissertation and Its Introductory Pages," p. 1.}
sketched without detailed proof or explanation. Some manuscripts indicate more in their outline than we actually find in their text. Difficulty in the analysis of these manuscripts stems in part from the very reach of Lonergan’s questions.\textsuperscript{215} Consider, for example, the following indication by Lonergan of his subject matter for the essay PA(1): "For to write on the Pauline conception of our Blessed Lord as the anakephalaiōsis of all things presupposes very definite views on all things, theological, philosophical, historical, social, political, even economic."\textsuperscript{216} In these documents we see clearly the evidence of a highly original and creative thinker who already had begun to explore, prior to the completion of his formal education, themes of his mature work. Noteworthy in the case of his notion of the dialectic of history is that Lonergan has developed a structure that becomes a permanent and central feature of his thought.

1.1 Dating of the Manuscripts

The evidence indicates that Lonergan wrote all the documents between 1933 and 1938. First, there is the relevant biographical information. In 1933 Lonergan left Montreal, where he was teaching at Loyola College, to study theology at the Gregorian University in Rome.\textsuperscript{217} His undergraduate program lasted from the fall of 1933 to the spring of 1937. This was followed in 1937-38 by his tertianship, a final year of Jesuit religious formation, at Amiens, France, and pastoral work in England and Ireland in the summer of 1938.\textsuperscript{218} In the fall of 1938 Lonergan began his doctoral studies in theology. His thesis topic was approved on December 6, 1938, and subsequently submitted on May 1, 1940.\textsuperscript{219} Lonergan then returned to Canada to begin teaching at L’Imaculée-Conception, a Jesuit scholasticate, in Montreal.

We find the first documented evidence of Lonergan’s interest in the dialectic of history in the letter written in January, 1935, from Rome to Fr. Keane in Montreal. In this letter he indicates the existence of a draft on the subject of a Thomistic metaphysic of history.\textsuperscript{220} Assuming that Lonergan is

\footnotesize{\begin{itemize}
\item \textsuperscript{215}The following comments by Frederick E. Crowe from "The Exigent Mind: Bernard Lonergan’s Intellectualism," in \textit{Spirit as Inquiry: Studies in Honor of Bernard Lonergan} (Chicago: Saint Xavier College, 1964), concerning the range of Lonergan’s interest accurately reflect the general thrust of these manuscripts: "If there has been a preoccupation with method and the knowing subject in almost all of his works, it was subordinate to a long-range purpose of knowing better what is, of returning methodically to being" (p. 329).
\item \textsuperscript{216}PA(1), p. i.
\item \textsuperscript{217}See Frederick E. Crowe, "Introduction," C, p. ix.
\item \textsuperscript{218}See Frederick E. Crowe, "A Note on Lonergan’s Dissertation and Its Introductory Pages," p. 1.
\item \textsuperscript{219}Ibid., pp. 3-4.
\item \textsuperscript{220}See p. xiii–iv
\end{itemize}}
reporting his activities since his arrival in Europe, then the earliest possible date for any of the manuscripts is the fall of 1933, the year he arrived in Rome to study theology.

Our assessment of 1938 as the latest date for any of the documents corresponds with the beginning of Lonergan’s doctoral work in theology. We have the evidence from Lonergan himself. In "Insight Revisited" he indicates he developed his theoretical analysis of history in the years 1937 and 1938. These dates correspond to his tertianship at Amiens. In a later letter to Fr. Keane, written from Milltown Park, Dublin, August 10, 1938, Lonergan indicates his keen interest in the subject at this time.221 We do not know how much time Lonergan was able to prudently devote to the subject after beginning his biennium but the task of writing the dissertation, which Lonergan accomplished quite quickly, must have severely limited him.222

Second, the internal evidence of the documents supports that of the biographical material. All of Lonergan’s sources were published prior to 1936, the latest date occurring in a citation from a German journal published in 1935 which we find in PA(1).223 In the batch A documents the references to current events are consistent with our hypothesis that they were written between 1933 and 1936.224 There are a number of references to Pius XI, whose papacy ended in 1939, but no references to Pius XII, who succeeded him. The references to Pius XI are in conjunction with either his encyclical Quadragesimo Anno or the papal letter "Christ the King."225 In the batch B documents Lonergan refers to the Spanish Civil War, but there is no reference to the Second World War; one might expect such a reference had Lonergan written the manuscripts after the start of the war.226

As for the dates of the specific documents we turn first to those of batch

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221See p. xiii–iv above
222As to the rapidity of Lonergan’s work on the dissertation the impending war perhaps sped the work along. It was approved on December 6, 1938, and finished "before the violence of May, 1940" when Lonergan left Italy for Canada. The work, then, was accomplished in a year and a half. See Frederick E. Crowe, "Notes on Lonergan’s Dissertation."
224For instance in the PH we find the following comment on the current political situation: "The political mechanism on which it (liberalism) rests is the ability of England to maintain the balance of power on the continent of Europe - a process that will last just so long as no power on the continent can snap its fingers at England" (p. 115).
226The reference to the Spanish Civil War can be found in ACH(1), p. 13. The Spanish Civil War started in July 1936 and ended in March of 1939.
A. The "Philosophy of History" was probably written first. At the earliest it was written in the fall of 1933, but as it contains some specific references to the political situation in Europe, it was more likely written after Lonergan's first term of studies, which ended in the Spring of 1934. The essay is probably what remains of the draft referred to in the letter to Fr. Keane, cited above, concerning the topic of a Thomistic metaphysics of history. In the letter Lonergan describes the document as follows:

It takes the "objective and inevitable laws" of economics, of psychology (environment, tradition) and of progress (material, intellectual; automatic up to a point, then either deliberate and planned or the end of a civilisation) to find the higher synthesis of these laws in the mystical Body. Primitive psychology, the ancient civilisations of Mesopotamia and Egypt, the Greek city, Hellenism, the Roman empire; then, regalism, the protestant revolt, liberalism, romanticism, communism, modernism, German and Italian Fascism and the Catholic Fascism or Action with Christ as King, - these all work out from metaphysics and psychology together with, of course, the Divine plan of grace.

Although the manuscript now at the Lonergan Archives is incomplete, containing perhaps only one-third of the original, there is enough correspondence between it and Lonergan's description to suggest that it is the one to which he refers. Certainly it is the only available candidate. References to current events and other internal evidence in the document itself do nothing to alter the assessment that it is written prior to the date of the letter, yet after Lonergan's arrival in Europe. As already indicated, the description of the current political situation fits Europe in this period. Furthermore, Lonergan relies considerably on the historian Christopher Dawson, to whom he refers in the essay, for his historical data and analysis. He writes:

Hence we must turn to the pre-historians, and I continue [sic] myself fortunate to be able to draw upon Mr. Christopher Dawson's undoubtedly brilliant and, by the competent, highly praised Age of the Gods. Unfortunately, my memory must act as intermediary between that book and this essay, so I should in advance beg pardon for any

227 William Mathews of the Milltown Institute in Dublin, Ireland, who is working on an intellectual biography of Lonergan, informed me in a letter dated August 16, 1990, that Lonergan took a course on Church History on which he was examined on March 9, 1934. The course was divided into three parts of six weeks each. The third part of the course "dealt with political questions such as the relation of the Church to revolution, liberalism, nationalism, socialism, and bolshevism." These are primary concerns of the essay PH.

228 See note 36 above.

Dawson's *Age of the Gods* was published in 1928, but in *Caring About Meaning*, a series of interviews conducted with Lonergan in 1981 and 1982, Lonergan remarked: "When I was teaching in Regency at Loyola, about 1930-31, I read The Age of the Gods." That he needed to work from memory suggests that Lonergan no longer had access to the book he originally read at Loyola, and this fact most probably puts him in Rome when he wrote this manuscript. Finally, Lonergan refers to what in all probability is the encyclical *Quadragesimo Anno* proclaimed by Pius XI on May 15, 1931. This is the latest date which we can verify with certainty in this document.

Now, fortunately, the document PA(1) is dated 1935 and signed by Lonergan. Lonergan quotes from a work of Donoso Cortes with a note that this was "cited by Eric Pryzwara in *Stimmen der Ziet*, p. 14, April 1935." This would clearly place this document after the first letter to Fr. Keane, which is dated January 22, 1935. SMHS was found clipped together with PA(1) in File 713. Item 10, which is two pages of handwritten comments on PA(1), contains a comment that may apply to the SMHS. All this suggests that it was written about the same time as PA(1). The remaining documents in batch A are similar to PA(1) in content. The document PA(2) appears to be a summary of the longer PA(1) and may, for this reason, have been written somewhat later. Its continuity with PA(1) and its difference from the batch B documents place it around the same time.

The documents in batch B were in all likelihood written in 1937-38. "A Theory of History" is without doubt the earliest. There is no reference to the analytic conception of history, and its formulation of the dialectic is less developed. Of the other three, "Outline of an Analytic Conception of History" is most likely written earlier than either ACH(1) or ACH(2) because it is less precise in its division of material than the other two. It also contains a distinct section on human solidarity and none on dialectic. In the latter two documents solidarity is treated in a specific section on dialectic where

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230 PH, p. 102.
231 Caring About Meaning, p. 9.
232 PH, p. 117. See note above. The encyclical referred to is undoubtedly *Quadragesimo Anno*, issued May 15, 1931, and in particular Part II, section 41. See Pius XI, "*Quadragesimo Anno*: Encyclical Letter on Reconstructing the Social Order."
233 See note 229 above.
234 We note that there appears to be some difference in the division of historical stages. In PA(1) Lonergan distinguishes a dialectic of fact, a dialectic of sin, and a dialectic of thought. In PA(2) he distinguishes a dialectic of fact, a dialectic of sin, and a dialectic of the absolute Geist. Compare PA(1), pp. 4-5, and PA(2), p. 4.
235 In the documents which refer explicitly to the "analytic conception of history" the three moments of the dialectic are progress, decline, and renaissance. In TH the three moments are the natural dialectic, the dialectic of sin, and the supernatural dialectic.
Lonergan appears to integrate the material on human solidarity from OACH.\textsuperscript{236} ACH(1) and ACH(2) are very similar in content and thus it is very difficult to determine which is the earlier and which is the later.\textsuperscript{237} Lonergan would not have seen this until the summer after his final exams.

Let us recapitulate. On the basis of the internal evidence of the documents, we suggest that the earliest possible date of their composition would be in the fall 1933 and the latest the fall of 1938. We can divide them into two distinct groups. Lonergan probably wrote the documents of batch A between 1934 and 1936. The documents of batch B were probably wrote in 1937 and 1938. For a summary of our tentative dating, ordering, and division of the manuscripts see Table 1. We turn now to an exposition of documents themselves.

\textsuperscript{236}In ACH(2), Lonergan writes: "Solidarity makes the dialectic possible." But in both ACH(1) and ACH(2) dialectic has become the fundamental category for the analytic conception of history. In I, chapter VII, Lonergan establishes the functional unity of practical common sense prior to his treatment of dialectic. The relevant sections can be found on pp. 207-18.

\textsuperscript{237}ACH(1), however, can definitely be dated after the spring of 1937. There is a reference there to W.R. Thompson on "descending induction" which can be found in his book \textit{Science and Common Sense} (London: Longmans Green and Co, 1937), pp. 32-33.
DOCUMENTS OF BATCH A

We can now begin to assemble the data from the relevant documents of File 713. We will accomplish this by way of exposition. The art of exposition requires the selection and emphasis of material. It is our intention in this chapter and the next to reflect, as accurately as possible, the materials as they relate to the origins of the dialectic of history. This chapter will consider the first four documents we have designated batch A. They will be considered in the order indicated in Table 1.

During the period of the composition of the documents of batch A Lonergan’s thought was developing rapidly in a number of areas. In the letter to Fr. Keane, Lonergan indicates that, besides an essay dealing with a Thomist metaphysic of history, he had written a 25,000-word essay on the act of faith and an essay on Newman of some 30,000 words. We know as well that Lonergan was pursuing his interest in economics at this time. His interest in the philosophy of history emerges in these manuscripts as a part of Lonergan’s response to the social questions of the day. It is evident that he regards the Western world as being in a state of fragmentation. He grasps the need for a social philosophy coming out of the Catholic tradition which can direct social action. Thus, although his work is theoretical, it is informed by a practical concern. The roots of the social philosophy which Lonergan envisages are in the Thomist intellectualist tradition. In PA(1), for instance, he describes his effort as, among other things, a metaphysic for Catholic action. In PH he writes of the necessity for a social theory which can grasp the nature of progress. A key component of the project will be

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239 Lonergan’s interest in economics dates back to at least 1930. In Caring About Meaning we find the following: "On the economics I worked from 1930 to 1944, set it aside for thirty-two years, then discovered new material and picked it up again five years ago" (p. 225).

240 Concerning the practical import of I see that volume, pp. xiv-xv. The comments would apply to these manuscripts.

241 Lonergan writes: "You can protect the good either by simply sitting back or by advancing with the good; but to advance with the good you have to have a theory of
a theory of history. At a time when Thomists were, by and large, advocates of a non-historical approach, Lonergan's effort to grasp historical process within the context of Thomist metaphysics was quite novel.\footnote{242}

1.1 Essay in Fundamental Sociology

Of all the batch A documents "Philosophy of History" provides the most abundant source of data for our topic. The document itself contains thirty-six typewritten pages numbered 95-130. Unlike all the other manuscripts we are considering, this text is not subdivided. There are occasional handwritten additions and some, although not many, deletions. There is also a single handwritten page, containing the title "Essay in Fundamental Sociology," which consists of a lengthy quotation from Plato's Republic, written in the Greek alphabet. This single page has been catalogued in the Lonergan Archives as a separate item from the thirty-six-page essay "Philosophy of History." The quotation from Plato found on this single page is the famous one from Republic, Book V, where Plato discusses the importance of the philosopher-king for the cessation of political troubles.\footnote{243}

That the numbered pages, headed by the title "Philosophy of History," begin at 95 and end at 130 indicates that this manuscript is part of a larger work which, as far as we know, no longer exists. It is possible, then, that "Philosophy of History" is a part of the "Essay on Fundamental Sociology." There is some evidence that this might indeed be the case. First, there are references in the manuscript to the quote from Plato which is found in the single sheet with the title "Essay in Fundamental Sociology."\footnote{244} Second, the

\footnote{242For specific reference to Lonergan’s contribution to the question and the assessment of its import some significant research has been done by Patrick Byrne, "The Thomistic Sources of Lonergan’s Dynamic World View," The Thomist 46 (1982), 108-45, and David Tracy, The Achievement of Bernard Lonergan.}

\footnote{243Republic, 473d.}

\footnote{244In PH we find the following: "Philosophy emerged with the assertion of its social significance. 'Men and cities will not be happy till philosophers are kings' is the central position of Plato’s Republic, and the Republic is the centre of the dialogues." This is followed by a four-page discussion of Plato’s position. On page 117 the failure of Plato’s proposal is regarded by Lonergan in this essay as the exigence for a higher supernatural viewpoint. And on page 126 Lonergan writes: "For it is only in the philosophy of the church that can be attained the realisation of that conception which Plato could not realise" (p. 126). For it is only in the philosophy of the church that can be attained the realisation of that conception which Plato could not realise. It was true when Plato penned his Republic but it is even more manifestly true to-day that 'Men and cities cannot have happiness unless philosophers are kings.' To the world in its present plight of economic distress and political
description of the contents of an essay Lonergan wrote on the metaphysics of history in his letter to Fr. Keane in 1935 indicates a more extensive essay than we now have at hand in "Philosophy of History." Third, in PA(1) Lonergan makes an explicit connection between the development of a metaphysic of history and the development of a "Summa Sociologica." Lonergan writes:

Any reflection on modern history and its consequent "Crisis in the West" reveals unmistakably the necessity of a Summa Sociologica. A metaphysic of history is not only imperative for the church to meet the attack of the Marxian materialist conception of history and its realization in apostolic Bolshevism: it is imperative if man is to solve the modern politico-economic entanglement, if political and economic forces are to be subjected to the rule of reason, if cultural values and all the achievement of the past is to be saved both from the onslaughts of purblind statesmen and from the perfidious diplomacy of the merely destructive power of communism.\footnote{In PA(1), pp. 17-18.}

The implication is that Lonergan, at this time, regarded "metaphysic of history" and "summa sociologica" as equivalent terms. In PH we find that Lonergan connects his investigation of a philosophy of history to the development of a social philosophy and the use by the Church of a "scientific sociology."\footnote{Lonergan writes in PH: "Finally, there is the new apostolate and the new persecution. These proceed from the conclusions of the dialectic of thought. The Church turns to scientific sociology and missionology" (p. 122). References to social philosophy are passim.} Thus, the internal and external evidence suggests that there is a reasonable probability that PH was in fact originally a part of the longer "Essay on Fundamental Sociology."

The manuscript PH is probably the earliest dealing with the dialectic of history, most likely written in 1933-34 during the first two years of Lonergan's studies in theology at the Gregorian University.\footnote{See pp. 69-70 above.} It is also the longest. In marked contrast to the more concisely formulated arguments of the later documents, especially those of batch B, his ideas here are in a stage of initial formulation. By way of contrast, ACH(2), which Lonergan probably wrote in 1937-38, contains eight divisions each further divided into sections, for a total of thirty-five divisions in eighteen pages. In contrast, PH has no major divisions. Since the thirty-five pages of text in "Philosophy of History" are not subdivided it will be necessary, in the interests of clarity, to suggest some practical division of the material. We have, therefore, divided our exposition of the text as follows: (1) the problem of liberalism; (2) philosophical foundations; (3) the phases of history; (4) the dialectical division of history; (5) the necessity of the supernatural; (6)
the supernatural component of the dialect; and (7) the meaning of history.

\section*{1.2 The Problem of Liberalism}

It is Lonergan's intent in \textit{PH} to develop a Catholic social philosophy, an essential component of which is a philosophy of history. A source of Lonergan's interest resides in the disorder of modern times. The power of liberalism\textsuperscript{248} is the manifestation of this disorder: "For however successful liberalism may be considered inasmuch as it holds power, there can be no doubt that this fact of power is at the root of the distempers of the present day."\textsuperscript{249} As Lonergan argues in the text, the difficulty lies with the fact that the liberal position denies the need for a higher control beyond that of individual reason. Not only is the modern disorder revealed in the failure of the secular philosophies but their existence contributes to the disorder.\textsuperscript{250} This position of his ought not to surprise us for it reflects not only the official position of the Roman Catholic Church at this time, but also the influence, on the young Lonergan, of thinkers like Dawson.\textsuperscript{251} Lonergan's analysis of the problem, however, in the context of developing a Thomist philosophy of history, represents a significant development for Catholic thought.\textsuperscript{252}

Lonergan considers Plato's social philosophy significant. Plato understood the relevance of philosophy for dealing with the problem of social disorder: "Plato's greatness lies in his fidelity to the social problem in its most acute form."\textsuperscript{253} And again: "It was true when Plato penned his Republic but it is even more manifestly true today that `Men and cities can not have happiness unless philosophers are kings.'"\textsuperscript{254} Nonetheless Plato's effort failed to provide the solution to the social problem. In \textit{PH}, Lonergan will argue that Plato's conception of the philosopher-king, as a solution to the problem of social disorder, can only be realised in the philosophy of the Catholic church. He writes: "To the world in its present plight of economic

\textsuperscript{248}Lonergan's use of the term liberalism approximates that of C. Dawson, whom Lonergan acknowledged as an early influence. Dawson's analysis of liberalism can be found in his \textit{Progress and Religion: An Historical Enquiry} (London: Sheed and Ward, 1929), pp. 177-250.

\textsuperscript{249}PH, p. 95.

\textsuperscript{250}He writes in PH, for example: "Bolshevism is ludicrous with its initial assertion that man is no more than an animal; but Bolshevism is terrible in its power to prove its own truth by making man no more than an animal" (p. 110).

\textsuperscript{251}On Catholic reaction to liberalism and modernism see, for example, T. M. Schoof, \textit{A Survey of Catholic Theology: 1800-1970}, pp. 45-72, and T. Howland Sanks, \textit{Authority in the Church: A Study of Changing Paradigms}.

\textsuperscript{252}Other than Christopher Dawson there does not seem to be a great deal of interest in the philosophy of history by Catholics in the Thomist tradition at this time. Jacques Maritain wrote \textit{On the Philosophy of History}, but it was the result of a series of lectures he gave at the University of Notre Dame in 1955.

\textsuperscript{253}PH, p. 108.

\textsuperscript{254}Ibid., p. 126.
distress and political insecurity the Church offers not philosophers but philosophy, nay,
, the Word made flesh."\textsuperscript{255}

Lonergan begins his discussion in the manuscript with the following: "The significance of the quarrel between church and state is not to be confined to the period extending from the middle ages to the successful and complete emergence of liberalism."\textsuperscript{256} Although we do not know the contents of the prior ninety-four pages it is this particular issue that leads into Lonergan's discussion of a need for a metaphysic of history. He writes: "There is much in the present world situation to confirm the view that liberalism in power is for the destruction of civilization."\textsuperscript{257} The liberal ideology is dominant and hence successful by virtue of the power of the modern state. Lonergan understands the modern social order to be split in its internal and external dynamics. There are two aspects to human living: an internal act of the will and an external activity. The internal act or conscience has been the concern of the Church, in its opposition to liberalism. External activity as merely external activity has ends in its own order and the liberal states have claimed it their right to control this order. Liberalism, with its control of the external order, holds the power, but the question remains whether "this incidence of power is for human progress or for human extinction."\textsuperscript{258} Liberalism bases its claim on an appeal to its sovereignty over the external order. But what is the end of external activity as such? This is the question the philosopher brings to the issue. Liberal ideology denies that the question is answerable. In response to this denial the Marxists propose a material solidarity.\textsuperscript{259} For Lonergan neither position is adequate to restore the integrity of the social order. The problem is to determine the end of the social order and the laws relevant to its attainment: to accomplish this task is to develop a philosophy of history.

\subsection{1.3 Philosophical Foundations}

We have already spoken of Lonergan's "scissors analogy" for understanding a scientific theory of history.\textsuperscript{260} Lonergan suggests that

\textsuperscript{255}Ibid.
\textsuperscript{256}Ibid., p. 95.
\textsuperscript{257}Ibid.
\textsuperscript{258}Ibid.
\textsuperscript{259}Lonergan writes later in the manuscript: "The present situation is on the one hand the Bolshevist assertion of the animal in man and on the other hand the Church’s absolute assertion of the spiritual nature of man. Between these two historic forces lie the liberal sovereign states with their economic problems and their political hatreds and fears: these are the pawns in the game however solid they may appear with their devotion to whatever is merely because it is" (p. 110).
\textsuperscript{260}See LPH, pp. 4-5.
although the major part of scientific procedure involves such activities as measuring, observing, curve-fitting, and finding a formula, these tasks constitute only the lower blade of the method. There is an upper blade constituted by an understanding of nature that anticipates the particular activities of the lower blade. Scientific procedure requires the activities of both blades. Galileo, for example, conducted his experiments on falling bodies by ascending the tower of Pisa, observing and measuring the results of their fall, etc., but he did so within the context of the upper blade of Euclidean geometry. Lonergan notes that the operative upper blade or heuristic from which the scientist proceeds is "usually expressed in differential equations or something like that." The study of history may be similarly divided. There is the historian who tries to understand what is going forward at a particular time and place. He desires insight into the particular data in the same way that the empirical scientist seeks to understand the data. Besides this work of the historian which constitutes the lower blade of historical method there is also an upper blade constituted by an understanding of what history is.

In PH Lonergan writes: "What is needed is a metaphysic of history, a differential calculus of progress." Although Lonergan will consider some historical detail by way of example, his fundamental concern in the essay is the upper blade. After stating the problem that occurs with the domination of liberal ideology, Lonergan considers the fundamental components of the upper blade. He asks what is the end of external human actions and what are the laws that govern the attainment of these ends? The answer to these questions will result in a "pure theory of external human action." Lonergan turns to the Aristotelian categories, and in particular the doctrine of the four causes, to provide him with an initial set of terms and relations. The doctrine of causality functioned to explain the causes of physical change. Expanded and refined, this doctrine of causality became an essential component of scholastic metaphysics and integral to the work of St. Thomas Aquinas. In Lonergan's account, human action is a function of three causes: material, formal, and efficient. Materially, it is the flow of

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261LPH, p. 5. See also I, pp. 577-79.
262PH, p. 99.
263Ibid., p. 95. Lonergan does not elaborate on what he means by pure theory. But in "The Gratia Operans Dissertation: Preface and Introduction" he writes: "It remains that history can follow a middle course, neither projecting into the past the categories of the present, nor pretending that historical inquiry is conducted without a use of human intelligence. That middle course consists in constructing an a priori scheme that is capable of synthesizing any possible set of historical data irrespective of their place and time, just as the science of mathematics constructs a generic scheme capable of synthesizing any possible set of quantitative phenomena." (pp. 11-12).
change "sensible in consciousness, physical in the subconscious and the external world." Formally, it is the emergence of intellectual forms with respect to the material flow. Efficiently, it is the effective control of the will. Lonergan's understanding of "the effective control of the will" follows from a particular interpretation of Aquinas on the nature of the will. For Aquinas, according to Lonergan, the will is appetitus rationalis sequens formam intellectus, a rational appetite which follows the form of the intellect. It follows from this that any one action of the individual has its material cause in the psycho-sensitive flow of change, its formal cause in the formation of intellectual forms with respect to the "phantasmal flux," and its efficient cause in the will, which, following the form of the intellect, transforms mere behaviour into rational conduct. The material cause is pre-determined (or pre-moved) for the individual by external experience: "What you can think about depends upon external experience." Immanent control, however, lies with intellect and will. Just as the material flow pre-moves the intellectual form, so the intellectual form pre-moves the will. The act of the will has the implicit effect of either inhibiting what is happening in the material flow or altering it. Insofar as a person accepts the intellectual forms (here meaning effective assent to the true and consent to the good) he attains the proper end, the energeia (energy-power) of his personality. If the person fails to accept, and effectively implement, the intelligible dictate he is merely pre-determined by the physical flow. Sin is this failure, for "sin is the failure to obey reason." These three causes merge to become one act. Finally, just as individual acts are reasonable in following intelligible dictates or unreasonable in failing to effectively follow them, so the external flow of action is reasonable or unreasonable according to the goodness of the individuals whose acts and non-acts have entered into and changed the flow. This consideration of the material, formal, and efficient causes of human actions establishes the unity of human nature. Implicit in

266 PH, p. 95.
267 Judging from the evidence of his letter to Fr. Keane in 1935, Lonergan regarded his understanding of Thomas on the intellect and will to be an improvement over current Thomist theory. His interpretation on this matter is crucial not only to his philosophy of history but to his entire philosophical position. He treats the matter explicitly, and at length, in the "Verbum" articles appearing in Theological Studies 7 (1946): 349-92; 8 (1947): 35-79, 404-44; 10 (1949): 3-40, 359-93. These were brought together in book form in Verbum: Word and Idea in Aquinas. According to Patrick Byrne in "The Thomistic Sources of Lonergan's Dynamic World View," Lonergan's appropriation of Aquinas' theory of intellect and will was essential to the development of his dynamic world-view. See especially pp. 119-35.
268 On the procession of will from intellect in Aquinas as interpreted by Lonergan see V, especially pp. 201-2.
269 PH, p. 96.
270 The meaning of energeia in this instance probably corresponds to operation or act as in Aquinas' use of actus. On the notion energeia as it is used in Aquinas' theology of the Trinity see the index in V under energeia.
271 PH, p. 96.
his account is the view that there exists a normative process of human action whose control is immanent in the process itself, for the immanent control of the process rests in the function of the intellect and will. Furthermore, there exists the deviation from the normative process through the failure of the will to act normatively. Both kinds of acts enter into the historical flow, and the occurrence of both kinds of acts is statistically pre-determined.272

But what is the relationship between the immanent (and internal) acts of persons and the external actions that result? In the first place, Lonergan notes the distinction between the material distinctness of individual persons and the intelligible unity that is the human species. Human beings are of one nature. Lonergan understands a nature to be the "intelligible form explaining why a thing is of the kind it is."273 Although there are many individuals the individuality of matter is not an intelligible difference; it is merely a matter of fact.274 Matter is the pre-condition for thought but it cannot itself be explained. It is the intelligible unity of human nature that provides the unity for what is, materially, mere individuality.

