

LONERGAN WORKSHOP

VOLUME 9



**edited by
Fred Lawrence**

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EDITORIAL NOTE

After the 30th anniversary of Insight we tried focusing the theme of each summer's Lonergan Workshop on some work by Lonergan. The article "Mission and Spirit" supplied the theme for many of the articles in this volume. Not surprisingly, though, both the authors included in this volume and its editor have used it as an umbrella for a wide array of issues and concerns.

The most obvious case of editorial initiative in this regard is the inclusion of a paper not originally delivered at a summer workshop, by long-time friend of Lonergan studies and cultivator of Lonergan's thought, James Pambrun. His paper on the relationship between science and theology compares Lonergan's approach with that of Paul Ricoeur. Its appearance here is due in part to our need to bring Lonergan's perspectives more into conversation with those of other thinkers prominent on today's scene.

Eduardo Perez-Valera, SJ contributes a paper that grows out of years of labor on the concrete integration of the foundations of spiritual direction in the Ignatian tradition and the foundations of humane science. The realization that the pure and unrestricted desire to know is closely related to the biblical 'purity of heart' is reinforced in this paper's meditation on the theme of "prayer with the whole heart."

The utterly existential motivation of Perez-Valera's article sounds forth again in Nancy Ring's grapple with spirituality in the context of the overall issue of the spirituality of women. Here Lonergan's style of intentionality analysis is used to put further relevant questions about the ecclesial dimension of Christian living, especially as regards feelings and the imagination. Further plumbing the relationship between symbols and feelings are the papers by Tad Dunne and Louis Roy, OP. Dunne engages in a playful speculation which uses Lonergan's functional specialties heuristically to explore the realm of the imaginal vis-a-vis our concrete orientation as Christians in history: with quite suggestive results. Roy turns religiously converted critical realism in the direction of specifically liturgical symbols and practices to make some quite provocative reflections.

Having been profoundly affected by the profound consonance between Lonergan's intellectualist stress on the preconceptual and prepredicative role of imagination and feelings, and psychologist Ira

Progoff's journaling workshops, William Mathews, sj has for many years been developing the nexus between autobiography and self-appropriation in his afternoon sessions at the summer Workshops. Something of a kairos occurred when Bill was captivated by the need for the specific kind of spiritual biography of Lonergan which could be written only by one who had been appropriating biography and autobiography. We are fortunate indeed to be able to publish a part of Mathews's biographical research partly made possible by his year as a Lonergan Fellow at Boston College.

Philip McShane takes the opportunity of the theme to remind the Lonergan community once again of the height and the distance implicit in Lonergan's challenge to theologians to operate 'at the level of their time' — namely, to enter the domain of austere interiority made uniquely possible by the rise of modern mathematics and science.

Demonstrating what is at stake in the specifically scholarly differentiation of consciousness, Ann Johnston undertakes to communicate a glimpse of what spirit and mission meant to the "faithful remnant" of the ancient time and place objectified in Isaiah's scroll.

Another Lonergan Fellow at Boston College, Filipino theologian Walter Ysaac, SJ was helped by Fr. Lonergan himself to understand that the functional specialty he is called to work in is *communications*. He spent his year as a Fellow exploring this functional specialty, with emphasis on interdisciplinary studies, in response to his concrete situation in the Philippines. His paper conveys the import of this concrete involvement.

There are, as always, a number of persons without whose self-giving collaboration this volume could not have been published. Special thanks are due to Charles Hefling, Darin McNabb, Anne O'Donnell, Jason Raia, and John Boyd Turner.

ERRATA

to *Loneragan Workshop*, volume 8

Hamish Swanston, "On First Reading Insight,"

page	line	correction
	16	reflective understanding → "reflective understanding"
192	2	temperament and disposition → temperamental disposition
	21	difficulty that I am → difficulty that, when Loneragan treats of matters tangential to my own interests and study, I am
193	2	<i>secundum recipientis</i> → <i>secundum modum recipientis</i>
199	4	<i>Oratoria</i> → <i>Oratoria IX</i>
	24	drama is notorious, their being → drama is notorious. The dullness for most of us of Aristophanes' comedies derives immediately from their being
203 fn 13		Iranian ... myth. → "Iranian ... myth" (592).
206	26	known unknown → "known unknown"
	27	opposition → apposition
207 fn 22		<i>English Literature</i> , 1983 → <i>English Literature</i> , Seattle, 1983.
208	6	<i>known unknown</i> → "known unknown"
	16	being?" (632) → being" (632)
209 fn 24		add: and with these it is profitable to take his reference to Mario Praz' <i>The Romantic Agony</i> on p. 237.

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IMAGINAL THEOLOGIES OF HISTORY

Tad Dunne, S.J.

Do you have the peace you expect from life? When do we work to avoid trouble and when to accept the cross? By which measure do we say the family is doing fine?

What concretely is the work of the Kingdom? What do you thank God for as you lie down at night? How are we to understand the different ecclesiologies and soteriologies contained in the various New Testament books? Is a bishop a good bishop because he runs a smooth operation? Puts all his trust in God? Has progressive programming?

In answering each of these questions, spontaneously we use some image of the ways we put order into our lives. These images represent for us, long before we analyze it, the work of finding and putting meaning into the history we are part of. Prior to naming that work as “kingdom” or “salvation” or “healing” or “peace,” we represent it through images drawn from everyday experience. Even before we designate some liturgical or artistic symbol to represent what transcendence means for us today, we use a more primary inner image to guide our symbol-making.

I must point out here that the images I am talking about are not goal-images — not images of the ideal community or the anticipated results of some five-year plan. Rather they are process-images; that is, images of the work involved in steering history. It is the difference between a description of an island one is sailing towards and a description of the art of sailing.

The difference between these two kinds of images struck me forcefully when I realized that the goal-images of Ignatius of Loyola changed during his lifetime, but that his process-image of the work of salvation remained constant. For him, salvation is a struggle between the inner pull to pride and the inner pull to humility. The same may be said, I believe, of Jesus himself. Although he left no account of how he made his decisions, he clearly shifted his goals

during his public life. He began by preaching repentance, but many did not repent. He healed, but many many people never thanked God for what happened to them. He gathered a community of faithful followers, but they did not understand what he was about. One after another, each of his goals failed him. And yet, through each failure, he is constantly portrayed as struggling against an enemy within people. In other words, he did not have a fixed goal-image of what salvation should look like, but he did have a fixed process-image of what the process to salvation should be.

These process-images are not mental photographs, mere graphical forms we can draw. Rather they are dramas — sequences of experiences we remember from inherited stories or from our own lives. For example, suppose a mother regards her work in raising children essentially as “protection.” The guiding image in her mind is neither a concept nor a picture of protection; it is rather her experience of protecting and being protected, of childhood houseplay, of fairy tales, and of family lore on grandparents.

In Bernard Lonergan’s model of the subject, the status of these process-images is that of a symbol. Their function is to provide the affect-laden vehicles through which the mind, the heart, and the body communicate. They are not easily recognizable. Interpretation is necessary to explain the symbol, not only for psychotherapeutic purposes but also for the purposes of phenomenology, literary criticism, religious healing of guilt, and existential philosophy (Lonergan, 1972: 64-69).

But while interpretation of symbols is necessary for a healthy psychological life, it is also necessary to be able to criticize symbols and to choose the symbol that best represents the task of life for us. That choice requires no less than a conversion. Relying on the work of Robert Doran, Lonergan refers to the sufficient flow of communication between body, mind, and heart as a “psychic conversion.”¹

¹When asked about the role of psychic conversion in doctrines, systematics, and communications, Lonergan replied: “It may cut down on the people who spend an enormous amount of time and mistaken effort to prove doctrines and turn up new systems in theology ... It enhances a person’s ability to communicate to others what he really knows and feels. If he can’t communicate between organism and mind and heart in himself, then there will be something odd about his efforts to communicate with others. You know when you are dealing with an oddball after a while.” From transcript of a question session during a Lonergan Workshop, 17 June 1976 (Boston: Boston College Lonergan Center), pp. 12-13.

I believe he is talking about the sort of "conversion" that pastoral ministers, teachers, and catechists work to achieve in the people to whom they minister. It is not a religious conversion, but a morally responsible choice of an affect-laden image, a symbol, a story, which gives elemental shape to the dynamic tensions we experience between our minds, hearts, and bodies.

Even if we were all psychically converted, that is, if the affects and images in our consciousness worked well to represent and integrate the world of body, mind, and heart, there is the further problem of comparing our own symbols with the symbols of others. It is common today to hear the question, What model are you coming out of? The question has generated a thousand articles and a million discussions. The idea that we use models to think *with* dominates not only ecclesiology and spirituality, but also the sciences of sociology, psychology, and economics. For a while, model-making was helpful because it allowed us to ask about the non-conceptual presuppositions that underlie the differences between people. But now that the issue of models is out on the table, it has become a point of honor never even to hint that someone else's model of Church or image of redemption leaves something to be desired. Criticizing someone else's model risks being counter-charged with something like: Oh, you're coming out of the historical-critical model, aren't you? As if no models can be grounded in anything but their own right to exist in somebody's mind.

Not surprisingly, in Lonergan's writings there is the material to ground the process-images with which we represent the work of bringing meaning and value to our historical situations. It runs parallel to his achievement in grounding the *categories* of science in our conscious and intentional operations. We can also ground the images of the meanings and order we hope for in the same conscious and intentional operations (Lonergan, 1957: chs. 2, 4, 6, 15; Dunne, 1985: ch. 5).² This grounding will be invaluable not only for our personal spiri-

²The "images" of order that I am speaking of here apply not only to common sense and the affective/religious realms but also to the realm of philosophic interiority inasmuch as they represent some heuristic features of the yet-to-be-known implicit in the intention of being. I am thinking here particularly of what Eric Voegelin calls "luminosity." See Lonergan's discussion of Voegelin (Lonergan, 1985: 190, 219). See also Lawrence, 1984: 53-67.

tual lives, but for anyone studying the spirituality of other persons or cultures.

A METAPHYSICS OF IMAGES

Finding a fundamental set of images is easier than one might first imagine. In the earliest pages of *Insight*, Lonergan points out how all insights pivot on images, and half-way through the book he has delineated four fundamental kinds of method — the classical, the statistical, the genetic, and the dialectical. It is likely, then, that each of these kinds of insight is carried by a distinct kind of image. If that is the case, then we might profit from examining the four “images” of transcendence which these different kinds of insight present to consciousness.

What are these four kinds of insight? In what Lonergan called the *classical* (alluding to the kind gained in the “classical” physics of Newton and Galileo), we have a simple if/then understanding of the relationship between events. Where there’s smoke there’s fire. When I turn this switch, the light goes on. We are surrounded with such expectations. We expect the sun to rise in the morning, the toaster to pop, the newspaper to be delivered. This expectation works not as a deduction from a metaphysics but first and foremost as an image in consciousness. We can find its prime analogy in our experience of the sun’s rising and setting, the regular alternation of night and day, although as an image it is easily associated with any sort of regularity whatsoever.

Lonergan’s second kind of insight he calls *statistical*. Here, we grasp that there is no direct functional relationship between certain kinds of events. Cancer is no respecter of persons. Rainfall has nothing to do with state boundaries. Just as we sometimes expect regularity, so at other times we expect coincidences and surprises. We deal with these randomly connected events not by formulating a set of if/then relationships but by setting a norm and seeing whether the deviations from the norm have any pattern. If they do, then we suspect something of the classical order at work. If my uncle consistently gets better poker hands than I do, I suspect he is relying on more than the random fall of the cards. We find prime analogies for

the coincidental in our experience of a bolt of lightning, of running into someone unexpectedly, or of discovering beauty in the play of light and shadow under a tree.

Now whereas classical and statistical expectations have to do with specific events, the two further ways — genetic and dialectic — focus on how events develop out of others — in other words, on the chain of unrepeatable events.

We experience a *genetic* kind of insight when we understand an inherent pattern of growth. For example, Erik Ericson describes our psychological development as an alternating sequence of crisis and resolution, where the resolution of, say, the crisis of identity creates the materials for the further crisis of intimacy, and so on. On the more commonplace level, we all understand that our plants need rich earth and fresh water to grow. People need the regular application of tender-loving-care to grow. What the sun does for a classical expectation or lightning does for statistical expectation, these commonplace experiences of growth do for genetic expectation. A genetic expectation assumes that growth is natural. It follows a law we can depend on. The driver of the development, be it regular watering or an alternating pattern of crisis and resolution, remains the same, the whole thing being driven really does change.

Finally, we have a *dialectical* kind of insight when we see that there is no fixed driver of development and, hence, no definite sequence of events that constitute growth. Probably the most familiar example of this is the flowering of human friendship. Unlike the flowers of our garden, no one can predict how a friendship will blossom. Its growth does not follow any fixed genetic sequence. As we all know, the friendship makes the friends just as much as friends make the friendship. This is because the drivers of dialectical development — in this case the friends themselves — are themselves changed in the growth process. Not that friendships do not have classical, statistical, and genetic factors as a kind of infrastructure, but to understand a particular marriage or love affair, we get a lot further by talking about its actual history, with its sudden turns and the unexpected shifts in attitudes which each partner took, rather than to jam it into such classical frameworks as “a dependency relationship” or “a parent-child relationship” or “hen-pecked.”

Now these four kinds of insight form a basic and relatively closed set of intellectual occurrences. Single events are either directly intelligible or they are not, and sequences of events are either directly intelligible or they are not. So, as far as grounding images are concerned, we have a good base to start from.

Our next question, then, is, What sort of images correspond to these kinds of insight? By “image,” however, we should not restrict our expectation to something geometric, or even to a static picture of, say, a tree or a thunderstorm. Primarily the image is a memory of some recognizable human experience of change, which only subsequently is named, narrated, and explained.

FOUR PROCESS-IMAGES

1. The Preservative Image

The first image is rooted in the classical intelligibility found in the regular, dependable appearance of sun and moon. Let me call it the *Preservative* image, in which life is stable and enduring because its seasons are predictable and cyclic. A person feels at ease if the present is a smooth continuation of the past, and gets the jitters when the unexpected breaks in. The best future will be an icon of the past, with its warm hearth and convivial supper table. Although a geometric representation of this image may be a circle, the cosmological image of the sun or the seasons certainly makes itself felt in consciousness more deeply.

In the Preservative image, one person’s authority over another is legitimated not by mere force of personality, which escapes rational explanation, but by some kind of contract — if only as natural as parenthood — in which the parties agree to a set of if/then conditions. This synchronizes their interpersonal harmony with the apparent harmonies of the universe. Typically, its authority is hierarchical, just as its Aristotelian cosmology is hierarchical, with the prime movers resting far from this little center of chaos we call home. It is an image by which the rationality of the whole must govern every part. As such, it is oblivious to idiosyncrasies and intolerant of any exceptions to the rule.

The Preservative image also reaches into the depths of a person's psyche. The ordered soul is the soul that remembers what it was taught and pays little attention to the dreams and fantasies that bubble to the surface now and then. It is not unadaptable, but adaptation is conceived as putting the traditional message in a modern dress, as if there could be no real need for new, unheralded meanings. Thinking, therefore, is a matter of applying principles, bringing the wisdom of the past to bear on the present. Any failure to meet some crisis is due not to the newness of the crisis, for there are no completely new crises, but to our own shortsightedness.

We can see this kind of process-image in Matthew's gospel.³ His church was in danger of breaking apart. The destruction of Jerusalem in 70 A.D. prompted Matthew's church and the Pharisee party each to close ranks, with each side forbidding anyone to belong to the other. So the Matthean church needed some touchstone of belonging that was not racial, for they included both Jews and Greeks, nor merely liturgical, for the Christian liturgies were almost completely derived from the Jewish. Matthew's church was also shaken from within by the teachings of some false prophets. Dissension was rising and charity was growing cold. So they also needed a principle of discernment with which to test the spirits.

To find a source of identity and a criterion of discernment, they looked to the teachings of Jesus and to the authorities whom Jesus appointed to lead. It was a community governed by word and rulers rather than spirit and populace. The Sermon on the Mount was its Magna Carta, which Jesus concluded with an injunction to test prophets by their fruits, presumably by whether or not they act according to the sermon they have just heard. Jesus gave Peter the keys to the kingdom and the jurisdictional power to "bind and loose." Matthew has no Pentecost. It is not the Spirit who will guide the Church but Jesus. Where Jesus exorcises demons in the power of the Spirit, the disciples do so in the name of Jesus. Matthew concludes his gospel with the words, "teach them to observe all the *commands I gave* you, and know that *I* am with you always; yes, to the end of time."

³For a study of the role of the Holy Spirit in the four gospels, I have relied mainly on Montague, 1976.

2. The Interruptive Image

The second kind of image is linked to our insight into coincidences. Whether or not these insights are correct is beside the point. Right or wrong, we name certain conjunctions lucky or unlucky. Call it the *Interruptive* image. In this perspective, life is full of surprises, but all ultimately are trustworthy. The person who lives best is the trusting person, allowing unexpected possibilities and asking for no more than daily bread. Even in unfortunate accidents, there is no use railing against the gods. It is either just an accident, or else the gods are interrupting our lives for no apparent reason. Where the Preservative image creates order through repeated applications of constant principles, this Interruptive image expects a bolt out of the blue.

Life is full of interruptions, and we must give them their due. Better an anarchical social order that responds to the peculiarities of individuals than a hierarchical one that ignores them. The Interruptive expectation is an agnostic image insofar as it denies our ambitions to control our lives and so downplays setting goals and making long-range plans. This is often the attitude of the very poor or wounded, admirable in their readiness to take one day at a time, but in most cases having little alternative. We see it also in a Mother Teresa or a Jean Vanier who identify closely with the wounded in our world.

The most important spiritual relationships are vertical, ready to respond to God's interruption of the human drama. The present moment is a sacrament, of infinite worth though it last but a moment. Spiritual freedom means "letting go and letting God." Horizontal relationships may be short-term or not, but they are often quite intimate and poignant.

In the Scriptures, John's gospel reveals such an image. Think of the timeless conversations Jesus had with Nicodemus at night or with the woman at the well. Think of how Jesus seems to have wandered suddenly into the lives of the man born blind and of the sick man at the Pool of Bethzatha. Think of his response to Mary at Cana that his "hour had not yet come" and then the wonderful

surprise of the best wine last. Or recall his response to Martha's hope in a far-off resurrection: "I am the resurrection," he says, cutting through her notions of future and focusing her gaze only on him. To see him, John says, is already to see the Father. I believe that we cannot really fathom the enigmatic statements in John about Jesus' being in the Father and vice versa unless we locate them in the context of John's interruptive vision of how this world gets its meaning.

Authority in the Johannine church is not by ordination or appointment. There are no "apostles" at all, that is, no designated office of discipleship. The primacy of discipleship is held by Mary Magdalene and the Beloved Disciple, simply because they love Jesus. They reached out to him physically; they stood by him at the Cross; they were the first to believe in the resurrection. Nor is there any missionary activity. John's church is sectarian, inner-directed, a community of love. It is guided by the Spirit, a Spirit of forgiveness: "Receive the Holy Spirit; whose sins you shall forgive ..." God's Spirit is a wind, Jesus says, "that blows where it wills; you cannot tell where it comes from or where it is going; and so it is with all who are born of the spirit."

3. The Progressive Image

Our third type of vision may be called *progressive*. It draws its image and power from our insights into the natural growth of flowers, trees, and animals, including our own selves. There is plenty of evidence around us and within us that life has a natural power to expand and progress, almost as if we can do little to stop it. It is an optimistic view, of course, although it also accounts for the dying of things as equally natural. It differs from the Preservative expectation because it loathes stagnation or mere repetition. In a Preservative culture, such as Ireland's, they say "You've never seen anything like it" as a warning. In a Progressive culture, such as our own, we say it will sell refrigerators.

To monitor the meaningfulness of life, authorities must be farmers, preparing the ground but letting the seeds sprout under their own power. The farmer may have been appointed or may be just

someone with a green thumb. What counts is the ability to foster growth. Governance is a matter of fertilizing, using fences to define definite but ample outer limits within which the governed may grow as they please. The greatest crimes are abusing children, teaching nonsense, and polluting the environment — whatever prevents nature and spirit from their natural blossoming.

To catch the image of the spirituality of the Progressive image, imagine that everything is a door to something better. You wake each morning in the hope of improving something, becoming a finer person, leaving the world a better place. What counts is not obedience to external laws, which to some extent you can wink at, but obedience to the inner urgings of the creative spirit.

Luke's gospel and his Acts of the Apostles seem driven by such a Progressive image. In contrast to Matthew's Preservative image, which relies on provincial authority to define membership, and to John's anarchical image of a closed sect, Luke looks to all of humanity. His genealogy of Jesus begins not from Abraham but from Adam, making Christ to be the New Adam, in whom all humanity finds its liberation. The Holy Spirit moves quietly in the conception of Jesus and in those who welcome this child, like a seed of God planted and waiting to break upward. And when it breaks fully at Pentecost, it speaks all the languages of humanity, as a wonderful pledge to end the curse of Babel. Christianity seems to burst forth, even from the unpromising turf of the Gentiles. It spreads like myrtle across Asia Minor to Rome, with the promise that it will reach even to "the ends of the earth."

Where Matthew suppresses any mention of the Holy Spirit in favor of an ordination by Jesus, Luke makes Pentecost the ordination of the apostles and the long-expected sign that the Day of Yahweh has come. In Peter's Pentecostal address, he cites the prophet Joel: "It shall come to pass in the last days, says God, that I will pour out a portion of my spirit on all humanity. Your sons and daughters shall prophesy. Your youngsters shall see visions and your old shall dream dreams. Yes, even on my servants and handmaids I will pour out a portion of my spirit in those days and they shall prophesy." From then on, it is clearly the Holy Spirit who guides the Church, and, where the Spirit has come upon anyone, the apostles must baptize them.

4. *The Dialectical Image*

Finally there is a *Dialectical* expectation, born of our sobering experiences of malice and stupidity and of our struggles to overcome them, principally in ourselves. In contrast to the Preservative, Interruptive, and Progressives images, which draw their analogies from nature, the Dialectical image draws upon human experience itself. Whenever we feel some tension between ourselves and others, simultaneously we feel a tension within ourselves between several possible ways of responding to them. In our families, our occupations, our churches, our friendships, at every turn of events, we ourselves change to some extent, making future turns of events difficult to predict.

But social groupings are not the prime analogy. The dialectics *between* people can be clarified by looking at the dialectics *within* people. We can see this if we consider our own history of dealing with our emotions. At best, the intelligent thing for us to do is to recognize our feelings, and the responsible thing to do is to decide whether to trust them or not. But none of us does this very well. We repress some feelings and indulge others. And, having done that, we habituate our intelligence, our responsibility, and our feelings to continue in the same style, making some of us uptight, some gushy, some bizarre, and some boring. Our affectivities and our intellects have conditioned each other, defined one another's limits through the actual life choices we have made, not because we have explicitly chosen one series of objects over another, but because we have explicitly chosen one deployment of our subjectivity over another.

While we all know this at one level of awareness, not all of us view humanity chiefly in these terms. For example, a psychological counsellor with the Progressive mindset acts as though our problems all stem from the unfertile soil of an unhappy family or from being choked by the thorns of some anxiety. A counsellor with the Dialectical expectation will acknowledge these environmental factors but will look also to the dialectical possibilities of the human soul. Where we have been malicious, there is also a therapy of repentance, forgiveness, and reconciliation. Where we have been dull of spirit, there is

also a therapy of understanding exactly how the dialectics in our life experiences have deformed our minds and hearts, followed by an envisioning of healthier alternatives.

Mark's gospel shows many of these features. Immediately after his baptism, Jesus is forcefully driven by the Holy Spirit into a wilderness inhabited by wild beasts, there to open the long-awaited battle against Satan while being looked after by angels. After this opening sally, Jesus' first and primordial miracle is an exorcism, which amounts to a proclamation that the nature of his mission is to defeat the evil spirit that has defeated his brothers and sisters. While the disciples have to struggle to understand who Jesus is and what he is about, the demons know immediately who he is. He is Jesus, Son of the Most High God and he has come to destroy them. He calls the legalistic traps of the Pharisees "temptations." He will describe himself as a robber who breaks into Satan's house, ties him up, and plunders his property.

But the destruction of the powers of evil cannot be accomplished in a single victory. The Jesus of Mark groans in spirit, laments the obtuseness of the disciples, is indignant when they push children away, twice lays hands on a blind man to complete a cure, calms a storm, calms another storm, warns about coming disasters, curses the barren tree, kicks over money tables — here is a contentious Savior! Immediately after Peter first acknowledges that Jesus is the Christ, Jesus jarringly makes the first of three predictions of his death. The narrative culminates in his greatest act of ministry — neither a profound teaching, nor a healing, nor even an exorcism, in fact no miracle at all. His greatest act is his martyrdom on the cross. At the cross itself, a Roman centurion recognizes that "truly this was the Son of God" by witnessing the way Jesus struggled unto death.

Have I too neatly found four gospels corresponding to four expectations of what "order" means in the world? Perhaps. Certainly, the evangelists did not intend to canonize any particular view of the soul's struggle. Nor are the differences between them as stark as I may have made them. Still, it is not difficult to find in other books of the Bible which of these four images of transcendence shapes its vision. Perhaps the reason we have many books in *The Book* is

precisely because the human spirit needed and still needs the full range of imagining the transcendent within which to hear the Good News.

In any case, the four gospels do convey four images of order. Although Scripture does not discuss the images as such, it is still a kind of "code," as Northrop Frye has suggested, which shapes the language and preconscious expectations of successive cultures, in a manner quite independent of the depth of their faith in God. So it should be no surprise that the heuristic codes embedded in the Scripture would resonate with the heuristic possibilities of every person's intellect.

If you have detected in my analysis a stronger emphasis on the Dialectical kind of image of the soul's work, then you have anticipated correctly. The Dialectical draws its analogy directly from human experience itself, while the other three find clearer analogies from the stars, the weather, and the fields. As such, by themselves alone they cannot adequately represent the phenomenon of disobedience to our own nature — an irrationality found only in creatures such as ourselves. On the other hand, the Dialectical image should be served by Preservative, Interruptive, and Progressive images, since they do represent the work of a creativity unimpeded by bias.

Also I do not mean to dismiss Matthew, Luke, and John simply because of the very general, albeit forceful, impression they give about what kind of spiritual insights are needed in the unfolding of the kingdom. If the gospels are an expansion of the core story of Jesus' death and resurrection, then these evangelists certainly intended to convey to their hearers that principle of life-through-death, the principle that it is better to suffer evil than to do evil, and the principle that the real evils of the world crop up in the human heart — all of which the image of the cross is meant to represent in compact form.

Nor, on the other hand, do I wish to canonize Mark's contentious vision of bringing about the kingdom. In our history, the image of struggle has too quickly been associated with a Manichean externalization of inner experience into two absolute and opposing forces of good and evil, "already out there now real." What is worse, this tendency to externalize the inner struggle has resulted repeatedly in mere struggle between two groups of people, which unfortu-

nately has often been construed as God's permission to slaughter any group deemed non-Christian.

Yet, considered precisely as an image of the work of the soul, the inner struggle between good and evil tendencies represents the finest moments in our tradition. If we are going to help people integrate their minds, hearts, and bodies through a psychic conversion, then it will help if we can set that work in the historical context of what has been going forward ever since Abraham left Ur of the Chaldees.

HISTORY OF THE DIALECTICAL IMAGE

With more or less emphasis on Preservative, Interruptive, and Progressive images, the Bible shows a gradual emergence and eventual dominance of a Dialectical image of salvation. From the time of Abraham, Israel broke away from the Preservative cosmology of a circular time-frame into a Progressive time-frame. True, the Torah is Preservative in character, but it is embedded in the promise of a land flowing with milk and honey. But Israel's awareness of time was also Interruptive. As history unfolded, Israel's calamities and infidelities cried out for God's interventions, through miraculous deeds in the desert and through the outcries of the prophets.

Finally, the Good News of God-among-us proclaimed "a message which was a mystery," Paul says, "hidden for generations and centuries and has now been revealed to his saints. This mystery is Christ *among* you, your hope of glory. This is the Christ we proclaim, this is the wisdom in which we thoroughly train everyone and instruct everyone, to make them all perfect in Christ. It is for this I struggle wearily on, helped only by his power driving me irresistibly" (Col 1:27-29).

Here begins the Dialectical image, in which God becomes carnal to accompany humanity, not to stand above it. As a driver of change, the incarnate Word himself is changed. The Godly life is depicted as an ongoing struggle unto death and the continuance of that Paschal mystery forward in the generations of disciples to follow. The Godly Spirit, living in everyone, groans in a great, continuous act of childbirth. The dialectical consciousness grew quite

slowly, however. The first inklings that a vision of present struggles was needed were felt as the churches became aware that the parousia was not imminent. If we are not looking forward to the end of time soon, then what is time now?

The churches then began to reflect directly on the connection that our inner dialectics have to the grand-scale course of history. From Paul's descriptions of the war of flesh against spirit, to the rules of the desert fathers on how to wage that war, we find in Augustine a complete image of how the dialectic of the soul is identical with the very dialectic of history. In his work *On Christian Combat* he pits the love of God and neighbor against concupiscence, with its predilections for the world, the flesh, and the devil. Then, in his *City of God* (esp. bk. 14, chs. 26-28; pp. 306, 310, 322, 392), to explain the entire history of the world, reaching back to creation and the fall of the angels, and forward to the bliss of eternal life, he pits charity against what he calls "the lust to dominate."

A millennium later, Ignatius of Loyola in his *Spiritual Exercises* (60-63), influenced by Augustine's theology of history, envisioned the world as a battleground between "the Commander-in-Chief of all Good People," Christ, and the rebel bandit, Lucifer. In his meditation on "the two standards," Ignatius pits humility against pride, as Augustine did, but he shrewdly adds the strategies by which Christ and Lucifer lead us one way or the other. Lucifer draws us to pride by tempting us first to dream about getting rich, then about being honored, and finally to pride. "From these three steps," Ignatius continues, "the Evil One leads to all other vices." Christ's strategy is the opposite, step for step. First we are drawn to desire poverty, at least spiritual if not material; then to want to bear insults, in imitation of Christ, rather than honors; from these spring humility and, he says, "all other virtues."

Unfortunately, while the visions of Augustine and Ignatius sanctioned an Interruptive and a Dialectical imagination for Christianity, which was accompanied by a Ptolemaic cosmology reinforcing the Preservative imagination, the only place for a Progressive imagination in the Church lay in the theories of automatic historical progress of Joachim of Fiore, which were condemned by council and scholastics alike. Then, beginning with Hegel, Marx, and the successes of the natural sciences, the idea of

Progress returned in secular dress. The Western imagination burned with the vision that history, despite its ups and downs, simply must make progress in the long run. I would like to point out, however, that a theory of “automatic” progress, unfolding according to laws of the stars or of supra-historical force, is actually not a Progressive image of the soul’s work, but a Preservative image: one simply must accommodate one’s self to routines beyond one’s control. On the level of practical living, however, insofar as secularism dismisses malice as a real factor in history, it embraces a Progressive vision of what consciousness must do to keep building something bigger and better.

Perhaps two world wars and a global truce based on stock-piling explosives have chilled any Progressive optimism of philosophers. Certainly they have not dampened the expectations of global corporations and the superpowers that a better future is within the grasp of any opportunist. They do not believe progress is automatic at all. They rely on practical insight into situations to make things better to the exclusion of any dialectical suspicion as to what “better” really means. If the middle ages were Dialectical without the complement of Progress, the twentieth century has been Progressive without the complement of Dialectics.

Meanwhile, the Interruptive vision has kept popping up over the centuries among fundamentalist or messianic groups as a regular reaction to the complexity and perhaps novelty of the Progressive and Dialectical visions of the soul’s work. It is today, as ever, the image of those who love the simple solution. Easily it allies itself with a Preservative vision that maintains a strict social code of behavior. What the Preservative and Interruptive kinds of images have in common, linked as they are with insights into situations and not into a *series* of situations, is an inability to imagine historical development.

One reason why the Dialectical imagination is so fuzzy in the expectations of Christians today is that the emergence of empirical method in science has left the parables of Augustine and Ignatius shining their light in the wrong corner. For all their power to stir up virtue in our hearts, these parables do not give a functional explanation of *how* loving God and imitating Christ make a positive contribution to the social and historical order. But our culture today demands

functional understanding, not mere homilies or contemplations, or ideals. If the Church today must speak of such unverifiable entities as angels and devils, at least it should complement that mythical language with empirical reference to the processes of consciousness. We want to know what good our virtue is for this world, not just the next; for our neighbor, not just ourselves. Christians today want religion to be not just a haven and a comfort for troubled souls; they want it also to be a creative force in secular society, offering an alternative to human self-destruction which makes sense to the secular mind.

It is evident, I believe, that Lonergan's achievement ranks high in this history of the Dialectical image. His philosophy of history offers both a functional explanation of the basic struggle of life and a focus on inner experience rather than outer polemics. Influenced by the existentialists, by the work of the philosophers of history Arnold Toynbee and Eric Voegelin, and by Augustine and Ignatius as well, he depicts two pulls in consciousness, one towards authenticity and the other towards unauthenticity. (On authenticity see indexes in Lonergan 1972, 1974, 1985, especially 1985: 165-70).

Authenticity is a matter of attending to experience, growing in understanding, verifying our grasp of reality, and taking responsibility for our world. These processes of consciousness are the motors of a developing culture. Unauthenticity is the refusal to obey these natural dynamics of our souls. We turn a blind eye to part of our experience, we censor the mind's work where insight threatens our comfort, we live in a narrow world, and take responsibilities only within restricted boundaries. Gradually our culture becomes less the product of insight and more of oversight; we apply shortsighted remedies and our problems thicken; the objective jumble becomes more impervious even to the best insights, were they available. Still, Lonergan says, besides this crippled creative process in history, a healing process is at work as well. The gentle forces of love in our hearts — love for one another, for one's country, and for God — demonstrably have the power to dissolve these biases and to put a stop to the revenge and hatred which propel the vicious circles spinning in our society. In other words, the healing process of love not only absorbs evil, as Augustine recognized; it also expands the horizons of

our understanding, releasing a creativity once bound in the service of egoism and shortsightedness.

This, in very general terms, is Lonergan's historical world-view.

THE DIALECTICAL IMAGE

My interest here, however, is not in Lonergan's theory of the dialectic of history. It is rather in our personal imagination of history — our "imaginal theology of history."

Now I have been answering the question, With what models or images do we represent the work of putting order into our world? Accordingly, if we are to use all our creative powers, our imaginations must grow accustomed to expecting any combination of the four basic ways of responding to situations: Preservative, Interruptive, Progressive, and Dialectical. We should recognize that while all four images can represent the creative vector of human history, only the Dialectical represents the healing vector. This task seems essential, I believe, to the process of a psychic conversion. The problem is that temperamentally most of us prefer one image over the others. So, to facilitate a psychic conversion in anyone, it will help immensely to discuss these differences.

For example, think of the different ways each of us imagines "peace." Some picture peace as the harmony of routine, some as the utter trust in God's interventive care, some as an expansive unleashing of our natural powers, and some as a quality of consciousness that acts as umpire in the heart, scrutinizing inner events to call some "safe" and others "out." If our imaginations do not have the full range of the mind's capacities (that is, of the four-fold battery of insights), we filter the psychic material we draw upon for creative thinking. In raising our children and in assessing public morals, we disagree on whether a situation is peaceful enough, and on the kinds of remedies needed. In our own personal lives, we can actually hate the Dialectical situations of our own souls and cling to the false security of a merely Preservative, Interruptive, or Progressive image. At the other extreme, seeing life as nothing but a continuous struggle, we can completely devalue any enterprise that is not strictly

Dialectical; we can despair of any benefit arising from the discipline of routine, ultimate trust in God's providence, and optimistic hope for a better future.

Essentially, then, a psychic conversion is a form of intellectual conversion in which we realize what kind of images is at work in us, and take responsibility for them. I believe it will involve discovering what kind of insight we spontaneously prefer, and then a deliberate broadening of our imaginations to include the full range of our mind's capacity. A Preservative imagination needs to see life's situations as part of the flow of history. It needs to surmount its natural hesitation to act on the sudden flash of insight, and to resist the compulsion to be prepared for every eventuality. The Interruptive imagination, like the Preservative, also needs to regard the historical aspects of situations, particularly the ecological effects of bright ideas. It could spend more energy learning skills that are routinely applicable in many situations. The Progressive imagination needs to soften its focus on the future and see what is of value in the present moment, in the routine and chance of natural living. In particular, while it has a keen sense of history's potentialities, it needs to expect malice, cruelty, and stupidity as well; in other words, to be wise as a serpent as well as guileless as a dove. The Dialectical imagination does have this capacity to expect vested interests to be working in any situation, but it needs to grow in respect of the mind's positive capacities for routine, apposite insight, and making situations genuinely better.

In any case, if human beings are involved, a full psychic conversion cannot leave the Dialectical image out of the picture. We humans are in fact continually assailed by desire to dominate others, to live a life dependent on no one, and to spend our energies making a name for ourselves. To the degree that these energies are shunted away from caring for others, not just ourselves, the intellectual resources of our culture go untapped and, with each successive generation, become depleted.

Notice that the dialectic is *within* each person. Two of our traditional dialectical images of life, "the journey" and "the battle," are easily misinterpreted as struggles against other people who do not share our own holy desires and high ideals. These pious

emblems then become just an imaginal rationalization for hating one's enemies.

Notice also that the dialectic is within *every* person, making it the intrinsic law of the flow of history. Just as the flow of a river unerringly follows the law of physics, so the flow of history follows the law of dialectical intelligibility. Every bend in the river, every slight ripple, effects the entire flow downstream.

To change the metaphor somewhat, from this historical point of view, the Dialectical expectation might envision the entire pool of human resources as being constantly drained to water the petty egoisms of individuals and groups. But each one of us is responsible for his or her soul. Let love flow to God and neighbor, dam up the channels that envision merely our security and reputation, and not only will our antagonism be healed, but there will flow forth a love from us that is full of creativity and invention for the good of the world around us.

On the other hand, if our image of reality is exclusively Preservative or Interruptive or Progressive, then we are losing a war we deny is being waged. We rationalize the terrors of history — genocide, mass deportation, nuclear stockpiling, global hunger — not by some theory but by imagining them as beyond the control of human creativity. The Progressive image deems the endless civil war in Ireland as just “part of the scheme of things.” The Interruptive image deems AIDS as just an “act of God.” The Progressive image deems levelling a slum as just “the price of progress.” By failing to imagine the roots of all things human as extending down into the recesses of consciousness to two contrary loves, we abdicate responsibility, we mummify creativity.

King Solomon was considered wise because he asked God not for some inner rule he could apply repeatedly to create civil harmony, nor for some radical trust in God's interventive care, nor for a spirit of creativity that would insure a continuously developing Kingdom. He asked for a discerning heart — a heart which knew how to test the claims of two mothers over one child, two loves over one person. We need such a heart today. I mean a heart that does more than listen to the voices of conscience. I mean a heart that also looks at our own imaginations, to see whether or not they have the full, Paschal breadth of a Dialectical image of history.

FOUR IMAGINAL THEOLOGIES OF HISTORY

1. Preservative

Stable, enduring, few disasters

Deep symbol: seasons, sun, moon

Classical intelligibility. Laws of cyclic motion: astronomy

Peace. Habit.

Looks to the past; keeps all old things; makes it through life without mishap. Warm hearth, supper table

Matthew's church: obedience: law and authority

Shortcomings: authoritarian, oblivious, "universal"; not paying attention to particular persons, situations, exceptions, etc.

2. Interruptive

Many changes, adaptability, surprises

Deep symbol: rainbows, earthquakes, thunderstorms

Statistical intelligibility. Laws of randomness, chance: statistics

Trust, surprise

Appreciates the present moment: meets each challenge as it comes; an open front door

John's church: transcendence of the moment; decentralized, charismatic authority

Shortcomings: unstable, short-term gains, pessimistic about theories

3. Progressive

Solving problems, overcoming obstacles

Deep symbol: natural growth of flowers, trees, etc.

Genetic intelligibility. Develop mental laws: botany, biology

Optimism, hope, trust in human nature. Prepare, gather resources.

Whoever hesitates is lost. "Home Improvements"

Luke's church: missionary vision; flexible authority

Shortcomings: does not see sin or sees a naive end to sin; excludes failures; "universal"; conceptualism

4. Dialectical

Winning some, losing some

Deep symbol: human interaction itself, historical process

Dialectical intelligibility: historiography, psychology

Ongoing negotiating, suspicious of bias. "Let's talk!"

Paul's church, Mark's church: realism; Paschal experience

Contentious toward authority

Shortcomings: difficult to name the poles of the dialectic accurately

Easily displaced by an adversarial view of reality, mere group bias

Three QUESTIONS

1. Dialectics

Is it legitimate to begin with Lonergan's account — and our personal verifications — of the struggle between authenticity and unauthenticity and then declare that we can see better the true Jesus beneath the narrative of the evangelists? In other words, can we start from our own praxis and claim that the fundamental action of Jesus was a dialectical of *authenticity* versus *unauthenticity*, defined as Lonergan has defined it?

2. Systematics

Augustine depicts the poles of the dialectic as charity versus the "lust to dominate." Ignatius depicts them as (1) riches *versus* poverty; (2) honors *versus* humiliations; (3) pride *versus* humility. He continues: "From these three steps, the Evil One leads to all other vices." If each of these can be considered as specifications of "authenticity *versus* unauthenticity," how would you specify the dialectic of today's culture?

3. Communications

You are a spiritual director. A Matthew comes to you for help in getting *control* of his life, getting more routine in it, more structure. Or a Joanne comes with a persistent theme of wanting simply to *trust* God each day. Or a Luke comes with an abiding concern to make more *progress* in his apostolate. Or a Marcia comes full of *struggles* with her pastor that never seem to end. How do you lead persons to critique their spontaneous symbols of transcendence and expand their imaginations? How do you teach a more dialectical spirituality that struggles for authenticity?

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SPIRIT AND MISSION OF THE “FAITHFUL REMNANT”: A STUDY OF COMMUNITY IN THE ISAIAH SCROLL

Ann Johnston, R.S.C.J.

A community's being is being-in-the-world; a community's self understanding has to be not only of itself but also of its world.¹ So the “tradition-bearers” who brought into being the “collection of collections” which is the Isaiah Scroll were the “tradition-bearers” of a community embedded in their history, a history in which they were intensely conscious of God's acting presence. This little community, referred to in the Isaiah text as the *limudim* or *those who are taught*, were witnesses to Yahweh's call and creation of Israel as a covenanted entity and the continuing, responsive, and lived dialectic of this “faithful remnant” of Israel. In the course of at least five centuries we can see this community dynamically evolve before our eyes.

Amidst the radical changes of historical, social, and religious context evident in the Isaiah Scroll, we can trace the existence of a community brought into being by the faithful responsiveness of this group to the Divine initiative. We have evidence of their faithful recording of a common experience of God, of their world and of God's call within that world, as the basis of their very existence. Reflection on this experience gave birth to an even deeper and shared understanding of God, of their identity in relation to this God, and of their mission both to the community of Israel and to the wider world. Their shared judgments, concerning their way of life and their way of responding to God deepened across the centuries, as they understood and interpreted God's judgments of the way life lived by the

¹I have applied to the community, understood as corporate entity, Bernard Lonergan's understanding of a human person: “As man's being is being-in-the-world, his self understanding has to be not only of himself but also of his world” (Lonergan, 1985: 23).

covenant community and God's continuing summons to live the call which *is* their identity. Those who would continue to support one another in the radical decision-making, inherent in this call to live the God-relationship, forged a community responsive to the heart of God and living the *hesed* of mutually responsive love.

In order to set the context for understanding this, let us look briefly at the texts which give evidence for the existence of this group. Then let us proceed to examine the common understanding of theology, teleology, and messianism which inspired the life of the group, under the rubric of Lonergan's understanding of finality. This will in fact lead us to an exploration of the dynamism of the community in terms of vertical and horizontal finality.²

Each major division of the Isaiah Scroll is conditioned by the radical change in the historical situation of Israel which resulted in her understanding of herself and of the conditions and meaning of her God-relationship. Chapters 1-39 can be placed in an eighth-century Judean context. The community of Israel of the South was "unholy" to the point of pollution, and the consequent loss of identity caused by this interior weakness left her open and vulnerable to Assyrian power plays. Rather than trust in Yahweh's protection, Israel sought refuge in alliances with foreign powers involving reliance on other gods. Isaiah of Jerusalem names and describes the rebelliousness of "the sons of Israel" and their flagrant violations of covenant life.

Chapters 40-55 depict a broken and despondent community still living in the Babylonian POW camp somewhere between the years 553 and 539 BCE and scarcely daring to believe in the proclamation of a new exodus and a new creation of Israel as the Servant Community bound to Yahweh her God in re-covenanted existence.

Chapters 56-66 reveal a restored but bickering community, in Jerusalem and its environs, in the fifth century BCE.

Present in each of these sections is apocalyptic material which seems freed from its historical anchors. The most notable of these is the Isaiah Apocalypse, chapters 24-27, which seems to have its origins among the members of an oppressed and politically helpless

²See diagram of the structure of the Isaiah Scroll, below.

minority in Israel seeking solace in apocalyptic images of Yahweh's victory over the forces of evil. Some would date this as late as the early second century, BCE when the Seleucid rule threatened the very existence of the entire Jewish community, and the priestly class within Judaism, faithful to the vision of Ezekiel, controlled the politico-religious life of the Jews in these centuries.

So much for the overall historical picture.

Amidst these radical changes in historical setting there is a remarkable continuity in the areas of theology, teleology, and messianism. The question I would like to explore with you is this: Can we look at this Isaianic corpus as having its origins in a prophetic community of the disciples of Isaiah of Jerusalem and subsequent generations of this community, a community whose experience and understanding of God draws its inspiration and original formulation from the experience and the call of this most articulate of Israelite prophets, but which was reformulated by successive generations of Isaiah's prophetic disciples who experienced and revisioned the expansion of Israel's vocation in changed historical circumstances?

Three specific passages in the Isaiah corpus make reference to the *limudim*, variously translated as "disciples"/"those who are taught," all having the root meaning *to learn, to be accustomed to*, and in the passive, *to be taught* as a disciple or follower. Each of the passages casts some light on the existence of a community of disciples and on the nature of the life of discipleship.

Isaiah 8 gives evidence of Isaiah as master of a group of prophet-disciples whose life centers around cultic activities, in particular, divinatory rites and practices. The description given in 8:1-8 bears all the marks of the revelatory character of "prophetic action" as part of a divinatory rite. The words and the directives for action are received by Isaiah in ecstasy: "the Lord spoke to me thus with a strong hand on me." To speak of a message received in this manner is to speak of the ecstasy of communication and communion (Haldar, 210, additional note 7). This was the ordinary means of receiving oracles among prophetic cult personnel.

In the present form of this tradition-complex there follow Isaiah's instructions to the religious community:

Guard the testimony,
 Seal up the teaching among my disciples
 And I will wait for Yahweh
 And I will trust Him. (Is 8:16-17)

There is not an elaborate description of the disciple circle here. This lack of fuller description can be interpreted as evidence that the group as such was well known in this period; knowledge of it is taken for granted and further elaboration is considered unnecessary. The disciples are called to be bearers and transmitters of testimony to a people seeking their direction and hope in false gods and in empty divinatory rites, people who "consult the mediums and wizards who chirp and mutter" (8:19). "Should not a people consult their God?" Holding this testimony until time of fulfillment is the role of the disciple-circle here:

I will wait for the Lord who is hiding his face
 from the House of Jacob,
 and I will hope in Yahweh. (8:17)

Chapter 50 of the Deutero-Isaianic material, coming from the community in exile, contains the next reference to the *limudim*. Here, the Holy One, Israel's Redeemer, forms under the Divine prerogative, and for the Divine purpose, the disciples: giving them the "tongue of a disciple," "an ear open to receive instruction," a receptive, contemplative spirit. The prophet disciple is called upon to speak to the weary, to rouse to activity the discouraged and down-hearted, those who cannot believe in their Redeemer God while life is still lived in a land of exile. Here is a description of the contemplative attitude in prayer of the disciple:

Morning after morning he awakens me,
 Wakens my ear
 To hear as those who are taught (*limudim*). (50:4c)

This listening attitude is characteristic of the prayer of this community of cult personnel involved in the cultic life of a people without a Temple.

The Lord has opened my ear
And I was not rebellious
I turned not away
I gave my back to the smiters
And my cheeks to them that pluck the beard
I hid not my face from shame and spitting
For the Lord God will help me
Therefore I have not been confounded
I have set my face like flint
I know I shall not be ashamed. (50:5-7)

The strength given in contemplative prayer, where the word is heard in a still and receptive heart, makes these disciples courageous and daring in accepting the persecution which is part of the prophet's life and calling. This call to the acceptance of suffering and total gift of one's life for the life of the community and as a salvific offering for the wider world, reaches its climax in the figure of the Suffering Servant depicted in Isaiah 52-53.

Chapter 54 contains the last specific reference to the *limudim*. Here, "those who are taught" are also referred to as sons (54:13) and as servants (54:17). The waiting time of exile has been complete. This is a song of assurance to Israel. The face of God, hidden for a "moment" from the sons of Jacob, now speaks to them as Yahweh, their Redeemer: "in *hesed* (bonded love) forever I am loving you with a compassionate heart" (54:8).

For a brief moment I forsook you
But with great compassion I will gather you.
In overflowing wrath for a moment I hid my face from you
But with everlasting love I will have compassion on
you says the Lord, your Redeemer. (54:7-8)

All your sons shall be taught by the Lord
And great shall be the prosperity of your sons. (54:13)

No weapon that is fashioned against you shall prosper,
And you shall confute every tongue
that rises against you in judgment.
This is the heritage of the servants of the Lord
And their vindication from me, says the Lord. (54:17)

Third Isaiah does not use the term *limudim* but carries the same concept embodied in the term “servant,” modeled on the idealized figure of the Suffering Servant of Yahweh so graphically and symbolically depicted in Deutero-Isaiah. Chapter 56 depicts this community of servants as a “faithful remnant” not only of Israel but all who would accept and live Yahweh’s calling:

And the foreigners who join themselves to the Lord,
 to minister to him,
 to love the name of the Lord,
 and to be his servants,
 Everyone who keeps the sabbath and does not
 profane it and hold fast to my covenant,
 These I will bring to my holy mountain
 and make them joyful in my house of prayer ...
 For my house shall be called
 a house of prayer for all peoples.
 Thus says the Lord God. (56:6-8)

The textual evidence for this disciple group is limited, indeed, but what we do have is significant. The life of the disciples of the prophet involves:

- holding the testimony of the prophet concerning Yahweh’s call to wait on God, to hope in God, to put their trust in Yahweh’s presence and action in their lives and not in political alliances involving allegiance to other “non-gods” (Is 8);
- living a life of prayer and openness to the Lord, which will bring daily the sense of direction and consciousness of the action of the Spirit in their lives (Is 30);
- living as a community of disciples, taught by the prophet, servants of Yahweh, called to live faithful to the Spirit and accepting of the suffering which discipleship involves; supportive of one another in this life of witnessing to Yahweh’s love and creation (Is 54).³

Can we see in this disciple-group a community called to live as bearers of hope to the people of Israel wallowing in despair and disillusionment? Is the call of the community a summons to be

³Especially as seen in the light of the preceding chapters 52-53.

witnesses of this waiting hope in the Holy One of Israel who calls the remnant of Israel for a universal purpose?

In making the claim for the existence of an Isaianic school as a community of disciples, faithful to the theological vision of the "founder," I would like to place before you an analogous situation in present day sociological and religious development which may serve as a model for comparison. The Isaianic religious community seems called to live a life of active waiting, involving total conversion, and to be an effective witness to the larger Israelite community through successive crises of faith. They are called to bear prophetic witness by their lives. The religious and monastic communities of today, having that same task of prophetic witness, are called to examine their way of life and to return to the "primitive spirit" and the original charism; to find there the inspiration and grounding for the reworking of their constitution and rule in such a way as to reflect the theological inspiration of founder or foundress; and, having done this, to discern the signs of the time and to revitalize the original message in its application to the present and to the minds and hearts and temperaments of those called by the Spirit to the life of the community today. In doing this, many communities retain in their present constitutions the successive stages of this documentation, each of which bears the marks of the original inspiration and the adaptations to the successive historical contexts.

Might not the Isaiah Scroll be just such a document? Can we find there the original inspiration and experience of the prophet and its successive adaptations, reworkings, shapings, which were called for by the theological-political-social emergencies in the community from the time of Isaiah's calling in the reign of Uzziah until the final formulation of this document somewhere in the third or second century BCE?

Let us examine next the inner unity and coherence of the material. In the midst of radical historical, sociological, and religious discontinuity, there is a unified and consistent, though evolving, theology, teleology, and messianism which distinguishes the life and mission of this community. In Lonergan's terms their finality, their relation to the end, remains constant, even as it evolves.

This is a community called into being by the Holy One of Israel, called to be holy in order to make possible the bonding, communion, and communication with the Holy God; called to be a sign of salvation to the nations beyond Judah, thus having a messianic purpose extending beyond the tribes of Israel and embracing the nations of the universe in need of the saving action of God. These three discrete but interlocking areas describe the relationship to Israel's God in terms of absolute finality, horizontal finality, and vertical finality.

Despite stylistic and historical differences in the component parts, there is a remarkable theological unity. The understanding of the Holy One of God is central to the experience of God throughout and Yahweh's *kabod*, the weight of Divine glory, fills the whole earth and is seen as a manifestation of the Divine essence. In each section of the corpus, although the understanding of the action of God is conditioned by the changing cultural matrix, this remains Israel's absolute finality: the bonded relationship with the Holy One.

Eighth-century Judah and Jerusalem, the setting of First Isaiah, was the *heimat* of Yahweh's covenant people, belonging to God, yet living in broken covenant relationship:

Sinful nation,
 A people laden with iniquity,
 Offspring of evil doers,
 Sons who deal corruptly,
 They have forsaken Yahweh,
 They have despised the Holy One of Israel,
 They are utterly estranged. (Is 1:4)

... they are a rebellious people,
 lying sons
 Sons who will not hear
 the instruction of Yahweh,
 Who say to the seers, 'see not';
 and to the prophets,
 prophecy not to us what is right,
 Speak to us smooth things
 prophecy illusions.
 Leave the way, turn aside from the path.
 Let us hear no more of the Holy One of Israel. (30:9-11)

Estranged sons! It is Yahweh, the Holy One of Israel, who has mothered and fathered Israel and from whom they are estranged. The prophet calls them to return, *shub*. In Hebrew the word signifies a physical turning round of the whole body-being, so that face to face with Yahweh, the relationship of conversation might once again be re-established. To this people whose fear has led them to dabbling in syncretistic practices inherent in alliances with foreign powers,⁴ blinded by the idolatry of material possessions, wealth, and social ostentation,⁵ enmeshed in the cultic blasphemy of sacrificial rites with bloodied hands and hearts closed to the needs of the poor,⁶ the Divine initiative ever persists in calling those whose identity is to be one with their God:

For all this his anger is not turned away
His hand is stretched out still.⁷

This motif is repeated thematically throughout the message of First Isaiah. And in turn, Isaiah of Jerusalem insistently proclaims: Yahweh alone is holy, Yahweh alone deserves your unbounded allegiance and loyalty:

Yahweh Sabaoth
This One you shall regard as holy
This One is object of your fear
This One is sole object of your awe. (8:13)

This title, Holy One of Israel, denoting relationship of possession, persists throughout the entire corpus. Additional epithets are added as Israel experiences the revelation of Yahweh's *hesed* in face of her varying needs and crises.

In sixth-century Babylon, to a people still captivated by the pageantry of the Babylonian cult and its mythic magnetism and ritualistic rhythms, disheartened by their plight as exiles, yet caught up into life in this foreign land, unbelieving in the "purpose" of their god

⁴Is 1:11; 1:12-15; 1:29-31; 2:8; 2:20; 5:12; 19:3-4; 28:7-8; 30:22; 31:7.

⁵Is 1:21-23; 2:6-8; 2:20-21; 3:16-17; 5:8-10; 5:11-12; 5:21-23.

⁶Is 1:16-17; 1:21-23; 3:14-15; 10:1-2; 29:13.

⁷Is 5:25; 8:12; 9:17; 9:21; 10:4.

in this time of exile, seeking refuge in the power of their captors' gods, the prophetic community, in the voice of Deutero-Isaiah, proclaims the same message: "Yahweh is the Holy One of Israel." And to this is attached the probing and accusing question: "To whom can you liken the Divine One?" (40:18). Worship of a proliferation of idols had become a way of life for the faithless of Israel. The exile, act of Yahweh's purifying anger, is drawing to a close: Cyrus, instrument of Yahweh's vindication, declares the end of this shameful captivity and directs Israel to return to the purity of her own religious ways and practices. The Holy One of Israel is now experienced as savior,⁸ redeemer,⁹ creator of Israel. The hand of Yahweh, which was experienced as the chastising hand of purifying anger, is now experienced as the "creative hand" (41:20). A new exodus is in the making. Yahweh, the Holy One, creates anew. We still have here a theology which both conceives of and knows God as the "Holy One of Israel." The religious experience of this period is one of a God who comforts and encourages, while, at the same time, the strong call is given to come away from idol worship. In this time of regrouping, of reassessing spiritual values and spiritual realities, of letting go of syncretistic practices and persuasions which have become part of life in Babylon, Yahweh says to them:

Behold they are all a delusion;
 Their works are nothing,
 Their molten images are empty wind. (41:29)

Yahweh, Israel's savior, redeemer, creator, calls them to belong again to the One who takes possession of them again, in order to lead out of idolatry¹⁰ and into restored and renewed relationship with Yahweh, living God and Savior (45:21), Holy One of Israel (47:4).

In the fifth- and fourth-century Babylon and Judah, to a people sunk in the self-complacency of satisfying wealth, guided by leaders who are blind and dumb and indolent, reluctant to return to or settle a land that signifies relationship involving both privilege and demand, still attracted by the mysterious lure of alien cults, the

⁸Is 43:3; 45:17; 49:26.

⁹Is 43:14; 44:24; 47:4; 48:17; 48:20; 49:7; 49:26; 52:9; 54:5; 54:8.

¹⁰Is 44:9ff; 45:16; 45:20; 46:1ff; 48:5.

disciples of Isaiah continue to bear witness to Yahweh as the Holy One of Israel. They are imbued with a theology which experiences the Holy One as savior, redeemer, creator, but also as father, whose chastising anger has completed his purpose, who calls for a return, both physical and moral, a rebuilding by these people whose experience of destruction, devastation, and suffering has created them anew as a "holy people," the "redeemed of Yahweh" (62:12). Purged of their dross, this "remnant community" is destined to open a way of redemption to many (66:18 ff).

In Third Isaiah, although theological centrality is given to the Holy One of Israel, and the glory of God is seen as a revelation of God's holiness (60:19; 63:3), the lack of persistence in titles and themes in this section, the sense of voices from both Babylon and Jerusalem, bears witness to its collective origin, while the repetition of theological and religious ideas reveals the same stream of tradition within this community.

The title "Holy One of Israel" is not present in the Isaiah Apocalypse of chapters 24-27. The holiness of God is still theologically central, but the appeal and the praise is to Yahweh, Israel's God, envisioned as reigning over the Universe. The universal community celebrates Yahweh's conquest of the forces of evil personified in the mythic Leviathan (27:1). As a result of this victory, Yahweh's vineyard, Israel "shall blossom and bring forth shoots, and fill the whole world with fruit" (27:6).

Thus a theology which experiences and knows God as the Holy One of Israel is dominant throughout these centuries, and the call of the prophet in each era is a call to return to the religious and ethical practices which reflect a way of life which demonstrates a lived belief in a covenant with Yahweh, the Holy One, who has elected them to this relationship for purposes beyond their own salvation.

For life in a dynamically evolving community, called to keeping alive the covenant relationship, there must be a clear goal, and a strong sense of that goal must be part of the articulated heritage which not only embodies their beliefs but also has power to move those beliefs into act. The purifying action of Yahweh is God's creative action in their history from the beginning. But what is the active, responsive aspect of their lives which gives direction by movement towards a tangible goal? What is this tangible goal which,

because it is of the very essence of this community, has power to move the community from within?

Teleology is defined as "the fact or character of being directed towards an end or shaped by a goal or purpose." It is also "the doctrine of belief that ends are immanent in nature." In examining the "continuing creation" of Israel by Yahweh and Israel's responsive and creative living with Yahweh, which can be seen in the Isaianic corpus, the sense of Yahweh's purpose for Israel (that is, *telos* or goal) and for the world through Israel (that is, the community's messianic task) gives the whole text a sense of cohesion.

Closely connected, then, to the theological vision which we have described is the teleology of these prophetic visionaries and the community messianism inherent in this. An analysis of this teleology must be approached from three directions:

- (1) the outward goal toward which this corporate being is directed and the specified relation to that goal;
- (2) the inward goal that flows from the very nature of their being;
- (3) the goal as it is called forth and conditioned by the world in which that community lives.

In seeking to describe this, let us look first at Lonergan's understanding of finality:

By "finality" I would name not the end itself but relation to the end, and I would distinguish absolute finality, horizontal finality and vertical finality.

Absolute finality is to God. For every end is an instance of the good, and every instance of the good has its ground and goal in absolute goodness.

Horizontal finality is to the proportionate end, the end that results from what a thing is, what follows from it, and what it may exact.

Vertical finality is to an end higher than the proportionate end ... [something higher beyond its own being and nature] (Lonergan, 1985: 24; emphases added).

Vertical finality is to its end, *not as inevitable, but as a possibility*. Its ends can be attained. They *may or may not be* attained (Lonergan, 1985: 26; emphases added).

The absolute goodness of God is the *hesed* of Yahweh which has called the community into covenanted relationship. A relationship to God alone is the *absolute finality*. This calling into covenant is a creative act in itself, creating a community whose call is to participate in the life with God, giving them their very identity. This covenanted people, bound to Yahweh, the Holy One, must *become holy* to be able to be in relationship with Yahweh. This *becoming a holy community* is the *horizontal finality* of Israel. The *vertical finality* of Israel, the end or goal beyond its own being, is the purpose for Israel and the *for the world* to be attained *through Israel*:

It is too light a thing that you should be my servant,
to raise up the tribes of Jacob
and to restore the preserved of Israel;
I will give you as a light to the nations,
that my salvation may reach to the end of the earth. (49:6)

In the Isaianic corpus, the goal of Yahweh for Israel, both in terms of horizontal and vertical finality, is fully embodied and given life in the concept of the "remnant." This concept is not original to Isaiah of Jerusalem; it was used by Amos, the prophet of Tekoa, and after him by Jeremiah, Ezekiel, and Zephaniah. It is adumbrated in Genesis and Exodus and found in Samuel and Kings, in Ezra, Nehemiah, and Chronicles (Hasel, 1974). In fact by the eighth century it seems to have been a part of Israel's theological tradition. Isaiah, however, was the first to speak of a "holy remnant." The remnant motif in Isaiah's thought and theology is intrinsically related to Yahweh's holiness. In this day, he perceives Israel as the "holy seed" (6:13), "which will emerge after Yahweh's cleansing judgment has fallen upon the nation" (Hasel, 1974: 395.). This is where theology and teleology are bound together inseparably in the Isaianic tradition. The purifying action of Yahweh upon Israel "will create" a purified and holy remnant which can be used for Yahweh's purpose among the nations of the world. Purification is directed at the people of Israel; those who actively receive it unto holiness become the purified remnant community, those who do not receive it choose death and annihilation, for they refuse the purpose of Yahweh both for those covenanted into relationship with Yahweh and for the nations which the purified remnant are destined to draw to Yahweh.

This teleology, embodied in the concept of remnant, in terms of *horizontal finality*, is variously developed and articulated down through the centuries. In Proto-Isaiah, the purging judgment of Yahweh creates a "holy remnant." In Deutero-Isaiah, the "redeemed of Yahweh" are the holy remnant and Yahweh is their *goel* (41:14; 43:3; 43:4; 47:4). In Trito-Isaiah, the holy ones, the redeemed of Yahweh, are perceived as the "Sought-Out," "a City Not Forsaken" (62:12). This is their *telos*, seen as intrinsic to their nature: the heritage (Is 19:25) of Yahweh; a community covenanted into existence by the *hesed*¹¹ of Yahweh is to be holy to be able to be in the *hesed*-bond, which is a dialectical bonding bringing greater depth of relationship as the dialectic is entered into at ever greater depths.

In terms of *vertical finality*, the elements of continuity in the articulation of this *telos* are striking. The end and goal of the mission of Isaiah of Jerusalem is to bring these people to understand that, though the judgment which comes upon them is to have for its intrinsic goal the existence of the "holy seed" which has been made holy by the purifying action of Yahweh (Is 6:8-13), its intrinsic goal is beyond the boundaries of Judah and Jerusalem and even of all Israel: "The root of Jesse shall stand as an ensign to the people; him shall the nations seek ..." (Is 11:10). Yahweh's judgmental purging is not for the sake of Israel alone. Even the Assyrian, seen as the destroyer in the eighth century, will be affected by Israel's God and Israel's existence. Yahweh will destroy the evil and the unholy in the whole universe:

This is the purpose that is purposed
concerning the whole earth;
And this is the hand that is stretched out
over all the nations. (Is 14:26)

That same hand that, through purging exile created the remnant, will make use of the remnant for the nations of the earth. In the days to come, in God's own time, this holy planting Jacob "shall take root; Israel shall blossom forth shoots, and fill the whole world with fruit" (Is 27:6).

¹¹For an understanding of the active, creative, acting aspect of *hesed*, see Sakenfeld, 1978, especially pp. 93-107.

Deutero-Isaiah expands the articulation of this teleology even further. The remnant comes to be idealized in the Servant:

... he will bring forth justice to the nations (42:11)

... he will not fail or be discouraged

till he has established justice in the earth. (42:4)

Called, then formed, then purified, then saved, the Servant is to be "a light to the nations" that the salvific action of Yahweh "may reach to the ends of the earth" (49:6). The redeemed of Yahweh, covenanted in *hesed*, shall be witness, leader, commander to the peoples:

Behold, you shall call the nations that you know not

And nations that you know not shall run to you

Because of the Lord your God, and the Holy One of Israel

For Yahweh has glorified you. (Is 55:5)

In the period of return and restoration, described in chapters 56 to 66, the vision of the universal mission of Israel is further articulated, but the voices of those calling are muted by the division within the community. Foreigners fail to believe in their worth and the "righteous" of the community see blood-bonding as a qualification for "election" and "redemption." The prophetic voices of the community of "servants" strive to make clear the universality of God's purpose:

My house shall be as a house of prayer for all peoples.

Thus says the Lord God

who gathers the outcasts of Israel;

I will gather yet others to Yahweh

besides his gathered ones. (Is 56:6-8)

Yahweh's purpose is to use his "gathered ones" to gather others into the life of God. This is the messianic task of the community who will live the God-relationship. The holiness of this "remnant" is to be a revelation of Yahweh's *kabod*:

Yahweh's glory will be seen upon you

And nations shall come to your light

And Kings to the brightness of your rising. (Is 60:3)

Israel's directedness, then, in terms of absolute finality, is to God in the covenant relationship of acting love. In terms of horizontal finality, the goal is to enter actively into becoming holy in order to be part of the "holy seed," the purged remnant of Yahweh, the true Israel. In terms of vertical finality, the "holy remnant" has as goal the communication of the hesed of Yahweh to the nations of the world. God is asking this community, this cohesive group, to enter into the life of God and fully to participate in that life in such a way that living this relationship with God will communicate and bear witness to the world of the Holy God in their midst.

STRUCTURE OF THE ISAIAH SCROLL

ISAIAH SCROLL chapters	1- 39 (excluding 24-27)	40 - 55	56 - 66	24 - 27
GEOGRAPHICAL Setting	Judah Jerusalem	Babylonian POW camp	Judah Jerusalem	Jerusalem environs
TIME FRAME (BCE)	8th century	6th century 553 - 539	5th century 515 - 400	3rd - 2nd century 250 - 190?
GOD TITLES	Holy One of Israel	Holy One of Israel the Mighty God the God of Israel	Holy One of Israel Creator Redeemer Father/Chastiser Mighty One of Jacob Father Savior Mother Potter	Righteous One
COMMUNITY	Remnant the holy seed <i>limudim</i>	<i>limudim</i> my servant witnesses remnant Servants of the Lord	faithful remnant priests of the Lord ministers of our God Hepzibah (my Delight) Beulah (Married) Redeemed of the Lord my servants my chosen City not Forsaken Sought Out	the Righteous his Elders

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LONERGAN'S APPRENTICESHIP 1904-46:¹ THE EDUCATION OF DESIRE

William Mathews, S.J.

INTRODUCTION

My interest in the biographical process and knowledge began when I was writing a doctorate on questioning. There I began to explore the manner in which a biography is a response to the questioning of the biographer. The biographical question proper arises out of the totality of the experiences which make up the life of the subject. The whole of the life, like a work of art, puts the total question. So biographers have to have a fundamental openness. Like the historian they have patiently to come to know all the concrete details of the life and then let those elements put the question to them, break down their inevitable preconceptions about the person. If any significant part of the life is hidden or lost or ignored, or if their questioning because of biases or an inadequate horizon is unfree to explore it, then to that extent the question as posed and the answer it generates will be distorted. Again and again they have to overcome a tendency to dismiss a time or a work in the life of their subject as unimportant. Equally biographers have to strive for the right kind of freedom or independence from both their subject and audience. Unbalanced discipleship or hero worship will be reflected in their narrative. Their goal is truth and in order to attain the truth they have to overcome various feelings in themselves towards what is great and what is shadowy in their subject.

What is the point or focus of biographical questioning? Is it concerned with:

¹This article is an expansion of a paper read to a Lonergan Studies group in St. Mary's Hall, Boston College, on March 9, 1988, and later at the Lonergan Workshop, Boston College, on June 21, 1988. I would like to thank the participants for their comments and encouragement, especially Joseph Flanagan, SJ, Joseph Duffy, SJ, and Fred Lawrence. I am also much indebted to Frederick Crowe, SJ.

- the illumination of character or personality, the management of temperament, the negotiation of the cast of the life?
- the discovery, following Aristotle and Ricoeur, of the plot and its variables of cast, stage, works, situations? The interconnectedness of events in a life, the meaning of the whole in the parts, narrative or story theme?
- what Heidegger calls the one central idea of a major thinker (sits well with Lonergan and *Method in Theology*)?
- Progoff's seed and dynatype (Lonergan remarked to Harvey Egan that he simply followed his dynatype)?
- Sartre's fundamental project — a plan? Can you plan your life?

Still, we have also to be critical of our spontaneous expectations as in some cases what we normally anticipate as the biographical process might in fact be in a state of collapse in a life.²

These ideas are important and helpful. They can direct our initial explorations. But I would like to suggest that the proper goal of the biographical process is not to impose, but rather to let the unique narrative that is the unfolding of the life disclose itself to us. That narrative is like a fingerprint, unique to every individual. It is not reducible to psychological theories or literary categories, helpful though they may be. It is there to be discovered in the concrete details of the life. Intellectual biographers have the task of understanding the unique manner in which the intellectual quest of a particular individual unfolded in his or her life. They approach the mind of the individual, not as a general group of structured mental operations or a genetic series of developmental stages, but rather as a unique personal narrative that unfolds concretely in time. Taking the life as a whole their concern is to discover in it the total intellectual plot, to recover and retell that usually tacit narrative which is experienced but rarely known by its subject.³ The goal of the biographer is to let the truth of a

²Oliver Sachs in the preface of his *The Man Who Mistook His Wife for a Hat* (New York: Harper, 1987) draws our attention to some awesome pathologies of the nervous system. By analogy, does it make sense to speculate about pathographies, pathologies of the human life story?

³See W. Mathews, "Wonder as Narrative," *Philosophical Studies* (NUI) 31 (1986-7) 258-279. Combine this essay with my "Lonergan's Quest," *Milltown Studies*, no. 17 (Spring 1986) 3-34, and "Interpreting Lives, Some Hermeneutical Problems in Auto-

unique and particular life disclose itself to the readers. Every person in their life is a face of the truth.

Lonergan's life as a whole strikes me as a profound image of the creative process itself in a human life, and this, quite apart from the precise content of his creativity. In a moment of insight in February 1965 he made a breakthrough on the question, for him, of the method of theology with the discovery of eight functional specialties in theology.⁴ Matthew Lamb and Colin Maloney were studying in Rome at the time, and Lonergan recounted to them this "great insight." But, it seems, such was the nature of the discovery that it was only a year later that he really recognized its magnitude and then, with Archimedean joy, celebrated it with Bernard Tyrrell. That moment integrated a process that had been germinating in his life for thirty-eight years and took a further seven years to articulate in the book, *Method in Theology*:

In 1926 I was sent to England to study philosophy at Heythrop College and at the same time to prepare for an external degree at London University. A year later aged twenty-two, I wrote to the Canadian Jesuit Provincial asking that my field of study be shifted to General Methodology. I didn't know anything about methodology at the time, but forty five years later I published a book on method in theology. All along I was interested in method and learning more and more about it (Cahn and Going, 1979: 10).

The fact that in a moment in February 1965 the meaning of forty-five years of Lonergan's life was united is worthy of consideration — this, despite the fact that some months after the moment of insight he was diagnosed as having serious lung cancer. After surgery he was miraculously lucky to live for almost another twenty years.⁵

Keats has said of Robert Burns that in the works of such a man we can see his whole life as though we were God's spies. Is that the purpose of the biographers? Would they attempt to rob their subject of his secret, despite Freud's protestations in his twenties that he was going to make things difficult for them? There is here the paradox of meaning and mystery. A biography never erases the mystery, the core

biography and Biography," *Irish Philosophical Journal* 3/1 (Spring 1986) 27-41, and you have the springboard for my present study.

⁴Lonergan refers to the discovery in Lambert *et al.*, 1982: 59, 74-75. For an account of the specialties see Lonergan, 1982: ch. 5.

⁵For an account of his operation see Lambert *et al.*, 149.

of darkness at the center of the life. Rather it underlines and even celebrates it. Ultimately, the goal of the biographer is to draw the reader into a celebration of the mystery of a human life in all its dimensions. Good biographies effect that invitation and communicate that understanding and feeling. Cover stories trivialize it. They do not disclose life as it is, the truth about what it is to be human.

As the question and the insights of the biographer grow, as well as discovering the narrative and its movements, part of the response is to discover partial and total life images which communicate, organically, its dynamism, its movement, its point. These images complement the more verbal biographical narrative. Some of them can sum up in an organic and dynamic manner the central point of the life, "Surprised by Joy," "Elected Silence," "A Candle in the Wind" and so forth. Equally there are partial images that bring together symbolically the mood and atmosphere of a chapter or fragment within the total life movement. In his autobiography *Surprised by Joy*, Lewis uses images such as "Check" and "Checkmate" to communicate the atmosphere of chapters in his religious conversion. God was making the moves. Merton in *The Seven Storey Mountain* uses images such as "Magnetic North" and "True North" to intimate a sense of the directions of the processes in his life at different times. As the biographer becomes familiar with the elements and movement of the life a task is to discover such organic images. What is interesting about them is that they communicate an element of both meaning and mystery.

Surprise and joy mean something to us, as does their conjunction in "Surprised by Joy." On the other hand the meaningful surprises in our lives seem to reveal a deeprooted and ingrained longing in the human heart to be surprised in a way that is beyond our comprehension. The total meaning of surprise and joy seems, like a bottomless well, to evade us. They seem to be permanently mysterious. The same could be said of the meaning of parenthood, friendship, love, work and creativity, conflict, forgiveness, reconciliation, the surd. The understanding which we aspire to of those human experiences seems somehow inevitably partial and incomplete. To what extent this is an attribute of our understanding of all properly human categories is an interesting question.

What images do I currently find helpful and suggestive of the structure of Loneragan's life? Centrally, I believe that Loneragan's life is

expressive of desire, intellectual desire, which expresses itself in a quest which, like a symphony, unfolds through four major movements. To suggest that a person is a quest is both meaningful and mysterious. Like joy a quest is something that we can understand, up to a point. But that very understanding in turn reveals a further mysterious dimension to the person. Why are we a quest, and what are we really and ultimately in quest of? Why do we have particular quests within our lives? Within its overall shape there seem to be four movements which are outlined below.

LONERGAN'S QUEST

- I. 1904-46 — The Education of Desire
 - A. Origins: The Making of a Classical Mind
 - B. The Thirties: Growth Under the Ground
 - C. 1940-46: The Golden Cord
- II. 1943-53 — The First Journey of Desire
 - How do we know what is real?
 - A. Recovering Aquinas' Intellectualism
 - B. Vigorously Composing the New — *Insight*
- III. 1953-72 — The Second Journey of Desire
 - What is the method of theology?
 - A. Teaching the Trinity and Incarnation
 - B. Focusing on the question of method in theology
 - C. Suddenly it all falls into place
 - D. Painfully composing *Method in Theology*
- IV. 1973-83 — The Evening of Desire
 - A distant peak
 - A. Feebly Towards the next economic summit

Although Lonergan is a very private person when it comes to describing his own interiority, the works in each of the movements are expressions of his desire, of his inwardness. The goal of the present

paper will be to trace the unfolding of the first movement up to the point of the decisions about *Verbum* and *Insight* in 1943 and 1946 respectively.

A. LONERGAN'S APPRENTICESHIP — THE WAY DOWN

Buckingham — Origins

Bernard Lonergan was born, the eldest of three boys, to Gerald and Josephine Lonergan on December 17, 1904 in Buckingham, Quebec. His father, who studied at Ottawa University and graduated as an engineer from McGill, was a Dominion surveyor. His work involved leaving the family home as soon as the winter snows melted and travelling to distant parts of Canada to survey the territories. He would not return until the late fall. Who knows what impact this image of a father departing to map vast territories had on his firstborn son who would later set about mapping vast fields of knowledge? The absence of the father made him the man in the house, a matter in which he took much pride. His mother was an extremely religious and devotional person, attending daily Mass. She enjoyed music and painting. In his later years hearing some music, probably the "Kreutzer" Sonata, reminded him of sitting outside on the lawn as a child and listening as she played "The Mockingbird," a take-off of it, in the house.

Lonergan's early education, from the age of about six until thirteen, was at the École Saint Michel, run then by the Brothers of Christian Instruction in Buckingham. He attended a small English-speaking section of the largely French School situated just across from the parish church of St. Gregory of Nazianzen. His teachers, including Br. Michael O'Dea, were careful about assigning and collecting work. Lonergan acknowledged that he developed good work habits for which he was grateful. He always had to work his hardest.⁶ About those days he has remarked:

⁶Visits to the school archives in Buckingham and to the Brothers archives in La Prairie have not yielded any information on the academic program of the school during the years Lonergan attended. Of particular interest would be the catechism he was brought up on and details of the commercial course which it is most probable that he took at the end of his grade school. Further clues are being pursued but at

In elementary school I liked math because you know what you had to do and could get an answer ... but mathematics helped a lot in clarifying what on earth you are doing when you are doing something (Lambert *et al.*, 2, 50).

Do we detect, in this early concern with how to do things, the seeds of an interest in methodology? English composition he found at first troublesome until he had something to say. He was also, on his own admission, a diligent rather than an imaginative or creative student. He was always learning (Lambert *et al.*, 133). This would square with the observations of his brothers that at Buckingham Lonergan was not an unusual but a quite normal and ordinary schoolboy.

One summer during those school years he was bored and asked his cousin what he should do on a slow, hot, summer day and was told, "Well, you read a book." He immediately read *Treasure Island* as his first (Lambert *et al.*, vii). When his Aunt Minnie moved into the family home she brought the works of Dickens with her. According to Fred Lawrence, in the evening when the family was asleep Lonergan used to read them by the fireside. He was always reading something although in his later years Michael Fahey recalls that he had to limit his reading of serious books to about five per year. The experience could be so intellectually stimulating, could evoke so many questions and insights, that it drained him both mentally and physically.

Loyola Montreal — The Making of a Classical Mind

Lonergan went to Loyola Montreal in 1918 as a boarder just short of his fourteenth birthday and studied there for four years. This was his first encounter with Jesuits. As a boarder he would almost follow the Jesuit daily order. He would rise at 6:20; prayers and Mass were at 6:45 and breakfast at 7:30. Study began at 8:15 and classes at 9:00. The day was highly structured until lights-out at 9:45 pm. Subjects studied included Latin, Greek, mathematics, English, French, history and religion. In Joseph Keating, William Bryan, and Francis Downes he had extremely good teachers of the classics. From this point on we have an abundance of data from which to chart the details of his

the moment nothing has been forthcoming. This detective work is all part of the biographical process and it has its frustrations.

life — his daily routine, the texts he studied, the exams he sat, the marks he got, the societies he joined.

His progress through high school was somewhat irregular. He started in third grammar but did so well in the Christmas examinations that in January he was promoted into second grammar and completed two school years in one. In his second year he started in first grammar. In about early February of 1920, when he was playing hockey in an outdoor rink, he froze his ears; his jugular became blocked, and he developed mastoids. The consequences were severe. He was in hospital for a month, down to seventy-three pounds, and was anointed before he recovered. It was the first of three serious hospitalizations that Lonergan was to experience. His mother stayed with him during his time in the hospital.

The scholastics teaching me at Loyola would come and visit me at the hospital, and they thought she was a very holy woman. When she was at school as a girl a nun wanted her to become a nun (Lambert *et al.*, 138).

He missed the rest of the year and thought that his education was finished, but his teacher wrote to his parents that he should return and move up from the high school to the college. This he did and in the following two years completed, without interruption, the college program in humanities and rhetoric.

His religious education during his high school years came out of Deharbe's *Full Catechism*.⁷ In the preface, after outlining the methods of the catechist — the historical, as revelation is in history; the logical, somewhat in the sense of the systematic; and the liturgical — attention is drawn to Augustine's assertion that unless the experience of the love of God in the catechist visibly animates the teaching it will not bear fruit. This echoes Lonergan's later position that theology ought to be, in one of its aspects, an expression of the love of God in the life of the theologian. The catechism opens with a condensed history of revealed

⁷The only version I have been able to consult to date is Joseph Deharbe, SJ, *A Complete Catechism of the Catholic Religion*, translated from the German by Rev. John Fander, sixth American Edition (New York: Schwartz, Kirwin and Fauss, 1908, 1912). The preface remarks that the catechism was first translated into English almost half a century earlier, some time around 1858. The question also arises, Would Lonergan actually have access to texts such as this and the ones mentioned in the next sections? My tacit assumption is that the library of the high school and college would have texts available to be read during the study periods.

religion, from Adam through Moses to Christ, in Christ and in the Church. The relation of the Catholic Church to Protestantism figures strongly. After a brief discussion of faith, its object, and mysteries, the catechism explores the contents of the Apostles' Creed and the Commandments. In dealing with the third article of the creed it introduces the mystery of the Incarnation and the doctrine of one divine Person consisting of two natures. It concludes with sections on grace, the sacraments, and prayer. It offers a very clear definition of actual and sanctifying grace. Actual grace, or the grace of assistance, acts transiently on the soul; sanctifying grace remains habitually in the soul.

In his college years the text was Devivier-Sasia's *Christian Apologetics*.⁸ This work was translated from the sixteenth edition of the French text and published in 1903. It is astonishing to open it and find as the opening phrase "Idea or notion of God." It also contains a definition of religion, a significant discussion of faith and reason, and reflections on Roman Catholicism in relation to the other Churches and culture. Just how alive the issues in these works were for Lonergan is an open question. At the same time in them he would have been introduced to the language of doctrines and of apologetics. That initial familiarity with the language would create a kind of base on which his later theological education would build. Still, it can be asked, do we detect an echo of them in his comments that *Insight* makes a contribution to the Introduction to Theology or, "as it is more commonly named, to Apologetics" (1957: 732)?

In English he studied in successive years Longfellow's *Voices in the Night*, Goldsmith's *Deserted Village*, Scott's *Lady of the Lake*, and Shakespeare's *Merchant of Venice*. He studied Bennett's *Latin Grammar*, Connell's *Greek Grammar*, as well as texts from Cicero, Virgil, Horace, Xenophon, and St. John Chrysostom. In mathematics he studied Hall and Knight's *Algebra and Trigonometry* and Hall and Stephens's *Euclid and Solid Geometry*.

⁸The title of the edition I have consulted is *Christian Apologetics or a Rational Exposition of the Foundations of Faith*, Volumes I and II by W. Devivier, SJ, translated from the 16th edition of the original French — preceded by an introduction on "The Existence and Attributes of God" and a treatise on "The Human Soul; its Liberty, Spirituality, Immortality and Destiny" by L. Peeters, SJ, edited, augmented and adapted to English readers by Joseph C. Sasia, SJ. It was published in San Jose by Popp and Hogan in 1903. It seems that 5,000 copies were printed then. A new edition was brought out in 1924.

For three successive years he studied Betten's two-volume history. The first, *The Ancient World*,⁹ dealt with history up to 800 A.D. Here he was introduced to Greek art and intellectual culture, to the Roman genius at making and ruling an empire, and through it all to the need for a Christian perspective on history. The second volume, *The Modern World*, co-authored by Kaufmann, went from 800 A.D. to the first world war. It dealt with the era of religious unity from Charlemagne through the Crusades up to the Renaissance, and then with the disruption of religious unity in the Reformation, the French Revolution, the Industrial Revolution, and so on, until the outbreak of the first world war. Both volumes were presented as a contribution to a true Christian education.

Loneragan's results were usually in the top three. Brian Hammond, who had to retire later because of ill health, pipped him once or twice. He was known as "brains Lonergan," or "Loneragan of the deep brow." The star pupil of the school at the time, and obviously a person Lonergan looked up to even though he was some years older, was Henry Smeaton.

The question of a religious vocation was on Lonergan's mind for some time during his school years, even before the illness. But the illness and its consequences made him think that he did not have the health. This he found a relief. However the question came back and he made the decision to join the Jesuits on a two-hour tram ride across Montreal on his way to a retreat at Sault (Lambert *et al.*, 131). He found the intervention of God in his life, inviting him to pursue a religious vocation, an experience which generated a certain amount of disturbance, resistance, and even dread.¹⁰ It was a major road taken in his life and one that shaped in its own way the work he would do in philosophy and theology. Another possible road at the time was a career in economics or finance. From an early age he read the stock exchange page in the newspapers, and economics was to remain a life-long interest of his.

⁹Volumes I and II, published by Allyn and Bacon, N.Y. 1916 and 1919 respectively.

¹⁰See Emilie Griffin, *How God Became Real* (New York: Seabury Press, 1979) ch. 1 for an account of the normal response to the intervention of God in a person's life.

Loneragan has stated that during his school and college years in Montreal he was interested in understanding:¹¹

Well I had my idea of what understanding was.

How early?

I had some idea of it going through Loyola. I acquired great respect for intelligence.

The book *Insight* presupposes this interest and respect. It has been my experience that students who come to it without an image of understanding in life situations have great difficulty getting started. He also has a memory of the question *quid sit* being raised, but not explained. In response to a question from Stan Machnik about aesthetic wonder and awe and the fact that he does not seem to incorporate it very fully in his writings, Loneragan replied:

The aesthetic side was my formation at Loyola and within the Juniorate which was all literary, pre-philosophic. I had that formation ... (that was the opening, eh? That had a fuller development later on) ... (O'Hara, 1987: 421).

When asked by Charlotte Tansey if he had any idea of what he would like to study at that time, he said that he did not (Lambert *et al.*, 137). So it seems that at the end of his high school and college days Loneragan did not have an explicit intellectual direction in his life. But he had made the decision to test a possible fundamental option, becoming a Jesuit.

The Novitiate: Guelph 1922-24 — His introduction to Spirituality

He entered the novitiate, situated on a farm on the outskirts of Guelph, Ontario, on July 29, 1922. After his four years at Loyola and his experience there, as a boarder, of the then Jesuit order of life, that aspect of the transition would have been easy. Not so easy would be the transition to an atmosphere in which the central emphasis would be on

¹¹On his schooling see Lambert *et al.*, 131-38. On understanding as an interest, 142. On an early interest in cognitional theory, 49. On his illness, 135-36. On his economic interests and school results, *Compass*, Spring 1985, 4-5. Valentine Rice has accumulated information on his early education.

the development of the religious rather than the intellectual side of the person, to some extent even at the expense of the latter. The basic style of the community was "monastic," it was withdrawn from the world. The novices worked on the farm at certain times. The community followed closely the liturgical seasons of the Church's calendar, listened to never-ending spiritual readings each morning from Rodriguez, learnt practically about religious discipline, self-mortification, and the vows of poverty, chastity, and obedience.¹²

The novice master was Fr. Arthur McCaffray, who was from the New York Province, a man who made a considerable impression on his novices.¹³ He communicated, both in his life and in his talks, the sense of Ignatian detachment, of the human foolishness of the call to follow Christ, and of the need to trust in providence. His style seems pious, dramatic, ascetical, immediate, and charismatic rather than systematic and orderly. The spirituality of the time focused almost exclusively on the persona rather than on the ego. Learning a set of habits through which one participated in the public religious order of the community was central. The inner life was nourished through prayer and devotions, but it does not seem to have been a time when individuals were encouraged to communicate *in any depth* their inner experiences of God's directing presence in their lives and prayer, or any difficulties they were having in those realms. There were, as it has been put, certain things that one did not talk about. We can speculate whether Lonergan's description of the human spirit of inquiry as detached and

¹²According to Harvey Egan, Lonergan grew up with the notion that the superior almost defined your life, told you where to go, what to do, what your life's work was going to be. As his personal dream began to unfold in the mid-thirties this left him with the question, How do you reconcile a personal dream with the role of superiors in your life? He raised the matter in his letter to the provincial in January of 1935 and in his interview with Père Desbuquoix during his tertianship in 1937-38. Some time after he went to Boston College in 1975 he came to the realization (or someone brought it to his attention) that the role of the superior for Ignatius was that of benevolently facilitating the apostolic work which the subject came to be enthusiastically engaged in. This discovery, according to Egan, meant a great deal to Lonergan. It was extremely liberating. The issue was very real for him throughout his life, so it would be extremely interesting to know what precise teaching he got on the matter in the novitiate.

¹³When asked, in an interview with Ray Phelan, SJ in 1973, about his impressions of McCaffray, Lonergan replied with one word: magnificent. It is to my knowledge the only comment he has made on his novicemaster. It is my impression that in that somewhat formal interview he was presenting his persona to the interviewer and answering the questions as a person with his public image ought to. How he felt interiorly about some of the issues raised is another question.

disinterested has Ignatian roots. In his own life there was a belief in providence, even in the providence of books, and he had an attitude of acceptance to the basic circumstances of his life, health, work, and situations that is quite Ignatian, in some instances even excessively so.

Long Retreat

He started his long retreat on Saturday, September 30, 1922 and ended on Monday, November 1. Detailed notes of *most* of the retreat conferences were taken by a second-year novice, James McGarry, and are extant. The first week of the exercises, dealing with sin, was dramatic, even Joycean, to say the least. The second week opened with a meditation on the Kingdom of Christ. It then followed the stories in the gospels of the Incarnation, visitation, nativity, the shepherds and magi, the hidden life and finding in the temple. These led into the central meditation on the Two Standards of good and evil. On page 48 of the notes there is a remark of Roothaan on the two standards:

The primary object of these two meditations is not, specifically, for one contemplating an apostolic life, but is for all people who wish to follow Christ; although Saint Ignatius endeavors to arouse zeal in the person meditating. The application of the meditation on the Two Standards is partly to the intellect, and partly to the will ... ¹⁴

Here we see an appeal to faculty psychology of which Lonergan will later be critical. The meditation on the three degrees of humility is presented as *the highest appeal of the exercises*. On page 51 conversion is defined as "getting a truth, and acting on it with a will."

Having presented the call and the invitation to decision, the retreat exercises continue with a series of meditations on detailed events from the public life of Christ — the baptism, temptations, call of the apostles, our response, the marriage feast at Cana, the death of John the Baptist, the raising of Lazarus, the transfiguration, Christ at Bethany. The meditations of the third week dealt with the passion of our Lord, the washing of the feet, agony in the garden, arrest, fall of Peter, Christ before Herod, before Pilate, Barabbas, scourging, *ecce homo*, and finally the crucifixion. The fourth week presented medita-

¹⁴The notes are available at the Lonergan Research Institute, Toronto.

tions on the appearance to Magdalene, the road to Emmaus. Finally, there was an extended contemplation to obtain divine love which, in its way, balances the dramatics of the first week.

Lonergan took his vows on the feast of St. Ignatius, July 31, 1924. In his later years he considered that the retreat spirituality of the time was not authentically Ignatian, a point which perhaps explains the fact that when he came to write about the relation between decision-making and feelings, he did not turn to the Ignatian models. The Ignatian inspiration was cut off by Roothaan. He wrote a commentary on the Exercises:

and made sure, you know, that it was applying the three powers of the soul: the memory, intellect and the will, the intellect being the faculty of reasoning. It was a rather big block in the spiritual life. It was the reduction of St. Ignatius to decadent conceptualist scholasticism (Lambert *et al.*, 45).

Lonergan seems to have returned to the Ignatian position through Voegelin's treatment of the golden cord in the *Laws*:

The pull of the golden cord doesn't force you; you have to agree, make the decision. But the jerk of the steel chain, that's what upsets you. That viewpoint is Ignatius and it is the whole ascetic tradition of the discernment of spirits (Lambert *et al.*, 22-23).¹⁵

Roothaan's spirituality was a stone that was offered when he was looking for bread. So also was the exhortation to examine one's motives on which he spent much time in the novitiate:

When you learn about divine grace you stop worrying about your motives; somebody else is running the ship. You don't look for reasons why you are doing thus and so (Lambert *et al.*, 145).

In his researches on *Grace and Freedom* he would discover that God is more in control of the human will than the will itself and obviously directs a vocational decision. This accounts for his position that personal motives do not give one the complete picture of the decision making.

In his later reflections Lonergan referred to the religious vocation as fundamentally a grace, as something that we could not

¹⁵For a further discussion of conscience see 155-56.

naturally aspire to, but as a gift, granted like the conversions of Paul and Augustine independent of merit. He also referred to it as an obvious symbol of transcendence.¹⁶ Living the counsels of the religious vocation is a sign of the redemptive presence of God in human lives.

The Juniorate: Guelph 1924-26 — The Second Phase of the Classical Education.

After the novitiate he spent a further two years of study in the juniorate at Guelph. The course in the juniors' diary was called rhetoric, and divided into a first and second year. It involved further study of the classics, Latin and Greek as well as some English and mathematics. His Latin teacher in the first year was Joseph Bergin, SJ, a man who was considered by many to be an unusually gifted teacher. It was said of him that he never read anything without having a pencil in his hand and his goal was to write simply with no redundant words. He was, unfortunately, made vice-rector at the end of Lonergan's first year and could not cope with the administrative pressures. His health broke down to such an extent that he left the juniorate between October and January of the second year. He later became the editor of the *Canadian Messenger*.