In the second place, the argument from pre-motion establishes the link between the unity of human nature and the solidarity of human action. Lonergan writes: "Men are one in their action. *Quidquid movetur ab alio movetur.*"275 Human persons are not sufficient reasons for their own actions. In order to account for change there must be an extrinsic mover, for if anything "were the sole sufficient reason of its change, then there would be no change now but the thing would always have been what it is now becoming."276 This is a contradiction in terms: "Everything that a man does or thinks is pre-moved by the action of other things."277

In the third place, the actuality of pre-motion does not deny free will. Human action can be "pre-determined to either of two alternatives: one rational, the other irrational."278 What is finally chosen is, however, not ultimately pre-determined, for "human elections, though free, are strictly subordinate to a statistical law."279

272The characterization of the occurrences of acts of intellect and will in a statistical context is very significant for the development of Lonergan’s dynamic worldview. See Patrick Byrne, "The Thomistic Sources of Lonergan’s Dynamic World View," pp. 108-45.
273PH, p. 97. The source of this view is Aquinas’ appropriation of Aristotle’s quod quid est. See V, pp. 16-25.
274In I Lonergan writes: "In brief, individuals differ, but the ultimate difference in our universe is a matter of fact to which there corresponds nothing to be grasped by direct insight" (p. 29).
275PH, p. 97. Lonergan’s source here is the argument from pre-motion which Aristotle originated and Aquinas applied. See GF, pp. 72-84, for Lonergan’s exposition of this problem as it related to the question of grace. See also Patrick Byrne, "The Thomistic Sources of Lonergan’s Dynamic World View," pp. 110-19.
276Ibid.
277Ibid.
278PH, p. 98.
279Ibid. It is noteworthy that Lonergan employs the notion of statistical law in this
The argument from pre-motion establishes a principle of unity for the human solidarity operative in history. Actions of a prior generation are pre-motions for the present generation. Lonergan writes: "No man can be better than he knows how and no man can be worse than his temptations and opportunities." The pre-motions of the material world, which include the prior actions of human beings, pre-determine all human actions according to statistical law. On this basis, Lonergan arrives at the conception of history "as the flow of human acts proceeding from one human nature, materially individuated in space-time, and all united according to the principle of pre-motion.

While the differentiation of intelligible form from material individuation forms the basis for the unity of the human species as species, pre-motion provided the key for establishing the solidarity of human action in time. Human beings are both one in nature and one in action. The key to the linkage is in the grasp of the intelligible relations between the material, formal, and efficient causes as they operate in human acts. This establishes the intelligible link between the internal acts of persons and the external flow. Having presented his initial sketch of the form of history, Lonergan now raises the crucial question concerning its end or purpose. His account rests on a consideration of the nature and finality of human intellect. The notion of progress is of fundamental significance in this account. History concerns change. In physical change what is important in any flow is its differential. In the science of physics the differentials for determining such change in the flow "are something beyond the elements, the individuals in the flow." Just as there are differentials that determine the flow of physical change, there are differentials for determining the flow of history. If we want to know the purpose of historical process then we need to determine them. This is the task of a metaphysic of history. Such a determination of the differentials conditions the possibility of a proper control of the direction of the flow.

discussion of human action. Again see Patrick Byrne, "The Thomistic Sources of Lonergan’s World View," pp. 118-19, where Byrne establishes the importance of Lonergan’s discovery of the statistical for understanding the conditions under which specific acts emerge.

280 PH, p. 98.

281 By "predetermined" Lonergan does not imply necessity for the pre-determination is statistical. This notion will later develop in I under the rubric of emergent probability into "a conditioned series of schemes of recurrence." See pp. 118-24.

282 PH, p. 98.

283 Ibid., p. 99.

284 Lonergan writes passionately on this matter in the text: "The nineteenth century was a century prating of Truth, Beauty, and Goodness. It had no concern for the differentials of flow in virtue of an asinine confidence in political economists. It has landed the twentieth century in an earthly hell. All the good intentions in the world are compatible with all the blunders conceivable. The nineteenth century was a century of good wills and bad intellects. The combination is fatal. Men being reasonable
result in progress.

Progress, for Lonergan, "is a matter of intellect." Intellect operates to understand sensible data. It provides the guiding form of human action which, with statistical effectiveness, transforms the sensible data. The interaction of sensible data, intellect, and human action occurs as part of a certain cyclical or recurrent pattern. Intellect provides a new understanding of the historical situation that, with certain probabilities, translates into human acts. These acts enter the historical flow to transform it. The new situation, in turn, will set new problems for the intellect resulting in a repetition of the process. The process is not simply repetitive but progressive, because the fresh synthesis, brought about by the acts of intellect, if intelligent, alters the actual historical situation.

A consideration of the finality of human intellect discloses the normative, recurrent, and progressive character of the process. Lonergan illustrates this by contrasting human intellect with angelic intellect. Angelic intellect, in its specific individuality, understands all that is to be understood in its world instantaneously: "It is intellect in act." Human intellect, however, is a potency. As a potency it does not attain perfection in an instance but goes through a series of incomplete acts on its way to perfection. Its progress or achievement is gradual. It reaches its perfection through a series of interactions between objective situations and acts of intellect. Objective situations provide the impetus for intelligible solutions. The will makes them effective. This cycle is the basic pattern for the development of human intellect. What is an instant for angelic intellect corresponds to all time for

according to their individual lights of reason offer no guarantee that they are reasonable. Nor is any effort of the epoch to stabilise intellect, to make all think alike whether by newspapers, government education, official prejudices and histories and all the rest, any guarantee that the total and the differential of the total wisdom of the epoch is truly intelligent and reasonable. What is needed is a metaphysic of history, a differential calculus of progress" (p. 99).


286This view of the function of intellect reflects the intellectualist interpretation of Aquinas which Lonergan claims for his own in the letter to Fr. Keane (January 1935). He writes: "In a word it is that, what the current Thomists call intellectual knowledge is really sense knowledge; of intellectual knowledge they have nothing to say; intellectual knowledge is, for example, the ‘seeing the nexus’ between subject and predicate in an universal judgment: this seeing a nexus is an operation they never explained. From an initial Cartesian ‘cogito’ I can work out a luminous and unmistakeable meaning to intellectus agens et possibilis, abstractio, conversion to phantasm, intellect knowing only the universal, illumination of phantasm, etc. etc” (p. 4).

287PH, p. 100.

288The following appears on the title page of PA(1) from Aquinas' Summa Theologiae, Ia, Q 85, a.3: "... oportet considerare, quod intellectus noster de potentia in actum procedit: omne autem, quod procedit de potentia in actum, prius pervenit ad actum incompletum, qui est medius inter potentiam et actum, quam ad actum perfectum ... actus autem incompletus est scientia IMPERFECTA, per quam scinttur res INDISTINCTE sub quadam CONFUSIONE ..."
the human intellect. Each act of human intellect is part of a process which tends to the completion of the perfect act of intellect not yet known.

An important corollary follows. Human achievement or progress is not that of individuals but of the species. Human individuality is merely material. The intelligibility of the individual is a function of the intelligible unity of the species. If progress is understood to be a matter of intelligence then it is properly understood only within the context of the solidarity of the species. Lonergan points out: "The individual genius is but the instrument of the race in its expansion." 289 The stages of intellectual development will also be stages of historical development: "Intellectual achievement is the achievement of the race, of the unity of human action." 290 The possibility of distinguishing real progress from apparent progress rests with the determination of the differentials. This requires a metaphysics grounded in sound philosophy. Lonergan takes the stand that a sound philosophy is possible, sound philosophy here meaning "definitive knowledge with an immutable basis." 291 Analogous to the differential in physics, which is something beyond the elements of the material flow, philosophy "stands above the shifting scene of time" 292 and has its basis "in the pure forms of knowledge." 293

Lonergan is brief on what would constitute the fundamental elements of a sound philosophy. He delineates the key categories as matter, contingency, and intelligible truth. Matter and contingency correspond to what is ultimately given in the data of sense and the data of consciousness respectively. 294 Intelligible truth appears to combine, in compact form, what in Insight would be form and act, the corresponding cognitional operations being understanding and judgment. He writes: "Finally there is

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289 PH, p. 100.
290 Ibid.
291 Ibid.
292 Ibid.
293 Ibid.
294 The argument in PH proceeds as follows: "Sense knowledge, even in the perfect act of intellect, will be knowledge of an inexplicable multiplicity: That is, the difference of this point from that point, and of this instance from that, and of this particular thing from that, with no possibility of their (sic) being any conceivable reason why each point, each instance, each particular thing is the particular thing that it is and not another. This gives the first element in metaphysical reality: the category of matter. Next, consciousness will always necessarily be a consciousness of action, of something acting, of the self-acting: this existing substantial action, this ens per se, is no more to be understood in itself as an existing ens per se that (sic) the difference between points can be explained in terms of more points. We are forced to set up another metaphysical category, which is the ultimate basis of their (sic) being anything to be conscious of, just as matter is the ultimate basis of their (sic) being anything to perceive; this category is contingency and contingency can no more be explained in terms of other contingent beings than matter can be explained in terms of more matter; contingency is the ultimate empirical in the order of conscious-ness just as matter is the ultimate empirical in the order of sense" (pp.100-1).
intellect and it has its form. This form is the truth of the intelligible. Whenever you understand, you go on to ask whether your understanding is true."295 Lonergan defers from any lengthy defence of his position: it is "a question for a different essay much more elaborate than this one."296

So far, Lonergan has established, through an investigation of the nature of human intellect, that there is a common cycle in its interaction with the environment which constitutes the possibility of a progressive dynamic. A consideration of the form of intellect reveals a dynamic movement of intellect from potential intelligence to actual intelligence over time through a series of incomplete acts. This form of intellect is normative and progressive. It is the guiding form of the cycle of human action. Although Lonergan does not put it in these terms in this document the form of intellect discloses a purpose or finality to history, for there is implied here an isomorphism between the immanent operation of intellect itself and objective historical process. In Insight Lonergan writes: "By finality we refer to a theorem of the same generality as the notion of being. This theorem affirms a parallelism between the dynamism of the mind and the dynamism of proportionate being."297 It is this isomorphism, implied in his account of the form of intellect, that allows Lonergan to distinguish phases of history on the basis of his account of human intellect.

1.4 The Phases of History

Having established his philosophical foundations, Lonergan now considers the division of the actual course of history. If intellectual development corresponds to stages of historical development, then the emergence of sound philosophy as a higher control serves as a basis for distinguishing two phases in human progress, an automatic stage and a philosophic stage. Lonergan describes the automatic stage as "a constant succession of brilliant flowerings and ultimate failures"298 typified by the rise and fall of empires in the Near East prior to the emergence of philosophy in Greece. The philosophic stage emerges with the discovery of philosophy in Greece. It has its ultimate basis in a sound philosophy that can effectively guide historical expansion. The historical realization of sound philosophy is, however, dialectical. As well, the relationship between the two basic phases is dialectical.299 On the basis of this distinction there

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296Ibid. As is well known, we can find his nuanced argument for such a sound philosophy in I.
297I, p. 445. Finality is the "dynamic aspect of the real" (p. 446).
299Lonergan does not make the dialectical character of this relationship explicit at this point. He writes later about the imposition of the dialectic of fact on the dialectic of thought and its consequences. The fact of this imposition indicates that the basic relationship between the two phases is itself dialectical.
emerges a fourfold division of the course of history as follows: (1) the world prior to the discovery of philosophy (the automatic stage); (2) the failure of philosophy to fulfil its social mission (from Plato to the dark ages); (3) an automatic cultural expansion (from the dark ages to the present); and (4) the future. Lonergan devotes fifteen pages of the manuscript to illustrate in detail the course of history in the context of this division.

For his account of the automatic phase of history Lonergan relies to a large extent on Dawson’s Age of the Gods. The advance of practical intelligence, which discovers new ways to exploit matter, fuels the automatic phase. Of major historical significance is the discovery of the ox and large-scale agriculture. It is in terms of this discovery that we can divide the cultures of the automatic stage into prior primitive cultures (hunters and gatherers) and the higher culture of the Mesopotamian Temple States and the Egyptian Dynasties. New means of exploiting matter necessitate the idea of property. The result is a division of labour which the higher culture makes socially effective by means of “a greater and more strictly enforced social solidarity.” The higher culture continues to expand, and it develops a differentiated social structure and cultural expression until, in the limit, it becomes an empire ordered by bureaucratic rule. The religion of this empire is polytheistic, a matter of the worship of local gods. Bureaucracies expand because they have a social purpose to which all else is subordinated. But expansion is not unlimited and the social purpose of the bureaucracies becomes a matter of their own preservation. There are no higher forms than the local gods to hold the empire together. It either stagnates, as happened in Egypt, or collapses because the state bureaucracies “cannot integrate the individual differential forces that would make for change and advancement.” These forces are suppressed. There is need of a new idea but of a different kind.

The new idea emerges with the Greeks, who arise from the ruins of the dying and collapsed empires of the Near East. Out of the exigencies of battle, the Greeks developed the social form of democracy which made the emergence of philosophy possible. Lonergan writes: “Death, the great leveller, is at the root of democracy. And democracy was the social form that made philosophy possible.” It is the emergence of philosophy that allows

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301 The cycle is described by Lonergan in I as follows: “The new inventions complement the old to suggest further improvements, to reveal fresh possibilities and, eventually, to call forth in turn the succession of mechanical and technological higher viewpoints that mark epochs in man’s material progress” (p. 208).
303 PH, p. 103. For example, the stricter social bond of the higher culture of the Near East differentiates it from the painted pottery cultures which preceded them. On the painted pottery cultures see Age of the Gods, pp. 68-86. On the growth of the higher cultures in the Near East see Age of the Gods, pp. 87-164.
304 PH, p. 103.
305 Ibid., p. 104. We should note the importance that Lonergan places on the social
history to advance to a higher phase beyond the cyclical rise and fall of the automatic phase.

What is the significance of the emergence of philosophy for the course of history? Arising out of the decline of the Greek city-state, philosophy provided the basis for a higher criticism. Plato is critical of Pericles, because in pursuing his pragmatic policies the energetic leader neglected the true happiness of the citizen; true happiness is something more than pragmatic success. Plato's dialectic reveals the contradiction of Pericles' position, for "no man without self-contradiction could deny that suffering injustice was better than doing injustice." It is with the discovery of the intelligible forms that the basis for Plato's criticism, and the dialectic, emerges. This discovery represents an epochal advance, "for it enabled men to express not by a symbol but by a concept the divine." Mere symbolic expression could not provide the necessary higher control needed to get beyond the cycle of rise and decline of the automatic stage. This is the limitation of the worship of the local gods in the Near East empires. Symbolism tended to vary from society to society and symbolic religions were easily corrupted. Lonergan cites the warnings of the prophets against idolatry, as well as the ease with which symbolism passed into the orgiastic lust of cults such as Baal and Dionysus.

Despite what Lonergan regards as the truth of Plato's position, it is not complete. Plato's strength was also his weakness. Because philosophy provides the concept there is a basis for Plato's criticism of society. Plato's search for a definition of virtue "establishes that virtue is an irreducible conditions out of which the higher form emerges. Lonergan writes: "Gotama would have been as great a dialectician as Socrates had he lived in Athens. But he lived where men had not the habit of demanding the reason why for everything, of listening to orators and appraising their arguments, of following the sophists to learn to be orators themselves. This social fact differentiated Socrates from all the wise and profound men who preceded him" (ibid.). In I Lonergan will sublate this insight into the explanatory context of emergent probability. See pp. 115-28 and 209-11.

Lonergan illustrates the point by referring to an essay of Dawson's: "You can give men better homes and food and clothing; you can build them theatres and parks and recreation grounds; you can decrease their labour and increase their wages and multiply a thousandfold the products of industry and the earth; and still men will not be content: but you can lead them through pain and misery, through toil and privation, and they will be happy if only they have something to die for" (PH, p. 105). I have been unable to locate the particular essay to which Lonergan refers.

Lonergan makes an interesting comment in the interview Caring About Meaning which helps to reveal his meaning here. The comment is in regard to a book on Plato, influential for his conversion from nominalism, which he read in the summer of 1930. He writes: "I believed in intelligence and I thought concepts were overrated. When I found in Stewart's Plato's Doctrine of Ideas that an idea, for Plato, was like Descartes' equation of the circle, I was home. You get the equation of the circle just by understanding" (p. 44). For further comments on Stewart see "Insight Revisited," in SC, pp. 264-65.

PH, p. 106.
something, the emergence of a new light upon experience that cannot be brought back and expressed in terms of experience."\(^{310}\) The weakness lay in his positive efforts to change society. The idea of the philosopher does not automatically translate into effective practical policy. Like Kant, Plato "set a perfect question but utterly failed to answer it."\(^{311}\) He could not translate his dialectical method into a practical program of action.\(^{312}\) Aristotle, in his turn, avoided the question concerning the ultimate basis of society and only attempted a practical ethics.

The heirs to Plato and Aristotle quickly failed to produce a practical manifestation of the higher control. The Epicurean renounced any efforts to find a higher control, while the Stoics sought it but only for the individual. The gods which Plato criticised "remained as strong as ever, a pall of gibbering ghosts to dim the lustre of the decaying empire of Rome."\(^{313}\) Philosophy failed as a social program, and the end result was the Dark Ages.

The third phase of history is a period characterised by continuous advance accompanied by a continuous regression. Rising out of the Dark Ages, a social unity develops out of those elements which formed both feudal society and the Christian Church. At first there is advance as a result of the development of the Church. From the monastic centres came agriculture, which is the foundation of commerce. From the Church canonists came the law which laid the basis for economic expansion. From the Church came universities and scholastic science. This unity of the Church and feudal society did not hold. The turning point was the scandal of the anti-popes. The combination of the corruption of papal authority and pagan corruption led to the splitting up of Christendom. Protestantism rejected the unity of Christendom. The state stabilised the division. The wars of religion gave birth to the principle of liberalism; but liberalism is a fact, not a theory. This is the very rejection of the need for a higher control which Plato claimed for philosophy.

Progress continued with the development of modern literature and the achievement of mathematical science, but the rejection of the need for a higher control by the liberal state resulted in a continuous retrogression which accompanied advance. The state is the villain of the piece. Its liberalism led either to modernism, the heir to liberalism, or bolshevism. Both arise out of the objective situation, and both attempt some manner of unity. Modernism turns to scientific positivism; it rejects as irrelevant to the objective situation all thought which is not positive science. Positive science

\(^{310}\)Ibid.
\(^{311}\)Ibid., p. 108.
\(^{312}\)Lonergan will describe Plato's dialectical method in I as follows: "In Plato, it denoted the art of philosophic dialogue and was contrasted with eristic" (p. 217). This is not what Lonergan means by dialectic in the dialectic of history. Although not explicitly stated in PH, in ACH(2) he writes: "By the dialectic we do not mean Plato's orderly conversation, nor Hegel's expansion of concepts, nor Marx's fiction of an alternative to mechanical materialism" (p. 6).
\(^{313}\)PH, p. 108.
itself represents inevitable law, "the truth of what is going to happen in any case."\textsuperscript{314} It continues the rejection of the need for a higher control. The bolshevist, on the other hand, takes advantage of the modernist indifference to the objective situation, starts with a materialist theory, argues that religion is false, and essentially claims that man is no more than an animal. Acting from this conviction bolshevism proves its point by making man no more than an animal.

In the present situation there is opposition between bolshevism, which asserts the animal in humanity, and the Church, which asserts its spiritual nature. Between these two forces are the liberal states, which are in economic and political disorder, dedicated to "whatever is merely because it is."\textsuperscript{315}

Lonergan summarises his account of the actual course of history in seven points. (1) Philosophy emerges automatically out of the initial automatic phase of history. (2) Because philosophy produces concepts and people want symbols, philosophy is impotent to fulfil the function of higher social control. (3) Christianity provides both a symbol and a trans-philosophical higher control. There results a reversal of the order of progress in the modern world. In the ancient world practical arts were learned first, followed by literature, science, and finally philosophy. In the modern order progress begins with philosophy, literature develops, modern science emerges and then is applied. (4) The ancient cycle is a dialectic of fact, having its first motion in material needs, while the modern cycle is a dialectic of thought, having its first motion from thought. (5) The retrogression of the modern period has its origins in the imposition of the dialectic of fact on the dialectic of thought. (6) The end result of this superposition is the emergence of the pure dialectic of fact in Marxism and bolshevism, which concerns itself only with those facts which it creates. (7) The state is the villain of the modern situation because it has rendered any higher control void and surrendered itself to the domination of economic law (liberalism).

The basic situation informing the future is that of the antinomy between Church and state. The state has its foundation in the outward flow of history. It is "the social expression of the natural ambitions and desires of man."\textsuperscript{316} At its best it produces a literature, scientific achievement, an ordered notion of culture, and common efforts towards the achievement of democracy. The state, however, is not simply the unfettered expression of what is best in humankind; it is also a real power. For the sake of this power the state will exploit both much of what is excellent in human ambition and natural desire and much that is evil. The state is, therefore, a crucial factor in "the incessant drag of the dialectic of fact."\textsuperscript{317}

\textsuperscript{314}Ibid., p. 110.
\textsuperscript{315}Ibid.
\textsuperscript{316}Ibid., p. 113.
\textsuperscript{317}Ibid.
Lonergan locates the source of this incessant drag of the dialectic of fact in a fundamental contradiction in the conscience of human beings between our knowledge of the good and our actual performance. "The good men would do they do not do."318 This tends to result in the rationalization of making what is wrong into a right. At first the tendency is incidental in the historical process, but when it occurs within the context of the dialectic of thought, wrong sets itself up as a theory. This establishes the possibility for still further rationalization. Then, it becomes a force for the deformation of conscience because we are corrupted unconsciously. What is false in our minds seeks consistency with the truth. We achieve this consistency only at the expense of falsification of all that is true. The actual situation worsens as the consequences of sin result in systematic distortion.

The Church, on the other hand, has its foundation in the conscience of men. The Church is not in principle opposed to the support of the state; that is "in the reasonable order of things."319 But the support of the state will not see the Church through the incessant drag of the dialectic of fact. Against the force of this dialectic and its corruption of conscience the Church has both the sacrament of penance and the teaching of the magisterium. Penance prevents rationalization by treating the deformation of the individual sinner. The teaching magisterium prevents such rationalization in the social field. Lonergan here sets the Church against all in the modern world that stems from the Reformation. He writes: "Everything in the modern mentality outside the church - insofar as that mentality rests upon tradition set up since the reformation - is necessarily in opposition to the church."320 Because of the difficulty of sweeping away this influence - Lonergan here adverts to the long course of Newman's conversion to Catholicism - those that the Church attracts are a select minority.

Liberalism is not a permanent solution to the problem of the historical dialectic. The modern liberal state is neither politically nor economically independent. Lonergan writes: "The world is run by an oligarchy of Grossmächte and the justice of their decisions is as much open to question as the existence of their right to make decisions."321 Lonergan argues for an end to the present order of sovereign states. In the first place, they do not operate on the basis of an intelligible principle. Consequently, they must argue from what is to what ought to be. In the second place, because they are not based in sound social theory, they have no real right to make absolute decisions. Actually the state is neither economically nor politically independent. Economically, the modern state is subject to economic forces that go beyond its capacity to direct. Politically, it depends upon a

318Ibid. Lonergan is perhaps alluding to Romans 7:19: "For what I do is not the good I want to do; no the evil I do not want to do - this I keep on doing" (New International Bible).
319Ibid.
320Ibid., p. 114.
321Ibid., p. 115.
precarious balance of power.\textsuperscript{322} In the third place, the actions of the modern state are immoral, both in the domination of the great powers and in the promotion of nationalism, to the detriment of culture.

Bolshevism is not an answer to the power of the liberal states. Lonergan writes: "When we pass from liberalism to bolshevism we descend to a lower level in the dialectic of fact."\textsuperscript{323} Bolshevism completes the program that begins in the rationalization of moral evil. In liberalism error and evil are included as datum for theory. Because wrong cannot be made consistent with the truth, the truth is distorted to maintain consistency. Bolshevism makes no pretense about asserting the truth. It simply creates its own conditions, according to its pragmatic program, and then asserts them to be true. Bolshevism will serve the same function to the liberal states as the barbarian legions served in destroying the decaying Roman empire. Bolshevism appeals to social justice, but its actual power derives from what it proposes to create of man "by propaganda, revolution, terrorism, and sexual perversion."\textsuperscript{324} It is the reduction of humankind to the merely animal.

1.5 The Dialectical Division of History

Having completed his analysis of the phases of history, Lonergan assembles the fundamental elements for the dialectical division of the historical process. He distinguishes the absolute dialectic, the dialectic of thought, and the dialectic of fact. Lonergan refers to the absolute dialectic as "revelation, prophecy, development of dogma."\textsuperscript{325} He will consider the absolute dialectic in greater detail when he considers the supernatural.

\textsuperscript{322}In the text Lonergan refers specifically to the position of England in the European balance of power before World War II. He writes: "The political mechanism on which it [the modern state] rests is the ability of England to maintain the balance of power on the continent of Europe - a process that will last just so long as no power on the continent can snap its fingers at England. When that day comes we shall have an European empire; a beneficial despot or an utter tyrant according to circumstance and mood; absolute, for the modern means of warfare give a central government as great a power over a greater area as did gun-powder to the monarchs; great or insignificant, according to the carnage and cost of the initial achievement; decadent, for the economic problem will remain and a socialistic empire is not a solution" (p. 115).

\textsuperscript{323}Ibid., p. 116.

\textsuperscript{324}Ibid. Lonergan’s assessment of Bolshevism did not moderate significantly. In the essay "Healing and Creating in History," in TC. Lonergan, referring to the deficiencies of the materialist, writes: "He will maintain with Marx that cultural attitudes are the by-product of material conditions and so he will bestow upon those subjected to communist power the salutary conditions of a closed frontier, clear and firm indoctrination, controlled media of information, a vigilant secret police, and the terrifying threat of the labour camps" (p. 107).

\textsuperscript{325}Ibid., p. 117.
component in history.  The dialectic of thought and the dialectic of fact are further divided into three components each.

The dialectic of fact consists of (1) mere fact, (2) sin, and (3) revealed fact. In the dialectic of fact, mere fact refers to the process of development out of material limitation. It is the operation of practical intelligence as it develops ways of exploiting material and the consequent development of appropriate economic and socio-political structures. Lonergan identifies it with the emergence and development of the ancient higher culture of the Near East. He identifies the category sin with the forces that corrupted both ancient culture and the beginning of modern culture. He identifies revealed fact with the development of Jewish and Christian religions up to the Middle Ages.

Analogous to the divisions of the dialectic of fact, the dialectic of thought is divided into (1) natural reason, (2) rationalism, and (3) faith. In the dialectic of thought, natural reason begins with Plato’s attempt at a social philosophy and manifests itself further in the development of philosophy. It is a development of intelligence that occurs at the level of abstract thinking or theory, whereas, in the dialectic of fact, the development is one of practical intelligence. Lonergan identifies rationalism with the movement from the reformation through liberalism to bolshevism. It constitutes the process in which theory is compromised, and ultimately corrupted, by sin systematised in the dialectic of thought. Faith, analogous to revealed fact in the dialectic of fact, he identifies with the development of scholastic social theory. It culminates in the social encyclicals of twentieth-century popes. It is a development of revealed religion which incorporates the development of natural reason in the dialectic of thought. The seven-part division of the dialectical process in history is indicated in Table 2.

The order of development is reversed when we move from the dialectic of fact to the dialectic of thought. In the dialectic of fact the process begins with the exploitation of matter by humankind and leads, eventually, to the emergence of the higher viewpoint of philosophy. The order of development is from the practical to the speculative. The dialectic of thought, on the other hand, begins with the speculative and only later does it lead to specific practical applications. The order of development, therefore, is from the speculative to the practical.

Lonergan finds evidence for the deformation of the dialectic of fact in the excesses of polytheistic cults such as the cults of Baal and Dionysus. He finds evidence of the deformation of the dialectic of thought in rationalism, liberalism, and bolshevism. The deformation of the dialectic of thought, however, more thoroughly infects the social world because it is a deformation of theory. It corrupts unconsciously the conscience of humankind and leads, without a higher control, to the ultimate deformation

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326See pp. 93-5 below.
327Lonergan refers specifically to Pius XI, who was then pope. See PH, p. 117.
of bolshevism.

1.6 The Necessity of the Supernatural

Essential to Lonergan's account of history is a consideration of both the necessity of the supernatural and its operation in history. It is the supernatural component that provides the viewpoint which transcends the deformations of liberalism and bolshevism. This component of his analysis occupies the remaining thirteen pages of the document. Lonergan begins by considering the necessity of the supernatural.

In the first place, as is evident from Lonergan's account of the course of history, philosophy failed to produce the needed higher control. Indeed, the problem of history is more complex when it includes the dialectic of thought. Sin becomes a datum for both action and theory. Sin infects theory to distort it and this distortion becomes systemic. Neither liberalism nor bolshevism is adequate to address the question for both are manifestations of this systemic distortion of the truth. Even the existence of revelation in both Judaism and in Christianity has not eliminated the problem, because both have failed to eliminate corruption and decline. The situation necessitates a higher viewpoint. Lonergan writes: "The hope of the future lies in a philosophic presentation of the supernatural concept of social order."328 It must be supernatural because reason alone is not enough. It must be philosophical because only a sound philosophy can establish the intellectual conviction that can reassure us, can eliminate false philosophies, and can give positive guidance in theoretical matters.

In the second place, Lonergan understands this necessity as a necessity not of nature but of action. Human action is a statistically pre-determined flow. All we can do is either accept or reject the intellectual forms that could guide our actions.

In the third place, the necessity of the supernatural does not prove that the supernatural is not supernatural. The supernatural is "what transcends nature in its constituents, consequences, exigences."329 The necessity of the supernatural for action arises solely out of the "fact" of sin. Sin is neither a constituent, nor a consequent, nor an exigence of nature. It is contrary to nature and arises out of the failure of individuals to follow the dictates of intelligible forms. It enters into the historical flow through the consequence of this failure. It is not necessary but follows from the choice not to follow reason. We grasp the intelligibility of choice not in terms of necessity but in terms of probability. Thus, the "fact" of sin does not "establish any exigence in the order of rights but only a petition to the Divine Mercy for the gratuitousness of grace."330 This is the case even though one might object

328PH, p. 117.
329Ibid., p. 118.
330Ibid.
that the present generation suffers unjustly for the sins of the past. Lonergan answers this objection by noting that our intelligibility is one, not many, in the order of reality; we are many only by virtue of material differentiation but we are one by virtue of the intelligible unity of the species. Any right or exigence has its foundation, not in matter, which is only a potentiality, but in the intelligible. Lonergan writes:

The one intelligible reality, man, humanity, unfolds by means of matter into a material multiplicity of men, that the material multiplicity may arise, not from itself, but from the intelligible unity, to an intelligible multiplicity of personalities. (italics are Lonergan's) Men become from man as grapes from the vine; if the vine corrupts, so do the grapes; but the grapes suffer no injustice from the vine; they are but part of the vine.\textsuperscript{331}

The notion of the intelligible solidarity of humankind, in conjunction with the fact of pre-motion, provides a basis for Lonergan's conception of the dialectic in history.\textsuperscript{332} Because human beings are one in action, and also one in sin through the statistically pre-determined flow, the fact of the historical dialectic based on sin emerges and with it the necessity for a solution.

1.7 The Supernatural Component of the Dialectic

The theological context of the account of the operation of the supernatural in history is the Mystical Body of Christ. Within this context the historical dialectic is brought under a higher control, and its disordered parts are integrated into the new movement ordered in Christ. The establishment of the historical solidarity of the human race is crucial. Because of the sin of the first man, Adam, the course of history is reversed. Humanity lost its Divine adoption. Instead of developing from an initial knowledge of philosophy, development is through the social exploitation of matter. A tradition of sin emerges in Adam's sin.

The same human solidarity, however, makes possible a Second Adam, Christ, who would restore, through a new creation, the Divine adoption of the human species. Christ is the first mover of the tradition of grace. This tradition transcends the historical movement defined by a dialectic of sin. Lonergan locates the scriptural source of this view in Romans 5:15-19. Adam's one sin sets up many offences resulting in the general corruption of

\textsuperscript{331}Ibid. The emphasis is Lonergan's.

\textsuperscript{332}Lonergan will take up the question of the unity of his dialectical conception of history in ACH(1), pp. 3-5. The existence of dialectic is made possible because of the fact of human solidarity.
The many corruptions of history, however, are brought under a higher control by virtue of the one justification of Christ. They are integrated or re-established (anakephalaiōsis) into a new movement in Christ. Lonergan identifies this new movement in history with the Mystical Body of Christ. As Second Adam, Christ is the prime mover. All subsequent action, which is a consequence of Christ’s action, is part of the Mystical Body. In this movement, nature is elevated by sanctifying grace, while action is made good by actual grace.

The relevant grace for a theory of history is actual grace. Lonergan defines actual grace as "the pre-motion consequent to Christ." As a social form it is the Church. Lonergan distinguishes four aspects of the Church. First, as a body living by virtue of the sacrifice of Christ it is an eternal priesthood. Second, as an extension of the body of Christ it has the power to admit or excise members. Third, as one in the mind of Christ it has teaching authority. Fourth, it executes the will of Christ, the head of the Body. It is through the Body of Christ in its social form that the Christian lives the life of the soul, elevated by grace to the supernatural order, in obedience to the trans-intelligible idée-force. This idée-force, through revelation, is the dictate of reason for the Christian. The Christian lives as one in Christ for "Christ is the vine and we are the branches."

The Church is in the world and this presence provides a further twofold historical movement. Each part of the movement divides itself into a prior dialectic of fact and a dialectic of thought. First, there is the movement of Christianity assimilating the world to itself, that is, the church as the leaven of the world. In the dialectic of fact this movement is a spontaneous expansion resulting from the living out of the gospel message. In the dialectic of thought, this movement of assimilation begins with a long period in which the Church develops through the influence of philosophy. The culmination is a new apostolate informed by "scientific sociology and missiology."

Second, there is the movement of the world in opposition to this assimilation of all things into the Body of Christ. In the dialectic of fact, the spontaneous expansion of Christianity is opposed by the odium fidei. As the Church systematises its dogma, the world develops its dialectic of thought opposed to the truth. This dialectic descends to its lowest manifestation in bolshevism. Between these two contending forces of anthropos pneumatikos (spiritual man) and anthropos sarkikos (physical man) lies the liberal idea of

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333 Lonergan refers here to Paul’s account of human corruption in Romans 1-3.
334 The notion of the pantón anakephalaiōsis becomes a key component for the documents PA(1) and PA(2). The phrase comes from Ephesians 1:10: "To put into effect when the time was ripe: namely that the universe, all in heaven and on earth, might be brought into unity in Christ" (NEB).
335 PH, p. 121.
336 Ibid.
337 Ibid., p. 122. Lonergan’s efforts to develop a Summa Sociologica in PH would be an example of the Church turning to scientific sociology.
anthropos psykhikos (the merely natural man). The liberal idea has "no firmer foundation than actual fact and ... no theory save a theory that ignores the two fundamental facts of original sin and the Incarnation."  

1.7 The Meaning of History

Lonergan concludes the essay first by setting out the rationale of his argument and second by examining the actual meaning of history derived from it.

Lonergan regards the analysis as strictly philosophical. The fundamental distinction is that of intelligible unity and material differentiation. The intelligible unity is both of nature and of action. The unity of action is derived from the principle of pre-motion. The limitation of free will, either to accept the dictate of intellect so as to pre-determine action according to intellect or not to accept the rational dictate and thus be entirely predetermined, is of crucial significance.

As to the second, history considers change. There are, according to Lonergan, three kinds of change. (1) Mere change that results from ordinary action (habitual patterns). This is of no interest to a theory of history because we cannot equate history simply with change. (2) There is, however, the intelligible change that follows from the emergence of new ideas. These ideas are in the concrete. Their logic is the logic of fact, and they are worked out in the objective situation. (3) The third kind of change follows from the emergence of systems of ideas. They are developed in the realm of pure thought and are abstract but when applied function to anticipate what the objective situation requires. The communist anticipates the breakdown of capitalism, the church executes a plan for social order, and the liberal remains confident in a "laissez-faire" policy. In our present situation, change in the social situation occurs not as a result of ideas in the concrete but as a result of the application of systems of ideas whose origin is abstract. Lonergan insists on the practical value of abstract ideas applied to the situation for, although there is a greater possibility of error with abstract ideas than with concrete ideas, "the world has got beyond the stage where concrete problems can be solved merely in the concrete." Unlike the intelligible laws of physical reality which function in blind obedience, we must first discover the appropriate laws of humanity before we can apply them. But despite the difficulties, the alternative to engaging the process is extinction.

There are then a total of seven dialectics: the absolute dialectic, the triple form of the dialectic of fact, and the triple form of the dialectic of thought. These dialectics superimpose and interact in three distinct periods. The three periods of history are: (1) the development of mind through material

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338 Ibid., pp. 121-22.
339 Ibid., p. 124.
need and social collaboration resulting finally in the idea of philosophy; (2) the development of philosophy to the emergence of the idea of a social philosophy; and (3) the development of society under the control of social philosophy. Liberalism makes conscious the need for a social philosophy. Communism is an attempt to give the world such a philosophy. Catholic social theory has existed since the Middle Ages, but its importance has not been acknowledged until now. It is clear, however, that despite Catholicism's traditionalist mentality, Lonergan regards the social philosophy of the Church to be the key element for the future of the third stage.340

It is only within a theological context that Lonergan finds the source for the meaning of history. The drama of creation, fall, and redemption provides the background and the key element of this meaning. The meaning of history "is the ever fuller manifestation of Eternal Wisdom first in a dialectic of fact and then through revelation in a dialectic of thought."341 The individual in history is either the pre-motion of that wisdom by following its dictates and so contributing to its fuller manifestation or, by failing to do so, contributing to the growing evil of the world. The "growth" or expansion of evil is limited. Eventually it is misled by its own excess, giving rise to a contradictory and higher movement for a greater good. Thus evil cannot ultimately triumph "for every evil is permitted merely that good may more fully abound."342 The individual, then, is either the instrument of sin or the instrument of Christ.

The direction of the historical flow accelerates as man passes from the factual to the reflective dialectic. "The nature of progress is to reconquer through Christ the loss nature sustains through sin."343 This will manifest itself, concretely, in the improvement of persons, who in acting out of Christian charity cooperate in the Divine work of salvation.

1.2 As humanity is one in nature and one in action all its works are a function of the acts of its members who are either instruments of sin leading to greater sin or instruments of justice. The greatest evil we face is the evil that is concretized in the historical flow. This injustice culminated in the enslavement of people and the decay of culture. The Christian counterpoint to this is charity which acts in the hope of the coming of the Kingship of Christ

1.8 Summary Remarks

340 Lonergan regards the Catholic traditionalist as essentially correct in his fundamental position but mistaken in his resistance to the need for a social philosophy. See PH, p. 125.
341 PH, p. 128.
342 Ibid., p. 127. The allusion here is probably to Romans 6:1: "What are we to say, then? Shall we persist in sin, so that there may be all the more grace?" (NEB).
343 Ibid., p. 128.
In PH Lonergan sets out to address the claim made in Plato's Republic that philosophy is essential for the proper ordering and operation of human society. It is clear from the text available to us that Lonergan agrees with Plato concerning the necessity of philosophy, and he goes some distance towards developing a philosophy of history adequate to the task of directing social action. It is also clear that Lonergan regards philosophy to be insufficient on its own to meet the problem of social disorder. Philosophy cannot provide a framework which could deal with the problem of sin. What is needed is a higher viewpoint that can be only be situated in the supernatural order. Lonergan identifies the higher order as that communicated through Jesus Christ in the Incarnation. Thus, the philosophy of history presented in PH is fundamentally theological. It is the alternative to what Lonergan regards as the deformations of liberal and Marxist philosophies. Lonergan develops the framework for his philosophy of history by exploiting dynamic elements implicit in Aquinas' metaphysics. He finds these elements in Aquinas' understanding of intellect and will, and his application of Aristotle's idea of pre-motion. Significantly, Lonergan uncovers a statistical intelligibility implicit in Aquinas' view. Because Lonergan understands human freedom as a choice between following the dictates of reason or not, Lonergan’s philosophy of history is dialectical. Though his understanding of dialectic will develop further by 1938, in PH Lonergan establishes the rudiments of his view. Finally, it is in the theology of the Mystical Body of Christ that Lonergan locates the theological component of his theory.

2 Pantôn Anakephalaiôsis: A Theory of Human Solidarity

The manuscript PA(1) is twenty-five pages in length and is dated 1935 by the author. Included with the manuscript in Lonergan’s file are two pages of handwritten comments on the essay by another hand, presumably an instructor to whom Lonergan gave the essay for comments. The text is subdivided. It begins with a three-page preface followed by the text proper. The text proper is divided into six parts as follows: (1) liberty as a disjunctive determination; (2) the historical determination of intellect; (3) the unity of human operation; (4) the synthesis of human operation; (5) the unity of man in the ontological ground of his being; and (6) Pantôn Anakephalaiôsis.

Whereas the focus of PH is on the formulation of a philosophy of history as part of a Catholic social philosophy, PA(1) is specifically concerned with the metaphysic of human solidarity. The two efforts are closely related. The question of human solidarity is integral to a philosophy of history. In PH, Lonergan raises the question in the context of establishing the unity of human action. Furthermore, the notion of human solidarity is essential

344 On the unity of human action see pp. 97-101 below.
in his treatment of the supernatural. In PA(1), we discover a common thread to both efforts. First, Lonergan’s understanding of the operation of human intellect and will informs both the philosophy of history and the metaphysic of human solidarity. Second, Lonergan’s theory of human solidarity is historical. Finally, as in his theory of history, Lonergan locates the theological component of his metaphysic of human solidarity in a theology of the Mystical Body.

2.1 The Preface to Pantôn Anakephalaiôsis

In St. Paul’s Epistle to the Ephesians (1:10) a scriptural text often cited in treatises on the Mystical Body, we find the phrase ανακφαλαιψοφαι τα αυτα. What Lonergan intends in this essay is to present a metaphysic appropriate to understanding this Pauline conception of Christ as the anakephalaiôsis of all things. Because the range of data relevant to this conception is all things, Lonergan contends that a metaphysic is necessary if we are to grasp the meaning. This requires a synthetic view whose proof is of the nature of Newman’s "integration of probabilities." The key to developing such an integration is the Thomist synthesis. Lonergan notes here that he is proposing a legitimate development of St. Thomas.

345See pp. 87-89 above.
347Lonergan does not dispute the authorship of the letter to the Ephesians and so refers to it as the Pauline conception.
348See J.H. Walgrave, Newman the Theologian: The Nature of Belief and Doctrine as Exemplified in his Life and Works, pp. 105-6. In reference to this material David Hammond in "The Influence of Newman’s Doctrine of Assent on the Thought of Bernard Lonergan: A Genetic Study," p. 105, notes that Lonergan "anticipates the critical question his philosophy and theology of history will raise: can his procedure be justified? He is thus careful to cut off any reductionist theory of rationality or proof by insisting that his synthesis is grounded in the operations of the mind as described by Newman." Hammond’s view concurs with our position regarding the centrality of Lonergan’s account of intellect for a theory of history. Hammond’s argument in terms of a defence against reductionism is viable. Was Lonergan conscious of the argument in these terms? We know that in the essays he contributed to the Blandyke Papers, Lonergan was clearly aware of the deficiency of conceptualism and argued, as Newman did, against conceptualist reductions of the concrete intellect.
349He writes: "The fundamental assumption of the essay is that a metaphysic is the necessary key to St. Paul, as its fundamental contention is that the Thomist synthesis (pushed, indeed, to a few conclusions which, if they seem new, may be regarded, I trust, as a legitimate development) provides such a key. The cardinal points of the conception we present are such as the theologian commonly fights shy of on the ground that they are too speculative to be of use to theology, - a principle that would
1.2 The conception of metaphysics in this essay reflects elements put forward in PH. There is, however, an increased interest in the question of the development of human personality. Lonergan notes that there are four fundamental assumptions in the essay: (1) there is a distinction between material and specific intelligible differentiation; (2) potency is merely a condition for the emergence of form and act; (3) personality is the emergence of individual intelligible differentiation out of mere material difference; and (4) the actuation of intelligible differentiation (the development of personality) occurs in the operation of human intellect and will according to statistical law in the context of human solidarity. Lonergan will argue that "no man is more than an instrumental cause and no causation fails to affect all men." This notion squares with the conception of the Mystical Body as an organism composed of members whose actions are inter-related. The principle of pre-motion joins these instrumental causes into "a solidary chain of causation." On this basis Lonergan can establish, as in PH, the relationship of the Fall and the Redemption to the corporate unity of humankind; Adam set a pre-motion that led to the distortion of the body social and Christ set up a new motion which re-integrates humanity to its proper ends. The intelligible unity of Christ replaces the material unity of Adam. This provides the metaphysical basis for the theology of the Mystical Body and the ground for the ultimate reality of the solidarity of the human species.

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certainly have clipped the wings of St. Thomas himself" (p. i).

350 We note that Lonergan distinguishes three types of personality in PH, spiritual, natural, and physical, corresponding to Catholic, liberal, and bolshevik social theory, respectively. The same typology persists in PA(1); however, Lonergan extends his analysis.

351 Lonergan uses this distinction in PH to establish the link between immanent acts of individuals and external action.


353 Lonergan refers to Romans 12:5: "singuli autem alter alterius membra." Ibid.

354 Ibid.
2.2 Liberty as a Disjunctive Determination

As in PH, the notion of human will as *appetitus naturalis sequens formam intellectus* is central to the argument. It is natural for humans to follow the dictates of the intellect. When we fail to do so we are violating our own natures. The act of the will, then, is the positive following of the dictates of reason, while the non-act of will is "the failure of the will to inhibit a motion that is contrary to reason."\(^{355}\)

Interesting is a brief consideration, by Lonergan, of what reasonable means in this context. Lonergan distinguishes objectively and subjectively reasonable. A human act, though historically determined, is objectively reasonable if it "is determinate in the order of pure reason."\(^{356}\) An act is only subjectively reasonable, though historically determined, because a person may not know why an act is right. The cause of this ignorance will lie in the historical field. In other words, we may do the right thing but not know why it is the right thing.

Finally, human freedom consists simply in "a choice between different determinate orders of events."\(^{357}\) Physical determination occurs when the will does not act. Historical determination occurs when the will does act. The key element in the difference is the intervention of intelligence into the material flow.

2.3 The Historical Determination of Intellect

It is in this section that Lonergan considers explicitly elements of the dialectic of history. As in PH, the account of intellect and will is crucial to the hypothesis. The treatment of intellect here shows some development, and there is some development in his ordering of the elements of the dialectic of history.

Lonergan makes nine points. First, every act of intellect is specified by phantasm, which itself is drawn from some historical situation. Thus, the historical situation sets the "outer limits" of what we can think about. Of note here is the phrase "specified by phantasm." In PH Lonergan speaks less precisely in terms of "phantasmal flux."\(^{358}\)

Second, every act of intellect is a universal. Lonergan's position is in accordance with Aquinas on this question.\(^{359}\) Given that will naturally

\(^{355}\)Ibid., p. 1.  
^{356}\)Ibid.  
^{357}\)Ibid., p. 2.  
^{358}\)In PH, the term is found in the following: "Thus, in the action of the individual there are three things: the psycho-sensitive flow of change; the intellectual forms with respect to the phantasmal flux; the power of imposing the intellectual forms upon the flow of change, thus transforming behaviour into rational conduct and speech into rational discourse" (p. 96).  
^{359}\)The problem of universals is central to the debate between nominalism and the
follows the form of intellect, the "universal act of intellect guides an indefinite number of acts of will" and this fact is at "the root of the philosophy of history." One act guides a person's many actions until a contradictory idea replaces it. Furthermore, Lonergan generalises the claim. The universal act of intellect guides not only the originator of the idea, but all those to whom it is communicated in a tradition, either directly or indirectly.

Third, a principle for the analysis of history follows. Because one act of intellect informs an indefinite number of acts of will at any time, a single set of ideas determines the flow of human operations. The flow changes as a result of the emergence of one new idea, and a change in the form of the flow emerges from a change in the form of the flow of new ideas. On this basis Lonergan distinguishes the first two differentials of human operation: (1) concrete thought, in which changes occur one new idea at a time, and (2) abstract thought, which results in changes in the form of the flow itself. We note that, though the argument is altered somewhat, Lonergan maintains a comparable distinction between practical and speculative thought integral to the division of dialectics in PH.

Fourth, citing Thomas Aquinas on the movement of human thought from potency to perfect act, Lonergan determines a third differential, which is the form of human thought itself. There is a development in Lonergan's thinking here. In PH, Lonergan differentiated a dialectic of fact, a dialectic of thought, and an absolute dialectic but he did not explicitly consider a division based on the movement of human thought itself.

Fifth, the form of the development of human thought is predicated, not of the individual, but of the species. Furthermore, Lonergan stresses the incompleteness of human intellectual development. He writes: "Perfect science does not exist yet; our science is an incomplete act of intellect." As in PH, Lonergan illustrates his point by means of the comparison of human and angelic intellect. He contends here, however, that if we reflect on the solidarity of human thought, then the same point can be made. Human beings think and act in terms of traditions which result from both the achievements and errors of the past. Very few persons contribute new ideas, and when they do they are but an instrumental causality of the species, as he will demonstrate later. In concrete situations most human beings work from traditional principles.

position adopted by Lonergan. The importance of his adoption of Aquinas' position here for his entire project can hardly be overestimated. For a review of the debate see Encyclopedia of Philosophy 6, s.v. "Universals," by A.D. Woozley. Lonergan introduces the notion of universals in this manuscript. In PH he does not, though a case can be made for a continuity between the two accounts. The introduction of the question of universals is part of a more nuanced account here.

360 PA(1), p. 3.
361 Lonergan cites Summa Theologiae, 1a Q 85 a3. He quotes from this same article on the title page of this manuscript.
Sixth, matter, which differentiates us as individuals, serves to isolate us from the unity of the species. But material individuation serves a higher end, which is the intellectual unity of the species. To illustrate this Lonergan notes the developments evoked by the exploitation of natural resources. After developments in material production the intersubjective group (tribe or family) is no longer adequate. New social forms emerge which require new political and legal structures. The advances eventually provide the leisure for the pursuit of culture and the development of the higher intellectual faculties.

Seventh, for the unity of the species achieved by intellect to be stable, it must be a unity in truth. Opposed to this unity in truth is the atomization of humanity, "the Zersplitterung that follows from error and sin."\textsuperscript{363}

Eighth, "there is in the natural order a three-fold dialectic in the historic progress of intellect."\textsuperscript{364} There is a dialectic of fact. This refers to the process that results from the emergence of concrete ideas. The objective situation gives rise to a phantasm which specifies an idea. The idea is acted upon but it is incomplete. There results a false (meaning incomplete) situation which eventually reveals itself to be false. There follows an emergence, by the same process, of a compensating idea. There is a dialectic of sin. False situations result not only from incomplete ideas, but also from the very failure to follow intellect at all. Lonergan gives as an example the liberalism that follows the religious wars consequent upon sixteenth-century heresy, and communism which follows the reality of capitalist exploitation and oppression. Finally, there is the dialectic of thought, which in its ideal form is the development of \textit{philosophia perennis}. As contaminated by the dialectic of sin, the dialectic of thought reveals the actual course of abstract thought since the emergence of philosophy. We note that Lonergan's typology of dialectic differs significantly from that of PH, which puts forward a typology composed of seven divisions rather than the three (or four) here.\textsuperscript{365} Because he is speaking of the natural order, Lonergan can eliminate from consideration the absolute dialectic. After eliminating this from the typology in PH there remains a dialectic of fact and a dialectic of thought each subdivided into three. In PA(1), Lonergan has taken this six-part division and reduced it to three. The emergence of the dialectic of sin is significant. In PH this dynamic was a sub-division of both the dialectic of fact and the dialectic of thought. In this manuscript it emerges as one of the fundamental divisions as the inverse insight which informs it emerges as

\textsuperscript{363}Ibid. As Lonergan indicated in PH the Zersplitterung is characteristic of decline as manifest in societies predominantly informed by liberal and Marxist ideologies.

\textsuperscript{364}Ibid. By natural, Lonergan means natural as opposed to supernatural, not natural in a sense which would include the totality of non-human processes.

\textsuperscript{365}See Table 2. If we consider the division composed of the dialectics of fact, of sin, and of thought there is a three-part division. If we divide the dialectic of thought into a pure and a distorted dialectic we have a four-part division. The text itself is ambiguous.
pivotal to Lonergan’s formulation.

Ninth, Lonergan introduces the notion of concupiscence in relation to the historical determination of intellect. The distortion of concupiscence results in the tendency of human intellect to believe that the sensible is real. This is a result of ignorance, but it also is a result of the fact that human beings develop first as animals and only gradually do they come to reason. The order of development has consequences for neural and psychic development, for the control of reason over lower levels is imperfect. Lonergan writes: "For it is under these circumstances that the subconscious development of nervous paths and patterns takes place in a way that later interferes with human autonomy over the flesh." The result is objective situations that never should have existed but which in any case end up in both personal and social tragedy.

2.4 The Unity of Human Operation

The next three sections (3-5) of the manuscript deal with the question of the unity of human operation. Lonergan discusses the origins of unity in the operations of intellect and will (section 3), integrates this notion within the context of a world order (section 4), and discusses the ontological basis for the unity of operation (section 5). We will consider these three sections as one unit.

Lonergan derives the unity of human operation from an account of the process of intellect. He writes: "The individual’s intellectual pattern is determined by phantasms which come from objective situations containing both a tradition of past intellectual achievement and the data for future development." Any new idea results from what is available in the tradition, comes to birth "by some chance individual meeting the postulate of the situation," and when communicated becomes the property of all who are in contact with it. The individual is but an instrument for general development. Lonergan notes that the distortion of the objective situation in the modern world may obscure the truth of this but still "modern men have to think in development of previous thought if they are to think at all." The unity of intellect results in an effective unity of will. The will is not determined by intellect because free will is the choice to either follow or not the dictates of intellect. There is, however, a "statistical uniformity" to its

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366Lonergan identifies this view with the nominalism of Occam. He writes: "The low energia of intellect leads men to believe that the sensible is the real, that is, the particular concrete object which if accepted without qualification as the real leaves William of Occam the "doctor invincibilis" (PA[1], p. 5).

367Ibid.

368Ibid., p. 6.

369Ibid.

370Ibid.
operation. Human beings will follow the dictates of intellect but only according to certain probabilities. Lonergan writes: "We recognize heroic virtue and inhuman vice as exceptions to a settled constancy."\textsuperscript{371} Human beings can either think as they were taught or think independently. If the latter, they either bring forth the needed new ideas or they contribute to the disunity of thought by proposing what is false to be true. All thought is a function of what he calls here "an Objective Geist, the common mind of man."\textsuperscript{372} The truly original mind is simply an instrument for the advance of the Objective Geist while the false original mind is an instrument of decline (Lonergan uses the word "destruction").\textsuperscript{373} The good will is an instrument for fulfilling the practical aims of the objective Geist, while the evil will makes human operation an instrument "for the sub-intellectual determinate order."\textsuperscript{374}

Next, Lonergan locates his analysis within the context of world order.\textsuperscript{375} First, there is a basis for human operation. Extrinsic, it is the succession of non-human world events in the physical and biological orders. Intrinsically, it is (1) the succession of birth, reproduction, and death which sustains the species biologically; (2) the succession of human acts related to each other and the conditioning succession of physical and biological events; and (3) the succession of human thoughts which arise out of prior extrinsic and intrinsic bases already established, controlling them, and in turn, contributing to them.

Second, there is a world order of which human operation is an instrument.\textsuperscript{376} The argument from pre-motion presumes an intelligible world order originating from a Designer, Creator, or First Mover.\textsuperscript{377} If we

\textsuperscript{371}Ibid., p. 7.

\textsuperscript{372}Ibid.

\textsuperscript{373}The notion of Objective Geist with its echoes of Hegel appears in this manuscript and PA(2) but does not appear in later documents.

\textsuperscript{374}Ibid.

\textsuperscript{375}What follows is an intimation of Lonergan's account of world order in I in terms of emergent probability. See I, pp. 115-39. As his account of human operation is essential to his account of history, it is safe to conclude that emergent probability will play a significant explanatory function in Lonergan's account of historical process. This is certainly the view of Kenneth Melchin in \textit{History, Ethics and Emergent Probability}. Lonergan writes in I: "For the advent of man does not abrogate the rule of emergent probability" (p. 209).

\textsuperscript{376}On the significance of Lonergan's appropriation of Thomas Aquinas' theory of operation for his development of a dynamic world-view see Patrick Byrne, "The Thomistic Sources of Lonergan's Dynamic World View." Byrne locates the origins of this appropriation in Lonergan's work on gratia operans in Aquinas done in his dissertation. The dissertation was written between 1938 and 1940.

\textsuperscript{377}Lonergan cites Augustine and Thomas Aquinas here but does not give the proof. He writes in PA(1): "R.P. Portalié in his article on St. Augustine in D.T.C. considers the fundamental point in the Augustinian explanation of grace to be the psychological fact that man has not the initiation of his thoughts. "To a Thomist, this
could grasp the world order in all its details "the whole course of history would be as simple and intelligible as the course of the earth round the sun to a modern astronomer." In this context, human operation, which responds to the pre-motions of the environment (understood in the broad sense to include both human and non-human events) according to already established laws, is simply an instrument. Human freedom, as well, is merely an instrument either for the development of the determinate order of objective Geist or for the determinate order of sub-intellectual operation. The choice is part of the order. Lonergan writes: "The omniscient sower who casts seed by the wayside, on stones, among thorns is not surprised when he reaps no harvest there!" Because God is the principal cause of all operation he uses human agents to effect his design. Thus, just as non-human events are the instrument of the Designer, so are human events. But because they can sin human beings can be the instrument of either righteousness or sin. Lonergan writes: "He may pass on to others what he has received or he may pass on less; but he can do nothing else." In this manner human beings constitute the world in which they live. Third, sin is a non-act. It is natural for the will to follow spontaneously the pre-motion of intellect because the will is a rational appetite. Sin is not a motion or cause but a failure to move or cause. There is the tendency to want to make sense of the difference between the act of the will and the non-act of the will by positing some further third act. But sin cannot be explained because it is completely unintelligible. Lonergan contrasts sin with mystery. Mystery is unintelligible to us but intelligible in itself. Sin, on the other hand, is unintelligible both to us and in itself. This point is absolutely crucial to an understanding of the dialectic of history.