Some details of the day-to-day life at that time are to be had in the log. In the first year Lonergan was assigned the task of reading and presenting his work on Plato's *Crito* in Greek. In letters to Henry Smeaton he talks about reading Homer, the *Iliad*, in August of 1925 with great zeal, interest, self-satisfaction. In November he read *Historia Thucydio*. A mathematics class started in February of the next year. During that time Lonergan taught the novices. The two years deepened his grasp of the classics but it was a time when I believe he

¹⁶In *Curiosity at the Centre of One's Life*, p. 391 we find the following. "One of the students was talking to me about one of the professors and said he wished he would not prepare his course on grace so much that he talked too long about it. So I said to him: 'why are you studying theology, why are you in the Society of Jesus?' And he paused. And I said: 'well, do you know?' He said: 'I guess I don't.' And then I said: 'That's God's grace, eh? It is having its effect on you — whether you are fully aware of it or not.'" In the discussion period on religion of his course on method in theology, July 1969, a question arose concerning symbols. It was then asked: Is celibacy a symbol? His answer was: "Celibacy is a witness to the transcendent; isn't it fairly obvious?" On his understanding in the 1940s of the relation between marriage and the religious life see "Finality, Love, Marriage," in *Collection*, p. 52.

lacked a good teacher. On August 30, 1926 in the company of MacGilvray and Phelan he left for philosophy in Heythrop College, Oxfordshire, England. It was to be his first encounter with philosophy and a very decisive experience in the movement of his life, despite the fact that on the two occasions that he mentions philosophy in his letters he suggested that it is bad for one's imagination.¹⁷

HEYTHROP 1926-30 — "Vocation" In My Beginning My End

On August 5, 1926 the Jesuit faculties of philosophy and theology moved from St. Mary's Hall and St. Beunos, to Heythrop College, Chipping Norton, Oxford. It was to a large and extremely remote estate about eighteen miles north of Oxford City. Again it lent itself to a community life style that was "monastic." The three Canadians arrived on September 14, 1926, just over a month after it opened for the first time. For the next three years he would study philosophy, until July 1930, for an external B.A. in London University. His subjects were Latin with Roman history, Greek with Greek history, French, and pure mathematics. The London B.A. effectively completed his classical education. In a rather ironic manner it would also introduce him to John Stuart Mill, this being very much a new beginning. With its sections on Roman and Greek history it continued his education in that subject.¹⁸

His philosophy teachers included Whiteside for logic and epistemology, Bolland for ontology, cosmology, and natural theology, Moncel for psychology (who probably introduced him to the Cartesian *cogito*), and Watt for ethics. Waddington taught him biology, and O'Hara and Irwin prepared him for his London degree in mathematics and classics respectively. Watt published his *Capitalism and Morality* in 1928. O'Hara with Dudley Ward published a book on *Projective Geometry* in 1936.¹⁹ About his teachers he has remarked:

¹⁷Letters of August 5-9, 1925 and June 20, 1927, to Henry Smeaton.

¹⁸From time to time the question, "Why did Caesar's crossing of the Rubicon mean the beginning of the civil war?" appeared on the intermediate Latin and Roman history examination papers, indicating a possible source for the phrase in *Insight*, p. 378.

¹⁹O'Hara taught Lonergan projective geometry. So although the book was published later, it probably is a good guide to the content of the course. In his 1944 manuscript

Whiteside would talk indefinitely on a topic and then he would give us a little dictation to put it all in a nutshell. When on Kant, he said, "Now I don't want you to think you have a refutation of Kant; these are just a few pin pricks, you see." But whatever he said was absolutely true (Lambert *et al.*, 129).

Fr. Bolland complained, while reading Suarez with a magnifying glass, that there are too many books. He didn't want spectacles but he eventually succumbed and got them.

He read his Suarez very faithfully. (And on the feast of St. Thomas he would say the Mass of the feria!) He taught cosmology and natural theology. You have to hold the formal objectivity of color otherwise you can't refute Kant: that was the thesis he was certain was right in cosmology. And the thesis he thought was right in natural theology was the *praedeterminatio physica* (it was wrong, you see). He knew that Vatican Council I had defined the possibility of proving the existence of God but didn't tell us which was the proof that held (Lambert *et al.*, 29).

Lewis Watt introduced Lonergan to what were then the necessary and iron laws of economics. "It would have been sinful to interfere with the Irish famine; that was supply and demand!" So he became interested in moral questions posed by the actual working of an economy (Lambert *et al.*, 30-31). The theme of discerning moral precepts based on the nature of the functioning of the economy itself runs through several major sections of *Caring About Meaning* (30-31, 80-86, 225-26), indicating how this interplay between economics and morality opened up by Watt grew. They also heard a good deal about Marx from him.²⁰

Probably in his third or fourth year he took courses in coordinate and projective geometry from Charles O'Hara, whom he considered quite a pedagogue:

One of his methods was to flag the diagram. Draw a diagram; mark all the values you know on it. You should then be able to see an equation or two equations — whatever you need — and get a solution. Don't learn the

on economics Lonergan for the first time brings in on pages 5-6 the notions of point, line, plane, and surface from projective geometry. These are discussed in O'Hara, *Projective Geometry* (Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1937) 27-28. This illustrates the retentiveness of Lonergan. Questions and points which he grasped at this time remained with him almost for a lifetime.

²⁰Alone of all his Heythrop lecturers, we have a set of notes taken by Maurice Nassen at the actual course he gave to Lonergan. The materialist conception of history and various forms of socialism are considered there.

trigonometrical formula by heart; just flag the diagram and read off the formula. ... Well, with O'Hara it was always insights. He didn't talk about them but that was what he was giving you (Lambert *et al.*, 9).

In other words, what O'Hara was teaching was not rules for answers. Rather he was trying to inculcate in his class something like what Patrick Byrne has called intellectual habits, the habits of questioning, of rearranging the image and of letting the insights emerge.

The London B.A.

In January, 1927 he successfully sat a matriculation examination for London University. After that the question arose, which degree ought he to take? In the summer he wrote to Fr. Fillion asking that the degree be changed to methodology. The methodological horizon at London University at the time was largely defined by Mill, and to a lesser extent by Bradley. Lonergan remarked that it was the only time in his life that he came across a program of study that he really wanted to take. This is a most extraordinary remark. In the whole of the apprenticeship period with which I am dealing this is the only time that he affirmed a personal interest in a course of study. The answer came back, do classics. Later he said he was glad that he did not do methodology at that time.

The London B.A. examination came in two parts, an intermediate and a final. Lonergan sat the intermediate part in either July or November/December of 1927. On my estimation he was rushing it, perhaps because he thought he could get through the whole degree in three years. It seems that in the intermediate examination he had the option of taking mathematics or logic. The syllabus for the logic course included much of the material of methodology. It was almost like a foundation course in that subject. By taking it he could meet some of his own interests in methodology while taking the classics degree. When answering the two three-hour logic papers he gave the examiner his own ideas and the result was a referral. This is not quite the same thing as a failure. Had he failed the paper he would have had to sit all four subjects again. All he had to do was take the logic papers again. Still he was humiliated. Bolland discussed it with Ray Phelan, one of the other Canadian students, and simply decided to let it be. He resat

the examination on July 4, 1928 and thereafter had no further problems with the London B.A.

In the works which he would have read for that examination, Mill's *A System of Logic*, Joseph's *An Introduction to Logic*, Joyce's *Principles of Logic*, and Coffey's *The Science of Logic*, some key elements of the methodological agenda which Lonergan would follow for the rest of his life were, to my mind, established. Under the analysis of formal logic the question of the universal method by means of which the human mind attains the truth in any intellectual discipline was raised. Applied logic or methodology was concerned with particular fields of inquiry. Equally, the questions of causality and system, of chance and probability, of description and explanation, and of the definition of things were on the agenda of the examination. The questions, but not the answers, constituted or defined an agenda for him. So we are faced with the enormous irony that a person whose whole life was devoted to the problem of method was referred in the first and only examination he ever took on the topic of methodology.

Two other formative intellectual experiences were his surd sermon and his reading of Newman's *Grammar of Assent*. Probably on February 16, 1927 Lonergan preached his sermon on the passage in Acts 28:26 which contains the phrase from Isaiah:

Go to this people and say, You will be ever hearing but never understanding: you will be ever seeing but never perceiving. For this people's heart has become calloused: they hardly hear with their ears, and they have closed their eyes. Otherwise they might see with their eyes, hear with their ears, understand with their hearts and turn and I would heal them.

For someone naturally interested in understanding it clearly affirmed the fact of a flight from understanding and its consequences for human living. After he gave the sermon he was told that his approach would confuse the faithful or words to that effect. As he put it, he received a dose of cold water. Despite this the experience awakened him to a question that remained with him for most of his life. How does one approach in human experience the peculiar consequences of the flight from understanding? It is a topic which is taken up in *Grace and Freedom*, in *Insight*, in *Method in Theology* — and even then he said that he had not exhausted the problem (Cahn and Going, 10). The phenomenon is interesting from two standpoints, firstly the issue itself,

and secondly the manner in which it illustrates how Lonergan's psyche was such that at this point in time a seed was sown, an interest was awakened, that would develop for the whole of his life. As we chart the unfolding of his life it is one of several major arteries within it.

If the surd sermon was an experience of a question to be lived, as Rilke would put it, in his encounter with Newman we find him getting a philosophical point clear. Later he will develop and refine the position, but in no way discard it. Lonergan's interest in cognitional theory and his frustrations at its confusions led him simply to pick Newman's *Grammar* off the bookshelves one day. The authors of the day acknowledged various operations of the mind. Frick named them apprehension, judgment, and ratiocination; Coffey, conception, judgment, and reasoning. It seems that it was through the analysis of inference that human understanding was explored. What does it mean to infer something? How do I infer that you are interested or anxious or bored? There were some who held that the only really true knowledge was formal inference, that is, inference derived from self-evident premises by rigorous syllogistic processes. Joseph differed, holding that "We have seen that inferences cannot all be reduced to a small number of fixed types."²¹ They are not all syllogistic, not even all that are deductive. This confusion over the multiplicities of forms of inference could be behind Lonergan's question — Are there laws for everything else in the universe except the human mind? — in *Collection*, page 2. A further question was: Suppose you have inferred something; how do you distinguish between true and false inferences? It was here that Newman came in.

Newman affirmed both informal and formal inference, but distinguished them from assent and the illative sense. He describes the process of arriving at a conclusion as follows:

It is plain that formal logical sequence is not in fact the method by which we are enabled to become certain of what is concrete. And it is equally plain, from what has already been suggested, what the real and necessary method is. It is the accumulation of probabilities, independently of each other, arising out of the nature and circumstances of the particular case which is under review; probabilities too fine to avail separately, too subtle and circuitous to be convertible into syllogisms, too numerous and various for such conversion,

²¹*An Introduction to Logic* (Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1906) 512.

even were they convertible. As a man's portrait differs from a sketch of him, in having, not merely a continuous outline, but all its details filled in, and shades and colors lain on, and harmonized together, such is the multiform and intricate process of ratiocination, necessary for reaching a concrete fact, compared with the rude operation of syllogistic treatment.²²

The use of the word *method* in this excerpt is extremely interesting, being more like a mental habit than a set of rules. As he distinguished the mental power of inferring from the illative sense or power, so also he distinguished an inference from an assent. For Newman the product of inference is always conditional. It never arrives at the truth. The act of assent that proceeds from the illative sense is that which makes this transition.

As apprehension is a concomitant, so inference is ordinarily the antecedent of assent. ... But neither apprehension nor inference interferes with the unconditional character of assent, viewed in itself. ... Assent is in its nature absolute and unconditional, though it cannot be given except under certain conditions. ... How is a conditional acceptance of a proposition — such as an act of inference — able to lead as it does to an unconditional acceptance of it? ... How is it that a proposition which is not, and cannot be, demonstrated, which at the highest can only be proved to be truth-like, not true, such as "I shall die," nevertheless claims and receives our unqualified adhesion. ... and thirdly, of the solution of the apparent inconsistency which is involved in holding that an unconditional acceptance of a proposition can be the result of its conditional verification.²³

For the operation of the illative sense you do not have to know everything about everything. The separation of inference from assent was a significant insight in Newman. This became for Lonergan a kernel around which his later thought grew.

In his exposure to Mill and logic, to the surd, and to Newman certain seeds took root in Lonergan's psyche and remained there growing under the ground. I believe his psyche was such that, intellectually, this exposure made an enormous and lasting impact on him — this, despite the fact that he has reiterated that there was no enthusi-

²²*An Essay in aid of a Grammar of Assent* (Westminster, MD: Christian Classics Inc, 1973) 288. Compare with *Insight*, 174-75.

²³*Grammar of Assent*, 157-58.

asm for philosophy at Heythrop. What he was concerned with was the London B.A.

It was on leaving Heythrop that I was encouraged to think I might work in philosophy. ... I left Heythrop a votary of Newman's and a nominalist. On my departure I had been to see Fr. Bolland to ask him whether I had best devote my future efforts to mathematics or classics. I had done both for an external pass at London: I was obviously cut out to be a student; I could not keep on at both. He raised the question that I might be wanted to teach philosophy or theology; I put the obvious objection of my nominalism, while admitting philosophy to be my fine frenzy. He said no one could remain a nominalist for long. He was right, in a way.²⁴

Lonergan seems to be suggesting here and elsewhere that he had something of the same kind of reaction to his philosophical as to his religious vocation when it first surfaced — to retreat from it. His attitude is frankly ambiguous.

The Thirties — Growth Under the Ground

In his time at Heythrop, Lonergan's intellectual vocation awakened. There were some earlier expressions and interests, but in the movement of his life the time at Heythrop was decisive, even though, like his religious vocation, he resisted it. It seems that fundamental interests were awakened during that time which would unfold and grow throughout his life. The task of the remainder of the paper will be to sketch, on two fronts, the fate of that awakening and the directions it established. Firstly, there was the problem of intellectual nourishment and encouragement. An interest and its related dream are initially vulnerable. They have nothing yet to show. What is required is some further growth and strengths in order for them to become an effective force in his life. Secondly, there is the parallel problem of navigating the situation in the world in which the

²⁴The first line of the quote is from "Insight Revisited," in *A Second Collection* (London: Darton, Longmans and Todd, 1974) 264. It underlines the point of being encouraged to think about a career in theology or philosophy. The second part of the quote is from a letter to the provincial in January 1935 and underlines that he was cut out to be a student but favored classics or mathematics over philosophy, his fine frenzy, at that time for the reasons given.

awakened interest finds itself. For such an awakened interest has to navigate a cast whose attitudes could promote or hinder it.

A good deal of the considerations to follow will be concerned with the manner in which Loneragan's awakening interest interacted with the cast of his life up to the point when the dream became incarnate in decisions to embark on the twofold project of the *Verbum* articles in 1943, and the book *Insight* in 1946. How did the seed grow and mature through his regency — teaching at Loyola Montreal for three years, his theology studies in Rome from 1933 until 1937, tertianship in Amiens, and finally his doctorate in theology in the Gregorian? All of these periods are parts of the process; they have their place and significance within it.

The Depression 1930-33 — Regency at Loyola Montreal

In the first three years of the decade Loneragan was a teacher in the college program at Loyola Montreal:

I was busy you know. My first year at Loyola I taught Latin, Greek, French and English and had the College debating society, the newsletter and the annual review (Lambert *et al.*, 32).

He taught humanities to the first arts stream. In his second year he also lectured in mathematics and mechanics. One of his pupils was Eric Kierans, later to become a well-known figure in Canadian politics and a cabinet member in the Trudeau government until he resigned in 1971. He and Loneragan were to become lifelong friends.²⁵ Teaching at Loyola was a total immersion experience. Others who shared the experience remarked that they liked it, but that it left little room for anything else and that there was a limit to the amount of it you could take. Loneragan was helped by the fact of once being a pupil at the college. He knew the ropes. Also the daily routine had hardly changed since he was there, although the curriculum was shifting from classics to courses aimed at medicine, law, and science. Only in 1943 would it break out of the horizon of the classics and inaugurate a full science program.

²⁵See Jamie Swift, *Odd Man Out, The Life and Times of Eric Kierans* (Vancouver and Toronto: Douglas and McIntyre, 1988) 13f.

Despite this total immersion he managed to find time to pursue some of his personal intellectual interests. The industrial world was in the throes of the depression at the time and his response was to attempt to understand, on a theoretical level, what was happening to the economy. So he studied social credit, the teaching of Major Douglas. It pointed to the permanent differential C between the wages A paid to workers, and the prices B charged by entrepreneurs, in the equation $B - A = C$. Because there was never enough money in an economy to buy all the goods manufactured, there was something akin to a permanent brake at work. So there began a fourteen-year study of the economy. He would return to the question again in 1978. He also read Christopher Dawson's *The Age of the Gods*, which broke him out of his classical horizon. It was, I believe, a move in the direction of emergent probability.

Second Year Teaching

During his second year he had some kind of confrontation with the rector, Thomas MacMahon. He was a man who had the reputation of being something of a sergeant major, and of meddling in other people's work. Although the details are unclear, it was probably related to observance of the daily order. The consequences for Lonergan were that his departure to theology, which ought to have been in the summer of 1932, was delayed a year. This could not have been a pleasant experience for him at the time, although later he seemed to think that the extra year was beneficial. Frederick Crowe comments on:

his difficulties in Regency (a run-in with the Rector, a resulting delay in theology — plus the departure from the Society of two close friends), of making his decision anew, so it seems, and the way he lived up to it.²⁶

In a letter of 1935 he would refer to this time as “years of painful introversion,” a time when he felt he could not explain himself and was being called to sacrifice his real interests. It is clear that Lonergan

²⁶Upper Canada (Jesuit) Province, *Newsletter* 60/3 (May-June 1985) 15-18. The remark is on page 18.

underwent something of a vocational crisis in his second year in Loyola.

Despite this, towards the end of his teaching years it seems he read J.A. Stewart, *Plato's Doctrine of Ideas*. Stewart, with his emphasis on verifying in one's own experience what Plato meant by an idea, could have been a steppingstone in the development of self-appropriation. What he also discovered in that book, through Stewart's discussion of the definition of the circle, was the mediating role of understanding in defining. Until you understand, have an insight, you can't define. When understanding has occurred it is easy to define. That was a big breakthrough and probably ended his nominalism. The definition is not simply verbal. Rather it articulates what the insight has grasped about the object of inquiry.

During the summer after he finished teaching at Loyola and before he began his theology he read Augustine's early dialogues at Cassiciacum. He put together a 25,000-word essay on the act of faith and gave it to his friend, Henry Smeaton. Smeaton's positive response was very encouraging. After Augustine he read some of Aquinas. Charlotte Tansey asked him what he was planning to do with his life at this time. Did he have an aim (Lambert *et al.*, 8-9)? From his answer it appears that he did not. Probably the delay in his theology had unnerved him a bit. The situation was soon to change dramatically.

Theology — I will favor you in Rome

In the fall of 1933 Lonergan started his theology in the College of the Immaculate Conception, Montreal. Some time after this he read Hoenen's first article. Here the manner in which insight abstracts a nexus of terms and relations from the diagram was outlined.²⁷ In 1928 Lonergan had recognized the importance of the diagram for inferring. But Hoenen's emphasis on understanding abstracting a nexus of terms and relations from the image, taken in conjunction with his grasp of the mediating role of understanding in defining were further

²⁷The article was initially published in June 1933, so it would not have arrived in Montreal until at least September. Lonergan mentions the term "nexus" in a letter of January 1935, so his reading of Hoenen can be dated between September 1933 and January 1935.

developments. Together they all began to add up. It seems that in and through the personal darkness the seed was growing.

Shortly after he began theology, news was received from Rome that because three scholastics from the Slav assistancy were not coming further places were available for Canadians. The provincial immediately set off for Montreal, and interviewed Lonergan among others.

At this juncture Fr. Hingston paid a flying visit to the Immaculate where I had begun my theology. I was to go to Rome. I was to do a biennium in philosophy. He put the question, Was I orthodox? I told him I was but also that I thought a lot. I was beginning to go into detail and happened to ask if I was making myself clear. He said he considered I had already answered the question sufficiently. Probably my profession of faith had impressed him; in any case I knew the futility of trying to express myself and so I allowed the matter to remain there. You see I had been completely elated at the prospect of going to Rome. I had regarded myself as one condemned to sacrifice his real interests and, in general, to be suspected and to get into trouble for things I could not help and could not explain. Here was a magnificent vote of confidence which, combined with the great encouragement I had had from Fr. Smeaton after years of painful introversion and with the words over the high altar in the church of St. Ignatius here "*Romae vobis propitius ero*," was consolation indeed.²⁸

The remark about thinking a lot is, I believe, a window on Lonergan's interiority. There is a certain humor in it, but we must see beyond that. The result of the visit was that three Canadian scholastics, including Lonergan, set sail immediately for Rome. Hingston at the time considered Lonergan to be brilliantly clever. He discussed his specializing in fundamental theology which he thought was much to Lonergan's liking. As the quotation above makes clear, Lonergan, at the time, was of the impression that he had been assigned to specialize in epistemology.

The move to Rome was a considerable steppingstone, a turning point in Lonergan's career, both intellectually and personally. It left behind the difficulties he had experienced during his regency in Montreal and restored his confidence. It completely elated him. With his background in Roman history he must have found the City fasci-

²⁸ Letter to the provincial, January 1935, 3-4.

nating. Once he got used to the way of proceeding, Lonergan went from strength to strength. There is no doubt that this move to Rome was an intersection which had repercussions on the whole course of events in his life. Had he remained in Montreal for theology, his life would have taken a totally different course.

The details of his theology studies can be followed in the *Liber Annualis* of the Gregorian University. In his first year Lonergan was in a class of just over 300 first-year students. Fundamental theology was taught by Tromp, using his texts, *De Revelatione Christiana* and *De Sacrae Scripturae Inspiratione*. The course *de ecclesia* was taught by Timotheus Zapelena using *De Ecclesia Christi*. One of his letters to Henry Smeaton at the time is illuminating. About the examinations in these subjects he remarks:

I believe that *De Ecclesia* is paired off with *De Inspiratione* while *De Revelatione* goes with the "New Testament Criticism." The last named is simple stuff if you have a memory like Macauley and can trot out all the Fathers who allude to or cite the gospel, how many times; or what is the internal evidence that a Jew, familiar with the geography of Palestine, the political condition there in 29 A.D., the religion of Israel, etc. etc. wrote the last Gospel. Or who was Mark and why was he or was he not the same as John Mark? Or what about the synoptic question? etc. etc. The maddening part is that you may cram all this up cold and go in and be asked to explain the difference between papyrus and vellum, and then tell the names, description, content, history, etc., of the more famous codices. Imagine getting up to the 28th Canon of Chalcedon and the significance of Osius being "head man" at Nicea and so far from having a chance to display your knowledge, coming a cropper over the long speeches in St. John.²⁹

Moral theology was taught by Arthurus Vermeersch in three parts, the first containing human acts, law, and conscience and the second the theological virtues of faith, hope, and charity, while the third part, by Ulpianus Lopez, on moral virtues, was concerned mainly with justice. The text was Vermeersch, *Theologia Moralis*. He also studied canon law with Ioannes Grasso — the nature of the Church, of Church and state, and the like. Finally there was a course on Church history and patrology. This was a two-year cycle, one year dealing with early history, the second with recent. In 1933 it was the second part,

²⁹Letter number 11 to Henry Smeaton, May 9, 1934, p. 7.

recent history, taught by Robert Leiber and it dealt with (I) Boniface to the Reformation and (II) the Reformation and Restoration, Luther, Calvin, Henry VIII, and the Council of Trent, up to 1648. The third part (each part took about six weeks) dealt with political questions such as the relation of the Church to revolution, liberalism, nationalism, socialism, and bolshevism. It also dealt with the Church in America, Latin America, and Asia. This seems to have been one of the few courses in Rome for which Lonergan kept his lecture notes, again an interesting indicator of personal interest in the subject.

*The Letter of January 1935*³⁰

In January of his second year Lonergan wrote a most significant letter to his provincial. On matters of deep interiority he always was a very private person. This being the case the content of the letter echoes unendingly in the mind of the reader. It amounts, actually, to a fundamental confessional statement as to where he stood on his life's work at that time. It was a letter he had great difficulty writing, discarding a number of versions, and completing the written version as a last measure.

After some introductory remarks about his own books — they included four texts of Plato, two of Aristotle, the writings of Shakespeare, Thucydides, Tacitus, Aeschylus, and Pindar with translations, translated sections of Plotinus, a Greek New Testament, and Italian and German dictionaries — and the manner in which his smoking eased his nerves — until his lung operation in 1965 he was a heavy smoker — he comes to the point. He affirms that he has been assigned to the project of teaching philosophy, in fact epistemology. That assignment requires that he communicate a problem he perceives, and some elements of his personal vision or dream expressive of his desire. His problem is that he considers the current interpretations of Aquinas to be misinterpretations. He is out of step with what he finds in the schools. Granted that he had been assigned to philosophy, it is obvious

³⁰The eight-page typed letter was dated January 22, 1935, sent from Via del Seminario, 120 Roma, 119. My previous two short quotations from the letter were published with the permission of Frederick Crowe who is taking steps to publish it in its entirety.

that he almost felt obliged in conscience to communicate this fact. Secondly, as he recognizes his unfolding dream and the work it will involve, he acknowledges that he needs help and advice in understanding the providential role which superiors are to play in it all.

The letter recalls the elements of his philosophical history, his Heythrop days, his reading of Newman, Stewart, and Augustine. It outlines the meeting with Hingston in Montreal after which he was sent to Rome. Next it takes up current Thomist cognitional theory. In his critique of it Lonergan mentions Marechal, refers to "seeing the nexus," a phrase that rings of Hoenen, the Cartesian *cogito*, agent and possible intellect, illumination of the phantasm — again echoes of Hoenen's paper. He also talks about going into his experience to discover what Aquinas is talking about, which is suggestive of self-appropriation. In all of this he finds himself out of step with current Thomist cognitional theory, which is really a form of sense knowledge and cannot explain "seeing the nexus."

Having outlined his differences with the Thomists on intellect, he moves on to new applications. Here it is his dream to put together a Thomistic metaphysics of history that will put Marx and Hegel into the shade. In his outline of that project he draws on all stages of his education in history — Loyola, London, Dawson, and the courses on Church history in the Gregorian. In a recently discovered text, written around this time, entitled *Panton Anakephalaiosis* (Lonergan, 1991), on the "drawing of all things together" in a new head, Lonergan expresses his thoughts on a metaphysics of solidarity. What the Church needs to develop is a *Summa Sociologica* in order to challenge the Marxist materialist conception of history and its realization in bolshevism. Christianity has to articulate its understanding of the presence of Christ in history.

This leads, in the letter, into a discussion of the relations between Augustine and Aquinas on intellect and faith. In the course of this he refers to Suarez and the Spaniards and their naive realism. Substance for them was "something there." It is perhaps one of the first intimations of his work on "the already out there now real" and its relation to things or substances. Having argued his case he states his support for Leo XIII's position on the *vetera* and the *nova*. He acknowledges that he does not know much about modern philosophy, and that

to attack the problem of method in philosophy would be a grand-scale operation calling for a couple of volumes.

The letter concludes with an affirmation that he is at home with his Jesuit vocation. He believes the project he has outlined in the letter to be his work. The further question is simply, Should the matter be left to providence, or does providence intend that superiors are to be conscious agents in bringing to completion what has already started? It is clear from the letter that a most remarkable transformation had taken place in Lonergan between finishing his work at Loyola, in the summer of 1933, and January of 1935. The move to Rome had unblocked the movement of the inner processes. Between about 1932 and 1935 the desires that had awakened in Heythrop passed through a depression and then flowered into a life dream. What is not yet on his agenda, as it could not be at this stage, is the problem of method in theology.

During the academic year 1934-35 Lonergan studied the doctrine of the Trinity and learned about processions, relations, persons, and missions in God, topics that he in turn would teach and rework. In the following year he took a significant course from Bernard Leeming, SJ on dogmatic theology, including *De Verbo Incarnato*. Leeming convinced him that in Christ there was only a single act of existence and so only a single person in two natures. There is not a human person in Christ. Again, in his own teaching he would build on and develop this insight. He was ordained on July 23, 1936. He finished the pre-doctoral phase of his theology studies a year later. Taken with his later doctorate, I believe they stand in just as significant a relationship with *Method in Theology* as his philosophy studies at Heythrop and London University stand to *Insight*.

Tertianship and Doctorate — The Forces of Destiny

Lonergan went to the Abbaye St-Acheul in Amiens in the fall of 1937 to do his tertianship. The tertian instructor was Père Leontius Aurel. There were twenty-three tertians, including the later well-known tertian director, Paul Kennedy. According to Kennedy, he went to the tertianship in Amiens because unlike Paray-le-Monial, where the ethos was ascetical and austere and the emphasis was on the

tertian doing it, at Amiens the ethos was mystical — the emphasis was on God doing the work! Aurel looked austere, but was admirable and spoke French very well. He came from a distinguished line; his instructor, who was also the rector of the house, was Père Pouillet, author of a spiritual dictionary. His instructor, in turn, was Père de Maumigny, who had written books on prayer. Lonergan, to my knowledge, never mentioned Aurel by name. It would turn out to be one of his most practical and pastoral years in the Society. Before going there, he travelled a bit:

That was the summer of 1937, when I finished theology in Rome and had three days in Florence. People who had been in theology with me were doing their tertianship and they took me everywhere — to places you wouldn't see otherwise. In a room at the Pitti Palace, the Raphaels! (Lambert *et al.*, 223).

This points to the question, How did the total experience of Europe between 1933 and 1940, with its sinister darkness, influence Lonergan's world view and philosophy? He was by this time fluent in both Italian and German. In the essay "Insight Revisited" (Lonergan, 1974: 263-78) he refers to work he did during his tertianship on the philosophy of history. In the extant texts we find him exploring the "why," the explanation of history. His categories include the ideal line of progress, decline, renaissance, and the multiple dialectic. It is groundwork for chapter 7 of *Insight*.

According to Kennedy the thirty-day retreat began early, within two weeks after their arrival in the house. As in the novitiate it was a classical preached retreat, involving three and sometimes four conferences each day. Lonergan must have been impressed by the experience because his notebook survives; it would only have survived all those years if he thought highly of it. As the tertians were recently ordained priests, there is a strong theme of priesthood in these notes. The talks were aimed at the existential issues involved in the fundamental option of the newly ordained Jesuit priests. They go round and round the fundamental reality of God's invitation in our lives, both to the religious life and to the priesthood, and our response in faith. The parallels between Christ and the world and the priest and the world are set forth.

In the second week the image of the rich young man is developed, and the religious life put forward as a series of invitations.

Priesthood is a grace. In the Old Testament humility, submission, and obedience were central. In the New Testament love of invitation — not of law but rather of response to the invitation “follow me” — is central. The three degrees of humility are related to three choices of vocation — of the rich young man, of the one who responds “let me bury my father,” and of the apostles. Kennedy remembered walking along the banks of the Somme at one time during the year with Lonergan who was trying to explain the three degrees of humility in terms of symbolic logic! As well as invitation, there is also mission. The Church ought not to neglect the foreign missions. In this dual emphasis on an interior call and an external mission there is a basis for uniting the religious persona and ego.

The remarks on faith in the notebook are quite striking, given Lonergan’s later position in *Method in Theology*. As the apostles, so we have to have our faith nurtured: “I believe, help my unbelief.”

Faith is the difference between a saint and ordinary Christians. *Saints see the things of God*. The Curé D’Ars said our prayer was to talk to God as one would to any man, be saturated in God, speak of God naturally, spontaneously, whole-heartedly, men expect it of you — and it makes a terrifically good impression.³¹

The third week centered on the Eucharist. The faithful are interested in the Mass, glad to hear it explained, told how to assist at it. The remarks here are somewhat ironical, given Lonergan’s comments of the low level of faith and participation in the Eucharist in the region of the Somme. Finally, love consists in deeds rather than in words, in mutual communication of “good.” God’s love is his desire to find himself in us; he inhabits, transforms, and finds in us the image of himself.

The house in Amiens had an enormous library of books on theology and spirituality. Outside lecturers were frequently invited in, including, according to Kennedy, de Lubac. As part of the program after Easter in 1938, he was sent for a week to Paris to the *Ecole sociale populaire* at Vanves to listen to four leaders each day speaking about specialized movements in Catholic Action:

The founder of the school and still its Rector, Père Desbuquoix, had built the school in the teeth of great opposition, and had obtained the money to pay the

³¹Page 31, paragraph 18.3 of the Notebook.

workmen in the same last-minute style as that narrated by Teresa of Avila in her account of her foundations. He was a man I felt I must consult, for I had little hope of explaining to my superiors what I wished to do and of persuading them to allow me to do it. So I obtained an appointment, and when the time came, I asked him how one reconciled obedience with initiative in the Society. He looked me over and said: "Go ahead and do it. If superiors do not stop you, that is obedience. If they do stop you, stop and that is obedience." The advice is hardly very exciting today but at the time it was for me a great relief (Loneragan, 1974: 265).

Taken with his concluding remarks in his letter to Henry Keane in January 1935 on the same topic, this acquires deeper significance. The problem of the providential role of his superiors in the unfolding of his academic vocation was there for Loneragan. Both these texts bring it out.

A First Throw of the Dice

Towards the end of his tertianship, the Jesuit general Fr. Ledochowski was holding a special congregation in Rome. He invited the assembled provincials to donate men to the Gregorian University. The Upper Canadian provincial of the time, Henry Keane, donated Loneragan, who was informed of this at the end of the tertianship and told to do a biennium in philosophy (1974: 266). With this apparently settled, he left Amiens, and during the summer did a certain amount of practical work.

On August 10, 1938, Loneragan wrote a letter from Milltown Park, Dublin, to his provincial. He was on his way to direct a retreat at the Loreto Convent in Wexford and spent some time preparing the notes for the conferences. The letter is extremely interesting for in it he clearly states that for him the philosophy of history is of major importance and would make an excellent topic for a biennium:

As philosophy of history is as yet not recognized as the essential branch of philosophy that it is, I hardly expect to have it assigned me as my subject during the biennium. I wish to ask your approval for maintaining my interest in it, profiting by such opportunities as may crop up, and in general devoting to it such time as I prudently judge can be spared.

In his letter of January 1935, Lonergan says that he had been assigned to the field of epistemology. So there is a question about what field of philosophy he was being directed towards at the time. The letter of 1938 ends with a remark about his mother in light of the fact that she was ill and he was not to return to Canada: "I had a splendid letter from my mother the other day, and that pulls a cloud out of the sky."

A Second Throw of the Dice

On July 20, shortly before Lonergan had written that letter, Vincent McCormick, rector of the Gregorian, wrote to the provincial thanking him for the donation that the Canadian Province had made of Lonergan to the work of the Gregorian. The letter continued:

Fr. Lonergan has left a splendid record behind him here; and we shall be happy to see him back for further studies. I would suggest — supposing his own preferences are not too strong for one field rather than the other — that he devote himself to Theology. In that Faculty there are hundreds of English-speaking students, who will be needing his help in the future. At present there is only one English-speaking professor in the Faculty.

In September Lonergan received a letter from Fr. McCormick containing this information. Later in the same year he was informed that he was to begin teaching theology, not at the Gregorian, but at the Immaculate Conception in Montreal (1974: 266).

The letters make poignant Lonergan's remarks about the role of superiors in the providential unfolding of the life of a Jesuit. Neither this decision nor the decision concerning the actual topic of his thesis was in his own hands. And yet both had enormous and, in some ways, extremely positive long-term implications for the later unfolding of his life. For instance, had Lonergan continued in philosophy it is extremely doubtful if he would ever have written a book about the method of theology. The fact that at the very last moment, so to speak, after being pointed in the direction of philosophy Lonergan was shifted to theology, probably meant that from now on the actual question of the method of theology would begin to become real for him. As long as he was being pointed in the direction of philosophy, I doubt if the question of method in theology was on his agenda at all. Also, being moved from Rome to

Montreal had its own considerable consequences in the leisure it allowed him for his researches.

His Doctorate — A Third Throw of the Dice

During his year in France, 1937-38, Lonergan had asked who would be a good director in Rome, and been told: Boyer. Why? He's intelligent. And the grounds for that view? He's able to change, as he did on the question of the real distinction between essence and existence.³²

Anyone who was capable of such a change of mind, Lonergan felt, ought to be good. About his thesis experience he has said:

I had a good thesis because Charles Boyer said to me: "There's this article in the *Summa* and I don't think the Molinists interpret it correctly; and I don't think the Banesianes interpret it correctly. Find out what it means."

In his account of the meeting in his thesis defense notes, Boyer invited him to study parallel uses and historical sources in the texts to see what light he could shed on the question.³³ Boyer, not Lonergan, seems to have chosen the topic and issued the basic directions. Like almost every other major decision in his life in the thirties, it was made for him, although, as we shall see later, given the nature of Lonergan's quest Boyer dealt him an unusually good hand of cards. A significant passage in the *Summa theologiae*, I-II, q. 111, a. 2 reads:

As was said above, grace can be understood in two senses. Firstly, as the divine assistance by which God moves us to will and do good; secondly, as the habitual gift implanted in us by God. In both these senses grace is satisfactorily divided into operative and cooperative grace.

The basic question which Boyer put to Lonergan was, What is the meaning of this article? The thesis topic was approved on December 6, 1938 under the title, "A history of St. Thomas' thought on operative

³²From a conversation with Fred Lawrence, December 7, 1984; see note 9 of Frederick Crowe's remarks on the preface and introduction to the thesis in *METHOD: Journal of Lonergan Studies* 3/2 (1985). Later, in a letter of 1945, he would remark that Boyer could not answer the questions he put to him, so he directed himself.

³³See O'Hara, 1987: 375-76. Lonergan also recounts the story in his defense notes, p. 15. These are in the Toronto archives.

grace." As such it was not concerned with theological dogmas but rather with charting the *history* of a *speculative movement* in systematic theology. It was a study of an intellectual development. Because there were conflicting interpretations of the passage it also involved an element of dialectic. The problem of method in theology, of distinguishing different methods within the task, was an inevitable part of the task. The thesis could be considered a significant steppingstone on the road to *Method in Theology*. An abbreviated version was later published with the title *Grace and Freedom*, indicating that related to the development on operative grace was a linked question: How does divine grace as operative and cooperative respect and preserve the freedom of the human will? The theological content of the thesis is considerable!

The Death of his Parents — February 1940

It was while he was working on his doctorate in Rome that his mother died in Canada. He had been in Rome for almost six years, and had requested permission to return to Canada the previous summer to visit her, knowing that she was not well. But the permission had not been granted. Later he recalled the experience in a letter to Frederick Crowe of December 21, 1976, at the time of the death of his mother:

The death of your mother keeps reminding me of the death of mine. It was in February 1940. I had been in Europe since 1933. Fr. Vincent McCormick, Rector of the Gregorian broke the news to me. He did it very nicely but I did not speak for three days. I guess I was in a minor state of shock. Well that was 36 years ago. I was 72 the other day.

Lonergan's mother died of severe cancer. According to Ann Lonergan, Mark's wife, the tumors seriously disfigured her body. Lonergan wrote home to his father at the time advising against an operation. The letter arrived too late and she died after the surgery. Mark wrote a moving letter to his two Jesuit brothers describing her last moments. Later, when we have to evaluate Lonergan's own response to the news that he himself had cancer, the fate of his mother and his response to it will take on further significance. His father died shortly after.

Midway through the biennium war had broken out. Lonergan had finished his dissertation before the violence of May 1940 and was assigned an early date for his defence, but had to leave Rome two days before it was due and arrived in New York on the *Conti di Savoia* on May 24. It was the last boat to leave Rome. From there he went to his teaching assignment at the College of the Immaculate Conception, Montreal.³⁴ He would not defend it until May 1943, some time after a large part of it had been published in *Theological Studies*. Because of the war the degree itself was not awarded until 1946/7, almost nine years after he registered for it.

B. LONERGAN'S APPRENTICESHIP: THE TRANSITION FROM THE WAY DOWN TO THE WAY UP

Montreal 1940-47 — The Golden Cord

In September 1940 Lonergan started his teaching as a professor of dogmatic theology at the College of the Immaculate Conception in Montreal. In his first year he taught the sacraments in general and baptism and confirmation in particular; in his second year, orders, extreme unction, and marriage, as well as operative grace and action in Aquinas. It was not until about 1945, when he moved into courses such as *de Deo Trino*, and in the following year, grace, for which he wrote "De Ente Supernaturali" as a supplement, that he found himself teaching courses in which he had a personal interest. His teaching focus in theology took some time to take shape. He taught Christology for the first time in 1948.

There would follow, between 1940 and about 1946, a time of sifting, almost of intellectual browsing, of letting the various themes in his then polyphonic consciousness play their melody for a time until, eventually, the dominant ones, those indicating the direction of the pull of the golden cord in his life would emerge and find their place. In Heythrop, Mill and Newman had opened up the methodological agenda. In 1930 the experience of the Depression started him on a

³⁴See "A Note on Lonergan's Dissertation" in *METHOD: Journal of Lonergan Studies* 3/2 (1985) 2.

fourteen-year study of economics. During his theology studies in Rome he became interested in the philosophy and metaphysics of history. Under the impression that his future was in epistemology he was concerned with the misinterpretations of Aquinas in that field. His undergraduate and doctoral studies in theology put the question of method in theology into play. What is interesting in retrospect is the length of time involved in coming to the basic decisions. He simply did not start at once on the *Verbum* articles and *Insight*. It took time, three and six years, for the decisions to form. Granted that, the situation at the Immaculate was very much in his favor.

Professors of theology were supposed to write; unless they did, and published, the Seminary would lose its power to confer ecclesiastical degrees, so you had a hold on them. Our Province had started Philosophy about 1930; nine years later, the Provincial wrote to Rome to ask about giving ecclesiastical degrees. The answer came back from the General, "Your professors don't write." So the Provincial came down and said to the professors, "Write." And they said, "If you are going to write, you need a library." That was news to him, you see. He said, "Well, get a library," and after the war they did (Lambert, *et al.*, 158).

Accordingly, in order to follow the directive, the professors had quite a small teaching load for a considerable number of years. The imperative was to write and it came at exactly the right time. Almost for the first time in his life, Lonergan had considerable leisure time to pursue his own interests, even to browse. After a decade of having decisions made for him it is now very interesting to follow the unfolding of his own agenda under his own direction.

The Thesis

One of his first tasks had to do with publishing sections of his doctoral thesis. "*Theological Studies* had just been founded and a friend who knew the editor let me know that copy would be welcome. So I rewrote my dissertation and the result was accepted" (1974: 266).³⁵ The early publication date, 1941-42, indicates that this must have been one of Lonergan's top priorities during his first year. It also

³⁵Lonergan wrote six articles of twenty-five pages, but *Theological Studies* published only the first two and the last two (as one article), one in 1941 and three in 1942; see Lambert *et al.*, 93.

must have been good for his confidence. After he had published the selections he was examined for the thesis by his own faculty in Montreal on June 6, 1943. For this defense he prepared a most elaborate set of notes, running to twenty-two pages of single-spaced typing. After an introductory address they went through the object of the dissertation, the state of the question when Aquinas began writing, the principal stages in the evolution of his thought on divine providence, the principal elements in the theory of operation, the main stages in the evolution of the notion of liberty, habitual grace as operative and cooperative, actual grace as operative and cooperative, and the aim of the dissertation, reviewing its origins in Boyer's remark on the text in the *Summa*. His aggregate mark turned out to be a 9. In December 1946 he forwarded to the Gregorian the required number of offprints of the final article from *Theological Studies*. This met the publication requirement. The actual degree was awarded in the year 1946-47.

Between 1940 and 1944 Lonergan's personal agenda seems to have unfolded on three fronts: the philosophy of history, economic theory, and "Finality, Love, Marriage." During his tertianship year of 1937-38 he worked on texts entitled "Analytic Concept of History." Those texts, which contain references to Dawson and Marx, dealt with the ideal line of history, with progress and decline, and with dialectic. The treatment in them of grace and history reminds me of the passage in *Insight*, page 742 on Christianity and history, on a historical collaboration in the face of the problem of evil. It is one thing to recognize on the level of ideas the problem of evil and a possible solution; it is another to identify and collaborate with its presence in history. Lonergan's Christology, had it been forthcoming, would not, I speculate, have been concerned so much with the Jesus of history in Palestine as with the directing presence of Christ in the historical process.

His reading of Toynbee continues that interest. About it he has remarked:

When I was teaching at the Immaculate Conception I read the first six volumes of Toynbee's *A Study of History* in the long winter evenings. (Jim Shaw used to procure them from the McGill Library for me. ... Toynbee writes in beautiful English. He is a magnificent phrase maker; you know: "challenge and response," ... all the headings he has. And then his appendices ... He is a mine of information (Lambert *et al.*, 88-89).

According to Jack Belair, in the summer of 1942 Lonergan procured his own set of the six volumes of Toynbee, as well as four of Sorokin. So I would date his first reading of Toynbee in the fall of 1941. Toynbee was, I believe, very important for Lonergan. He would figure in both *Insight* and *Method in Theology*. Here again we see his unfolding interest in history and culture expanding. Toynbee's books raised the question, What is a civilization? From that they went on to explore the genesis, development, expansion, disintegration, collapse, and breakdown of the civilizations of the world. Volumes I and II explore the nature of challenge and response of a host of civilizations to their specific environment. Volume III introduces the notion of withdrawal and return as a creative force. Up to volume VI the problem of disintegration is explored, using notions such as schism and palingenesis. From page 278 of volume VI *the rhythm of disintegration* is explored in a variety of cultures. This notion of rhythm will be taken up by Lonergan in his first typescript on economics. There is a rhythm of both growth and disintegration.

In 1942 he produced his first substantial text on economic theory, entitled "For a New Political Economy." The occurrence of the term "political economy" in the title is most interesting, linking his work with some of the classical authors. It is probable that he got his knowledge of that field from his reading of Heinrich Pesch's *Lehrbuch der Nationalökonomie*, on which he made notes. The three interrelated questions on the nature of economic production, of exchange, and of finance, are all present. Interesting is the fact that he views that work on economics as concerned with the liberation of the higher processes of culture and civilization from an almost mechanical knot on the economic level.

After completing this text, between 1942 and 1944 he seems to have read the works of major economists including Robbins, Knight, Schumpeter, Hayek, Ross, Lindahl, and Pesch. I believe that he came across Schumpeter's *Business Cycles* quite late in the day, perhaps as he was completing the 1944 text. He tried out the 1944 text on some economists, but the response made it clear to him that he was at a dead end at the time:

PL: Why did you leave your paper aside and unpublished?

BL: Economists didn't make head or tail of it. I didn't want to publish a dead fish. ...

PL: You consulted economists?

BL: Yes, I had consulted a fellow who was in charge of the Tax Foundation in Canada. (He was predicting what the budget would be. Chartered accountants and corporation lawyers established the Tax Foundation so that they would have an independent opinion on what taxes were needed. ...) He was in contact with a professor at McGill about the manuscript. I got no encouragement from anyone I showed it to in '44. ...

PL: So you put it aside?

BL: Until I saw that there was room for it. If you publish a book and no one understands it and it doesn't sell — ? (It will be almost impossible to get it published in any case.) (Lambert *et al.*, 182).

Lonergan had been working on this question since 1930. It is clear that between 1942 and 1944 his work went through some kind of a flowering. What might be the significance of his insights at the time has yet to be established.

Finality, Love, Marriage

In the work on history and economics there was developing an image for the question about the intelligibility of world order. During his second year at the Immaculate he taught a course on marriage. He invited the class to study the positive part in the moral books and then concentrated on the ideas that appeared in his essay on "Finality, Love, Marriage." It deals with the question about the relations of the biological level of life, constituted among other things by sexuality and reproduction, with the psychological and intellectual level characterized by friendship and understanding, and with the level of God's grace. There he effectively adds the biological process of evolution to the historical processes discussed by Toynbee and Dawson. Shull, quoted in the essay, could have been his link between natural and life science, on the one hand, and history and culture on the other in the build up towards emergent probability. In response to related essays debating the ends of marriage, Rome issued a stricture. Lonergan dropped the topic.

The 'Verbum' Decision of 1943

These developments bring us to the verge of major life decisions in the realm of his work. Lonergan's interest in cognitional theory developed in 1926. From 1930 economic theory was on his agenda. The philosophy of history became an interest during his theology studies in Rome, although he did recognize the problem of the misinterpretation of Aquinas on knowing. From about 1935 on these three interests were in some form of competitive interaction. The economics did not get anywhere. The theory and philosophy of history generated the background for emergent probability and chapter 6 of *Insight*. But in another sense they were put on hold. An early table of contents of *Insight* had a chapter entitled "The Structure of History."³⁶ In 1938, through his doctoral work, he would have encountered Aquinas on a serious scholarly level for the first time. Out of the interplay he came, so it seems, in 1943 to make the decision that would direct the course of his life for the next six or even ten years. Interesting here is the question, To what extent at the time was it some intimation of the problem of method in theology that caused him to move in this direction? *Insight* was written as a preparation for that study. What about the *Verbum* articles?