Given the false fact of sin and its consequences for humankind, what is the ontological basis for human unity and what is the metaphysical principle of the redemption? According to Lonergan, this is one and the same question. Ontologically, human beings are one in nature but many in modality, one in form but many in matter. Lonergan writes: "Man is never more than a member of a species." The form of humankind is of the species. The individual is really an individual, but the reality of the individual is a compound of pure reality, constituted by that which participates in the Divine Essence, and the twofold potencies of contingency

truth is self-evident. *Quidquid movetur ab alio movetur*. Will has to be premoved by intellect; intellect has to be premoved by phantasm; phantasm has to be premoved by an objective situation and environment; finally, the objective situation and environment is partly the determinate work of nature, partly the accumulated work of mankind acting now according to its limited knowledge and now against this knowledge" (p. 8).

378Ibid., p. 8.
379Ibid., p. 9. The particular issue of the relationship of liberty to the supernatural order will be a main concern of Lonergan's doctoral dissertation. See GF, pp. 93–116.
381Ibid., p. 11. The emphasis is Lonergan's.
and matter. The potencies condition the possibility "of their (sic) being any imitation or participation of the Divine Essence besides the full possession enjoyed by the Divine Persons." Insofar as human beings are particulars they are contingent and material, but as a universal nature humankind is an "intelligible essence and a limited aspect of the Divine Essence." Therefore, as potency is because of act, the laws of humankind should proceed from and in terms of its universal nature, irrespective of material difference.

If we consider the issue theologically we reach the same conclusion. Because humankind is made in the image of the Triune God, just as there is a consubstantial relationship between the Father and the Son so, too, there is an analogous relationship of consubstantiality in humankind. But insofar as humankind fails to resemble the Divinity, it falls short of Reality. Thus Lonergan concludes that "the difference between men is less real than the unity of men."

Lonergan comes to four conclusions. First, human personality emerges out of the alteration of material difference and intelligent unity. In an individual the intellect and will actuate the potency and what emerges is a particular personality with a given orientation. The habit of will which emerges is what we call character. Because of this actuation and the personal orientation which results we are able to speak of moral persons. Second, the continuous variety of the objective Geist is a function of the emergence of personalities in particular places and times. Third, granting the species character of personality, existing personalities are the products of prior ones and the producers of future ones. Because of the continuity of mutual influence over time, we can conclude that there is a moral personality of humanity. All persons owe a debt to the past and all persons are responsible in the present and to the future, for no person is self-determined. Fourth, given the nature of relations in the Triune God and given the fact that human beings are made in that image, there should ideally emerge persons who reflect their creation in the image of the Triune God, that is, "physical personalities that should be adoptive sons of God and the moral personality that should be the spirit of love for all men." But given the fact of sin, there emerge three kinds of personality according to differing orientation: anthropoi sarkikoi, who are orientated towards sensible satisfaction; anthropoi psychikoi, who are orientated towards the True, the Good, and the Beautiful; and anthropoi pneumatikoi, who are orientated towards God as known through faith in revelation. All types are, however, instruments of God's design, for despite human shortcomings, the Divine plan remains. Persons orientated towards God "constitute a moral personality of love for all men that all may be orientated to the Father of

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382 Ibid.
383 Ibid.
384 Ibid., p. 12.
385 Ibid., p. 13.


2.5 "Pantôn Anakephalaiôsis"

Establishing the instrumental character of human operation proves important in Lonergan's exposition of the Pauline conception of Christ as pantôn anakephalaiôsis, the integrator of all things. Since human operation is instrumental, particular importance is attached to being the first agent in the chain of pre-motion. Adam, pre-moved by Eve and the serpent, sinned and so set up the reign of sin whereby Adam communicates human nature through parents to the human race. The human nature that is communicated is, by way of privation, less than it would have been had Adam not sinned. Hence parents are only quasi-instrumental causes, communicating less because of the privation. The course of history is reversed and the tradition of concupiscence is established. Humankind must develop from the potency of intellect "under the leadership of phantasms specifying intellect as chance offered them." Progress is not planned but proceeds through the series of incomplete acts of intellect as explained above. Finally, as a consequence the human race in the line of Adam dies the death that is the penalty of sin.

Christ, the second Adam, came into the world and set up the Kingdom of God. He communicates the Divine adoption by baptism of water and spirit. The church and parents are the instrumental causes of this communication. Christ transmutes death into right sacrifice and so restores the harmony of humankind through the grace of dogma.

Lonergan understands the grace of dogma to be "an absolute Geist above the wandering objective Geist of humanity." Lonergan expands on his meaning in some detail. First, he considers the timing of the coming of Christ. Philosophy had to be discovered before the Incarnation because Christian dogma could not be expressed in the symbolism of the pre-philosophic age. Symbolism in the pre-philosophic age tended to lead to idolatry. Furthermore, philosophy itself had to break down to make plain the impotence of philosophy to solve the problem of unity without Christ.

Second, the supernatural revelation revealed in Christ is not simply a content but "premoves a living and developing mind: the mind of the mystical body." Lonergan cites Nicea, the advance of scholastic theology over patristic theology, and Aquinas' adoption of Aristotle's method as examples of the living and developing context.

Third, such a development is not a development of dogma, that is,

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387Ibid., p. 16.
388PA(1), p. 16.
389Ibid. Lonergan cites 1 Corinthians 2:16, which reads: "Who knows the mind of the Lord? Who can advise him?" We, however, possess the mind of Christ" (NEB).
revelation as such. It is a development through dogma.\textsuperscript{390} The mind of the Mystical Body develops by selecting, through the light of illumination that proceeds from the Divine Word, that which is true in incomplete acts. In this way, it reflects the restoration through grace of what would have been had the human race developed according to infused knowledge rather than through the process of development as deformed by concupiscence.

Fourth, the intellectualist position of the Church, as an expression of the development of the Absolute \textit{Geist}, is "the sole possibility of a practical human unity."\textsuperscript{391} The intellectual benefit of the developing absolute \textit{Geist} is something that fallen humankind, with its tendency to nominalism and sensism, easily fails to grasp. So, for example, there has been in Christian history Gnosticism, the break-up of protestantism, and the failure of growth in the Eastern Church. The intellectualist position of the Church whose fundamental position is \textit{Bonum hominis est secundum rationem esse} can overcome this disunity.\textsuperscript{392} The modern situation in the West is one of crisis. Only dogma can unite and only the dogma of Christ truly unites.\textsuperscript{393} Imperative to the development through dogma that meets the modern situation is a \textit{Summa Sociologica}\textsuperscript{394} or metaphysic of history.\textsuperscript{395}

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\textsuperscript{390}There is an interesting correction in the text. On one occasion Lonergan writes: "The development of the Absolute \textit{Geist} of dogma cannot be a development of the dogma." He corrects the text by hand to "the development of the absolute \textit{Geist} through dogma cannot be a development of the dogma" (p. 17). And later we have: "The development of dogma is not by the acceptance of incomplete acts of intellect and their factual refutation when put in practice" (p. 17). Again the "development of dogma" becomes "development through dogma." He writes in his own hand in the margin of the same page of the text the following which might explain his thinking here: "N.B. The development of dogma is the developed Absolute \textit{Geist} turning back upon the content of revelation and seeing more there than was seen before." (The emphasis is Lonergan's.) In \textit{MT} Lonergan makes the distinction between the permanence of dogma and the historicity of dogma. Dogmas are permanent in their meaning because they express revealed mysteries. The historicity of dogma results from the fact that they are also statements made in particular ongoing contexts. See pp. 324-6.

\textsuperscript{391}\textit{PA(1)}, p. 17.

\textsuperscript{392}\textit{Ibid.}, p. 17. Lonergan means by the intellectualist position of the Church the Thomist position.

\textsuperscript{393}Lonergan writes in \textit{PA(1)}: "The dogma of communism unites by terrorism to destroy; the dogma of race unites to protect but it is meaningless as a principle of advance and it is impotent as a principle of human unity; in plain language, it is not big enough an idea to meet the problem; it is a nostrum that increases the malady. There remains only the dogma of Christ" (p. 18).

\textsuperscript{394}Lonergan’s practice in both \textit{PH} and \textit{PA(1)} has been to equate the notion of a \textit{Summa Sociologica} with a philosophy of history. It is clear that Lonergan regards the working out of a philosophy of history as vital to the enterprise of developing a social philosophy. The question remains to what extent he views them as one and the same task.

\textsuperscript{395}Here follows Lonergan’s description of the situation in \textit{PA(1)}: "A metaphysic of history is not only imperative for the church to meet the attack of the Marxian
We derive a further benefit from understanding the Absolute Geist from the standpoint of the intellectualist position. It is a natural means for overcoming the disharmony caused by concupiscence. In the first place, the sacraments are not intended to exorcise the evil. In the second place, because concupiscence is the extrinsic privation of an instrumental means to an end it can be overcome by Christ who restores. In the third place, wise laws prudently applied do much to mitigate the disharmony. In the fourth place, intellectual culture does much to blunt the crudity of passion. In the fifth place, intelligently ruled economics and the continual advance of science will lead to more leisure for the development of higher faculties than in the past. In the sixth place, as we begin to learn more about human physiology and subconscious activity there should be developments in educational theory which will help us solve problems of which we are now incapable.

Moreover, it is in the context of the Absolute Geist, the developing mind of the Mystical Body, that Christ most clearly appears as pantôn anakephalaiôsis. By Adam the reign of sin began which resulted in the progressive atomization of humanity. Matter individuates, and in order to overcome matter, human beings must unite economically, politically, culturally, and religiously. In every case, unity results from an idea and following the idea betters the situation; in every case, sin destroys the progress. The problem is the sin. The peace of unity results only if the effective causality of the will follows the form of the intellect. But the reign of sin culminates in the atomization of humanity.

Christ as the new head of humanity, as the originator of the absolute Geist, restores and reintegrates what has been split. The absolute Geist is the intellect in which the Church participates. This absolute Geist always progresses by selecting the truth in the incomplete acts of the objective Geist. It progresses by intellect, which is the principle of unity, and peace is a unity in truth. Christ’s work is the work of peace – a peace that the world of sin cannot give. Plato in the Republic saw the social necessity of philosophy. As the mystêrion of the anakephalaiôsis, Christ is the philosopher-king of which Plato could only dream. The Church, as the instrument of the absolute Geist, provides the means. Anathemas hold in check false speculation. The obligation of confession prevents the rationalization of making sin out to be other than it is. It gives the support of sacramental grace. It teaches the doctrine of charity, which is the only means of overcoming the evil of error and the only alternative to the materialist conception of history and its realization in apostolic Bolshevism: it is imperative if man is to solve the modern politico-economic entanglement, if political and economic forces are to be subjected to the rule of reason, if cultural values and all the achievement of the past is to be saved both from the onslaughts of purblind statesmen and from the perfidious diplomacy of the merely destructive power of communism. But to establish the intellectual unity of men by appealing to reason is impossible; men refuse to be reasonable enough to take the League of Nations seriously, and that is too elementary a notion to be called a metaphysic” (pp. 17-18).
dialectic of sin.

Finally, Christ as *anakephalaiōsis* of humanity is not only the Divine Word, the source of intellectual light, but also the object for the love of will. From the Divine Word proceeds the active spiration of the Holy Spirit. "From Christ by the sending of the Holy Ghost proceeds the active spiration in the human image of the Trinity; and in response to this active influence is the passive supernatural love of man, the theological virtue of charity." 396 This love in Christ becomes the centre for the social solidarity of humanity. All things must be restored in Christ for there to be a true restoration of the social order. The problem of intellectual unity and effective will is beyond the reach of humanity. "Man is not willing to take himself as no more than an instrument." 397 The alternative to this impotence is to live a life of sacrifice following Christ. "Sacrifice, the shedding of blood, that is the whole meaning of life; and in this eternal oblation Christ is the primum agens." 398

Fifth, the final synthesis of history derives from the antithesis of the first and second Adam. That final synthesis is effected in the economy of the Trinity.

The antithesis exists because of sin. But why did God not create a world in which there is no sin? Because the Divine Wisdom in its transcendence of mystery and grace is better revealed when there are some creatures who sin. The manifestation of this wisdom is revealed not in the justice that is meted to those who sin but in the need for created grace. There must be the need, for God, who is intelligent, does not do things unnecessarily. Sin created the need. In angels the sin is an individual falling away, for each angel is an individual species. In human beings, sin is of potential individuals who are united though a metaphysical unity of one nature and operation. Thus the sin of one individual extends to the nature and operation of all individuals. The sin of Adam leads to a reign of sin, but the infinite Wisdom conquers the infinity of sin through the intervention of Christ. As matter is to form, so in some analogous way the sin of the first Adam is to the mystery of faith in Christ.

But the significance of Christ is cosmic. He is not just the initiation of the supernatural solution to the problem of evil but He restores all things both in heaven and in earth as indicated by the meaning of in Ephesians 1:10. It is a final settling of all accounts with sin. How is this so? First, because of the solidarity of humanity, sin spreads into a reign. The end result of the dialectic of sin in the modern world is but the consequence of prior situations going back to the very sin of Adam. Second, the sin of Adam himself was pre-moved by the serpent. Adam by his sin made himself an instrument of Satan's pre-motion; the reign of sin is, in fact, a reign of Satan, the earthly consequence of the sin of angels. Christ the second Adam and Divine Word settles all accounts.

396Ibid., p. 21.
397Ibid., p. 22.
398Ibid.
2.6 Summary Remarks

Although the main thrust of PA(1) is not towards a philosophy of history, a consideration of its contents indicates that there are developments in Lonergan's thinking that are relevant to such a philosophy. Lonergan explicitly addresses the issue in his consideration of the historical determination of the intellect. Lonergan discovers the principle for an analysis of history in the understanding that every act of intellect is a universal. The differentiation of concrete thought, abstract thought, and the form of human thought itself provides the basis for determining three differentials for human operation in history. This basic division is seminal in the development of the three stages of meaning that appear in Method, and it is significant in the development of the historical stages as they appear in the documents of batch B. Lonergan's account of intellect is more nuanced in PA(1), setting the stage for the differentiation between understanding and reason which emerges explicitly in relation to a theory of history in the documents of batch B. In Lonergan's account of the unity of human operation there emerges a consideration of human operation in terms of an account of world-order which intimates the theory of emergent probability. Lonergan explicitly explores the question of the development of personality, setting the stage for the emergence of the notion of ordered freedom in the documents of batch B and thus pointing to the existential element of his philosophy. The theory of solidarity in the theological context of the Mystical Body, which Lonergan develops in PA(1), becomes an essential component of the analytic conception of history. Lonergan, therefore, can establish the intelligible connection between the dialectic of history and the continuing Trinitarian missions in history.

3 Pantôn Anakephalaiôsis

This is a second manuscript devoted to the Pauline conception of Christ as pantôn anakephalaiôsis. It is a five-page document divided in point form into fourteen sections. The contents suggest that it could have been written as a summary of the argument of PA(1), but there is not a lot of evidence to indicate whether or not this document was written before or after PA(1). There are, however, two differences between the documents to consider. First, Lonergan introduces in PA(2) the theological distinction between real and imitative consubstantiality which is relevant to a theology of solidarity. This represents a more explicit articulation of the ultimately Trinitarian
context of Lonergan’s metaphysic of human solidarity. Second, there is a difference in the account of the dialectical development of intellect; instead of the dialectic of thought, Lonergan speaks of the dialectic of the absolute Geist. He also makes explicit that the threefold dialectic of fact, sin, and absolute Geist occurs in both pre-philosophic and philosophic stages. Although this idea is implicit in his account in PA(1), it is stated explicitly in the context of the division of the dialectic in PA(2). A consideration of this, in terms of the overall development of Lonergan’s thought on the division and stages of the dialectics, would likely be important for a determination of the order of composition. In considering the differences between the manuscripts what evidence we have tends to place PA(2) as the latter of the two documents.

The contents of PA(2) constitute, aside from the differences noted, a sketch of the argument in PA(1). We will briefly indicate the points considered in the manuscript.

(1) The aim of the work is to outline the metaphysic of human solidarity implicit in St. Paul.

(2) There are two kinds of solidarity: real, pertaining to the Divine Persons, and imitative. The ratio theologica of this difference is found in Genesis 1:26, "Let us make man to our image and likeness," and in the theological thesis that the Generation of the Word is generatio proprie dicta. The doctrine of universals is the ratio philosophica.

(3) Lonergan distinguishes individuality and personality. Personality is differentiated into potential and actual.

(4) There are three kinds of personality: anthropos sarkikos, anthropos psykhikos, and anthropos pneumatikos.

(5) Human beings are in genere intelligibilium ut potentia.

(6) The human will is appetitus naturalis sequens formam intellectus.

(7) The human intellect is predetermined in the form that it presents to the will except when there is an undue influence on the will. The undue influence on the will causes errors such as undue haste, ignorance, and rationalization.

(8) On account of the unity of intellect and the statistical uniformity of
will the human species is one in nature and one in action. The basic principle is *quidquid movetur ab alio movetur*. The general thesis is the human species is never more than *causa secunda et instrumentalis*.

(9) Human beings think as they are taught. The man with the original idea is the exception. The context for the emergence of new ideas is in terms of a seven-step succession. First, there is discovery of practical ideas for securing basic material needs. Second, there is the higher organization of social forms beyond that of tribe and family. Third, there is the birth of the mechanical arts and sciences supported by a division of labour. Fourth, there is the development of culture in terms of the symbolic expression of the Divine. Fifth, there is the emergence of philosophy and its consequent failure. Sixth, there is the disintegration of philosophy. Seventh, there is the atomization of thought.

(10) There is a triple dialectic in the development of human intellect: the dialectic of fact, the dialectic of sin, and the dialectic of absolute *Geist*. The dialectics occur in two phases: pre-philosophic and philosophic.

(11) Lonergan indicates four relevant aspects of the will. First, the will is the immanent act in the actuation of personality. Second, as a transient act the act of will controls the transient human operations. There will be either reasonable or unreasonable acts. Third, the concrete situation is all but predetermined. Fourth, there is a statistical uniformity to human wills.

(12) Human liberty amounts to no more than not sinning.

(13) The primal agency of the whole of human operation can be set forth in a consideration of the antithesis of the first and second Adam.

(14) Though human beings are made in the image and likeness of the Trinity, they are a transient dynamism of intellect and will conditioned by matter. Hence the creation of any personality is the corporate work of the individual and his or her predecessors. The production of individual personalities is a continuing succession of emerging individuals. There is, therefore, not only individual personality but also "the moral personality of solidary humanity." As many, it is the "generation of the adoptive sons of God." As one, it is the "emergence of universal charity: the love of Christ and the love of all men in Christ."

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400 This material corresponds to the phases of history outlined by Lonergan in PH, pp. 102-16.

401 In PA(1) Lonergan appeared to be moving in this direction. This arrangement completes the movement insofar as the dialectic of fact is generalised to include both the prior dialectic of fact and the dialectic of thought. The relevant distinction between these two dialectics is now made explicit in terms of the distinction between a pre-philosophic and a philosophic phase in history. With this division Lonergan is very close to the formulation that emerges in the documents of batch B.

402 PA(2), p. 5.

403 Ibid.

404 Ibid.
4 Sketch for a Metaphysic of Human Solidarity

This manuscript is a two-page sketch establishing the basis for a threefold typology of human personality. It was found attached to PA(1) in File 713. As such, it does not contribute directly, but rather analogously, to the question of the dialectic of history. Insofar as human solidarity is a pre-condition of any dialectic this sketch is relevant. Lonergan makes seven points.

(1) "The real is exhausted by the terms: existence, individuation, essence; i.e., everything that is exists as a particular of a certain kind."  

(2) "Existence is either intelligible or empirical." In the order of empirical existence the intellectual and the spiritual are really one thing because they are, in fact, both found in one contingent being (human), although either may be found separately (angels and animals).

(3) "Individuation is either intelligible or empirical." Intelligible differentiation is by virtue of intelligible difference, while material differentiation is merely a matter of fact possessing no ultimate intelligible difference.

(4) "Reality is either pure or impure." Pure reality is that aspect of the Divine essence that is imitated, while impure reality is that which there must be, besides pure reality, for there to be an imitation of the latter. Pure reality is act while impure reality is a passive potency; acts are limited through their potencies. God is pure act, so in God there is no potency. In all creatures there is something that is not God, therefore there is potency. Contingency and materiality are unintelligible per se; neither is found in God but both are found in creatures. They are the impure reality; essence is the pure participation.

(5) From the fact that reality is either pure or impure two corollaries follow. First, we determine the reality of a thing by the measure of the participation of the Divine essence, not by its particularity. Second, in the lower grades of being differentiation is according to the measure of imitation of the Divine essence. This is possibly true of the angels. In the Trinity this cannot be the case because each person is God absolutely. The differentiation is by esse relativum; "by the reality of opposed yet mutually implicit function."
(6) "Pure reality is dynamic." The reality of God is dynamic. Physical reality, apart from its particularity, is energy. Biological reality is, apart from its particularity, generative. The dynamic of reality is either motus or energeia. The distinction is that between motion and procession.

(7) Lonergan distinguishes individuality and personality. An infant is only potentially a personality but is actually individual. A personality, formally, is the combination of habits of intellect and will resulting in a particular character. Personality is a relation in human beings derived from spiritual potencies used well or not, corresponding to the passive potency of individuation by matter. We begin through individuation through matter, but we develop immaterial existence through intellectual and moral development. Lonergan divides personalities into (a) anthropos pneumatikos constituted by the light and charity that comes from the Holy Spirit, (b) anthropos psykhikos orientated to the True, the Good, and the Beautiful, and (c) anthropos sarvikos orientated to the sensible.

5 Concluding Remarks on the Documents of Batch A

In the documents of batch A Lonergan has made great strides towards the basic form of his notion of the dialectic of history. As is clear from our exposition of the manuscripts Lonergan’s ideas are developing. This development is especially noteworthy in the division of the dialectics. A careful consideration of this movement would be essential for determining the course of the development of Lonergan’s ideas on the dialectic of history. We also see the evidence for other developments and refinements in Lonergan’s thinking. Because of the systematic thrust of Lonergan’s thinking these developments will be significant in any exhaustive analysis. It is worth noting as well the existence of a solid core of insights which condition the emergence of these developments. In this respect we can hardly underestimate the significance of his appropriation of Aquinas’ understanding of intellect and will, his use of the theory of pre-motion, and his grasp of the statistical intelligibility relevant to both.

In the documents of batch A the framework out of which Lonergan operates is metaphysical. There is undeniable evidence of Aquinas’ influence in metaphysics, though to what extent it was from the reading of Aquinas is not clear. But there is also the "existentialist" influence of Newman from whom Lonergan evolved his concrete approach to the

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412 Ibid.
413 Lonergan writes: "Motus est entis in potentia in quantum huiusmodi. Energeia est actus entis in actu in quantum huiusmodi (procession)" (p. 2).
414 In "Insight Revisited" Lonergan notes the influence while at the Gregorian of his teacher Bernard Leeming and also that of Maréchal. He writes: "I had become a Thomist through the influence of Maréchal mediated to me by Stefanos Stephanu and through Bernard Leeming’s lectures on unicum esse in Christo" (SC, p. 276). See also p. 265.
In the documents of batch B the influence of Aquinas remains, but Lonergan develops, with the assistance of an analogy from Newton's method of determining actual motion, the analytic conception of history which he explicitly differentiates from traditional metaphysics.

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415 In "Insight Revisited" Lonergan writes: "I had become something of an existentialist from my study of Newman's A Grammar of Assent" (ibid).
On his own account Lonergan formulated a theory of history about 1937-38. The four documents in batch B constitute the data we have for this specific effort. In these manuscripts Lonergan develops the triadic form for the dialectic of history, a form which remains a constant in Lonergan’s analysis. In three of the four documents Lonergan names his theory "the analytic conception of history." In these documents the three moments of the dialectic are named "ideal line of history," "decline," and "renaissance." In "A Theory of History" he simply speaks of "a theory of history." The three "moments" are called the "natural dialectic," the "dialectic of sin," and the "supernatural dialectic." Given the level of development of the account of the dialectic of history, TH is most probably the earliest of the four documents.\(^{416}\) Despite these differences all four documents share an important development in Lonergan’s dialectic understanding of history and of dialectic. Up to this point, he has considered dialectic and history in the broadly conceived context of producing a *Summa Sociologica*, a social philosophy which would provide a metaphysic for Catholic action. This effort included the development of a properly Catholic philosophy of history, the development towards what he calls a metaphysic of human solidarity, and the integration of both into its theological context in a theology of the Mystical Body. We now proceed to the exposition of the documents of batch B. First, we shall consider TH. Then we shall discuss the remaining three documents as a unit.

With the documents of batch B there occurs a significant differentiation of tasks. The specific question of a theory of history is taken up in its own right. This shift is reflected perhaps in Lonergan’s choice to speak of history in terms of a "theory" and an "analytic conception" instead of in terms of a "metaphysic" or "philosophy." Lonergan will distinguish what he means by the analytic conception of history from other metaphysical analyses.\(^{417}\) At this time the formulation of the theory is in terms of three moments and three distinct stages with which Lonergan scholars are familiar. This account corresponds to the basic pattern Lonergan adopts in his published writings. This is not an abandonment of the concern for the social question

\(^{416}\)See chapter 3 above for comments on the dating of TH.

\(^{417}\)See ACH(1), p. 1; ACH(2), p.3; OACH, p. 1.
but a more specific exploration of a fundamental theorem for Catholic social philosophy. The effort is consistent with Lonergan's understanding of the need for Catholic action to be directed by theory that is on the level of the times. However difficult the task, theory cannot be abandoned for action; rather action requires direction by intelligent theory.418

1 "A Theory of History"

In TH Lonergan still includes consideration of the relevance of the theology of the Mystical Body to a theory of history, but his interest is clearly centred on the formal element which a theory of history would provide for the treatise on the Mystical Body.419 In TH the model for history derived from the analogy of the threefold approximation emerges. The manuscript is nine pages in length. If we go by Lonergan's scheme of exposition in the text it is incomplete. After a brief definition and a comment on procedure Lonergan offers an outline of its contents. For the contents of the outline see Table 3.

The document we now have contains all of section A, "The Form of Historical Movement." Section B, "The Content of Historical Movement," is missing except for part (a) of section B, "The Significance of Human History." This section functions as a prolegomenon to an actual consideration of the contents of history; the material that would have been derived from a consideration of the contents of historical movement either was never written or has been lost. In any case, it is clear that a consideration of the formal element constituted for Lonergan the fundamental concern.

1.1 Material and Formal Elements

In TH Lonergan continues his development of the "upper blade" for history: "A theory of history is an explanatory account of those general forms of the movement of human history within which particular events take place."420 Its concern is the laws which govern the direction and

418In I Lonergan refers to the "realist" option of the practical man as "the operative principle in the breakdown and the disintegration of civilizations" (p. 747). But already in PH Lonergan writes: "But, whether we like it or not, the world has got beyond the stage where concrete problems can be solved merely in the concrete" (p. 124).

419On this relationship Lonergan writes the following in I: "Now while the Scriptural, patristic, and dogmatic materials for a treatise on the Mystical Body have been assembled, I would incline to the opinion that its formal element remains incomplete as long as it fails to draw upon a theory of history" (p. 742).

420TH, p. 1. The introduction of the term "explanatory" is significant. In I Lonergan differentiated between description and explanation. See Index under
content of historical movement and not the explanation of particular events; it differs from history as the universal differs from a particular individuation. It is not, however, a study of the universal as a pure abstraction, but a study of what Lonergan calls here the "historical universal." By this he means "human nature considered neither abstractly nor concretely, nor apart from its individuations nor yet in its individuations but in the laws of its explansion [sic] through successive generations of new individuations." By understanding the object of historical theory to be the "historical universal," Lonergan is able to overcome the apparent contradiction between metaphysical analysis, on the one hand, and historicity on the other. This procedure proves to be significant in the development of his thought.

Lonergan notes here that theory of history differs from history in its procedure. History is an empirical science, and if it does proceed to theory, it begins from the facts. The theory of history, on the other hand, is an explanatory a priori construction in which the form is deduced "from the inherent laws of human nature." These inherent laws incorporate, as we have already indicated, an account of the concrete development of intellect.

1.2 Procedure

It is in TH that the theoretical account of history based on the model of a threefold approximation emerges explicitly. Lonergan introduces the analogy by considering the problem of determining the trajectory which results from the firing of a long-ranged gun. First, we distinguish the explanation of the initial and final explosions from the trajectory that would join them. Then, to determine the trajectory itself we need to invoke Newton's three laws of motion. The first law states that in an ideal state bodies move in a straight line with a constant velocity; it is a first approximation to the actual course of the trajectory. The second law takes into account the law of gravity, and the third law considers the influence of air resistance, wind, and the movement of the earth. These two laws correct the ideal line of the first law; taken together with the first law we arrive at the actual trajectory. The analogy holds for the form of history in the

"Description-Explanation," "Explanation," and "Explanatory Conjugates."

421Ibid. The term appears comparable to "concrete universal," which appears in Lonergan's published work. Compare the following from I: "And as the remote possibility of thought on the concrete universal lies in the insight that grasps the intelligible in the sensible, so its proximate possibility resides in a theory of development that can envisage not only natural and intelligent progress but also sinful decline, and not only progress and decline but also supernatural recovery" (p. 743). Of particular relevance here is the fact that Lonergan addresses the methodological issue in the "Introduction" to the Gratia Operans Dissertation. See "The Gratia Operans Dissertation: Preface and Introduction," esp. pp. 11-16.

422TH, p. 1.
following manner. First, we distinguish the form from the content of history just as we distinguished the initial and final explosions from the trajectory that joins them. Second, the form is grasped by discovering the general law and correcting it with the relevant successive approximations. Having determined the form we consider the content. In actual fact, the form and the content are one and the same thing and have, as it were, to be considered together if they are to be understood at all. This last point is the basis of his efforts to consider both the form and content of history and is highly suggestive of Lonergan's often quoted comment on generalized empirical method: "It does not treat of objects without taking into account the corresponding operations of the subject; it does not treat of the subject's operation without taking into account the corresponding objects."423

1.3 The Natural Dialectic

Lonergan determines the first approximation for a theory of history from the laws governing the development of human thought. He establishes that human action is, in fact, governed by thought and that this thought tends to be uniform among contemporaries. He then indicates the law governing the historical development of thought.

The fact that will follow the form of intellect establishes that human thought governs human action. Human beings cannot act upon what, in fact, they cannot think about: "An Eskimo cannot think of watering his camel because he has not one."424 This is only approximately true, for human beings do not always know what they should think about nor do they always do what they know they should. Still, this approximate truth is the first law and constitutes an ideal line for historical development.

To establish that human thought tends to be uniform among contemporaries Lonergan follows his, by now, standard argument. Intellect is determined by phantasm and phantasm is determined by the historical situation.425 Therefore, human beings will think the same way if they have the same data before them. This fact yields a uniformity among those whose experience coincides. Though not all human beings have the same data before them, the natural spread of ideas ensures the tendency to uniformity among contemporaries; good ideas ideally will spread if they are advantageous. If they do not spread they can, in any case, be disregarded by the theoretician of history.426

423"Religious Knowledge," in TC, p. 141.
424TH, p. 2.
425Lonergan will replace the term "determines" with "conditions" in his later published material. See, for example, I, pp. 94-97.
426Why? Because the fundamental context for the theoretician of history is social, not individual. An individual may come up with the idea for a better mouse trap, but if the idea is not communicated or if communicated has no effect on the community then it does not serve to produce historical change.
Lonergan derives the general law for the historical development of thought from the fact that intellect proceeds from the more general to the more particular. For example, a student engineer must learn the principles of engineering before he is counted competent to erect a hotel or lay a drain. But we do not come to the most general conception right away. Concretely, there is a discovery of a general idea which works out as far as it will go. The limitation of the idea becomes apparent in practice and leads to the discovery of a "complementary opposed principle, an antithesis."\textsuperscript{427} When the antithesis is applied eventually we become aware of the limitations of both ideas. This limitation leads to the discovery of their synthesis.\textsuperscript{428} It is only as a result of the most general understanding that a complete understanding of the particular is possible. This account is in continuity with the accounts of historical progress in both PH and PA(1). In the earlier manuscripts Lonergan derives the cycle by considering the series of pre-motions from historical situation to human action which act to transform the basic situation. Lonergan adds here the further context provided by the insight that progress, through the operation of human intellect, is from the general to the particular resulting in a cumulative grasp of particulars.

In TH Lonergan calls the first approximation for the form of history the natural dialectic. "The natural dialectic is a series of ascending general principles each followed by expansion, antithesis, and a soluble problem."\textsuperscript{429} It is a function of the ideal development of human thought as it determines human action. There is first of all a routine established by the fact that the data of experience determines thought and thought, ideally, determines action. Human actions then serve to create objective social forms, customs, and institutions which constitute the routine of life. The routine itself is not, however, history but a condition of the possibility of history "for history is the history of change."\textsuperscript{430} Historical change emerges with new thought. Some general idea emerges which expands gradually, through the process of human thought and action, from lesser to greater generality, achieving concrete results. In the idea of the natural dialectic we find a generalization of the elements of the dialectic of fact and the dialectic of thought already developed by Lonergan. The generalization results from a grasp of the progressive cycle common to both dialectics. Lonergan accounts for the distinction he had between the dialectic of thought and the dialectic of fact in his consideration of historical stages.\textsuperscript{431}

\textsuperscript{427} TH, p. 3.
\textsuperscript{428} Compare this with the account of dialectic in I as "a concrete unfolding of linked but opposed principles of change" (p. 217).
\textsuperscript{429} TH, p. 4.
\textsuperscript{430} Ibid., p. 3.
\textsuperscript{431} In TH Lonergan distinguishes in his initial scheme of exposition two historical stages: (1) Ancient History and (2) Modern History.
1.4 The Dialectic of Sin

The second approximation, which acts to correct the projection of the ideal line of the natural dialectic, is the dialectic of sin: "The corrupted dialectic is a series of descending general principles each followed by an evil expansion, a violent antithesis, a really insoluble problem which none the less will appear to be solved by the negation of some truth and the consequent introduction of a still lower synthesis."432 This dialectic emerges from the "fact" of sin, and its general characteristics have already been worked out by Lonergan. Its basis lies in the inverse insight that sin is a non-act.433 It is unintelligible, a failure to do what the intellect dictates. Within the context of the ideal line of the natural dialectic, thought dictates a certain course of action. "Sin is action outside this ideal course."434 Just as the action that comes out of the ideal line transforms the data of experience, so, too, does the action that results from the deviation of sin. The transformation, however, is incorrect; if the resulting data is wrong then the acts of understanding that arise from this data will be wrong as well. The result is a cumulative distortion of the objective situation: "Sin is a surd in the historical process."435 The surd cannot be explained, other than incidentally in terms of human passion and weakness, because we cannot understand that which is intrinsically unintelligible.

Not only does the dialectic of sin corrupt the objective situation but, as it infects theory, it corrupts systematically. The accumulation of sin in the data of experience leads to a mistrust of theory and of abstract principles which should guide conduct. If theory is what ought to be done then in practice what ought to be done is not. If we want to succeed in life we do not what is right but what is practised. This social surd leads to moral indifference in private life and Realpolitik in public life. Theory is increasingly adjusted to practice as human beings attempt to explain what cannot be explained. Eventually the truth becomes irrelevant to the practice of living in a world dominated by such moral indifference and Realpolitik.

1.5 The Supernatural Dialectic

The third approximation for the theory of history is the supernatural dialectic. It is the contrary of the dialectic of sin. Whereas sin introduces into the objective situation that which is intrinsically unintelligible, the supernatural dialectic introduces into history that which is "unintelligible"
due to an excess of intelligibility. The supernatural is either *quoad modum*, that which merely transcends the actual potentialities of nature, or *quoad substantiam*, the introduction of God as He is in Himself into the historical situation. The law of the supernatural dialectic follows from its own nature, which transcends the human intellect "and so must be simply conserved and not submitted to the play of thesis, antithesis and higher synthesis which human intellect exerts upon its proper object." But, because the dialectic of sin proceeds from human weakness, the immutable law of the supernatural is met by an antithesis in the historical situation. Rationalism, the antithesis, attempts to understand what it cannot understand, the supernatural which transcends human intellect. The result is an aggravation of the evil in the objective situation which causes an acceleration of the downward spiral. Lonergan writes: "Without revealed religion to explain, modernism would be evident nonsense; without it to attack, communism would be stripped of its most virulent doctrines." Though the supernatural dialectic transcends all evolution of doctrine, the presence of the antithesis (rationalism) is the occasion for a development that lies in the rejection of the antithesis. There is "a consequent increase in the precision as well as an extension of the applications of the original deposit."

Lonergan did not consider the positive aspect of the supernatural life, for it lies outside the scope of the inquiry. He does, however, elaborate on the negative aspect, that is, "that the supernatural is the restoration of nature in face of the dialectic of sin." The supernatural meets the dialectic of sin with the doctrines of personal confession, faith, and charity. First, the dialectic of sin begins with rationalization. This is met by the doctrine of confession, which obliges the sinner to admit the fault, admit that sin is sin, repent, and avoid sinning again. This attacks the dialectic at its root by pointing out to the sinner the contradiction between his or her conscience and his or her acts. The opposition in the objective sphere between theory and practice is now shifted to the subjective field. Second, the dialectic of sin is also a theoretical error. This is met by the doctrine of faith, which substitutes reason and will for understanding. So, for example, we cannot understand how God, who is infinitely good, could have created a world of

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436 This distinction is comparable to the distinction made by Lonergan between relatively supernatural solutions and absolutely supernatural solutions. See I, pp. 725-26.

437 TH, p. 5.

438 The implication seems to be that the supernatural dialectic only meets its antithesis with the emergence of rationalism. But Lonergan indicates both in documents written prior to TH and in those written later that the supernatural dialectic and its antithesis operate prior to the emergence of rationalism. Hence, there is the odium fidei of Roman paganism in response to the message of Christianity.

439 TH, p. 5.

440 Ibid.

441 Ibid.
pain. Reason proves it to be the case and the will "quashes your sentimental difficulties." The real opposition is not between reason and faith but between understanding and faith. Our understanding is corrupted with the unintelligibility of sin, while the object of faith is the transcendent God who is beyond the grasp of human intelligibility. Third, human beings are made up of both reason and passion. Passion unrestrained by reason results in the cruelties of injustice and oppression. This is tempered by the idea of justice in the Old Testament and of charity in the New Testament, which teaches us to love our enemies.

1.6 The Significance of Human History

What is the meaning of the three elements of the formal component of history? Lonergan approaches the question by inquiring into (1) the end of humankind, (2) the rationale for the existence of the dialectics, and (3) the reason why they are what they are.

First, the end of humankind is according to its nature and its nature is to be a universal individuated by matter. In nature, the finality of the universal individuated by matter is in the species as a whole. Finality remains in the species as a whole "unless there arises the potentiality of intelligible difference in the materially individuated individuals." This is the case with the human species, which is in genere intelligibilium ut potentia. Hence, the intelligible finality of humankind is not in the universal but in the particular. That finality "is the realization of the potential intelligible difference." Success in this venture is a function of the intelligence of choices, failure a function of unintelligent choices. The goal is beyond our vision, whether it lies in "the transcendence of the limitations in matter" resulting from our intelligent choices or in the "deeper intrusion into matter and its constraints" resulting from our unintelligent choices.

Second, why should the dialectics exist if the finality of human beings is of the particular, for the existence of the dialectics impedes the attainment of the natural finality of human persons? Although the natural dialectic determines the intelligibilities that have to be chosen, the dialectic of sin obscures the intelligible, and even the supernatural dialectic only mitigates but does not eliminate evil. Even though finality is to the particular, the natural law follows the intelligible unit, that is the universal. The individual functions in the context of universal conditions and within the limits of universal laws. Human beings, if they were not subject to those conditions and limitations, would not be material particulars but would already be

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442 Ibid.
443 Ibid., p. 6.
444 Ibid.
445 Ibid.
intelligible particulars. In fact, human beings are limited by their material particularity.

Third, the very nature of the natural dialectic appears unjust, for it constitutes an antecedent law of sin before persons actually commit sin. The dialectic proceeds from principles of lower generality to principles of higher generality. To know the lower order activity without knowing the higher results in inadequately directed persons. The imposition of the lower activity centered in the senses on activity at the higher level is automatically exaggerated into concupiscence. Outside of a person's individual sins, occasions of sin that result from the apparent injustice are no more than the gymnasion for virtue. There is a law of sin of which these occasions of sin are a part. But the natural scheme fits into the supernatural scheme. In the supernatural scheme humankind was created in the state of sanctifying grace, which brought with it the preternatural gifts of infused knowledge and freedom from concupiscence. This situation would have inverted the natural order, "making it a direct expansion with deductive security instead of the antithetical expansion by inductive trial and error." If Adam had followed the right course all nature would have been elevated, for both grace and its goods terminate in the universal. But by sin, grace was lost and the natural consequence of the preternatural gift was lost. Just as sin is the obscuring of what should be present, so original sin is the absence in human nature of the supernatural grace. Thus, original sin augmented by the sins of individuals in the course of history constitutes the law of sin.

The original grace, which set up the natural order prior to the sin of Adam, was a grace of bounty but because of the sin of Adam and the historical consequences of that sin, the bestowal of grace through Christ is an act of God's mercy. It is a matter of redemption, and its principle is that "those loved by Christ are for Christ's sake loved by God with the love that is the infusion of sanctifying grace and the indwelling of the Holy Spirit."

The economy of the redemption is effected by the systematization of this principle in history. Its constitution is in the life, teaching, and sacrificial death of Christ. The life of Christ is the one act that is of itself pleasing to the infinite God; it is the one act which can be satisfaction for the sins of humanity and so restore humanity to its sacred calling. The actual application of the redemption is in the economy of the Mystical Body. Lonergan makes five points concerning this economy. First, the economy of the Mystical Body is its constitution. Christ, as a second Adam, initiates a new series of humanity. In Christ, through baptism, humanity is lifted out of the old solidarity in Adam's sin and into a new humanity in Christ. Humanity becomes united in the Mystical Body. Second, the character of

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446 Ibid., p. 7. This is the first occurrence of the inductive/deductive distinction which becomes prominent in the division of the historical dialectic in ACH(1) and ACH(2).
447 On the reign of sin, see I, pp. 692-93.
448 TH, pp. 7-8.
the Mystical Body is in the transformation from the material solidarity in
Adam to the state of conformity in Christ in every act of life. Third, the
organization of the Mystical Body is a true spiritual society with its
hierarchy of members and functions. It is a reflex society: "the conscious
preservation of the supernatural deposit of faith against the usurpations of
the natural dialectic." It is the attainment in humanity of what the natural
dialectic should attain but failed to attain. Fourth, the force of the Mystical
Body is spiritual; through actual grace the Mystical Body produces a new
series of Christs; through the informing soul of the Holy Spirit in the Church
these new Christs are guided. Fifth, the finality of this economy is to the
supernatural glory of God.

The significance of human history resides in all three elements of its
form. The natural element provides the material condition. The element of
sin calls forth the mercy of God. The supernatural element constitutes its
principle and intrinsic significance. Lonergan indicates that a more precise
formulation would involve consideration of the actual contents of history,
but the manuscript ends here. A consideration of the scheme of exposition
indicates that Lonergan intended to consider the operation of each of the
three elements in terms of two historical stages, ancient and modern
history, corresponding to the division of history into its pre-philosophic and
philosophic phases.

1.7 Summary Remarks

With TH Lonergan's use of Newton's model of the threefold
approximation emerges as a basis for developing a dialectical theory of
history. The division of dialectic approximates that of PA(2). In that
manuscript Lonergan speaks of the dialectic of fact, the dialectic of sin, and
the absolute dialectic. In TH the division is natural dialectic, dialectic of sin,
and supernatural dialectic. It is possible that in PA(2) Lonergan had the
model of the threefold approximation in mind, although it is only in TH that
it emerges explicitly. It is significant, as well, that in TH the theory of history
is treated as a subject in its own right. In OACH, ACH(1), and ACH(2)
Lonergan will develop this particular topic into the form he calls the
"analytic conception of history." It is in these manuscripts, out of the ones
we are considering, that Lonergan's treatment on the subject of the dialectic
of history reaches it most developed form.

449 Ibid., p. 8.
450 See Table 3.
2 The Analytic Conception of History

So far, we have related the contents of each document separately. In considering those documents, which explicitly concern the analytic conception of history, we depart from our procedure to consider the three relevant documents together in one account. Our reason for doing this stems from the considerable similarity we find in all three manuscripts. Separate treatment would result in an undue amount of repetition.

The resemblance between the three documents increases the probability that they were written around the same time. Still, it is possible to make some tentative assessment of the order of composition. Although there is evidence in the texts themselves, the outlines of contents for each manuscript suggest the following possible order of composition: first, the "Outline of an Analytic Concept of History"; second, "Analytic Conception of History in Blurred Outline"; and third, "Analytic Conception of History." OACH is clearly an earlier document, but on the basis of the evidence available, it is very difficult to assign an order to the other two manuscripts: their contents are very similar. Though it is incomplete at nineteen pages, OACH is the longest document. Its outline indicates that there should be eight divisions in the text whereas, in fact, there are but seven. Missing is a promised account of "Multiple Dialectic." The last section called "Renaissance" is itself incomplete, suggesting that what follows was written but has been lost. ACH(1) is eighteen pages and is complete. It includes a sketch of "Multiple Dialectic," the account of which is missing from OACH. ACH(2) is fifteen pages and also complete. Whereas OACH is written in the form of an essay, both ACH(1) and ACH(2) are basically sketches which seldom elaborate beyond the bare bones of the argument. There are, however, some significant developments in these two documents, which we shall indicate as the occasion arises.

In these documents Lonergan builds on the foundation worked out in TH. He refines his formulation of the three moments of history, and he develops an explicit account of the three-stage division of history that compares to the formulation in his published work. There emerges explicitly the notion of the analytic conception of history and the concomitant refinement in his formulation of methodological procedures. Finally, Lonergan refines and generalizes his formulation of dialectic. It emerges as the unitive category for his analytic theory of history.

2.1 Analytic Concepts

Lonergan introduces us to the notion of analytic concepts by first comparing what he calls "concepts of apprehension" and "concepts of understanding." Concepts of apprehension are those which are known by
definition, i.e., nominally.\footnote{Lonergan does not use the term nominal but his meaning is the same. On nominal and real definitions see I, pp. 10-11.} We can only deduce from concepts of apprehension what is implied in the definition. For example, we can deduce the properties of a circle from the definition of a circle. On the other hand, a concept of understanding reveals why something is what it is. This concept can then become the premise of further knowledge. To understand Lonergan's approach to the task it is crucial to grasp the distinction between concepts of apprehension and concepts of understanding. The analytic conception, like any scientific theory, results from a grasp of the data. It is not simply a procedure of logical deduction.

Second, Lonergan makes a distinction between analytic and synthetic acts of understanding: "Any act of understanding is the apperceptive unity of a many."\footnote{ACH(2), p.3; ACH(1), p.1. In OACH Lonergan does not refer to acts of understanding as the "apperceptive unity of a many."} Synthetic acts of understanding are those which proceed from a many that is concrete and particular. Lonergan provides as an example Newman's illative sense.\footnote{See John Henry Newman, An Essay in Aid of a Grammar of Assent, ed. I.T. Ker (Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1985), chapter IX, pp. 223-47.} Analytic acts proceed from a many that is abstract. The many may be logical; for example, when we define man as a rational animal. This is a logical multiplicity of genus and difference. The many may also be real. Lonergan gives us three relevant examples: Aquinas' metaphysical categories; the terms of analytic chemistry; and Newton's analysis of planetary motion on the model of a threefold approximation.

Third, Lonergan distinguishes static and dynamic analysis. The multiplicity of the metaphysician is real but static. The multiplicity of the Newtonian astronomer is real but dynamic. This distinction is important in establishing an analysis appropriate for change.

The analytic conception of history is based on a multiplicity that is real and dynamic. In terms of the scissors analogy we would say the analytic conception of history is a procedure of the upper blade. It is an act of understanding which answers the question: why is history what it is? It is analytic because it proceeds from abstract terms to the categories of historical events, rather than from historical events to abstract categories. The abstract categories proceed from a real analysis of human nature. Because its analysis is of action, not being, the multiplicity it abstracts from is dynamic, like that of Newton's astronomer, rather than "static," like that of the metaphysician.

\section{2.2 History}

Lonergan distinguishes two types of history. There is the history that is written and the history that is written about. The historian produces the
history that is written. The historian begins with the concrete data and proceeds to seek out the unity in the data. The procedure is synthetic. Like any other act of understanding the synthetic act unifies the data; but because it proceeds from the particular and concrete it cannot grasp the general causes of history. It would be impossible to synthesize the total aggregate of acts that constitute human history. The historian always proceeds from the data of this time and place and so cannot, by using the same procedure, know the general causes of history that would be true in all places and in all times. He cannot grasp the meaning of the whole. The historian is a chronicler concerned with matters of fact: "And only tentatively and with misgivings will he venture from the solid routine of determining facts to the realm of causes."\textsuperscript{454}

The theoretician of history, on the other hand, is a scientist. His data is the history that is written about, that is, the general dynamics of historical process. The theoretician of history addresses the question: what makes history what it is? Lonergan writes: "First of all would he know causes; so he sets pure science before applied science, devoting his attention to what is essential and leaving the accidental to later developments of the pure theory."\textsuperscript{455} The procedure is analytic and the result the analytic conception of history. Like the synthetic act, the analytic act is an act of understanding and so unifies the data. It does not, however, proceed from historical fact to theory but from abstract terms to the categories of historical events.

The material cause of history is the aggregate of human events, past, present, and future. Events include what is thought or said or done: "An event is historic in the measure it influences human action."\textsuperscript{456} The formal object of history is human actions in their causes: that is, "the making and unmaking of man by man."\textsuperscript{457} We arrive at the formal object of the analytic conception of history by deleting from consideration "all that is not subject to a priori determination, quoad nos."\textsuperscript{458} Human action, as it proceeds from the First Cause or Creator, is the formal object of a theological theory of history. This science, however, must follow, not proceed, a philosophical theory: "In history the First Cause cooperates, and when causes cooperate we must begin not from the cause more excellent in itself but from the cause better known to us."\textsuperscript{459} Secondary causes give us the formal object of the analytic conception of history. We abstract from the accidental and material causes of history to attend to the essential causes. Though accidental and material causes may be of considerable importance for a particular history,
"it remains that history is not essentially a succession of such events." As important as the Black Death was for fourteenth-century Europe, this fact does not help us determine what it is that makes history what it is. Essential causes are actions of human wills in the framework of human solidarity; human acts have an "effective transience" by which they influence others either directly or indirectly. Of the essential causes of history Lonergan distinguishes those of formal and material import. The former is the will as it is exerted in the manner of living, while the latter is the will as it is exerted in propagation and survival.

2.3 Dialectic

In OACH Lonergan considers, as he has in all previous documents, the question of human solidarity. Human beings are radically one because they are a species with one intelligibility and many material differentiations. Progress is of the species. Because the human intellect is only a potential intellect the progress occurs over time. Individuals are but instrumental causes of the progress of the species; their products are but the products of their generation. Lonergan sums up his meaning with the phrase: "We make ourselves not out of ourselves but out of our environment."

Lonergan means by environment something with "some of the universality of the Ignatian reliqua." He distinguishes physical environment, the family, kinship, and state. Human beings may either exist in the loose intersubjective relations of family and tribe, or they may apply their intelligence to the problems of existence, developing a more differentiated social structure characterized by the division of labour and the existence of the state. The dilemma leads to a law. First, any development of higher culture presupposes the measure of general security and leisure which is conditioned by a previous economic development. Second, economic development liberates human beings from physical necessity only to impose a social necessity; the specialization necessitated by economic development evokes a higher social organization. Third, as economic development proceeds there is a proportionate increase in the complexity of the social unit.

The social organism, as it develops from loose intersubjective forms to complex social hierarchies, is at all times subject to a dominant, socially effective thought. This dominant thought is the product of a dialectical

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460 OACH, p. 2.
461 See OACH, p. 2. In ACH(2) Lonergan drops the term human solidarity here and speaks of the effective transience of human wills which influences others directly or indirectly. See ACH(2), p. 4.
462 OACH, p. 4.
463 Ibid.
464 Lonergan does not use the term intersubjective in the manuscript, though his account squares with his use of the term in I. See pp. 211-14.
process; at any particular time the dominant thought emerges from a situation to impose itself on that situation and so transform it. The concrete result can be works that are either excellent or deficient. Human solidarity is the mechanism which produces, through channels of mutual influence, the tendency to uniformity in human thought. In both ACH(1) and ACH(2) human solidarity is that which makes the dialectic possible.\textsuperscript{465} The material object of history is an aggregate. If human history were simply an aggregate there would be no possibility of there being a dialectic. The existence of human solidarity provides for the possibility of dialectic because it indicates the presence of an intelligible unity with a material aggregate.\textsuperscript{466}

The notion of dialectic emerges as the principle of unity for the analytic conception of history: "Real analysis presupposes a real unity: we cannot study the human will in the abstract, nor human wills in the aggregate, but must find some underlying principle of unity before we can begin to analyze. Hence we speak of dialectic."\textsuperscript{467} The difficulty becomes apparent when we consider the inadequacy of a purely logical unity for the material of history. Although a logical unity proceeds from the unification of abstract terms it considers terms only in the abstract. Its object is to determine what is true in all possible universes so that every term it uses has one and only one precise meaning. For example, fundamental to logic are the principles of identity, non-contradiction, and excluded middle. These forms ensure the coherence of any statements in a logical universe. In order for a statement to meet the requirements it need only be a consistent application of these rules. There is no further development of the form for the goal of coherence is precisely the achievement of this universal stability. The human subject is, however, a real multiplicity of matter and spirit. Human beings because they are intelligent have the capacity to discover the intelligible in the sensible and as a result have the capacity to transform matter. By virtue of free will acts acts can be both the product of intelligence and the product of the lack of intelligence. The real analysis proper to general historical process has as its material the aggregate of human acts past, present, and future. Its formal object is the transformation of the human situation by human acts, either for good or not. This material object of history does not possess any intelligible unity in itself - it is an aggregate. What basic form is adequate to unify the diverse data that constitute the material of history? The human subject is a compound of material and spiritual components. Human acts are both intelligible and unintelligible. Because of the dynamism of human intelligence-in-act the material changes. Yet the human species is a unity and there must be a unity to the products of the human species. Therefore, there must be a unity to history.

The form that Lonergan proposes to unify the fundamental data of

\textsuperscript{465}See ACH(1), pp. 4-5, and ACH(2), p. 6.

\textsuperscript{466}Lonergan writes: "The dialectic of history, as we are conceiving it, has its origins in the tensions of adult human consciousness" (NRHM, p. 178).

\textsuperscript{467}ACH(1), p. 3.
historical process is dialectic. Dialectic is a general category that can incorporate dynamic process, as in the alteration of the material and the spiritual identified in a phenomenology of human action, and can take into account both intelligible and unintelligible results. Dialectic is for Lonergan a concrete, dynamic, and experimental process in which objective reality shapes human thought in conformity with its own nature. He writes:

By the dialectic we do not mean Plato's orderly conversation, nor Hegel's expansion of concepts, nor Marx's fiction of an alternative to mechanical materialism.

We do mean something like a series of experiments, a process of trial and error; yet not the formal experiment of the laboratory, for man is not so master of his fate; rather an inverted experiment, in which objective reality molds the mind of man into conformity with itself by imposing upon him the penalty of ignorance, error, sin, and at the same time offering the rewards of knowledge, truth, righteousness (Italics are Lonergan's).

The form of the dialectic is determined by the interaction of the mind and reality: "By the dialectic, then, we mean the succession (within a social channel of mutual influence) of situation, thought, action, new situation, new thought, and so forth." Dialectic is concrete because it concerns the actual process of human history. It is experimental because the outcomes, personalities, and events are not necessary but contingent, the result of a concrete process of trial and error, the actual occurrence of intelligence in affairs, or its lack and the resulting consequences. Dialectic provides the unity for Lonergan's analytic conception of history because it is a notion which is capable of including both the material aggregate, an intelligent unity, and the existence of both intelligent and unintelligent principles in the social solidarity.

The existence of dialectic, as we indicated, follows from human solidarity. That dialectic is actual in the human situation results from the fact that, although human beings are essentially free, their freedom is effectively limited. Choice is the essential feature of human action and so it will establish the basic structure of dialectic. It is the nature of the will to follow the dictates of its own intellect. But in fact human beings do not

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468 Lonergan notes that by objective reality he does not mean material reality but "all reality, and especially Reality." Ibid., p. 3.
469 ACH(2), p. 6. See also OACH, p. 5, and ACH(1), p. 3.
470 OACH, p. 5.
471 See I, pp. 619-21, for the difference between essential and effective freedom.
472 Lonergan puts it this way in ACH(2): "Solidarity makes the dialectic possible. Is it actual? The question is already answered. Man's freedom is limited. The will follows the intellect in truth, or obscures it to error, or deserts it to leave man an animal" (p. 6).
473 See p. 33 above.
always do so; thus they produce an environment that is the product of both intelligence and the lack of intelligence.

Lonergan distinguishes three rates: normal, sluggish, and feverish. Normal is ideal and is simply the dialectic operating as it should to bring forth situations which eliminate evil and effect the good. A sluggish dialectic results from the lack of response to the evils of the objective situation. A feverish dialectic is an excessive activity resulting from either the intolerable pressure of objective evil, or an unbalanced optimism, or from the break-up of the society.