About that decision he has said:

In 1933 I had been much struck by an article of Peter Hoenen's in *Gregorianum* arguing that intellect abstracted from phantasm not only terms but also the nexus between them. He held that that certainly was the view of Cajetan and probably of Aquinas. Later he returned to the topic, arguing first that Scholastic philosophy was in need of a theory of geometrical knowledge, and secondly producing various geometrical illustrations such as the Moebius strip that fitted in very well with his view that not only terms but also nexus were abstracted from phantasm. (5) So about 1943 I began collecting materials for an account of Aquinas' views of understanding and inner word. ... The basic point was that Aquinas attributed the key role in cognitional theory not to inner words, concepts, but to acts of understanding. Hoenen's point that intellect abstracted both terms and nexus from the phantasm was regarded as Scotist language. ... Aquinas held that intellect abstracted from phantasm a preconceptual form or species of *quod quid erat*

³⁶See *Bulletin of the Lonergan Research Institute*, no. 1 (November 1986) 3.

esse, whence both terms and nexus were inwardly spoken (Lonergan, 1974: 266-67).³⁷

It is interesting how this particular decision emerges out of the range of interests which Lonergan's life has exhibited up to this point. His interests in economics and history illustrate a very deep-rooted desire to enter into and resolve the deepest problems of the century. Yet instead of entering into them directly he seems to withdraw into the problems of a remote place and time. Why this decision? Was it a withdrawal after the fashion of Toynbee to think things out at a fundamental level with a view to then returning, properly equipped, to deal with the present? Or was the decision simply dictated by a process of elimination?

The *Insight* decision flowed out of the *Verbum* decision. In 1940, when Lonergan was teaching at the Immaculate, Eric O'Connor began teaching at Loyola and was having difficulty. He and Lonergan discussed the difficulties. Thus began a relationship that was to be extremely fertile and supportive. As Lonergan says:

The result was that I had an expert mathematician who also knew his physics (during the Second World War he helped out at McGill University and taught quantum theory there) whom I could consult when writing the earlier chapters of *Insight* (1974: 267).

O'Connor was one of the founders of the Thomas More Institute in Montreal. He invited Lonergan to give a course in its opening year. The response encouraged him to think a book such as *Insight* was a possibility:³⁸

³⁷See also Lambert *et al.*, 11 for his further remarks on Hoenen; 21 for remarks on his two massive dissertations on Aquinas.

³⁸"Thought and Reality" is the title of chapter 15 of Bradley's *Appearance and Reality*. This raises the question, Did Bradley influence Lonergan at all? There is a strong resemblance between many of the chapter headings in *Insight* and *Appearance and Reality*. On the negative side is the fact that when I framed a question which was put to him at a Workshop in Boston College about a possible connection between the chapter headings, he denied an influence. On the positive side is the fact that a library card from the Regis library at the time exists for the book with a single name on it — Lonergan. Equally in his bibliography file in the Toronto archives there is a card typed by him listing *Appearance and Reality*, *Ethical Studies*, *Truth and Reality*, and *The Principles of Logic*.

Another factor was that a group of Montrealers, including Fr. O'Connor, founded the Thomas More Institute for Adult Education after the end of the war in 1945. I gave a course there on *Thought and Reality*. In September there were about forty-five students coming; at Easter there were still forty-one students coming. It seemed clear that I had a marketable product not only because of the notable perseverance of the class but also from the interest that lit up their faces and from such more palpable incidents as a girl marching in at the beginning of a class, giving my desk a resounding whack with her hand, and saying, "I've got it." Those who have struggled with *Insight* will know what she meant (1974: 268).

It seems that at Easter 1946 the decision to go ahead with the project that would result in *Insight* took some more or less tentative shape. Those who were present testify that very many of the ideas that were to appear in *Insight* were presented in that course.³⁹

So it was that Lonergan's long apprenticeship came to an end. Two major decisions that would shape the works of his maturity and prepare the ground for *Method in Theology* had been made. How they later unfolded is another chapter in the story. Equally between about 1945 and 1948 his teaching focus in theology on the courses on the Trinity and the Incarnation began to take shape. Directions were established which would continue in his teaching until 1965. These too would make their own contribution to the story of *Method in Theology*.

³⁹A reportatio of this course by O'Hara is available at Lonergan Centers. It will be published in the *Collected Works*.

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MISSION AND SPIRIT: QUESTIONS OF PROBABILITY AND PROVIDENCE

Philip McShane

It is not irrelevant that I wrote this short comment in the Radcliffe Science Library in Oxford. I went to Oxford in May, and will return there in July, primarily to try to revisit seriously and creatively, Proust-fashion, two areas of personal quest. In the mid-fifties, as a graduate in theoretical physics, I had struggled with the quantum-dynamical circumincessions of the fundamental particles. In the early sixties, as undergraduate in theology, I struggled with the analogically-remote circumincession of the fundamental Persons. In neither struggle was I overly successful, though my Trinitarian effort reached publication in *Theological Studies* in 1962: a sign, perhaps, of the low standards prevailing in the queen of the sciences.¹

My revisit soon revealed one major fact: whereas in particle physics there had been a massively challenging change of context,² in

¹Not entirely a joke. John Courtney Murray, then editor of *Theological Studies*, read "The Contemporary Thomism of Bernard Lonergan" (published later in *Philosophical Studies*, Ireland, 1962), considered it unsuited to *T.S.*, but suggested a presentation of the achievement of Lonergan's *Verbum* articles (*T.S.* 1946-1949). I was in first-year theology at the time, suffering the cultural shock of moving from a lectureship in mathematical science to the commonsense eclecticism of theology in Dublin. I doubt if Murray was aware of my undergraduate status. But the point is, I was doing something as an undergraduate in theology that couldn't possibly occur in the mathematical physics of the time: it brings out concretely a central point of this brief paper.

²That no change can be communicated unless the reader can work from an analogue in some world of theory, is a point recognized by few theologians and not all physicists (even Einstein). It is worth noting, however, that "popularization" or summary is, so to speak, in the I of the beholder. So, a recent popular account by R.P. Creason and C.L. Mann of modern particle theory (mainly of the work of Sheldon Glashow), "How the Universe Works," *Atlantic Monthly*, August, 1984, pp. 66-93, could be significantly enlightening to someone competent in group

Trinitarian theology people in systematics muddled along in myth and rhetoric³ much as they had been doing in the mid-sixties, or should I say the mid-fourteenth century? Blackwell's bookstore, where, providentially, physics and theology are on the same floor, was helpful here. Relevant stuff in physics on Lie Groups was beautifully incomprehensible, whereas theology was as readable as ever, and I found a 1988 book on the Most Holy Trinity which was both readable and representatively confused.⁴ My two challenges, then, take on quite different characters. In physics I must drive on well beyond my graduate texts; in theology I return to old and neglected undergraduate texts. But more on this in the conclusion.

Let me now turn to the text before us, "Mission and the Spirit." When I discovered in April that this was the text for the Lonergan Workshop, I mused over the aim and possibilities of our meeting. I was eventually led to put the problem in the context of the discussion of expression and interpretation of *Insight*.⁵

Let us consider *Insight* as the relevant expression. Let me suppose, then, that "Mission and the Spirit" is the corresponding simple interpretation. Is the Workshop to be a set of reflective interpretations? Does its goal include the ambitioning of a universal view-

theory and quantum physics. Parallels can be drawn with "Mission and the Spirit."

*[Quotations in the text, mainly from *De Deo Trino II. Pars Systematica*, and in footnotes, are given by page numbers, followed by line numbers in smaller print.]

³Lonergan opposes rhetoric to system in *De Deo Trino II* (1964) 78, 2-6; 91, 24. His view of system there (*DDT*, 7-64) does not express the rich development of his thinking on genetic systematics during the previous decade; *Method in Theology* (1972) even less so. Contemporary rhetoric magnificently, and regularly neurotically, cloaks both "the vast arid wastes of theological controversy" (*MIT*, 343) and the backwardness of subject "busy concealing the fact from themselves" (*Third Collection*, 1985: 133). What is communally needed is a functional specialist investigation leading to a genetic systematics of genera, species, and varieties of progressive speech. The present essay speaks to a more proximate solitary searching of "self-taste" (*Third Collection*: 132).

⁴John O'Donnell's (1988) book, *The Mystery of the Triune God* moves truncatedly from an eclectic selective discussion of antinomies to rhetorical appeals to Barth, Rahner, and so on. This may seem harsh, but I am thinking of the impossibility of of a parallel in serious physics: there, one must cope adequately with the best efforts, in any language, in the field. In later theology, casual selectivity and truncation will have increased probabilities of exclusion through the implementation of *Method in Theology*, p. 250

⁵Lonergan, *Insight*, 562, line 14; 563, 15.

point? Can our efforts envisage mythic components of, e.g. and so on, and so on.

Now, of course, "Mission and the Spirit" is not a simple interpretation: A_1 and A_{ms} are not identical. One can put $A_{ms} = A_1 + dA$, where dA is not infinitesimal: it includes twenty years of Lonergan's intellectual growth as well as the explication of faith-elements of the concluding eighty heuristic pages of *Insight*⁶ already present in Lonergan's fifty-year-old viewpoint. Indeed, on a proper view of generalized intellectual growth one may claim dA to be much larger than A .

The problem may be put in homely fashion considering maps, map-reading, and journeying. While in Oxford I used a three-part map: an inner-city map; a full-city map which included the inner section reduced in scale; and an Oxfordshire map in which the town of Oxford was an interesting identifiable blob. The shrinkage of Oxford in the second map, or, further, to an identifiable blob does not, clearly, make the journey to the Bodleian Library any shorter. I will not draw out the parallel, but it may not be too outrageous to suggest that "Mission and the Spirit" is an interesting identifiable blob.

What, then, can we do? My task today, with Pat Byrne, is to shed some guiding light on the meaning of probability and providence. I will do that first by noting the significance of the word "guiding." The central element in the principal insight communicated by both *Insight* and "Mission and the Spirit" is an invitation to prolonged contemporary exercises in generalized empirical method. But "Mission and the Spirit" requires that the exercises be enlarged by a context of faith. That enlarged context and the relevant exercises are my immediate interest here.

The additional context for adequately grasping the meaning of both "Mission" and "Spirit" is conveniently expressed in the 151 central pages (65-215) of *De Deo Trino, II: Pars Systematica* (Lonergan, 1964). One must note here that the meaning of "Mission" and "Spirit" in this new context is no more evident than the meaning of "color"

⁶I am counting here precisely from p. 669 to the conclusion of the Epilogue. There are many intriguing parallels between *Insight* chapter XIX and Thomas's *Pars Prima*. One may, for instance, compare Thomas's questions 3-26 with the elaboration of the hypothesis of chapter XIX, section 9. While Thomas moves, in question 27, to the hypothesis of intelligible emanations, Lonergan moves to verification: he might well have moved in another direction, "in the twenty-seventh place ..."

and “spin” in the context of Quantum Chromodynamics. And one might enlarge that reflection to consider that the achievement of the functional speciality, communications, is not some mythic return to common meaning, but the final fruition of an eight-fold climb to remote theological meaning.

This additional context is the result of cleansing contemplative prayer. Lonergan in “Mission and the Spirit” (1985: 27) recalls *theoria* as naming contemplative prayer in the Greek patristic tradition. Here I posit it as a foundational stance, magnificently evidenced in Lonergan’s expression of the challenge of moving towards a fruitful understanding of the eternal reality of providence, of conceiving the Christian Divinity. I can only give hints to his pointers, misprints.

One is seeking to appreciate, systematically and lovingly, the personality patterns of one’s loving appreciation of an infinite, totally mysterious, befriending: a primary befriending in being inseparable from an absolutely supernatural befriending. But the focus of that search, in the relevant four chapters of *De Deo Trino*, is on the circumincessional inner Divine Friendship — not then on God as creator or on God as lover of all, but on God constituted eternally as Three (DDT: 91, 3-10), and we glimpse that autonomy (90, 9-29), not in searching our practicality or our love of knowledge, but in so far as we struggle to grasp, conceive, and accept our own autonomous self-conceiving, self-projecting, self-electing, here-and-now to be such or so (90, 30 to 91, 2). It is, then, a deeply prudent taking into possession, into procession, of self-procession, “within the position”⁷ in the dark light of faith. Insofar as one initiates this “taking into possession” then one may move from the reality of being an image of God out of the divine intention, to being an image of God out of one’s own intention (202, 26-29). The move is frail: it has the frailty of analogical understanding; it has the frailty of unholiness; it has the frailty of virtuality, heuristicality, beginnings (70, 4; 87, 6; 89, 11; 155, 23-26; 245, 31-32). So, we make a beginning of intelligibly (94, 18-20) speaking our inner word of the circumincessional Divine Word and holily

⁷This is by no means easy. One is gracefully invited to go beyond “startling strangeness” (Insight: xxii; new editions, xxix) to a Proustian remembering, “membering,” (“the Bridge of Bones”), all this “a sheer leap into the void for the existential subject” (Insight: 539). On the difficulty of reaching the initial strangeness, see McShane, 1978.

spirating our participative (235, 2-10, 27-28; 237, 1) loving of the circumin-
 cessional Divine Spirit (256, 1-3). But the inner word discerningly
 sublated in Faith to the factual status of accepted image is of oneself in
 one's unintelligent and dishonest heuristic normativity. That intimate
 reality demands an ongoing vortex-transformation of the exist-
 ential subject, ranging from the private whirlpooling of inner
 dreams (Adler, 1961) to the communal vortex of differentiated func-
 tional specialization.⁸ However, our present focus is on the spiral of
 graceful theoretic interiority⁹ and its proportionate spiration. That,
 then, to which the reduplicative meaning reaches is a procession from
 infinite understanding of its possibilities and achievements and a
 procession of necessary infinite honesty (183, 29-34). In our concep-
 tion we speak of primary and secondary components of the idea of
 being, and relations of creation,¹⁰ their grasp being mediated to us by
 world process: and now, perhaps, we can glimpse more clearly the
 meaning of the first sentence of "Mission and the Spirit": "man's ...
 self-understanding has to be not only of himself but also of his
 world."¹¹ As the procession of the world is from the understanding of
 creatures (107-109; 182, 20-26; 196, 11-19), so our processing word is called to
 be, and this call becomes luminous to us "*quatenus fit vera sui sibi
 manifestatio et honesta sui acceptatio*" (200, 3-4), where the *sui* is of the
 existential self, self-processing, and the *manifestatio* is the inner
 word of this concrete self-processing. The manifestation can be
 concrete, symbolic, rhetorical, as in reflections of spontaneous sanc-
 tity; or it can be technical, exact, systematic (200, 4-9). The general faithful
 require that the divine persons to which they speak be conscious
 and distinct: the theologian is called to conceive and spirate of
 this consciousness with clarity, as friend and befriended, not un-
 worthy servant (161, 9-13; 50, 13-28), not living in the "sin of backward-
 ness ... of the individuals that fail to live on the level of their times".¹²
 So, the theologian's *Contemplatio ad Amorem Obtinendam* cannot

⁸It is useful to put *Method in Theology*, p. 144, line 27 to p. 145 line 2 into the general context of the communal second time of the temporal subject (*De Deo Trino*, II, 200, lines 10-14).

⁹*Insight*, lines 35-38 on both pp. 186 and 625.

¹⁰*Ibid.*, chapter XIX, sections 4-8 and p. 660, 19 to 669, 14.

¹¹*Third Collection*, p. 23. *De Deo Trino*, II, 201, lines 1-5.

¹²Lonergan, *Third Collection*, "Dialectic of Authority," p. 8.

remain in the symbolic comfort of an already-out-there or in-here or Totally-other: it must move slowly, over the years, spiral-“wise,” vortex-wise, among the creatures that are beings of theoretic meaning, finding a deeper if colder beauty in the theory of emergent probability than in the evolutionary description of the hovering hummingbird. And the cultivation of the inner word of leptons and quarks can surely have a significance *ut ad invisibilium amorem rapiamur*? Only by such struggles can one reach, in a manner that is theologically adequate for our time, the meaning of probability and of Trinitarian providence, and, in so doing, personally give the universe a unity of its finality, the glory of the unity of one intelligent view.¹³

Finally, it seems to me that this core Trinitarian struggle must be a daily reaching, homely yet elitist (Lonergan, 1972: 14, 350-51), Christocentric as we walk the ball of the earth in air breathed by God. But I would emphasize that the daily reaching is not some strange religious piety: such reaching is no stranger to creative people in the world of science, and such scientific procedure is a natural analogue for the process of grasping Eternal Process. So, I return to my initial reflections.

As I pattered through books in the Radcliffe Science Library, I was pleasantly surprised to come across the unmistakable name, Lochlann O’Raifeartaigh, of my graduate colleague in mathematical physics. His article, on “Broken Symmetry” (1968), was worlds away from the quantum electrodynamics that we studied in 1956. In the years between, and since, he has moved laboriously forward, in continuous and discontinuous transpositions of the best available views in the field. He is committed to thinking systematically, honestly, critically; he has no commitment to popularization. His commitment to thinking about the fundamental particles seems to me to be of a different caliber from that of many Christian theologians’ commitment to thinking about the fundamental Persons. Can it be permanently true, beyond the scope, then, of the emergent probability of Cosmopolis, that the children of this world are wiser than the children of light?

Perhaps, as Joan Robinson (1973) wrote a decade or so ago, in a creative attempt at a new undergraduate text in economics, it is time

¹³*Insight*, p. 250, 11. 33-34; also the conclusion of the “Preface” to McShane, 1985.

to start over. Perhaps what we need is some solid undergraduate contemplation. I have to hand two neglected undergraduate texts: Thomas's *Summa Theologiae* (specifically, QQ. 27 ff.) and, of course, Lonergan's *De Deo Trino, II: Pars Systematica*. As I worked on the latter book during my stay in Oxford, I began to think of its possibilities as a new book *Book of Common Prayer*. At present, obviously, it is a book of uncommon prayer. Yet a Trinitarian community of theologians, as such and so beyond community of Faith, requires that the unique analogue for the Christian God (*DDT*, II, 86-92; I, 276-298) that is each of us, in our opaque, intelligible proceedings, become an object of lonely contemplation. This requirement of freedom falls under emergent probability¹⁴ and Trinitarian providence.

¹⁴Here I make no attempt to comment creatively on Lonergan's views of probability or emergence. In the text of "Mission and the Spirit," p. 25, he draws attention to theorems of Bernoulli and Laplace, showing his continued interest in problems of empirical reference, problems that led him to modify the text of *Insight*, p. 66 lines 24 to p. 67 line 2, for the second edition. The theorems are at the origin of the twentieth-century development of Central Limit Theorems dealing with questions of the convergence of probability distribution functions.

Chapter 8 of my *Randomness, Statistics and Emergence* (1971) is a lengthy comment on the modified text of *Insight* as throwing light on such a development and its flaws. There is a variety of less subtle flaws in contemporary theory on probability. Chapter 4 of *Randomness* deals with a common mistake, of both ordinary usage and textbooks, of applying probabilities to singular instances. Chapter 11 focuses on concrete schemes (actual, and realizable), substructures of assemblies, as relevant heuristic units (instead of, for example, genes or gene-pools) for a statistics of emergence or survival. And so on. Lonergan's subtle and unique aggreformic and statistical emergentism has so far had little impact on a scientific community naively and implicitly committed to reductionist conceptualism. Lonergan's own references (see note 3, "Mission and the Spirit") remain the primary source of light on the subject, but they are all too easily read within the truncated contemporary perspective or without the mental exercises of statistical theory, etc., etc.

Which, of course, brings us back, Finnegans: Wake!—"wise," to the beginning: or should we go further and gracefully recognize *Insight* itself as an interesting blob, a condensed map of a genius-climb of twenty-eight years?

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LONERGAN AND RICOEUR: EMERGING COMPLEMENTARY PHILOSOPHICAL APPROACHES FOR THEOLOGICAL VIEWS OF SCIENCE

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1. CONTEXT

In a highly illuminating essay, Matthew Lamb (1985) has delineated in a remarkably concise fashion the status of the current issues involved in the encounter between philosophy of science and theology. Into the domains both of the philosophy of science and of theology, hermeneutics, with its "primary interpretative concerns of historical consciousness" (1985: 71), has made irreversible incursions.

In the domain of philosophy of science the name of Thomas Kuhn continues to run like a thread through most of its internal debates, from the time of his famous *Structures of Scientific Revolutions* to the present (Hacking, 1986; Byrne, 1984). Kuhn's approach, characterized by Lamb as an "historiography of science" (1985: 44, 88), has been instrumental in introducing the hermeneutical concerns within the philosophies of science.

Coupled with the work of Polanyi and Toulmin, Kuhn is a major reference in the debates which have witnessed, on the one hand, the collapse within philosophies of science of positivism and logical empiricism (Lamb, 1985: 74-76) and, on the other hand, an "emerging consensus" within philosophies of science that the fundamental dichotomy between objectivity and subjectivity is illusory. This has resulted in nothing less than a major crisis on the status of scientific rationality and the nature of its "objectivity."

The shift from "deductivist ideals" in philosophies of science to the recognition of "paradigm analysis" (1985: 76, 82) has reconfigured the debates and their representative groupings of scholars (critical

rationalists and epistemological anarchists) which increasingly must come to identify, understand, and resolve, according to Lamb, the fundamental dichotomy that has given birth to this crisis and which, unless resolved, remains the major obstacle to development within the domain of the philosophy of science.

Lamb argues that the root of this fundamental dichotomy is the "modern dichotomy between subjectivity and objectivity" (1985: 75), an inheritance of the earlier questionable assumption that the presence of subjectivity within an account of rationality weakens, taints, compromises the higher ideals of true knowledge, which at one time were identified with the desire to foster "the formally logical, ahistorical procedures of 'pure objectivity' or 'pure reason'" (1985: 75) — in short, neutral objectivism.

The more promising efforts for disengaging philosophy of science from its crises which have led to developments in philosophies of science (1985: 76, 77; Van den Hengel, 1987) appear to remain with those who have moved from an attempt to theorize about theories, to an attempt to identify the "heuristic performances" and "praxis of theorizing." The praxis of conversations, "the exercise of continually asking further relevant questions," and with this a sharper attention to the "communities of enquiring scientists" (1985: 80, 82), is quickly redefining for philosophies of science new criteria of objectivity, criteria that recognize the role of subjectivity and ideology.

Lamb maintains, however, that to date success remains limited and fragmentary. Praxis, as a hermeneutical heuristic, must still face questions of truth and freedom. The praxis of conversation, the ideal of the hermeneutical approach, does not go forward unimpaired. "Reason is not an automatically guaranteed process" (83). Questions and conversations are capable of being systematically suppressed, if not distorted. In short, the praxis of theorizing takes place in concrete subjects, communities, and institutions governed by specific values and interests.

Lamb calls, therefore, for a complement to hermeneutics, namely, dialectics. He writes that the "crises attendant upon the pluralism of reason are actually crises of the subjects and institutions of reason" (89-90).

What role does theology play in all this? Lamb identifies two current tendencies. One is associated with Pannenberg and Tracy

and strives "to complement paradigm analysis with philosophical hermeneutics." The second, with which Lamb identifies his own efforts, is associated with Peukert. It appeals to theories of communication that take up within themselves theories of science (1985: 71).

The present article aims to delineate another possible tendency. I wish to point to an emerging complementarity that can take shape by drawing on the works of Lonergan and Ricoeur, and to show how a complementarity shaped by the combined resources of these works can make specific contributions to the dialogue between science and faith.

Its specific merits are that it enables us, *first*, to highlight more sharply a number of basic issues; *second*, to differentiate specific intelligibilities which help us understand what emphases are associated with what kind of issues and what sort of contexts must be identified within which certain issues and problematics surface; and *finally*, to identify different heuristics with which more profitably we might anticipate where possible solutions may emerge, given specific questions and their appropriate contexts.

At the outset, our study supports one of Lamb's essential insights, namely, that the dichotomy between subjectivity and objectivity needs to be rethought by working from a level of interpretation that precedes the dualism of our notions of subject and object. A correct and more profitable reconstruction would need to show how neither subjectivity nor objectivity can be understood without the insight into truth and its reality that each brings to the other. As Lonergan often said: objectivity is genuine subjectivity. A recognition of subjectivity is not the weakness but the strength of a notion of objectivity (Byrne, 1981b).

This being said, however, I believe a more detailed study will show that the full meaning of this new interpretation can make significant inroads into the current debates. We shall clarify this in a preliminary way, by referring to the two orientations identified by Lamb.

The first trend

Let us first make a point concerning the theories of communication and dialectics which have transformed and educated our thinking on praxis. There is no doubt that Lamb is right. Social policies and prevailing forms of social communication affect knowledge (88). Even within these schemes, however, scientists can come to know what is true about the world in which we live. This does not imply that knowledge is automatic, or that it is purely the result of routinely applying some method for obtaining knowledge (Ricoeur, 1974: 13, 15).

But, the history of philosophies of science has progressively shown that wide-ranging transformations in intellectual intelligibilities, the major moments of which are the illuminations of insight and inverse insight, make up the recurrent undercurrent of the foundations of the scientific revolution (Butterfield, 1957).¹ The intelligibility of this history has been identified more clearly in Lonergan's understanding of intellectual conversion; it continues to guide us in comprehending why what we call knowledge is knowledge and what we call true is truth. The turn to the subject as the foundational moment of intellectual conversion has brought into the light of day the self-corrective procedures of cognitive operations.

In an earlier article (Pambrun, 1987), I mentioned that we can move too quickly from hermeneutics to praxis. Referring to the qualifications provided by Lamb, I would now say that we can move too quickly from praxis — understood as the “hermeneutical inroads in the philosophy of science” (Lamb: 74) — to dialectics. Why is this so? For the simple reason that given even distorted communication and suppressed questions, a scientist still knows *qua* scientist something that is factually true.

There is an opportunity at this point to address what Lamb has highlighted as a dichotomy at the basis of contemporary crises, namely, the dichotomy between subjectivity and objectivity. I believe

¹It is interesting to compare the historical studies on the revolution in science by Butterfield (1957) and the recent work by I. Bernard Cohen (1985). On this, see the review by Hacking (1986).

Lonergan's work in *Insight* and the structure of cognitional operations still can shed new light on this.²

The second trend

We now turn to the second trend in theology that Lamb has identified. I do not think, when it comes to science and meaning, that it is a question of simply taking explanation up within understanding (Pannenberg, 1976: 216-224). It is, rather, a question of taking both explanation and understanding up within a process of interpretation whose two distinct poles, one methodic, the other non-methodic, consist of explanation and understanding (Ricoeur, 1978a:165).

It seems to me that one of the salutary features of Ricoeur's approach is to interrupt hermeneutics in its natural inclination towards praxis (dialectics) and to pay attention at the level of truth statements to the gains of explanation. Explanation bears predicative force in the process of interpretation as a process of self-understanding (Ricoeur, 1983: 194-197). Here again, despite social ideology, science makes a claim as a self-correcting procedure and moment on our way to correct interpretation. In this regard, I believe that Lonergan's understanding of intellectual conversion is complemented by Ricoeur's dialectic of explanation and understanding.

The work of both Ricoeur and Lonergan contributes to the shaping of a heuristic of complementary intelligibilities. I believe that this heuristic can demonstrate not only how social dialectics can liberate the research traditions of natural science, but also, and even perhaps more, how it has been and is the self-corrective cognitional operations of science in its desire to know the physical world that can lead to a moral conversion and the transformation of culture toward the good (Lawrence, 1986: 134-135; Pannenberg, 1976: 219).³

²Given both Lamb's and Byrne's debt to the work of Lonergan, their quite different emphases on the question of natural science are quite striking. See Lamb, 1985, and Byrne, 1981a, 1981b, 1984.

³ I think it is important to mention the book by Mary Gerhart and Allan Russell (1984). This book is noteworthy in that it not only is an interdisciplinary endeavor (Gerhart, Religious Studies; Russell, Physics), but also draws on the contributions of Lonergan and Ricoeur. While in many ways I support this orientation, I still have some reservations on the application of some terms, and on what I view to be

The present essay is a more detailed elaboration of why I see that complementarity to be emerging. I believe that there is truth in what Lamb says about the crises of subjects and their institutions. I do not think, however, that the intelligibility of this truth is best considered within a question of science as such; I think it is a question of our social imagination. In the given contexts of our questions, this refers more to the question of technology than it does to the question of science. In saying this I would not imply that technology is separate from science, or that science does not bear certain technological consequences. Indeed one of the major features of the contemporary profile of science and technology is that whereas at one time the technician's role was quite separate from the scientist's, today, given the nature of modern tools, the scientist is also a technician. This is nowhere more evident than in the area of computer technology. Nonetheless, for the purposes of understanding the issues of our debates, I believe it is still vital to maintain a working distinction between science and technology.⁴ I believe that the question of the social imaginary, posed as it is in terms of social praxis, belongs to the realm of intelligibilities associated with technology and not necessarily with science as such, that is, as a cognitively accountable methodological foundation of knowledge.

As a result, we must re-define not only the meaning of technology (which I do not intend to do here), but also the manner in which we speak of conversion in the philosophy of science — which I propose to look at here. I shall attempt to give an account of my judgment by following the insights of Lonergan and Ricoeur, in three steps. The first consists of their identification of major shortcomings at the epistemological level, and of how these obstruct a view of what science knows. Secondly, I shall elaborate their own reconstructions, one *via* cognitional structure and judgment, the other *via* language and imagination. In the third step, I shall attempt a critical assessment of their contributions, *via* a critical reading of one by the other.

important distinctions yet to be made, especially concerning the appeal to transcendence and the relationship between model and metaphor.

⁴I find a good aid in formulating such a distinction to be the work of Paul Ricoeur on social imagination (e.g. 1978b; 1979b; 1985) and Heidegger's reflections on science and technology (1967; 1977).

2. AGENDAS

It is important to keep in mind the particular agendas in view of which each considers the question of science. In view of developing both a metaphysics (Lonergan, 1957: xix, xxvii) and a method for theology Lonergan addresses the issue of cognitional structure. The axis which holds the structure and complex of cognitional operations together is intentionality, which is grounded in an unrestricted desire to know being. On this point, the point of whether we can say what is, Lonergan will underline what he considers to be the major obstacles to partial truths, if not contradictions, in modern views of knowing, modern theories that have made us suspicious, in a climate of pluralism and dialectics, of knowing what is real, or better, knowing the real.

The consequences even for science are far-reaching, for we may note the recent shift in philosophy of science from what can be proved to what remains falsifiable. Ingrained in these hermeneutical transformations of the attitudes within modern science is a deep-seated suspicion of being able to know what is true, of judging "this is so." It is Lonergan's view that were this suspicion indeed true, nothing less than the collapse of any action, any communication, any progress, and indeed any possibility of authentic subjectivity, would be the result. The cause of this disease, however, is obvious and a cure is available.

For Lonergan the symptoms are naive realism and idealism: the *virus* is a common sense as the foundation of knowledge, according to which knowing is a question of looking or seeing better. A partial truth is involved here, in that as sentient beings we first attend to things insofar as they make an impression on our senses. It is one thing to experience something, and in perception intuit an idea of it. It is another thing, however, to say that this is knowing it. This view of knowing as perception often implies another error, one linked to our commonsense notion of a subject-object dichotomy. In this error it is assumed that what I (the subject-already-in-here-now) strive to know as object, is already-out-there-now; and that knowledge

is somehow a cumulative gain of all details concerning that already-out-there-now object that I perceive.

For Lonergan, even Kant was inhibited, in the long run, by assuming as fact this subject-object split. Even if what could be known could be known only inasmuch as it conformed to the *a priori* capacities of the subject to know, Kant fell prey to remaining at the level of a phenomenalism since his categories of subjective intentionality could never *in fact* reach the object. In confronting Kant, however, Lonergan did not seek to reject him, but rather to develop and complete his turn to the subject. By attending to ourselves as knowers, and to the data of our consciousness and the cognitive operations comprised in the act of knowing, Lonergan believed that more could be said and that judgment could receive its due. But as long as we labor under the prejudice that knowing is looking, we fail to attend to basic facts which show that knowing is otherwise. Knowledge is not the result of looking; it is a result of experiencing, understanding, and judging.

Ricoeur's agenda is quite different from Lonergan's; nonetheless his account of the major obstacles inherent in modern epistemology is remarkably similar. Ricoeur's remarks on science as explanation are taken up with the objectives of the hermeneutical enterprise. In large part, the focus of this enterprise is, in line with Gadamer's own orientation, a practical philosophy (Gadamer, 1981a; 1981b), a philosophy of human action and self-understanding (Ricoeur, 1974; 1981: 39; 1983). Ricoeur has made his own the Heideggerian insight according to which understanding is rooted in our participation in life and in our practical orientations, already characterized by social and cultural traditions, in the world. A hermeneutics, therefore, not only elaborates our participation in the depth structures of life but also investigates the resources available to us by which we are able to make our own the surplus of meaning and the possibilities of life as a task of self-understanding. Implied in this is a fundamental relationship to the good (Gadamer) or a wager on behalf of the superabundance of hope (Ricoeur). Finally, it should be noted in this regard that because of hermeneutic's affinity with a philosophy of participation and human action, it bears a specific, albeit qualified, relationship with political philosophies and theologies (Lawrence, 1981; Ricoeur, 1985c).

Breaking away from the tradition of idealism and its implied immediacy of the subject to itself in acts of consciousness, Ricoeur, like Gadamer, has turned to language, and with this to our social and cultural objectifications, as the medium of self-understanding. Without going into all the reasons for this choice, I should indicate that a turn to language is effected in the confidence of the creative as well as revelatory thrust of language.

The most powerful instance of this creative power of language is the metaphor.⁵ As a strategy of language, metaphor is a means towards a creative and participative assimilation of Reality. The heuristic and methodical insights into the metaphorizing strategy are tied to an understanding of imagination. It is within the context of the relationship of imagination to metaphor that Ricoeur addresses science, whose correlative creative strategy is not metaphor but model. I think it is important to underline the shift here from metaphor to model. For Ricoeur, it is model that is the heuristic device (Ricoeur, 1979: 141) that corresponds to the intelligibilities of the natural sciences. While model is spoken of by Ricoeur within the larger understanding of how metaphor is a strategy of language, nonetheless model remains a distinct heuristic device (Ricoeur, 1976: 66).

In this context Ricoeur's work has often alluded to that of Mary Hesse and the predicative capacity of model to grasp within science the process of the logic of discovery. As with Lonergan's notion of judgment, however, Ricoeur's appropriation of model in order to disclose a truth of science is a hard-won gain, given the prevailing prejudices concerning image and imagination.

The full meaning of model in science and therefore a crucial feature of epistemology of science can only be realized if a fundamental clarification is made concerning imagination, of which model is an expression. For Ricoeur this is the fact that our notion of image is *not* determined by a commonsense notion of image as perception. To fall prey to this view that image is only seeing frustrates from the beginning a comprehension of the predicative power of imagination and ultimately, when model is evoked as a heuristic

⁵Recently Ricoeur has also taken up the creative power at the level of narrativity (Ricoeur 1984; 1985a; 1985b).

moment in scientific discovery, the possible truth claims of science in relation to reality.

Given these agendas and their corresponding philosophical intelligibilities, I think it is important neither to reduce either contribution, Ricoeur's or Lonergan's, to the other, nor to attempt to compress both intelligibilities of science within one intelligibility. Their common assault, however, on one feature of modern thought is quite striking. For each, this error has pervaded modern philosophy right up to the present and continues to dominate modern theories of science. It is a philosophy of ordinary language or commonsense philosophy of perception which obstructs science's own self-awareness.

In what follows I wish to show with both Lonergan and Ricoeur that only by attending to those modes from which science may at first seem most remote and foreign is something of a positive awareness of science realized.

Lonergan achieves this with a heightened awareness of the subject, while Ricoeur does so with a heightened awareness of resources of language and the role of imagination. Both identify specific cognitive operations without which science would not be science. Both in the long run attempt to raise the real possibility of objectivity and recognize the claim within science to know reality.

3. LONERGAN

A good text for navigating through Lonergan's complex corpus is the one entitled "Cognitional Structure" (Lonergan, 1967a). It sets out *in nuce* Lonergan's call for a turn to the subject and the foundation of a notion of objectivity which follows from this. In addition, it identifies the major obstacles in contemporary approaches to objective knowledge. I shall follow its major lines, referring where necessary and suitable to other texts of Lonergan.

The structure of his article can be seen to move from operations the subject performs in knowing, to objective knowledge. At the center of it stands an epistemological theorem: "knowledge in the proper sense is knowledge of reality or, more fully, that knowledge is

intrinsically objective, that objectivity is the intrinsic relation of knowing to being, and that being and reality are identical" (1967a: 228). The epistemological theorem is the hinge on which swings the door from the domain of subjectivity to that of objectivity. Objectivity remains, however, a relation: a relation of what is known and our unrestricted desire to know unrestricted being. No one ever brings this unrestricted desire to its end nor does any finite creature fully know being (Lonergan, 1957: 657-669; Byrne, 1981a).

What, then, given the dynamic intentionality of our desire to know, allows us at any moment to "stop and say" objectively "this is so"? Lonergan would say that our capacity to judge, an act in which our complex cognitional activity culminates, does. Independent of this understanding of our cognitional activity, there is a failure to understand precisely what objective knowledge is. Does this mean that prior to Lonergan's account of cognitional structure there has been no knowing? No, of course not; but there has been a weakness in knowing why it is knowing. People have been aware of experience, understanding, and judging; yet it is another thing to say that there has existed a self-knowledge in this experience, understanding, and judging. Indeed it is precisely the scientific revolution which has brought to the fore the crises in our comprehension of objective knowledge. To date, however, solutions have been lacking precisely, according to Lonergan, because of our inattention to cognitional structure in our acts of knowing.

Because of this inattention, Lonergan argues, epistemologies have fallen short by constructing solutions to the crises by building theories on foundations that draw on only one feature or operation of cognitional activity (Lonergan 1967a: 231-236), instead of paying attention to the *entire* structure of our cognitional operations. Thus by advert-ing to our cognitional activity in our acts as knowers Lonergan would not be contradicting recent epistemological efforts as much as refining them by articulating their proper foundation. Such a foundation, however, requires intellectual conversion. First, it demands a radical break with that presupposition which has ruled contemporary forms of epistemological theory, namely the presupposition that knowing is looking. No great efforts of mental gymnastics are needed to dethrone that presupposition; simply a fact: adult knowing

is not the mere seeing but the complex functioning of our experience, understanding, and judging.

But that fact rests on a heightened awareness of ourselves as subjects and as adult knowers. What is required is not simply attention to any one of its operations, be it questioning, understanding, or judging, but apprehending these in their functional relations, as a question which leads to the exercise of understanding, as the latter presupposes the former, as both lead to judging and as the latter is made not without reference to questioning and understanding. Thus in attending to cognitional activity, the subject attends to the complex structure made up of its inner functional relationships, and no act of knowledge is independent of the activity of this entire complex.

Before taking up the reference to the objective pole, however, one more characteristic, central to the entire complex of cognitional structure, must be mentioned, namely the intentionality of knowing toward being. For Lonergan cognitional activity is self-constituting. In face of the world in which we live, spontaneously we ask questions, which lead to attempts to understand, which lead to judgments. What is evident to any knower, however, and implied in the experience of herself as knower is the desire to know something, what Lonergan calls reality or what is. I know myself as a knower who intends to know, and it is this relationship to being, in my desire to know everything about everything that I find the "glue" which holds together as a unity the complex cognitional structure and its dynamism. This fundamental relationship to being which has become evident precisely in my attention to myself as knower, sets up for Lonergan the epistemological framework within which he will be able to affirm the possibility of objective knowledge. It is this fundamental relationship to reality that runs through all dimensions of our experience, biologically as well as cognitively, which will permit an affirmation at any stage of our effort to know that "this is so."

We began with an epistemological theorem which sent us back to cognitional theory, which in turn cast us forward to a metaphysics. It is this which now permits us to return to the epistemological question of objective knowledge for Lonergan. We swing from attention to subjectivity to attention to objectivity.

Objective knowledge draws on a reference to the two vectors just mentioned: first, that which sent us in the direction of subjec-

tivity and cognitional structure; and second, that which sent us in the direction of our unrestricted desire to know being. Neither the former nor the latter is what is meant by objective knowledge, but both clarify its possibilities.

In the first place, returning to Lonergan's epistemological theorem — knowing intends being, being is reality, reality is concrete. But this being, intended in our unrestricted desire to know, which would bring the dynamism of our cognitional structure to an end, remains a horizon of knowing, unattainable as an absolute intelligibility to the finite creature. Questions remain to be asked beyond that which we already know. Thus we must remain satisfied with a knowledge of being that can never be "absolute knowledge," that is, one which corresponds to an understanding about everything that is to be understood or, in short, the final term of all knowledge. But it must be remembered that because of the intrinsic relationship, *via* intentionality of the knower and being, to reality, a knowledge of proportionate being is knowledge known by intelligence, a knowledge, therefore, which remains concrete and real. The question becomes, then, how is this knowledge of being at any moment affirmed? To answer this we must come back to the structure of cognitional activity and point to judgment.

Judgment is the foundation of such an affirmation, judgment considered as a cognitional operation that brings to a provisional term the cycle of cognitional operations of questioning and understanding. Judgment asks what is "virtually unconditioned" at the level of proportionate being. A virtually unconditioned truth is one whereby we can affirm both what specific conditions must be met for a thing to be and whether these conditions have been met, given, it must be understood, our ability to identify specific intelligible and real contexts within which these conditions function.

If the answer to these questions is that the conditions have been met, we say at the level of judgment, that such *is so*. The concrete and real nature of this truth needs to be emphasized. When we refer to a virtually unconditioned we imply that there remain no conditions which have to be met for this thing to be. Thus we have transcended any notion of knowledge which relies purely on possibility, idea, or *imaginable* possibility. Such and such is.

Let us further clarify this. Lonergan speaks of the relationship between the thing and its conditions. Implied in this is a radical transformation of what is the object of objective knowledge. If attention to cognitional structure freed us from the prejudice that knowing is looking, it also effected a freedom from the corresponding notion of what is intended to be known as object by perception. No longer is an object "already-out-there-now" the issue for objective knowledge. Being, that which is to be known, is understood to be isomorphic with the way we know *via* cognitional operations.

Being is now to be understood in relation to the act of judgment, which both brings to a focus the structure of cognitional operations and affirms in turn the intelligible pattern and sequences of relations by which something is. Judgment, then, does not make a decision based purely on an arithmetical accumulation of specific points of data; rather it reads the intelligibility of patterns and sequences such that it affirms the connection between these and a thing that exists, and then states that such and such is the case.

We set out on this venture in view of the question of science, and now we may state some more specific links. How does this affect our view of the possibility of objective knowledge in science? In two ways: first, with regard to cognitional structure's debt to science; and second, with regard to the scientific debt to cognitional structure.

Although post-Enlightenment thought, nurtured on the results of the scientific revolution, has been faced with the crises of epistemologies, it is only because of the progressive elaboration of cognitional operations in scientific empirical procedure that Lonergan is able to develop his own response to the epistemological crisis. His turn to the subject and the self-knowledge of the knower is indebted to the development *via* science of our understanding of the material world and our understanding of this kind of understanding. Lonergan began *Insight* by attending to insights of science for a very specific reason. Drawing on his reading of Aquinas where cognitional theory is basic, and an understanding that cognition is revealed in our understanding of the material universe, Lonergan knew that the transformations and revolution in science afforded new data on our acts of understanding. Thus the insights and methodical procedures which were developed within science were, he considered, a *sine qua non* for the development of cognitional

theory and our understanding of cognitional structure. This is why Lonergan notes that among the obstacles impeding intellectual conversion is a fidelity to an all too Aristotelian view of science. The meaning of science that our culture works with has changed (Lonergan, 1974a: 103-104; 1974b: 55-57; Gadamer, 1977b: 177-180) and, therefore, so have the foundations of metaphysics. More specifically, scientific culture has been constitutive of our heightened self-awareness and self-understanding. This has become an irreversible feature in the emergence of meaning in our world.

But, as indicated above, the debt flows in both directions. Science in its own self-understanding, in an understanding of its own foundations, has much to gain from cognitional theory. In an age of the recognition of the non-neutrality of scientific knowledge, science has suffered many wounds to its pride as a measure of objective truth. Both the history of new emerging insights in science and the development in scientific disciplines, which rely now on classical scientific theory and now on the notion of probability and statistics, have left both scientists themselves and philosophers scrambling to assess what exactly is the status of knowledge here. The suspicion is implicit in the shift from proof to falsifiability, and in the crises associated with digesting fully the impact of other hermeneutical inroads into the philosophies of science. It is as if scientists are never sure how long their findings will stand up.

Cognitional theory shows that a mere shift to a language of process is inadequate. For science *can* apprehend what is true. The act of judgment rests on this conviction and the operation of judgment is itself evidence of this as objectively true. But in saying this we must be aware of the goal of our intention in knowing: it is not the already-out-there-now; what is known is determined by the act of knowing itself, which identifies the link between what really exists and the conditions under which it is so. The delimitation within proportionate being is crucial here. What judgment affirms to be so pays attention to the patterns and sequences of operations or functions as well as their recurrence. At any time this requires an intelligible unity. But this does not pretend to be all-encompassing intelligibility.

There is a difference between our unrestricted desire to know and any act of judgment concerning proportionate being. As a result,

and given these intelligibilities, there are different sciences; yet because questions continue to emerge which reflect our unrestricted desire to know, individual sciences must give way to other intelligibilities which incorporate wider ranges of data. So we move intelligibly and historically from physics to chemistry to biology to psychology. Because insights do not involve just one kind of intelligibility we speak of classical and statistical laws. But in each case there is a judgment and, given the idea that judgment has gathered sufficient evidence to determine that conditions have been met for this thing to exist, we can say "it is so," "it is true." On this score science need not be held hostage to a claim on behalf of non-neutrality. It possesses the power to affirm what is and what is known.

As we read in Lonergan, such is the debt science owes cognitional theory. A turn, paradoxically, to a heightened awareness of the subject in cognitional activity is not the beginning of an insight into the weakness of science; it is the articulation of the foundations of the strength and power of science to say what is true about what is factually so. The direction of these insights into judgment and science leads to one further paradox and, in my reading, to a point not yet often emphasized in commentaries on Lonergan. For all the emphasis on a heightened awareness of one's own subjectivity and its relationship to being as the condition of objective knowledge, for all the emphasis on authentic subjectivity as the condition for objectivity, judgment brings us to a point where insight into the link between a thing and its fulfilled conditions is an insight into truth *independent now* of the subject. That is, this is so given these fulfilling conditions, and it is so for everyone. It is a truth *independent* of the subject or of whatever perspective the subject adopts. As Lonergan states at this point, "being has been reached":

Because human knowing reaches such an unconditioned, it transcends itself. For the unconditioned *qua* unconditioned cannot be restricted, qualified, limited; and so we all distinguish sharply between what is and, on the other hand, what appears, what seems to be, what is imagined or thought or might possibly or probably be affirmed; in the latter cases the object is still tied down by relativity to the subject; in the former the self-transcendence of human knowing has come to its term; when we say that something is, we mean that its reality does not depend upon our cognitional activity (1967a: 230).

This claim is far from a denial of the subject. It is a confirmation of the truth of self-transcendence which is a unique feature of the truth of subjectivity. The subject knows and intends something more than itself, and reality therefore is not purely relative or merely subjective. It is objective and concrete. Faithful to its own goals, then, science can really lead us to reality which is independent of the subject, when truth remains truth for all, and reality is real for all. It is precisely this knowledge and security in such knowledge which is the condition for any authentic subjectivity and communication among subjects. Science deserves to be recognized for what it contributes here.

4. RICOEUR

We began our consideration of Lonergan with his epistemological theorem. Let us begin our consideration of Ricoeur with his view of philosophy in its epistemological and ontological dimensions: "If philosophy is to survive, it is not by inciting methodological schisms. Its destiny is bound to its capacity to subordinate the very idea of method to a more fundamental concept of the relation of truth to things and to beings" (Ricoeur, 1978a: 150). The negative side of his statement refers to the history of epistemological debates which have progressively led to an opposition between explanation and understanding. The positive side of the statement refers to the process of interpretation which incorporates both poles, explanation and understanding, in view of opening up possibilities according to which one may appropriate one's desire to be.⁶

Ricoeur takes a unique step in the development of the history of hermeneutics insofar as he calls for a return from ontology to epistemology, a path which requires that the analytic methodical pole of interpretation, namely explanation, be recuperated within a process of interpretation and philosophy. This implies a challenge to the tradition of hermeneutics that has increasingly recognized itself

⁶"I would say that interpretation is the process by which the disclosure of new modes of *being* ... give to the subject a new capacity of knowing himself" (Ricoeur, 1978a: 145).

as being engaged in a process of understanding quite different from the mode of explanation whose measure is the exact sciences. Ricoeur has identified the tragic consequences of this schism not only for knowledge itself but also for our understanding of reality. The dualism between explanation and understanding objectifies itself in the dualism between science and human studies and between their respective views of what is real.