Lonergan divides the dialectic into single and multiple forms. The single dialectic is the dialectic within the channel of mutual influence constituted by the social unit. Lonergan defines the social unit in the strict sense as "any group united in time and place that think [sic] alike." 473 In practical terms it is the tribe or state in which people act as channels of mutual influence in the context of a socially dominant thought.474 Multiple dialectics are dialectics constituted by the transference and interactions of single dialectics, and the synthetic unity of these units and their interactions in the whole course of history.

The actual dialectic in a particular historical context is determined by the choices made by human wills. The choices of the past create the actual situation. Present choices, individually and collectively, contribute to either the solution to the problems of the present culture or to the continual stagnation or breakdown of the culture.

2.4 The Three Categories

Lonergan arrives at the analytic conception of history by means of the analysis of the dialectic. "The dialectic is the aggregate of human actions in their interdependence in the present and in their solidarity with the past and the future."475 An analysis of the dialectic requires a consideration of the fundamental types of human action - agere sequitur esse: human beings must learn their nature and then the will is free to follow that nature. This gives us two categories: (1) actions according to human nature and (2) actions contrary to human nature. Actions according to human nature are potentially intelligible to human beings, while actions contrary to human nature are unintelligible per se.476 The third category of actions are those which are above human nature. Their intelligibility lies in the supernatural

474The tribe would be the social unit of intersubjective communities, the state of civil communities. See I, pp. 212-13.
475ACH(1), p. 5.
476Lonergan notes in ACH(1) that sins, which are action contrary to reason, are unintelligible but not unknowable. "Sin is the possible object of apprehension and judgment; it is not a possible object of understanding" (p. 5). We can know that "x" is a sin but we can only excuse it, not explain it.
order. A knowledge of these actions is available to us insofar as we acknowledge the gift of religious faith. These categories of the intelligible, the unintelligible, or too intelligible constitute the confines of intelligence itself. They are metaphysically ultimate because outside of these categories there is nothing.

The transition from this formal analysis of human actions to a dynamic analysis coincides with the shift from a consideration of types of human action, as such, to a consideration of human actions as they actually are in the dialectic. Lonergan gets his clue from Newton’s method of threefold approximation. Newton’s first law of planetary motion establishes that bodies move with a constant velocity unless another force intervenes. This becomes a first approximation to the actual movement of planets. The addition of the law of gravity between the sun and the planets yields an elliptical orbit for the planet and constitutes the second approximation. Finally, the influence of the gravity of one planet on another gives us the perturbed ellipses in which the planets actually move. Each approximation is an intellectual construct that on its own cannot account for the actual perturbed ellipses of planetary motion. But the final model, arrived at through a consideration of all three constructs, yields a scientific theory that can account for the actual data. The empirical investigation of planetary motion will verify the theory.

Lonergan develops his dynamic analysis of history in the same fashion. The first approximation to the actual course of history results from the assumption that all human action is in accordance with human nature. The second follows from a consideration of those acts which do not follow from human nature. The third considers those actions whose source originated beyond human nature. Because these three categories of action, taken together, are metaphysically ultimate there is no possibility of positing a higher synthesis.

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477 Lonergan writes in OACH: “There is a third category of human actions: those above nature. Their intelligibility lies not in the natural order but the supernatural. Animalis autem homo non percipit ea quae sunt Spiritus Dei: stultitia enim est illi, et non potest intelligere: quia spiritualiter examinatur. We are owl-eyed in the daylight of the gods: that daylight is amidst us. Deus qui dixit de tenebris lucem splendescere, ipse illuxit in cordibus nostris” (p. 6). The emphasis is Lonergan’s.

478 Lonergan writes in ACH(2): “To posit a higher synthesis there must be the possibility of setting an antithesis against the thesis. But our thesis includes the intelligible to man, the unintelligible simpliciter, and the too-intelligible for man. Outside these categories there is nothing, and so an antithesis is impossible” (p. 8).

479 The method is the same as that used by Lonergan in TH, though the example has changed from the problem of determining the trajectory of a bullet to the problem of determining planetary motion. Notice that Lonergan does not advert to the question of the contents of history but is occupied only with the form itself.
2.5 The Ideal Line of History

Concerning the first approximation to any possible course of history Lonergan writes: "The ideal line of history is the history that would arise did all men under all conditions in all thoughts words and deeds obey the natural law, and this without the aid of grace."\(^{480}\) The ideal line envisages a state of pure nature in which, as a matter of fact, human beings did not sin and did not need the *gratia sanans*, which repairs the rupture caused by sin.\(^{481}\)

By its nature, human intelligence is progressive: "*Homo est in genere intelligibilium ut potentia; intellectus procedit per actus incompletos ad actum perfectum.*"\(^{482}\) The instrument of historical progress is the human mind. This progress is not the achievement of a single individual, nor even a few generations, but the cumulative product of human beings in all places and through all times. The form of history is a projection in history of the form of intellectual development; assuming the cooperation of human wills "an analysis of the mind will reveal the outlines of progress."\(^{483}\) The problems of each situation would result in the discovery of the best available course of action leading to a new and improved situation. Because wills would cooperate with intellect in human solidarity, progress would proceed unhindered by any resistance to the implementation of new courses of action. A study of the structure of intellectual development would indicate not only a cycle of new ideas leading to new situations, but also a series of distinct stages.\(^{484}\) Lonergan writes: "The human intellect is a conscious potency conditioned by sense. In so far as it is a conscious potency, there are two types of intellectual operation: spontaneous and reflex."\(^{485}\) Corresponding to the two types of intellectual operation are two stages in history, a reflex period and a spontaneous period. Because the reflex period assumes the development of canons of thought and method we can infer from this the prior existence of a spontaneous period.\(^{486}\) Because the

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\(^{480}\)ACH(2), p. 9.  
\(^{481}\)Lonergan notes that the approximation is not verifiable but nonetheless this does not diminish its value for his theory. It is an ideal construct derived from the normative character of human thought and action. But without such an ideal construct how would we know the actual course of history?  
\(^{482}\)ACH(2), p. 9.  
\(^{483}\)Ibid.  
\(^{484}\)As is clear to this point Lonergan began to work on the idea of historical stages in the earliest material we have considered. What is important for our study is the development that occurs.  
\(^{485}\)ACH(2), pp. 9-10.  
\(^{486}\)This division corresponds to the division of history into an automatic (pre-philosophic) phase and a philosophic phase which Lonergan has already developed. The spontaneous period simply assumes the occurrence of new ideas which progressively alter the human situation. It has the characteristics of common sense development and would be reflected, historically, in the achievements of Mesopotamia and Egypt in the ancient world with their development of practical arts and political
intellect is conditioned by experience, Lonergan differentiates two fields of knowledge, the philosophic and the scientific, and two methods which correspond to these two fields, deductive and inductive.\footnote{487} First, in the philosophic field, "thought depends upon the mere fact of experience (general metaphysic) or upon its broad and manifest characters (cosmology, rational psychology, ethics)."\footnote{488} Its method is primarily deductive as is characteristic of reason. Deductive thought proceeds in a straight line from the general to the particular.\footnote{489} It has its own genesis, but once its basic terms and relationships have been worked out, its formulation is relatively invariant. It is then open to greater refinement and accuracy but not to radical revision.\footnote{490}

Scientific thought, on the other hand, does not proceed from the general features of existence but by way of understanding from the actual data of experience. Lonergan writes: "There is the scientific field in which thought depends not upon experience in general nor upon its generalities but upon organization. This in turn corresponds to Lonergan's first stage of meaning. The reflex period is a further and significant advancement over the spontaneous period because it produces not simply ideas but systems of ideas. Lonergan develops this into the second stage of meaning discussed in MT, pp. 85-96.

\footnote{487}In OACH Lonergan refers to the two methods of thought as reason and understanding rather than deductive and inductive, and he does not refer to either induction or deduction in his explanation. The correspondence of reason with deduction and understanding with induction, however, gives us a good idea of what Lonergan had in mind. Lonergan was aware of the different operations of understanding and judgment in these manuscripts and makes use of the difference here. In OACH there is the following: "Now reason attains truth. Philosophy and mathematics have indeed their period of groping, but this lasts only till the most general term of the science is reached ... On the other hand the immediate goal of the understanding is to understand, to know the intelligibility of things" (p. 8). Although we might like a better indication of what Lonergan means here, it is safe to conclude that by reason or deduction Lonergan does not mean simply logic.

\footnote{488}ACH(2), p. 10.

\footnote{489}A brief comment on Lonergan's understanding of deductive is in order. In I Lonergan speaks critically of the deductive method for metaphysics. See pp. 402-8. But, in all likelihood, this is not what he means here. The meaning is clearer if we reflect on his characterization of deduction as proceeding from the general to the particular according to reason. What Lonergan has in mind here would be better located in Chapter IX of I, especially pp. 277-8. His use of the term deductive here may have its roots in H.W.B. Joseph's An Introduction to Logic (2nd ed., rev. Oxford: Oxford at the Clarendon Press, 1916), with which Lonergan was familiar. We find the following in that text: "Hence we incline to think of Deduction and Induction as processes moving between the same points, but in opposite directions; Deduction, we think, argues from general principles to particular facts, Induction from particular facts to general principles" (p. 397).

\footnote{490}Lonergan's account of metaphysics in I would constitute such a relatively invariant system. Lonergan writes: "Such a metaphysics, once it had surmounted its initial difficulties, would be stable. It would admit incidental modifications and improvements, but it could not undergo the revolutionary changes to which empirical sciences are subject" (p. 393).
details of experience observed with the greatest care and accuracy."  Its method is, on the whole, inductive; that is, it proceeds from the particular to the general according to the nature of understanding, which he characterizes as "the intellectual light that reveals the one in the many." Its pattern of development is by way of thesis, antithesis, and higher synthesis. The result is the ongoing progress of science as scientists discover more adequate hypotheses to replace existing ones. Lonergan notes that there are two ways of being certain of what one understands: one is through philosophy, which excludes the possibility of a higher synthesis, the other is through the full knowledge of the facts, as in Newman's real apprehension.

On the basis of this division, Lonergan derives the ideal line of history consisting of three basic stages. The division is as follows: (1) spontaneous history and spontaneous thought; (2) spontaneous history and reflex thought; and (3) reflex history and reflex thought. The first period covers the period from the beginning to the discoveries of philosophy and science. The second period takes us from these discoveries to the social application of philosophy and science; that is, to the realization that the essential task of mankind is human self-constitution. The third period would be dominated by the social consciousness of historic mission. The whole process is characterized by a greater actual differentiation of task resulting in both a greater social complexity and greater human autonomy. As intellect progresses there will be a lessening of the dependence on nature and a greater dependence on the social structure and its schemes: so human organization moves from tribe to nation state to global village. An outline of the ideal line and its stages according to the analytic conception of history can be found in Table 4. Notice that the scheme appears to be an intimation of what emerges later as the three stages of meaning.

Concerning the third stage we need to make a number of clarifications. The "general line" of the deductive field does not correspond with Stalin's general line but the idea is similar. The general line would be constituted by a philosophy of history towards which these manuscripts are an effort. The

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491 ACH(2), p. 10. Lonergan cautions in OACH: "Not indeed that scientists do not reason, nor that philosophic synthesis is an anomaly; but that the great concern of the philosopher is to establish uncontroversible truth, while that of the scientist is better and better to understand" (p. 8).

492 ACH(2), p. 10.

493 Though the act of understanding is per se infallible, in fact our understanding, which abstracts from phantasms which in turn come from the historical situation, depends upon our apprehension of experience which is the product both of intelligent and unintelligent acts. A real apprehension excludes the possibility of an antithesis. It is what Lonergan will call in I an invulnerable insight. See I, pp. 284-5. On Newman's real apprehension see An Essay in Aid of a Grammar of Assent, pp. 12-14.

494 See MT, pp. 85-99. The scheme can be found in ACH(2), p. 11. Note that in OACH Lonergan substitutes deductive and inductive fields with the field of reason and the field of understanding respectively.
philosophical position at the root of Stalin's understanding of history is materialist and fundamentally different from Lonergan's intellectualist position. 495

Lonergan comments that the inductive field "would be marked by an ordered freedom." 496 By the inductive field Lonergan means specifically here the field of practical activity. 497 Concerning the order Lonergan makes three points. First, it is the order which would distinguish the tasks of the inductive and deductive fields until the stage is reached "when all knowledge reaches its unity." 498 Second, it is the order corresponding to that attained through human development. Lonergan characterizes this development in terms of greater differentiation and larger units in the social structure. 499 Third, it is the order that operates according to the virtuous mean. Although intellect is the operator in human progress human beings are not simply intellect and so real human progress must take into account the tension of human existence. The process of integration is also a part of the order. 500 By virtuous mean Lonergan is most probably referring to the Aristotelian notion. 501 Lonergan seems, with the notion of virtuous mean, to be intimating something akin to the law of genuineness discussed in Insight. 502

Concerning freedom Lonergan makes two points. First, the source of


496ACH(1), p. 9. The notion of "ordered freedom" occurs in all three manuscripts. In both ACH(2) and OACH the discussion of "ordered freedom" does not occur within this present context of the ideal line but rather in the discussion of renaissance. The actual account is comparable. In OACH the condition of progress is ordered freedom. The new order of renaissance "fulfils the condition of progress, not merely by confronting decline, but by inspiring man" (p. 16). In ACH(2) Lonergan writes: "To restore progress the new order must restore ordered freedom" (p. 15).

497We would find the relevant material in I, pp. 207-44.


499Lonergan writes in ACH(1): "For the greater the progress, the greater the differentiation of occupation, the more complex the social structure organising these differences to the general end, the wider the extent of the unit" (p. 9).

500For the terms operator and integrator and the law of tension see I, chapter XV, especially pp. 465-79.

501See Aristotle, Nicomachean Ethics, 1106b1-1109a18.

502In the manuscript Lonergan does not write in terms of operator and integrator nor in terms of the law of genuineness, although the material in chapter XV of I could well be a development of the basic idea expressed in the text. Lonergan writes as follows in ACH(1): "The power of intellect is the domination of the universal over the material many: its exploitation is hierarchy. But man is not intellect, and he must not permit himself to be led by the nose in his progress; else the term of his efforts would be exceedingly intelligible but utterly inhuman" (p. 9). Relevant is the law of limitation and transcendence. See I, pp. 473-75. On the law of genuineness see I, pp. 475-79.
freedom is the self-renouncing will that directs itself to the end of human progress. Lonergan notes that the forces of law and order can only deal with the exception to the rule. Second, the freedom that has its source in the self-renouncing will leaves the maximum initiative to the individual. It is only as a result of the cooperation of individuals that increments of progress, which are concrete and particular, can be discovered and implemented. Lonergan contrasts the movement of ordered freedom, in which the individual bears the risks, with the totalitarian state, which cannot run the risks of real progress though it may well succeed at effecting material improvements. The real problems of the day are not material but social: the real need is to develop socially conscious human beings.

2.6 Decline

Lonergan gives as a first approximation to the actual course of history an ideal line that imagines what it would be like if human beings always and everywhere followed the dictates of their own reason. Human beings, however, do not automatically follow the principles of ordered freedom just outlined. In order to arrive at a closer approximation to the actual course of history, Lonergan considers the deviation from the ideal line which results from those actions which do not proceed from human intelligence. There follows a systematic deviation from the ideal line of history which Lonergan calls decline.

By decline Lonergan means the deformation of the social conscience. Its principle is sin, which is "the repudiation of reason in a particular act." Lonergan does not mean by decline the incidental deviation from nature. When men and women sin against their consciences their sin is an exception to the rule, and they recognize the deviation from what has been habitually observed. Because such deviations are casual and accidental by their nature they do not concern pure theory. The deformation of decline

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503 Compare the following from I: "In the first place, there is such a thing as progress and its principle is liberty. There is progress, because practical intelligence grasps ideas in data, guides activity by the ideas, and reaches fuller and more accurate ideas through the situations produced by the activity. The principle of progress is liberty, for the ideas occur to the man on the spot, their only satisfactory expression is their implementation, their only adequate correction is the emergence of further insights; on the other hand, one might as well declare openly that all new ideas are taboo, as require that they be examined, evaluated, and approved by some hierarchy of officials and bureaucrats; for members of this hierarchy possess authority and power in inverse ratio to their familiarity with the concrete situations in which the new ideas emerge; they never know whether or not the new idea will work; much less can they divine how it might be corrected or developed; and since the one thing they dread is making a mistake, they devote their energies to paper work and postpone decisions" (pp. 234-35).


505 Recall that Lonergan considers the analytic conception of history to abstract
is more than incidental because the sins are not exceptions to the rule but incidents of the rule. There occurs the actual interchange of wrong for right such that wrong is taken to be right. As intellect is the source of our knowledge of right and wrong such a deformation of intellect creates a social situation in which wrong is habitually taken for right. Such widespread mistaken belief is far more serious than incidental waywardness. The shepherd can afford to look for lost sheep when the herd is on the right track. But if the whole herd is lost and heading in the wrong direction the task at hand is quite different. The deformation of the social conscience occurs gradually. It is the cumulative effect of the consequences of sin repudiating reason: "Decline realizes this repudiation. The cumulative effects of systematic sin empty out of the world's philosophy every principle that raises man above the beast." 

In the case of such social deformation the number of individuals who resist accepting it "hardly is sufficient to justify consideration in general theory." 

Just as Lonergan distinguishes stages in the ideal line of progress so he subdivides decline. He distinguishes major decline, minor decline, and compound decline. Minor decline, corresponding to the group bias of Insight, results from the deformation of conscience on the practical level of inductive thought. Major decline corresponds to the general bias of Insight and results from the deformation of conscience on the theoretical level of deductive thought. Compound decline refers to the combination and interaction of minor and major decline.

Practical progress proceeds by the laws of inductive thought. The theses of inductive thought are, by their nature, incomplete. They are not simply false or they could not begin to function, but they are open to the correction and improvement that results from new experiences, new ideas, and outside influences. Truly progressive ideas, however, have some disadvantages for habitual ways of doing things. Because concrete issues are complex, it is not clear to most that they will indeed be better off as a result of the implementation of progressive ideas. They threaten established routine and vested interest. They have "the element of risk and demand the spirit that condemns the sheltered life - insured from tip to toe - and so are met with the solid opposition of all those whose wisdom rests on the base rock of stupidity." The mere fact of social progress produces a tension in the social situation between the elements of change, which would alter established routines, and the element of conservation which would preserve those routines.

Minor decline flows from both individual and group bias and the

from accidental causes. See p. 134 above.

ACH(1), p. 10.

Ibid.

On group bias see I, pp. 222-25.

On general bias see I, pp. 225-42.

OACH, p. 10.
distortion it engenders in practical thought. Its principal form is not loving our neighbours as ourselves; that is, not treating all persons as instances of a universal. We find it expressed in the modern notion of enlightened self-interest. Lonergan writes: "Enlightened self-interest seems practically a contradiction in terms, for self-interest puts self at the centre of the universe and that is not the centre. Self-interest cannot be enlightened because it is not objective."511 Such egoism tends towards the social division Marx characterized as class war. The bias of those favored by the social system fails to recognize or attend to the antithesis that does not directly affect them. Real progress would demand the recognition of ideas that might affect vested interests or would have demanded the sacrifice of self-interests for the common good. The favored group can dismiss ideas that are not to their advantage. The favored are able to protect their own interests and to offer a "degrading palliative" to those groups in disfavor. The result is disorder; the social unity in truth is sundered and the social disorder of class conflict follows. There is a rapid, narrow, and unbalanced progress with injustice as a consequence. Such disorder cannot be resolved by a measure of good will: "It is the concrete and practically ineradicable form of the social structure, of achievements, institutions, customs, habits, mentalities, characters."512 The result is a social surd that, like the complex number in algebra, contains the irrational. Sin goes against the intelligible and the rational, for it is unintelligible. The consequences of systematic sin distort the objective patterns of cooperation. Whereas the progressive movement of the ideal line of progress proceeds from thesis, antithesis, to higher synthesis, if we start from sinful disorder there is no higher intelligible synthesis that can include the lack of intelligibility of the surd. The social surd sets problems that, in fact, have no intelligible solution: "Acknowledge the `fait accompli' and you perpetuate injustice; refuse to acknowledge it and you are but fashioning an imaginary world in which you cannot live."513

Major decline is the erection of sin into a principle. "When men sin against their consciences, their sins are exceptions to a rule that is recognized and real. When they deform their consciences, sin from being the exception to the law becomes the law itself."514 Major decline proceeds from the deformation of conscience to the dethronement of reason. Objectively, sin is unintelligible. Subjectively, we tend to self-justification, which asserts that what is wrong is right and what is right is wrong. There follows the divorce of theory from practice in favour of bad practice. Theory is consequently made to conform with bad practice. Sin becomes the principle and reason is dethroned. Rather than the successive higher syntheses of the ideal line of progress we have a succession of lower syntheses as theory conforms to bad practice, which worsens rather than

511ACH(1), p. 11.
512Ibid.
513OACH, p. 10.
improves the situation. Finally, theory is unable to have any relationship with the ongoing situation. The academy is relegated to the ivory tower; the pragmatists of the Realpolitik rule worldly affairs. There is a calling forth of a human mysticism which appeals to everything in human beings except their reason, for example, the mysticism of race and nationalism which fueled the Nazi movement. Major decline "terminates in the emancipation of man from reason and his enslavement to the accidental causes of history."  

In the succession of lower syntheses in the West Lonergan distinguishes nominal survivors and new arrivals. He writes: "Since the break-up of Christendom we have had Protestantism, Deism, Liberalism, Naturalism, Communism, Racism. These have been new arrivals in their day. Since, they have been watered down and accommodated to most new winds of doctrine."  

Compound decline is the result of the interaction of major and minor decline. Major decline hastens the decline set in motion by minor decline. If minor decline tends to disorder then combined with major decline it heads toward chaos. Major decline deprives practical thought of the benefits of the first principles of philosophy and religion: "An error in the plan is the ruin of a construction; an error in principle is the ruin of all constructions."  

Minor decline contributes to major because it provides the social inequity which becomes the condition necessary for the imposition of the successive stages of lower synthesis of major decline. Lonergan writes: "The mechanism for their [the successive stages of the lower synthesis of major decline] imposition ... is the revolutionary tendency inherent in the injustice and tension of the minor decline."  

We should note that decline is not something of itself but a distortion and ultimate stultification of progress which follows from the natural inclination of human intelligence. This is a consequence of the fact that decline results from the absence of the very intelligence which is the source of progress. The forces of decline can, however, exploit the achievements of progress for its own ends. For example, governments can employ technological innovation to improve methods of political repression and they can exploit nuclear physics for destructive ends.  

Finally, we note that Lonergan’s account of decline is a consideration of the abstract form of the deviation from the ideal line. The relationship of the ideal line of progress and the deviation of decline will introduce us to the third approximation.  

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515 OACH, p. 12. The emphasis is Lonergan’s.  
517 OACH, p. 12.  
518 Ibid., p. 13.
2.7 Renaissance

There is a problem. Progress is the thesis of nature; it is what should be were reason always followed. Decline, on the other hand, is the antithesis whose principle is sin. Progress alone cannot overcome decline because it results from human intelligence and human intelligence cannot grasp sin. Therefore, any possible synthesis of the thesis, progress, and the antithesis, decline, must transcend the human horizon. Lonergan writes: "It is not the mind of man that can make issue with the unintelligibility of sin and the distortion and dethronement of the mind itself."\textsuperscript{519} For Lonergan, the synthesis of the thesis and antithesis of the dialectic is a supernatural component revealed to humankind. This supernatural component is the third approximation to the actual course of history.\textsuperscript{520} In these manuscripts Lonergan refers to this approximation as renaissance.

Lonergan distinguishes accidental renaissance from essential renaissance. Accidental renaissance is the rebirth that occurs because of the effects of time.\textsuperscript{521} It is conditioned by a dark age and it is a matter of chance.\textsuperscript{522} It is essential renaissance which corresponds to the higher order which transforms the dialectic of progress and decline. Lonergan characterizes it in terms of its disproportion to the human order. Just as the human is to the beast so the new order is to the human.\textsuperscript{523}

It is in his treatment of the supernatural component that Lonergan refers explicitly to the way in which his theory of history will supplant the Hegelian one. The texts indicate Lonergan believed Hegel failed to take into account the supernatural, and this omission is crucial.\textsuperscript{524} For his part, Lonergan

\textsuperscript{519}ACH(2), p. 15.
\textsuperscript{520}The question of the supernatural component is taken up in I in chapter XX. See pp. 687-703 and pp. 718-29.
\textsuperscript{521}The distinction between accidental and essential renaissance occurs in ACH(1), p. 14. In OACH, however, Lonergan comments: "Renaissance then can be no routine spring" (p. 14).
\textsuperscript{522}From I the following is relevant: "Chance is merely the non-systematic divergence of actual frequencies from the ideal frequencies named probabilities. Chance explains nothing. It pertains irretrievably to the merely residue, to the aspects of the data from which intelligence always abstracts" (p. 114).
\textsuperscript{523}We have here the seeds of the hierarchy of being that Lonergan develops in I. See pp. 254-59 and pp. 437-42. In OACH he indicates a brief sketch of the hierarchy. He writes: "What is the higher order? It is the emergence in man of what transcends man as man the beast, the beast the plant, plants the physical elements" (p. 14).
\textsuperscript{524}A complete accounting of the differences between Hegel's account of history and Lonergan's would reveal other differences besides this omission. Lonergan addresses the issue in I, pp. 421-23. The following quote from OACH is relevant here: "No theory of history that does not envisage the emergence in humanity of the transcendent can embrace the facts of the new order. Thus Hegelian and rationalist higher criticism has been engaged in the essentially futile and nonsensical task of explaining away the facts of the NT [New Testament] and VT [Old Testament]: theory is to explain, not to explain away; it is to account for the fact not to show that the fact
identifies four characteristics of the higher order. First, the new order must be knowable for "man knows being, and outside being there is nothing." Knowledge of the existence of the new order does not require that one understand it. Second, the new order is a mystery. It is in principle beyond human understanding because it transcends human knowing just as human knowing transcends animal knowing. Third, humankind could not raise itself up to the new order because nothing can transcend itself. Fourth, the new order would not negate human nature but include it in the higher synthesis. Just as the human species is subject to the laws of physics, chemistry, and biology yet includes these laws within the higher organization of intelligent action, so, too, human nature would be subsumed within the higher supernatural order. Lonergan adds that the acceptance of the new order must be rational, so evidence, in the form of miracles, is provided. Furthermore, attainment of the end is a function of a person’s immanent merits and demerits even though the condition of any immanent activity is social. This concurs with the priority of individual persons in the advance of progress through ordered freedom.

Lonergan indicates the relationship between the new supernatural order and progress and decline. The new order would set supernatural forms available to humankind which would offset the causes of decline and so restore the line of natural progress. The characteristics of the renaissance can be determined by considering their opposition to the causes of decline. The manuscripts differ somewhat on this matter, not in principle but in the ordering of the lists. The most complete list we find in ACH(1), which lists seven characteristics. First, against self-justification the new order sets penance. Second, against the unintelligibility of the social situation the new order sets faith. Third, against what Lonergan calls the "successive ambiguities of the dialectic, which brings forth both the higher synthesis of progress and the lower synthesis of decline," the new order sets an authority which is providentially infallible. Fourth, against the discrediting of the order by reason the new order sets its own reason in the context of a higher synthesis of faith and authority. Fifth, against despair the new order sets hope. Sixth, against the egoism of minor decline the new order sets the charity which transcends justice. Seventh, to make this charity real and

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525 OACH, p. 14. This phrase reoccurs in I and the position implicit in it is crucial to Lonergan’s metaphysics. See pp. 348–50.
526 For example, we can conceive that there exists a new order and that it is supernatural without understanding its essence in the same way that we can know of the existence of electricity without knowing how or why it works.
527 The notion of mystery is taken up in Lonergan’s DRC, p. 2.
528 Note that Lonergan does not here differentiate the psychic level. In I he does. See pp. 256–7.
529 See pp. 143–45 above.
530 This idea will develop into the supernatural conjugates of I. See pp. 696–97.
531 ACH(1), p. 15.
effective the new order teaches the counsel of poverty, chastity, and obedience: "This new order must be instinct with love, a brotherhood that is a reality and not a mere high-sounding pretense, that proves itself not by professions of friendliness but by deeds of self-sacrifice." The new order by its encouragement to self-sacrifice, by its presentation of supernatural mystery as an alternative to the problem of sin, and by its offer of hope in an otherwise hopeless situation leads to human acts which offer a third source for the self-constitution of humankind and so alters the general course of history. Finally, in ACH(2) Lonergan adds that in order to restore progress the new order must restore ordered freedom. In the context of ordered freedom individuals can collaborate in the advance towards the goal of progress, bearing the risks that would be involved in each advance.

The account of renaissance in both ACH(1) and ACH(2) ends with this consideration of its characteristics. In OACH Lonergan continues his account to address a series of theological questions. He will consider the existence and communication of the new order, its inner law which is the Mystical Body, the operation of the Mystical Body, and the progress of the Church.

First, the new order exists and it is divine. Lonergan will identify the communication of this supernatural component in history with the Incarnation. The communication of the divine in the Word made flesh introduces a cosmic viewpoint which reveals two essential truths for our thought about the historical process. First, the good that humans do is infinitesimal, "the work of an unneeded servant." Second, the sins of human beings are not simply violations of natural law or corruptions of humankind but offenses against God. We do not really understand the gravity of our sins, but the more we approach some understanding of this gravity the greater the possibility of our seeing things as they are. Human history is the story of the reign of sin, whose wages are death. The economy of the new order communicated by Christ is that through death there is life. Christ sacrificed himself so as to make reparations for the sins of humanity. Through Christ's act we became one with him. This act of reparation, whereby we are transformed into the children of God, constitutes the supreme moment of history and "all the rest its diluted epiphany."

Although we have sinned and must die our death becomes a birth into the life of God.

Second, the new order communicated by Christ does not resolve the historical dialectic in one instant but has its expansion within the old.

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532OACH, p. 15.
533See ACH(2), p. 15.
534He writes in OACH: "The new order exists. It has given the world its credentials. It is divine. The transcendent that has emerged in humanity is God, the Word made flesh, and it has assumed our nature, that we may participate in His" ( p. 16).
535OACH, p. 16.
536Ibid.
Christ, who became human, exists and is edified in his space-time context. This existence in history is the Mystical Body and it has its inner law. Lonergan identifies three aspects to the inner law of the Mystical Body.

In the first place, Christ by sending his apostles and founding a church initiated a new movement in history. This action creates a new element in the human environment, "a set of pre-motions of spiritual significance in addition to the pre-motions of the geographical and politico-social environments."\textsuperscript{537} The Church is Christ's perpetuating of himself historically. This fact suggests the significance of Christian solitude and meditation. It is "the systematic effort to cut off other pre-motions and grow on pre-motions from Christ."\textsuperscript{538}

In the second place, Christ sent the Holy Spirit. As the Holy Spirit assimilates to Christ through the hypostatic union so those born of the Holy Spirit are accidentally sanctified by grace. Furthermore, since the humanity of Christ is "the perfect expression in nature of grace"\textsuperscript{539} the action of the Spirit tends in each individual to express grace in nature and so produce other Christs. This enriches and intensifies the specifically spiritual pre-motions. There is a complex interdependency in the Mystical Body between its inner and outer members, both among themselves and in their dependence through the Spirit on Christ. This complex set of relationships reaches its culmination in sacramental union.

In the third place, the world is to the Mystical Body as matter is to form. The world, however, utterly fails to comprehend the Mystical Body for it communicates mystery, what is beyond understanding, and the world judges by its own standards. Although there are periods of open-mindedness, in the long run the world is hostile to the Mystical Body. Thus the supreme law of the economy of grace is "per mortem ad vitam."\textsuperscript{540} Because, through Christ, death is made positive, what would be failure becomes a triumph. The Church cannot fail because her failures are triumphs: "Sanguis martyrum, semen ecclesiae."\textsuperscript{541} Self-sacrifice becomes the means whereby the members of the Mystical Body are completed: "We are not the vine, much less the gardener, but only the branches to be pruned if good and cut away if faithless."\textsuperscript{542}

The Mystical Body operates also in the natural order. There is in the world both minor and major decline. Minor decline operates in the Church;

\textsuperscript{537}Ibid., p. 17.
\textsuperscript{538}Ibid.
\textsuperscript{539}Ibid.
\textsuperscript{540}Ibid., p. 18. The reference here is to what Lonergan will call the "law of the cross" in De Verbo Incarnato, pp. 676-734 (1960 ed.) In his article "The Transition From a Classicist World-View to Historical-Mindedness" in SC Lonergan writes: "There is in my book Insight a general analysis of the dynamic structure of human history, and in my mimeographed text De Verbo Incarnato a thesis on the lex crucis that provides its strictly theological complement" (p. 7).
\textsuperscript{541}OACH, p. 18.
\textsuperscript{542}Ibid.
hence there is in the Mystical Body a tension between those who attempt in varying degrees to make the best of both the spiritual world and the earthly world and those saints "who strive for the full flowering of grace in nature." The tension can spill over into criticism, anti-clericalism, and rebellion. Divine providence ensures that major decline is excluded from the Church. Thus any possibility of major decline results in schism and its actuality in heresy. The schismatics reject spiritual authority because it conflicts with their interests. They may justify their position on the basis of minor decline in the Church. The heretic, on the other hand, rejects Mystery in favour of human understanding. Thus the heretic tries to understand the Trinity, for example, and would try to impose this understanding. Both the schismatic and the heretic are outside the Church. Their decline is unnoticed, but because the decline is from a higher level than the rest of the world their actions open up the normal processes of decline and the result is a greater hopelessness than would have been known otherwise.

The manuscript OACH begins a discussion of four aspects of the progress of the Church. Only three are briefly addressed before the manuscript ends: the development of dogma, of spirituality, and of works of charity and the apostolate. The development of dogma is in response to heresy. Its development is like that of reason in that it is a gradual process towards refinement. It is not, however, simply a matter of deduction in the mind. It is a vital movement of the Church, itself under the guidance of the Holy Spirit, which makes ever more explicit through the dialectic process the reality of the Church. Spirituality is also a vital growth, the substance of passionate desire for assimilation to Christ evident in every age. The works of charity and the apostolate have always been relevant, but Lonergan draws attention to them here "because in Catholic Action and Missiology we think may be recognized an enlargement of conception and reform of method that would indicate that the Church has moved into the sphere of 'reflex history'". The manuscript breaks off here without the promised discussion of the multiple dialectic.

2.8 The Multiple Dialectic

The notion of the multiple dialectic is treated in both ACH(1) and ACH(2). The single dialectic is the recurrent succession of situation, thought, action, new situation, etc., as it occurs within a single social unit.  

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[543] Ibid., pp. 18-19.
[544] Ibid., p. 19.
[545] Lonergan does not indicate here what would constitute a single social unit, but there are indications of what he means from his discussion of solidarity. Because intellect responds to the pre-motions of the environment, the social unit would be defined by a common experience and a dominant, socially effective thought. In OACH Lonergan writes: "The dominant thought is the socially effective thought; it goes into execution while other thought, apart from minor manifestations in the present and a
The multiple dialectic is the synthetic unity of the aggregate of these single dialectics. Lonergan distinguishes a single dialectic without grace, a multiple dialectic without grace, a single dialectic with grace, and a multiple dialectic with grace. The two principles of the single dialectic without grace are progress and decline. There is initially a progress that gradually is overtaken by the force of sin. It is the pattern of rise and fall as, for example, formulated by Oswald Spengler. The pattern is accentuated by the priority of the economic over the cultural. It is easier to work for economic improvement than to sacrifice for the impalpable benefits of culture. Therefore, the course of history, for the single dialectic without grace, is first economic, second some cultural advance, and finally the animalization of man at this higher level.

The addition of the principle of renaissance gives us the single dialectic with grace. There is no major decline within the "new order" itself. Insofar as the counsels of the new order are embraced by its leaders and their spirit observed by all there is no possibility of minor decline. But because acceptance of the new order is a matter of individual human choice both major and minor decline can exist in the dialectic with grace. As a result the admission of grace into the dialectic tends in the long run to lead to social disruption. The disruption is different, however, from the atomization which follows from decline. On the one hand, decline leads to the animalization of humanity and the cacophony of individual reasons. On the other hand, the new order divides society into two camps in vital conflict with each other. "Christ came on earth to bring not peace but the sword." Although the single dialectic without grace is not without decline, the character of the progress and decline is different. Its initial progress is deeper and more balanced because it aims at higher values and its decline is delayed for a longer period because the existence of grace slows the process of decline.

Lonergan employs the notions of transference and reaction to explain the derivation of the multiple dialectic from the single dialectic. Transference is the importation into a social unit of influences from another social unit, whether for good or for ill. The transference may be real when it is in the form of migration or formal when it is a transference of ideas. It may be spatial, when the units involved in the transference are contemporary, or
temporal, when one unit inherits from another unit which is in decay. Reaction is the opposition to either progress or decline within the social unit, in this instance due to its importation from another social unit. Such reactions can be either healthy or unhealthy depending on whether the opposition is to decadence or progress.

Lonergan states five general laws of transference:\textsuperscript{549} (1) Improvements in the material order are easily transferred; (2) Minor decline is essentially a domestic product and so is seldom transferred; (3) An intense national spirit resists everything that is not clearly superior to its own achievement though national spirit itself can also decline; (4) Sound philosophy or scientific thought is incompatible with major decline; (5) When major decline is transferred it is impossible not to also transfer the decline with the thought.

From these general laws of transference Lonergan deduces general laws of the multiple dialectic without grace: (1) Transference with a healthy reaction results in the continuity of human progress even though there is a succession of decline in each of the progressive peoples; (2) When transference occurs without a healthy reaction there is a universalization of decline; (3) Migration is equivalent to transference with a healthy reaction while conquest tends to universalize decline; (4) Resistance to major decline requires the assistance of a higher order; (5) It is better for a people to live under pressure whether it be a matter of physical environment or from unfriendly neighbours. Such people are more likely to meet transference with a healthy reaction but, on the other hand, they tend to be greedier and to make their mission war; (6) It is unlikely that a multiple dialectic without grace can bring progress beyond the beginnings of reflex thought. The transference of reflex thought involves the transference of major decline and that can only be met by a higher order. It is, therefore, impossible to escape decline in the multiple dialectic without grace.

The new order unites into a single higher dialectic the aggregate of social units it embraces. There are different stages of this single dialectic. In the initial stage of progress the different social units will unite into a super-state, Christendom, which will act more or less as one against what opposes it. As long as there is no major decline there will be the possibility of renewal, no matter what the extent of the minor decline. If the social units are tending to disruption, however, we are threatened with the apocalypse. The multiple dialectic with grace is not this single dialectic but, rather, the place of this single dialectic in the whole of history. The relationship between the single dialectic with grace and those without forms the subject matter of missiology, not, however, in the sense of dealing with concrete problems in particular places but in the context of the larger questions of control over the effort of missions on a global scale. Lonergan speculates on the relevance of a philosophy of history to this effort. He writes: "The issues a developed theory of history might examine would be the relative facility

\textsuperscript{549}These general laws are listed only in ACH(1), pp. 16-17.
and the relative durability and value of conversion in the different stages of the single dialectic." The ideal situation for the task of missions would be that of a people who are in decline but who still have a future. With this suggestion the manuscript ends.

2.9 Concluding Remarks on the Documents of Batch B

In these manuscripts the meaning of history for Lonergan is constituted by the dialectical relation of three principles arrived at by means of approximation: the progress of nature, the decline of sin, and the renaissance of the supernatural order. Progress is humanity as created, decline is the consequence of the falling away of humanity from its nature, and renaissance is the higher synthesis of both effected through the intervention of grace. By moving beyond the properly human elements of history and their distortion in decline to include an account of acts resulting from the operation of the supernatural in history, Lonergan can claim to have developed an account of the basic elements of historical dynamics that goes beyond a merely secular account of the meaning of history.

Based on an account of the progress of human intellect Lonergan distinguishes three distinct stages in history: spontaneous thought and history; reflex thought but spontaneous history; and reflex thought and history. Thus, the movement of history occurs in specific stages of development. Lonergan differentiates three types of decline: minor decline, major decline, and the compound of minor decline and major decline. In his account of decline we find the basic features of the "longer cycle of decline" introduced in Insight. In his account of renaissance Lonergan distinguishes minor and major renaissance. He introduces the supernatural conjugates as the intelligibility that operates to reverse the effects of sin. In Lonergan's account of Christ's act of reparation for the sins of humankind there is the seed of the "law of the Cross."

Furthermore, there is a significant expansion in the manuscripts of batch B in Lonergan's conception of dialectic. Dialectic emerges as the unifying notion for the theory. This anticipates Lonergan's treatment of dialectic in Insight where he envisages dialectic as a basic differential for generalized empirical method and "the general form of a critical attitude" for the human sciences.551

In the next chapter we shall discuss the significance of developments in the manuscripts for the notion of dialectic of history.

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551See I, p. 244.
DEVELOPMENT IN THE NOTION OF THE DIALECTIC OF HISTORY: 1933-1938

As there are limits to what we can accomplish through an exposition of the materials, our efforts thus far have been only preliminary to any comprehensive interpretation of these manuscripts. Still, we can hazard a number of observations. Despite the fact that the manuscripts are but sketches, it is clear that Lonergan had developed something of permanent significance. The manuscripts indicate his early interest in social philosophy and this is related to the need for a theory of history. The emergence of the method of approximation is significant. It not only is evidence of Lonergan’s originality but it also gives us some indications of Lonergan’s early thought on the question of method. A case could be made that the threefold form he develops here (progress, decline, and renaissance) informs the fundamental structure of Lonergan’s seminal work in philosophy, *Insight*. In *Method in Theology* the same threefold form is considered in the context of the human good. As late as 1977, in the essay "Natural Right and Historical Mindedness," Lonergan returns to the ideas that originated in these manuscripts to further develop his thoughts on the dialectic of history. Furthermore, the manuscripts give us an indication of some of the early influences on Lonergan’s thought. They confirm Lonergan’s interest in the dynamic elements in Aquinas at a date prior to the start of his doctoral dissertation. Attention to these manuscripts could contribute not only to Lonergan scholarship, but also to the general theological debate concerning the questions of historicity, dialectic, and praxis.

552 See *I*, pp. 579-81, for Lonergan’s sketch of the method to be employed in the task of interpretation as a science.
553 See especially the preface to *I*, pp. xii-xv. Lonergan writes: "The present work, then, may be said to operate on three levels. It is a study of human understanding. It unfolds the philosophical implications of understanding. It is a campaign against the flight from understanding. These three levels are solidary" (p. xii). Chapters I-XVIII of *I* could be said to concern progress and decline. Chapter XIX introduces the supernatural and chapter XX concerns the heuristic structure of the solution to the problem of evil or renaissance.
554 See *MT*, pp. 52-55.
555 See *TC*, pp. 169-83.
It is, however, the emergence and early development of Lonergan's notion of the dialectic of history that interests us in this chapter. The comparison of the exposition conducted in chapters 4 and 5 with our initial account of the dialectic of history and its foundations in chapters 1 and 2 indicates that Lonergan had not completed the development of his theory by 1938. Yet, it is evident that Lonergan had already developed in PH, the earliest of these manuscripts, an original approach to the philosophy of history. A substantial core of his theory emerges, from which he expands in the latter manuscripts. For instance, the three moments and three stages of history and the notion of dialectic remain permanent features of his thought. In what follows we shall indicate a sketch of the major features of development in the manuscripts with respect to the notion of the dialectic of history.

1 Foundations

In the manuscripts of batch A Lonergan establishes basic elements of his theory of history. His stated aim was to determine the differentials of the flow of history. The analogy to scientific method is probably not accidental. It expresses an awareness on Lonergan's part that an adequate theory must be scientific. Notes titled "Historical Analysis" from File 713 indicate Lonergan's meaning.

The fact is that the study of history necessarily presupposes the solution of a large number of questions, just as physical or chemical research leads nowhere without a prior and independent mathematics. Research can never give more than the data and these are never more than samples of a larger whole. To reach that ultimate through the data there has to be a determination of the empty categories to which the data give a content. To write history one has to know what history is.

In fact, just as physical or chemical research presupposes a mathematics that is prior and independent, so too history presupposes the determination of the categories or pure correlations for which historical data can never do more than supply a content.\footnote{Historical Analysis." These notes are catalogued with item 1, the main part of which contains Lonergan's notes on Toynbee's A Study of History. As to the particular date of "Historical Analysis" there is nothing to confirm it, though the style and contents suggest it is perhaps from the early 1940s.}

To determine the relevant categories and correlations for history Lonergan expands the relevant empirical data to include both the data of sense and the data of consciousness. On this basis he can develop a theory of human action whose foundations are discoverable in the operations of the subject. Thus, Lonergan grounds his theory not on logical form but on a study of
actual performance. This position is continuous with his early criticism of conceptualism evident in the "Blandyke Papers."  

The study of the operations of intellect and its relationship to concrete human action is, therefore, a basic component in his search for the appropriate correlations. Lonergan realizes both the dynamic character of human intellectual operation and the essential role intelligence plays in human progress. It is the emergence of new ideas through the operation of human intellect that makes progress possible. Furthermore, it is Lonergan's attention to concrete operation that provides the evidence for the development of the necessary philosophic foundations for a theory of history.

In the manuscripts of batch A Lonergan develops a basic position on the normative function of human intellect, its relationship to will, and the relationship of both to the movement of history. The intellect is pre-moving by the historical situation, from intellect emerge possible solutions to problems, will follows the form of intellect to produce human acts which in turn alter the initial situation. Furthermore, because human choice is free to follow or not follow the form of intellect Lonergan recognized the probability of deviation from the norm.

In the manuscripts of batch A Lonergan's appropriation of the phenomenology of cognition is considerably less differentiated than in his later published work. In PH and PA(1) Lonergan does not clearly differentiate understanding and judgment as distinct conscious levels. In PH, for example, he does distinguish questions for intelligence and questions for judgment though he does not differentiate different levels. In PA(1) his treatment appears to reflect a greater precision about cognitional process. In PH he writes of "intellectual forms with respect to the phantasmal flux" whereas in PA(1) he notes "that every act of intellect will be specified and so determined by a phantasm." Lonergan also refers in PA(1) to intellectual development as dialectical, meaning a series of progressive developments from potency to perfect act, a notion he derives from Aquinas. This greater precision reflects perhaps further reading of Aquinas. Other new elements that appear in his account of intellect and will are Lonergan’s references to universals, the principle of material individuation, and the effect of concupiscence on the performance of intellect and will. In OACH, in batch B, Lonergan differentiates two levels of thought, a field of understanding and a field of reason. The occasion is

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558See p. 84 note 58 above.
559See pp. 102-105 above.
560PH, p. 96.
561PA(1), p. 3.
562Ibid.
563See OACH, p. 9.
the division of stages of the form of intellectual development. In ACH(1) and ACH(2) Lonergan refers to the field of understanding as the inductive field and the field of reason as the deductive field.\textsuperscript{564} The distinction of understanding and reason (induction and deduction) bears fruit in greater precision with regard to the stages of history.

In the documents of batch A Lonergan acknowledges the basic tension between material and spiritual elements and the role of this tension in historical development and decline. In PH he distinguishes the material and formal (intelligent) elements of human action. The effective imposition of intelligence through will on the material flow produces progress, while the failure in this regard results in the dominance of the flow. The alternation of material and formal elements by virtue of pre-motion constitutes a basic component of his explanation of historical progress. In PA(1) the same alternation is acknowledged. He adds, however, some comments on the effect of concupiscence on the operation of this alternation. Specifically, he refers to the interference of distorted psychic development with the natural development of intellect and the effectiveness of the will. This intimates Lonergan's exposition in Insight of the dialectic of the subject and the interference of sensitive flow with the detached disinterested desire to know. In batch B the same basic tension prevails, informing Lonergan's understanding of the form of dialectic.

There is evidence of the emergence of elements of Lonergan's notion of emergent probability in these manuscripts. There is Lonergan's claim in both PH and PA(1) that the relationship between intellect and will is statistical. This would indicate that Lonergan was aware of this significant component of his notion of emergent probability by 1935 at the latest.\textsuperscript{565} Even if Lonergan understands himself at this time as operating within the scholastic tradition the admission of the significance of statistical law marks an implicit break from classical scholasticism. Lonergan will later speak of his own development out of classical culture.\textsuperscript{566} His use of the notion of statistical law here is evidence of at least the beginnings of that development. In PA(1) he acknowledges a further significance of the succession of non-human events, both physical and biological, in a unified conception of human operation. He notes that physical and biological succession of events condition the succession of human acts.\textsuperscript{567} This indicates that Lonergan had at least a rudimentary conception of a hierarchy of schemes of recurrences, an essential component of his understanding of world order.\textsuperscript{568} Turning to batch B, Lonergan's

\textsuperscript{564} See Table 8.
\textsuperscript{565} See pp. 78-85 and 105-107 above. This would push back the origins of Lonergan's interest in this element of his dynamic world view to at least 1935. See Patrick Byrne, "The Thomistic Sources of Lonergan's Dynamic World View," where the author locates the origins of Lonergan's interest with his dissertation.
\textsuperscript{567} See pp. 106-107 above.
\textsuperscript{568} See I, chapter VIII.
characterization of progress as a tending towards greater complexity and towards greater opportunity for human control of progress reflects this developing notion of emergent probability.\(^{569}\)

Throughout the documents Lonergan acknowledges the fundamental social character of human activity. In PH he argues that the intelligibility of the individual is a matter of the intelligibility of the species. Consequently, human progress is not of the individual but of the species. The same point is made in PA(1), PA(2), and SMHS. Indeed, the primary issue of these three documents is to establish the philosophic foundations for a metaphysic of human solidarity. This grasp of human solidarity is essential for understanding history as an intelligible unity. In OACH Lonergan argues for "the solidarity of human decisions as the essence of history."\(^{570}\) In ACH(1) and ACH(2) it is the solidarity of humankind that makes the dialectic possible.

In all the documents the ultimate ground of the intelligibility of human solidarity and of human history is supernatural. Thomas Aquinas' theorem of the supernatural will play a vital role in Lonergan's theology after 1938. In particular the theorem was of great significance in the argument of Lonergan's dissertation.\(^{571}\) Sebastian Moore in a recent article notes that "Lonergan was of the opinion that Thomas's theorem of the supernatural does for the complex data of religious experience the massive job of ordering and clarifying that Einstein's theorem of General Relativity does with the data of the physical universe."\(^{572}\) Thus the emergence of the supernatural as a fundamental element here is significant. In PH Lonergan argues for the necessity of the supernatural in an account of history. The supernatural constitutes the higher viewpoint of the dialectic. It is only in the context of the supernatural order that we can glimpse the ultimate intelligibility in history. In PA(1) Lonergan understands human operation as an instrument of the divine world order. In all the documents Lonergan considers the question of the fitness, or theological intelligibility, of the Incarnation and its relation to the dialectic of history.\(^{573}\) The appropriate theological component for understanding the higher supernatural order operating in history is the notion of Christ as the \textit{pantón anakephalaiōsis}, that is, the Mystical Body of Christ. Finally, Lonergan regards this dialectical theory of history as having a role to play in the historical mission of the Church and thus in the actual operation of the Mystical Body. It is by means of the supernatural theory of history that the Church can provide an adequate context for the intelligent direction of history. With the organization of the theory according to the model of approximation in batch B the principle of

\(^{569}\)See, for instance ACH(2), p. 11.

\(^{570}\)OACH, p. 3.

\(^{571}\)See \textit{GF}, pp. 11-21.


\(^{573}\)See DRC for an example of how Lonergan employs his theory of history to the theology of the Incarnation.
Differentials, Dialectic, and Stages

We have yet to consider some key developments in Lonergan's understanding of the basic structure of his theory. The components of the prior section represent fairly stable features of Lonergan's theory evident from the beginning. Though Lonergan was to greatly enrich and develop his appreciation of these foundations in later works there were no significant shifts which affected the structure of his theory of history. They represent the philosophical and theological foundations from which Lonergan could develop.

If philosophical foundations constitute a constant base for understanding human activity, what are the categories and correlations particularly relevant for history? The relevant categories are the differentials of change, dialectic, and the stages of history. A study of Lonergan's attempts to establish the actual differentials for his theory, their relationship to the stages of history, and his conception of dialectic reveals significant development.

There is a connection between Lonergan's thinking on stages, differentials, and dialectic. The differences in the early manuscripts reflect incompleteness in the development of the theory. Lonergan had not reached a satisfactory conception of the upper blade for the analysis of history in the manuscripts of batch A. Although the basic elements occur even in the earliest manuscripts Lonergan had as yet not developed the appropriate structure for relating the elements. This explains in part the shifts and variation we discover in the documents of batch A. As we shall argue, it is only with the emergence of the method of approximation that Lonergan solves the problem and so establishes the stable form for his theory in the documents of batch B.

As it turns out, the determination of the basic differentials of the upper blade is the key for Lonergan's organization of the stages of history and for his understanding of dialectic as applied to history. In PH we have Lonergan's earliest effort at establishing the differentials for the theory, the stages of history, and the types of dialectic. He establishes his primary differentials for the upper blade on the basis of how intellect actually intervenes in the process of change. He distinguishes mere change and

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574 I am certainly not denying here the notable development in Lonergan's philosophical thought after 1935. But an argument could be made that even as early as 1935 Lonergan had made the "breakthrough" to the basic positions on knowing, objectivity, and being he was later to elaborate in I, p. 388. His refinement of this breakthrough was seminal but the manuscripts of this study exhibit positions which are substantially in accord with the basic positions.
intelligent change. Mere change has no relevance to historical process. Intelligent change is of two types: change that follows from the emergence of new ideas (concrete ideas) and change that follows from the emergence of systems of ideas (abstract ideas). The two types of intelligent change provide the basic differentials for the theory. Lonergan divides each of the primary differentials into three classes: ideas that follow from an understanding of the objective world, ideas that follow from sin, and ideas that follow from the elevation of divine revelation. A summary of the differentials as found in PH can be found in Table 5.

You will notice that the threefold division of types of concrete and types of abstract change is essentially the same division as the more familiar threefold approximation. What is different is its function in the determination of the differentials. In this present division from PH the basic division is according to the types of intelligible intervention, whether concrete or abstract, while the secondary division is according to what is to become the threefold approximation. On the basis of this division Lonergan establishes his division of dialectic. He adds to the basic division of differentials an absolute dialectic whose content is the development of dogma in its reaction to the world. Lonergan does not state explicitly what he means by dialectic in PH but his usage is equivalent to that of PA(1).

Lonergan's analysis of the stages of history in PH derives from his division of the dialectic. The first stage is the development of the mind through material and social collaboration, i.e., through the intervention of concrete intelligence. This is fundamentally equivalent to the first plateau of Lonergan's mature theory. The second stage is "the development of philosophy from Plato to the emergence of the idea of a social philosophy." This is basically equivalent to Lonergan's second plateau. The third stage is "the development of society under the control of a social philosophy." This is equivalent to Lonergan's third plateau. Basically, then, Lonergan had arrived at the threefold division of history according to the stages in PH.

In PA(1) Lonergan does not discuss stages of history, but there is a change in his organization of the basic differentials. He distinguishes (1) concrete thought, (2) abstract thought, and (3) the form of thought. Lonergan also differentiates three dialectics: the dialectic of fact, the dialectic of sin, and the dialectic of thought. It is important to note that Lonergan is speaking of the natural order only. The division of dialectic differs from that of PH. The significant change is the emergence of a dialectic of sin. This development represents perhaps the beginning of a

\[575\] See PH, p. 125. See Table 2.
\[576\] PH, p. 125.
\[577\] Ibid.
\[578\] Lonergan writes: "There is in the natural order a three-fold dialectic in the historic progress of intellect" (PA[1], p. 4). Later Lonergan speaks of the development of absolute Geist, which would match the dialectic revealed by faith of PH. See PA(1), p. 17.
shift towards the arrangement of batch B. Lonergan does not establish explicitly the relationship between his account of differentials and his account of dialectic in the manuscripts. The distinction between concrete thought, abstract thought, and the form of thought could be construed as a form of the threefold division of stages in PH. In any case, this particular expression of the division is transitory and does not survive in later documents.

In PA(2) Lonergan distinguishes two differentials - (1) pre-philosophic and (2) philosophic, which is equivalent to the division according to concrete and abstract thought - and maintains a threefold division of dialectic consisting of (1) a dialectic of fact, (2) a dialectic of sin, and (2) a dialectic of absolute Geist, each divided into a pre-philosophic and a philosophic stage. This division is essentially a return to the form of PH. This is illustrated in Table 6. Lonergan does not mention historical stages here though he does lay out a seven-step analysis of the emergence of ideas. This analysis builds on the basic differentiation of pre-philosophic and philosophic stages.

We note there is some difference in Lonergan’s thought on the organization of the primary differentials. In this respect the addition of the form of thought as a primary differential in the account in PA(1) does represent something of an anomaly. Perhaps it was a different expression of the basic stages that better suited the context of the essay. It certainly would concur with Lonergan’s division of the plateaus on the basis of developments, systematic developments, and developments in general. Changing our assessment of the order of the composition of manuscripts would not, however, solve the problem. There is then the difficulty of explaining the more nuanced language of both PA(1) and PA(2). Given that these manuscripts represent the early stages of the development of both his theory of history in particular and his intellectual development in general, it is not surprising to discover some variation in his conception.

We note, however, that in the documents of batch A, despite some variance in expression, the primary differentials are determined not by the triad of the threefold approximation but rather on the basis of how intelligent operation alters the flow. As we turn to the documents of batch B we discover that Lonergan reverses the emphasis and in doing so discovers the basic structure for his theory.