Human and social sciences feel that they must reject the claim that what is real can only be determined by natural sciences, while natural sciences hold in suspicion those modes of interpretation whose data and methods escape sufficient empirical command. In return, human sciences which aspire to the status of science find themselves in a perplexing position, caught between a recognition of their links to wider networks of participation in culture and to deeper levels of the life structure, and a recognition of their desire to be publicly accountable to those standards which derive from the natural sciences. Philosophies that link themselves more closely to one or other method find themselves, in their conflicting approaches, parties to the tearing apart of the fabric of *reality* itself.

My primary objective at this stage is not to give a rendering of the full pattern of Ricoeur's solution to problems of truth and reality. I am concerned principally with his account of scientific method and how it is indirectly recuperated within his hermeneutical approach. It must be remembered that Ricoeur's approach is dominated in the long run by the concerns of a practical philosophy, a philosophy of human action. This intention plays a dominant role in his remarks on science. The recuperation of science represents for him a constitutive mode of our being in the world, a moment which demands to be accounted for in the more comprehensive understanding of our relationship to being and reality.

A solution to the problem of the dualism of explanation and understanding will require a move to a deeper level of interpretation, where it will be possible to identify both methodical approaches operative within each other's disciplines. The claim on behalf of hermeneutics to access wider and wider structures of reality than those under empirical command and control has made it less sensitive to the explanatory feature which permits understanding itself to take place; on the other hand, the claim on behalf of science to

empirically "controllable" data has made it less sensitive to the values of modes of understanding over which it has no "methodical control" but which nonetheless are constitutive of the entire logic of discovery in the "natural" world. In my judgment an increasing recognition of this is part of the crisis in philosophies of science which I referred to in my introduction.

The failure to date, however, at least within hermeneutics, to recognize that explanation and understanding represent two poles, one methodic, the other non-methodic, within both natural science and human science, is the result of basic epistemological prejudice (Ricoeur, 1979a: 139). Like Lonergan, Ricoeur locates this problem at the level of picture thinking; there exists the assumption that our imagination and image of reality represents what is seen, and that what is seen already exists.

My presentation of Ricoeur focuses on how this prejudice must be dismantled, on what as a result will arise as a new foundation for knowing, and on how this bears on a view of science. I shall leave aside for now how this touches the human sciences themselves. The issue remains what Ricoeur sees a hermeneutical retrieval of explanation as able to bring to an understanding of science, and also why, on the way back to praxis, science in its own way contributes an irreducible clarification of the hermeneutical orientation.

The dismantling of the prejudice against imagination requires a rehabilitation of our view of image as it draws from the resources of language, and principally from the figure of speech called metaphor. Here I shall be following the major lines of Ricoeur's article, "The Function of Fiction in Shaping Reality" (1979a). Although, paradoxically, this title may seem remote from the interests of comprehending the scientific approach, we shall find within it how a turn to science constitutes an unavoidable step in rehabilitating the power of imagination, and in turn how science contributes to the truth claim of imagination itself as a heuristic process.

The first question properly may be, Why begin with a reference to image and imagination? Because, an initial response suggests, it is what is popularly rejected as a legitimate cognitive symbol. Implied in the notion of image as picturing is the popular misconception that image is merely a decorative feature of expression; rather than contributing to truth claims and reality, it distracts from these.

Image is relegated to superficial, subjective, and affective dimensions of reality. This prejudice is sustained by a popular empiricist epistemology and a view coming from science which is suspicious of what tends to belong to private, unobserved feelings or intuitions (1978b: 4).

Linked to these prejudices, which place image and imagination in the realm of private minds and their unobservable experiences, is the view that image is in fact picturing or representing to ourselves something which is absent. Implicit throughout is the idea that image is a representation, a copy of some absent thing that the mind creates for itself, and thus suggests the notion that we are spectators to what Ricoeur calls the product of "mental alchemy" (1979a: 129). Like Lonergan, but now at the level of imagination, Ricoeur will only get beyond such epistemological prejudices by breaking with this stubborn view, encouraged by philosophies of common sense and ordinary language, which believe that image is picturing.

How does Ricoeur begin? By first pointing out that it is not mind that produces images; language does. Before being seen, images are spoken. Thus Ricoeur sets out on the route that starts from language and creative capacities of language. Only when image and imagination are anchored in the realm of language can he begin to free imagination from the burden of its previous prejudices.

For Ricoeur, language shows these creative capacities, principally in the sphere of metaphor. Metaphor will become the occasion whereby we may begin to watch the productive capacities of language at work and its ability to make way for the emergence of meaning. It is precisely because of metaphor's ability in effecting the emergence of new meanings, in inventing meaning, that it can also "generate an emergence of new images" (1979a: 127).

It is impossible within the space of this essay to follow step by step Ricoeur's account of the stages on behalf of a rehabilitation of the cognitive weight of image and imagination. But once imagination is anchored in the power of metaphor which brings to focus the creative capacity of language, implications follow.

First, we are introduced to the predicative force of language and imagination. Imagination does not stand in service to an already given prejudice of picturing. It stands in service to new possibilities

of meaning, tied to new visions of reality, to which we have access in the process of language itself. Implied within this shift is the shift in *reference* from what is already familiar in ordinary day by day use of language to new possibilities gained by a metaphorical process which, by nature, breaks with anticipations of ordinary use. This is why Ricoeur often refers both to poetry and to fiction as paradigmatic cases. The life of poetry and fiction lies precisely in their ability to refer to ordinary discourse, yet, at the same time, with its power of semantic innovation, to create what is referred to as a semantic clash. At first the power of semantic innovation which poetry/metaphor is, suspends immediacy to ordinary discourse and its semantic aims. Yet, in the clash between this ordinary predication of meaning and the relatively remote region designed by semantic use, there is suddenly discerned a new proximity born out of the tension between these remote semantic fields.

The competency with which we see that what were remote semantic fields are more proximate is the work of metaphor and imagination. But here the heuristic force of imagination needs to be highlighted. The new predicative pertinence resides in the dialectical relationship of the semantic field, once remote, now close. If ordinary semantic meaning is overcome in the view of one remote, it does not mean that it is left behind. The tension that exists in these references, ordinary and remote, sustains the emergence of new images.

The clash, or tension, or split reference feeds the new predicative pertinence. Imagination which operates within this tension schematizes new images. It is this ability to generate new images and thereby hold in suspense new meaning that separates definitively this differentiated notion of image from the earlier views of ornamental image. Image arises within language use as the power of language to generate new meaning. We are on the threshold of a break with a whole philosophical tradition on reality and with its corresponding notion of truth. Nothing less than the power to recreate reality is implied here in the poetic art of schematizing *via* image and imagination. For what is this new predicative pertinence if not an insight *via* image into a new semantic field? Moreover, I do not think that here we are far from Lonergan's notion of the real, when we begin to discern that we leave the restrictive worlds of objects *already-out-there-now* to engage ourselves in new worlds of

meanings, discerned by the complex of new predicative relations. Perhaps this is why Ricoeur in his own philosophy could not remain at the level of a metaphorical statement, but had to move into the world of text and fiction with their attention to the reconfiguration of reality. Reality is this reconfiguration, it is this world redescribed (1977: 242) that imagination has the power to hold in view. In this sense, truth is ultimately metaphorical truth!

But, in order to see this, prejudices concerning reality must be overcome. As for Lonergan it was paradoxically the path through heightened subjectivity which led to objectivity, so for Ricoeur it is the path through fiction which leads, not to a turning away from reality, but to an augmentation of reality. It is only the suspension of the reference to obvious and ordinary semantic fields in the art of fiction that opens up a space within which the deeper life structures of reality can emerge. But this emergence is not a "natural process"; it is the gain of cultures and the objectifications of culture. For this reason Ricoeur refers to the notion of work. Work is the creative activity of imagination by which it redescribes reality in order to permit the emergence of new meaning, anchored in the depth of the structures of life.

The more imagination deviates from that which is called reality in ordinary language and vision, the more it approaches the heart of the reality which is no longer the world of manipulable objects, but the world into which we have been thrown by birth and within which we try to orient ourselves by projecting our innermost possibilities upon it, in order that we dwell there, in the strongest sense of that word. But this paradox is only sustainable if we happen to concede that we have not only to amend our ideas as to what an image is, but also our prejudices as to what reality is (1978a: 139).

Language in its creative capacities and achievements is the medium of our ontological truth.

At this point the relationship of these remarks to science must be treated in a more specific way. Parallel to the approach in the Lonergan section, it may be asked, What is the debt science owes to this discourse on imagination? and, What debt does a discourse on imagination owe to science? Regarding the first, science is assisted in accounting for its relationship to reality; in the second, imagination gains a density of authority regarding its truth claims.

Ricoeur has argued that one of the prejudices which holds in bondage the creative power of imagination is the view that "reality is only what science declares it to be" (1979a: 139). In this instance, the real becomes the "everyday interests" and imagination is rejected as obstructing possibilities for truth claims. But now science, anchored in the productive capacities of language, is offered its own opportunity to reassess the boundaries of its competency⁷ and the intentionality of its activity with regard to language.

Is it not possible to recognize within science the predicative power which belongs to imagination? An assessment of the logic of discovery in science does indeed affirm this, in the emerging recognition of the use of models and paradigms within science. An account of this will augment the truth of science, affirm its relationship with reality, and grant it a power of re-description which is more than that of pure denotation. Just as metaphors are recognized to be more than purely decorative devices for language — that is, they are constitutive of the emergence of meaning and the re-description of reality — so too, models in science are not merely conceptual afterthoughts. They themselves play a fundamental constitutive role in understanding the reality that science seeks to know (1979a: 141).

It is not insignificant that Ricoeur, in addressing the issue of science in his book, *Rule of Metaphor*, treats it within his "Study on Reference" (1977: 239-246). Drawing especially on the work of Mary Hesse, Ricoeur shows how science, in its understanding of the logic of discovery, must break away from a too deductivist approach to discovery. In fact the evidence is otherwise; science discovers something in the act or operation of re-describing reality *via* models.⁸ But model here cannot be reduced to some kind of psychological intuition; it bears epistemological and cognitive weight.

If scientific discovery is an insight into new connections that govern what is known, discovery cannot be pure deduction. Theoretical models in science provide the opportunity to re-describe reality under observation in order to create the possibility of seeing new connections. Models preserve the possibility of moving from one domain of connection to the other because of this capacity to sustain iso-

⁷See my introduction above on Lamb.

⁸On different types of models, see Ricoeur, 1977: 240-241.

morphic structures between an "original domain" and "one re-described." Again it is the possibility of new predicative pertinence which cuts across remote semantic fields, perhaps here theoretical fields. Deduction is not eliminated; it is maintained in the re-description, but as a capacity for explanation, which sheds light on the predicative structured relationships. Regarding science, the text re-described must still possess qualities of coherence and legibility. This, however, does not diminish the emergence of meaning within scientific discovery, for *explananda* in the form of models have predicative force (1977: 242).

This touches fundamentally on the relationship between rationality and reality. Reason is given new life. It no longer searches for *invariant meanings*: it, as science, plays a constitutive role in objectifying understanding in a "continually expanding world." Science plays a leading role in the emergence of such a world *via* the objectifications of its *explananda*, and therefore plays a role in the discovery of new worlds of interconnections.

But if imagination that is referred to model in science gives scientific reason new life, scientific language in turn assists metaphor in its own claim to truth. So important is this that Ricoeur has called the relationship of model and metaphor the most decisive step in liberating "the theory of fiction from the yoke of imagination as picture" (1979a: 140). Ricoeur developed this in two ways: first, in attention to the formation of larger texts beyond simple metaphorical statements; second, with attention to the heuristic function of model.

I spoke earlier of the need on Ricoeur's part to move from the metaphorical statement to a larger text. What is seen is not just one new meaning. Model accentuates the fact that we are dealing with a series, a structure of interconnected meanings. Here the metaphoric universe becomes a network of metaphorical statements. Model in science has the capacity "to see new connections." We recall Lonergan's notion of judgment here which saw the link between a thing and the recurring fulfilling conditions by which it is a thing. What, therefore, science affirms in models informs metaphorical truth about reality which is reached only through such larger semantic structures as texts, poems, tragedies, narratives, and so on.

By urging on the movement from metaphorical statements to metaphorical or poetic texts, models also paved the way for a new

density to the truth claim. By extending metaphor *via* models to a process of re-description of reality, an isomorphic structure of text and reality is highlighted, which permits a stronger reverberation with the depth structures of life.

This second point, referring to a deeper participation in life, Ricoeur develops under the rubric of the heuristic function of model (1977: 141). This function is linked to the power of model to re-describe reality. But what is emphasized here is not just the interconnection of metaphorical statement or metaphors; it also is the genre of the text which lends it a texture. The affective tones associated with texture are intended purposely. For the heuristic function's link to re-description must pass through the cognitive moments of mood and feeling. Here I cannot go into Ricoeur's correctives to the more emotive connotations usually ascribed to feeling. Suffice it for our purpose to emphasize that mood and feeling bear cognitive weight. They in no way suggest the suspension of reason; rather for Ricoeur their purpose is to enhance the cognitive power of interpretation.

How is this done? By assimilation. The heuristic function of model, linked as it is to re-description, makes possible at the level of structure the transfer of meanings. In this way model offers imagination the power to see or "read" reality in a new way and open up new possibilities for being. Yet the truth claim of new possibilities in terms of re-descriptions displays itself only where there exists a new and deeper dwelling in the depth structures of life. Feeling enters here as that by which we know the truth of our deeper attunement to reality. We are suddenly reminded that we, as subjects, participate in life and are part of the process of imagination. The closer and closer reverberation with reality that is *felt* in us is the mark of the truth claim. The subject by means of the process of imagination experiences this greater assimilation with reality. Feeling is the medium for this assimilation and, in assimilation, brings to completion a specific process of imagination; it completes the meaning of this text.

One would search in vain here for Ricoeur to present criteria for a truth claim which correspond to an anticipated objectivity of ordinary discourse. In its debt to imagination, explanation's intended notion of reality has been transformed and escapes the reduction imposed by the usual splits of subject-object. With feeling truth emerges in the subject's own predisposition to reality, a pre-

disposition whose validity is tested in the experience of attunement to reality. Feeling is the power of predicative assimilation, in which we begin to dwell in the deeper structures of life in which we are assimilated. We make our own this reality.

The function of feeling "is to abolish the distance between knower and known without cancelling the cognitive structure of thought and the intentional distance which it implies" (1979b: 154). Strangely enough, that process of interpretation which ends with assimilation in the subject's appropriation of new possibilities for being is a process that owes its achievement to explanation and the heuristic power of model in science.

It is tempting to take up these remarks and develop their implication at the level of praxis. Our immediate purpose, however, is to accentuate the explanatory function of model in the overarching process of interpretation which only later looks towards new possibilities of being at the praxical level. To stay with the main line of investigation, then, we may recall the concluding remarks on Lonergan in the previous section, in relation to which the concluding remarks on Ricoeur here seem somewhat astonishing. Was it not true that Lonergan's road to truth about being and reality led *via* a heightened activity of the subject to the act of judgment where there appeared an understanding of what is independent of cognitional activity? What began with a turn to the subject ended with a transcendental claim on behalf of objectivity made somewhat independently of any specific subject. With Ricoeur, on the other hand, what began with language has worked its way *via* a rehabilitated view of imagination to a culmination in a cognitive truth claim which privileges the assimilation of the particular subject; that is, the commitment of the subject to make and re-make reality in possibilities for being. In both cases these developments have emerged in conjunction with a rethinking of the activity of science.

How is it that for one, Lonergan, authentic subjectivity has led to objectivity, while for the other, Ricoeur, the subject-less inherent creative powers of language have led, *via* explanation, to an awareness of the import of authentic subjectivity? The conflict, we shall see, is only apparent. But this question leads to the next section, in which I attempt to assess these reflections on the two thinkers as they concern a renewed approach to science, and what now appears to be

the irreducible complementarity of the two orientations concerning the question of science.

5. COMPLEMENTARITY OF LONERGAN AND RICOEUR

My purpose in taking up these two figures was not simply to watch the deployment of two independent interpretations of science. In my judgment the critical transpositions that each offers have opened the doors within current theological orientations to one another and, in addition, have promoted our theological understanding of science. The crises that science faces in its own self-understanding, and the crises it forces us to wrestle with at a cultural level, are our common lot. The frameworks which both Lonergan and Ricoeur provide offer us a fresh possibility to analyze the basic problematics of these crises and to work in a more mutually helpful way towards required solutions.

It would be of no little significance were it possible to see in these masters a fundamental complementarity in understanding a major development of our culture and the self-understanding of our age. This fifth section, then, seeks to explore the major lines of this complementarity. I should underscore at the outset, however, that a complementarity is not a congruence. The concluding remarks in the previous section have already indicated as much.

Complementarity recognizes the distinct frameworks within which each develops their interpretation and judgments, and the intelligibilities specific to these frameworks. In short, complementarity forbids the reduction of one approach to that of the other. At the same time, it does not prevent us from discovering clues in each intelligibility which help us to see that both are moving in a remarkably similar direction where fundamental issues are concerned, and that both provide an input on behalf of a remarkable consensus regarding both the problematics facing us in science and the directions of a more adequate response.

The remarks that follow build on the moments of consensus and distinct intelligibilities that gave evidence of such complementarity. I develop my assessment of the complementarity, *first*, by re-

emphasizing their interpretation of the common epistemological prejudices; *second*, as a consequence, by re-examining their reworking of the notion of reality intended in truth-claims of science; and *third*, by clarifying the significance of each one's proposals for the other, given the different frameworks of intelligibility. Given the detail of our analyses above, development of the first and second points is brief.

5.1 Interpretation of common epistemological prejudices

Both Lonergan and Ricoeur have promoted philosophies whose major characteristic is a search of our deeper foundations upon which communication among disciplines is possible today. For neither thinker has the probing and framing of these foundations taken place without an analysis of major philosophical and epistemological prejudices that haunt modern theories of knowledge. The diagnoses of these weaknesses are the first evidence of our anticipated complementarity in their approaches.

Whether it be Lonergan's explicit reference to knowing, or Ricoeur's explicit reference to imagination, both identify the problem of philosophies based on ordinary language and common sense, which assume it to be evident that knowing is looking or image is a representation or a picture copy. Lonergan has diagnosed the symptoms of this fundamental problem in such approaches as empiricism, naive realism, and idealism. For his part Ricoeur has diagnosed it *via* symptoms of philosophies of imagination (1978b: 5). Concerning our approach to science, it is interesting to note how both recognized the need to break from philosophies which had all too quickly adopted epistemologically generated dichotomies of subject and object. Both were convinced that there was more to a notion of subjectivity than claims of an interior intuitionist grasp; both were convinced there was more to a notion of objectivity than could be claimed by a sentient notion of object as already out there now over against me.

But if both break free from these prejudices and their naive epistemologies, it would be by way of appealing to a prior-to-epistemology moment of philosophical discourse. Lonergan, following

his Thomist heritage, would find this prior moment in cognitional structure; Ricoeur, following his post-Heideggerian break with psychologically based epistemology, would find this in the creative resources of language.

5.2 The notion of reality intended in truth claims of science

The appeal to new foundations invites us to shift from the negative side to the positive side of their achievement. A number of consistent discoveries can be underlined here.

First, each has shown the integral coherence among philosophical levels. Breaking with an epistemological tradition implies more than merely adjusting or correcting one feature of a philosophical fabric. By appealing to new foundations Lonergan and Ricoeur have woven new philosophical patterns whose very consistency calls for major transformations in our view of reality; for it is reality itself that is known in the coherence and consistency of cognitional structure, epistemology, and metaphysics.

For both, this is why intellectual conversion and a rehabilitation of imagination are so difficult. Each implies a comprehension of a rather different relationship to reality. One cannot abandon epistemological prejudices without at the same time placing in jeopardy that notion of reality which implicitly prevailed as a result of those prejudices or even supported them. It is not enough, then, to accept epistemological transformations and assume that notions of reality, originally linked with them, continue to prevail. It remains a case of placing new wine in old skins. In reference to science this remains one of the crises of our age.

Given the turn to the subject in recent philosophy, it is still Lonergan's conviction that a medieval notion of reality prevails. This has surfaced recently in the persistence of mechanically informed models of reality, in spite of statistical intelligibilities. Conversion is nothing less than an introduction into a whole new world of being; otherwise it is not conversion. For Ricoeur the re-description of reality is not partial; it is a new semantic field or it is not conversion at all. This has profound implications for what we intend when we know reality. In this regard science has been both donor and recipi-

ent. Gone forever from their philosophies are the more simplistic object-subject schemes. Attention to science by Lonergan and attention to the explanatory function of model by Ricoeur have led them to identify the relational character of what is known. Judgment, on Lonergan's part, and the link between heuristic function and re-description, on Ricoeur's part, intend structural complexities by which what is real is real.

Further, the truth claim regarding what is known is not independent of a recognition of structural intelligibilities. If there is a unity to a thing for Lonergan, or an image which embodies reality for Ricoeur, implied in these identifications are the structural complex, its functional relations, and interconnections. There is no object already-out-there-now, to use Lonergan's expression. This discovery on the side of objectivity has its subjective correlate. The structures of knowing and known are isomorphic. What is known is only known according to how one knows. For Lonergan the complex structure of intelligibility on the objective side is matched by the cognitional-structural complex on the subjective side. The mind can know reality because it already participates on its own in the reality which it seeks to know. The evidence for this is the cognitional operations themselves which, in the complex operations, reflect the complexity of reality intended.

Ricoeur is even more forthright about this. Recall how feeling for him is an accentuation of the cognitive import of the metaphysical process. But this involves, *via* imagination and the work of re-description, an attunement of self with reality, and an ability beforehand to make reality mine. The legibility on the side of reality objectified in text is matched by the capacity of the subject to read. The genuine reader is none other than that one who can see reality in a new way.

The dichotomies of subject-object have been replaced by an account of subjectivity and objectivity which arises from the soil of common participation in the real. To say science is a donor emphasizes the role the explanatory mode of interconnections had on displacing a pure attention to object; to say science is a recipient is to say it benefits from the acknowledgment that a thing in its intelligible unity can be known to be true. For both Lonergan and Ricoeur admit that the cognitional and imaginary process comes to an end. For

Lonergan, I can say, it is so. For Ricoeur, the text has a beginning and an end. Judgment for Lonergan, model for Ricoeur, allow for a certain claim to truth that belongs uniquely to the stature of science to possess. If the range of the present analysis for their work were extended, it could be shown that without this claim there could not be, for Lonergan, a moral subject or, for Ricoeur, an appropriation of one's own-most possibilities of being.

It is worthwhile to pause and reflect on this understanding. For it is quite easy to slip by this affirmative moment at a time when the view of the non-neutrality of science seems to reign. This can occur if distinctions among types of discourse are not attended to. Science is often drawn, *via* the issue of non-neutrality, within a discourse concerning sociopolitical praxis and options. But the end proportionate to praxis is not one which really touches science as such; it deals with a notion of technology and applications of scientific knowledge.⁹

Many may find such distinctions difficult to make, given the integral nature of scientific-technological complex in our culture, but Ricoeur and Lonergan are clear on the foundations of such distinctions. Lonergan persists in the distinction between factual knowledge of proportionate being which relates to science, and knowledge of value and good which opens us to the domain of praxis (Melchin, 1987: 227-233). Ricoeur himself has made a clear distinction between the natural sciences and social sciences, the one governed by explanation, the other by understanding. Neither wishes to exclude the dimension of praxis or understanding from science. Lonergan speaks of intellectual conversion as foundational to science; Ricoeur admits understanding as a moment of scientific imagination; but both know the discontinuity between the theoretical and practical sciences. If we slip too easily past such distinctions we may lose sight of the stature of science in its truth claim and deny a critical control

⁹In my view the question of technology is first and foremost an issue of the social imagination. I would differentiate the social imaginary into three dimensions: cultural, political, and economic (see Ricoeur, 1965). See also note 4 above. In the economic register, I think it would be interesting to refer to the work of Jane Jacobs (1984). To be sure, scientific knowledge is affected by the social imagination, but I do not believe that this is the primary heuristic for understanding scientific knowledge as scientific. On the latter, I find Lonergan's structure of cognitional operations more helpful.

to our discourse on praxis. In the short term, however, it should allow for the autonomy of science and recognition of its contribution to communication among the plurality of discourses.

A final remark in this section arises from the discovery that, although science can make a judgment that says such and such is so, and although texts have an ending, science does not extricate itself from the dynamisms in which it participates and which are integral to it. For Lonergan, judgments lead to new questions and new questions set up new cycles of cognitional operations; for Ricoeur, texts are available to new readers, and new readers set in motion new processes of imagination and re-description. Science, therefore, bears insight into truth yet is open to more truth. Science contributes to the emergence of our understanding of reality and it itself is taken up once more as a task for reflection given new worlds of truth.

What is the heart of this dynamism and emergence? Relative to science we would say it is the scientist, to the point where a true account of science is not possible independent of a turn to the scientist. For Lonergan it was not possible to reach the nature of the truth claim of judgment apart from attention to the heightened activity of the knower; likewise for Ricoeur it was not possible to emphasize the cognitive claim of truth without attention to the reader. For both Lonergan and Ricoeur it is at the level of the subject that a primordial relationship to reality exists which, again for both, remains a real concrete condition of the possibility of the emergence of knowledge. At this level we are always dealing with an irrepressible and unrestricted desire to know and an unrestricted desire to be. While any knowledge remains our access to proportionate being, the only fact that will always assure science of its life as an activity which will continue to allow for the emergence of new meanings, and new worlds to be re-described, is the presence of the scientist. It is one of the real gains in reading Lonergan and Ricoeur on the question of science that an account of the scientist does not detract from the power of science to know. Quite the contrary, by attending to the scientist, one enhances the cognitive weight of scientific affirmation and imagination precisely in the dynamics of the emerging world.

The final reference to the subject warns us, though, that these agreed discoveries of Lonergan and Ricoeur do not lead to a con-

gruence in approach. The intelligibilities are sufficiently distinct to permit us to affirm only complementarity. As remarked, reference to the place of the subject in these respective intelligibilities gives rise to further questions.

One of the major assumptions of hermeneutical discourse is the view that we have moved beyond the period of all-encompassing and comprehensive systems in philosophy and theology (Ricoeur, 1985b: 280-299). Hermeneutics has integrated within its own philosophy the contingencies of our modes of knowledge. Thinking is a way making way, to use a Heideggerian expression, and it is nothing short of intellectual arrogance to assume a point of view which pretends to survey the entire history of thought and its historical conditions both past and future (Voegelin, 1974: 1-11). Interpretation has become fundamentally a mode of being human which needs to recognize its own inherent limitations, even if it possesses an unrestricted openness toward truth.

This assumption is not contested by transcendental thinkers. Indeed it is what gave birth to a new freedom of investigation in areas once thought closed to debate. Rahner spared no effort promoting his views on transcendental hermeneutics, views which acknowledged that, beyond what has already been said, more can always be said. His expression of our asymptotic approach to truth has governed our own self-understanding in relation to truth and, in the case of theology, revelation itself. Lonergan in his own right has drawn the clear distinction between knowledge of proportionate being, our finite knowledge of history, and that knowledge unique to God which understands everything about what can be understood.

These hermeneutical assumptions have not paralyzed either Lonergan or Ricoeur in their views of our capacity to make truth claims. The hermeneutical discoveries of recent years, rooted in a more profound awareness of our historical mode of being, have not for these thinkers led to a relativized notion of truth. Quite the contrary, for this discovery has enhanced their understanding both of what can be known, and of what can be known to be true.

The recognition of both the transcendental and the hermeneutical options and, at the same time, a recognition of each option's mode of access to truth, sets the context within which I shall offer

some concluding remarks on Lonergan's and Ricoeur's approach to science.

5.3 The significance of each one's proposals for the other

Although I have recognized the remarkable similarities in their assessment of and response to the contemporary epistemological crises inhabiting science, their own modes of understanding are not completely interchangeable. It is my view that each represents a complementary mode of intelligibility that enriches our fuller comprehension of the activity that science is, and of the contribution that science makes to our culture today.

Further, the modes of intelligibility are a reflection of quite distinct agenda. Lonergan's cognitional structure is identified in view of a knowledge of proportionate being; Ricoeur's, in view of the heuristic function and power of imagination. Both represent long and arduous routes on the way to self-understanding. It is not sufficient to stop here, however. Complementarity does not simply imply two distinct parallel intelligibilities that can operate independently of one another; it also implies that each illuminates in the other a moment of its own philosophical approach.

This idea of complementarity is informed by Lonergan's account of the complementarity between classical and statistical intelligibilities in science. Both intelligibilities stand for insights that are true and both insights need to be held together in an understanding of the anticipations of any working scientist today. Lonergan has argued that one of the major obstacles in contemporary thinking on science is the implicit and erroneous idea that what is sought as a result of statistical intelligibility is a schema that meets criteria anticipated by classical intelligibility. What is forgotten is that each insight represents an understanding of laws operative in the natural world which are irreducible to the other intelligibility. But together both intelligibilities contribute to an understanding of the world science investigates. In a formal way I believe that this notion of complementarity can help promote communication between the frameworks of intelligibility used by both Lonergan and Ricoeur. In the next few paragraphs I hope to show how a complementarity can

be upheld and what implications this holds for a contemporary approach to science.

I begin my remarks by picking up once more the question raised at the end of our second part (5.2) concerning the subject. How does a complementarity emerge between these two approaches, one of which begins with a heightened activity of the subject, the other with a dispossession of the subject by turning to language? What occurs as a paradox at one level, at another can be seen to be two responses to a similar problematic.

Both cases — the turn to a heightened activity of the subject, and the turn to language in the dispossession of the subject — respond to the philosophical problem of immediacy of the subject to itself and to Being. In face of idealism and its naive immediacy of the subject to its own consciousness, Lonergan and Ricoeur, confronting within the hermeneutical tradition a psychologically-based epistemology (Ricoeur, 1983: 175-178, 187-197), turned to a level of participation where, prior to the subject's immediate self-consciousness, there exists the subject's being given over to self. The irreducible medium of this givenness and the place of the subject's emergence to identity is language (Ricoeur, 1983: 175-176).

In the phenomenon of language and the structures of its cultural objectifications (especially the world objectified in texts), Ricoeur believed that he had found room for the subject to stand back from itself, dispossess itself in a world other than its own immediate one, and thus return to itself more critically. Although always written and produced by authors and poets, texts nevertheless assume a life of their own, existing independently of their original authors and cultures by virtue of the laws of syntax, grammar, and codification. This objective "sense" of the text permitted access to the world of the text by any reader, quite apart from a prior knowledge of author or originating subject. This initial reference to language and text provided an "objective" locus, a self-critical locus on behalf of the subject's appropriation of self in the world of possibilities opened by the text. For this reason Ricoeur will emphasize the reader over the author, while never denying an intentionality in the text.

Although Lonergan appears to move in the opposite direction, his strategy for dealing with the idealist subject is not dissimilar. As with Ricoeur, gone is a looking into consciousness and a more intu-

itive mode of self-apprehension. If Lonergan has surpassed this on behalf of a mode of heightened awareness of the subject, it is only *via* a long phenomenology of how a subject in her experience of being a subject turns towards herself. Whereas for Ricoeur a text provides a critical locus of distantiation on behalf of a return to self-understanding, for Lonergan the text of cognitional operations, its structure and invariant pattern of relations, becomes the critical locus of distantiation. Further, any reader of *Insight* will find this phenomenology stretched over extensive historical periods of insight as these have been experienced, principally by scientists. What at first appears to be a direct route to self-awareness becomes a long adventure into the objective operations of cognitional activity (Lonergan, 1967b).

Both thinkers offer us, therefore, a discourse on behalf of a critical self-appropriation, and both do so by turning our attention to operations whose structural complexes stand as objective regions of distantiation; and both complexes, one cognitional and the other language and its objectifications in texts, are self-constituting. Wonder and asking questions, for Lonergan, set in motion the dynamic pattern of cognitional operations; the predicative force of language accounts, in Ricoeur, for the emergence of new images at the level of composition of texts.

These reflections on each thinker's account of the critical discourse on behalf of subjectivity give evidence of a common orientation in response to a specific problematic. However, if anything accounts for their distinct but complementary approach to science, it may not be found there, but rather in their understanding of what kind of truth is sought through such critical discourses. It must be noted that the cycle of cognitive operations in approach ends with judgment, that is, a moment when it can be said, independent of cognitional operations, "this is so." The cycle of imagination in Ricoeur's approach ends with the cognitive moment called feeling, where in the subject there is a reverberation between reality and the world re-described, a moment Ricoeur would call *mimesis* (1977: 244-245; 1984: 31-87). These two endings bring together something remarkably distinct, but nonetheless essential to the comprehension of science, and each brings something enlightening to what is involved in each other's mode of intelligibility.

Let us first move from Ricoeur to Lonergan, and then back. Lonergan has recognized that imagination is a step on the way to insight (Lonergan, 1972: 86 f.; Foshay, 1986: 109-114). But his structure of cognitional operations is not identified with regard to this, but with regard to a judgment on proportionate being. Ricoeur has identified cognitional factors which are identified in view of imagination. As a result, Ricoeur's approach has the ability to promote an elaboration of a specific feature of Lonergan's phenomenology of insight, namely, an understanding of how images contribute to the emergence of our scientific intelligibility of those laws governing our world. At the same time, such a contribution has the merit of elaborating within a discussion on science a wider context than that originally identified by Lonergan. It brings immediately to the fore a recognition of the impact of culture within the framework of historical intentionality. To be sure, Lonergan is fully aware of the cultural impact on our understanding and our attempts to understand. But he begins with cognitive operations. Ricoeur, on the other hand, begins with imagination and draws us at the very outset to the level of culture; he draws us immediately and from the beginning into the wider world of cultural and scientific discourses than is admitted by an analysis of cognitional operations.

It is worth noting how often Lonergan cites Herbert Butterfield's *Origins of Modern Science*. It is a principal theme of this text that what was required in the move to modern science was a transposition from an Aristotelian view of the universe to one more accountable. Yet it is intriguing to follow the wider cultural readings that accompany the more particular readings of scientific achievements, to the point where it is very difficult to conceive of the modern revolution in science apart from many other fulfilling cultural conditions and developments.

Along with this comes an understanding of the complex of intersubjectivity which is foundational to any questioning subject. Lonergan speaks of the self-constituting dynamic of cognitional operations. This, however, is not independent of the world in which I already participate and in which I engage with my questions and sense of wonder, a world which confronts me with an order already manifest in the cultural objectifications of texts and monuments past and present.

Finally, in regard to intentionality, Ricoeur draws our attention to what is an operative heuristic in Lonergan's own account, namely, a worldview. Lonergan is well known for his account of emergent probability and the insights which have led to his unique formulation of his worldview. Lonergan also has acknowledged how such worldviews are operative in one's anticipation of insight. But emergent probability is a "view" in the sense that it is a composed image, on Lonergan's part, of the horizon before which he reads, probes, tests reality.

It would appear that while Lonergan has differentiated judgment and the unrestricted desire to know, this image of emergent probability nonetheless plays a mediating role toward a fuller and fuller relationship with reality within the structure of our intentionality. So central is this that Lonergan himself considers the crucial dialectical debates which take place at the level of worldviews to be central to our own self-appropriation. Such an image, our world view, is for anyone constitutive of the very meaning of reality and our scientific understanding of it. Here we can say that imagination gives rise to insight and, given the history of imagination, is itself a differentiation of that insight.¹⁰

There is no suggestion here that Lonergan would deny these contributions. My suggestion is, however, that a fuller account of their role and of their presence to our understanding, requires a different philosophical intelligibility from that which Lonergan was prepared to make his own. By this I simply mean the specific return of philosophical answers formulated in face of a specifically and philosophically identified range of questions.

The same can be said if we move from Lonergan to Ricoeur. Ricoeur refers to feeling as a cognitive moment bringing to a term the process of imagination. For Ricoeur an acknowledgment of the mode of feeling is important in that it reminds us of the presence of the subject in the process of imagination. Lonergan's elaboration of cognitional structure helps develop this dimension in two specific ways. First, it is important to recall with Lonergan two distinct inten-

¹⁰Besides Heidegger's remarks on the older notion of mathematics and its meaning (Heidegger, 1967: 69-76), I think a study of how "emergent probability" functions as an imaginative construct in Lonergan's work would be quite interesting to take up in this regard.

tions with regard to cognitional operations and the subject. One concerns the orientation toward being, the other toward the good. One is toward a judgment of what is, the other toward responsible decision. While the structure of cognitional operations undergirds both intentions, the character of operations in each is quite distinct (Melchin, 1987: 227-233). As a result Lonergan distinguishes the knowing subject and the existential subject. Such a distinction brings vital clarification to the meaning of Ricoeur's cognitive feature called feeling. This he links with commitment and engagement by the reader in new possibilities for being. Such a description, however, indicates that we have passed from the world of judgment, concerning what factually is, to the world of value concerning possible and probable courses of action. In my opinion it is important to maintain not only Lonergan's distinction, but also his explanation of its cognitional foundations. This is all the more important at the present time, when an evaluation of science is too quickly linked with its technological consequences, and science becomes accused of being the harbinger of a collective ideology.

That being said, the issue of the truth claim of scientific evidence and method still remains to be addressed. Does science arrive at conclusions which can be said to be true? In Ricoeur's account of the hermeneutical methodic pole called explanation, emphasis is placed in the internal coherence, readability, structural complex of inter-signifying codes and interconnected predicative statements. In general he refers to the "sense" of a text which lends itself to an analytic. For my part, I believe that Lonergan's development of the thinking subject's cognitive structure, isomorphic with the reality that is known, is enlightening. Lonergan himself has affirmed that judgment is the ability to recognize the relationship between a thing, its fulfilled conditions and whether these conditions have been met. Such a correlative cognitive act would still correspond nicely with what Ricoeur described as the interconnection of textual statements or its inner metaphorical predictions.

It is not insignificant that Ricoeur refers to explanation with a view to a methodological corrective in the human and social sciences. By attending primarily to these sciences the mode of explanation is not as fully emphasized as at the level of natural sciences. He himself admits that the type of objectivity corresponding to what is the aim of

hermeneutical philosophy, linked as it is to the research traditions of the human and social sciences, is not the same as the type of objectivity corresponding to the aim of other types of investigations (Ricoeur, 1985b: 326-327). Lonergan's clearer account of the cognitional foundations of the natural sciences, in my view, brings an enlightening precision to these observations (Byrne, 1981b).

Ricoeur's explanation of the cognitive continues to labor under the pull of metaphorical truth since this, in the long run, tends towards an elaboration of praxis and the world of possibilities. It belongs to the value of Lonergan's work to articulate a distinction that gives full merit to the cognitive weight and the explanatory pole of the natural sciences.¹¹ As a result there is no claim that feeling, being a cognitive moment pertaining to a judgment of what is, is thereby dissipated. To be sure, this remains bound with the mode and process of imagination that is acknowledged by Lonergan in his presentation of insight. Indeed it serves to re-emphasize the irreplaceable presence of the scientist to science and the affirmation of the only place where science is enacted — among scientists.

It is perhaps the paradoxical merit of Ricoeur's approach to have re-emphasized this, when for Lonergan judgment affirms what is independent of cognitional structure. For Ricoeur what is affirmed to be true in scientific texts stands awaiting further scientific readers. Once more, there is no suggestion that Ricoeur would contest these elaborations. They are the result of philosophical elaborations attending to questions drawn up according to different agenda and under the weight of distinct philosophical traditions. This does not minimize, however, the collective strength of Lonergan's and Ricoeur's approaches to the crisis of scientific knowledge and the autonomous role of this knowledge.

Beyond similarities in their approaches already accounted for, I would emphasize this complementarity which focuses on the mutual clarification one brings to the other's framework. It keeps in effect a dialectic tension which enhances our assessment of science. To use Ricoeur's words, there is a discontinuity between explanation and understanding. *Both explanation and understanding*, however,

¹¹See Van den Hengel's remarks concerning Ricoeur in Van den Hengel, 1987b.

are moments in the process of acquiring knowledge by the natural sciences themselves.

A more detailed account of both these hermeneutical poles, as rendered by Lonergan's cognitional structure and Ricoeur's method of imagination, provides an enhanced understanding of what belongs to the autonomous labor of scientific method and reason. Scientific judgment of fact cannot rest from the creative force of scientific imagination that announces a predicative thrust within any such scientific text. Such a text bears within itself creative possibilities that give rise to new questions. On the other hand such referential claims cannot have any meaning apart from the cognitive capacity of any scientist to say, "it is so," and therefore to engage, in confidence and with meaning, in further questioning, understanding, and decision making.

It is all the more important to grasp these dimensions before a philosophy of science becomes absorbed by reflections of technological achievements and their consequences. Although strongly wedded with the issue of science in our culture, the issue of technology still requires its own mode of interpretation.

It has been the major objective of this paper to pay attention to the resources that the leading figures of two contemporary philosophical traditions bring to bear on our evaluation and assessment of science. It is my hope that by listening to these figures a space may be opened within which presuppositions could be clarified and positive exchanges promoted.

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THE STRUCTURE OF CHRISTIAN PRAYER AND ITS INTEGRATION WITH THE SCIENCES

Eduardo Perez Valera S.J.

In this paper I should like to adumbrate the way towards the retrieval of the Christian mystical tradition and its integration with the academic world. I offer first a thematization of prayer in its differentiated structure; then I add a word about prayer's integration with life, mainly in the philosopher, in the natural and human scientist, and in the artist.

The word "mystical" is associated mainly with prayer. Prayer is the highest spontaneous activity of the human spirit. It is characterized primarily by the fact that it is not an achievement of the human spirit through its ordinary activities of experiencing, thinking, understanding, deliberating, loving, but must be disengaged from these activities by a strength perceived by a differentiated consciousness of the divine, a strength which transcends human nature and its world. In one word, prayer is mainly a gift, and in this paper such gift gives meaning to the word "mystical." Insofar as prayer is a human activity but not the result of human effort, it is mystical. Insofar as human effort can cooperate with the divine gift, such effort and the attitude underpinning it should be characterized as "ascetic." The interplay of both, mystical gift and ascetic effort, makes possible the performance of prayer which will be objectified here. In the measure in which such attempt is successful, it will open the view in which the Christian mystical tradition can be critically understood and prayerfully assimilated. As I will explain in due time, this interpretation of prayer may be considered as a particular example of a general law of every development, formulated by Bernard Lonergan as the law of limitation and transcendence (1957: 469-71).

In human affairs, to every differentiation there should follow a healthy integration (471-73). Authentic prayer, when dissociated from life, when dissociated from philosophy, from the sciences and from art in the philosopher, the scientists, and the artists, may in the best of all cases suffer atrophy and remain childish; in the worst, it may be deformed and present the occasion for religious illusions. Rarely, we will find a more fitting case to which may be applied the Latin tag: *corruptio optimi pessima*. In any case, after the objectification of prayer, I add a summary statement about its integration.

My attempts towards integration may be formulated as an answer to this question: What is the relationship between prayer and the academic disciplines? It seems that we have to answer what humans do when they engage in academic work, what they do when they pray, and how those endeavors are mutually related. The key to those answers may be found in Lonergan's thematization of human consciousness as constituted by five different but related levels (1957, 1972, 1973). The strategy of this paper is simply to develop such a position.

My exposition, then, falls into three parts. In a brief introduction I present the human context in which prayer occurs. This can be skipped by those familiar with Lonergan's method. In the second part, I offer a thematization of prayer, its development and some of its implications, formulated in Christian terms. In the third, I try to give expression to the integrating interplay between prayer and the academic disciplines, under the aspect of prayer laying the deepest foundation of all of them.

1. INTRODUCTION THE HUMAN CONTEXT OF PRAYER

1.1 The dynamic basis of a modern anthropology

Lonergan thematizes human consciousness to be constituted by five levels: experiencing, understanding, judging, deciding, and falling in love in an unrestricted fashion. Each of the five levels corresponds to a transcendental precept: "Be attentive, be intelligent, be reasonable, be responsible, and be in love." The levels are different,

that is, we can have mere experiencing without understanding, mere understanding without judgment in which we know our understanding to be true, mere judgment without the ethical decision to implement values, mere implementation of values without reaching the level of unrestricted love. It is true that the levels are different, but they are also related. For we cannot understand without experiencing. We cannot know the truth in judgment without understanding, we cannot choose values without judging, we cannot be in love in an unrestricted fashion without being in love with human values. Moreover, to add a basic pedagogical clarification, all the descriptions and explanations related to the five levels must be verified in ourselves. In such case, we accomplish the "self-appropriation of one's own spirit." When we do this, we get hold of the source that brings forth all human endeavors throughout history, and thereby we get hold of an instrument for the methodological re-interpretation of the past and for building up the future.

It appears at once that his thematization of human consciousness means, not only the thorough transposition envisioned by the Hegelian dialectic, from a way of thinking centered on the notion of *substance*, to that which functions in terms of the *subject*, but also a reinterpretation of the way of integration of the Thomist "mind" and the Augustinian (Pascalian and scriptural) heart. The mind corresponds to the first three levels of consciousness; the heart to the last two, where obviously, the unrestricted love of the fifth level transvaluates and sustains the love of human values of the fourth level and, by its very nature, builds the foundation of human consciousness as a whole, in a sense to be further clarified throughout this paper.

1.2 *Self-transcendence as the Criterion of Authentic Humanity*

The technical, explanatory term of the fifth level of consciousness, at which we are in love in an unrestricted fashion, is "the third level of self-transcendence." The activity that flows from it is prayer. To highlight this activity let us briefly consider the terms "self-transcendence" and "being in love in an unrestricted fashion."

At the first level of consciousness, the level of experience, and at the second, the level of intelligence, the subject performs activities

such as seeing, hearing, thinking, grasping the reason why, and so on, whose content is tied to the relativity of the subject. For instance, the same color which is seen as green by a subject, may be seen as red by another. But when we affirm anything that is true, we grasp something that is somehow *unconditioned*, *absolute*, and in that measure, *transcends* the subject. For instance, the fact that I am writing is somehow absolute, it does not depend on my cognitional activities. When I affirm it, I transcend myself. On the other hand, when the content that transcends the subject is not only affirmed but becomes the object of a decision supported by my whole being, we have the expansion of consciousness that is called love, and its state, the state of being in love.

The third level of transcendence is also related to an absolute, but such an absolute is perceived by the differentiated consciousness as having no conditions whatsoever, as unrestricted, as other-worldly, "who" reveals himself to the human spirit as an invitation to let itself be led by the Spirit; to reach the new heights that in the Christian tradition are characterized as holiness. The positive human response is generically characterized as prayer, and the state as a whole, as being in love in an unrestricted fashion.

This introduction intended to convey the general human context in which prayer occurs. Perhaps, as well, it may be conceded that the anthropological scheme is rich in implications. For instance, the dynamism of the human spirit answering its own demands, experiences, understands, judges and decides, and falls in love in an unrestricted fashion. But, when the blend of activities is concentrated on experience, it brings forth the arts; when the focus mainly is on intelligence, it brings forth the sciences; when mainly on judgment, it brings forth philosophies; when mainly on decision, it brings forth history; when the focus is on the experience of unrestricted love, depending on the context it brings forth, either the dialogue which is a communication with the Love who moves the sun and the other stars — prayer — or the science which still may have the modest claim of being the queen of them all, by serving all as laying down their deepest foundations — theology.

2. THE DIFFERENTIATION OF PRAYER

2.1 *The prayer with the whole heart and its objective pole*

After indicating the general context in which prayer occurs, in order to introduce my main explanatory term regarding the differentiation of prayer, the prayer with the whole heart, I must highlight the fifth level of consciousness, the most recondite conscious dimension belonging to the heart. As a first characterization, let us attend to the fact that the unfolding of the transcendental notion, by virtue of which the human subject is human, is not completed unless it reaches the level of the heart. In other words,

what promotes the subject from experiential to intellectual consciousness is the desire to understand, the intention of intelligibility. What next promotes him from intellectual to rational consciousness, is a fuller unfolding of the same intention: for the desire to understand, once the understanding is reached, becomes the intention of the right intelligible, of the true, and through truth, of reality (Lonergan, 1968: 22).

Moreover, the intention of the intelligible, the true, the real becomes the intention of the good, of value, when the subject confronts his world and asks what is worthwhile. But the overarching, transcendental notion of several objectives governing the expansion of human consciousness cannot stop there. For its most radical demand is for absolute truth and goodness, in the sense that they do not have any conditions whatsoever. The intention of the intelligible, truth, and value becomes, at the level of the heart, the transcendental notion of God. Human consciousness whose activity is restricted to implement the values available at the fourth level, is like the thoroughbred which stops before the last stretch and never finishes the race.

The transcendental intention makes itself present in the first three levels through questions for intelligence and for reflection. In the fourth, the psyche and the transcendental intention work together, for values are apprehended in feelings, before they become the object of the transcendental notion of value in its questions for evaluation (Lonergan, 1972: 38). Finally, in the fifth, the role of the

psyche becomes more obvious and more preponderant. As in the fourth it apprehends values, in the fifth it is transformed in the more or less burning desire for God. Such desire may ask for and obtain the cooperation of conscious intentionality, but even then, the subject cannot avoid the impression of a pursuit in the dark, till the desire for God is brought to fulfillment. From his first paper on religious experience (1969: 10-11), Lonergan described eloquently the "state of being in love in an unrestricted fashion" as a gift, because it is not the product of our knowledge and choice; as the proper fulfillment of our capacity for unrestricted questioning; and religious consciousness in general as "possessing a basis that may be broadened and deepened and heightened and enriched but not superseded"(12). In any case, the fulfillment brought about by unrestricted love sets a limit to our human capacities, for our strength is unable to bring about such a fulfillment; it sets also a limit to the expansion of consciousness, in the sense that we do not find there a sixth level, and finally, it marks the beginning of a new type of questioning, in the sense that human intentionality may be concerned with the understanding of the experienced Mystery.

I have focused on the fifth level of consciousness to fix the context within which we can speak of "the prayer of the whole heart." It can be characterized as the prayer which embodies the subject's full cooperation with the divine gift. But such summary characterization calls for some clarifications. First, then, the prayer with the whole heart is different from the state of being in love in an unrestricted fashion, as such, or, in Christian terms, from the state of loving God with one's whole heart and whole soul, with all one's mind and one's strength (Mk 12:30). If you characterize this state as "prayer," as it is not the result of human effort, it is mystical; but the prayer with the whole heart supposes the gift, it is the human effort to cooperate with the gift, it is ascetical. However, if it were not full cooperation with the gift, such prayer could not be said to be "with the whole heart." Again, meaning may be clarified through an example. A fully competent teacher may take the responsibility of helping a student. Let us suppose that with such help, the student is able to avoid all the exterior and interior hindrances to study, and reach and sustain a detached, interested attitude concentrated on understanding his subject. After a determined time, the teacher may reach the

responsible, prudential judgment that the student, despite his mediocre success at study, has been studying "with his whole mind," has been doing his very best. But a similar prudential judgment can be reached regarding a person's prayer. A woman may work wholeheartedly at removing interior and exterior hindrances to prayer; she may be attentive to implementing the conditions regarding the immediate preparation of prayer; she may persevere in prayerful concentration to be penetrated by the Christian Word. If so, she has been doing her very best to cooperate with the divine gift. When this prudential judgment is correct, this woman has been praying with her whole heart.

The prayer with the whole heart is then a general term which can be concretely applied to the prayer of St. John of the Cross and to the prayer of every one of us, when we cooperate fully with the divine gift. Obviously, it is different in different persons, and in the same person at different times, but the relevant thing is that everyone, as far as possible, cooperates fully at all times with the divine gift.

I have been trying to clarify the meaning of the basic term "prayer with the whole heart." Now I must add that this prayer leads to a direct experience of the mystery of God. However, my statement again needs elucidation. For it can be argued that the gift of being in love in an unrestricted fashion is itself a direct experience of the mystery of God. In other words, the essence of the human spirit seems to lie in its intentionality, in its capacity to ask questions, unfolding in five different levels. In ascetical terms, its essence lies in its sheer poverty, for in its most radical capacity, it can only ask like a beggar. As a desire to know, its object is being (Lonergan, 1968: 18), and being is immediately related to questioning; but the partial knowledge that humans can reach of being is mediated through the activities of experiencing, understanding, and judging. As a desire of God, its "object" is directly related to this desire, and it is fulfilled in this life through a direct experience of his mystery, through the experience of being in love in an unrestricted fashion. In this sense, the gift of being in love in an unrestricted fashion is a direct experience of the mystery of God, and it remains to be explained in which sense the prayer with the whole heart leads to a direct experience of the mystery of God.

We reach such explanation when we pay attention to the context of prayer with the whole heart and its differentiation. It supposes the gift and is performed as cooperation with the gift. In other words, it supposes an experience of the mystery of God; then, as the best way to cooperate with the gift, it is the ordinary way to deepen the experience. Of course, a new, deeper, direct experience of the mystery of God cannot be said, in a strict sense, to be mediated through prayer; it will be again totally a gift.

However, attention to the differentiation of prayer uncovers that being in love in an unrestricted fashion brings forth a longing for knowledge, and such knowledge is strictly mediated through prayer with the whole heart. While I will deal with such differentiation in the remainder of the first part of this paper, it seems convenient to attend here to the fact that the experience of being in love in an unrestricted fashion may be relatively undifferentiated, and only the prayer with the whole heart will bring to light the reaches which are hidden there like in a seed. For instance, people may enjoy a revelatory experience of the world-transcendent Good, which draws them to an attunement with Itself (Voegelin, 1957: 236-37). This may be characterized as a religious experience related to an infinite Good. However, when praying with the whole heart, the subject clearly acknowledges the mystery not of Something, but of Someone transcendent, bending Himself towards the human heart for salvation. Again, a religious person may conceive bliss vaguely, as union with God. But the prayer with the whole heart, interpreted in the light of the Christian tradition, may bring us to a supreme certainty of our eternal salvation. In that sense, it may bring about an experience of immortality. Again, as I will explain later in more detail, the religious person is instructed by the Spirit on the way towards the supreme freedom; but, ordinarily, the relatively full illumination necessary for the implementation of everyone's mission is bestowed only upon the prayer with the whole heart. Again, the gift of unrestricted love opens the way in which we can integrate everything that is compatible with it, and reject evil, which cannot be integrated; but, ordinarily, only the prayer with the whole heart can develop the delicate capacity for actual integration and discernment.

If it is true that the gift of unrestricted love is a basic component of religious involvement in all the authentic religions of the

world (Lonergan, 1969: 14), so the prayer with the whole heart would be virtually the same in all of them. Throughout this paper, however, such prayer is interpreted in a Christian context. In this sense, the direct experience of the mystery of God and the consequent prayer with the whole human heart, is the grace proper to the New Testament; through it, we enjoy total communion with the life of the Son, and by virtue of the workings of the Holy Spirit, we have immediate access to our Father in Heaven (Eph 3:8-12; Gal 4:16). It conveys directly, without intermediaries, the direct revelation of the Lord to his people, which brings to fulfillment the hopes of the prophets and the most pure aspirations of Israel (Nm 11:29; Jer 31:31-34; Ez 36:25-27; Mt 23:8-10; Jn 6:43-47; Acts 2:1-4; Rom 5:1-5; and so on). Moreover, it is not something exceptionally given, but is the ordinary context in which unfolds the life of faith, hope, and charity (1 Cor 12:31-14:1a), within the "face to face" of friendly intimacy (Nm 12:7-8). It is such experience of love which Ignatius of Loyola seems to have in mind when he writes that "it belongs to God alone to give consolation to the soul without previous cause, for it belongs to the Creator to enter into the soul, to leave it, and to act upon it, drawing it wholly to the love of His Divine Majesty ..." (Loyola: n.330). Such is our interpretation of the state of being in love in an unrestricted fashion and the consequent prayer with the whole heart (Rossi de Gasperis, 1982: 11-14). Its method is typical of the Christian tradition which, in order to reach the full meaning of the most intimate events occurring within the human heart, relates them to the historical reality of divine revelation.

I have explained in some detail the notion of the prayer with the whole heart and its objective pole. Attention to their differentiation will bring further clarifications to both. When one perseveres in praying with the whole heart, one experiences, with the movement of psychological "ups" and "downs," the strenuous struggle with oneself and the delight accompanying one's highest spontaneity, the leading hand of the Spirit. Such experience is the Christian experience of the way of the Cross and Resurrection. The thematization of its unfolding phases and their objective poles will uncover the structure of Christian prayer.

2.2 *The prayer with the whole heart as the experience of being led by the Spirit to Christ*

The prayer with the whole heart, when unfolding methodically, encompasses the experience of being interiorly led by someone. In its Christian interpretation, the leading Master is the Holy Spirit, and its objective pole is knowledge of the mystery of Christ. Let us analyze its different aspects.

The essential poverty of the human spirit asking for the intelligible, true, value-related and ultimate meaning spells its radical dependence. For its performance of getting hold of a true meaning and affirming it, of getting hold of a true value and implementing it is the conscious, essential acknowledgement of bowing to the absolute in essential dependence. Truth and value are the bread of the spirit, on which its life and growth depend in an absolute fashion. As the bow is broken by tension, so is the spirit by looseness. But once it welcomes the tension of responsible engagement, it has no alternative but to affirm truth and implement value. The limit towards which this truth points is the savory bread of unrestricted love and its realm, where human engagement and responsibility with their corresponding truths and values are the object of a transformation. But unrestricted love also transforms the native poverty of the human spirit by converting its simple intentionality into prayer. When the human spirit prays, it is able to ask for and receive the Spirit of the Lord. Such is the gift of the New Testament (Aquinas, *ST*: I-II, 106, 1 c).

Besides the liturgical, the New Testament gives witness to three different kinds of prayer. Cosmic prayer is the one in which we pray for material things (Mt 6:11), ascetic prayer (Lk 11:13) the one in which we ask the Holy Spirit for ourselves, and in the apostolic prayer (Phil 1:9) we ask the Holy Spirit for others. Perhaps any of the three kinds of prayer, if it is authentic, includes the other two in an implicit fashion. In any case, it seems that prayer, in the most strict sense, is the one asking for the Holy Spirit, and in such context, the cosmic prayer deserves also the name of prayer.

Throughout this paper, I am considering the differentiation of ascetic prayer, which asks for the Holy Spirit and his gifts. But it seems worthwhile to consider the difference between the Holy Spirit

and his gifts. For Paul speaks clearly about the gifts (1 Cor 12), while his disciple Luke prefers to speak about the Gift (Lk 11:13). Do they mean different things? The answer to this question may throw some light on the nature of ascetic prayer.

It seems that the traditional way to speak about the gifts of the Spirit has its origins in the Christian interpretation of the second verse of the messianic poem of Is. 11, listing the attributes of the Messiah. To this list the Septuagint added "piety" as a repetition of the fear of Yahweh, and so we reach the traditional "seven gifts of the Holy Spirit" (New Jerusalem Bible: 1207, d): wisdom, insight, counsel, power, knowledge, piety, and the fear of Yahweh. But, as we have said, Luke, who on this point makes a correction of Matthew, speaks only about the Gift (11:13). He seems to insinuate that the only gift really worthy of God is the gift of himself in his Holy Spirit. What, then, is the relationship between the Gift and the gifts? An example may bring some light. In the center of the sun, we would be unable to perceive colors, not because of the absence of light, but because the light available there is disproportionate to the workings of the human eye. Only when the light of sun penetrates the earthly atmosphere, are there formed the colors violet, blue, yellow, and so on, which are adapted to the weakness of the human sight.

In a similar fashion, we can understand the multiplicity of the gifts and the singularity of the Gift. The Holy Spirit heals our weakness when he is given to us as "power," heals our lack of cordiality towards God and towards people when he is given as "piety." Moreover, to enliven our dullness for apprehending the truth, we receive him as "insight"; to adapt truth to practical affairs of daily life, as "counsel"; to perfect our capacity to judge, as "wisdom" and as "knowledge." In one word, as the Holy Spirit is one, the Gift is one, as our weaknesses are manifold, the gifts are many. This analysis coincides with Lonergan's remark on the subject (Robert, 1986: 338). He prefers to speak about the Gift, the love that is given (Rom 5:5). But he goes on to add that from this love proceed judgments of value, and from these judgments of value a different kind of love: the responsible action that implements them. In a similar fashion, the Holy Spirit is thought to proceed in the Holy Trinity. Moreover, Lonergan tells us that faith is the glance, the eye of love; hope is the confidence in the Beloved one; and the gifts of the Holy Spirit are other effects flowing

from such faith, confidence, and love. In this context, prayer with the whole heart is the loving action implementing a value judgment out of love and asking for the gifts of Love.

We have found an analogy between the performance of the human spirit asking for the intelligible, the true, and the good, and that of the same spirit asking for the gifts of the Holy Spirit. Now we may turn to the analogy between the guidance received by the human spirit from the unrestricted desire to know, in order to reach understanding, and that received by the subject praying with the whole heart from the Holy Spirit, to reach knowledge of the mystery of Christ.

Loneragan has made us familiar with the heuristic techniques that are an objectification of the way the desire to know leads the subject towards understanding. When solving a problem in algebra, we have to name the unknown, to infer its properties, to combine them and form an equation, so that the whole solution makes the unknown into a known. Again, when looking for the nature of things, the empirical inquirer anticipates some undetermined function to be the required function. Then he or she moves towards its determination by writing down differential equations, one of whose solutions will be the function he or she is looking for (1957: 36-39). The relevant point here is that those procedures are not arbitrary, but simply the objectification of the desire to know opening the way towards understanding. We can generalize and discover the leading role of the desire to know in intellectual development as a whole. The subject is led to integrate data and images in insight. The effort to formulate systematically what has been understood, or the effort to act upon it, gives rise to further questions, directs attention to further data, leads to the emergence of further insights, and so the wheel of development turns anew. Such is the dynamism of the desire to know, breaking always new ground, incarnating itself in individuals and receiving Nobel prizes each year.

But still more impressive is the guidance that humans may receive at the level of the heart. For, on the one hand, the leading dynamism of the desire to know heads certainly towards self-transcendence, because women and men cannot avoid meeting the question of whether their understanding is true. But the desire itself, with its normative character is immanent in the subject. On the other

hand, when praying with the whole heart, the subject soon comes to experience that he, in his heart, is being led, not by any immanent, normative force, but by someone transcending the human heart. In the dark realm of the psyche, the inner eye discovers a tiny ray of light opening a way. But the subject does not dare to walk there alone, because he has discovered that in such a realm walking alone is equivalent to getting lost. Moreover, the guidance of the transcendent spirit is experienced as both gentle and overpowering. It is gentle, because it does not impose itself upon the heart, it does not force anything; a refusal to be led would be enough to make him impotent. It is felt, however, as overpowering in the sense that it communicates a certainty about the authenticity of its action not available in the realm of common sense, science, or philosophy; and engenders such a conviction about its efficacy that the subject cannot but bow, accept, thank, and adore (John of the Cross, *Ascent of Mount Carmel*, fourth stanza).

Moreover, as the desire to know leads to an inner word, insight, to be incarnated in an outer word, expressions, so the Holy Spirit leads the human heart to intimate knowledge of the Inner Word spoken in the bosom of the Father and incarnated in Mary. And here, again, inner experience and external historical revelation join hands. The subject's intimate knowledge of the mystery of the Word discovers him as living with the Father and in the Father (Jn 1:1-2:18; 14:1-4, 9-11; 20:1-18), as not having any consistency in himself (Lk 23:46; Jn 5:19-30; 7:16-18; 8:26, 28-29, 42; 12:49-50; 14:10-11), but as eternally and totally "towards the Father" (Jn 1:1-2:18), leading his earthly life in him and for him (Jn 6:57; 17:1-26; and so forth). Furthermore, this knowledge possesses a quality of interiority and intimacy lacking in any other kind of knowledge. Here, again, Lonergan lends us a hand for its characterization. A driver may have a relatively thorough knowledge of his car, but he does not become through that knowledge a car, nor does a physicist become an atom because he knows the inner nature of the atom. But philosophical insight implies a kind of identification with its object. In a sense, Lonergan's *Insight* wants to convey only one basic insight leading to the basic knowledge of what a *critical subject* is (1972: 83). It is the special case of the general structure in which *understanding* a thing demands that you *become* the thing you want to understand. It is possible that a reader understands the words of the book, without understanding what the words

try to communicate. It will be a colorless and superficial understanding. But if together with the words, she understands the thing, she will be a critical subject because she understands and responsibly affirms its nature. She will have an incarnate knowledge of herself as subject.

The quality of the philosophical insights throws some light on the meaning of "Christian divinization," as the word was employed by the Greek Fathers (Rahner, 1969: 413); of the Christian identification and transformation in Christ, as the Christian tradition has preached throughout the centuries. In their scriptural roots, those things are connected with the allegory of the true vine (Jn 15:1-17), with the Pauline injunction to make our own the mind of Christ Jesus (Phil 2:5), with the experiential fact it is no longer I who is alive, "but Christ living in me" (Gal 2:20). From the point of view of theological explanation, they result from the knowledge of the mystery of Christ flowing from unrestricted love, fostering unrestricted love, demanding transformation and identification, and effecting divinization. It is the typical knowledge of the mystery of Christ bestowed on the one who prays with the whole heart.

But there is a still further aspect in which the assimilation of the book *Insight* illuminates a basic truth of Christian spirituality. Obviously, the writing of *Insight* is the result of a relatively thorough assimilation of a tradition. It supposes the discovery of the centrality of the act of insight in the Aristotelian and Thomist tradition, the discovery of judgment as related to the Thomist *esse* (Lonergan, 1967b: 1-95), the cognitional analysis of the acts of understanding of modern scientists and modern historians (1957: 33-69; 1972: 197-220). Moreover, it demands from the reader what I have characterized in this section as "incarnate knowledge." If the reader wants to understand, he or she must become what he or she wants to understand. In the measure in which the reader accomplishes that, the tradition to which *Insight* belongs will be alive in him or in her. But the primitive Christian church holds a parallel view continued to this day by the Catholic tradition. According to Louis Bouyer, in Protestantism everything is said to go on as if the Incarnation has ended with the Ascension of the Lord. "The memory of that past incarnation preserved in the Gospels seems to furnish simply an occasion for the direct contact of each individual soul with the Word that has once for

all set down its human expression in these books alone" (Bouyer, 11). But in the Catholic vision, the incarnation of Christ goes on until the end of the world, for Christ is alive in his Body, the Church, through the Holy Spirit. Such is the truth experienced by the man or woman praying with the whole heart, when he or she receives knowledge of the mystery of Christ. Accordingly, as the incarnation of Christ was accomplished through Mary, so Christ's incarnation in his Body, the Church, cannot be otherwise. However, this truth is not the result of sheer deduction. Before Christians reached such a conclusion, it was an experiential fact interpreted under the light of the Spirit (Haughton: 174-212).

Finally, let us add a word about the source of this wondrous, Christian illumination. In the Christian tradition, the baptism of Christ is the mystery of his illumination: "You are my Son" (Mt 3:17). The insight of his divine sonship arises from the unrestricted love in his heart through the Holy Spirit, and incarnates itself in his human consciousness. It clarifies for him the mystery of his own incarnation, the meaning of his life and the heart of his message (Lonergan, 1964a: 332-416). When we pray with the whole heart, we may participate in such illumination. The religious insight in which we discover at the same time God as our Father, our divine adoptive sonship, and our union with the Son, constitutes the supreme illumination of the meaning of human existence.

2.3 The prayer with the whole heart is a struggle with oneself and leads to an experience of Christian freedom

In this section we propose to explain in more detail the prayer with the whole heart as the strenuous effort to cooperate with the Spirit, and its objective pole: the way of self-realization in freedom.

When dealing with genetic method, Lonergan is concerned with outlining the structure of development in the organism, in the animal, and in the human being (1957: 458-83). In every case of development, we find an upwardly directed dynamism effecting an integration of the underlying manifolds. Such dynamism is responsible for the acts of intussusception, assimilation, and excretion in the organism, on the basis of physical and chemical manifolds; for acts of perception, conation, and response in the

animal, which constitute a new integration of the organic; for insights, formulations, and judgments integrating psychic underlying manifolds; for deliberations, evaluations, decisions bestowing a new integration upon intelligence; for the unrestricted love, integrating and transforming the whole. As in the plant there is the single development of the organism, so human development is at once organic, psychic, intelligent, moral, and spiritual, where spiritual is related to the fifth level of consciousness. In this context, we are concerned with the human, conscious tension between the integrating dynamism and the underlying manifold to be integrated. Because of the concrete development to be operated, there is tension. For instance, "present perceptiveness is to be enlarged, and the enlargement is not perceptible to present perceptiveness. Present desires and fears have to be transmuted, and the transmutation is not desirable to present desire, but fearful to present fear" (Lonergan, 1957: 473).

Moreover, such tension occurs between limitation and transcendence. Underlying manifolds play a limiting role. The integrating principle is unrestricted. But healthy development supposed the interaction of both. If, in the intellectual pattern of experience, we forget our limitations and give free rein to the desire to know, sooner or later we will collapse on the way. But through trial and error, we may obtain harmonious cooperation from both principles of development, and so we can reach the golden point of utmost efficiency with a minimum of fatigue. Something similar may happen at the fifth level of consciousness. There, the desire of God demands from us full cooperation; but if we forget that this means cooperation within our human limitations, we will be heading not towards holiness, but towards a nervous breakdown. It is a rare achievement to know precisely what we know and what we do not know; but it is not a lesser achievement to know exactly what we can and what we cannot do. However, in the realm of prayer there is no acceptable alternative to the fact that we must find out, through trial and error, what is the concrete, full cooperation demanded from us by the Spirit of the Lord. For doing less would be laziness, and trying to do more, recklessness. Equally distant from each extreme is the prayer with the whole heart.

Accordingly, the prayer with the whole heart implies a development. It starts with the general desire to cooperate fully with the Spirit (Loyola, n.5), and its unfolding entails a war with oneself in order to attain, within the highest tension of limitation and transcendence, the golden point in which deepest engagement and utmost detachment blend together in harmony. In the prayer with the whole heart, opposed elements constitute a balanced unity. Its experiential aspect of limitation and transcendence builds up the empirical counterpart of the theological point made by the theology of the past, according to which the converted Christian is *simul iustus et peccator*, at one and the same time both just and sinner (Meyer, 64). Moreover, the unfolding of the prayer with the whole heart embodies the harmonious unity of many other elements opposed among themselves. In the intellectual pattern of experience, the search for knowledge brings together my ignorance of the unknown and a certain kind of knowledge of the unknown. For, on the one hand, I am ignorant: if I had knowledge I would not be looking for it. On the other, if I did not know at least some qualities of the unknown, I could not look for it either.

Something analogous occurs in prayer. I am supposed to ask for the gifts of the Spirit, but I do not know concretely what I am praying for, as long as I do not receive them. My prayer cannot avoid being in the dark. But at the same time, I am supposed to pray with the profound confidence that I will receive what I am praying for. It is a blend of helpless ignorance and confidence, where confidence lightens and enlightens the dark path of prayer. Again, prayer with the whole heart is the experience of making my most strenuous effort to attain what I am praying for. I cannot, however, expect anything at all on the basis of my effort alone. For if it were the result of my effort alone, it would not be the *gift* I am praying for. Prayer with the whole heart is, then, a blend of my utmost effort with acknowledgement of my total impotence. Such effort usually is performed within the peace that the world cannot give (Jn 14:27).

The foregoing can be expressed more concretely through some examples. Christian conversion begins with repentance (Acts 2:38), but repentance supposes the gift of knowledge of our sins. We may be ready to accept our superficial moral failure, but usually we have some difficulty in acknowledging in ourselves our radical sinfulness,

that dimension of lovelessness different from moral evil and mostly hidden from us by sustained superficiality (Lonergan, 1972: 242). But it can be acknowledged by the man or the woman who decides to cooperate with the Spirit by turning from distraction to recollection, from the simple absorption in worldly tasks to the inner service of the Word, which comprehends and transforms the worldly tasks. When this happens, we realize that prayer removes an obstacle of subtle self-centeredness: the point of departure of the prayer asking for the deeply felt, life-giving knowledge of sin is not our sins, but the Word revealing to us that we are sinners. Something similar happens when we pray for the transforming knowledge of the Lord. We are likely to begin praying from our own experience to look for situations in his life with which we can identify. However, "if we insist on understanding Christ by understanding ourselves, on grasping the meaning of his life by using our lives as reference points" (Lustiger, 1988: 8), we soon discover that we cannot go far in prayer. The man or woman praying with the whole heart has to learn to make the Word his or her starting point, to wait for the guidance of the Spirit, to adapt his or her intelligence and psyche, so that he or she can persevere to the end. In any case we learn that such a path is both humiliating and illuminating. It is humiliating because the intellect comes to the discovery that, in the last analysis, it is not master, but servant. It is illuminating, because we are shown the other-worldly horizon in which the things of this world are understood in their deepest meaning. Such is the prize bestowed on human effort, when we remove the subtle self-centeredness which prevents us from discovering experientially the key to self-realization: making the Word the center of our prayer, and, consequently, of our lives.

The objective pole of our prayerful effort is constituted by self-realization in freedom. The prayer with the whole heart shifts from the general desire to cooperate with the Spirit to the actual performance of cooperation, and issues in the knowledge of a personal mission whose accomplishment is equivalent to living out one's identity.

Lonergan adopted from Joseph de Finance the notion of vertical liberty, refined it and integrated it thoroughly into his thought. Life in freedom is characterized negatively as the one that has not yet emerged inasmuch as one just drifts through life (1972: 40). A man or

a woman is said to be a drifter in the measure in which he or she says, thinks and does what everyone else is thinking, saying, doing and everyone else is drifting too. But sooner or later humans awake to the fact that they have to take the responsibility of their own lives, and then, their whole existence becomes a living question for themselves. It can work unexpressed, under the shade of consciousness, in the search for authentic values; or it can be expressed in the existential question: *What am I going to make of myself?* Such a question is rich in implications. First of all, it gives expression to the human call for responsible and authentic action. It implies acceptance of my responsibility in regard to my life and to the limitations under which I must choose. For the naked fact of my birth, talents, and deficiencies and the circumstances surrounding my life are mostly beyond my control. Moreover, if that question leads to freedom, it also implies a condition of freedom, in the sense that once the question is put it demands a responsible answer that is itself not free but constitutes the very root of freedom. In other words, I may choose to be a lawyer, or a physician, or an engineer, but under the condition that my answer implies my decision to try to be first of all *an authentic human being*.

Any answer to the existential question, which excludes human authenticity is rejected peremptorily by human consciousness, as the stomach would reject a stone offered as food. Again, the existential question demands the knowledge of human reality necessary for choosing the answer and implementing the consequent decision. And so, choosing to be a physician means choosing a long university education providing the knowledge and training necessary for the practice of the profession. In any case, the existential decision demands the search for light illuminating the chosen path. Lastly, the authentic implementation of the existential decision determines the measure in which existential freedom has been won. In the human condition, it usually appears as a more or less conspicuous gap between the ideal and the implementation. And this gap spells the need of salvation.

We are already familiar with the notion of sublation; and when the existential question is put in the context of the fifth level of consciousness, the question itself and the possibility of its answer undergo a wondrous transformation. First of all, the question itself is

transformed: *What am I supposed to make of myself according to God's will?* The consideration of its implications will bring to light the extent of the transformation.

First, then, the question implies that we can know God's will about ourselves, make it our own, and implement it in our lives. The general premise of such will is supplied by the content of Christian revelation, inasmuch as every Christian is called to be perfect as the Father (Mt 5:48) by reproducing on earth the image of the Son. Such divine will is general, but must be concretely self-appropriated by every Christian, and the royal way to self-appropriation is the prayer with the whole heart. The content of the enlightenment given through it to every Christian spells the concrete, personal image of the Lord to be appropriated and expressed in life under the form of a particular charism or ecclesial role to be performed. Like the Lukan, Markan, and Pauline Christ, the authentic Christ of every Christian is both concrete and universal. Furthermore, any authentic life reproducing the image of the Son demands ever a new search for new light. This new light, when given, provides the background in which the Christian can reach a fuller knowledge of the divine will by interpreting his or her human, historical reality. Moreover, as the light gives also the strength to reach and implement a fuller and deeper freedom, the progressive succession of search, discovery and implementation of divine light throughout a lifetime constitutes the supreme achievement of human existence.

2.4 *The prayer with the whole heart as play, leading to an experience of the Church*

Play signifies here the aesthetic dimension of human life exhibiting the easy unfolding of human spontaneity. Lonergan gives expression to it when dealing with the aesthetic pattern of experience (1957: 184-85). My point in this section is that, as the aesthetic dimension may blend with the intellectual and dramatic pattern of experience, it may also transform prayer. Its implication is that this fact nuances my reference to falling in love in an unrestricted fashion as the highest human spontaneity. Certainly the intentional operations of every level of consciousness are spontaneous, and the fifth level is the highest. But the gift of being in love in an unrestricted fashion,

without our cooperation, would die away like a burning flame without fuel. However, if we acknowledge that, as loving Love, our cooperation with the gift is also spontaneous, then we have to hold that, in fact, our highest spontaneity is not falling in love in an unrestricted fashion, but our wholehearted cooperation with the gift, that is, the prayer with the whole heart. Moreover, because the prayer with the whole heart, if it has any meaning at all, means marshalling all the intentional and psychic energies with their bodily basis, in the service of the praying heart, so its cooperation with the gift of love, as I will explain later in more detail, must go as far as to persevere in transforming those intentional-psychic energies and body, every single second of every minute, throughout a lifetime. But that is dramatic artistry. Its aim is the realization of the highest desire living in the human heart, that is, to transform one's life into a work of art. Its ascetic Christian expression is praying without intermission. Its objective pole is identified with its historical, intersubjective dimension: the Church.

When dealing, then, with the aesthetic pattern of experience (1957: 184), Lonergan thematizes the experience that can occur for the sake of experiencing, slip beyond the confines of serious-minded biological purpose, and so cause a liberation heralded by a self-justifying, spontaneous joy. We do not have any difficulty in identifying such experience in the exuberance of life breaking through the barriers of the instinct of conservation and manifesting itself in the untiring play of children, in the agility and beauty of the sports, in the contemplation of the backward and forward motion of the sea waves under the spring sun. The delight going along with aesthetic experience and its ecstatic quality may appear in different realms, but usually not before paying the price of a great toil. The experience of a painter fighting with shapes and colors to give expression to his meaning may be anything but aesthetic experience. The joy and exhilaration felt by a friend of mine when teaching differential equations, was preceded by many years of effort at mastering the subject. And prayer with the whole heart may become itself an aesthetic experience. The praying Christian is engaged in listening in awe and reverence to the Word; and his or her activity may be considered as following the advice of J.A. Bengel in his preface to the *Greek New Testament* (1974), which has the ring of a golden saying: *Te totum*

applica ad textum; rem totam applica ad te, "apply yourself thoroughly to the text; apply its content thoroughly to yourself." The first part of the advice spells usually the strenuous effort that the Word demands from the praying Christian; the second is related to his or her dramatic artistry. In any case, thorough application to the Word results not in penetrating the Word, but in being penetrated by the Word and the ensuing delightful, ecstatic, savory, eminently liberating contemplation that may be identified with aesthetic experience.

As a delightful unfolding of one's spontaneity, the prayer with the whole heart, then, brings about an aesthetic liberation. But now I have to explain that, as a constituent of the dramatic pattern of experience, it also effects a dramatic liberation. If the man moving in the direction of the dramatic pattern of experience is carried by the conspicuous concern to get things done, when praying with the whole heart, he is actually carrying into effect his fullest cooperation with the work of the Spirit. In this sense, prayer belongs to the dramatic pattern. Moreover, its influence upon its dramatic artistry is paramount.

Dramatic artistry works toward the harmonious unity of responsible engagement and utmost detachment embodied in a docile psyche. Engagement and detachment are demands of human intentionality. But the perceiving and feeling function in the animal, and indeed in the human animal, is a self-attached and self-interested center within its narrow world of stimuli and responses. Antecedently one could despair of bringing together into an harmonious unity such divergent, opposed principles of action; and despair would be the ordinary outcome in the man or the woman striving for authenticity on the basis of human strength alone. But we are not left to our own devices. We not only receive the Spirit of the Lord, but by virtue of the same Spirit, we are able to cooperate with the Lord through the light-giving prayer with the whole heart. The Spirit is both Master and Physician, teaching and healing through light. First of all, then, prayer with the whole heart is already the highest possible unity between detachment and responsibility on the one hand, and the center of sensations, feelings, memories, images, conations which is the human psyche, on the other. Of course, such unity of opposites may be feeble, precarious, easily shattered; but my point here is that

the prayer with the whole heart tends to strengthen this unity, to build it up into a living, developing dynamism ever more balanced and steadfast. For love is healing and life-giving. It heals the unconscious realm of the psyche, it fortifies intelligence and imagination, so that their pre-conscious cooperation to select images for conscious attention, insight, judgment, and decision is free from the bias that would overwhelm the light of consciousness with the darkness of elementary passions (Doran, 1979: 155). Again, the prayer with the whole heart fortifies and refines the workings of human intentionality. It liberates it

from the individual bias that would grant to the satisfaction of one's ego a privileged and eventually solitary place in the list of motives that govern one's decisions and performance and would arbitrarily brush aside the questions that challenge such an allegiance to oneself; ... from the group bias that would identify the human good with what is good for one's intersubjective group or social class or nation; from the general bias that neglects the questions and refuses the insights that would arise from an intelligence that takes its stand on the inherent dynamism of its own love of intelligibility, truth and value (Doran, 1979: 155).

And, of course, more than anything, on the love of God. Such is the dramatic liberation brought about by the prayer with the whole heart. While in the next section I will nuance further my present statement about the relation between dramatic liberation and prayer, it is true that prayer reconciles a woman with herself by reconciling her with her Creator. She can go forward in inner freedom to accomplish her mission, in the affective detachment from inner states and outer objects and situations, that matches the detachment communicated by the Spirit of the Lord.

We have been dealing with the prayer with the whole heart as the agent of an aesthetic and dramatic liberation, which thereby makes possible authentic dramatic artistry. Now let us explain that the prayer with the whole heart is thoroughly personal, and for that very reason, communitary. We have repeatedly alluded to the spontaneity of human intentionality unfolding through five levels of consciousness. But the accompanying intersubjective dimension is no less spontaneous. Such spontaneity is already present in the primitive community, in which

the bond of mother and child, man and wife, father and son, reaches into a past of ancestors to give meaning and cohesion to the clan or tribe or nation. A sense of belonging together provides the dynamic premise for common enterprise, for mutual aid and succor, for the sympathy that augments joys and divides sorrows" (Lonergan, 1957: 212).

On such primitive spontaneity human intentionality exerts its sway and builds up the community, as achievement of common meaning. Therefore, there is community in the measure in which there is a common field of experience, common understanding, common areas in which all affirm and deny in the same manner, common decision flowering in the love that holds together families, cities, nations (Lonergan, 1972: 79). At the level of unrestricted love we identify the Christian community as the living Body of the Lord, in which unrestricted love finds its fullest meaning as the love of God flooding our heart through the Holy Spirit; the prayer with the whole heart finds its fullest meaning as the highest spontaneous cooperation with his work, and the ensuing dramatic artistry as the specific cooperation with the Spirit, in order to transform the persons who will transform the world into the Kingdom of God. In one word, the prayer with the whole heart is also the experience of the Church in the measure in which its roots, lying in unrestricted love, and its unfolding and its consequences find their fullest meaning in the revelation of God through Jesus Christ, mediated through the centuries by the Christian community. Such is the communitary aspect of Christian prayer, even when performed behind closed doors (Mt 6:6). Let us add a word about its personal aspect emerging as such from the community.

Lonergan draws our attention to the contemporary notion of the person, coming out of genetic biology and psychology.

From the "we" of the parents comes the symbiosis of mother and child. From the "we" of the parents and the symbiosis of mother and child comes the "we" of the family. Within the "we" of the family emerges the "I" of the child. In other words, the person is not the primordial fact. What is primordial is the community. It is within community through the intersubjective relations that are the life of community that there arises the differentiation of the individual person" (1973: 58).

From this point of view, it is obvious that the spiritual development achieved through the prayer with the whole heart is thoroughly an ecclesial experience; that liturgical prayer and ascetical prayer are not contradictory but complementary; that prayerful solitude has meaning only within the solidarity of the community, and that this prayer leads to a deeper experience of it. Such is the story of the divine vocations in the Bible. The individual is temporarily separated from the community, as in the case of Noah, Abraham, Moses, Paul; but their transformation in solitude is the beginning of the transformation of the community as a whole.

The Christian theological tradition has been able to find some imperfect but fruitful understanding of the Trinity through the psychological analogy. In Lonergan's version, we are presented with the definition of the intelligible emanation describing the way in which the concept is born from the act of insight. Then we are led to extrapolate the definition on the supposition of insight being infinite, and to draw out the consequences (Lonergan, 1964b: 70). Such consequences coincide with the dogmatic pronouncements which are the result of the slow, painstaking historical development of the Christian dogma, accomplished through the first twelve centuries. Some of us find rather surprising the fact that the analysis of the human insight ties in with the historical development of dogma. But no less surprising is the fact that the prayer of the whole heart discovers the very roots of the historical Church. For certainly the most intimate experiences of prayer find their fullest meaning in the meaning mediated by the Church. The reason is that the source itself of the tradition is constituted by prayer. *Cor ad cor loquitur!*

2.5 *Prayer with the whole heart unfolds through psychological "ups" and "downs" and leads to an experience of discernment*

When engaged in the exercise of intensive prayer, a person may find himself or herself in three different, opposed situations. Two of them may occur when praying with the whole heart; the third excludes such prayer. Here I will try to objectify those situations with the help of terms from depth-psychology.

A stream of feeling flows together with every human activity. What is obvious in the fan cheering for the team is also true of the scholar immersed in books, of the business person signing a transaction, of the monk engaged in meditation. According to Jung, in psychological terms, the intentionality manifested in such acts as questioning, understanding, deliberating and their ever accompanying flow of feeling have their origin in the deepest layer of the unconscious, whose energy is regulated by the "principle of opposed elements" and the "law of progression and regression" (Jung, 1960: 32-66). The principle of opposed elements explains that the tension between the elements generates life. According to Jung, the mythic explanation of the origin of the universe as the result of tension between opposed elements is no more than the psyche's projection of its own mode of operating. In any case, to some extent we can experience the tension between sleep and wakefulness, work and rest, the primitive passion of hate changing itself into love, and that of love into hate (2 Sam 13). In a similar fashion, "progression" and "regression" are observable phases within the movement of psychic energy. Progression gives expression to the movement of life when everything goes smoothly, when daily advance in the adaptation to life is successful. This situation changes when the progressive movement of psychic energy collides with some barrier. This obstacle prevents its smooth flow and the balance in the tension between the elements is disrupted. Instead of harmony, peace, and order, discord, agitation and confusion reign. The conflict generates new energy, and in the measure to which it is not employed in adapting the person to the demands of life, it may be accumulated and repressed into the unconscious.

The prayer with the whole heart is the result of the tension between the desire of God and the transcendent mystery of God. For this reason, psychic energy is more than ever subject to different kinds of pulls and counterpulls. When persevering in prayer, a person may oscillate between two extreme situations. The first one is constituted mainly by an experience of peace, light, and love (Loyola, n. 316, 330). Any kind of friction in the tension of opposed elements disappears from consciousness and gives to to a wondrous splendid harmony penetrated by otherworldly peace. The heart is so overflowing with, and inflamed by, the love of the Creator that the love of

created things is thoroughly encompassed within it. The knowledge flowing from it is luminous, the confidence deep. It brings the human heart out of itself, so that it is obvious that it cannot be produced or reproduced by its native strength. At the same time, denying its occurrence would be equivalent to self-denial.

The second situation is opposed to the first. As the first is constituted by an experience of peace, light, and love, so in the second situation the tension between the poles gives way to an experience of restlessness, darkness, and forlornness (Loyola, n. 317). When confronting such a situation, the praying person may believe that, as the sun is surely there behind the dense clouds, so God's existence has not been impaired in any way by his or her experience; that he or she has just temporarily lost "sight" of the divine mystery. But such faith does not take away anything from the fact that earthly things exert upon his or her sensibility a counterpull that apparently has nothing to do with divine love, that confidence tends to give way to despair; that the experienced darkness may be felt as absolutely meaningless, and for that reason is very difficult to bear. Sometimes the praying person may have some inkling that, as with the first experience, the cause of the second transcends the human heart.

I have described two extreme dispositions that may arise in the person praying with the whole heart. But there is a third possibility, opposed to these two. It may occur when the desire to cooperate fully with the Spirit is present within a person, but the tension between the desire of God and his mystery, either is not felt at all in consciousness, or it gives way to an unhealthy strain of body and mind. In the first case, the attention is unfocused, the imagination is loose (Loyola, n. 6). In the latter, some concern alien to prayer prevents psyche and intentionality from concentrating in the Word. In both cases, the prayer with the whole heart is excluded.

The "ups" and "downs" of prayer, *when properly interpreted under the light of the Spirit*, indicate a path that is both human and divine. It is divine because it can only be perceived through the light that is a gift, and because the delineation of the path is, and is perceived to be, in the last analysis, the work of the Giver. It is also human because a woman or man can make that path her or his own.

But in the whole process, the work of discernment is paramount. Here we have to be satisfied with the outline of its

general structure. First we have to explain the anthropological component to be subsumed under the dynamics of the two-edged sword of the Word of God (Heb 3:12).

In human affairs, every methodical activity operates in a scissors-like fashion (Lonergan, 1957: 33-69; 312-13, 522-23, 577-78, 580-81, 586-87; see *Insight*, index under Heuristic). The upper blade is a form to be applied to the lower which is the material component. For instance, playing a baseball game is a matter of using the skills available in a team according to the techniques operating in the manager's mind. In physics, moving towards the determination of an undetermined function is a matter of operating under the light of differential equations. This idea of methodical activity can open the way towards the unification of the sciences. For as all of them are the result of experiencing, understanding, judging, and deciding — in other words, as all of them are the result of the workings of the dynamic structure of knowing and willing applied to different sets of data — so they can be reinterpreted under the light of the same structure and yield the *philosophy of mathematics*, the *philosophy of religion*, the *philosophy of history*, and so on. In this case, the formal, upper blade is *philosophy of the dynamic structure*; the lower, the particular disciplines (Lonergan, 1967a: 198). Therefore, when we grasp the dynamic structure, we discover a principle of unification for the sciences.

Our point here, of course, is that such achievement is the result of a painstaking work of discernment. For the discovery of our own insight is accomplished through the actual discernment between intellect and sense, between light and darkness. Discovering the difference between insight and judgment means the actual discernment between light in general and light that possesses a certain absolute character (Lonergan, 1957: 280-1). But once we have performed such exercise, we are ready for a different kind of discernment. We can tell the difference between the statements that are consistent with our self-affirmation, the positions, and those that are not, the counter-positions. We may even develop the skills to discern and appropriate what is valuable in the counter-positions (387-90). Moreover, we may be ready for a more painful, existential discernment and uncover in ourselves the underdevelopment of intelligence which is equivalent to personal and group egoism, or the self-

centeredness which is blind to the views that bear fruits only in the long run (218-242).

But this is not the whole story. For, as I remarked at the beginning of this section, besides the intentional activities unfolding in five different levels, there is the stream of feeling permeating the intentional operations and undergoing a change as the operations move from one level to the next. The proper unfolding of the operations marks the path where one constitutes one's world. However, the proper unfolding of intentionality may be blocked by feelings preventing one, for example, from understanding correctly a situation, and urging one to judge without understanding. In this way, the intentional process constituting one's world goes astray. As we learned through insight into insight to discern between positions and counterpositions, so to bring a remedy to this situation we have to learn, under the light of insight into insight, to discern between blocking and creative feelings: to disengage from our feelings the meaning attached to the images evoking them or of being evoked by them; to go on to understand their origin in the unconscious, through the understanding of our dreams, and their effect in our bodily movements through the asceticism of continuous attention. In this way we can learn to negotiate with our psyche — sensitivity and feelings — to transform it, so that it becomes a docile and creative partner of intentionality. Such is the discernment whose subtle strategy and implications has been expounded by Robert Doran in his works *Subject and Psyche* and *Psychic Conversion and Theological Foundations*. The purpose of such intellectual and psychic discernment is to find ever more clearly the path of freedom, leading to ever fuller self-realization.

I have presented the general strategy of philosophic and psychic discernment associated with the discovery of the scissors-like workings of method. Under the light of the dynamic structure, the sciences somehow may become one and the psyche may be transformed.

Now I have to explain that Christian discernment works also in a scissors-like fashion. The upper blade is constituted by the horizon of the Word of God penetrating human intentionality and psyche through the prayer with the whole heart. The lower blade is constituted by one's concrete situation.

Spiritual discernment is a matter of finding out what the will of God is, so that we are able to choose the best, according to God's will (Loyola, n. 139). In general, it will be acknowledged that an accurate grasp of an object supposes the entrance into its proper horizon. It is impossible to understand the theory of relativity from the point of view of common sense, and we cannot grasp the structure of knowledge outside the horizon of interiority. But something analogous can be said also in regard to decisions. When a man or a woman considers making a decision, more than anything else his or her life horizon, world, basic orientation, habitual atmosphere, is of greater significance. For it is in the light of this horizon that one is going to deliberate and interpret concrete situations, circumstances, and events. In the case of Christian discernment, such a comprehensive view cannot be different from the horizon of the Word of God, where we are introduced by the Spirit when praying with the whole heart. Such prayer supposes faith that the whole truth of man and woman and their world cannot be grasped from a horizon different from that of the Word, and fosters the desire to live within that world forever (Acts 1:14; 2:42,46; 6:4; 11:23-24, and so on). As we have seen, prayer also accomplishes the purification and illumination of mind and heart, so that they may be transformed into a home of wisdom, where insight and knowledge of the Word become the bread of life. Such, then, is the upper blade of Christian discernment.

The lower blade is constituted by the manifold of events and circumstances which constitute a person's life situation. While here I cannot go into concrete examples, I must stress that prayer with the whole heart cannot be "with the whole heart" if it fails to deliberate and to find the will of God and implement it. Prayer that falls short of such cooperation with the Spirit is like the tree which receives nutrition from the earth, grows beautifully, branches gorgeously, reaches full bloom, but fails to bear fruit. Prayer with the whole heart should transcend the time of formal, ascetic prayer and transform itself into a life constantly searching for the divine will, in order to make God's freedom our own (Rom 12:1-2).

In our day, we find three attitudes opposed to this one. There are many who speak about discernment and would like to carry it into practice but suppose that they cannot be successful. For that reason, in matters of discernment, they tend to rely on "experts."

There is another group which tends to identify spiritual discernment with spiritual illusion, and think it best to *replace* the responsible effort to find concretely the will of God with obedience to the Church authority or, perhaps, to that of a charismatic leader. Finally, there are those who believe that the exercise of discernment is barren, and prefer to "follow their conscience," without submitting it to a thorough spiritual criticism. These may fall victim to the subtle delusion of trying somehow to replace truth with sincerity. In any case, these three groups fail to cooperate fully with the Spirit to grow and to reach the freedom of the Spirit (Rossi de Gasperis, 91). The attitude of the one praying with the whole heart is equally distant from each of them.

Let us finish this section with an observation regarding the relations among spiritual, intellectual, and psychic discernment. The actual performance of intellectual discernment is possible through intellectual conversion, and that of psychic discernment through psychic conversion. Christian conversion may foster intellectual conversion, for instance, by demanding consistency between the criterion of reality employed to explain beliefs, and that for explaining scientific and everyday matters. We attain such consistency when, through intellectual conversion, we affirm that everything that is truly affirmed is real (Lonergan, 1957: 549-52). Moreover, after intellectual conversion has been accomplished, Christian prayer may foster psychic conversion by demanding cooperation with the Spirit changing human affectivity through his light. Such cooperation may be performed more easily with the help of psychic conversion.