In the documents of batch B the threefold approximation (progress, decline, and redemption) becomes the characteristic feature of Lonergan’s account of the dialectic of history. The application of this method to his theory of history represents the breakthrough in the development of Lonergan’s theory, and the end result represents a permanent and fundamental achievement of Lonergan’s thought during the period of his study at Rome. The method provided the appropriate heuristic form for

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579 For our account see p. 116 above.
580 See pp. 44-45 above.
approaching the question of general history.

For Lonergan the problem in developing a theory of history was to discover the fundamental differentials which effected change in the concrete flow of history. Lonergan discovered that the operation of intellect constitutes the essential human contribution to history. The pre-motion of intellect by the historical situation and the understanding of the will as a statistically effective means of implementing the discoveries of intellect into action provided the link between the operations of intellect and the concrete flow of history. Human will is free and so there emerges the probability of the occurrence of both the intelligent and unintelligent operation of intellect and the transfer of both into the concrete situation. Intelligent and unintelligent operation affected the flow of history in different ways. Intelligent operation combined with effective will resulted in gradual improvement. Human history comes increasingly under the conscious human control. Unintelligent operation and ineffective will resulted in a cumulative decrease in conscious human control and an increasingly irrational social situation. Lonergan acknowledged the problem of evil and the existence of a divine solution. Consequently, he acknowledged the operation of divine grace in human history. Divine grace alters the dialectical relation of progress and decline by cooperating with progress and by reversing decline. This constituted a third kind of operation in human history. With the method of approximation progress, decline, and redemption became the fundamental differentials for the flow of history.

The breakthrough occurs in TH. Lonergan distinguishes the form and content of historical movement. The form he divided into three components: (1) the general law, the natural dialectic; (2) the first correction, the dialectic of sin; and (3) the second correction, the supernatural dialectic. The division of the content of history in TH is indicated in Table 7. We note that the division of the content of history approximated the division of dialectic in PA(2). What is significant in TH is the emergence of the explicit reference to the procedure of approximation drawn from Newton. The fundamental division for the pure form now rests on the differentiation of acts according to their origins either in natural intelligence, sin, or grace, not according to the stages of intellectual development.

In the documents on the analytic conception of history this breakthrough is further solidified and Lonergan’s theory of history is significantly expanded. The three differentials of progress, decline, and renaissance become the organizing principle of his analytic theory of history; the stages of history become sub-divisions of progress. Moreover, the account of the stages of human development is significantly enriched. Lonergan distinguishes spontaneous history, the development of reflex thought, and reflex history. Each is further subdivided into a deductive field and an

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581TH, p. 2.
inductive field. Lonergan indicates general norms of development. Furthermore, in the manuscripts on the analytic conception of history there is significant expansion of Lonergan's account of decline and renaissance, what is in the batch A documents the dialectic of sin and the dialectic of absolute Geist. Lonergan differentiates a major decline and a minor decline. Both follow from sin and are deviations from the ideal line of progress, but minor decline is the effect of sin in the inductive field of thought and major decline is the effect of sin in the deductive field of thought. This distinction Lonergan develops into the shorter and longer cycles of decline presented in Insight. Lonergan also distinguished two types of renaissance, minor and major. Accidental renaissance results from the healing effects of time while essential renaissance results from the emergence of a higher supernatural principle. In his account of the multiple dialectic Lonergan indicates further the operation of grace as it affects the dialectic of progress and decline. Table 8 represents the organization of the analytic conception of history in the documents of batch B. The basic differentials are now progress, decline, and renaissance. Lonergan organizes the historical stages or plateaus in terms of an ideal line of progress. In the documents of batch A the order was the reverse; the stages constituted the basic differentials while the equivalents to progress, decline, and renaissance were derivative.

3 Development in the Notion of Dialectic

The other major area of development in the documents of batch B is in Lonergan's notion of dialectic. We have already introduced a brief sketch of the form of dialectic in chapter 1 above. The issue of dialectic as it relates to Lonergan's thought, however, has been somewhat controversial. For this reason we will briefly review the controversy before elaborating on the development of the notion in the manuscript. An account of the development of the notion of dialectic in these manuscripts can contribute to the controversy insofar as the documents offer evidence to support an interpretation of Lonergan's use of the notion.

In particular there is a dispute concerning the consistency of his use and the application of the form of dialectic to non-human process. There is general agreement that Lonergan has applied the notion of dialectic broadly and in diverse ways. Thus, as we might expect, we can discover throughout Lonergan's work a diverse and nuanced use of the notion. Because of its broad application it is not really surprising that there has emerged

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582See Table 8.
583As we know from the exposition of the documents there is some variation in the representation of the stages in the three documents which constitute the analytic conception of history. We will use the most advanced formulation found in ACH(2).
584On the diverse application of Lonergan's use of dialectic see pp. 81-82 above.
disagreement as to just what Lonergan has meant by dialectic. In particular, we find in the journal Method: A Journal of Lonergan Studies, a debate between Ronald McKinney, S.J. and Glen Hughes on the subject.\textsuperscript{585} In an article published in 1982 McKinney makes the claim that there exists in Lonergan's writings three distinct but related types of dialectic heuristic structures: a dialectic as sublation, a dialectic as complementarity, and a dialectic as contradiction.\textsuperscript{586} He makes the further claim that dialectic constitutes the fundamental structure underlying every aspect of the content and method of Lonergan's work including application to both natural and human process. Glen Hughes strongly opposes McKinney's interpretation of the extent of Lonergan's usage to include natural process. Furthermore, he also argues against McKinney's claim for three distinct dialectical heuristic structures. There is for Hughes but "one dialectical method discussed at length in Method in Theology, chapter 10."\textsuperscript{587}

Recently, Robert Doran has argued that there are "two forms of the realization of a single but complex notion of dialectic."\textsuperscript{588} These two forms are based on two different kinds of opposition: the dialectic of contraries and the dialectic of contradictories. The dialectic of contraries is an opposition reconcilable in a higher synthesis. Examples of Lonergan's use of the dialectic of contraries are the dialectic of subject and community in Insight. The dialectic of contradictories is an opposition of exclusion. Examples of the dialectic of contradictories are position and counter-position in metaphysics in Insight, the opposition of good and evil, and the dialectic method of Method in Theology.

Lonergan initially develops his use of the notion of dialectic in the manuscripts we are studying. Lonergan applies the notion of dialectic to the development of human intellect and to the development of history. There is, of course, an intelligible connection between the two, for the advancement of history depends upon the operation of intellect. The effective application of intelligence to the historical situation is what distinguishes mere change from historical change. In PH dialectic has already assumed a basic importance for Lonergan's understanding of both the dynamic process of intellect and therefore the process of history. Firstly, Lonergan is aware of the fundamentally contradictory nature of human election, though he does not refer to this explicitly as dialectic in the manuscripts. He writes: "Human action is always pre-determined to either of two alternatives: one rational the other irrational. Which is elected is not ultimately predetermined, though it is affected by the person's character or habit of will."\textsuperscript{589} Secondly, Lonergan does characterize the process of

\textsuperscript{585}MET 1 (1983), pp. 60-73.
\textsuperscript{588}Theology and the Dialectics of History, p. 10.
\textsuperscript{589}PH, p. 98.
intellect as it responds to the given situation as dialectical. Thus, there is a dialectic of fact which "has its first motion in material needs." There is a dialectic of thought which "has its first motion from thought." This process is also differentiated from the distortion of the process due to sin. Thus, Lonergan will distinguish the dialectics of fact and thought from the retrograde movement that occurs due to the distortion of the process. In PH Lonergan adds to the dialectics of fact and thought an absolute dialectic and develops his complex sevenfold dialectic based on his initial account of the basic form of the dynamic process of history and its alteration due to the effect of sin and grace. On the basis of Lonergan's account of human election we can recognize in PH, at least implicitly, a use of dialectic that implies contradictories. We can also recognize in PH a use of dialectic, following from the basic form of his account of historical process, that would include the sublation of an initial position and its antithesis into a higher synthesis.

Lonergan mentions explicitly in PA(1) the use of dialectic as a process of the sublation of lower viewpoints into higher viewpoints. He writes:

It is to be noted that every act of intellect is a universal. The consequence is of importance to this inquiry, inasmuch as the universal act of intellect will be a premise to an indefinite number of acts of will. We are here at the root of the philosophy of history: the one act of intellect guides a man's many actions till it is replaced by a contradictory idea.

And further:

Consequent to the relation between intellect and human act, one act of intellect being capable of informing an indefinite number of acts of will, is the following principle for the analysis of history: the flow of human operations is determined by a single set of ideas; a change in all the flow of operation follows from the emergence of one new idea; the form of a flow of changes follows from the form of the flow of new ideas, that is, from a purely logical dialectic.

The form of the process of thought here is understood as a progress through which a series of incomplete acts moves towards perfect act. Thus, it is a dialectic process in which incomplete acts are sublated by more complete

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590 PH, p. 111.
591 Ibid.
592 For example, in PH Lonergan writes: "The retrograde movement in the modern period arises from the super-position of the dialectic of fact upon the dialectic of thought" (p. 111).
593 See Table 2.
594 PA(1), p. 3.
595 Ibid.
acts and lower viewpoints are sublated into higher viewpoints. As well, in PA(1) Lonergan reaffirms his understanding of the contradictory character of human election: "To follow the dictate of reason is to act well, not to follow it is to sin." Thus Lonergan can differentiate in this manuscript the dialectic of fact, the dialectic of sin, and the dialectic of thought, indicating that there is both a normative dialectical process (dialectic of fact and the dialectic of thought) and a distorted dialectical process (the dialectic of sin). PA(2) reaffirms the use of dialectic for normative historical process (dialectic of fact), distorted historical process (dialectic of sin), and for supernatural reformation of the process (dialectic of absolute Geist).

In the documents of batch B Lonergan extensively refines his understanding of the notion of dialectic. In TH, although Lonergan has introduced the model of approximation, he maintains the terminology of the batch A manuscripts and refers to the threefold division as the natural dialectic, the dialectic of sin, and the supernatural dialectic. In this respect TH represents a transition between the viewpoint of earlier documents on dialectic and the viewpoint which emerges in the three documents on the analytic conception of history. In the later documents Lonergan offers a more extensive treatment of the notion of dialectic. The shift is part of a general shift in focus in these manuscripts to the more differentiated treatment of the theory of history. The demands of developing an adequate theory require a greater clarity in the understanding of dialectic. The crucial point, however, is that the notion of dialectic emerges as the unifying principle for the theory of history. It is a notion that is concrete, dynamic, and contradictory. As concrete it applies to the actual historical process. It is "the succession (within a social channel of mutual influence) of situation, thought, action, new situation, new thought, and so forth." As such it is a notion capable of including (1) the diversified contents of the historical flow, (2) the unifying contributions of intelligence, and (3) the alternation between the two that results in new situations. But dialectic can also provide a form which can account for both the intelligent and the unintelligent, their effect on the historical situation (progress and decline), and the reversal of elements of decline through the efficacy of the supernatural virtues (redemption). Lonergan extends his analysis of dialectic in these manuscripts to discuss the rates of dialectic, to distinguish single and multiple forms of dialectic, and to draw a sketch of their operation.

The aim of the analytic conception of history was to develop an a priori heuristic for the study of history in general, and dialectic is the key unifying principle of that upper blade. Lonergan understands dialectic here to be what he will call in Insight a pure form. In Insight he writes: "Dialectic

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597See PA(2), pp. 2-3.
598See pp. 133-6 above. The title of the section in ACH(1) dealing with dialectic is called "The Unity of History: The Dialectic." See p. 3.
5990ACH, p. 5.
stands to generalized method, as the differential equation to classical physics, or the operator equation to the more recent physics.” But it was just such a differential that Lonergan set out to discover in these manuscripts from the thirties.

The evidence from these manuscripts argues in favour of a broad application of the notion of dialectic. It is a unifying principle for historical movement and so would include all human conscious activity and its interaction with the underlying flow which provides the data for consideration. It anticipates the process of intellect and the process of history itself. It includes the operation of grace in history. It is applicable as a critical tool for distinguishing normative process from its distortion. There is, however, no indication that Lonergan would apply dialectic to non-human process. Indeed, he develops his notion of dialectic in the context of working out a theory of history, not a philosophy of nature. There does, however, seem to be evidence that Lonergan understood the contradictory elements of dialectic in a way that could include a dialectic of contraries and a dialectic of contradictories. As Lonergan derives the form of dialectic from the succession of situation, new idea, new situation, then there is no reason to suppose that the contradictory poles are mutually opposed. Indeed, the process functions because new ideas are responses to the situation and because new ideas, in turn, modify the initial situation. On the other hand, it is clear that Lonergan acknowledges the mutual opposition of right and wrong; will either follows or does not follow the form of intellect. Finally, the introduction of a higher supernatural viewpoint grants a legitimacy to the notion of dialectic as sublation, or at least the relevance of sublation to the notion of dialectic. The effect of grace allows for the possible reversal or conversion of sinful living, wrong-headed positions, and the effects of concupiscence on human intellect and will. This is indicated in the shift from a bi-polar dialectic to a tri-polar conjunction and opposition which Lonergan elaborates in the account of multiple dialectic. In this way evil can be transformed or converted into a good and so the initial opposition of good and evil is resolved by the sublation effected by the higher viewpoint.

4 Summary

First, our study has indicated that in the period prior to the completion of his doctoral work at the Gregorian, Lonergan had developed a theory of history that represents a permanent feature of his thought. The theory is grounded in philosophical and theological positions that, although they develop significantly, are nevertheless in accord with the basic positions of Insight.

Second, there is evidence of development in the manuscripts. The pivot

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600I, p. 244.
of the development is the emergence of the method of approximation that allows Lonergan to reach a stable formulation of his theory. At the same time there is a significant development and subsequent articulation of the crucial notion of dialectic. In our analysis of dialectic we suggested that by 1938 Lonergan had developed a unifying notion which he understood as a pure form for the analysis of the complex possibilities of human activity.

Finally, in chapter three we presented our initial hypothesis concerning the order and dating of the documents. We suggested an operative division of the manuscripts into batch A and batch B. This division was in part dictated by the demands of the exposition to follow, but the division was not random for the manuscripts upon investigation seemed to fall naturally into two distinct groups. Our exposition of the documents and our consideration of their development in this chapter would tend to confirm the initial claim.
In an ultimate sense, the meaning of the dialectic of history is a divine mystery; an intelligibility that is in excess of our intellect. This certainly would be Lonergan's position. In a domestic exhortation, read at Regis College, on the Mystical Body of Christ Lonergan wrote:

Because it is a supernatural doctrine, the relevant viewpoint ... is the viewpoint of God Himself, so that, while from books and lectures one can learn many things about the Mystical Body, still it is only in prayer and contemplation that one comes really to know and to appreciate it.\textsuperscript{601}

To establish a solid foundation appropriate to the third plateau for this supernatural context was a fundamental part of Lonergan's effort. Like Marx, Lonergan was not content with a philosophy which only thinks about the world: he also wanted to change it. Concerning the problem of the dialectic of history he writes: "No problem is at once more delicate and more profound, more practical and perhaps more pressing."\textsuperscript{602} Yet, unlike Marx, Lonergan did not seek out the short course of revolution to correct the imbalances of the shorter cycle of decline but rather took the high road to determine the heuristic features of a higher viewpoint capable of meeting the issues set by the longer cycle of decline. That higher viewpoint is supernatural.

An exhaustive effort towards the core of Lonergan's meaning is beyond the possibilities of this essay; still we have made some advance towards this remote goal of our inquiry with a more proximate end. In chapter 1 we explored the basic foundations which underlay Lonergan's account of the dialectic of history. In chapter 2 we indicated the elements of the dialectic of history. In chapter 3 we treated the question of the order and dating of the early documents on history written from 1933 to 1938. We presented our initial hypothesis concerning the order and dating of the documents. We suggested an operative division of the manuscripts into batch A and

\textsuperscript{602}I, p. xiv.
batch B. This division was in part dictated by the demands of exposition to follow, but the division was not random, for the manuscripts upon investigation seemed to fall naturally into two distinct groups. It is our claim that the emergence of the method of approximation in "A Theory of History" provides the key to division of the development of Lonergan's thought on the dialectic of history into two phases: an earlier phase represented by the documents of batch A and a later stage represented by the documents of batch B. Consideration of the development of the notion of dialectic further strengthens the argument. Our exposition of the documents and our consideration of their development in chapters 4 and 5 have added additional internal evidence to support the initial hypothesis.

On the basis of the exposition of the manuscripts in chapters 4 and 5 we were able (1) to indicate core elements of Lonergan's notion of the dialectic of history that have their origin in these manuscripts; (2) to show that there was development in Lonergan's notion of the dialectic of history culminating in the emergence of Lonergan's quite original analytic conception of history in the documents of batch B; and (3) to indicate a parallel development in the notion of dialectic. We shall now offer a few brief comments on the relevance of Lonergan's work in these manuscripts (1) to his own development, (2) to the concerns of the theological community, and (3) to the historical mission of the Church.

Lonergan's early foray into the theory of history was not incidental to his later work. Frederick Crowe, commenting in a recent article on what motivated Lonergan, writes:

To grant that there was a strategy in his planning need not conceal from us that he was under a kind of compulsion as well: he had to get to the bottom of things. Like a famous reformer, there he took his stand because he could do no other.603

What we have in these manuscripts are examples of Lonergan's original thought that are a part of his effort to get to the bottom of things. Evident in the broad and daring sweep of his argument are fundamental elements of his later work. So the fundamental threefold organization of his analytic conception of history emerges as an organizing principle in Insight.

The problem of human history is basic to developing an adequate context for theology in the third stage of meaning, and the analytic conception of history represents a breakthrough. The significance of Lonergan's achievement, however, goes beyond whatever academic interest we may have in it. Lonergan intended to develop a framework for Christian praxis. But as Lonergan wrote in Insight: "There is needed, then, a critique of history before there can be any intelligent direction of history."604 Again I

604I, p. 240.
turn to Frederick Crowe, who writes: "From start to finish of his career Lonergan was orientated and guided by a deep-lying pastoral concern." It is good to remember that Lonergan wrote these manuscripts during the thirties when the world was in the grip of a depression and the world's powers were on the verge of war. His chosen path did not lead him to political action. He withdrew in order to understand the roots of the problem. This withdrawal eventually produced a theory of history, a philosophy, a theological methodology, and a macroeconomic theory. These products are not without their significance for Christian praxis and liberation. At present liberation theologies are engaged in the task of trying to undo the effects of economic and political injustice. This reversal cannot be achieved by action alone but requires intelligent direction. It cannot be achieved by common sense alone, for common sense must submit itself to a higher viewpoint. There is need of an adequate framework for both the critique of past praxis and for the direction of future praxis. Lonergan's contribution is to have provided such a framework. Lonergan once remarked that Marx changed the world by sitting in the British Museum. Lonergan's contribution, too, was intellectual, and like Marx it is not without practical implications.

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### TABLE 1 Division and Order of the Manuscripts

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Document</th>
<th>Date of Composition</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Batch A</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>&quot;Philosophy of History&quot;</td>
<td>1933-34?</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>&quot;Pantôn Anakephalaiôsis&quot;</td>
<td>1935</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>- A Theory of Human Solidarity&quot;</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>&quot;Sketch for a Metaphysic of Human Solidarity&quot;</td>
<td>1935?</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>&quot;Pantôn Anakephalaiôsis&quot;</td>
<td>1935?</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Batch B</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>&quot;A Theory of History&quot;</td>
<td>1937?</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>&quot;Outline of an Analytic Conception of History&quot;</td>
<td>1937-38?</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>&quot;Analytic Concept of History, in Blurred Outline&quot;</td>
<td>1937-38?</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>&quot;Analytic Concept of History&quot;</td>
<td>1937-38?</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

### TABLE 2 Division of Dialectic in PH

1. Absolute Dialectic
2. Dialectic of Fact
   (a) mere fact
   (b) sin
   (c) revealed fact
3. Dialectic of Thought
   (a) natural reason
   (b) rationalism
   (c) faith
TABLE 3 Division of Dialectic in TH

A. The Form of Historical Movement
   a) The General Law, the Natural Dialectic
   b) The First Correction, the Dialectic of Sin
   c) The Second Correction, the Supernatural Dialectic

B. The Content of Historical Movement
   a) The Significance of Human History
   b) Ancient History
      1) Natural Dialectic, Achievement of Near East
      2) Dialectic of Sin, Paganism
      3) Supernatural Dialectic, Israel
   c) Modern History
      1) Natural Dialectic, Achievement of Science
      2) Dialectic of Sin, Protestantism, Liberalism, Communism
      3) Supernatural Dialectic, Catholic Action

TABLE 4. The Division of Dialectic in the Analytic Concept of History

1. Spontaneous thought and history
   Deductive field: popular religion and morality
   Inductive field: agriculture, mechanical arts, economics, political structure, fine arts, humanism, discovery of philosophy and science

2. Reflex thought but spontaneous history
   Deductive field: religion and morality on philosophic basis
   Inductive field: applied science, international law (ius gentium), enlightenment theories of history

3. Reflex thought and history
   Deductive field: the "general line" of history philosophically determined (cf. Stalin's general line)
   Inductive field: edification of world state
### TABLE 5. Differentials In PH

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>1</th>
<th>change in concrete ideas</th>
<th>(a) intelligent</th>
<th>(b) sinful</th>
<th>(c) elevated by faith</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>2</td>
<td>change in abstract ideas</td>
<td>(a) intelligent</td>
<td>(b) sinful</td>
<td>(c) elevated by faith</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

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### TABLE 6. Differentials in PA (2)

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>1</th>
<th>Pre-philosophic</th>
<th>(1) dialectic of fact</th>
<th>(2) dialectic of sin</th>
<th>(3) dialectic of absolute Geist</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>2</td>
<td>Philosophic</td>
<td>(1) dialectic of fact</td>
<td>(2) dialectic of sin</td>
<td>(3) dialectic of absolute Geist</td>
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### TABLE 7. The Division of the Content in TH

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>1</th>
<th>Ancient History</th>
<th>(a) natural dialectic</th>
<th>(b) dialectic of sin</th>
<th>(c) supernatural dialectic</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>2</td>
<td>Modern History</td>
<td>(a) natural dialectic</td>
<td>(b) dialectic of sin</td>
<td>(c) supernatural dialectic</td>
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</tbody>
</table>
**TABLE 8. Differentials for the Analytic Conception of History**

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>(1) Progress</th>
<th>(b) Reflex thought/spontaneous history</th>
</tr>
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<tbody>
<tr>
<td>(a) Spontaneous history</td>
<td>(i) deductive field</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>(ii) inductive field</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>(c) Reflex thought and history</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>(i) deductive field</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>(ii) inductive field</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>(2) Decline</td>
<td>(b) Major decline</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>(c) Minor decline + major decline</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>(3) Renaissance</td>
<td>(b) Essential renaissance</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Abbreviation</td>
<td>Description</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>--------------</td>
<td>-------------</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>ACH(1)</td>
<td>&quot;Analytic Conception of History, in blurred outline&quot;</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>ACH(2)</td>
<td>&quot;Analytic Conception of History&quot;</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>CW4</td>
<td>Collected Works of Bernard Lonergan, Volume 4</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>DRC</td>
<td>De ratione convenientiae euisque radice, de excellantia ordinis, de signis rationis, systematice et universaliter ordinatis, denique de convenientia, contingentia, et fine incarnationis. With Appendix Aliqua solutio possibilis</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>GF</td>
<td>Grace and Freedom: Operative Grace in the Thought of St. Thomas Aquinas</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>I</td>
<td>Insight: A Study of Human Understanding</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>LPH</td>
<td>&quot;Philosophy of History.&quot; Lecture given at Thomas More Institute for Adult Education, Montreal, September 23, 1960</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>LW</td>
<td>Lonergan Workshop</td>
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<tr>
<td>MET</td>
<td>Method: A Journal of Lonergan Studies</td>
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<tr>
<td>MT</td>
<td>Method in Theology</td>
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<tr>
<td>NRHM</td>
<td>&quot;Natural Right and Historical Mindedness&quot; in A Third Collection</td>
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<tr>
<td>OACH</td>
<td>&quot;Outline for an Analytic Conception of History&quot;</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>PE</td>
<td>The Philosophy of Education</td>
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<tr>
<td>PA(1)</td>
<td>&quot;Pantôn Anakephalaiòsis: A Theory of Human Solidarity&quot;</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>PA(2)</td>
<td>&quot;Pantôn Anakephalaiòsis&quot;</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>PH</td>
<td>&quot;Philosophy of History&quot;</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>SC</td>
<td>A Second Collection</td>
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<td>SMHS</td>
<td>&quot;Sketch for a Metaphysic of Human Solidarity&quot;</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>TC</td>
<td>A Third Collection</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>TH</td>
<td>&quot;Theory of History&quot;</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>V</td>
<td>Verbum: Word and Idea in Aquinas</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
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INDEX OF NAMES

Aristotle, 7, 14, 60, 79, 81, 88, 99, 110, 144
Augustine, St., 3, 107

Berdyaev, N. 64
Binswanger, L. 19
Biolo, S., 3
Bréhier, E., 64
Brezovec, J., 59
Burns, J.P., xxiv
Burrell, D., 10
Byrne, P., xxiv, 11, 74, 79-81, 107, 162

Cortes, D. 68, 70
Crowe, F., xix-xxviii, 13-14, 34, 41, 59, 66-68, 71, 176-177

Darwin, C., 15, 28
Dawson, C., xv, xvii-xix, 70, 76-77, 86, 87, 154
Descartes R., 87
Dooyeweerd, H., xvii
Doran, R., xviii, xxii 11, 13-14, 17, 20, 23, 45, 53-54, 58, 170
Dray, W., 3, 4
Dunne, J., 51
Dunne, T., xxii-xxiii, 59

Eagleson, J., xv
Einstein, A., 163
Ellul, J., 3
Evans, J., xvii

Fallon, T., xxv, 4
Freud, S., 19

Galileo, G., 78
Going, C., xviii, xxi, 4, 18, 43, 78,

Goldstein, L., 4
Grant, G., 3, 6, 176
Gregson, V., xviii, 9
Gutierrez, G., xvi

Hammond, D., xxv, 12, 13, 73, 100
Heard, G., 64
Hegel, G.W., xx, xxvii, 4, 9, 15, 35, 40, 60, 88, 106, 137, 149
Hochban, J., 64
Hughes, G., 169, 170
Huizinga, J., 64

Inda, C., xv

Jaspers, K., xv, xvii, xix
Joseph, H.W.B., 141
Jung, C., 19

Kant, I., 32, 88
Kaufmann, G., 10
Keane, Fr., xx, 9, 68-70, 73, 75, 79,

Kelly, J.R., 100
Ker, I., 133
Klibansky, R., 64
Kreyche, G.F., 79

Lamb, M., xix, 9, 23
Lambert, P., xviii
Laporte, J-M., xxii
Lawrence, F., xxi, xxviii, 9, 11
Loewe, W., xxiii
Marcuse, H., 3
Maréchal, J., 119
Maritain, J., xvii, 77
Marx, K., xx, xxvii, 3-4, 6, 9, 40, 52, 88, 92, 137, 146, 175, 177
Mathews, W., xxiv, 10, 11, 26, 69
McIntire, T., xvi
McKinney, R., 169-170
McPartland, T., xxiii, 1, 2, 4
McShane, P., xxii, 10, 11, 15, 19
Melchin, K., xxiii, 15, 106
Mersch, E., 100
Metz, J-B., xvii
Moore, S., 163
Morelli, M., xvi, xix

Newman, J.H., xxv, 12-13, 73, 91, 100, 119, 133, 142
Newton, I., 42, 119, 123, 131, 133, 139, 168

O'Callaghan, M., xxiv
O'Donovan, C., 34
Olsen, A., 12
Occam, W., 105

Paton, H.J., 32, 64
Pericles, 87
Plato, 55, 59, 64, 74-75, 77, 86-89, 92, 99, 112, 137, 166
Pompa, L., 4
Portalié, R., 107
Pius XI, 68-70, 74, 93
Pius XII, 68
Przywara, E., 68

Rahner, K., xv
Richardson, D., xvii
Riley, P., xxv, 4
Ross, D., 79

Sala, G., 32
Sanks, T.H., 76
Schoof, T.M., xvii, 76
Shields, M., xxi
Snell, B., 2
Socrates, 87
Somerville, D.C., xvii, 50
Sorokin, P., xvii, xix
Stalin, J., 143
Stewart, J.A., 87, 88
Stoics, 88

Tansey, C., xviii
Thomas Aquinas, St., 3, 10, 13,
79-81, 83, 99, 103, 107, 110, 118-119, 133
Thompson, W.R., 71
Toynbee, A., xvii, xviii, 50, 64, 160,
Tracy, D., xxiv, 10, 13, 74
Tucker, R., 4, 143

Vertin, M., xxi, 10
Vico, G., 3
Voegelin, E., xv-xvi, xix, xxi, 1, 2

Webb, E., 1
Walgrave, J.H., 100
Woozley, A.D., 103
Worgul, G., 12