But Christian conversion and prayer not only foster but *need* psychic and intellectual conversion. As Christian theology needs the help of philosophy to sublimate the whole of human living (Lonergan, 1984: 7-8), so Christian prayer needs intellectual and psychic conversion to heal the whole person. Ordinarily, only the prayer with the whole heart, with the help of intellectual conversion, can heal our egoistic, group and general bias; only prayer with the whole heart, with the help of psychic conversion, can heal the affectivity, and prevent it from blocking the intentionality of love. And only when one is thoroughly healed, can one's love of God be complete.

In the measure that one's love of God is complete, then values are whatever one loves, and evils are whatever one hates so that, in Augustine's phrase, *Ama Deum et fac quod vis*. Then affectivity is of a single piece. Further developments only fill out our previous achievement. Lapses from grace are rarer and more quickly amended" (Lonergan, 1972: 39).

2.6 *Prayer as structure*

I have explained five relations constituted by ten terms. In every case the subjective pole of every relation is the prayer with the whole heart in one of its unfolding phases. To each of these phases corresponds an objective pole. Prayer with the whole heart means, then, the whole of human intentionality and psyche with their bodily basis thoroughly applied to the Word, to be penetrated by the Word. In this sense, our ten elements build up a dynamic structure which constitutes a dynamic whole. The structure is explanatory in the sense that one of the elements implies all the others. However, such implication does not mean that they can be abstractly deduced from one another, but that, if any element is lacking in the concrete performance of the praying subject, in the last analysis, such performance is found wanting, underdeveloped, unbalanced, lacking in authenticity. On the other hand, when all the elements are present, any further element would be superfluous. Therefore, to understand, for instance, what Christian discernment is, we need to understand the other nine elements and their correlations. And the same must be said of any one of the other elements. When the structure works properly, the way is open for progress. Progress in prayer means subjectively the ever new application of the praying heart to the Word; on the objective pole, the ever renewed struggle with our weaknesses to bring forth ever new fruits of the Spirit. Such, then, is the structure. Let us point out some of its implications.

This objectification of prayer constitutes a development of Lonergan's view that as knowing is a structure of conscious intentional operations, so self-knowledge is the reduplication of the structure (Lonergan, 1967: 221-226¹). The person praying with the whole

¹See also *Insight*, page 115: "For knowing and known, if they are not an identity, at least stand in some correspondence and, as the known is reached only through

heart spontaneously assembles in himself or herself the ten elements we have described. But it does not follow that he or she can objectify them and point out their correlations. A first objectification is ordinarily achieved with the help of spiritual direction. As we achieve self-knowledge in philosophy through the objectification of our experience, understanding, and judging, as we obtain a different kind of self-knowledge when we identify and objectify our hidden feelings in psychotherapy (Lonergan, 1972: 34), so we reach the self-knowledge in Christ, emanating from unrestricted love, when we attend to and somehow understand and affirm our prayer and the fruits it bears through spiritual direction. A fuller spiritual self-knowledge is achieved when, by developing Lonergan's position, we are able to explain in a single view the unfolding of the prayer with the whole heart in its different phases and their corresponding objective poles.

This kind of self-knowledge in Christ is relevant for spiritual direction, because it presents a structure that is both concrete and universal. It is universal because it is found more or less differentiated in every praying Christian. It is concrete, because the concrete self-appropriation of the Word spells the concrete story of every Christian life. If one keeps in mind this structure of spiritual self-knowledge, one may be able to help praying people to look for spiritual balance by fostering the growth of underdeveloped elements. Furthermore, as this structure of spiritual self-knowledge is the result of attending to, understanding, and affirming the roots of interiority, so too it offers a higher viewpoint for the interpretation of spiritual writers in the Christian tradition, from the time of the primitive Church to our day. For all of them are dealing with the Christian as transformed and penetrated by the Word, but our thematization supposes the recent discovery of several categories of human interiority which are ultimate in a definite sense.

Again, if we keep in mind the structure of prayer, it is not difficult to understand that the praying Christian is a living analogy

knowing, structural features of the one are bound to be reflected in the other." Clearly a prime instance of this is when the to-be-known is oneself. Central here is the insight that the human subject, while directly experiencing oneself in and as conscious, has no direct intuitive knowledge of oneself, but knows oneself as any other thing is known, indirectly through asking and correctly answering the What is it? and Is it so? questions.

of the Trinity. The consciousness of being in love in an unrestricted fashion may be considered to be the analogue which is an imperfect representation of the Source of the Divinity: the Father. The knowledge proceeding from unrestricted love and transforming the Christian heart is a *verbum interius* conveying knowledge of the Word, the Son, and for that very reason reflecting the Word, the Son; the loving dynamism penetrating the whole of prayer mirrors the Holy Spirit. Hans Urs von Balthasar acknowledges the foundational role of the Trinitarian experience, and provides a theological explanation (1961: 26-27). Moreover, in this context, obedience and humility are not virtues like any others, but attitudes underpinning the Trinitarian experience. Prayer with the whole heart is, in its subjective pole, the obedient performance following the dynamism of love. Moreover, the attitude resulting from the knowledge that it brings forth is humility. For the knowledge arising from love, to be appropriated by the Christian is, in the last analysis, knowledge of the Lamb of God, true to the earth by being truly *humilis*, that is, close to the *humus* (von Balthasar, 1967: viii). In other words, knowledge of the mystery of God arising in the human heart is also a revelation of human greatness and human sinfulness, and the knowledge of those opposed elements blends into an attitude that is called humility by Christians. The Augustinian *noverim te, noverim me* is the passionate cry of the heart arising from loving obedience and leading to loving humility (Doran, 1977: 128).

I have explained that a Trinitarian analogy and the foundational virtues of obedience and humility are ingrained within the structure of Christian prayer. Now I will add that it is also related to the Ignatian *Spiritual Exercises*. In fact, the thematization of the structure is the thematization of a cross-section of the typical experience of the Ignatian retreat. Here, the meaning of "cross-section" is the following. The complete Ignatian retreat lasts about thirty days. The structure of prayer thematized in this paper coincides with the structure of the experience of the retreatant on any day of the retreat, from the first to the last.

In this context, it is fair to advance a question about the retreatant's *experience*. The spiritual experience made during the Ignatian retreat, like any other experience, is time-conditioned and passes away. What does it leave in the praying person? The answer is

both easy and significant: *the experience of praying intensely with the whole heart leaves the capacity to live intensely with the whole heart*. And leading a life with the whole heart implies a new spiritual experience constituted, again, by an objective and a subjective pole. The subjective pole is constituted, in Ignatian terms, by "growing in devotion," that is, by the capacity to find God in all things. The objective pole is the same life growing in devotion, as it brings forth the fruits of the Spirit (Ledrus, 714-733). This same point can be expressed in another fashion. The prayer of the *Exercises*, which is the prayer with the whole heart, is performed within the tension of the desire of God and the mystery of God. Such tension gives birth to a constellation of insights permeated by feeling that crystallize in a decision to be implemented in life (Loyola, n. 189). The return to the ordinary life after the retreat gives way to a new tension between the heart pregnant with the light of the Spirit and the "present moment," carrier of a divine message (de Caussade, 3-41). The new tension generates "devotion" and the fruits of the Spirit, according to everyone's charisma and cooperation.

It seems convenient to add a word about the attitude of the person living with the whole heart. Robert Doran borrows from James Hillman the term "soul-making" to characterize an attitude resulting from and carrying on psychic conversion. By soul-making he means

attentiveness to the sequence of sensations, memories, images, emotions, conations, associations, bodily movements and spontaneous intersubjective responses that constitute the human sensitive psyche: existentially directed attentiveness to the movement of life itself, to that movement in which direction is discovered by intelligent inquiry, reasonable reflection and responsible deliberation. Soul-making results from attentiveness to the sensitively experienced movement of Life (Doran, 1981: 148-49).

Doran's point is that soul-making "brings home" the self-appropriation of conscious intentionality, and roots it in the very movement of life in which one finds direction by remaining faithful to that order.

Though I agree with this view, my present point is different. My point is that soul-making is the ascetic practice that "brings home" the prayer with the whole heart and roots it in the very move-

ment of life, which is the place of the life-generating tension between the heart pregnant with the light of the spirit and "the present moment." The conscious movement of life and the attention directed to it are simultaneous. If we practice soul-making against the background of the general will to live in God's presence and with the intention of trying to find him in all things, we experience living in spiritual self-possession. At times, such a background will, a will to live in the presence of God, may change itself into the more or less strongly felt continuous experience of His presence, which bestows a new dimension upon spiritual self-possession. But such an experience is not contingent on our ascetic effort. The important thing is the individual's cooperation with the Spirit, which transforms the prayer with the whole heart into a life lived with the whole heart. Such is the significance of soul-making practiced in the religious context just indicated (Lallemant: 80-107).

I have pointed out that the structure of prayer as thematized is an interpretation of the Ignatian *Spiritual Exercises* that can be extended into everyday life. However, this interpretation finds its point of departure, not in the Ignatian text, but in the performance of the praying heart. I will explain this point by using an analogy from *Insight*.

When we follow the activity of understanding as thematized in *Insight*, we rediscover the Aristotelian-Thomist metaphysical elements, and are in the position to purify and develop that tradition (Lonergan, 1967: 385-586). The Aristotelian *potency* and *form* correspond to experiencing and understanding; and the Thomist *esse* or act of existing corresponds to the judgment (Lonergan, 1967b: 59-66). Moreover, we are able to develop Aristotelian and Thomist metaphysics, insofar as we are able to incorporate the new *forms* discovered by the natural sciences into a new dynamic metaphysics. Again, we can add a refinement to this tradition. As we are able to distinguish between descriptive and explanatory knowledge (1957: 394-95), so we can purify metaphysics from old opinions which cannot reach the level of verified explanation. Such is the way of insight in philosophy.

Likewise, when we follow the performance of the praying heart, we rediscover not only the authentic Ignatian *Exercises* and with them the structure of Christian prayer, but also, as will soon

become clear, the Bible and its Jewish-Christian tradition in its authenticity.

After fifteen years of directing the Ignatian *Exercises* and studying the relations between the prayer of the *Exercises* and the Bible, Francesco Rossi de Gasperis has reached the surprising conclusion that there are five points in the spiritual experience in which the Bible and the *Exercises* intercommunicate and vivify each other (1982: 5-49). These points are: (1) the experience of God; (2) the experience of discovering Christ under the guidance of the Spirit; (3) the experience of Christian freedom; (4) the experience of the Church; and, (5) the experience of discernment. But that conclusion fits in very neatly with our interpretation. His five points constitute the objective poles of the prayer with the whole heart unfolding in different phases.

Rossi de Gasperis (1977: 11-43) has his own version of the prayer with the whole heart. He has explained ever more convincingly that the Ignatian prayer following the powers of the soul (Brou, 109-119), memory, intellect, and will is isomorphic with the *lectio, meditatio, oratio-contemplatio* in the biblical tradition of *lectio divina*. It is the unfolding of the *lectio divina* in its different phases that brings forth the five-fold experience just outlined. Accordingly, the interpretation of the *Exercises* on the explicit basis of the Bible, as explained by Rossi de Gasperis, and of human consciousness, as explained in this paper, spells out a development in the tradition of the *Exercises*. In addition, the rediscovery of the Bible as the book which educates the heart, and related explanatorily to the performance of the praying subject, means also a certain development in the tradition of the Bible. Such interpretations bring about a purification of the *Exercises* as understood through the conceptualist tradition of scholastic philosophy, and of the Bible, insofar as they cut through rationalistic interpretations and lead to the enjoyment of its spiritual message. As in the case of philosophy, the instrument of purification and discernment is the act of insight, so in the case of the *Exercises* and the Bible, the instrument of purification and discernment is the praying heart.

This last statement calls for clarification. For the results of the research relating the prayer of the *Exercises* to human consciousness, and the results of the research relating the prayer of the *Exer-*

cises to the Bible, together build a single whole. Such thematizations are not only the result of prayer — the heart — but also the result of research and insight — the mind. Indeed, such studies illustrate how an integration of mind and heart can be brought about. May we suggest here that such an integration of both mind and heart is a key issue of our age. And if we acknowledge this, we are not far from recognizing the foundational role of the heart in all endeavors of the mind.

The issue has its antecedents. The problem that Aquinas faced in the Middle Ages, the key problem related to the theory of the double truth (Copleston, 48), recurs in another fashion in our age. In the Middle Ages it was asked whether there can be something that is true in philosophy and not true in theology, and vice versa. It was the question of the dichotomy philosophy-theology. In our age, the age of the *Wendung zum Subjekt*, of the Kierkegaardian interiority, it recurs under the dichotomy of mind and heart. Moreover, the solution of Aquinas was not the abstract rebuttal of the controversialist, but the concrete, painful, and in the highest degree illuminating unfolding of his *Summa theologiae*, in which philosophy and theology were blended together in a coherent whole. Similarly, the solution to the problem in our age must be carried out in the concrete, difficult realm of matters of fact. It calls for the concrete transformation of the subject, as a result of prayer and study, for the integration of the manifold products of the mind, for the concrete collaboration of mind and heart, where a differentiation of mind calls forth a corresponding differentiation of prayer. And the differentiation of prayer invites still further differentiation of the mind.

The foregoing clarification sets the stage for a summary statement about the integration of prayer with the academic disciplines. The reader will agree that we have been handling this issue throughout this paper. We tried to describe every one of the unfolding phases of the prayer with the whole heart and their objective poles as a sublation of a corresponding activity in the intellectual (in one case of the aesthetic) pattern of experience. Accordingly, the remainder of this paper will have the character of an application of the general to the particular. We will handle this question of integration between prayer and the academic disciplines under the aspect of prayer being foundational for all of them.

3. PRAYER AS FOUNDATIONAL

3.1 *A general statement*

In the introduction of this paper, I presented the anthropological context of prayer, and hinted at its foundational role. This role can now be highlighted. In the unfolding of the human cognitional activities, experiencing stimulates inquiry, and inquiry leads to understanding and judging. As understanding and judging deepen, the field of our experience expands. Moreover, experiencing, understanding, and judging offer the point of departure to evaluations and decisions for the implementation of values; and values offer the dynamic base and direction to our minds. Lastly, values find in unrestricted love their transvaluation and their deepest foundation. On the other hand, any scientific or philosophic differentiation of our experiencing, understanding, judging, and deciding is to be sublated, assimilated, and integrated by love through the activity of the praying heart. From the point of view of the authentic subject, as long as such assimilation is not carried out, the products of the mind, despite their riches and beauty, remain barren. The praying heart, in turn, gives rise to questions that tend to differentiate, refine, and purify the activities of the mind, and open new horizons where its discoveries can be implemented.

When we attend to the experience of the heart transforming the mind, simultaneously we discover the heart as foundation for the whole human life. Furthermore, the character of the state of being in love in an unrestricted fashion witnesses to the solidity of such a foundation. We can make a further description of it in terms of the transcendental precepts. It corresponds directly to the fifth, "Be in love," but we can apply to it the other four. "Be attentive" — attention to the experience makes clear its character of belonging to the data of human consciousness, intimately related to the data constituting the other levels; "Be intelligent" — the heart brings forth a new kind of insights of its own which, in a deeper sense, are self-justifying and true. This is the kind of knowledge that is called faith in religious traditions. Faith is the eye of love, and its object is the mystery of love

and awe (Lonergan, 1972: 115). "Be reasonable" corresponds to the commitment of the subject to the truth of the knowledge flowing from religious love. "Be responsible" corresponds to the total transformation of the subject, its world, its history, that he or she must bring about through the dynamism of unrestricted love.

Such is the general statement of prayer as foundational. The following subsections attempt to adapt this account to philosophy to the natural and human sciences and to the arts.

3.2 *Prayer as foundational for philosophy*

From its beginning to our day, philosophy in the Western tradition is concerned with bringing about a radical change in the subject, amounting to a conversion of the subject. This tradition has led in our day to the creation of a critical philosophy or a philosophy of philosophies, which claims to be the key to the correct interpretation of all the philosophies of the past, of the present, and of the future. Such is Lonergan's philosophy (1957: 530-31). Moreover, in the study of philosophy, I would not be satisfied with anything less than a critical philosophy such as this. For any other that would not reach its critical viewpoint, would be either disregarding, ignoring, or neglecting the real capacities of the human mind. In any case, so far as I can tell, the assimilation of a critical philosophy demands:

(1) giving free play to the pure, unrestricted, disinterested desire to know, so that no alien desire prevents its concrete unfolding.

(2) directing the dynamism of such desire to the acquisition of "self-appropriation." Such self-appropriation includes (a) the discovery of oneself as understanding the commonsense insights and the theoretical insights occurring in every realm in which the human mind operates; and (2) the absolute, responsible self-affirmation of the subject as experiencing, understanding and judging (Lonergan, 1980: 1-22).

(3) clarifying intelligently, rationally, and responsibly the positions that such performance implies, and making them the base of operations for the reinterpretation of the past as a whole and for building up the future (1957: 387-90).

Many would interpret this program as the call to a war with oneself, and not everybody would be ready to submit to its demands.

But the point I want to make presently is a different one: the subject praying with the whole heart has answered to deeper and more stern demands. She has followed the Spirit of the Lord, after answering thoroughly to the Lord's call. Moreover, in the measure of the grace which has been granted to her, she has performed the self-appropriation of the incarnate Word. Moreover, in utter surprise she finds herself armed with self-confidence for the implementation of a program that is more divine than human—to bring about the Kingdom of God on earth.

It may be that a person starts answering to the demands of the unrestricted, pure, disinterested desire to know, and so is gradually and painfully led to discover that *abyssus abyssum invocat*, that the mind leads to the heart, that there is a similarity between the pure, unrestricted, disinterested desire to know and John the Baptist: both lead to Christ. But, when a subject has his life grounded on unrestricted love, he will be led far more smoothly to the discovery that following the Holy Spirit includes somehow following the pure, disinterested, unrestricted desire to know; that the self-appropriation of the Word implies somehow the self-appropriation of the subject; that a critical philosophy may be a useful tool in the hands of Love, in order to bring about the Kingdom of God on earth. In effect, this man or woman will experience in a new way the fact that the heart is the foundation of the mind. Each will discover the concrete sense in which prayer is the foundation of philosophy.

3.3 *Prayer as foundational for the human sciences*

The appropriation of Lonergan's critical philosophy implies the basic identification of meaning with the intentionality of the human spirit striving for intelligence, truth, and value, and for the thoroughly unconditioned absolute. As the very "substance" of the human spirit is its intentionality, we say that it is constituted by meaning. The meaning of marriage is the very substance of marriage. The meaning of a constitution is the very substance of a constitution. In every case, we have the intentionality of the human spirit bringing forth a meaning. In contrast to the world of nature that is only mediated by meaning (we cannot know the world of nature without the mediating activities of experiencing, under-

standing, and judging), the human world, in the strictest sense, is constituted by meaning (1967a: 252-3). Such is the most proper realm of the human sciences.

I limit myself to a few relevant examples to give meaning to the statement that prayer has a foundational role in regard to the human sciences. The being of the human subject is its becoming: the becoming of the human subject is constituted by a growing apprehension and assimilation of meaning. This is the subject-matter of psychology. Moreover, the interaction of subjects among themselves gives rise to spontaneous intersubjectivity, constituted by a manifold of meanings. They are studied by sociology. The meanings and values embodied in cultural institutions are the object of cultural anthropology. In every case, the expansion and development or breakdown and decline of meaning is also the concern of history.

On the other hand, a differentiated experience of prayer includes the experience of growing, in the deepest sense of the word. It is the experience of divine meaning incarnating itself in a human subject. Such experience builds up the basis and provides the criterion offered by the heart for any psychology dealing with human becoming. Any psychology building on that basis may have to submit to the strict academic standards of the mind, but as grounded on the loving heart it is founded upon a rock.

Again, the praying subject, led by the Spirit, has discovered a human society that, in the measure in which it is authentic, is constituted by pure human love, thoroughly transformed by divine love. Through such experience the subject knows that if such a society were to expand and receive within itself the whole human family, the whole earth would turn into a heaven. As in the case of psychology, such experience offers a basis and a criterion for the study of sociology.

Again, the praying subject has a more or less differentiated experience of the solidity of religious values implemented in a culture. Such experience may be both basic and normative for a cultural anthropology.

Again, in every aspect of the human world we find meaning and absence of meaning, intelligibility and unintelligibility, truth and falsehood, good and evil. The human scientist needs dialectical tools to deal with them in such a way that evil is curbed and the good

is fostered. But the praying subject knows that no dialectical tool can get to the heart of the matter without prayer. Differentiated prayer leads to an experience of discernment between good and evil, and such experience offers the very basis which communicates new effectivity to human endeavors destined to foster the good and to curb the evil.

3.4 Prayer as the foundation of natural sciences

The answer to an objection will say something about the sense in which prayer can be a foundation of the natural sciences. Someone could object that there may be excellent natural scientists who declare that their sciences do not need a foundation other than their own minds. However, from the point of view of interdisciplinary studies, such “heartless” science, as such, is irrelevant. For, in the last analysis, it, like any human endeavor, must be subsumed by the heart. The fact that, in the last analysis, the natural sciences, as a part of human life, have their basis in the praying heart, does not depend on the whim of the scientist who does not pray. Moreover, from the viewpoint of the self-transcending subject, a science that is declared to lack any religious foundation whatsoever — if such a statement means what it says in the context of this paper — is no more than the product of an unauthentic subject. (My statement refers solely to the human subject who rejects the transcendental precept “Be in Love.” In doing so he or she becomes, for that very reason, a truncated subject). Let us say a word about each of these two points.

The systematic exigence which leads human subjects to formulate worldviews is a vital necessity, not an intellectual luxury. It is the necessity to know the world as a whole, to get acquainted with the house in which we live. It is implicit, I believe, in the precept, “Know thyself.” For self-knowledge and knowledge of our world are correlative. Self-knowledge may demand a better knowledge of our world, and the knowledge of our world may be the springboard for a more profound self-knowledge. Such a systematic exigence is expressed in our day in the virtually universal agreement of the academic world on the urgent necessity for interdisciplinary studies. It

is not clear, however, if all who agree on the necessity of such studies, also agree on what they presuppose.

Interdisciplinary studies as a whole, when methodically carried out, suppose not only the knowledge of individual sciences, but also knowledge of their nature, of their methods, of the framework in which they operate and in which it is possible to find concrete correlations and concrete ways of cooperation. In other words, for methodical interdisciplinary studies, we need to know not only the sciences, but also *what we do when we do sciences*. But that question is philosophic. It is the basic question answered by the critical philosophy which we have been presupposing here. In any case, interdisciplinary studies need a viewpoint which is higher than that of the natural sciences, a viewpoint which includes all of them. For that reason, from the point of view of interdisciplinary studies, the fact that there may be some natural scientists who reject prayer as the foundation of life and hence the foundation of the natural sciences, is quite irrelevant. For the results of the natural sciences must be subsumed under human sciences and human decisions, and, as we have seen, the ultimate basis of the world constituted by meaning may be uncovered solely by the exercise of the highest spontaneity of the human spirit: prayer.

From the point of view of the authentic human subject, the matter can be envisioned even more concretely. The fact that the natural sciences are methodologically restricted to this world contributes to the illusion that they are "value-free." Moreover, the natural sciences have been and continue to be the illusory justification of a manifold of materialistic and positivistic philosophies. A praying scientist, however, would trace those illusions in the last analysis back to a lack of experience of ultimate meaning. The scientist who prays knows that his science is not value-free. It is the scientist's professional way to give expression to her state of being in love in an unrestricted fashion. Moreover, through the powerful experience of her own spirit as actuated by the Spirit, she knows, even if she does not possess a critical philosophy, that the materialistic interpretation of the universe is the result of the childish reductionism of the inexperienced.

3.5 *Prayer as foundational for the arts*

We have been engaged in presenting prayer as foundational. This is the conclusion of the effort to articulate in modern terms the ancient truth that the Word is the Truth and accordingly, the ultimate foundation of all truth. But the arts also belong to the academic disciplines, and perhaps this paper would be incomplete without a last word about prayer as the activity which touches the Word, the Art of the Father, the foundation of all the arts.

In human consciousness, then, there occurs the philosophical experience. In the context of the philosophy we have been presupposing, it is the experience of the pure, disinterested, unrestricted desire to know, leading the concrete human subject to take possession of itself. Similarly, there is an aesthetic experience. It is an experience at the level of sense and feeling. It can be described as possessing some qualities which resemble the pure, disinterested, unrestricted desire to know. Aesthetic experience is pure. It is the experience for the sake of experiencing. It is disinterested. It transcends any serious-minded biological purpose, and carries with it a spontaneous, self-justifying joy. It may be colored by awe, before the depth of the world of sense and the immensity of the world of imagination. Such is the world of the aesthetic experience in which the artist operates (Lonergan, 1957: 184-5).

The experience of being in love in an unrestricted fashion, as we have seen, also possesses an aesthetic dimension. There the purity of the experience for the sake of experiencing finds its fulfillment in loving in an unrestricted way for the sake of loving. The aesthetic liberation from the strains of biological purposiveness and the constraints of mathematical proofs and scientific verifications is sublated by the liberation of the exercise of one's highest spontaneity. Finally, the aesthetic awe before the "ahhh-ness" of things turns into an embrace with the root of their mystery.

In the aesthetic world, the artist is the creator. As the scientist looks for intelligible systems, "so too the artist exercises his intelligence in discovering ever novel forms that unify and relate the contents and acts of the aesthetic experience" (Lonergan, 1957: 184). For that reason, the artist has to learn to get deep into the house of his or

her memories, to look there or in the actual experience of nature and everyday life, for the spark that brings to life the poem, the painting, the statue. But prayer with the whole heart will transform this experience. Through it, the artist will receive new eyes for the glory embodied in nature and in the events of everyday life, and will be able to see in the miserable happenings of his or her past marvelous treasures of love. The artist who prays will develop the sense of discernment that is not confused by the surfaces, and will find in unrestricted love the deepest verification of the fact that "in the depths, everything becomes law" (Rilke: 39).

Finally, the artist must learn the virtue of patience. Before the work of art comes to maturity in her mind, there may be a long time of painful gestation. She has to learn to let each impression and each feeling come to completion, because their slow growth includes many elements that lie beyond her control. The spark of creation is preceded by a long time of twilight. She has to wait. But such experience is worthwhile. When it is sublated by the experience of unrestricted love, she will come to understand both how she herself is an incredibly precious work of art whose Author is the Spirit of the Lord and how infinitely patient the Divine Artist has been. Surely and gently and persistently, such insight will transform her art.

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INTENTIONALITY ANALYSIS, THE CHURCH, AND WOMEN'S SPIRITUALITY

Nancy Ring

The retrieval of the pre-scholastic understanding that mind and heart, doctrine and spirituality, are inseparably united has been one of the most valuable developments of contemporary theology. To this retrieval Bernard Lonergan made a major contribution, especially, I believe, in his articulation of self-transcendence, whereby he demonstrated that human intentionality finds fulfillment in the actualizing of the desires to know and to love (Lonergan, 1972; 1974).¹

Whereas theologians have reminded us of the unity of the person, the documents of Vatican II have reiterated for us the fact that each person is called to holiness, and that the community of the church in its entirety is called to be a sacrament of God's goodness. Diverse roles and tasks distinguish members of the church one from the other, but this does not negate the fact that each person receives identity from relation to the whole community.²

Further, the entire community is the sacrament of Christ to the world; but since all persons, believers and unbelievers alike, con-

¹The presupposition of this paper will be that the discovery of our deepest desires is essential to the development of a personal spirituality because in these desires God's intention for each of us is revealed. I will not develop the evolution of this thesis because it has been thoroughly discussed in the literature on Ignatian spirituality, and because it has been treated at Lonergan Workshops in previous years. For further clarification of this thesis, the reader may refer to the works of Frederick Crowe and Robert Doran which appear in "Works Consulted."

²There is an analogy, here, with depth psychology. Jacques Lacan, especially, has shown that it is only when the infant separates psychologically from the mother, about the age of nine to twelve months, that it begins to know the difference between itself and the other. This occurs because the infant has become aware that there is a "father" to whom the mother is also related. With this separation the infant assumes its role in the family, and begins its own ego development. Thus, it can be said that one knows oneself only in relation to an other. If this is true psychologically, it can be true, analogously, in the relationships we establish *vis-a-vis* communities other than the family.

stitute "the world," the community of the church is the sacrament of Christ to believers as well as unbelievers. There exists, then, a reciprocal, dialectical relationship between personal identity and the identity of the community of the church. Person and church are defined implicitly; the development of one influences the development of the other; mutual, dialectical development results in a new self-understanding for each. Similarly, when either the church or the person blocks development or self-transcendence by adopting a counterposition, ideology, or bias, as the basis of decision-making, then each suffers. Each suffers, that is, if either is more than extrinsically involved with the other; if the church is more than its bureaucratic structure and the person is more than the individual member of an organization.

Because of this dialectical relation between the Christian and the church community, spirituality, understood as the personal appropriation of God's revelation, has become recognized as foundational to the life of the church, both theologically and in practice (Reiser, 1983). Because of this rediscovery of the centrality of spirituality we recognize that the development of one's relationship with God is essential to human wellbeing, to theology, and to the church. We recognize, also, that theological doctrine either promotes that relationship or remains incidental and inconsequential.³

Among the most distinctive doctrines of the Christian church is that of the death-resurrection of Jesus, the Christ. When understood within the parameters of theological method, the claim can be made that in Jesus is revealed God's intention for humankind, and that this doctrine not only recapitulates the meaning of Jesus' words and deeds, but symbolizes the nature of our lives also. When our lives portray confidence that life comes out of death, that grace has precedence over sin, that, even in the absence of reasons for hope, there is hope because of God's faithfulness, then we have appropriated the distinctively Christian revelation which God has revealed in the death-resurrection of Jesus, the Christ.

³I am using the term "theological doctrines" as Lonergan does in chapter 12 of *Method in Theology* to refer to the application of theological method to particular doctrines. I am using the term "church doctrine" as he defines this term in the same chapter: an official interpretation of the church concerning the original message of Jesus.

This appropriation of the Mystery revealed in Jesus the Christ is the corporate task of the community as well as the task of each person within the community. Although all Christians have shared this same task, the fact of the particular and unique historical conditioning of each person as well as the historical and cultural contexts in which the church is situated means that the manner in which the Mystery of God in Christ is appropriated will be unique in each person. The fact of historical conditioning means, also, that the community of the church situated as it is in various particular, historical, and cultural contexts will preach and appropriate the Mystery of God in Christ in non-identical manners. Although I would no longer argue that the social is primary, either for sin or grace, or that the personal is derivative, I would argue that the social and personal appropriation of the Mystery of Christ is mutually effective. Both person and community are obliged to stand in the truth rather than to be merely correct.

Recognizing that spiritual development is incumbent upon the community of the church as well as upon the person, recognizing, also, that the community of the church can either help or hinder the development of personal spirituality, I am, nevertheless, going to emphasize in this paper the development of the personal spirituality of Roman Catholic women within the context of the church community. Within this Christian context, I will treat the twin demands of self-transcendence and the reversal of biases, traditionally known as purification, made applicable, of course, to every aspect of life: business, politics, the academy.

Yet, culture is not an unchanging reality, something to which we can point and say, There it is! Rather, culture changes and develops, and the meanings and values which inform a group's way of life changes. There are quiescent periods and periods marked by rapid development. At this moment in history, we find ourselves in a period of rapid development. There are many reasons for this development, but one principal factor is that women are increasingly aware that they need not define themselves in terms of male normativity. As a result, women are themselves contributing to a change in the cultural mentality. Concern with inclusive language is one indication of this. What began as a matter of importance to only a few has become an increasingly standard manner of expression except in

certain clerical and all-male environments. It is within such an environment that women must appropriate the Mystery of God as revealed in the death-resurrection.

1. FEMINIST ANTHROPOLOGIES

One fact that the feminist literature has made abundantly clear is that not all women interpret their experiences in the same manner (Carr, 1988). A perusal of the literature also indicates that a woman's understanding of what it means to be human directs her understanding of the church as either an insurmountable obstacle to women's spirituality or as a resource for spirituality despite its patriarchal spirituality (Wilson-Kastner, 1983, ch. 1; Ruether, 1983, ch. 4). Because faith is always interpreted, it is precisely at this point that one's philosophical, theological, and cultural presuppositions come into play, and that there is an unequivocal necessity to bring these to consciousness in order to see where these presuppositions lead. Otherwise, any proposed spirituality, although well-intentioned, would be uncritical and would lead to distortion of the Christian Mystery. Some examples are in order.⁴

If one's faith is informed by an uncritical Aristotelianism, male and female will be understood as dual aspects of humanity: separate and distinct. Although the rhetoric may be one of the unity of humankind, the operative assumption is that the male, as the exemplar of the species, possesses an eminence of degree to which even the holiest of females cannot aspire. Thus, gender is determinative of one's status within the community as well as of the roles one may fulfill.

Another assumption of uncritical Aristotelianism may be that one's God-consciousness is not modified by gender. Within such a framework, however, the male interpretation of Christianity becomes normative, and there is no particular importance attached to the manner in which a female experiences God-consciousness. If Lonergan has taught us anything, however, it is that the particu-

⁴These categories have been suggested by the study of M. Aquin O'Neill. The implications for spirituality are mine.

larity of one's experience is the starting place of objectivity. "The fruit of truth must grow and mature on the tree of the subject, before it can be plucked and placed in its absolute realm" (1974: 71).

Not to belabor the obvious, it must be clear that such uncritical philosophical presuppositions, suppositions that reinforce and legitimate male normativity and disregard the particularity of both male and female experiences of God-consciousness, thereby implicitly elevating the male experience to normativity, inform official Roman church documents concerning the roles and place of women in today's church.

A spirituality such as that proposed for women during the "Marian age" would be typical of the ideals proposed for women within such a framework. Women were to be (are to be) docile, receptive, and obedient to authority — male authority. A spirituality built upon these uncritical philosophical premises would lead to women's authentically appropriating an unauthentic tradition (Lonergan, 1972: 80). In this case, the tradition is unauthentically presented because it requires that a certain culturally-bound interpretation of the relationship between male and female be central to the appropriation of the Christian tradition. It is not.

Closely related to an uncritical Aristotelianism is an uncritical Jungian approach to understanding the relationship existing between male and female. This position assumes that there exist, ontologically, masculine and feminine characteristics and the human ideal is to integrate the two.

The difficulty, here, besides the reification of masculine and feminine characteristics, is that what is named masculine and what is named feminine is too often and too facilely determined by cultural stereotypes.⁵ The characteristics described as feminine are usually those that, understood in a commonsense fashion, preclude those qualities which society rewards.⁶ Yet, the spirituality proposed and

⁵An excellent example of this uncritical Jungian approach and the assumptions it makes about feminine spirituality is found in an article by Patrick Arnold (1984).

⁶Although there are reasons to maintain that gender is a particular qualification of the subject which influences one's growth and development, one can also grasp the difficulty involved in speaking of specifically masculine or feminine characteristics. Just because certain characteristics are rewarded by society is indicative neither that they are superior qualities nor that, simply because they have been assimilated by the male, they are masculine qualities.

fostered by such a misunderstanding of Jungian anthropology may lead either to a woman's cultivation of male traits that are culturally endorsed or to her cultivation of culturally-endorsed feminine traits. Either approach results in a truncated spirituality. The first approach results in women becoming men, culturally and spiritually speaking. The second encourages the development of spiritual dependence.

Although the position I will now articulate is associated with radical feminism (O'Neill, 1975), I find it closely allied to the two previous examples of interpreting what it means to be human. Some feminists assume that the freedom from reproductive processes enjoyed by the male — a freedom which results in his being free to create culture by entering into the market place and developing the arts, is an ideal to which females should also aspire and which technology can make possible. A sort of androgyny becomes the ideal, not in a dialectical fashion in which both male and female change, but by the uncritical assumption by the female that male prerogatives are worth aspiring to. Thus, in a subtle fashion, the female is assimilated to the male ideal. This position assumes that the future of feminism is known. It consists in the acquisition by the female of male position and power as it is presently experienced.

From such a position, women's spirituality would encourage the development of those attitudes and characteristics that would permit churchwomen to do the things that churchmen do, for the most part as they are presently done, or it would lead to such commonly asked questions as, Can a male Christ save women?

2. INTENTIONALITY ANALYSIS: A HIGHER VIEWPOINT

It seems to me that each of these positions results in an impasse. The impasses could be a result of one of three forms of uncritical subjectivity which Lonergan treats in "The Subject" (1974:6-86): the neglected subject, the truncated subject, or the immanentist subject. Whichever may be the case in a particular instance, it would be my position that the intentionality analysis of Bernard Lonergan

provides us with a way out of any of these impasses. It provides us with a way out if we give primacy to praxis and understand experience as that which is concomitant with consciousness and makes us present to ourselves as experiencing, understanding, judging, deciding, and loving subjects. The following is a development of this insight.

For a long time, now, I have understood Dante's *Purgatorio* to exemplify in poetic language, the language of faith, the Eros to know and to love as described by Loneragan, as well as the flight from understanding that he has explained. If you recall, all the persons on each of the storeys of the Mount of Purification must learn to see what in their lives prevents them from choosing their heart's desire, standing upright, and perceiving new visions of God's wholeness and of their own. Virgil's description of Dante as they emerge from this process of purification can aptly be addressed to each of us (XXVII, 140-42):

Free, upright, whole, thy will henceforth lays down
Guidance that it were error to neglect,
Whence o'er thyself I mitre thee and crown.

In response to the task of becoming free, upright, and whole, it seems to me that Roman Catholic women, rather than focusing on theoretic differentiations of men and women, should pose themselves three questions which flow from their own experience of self-presence. These three questions are: What are the gifts that I have to contribute to the corporate witness of the church? What in myself and in social and ecclesial environments militates against this? Have I enough belief in God's revelation in Christ to acknowledge those obstacles to life, to desist from allowing them to shape my world-view and actions so that I may stand free, upright, and whole, acknowledge my gifts, and offer them to the community?

3. EMBODIED GIFTS

In asking the first question within the context of intentionality analysis, the following problems are obviated: historical conditioning is acknowledged but is not determinative.

For example, as a woman I acknowledge the fact of patriarchy, but I do not react to it in such a way that it circumscribes my gifts or determines my actions. To do so would be to act differently, but in no freer manner than I now do. This would be to engage in paradox, not dialectic, and paradox does not change any situation. It merely reinforces the very duality or polarity that uncritical theory, empirical or idealist, now prescribes and which feminists rightly resist.

Secondly, what it means to be female in this day and age will be constituted by my decisions as to what is of value to me and to the community. There is no *a priori* setting of a specific agenda such as the assumption of culturally defined male or female roles. As a result, neither male nor female normativity is presumed. In fact, the only presumed normativity is that of the transcendental imperatives: be attentive; be intelligent; be reasonable; be responsible; be loving. And although I can only be faithful to these imperatives within a certain historical setting, I am, by my decisions, contributing to the formation of the history of which I am a part.

Further, the gifts that I have to offer are shaped by the fact that I am a woman. I cannot dissociate myself from my body or from the feelings, desires, and tendencies that such embodiment implies. To do so would be reductionistic, to reduce the body to its biological function rather than understanding it as a symbol through which I encounter life. Understood symbolically, the body mediates my encounter with reality, and performs the same function as any archetypal symbol. An archetypal symbol, such as water, never loses its materiality, and it gives rise to those concepts and feelings associated with water: coolness, freshness, destruction, for example. Analogously, woman's body, understood symbolically, never loses its materiality, but it gives rise to those concepts and feelings associated with its qualities: conception, birthing, nurturing. As all symbolic

qualities, these are neither detached from their material base nor reduced to their material base. They mediate temporally, generically, and existentially.

For too long, the recognition that we become Christian as either men or women had been denied any positive valuation in the understanding of the Christian task. But, I would maintain, the gifts that any of us have to offer are shaped by the body with which and through which we encounter reality. The gifts that I offer, then, are openness shaped by the desire to conceive; creativity, shaped by the desire to give birth; intelligence, shaped by the desire to nurture. Men, of course, possess openness, intelligence, and creativity; but their embodiment gives a different contour to these qualities.

4. OBSTACLES TO WOMEN'S SELF-TRANSCENDENCE

In responding to the second question — What in my personal or social and ecclesial life militates against the offering of my gifts to the community? — I acknowledge my personal responsibility for the discovery, cultivation, and sharing of my gifts. In so doing, I refuse to legitimate the dynamic of polarity which dichotomizes the relationship between men and women. Recognizing that there are social and cultural limitations in both the civil and ecclesial arenas which limit the actualizing of my resources, my primary concern, nevertheless, is to acknowledge those areas of sin and bias in myself which reinforce my refusal to allow the deepest desires of my heart to make themselves known both to God and to myself. If we really do exist in a reciprocal relation with the community, I need, also, to discern patterns of the group bias and general bias of common sense that distort social reality and exert a skewed influence. However, I must also recognize that the actualizing of bias is not the exclusive function of men's groups. Although they are certainly the victims of patriarchy, women are not innocent when it comes to benefitting from involvement in group biases. This is not to blame the victim, a procedure often engaged in by those who exercise dominative power; it is to state that women must relinquish the illusion of innocence if

they are to share, productively, in opening new approaches to their own spirituality.

5. WOMEN'S APPROPRIATION OF THE DEATH-RESURRECTION OF CHRIST JESUS

The third question that each woman must ask herself brings us to the heart of the matter. Have I enough belief in God's revelation in Christ not only to acknowledge the personal, social, and ecclesial biases that oppose the graced life, but also to enter into the process of transformation, the process of death-resurrection, so that these biases will no longer dictate my action? For, in a patriarchal church and in a patriarchal society, my disengagement from any form of bias leads to death, and we can only trust that resurrection will follow.⁷

I still maintain the position that the principal, although not the only, way that transformation occurs or that biases are reversed by the various conversions, is by dialogical prayer (Ring, 1983). To engage in such prayer, one must develop a reflective attitude about oneself, especially about one's desires and feelings. Now, to the extent that women become conscious of and affirm the unique aspects of their humanity, to that extent they are becoming restless with a spirituality and God-language derived from typically male experience. This restlessness, if recognized and acknowledged in prayer, becomes the cutting edge of women's spirituality, the place of choices and transformation. Here, a women must choose to trust God and to trust her experience of God; these two elements are not unrelated. Here, she is challenged to let go those elements which are peripheral and extrinsic to the tradition: theological and ideological interpretations of the tradition which suggest woman's subordinate status and which prevent her from being free, upright, and whole.

The recognition of restlessness is the place of purification, for it demands the restructuring of the imagination whereby a more

⁷The same could be said of men's spirituality. The difference between the two is in the manifestation of their particular bias. Women's may have to give up dependence; men's, dominative power.

adequate vision of the meaning of God's revelation displaces a less adequate one. This involves initiative and risk, the willingness to walk into the unknown. Trust, initiative and risk are the characteristics of the spirituality of any woman or man. What distinguishes the men and women are the ends to which these characteristics are directed. Whereas women may need to risk standing upright, men may need to risk viewing reality from the position of non-power.

For women to develop the habit of acknowledging and remaining faithful to their experience, of acting in consonance with the demands of their hearts and minds requires immense discipline and insight. Not to acquiesce to a particularly male interpretation of their experience is indeed to die to the pleasures and rewards afforded to those women who adjust their self-understanding and consequently their understanding of God to an ecclesial ideology.

That there have been women throughout the history of our tradition who, even in the environment of male normativity, have succeeded in remaining faithful to their embodied experience of God is testimony to their trust and courage. It is also testimony to the fact that culture shapes but is not totally determinative of one's appropriation of the Mystery of God. Undoubtedly, that is why there has been a contemporary resurgence of interest in the Biblical stories of Miriam, Rebecca, Ruth, Judith, and Mary of Nazareth. That is why there has been a resurgence of interest in the writings of such women as Julian of Norwich, Hildegard of Bingen, Teresa of Avila, Joan of Arc, Catherine of Siena, and of their daughters, those women whose courageous and prophetic faithfulness has provided the encouragement we all need to act in accordance with the demands of the Spirit rather than secular and ecclesial regulations.

The writings of these same women are also testimony that out of such faithfulness one enters into new life. The dynamic of the death-resurrection of Christ Jesus becomes the dynamic of one's own life. Indeed, the doctrine itself has become existentially effective in one's life, the basis of one's decisions and actions. The union of heart, mind, and spirit required to accomplish such an appropriation of this doctrine is a manifestation of the effects of grace, of the realized conviction that one's whole self — body, spirit, and soul — lives within the gracious environment of the Holy Mystery of God. Such a conviction represents the essence of our tradition.

Although it is requisite that the self-symbolization of each person become that of the death-resurrection of Christ, it is equally imperative that the church as community become the sacrament of Christ. The community of the church is more than the sum of its parts. This means that the structural aspects of the church realized by the various ministries in which members serve, as well as the policies that are proclaimed and the theologies that are taught, must be open to ideological critique. Those whom the community has named as leaders must be conscious that office may be used to legitimate power and that the purifying dynamic of the death-resurrection of Christ must be applied to church policies and pronouncements, also. The church, then, must listen attentively to the voices of the disenfranchised within its body. The truth is often voiced by those who have no position to lose in its saying.

Such a church will become a sacrament of God's intention for humankind, to those who do not claim membership in it as well as to those who do. It will provide a foundation for the spirituality of both women and men whose lives will contribute to the continued flourishing of the community. Reciprocity will characterize the relationship between the community's structure and the community's members.

Humankind is made in God's image, but that image is flawed when male and female remain undifferentiated, and both genders are subsumed under the rubric of male normativity. When this is allowed to happen, the church has disavowed its sacramentality and its members are impeded from living in the mutuality which the dignity and vocation of each requires. It is, therefore, incumbent upon us all to support, humbly and faithfully, one another in becoming free, upright, and whole, even when this demands that we let die customs and ways of thinking that obviate such radical Christianity.

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GRACE, MEDIATION, AND LITURGICAL ORIENTATIONS

Louis Roy

One of the current problems in Catholic liturgy is that many scholars and pastors, who have been spiritually and theologically trained in a scholastic framework, have reacted against it and adopted another outlook which very much emphasizes the symbolic structure of religious experience. While this insistence is commendable in itself, it can unfortunately be interpreted in an idealist or liberal manner. When this is the case, the implication is that religion is first and foremost a matter of human interpretation, hope, and solidarity, and not much of a coming to terms with the living God of the Bible. In liturgy as well as in other areas of church life, the recent stress on horizontal relationships has been such as to jeopardize the vertical relationship to God.

Intellectually, what is at stake is an understanding of grace and mediation. In the Catholic tradition there have been at least four basic ways of apprehending the role of a religious mediation: naive realism, extrinsicism, liberalism, and critical realism. My analysis of these positions will be inspired by the thought of Bernard Lonergan, complemented by that of other authors. What I shall be characterizing are not four theologies each totally ascribable to one particular thinker, but rather general intellectual orientations as they are assumed and acted upon by numerous Catholic believers. After examining the first three, I shall argue that only the fourth can afford us a theological vision in which the horizontal and vertical relationships central to liturgy are appropriately related.

1. NAIVE REALISM

According to this worldview, sense perception is the paradigm of any contact with reality. Any other access to the real is thought to be some other kind of perception. Hence, anything that is encountered, known, loved must be directly present, including “spiritual” or “supernatural” beings. One does not acknowledge the role of symbols as intermediaries created by the human soul and allowing it to relate to the real in multifaceted ways. On the contrary, reality is pictured as directly available in signals or signs (Langer, x, 57-59), which indicate the physical or spiritual presence of beings that are real because they move and they influence people. Thus God’s or the saints’ or the devil’s action is felt as taking place right here in someone’s experience prior to any question or reflection. One can find in a recent book a sophisticated discussion of mystical experiences based on such an unsophisticated position as naive realism. For the author, experiences of God and sense experiences must be alike (Wainwright, 1981: xiii, xiv, 83, 84, 161, 184). In the same vein, a French bestseller by André Frossard bears the title: *Dieu existe, je l’ai rencontré* which can be translated: “God exists, for I have met him.” My mentor, Père Marie-Dominique Chénu, O.P., wittily commented on this title by stating: “God exists, for I have *not* met him.” I shall return to this little squabble at the end of my fourth section.

For naive realism, there is no religious mediation: God’s presence, albeit hidden to the senses, is immediate, directly perceived and felt. As a matter of fact, religious experiences of naive realists *are* based on intermediaries (hymns, exhortations, testimonies, rituals, and so on). The problem is that they are not understood to be mediations, because no distinction is made between God’s grace and them. This is what Guzie calls “concretism.”

In the concretist fallacy, there is no distinction between the events of the revealing experience and the symbols or doctrines which express that revelation. This fallacy is observed in the fundamentalists of every era, who identify the symbols of our own making with the reality of God. If you don’t believe the way I do, you don’t believe in the one true God (1981: 124).

Needless to say, this pentecostalist orientation is so weak intellectually that present-day Catholic liturgists repudiate it. I shall therefore concentrate on the dialectic that is going on among the next three conceptions of grace.

2. EXTRINSICISM

The French philosopher Maurice Blondel seems to have been the first Christian thinker to expose aptly the defects of extrinsicism. In 1903, he wrote:

Does the supernatural consist, as the extrinsicist thesis implies, in a notional relationship determined and imposed by God, there being no link between natural and supernatural but only an ideal juxtaposition of heterogeneous and even impenetrable elements which only the obedience of our minds can bring together? In that case the supernatural subsists only if it remains extrinsic to the natural, and if it is proposed to us from outside, its whole value residing in the fact that it is *above* nature (Blondel, 283; see de Lubac, 1984: 37-38).

Extrinsicism is based on a medieval distinction between nature and grace which, in modern times, has hardened into a separation, "as two layers so carefully placed that they penetrate each other as little as possible" (Rahner, 167). They are seen as two juxtaposed worlds, each with its commensurate end and kind of activities. For instance, Ripalda (1594-1648) reifies the supernatural dimension when he writes that it is a *substantia supernaturalis*, "a supernatural substance" (quoted by Kenny, 80). In popular piety, this substance has been looked upon as a spiritual treasure which can be quantitatively increased, thanks to one's merits, but remains completely foreign to the human mind's quest for meaning.

Karl Rahner characterizes this conception in the following manner. Although Catholics know through the teaching of faith that God grants them supernatural life, many of them assume that the intellectual and ethical acts which are naturally theirs are left totally untouched by grace. These acts "are referred to the supernatural only by their objects (by faith, by a pure intention, etc.)" (Rahner, 168). Talking about the believer who has espoused this view of the relationship between the natural and the supernatural, Rahner writes:

But the space where he comes to himself, experiences himself and lives, is, as regards the data of consciousness, not filled by this grace. His experience of his spiritual and moral acts in their proper reality (in contrast to their proposed objects, which are distinct from the acts) remains exactly what it would and could be, if there were no such thing as a supernatural "elevation" of these acts (166).

The distinction temporal/spiritual, which has been historically useful in so far as it asserts the validity of lay people's decisions over against excessive clerical jurisdiction, has unfortunately also involved a separation. In modern Catholicism, human action has been looked upon in terms of religious duty, as a field in which Christian commandments should be applied. On the other hand, religion has been reduced to the spiritual. Grace is sanctification taking place only in the soul. In the sacraments God produces spiritual effects *ex opere operato*. He is imagined to be locally present in the things, words, and gestures that constitute the Christian rituals. These rituals are not intrinsically related to daily life, because the two are thought to be heterogeneous domains. According to this view, therefore, the mediation between the Mystery and the human realm becomes very tenuous. In a first step, the sacraments mediate God's grace to the internal life of the soul; in a second step, meritorious obedience mediates God's will to the external field of human action.

Curiously enough, although this conception is based on the dichotomy of natural/supernatural, the piety that goes along with it takes its revenge: in the lived experience of the Mass, benediction of the Blessed Sacrament, the saying of the rosary, and so on, there is a definite religious enjoyment, a taste for sacred music, silence, recollection. In principle, since extrinsicism maintains that there cannot be any experience of God prior to the resurrection, such religious feelings should be pronounced purely natural. In practice, however, the believers spontaneously regard them as part and parcel of the link they have with Christ. Thus, the contradiction between this theory and its practice calls into question the adequacy of the theory. Furthermore, the emotional rewards of this way of relating to God explain, at least in part, the indignation that expresses itself vehemently among conservative Christians whenever their piety is threatened by the position that I shall characterize as liberalism.

3. LIBERALISM

In his analysis of extrinsicism, Rahner raises the hypothesis that "modern naturalism," or "modern lack of interest in the supernatural," may very well have emerged "on the basis of such a view of grace, which must be to some extent nominalist" (169). When late medieval nominalism, sixteenth-century Lutheranism and seventeenth-century scholasticism had all agreed, for different reasons, on the opposition between nature and grace, it was logical for the eighteenth-century Enlightenment to extol the natural and reject a supernatural which seemed no longer needed for the happiness of humankind. Several subsequent Western thinkers have deemed not only the supernatural but also God to be incompatible with human freedom. In the nineteenth century, however, German idealism, coupled with romanticism, allowed many Christians, in the wake of Schleiermacher, to escape atheism. The price to be paid was the abandonment of the supernatural and of the personal God of the Bible. The God of idealism could not indeed threaten human autonomy. Nietzsche pronounced him dead. But was that God ever alive?

For a long time, Catholicism by and large remained immune to philosophical idealism. From approximately 1870 until 1945 extrinsicism reigned in Catholic theology and piety. According to de Lubac, it was in the nineteenth century that scholastic theologians began to replace the adjective "supernatural" by the noun "supernature," "thus completing in their language a deviation of thought whose history was already long" (1984: 33). In the first part of the twentieth century, the terminology of nature/supernature became "more and more encroaching" (1984: 34). But after the Second World War, mostly thanks to de Lubac's book *Surnaturel* (1946), the inadequacy of extrinsicism was more and more exposed. A profound need was felt to highlight the aspects of Christian life that had been systematically neglected by extrinsicism: the secular, the historical, the existential, the interpersonal, the bodily, the symbolic.

The vigorous reaction against extrinsicism has thrust many Catholic theologians into the opposite extreme: liberalism. I shall use

the word *liberalism* in more or less the same way as Newman (269-278), although I would not disagree with everything he included in that label. In the context of this essay, "liberalism" will mean the exaltation of an autonomous human nature at the expense of the reality of God and of the supernatural. Of course, in Christian writings and liturgies tainted by liberalism, the vocabulary still includes biblical words such as God, grace, sin, salvation, and so on. But having rejected a naively realistic metaphysics and having come under the influence of philosophical idealism, one cannot intellectually account for the absolute transcendence of God and for the distinction natural/supernatural, which presupposes the absolute transcendence of God. The ontological uncertainties regarding God and his self-gift bring about a heavy stress on the indirect character of religion. Mediations (people, events, words, gestures, music, works of art) occupy the whole field of religious consciousness, to the detriment of the living God to whom they no longer effectively refer. Religion becomes a dimension of this earthly life, which in practice is considered to be more real than God. Therefore mediations are seen as intermediaries between the non-religious aspects and the religious dimension of *human life*, rather than between human life and God.

Tad Guzie, for example, has little sympathy for those who raise the question whether Catholic worship has lost a sense of the sacred. He concedes that there is a loss of mystery whenever a celebration is "poor and unprepared." Yet he does not in the least deplore the abandonment of "certain stimuli that used to make us attentive to the presence of God: sanctuary bells, organ music, certain kinds of chanting, certain regalia, even certain smells like the fragrance of incense." He degrades to the level of "stimuli" what any good scholar of religion would regard as symbolic mediations. And on what ground does he dismiss them? The sacredness of a sacrament is not to be found in some kind of otherworldliness, or in stimuli that are only experienced in the church building. The real mystery is that we, though many, are one body in Christ in this everyday world (Guzie, 1981: 62). Over against this "otherworldliness," he very much emphasizes the horizontality of religious mediations. There is a place in any liturgy for moments which direct our attention "upward." But any

liturgical celebration is in its total thrust "horizontal" (*ibid.*, 62; see 61-62; 74-75; 79).

The reason why he has so little room for verticality in liturgy and why he repeatedly stresses the horizontality is that for him the sacraments are not individualistic but communal events. But if this sound liturgical principle leads him into down-playing the verticality, it is because he associates verticality with individualistic piety. One should ask, however: is there anything individualistic about the "stimuli" he has listed? Have they not for centuries been communally experienced? I agree that, prior to the recent liturgical reform, there was a need for new symbols which would express the horizontal bonds among the participants united in Jesus Christ. On the other hand, I do not see why this legitimate horizontality should relegate verticality to such a secondary place. There is no necessary link between verticality and individualism. As I shall argue in the next section, there can be a verticality that arises from a communally celebrated horizontality.

Guzie repudiates "otherworldliness," not only because he associates it with individualistic piety, but also because he lacks an adequate epistemology and ontology that would enable him to make sense of what is otherworldly in Christianity. In a previous book, he states that one can ask two basic questions. There is "the empirical question: What is that out there?" and there is "the human question: What is that for man?" (1974: 27). One can ask these two questions with respect either to the eucharistic bread and wine or to the eucharistic action (62, 71). If we focus on the bread and wine, as has been done since the early middle ages, we lose sight of the fact that the Eucharist is an action done by the Christian assembly. If we raise the second question in the context of the eucharistic action, we ask about its meaning.

One should welcome this shift from the sacred things to the eucharistic action, which has become standard doctrine among liturgists and which is helpful for the understanding of the sacraments. On the other hand, this shift has often been accompanied by a mistaken sacramental belief and a misguided philosophical transition.

The mistaken sacramental belief is that a liturgical action should be expressed first and foremost in terms of horizontal com-

munication. Along with Guzie, many other liturgists and pastors do not realize that vertical symbols, whose expressiveness is not directly interhuman, can be communally lived in a sacramental setting as the signs of the community's relationship to God. Their concept of liturgical action is not broad enough to include immanent acts of knowing and loving which do not always have to be translated into the kind of words and gestures that aim at horizontal communication.

The misguided philosophical transition has been from extrinsicism to idealism. The contrast between "the empirical question," which refers us to what is "out there" (Guzie's very words), and "the human question," which refers us to the symbolic, is typical of the Kantian tradition. It would be unfair to reproach Guzie for having tried and having managed to shed some light upon liturgical issues by using this inadequate philosophical context. At least, the Kantian two-leveled account of human knowing has enabled him to repudiate the one-leveled account offered by naive realism. But Kantian epistemology has its shortcomings, which I must briefly note here. In contrasting the "empirical" and the "human" levels of knowing, Guzie misses a third level, the level of judgment, where that which has been understood as meaningful is verified and affirmed as true. Furthermore, theologians who do not explore this level fail to establish clearly that everything which is affirmed as true and real is contingent and limited, and that there must be a necessary and unlimited Being whose unknown essence is "to be." Therefore, far from being "otherworldly" in Guzie's pejorative sense, verticality is central in Christian worship, precisely because God is absolutely transcendent and uniquely real.

4. CRITICAL REALISM

Critical realism, when it is put at the service of revelation, can ground the transcendent reality of God and ascribe a definite experiential and ontological status to grace. In this fourth and last section, I shall try to show the connections that exist between this theological

assertion and the role of mediation in human life and in Christian liturgy.

Let us begin with its opposite, immediacy. The most obvious case of immediacy is perception: "seeing is immediate to what is being seen, hearing to what is being heard, touch to what is being touched" (Lonergan, 1972: 28). As infants, we all begin our life immersed in a narrow world of immediacy. But as soon as we use our imagination and our thinking power, we enter the larger world mediated by meaning. In this world, images, words, and symbols exercise their function as mediators: they mediate what they mean, and what they mean is something other than themselves. We must beware lest we envisage this mediation in a spatial way: the mediated is not physically carried into our brains item by item, but is highly and complexly organized so as to be understood as making sense and judged as being true. Both this creativity of the human mind, which the idealists have admirably highlighted, and the concern to attain what is real, to which they have paid less attention, lead us far beyond the world of perceptual immediacy.

This is not to say, however, that everything beyond perceptual immediacy is mediated. Our intellectual activity is spontaneously purposeful: it aims at understanding and at knowing correctly. It asks: "What is this?" "Is this true?" "Is this worthwhile?" Such questions lie at the root of the human spirit. They show a fundamental desire or intention to find and respect being. Hence, the questioning that constitutes human intentionality and that directly tends towards being is immediately related to being, whereas the answers in which being is partially reached are mediated by our questions and our other intellectual operations (Lonergan, 1974: 78-79).

Therefore, besides the immediacy of perception and the mediatedness of full knowledge, there is the twofold immediacy of our own intentionality. First, thanks to questioning, which expresses desire, intentionality directly aims at being (although this by no means entails any intuition of being). Second, intentionality is also in touch with itself, because we are conscious of our operations. Such consciousness is immediate, but it becomes mediated when it is adverted to, understood in its connections, affirmed, consented to. In sum, human knowing is a compound of immediacy and mediatedness. In different ways, we are directly present to what is perceived, to our

intention of being and to our own conscious acts. On the other hand, nothing becomes explicitly known unless it is mediated by our acts.

Mutatis mutandis the same conjunction of immediacy and mediatedness is found in our relationship to God. Let us consider, in the first place, the human quest for God. In contrast to what Feuerbach, Marx, and Freud thought, the question of God is not derivative from any other human need. It stems from the unrestricted desire to know and to rejoice in everything that is. Since this fundamental desire consciously operates, we are actually open to God as source of our light and love. On the other hand, the appropriation of the way we raise and pursue the question of God is mediated by the long series of events which make our intellectual biography. At the end of the section on liberalism, this essay has offered a rapid sketch of the basic steps that lead to the affirmation of the transcendent reality of God. Rooted in the immediacy of questioning and of our other spiritual acts, and unfolding thanks to the mediation of all the stages that constitute its journey, human intentionality, whenever unhampered, becomes realist in a critical manner. It differs from naive realism, since it takes seriously the mediated character of knowledge. It differs from idealism, since it bases its openness to finite being as well as to God on a critical appropriation of the fact that humans normally try to judge correctly both in matters of fact and in matters of value.

In the second place, the same procedure governs a sound theology of grace. On the one hand, very basic is the immediate experience of being in love in an unrestricted fashion, which corresponds to a unique affective fulfillment (Lonergan, 1972: 105-106). On the other hand, in order to be known and willed, this basic religious experience, which is the great gift of God, must be mediated by persons, events, words, symbols, and so on. The central Mediator is Jesus Christ who, in a special way, introduces each of us into a process of mutual self-mediation. Self-mediation is the fact that we make ourselves as we render ourselves meaningful and good by way of our decisions, deeds, and sufferings. It is mutual when it is done in interaction with other people. Thus, as Jesus realized and accepted his own mission, by humanly becoming a second Moses in his ministry and a suffering servant in his passion, he did it *for us*, in order to show the only path through which human nature could be

granted "the divinely originated solution to the problem of evil" (Doran, 200). Because of what he became for our sake, in our turn we can become ourselves for his sake. Furthermore, such mutual self-mediation extends to all interpersonal relationships: whenever we act and suffer for the sake of the body of Christ, we allow our brothers and sisters to become fully themselves according to the purpose of the Father (Lonergan, 1984: 15-19).

As immediately present in us, grace, or the gift of God's love, is poured into our hearts by the Holy Spirit. As mediated through the process of mutual self-mediation, grace is freely cultivated by its recipients thanks to all the means that link them up with Jesus Christ. In the context of critical realism, these two sides of the same reality may be formulated as follows. First, what is unmediated — God's presence to graced intentionality in the gift of his love — is most real, even though it in itself belongs, not to the world mediated by meaning, but to the realm of transcendence, because it entails a participation in God's own life. Second, Jesus Christ, the central Mediator, as well as the symbolic mediations that prolong him and reveal our meaningfulness and worth, relate us to God in a real, albeit not perceptual way, in complementarity with the inner gift of the Holy Spirit.

Thus, the conjunction between the mission of the Spirit and the mission of the Son brings together, both in ordinary living and in liturgy, the verticality and the horizontality of Christian symbolism, according to the embodied character of redemption. Because of the Incarnation, there is no separation between the verticality and the horizontality. The vertical relationship between God and us is embodied in all the human operations and feelings by means of which we horizontally interact and constitute ourselves as humans. Horizontality is thus granted its inalienable importance by being celebrated as a gift of God. There is also no separation between the supernatural and the natural. Supernatural acts are nothing else than elevated *human* acts, be they vertical or horizontal. If there is indeed a distinction between these aspects of our experience, it is due to the fact that, logically and ontologically, the gift of God's own life, proclaimed in the New Testament, lies totally beyond the capacity of human nature.

It is such a view of graced intentionality that has enabled Flanagan (1978a: 76-79; 1978b: 228-240) to see, more deeply than Frye himself, the full significance of anagogic symbols. Such symbols have an eschatological function. Their role in liturgy consists in suggesting, in a way that vividly speaks to the whole person, that human life on earth is not self-sufficient, that meaning and love are partial, unstable, coupled with destructive tendencies, that desire and fear cannot be kept within the confines of this world, that nature may eventually be completely transformed and transcended, that the imaginative power of humankind looks towards Mystery and towards redemption, that Christ stands in relationship to all parts of the universe and all stages of history according to a mode of presence that crosses the boundaries of space and time.

If we transpose what Frye writes about anagogic symbols into the key of critical realism, we can make the following assertions. Far from throwing us back upon ourselves as symbol-creators who would merely express their own meanings in an idealist framework, mediations relate us to a real God whose Spirit touches us in the immediacy of desire and grace. They also relate us to a real God whose incarnate Word challenges us towards self-transcendence, conversion and self-sacrificing love. Symbols do not contain their own meaning in an immanentist way; they expose us to the Mystery in a realist manner. They are not screens onto which purely human meaning would be projected; they are windows opening up to "the holy city, new Jerusalem, coming down out of heaven from God" (Rev 21: 2).

In the light of what has been established in this section, I should like to revert to the disagreement between Chenu and Frossard. On the one hand, Chenu's position could be interpreted (wrongly, I think) as suggesting an idealist stance, whereas Frossard's could be interpreted (equally wrongly) as an instance of naive realism. On the other hand, one should decipher what each is rightly asserting. Thus, with Chenu, who states: "God exists, for I have *not* met him," I would say that the uniqueness of God entails the fact that one cannot meet Him in a perception-like experience. With Frossard, who states: "God exists, for I have met him," I would say that, because of its dynamic and open structure and because of its being elevated by grace, human intentionality can meet God, for one

can be conscious of being in love with God and of desiring to know him.

Let us now retrace our steps. We saw at the outset that present-day Catholic liturgists are sophisticated enough not to account for the sacramental experience in terms of naive realism. In addition, following the recent rejection of scholasticism by most theologians, most Christians cannot make sense of the distinction natural/supernatural, which extrinsicism has transformed into a separation. Finally, under the influence of idealism, many liturgists find it normal to underline horizontal relationships in such a way that the vertical relationship is hardly expressed any more. Religiously speaking, I think this orientation betrays an impoverishment in the life of faith, which prayerfulness and spiritual counselling should partly remedy. Theologically speaking, I have tried briefly to expose the immanentist rationale which underlies this orientation. I have also endeavored to show that an awareness of the supernaturally elevated human intentionality, in its unmediated and mediating functions, can justify another liturgical orientation, which emphasizes vertical symbolism. The use of critical realism should enable theologians and pastors to situate horizontal symbolism within its actual context, which is the verticality of the incarnate Mystery. "Truly, truly, I say to you, you will see heaven opened, and the angels of God ascending and descending upon the Son of man" (John 1: 51).

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DOING THEOLOGY IN THE PHILIPPINE CONTEXT¹

Walter L. Ysaac, S.J.

The question I was asked is: How do I do theology in the Philippine revolutionary context? However, for reasons that I hope will become clearer later, I would like to reformulate the question somewhat differently: What precisely am I doing when I am doing theology in the Philippines?²

After doing theology for eight years in Rome, Innsbruck, New York, and Toronto, I asked my mentor, Bernard Lonergan, what he thought I should be doing when I went back to do theology in a developing Asian country like the Philippines. He thought for a minute and then, his face lighting up, came back to me with this advice: Do Communications and move in at once into interdisciplinary collaboration. For me this was quite a letdown, for I had hoped to be doing a lot of the other seven theological specialties that he described so well in his book, *Method in Theology*.³ Communications, the eighth and

¹This talk was originally given at a panel discussion held on November 10, 1987, at Harvard Divinity School on, "Doing Theology in a Revolutionary Context." Besides the author, the other panelists were a South African Presbyterian minister and a Marxist layman from Nicaragua. The author was asked to present the same talk for the Lonergan Workshop. He did so, on June 24, 1988, but in a somewhat new form, summarizing some parts and bringing in observations and comments that relate parts of the talk more explicitly to Lonergan's ideas. These additions have been incorporated as footnotes in this article.

²To be more precise, the reformulation, following Lonergan, should be expanded into three questions: What do I do when I do theology in the Philippine context? Why is doing that doing theology? What do I affirm and come to understand when I do that? And, as we shall see, all three questions have, in fact, at least to some extent, been answered even in the original Harvard talk.

³The other seven theological specialties expounded by Lonergan in his book are: Research, Interpretation, History, Dialectics, Foundations, Doctrines, and Systematics. For Lonergan, what theologians do in any of these functional specialties, including the last one, Communications, is *doing theology in a real sense of the word*. In fact, it is in the last one, Communications, that the other seven reach their completion and maturation and begin to bear fruit. Close collaboration with

last specialty, was at that time the least studied and done, because it seemed then to be the easiest and the least challenging of all. But I decided to try to follow his advice.

That conversation occurred in May of 1973.⁴ I have been doing theology as Communications ever since, and, as far as I can see, I will be continuing to do so up to the very end — as long as I am still doing theology in the Philippines and doing it for and with my people.

Doing theology as Communications proved to be not only challenging but quite fascinating. I realized that I had to be in touch with the people, in close communicative, that is, intersubjective, artistic, symbolic, linguistic and incarnate (“heart-to-heart”) touch with the people.⁵ To be out of touch would make the task impossible. Just to continue what we had been doing, teaching theology in English to a group of elite English-speaking seminarians and students, would not be enough. I knew I had to go to the people.

Now in the Philippines, “people” means, overwhelmingly, the poor. But how does one do theology for and with the poor?

Doing theology as Communications for and with the poor is not simply communicating or inculturating or “incarnating” the gospel for and with them. It demands more. It means communicating and “preaching the good news to the poor” *even as one joins them* in their struggle to survive. They must learn and absorb the good news in and through the very process and praxis of their struggle to survive⁶. There would be something false and unauthentic in one’s doing otherwise. By praxis is meant not mindless activism⁷ — for the poor

the other disciplines, a constitutive part of Communications, will bring the doing of theology to its fullest contemporary form.

⁴Eleven years later, immediately after the 1984 Santa Clara Lonergan Symposium, the author flew to Toronto and had another conversation with Lonergan who was then confined at the Jesuit Infirmary. Lonergan was clearly pleased to hear about Santa Clara and especially about what had been happening in Manila as a result of his advice. No doubt, if only he were alive today, he would even be more pleased to hear about what has happened since then!

⁵This is also the first rule prescribed by Mao Zedong to his followers when “doing ideology” with the village people: live with them, eat with them, sleep with them, study with them, work with them.

⁶Besides being in touch with the people, a Philippine theologian must also seek to “preach the good news to the poor” so that they hear it *in and through* their very struggle to survive.

⁷The third thing a theologian must learn to do is to uncover for the poor the meaning and value of their efforts to survive, so much so that they see this meaning and

do not want to survive as mindless animals, but as thinking, reflecting, deliberating, self-constituting human beings. And by praxis we do not mean putting them through the grind of an ideological indoctrination⁸ — for the poor, as human beings and as the favored children of God, want and deserve to do their own thinking, understanding, judging, deciding, and acting. One must do theology not only for them but *with* them. From this it is clear that doing theology in a developing Asian country like the Philippines, far from being easy and unchallenging, is really quite a formidable task.

DOING THEOLOGY AS COMMUNITY-BUILDING⁹

Doing theology in the Philippines demands more than doing theology as inculturation. It means doing theology *as community-building*. Now community is not an aggregate of separated, closed-in individuals extrinsically joined and bound together by a strictly enforced social contract. For individual men and women are not monads. Hence, community-building is something else. It is building up, within the people, *authentic and shared experiencing, understanding, judging, deciding, and acting*. Without these opera-

value as part of the Christian good news, as a reality even more important to them than their survival (see Ysaac, 1986a: 23-55).

⁸The fourth thing a theologian must make sure of doing is to see to it that the poor themselves see this meaning and value *as their own discovery, as the fruit of their own growth and thinking*. It is at this point that the Christian theologian must part company with all ideologists, whether Marxist or Capitalist or whatever. Any imposition of ideologies will only serve to alienate the poor even more. The poor must be allowed to grow in authenticity at their own pace, so that the good news does not become "disruptive of their culture" nor "an alien patch superimposed upon it, but a line of development within the culture" (Lonergan, 1972: 362; see also Ysaac, 1986a: 6-38; 1986b).

⁹Community-building, the fifth thing doing theology in the Philippines must include, does not mean here the building up of more and more communities. It simply means to build up an ever larger *measure* of community in society, so that society and sovereign states can function; it means to renew this constantly so that "the measure of community already enjoyed" is not "squandered" (Lonergan, 1972: 361). What Lonergan is calling for is the common concerted action of authentic reflection-action groups to promote authenticity wherever and whenever it is found and to undo the mischief wrought by unauthenticity in society. It is such action of such groups that will bring about a greater measure of community in society. In the concrete, it is building up, within society, more and more authentic and shared experiencing, understanding, judging, deciding, and acting.

tions done in common no community will emerge, much less survive. This — community building — is what I had to face up to when Providence sent me to do theology in direct contact and collaboration with a tiny group of families in a huge slum area in the center of Manila, long considered an eyesore and a “nose-sore” by the more sleek and perfumed people of the city, and once called, in fact, the “Casbah” of Manila by a complaining newspaper columnist.¹⁰

In the beginning I was just doing what they asked me to do: say Mass for them in their cramped, old, little barrio chapel or *bisita*. Then gradually they started to do things together. One did not have to look far to see that what they wanted most to do together was to survive. This, after all, was what they had been doing all their lives. How can the good news help them to survive?

I decided to appeal to the little group of Christians who had been faithfully coming to the barrio chapel¹¹ for Mass. I asked this group to go carefully over their area and identify the most indigent families, those who were too hungry or too weak or just too desperately poor to even afford to come to the chapel for Mass. And they found almost a hundred. I asked them if they would join me in working for these hundred families. We would help these families build themselves up into a real community. But how?

The focus would be on the children.¹² One child from each family would be invited to become a sponsored¹³ member of a new children’s community to be formed. An adult from each family would be asked to accompany or represent the child in the regular meetings. The meetings would be held to discuss and decide what common projects or activities the children would have each month to

¹⁰The author also tried to “do theology” in the same manner in six other depressed areas: a scavengers’ ghetto, a squatters’ relocation area, a workers’ neighborhood, a huge “smoky mountain” garbage dump site, a rural lowland barrio with a long tradition, and another rural mountain village without any old tradition.

¹¹A typical urban barrio in the Philippines would have about five hundred families and only a small fraction would be able to attend the one Mass in their small barrio chapel.

¹²The Philippines is, quite literally, a very young nation, with most of the population made up of young people and children.

¹³Sponsorship is through a long process that gradually and personally relates in an authentic and mutually enriching friendship an indigent child to a sponsoring family, from whom the child receives help more or less regularly through the selfless and dedicated personal services of a sponsorship foundation, which in this particular case is the Kansas City-based *Christian Foundation for Children*.

help them grow and cope and survive together with their families. The adult companions or representatives of the child members would do the thinking, the reflecting, the deliberating and the deciding during the meetings. The rest of the barrio chapel community, including the priest, would simply play a supportive role. Instead of being marginalized, these hundred families would form the center and core community of the barrio.¹⁴ They would set the pace and sustain the momentum of growth in the whole slum area. No totalitarian or ideological force or framework would be imposed on them. They would think and work entirely within the built-in dynamism and completely open, spontaneous framework for self-transcendence that they already had in common. All they had to do was to be faithful and true to their own creative human interiority, that is, to their *kalooban* spontaneously and dynamically impelling them to be *attentive* to what they were *experiencing* or to what was happening in and around them, to try to *understand intelligently* what it was, to try to make a *reasonable judgement* about it, and to try to come together at a right evaluation and a *responsible decision* on what to do about it, so as to be able to proceed together on a particular course or policy of common concerted action.

And they tried to do just that in their meetings. Surprisingly enough, they found it not at all difficult but even quite refreshing. At first their decisions were on simple, ritual things, such as snacks, uniforms, games, outings, celebrations, and so on. But little by little they began to take on the more complex life and death problems, such as malnutrition, disease, injustice, greed, deception, manipulation, oppression, joblessness, bribery, extortion, terrorism, violence.

Gradually, this rather simple but not at all *simpliste* exercise of common and authentic experiencing, understanding, judging, deciding, and acting revealed to them their surprising inborn power for creative common concerted action. It also revealed both their own continuing, unobtrusive growth in shared interiority or *kalooban*, and their amazing self-constitution and progress as authentic community. Thus they finally realized that their shared *kalooban* was in truth a tremendous reservoir of strength for transforming

¹⁴Thus, in every barrio there would be three distinct groups: the "poorest of the poor" community of sponsored families, the "eucharistic community" of those who regularly attend Mass, and the rest of the general population of the barrio.

and building themselves up into community, that this shared *kalooban* of theirs was quite capable of creating and increasing indefinitely the human good in their little community — and that, indeed, it was, in all of creation, God's greatest and most precious gift to them.

But what excited them most was the discovery that in their shared *kalooban* there was also, present and operative, an even greater dynamism, an even greater gift of God to them — a tremendous power, namely, for healing.

Their discovery came about this way. These one hundred most-indigent families had no regular income. To meet any emergency need, their only recourse was to borrow from greedy usurers, a habit which only increased and prolonged their suffering. In one of their meetings they decided to put an end to this. From their deliberations they agreed to start what eventually turned out to be an emergency credit cooperative. Each child would deposit each month a small portion of his or her little monthly allowance. Multiply that by a hundred and in a few months' time they would have enough to start a credit cooperative to give out loans for at least thirty emergencies! The mode of payment they had agreed on was a real gem. It was decided that without any regular income the borrowers could not be expected to pay their loan except in tiny bits that they could easily spare out of the little earnings that they could scrape up in their day-to-day struggle to survive — say five cents a day for a loan of five dollars. The experiment was a huge success, so much so that it was also tried in other places. Its amazing success, however, also brought out into the open some hidden wounds in the community.

A number of families tried — and failed — to obtain loans for purposes other than emergency. In one meeting, about twenty of these families decided to pull out completely, a decision that could endanger the whole project, not only the credit cooperative but the whole community-building effort as well. When I suggested that the coordinator point out to them that they were making a very irresponsible decision, they readily admitted in their meeting that what they were doing was irresponsible but that they would do it anyway. The coordinator came back to me and asked, almost in tears, what she should do. As it would be quite pointless to call on people to be responsible who were no longer interested in being so, we decided to appeal

to something else in their *kalooban* that we knew God must have put there somehow. We decided to appeal to their love and concern for their fellow poor, especially those who were even more indigent than they. "Don't they feel anything at all for these less fortunate families? Don't they feel good that, even as poor as they are, they have been able to do a lot of good and prevent a lot of suffering among the poorest of the poor in their community? Is an interest-earning deposit of twenty-five cents a month too high a price to pay for all the human good they see it is producing and all the human suffering it is preventing? How can their community survive, if they are no longer interested in community-building?" These and similar thoughts were what the coordinator and I decided to say to them in their next meeting.

I do not know up to now what exactly transpired in that meeting, or how it happened, but apparently it worked! The twenty families even went so far as to write me letters of apology! This and similar happenings in the course of their community meetings and praxis have awakened them to an even greater truth, namely, that in their shared interiority or *kalooban*, they have from God not only the power to create and transform, but also the power to heal and renew, themselves and one another, into one strong, resilient, and vibrant community. It was a mind-boggling discovery for them. St. Paul had described it as the wonderful experience of discovering oneself as "a new creation," as suddenly having an altogether new life and a completely recreated interiority or *kalooban* intimately shared with God and God's people. It is the experience of the healing power of "the gift of God's love being poured into our hearts through the Holy Spirit" which makes us all spontaneously call out to God as our Father and recognize all human beings as our brothers and sisters in Christ.

Through their authentic, that is, self-transcending praxis of exercising together their shared interiority or *kalooban*, these poor, simple and mostly unlettered people have gradually and quietly "verified" for us, as it were, most, if not all, of the truths of the new and good things or "good news" that we encounter repeatedly in our sacred scriptures. They probably will not be able to explain or explicate or articulate these truths, but they are surely somehow experiencing them — and experiencing them to the hilt and in the most elemental manner. That is one of the most amazing things

about this self-transcending praxis of shared *kalooban*. People do not need to have it explained to them, for they already have it present and operative and shared — spontaneously and completely — among them. They don't have to know what Lonergan calls the levels of self-transcendence in order to experience and realize these levels in their lives. They are already there, present and operative in their consciousness, whether they advert to them or not. The more fundamental and basic task is to promote and reenforce every little act of self-transcendence or authenticity whenever and wherever it is found. Though, of course, it would be far more effective, productive, efficient, invulnerable in people, if they, or at least the leaders who "do theology" in this way with them, were not only doing it but *knew* what they were doing *while* they were doing it. In other words, in order for a leader to be able to recognize and promote authenticity in others, it helps a lot if she has already appropriated her own *kalooban*, and so has already known and recognized it first in herself.

Another amazing thing about this shared *kalooban* is that, though it may be weakened, wounded, or paralyzed by external pressures, violence, or terror, it can never be destroyed by any external force. In fact it seems to thrive most when subjected to external abuse and violence and when all odds are against it. Nor can it be completely stilled through the subject's or community's own internal acts of self-betrayal. It is the last bastion standing between a person's or community's survival and annihilation, indestructible even to itself. Though authenticity is ever precarious and never a secure possession in this life, the capacity for it remains nonetheless in every living human consciousness, and the person is always capable of being healed.

This shared *kalooban* or interiority is also interesting in that it is first experienced as shared before it can ever be experienced as separated or alienated or monadically closed in on itself. In fact, it is the human individual's main instrument and possibility for sharing, and for really linking up with others.

The healing power of the gift of God's love was experienced by these one hundred indigent families both in their shared *kalooban* and in their community activities. First of all, they saw that their experience and exercise of this *transcendent love*, of loving and being

loved without any conditions, lifted them to a new state of fulfilment and of being, of being-in-love, and brought with it a new habit of *charity* or fraternal love, which dissolved and melted away much of the hardness in their *kalooban*, and reduced in their community much of the violence brought about by hatred of all kinds. Secondly, they found that this transcendent love created in them a new source of knowing, another knowledge, as it were, born of love, that balances and heals and completes whatever they learn about themselves and others, a *faith* that so expands their *kalooban*, that spontaneously they move out of and beyond all self-enclosed ideological thinking and acting. Thirdly, they learned that this love also generated in them an expectation so complete and refreshing, another vision, as it were, born of love, that ever moves them on to greater things and sustains them against all odds, a *hope* that so lifts up their *kalooban* that they are able to overcome and break free of the many human-made psychological, sociological, economic and political *determinisms* that bring about and perpetuate in human society the long cycle of decline.

DOING THEOLOGY AS NATION-BUILDING¹⁵

If this self-transcending method, or praxis, of shared *kalooban* followed by common concerted action proved quite successful in a small Christian community and among the poorest of the poor, the question remains whether it would also be successful in an entire nation and among the well-to-do, the very wealthy, and the not-so-indigent-poor.¹⁶ This is the question for consideration now. And the answer, it seems, must be a resounding *yes*, with the 1986 Philippine Revolution serving as a classic example.

¹⁵This is the sixth challenge that a Philippine theologian must meet.

¹⁶There is no real middle class in the Philippines. Those usually referred to as "middle class" would be the families comprising the vast majority of the population with fixed regular earnings but, most of them, still far below the poverty line. This is the large group that constituted what has now been called the "middle forces" of the 1986 Philippine Revolution, as contrasted with the forces of the extreme right and the extreme left.

BACKGROUND

When Lonergan's book, *Insight*, first came off the press in 1957, I was just starting my philosophy studies in the Philippines. But even then, it already held a strange fascination for me, so much so that I read, studied and reread it many times on my own. When I went to Rome to begin my theology studies, I used to go to Lonergan himself with a long list of questions not about theology but about his book. And so I was once asked good-naturedly by a fellow student from South America why on earth an Asian such as myself was so interested in Lonergan who was such a thorough rationalist. Since then I have thought a lot about this question, and now I think I know the answer. What had really fascinated me about Lonergan was his thorough exposition of human interiority, which he keeps on inviting his readers to verify in themselves. You see, as a Filipino, I grew up among a people that had always put a high premium on shared authentic interiority or *kalooban*. So when I first read *Insight*, I must have perceived it as the answer to what instinctively I had been looking for: the most thorough study ever of what we Filipinos have always considered our most precious possession, our *kalooban*.

Thus, despite the many evils of almost four centuries of Spanish colonization, we remember our Spanish colonizers even today with a certain measure of fondness and gratitude — a trait very uncharacteristic of colonized peoples — for bringing us the good news of Christianity. For Christianity in its very core, even if wrapped up in uncomfortable and sometimes oppressive Spanish raiment, did heal and expand native Filipino *kalooban*. And when finally we Filipinos decided to cast off the yoke of Spain, we did so relying heavily on the resources of our own Christian *kalooban*, as uniquely expressed and nourished by the only widely and popularly translated, read, and sung adult catechism ever written in the whole history of the Philippines, the *Pasiong Mahal*.¹⁷ Similarly, although

¹⁷The *Pasiong* is a narrative literary account of the whole history of salvation centered on the Passion of Christ. It is written in epic verse in the vernacular, and exists in several versions approved by the Church, though one proved to be the most popular, the *Pasiong Mahal*. For all practical purposes, the Filipino people have

the Americans unjustly took over the Philippines and even more unjustly forced their imperial dream and will on the country, we none the less still remember them with some degree of friendly affection for apprenticing us Filipinos in their own art and brand of political democracy. For American democracy, despite everything else it brought with it, did provide us Filipinos with a practical model of political freedom that in truth served as an effective defense against violations of our Filipino *kalooban*.

The people of the Philippines learned the value of *kalooban* somewhat the hard way. For in the last five hundred years of their history, they were forced to go through the painful experience of continuously and successively being under the Spanish, British, American, Japanese, and, last of all, even *Filipino elite* brand of domination. In their condition as victims they realized that their only source of strength was their shared *kalooban* and that it was also the only precious possession they could hold on to and keep forever inviolate and inviolable. In the crucible of suffering they instinctively identified with the *Hesus* of the *Pasiong Mahal*, whose story they read and played and sang about, and made his *kalooban* the norm and main support of their own. Mystical identification and sharing with the *kalooban* of Christ was not at all hard for them to accept and understand, for they had no notion of "individual" in modernity's sense of a completely locked-in spiritual monad, nor, for that matter, did they have any concept of "community" that comes close to the modern sense of aggregates of individuals extrinsically bound together only by a social contract. This, in brief, is the background of the amazing story of the 1986 Philippine Revolution.

FOREGROUND

What immediately triggered the events that led to and brought about the three-day Philippine Revolution was the desperate condition of the country. The democratic institutions that had for some

regarded this as their country's own epic. It is fascinating to see that the Filipino people do *not* find the biblical story in their own epics but rather discover *their epic story* in the biblical story itself just as they have written and played and sung it in epic verse and rhyme in the *Pasiong Mahal*.

time served as a more or less effective defense against at least the more brazen and blatant violations of Filipino *kalooban* — the legislative, judicial and executive branches of government, the press and media, the educational system, the local governments, the police and military, the economy — were all gone, either destroyed or prostituted by Marcos's Machiavellian machinations. For all practical purposes, the Church was the only remaining institution that still stood free of Marcos's iron and totalitarian grip on the country. So the Church was dragged, almost willy-nilly, into being the national rallying-point and the organizational base for all the concerted and common community action groups that mushroomed among the people all over the country both before and during the Revolution. Instinctively, desperately, the Filipinos began to fall back again and rely on their only great resource and strength as a people, their precious Filipino *kalooban*, especially as healed and heightened by their elemental Christianity. That is why Filipinos are commonly at their best in times of crisis but often at their worst in times when there is no crisis.

But there was something unique in the revolutionary crisis of 1986. What was at stake then was not only the Filipino people's material and external resources and possessions but their very *kalooban*. Faced with this threat, their spontaneous and dynamic response was unique. Filipinos were not merely reacting to the exploitation and destruction of their country's natural resources, the corruption and prostitution of their nation's democratic institutions, the massive and unrelenting squandering and plunder of their government's meagre finances and their children's modest patrimony, the unparalleled and crass betrayal of every Filipino's most sacred obligations and most cherished duties to the Land (*patria*) of their birth. No, it was much more than that. Filipinos had to respond to the most direct and shameless assault on their dignity and *kalooban* as a people. And their uniquely Filipino response not only blunted the assault but redeemed and vindicated, as well as demonstrated to the world, their gentle and magnificent dynamic interiority or *kalooban* as a Christian people. All over the thousand-and-one islands of the archipelago, there blossomed little reflection-action groups of all sorts and kinds and from all walks of life, maybe as tiny or even smaller than our own little group, who did a lot of thinking,

reflecting, searching, yearning, praying, and seeking together for the truth, who did a lot of discerning, deciding, acting, marching, and working together, a lot of risking, fasting, suffering, struggling, loving, sacrificing, and even dying together for the truth that alone can make them fully alive and free. I cannot name all these groups, but I know there were bishops' groups¹⁸ as well as street children's groups, groups of Christians as well as Moslems, soldiers as well as young activists, businessmen as well as workers, of computer technicians as well as farmers, some homogeneous, others heterogeneous, all collaborating and contributing creatively, each according to her or his own competence, on a common course of concerted group action for the progressive human good of the nation.

But whatever and whoever they were, whatever it was they all did together, all this simply and finally reached its magnificent climax in the three-day Philippine Revolution. It was the uniquely Filipino *kalooban's* dynamic, cumulative, non-violent yet all-powerful way of saying a firm and final *no* not so much to the person of the dictator as to everything he and his cronies were *thinking and doing and standing for*. It was the native Filipino *kalooban's* indignation at being forced to listen to and *to tell and live their lies*. As one author has put it so well, what happened in the Philippines was a revolution from the heart. It was an exercise of shared interiority, a demonstration on the national level of the tremendous power of *kalooban*, a revolution won completely through non-violence, through the old-fashioned virtues of faith, hope, and charity, through the exorcising, healing power of prayer and fasting and the sheer calling and drawing power of authenticity. And it brought about the emergence of a new model of community and nation, not at all based on force but having its origin in shared interiority, in our common *kalooban*.

Having emerged, a further question about it is now being asked. Will this new model of community and nation survive? Can we set up the conditions for our survival, continuance, develop-

¹⁸For instance, the Philippine bishops' decision to issue the crucial post-February 1986 election statement on the moral status of the Marcos government as well as their invitation to the Filipino people to make their own common group reflection, judgment, decision, and action on the matter. This unprecedented action was acclaimed as "Vatican II ecclesiology at its best" (*Catholic New York*, March 6, 1986). For more outstanding examples of this dynamic kind of authentic group action, see Nudas and O'Brien.

ment — namely, a new form of government that relies on, requires, calls forth, and in some sense is subordinate to, the creative and healing power of the shared *kalooban* of our people? Will the rest of the world help us — *allow* us — to survive and form such a unique model of government based on an altogether new notion of authority, namely, one rooted in and arising from the power of authenticity, of intelligence and love, rather than of ideology and force?

To this we add an even more challenging question. Even if it does survive and such a new model of government is able to be formed, can such a government succeed? In a word, can such a government govern?

The answer to these questions must be sought, I believe, in the 1986 Philippine Revolution itself. What brought it about would also bring about the emergence and survival of the new form of government which could successfully sustain and promote the fruits of that revolution. The authentic common reflection and action groups, whose proliferation and growth climaxed in the revolution, must not be allowed to die and disappear. Not only the success but the very survival of this new form of government hangs upon the continued growth of these common reflection and action groups that the people themselves had spontaneously and effectively formed to bring about the revolution. There simply is no alternative. These independent groups, in the measure of their authenticity, would be even more effective, now that the post-revolution government itself, operating within the horizon of the overwhelmingly approved new Philippine Constitution,¹⁹ is formally pledged to respect their role in nation-building and to consult and collaborate with them. The fruits of these

¹⁹See article 13, section 15 of the 1987 Philippine Constitution. Another unique feature of the 1987 Philippine Constitution, born of the 1986 Philippine Revolution, is the set of concrete specific courses of action it recognizes as always remaining with the people, not as an undifferentiated mass of humanity but as organized and as continually organizing themselves into these spontaneous reflection-action communal groups outside of and beyond the political control of the state or any vested interest; in fact, it acknowledges these groups as an independent extra-governmental institution capable not only of approving government-proposed laws but of proposing and approving, under certain conditions, their own extra-congressional legislation that can supplant the laws of Congress. The community-building project described in this paper has since grown into a full-fledged NGO (non-governmental organization) serving over a thousand families of the "poorest of the poor" in seven depressed areas, forming over seventy small basic community groups.

intersubjective, interdisciplinary and inter-group consultations and collaborations with the people are even now beginning to be felt.

Now the task of theology in this new post-revolution period is to inspire and sustain and promote the growth and the fullest authentic interiority, the shared *kalooban*, of these groups. In other words, to do theology now in the Philippine context means to communicate or explicate to the people the gift and gospel of God's love already at work in their shared dynamic interiority, *even as we join them in their struggle against all odds to survive as a new nation founded not at all on ideology and force but on shared kalooban and sheer authenticity.*

What are the odds for and against the survival of this new form of government based on this new model of community and nation?

The odds against it are enormous. The forces of the ideological and totalitarian left and right, Filipino and foreign, must somehow be neutralized, not through the use of a counter-ideology or force, but simply through the healing power of shared *kalooban* and authenticity. The possibilities of emergence and survival of such an event and situation have up to now not been very good. It needs more patient onward plodding through even more uncharted territory and for an even longer uncertain time. Again, at present no model exists which Filipinos can follow, no other country or government to serve as paradigm. Filipinos themselves must somehow grope and search, learn and create their own model, relying mostly on their spontaneous *kalooban* framework for collaborative creativity. Again, at present Filipinos do not have the financial and natural resources necessary for the infrastructures of social transformation, nor can they expect these to be forthcoming in the immediate future. They must rely, then, mainly on the creative and transformative power of their own shared *kalooban* and common group actions.

Further, again and again the Filipino people are exposed and sometimes mercilessly judged by many media people, politicians, bankers, philosophers, and even theologians, local and foreign, who do not have the same horizon, who strongly believe every government can be built up and sustained only through an effective network of sanctions and force, who consciously or unconsciously want the present novel experiment to fail, exaggerating its mistakes and belittling its achievements, who have no notion of the complexity and

novelty of the task, who are using their own unexamined nation and culture as norm, who have fixed philosophic presuppositions and predictions on what is possible and "realistic," whose understanding of the economy and of the possibilities of economic and land reform is not only confused but inadequate. These negative conditions, to mention only a few, are what Filipinos are up against.

But if the odds against us are great, the odds for us are, in a certain sense and to a surpassing and surprising degree, even greater. The unique quality of shared *kalooban* is that we are able not only to create and multiply the good and the conditions working in our favor, but also to overcome and transform whatever evil and odds there may be against us into even more good and into even more conditions to our favor. Authentic shared *kalooban*, especially when it is explicitly shared with God²⁰ and his people through the gift and gospel of his love, has more than enough to overcome all odds against it. Fidelity to this love, generating authenticity, is essentially and precisely what the Filipino people need, above all, in order to succeed in this unique and novel experiment of theirs. It is what has already worked for them in the 1986 Philippine Revolution. It is what will work for them in all the hard and dark days ahead. Every other good and resource, everything else, will just be something added to it, something merely contributing to, and hastening, its eventual, providential success.²¹

²⁰It seems only Lonergan's systematics has adequately grounded the "we" of basic Christian community in the "We" of Basic Community, namely, the Community of the Father, the Son, and the Holy Spirit. For a thorough and quite inspiring elaboration of this thesis see Lawrence, 1985, 265-280.

²¹For a more comprehensive development of the basic ideas in this paper, see Ysaac, 1986a and 1986b.

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